instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: e1000e_update_rx_offloads(E1000ECore *core)
{
int cso_state = e1000e_rx_l4_cso_enabled(core);
trace_e1000e_rx_set_cso(cso_state);
if (core->has_vnet) {
qemu_set_offload(qemu_get_queue(core->owner_nic)->peer,
cso_state, 0, 0, 0, 0);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 6,094
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: IsPointerDevice(DeviceIntPtr dev)
{
return (dev->type == MASTER_POINTER) ||
(dev->valuator && dev->button) || (dev->valuator && !dev->key);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 4,852
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int relativeLeftOffset(int caretPosition, int leftOffset)
{
ASSERT(caretPosition >= 0);
return std::max(0, caretPosition - leftOffset);
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 104,545
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void* HTMLInputElement::preDispatchEventHandler(Event* event)
{
if (event->type() == EventTypeNames::textInput && m_inputTypeView->shouldSubmitImplicitly(event)) {
event->stopPropagation();
return 0;
}
if (event->type() != EventTypeNames::click)
return 0;
if (!event->isMouseEvent() || toMouseEvent(event)->button() != LeftButton)
return 0;
return m_inputTypeView->willDispatchClick().leakPtr();
}
Commit Message: Add HTMLFormControlElement::supportsAutofocus to fix a FIXME comment.
This virtual function should return true if the form control can hanlde
'autofocucs' attribute if it is specified.
Note: HTMLInputElement::supportsAutofocus reuses InputType::isInteractiveContent
because interactiveness is required for autofocus capability.
BUG=none
TEST=none; no behavior changes.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/143343003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165432 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 113,988
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void vnc_qmp_event(VncState *vs, QAPIEvent event)
{
VncServerInfo *si;
if (!vs->info) {
return;
}
g_assert(vs->info->base);
si = vnc_server_info_get();
if (!si) {
return;
}
switch (event) {
case QAPI_EVENT_VNC_CONNECTED:
qapi_event_send_vnc_connected(si, vs->info->base, &error_abort);
break;
case QAPI_EVENT_VNC_INITIALIZED:
qapi_event_send_vnc_initialized(si, vs->info, &error_abort);
break;
case QAPI_EVENT_VNC_DISCONNECTED:
qapi_event_send_vnc_disconnected(si, vs->info, &error_abort);
break;
default:
break;
}
qapi_free_VncServerInfo(si);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 8,034
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::unique_ptr<NavigationRequest> NavigationRequest::CreateRendererInitiated(
FrameTreeNode* frame_tree_node,
NavigationEntryImpl* entry,
const CommonNavigationParams& common_params,
mojom::BeginNavigationParamsPtr begin_params,
int current_history_list_offset,
int current_history_list_length,
bool override_user_agent,
scoped_refptr<network::SharedURLLoaderFactory> blob_url_loader_factory) {
DCHECK(FrameMsg_Navigate_Type::IsReload(common_params.navigation_type) ||
common_params.navigation_type ==
FrameMsg_Navigate_Type::DIFFERENT_DOCUMENT);
RequestNavigationParams request_params(
override_user_agent,
std::vector<GURL>(), // redirects
common_params.url, common_params.method,
false, // can_load_local_resources
PageState(), // page_state
0, // nav_entry_id
false, // is_history_navigation_in_new_child
std::map<std::string, bool>(), // subframe_unique_names
false, // intended_as_new_entry
-1, // |pending_history_list_offset| is set to -1 because
current_history_list_offset, current_history_list_length,
false, // is_view_source
false /*should_clear_history_list*/);
std::unique_ptr<NavigationRequest> navigation_request(new NavigationRequest(
frame_tree_node, common_params, std::move(begin_params), request_params,
false, // browser_initiated
true, // from_begin_navigation
nullptr, entry,
nullptr)); // navigation_ui_data
navigation_request->blob_url_loader_factory_ =
std::move(blob_url_loader_factory);
return navigation_request;
}
Commit Message: Check ancestors when setting an <iframe> navigation's "site for cookies".
Currently, we're setting the "site for cookies" only by looking at the
top-level document. We ought to be verifying that the ancestor frames
are same-site before doing so. We do this correctly in Blink (see
`Document::SiteForCookies`), but didn't do so when navigating in the
browser.
This patch addresses the majority of the problem by walking the ancestor
chain when processing a NavigationRequest. If all the ancestors are
same-site, we set the "site for cookies" to the top-level document's URL.
If they aren't all same-site, we set it to an empty URL to ensure that
we don't send SameSite cookies.
Bug: 833847
Change-Id: Icd77f31fa618fa9f8b59fc3b15e1bed6ee05aabd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1025772
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553942}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 144,120
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void check_stack_aligned(unsigned long sp)
{
if (sp & 0x7UL)
force_sig(SIGILL, current);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 25,726
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void update_tg_load_avg(struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq, int force)
{
long delta = cfs_rq->avg.load_avg - cfs_rq->tg_load_avg_contrib;
/*
* No need to update load_avg for root_task_group as it is not used.
*/
if (cfs_rq->tg == &root_task_group)
return;
if (force || abs(delta) > cfs_rq->tg_load_avg_contrib / 64) {
atomic_long_add(delta, &cfs_rq->tg->load_avg);
cfs_rq->tg_load_avg_contrib = cfs_rq->avg.load_avg;
}
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 92,783
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct vrend_linked_shader_program *add_shader_program(struct vrend_context *ctx,
struct vrend_shader *vs,
struct vrend_shader *fs,
struct vrend_shader *gs)
{
struct vrend_linked_shader_program *sprog = CALLOC_STRUCT(vrend_linked_shader_program);
char name[16];
int i;
GLuint prog_id;
GLint lret;
int id;
int last_shader;
if (!sprog)
return NULL;
/* need to rewrite VS code to add interpolation params */
if ((gs && gs->compiled_fs_id != fs->id) ||
(!gs && vs->compiled_fs_id != fs->id)) {
bool ret;
if (gs)
vrend_patch_vertex_shader_interpolants(gs->glsl_prog,
&gs->sel->sinfo,
&fs->sel->sinfo, true, fs->key.flatshade);
else
vrend_patch_vertex_shader_interpolants(vs->glsl_prog,
&vs->sel->sinfo,
&fs->sel->sinfo, false, fs->key.flatshade);
ret = vrend_compile_shader(ctx, gs ? gs : vs);
if (ret == false) {
glDeleteShader(gs ? gs->id : vs->id);
free(sprog);
return NULL;
}
if (gs)
gs->compiled_fs_id = fs->id;
else
vs->compiled_fs_id = fs->id;
}
prog_id = glCreateProgram();
glAttachShader(prog_id, vs->id);
if (gs) {
if (gs->id > 0)
glAttachShader(prog_id, gs->id);
set_stream_out_varyings(prog_id, &gs->sel->sinfo);
}
else
set_stream_out_varyings(prog_id, &vs->sel->sinfo);
glAttachShader(prog_id, fs->id);
if (fs->sel->sinfo.num_outputs > 1) {
if (util_blend_state_is_dual(&ctx->sub->blend_state, 0)) {
glBindFragDataLocationIndexed(prog_id, 0, 0, "fsout_c0");
glBindFragDataLocationIndexed(prog_id, 0, 1, "fsout_c1");
sprog->dual_src_linked = true;
} else {
glBindFragDataLocationIndexed(prog_id, 0, 0, "fsout_c0");
glBindFragDataLocationIndexed(prog_id, 1, 0, "fsout_c1");
sprog->dual_src_linked = false;
}
} else
sprog->dual_src_linked = false;
if (vrend_state.have_vertex_attrib_binding) {
uint32_t mask = vs->sel->sinfo.attrib_input_mask;
while (mask) {
i = u_bit_scan(&mask);
snprintf(name, 10, "in_%d", i);
glBindAttribLocation(prog_id, i, name);
}
}
glLinkProgram(prog_id);
glGetProgramiv(prog_id, GL_LINK_STATUS, &lret);
if (lret == GL_FALSE) {
char infolog[65536];
int len;
glGetProgramInfoLog(prog_id, 65536, &len, infolog);
fprintf(stderr,"got error linking\n%s\n", infolog);
/* dump shaders */
report_context_error(ctx, VIRGL_ERROR_CTX_ILLEGAL_SHADER, 0);
fprintf(stderr,"vert shader: %d GLSL\n%s\n", vs->id, vs->glsl_prog);
if (gs)
fprintf(stderr,"geom shader: %d GLSL\n%s\n", gs->id, gs->glsl_prog);
fprintf(stderr,"frag shader: %d GLSL\n%s\n", fs->id, fs->glsl_prog);
glDeleteProgram(prog_id);
free(sprog);
return NULL;
}
sprog->ss[PIPE_SHADER_VERTEX] = vs;
sprog->ss[PIPE_SHADER_FRAGMENT] = fs;
sprog->ss[PIPE_SHADER_GEOMETRY] = gs;
list_add(&sprog->sl[PIPE_SHADER_VERTEX], &vs->programs);
list_add(&sprog->sl[PIPE_SHADER_FRAGMENT], &fs->programs);
if (gs)
list_add(&sprog->sl[PIPE_SHADER_GEOMETRY], &gs->programs);
last_shader = gs ? PIPE_SHADER_GEOMETRY : PIPE_SHADER_FRAGMENT;
sprog->id = prog_id;
list_addtail(&sprog->head, &ctx->sub->programs);
if (fs->key.pstipple_tex)
sprog->fs_stipple_loc = glGetUniformLocation(prog_id, "pstipple_sampler");
else
sprog->fs_stipple_loc = -1;
sprog->vs_ws_adjust_loc = glGetUniformLocation(prog_id, "winsys_adjust");
for (id = PIPE_SHADER_VERTEX; id <= last_shader; id++) {
if (sprog->ss[id]->sel->sinfo.samplers_used_mask) {
uint32_t mask = sprog->ss[id]->sel->sinfo.samplers_used_mask;
int nsamp = util_bitcount(sprog->ss[id]->sel->sinfo.samplers_used_mask);
int index;
sprog->shadow_samp_mask[id] = sprog->ss[id]->sel->sinfo.shadow_samp_mask;
if (sprog->ss[id]->sel->sinfo.shadow_samp_mask) {
sprog->shadow_samp_mask_locs[id] = calloc(nsamp, sizeof(uint32_t));
sprog->shadow_samp_add_locs[id] = calloc(nsamp, sizeof(uint32_t));
} else {
sprog->shadow_samp_mask_locs[id] = sprog->shadow_samp_add_locs[id] = NULL;
}
sprog->samp_locs[id] = calloc(nsamp, sizeof(uint32_t));
if (sprog->samp_locs[id]) {
const char *prefix = pipe_shader_to_prefix(id);
index = 0;
while(mask) {
i = u_bit_scan(&mask);
snprintf(name, 10, "%ssamp%d", prefix, i);
sprog->samp_locs[id][index] = glGetUniformLocation(prog_id, name);
if (sprog->ss[id]->sel->sinfo.shadow_samp_mask & (1 << i)) {
snprintf(name, 14, "%sshadmask%d", prefix, i);
sprog->shadow_samp_mask_locs[id][index] = glGetUniformLocation(prog_id, name);
snprintf(name, 14, "%sshadadd%d", prefix, i);
sprog->shadow_samp_add_locs[id][index] = glGetUniformLocation(prog_id, name);
}
index++;
}
}
} else {
sprog->samp_locs[id] = NULL;
sprog->shadow_samp_mask_locs[id] = NULL;
sprog->shadow_samp_add_locs[id] = NULL;
sprog->shadow_samp_mask[id] = 0;
}
sprog->samplers_used_mask[id] = sprog->ss[id]->sel->sinfo.samplers_used_mask;
}
for (id = PIPE_SHADER_VERTEX; id <= last_shader; id++) {
if (sprog->ss[id]->sel->sinfo.num_consts) {
sprog->const_locs[id] = calloc(sprog->ss[id]->sel->sinfo.num_consts, sizeof(uint32_t));
if (sprog->const_locs[id]) {
const char *prefix = pipe_shader_to_prefix(id);
for (i = 0; i < sprog->ss[id]->sel->sinfo.num_consts; i++) {
snprintf(name, 16, "%sconst0[%d]", prefix, i);
sprog->const_locs[id][i] = glGetUniformLocation(prog_id, name);
}
}
} else
sprog->const_locs[id] = NULL;
}
if (!vrend_state.have_vertex_attrib_binding) {
if (vs->sel->sinfo.num_inputs) {
sprog->attrib_locs = calloc(vs->sel->sinfo.num_inputs, sizeof(uint32_t));
if (sprog->attrib_locs) {
for (i = 0; i < vs->sel->sinfo.num_inputs; i++) {
snprintf(name, 10, "in_%d", i);
sprog->attrib_locs[i] = glGetAttribLocation(prog_id, name);
}
}
} else
sprog->attrib_locs = NULL;
}
for (id = PIPE_SHADER_VERTEX; id <= last_shader; id++) {
if (sprog->ss[id]->sel->sinfo.num_ubos) {
const char *prefix = pipe_shader_to_prefix(id);
sprog->ubo_locs[id] = calloc(sprog->ss[id]->sel->sinfo.num_ubos, sizeof(uint32_t));
for (i = 0; i < sprog->ss[id]->sel->sinfo.num_ubos; i++) {
snprintf(name, 16, "%subo%d", prefix, i + 1);
sprog->ubo_locs[id][i] = glGetUniformBlockIndex(prog_id, name);
}
} else
sprog->ubo_locs[id] = NULL;
}
if (vs->sel->sinfo.num_ucp) {
for (i = 0; i < vs->sel->sinfo.num_ucp; i++) {
snprintf(name, 10, "clipp[%d]", i);
sprog->clip_locs[i] = glGetUniformLocation(prog_id, name);
}
}
return sprog;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 8,788
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(substr_compare)
{
zend_string *s1, *s2;
zend_long offset, len=0;
zend_bool cs=0;
size_t cmp_len;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "SSl|lb", &s1, &s2, &offset, &len, &cs) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (ZEND_NUM_ARGS() >= 4 && len <= 0) {
if (len == 0) {
RETURN_LONG(0L);
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "The length must be greater than or equal to zero");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
if (offset < 0) {
offset = ZSTR_LEN(s1) + offset;
offset = (offset < 0) ? 0 : offset;
}
if ((size_t)offset >= ZSTR_LEN(s1)) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "The start position cannot exceed initial string length");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
cmp_len = (size_t) (len ? len : MAX(ZSTR_LEN(s2), (ZSTR_LEN(s1) - offset)));
if (!cs) {
RETURN_LONG(zend_binary_strncmp(ZSTR_VAL(s1) + offset, (ZSTR_LEN(s1) - offset), ZSTR_VAL(s2), ZSTR_LEN(s2), cmp_len));
} else {
RETURN_LONG(zend_binary_strncasecmp_l(ZSTR_VAL(s1) + offset, (ZSTR_LEN(s1) - offset), ZSTR_VAL(s2), ZSTR_LEN(s2), cmp_len));
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-17
| 0
| 14,664
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __sha1_neon_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
unsigned int len, unsigned int partial)
{
struct sha1_state *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
unsigned int done = 0;
sctx->count += len;
if (partial) {
done = SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE - partial;
memcpy(sctx->buffer + partial, data, done);
sha1_transform_neon(sctx->state, sctx->buffer, 1);
}
if (len - done >= SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE) {
const unsigned int rounds = (len - done) / SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE;
sha1_transform_neon(sctx->state, data + done, rounds);
done += rounds * SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE;
}
memcpy(sctx->buffer, data + done, len - done);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 46,607
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: eXosip_reset_transports (struct eXosip_t *excontext)
{
int i = OSIP_WRONG_STATE;
if (excontext->eXtl_transport.tl_reset)
i = excontext->eXtl_transport.tl_reset (excontext);
return i;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 17,293
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::unique_ptr<service_manager::Service> ResourceCoordinatorService::Create() {
auto resource_coordinator_service =
std::make_unique<ResourceCoordinatorService>();
return resource_coordinator_service;
}
Commit Message: memory-infra: split up memory-infra coordinator service into two
This allows for heap profiler to use its own service with correct
capabilities and all other instances to use the existing coordinator
service.
Bug: 792028
Change-Id: I84e4ec71f5f1d00991c0516b1424ce7334bcd3cd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/836896
Commit-Queue: Lalit Maganti <lalitm@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: oysteine <oysteine@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Albert J. Wong <ajwong@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Hector Dearman <hjd@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529059}
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 150,127
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void InitXCFImage(XCFLayerInfo *outLayer,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
outLayer->image->page.x=outLayer->offset_x;
outLayer->image->page.y=outLayer->offset_y;
outLayer->image->page.width=outLayer->width;
outLayer->image->page.height=outLayer->height;
(void) SetImageProperty(outLayer->image,"label",(char *)outLayer->name,
exception);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/104
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 73,586
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: php_apache_server_startup(apr_pool_t *pconf, apr_pool_t *plog, apr_pool_t *ptemp, server_rec *s)
{
void *data = NULL;
const char *userdata_key = "apache2hook_post_config";
/* Apache will load, unload and then reload a DSO module. This
* prevents us from starting PHP until the second load. */
apr_pool_userdata_get(&data, userdata_key, s->process->pool);
if (data == NULL) {
/* We must use set() here and *not* setn(), otherwise the
* static string pointed to by userdata_key will be mapped
* to a different location when the DSO is reloaded and the
* pointers won't match, causing get() to return NULL when
* we expected it to return non-NULL. */
apr_pool_userdata_set((const void *)1, userdata_key, apr_pool_cleanup_null, s->process->pool);
return OK;
}
/* Set up our overridden path. */
if (apache2_php_ini_path_override) {
apache2_sapi_module.php_ini_path_override = apache2_php_ini_path_override;
}
#ifdef ZTS
tsrm_startup(1, 1, 0, NULL);
#endif
sapi_startup(&apache2_sapi_module);
apache2_sapi_module.startup(&apache2_sapi_module);
apr_pool_cleanup_register(pconf, NULL, php_apache_server_shutdown, apr_pool_cleanup_null);
php_apache_add_version(pconf);
return OK;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 3,391
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ScrollableUsersListView* LockContentsView::TestApi::users_list() const {
return view_->users_list_;
}
Commit Message: cros: Check initial auth type when showing views login.
Bug: 859611
Change-Id: I0298db9bbf4aed6bd40600aef2e1c5794e8cd058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1123056
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyin Hu <xiaoyinh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jacob Dufault <jdufault@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572224}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 131,559
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int airo_set_retry(struct net_device *dev,
struct iw_request_info *info,
struct iw_param *vwrq,
char *extra)
{
struct airo_info *local = dev->ml_priv;
int rc = -EINVAL;
if(vwrq->disabled) {
return -EINVAL;
}
readConfigRid(local, 1);
if(vwrq->flags & IW_RETRY_LIMIT) {
__le16 v = cpu_to_le16(vwrq->value);
if(vwrq->flags & IW_RETRY_LONG)
local->config.longRetryLimit = v;
else if (vwrq->flags & IW_RETRY_SHORT)
local->config.shortRetryLimit = v;
else {
/* No modifier : set both */
local->config.longRetryLimit = v;
local->config.shortRetryLimit = v;
}
set_bit (FLAG_COMMIT, &local->flags);
rc = -EINPROGRESS; /* Call commit handler */
}
if(vwrq->flags & IW_RETRY_LIFETIME) {
local->config.txLifetime = cpu_to_le16(vwrq->value / 1024);
set_bit (FLAG_COMMIT, &local->flags);
rc = -EINPROGRESS; /* Call commit handler */
}
return rc;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 23,999
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int sctp_do_sm(struct net *net, sctp_event_t event_type, sctp_subtype_t subtype,
sctp_state_t state,
struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
struct sctp_association *asoc,
void *event_arg,
gfp_t gfp)
{
sctp_cmd_seq_t commands;
const sctp_sm_table_entry_t *state_fn;
sctp_disposition_t status;
int error = 0;
typedef const char *(printfn_t)(sctp_subtype_t);
static printfn_t *table[] = {
NULL, sctp_cname, sctp_tname, sctp_oname, sctp_pname,
};
printfn_t *debug_fn __attribute__ ((unused)) = table[event_type];
/* Look up the state function, run it, and then process the
* side effects. These three steps are the heart of lksctp.
*/
state_fn = sctp_sm_lookup_event(net, event_type, state, subtype);
sctp_init_cmd_seq(&commands);
debug_pre_sfn();
status = state_fn->fn(net, ep, asoc, subtype, event_arg, &commands);
debug_post_sfn();
error = sctp_side_effects(event_type, subtype, state,
ep, asoc, event_arg, status,
&commands, gfp);
debug_post_sfx();
return error;
}
Commit Message: sctp: Prevent soft lockup when sctp_accept() is called during a timeout event
A case can occur when sctp_accept() is called by the user during
a heartbeat timeout event after the 4-way handshake. Since
sctp_assoc_migrate() changes both assoc->base.sk and assoc->ep, the
bh_sock_lock in sctp_generate_heartbeat_event() will be taken with
the listening socket but released with the new association socket.
The result is a deadlock on any future attempts to take the listening
socket lock.
Note that this race can occur with other SCTP timeouts that take
the bh_lock_sock() in the event sctp_accept() is called.
BUG: soft lockup - CPU#9 stuck for 67s! [swapper:0]
...
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8152d48e>] [<ffffffff8152d48e>] _spin_lock+0x1e/0x30
RSP: 0018:ffff880028323b20 EFLAGS: 00000206
RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff880028323b20 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff880028323be0 RDI: ffff8804632c4b48
RBP: ffffffff8100bb93 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff880610662280 R11: 0000000000000100 R12: ffff880028323aa0
R13: ffff8804383c3880 R14: ffff880028323a90 R15: ffffffff81534225
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880028320000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0018 ES: 0018 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 00000000006df528 CR3: 0000000001a85000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Process swapper (pid: 0, threadinfo ffff880616b70000, task ffff880616b6cab0)
Stack:
ffff880028323c40 ffffffffa01c2582 ffff880614cfb020 0000000000000000
<d> 0100000000000000 00000014383a6c44 ffff8804383c3880 ffff880614e93c00
<d> ffff880614e93c00 0000000000000000 ffff8804632c4b00 ffff8804383c38b8
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffffa01c2582>] ? sctp_rcv+0x492/0xa10 [sctp]
[<ffffffff8148c559>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0
[<ffffffff814974a0>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff8148c716>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120
[<ffffffff814974a0>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff8149757d>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0xdd/0x2d0
[<ffffffff81497808>] ? ip_local_deliver+0x98/0xa0
[<ffffffff81496ccd>] ? ip_rcv_finish+0x12d/0x440
[<ffffffff81497255>] ? ip_rcv+0x275/0x350
[<ffffffff8145cfeb>] ? __netif_receive_skb+0x4ab/0x750
...
With lockdep debugging:
=====================================
[ BUG: bad unlock balance detected! ]
-------------------------------------
CslRx/12087 is trying to release lock (slock-AF_INET) at:
[<ffffffffa01bcae0>] sctp_generate_timeout_event+0x40/0xe0 [sctp]
but there are no more locks to release!
other info that might help us debug this:
2 locks held by CslRx/12087:
#0: (&asoc->timers[i]){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff8108ce1f>] run_timer_softirq+0x16f/0x3e0
#1: (slock-AF_INET){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffffa01bcac3>] sctp_generate_timeout_event+0x23/0xe0 [sctp]
Ensure the socket taken is also the same one that is released by
saving a copy of the socket before entering the timeout event
critical section.
Signed-off-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 57,017
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pdf14_forward_put_params(gx_device * dev, gs_param_list * plist)
{
pdf14_device * pdev = (pdf14_device *)dev;
gx_device * tdev = pdev->target;
bool was_open = tdev->is_open;
int code = 0;
if (tdev != 0 && (code = dev_proc(tdev, put_params)(tdev, plist)) >= 0) {
gx_device_decache_colors(dev);
if (!tdev->is_open) {
code = gs_closedevice(dev);
if (code == 0)
code = was_open ? 1 : 0; /* target device closed */
}
gx_device_copy_params(dev, tdev);
}
return code;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 2,955
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned int packet_poll(struct file *file, struct socket *sock,
poll_table *wait)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct packet_sock *po = pkt_sk(sk);
unsigned int mask = datagram_poll(file, sock, wait);
spin_lock_bh(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock);
if (po->rx_ring.pg_vec) {
if (!packet_previous_rx_frame(po, &po->rx_ring,
TP_STATUS_KERNEL))
mask |= POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;
}
spin_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock);
spin_lock_bh(&sk->sk_write_queue.lock);
if (po->tx_ring.pg_vec) {
if (packet_current_frame(po, &po->tx_ring, TP_STATUS_AVAILABLE))
mask |= POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM;
}
spin_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_write_queue.lock);
return mask;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 40,631
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void dwc3_gadget_giveback(struct dwc3_ep *dep, struct dwc3_request *req,
int status)
{
struct dwc3 *dwc = dep->dwc;
req->started = false;
list_del(&req->list);
req->remaining = 0;
if (req->request.status == -EINPROGRESS)
req->request.status = status;
if (req->trb)
usb_gadget_unmap_request_by_dev(dwc->sysdev,
&req->request, req->direction);
req->trb = NULL;
trace_dwc3_gadget_giveback(req);
spin_unlock(&dwc->lock);
usb_gadget_giveback_request(&dep->endpoint, &req->request);
spin_lock(&dwc->lock);
if (dep->number > 1)
pm_runtime_put(dwc->dev);
}
Commit Message: usb: dwc3: gadget: never call ->complete() from ->ep_queue()
This is a requirement which has always existed but, somehow, wasn't
reflected in the documentation and problems weren't found until now
when Tuba Yavuz found a possible deadlock happening between dwc3 and
f_hid. She described the situation as follows:
spin_lock_irqsave(&hidg->write_spinlock, flags); // first acquire
/* we our function has been disabled by host */
if (!hidg->req) {
free_ep_req(hidg->in_ep, hidg->req);
goto try_again;
}
[...]
status = usb_ep_queue(hidg->in_ep, hidg->req, GFP_ATOMIC);
=>
[...]
=> usb_gadget_giveback_request
=>
f_hidg_req_complete
=>
spin_lock_irqsave(&hidg->write_spinlock, flags); // second acquire
Note that this happens because dwc3 would call ->complete() on a
failed usb_ep_queue() due to failed Start Transfer command. This is,
anyway, a theoretical situation because dwc3 currently uses "No
Response Update Transfer" command for Bulk and Interrupt endpoints.
It's still good to make this case impossible to happen even if the "No
Reponse Update Transfer" command is changed.
Reported-by: Tuba Yavuz <tuba@ece.ufl.edu>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 1
| 169,579
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: TextureManager::TextureInfo::LevelInfo::LevelInfo(const LevelInfo& rhs)
: cleared(rhs.cleared),
target(rhs.target),
level(rhs.level),
internal_format(rhs.internal_format),
width(rhs.width),
height(rhs.height),
depth(rhs.depth),
border(rhs.border),
format(rhs.format),
type(rhs.type),
estimated_size(rhs.estimated_size) {
}
Commit Message: Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 103,728
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebPagePrivate::onPluginStartBackgroundPlay(PluginView* plugin, const char* windowUniquePrefix)
{
m_client->onPluginStartBackgroundPlay();
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 104,316
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: dx_probe(const struct qstr *d_name, struct inode *dir,
struct dx_hash_info *hinfo, struct dx_frame *frame_in, int *err)
{
unsigned count, indirect;
struct dx_entry *at, *entries, *p, *q, *m;
struct dx_root *root;
struct buffer_head *bh;
struct dx_frame *frame = frame_in;
u32 hash;
frame->bh = NULL;
if (!(bh = ext4_bread(NULL, dir, 0, 0, err))) {
if (*err == 0)
*err = ERR_BAD_DX_DIR;
goto fail;
}
root = (struct dx_root *) bh->b_data;
if (root->info.hash_version != DX_HASH_TEA &&
root->info.hash_version != DX_HASH_HALF_MD4 &&
root->info.hash_version != DX_HASH_LEGACY) {
ext4_warning(dir->i_sb, "Unrecognised inode hash code %d",
root->info.hash_version);
brelse(bh);
*err = ERR_BAD_DX_DIR;
goto fail;
}
hinfo->hash_version = root->info.hash_version;
if (hinfo->hash_version <= DX_HASH_TEA)
hinfo->hash_version += EXT4_SB(dir->i_sb)->s_hash_unsigned;
hinfo->seed = EXT4_SB(dir->i_sb)->s_hash_seed;
if (d_name)
ext4fs_dirhash(d_name->name, d_name->len, hinfo);
hash = hinfo->hash;
if (root->info.unused_flags & 1) {
ext4_warning(dir->i_sb, "Unimplemented inode hash flags: %#06x",
root->info.unused_flags);
brelse(bh);
*err = ERR_BAD_DX_DIR;
goto fail;
}
if ((indirect = root->info.indirect_levels) > 1) {
ext4_warning(dir->i_sb, "Unimplemented inode hash depth: %#06x",
root->info.indirect_levels);
brelse(bh);
*err = ERR_BAD_DX_DIR;
goto fail;
}
if (!buffer_verified(bh) &&
!ext4_dx_csum_verify(dir, (struct ext4_dir_entry *)bh->b_data)) {
ext4_warning(dir->i_sb, "Root failed checksum");
brelse(bh);
*err = ERR_BAD_DX_DIR;
goto fail;
}
set_buffer_verified(bh);
entries = (struct dx_entry *) (((char *)&root->info) +
root->info.info_length);
if (dx_get_limit(entries) != dx_root_limit(dir,
root->info.info_length)) {
ext4_warning(dir->i_sb, "dx entry: limit != root limit");
brelse(bh);
*err = ERR_BAD_DX_DIR;
goto fail;
}
dxtrace(printk("Look up %x", hash));
while (1)
{
count = dx_get_count(entries);
if (!count || count > dx_get_limit(entries)) {
ext4_warning(dir->i_sb,
"dx entry: no count or count > limit");
brelse(bh);
*err = ERR_BAD_DX_DIR;
goto fail2;
}
p = entries + 1;
q = entries + count - 1;
while (p <= q)
{
m = p + (q - p)/2;
dxtrace(printk("."));
if (dx_get_hash(m) > hash)
q = m - 1;
else
p = m + 1;
}
if (0) // linear search cross check
{
unsigned n = count - 1;
at = entries;
while (n--)
{
dxtrace(printk(","));
if (dx_get_hash(++at) > hash)
{
at--;
break;
}
}
assert (at == p - 1);
}
at = p - 1;
dxtrace(printk(" %x->%u\n", at == entries? 0: dx_get_hash(at), dx_get_block(at)));
frame->bh = bh;
frame->entries = entries;
frame->at = at;
if (!indirect--) return frame;
if (!(bh = ext4_bread(NULL, dir, dx_get_block(at), 0, err))) {
if (!(*err))
*err = ERR_BAD_DX_DIR;
goto fail2;
}
at = entries = ((struct dx_node *) bh->b_data)->entries;
if (!buffer_verified(bh) &&
!ext4_dx_csum_verify(dir,
(struct ext4_dir_entry *)bh->b_data)) {
ext4_warning(dir->i_sb, "Node failed checksum");
brelse(bh);
*err = ERR_BAD_DX_DIR;
goto fail;
}
set_buffer_verified(bh);
if (dx_get_limit(entries) != dx_node_limit (dir)) {
ext4_warning(dir->i_sb,
"dx entry: limit != node limit");
brelse(bh);
*err = ERR_BAD_DX_DIR;
goto fail2;
}
frame++;
frame->bh = NULL;
}
fail2:
while (frame >= frame_in) {
brelse(frame->bh);
frame--;
}
fail:
if (*err == ERR_BAD_DX_DIR)
ext4_warning(dir->i_sb,
"Corrupt dir inode %lu, running e2fsck is "
"recommended.", dir->i_ino);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: ext4: avoid hang when mounting non-journal filesystems with orphan list
When trying to mount a file system which does not contain a journal,
but which does have a orphan list containing an inode which needs to
be truncated, the mount call with hang forever in
ext4_orphan_cleanup() because ext4_orphan_del() will return
immediately without removing the inode from the orphan list, leading
to an uninterruptible loop in kernel code which will busy out one of
the CPU's on the system.
This can be trivially reproduced by trying to mount the file system
found in tests/f_orphan_extents_inode/image.gz from the e2fsprogs
source tree. If a malicious user were to put this on a USB stick, and
mount it on a Linux desktop which has automatic mounts enabled, this
could be considered a potential denial of service attack. (Not a big
deal in practice, but professional paranoids worry about such things,
and have even been known to allocate CVE numbers for such problems.)
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Zheng Liu <wenqing.lz@taobao.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 32,250
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int perf_pmu_register(struct pmu *pmu, const char *name, int type)
{
int cpu, ret;
mutex_lock(&pmus_lock);
ret = -ENOMEM;
pmu->pmu_disable_count = alloc_percpu(int);
if (!pmu->pmu_disable_count)
goto unlock;
pmu->type = -1;
if (!name)
goto skip_type;
pmu->name = name;
if (type < 0) {
type = idr_alloc(&pmu_idr, pmu, PERF_TYPE_MAX, 0, GFP_KERNEL);
if (type < 0) {
ret = type;
goto free_pdc;
}
}
pmu->type = type;
if (pmu_bus_running) {
ret = pmu_dev_alloc(pmu);
if (ret)
goto free_idr;
}
skip_type:
if (pmu->task_ctx_nr == perf_hw_context) {
static int hw_context_taken = 0;
/*
* Other than systems with heterogeneous CPUs, it never makes
* sense for two PMUs to share perf_hw_context. PMUs which are
* uncore must use perf_invalid_context.
*/
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(hw_context_taken &&
!(pmu->capabilities & PERF_PMU_CAP_HETEROGENEOUS_CPUS)))
pmu->task_ctx_nr = perf_invalid_context;
hw_context_taken = 1;
}
pmu->pmu_cpu_context = find_pmu_context(pmu->task_ctx_nr);
if (pmu->pmu_cpu_context)
goto got_cpu_context;
ret = -ENOMEM;
pmu->pmu_cpu_context = alloc_percpu(struct perf_cpu_context);
if (!pmu->pmu_cpu_context)
goto free_dev;
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
struct perf_cpu_context *cpuctx;
cpuctx = per_cpu_ptr(pmu->pmu_cpu_context, cpu);
__perf_event_init_context(&cpuctx->ctx);
lockdep_set_class(&cpuctx->ctx.mutex, &cpuctx_mutex);
lockdep_set_class(&cpuctx->ctx.lock, &cpuctx_lock);
cpuctx->ctx.pmu = pmu;
__perf_mux_hrtimer_init(cpuctx, cpu);
cpuctx->unique_pmu = pmu;
}
got_cpu_context:
if (!pmu->start_txn) {
if (pmu->pmu_enable) {
/*
* If we have pmu_enable/pmu_disable calls, install
* transaction stubs that use that to try and batch
* hardware accesses.
*/
pmu->start_txn = perf_pmu_start_txn;
pmu->commit_txn = perf_pmu_commit_txn;
pmu->cancel_txn = perf_pmu_cancel_txn;
} else {
pmu->start_txn = perf_pmu_nop_txn;
pmu->commit_txn = perf_pmu_nop_int;
pmu->cancel_txn = perf_pmu_nop_void;
}
}
if (!pmu->pmu_enable) {
pmu->pmu_enable = perf_pmu_nop_void;
pmu->pmu_disable = perf_pmu_nop_void;
}
if (!pmu->event_idx)
pmu->event_idx = perf_event_idx_default;
list_add_rcu(&pmu->entry, &pmus);
atomic_set(&pmu->exclusive_cnt, 0);
ret = 0;
unlock:
mutex_unlock(&pmus_lock);
return ret;
free_dev:
device_del(pmu->dev);
put_device(pmu->dev);
free_idr:
if (pmu->type >= PERF_TYPE_MAX)
idr_remove(&pmu_idr, pmu->type);
free_pdc:
free_percpu(pmu->pmu_disable_count);
goto unlock;
}
Commit Message: perf/core: Fix concurrent sys_perf_event_open() vs. 'move_group' race
Di Shen reported a race between two concurrent sys_perf_event_open()
calls where both try and move the same pre-existing software group
into a hardware context.
The problem is exactly that described in commit:
f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
... where, while we wait for a ctx->mutex acquisition, the event->ctx
relation can have changed under us.
That very same commit failed to recognise sys_perf_event_context() as an
external access vector to the events and thereby didn't apply the
established locking rules correctly.
So while one sys_perf_event_open() call is stuck waiting on
mutex_lock_double(), the other (which owns said locks) moves the group
about. So by the time the former sys_perf_event_open() acquires the
locks, the context we've acquired is stale (and possibly dead).
Apply the established locking rules as per perf_event_ctx_lock_nested()
to the mutex_lock_double() for the 'move_group' case. This obviously means
we need to validate state after we acquire the locks.
Reported-by: Di Shen (Keen Lab)
Tested-by: John Dias <joaodias@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Min Chong <mchong@google.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Fixes: f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170106131444.GZ3174@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 68,402
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoProgramPathFragmentInputGenCHROMIUM(
GLuint program,
GLint location,
GLenum genMode,
GLint components,
const GLfloat* coeffs,
GLsizei coeffsBufsize) {
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 142,074
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: __insert_file_id (struct stat const *st, enum file_id_type type)
{
file_id *p;
static file_id *next_slot;
if (!next_slot)
next_slot = xmalloc (sizeof *next_slot);
next_slot->dev = st->st_dev;
next_slot->ino = st->st_ino;
next_slot->queued_output = false;
p = hash_insert (file_id_table, next_slot);
if (!p)
xalloc_die ();
if (p == next_slot)
next_slot = NULL;
p->type = type;
return p;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 2,728
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int acpi_check_region(resource_size_t start, resource_size_t n,
const char *name)
{
struct resource res = {
.start = start,
.end = start + n - 1,
.name = name,
.flags = IORESOURCE_IO,
};
return acpi_check_resource_conflict(&res);
}
Commit Message: acpi: Disable ACPI table override if securelevel is set
From the kernel documentation (initrd_table_override.txt):
If the ACPI_INITRD_TABLE_OVERRIDE compile option is true, it is possible
to override nearly any ACPI table provided by the BIOS with an
instrumented, modified one.
When securelevel is set, the kernel should disallow any unauthenticated
changes to kernel space. ACPI tables contain code invoked by the kernel, so
do not allow ACPI tables to be overridden if securelevel is set.
Signed-off-by: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 53,811
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: escKeyProc(int c, int esc, unsigned char *map)
{
if (CurrentKey >= 0 && CurrentKey & K_MULTI) {
unsigned char **mmap;
mmap = (unsigned char **)getKeyData(MULTI_KEY(CurrentKey));
if (!mmap)
return;
switch (esc) {
case K_ESCD:
map = mmap[3];
break;
case K_ESCB:
map = mmap[2];
break;
case K_ESC:
map = mmap[1];
break;
default:
map = mmap[0];
break;
}
esc |= (CurrentKey & ~0xFFFF);
}
CurrentKey = esc | c;
w3mFuncList[(int)map[c]].func();
}
Commit Message: Make temporary directory safely when ~/.w3m is unwritable
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 84,493
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t MediaPlayerService::dump(int fd, const Vector<String16>& args)
{
const size_t SIZE = 256;
char buffer[SIZE];
String8 result;
SortedVector< sp<Client> > clients; //to serialise the mutex unlock & client destruction.
SortedVector< sp<MediaRecorderClient> > mediaRecorderClients;
if (checkCallingPermission(String16("android.permission.DUMP")) == false) {
snprintf(buffer, SIZE, "Permission Denial: "
"can't dump MediaPlayerService from pid=%d, uid=%d\n",
IPCThreadState::self()->getCallingPid(),
IPCThreadState::self()->getCallingUid());
result.append(buffer);
} else {
Mutex::Autolock lock(mLock);
for (int i = 0, n = mClients.size(); i < n; ++i) {
sp<Client> c = mClients[i].promote();
if (c != 0) c->dump(fd, args);
clients.add(c);
}
if (mMediaRecorderClients.size() == 0) {
result.append(" No media recorder client\n\n");
} else {
for (int i = 0, n = mMediaRecorderClients.size(); i < n; ++i) {
sp<MediaRecorderClient> c = mMediaRecorderClients[i].promote();
if (c != 0) {
snprintf(buffer, 255, " MediaRecorderClient pid(%d)\n", c->mPid);
result.append(buffer);
write(fd, result.string(), result.size());
result = "\n";
c->dump(fd, args);
mediaRecorderClients.add(c);
}
}
}
result.append(" Files opened and/or mapped:\n");
snprintf(buffer, SIZE, "/proc/%d/maps", getpid());
FILE *f = fopen(buffer, "r");
if (f) {
while (!feof(f)) {
fgets(buffer, SIZE, f);
if (strstr(buffer, " /storage/") ||
strstr(buffer, " /system/sounds/") ||
strstr(buffer, " /data/") ||
strstr(buffer, " /system/media/")) {
result.append(" ");
result.append(buffer);
}
}
fclose(f);
} else {
result.append("couldn't open ");
result.append(buffer);
result.append("\n");
}
snprintf(buffer, SIZE, "/proc/%d/fd", getpid());
DIR *d = opendir(buffer);
if (d) {
struct dirent *ent;
while((ent = readdir(d)) != NULL) {
if (strcmp(ent->d_name,".") && strcmp(ent->d_name,"..")) {
snprintf(buffer, SIZE, "/proc/%d/fd/%s", getpid(), ent->d_name);
struct stat s;
if (lstat(buffer, &s) == 0) {
if ((s.st_mode & S_IFMT) == S_IFLNK) {
char linkto[256];
int len = readlink(buffer, linkto, sizeof(linkto));
if(len > 0) {
if(len > 255) {
linkto[252] = '.';
linkto[253] = '.';
linkto[254] = '.';
linkto[255] = 0;
} else {
linkto[len] = 0;
}
if (strstr(linkto, "/storage/") == linkto ||
strstr(linkto, "/system/sounds/") == linkto ||
strstr(linkto, "/data/") == linkto ||
strstr(linkto, "/system/media/") == linkto) {
result.append(" ");
result.append(buffer);
result.append(" -> ");
result.append(linkto);
result.append("\n");
}
}
} else {
result.append(" unexpected type for ");
result.append(buffer);
result.append("\n");
}
}
}
}
closedir(d);
} else {
result.append("couldn't open ");
result.append(buffer);
result.append("\n");
}
gLooperRoster.dump(fd, args);
bool dumpMem = false;
bool unreachableMemory = false;
for (size_t i = 0; i < args.size(); i++) {
if (args[i] == String16("-m")) {
dumpMem = true;
} else if (args[i] == String16("--unreachable")) {
unreachableMemory = true;
}
}
if (dumpMem) {
result.append("\nDumping memory:\n");
std::string s = dumpMemoryAddresses(100 /* limit */);
result.append(s.c_str(), s.size());
}
if (unreachableMemory) {
result.append("\nDumping unreachable memory:\n");
std::string s = GetUnreachableMemoryString(true /* contents */, 10000 /* limit */);
result.append(s.c_str(), s.size());
}
}
write(fd, result.string(), result.size());
return NO_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: MediaPlayerService: avoid invalid static cast
Bug: 30204103
Change-Id: Ie0dd3568a375f1e9fed8615ad3d85184bcc99028
(cherry picked from commit ee0a0e39acdcf8f97e0d6945c31ff36a06a36e9d)
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 157,981
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ocfs2_unlock_and_free_pages(struct page **pages, int num_pages)
{
int i;
for(i = 0; i < num_pages; i++) {
if (pages[i]) {
unlock_page(pages[i]);
mark_page_accessed(pages[i]);
put_page(pages[i]);
}
}
}
Commit Message: ocfs2: ip_alloc_sem should be taken in ocfs2_get_block()
ip_alloc_sem should be taken in ocfs2_get_block() when reading file in
DIRECT mode to prevent concurrent access to extent tree with
ocfs2_dio_end_io_write(), which may cause BUGON in the following
situation:
read file 'A' end_io of writing file 'A'
vfs_read
__vfs_read
ocfs2_file_read_iter
generic_file_read_iter
ocfs2_direct_IO
__blockdev_direct_IO
do_blockdev_direct_IO
do_direct_IO
get_more_blocks
ocfs2_get_block
ocfs2_extent_map_get_blocks
ocfs2_get_clusters
ocfs2_get_clusters_nocache()
ocfs2_search_extent_list
return the index of record which
contains the v_cluster, that is
v_cluster > rec[i]->e_cpos.
ocfs2_dio_end_io
ocfs2_dio_end_io_write
down_write(&oi->ip_alloc_sem);
ocfs2_mark_extent_written
ocfs2_change_extent_flag
ocfs2_split_extent
...
--> modify the rec[i]->e_cpos, resulting
in v_cluster < rec[i]->e_cpos.
BUG_ON(v_cluster < le32_to_cpu(rec->e_cpos))
[alex.chen@huawei.com: v3]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59EF3614.6050008@huawei.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59EF3614.6050008@huawei.com
Fixes: c15471f79506 ("ocfs2: fix sparse file & data ordering issue in direct io")
Signed-off-by: Alex Chen <alex.chen@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Gang He <ghe@suse.com>
Acked-by: Changwei Ge <ge.changwei@h3c.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@versity.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 85,511
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int kvm_arch_vcpu_setup(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
int r;
vcpu->arch.mtrr_state.have_fixed = 1;
r = vcpu_load(vcpu);
if (r)
return r;
r = kvm_vcpu_reset(vcpu);
if (r == 0)
r = kvm_mmu_setup(vcpu);
vcpu_put(vcpu);
return r;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Convert MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME to use gfn_to_hva_cache functions (CVE-2013-1797)
There is a potential use after free issue with the handling of
MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME. If the guest specifies a GPA in a movable or removable
memory such as frame buffers then KVM might continue to write to that
address even after it's removed via KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION. KVM pins
the page in memory so it's unlikely to cause an issue, but if the user
space component re-purposes the memory previously used for the guest, then
the guest will be able to corrupt that memory.
Tested: Tested against kvmclock unit test
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 33,282
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void nfs4_close_sync(struct path *path, struct nfs4_state *state, mode_t mode)
{
__nfs4_close(path, state, mode, 1);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID:
| 1
| 165,711
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::CancelActiveAndPendingDialogs() {
if (dialog_manager_) {
dialog_manager_->CancelDialogs(this, /*reset_state=*/false);
}
if (browser_plugin_embedder_)
browser_plugin_embedder_->CancelGuestDialogs();
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 135,637
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int kwajd_read_headers(struct mspack_system *sys,
struct mspack_file *fh,
struct mskwajd_header *hdr)
{
unsigned char buf[16];
int i;
/* read in the header */
if (sys->read(fh, &buf[0], kwajh_SIZEOF) != kwajh_SIZEOF) {
return MSPACK_ERR_READ;
}
/* check for "KWAJ" signature */
if (((unsigned int) EndGetI32(&buf[kwajh_Signature1]) != 0x4A41574B) ||
((unsigned int) EndGetI32(&buf[kwajh_Signature2]) != 0xD127F088))
{
return MSPACK_ERR_SIGNATURE;
}
/* basic header fields */
hdr->comp_type = EndGetI16(&buf[kwajh_CompMethod]);
hdr->data_offset = EndGetI16(&buf[kwajh_DataOffset]);
hdr->headers = EndGetI16(&buf[kwajh_Flags]);
hdr->length = 0;
hdr->filename = NULL;
hdr->extra = NULL;
hdr->extra_length = 0;
/* optional headers */
/* 4 bytes: length of unpacked file */
if (hdr->headers & MSKWAJ_HDR_HASLENGTH) {
if (sys->read(fh, &buf[0], 4) != 4) return MSPACK_ERR_READ;
hdr->length = EndGetI32(&buf[0]);
}
/* 2 bytes: unknown purpose */
if (hdr->headers & MSKWAJ_HDR_HASUNKNOWN1) {
if (sys->read(fh, &buf[0], 2) != 2) return MSPACK_ERR_READ;
}
/* 2 bytes: length of section, then [length] bytes: unknown purpose */
if (hdr->headers & MSKWAJ_HDR_HASUNKNOWN2) {
if (sys->read(fh, &buf[0], 2) != 2) return MSPACK_ERR_READ;
i = EndGetI16(&buf[0]);
if (sys->seek(fh, (off_t)i, MSPACK_SYS_SEEK_CUR)) return MSPACK_ERR_SEEK;
}
/* filename and extension */
if (hdr->headers & (MSKWAJ_HDR_HASFILENAME | MSKWAJ_HDR_HASFILEEXT)) {
off_t pos = sys->tell(fh);
char *fn = (char *) sys->alloc(sys, (size_t) 13);
/* allocate memory for maximum length filename */
if (! fn) return MSPACK_ERR_NOMEMORY;
hdr->filename = fn;
/* copy filename if present */
if (hdr->headers & MSKWAJ_HDR_HASFILENAME) {
if (sys->read(fh, &buf[0], 9) != 9) return MSPACK_ERR_READ;
for (i = 0; i < 9; i++, fn++) if (!(*fn = buf[i])) break;
pos += (i < 9) ? i+1 : 9;
if (sys->seek(fh, pos, MSPACK_SYS_SEEK_START))
return MSPACK_ERR_SEEK;
}
/* copy extension if present */
if (hdr->headers & MSKWAJ_HDR_HASFILEEXT) {
*fn++ = '.';
if (sys->read(fh, &buf[0], 4) != 4) return MSPACK_ERR_READ;
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++, fn++) if (!(*fn = buf[i])) break;
pos += (i < 4) ? i+1 : 4;
if (sys->seek(fh, pos, MSPACK_SYS_SEEK_START))
return MSPACK_ERR_SEEK;
}
*fn = '\0';
}
/* 2 bytes: extra text length then [length] bytes of extra text data */
if (hdr->headers & MSKWAJ_HDR_HASEXTRATEXT) {
if (sys->read(fh, &buf[0], 2) != 2) return MSPACK_ERR_READ;
i = EndGetI16(&buf[0]);
hdr->extra = (char *) sys->alloc(sys, (size_t)i+1);
if (! hdr->extra) return MSPACK_ERR_NOMEMORY;
if (sys->read(fh, hdr->extra, i) != i) return MSPACK_ERR_READ;
hdr->extra[i] = '\0';
hdr->extra_length = i;
}
return MSPACK_ERR_OK;
}
Commit Message: kwaj_read_headers(): fix handling of non-terminated strings
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 1
| 169,111
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int map_io(struct multipath *m, struct request *clone,
struct dm_mpath_io *mpio, unsigned was_queued)
{
int r = DM_MAPIO_REMAPPED;
size_t nr_bytes = blk_rq_bytes(clone);
unsigned long flags;
struct pgpath *pgpath;
struct block_device *bdev;
spin_lock_irqsave(&m->lock, flags);
/* Do we need to select a new pgpath? */
if (!m->current_pgpath ||
(!m->queue_io && (m->repeat_count && --m->repeat_count == 0)))
__choose_pgpath(m, nr_bytes);
pgpath = m->current_pgpath;
if (was_queued)
m->queue_size--;
if ((pgpath && m->queue_io) ||
(!pgpath && m->queue_if_no_path)) {
/* Queue for the daemon to resubmit */
list_add_tail(&clone->queuelist, &m->queued_ios);
m->queue_size++;
if ((m->pg_init_required && !m->pg_init_in_progress) ||
!m->queue_io)
queue_work(kmultipathd, &m->process_queued_ios);
pgpath = NULL;
r = DM_MAPIO_SUBMITTED;
} else if (pgpath) {
bdev = pgpath->path.dev->bdev;
clone->q = bdev_get_queue(bdev);
clone->rq_disk = bdev->bd_disk;
} else if (__must_push_back(m))
r = DM_MAPIO_REQUEUE;
else
r = -EIO; /* Failed */
mpio->pgpath = pgpath;
mpio->nr_bytes = nr_bytes;
if (r == DM_MAPIO_REMAPPED && pgpath->pg->ps.type->start_io)
pgpath->pg->ps.type->start_io(&pgpath->pg->ps, &pgpath->path,
nr_bytes);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&m->lock, flags);
return r;
}
Commit Message: dm: do not forward ioctls from logical volumes to the underlying device
A logical volume can map to just part of underlying physical volume.
In this case, it must be treated like a partition.
Based on a patch from Alasdair G Kergon.
Cc: Alasdair G Kergon <agk@redhat.com>
Cc: dm-devel@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 23,590
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BrowserPluginGuest::UpdateDragCursor(WebKit::WebDragOperation operation) {
RenderViewHostImpl* embedder_render_view_host =
static_cast<RenderViewHostImpl*>(
embedder_web_contents_->GetRenderViewHost());
CHECK(embedder_render_view_host);
RenderViewHostDelegateView* view =
embedder_render_view_host->GetDelegate()->GetDelegateView();
if (view)
view->UpdateDragCursor(operation);
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 114,428
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SendProgressNotifications(
const GURL& url, int num_total, int num_complete) {
for (NotifyHostMap::iterator it = hosts_to_notify.begin();
it != hosts_to_notify.end(); ++it) {
AppCacheFrontend* frontend = it->first;
frontend->OnProgressEventRaised(it->second, url,
num_total, num_complete);
}
}
Commit Message: AppCache: fix a browser crashing bug that can happen during updates.
BUG=558589
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1463463003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#360967}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 124,169
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static php_stream_context *decode_context_param(zval *contextresource TSRMLS_DC)
{
php_stream_context *context = NULL;
context = zend_fetch_resource(&contextresource TSRMLS_CC, -1, NULL, NULL, 1, php_le_stream_context(TSRMLS_C));
if (context == NULL) {
php_stream *stream;
stream = zend_fetch_resource(&contextresource TSRMLS_CC, -1, NULL, NULL, 2, php_file_le_stream(), php_file_le_pstream);
if (stream) {
context = stream->context;
if (context == NULL) {
/* Only way this happens is if file is opened with NO_DEFAULT_CONTEXT
param, but then something is called which requires a context.
Don't give them the default one though since they already said they
didn't want it. */
context = stream->context = php_stream_context_alloc(TSRMLS_C);
}
}
}
return context;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 15,284
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: handle_new(int use, const char *name, int fd, int flags, DIR *dirp)
{
int i;
if (first_unused_handle == -1) {
if (num_handles + 1 <= num_handles)
return -1;
num_handles++;
handles = xreallocarray(handles, num_handles, sizeof(Handle));
handle_unused(num_handles - 1);
}
i = first_unused_handle;
first_unused_handle = handles[i].next_unused;
handles[i].use = use;
handles[i].dirp = dirp;
handles[i].fd = fd;
handles[i].flags = flags;
handles[i].name = xstrdup(name);
handles[i].bytes_read = handles[i].bytes_write = 0;
return i;
}
Commit Message: disallow creation (of empty files) in read-only mode; reported by
Michal Zalewski, feedback & ok deraadt@
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 60,339
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int set_dabr(struct arch_hw_breakpoint *brk)
{
unsigned long dabr, dabrx;
dabr = brk->address | (brk->type & HW_BRK_TYPE_DABR);
dabrx = ((brk->type >> 3) & 0x7);
if (ppc_md.set_dabr)
return ppc_md.set_dabr(dabr, dabrx);
return __set_dabr(dabr, dabrx);
}
Commit Message: powerpc/tm: Fix crash when forking inside a transaction
When we fork/clone we currently don't copy any of the TM state to the new
thread. This results in a TM bad thing (program check) when the new process is
switched in as the kernel does a tmrechkpt with TEXASR FS not set. Also, since
R1 is from userspace, we trigger the bad kernel stack pointer detection. So we
end up with something like this:
Bad kernel stack pointer 0 at c0000000000404fc
cpu 0x2: Vector: 700 (Program Check) at [c00000003ffefd40]
pc: c0000000000404fc: restore_gprs+0xc0/0x148
lr: 0000000000000000
sp: 0
msr: 9000000100201030
current = 0xc000001dd1417c30
paca = 0xc00000000fe00800 softe: 0 irq_happened: 0x01
pid = 0, comm = swapper/2
WARNING: exception is not recoverable, can't continue
The below fixes this by flushing the TM state before we copy the task_struct to
the clone. To do this we go through the tmreclaim patch, which removes the
checkpointed registers from the CPU and transitions the CPU out of TM suspend
mode. Hence we need to call tmrechkpt after to restore the checkpointed state
and the TM mode for the current task.
To make this fail from userspace is simply:
tbegin
li r0, 2
sc
<boom>
Kudos to Adhemerval Zanella Neto for finding this.
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
cc: Adhemerval Zanella Neto <azanella@br.ibm.com>
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 38,642
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::DispatchUnloadEvents() {
PluginScriptForbiddenScope forbid_plugin_destructor_scripting;
if (parser_)
parser_->StopParsing();
if (load_event_progress_ == kLoadEventNotRun)
return;
if (load_event_progress_ <= kUnloadEventInProgress) {
Element* current_focused_element = FocusedElement();
if (auto* input = ToHTMLInputElementOrNull(current_focused_element))
input->EndEditing();
if (load_event_progress_ < kPageHideInProgress) {
load_event_progress_ = kPageHideInProgress;
if (LocalDOMWindow* window = domWindow()) {
const TimeTicks pagehide_event_start = CurrentTimeTicks();
window->DispatchEvent(
*PageTransitionEvent::Create(EventTypeNames::pagehide, false),
this);
const TimeTicks pagehide_event_end = CurrentTimeTicks();
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(
CustomCountHistogram, pagehide_histogram,
("DocumentEventTiming.PageHideDuration", 0, 10000000, 50));
pagehide_histogram.CountMicroseconds(pagehide_event_end -
pagehide_event_start);
}
if (!frame_)
return;
mojom::PageVisibilityState visibility_state = GetPageVisibilityState();
load_event_progress_ = kUnloadVisibilityChangeInProgress;
if (visibility_state != mojom::PageVisibilityState::kHidden) {
const TimeTicks pagevisibility_hidden_event_start = CurrentTimeTicks();
DispatchEvent(*Event::CreateBubble(EventTypeNames::visibilitychange));
const TimeTicks pagevisibility_hidden_event_end = CurrentTimeTicks();
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(CustomCountHistogram, pagevisibility_histogram,
("DocumentEventTiming.PageVibilityHiddenDuration",
0, 10000000, 50));
pagevisibility_histogram.CountMicroseconds(
pagevisibility_hidden_event_end -
pagevisibility_hidden_event_start);
DispatchEvent(
*Event::CreateBubble(EventTypeNames::webkitvisibilitychange));
}
if (!frame_)
return;
frame_->Loader().SaveScrollAnchor();
DocumentLoader* document_loader =
frame_->Loader().GetProvisionalDocumentLoader();
load_event_progress_ = kUnloadEventInProgress;
Event& unload_event = *Event::Create(EventTypeNames::unload);
if (document_loader &&
document_loader->GetTiming().UnloadEventStart().is_null() &&
document_loader->GetTiming().UnloadEventEnd().is_null()) {
DocumentLoadTiming& timing = document_loader->GetTiming();
DCHECK(!timing.NavigationStart().is_null());
const TimeTicks unload_event_start = CurrentTimeTicks();
timing.MarkUnloadEventStart(unload_event_start);
frame_->DomWindow()->DispatchEvent(unload_event, this);
const TimeTicks unload_event_end = CurrentTimeTicks();
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(
CustomCountHistogram, unload_histogram,
("DocumentEventTiming.UnloadDuration", 0, 10000000, 50));
unload_histogram.CountMicroseconds(unload_event_end -
unload_event_start);
timing.MarkUnloadEventEnd(unload_event_end);
} else {
frame_->DomWindow()->DispatchEvent(unload_event, frame_->GetDocument());
}
}
load_event_progress_ = kUnloadEventHandled;
}
if (!frame_)
return;
bool keep_event_listeners =
frame_->Loader().GetProvisionalDocumentLoader() &&
frame_->ShouldReuseDefaultView(
frame_->Loader().GetProvisionalDocumentLoader()->Url(),
frame_->Loader()
.GetProvisionalDocumentLoader()
->GetContentSecurityPolicy());
if (!keep_event_listeners)
RemoveAllEventListenersRecursively();
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when self-navigating to local-scheme URL
As the linked bug example shows, we should inherit CSP when we navigate
to a local-scheme URL (even if we are in a main browsing context).
Bug: 799747
Change-Id: I8413aa8e8049461ebcf0ffbf7b04c41d1340af02
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1234337
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597889}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 143,985
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void gen_debug(DisasContext *s, target_ulong cur_eip)
{
gen_update_cc_op(s);
gen_jmp_im(cur_eip);
gen_helper_debug(cpu_env);
s->is_jmp = DISAS_TB_JUMP;
}
Commit Message: tcg/i386: Check the size of instruction being translated
This fixes the bug: 'user-to-root privesc inside VM via bad translation
caching' reported by Jann Horn here:
https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1122
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
CC: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
CC: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Pranith Kumar <bobby.prani@gmail.com>
Message-Id: <20170323175851.14342-1-bobby.prani@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-94
| 0
| 66,329
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: OxideQQuickWebViewPrivate* OxideQQuickWebViewPrivate::get(
OxideQQuickWebView* view) {
return view->d_func();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,100
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ib_ucm_ctx_put(struct ib_ucm_context *ctx)
{
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&ctx->ref))
complete(&ctx->comp);
}
Commit Message: IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface
The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl(). This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.
For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.
For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).
The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 52,789
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int l2_allocate(BlockDriverState *bs, int l1_index, uint64_t **table)
{
BDRVQcowState *s = bs->opaque;
uint64_t old_l2_offset;
uint64_t *l2_table = NULL;
int64_t l2_offset;
int ret;
old_l2_offset = s->l1_table[l1_index];
trace_qcow2_l2_allocate(bs, l1_index);
/* allocate a new l2 entry */
l2_offset = qcow2_alloc_clusters(bs, s->l2_size * sizeof(uint64_t));
if (l2_offset < 0) {
ret = l2_offset;
goto fail;
}
ret = qcow2_cache_flush(bs, s->refcount_block_cache);
if (ret < 0) {
goto fail;
}
/* allocate a new entry in the l2 cache */
trace_qcow2_l2_allocate_get_empty(bs, l1_index);
ret = qcow2_cache_get_empty(bs, s->l2_table_cache, l2_offset, (void**) table);
if (ret < 0) {
goto fail;
}
l2_table = *table;
if ((old_l2_offset & L1E_OFFSET_MASK) == 0) {
/* if there was no old l2 table, clear the new table */
memset(l2_table, 0, s->l2_size * sizeof(uint64_t));
} else {
uint64_t* old_table;
/* if there was an old l2 table, read it from the disk */
BLKDBG_EVENT(bs->file, BLKDBG_L2_ALLOC_COW_READ);
ret = qcow2_cache_get(bs, s->l2_table_cache,
old_l2_offset & L1E_OFFSET_MASK,
(void**) &old_table);
if (ret < 0) {
goto fail;
}
memcpy(l2_table, old_table, s->cluster_size);
ret = qcow2_cache_put(bs, s->l2_table_cache, (void**) &old_table);
if (ret < 0) {
goto fail;
}
}
/* write the l2 table to the file */
BLKDBG_EVENT(bs->file, BLKDBG_L2_ALLOC_WRITE);
trace_qcow2_l2_allocate_write_l2(bs, l1_index);
qcow2_cache_entry_mark_dirty(s->l2_table_cache, l2_table);
ret = qcow2_cache_flush(bs, s->l2_table_cache);
if (ret < 0) {
goto fail;
}
/* update the L1 entry */
trace_qcow2_l2_allocate_write_l1(bs, l1_index);
s->l1_table[l1_index] = l2_offset | QCOW_OFLAG_COPIED;
ret = qcow2_write_l1_entry(bs, l1_index);
if (ret < 0) {
goto fail;
}
*table = l2_table;
trace_qcow2_l2_allocate_done(bs, l1_index, 0);
return 0;
fail:
trace_qcow2_l2_allocate_done(bs, l1_index, ret);
if (l2_table != NULL) {
qcow2_cache_put(bs, s->l2_table_cache, (void**) table);
}
s->l1_table[l1_index] = old_l2_offset;
if (l2_offset > 0) {
qcow2_free_clusters(bs, l2_offset, s->l2_size * sizeof(uint64_t),
QCOW2_DISCARD_ALWAYS);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 16,930
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int btrfs_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
const char *symname)
{
struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans;
struct btrfs_root *root = BTRFS_I(dir)->root;
struct btrfs_path *path;
struct btrfs_key key;
struct inode *inode = NULL;
int err;
int drop_inode = 0;
u64 objectid;
u64 index = 0 ;
int name_len;
int datasize;
unsigned long ptr;
struct btrfs_file_extent_item *ei;
struct extent_buffer *leaf;
name_len = strlen(symname) + 1;
if (name_len > BTRFS_MAX_INLINE_DATA_SIZE(root))
return -ENAMETOOLONG;
/*
* 2 items for inode item and ref
* 2 items for dir items
* 1 item for xattr if selinux is on
*/
trans = btrfs_start_transaction(root, 5);
if (IS_ERR(trans))
return PTR_ERR(trans);
err = btrfs_find_free_ino(root, &objectid);
if (err)
goto out_unlock;
inode = btrfs_new_inode(trans, root, dir, dentry->d_name.name,
dentry->d_name.len, btrfs_ino(dir), objectid,
S_IFLNK|S_IRWXUGO, &index);
if (IS_ERR(inode)) {
err = PTR_ERR(inode);
goto out_unlock;
}
err = btrfs_init_inode_security(trans, inode, dir, &dentry->d_name);
if (err) {
drop_inode = 1;
goto out_unlock;
}
/*
* If the active LSM wants to access the inode during
* d_instantiate it needs these. Smack checks to see
* if the filesystem supports xattrs by looking at the
* ops vector.
*/
inode->i_fop = &btrfs_file_operations;
inode->i_op = &btrfs_file_inode_operations;
err = btrfs_add_nondir(trans, dir, dentry, inode, 0, index);
if (err)
drop_inode = 1;
else {
inode->i_mapping->a_ops = &btrfs_aops;
inode->i_mapping->backing_dev_info = &root->fs_info->bdi;
BTRFS_I(inode)->io_tree.ops = &btrfs_extent_io_ops;
}
if (drop_inode)
goto out_unlock;
path = btrfs_alloc_path();
if (!path) {
err = -ENOMEM;
drop_inode = 1;
goto out_unlock;
}
key.objectid = btrfs_ino(inode);
key.offset = 0;
btrfs_set_key_type(&key, BTRFS_EXTENT_DATA_KEY);
datasize = btrfs_file_extent_calc_inline_size(name_len);
err = btrfs_insert_empty_item(trans, root, path, &key,
datasize);
if (err) {
drop_inode = 1;
btrfs_free_path(path);
goto out_unlock;
}
leaf = path->nodes[0];
ei = btrfs_item_ptr(leaf, path->slots[0],
struct btrfs_file_extent_item);
btrfs_set_file_extent_generation(leaf, ei, trans->transid);
btrfs_set_file_extent_type(leaf, ei,
BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_INLINE);
btrfs_set_file_extent_encryption(leaf, ei, 0);
btrfs_set_file_extent_compression(leaf, ei, 0);
btrfs_set_file_extent_other_encoding(leaf, ei, 0);
btrfs_set_file_extent_ram_bytes(leaf, ei, name_len);
ptr = btrfs_file_extent_inline_start(ei);
write_extent_buffer(leaf, symname, ptr, name_len);
btrfs_mark_buffer_dirty(leaf);
btrfs_free_path(path);
inode->i_op = &btrfs_symlink_inode_operations;
inode->i_mapping->a_ops = &btrfs_symlink_aops;
inode->i_mapping->backing_dev_info = &root->fs_info->bdi;
inode_set_bytes(inode, name_len);
btrfs_i_size_write(inode, name_len - 1);
err = btrfs_update_inode(trans, root, inode);
if (err)
drop_inode = 1;
out_unlock:
if (!err)
d_instantiate(dentry, inode);
btrfs_end_transaction(trans, root);
if (drop_inode) {
inode_dec_link_count(inode);
iput(inode);
}
btrfs_btree_balance_dirty(root);
return err;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <chris.mason@fusionio.com>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <pascal@junod.info>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 34,352
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::unique_ptr<NavigationUIData> WebContentsImpl::GetNavigationUIData(
NavigationHandle* navigation_handle) {
DCHECK(IsBrowserSideNavigationEnabled());
return GetContentClient()->browser()->GetNavigationUIData(navigation_handle);
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 135,724
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool DXVAVideoDecodeAccelerator::GetStreamsInfoAndBufferReqs() {
HRESULT hr = decoder_->GetInputStreamInfo(0, &input_stream_info_);
RETURN_ON_HR_FAILURE(hr, "Failed to get input stream info", false);
hr = decoder_->GetOutputStreamInfo(0, &output_stream_info_);
RETURN_ON_HR_FAILURE(hr, "Failed to get decoder output stream info", false);
DVLOG(1) << "Input stream info: ";
DVLOG(1) << "Max latency: " << input_stream_info_.hnsMaxLatency;
CHECK_EQ(input_stream_info_.dwFlags, 0x7u);
DVLOG(1) << "Min buffer size: " << input_stream_info_.cbSize;
DVLOG(1) << "Max lookahead: " << input_stream_info_.cbMaxLookahead;
DVLOG(1) << "Alignment: " << input_stream_info_.cbAlignment;
DVLOG(1) << "Output stream info: ";
DVLOG(1) << "Flags: "
<< std::hex << std::showbase << output_stream_info_.dwFlags;
CHECK_EQ(output_stream_info_.dwFlags, 0x107u);
DVLOG(1) << "Min buffer size: " << output_stream_info_.cbSize;
DVLOG(1) << "Alignment: " << output_stream_info_.cbAlignment;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 106,930
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int jpc_pi_nextrlcp(register jpc_pi_t *pi)
{
jpc_pchg_t *pchg;
int *prclyrno;
pchg = pi->pchg;
if (!pi->prgvolfirst) {
assert(pi->prcno < pi->pirlvl->numprcs);
prclyrno = &pi->pirlvl->prclyrnos[pi->prcno];
goto skip;
} else {
pi->prgvolfirst = 0;
}
for (pi->rlvlno = pchg->rlvlnostart; pi->rlvlno < pi->maxrlvls &&
pi->rlvlno < pchg->rlvlnoend; ++pi->rlvlno) {
for (pi->lyrno = 0; pi->lyrno < pi->numlyrs && pi->lyrno <
JAS_CAST(int, pchg->lyrnoend); ++pi->lyrno) {
for (pi->compno = pchg->compnostart, pi->picomp =
&pi->picomps[pi->compno]; pi->compno < pi->numcomps &&
pi->compno < JAS_CAST(int, pchg->compnoend); ++pi->compno, ++pi->picomp) {
if (pi->rlvlno >= pi->picomp->numrlvls) {
continue;
}
pi->pirlvl = &pi->picomp->pirlvls[pi->rlvlno];
for (pi->prcno = 0, prclyrno = pi->pirlvl->prclyrnos;
pi->prcno < pi->pirlvl->numprcs; ++pi->prcno, ++prclyrno) {
if (pi->lyrno >= *prclyrno) {
*prclyrno = pi->lyrno;
++(*prclyrno);
return 0;
}
skip:
;
}
}
}
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Fixed an integer overflow problem in the JPC codec that later resulted
in the use of uninitialized data.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 70,365
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: exsltFuncFunctionComp (xsltStylesheetPtr style, xmlNodePtr inst) {
xmlChar *name, *prefix;
xmlNsPtr ns;
xmlHashTablePtr data;
exsltFuncFunctionData *func;
if ((style == NULL) || (inst == NULL) || (inst->type != XML_ELEMENT_NODE))
return;
{
xmlChar *qname;
qname = xmlGetProp(inst, (const xmlChar *) "name");
name = xmlSplitQName2 (qname, &prefix);
xmlFree(qname);
}
if ((name == NULL) || (prefix == NULL)) {
xsltGenericError(xsltGenericErrorContext,
"func:function: not a QName\n");
if (name != NULL)
xmlFree(name);
return;
}
/* namespace lookup */
ns = xmlSearchNs (inst->doc, inst, prefix);
if (ns == NULL) {
xsltGenericError(xsltGenericErrorContext,
"func:function: undeclared prefix %s\n",
prefix);
xmlFree(name);
xmlFree(prefix);
return;
}
xmlFree(prefix);
xsltParseTemplateContent(style, inst);
/*
* Create function data
*/
func = exsltFuncNewFunctionData();
func->content = inst->children;
while (IS_XSLT_ELEM(func->content) &&
IS_XSLT_NAME(func->content, "param")) {
func->content = func->content->next;
func->nargs++;
}
/*
* Register the function data such that it can be retrieved
* by exslFuncFunctionFunction
*/
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
/*
* Ensure that the hash table will be stored in the *current*
* stylesheet level in order to correctly evaluate the
* import precedence.
*/
data = (xmlHashTablePtr)
xsltStyleStylesheetLevelGetExtData(style,
EXSLT_FUNCTIONS_NAMESPACE);
#else
data = (xmlHashTablePtr)
xsltStyleGetExtData (style, EXSLT_FUNCTIONS_NAMESPACE);
#endif
if (data == NULL) {
xsltGenericError(xsltGenericErrorContext,
"exsltFuncFunctionComp: no stylesheet data\n");
xmlFree(name);
return;
}
if (xmlHashAddEntry2 (data, ns->href, name, func) < 0) {
xsltTransformError(NULL, style, inst,
"Failed to register function {%s}%s\n",
ns->href, name);
style->errors++;
} else {
xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"exsltFuncFunctionComp: register {%s}%s\n",
ns->href, name);
}
xmlFree(name);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 173,292
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: strtok_r(char *s, const char *delim, char **state) {
char *cp, *start;
start = cp = s ? s : *state;
if (!cp)
return NULL;
while (*cp && !strchr(delim, *cp))
++cp;
if (!*cp) {
if (cp == start)
return NULL;
*state = NULL;
return start;
} else {
*cp++ = '\0';
*state = cp;
return start;
}
}
Commit Message: evdns: fix searching empty hostnames
From #332:
Here follows a bug report by **Guido Vranken** via the _Tor bug bounty program_. Please credit Guido accordingly.
## Bug report
The DNS code of Libevent contains this rather obvious OOB read:
```c
static char *
search_make_new(const struct search_state *const state, int n, const char *const base_name) {
const size_t base_len = strlen(base_name);
const char need_to_append_dot = base_name[base_len - 1] == '.' ? 0 : 1;
```
If the length of ```base_name``` is 0, then line 3125 reads 1 byte before the buffer. This will trigger a crash on ASAN-protected builds.
To reproduce:
Build libevent with ASAN:
```
$ CFLAGS='-fomit-frame-pointer -fsanitize=address' ./configure && make -j4
```
Put the attached ```resolv.conf``` and ```poc.c``` in the source directory and then do:
```
$ gcc -fsanitize=address -fomit-frame-pointer poc.c .libs/libevent.a
$ ./a.out
=================================================================
==22201== ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60060000efdf at pc 0x4429da bp 0x7ffe1ed47300 sp 0x7ffe1ed472f8
READ of size 1 at 0x60060000efdf thread T0
```
P.S. we can add a check earlier, but since this is very uncommon, I didn't add it.
Fixes: #332
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 70,705
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::setCookie(const String& value, ExceptionState& es)
{
if (settings() && !settings()->cookieEnabled())
return;
if (!securityOrigin()->canAccessCookies()) {
String accessDeniedMessage = "Access to 'cookie' is denied for this document.";
if (isSandboxed(SandboxOrigin))
es.throwSecurityError(accessDeniedMessage + " The document is sandboxed and lacks the 'allow-same-origin' flag.");
else if (url().protocolIs("data"))
es.throwSecurityError(accessDeniedMessage + " Cookies are disabled inside 'data:' URLs.");
else
es.throwSecurityError(accessDeniedMessage);
return;
}
KURL cookieURL = this->cookieURL();
if (cookieURL.isEmpty())
return;
setCookies(this, cookieURL, value);
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 102,860
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: IntSize DateTimeChooserImpl::contentSize()
{
return IntSize(0, 0);
}
Commit Message: AX: Calendar Picker: Add AX labels to MonthPopupButton and CalendarNavigationButtons.
This CL adds no new tests. Will add tests after a Chromium change for
string resource.
BUG=123896
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/552163002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@181617 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-22
| 0
| 111,803
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static PositionInFlatTree AdjustPositionRespectUserSelectAll(
Node* inner_node,
const PositionInFlatTree& selection_start,
const PositionInFlatTree& selection_end,
const PositionInFlatTree& position) {
const VisibleSelectionInFlatTree& selection_in_user_select_all =
CreateVisibleSelection(ExpandSelectionToRespectUserSelectAll(
inner_node,
position.IsNull()
? SelectionInFlatTree()
: SelectionInFlatTree::Builder().Collapse(position).Build()));
if (!selection_in_user_select_all.IsRange())
return position;
if (selection_in_user_select_all.Start().CompareTo(selection_start) < 0)
return selection_in_user_select_all.Start();
if (selection_end.CompareTo(selection_in_user_select_all.End()) < 0)
return selection_in_user_select_all.End();
return position;
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 124,904
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void TCP_ECN_rcv_synack(struct tcp_sock *tp, const struct tcphdr *th)
{
if ((tp->ecn_flags & TCP_ECN_OK) && (!th->ece || th->cwr))
tp->ecn_flags &= ~TCP_ECN_OK;
}
Commit Message: tcp: drop SYN+FIN messages
Denys Fedoryshchenko reported that SYN+FIN attacks were bringing his
linux machines to their limits.
Dont call conn_request() if the TCP flags includes SYN flag
Reported-by: Denys Fedoryshchenko <denys@visp.net.lb>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 41,101
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
int i;
SSL3_RECORD *wr;
wr = &(ssl->s3->wrec);
i = COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress, wr->data,
SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH,
wr->input, (int)wr->length);
if (i < 0)
return (0);
else
wr->length = i;
wr->input = wr->data;
#endif
return (1);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-17
| 0
| 6,185
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void bitmap_writer_show_progress(int show)
{
writer.show_progress = show;
}
Commit Message: list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 54,906
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int nfs_flush_incompatible(struct file *file, struct page *page)
{
struct nfs_open_context *ctx = nfs_file_open_context(file);
struct nfs_lock_context *l_ctx;
struct nfs_page *req;
int do_flush, status;
/*
* Look for a request corresponding to this page. If there
* is one, and it belongs to another file, we flush it out
* before we try to copy anything into the page. Do this
* due to the lack of an ACCESS-type call in NFSv2.
* Also do the same if we find a request from an existing
* dropped page.
*/
do {
req = nfs_page_find_request(page);
if (req == NULL)
return 0;
l_ctx = req->wb_lock_context;
do_flush = req->wb_page != page || req->wb_context != ctx;
if (l_ctx && ctx->dentry->d_inode->i_flock != NULL) {
do_flush |= l_ctx->lockowner.l_owner != current->files
|| l_ctx->lockowner.l_pid != current->tgid;
}
nfs_release_request(req);
if (!do_flush)
return 0;
status = nfs_wb_page(page_file_mapping(page)->host, page);
} while (status == 0);
return status;
}
Commit Message: nfs: always make sure page is up-to-date before extending a write to cover the entire page
We should always make sure the cached page is up-to-date when we're
determining whether we can extend a write to cover the full page -- even
if we've received a write delegation from the server.
Commit c7559663 added logic to skip this check if we have a write
delegation, which can lead to data corruption such as the following
scenario if client B receives a write delegation from the NFS server:
Client A:
# echo 123456789 > /mnt/file
Client B:
# echo abcdefghi >> /mnt/file
# cat /mnt/file
0�D0�abcdefghi
Just because we hold a write delegation doesn't mean that we've read in
the entire page contents.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.11+
Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 39,158
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MagickExport MagickBooleanType GetXMLTreeAttributes(const XMLTreeInfo *xml_info,
SplayTreeInfo *attributes)
{
register ssize_t
i;
assert(xml_info != (XMLTreeInfo *) NULL);
assert((xml_info->signature == MagickSignature) ||
(((const XMLTreeRoot *) xml_info)->signature == MagickSignature));
if (xml_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"...");
assert(attributes != (SplayTreeInfo *) NULL);
if (xml_info->attributes == (char **) NULL)
return(MagickTrue);
i=0;
while (xml_info->attributes[i] != (char *) NULL)
{
(void) AddValueToSplayTree(attributes,
ConstantString(xml_info->attributes[i]),
ConstantString(xml_info->attributes[i+1]));
i+=2;
}
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message: Coder path traversal is not authorized, bug report provided by Masaaki Chida
CWE ID: CWE-22
| 0
| 71,965
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int64_t FrameFetchContext::ServiceWorkerID() const {
DCHECK(IsControlledByServiceWorker());
DCHECK(MasterDocumentLoader());
auto* service_worker_network_provider =
MasterDocumentLoader()->GetServiceWorkerNetworkProvider();
return service_worker_network_provider
? service_worker_network_provider->ControllerServiceWorkerID()
: -1;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 138,772
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
struct path *path = (struct path *)&prep->payload.data[big_key_path];
struct file *file;
u8 *enckey;
u8 *data = NULL;
ssize_t written;
size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
int ret;
ret = -EINVAL;
if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 1024 * 1024 || !prep->data)
goto error;
/* Set an arbitrary quota */
prep->quotalen = 16;
prep->payload.data[big_key_len] = (void *)(unsigned long)datalen;
if (datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) {
/* Create a shmem file to store the data in. This will permit the data
* to be swapped out if needed.
*
* File content is stored encrypted with randomly generated key.
*/
size_t enclen = datalen + ENC_AUTHTAG_SIZE;
loff_t pos = 0;
data = kmalloc(enclen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!data)
return -ENOMEM;
memcpy(data, prep->data, datalen);
/* generate random key */
enckey = kmalloc(ENC_KEY_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!enckey) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto error;
}
ret = get_random_bytes_wait(enckey, ENC_KEY_SIZE);
if (unlikely(ret))
goto err_enckey;
/* encrypt aligned data */
ret = big_key_crypt(BIG_KEY_ENC, data, datalen, enckey);
if (ret)
goto err_enckey;
/* save aligned data to file */
file = shmem_kernel_file_setup("", enclen, 0);
if (IS_ERR(file)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(file);
goto err_enckey;
}
written = kernel_write(file, data, enclen, &pos);
if (written != enclen) {
ret = written;
if (written >= 0)
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto err_fput;
}
/* Pin the mount and dentry to the key so that we can open it again
* later
*/
prep->payload.data[big_key_data] = enckey;
*path = file->f_path;
path_get(path);
fput(file);
kzfree(data);
} else {
/* Just store the data in a buffer */
void *data = kmalloc(datalen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!data)
return -ENOMEM;
prep->payload.data[big_key_data] = data;
memcpy(data, prep->data, prep->datalen);
}
return 0;
err_fput:
fput(file);
err_enckey:
kzfree(enckey);
error:
kzfree(data);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.
(2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.
(3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.
This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.
The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.
The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.
Additionally, barriering is included:
(1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.
(2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.
Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.
Fixes: 146aa8b1453b ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 60,204
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool RendererSchedulerImpl::TaskQueuePolicy::IsQueueEnabled(
MainThreadTaskQueue* task_queue) const {
if (!is_enabled)
return false;
if (is_paused && task_queue->CanBePaused())
return false;
if (is_blocked && task_queue->CanBeDeferred())
return false;
if (is_stopped && task_queue->CanBeStopped())
return false;
return true;
}
Commit Message: [scheduler] Remove implicit fallthrough in switch
Bail out early when a condition in the switch is fulfilled.
This does not change behaviour due to RemoveTaskObserver being no-op when
the task observer is not present in the list.
R=thakis@chromium.org
Bug: 177475
Change-Id: Ibc7772c79f8a8c8a1d63a997dabe1efda5d3a7bd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891187
Reviewed-by: Nico Weber <thakis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alexander Timin <altimin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532649}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 143,425
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool LookupMatchInTopDomains(const icu::UnicodeString& ustr_skeleton) {
std::string skeleton;
ustr_skeleton.toUTF8String(skeleton);
DCHECK_NE(skeleton.back(), '.');
auto labels = base::SplitStringPiece(skeleton, ".", base::KEEP_WHITESPACE,
base::SPLIT_WANT_ALL);
if (labels.size() > kNumberOfLabelsToCheck) {
labels.erase(labels.begin(),
labels.begin() + labels.size() - kNumberOfLabelsToCheck);
}
while (labels.size() > 1) {
std::string partial_skeleton = base::JoinString(labels, ".");
if (net::LookupStringInFixedSet(
g_graph, g_graph_length, partial_skeleton.data(),
partial_skeleton.length()) != net::kDafsaNotFound)
return true;
labels.erase(labels.begin());
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Add confusability mapping entries for Myanmar and Georgian
U+10D5 (ვ), U+1012 (ဒ) => 3
Bug: 847242, 849398
Test: components_unittests --gtest_filter=*IDN*
Change-Id: I9abb8560cf1c9e8e5e8d89980780b89461f7be52
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1091430
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mustafa Emre Acer <meacer@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#565709}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 153,925
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void nfnetlink_rcv_batch(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
u_int16_t subsys_id)
{
struct sk_buff *oskb = skb;
struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
const struct nfnetlink_subsystem *ss;
const struct nfnl_callback *nc;
static LIST_HEAD(err_list);
u32 status;
int err;
if (subsys_id >= NFNL_SUBSYS_COUNT)
return netlink_ack(skb, nlh, -EINVAL);
replay:
status = 0;
skb = netlink_skb_clone(oskb, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!skb)
return netlink_ack(oskb, nlh, -ENOMEM);
nfnl_lock(subsys_id);
ss = nfnl_dereference_protected(subsys_id);
if (!ss) {
#ifdef CONFIG_MODULES
nfnl_unlock(subsys_id);
request_module("nfnetlink-subsys-%d", subsys_id);
nfnl_lock(subsys_id);
ss = nfnl_dereference_protected(subsys_id);
if (!ss)
#endif
{
nfnl_unlock(subsys_id);
netlink_ack(oskb, nlh, -EOPNOTSUPP);
return kfree_skb(skb);
}
}
if (!ss->commit || !ss->abort) {
nfnl_unlock(subsys_id);
netlink_ack(oskb, nlh, -EOPNOTSUPP);
return kfree_skb(skb);
}
while (skb->len >= nlmsg_total_size(0)) {
int msglen, type;
nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
err = 0;
if (nlmsg_len(nlh) < sizeof(struct nfgenmsg) ||
skb->len < nlh->nlmsg_len) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto ack;
}
/* Only requests are handled by the kernel */
if (!(nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_REQUEST)) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto ack;
}
type = nlh->nlmsg_type;
if (type == NFNL_MSG_BATCH_BEGIN) {
/* Malformed: Batch begin twice */
nfnl_err_reset(&err_list);
status |= NFNL_BATCH_FAILURE;
goto done;
} else if (type == NFNL_MSG_BATCH_END) {
status |= NFNL_BATCH_DONE;
goto done;
} else if (type < NLMSG_MIN_TYPE) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto ack;
}
/* We only accept a batch with messages for the same
* subsystem.
*/
if (NFNL_SUBSYS_ID(type) != subsys_id) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto ack;
}
nc = nfnetlink_find_client(type, ss);
if (!nc) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto ack;
}
{
int min_len = nlmsg_total_size(sizeof(struct nfgenmsg));
u_int8_t cb_id = NFNL_MSG_TYPE(nlh->nlmsg_type);
struct nlattr *cda[ss->cb[cb_id].attr_count + 1];
struct nlattr *attr = (void *)nlh + min_len;
int attrlen = nlh->nlmsg_len - min_len;
err = nla_parse(cda, ss->cb[cb_id].attr_count,
attr, attrlen, ss->cb[cb_id].policy);
if (err < 0)
goto ack;
if (nc->call_batch) {
err = nc->call_batch(net, net->nfnl, skb, nlh,
(const struct nlattr **)cda);
}
/* The lock was released to autoload some module, we
* have to abort and start from scratch using the
* original skb.
*/
if (err == -EAGAIN) {
status |= NFNL_BATCH_REPLAY;
goto next;
}
}
ack:
if (nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_ACK || err) {
/* Errors are delivered once the full batch has been
* processed, this avoids that the same error is
* reported several times when replaying the batch.
*/
if (nfnl_err_add(&err_list, nlh, err) < 0) {
/* We failed to enqueue an error, reset the
* list of errors and send OOM to userspace
* pointing to the batch header.
*/
nfnl_err_reset(&err_list);
netlink_ack(oskb, nlmsg_hdr(oskb), -ENOMEM);
status |= NFNL_BATCH_FAILURE;
goto done;
}
/* We don't stop processing the batch on errors, thus,
* userspace gets all the errors that the batch
* triggers.
*/
if (err)
status |= NFNL_BATCH_FAILURE;
}
next:
msglen = NLMSG_ALIGN(nlh->nlmsg_len);
if (msglen > skb->len)
msglen = skb->len;
skb_pull(skb, msglen);
}
done:
if (status & NFNL_BATCH_REPLAY) {
ss->abort(net, oskb);
nfnl_err_reset(&err_list);
nfnl_unlock(subsys_id);
kfree_skb(skb);
goto replay;
} else if (status == NFNL_BATCH_DONE) {
ss->commit(net, oskb);
} else {
ss->abort(net, oskb);
}
nfnl_err_deliver(&err_list, oskb);
nfnl_unlock(subsys_id);
kfree_skb(skb);
}
Commit Message: netfilter: nfnetlink: correctly validate length of batch messages
If nlh->nlmsg_len is zero then an infinite loop is triggered because
'skb_pull(skb, msglen);' pulls zero bytes.
The calculation in nlmsg_len() underflows if 'nlh->nlmsg_len <
NLMSG_HDRLEN' which bypasses the length validation and will later
trigger an out-of-bound read.
If the length validation does fail then the malformed batch message is
copied back to userspace. However, we cannot do this because the
nlh->nlmsg_len can be invalid. This leads to an out-of-bounds read in
netlink_ack:
[ 41.455421] ==================================================================
[ 41.456431] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in memcpy+0x1d/0x40 at addr ffff880119e79340
[ 41.456431] Read of size 4294967280 by task a.out/987
[ 41.456431] =============================================================================
[ 41.456431] BUG kmalloc-512 (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
[ 41.456431] -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
...
[ 41.456431] Bytes b4 ffff880119e79310: 00 00 00 00 d5 03 00 00 b0 fb fe ff 00 00 00 00 ................
[ 41.456431] Object ffff880119e79320: 20 00 00 00 10 00 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ...............
[ 41.456431] Object ffff880119e79330: 14 00 0a 00 01 03 fc 40 45 56 11 22 33 10 00 05 .......@EV."3...
[ 41.456431] Object ffff880119e79340: f0 ff ff ff 88 99 aa bb 00 14 00 0a 00 06 fe fb ................
^^ start of batch nlmsg with
nlmsg_len=4294967280
...
[ 41.456431] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 41.456431] ffff880119e79400: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 41.456431] ffff880119e79480: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 41.456431] >ffff880119e79500: 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 41.456431] ^
[ 41.456431] ffff880119e79580: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 41.456431] ffff880119e79600: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 41.456431] ==================================================================
Fix this with better validation of nlh->nlmsg_len and by setting
NFNL_BATCH_FAILURE if any batch message fails length validation.
CAP_NET_ADMIN is required to trigger the bugs.
Fixes: 9ea2aa8b7dba ("netfilter: nfnetlink: validate nfnetlink header from batch")
Signed-off-by: Phil Turnbull <phil.turnbull@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 1
| 166,919
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int kvm_task_switch(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u16 tss_selector, int reason,
bool has_error_code, u32 error_code)
{
struct decode_cache *c = &vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt.decode;
int ret;
init_emulate_ctxt(vcpu);
ret = emulator_task_switch(&vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt,
tss_selector, reason, has_error_code,
error_code);
if (ret)
return EMULATE_FAIL;
memcpy(vcpu->arch.regs, c->regs, sizeof c->regs);
kvm_rip_write(vcpu, vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt.eip);
kvm_x86_ops->set_rflags(vcpu, vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt.eflags);
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
return EMULATE_DONE;
}
Commit Message: KVM: X86: Don't report L2 emulation failures to user-space
This patch prevents that emulation failures which result
from emulating an instruction for an L2-Guest results in
being reported to userspace.
Without this patch a malicious L2-Guest would be able to
kill the L1 by triggering a race-condition between an vmexit
and the instruction emulator.
With this patch the L2 will most likely only kill itself in
this situation.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <joerg.roedel@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 41,394
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ip_vs_svc_hash(struct ip_vs_service *svc)
{
unsigned hash;
if (svc->flags & IP_VS_SVC_F_HASHED) {
pr_err("%s(): request for already hashed, called from %pF\n",
__func__, __builtin_return_address(0));
return 0;
}
if (svc->fwmark == 0) {
/*
* Hash it by <protocol,addr,port> in ip_vs_svc_table
*/
hash = ip_vs_svc_hashkey(svc->af, svc->protocol, &svc->addr,
svc->port);
list_add(&svc->s_list, &ip_vs_svc_table[hash]);
} else {
/*
* Hash it by fwmark in ip_vs_svc_fwm_table
*/
hash = ip_vs_svc_fwm_hashkey(svc->fwmark);
list_add(&svc->f_list, &ip_vs_svc_fwm_table[hash]);
}
svc->flags |= IP_VS_SVC_F_HASHED;
/* increase its refcnt because it is referenced by the svc table */
atomic_inc(&svc->refcnt);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: ipvs: Add boundary check on ioctl arguments
The ipvs code has a nifty system for doing the size of ioctl command
copies; it defines an array with values into which it indexes the cmd
to find the right length.
Unfortunately, the ipvs code forgot to check if the cmd was in the
range that the array provides, allowing for an index outside of the
array, which then gives a "garbage" result into the length, which
then gets used for copying into a stack buffer.
Fix this by adding sanity checks on these as well as the copy size.
[ horms@verge.net.au: adjusted limit to IP_VS_SO_GET_MAX ]
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 29,288
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(openssl_pkey_get_details)
{
zval *key;
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
BIO *out;
unsigned int pbio_len;
char *pbio;
zend_long ktype;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "r", &key) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if ((pkey = (EVP_PKEY *)zend_fetch_resource(Z_RES_P(key), "OpenSSL key", le_key)) == NULL) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
out = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
PEM_write_bio_PUBKEY(out, pkey);
pbio_len = BIO_get_mem_data(out, &pbio);
array_init(return_value);
add_assoc_long(return_value, "bits", EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey));
add_assoc_stringl(return_value, "key", pbio, pbio_len);
/*TODO: Use the real values once the openssl constants are used
* See the enum at the top of this file
*/
switch (EVP_PKEY_base_id(pkey)) {
case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
case EVP_PKEY_RSA2:
{
RSA *rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey);
ktype = OPENSSL_KEYTYPE_RSA;
if (rsa != NULL) {
zval z_rsa;
const BIGNUM *n, *e, *d, *p, *q, *dmp1, *dmq1, *iqmp;
RSA_get0_key(rsa, &n, &e, &d);
RSA_get0_factors(rsa, &p, &q);
RSA_get0_crt_params(rsa, &dmp1, &dmq1, &iqmp);
array_init(&z_rsa);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(z_rsa, n);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(z_rsa, e);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(z_rsa, d);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(z_rsa, p);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(z_rsa, q);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(z_rsa, dmp1);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(z_rsa, dmq1);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(z_rsa, iqmp);
add_assoc_zval(return_value, "rsa", &z_rsa);
}
}
break;
case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
case EVP_PKEY_DSA2:
case EVP_PKEY_DSA3:
case EVP_PKEY_DSA4:
{
DSA *dsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_DSA(pkey);
ktype = OPENSSL_KEYTYPE_DSA;
if (dsa != NULL) {
zval z_dsa;
const BIGNUM *p, *q, *g, *priv_key, *pub_key;
DSA_get0_pqg(dsa, &p, &q, &g);
DSA_get0_key(dsa, &pub_key, &priv_key);
array_init(&z_dsa);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(z_dsa, p);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(z_dsa, q);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(z_dsa, g);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(z_dsa, priv_key);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(z_dsa, pub_key);
add_assoc_zval(return_value, "dsa", &z_dsa);
}
}
break;
case EVP_PKEY_DH:
{
DH *dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(pkey);
ktype = OPENSSL_KEYTYPE_DH;
if (dh != NULL) {
zval z_dh;
const BIGNUM *p, *q, *g, *priv_key, *pub_key;
DH_get0_pqg(dh, &p, &q, &g);
DH_get0_key(dh, &pub_key, &priv_key);
array_init(&z_dh);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(z_dh, p);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(z_dh, g);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(z_dh, priv_key);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(z_dh, pub_key);
add_assoc_zval(return_value, "dh", &z_dh);
}
}
break;
#ifdef HAVE_EVP_PKEY_EC
case EVP_PKEY_EC:
ktype = OPENSSL_KEYTYPE_EC;
if (EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey) != NULL) {
zval ec;
const EC_GROUP *ec_group;
int nid;
char *crv_sn;
ASN1_OBJECT *obj;
char oir_buf[80];
ec_group = EC_KEY_get0_group(EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pkey));
nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(ec_group);
if (nid == NID_undef) {
break;
}
array_init(&ec);
crv_sn = (char*) OBJ_nid2sn(nid);
if (crv_sn != NULL) {
add_assoc_string(&ec, "curve_name", crv_sn);
}
obj = OBJ_nid2obj(nid);
if (obj != NULL) {
int oir_len = OBJ_obj2txt(oir_buf, sizeof(oir_buf), obj, 1);
add_assoc_stringl(&ec, "curve_oid", (char*)oir_buf, oir_len);
ASN1_OBJECT_free(obj);
}
add_assoc_zval(return_value, "ec", &ec);
}
break;
#endif
default:
ktype = -1;
break;
}
add_assoc_long(return_value, "type", ktype);
BIO_free(out);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-754
| 0
| 4,510
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int tcp_prune_queue(struct sock *sk)
{
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
SOCK_DEBUG(sk, "prune_queue: c=%x\n", tp->copied_seq);
NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_PRUNECALLED);
if (atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc) >= sk->sk_rcvbuf)
tcp_clamp_window(sk);
else if (tcp_under_memory_pressure(sk))
tp->rcv_ssthresh = min(tp->rcv_ssthresh, 4U * tp->advmss);
tcp_collapse_ofo_queue(sk);
if (!skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_receive_queue))
tcp_collapse(sk, &sk->sk_receive_queue,
skb_peek(&sk->sk_receive_queue),
NULL,
tp->copied_seq, tp->rcv_nxt);
sk_mem_reclaim(sk);
if (atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc) <= sk->sk_rcvbuf)
return 0;
/* Collapsing did not help, destructive actions follow.
* This must not ever occur. */
tcp_prune_ofo_queue(sk);
if (atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc) <= sk->sk_rcvbuf)
return 0;
/* If we are really being abused, tell the caller to silently
* drop receive data on the floor. It will get retransmitted
* and hopefully then we'll have sufficient space.
*/
NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_RCVPRUNED);
/* Massive buffer overcommit. */
tp->pred_flags = 0;
return -1;
}
Commit Message: tcp: fix zero cwnd in tcp_cwnd_reduction
Patch 3759824da87b ("tcp: PRR uses CRB mode by default and SS mode
conditionally") introduced a bug that cwnd may become 0 when both
inflight and sndcnt are 0 (cwnd = inflight + sndcnt). This may lead
to a div-by-zero if the connection starts another cwnd reduction
phase by setting tp->prior_cwnd to the current cwnd (0) in
tcp_init_cwnd_reduction().
To prevent this we skip PRR operation when nothing is acked or
sacked. Then cwnd must be positive in all cases as long as ssthresh
is positive:
1) The proportional reduction mode
inflight > ssthresh > 0
2) The reduction bound mode
a) inflight == ssthresh > 0
b) inflight < ssthresh
sndcnt > 0 since newly_acked_sacked > 0 and inflight < ssthresh
Therefore in all cases inflight and sndcnt can not both be 0.
We check invalid tp->prior_cwnd to avoid potential div0 bugs.
In reality this bug is triggered only with a sequence of less common
events. For example, the connection is terminating an ECN-triggered
cwnd reduction with an inflight 0, then it receives reordered/old
ACKs or DSACKs from prior transmission (which acks nothing). Or the
connection is in fast recovery stage that marks everything lost,
but fails to retransmit due to local issues, then receives data
packets from other end which acks nothing.
Fixes: 3759824da87b ("tcp: PRR uses CRB mode by default and SS mode conditionally")
Reported-by: Oleksandr Natalenko <oleksandr@natalenko.name>
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 55,399
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pixel_copy(png_bytep toBuffer, png_uint_32 toIndex,
png_const_bytep fromBuffer, png_uint_32 fromIndex, unsigned int pixelSize)
{
/* Assume we can multiply by 'size' without overflow because we are
* just working in a single buffer.
*/
toIndex *= pixelSize;
fromIndex *= pixelSize;
if (pixelSize < 8) /* Sub-byte */
{
/* Mask to select the location of the copied pixel: */
unsigned int destMask = ((1U<<pixelSize)-1) << (8-pixelSize-(toIndex&7));
/* The following read the entire pixels and clears the extra: */
unsigned int destByte = toBuffer[toIndex >> 3] & ~destMask;
unsigned int sourceByte = fromBuffer[fromIndex >> 3];
/* Don't rely on << or >> supporting '0' here, just in case: */
fromIndex &= 7;
if (fromIndex > 0) sourceByte <<= fromIndex;
if ((toIndex & 7) > 0) sourceByte >>= toIndex & 7;
toBuffer[toIndex >> 3] = (png_byte)(destByte | (sourceByte & destMask));
}
else /* One or more bytes */
memmove(toBuffer+(toIndex>>3), fromBuffer+(fromIndex>>3), pixelSize>>3);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
| 1
| 173,685
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: unlock_cache (void)
{
FcMutexUnlock (cache_lock);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 10,405
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Browser::TakeFocus(bool reverse) {
NotificationService::current()->Notify(
NotificationType::FOCUS_RETURNED_TO_BROWSER,
Source<Browser>(this),
NotificationService::NoDetails());
return false;
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 98,336
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: box_overabove(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
BOX *box1 = PG_GETARG_BOX_P(0);
BOX *box2 = PG_GETARG_BOX_P(1);
PG_RETURN_BOOL(FPge(box1->low.y, box2->low.y));
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 38,821
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int apply_to_pmd_range(struct mm_struct *mm, pud_t *pud,
unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
pte_fn_t fn, void *data)
{
pmd_t *pmd;
unsigned long next;
int err;
BUG_ON(pud_huge(*pud));
pmd = pmd_alloc(mm, pud, addr);
if (!pmd)
return -ENOMEM;
do {
next = pmd_addr_end(addr, end);
err = apply_to_pte_range(mm, pmd, addr, next, fn, data);
if (err)
break;
} while (pmd++, addr = next, addr != end);
return err;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 21,203
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: dest_get_scanline_narrow (pixman_iter_t *iter, const uint32_t *mask)
{
pixman_image_t *image = iter->image;
int x = iter->x;
int y = iter->y;
int width = iter->width;
uint32_t * buffer = iter->buffer;
image->bits.fetch_scanline_32 (&image->bits, x, y, width, buffer, mask);
if (image->common.alpha_map)
{
uint32_t *alpha;
if ((alpha = malloc (width * sizeof (uint32_t))))
{
int i;
x -= image->common.alpha_origin_x;
y -= image->common.alpha_origin_y;
image->common.alpha_map->fetch_scanline_32 (
image->common.alpha_map, x, y, width, alpha, mask);
for (i = 0; i < width; ++i)
{
buffer[i] &= ~0xff000000;
buffer[i] |= (alpha[i] & 0xff000000);
}
free (alpha);
}
}
return iter->buffer;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 15,439
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PaymentRequestState::PopulateProfileCache() {
std::vector<autofill::AutofillProfile*> profiles =
personal_data_manager_->GetProfilesToSuggest();
std::vector<autofill::AutofillProfile*> raw_profiles_for_filtering;
raw_profiles_for_filtering.reserve(profiles.size());
for (size_t i = 0; i < profiles.size(); i++) {
profile_cache_.push_back(
std::make_unique<autofill::AutofillProfile>(*profiles[i]));
raw_profiles_for_filtering.push_back(profile_cache_.back().get());
}
contact_profiles_ = profile_comparator()->FilterProfilesForContact(
raw_profiles_for_filtering);
shipping_profiles_ = profile_comparator()->FilterProfilesForShipping(
raw_profiles_for_filtering);
if (spec_->request_payer_name() || spec_->request_payer_phone() ||
spec_->request_payer_email()) {
bool has_complete_contact =
contact_profiles_.empty()
? false
: profile_comparator()->IsContactInfoComplete(contact_profiles_[0]);
journey_logger_->SetNumberOfSuggestionsShown(
JourneyLogger::Section::SECTION_CONTACT_INFO, contact_profiles_.size(),
has_complete_contact);
}
if (spec_->request_shipping()) {
bool has_complete_shipping =
shipping_profiles_.empty()
? false
: profile_comparator()->IsShippingComplete(shipping_profiles_[0]);
journey_logger_->SetNumberOfSuggestionsShown(
JourneyLogger::Section::SECTION_SHIPPING_ADDRESS,
shipping_profiles_.size(), has_complete_shipping);
}
const std::vector<autofill::CreditCard*>& cards =
personal_data_manager_->GetCreditCardsToSuggest(
/*include_server_cards=*/base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(
payments::features::kReturnGooglePayInBasicCard));
for (autofill::CreditCard* card : cards)
AddAutofillPaymentInstrument(/*selected=*/false, *card);
}
Commit Message: [Payment Handler] Don't wait for response from closed payment app.
Before this patch, tapping the back button on top of the payment handler
window on desktop would not affect the |response_helper_|, which would
continue waiting for a response from the payment app. The service worker
of the closed payment app could timeout after 5 minutes and invoke the
|response_helper_|. Depending on what else the user did afterwards, in
the best case scenario, the payment sheet would display a "Transaction
failed" error message. In the worst case scenario, the
|response_helper_| would be used after free.
This patch clears the |response_helper_| in the PaymentRequestState and
in the ServiceWorkerPaymentInstrument after the payment app is closed.
After this patch, the cancelled payment app does not show "Transaction
failed" and does not use memory after it was freed.
Bug: 956597
Change-Id: I64134b911a4f8c154cb56d537a8243a68a806394
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1588682
Reviewed-by: anthonyvd <anthonyvd@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Rouslan Solomakhin <rouslan@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654995}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 151,156
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ExtensionGlobalError::set_accept_callback(
ExtensionGlobalErrorCallback callback) {
accept_callback_ = callback;
}
Commit Message: [i18n-fixlet] Make strings branding specific in extension code.
IDS_EXTENSIONS_UNINSTALL
IDS_EXTENSIONS_INCOGNITO_WARNING
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_HEADING
IDS_EXTENSION_ALERT_ITEM_EXTERNAL And fix a $1 $1 bug.
IDS_EXTENSION_INLINE_INSTALL_PROMPT_TITLE
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9107061
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@118018 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 107,753
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t store_new_id(struct device_driver *drv, const char *buf,
size_t count)
{
struct hid_driver *hdrv = to_hid_driver(drv);
struct hid_dynid *dynid;
__u32 bus, vendor, product;
unsigned long driver_data = 0;
int ret;
ret = sscanf(buf, "%x %x %x %lx",
&bus, &vendor, &product, &driver_data);
if (ret < 3)
return -EINVAL;
dynid = kzalloc(sizeof(*dynid), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dynid)
return -ENOMEM;
dynid->id.bus = bus;
dynid->id.group = HID_GROUP_ANY;
dynid->id.vendor = vendor;
dynid->id.product = product;
dynid->id.driver_data = driver_data;
spin_lock(&hdrv->dyn_lock);
list_add_tail(&dynid->list, &hdrv->dyn_list);
spin_unlock(&hdrv->dyn_lock);
ret = driver_attach(&hdrv->driver);
return ret ? : count;
}
Commit Message: HID: core: prevent out-of-bound readings
Plugging a Logitech DJ receiver with KASAN activated raises a bunch of
out-of-bound readings.
The fields are allocated up to MAX_USAGE, meaning that potentially, we do
not have enough fields to fit the incoming values.
Add checks and silence KASAN.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 49,534
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool TabsRemoveFunction::RemoveTab(int tab_id, std::string* error) {
Browser* browser = NULL;
WebContents* contents = NULL;
if (!GetTabById(tab_id, browser_context(), include_incognito(), &browser,
nullptr, &contents, nullptr, error)) {
return false;
}
if (!browser->window()->IsTabStripEditable()) {
*error = keys::kTabStripNotEditableError;
return false;
}
contents->Close();
return true;
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Restrict tabs.captureVisibleTab()
Modify the permissions for tabs.captureVisibleTab(). Instead of just
checking for <all_urls> and assuming its safe, do the following:
- If the page is a "normal" web page (e.g., http/https), allow the
capture if the extension has activeTab granted or <all_urls>.
- If the page is a file page (file:///), allow the capture if the
extension has file access *and* either of the <all_urls> or
activeTab permissions.
- If the page is a chrome:// page, allow the capture only if the
extension has activeTab granted.
Bug: 810220
Change-Id: I1e2f71281e2f331d641ba0e435df10d66d721304
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/981195
Commit-Queue: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Karan Bhatia <karandeepb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#548891}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 155,661
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int addrconf_sysctl_register(struct inet6_dev *idev)
{
int err;
if (!sysctl_dev_name_is_allowed(idev->dev->name))
return -EINVAL;
err = neigh_sysctl_register(idev->dev, idev->nd_parms,
&ndisc_ifinfo_sysctl_change);
if (err)
return err;
err = __addrconf_sysctl_register(dev_net(idev->dev), idev->dev->name,
idev, &idev->cnf);
if (err)
neigh_sysctl_unregister(idev->nd_parms);
return err;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: addrconf: validate new MTU before applying it
Currently we don't check if the new MTU is valid or not and this allows
one to configure a smaller than minimum allowed by RFCs or even bigger
than interface own MTU, which is a problem as it may lead to packet
drops.
If you have a daemon like NetworkManager running, this may be exploited
by remote attackers by forging RA packets with an invalid MTU, possibly
leading to a DoS. (NetworkManager currently only validates for values
too small, but not for too big ones.)
The fix is just to make sure the new value is valid. That is, between
IPV6_MIN_MTU and interface's MTU.
Note that similar check is already performed at
ndisc_router_discovery(), for when kernel itself parses the RA.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 41,800
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void red_channel_client_ack_zero_messages_window(RedChannelClient *rcc)
{
rcc->ack_data.messages_window = 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 2,079
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool emulator_get_cpuid(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
u32 *eax, u32 *ebx, u32 *ecx, u32 *edx)
{
struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *cpuid = NULL;
if (eax && ecx)
cpuid = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(emul_to_vcpu(ctxt),
*eax, *ecx);
if (cpuid) {
*eax = cpuid->eax;
*ecx = cpuid->ecx;
if (ebx)
*ebx = cpuid->ebx;
if (edx)
*edx = cpuid->edx;
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 20,666
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::unique_ptr<TracedValue> InspectorPaintInvalidationTrackingEvent::Data(
const LayoutObject* layout_object,
const LayoutObject& paint_container) {
DCHECK(layout_object);
std::unique_ptr<TracedValue> value = TracedValue::Create();
value->SetString("frame", ToHexString(layout_object->GetFrame()));
SetGeneratingNodeInfo(value.get(), &paint_container, "paintId");
SetGeneratingNodeInfo(value.get(), layout_object, "nodeId", "nodeName");
return value;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 138,616
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Document* XMLHttpRequest::document() const
{
ASSERT(scriptExecutionContext()->isDocument());
return toDocument(scriptExecutionContext());
}
Commit Message: Don't dispatch events when XHR is set to sync mode
Any of readystatechange, progress, abort, error, timeout and loadend
event are not specified to be dispatched in sync mode in the latest
spec. Just an exception corresponding to the failure is thrown.
Clean up for readability done in this CL
- factor out dispatchEventAndLoadEnd calling code
- make didTimeout() private
- give error handling methods more descriptive names
- set m_exceptionCode in failure type specific methods
-- Note that for didFailRedirectCheck, m_exceptionCode was not set
in networkError(), but was set at the end of createRequest()
This CL is prep for fixing crbug.com/292422
BUG=292422
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24225002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@158046 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 110,914
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SetCallback(Callback callback) { callback_ = callback; }
Commit Message: Do not use NavigationEntry to block history navigations.
This is no longer necessary after r477371.
BUG=777419
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: I701e4d4853858281b43e3743b12274dbeadfbf18
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/733959
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511942}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 150,404
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: standard_height(png_const_structp pp, png_uint_32 id)
{
png_uint_32 height = HEIGHT_FROM_ID(id);
if (height == 0)
height = transform_height(pp, COL_FROM_ID(id), DEPTH_FROM_ID(id));
return height;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
| 0
| 160,040
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t shmem_file_splice_read(struct file *in, loff_t *ppos,
struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, size_t len,
unsigned int flags)
{
struct address_space *mapping = in->f_mapping;
struct inode *inode = mapping->host;
unsigned int loff, nr_pages, req_pages;
struct page *pages[PIPE_DEF_BUFFERS];
struct partial_page partial[PIPE_DEF_BUFFERS];
struct page *page;
pgoff_t index, end_index;
loff_t isize, left;
int error, page_nr;
struct splice_pipe_desc spd = {
.pages = pages,
.partial = partial,
.nr_pages_max = PIPE_DEF_BUFFERS,
.flags = flags,
.ops = &page_cache_pipe_buf_ops,
.spd_release = spd_release_page,
};
isize = i_size_read(inode);
if (unlikely(*ppos >= isize))
return 0;
left = isize - *ppos;
if (unlikely(left < len))
len = left;
if (splice_grow_spd(pipe, &spd))
return -ENOMEM;
index = *ppos >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
loff = *ppos & ~PAGE_CACHE_MASK;
req_pages = (len + loff + PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
nr_pages = min(req_pages, pipe->buffers);
spd.nr_pages = find_get_pages_contig(mapping, index,
nr_pages, spd.pages);
index += spd.nr_pages;
error = 0;
while (spd.nr_pages < nr_pages) {
error = shmem_getpage(inode, index, &page, SGP_CACHE, NULL);
if (error)
break;
unlock_page(page);
spd.pages[spd.nr_pages++] = page;
index++;
}
index = *ppos >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
nr_pages = spd.nr_pages;
spd.nr_pages = 0;
for (page_nr = 0; page_nr < nr_pages; page_nr++) {
unsigned int this_len;
if (!len)
break;
this_len = min_t(unsigned long, len, PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - loff);
page = spd.pages[page_nr];
if (!PageUptodate(page) || page->mapping != mapping) {
error = shmem_getpage(inode, index, &page,
SGP_CACHE, NULL);
if (error)
break;
unlock_page(page);
page_cache_release(spd.pages[page_nr]);
spd.pages[page_nr] = page;
}
isize = i_size_read(inode);
end_index = (isize - 1) >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
if (unlikely(!isize || index > end_index))
break;
if (end_index == index) {
unsigned int plen;
plen = ((isize - 1) & ~PAGE_CACHE_MASK) + 1;
if (plen <= loff)
break;
this_len = min(this_len, plen - loff);
len = this_len;
}
spd.partial[page_nr].offset = loff;
spd.partial[page_nr].len = this_len;
len -= this_len;
loff = 0;
spd.nr_pages++;
index++;
}
while (page_nr < nr_pages)
page_cache_release(spd.pages[page_nr++]);
if (spd.nr_pages)
error = splice_to_pipe(pipe, &spd);
splice_shrink_spd(&spd);
if (error > 0) {
*ppos += error;
file_accessed(in);
}
return error;
}
Commit Message: tmpfs: fix use-after-free of mempolicy object
The tmpfs remount logic preserves filesystem mempolicy if the mpol=M
option is not specified in the remount request. A new policy can be
specified if mpol=M is given.
Before this patch remounting an mpol bound tmpfs without specifying
mpol= mount option in the remount request would set the filesystem's
mempolicy object to a freed mempolicy object.
To reproduce the problem boot a DEBUG_PAGEALLOC kernel and run:
# mkdir /tmp/x
# mount -t tmpfs -o size=100M,mpol=interleave nodev /tmp/x
# grep /tmp/x /proc/mounts
nodev /tmp/x tmpfs rw,relatime,size=102400k,mpol=interleave:0-3 0 0
# mount -o remount,size=200M nodev /tmp/x
# grep /tmp/x /proc/mounts
nodev /tmp/x tmpfs rw,relatime,size=204800k,mpol=??? 0 0
# note ? garbage in mpol=... output above
# dd if=/dev/zero of=/tmp/x/f count=1
# panic here
Panic:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
IP: [< (null)>] (null)
[...]
Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
Call Trace:
mpol_shared_policy_init+0xa5/0x160
shmem_get_inode+0x209/0x270
shmem_mknod+0x3e/0xf0
shmem_create+0x18/0x20
vfs_create+0xb5/0x130
do_last+0x9a1/0xea0
path_openat+0xb3/0x4d0
do_filp_open+0x42/0xa0
do_sys_open+0xfe/0x1e0
compat_sys_open+0x1b/0x20
cstar_dispatch+0x7/0x1f
Non-debug kernels will not crash immediately because referencing the
dangling mpol will not cause a fault. Instead the filesystem will
reference a freed mempolicy object, which will cause unpredictable
behavior.
The problem boils down to a dropped mpol reference below if
shmem_parse_options() does not allocate a new mpol:
config = *sbinfo
shmem_parse_options(data, &config, true)
mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol)
sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol /* BUG: saves unreferenced mpol */
This patch avoids the crash by not releasing the mempolicy if
shmem_parse_options() doesn't create a new mpol.
How far back does this issue go? I see it in both 2.6.36 and 3.3. I did
not look back further.
Signed-off-by: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 33,501
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static uint8_t arcmsr_hbaD_abort_allcmd(struct AdapterControlBlock *pACB)
{
struct MessageUnit_D *reg = pACB->pmuD;
writel(ARCMSR_INBOUND_MESG0_ABORT_CMD, reg->inbound_msgaddr0);
if (!arcmsr_hbaD_wait_msgint_ready(pACB)) {
pr_notice("arcmsr%d: wait 'abort all outstanding "
"command' timeout\n", pACB->host->host_no);
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: scsi: arcmsr: Buffer overflow in arcmsr_iop_message_xfer()
We need to put an upper bound on "user_len" so the memcpy() doesn't
overflow.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <marco.gra@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Henzl <thenzl@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 49,794
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int decode_phys_chunk(AVCodecContext *avctx, PNGDecContext *s)
{
if (s->state & PNG_IDAT) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "pHYs after IDAT\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
avctx->sample_aspect_ratio.num = bytestream2_get_be32(&s->gb);
avctx->sample_aspect_ratio.den = bytestream2_get_be32(&s->gb);
if (avctx->sample_aspect_ratio.num < 0 || avctx->sample_aspect_ratio.den < 0)
avctx->sample_aspect_ratio = (AVRational){ 0, 1 };
bytestream2_skip(&s->gb, 1); /* unit specifier */
bytestream2_skip(&s->gb, 4); /* crc */
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/pngdec: Fix off by 1 size in decode_zbuf()
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: 444/fuzz-2-ffmpeg_VIDEO_AV_CODEC_ID_PNG_fuzzer
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 66,927
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virDomainMigrateVersion3Full(virDomainPtr domain,
virConnectPtr dconn,
const char *xmlin,
const char *dname,
const char *uri,
unsigned long long bandwidth,
virTypedParameterPtr params,
int nparams,
bool useParams,
unsigned int flags)
{
virDomainPtr ddomain = NULL;
char *uri_out = NULL;
char *cookiein = NULL;
char *cookieout = NULL;
char *dom_xml = NULL;
int cookieinlen = 0;
int cookieoutlen = 0;
int ret;
virDomainInfo info;
virErrorPtr orig_err = NULL;
int cancelled = 1;
unsigned long protection = 0;
bool notify_source = true;
unsigned int destflags;
int state;
virTypedParameterPtr tmp;
VIR_DOMAIN_DEBUG(domain,
"dconn=%p, xmlin=%s, dname=%s, uri=%s, bandwidth=%llu, "
"params=%p, nparams=%d, useParams=%d, flags=%x",
dconn, NULLSTR(xmlin), NULLSTR(dname), NULLSTR(uri),
bandwidth, params, nparams, useParams, flags);
VIR_TYPED_PARAMS_DEBUG(params, nparams);
if ((!useParams &&
(!domain->conn->driver->domainMigrateBegin3 ||
!domain->conn->driver->domainMigratePerform3 ||
!domain->conn->driver->domainMigrateConfirm3 ||
!dconn->driver->domainMigratePrepare3 ||
!dconn->driver->domainMigrateFinish3)) ||
(useParams &&
(!domain->conn->driver->domainMigrateBegin3Params ||
!domain->conn->driver->domainMigratePerform3Params ||
!domain->conn->driver->domainMigrateConfirm3Params ||
!dconn->driver->domainMigratePrepare3Params ||
!dconn->driver->domainMigrateFinish3Params))) {
virReportUnsupportedError();
return NULL;
}
if (virTypedParamsCopy(&tmp, params, nparams) < 0)
return NULL;
params = tmp;
if (VIR_DRV_SUPPORTS_FEATURE(domain->conn->driver, domain->conn,
VIR_DRV_FEATURE_MIGRATE_CHANGE_PROTECTION))
protection = VIR_MIGRATE_CHANGE_PROTECTION;
VIR_DEBUG("Begin3 %p", domain->conn);
if (useParams) {
dom_xml = domain->conn->driver->domainMigrateBegin3Params
(domain, params, nparams, &cookieout, &cookieoutlen,
flags | protection);
} else {
dom_xml = domain->conn->driver->domainMigrateBegin3
(domain, xmlin, &cookieout, &cookieoutlen,
flags | protection, dname, bandwidth);
}
if (!dom_xml)
goto done;
if (useParams) {
/* If source is new enough to support extensible migration parameters,
* it's certainly new enough to support virDomainGetState. */
ret = virDomainGetState(domain, &state, NULL, 0);
} else {
ret = virDomainGetInfo(domain, &info);
state = info.state;
}
if (ret == 0 && state == VIR_DOMAIN_PAUSED)
flags |= VIR_MIGRATE_PAUSED;
destflags = flags & ~(VIR_MIGRATE_ABORT_ON_ERROR |
VIR_MIGRATE_AUTO_CONVERGE);
VIR_DEBUG("Prepare3 %p flags=%x", dconn, destflags);
cookiein = cookieout;
cookieinlen = cookieoutlen;
cookieout = NULL;
cookieoutlen = 0;
if (useParams) {
if (virTypedParamsReplaceString(¶ms, &nparams,
VIR_MIGRATE_PARAM_DEST_XML,
dom_xml) < 0)
goto done;
ret = dconn->driver->domainMigratePrepare3Params
(dconn, params, nparams, cookiein, cookieinlen,
&cookieout, &cookieoutlen, &uri_out, destflags);
} else {
ret = dconn->driver->domainMigratePrepare3
(dconn, cookiein, cookieinlen, &cookieout, &cookieoutlen,
uri, &uri_out, destflags, dname, bandwidth, dom_xml);
}
if (ret == -1) {
if (protection) {
/* Begin already started a migration job so we need to cancel it by
* calling Confirm while making sure it doesn't overwrite the error
*/
orig_err = virSaveLastError();
goto confirm;
} else {
goto done;
}
}
/* Did domainMigratePrepare3 change URI? */
if (uri_out) {
uri = uri_out;
if (useParams &&
virTypedParamsReplaceString(¶ms, &nparams,
VIR_MIGRATE_PARAM_URI,
uri_out) < 0) {
cancelled = 1;
orig_err = virSaveLastError();
goto finish;
}
} else if (!uri &&
virTypedParamsGetString(params, nparams,
VIR_MIGRATE_PARAM_URI, &uri) <= 0) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, "%s",
_("domainMigratePrepare3 did not set uri"));
cancelled = 1;
orig_err = virSaveLastError();
goto finish;
}
if (flags & VIR_MIGRATE_OFFLINE) {
VIR_DEBUG("Offline migration, skipping Perform phase");
VIR_FREE(cookieout);
cookieoutlen = 0;
cancelled = 0;
goto finish;
}
/* Perform the migration. The driver isn't supposed to return
* until the migration is complete. The src VM should remain
* running, but in paused state until the destination can
* confirm migration completion.
*/
VIR_DEBUG("Perform3 %p uri=%s", domain->conn, uri);
VIR_FREE(cookiein);
cookiein = cookieout;
cookieinlen = cookieoutlen;
cookieout = NULL;
cookieoutlen = 0;
/* dconnuri not relevant in non-P2P modes, so left NULL here */
if (useParams) {
ret = domain->conn->driver->domainMigratePerform3Params
(domain, NULL, params, nparams, cookiein, cookieinlen,
&cookieout, &cookieoutlen, flags | protection);
} else {
ret = domain->conn->driver->domainMigratePerform3
(domain, NULL, cookiein, cookieinlen,
&cookieout, &cookieoutlen, NULL,
uri, flags | protection, dname, bandwidth);
}
/* Perform failed. Make sure Finish doesn't overwrite the error */
if (ret < 0) {
orig_err = virSaveLastError();
/* Perform failed so we don't need to call confirm to let source know
* about the failure.
*/
notify_source = false;
}
/* If Perform returns < 0, then we need to cancel the VM
* startup on the destination
*/
cancelled = ret < 0 ? 1 : 0;
finish:
/*
* The status code from the source is passed to the destination.
* The dest can cleanup if the source indicated it failed to
* send all migration data. Returns NULL for ddomain if
* the dest was unable to complete migration.
*/
VIR_DEBUG("Finish3 %p ret=%d", dconn, ret);
VIR_FREE(cookiein);
cookiein = cookieout;
cookieinlen = cookieoutlen;
cookieout = NULL;
cookieoutlen = 0;
if (useParams) {
if (virTypedParamsGetString(params, nparams,
VIR_MIGRATE_PARAM_DEST_NAME, NULL) <= 0 &&
virTypedParamsReplaceString(¶ms, &nparams,
VIR_MIGRATE_PARAM_DEST_NAME,
domain->name) < 0) {
ddomain = NULL;
} else {
ddomain = dconn->driver->domainMigrateFinish3Params
(dconn, params, nparams, cookiein, cookieinlen,
&cookieout, &cookieoutlen, destflags, cancelled);
}
} else {
dname = dname ? dname : domain->name;
ddomain = dconn->driver->domainMigrateFinish3
(dconn, dname, cookiein, cookieinlen, &cookieout, &cookieoutlen,
NULL, uri, destflags, cancelled);
}
if (cancelled) {
if (ddomain) {
VIR_ERROR(_("finish step ignored that migration was cancelled"));
} else {
/* If Finish reported a useful error, use it instead of the
* original "migration unexpectedly failed" error.
*
* This is ugly but we can't do better with the APIs we have. We
* only replace the error if Finish was called with cancelled == 1
* and reported a real error (old libvirt would report an error
* from RPC instead of MIGRATE_FINISH_OK), which only happens when
* the domain died on destination. To further reduce a possibility
* of false positives we also check that Perform returned
* VIR_ERR_OPERATION_FAILED.
*/
if (orig_err &&
orig_err->domain == VIR_FROM_QEMU &&
orig_err->code == VIR_ERR_OPERATION_FAILED) {
virErrorPtr err = virGetLastError();
if (err &&
err->domain == VIR_FROM_QEMU &&
err->code != VIR_ERR_MIGRATE_FINISH_OK) {
virFreeError(orig_err);
orig_err = NULL;
}
}
}
}
/* If ddomain is NULL, then we were unable to start
* the guest on the target, and must restart on the
* source. There is a small chance that the ddomain
* is NULL due to an RPC failure, in which case
* ddomain could in fact be running on the dest.
* The lock manager plugins should take care of
* safety in this scenario.
*/
cancelled = ddomain == NULL ? 1 : 0;
/* If finish3 set an error, and we don't have an earlier
* one we need to preserve it in case confirm3 overwrites
*/
if (!orig_err)
orig_err = virSaveLastError();
confirm:
/*
* If cancelled, then src VM will be restarted, else it will be killed.
* Don't do this if migration failed on source and thus it was already
* cancelled there.
*/
if (notify_source) {
VIR_DEBUG("Confirm3 %p ret=%d domain=%p", domain->conn, ret, domain);
VIR_FREE(cookiein);
cookiein = cookieout;
cookieinlen = cookieoutlen;
cookieout = NULL;
cookieoutlen = 0;
if (useParams) {
ret = domain->conn->driver->domainMigrateConfirm3Params
(domain, params, nparams, cookiein, cookieinlen,
flags | protection, cancelled);
} else {
ret = domain->conn->driver->domainMigrateConfirm3
(domain, cookiein, cookieinlen,
flags | protection, cancelled);
}
/* If Confirm3 returns -1, there's nothing more we can
* do, but fortunately worst case is that there is a
* domain left in 'paused' state on source.
*/
if (ret < 0) {
VIR_WARN("Guest %s probably left in 'paused' state on source",
domain->name);
}
}
done:
if (orig_err) {
virSetError(orig_err);
virFreeError(orig_err);
}
VIR_FREE(dom_xml);
VIR_FREE(uri_out);
VIR_FREE(cookiein);
VIR_FREE(cookieout);
virTypedParamsFree(params, nparams);
return ddomain;
}
Commit Message: virDomainGetTime: Deny on RO connections
We have a policy that if API may end up talking to a guest agent
it should require RW connection. We don't obey the rule in
virDomainGetTime().
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 93,886
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void sas_init_dev(struct domain_device *dev)
{
switch (dev->dev_type) {
case SAS_END_DEVICE:
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->ssp_dev.eh_list_node);
break;
case SAS_EDGE_EXPANDER_DEVICE:
case SAS_FANOUT_EXPANDER_DEVICE:
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->ex_dev.children);
mutex_init(&dev->ex_dev.cmd_mutex);
break;
default:
break;
}
}
Commit Message: scsi: libsas: direct call probe and destruct
In commit 87c8331fcf72 ("[SCSI] libsas: prevent domain rediscovery
competing with ata error handling") introduced disco mutex to prevent
rediscovery competing with ata error handling and put the whole
revalidation in the mutex. But the rphy add/remove needs to wait for the
error handling which also grabs the disco mutex. This may leads to dead
lock.So the probe and destruct event were introduce to do the rphy
add/remove asynchronously and out of the lock.
The asynchronously processed workers makes the whole discovery process
not atomic, the other events may interrupt the process. For example,
if a loss of signal event inserted before the probe event, the
sas_deform_port() is called and the port will be deleted.
And sas_port_delete() may run before the destruct event, but the
port-x:x is the top parent of end device or expander. This leads to
a kernel WARNING such as:
[ 82.042979] sysfs group 'power' not found for kobject 'phy-1:0:22'
[ 82.042983] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 82.042986] WARNING: CPU: 54 PID: 1714 at fs/sysfs/group.c:237
sysfs_remove_group+0x94/0xa0
[ 82.043059] Call trace:
[ 82.043082] [<ffff0000082e7624>] sysfs_remove_group+0x94/0xa0
[ 82.043085] [<ffff00000864e320>] dpm_sysfs_remove+0x60/0x70
[ 82.043086] [<ffff00000863ee10>] device_del+0x138/0x308
[ 82.043089] [<ffff00000869a2d0>] sas_phy_delete+0x38/0x60
[ 82.043091] [<ffff00000869a86c>] do_sas_phy_delete+0x6c/0x80
[ 82.043093] [<ffff00000863dc20>] device_for_each_child+0x58/0xa0
[ 82.043095] [<ffff000008696f80>] sas_remove_children+0x40/0x50
[ 82.043100] [<ffff00000869d1bc>] sas_destruct_devices+0x64/0xa0
[ 82.043102] [<ffff0000080e93bc>] process_one_work+0x1fc/0x4b0
[ 82.043104] [<ffff0000080e96c0>] worker_thread+0x50/0x490
[ 82.043105] [<ffff0000080f0364>] kthread+0xfc/0x128
[ 82.043107] [<ffff0000080836c0>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x50
Make probe and destruct a direct call in the disco and revalidate function,
but put them outside the lock. The whole discovery or revalidate won't
be interrupted by other events. And the DISCE_PROBE and DISCE_DESTRUCT
event are deleted as a result of the direct call.
Introduce a new list to destruct the sas_port and put the port delete after
the destruct. This makes sure the right order of destroying the sysfs
kobject and fix the warning above.
In sas_ex_revalidate_domain() have a loop to find all broadcasted
device, and sometimes we have a chance to find the same expander twice.
Because the sas_port will be deleted at the end of the whole revalidate
process, sas_port with the same name cannot be added before this.
Otherwise the sysfs will complain of creating duplicate filename. Since
the LLDD will send broadcast for every device change, we can only
process one expander's revalidation.
[mkp: kbuild test robot warning]
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
CC: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
CC: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
CC: Ewan Milne <emilne@redhat.com>
CC: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
CC: Tomas Henzl <thenzl@redhat.com>
CC: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 85,470
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: CIFSSMBUnixSetFileInfo(const int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon,
const struct cifs_unix_set_info_args *args,
u16 fid, u32 pid_of_opener)
{
struct smb_com_transaction2_sfi_req *pSMB = NULL;
FILE_UNIX_BASIC_INFO *data_offset;
int rc = 0;
u16 params, param_offset, offset, byte_count, count;
cFYI(1, "Set Unix Info (via SetFileInfo)");
rc = small_smb_init(SMB_COM_TRANSACTION2, 15, tcon, (void **) &pSMB);
if (rc)
return rc;
pSMB->hdr.Pid = cpu_to_le16((__u16)pid_of_opener);
pSMB->hdr.PidHigh = cpu_to_le16((__u16)(pid_of_opener >> 16));
params = 6;
pSMB->MaxSetupCount = 0;
pSMB->Reserved = 0;
pSMB->Flags = 0;
pSMB->Timeout = 0;
pSMB->Reserved2 = 0;
param_offset = offsetof(struct smb_com_transaction2_sfi_req, Fid) - 4;
offset = param_offset + params;
data_offset = (FILE_UNIX_BASIC_INFO *)
((char *)(&pSMB->hdr.Protocol) + offset);
count = sizeof(FILE_UNIX_BASIC_INFO);
pSMB->MaxParameterCount = cpu_to_le16(2);
/* BB find max SMB PDU from sess */
pSMB->MaxDataCount = cpu_to_le16(1000);
pSMB->SetupCount = 1;
pSMB->Reserved3 = 0;
pSMB->SubCommand = cpu_to_le16(TRANS2_SET_FILE_INFORMATION);
byte_count = 3 /* pad */ + params + count;
pSMB->DataCount = cpu_to_le16(count);
pSMB->ParameterCount = cpu_to_le16(params);
pSMB->TotalDataCount = pSMB->DataCount;
pSMB->TotalParameterCount = pSMB->ParameterCount;
pSMB->ParameterOffset = cpu_to_le16(param_offset);
pSMB->DataOffset = cpu_to_le16(offset);
pSMB->Fid = fid;
pSMB->InformationLevel = cpu_to_le16(SMB_SET_FILE_UNIX_BASIC);
pSMB->Reserved4 = 0;
inc_rfc1001_len(pSMB, byte_count);
pSMB->ByteCount = cpu_to_le16(byte_count);
cifs_fill_unix_set_info(data_offset, args);
rc = SendReceiveNoRsp(xid, tcon->ses, (struct smb_hdr *) pSMB, 0);
if (rc)
cFYI(1, "Send error in Set Time (SetFileInfo) = %d", rc);
/* Note: On -EAGAIN error only caller can retry on handle based calls
since file handle passed in no longer valid */
return rc;
}
Commit Message: cifs: fix possible memory corruption in CIFSFindNext
The name_len variable in CIFSFindNext is a signed int that gets set to
the resume_name_len in the cifs_search_info. The resume_name_len however
is unsigned and for some infolevels is populated directly from a 32 bit
value sent by the server.
If the server sends a very large value for this, then that value could
look negative when converted to a signed int. That would make that
value pass the PATH_MAX check later in CIFSFindNext. The name_len would
then be used as a length value for a memcpy. It would then be treated
as unsigned again, and the memcpy scribbles over a ton of memory.
Fix this by making the name_len an unsigned value in CIFSFindNext.
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Darren Lavender <dcl@hppine99.gbr.hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 24,996
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SendScrollEvent(ui::EventProcessor* dispatcher,
float x,
float y,
int touch_id,
GestureEventConsumeDelegate* delegate) {
delegate->Reset();
ui::TouchEvent move(ui::ET_TOUCH_MOVED, gfx::PointF(x, y),
touch_id,
base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(simulated_now_));
ui::EventDispatchDetails details = dispatcher->OnEventFromSource(&move);
ASSERT_FALSE(details.dispatcher_destroyed);
simulated_now_++;
}
Commit Message: Pass ui::LatencyInfo correct with unified gesture detector on Aura.
BUG=379812
TEST=GestureRecognizerTest.LatencyPassedFromTouchEvent
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/309823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@274602 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 112,086
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int skcipher_decrypt_blkcipher(struct skcipher_request *req)
{
struct crypto_skcipher *skcipher = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
struct crypto_tfm *tfm = crypto_skcipher_tfm(skcipher);
struct blkcipher_alg *alg = &tfm->__crt_alg->cra_blkcipher;
return skcipher_crypt_blkcipher(req, alg->decrypt);
}
Commit Message: crypto: skcipher - Add missing API setkey checks
The API setkey checks for key sizes and alignment went AWOL during the
skcipher conversion. This patch restores them.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: 4e6c3df4d729 ("crypto: skcipher - Add low-level skcipher...")
Reported-by: Baozeng <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 64,788
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: jsonb_array_length(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
Jsonb *jb = PG_GETARG_JSONB(0);
if (JB_ROOT_IS_SCALAR(jb))
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
errmsg("cannot get array length of a scalar")));
else if (!JB_ROOT_IS_ARRAY(jb))
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
errmsg("cannot get array length of a non-array")));
PG_RETURN_INT32(JB_ROOT_COUNT(jb));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 2,618
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int yr_object_dict_set_item(
YR_OBJECT* object,
YR_OBJECT* item,
const char* key)
{
YR_OBJECT_DICTIONARY* dict;
int i;
int count;
assert(object->type == OBJECT_TYPE_DICTIONARY);
dict = object_as_dictionary(object);
if (dict->items == NULL)
{
count = 64;
dict->items = (YR_DICTIONARY_ITEMS*) yr_malloc(
sizeof(YR_DICTIONARY_ITEMS) + count * sizeof(dict->items->objects[0]));
if (dict->items == NULL)
return ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY;
memset(dict->items->objects, 0, count * sizeof(dict->items->objects[0]));
dict->items->free = count;
dict->items->used = 0;
}
else if (dict->items->free == 0)
{
count = dict->items->used * 2;
dict->items = (YR_DICTIONARY_ITEMS*) yr_realloc(
dict->items,
sizeof(YR_DICTIONARY_ITEMS) + count * sizeof(dict->items->objects[0]));
if (dict->items == NULL)
return ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY;
for (i = dict->items->used; i < count; i++)
{
dict->items->objects[i].key = NULL;
dict->items->objects[i].obj = NULL;
}
dict->items->free = dict->items->used;
}
item->parent = object;
dict->items->objects[dict->items->used].key = yr_strdup(key);
dict->items->objects[dict->items->used].obj = item;
dict->items->used++;
dict->items->free--;
return ERROR_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Fix heap overflow (reported by Jurriaan Bremer)
When setting a new array item with yr_object_array_set_item() the array size is doubled if the index for the new item is larger than the already allocated ones. No further checks were made to ensure that the index fits into the array after doubling its capacity. If the array capacity was for example 64, and a new object is assigned to an index larger than 128 the overflow occurs. As yr_object_array_set_item() is usually invoked with indexes that increase monotonically by one, this bug never triggered before. But the new "dotnet" module has the potential to allow the exploitation of this bug by scanning a specially crafted .NET binary.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 63,468
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GLuint GLES2Implementation::GetProgramResourceIndexHelper(
GLuint program,
GLenum program_interface,
const char* name) {
typedef cmds::GetProgramResourceIndex::Result Result;
SetBucketAsCString(kResultBucketId, name);
auto result = GetResultAs<Result>();
if (!result) {
return GL_INVALID_INDEX;
}
*result = GL_INVALID_INDEX;
helper_->GetProgramResourceIndex(program, program_interface, kResultBucketId,
GetResultShmId(), result.offset());
WaitForCmd();
helper_->SetBucketSize(kResultBucketId, 0);
return *result;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,011
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int BluetoothDeviceChooserController::CalculateSignalStrengthLevel(
int8_t rssi) {
RecordRSSISignalStrength(rssi);
if (rssi < k20thPercentileRSSI) {
RecordRSSISignalStrengthLevel(content::UMARSSISignalStrengthLevel::LEVEL_0);
return 0;
} else if (rssi < k40thPercentileRSSI) {
RecordRSSISignalStrengthLevel(content::UMARSSISignalStrengthLevel::LEVEL_1);
return 1;
} else if (rssi < k60thPercentileRSSI) {
RecordRSSISignalStrengthLevel(content::UMARSSISignalStrengthLevel::LEVEL_2);
return 2;
} else if (rssi < k80thPercentileRSSI) {
RecordRSSISignalStrengthLevel(content::UMARSSISignalStrengthLevel::LEVEL_3);
return 3;
} else {
RecordRSSISignalStrengthLevel(content::UMARSSISignalStrengthLevel::LEVEL_4);
return 4;
}
}
Commit Message: bluetooth: Implement getAvailability()
This change implements the getAvailability() method for
navigator.bluetooth as defined in the specification.
Bug: 707640
Change-Id: I9e9b3e7f8ea7f259e975f71cb6d9570e5f04b479
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1651516
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Giovanni Ortuño Urquidi <ortuno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#688987}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 138,073
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OxideQQuickWebViewPrivate::setLocationBarAnimated(bool animated) {
if (!proxy_) {
construct_props_->location_bar_animated = animated;
} else {
proxy_->setLocationBarAnimated(animated);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,166
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: long arch_ptrace(struct task_struct *child, long request,
unsigned long addr, unsigned long data)
{
int ret = -EPERM;
void __user *datavp = (void __user *) data;
unsigned long __user *datalp = datavp;
switch (request) {
/* read the word at location addr in the USER area. */
case PTRACE_PEEKUSR: {
unsigned long index, tmp;
ret = -EIO;
/* convert to index and check */
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC32
index = addr >> 2;
if ((addr & 3) || (index > PT_FPSCR)
|| (child->thread.regs == NULL))
#else
index = addr >> 3;
if ((addr & 7) || (index > PT_FPSCR))
#endif
break;
CHECK_FULL_REGS(child->thread.regs);
if (index < PT_FPR0) {
tmp = ptrace_get_reg(child, (int) index);
} else {
flush_fp_to_thread(child);
tmp = ((unsigned long *)child->thread.fpr)
[TS_FPRWIDTH * (index - PT_FPR0)];
}
ret = put_user(tmp, datalp);
break;
}
/* write the word at location addr in the USER area */
case PTRACE_POKEUSR: {
unsigned long index;
ret = -EIO;
/* convert to index and check */
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC32
index = addr >> 2;
if ((addr & 3) || (index > PT_FPSCR)
|| (child->thread.regs == NULL))
#else
index = addr >> 3;
if ((addr & 7) || (index > PT_FPSCR))
#endif
break;
CHECK_FULL_REGS(child->thread.regs);
if (index < PT_FPR0) {
ret = ptrace_put_reg(child, index, data);
} else {
flush_fp_to_thread(child);
((unsigned long *)child->thread.fpr)
[TS_FPRWIDTH * (index - PT_FPR0)] = data;
ret = 0;
}
break;
}
case PPC_PTRACE_GETHWDBGINFO: {
struct ppc_debug_info dbginfo;
dbginfo.version = 1;
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_ADV_DEBUG_REGS
dbginfo.num_instruction_bps = CONFIG_PPC_ADV_DEBUG_IACS;
dbginfo.num_data_bps = CONFIG_PPC_ADV_DEBUG_DACS;
dbginfo.num_condition_regs = CONFIG_PPC_ADV_DEBUG_DVCS;
dbginfo.data_bp_alignment = 4;
dbginfo.sizeof_condition = 4;
dbginfo.features = PPC_DEBUG_FEATURE_INSN_BP_RANGE |
PPC_DEBUG_FEATURE_INSN_BP_MASK;
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_ADV_DEBUG_DAC_RANGE
dbginfo.features |=
PPC_DEBUG_FEATURE_DATA_BP_RANGE |
PPC_DEBUG_FEATURE_DATA_BP_MASK;
#endif
#else /* !CONFIG_PPC_ADV_DEBUG_REGS */
dbginfo.num_instruction_bps = 0;
dbginfo.num_data_bps = 1;
dbginfo.num_condition_regs = 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64
dbginfo.data_bp_alignment = 8;
#else
dbginfo.data_bp_alignment = 4;
#endif
dbginfo.sizeof_condition = 0;
dbginfo.features = 0;
#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_ADV_DEBUG_REGS */
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, datavp,
sizeof(struct ppc_debug_info)))
return -EFAULT;
ret = __copy_to_user(datavp, &dbginfo,
sizeof(struct ppc_debug_info)) ?
-EFAULT : 0;
break;
}
case PPC_PTRACE_SETHWDEBUG: {
struct ppc_hw_breakpoint bp_info;
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, datavp,
sizeof(struct ppc_hw_breakpoint)))
return -EFAULT;
ret = __copy_from_user(&bp_info, datavp,
sizeof(struct ppc_hw_breakpoint)) ?
-EFAULT : 0;
if (!ret)
ret = ppc_set_hwdebug(child, &bp_info);
break;
}
case PPC_PTRACE_DELHWDEBUG: {
ret = ppc_del_hwdebug(child, addr, data);
break;
}
case PTRACE_GET_DEBUGREG: {
ret = -EINVAL;
/* We only support one DABR and no IABRS at the moment */
if (addr > 0)
break;
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_ADV_DEBUG_REGS
ret = put_user(child->thread.dac1, datalp);
#else
ret = put_user(child->thread.dabr, datalp);
#endif
break;
}
case PTRACE_SET_DEBUGREG:
ret = ptrace_set_debugreg(child, addr, data);
break;
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64
case PTRACE_GETREGS64:
#endif
case PTRACE_GETREGS: /* Get all pt_regs from the child. */
return copy_regset_to_user(child, &user_ppc_native_view,
REGSET_GPR,
0, sizeof(struct pt_regs),
datavp);
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64
case PTRACE_SETREGS64:
#endif
case PTRACE_SETREGS: /* Set all gp regs in the child. */
return copy_regset_from_user(child, &user_ppc_native_view,
REGSET_GPR,
0, sizeof(struct pt_regs),
datavp);
case PTRACE_GETFPREGS: /* Get the child FPU state (FPR0...31 + FPSCR) */
return copy_regset_to_user(child, &user_ppc_native_view,
REGSET_FPR,
0, sizeof(elf_fpregset_t),
datavp);
case PTRACE_SETFPREGS: /* Set the child FPU state (FPR0...31 + FPSCR) */
return copy_regset_from_user(child, &user_ppc_native_view,
REGSET_FPR,
0, sizeof(elf_fpregset_t),
datavp);
#ifdef CONFIG_ALTIVEC
case PTRACE_GETVRREGS:
return copy_regset_to_user(child, &user_ppc_native_view,
REGSET_VMX,
0, (33 * sizeof(vector128) +
sizeof(u32)),
datavp);
case PTRACE_SETVRREGS:
return copy_regset_from_user(child, &user_ppc_native_view,
REGSET_VMX,
0, (33 * sizeof(vector128) +
sizeof(u32)),
datavp);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_VSX
case PTRACE_GETVSRREGS:
return copy_regset_to_user(child, &user_ppc_native_view,
REGSET_VSX,
0, 32 * sizeof(double),
datavp);
case PTRACE_SETVSRREGS:
return copy_regset_from_user(child, &user_ppc_native_view,
REGSET_VSX,
0, 32 * sizeof(double),
datavp);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_SPE
case PTRACE_GETEVRREGS:
/* Get the child spe register state. */
return copy_regset_to_user(child, &user_ppc_native_view,
REGSET_SPE, 0, 35 * sizeof(u32),
datavp);
case PTRACE_SETEVRREGS:
/* Set the child spe register state. */
return copy_regset_from_user(child, &user_ppc_native_view,
REGSET_SPE, 0, 35 * sizeof(u32),
datavp);
#endif
/* Old reverse args ptrace callss */
case PPC_PTRACE_GETREGS: /* Get GPRs 0 - 31. */
case PPC_PTRACE_SETREGS: /* Set GPRs 0 - 31. */
case PPC_PTRACE_GETFPREGS: /* Get FPRs 0 - 31. */
case PPC_PTRACE_SETFPREGS: /* Get FPRs 0 - 31. */
ret = arch_ptrace_old(child, request, addr, data);
break;
default:
ret = ptrace_request(child, request, addr, data);
break;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 25,469
|
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