instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t port_fops_splice_write(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe,
struct file *filp, loff_t *ppos,
size_t len, unsigned int flags)
{
struct port *port = filp->private_data;
struct sg_list sgl;
ssize_t ret;
struct port_buffer *buf;
struct splice_desc sd = {
.total_len = len,
.flags = flags,
.pos = *ppos,
.u.data = &sgl,
};
/*
* Rproc_serial does not yet support splice. To support splice
* pipe_to_sg() must allocate dma-buffers and copy content from
* regular pages to dma pages. And alloc_buf and free_buf must
* support allocating and freeing such a list of dma-buffers.
*/
if (is_rproc_serial(port->out_vq->vdev))
return -EINVAL;
/*
* pipe->nrbufs == 0 means there are no data to transfer,
* so this returns just 0 for no data.
*/
pipe_lock(pipe);
if (!pipe->nrbufs) {
ret = 0;
goto error_out;
}
ret = wait_port_writable(port, filp->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK);
if (ret < 0)
goto error_out;
buf = alloc_buf(port->out_vq, 0, pipe->nrbufs);
if (!buf) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto error_out;
}
sgl.n = 0;
sgl.len = 0;
sgl.size = pipe->nrbufs;
sgl.sg = buf->sg;
sg_init_table(sgl.sg, sgl.size);
ret = __splice_from_pipe(pipe, &sd, pipe_to_sg);
pipe_unlock(pipe);
if (likely(ret > 0))
ret = __send_to_port(port, buf->sg, sgl.n, sgl.len, buf, true);
if (unlikely(ret <= 0))
free_buf(buf, true);
return ret;
error_out:
pipe_unlock(pipe);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: virtio-console: avoid DMA from stack
put_chars() stuffs the buffer it gets into an sg, but that buffer may be
on the stack. This breaks with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y (for me, it
manifested as printks getting turned into NUL bytes).
Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Amit Shah <amit.shah@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 66,608
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: XML_SetExternalEntityRefHandler(XML_Parser parser,
XML_ExternalEntityRefHandler handler)
{
if (parser != NULL)
parser->m_externalEntityRefHandler = handler;
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Fix extraction of namespace prefix from XML name (#186)
CWE ID: CWE-611
| 0
| 92,280
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xsmp_get_discard_command (GsmClient *client)
{
SmProp *prop;
prop = find_property (GSM_XSMP_CLIENT (client), SmDiscardCommand, NULL);
if (!prop || strcmp (prop->type, SmLISTofARRAY8) != 0) {
return NULL;
}
return prop_to_command (prop);
}
Commit Message: [gsm] Delay the creation of the GsmXSMPClient until it really exists
We used to create the GsmXSMPClient before the XSMP connection is really
accepted. This can lead to some issues, though. An example is:
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=598211#c19. Quoting:
"What is happening is that a new client (probably metacity in your
case) is opening an ICE connection in the GSM_MANAGER_PHASE_END_SESSION
phase, which causes a new GsmXSMPClient to be added to the client
store. The GSM_MANAGER_PHASE_EXIT phase then begins before the client
has had a chance to establish a xsmp connection, which means that
client->priv->conn will not be initialized at the point that xsmp_stop
is called on the new unregistered client."
The fix is to create the GsmXSMPClient object when there's a real XSMP
connection. This implies moving the timeout that makes sure we don't
have an empty client to the XSMP server.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=598211
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 63,583
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xfs_set_mode(struct inode *inode, umode_t mode)
{
int error = 0;
if (mode != inode->i_mode) {
struct iattr iattr;
iattr.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE | ATTR_CTIME;
iattr.ia_mode = mode;
iattr.ia_ctime = current_fs_time(inode->i_sb);
error = -xfs_setattr_nonsize(XFS_I(inode), &iattr, XFS_ATTR_NOACL);
}
return error;
}
Commit Message: xfs: validate acl count
This prevents in-memory corruption and possible panics if the on-disk
ACL is badly corrupted.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 21,933
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BackendImpl::ReportError(int error) {
STRESS_DCHECK(!error || error == ERR_PREVIOUS_CRASH ||
error == ERR_CACHE_CREATED);
DCHECK_LE(error, 0);
CACHE_UMA(CACHE_ERROR, "Error", 0, error * -1);
}
Commit Message: Blockfile cache: fix long-standing sparse + evict reentrancy problem
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for an alternative perspective
plus a reduction to make fixing this much easier.
Bug: 826626, 518908, 537063, 802886
Change-Id: Ibfa01416f9a8e7f7b361e4f93b4b6b134728b85f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/985052
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547103}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 147,269
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: _exsltDateParseGDay (exsltDateValDatePtr dt, const xmlChar **str)
{
const xmlChar *cur = *str;
int ret = 0;
PARSE_2_DIGITS(dt->day, cur, VALID_DAY, ret);
if (ret != 0)
return ret;
*str = cur;
#ifdef DEBUG_EXSLT_DATE
xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"Parsed day %02i\n", dt->day);
#endif
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 156,583
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void nl80211_send_scan_aborted(struct cfg80211_registered_device *rdev,
struct net_device *netdev)
{
struct sk_buff *msg;
msg = nlmsg_new(NLMSG_DEFAULT_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!msg)
return;
if (nl80211_send_scan_msg(msg, rdev, netdev, 0, 0, 0,
NL80211_CMD_SCAN_ABORTED) < 0) {
nlmsg_free(msg);
return;
}
genlmsg_multicast_netns(wiphy_net(&rdev->wiphy), msg, 0,
nl80211_scan_mcgrp.id, GFP_KERNEL);
}
Commit Message: nl80211: fix check for valid SSID size in scan operations
In both trigger_scan and sched_scan operations, we were checking for
the SSID length before assigning the value correctly. Since the
memory was just kzalloc'ed, the check was always failing and SSID with
over 32 characters were allowed to go through.
This was causing a buffer overflow when copying the actual SSID to the
proper place.
This bug has been there since 2.6.29-rc4.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Luciano Coelho <coelho@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 26,749
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int tun_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *m, size_t total_len)
{
struct tun_struct *tun = container_of(sock, struct tun_struct, socket);
return tun_get_user(tun, m->msg_iov, total_len,
m->msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 23,874
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GBool GfxResources::lookupMarkedContentNF(char *name, Object *obj) {
GfxResources *resPtr;
for (resPtr = this; resPtr; resPtr = resPtr->next) {
if (resPtr->propertiesDict.isDict()) {
if (!resPtr->propertiesDict.dictLookupNF(name, obj)->isNull())
return gTrue;
obj->free();
}
}
error(-1, "Marked Content '%s' is unknown", name);
return gFalse;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 8,101
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebSocketJob::OnSentSpdyData(int amount_sent) {
DCHECK_NE(INITIALIZED, state_);
DCHECK_NE(CONNECTING, state_);
if (state_ == CLOSED)
return;
if (!spdy_websocket_stream_.get())
return;
OnSentData(socket_, amount_sent);
}
Commit Message: Use ScopedRunnableMethodFactory in WebSocketJob
Don't post SendPending if it is already posted.
BUG=89795
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7488007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93599 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 98,384
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int srpt_rx_mgmt_fn_tag(struct srpt_send_ioctx *ioctx, u64 tag)
{
struct srpt_device *sdev;
struct srpt_rdma_ch *ch;
struct srpt_send_ioctx *target;
int ret, i;
ret = -EINVAL;
ch = ioctx->ch;
BUG_ON(!ch);
BUG_ON(!ch->sport);
sdev = ch->sport->sdev;
BUG_ON(!sdev);
spin_lock_irq(&sdev->spinlock);
for (i = 0; i < ch->rq_size; ++i) {
target = ch->ioctx_ring[i];
if (target->cmd.se_lun == ioctx->cmd.se_lun &&
target->cmd.tag == tag &&
srpt_get_cmd_state(target) != SRPT_STATE_DONE) {
ret = 0;
/* now let the target core abort &target->cmd; */
break;
}
}
spin_unlock_irq(&sdev->spinlock);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: IB/srpt: Simplify srpt_handle_tsk_mgmt()
Let the target core check task existence instead of the SRP target
driver. Additionally, let the target core check the validity of the
task management request instead of the ib_srpt driver.
This patch fixes the following kernel crash:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000001
IP: [<ffffffffa0565f37>] srpt_handle_new_iu+0x6d7/0x790 [ib_srpt]
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
Call Trace:
[<ffffffffa05660ce>] srpt_process_completion+0xde/0x570 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffffa056669f>] srpt_compl_thread+0x13f/0x160 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffff8109726f>] kthread+0xcf/0xe0
[<ffffffff81613cfc>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@sandisk.com>
Fixes: 3e4f574857ee ("ib_srpt: Convert TMR path to target_submit_tmr")
Tested-by: Alex Estrin <alex.estrin@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
Cc: Sagi Grimberg <sagig@mellanox.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 1
| 167,001
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OutOfProcessInstance::DidOpen(int32_t result) {
if (result == PP_OK) {
if (!engine_->HandleDocumentLoad(embed_loader_)) {
document_load_state_ = LOAD_STATE_LOADING;
DocumentLoadFailed();
}
} else if (result != PP_ERROR_ABORTED) { // Can happen in tests.
NOTREACHED();
DocumentLoadFailed();
}
if (engine_->IsProgressiveLoad()) {
pp::VarDictionary message;
message.Set(kType, kJSCancelStreamUrlType);
PostMessage(message);
}
}
Commit Message: Prevent leaking PDF data cross-origin
BUG=520422
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1311973002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#345267}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 129,415
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: tcp_sendf (server *serv, const char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list args;
/* keep this buffer in BSS. Converting UTF-8 to ISO-8859-x might make the
string shorter, so allow alot more than 512 for now. */
static char send_buf[1540]; /* good code hey (no it's not overflowable) */
int len;
va_start (args, fmt);
len = vsnprintf (send_buf, sizeof (send_buf) - 1, fmt, args);
va_end (args);
send_buf[sizeof (send_buf) - 1] = '\0';
if (len < 0 || len > (sizeof (send_buf) - 1))
len = strlen (send_buf);
tcp_send_len (serv, send_buf, len);
}
Commit Message: ssl: Validate hostnames
Closes #524
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 58,466
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void XMLHttpRequest::abortError()
{
genericError();
if (!m_uploadComplete) {
m_uploadComplete = true;
if (m_upload && m_uploadEventsAllowed)
m_upload->dispatchEventAndLoadEnd(XMLHttpRequestProgressEvent::create(eventNames().abortEvent));
}
m_progressEventThrottle.dispatchEventAndLoadEnd(XMLHttpRequestProgressEvent::create(eventNames().abortEvent));
}
Commit Message: Don't dispatch events when XHR is set to sync mode
Any of readystatechange, progress, abort, error, timeout and loadend
event are not specified to be dispatched in sync mode in the latest
spec. Just an exception corresponding to the failure is thrown.
Clean up for readability done in this CL
- factor out dispatchEventAndLoadEnd calling code
- make didTimeout() private
- give error handling methods more descriptive names
- set m_exceptionCode in failure type specific methods
-- Note that for didFailRedirectCheck, m_exceptionCode was not set
in networkError(), but was set at the end of createRequest()
This CL is prep for fixing crbug.com/292422
BUG=292422
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24225002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@158046 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 1
| 171,164
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: feed_table(struct table *tbl, char *line, struct table_mode *mode,
int width, int internal)
{
int i;
char *p;
Str tmp;
struct table_linfo *linfo = &tbl->linfo;
if (*line == '<' && line[1] && REALLY_THE_BEGINNING_OF_A_TAG(line)) {
struct parsed_tag *tag;
p = line;
tag = parse_tag(&p, internal);
if (tag) {
switch (feed_table_tag(tbl, line, mode, width, tag)) {
case TAG_ACTION_NONE:
return -1;
case TAG_ACTION_N_TABLE:
return 0;
case TAG_ACTION_TABLE:
return 1;
case TAG_ACTION_PLAIN:
break;
case TAG_ACTION_FEED:
default:
if (parsedtag_need_reconstruct(tag))
line = parsedtag2str(tag)->ptr;
}
}
else {
if (!(mode->pre_mode & (TBLM_PLAIN | TBLM_INTXTA | TBLM_INSELECT |
TBLM_SCRIPT | TBLM_STYLE)))
return -1;
}
}
else {
if (mode->pre_mode & (TBLM_DEL | TBLM_S))
return -1;
}
if (mode->caption) {
Strcat_charp(tbl->caption, line);
return -1;
}
if (mode->pre_mode & TBLM_SCRIPT)
return -1;
if (mode->pre_mode & TBLM_STYLE)
return -1;
if (mode->pre_mode & TBLM_INTXTA) {
feed_textarea(line);
return -1;
}
if (mode->pre_mode & TBLM_INSELECT) {
feed_select(line);
return -1;
}
if (!(mode->pre_mode & TBLM_PLAIN) &&
!(*line == '<' && line[strlen(line) - 1] == '>') &&
strchr(line, '&') != NULL) {
tmp = Strnew();
for (p = line; *p;) {
char *q, *r;
if (*p == '&') {
if (!strncasecmp(p, "&", 5) ||
!strncasecmp(p, ">", 4) || !strncasecmp(p, "<", 4)) {
/* do not convert */
Strcat_char(tmp, *p);
p++;
}
else {
int ec;
q = p;
switch (ec = getescapechar(&p)) {
case '<':
Strcat_charp(tmp, "<");
break;
case '>':
Strcat_charp(tmp, ">");
break;
case '&':
Strcat_charp(tmp, "&");
break;
case '\r':
Strcat_char(tmp, '\n');
break;
default:
r = conv_entity(ec);
if (r != NULL && strlen(r) == 1 &&
ec == (unsigned char)*r) {
Strcat_char(tmp, *r);
break;
}
case -1:
Strcat_char(tmp, *q);
p = q + 1;
break;
}
}
}
else {
Strcat_char(tmp, *p);
p++;
}
}
line = tmp->ptr;
}
if (!(mode->pre_mode & (TBLM_SPECIAL & ~TBLM_NOBR))) {
if (!(tbl->flag & TBL_IN_COL) || linfo->prev_spaces != 0)
while (IS_SPACE(*line))
line++;
if (*line == '\0')
return -1;
check_rowcol(tbl, mode);
if (mode->pre_mode & TBLM_NOBR && mode->nobr_offset < 0)
mode->nobr_offset = tbl->tabcontentssize;
/* count of number of spaces skipped in normal mode */
i = skip_space(tbl, line, linfo, !(mode->pre_mode & TBLM_NOBR));
addcontentssize(tbl, visible_length(line) - i);
setwidth(tbl, mode);
pushdata(tbl, tbl->row, tbl->col, line);
}
else if (mode->pre_mode & TBLM_PRE_INT) {
check_rowcol(tbl, mode);
if (mode->nobr_offset < 0)
mode->nobr_offset = tbl->tabcontentssize;
addcontentssize(tbl, maximum_visible_length(line, tbl->tabcontentssize));
setwidth(tbl, mode);
pushdata(tbl, tbl->row, tbl->col, line);
}
else {
/* <pre> mode or something like it */
check_rowcol(tbl, mode);
while (*line) {
int nl = FALSE;
if ((p = strchr(line, '\r')) || (p = strchr(line, '\n'))) {
if (*p == '\r' && p[1] == '\n')
p++;
if (p[1]) {
p++;
tmp = Strnew_charp_n(line, p - line);
line = p;
p = tmp->ptr;
}
else {
p = line;
line = "";
}
nl = TRUE;
}
else {
p = line;
line = "";
}
if (mode->pre_mode & TBLM_PLAIN)
i = maximum_visible_length_plain(p, tbl->tabcontentssize);
else
i = maximum_visible_length(p, tbl->tabcontentssize);
addcontentssize(tbl, i);
setwidth(tbl, mode);
if (nl)
clearcontentssize(tbl, mode);
pushdata(tbl, tbl->row, tbl->col, p);
}
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message: Prevent negative indent value in feed_table_block_tag()
Bug-Debian: https://github.com/tats/w3m/issues/88
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 84,623
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BufferMeta(const sp<GraphicBuffer> &graphicBuffer, OMX_U32 portIndex)
: mGraphicBuffer(graphicBuffer),
mIsBackup(false),
mPortIndex(portIndex) {
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: IOMX: work against metadata buffer spoofing
- Prohibit direct set/getParam/Settings for extensions meant for
OMXNodeInstance alone. This disallows enabling metadata mode
without the knowledge of OMXNodeInstance.
- Use a backup buffer for metadata mode buffers and do not directly
share with clients.
- Disallow setting up metadata mode/tunneling/input surface
after first sendCommand.
- Disallow store-meta for input cross process.
- Disallow emptyBuffer for surface input (via IOMX).
- Fix checking for input surface.
Bug: 29422020
Change-Id: I801c77b80e703903f62e42d76fd2e76a34e4bc8e
(cherry picked from commit 7c3c2fa3e233c656fc8c2fc2a6634b3ecf8a23e8)
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 1
| 174,126
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void vhost_dev_reset_owner(struct vhost_dev *dev, struct vhost_memory *memory)
{
int i;
vhost_dev_cleanup(dev, true);
/* Restore memory to default empty mapping. */
memory->nregions = 0;
dev->memory = memory;
/* We don't need VQ locks below since vhost_dev_cleanup makes sure
* VQs aren't running.
*/
for (i = 0; i < dev->nvqs; ++i)
dev->vqs[i]->memory = memory;
}
Commit Message: vhost: actually track log eventfd file
While reviewing vhost log code, I found out that log_file is never
set. Note: I haven't tested the change (QEMU doesn't use LOG_FD yet).
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 42,213
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sc_pkcs15emu_sc_hsm_read_tokeninfo (sc_pkcs15_card_t * p15card)
{
sc_card_t *card = p15card->card;
int r;
u8 efbin[512];
size_t len;
LOG_FUNC_CALLED(card->ctx);
/* Read token info */
len = sizeof efbin;
r = read_file(p15card, (u8 *) "\x2F\x03", efbin, &len, 1);
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "Skipping optional EF.TokenInfo");
r = sc_pkcs15_parse_tokeninfo(card->ctx, p15card->tokeninfo, efbin, len);
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "Skipping optional EF.TokenInfo");
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_SUCCESS);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds writes
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problems.
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 78,816
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BluetoothAdapter::~BluetoothAdapter() {
if (set_powered_callbacks_)
set_powered_callbacks_->error_callback.Run();
}
Commit Message: bluetooth: Implement getAvailability()
This change implements the getAvailability() method for
navigator.bluetooth as defined in the specification.
Bug: 707640
Change-Id: I9e9b3e7f8ea7f259e975f71cb6d9570e5f04b479
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1651516
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Giovanni Ortuño Urquidi <ortuno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#688987}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 138,212
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static s32 vmci_transport_error_to_vsock_error(s32 vmci_error)
{
int err;
switch (vmci_error) {
case VMCI_ERROR_NO_MEM:
err = ENOMEM;
break;
case VMCI_ERROR_DUPLICATE_ENTRY:
case VMCI_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS:
err = EADDRINUSE;
break;
case VMCI_ERROR_NO_ACCESS:
err = EPERM;
break;
case VMCI_ERROR_NO_RESOURCES:
err = ENOBUFS;
break;
case VMCI_ERROR_INVALID_RESOURCE:
err = EHOSTUNREACH;
break;
case VMCI_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS:
default:
err = EINVAL;
}
return err > 0 ? -err : err;
}
Commit Message: VSOCK: vmci - fix possible info leak in vmci_transport_dgram_dequeue()
In case we received no data on the call to skb_recv_datagram(), i.e.
skb->data is NULL, vmci_transport_dgram_dequeue() will return with 0
without updating msg_namelen leading to net/socket.c leaking the local,
uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable to userland -- 128 bytes of
kernel stack memory.
Fix this by moving the already existing msg_namelen assignment a few
lines above.
Cc: Andy King <acking@vmware.com>
Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <dtor@vmware.com>
Cc: George Zhang <georgezhang@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 30,375
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static u32 srpt_sess_get_index(struct se_session *se_sess)
{
return 0;
}
Commit Message: IB/srpt: Simplify srpt_handle_tsk_mgmt()
Let the target core check task existence instead of the SRP target
driver. Additionally, let the target core check the validity of the
task management request instead of the ib_srpt driver.
This patch fixes the following kernel crash:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000001
IP: [<ffffffffa0565f37>] srpt_handle_new_iu+0x6d7/0x790 [ib_srpt]
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
Call Trace:
[<ffffffffa05660ce>] srpt_process_completion+0xde/0x570 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffffa056669f>] srpt_compl_thread+0x13f/0x160 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffff8109726f>] kthread+0xcf/0xe0
[<ffffffff81613cfc>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@sandisk.com>
Fixes: 3e4f574857ee ("ib_srpt: Convert TMR path to target_submit_tmr")
Tested-by: Alex Estrin <alex.estrin@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
Cc: Sagi Grimberg <sagig@mellanox.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 50,699
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool TemplateURLRef::IsValid(const SearchTermsData& search_terms_data) const {
ParseIfNecessary(search_terms_data);
return valid_;
}
Commit Message: [Contextual Search] Change "Now on Tap" to "Contextual Cards"
BUG=644934
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2361163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#420899}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 120,299
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool check_same_owner(struct task_struct *p)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *pcred;
bool match;
rcu_read_lock();
pcred = __task_cred(p);
if (cred->user->user_ns == pcred->user->user_ns)
match = (cred->euid == pcred->euid ||
cred->euid == pcred->uid);
else
match = false;
rcu_read_unlock();
return match;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 26,263
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int php_zip_ops_flush(php_stream *stream TSRMLS_DC)
{
if (!stream) {
return 0;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 9,511
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool TextureManager::MarkMipmapsGenerated(TextureManager::TextureInfo* info) {
DCHECK(info);
if (!info->CanRender(feature_info_)) {
DCHECK_NE(0, num_unrenderable_textures_);
--num_unrenderable_textures_;
}
if (!info->SafeToRenderFrom()) {
DCHECK_NE(0, num_unsafe_textures_);
--num_unsafe_textures_;
}
num_uncleared_mips_ -= info->num_uncleared_mips();
DCHECK_GE(num_uncleared_mips_, 0);
mem_represented_ -= info->estimated_size();
bool result = info->MarkMipmapsGenerated(feature_info_);
mem_represented_ += info->estimated_size();
UpdateMemRepresented();
num_uncleared_mips_ += info->num_uncleared_mips();
if (!info->CanRender(feature_info_)) {
++num_unrenderable_textures_;
}
if (!info->SafeToRenderFrom()) {
++num_unsafe_textures_;
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 103,730
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void dispatchDataCall(Parcel& p, RequestInfo *pRI) {
const int numParamsRilV3 = 6;
int pos = p.dataPosition();
int numParams = p.readInt32();
if (s_callbacks.version < 4 && numParams > numParamsRilV3) {
Parcel p2;
p2.appendFrom(&p, 0, pos);
p2.writeInt32(numParamsRilV3);
for(int i = 0; i < numParamsRilV3; i++) {
p2.writeString16(p.readString16());
}
p2.setDataPosition(pos);
dispatchStrings(p2, pRI);
} else {
p.setDataPosition(pos);
dispatchStrings(p, pRI);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE
Fix security vulnerability in pre-O rild code.
Remove wrong code for setup_data_call.
Add check for max address for RIL_DIAL.
Bug: 37896655
Test: Manual.
Change-Id: I05c027140ae828a2653794fcdd94e1b1a130941b
(cherry picked from commit dda24c6557911aa1f4708abbd6b2f20f0e205b9e)
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 162,093
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int tcp_try_undo_loss(struct sock *sk)
{
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
if (tcp_may_undo(tp)) {
struct sk_buff *skb;
tcp_for_write_queue(skb, sk) {
if (skb == tcp_send_head(sk))
break;
TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->sacked &= ~TCPCB_LOST;
}
tcp_clear_all_retrans_hints(tp);
DBGUNDO(sk, "partial loss");
tp->lost_out = 0;
tcp_undo_cwr(sk, true);
NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPLOSSUNDO);
inet_csk(sk)->icsk_retransmits = 0;
tp->undo_marker = 0;
if (tcp_is_sack(tp))
tcp_set_ca_state(sk, TCP_CA_Open);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: tcp: drop SYN+FIN messages
Denys Fedoryshchenko reported that SYN+FIN attacks were bringing his
linux machines to their limits.
Dont call conn_request() if the TCP flags includes SYN flag
Reported-by: Denys Fedoryshchenko <denys@visp.net.lb>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 41,224
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FontSelector* OffscreenCanvas::GetFontSelector() {
if (auto* document = DynamicTo<Document>(GetExecutionContext())) {
return document->GetStyleEngine().GetFontSelector();
}
return To<WorkerGlobalScope>(GetExecutionContext())->GetFontSelector();
}
Commit Message: Clean up CanvasResourceDispatcher on finalizer
We may have pending mojo messages after GC, so we want to drop the
dispatcher as soon as possible.
Bug: 929757,913964
Change-Id: I5789bcbb55aada4a74c67a28758f07686f8911c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489175
Reviewed-by: Ken Rockot <rockot@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#635833}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 152,142
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void get_lowest_part_y(H264Context *h, int refs[2][48], int n,
int height, int y_offset, int list0,
int list1, int *nrefs)
{
int my;
y_offset += 16 * (h->mb_y >> MB_FIELD(h));
if (list0) {
int ref_n = h->ref_cache[0][scan8[n]];
Picture *ref = &h->ref_list[0][ref_n];
if (ref->tf.progress->data != h->cur_pic.tf.progress->data ||
(ref->reference & 3) != h->picture_structure) {
my = get_lowest_part_list_y(h, ref, n, height, y_offset, 0);
if (refs[0][ref_n] < 0)
nrefs[0] += 1;
refs[0][ref_n] = FFMAX(refs[0][ref_n], my);
}
}
if (list1) {
int ref_n = h->ref_cache[1][scan8[n]];
Picture *ref = &h->ref_list[1][ref_n];
if (ref->tf.progress->data != h->cur_pic.tf.progress->data ||
(ref->reference & 3) != h->picture_structure) {
my = get_lowest_part_list_y(h, ref, n, height, y_offset, 1);
if (refs[1][ref_n] < 0)
nrefs[1] += 1;
refs[1][ref_n] = FFMAX(refs[1][ref_n], my);
}
}
}
Commit Message: avcodec/h264: do not trust last_pic_droppable when marking pictures as done
This simplifies the code and fixes a deadlock
Fixes Ticket2927
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 28,243
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void hid_free_report(struct hid_report *report)
{
unsigned n;
for (n = 0; n < report->maxfield; n++)
kfree(report->field[n]);
kfree(report);
}
Commit Message: HID: core: prevent out-of-bound readings
Plugging a Logitech DJ receiver with KASAN activated raises a bunch of
out-of-bound readings.
The fields are allocated up to MAX_USAGE, meaning that potentially, we do
not have enough fields to fit the incoming values.
Add checks and silence KASAN.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 49,493
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: g_utf8_strlen (const gchar * p, gssize max)
{
glong len = 0;
const gchar *start = p;
g_return_val_if_fail (p != NULL || max == 0, 0);
if (max < 0)
{
while (*p)
{
p = g_utf8_next_char (p);
++len;
}
}
else
{
if (max == 0 || !*p)
return 0;
p = g_utf8_next_char (p);
while (p - start < max && *p)
{
++len;
p = g_utf8_next_char (p);
}
/* only do the last len increment if we got a complete
* char (don't count partial chars)
*/
if (p - start <= max)
++len;
}
return len;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 4,771
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void virtio_device_set_child_bus_name(VirtIODevice *vdev, char *bus_name)
{
if (vdev->bus_name) {
g_free(vdev->bus_name);
vdev->bus_name = NULL;
}
if (bus_name) {
vdev->bus_name = g_strdup(bus_name);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 14,450
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RenderProcessHostImpl::GetRemoteInterfaces() {
return child_connection_->GetRemoteInterfaces();
}
Commit Message: Switching AudioOutputAuthorizationHandler from using AudioManager interface to AudioSystem one.
BUG=672468
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2692203003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450939}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 128,263
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HTMLInputElement::resetListAttributeTargetObserver()
{
if (inDocument())
m_listAttributeTargetObserver = ListAttributeTargetObserver::create(fastGetAttribute(listAttr), this);
else
m_listAttributeTargetObserver = nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 112,976
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: uint16_t smb1cli_conn_server_security_mode(struct smbXcli_conn *conn)
{
return conn->smb1.server.security_mode;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 2,400
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void IndexedDBDispatcher::RequestIDBFactoryOpen(
const string16& name,
WebIDBCallbacks* callbacks_ptr,
const string16& origin,
WebFrame* web_frame) {
ResetCursorPrefetchCaches();
scoped_ptr<WebIDBCallbacks> callbacks(callbacks_ptr);
if (!CurrentWorkerId() &&
!ChildThread::current()->IsWebFrameValid(web_frame))
return;
IndexedDBHostMsg_FactoryOpen_Params params;
params.thread_id = CurrentWorkerId();
params.response_id = pending_callbacks_.Add(callbacks.release());
params.origin = origin;
params.name = name;
Send(new IndexedDBHostMsg_FactoryOpen(params));
}
Commit Message: Add DCHECK to ensure IndexedDBDispatcher doesn't get re-created.
This could happen if there are IDB objects that survive the call to
didStopWorkerRunLoop.
BUG=121734
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9999035
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@131679 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 108,705
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: nfs4_stat_to_errno(int stat)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; nfs_errtbl[i].stat != -1; i++) {
if (nfs_errtbl[i].stat == stat)
return nfs_errtbl[i].errno;
}
if (stat <= 10000 || stat > 10100) {
/* The server is looney tunes. */
return -EREMOTEIO;
}
/* If we cannot translate the error, the recovery routines should
* handle it.
* Note: remaining NFSv4 error codes have values > 10000, so should
* not conflict with native Linux error codes.
*/
return -stat;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 23,403
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PanoramiXFindIDByScrnum(RESTYPE type, XID id, int screen)
{
PanoramiXSearchData data;
void *val;
if (!screen) {
dixLookupResourceByType(&val, id, type, serverClient, DixReadAccess);
return val;
}
data.screen = screen;
data.id = id;
return LookupClientResourceComplex(clients[CLIENT_ID(id)], type,
XineramaFindIDByScrnum, &data);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,370
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int WebContentsImpl::GetEmbeddedInstanceID() const {
BrowserPluginGuest* guest = GetBrowserPluginGuest();
if (guest)
return guest->instance_id();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 110,633
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ~XCustomCursor() {
XcursorImageDestroy(image_);
XFreeCursor(GetXDisplay(), cursor_);
}
Commit Message: Make shared memory segments writable only by their rightful owners.
BUG=143859
TEST=Chrome's UI still works on Linux and Chrome OS
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854242
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@158289 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 119,236
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t ext4_attr_store(struct kobject *kobj,
struct attribute *attr,
const char *buf, size_t len)
{
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = container_of(kobj, struct ext4_sb_info,
s_kobj);
struct ext4_attr *a = container_of(attr, struct ext4_attr, attr);
return a->store ? a->store(a, sbi, buf, len) : 0;
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix undefined behavior in ext4_fill_flex_info()
Commit 503358ae01b70ce6909d19dd01287093f6b6271c ("ext4: avoid divide by
zero when trying to mount a corrupted file system") fixes CVE-2009-4307
by performing a sanity check on s_log_groups_per_flex, since it can be
set to a bogus value by an attacker.
sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex = sbi->s_es->s_log_groups_per_flex;
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex < 2) { ... }
This patch fixes two potential issues in the previous commit.
1) The sanity check might only work on architectures like PowerPC.
On x86, 5 bits are used for the shifting amount. That means, given a
large s_log_groups_per_flex value like 36, groups_per_flex = 1 << 36
is essentially 1 << 4 = 16, rather than 0. This will bypass the check,
leaving s_log_groups_per_flex and groups_per_flex inconsistent.
2) The sanity check relies on undefined behavior, i.e., oversized shift.
A standard-confirming C compiler could rewrite the check in unexpected
ways. Consider the following equivalent form, assuming groups_per_flex
is unsigned for simplicity.
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex == 0 || groups_per_flex == 1) {
We compile the code snippet using Clang 3.0 and GCC 4.6. Clang will
completely optimize away the check groups_per_flex == 0, leaving the
patched code as vulnerable as the original. GCC keeps the check, but
there is no guarantee that future versions will do the same.
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 20,446
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void perf_event_output(struct perf_event *event,
struct perf_sample_data *data,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct perf_output_handle handle;
struct perf_event_header header;
/* protect the callchain buffers */
rcu_read_lock();
perf_prepare_sample(&header, data, event, regs);
if (perf_output_begin(&handle, event, header.size))
goto exit;
perf_output_sample(&handle, &header, data, event);
perf_output_end(&handle);
exit:
rcu_read_unlock();
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix race in swevent hash
There's a race on CPU unplug where we free the swevent hash array
while it can still have events on. This will result in a
use-after-free which is BAD.
Simply do not free the hash array on unplug. This leaves the thing
around and no use-after-free takes place.
When the last swevent dies, we do a for_each_possible_cpu() iteration
anyway to clean these up, at which time we'll free it, so no leakage
will occur.
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 56,090
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoBindVertexArrayOES(GLuint client_id) {
VertexAttribManager* vao = nullptr;
if (client_id != 0) {
vao = GetVertexAttribManager(client_id);
if (!vao) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
"glBindVertexArrayOES", "bad vertex array id.");
current_decoder_error_ = error::kNoError;
return;
}
} else {
vao = state_.default_vertex_attrib_manager.get();
}
if (state_.vertex_attrib_manager.get() != vao) {
if (state_.vertex_attrib_manager)
state_.vertex_attrib_manager->SetIsBound(false);
state_.vertex_attrib_manager = vao;
if (vao)
vao->SetIsBound(true);
if (!features().native_vertex_array_object) {
EmulateVertexArrayState();
} else {
GLuint service_id = vao->service_id();
api()->glBindVertexArrayOESFn(service_id);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,270
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Track::~Track() {
Info& info = const_cast<Info&>(m_info);
info.Clear();
ContentEncoding** i = content_encoding_entries_;
ContentEncoding** const j = content_encoding_entries_end_;
while (i != j) {
ContentEncoding* const encoding = *i++;
delete encoding;
}
delete[] content_encoding_entries_;
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 160,865
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebDevToolsAgentImpl::didCreateScriptContext(WebLocalFrameImpl* webframe, int worldId)
{
if (worldId)
return;
if (WebCore::LocalFrame* frame = webframe->frame())
frame->script().setContextDebugId(m_hostId);
}
Commit Message: [4/4] Process clearBrowserCahce/cookies commands in browser.
BUG=366585
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/251183005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172984 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 114,200
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CWebServer::CleanSessions() {
m_sql.safe_query(
"DELETE FROM UserSessions WHERE ExpirationDate < datetime('now', 'localtime')");
}
Commit Message: Fixed possible SQL Injection Vulnerability (Thanks to Fabio Carretto!)
CWE ID: CWE-89
| 0
| 90,960
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: brcmf_cfg80211_add_key(struct wiphy *wiphy, struct net_device *ndev,
u8 key_idx, bool pairwise, const u8 *mac_addr,
struct key_params *params)
{
struct brcmf_if *ifp = netdev_priv(ndev);
struct brcmf_wsec_key *key;
s32 val;
s32 wsec;
s32 err;
u8 keybuf[8];
bool ext_key;
brcmf_dbg(TRACE, "Enter\n");
brcmf_dbg(CONN, "key index (%d)\n", key_idx);
if (!check_vif_up(ifp->vif))
return -EIO;
if (key_idx >= BRCMF_MAX_DEFAULT_KEYS) {
/* we ignore this key index in this case */
brcmf_err("invalid key index (%d)\n", key_idx);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (params->key_len == 0)
return brcmf_cfg80211_del_key(wiphy, ndev, key_idx, pairwise,
mac_addr);
if (params->key_len > sizeof(key->data)) {
brcmf_err("Too long key length (%u)\n", params->key_len);
return -EINVAL;
}
ext_key = false;
if (mac_addr && (params->cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40) &&
(params->cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104)) {
brcmf_dbg(TRACE, "Ext key, mac %pM", mac_addr);
ext_key = true;
}
key = &ifp->vif->profile.key[key_idx];
memset(key, 0, sizeof(*key));
if ((ext_key) && (!is_multicast_ether_addr(mac_addr)))
memcpy((char *)&key->ea, (void *)mac_addr, ETH_ALEN);
key->len = params->key_len;
key->index = key_idx;
memcpy(key->data, params->key, key->len);
if (!ext_key)
key->flags = BRCMF_PRIMARY_KEY;
switch (params->cipher) {
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40:
key->algo = CRYPTO_ALGO_WEP1;
val = WEP_ENABLED;
brcmf_dbg(CONN, "WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40\n");
break;
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104:
key->algo = CRYPTO_ALGO_WEP128;
val = WEP_ENABLED;
brcmf_dbg(CONN, "WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104\n");
break;
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP:
if (!brcmf_is_apmode(ifp->vif)) {
brcmf_dbg(CONN, "Swapping RX/TX MIC key\n");
memcpy(keybuf, &key->data[24], sizeof(keybuf));
memcpy(&key->data[24], &key->data[16], sizeof(keybuf));
memcpy(&key->data[16], keybuf, sizeof(keybuf));
}
key->algo = CRYPTO_ALGO_TKIP;
val = TKIP_ENABLED;
brcmf_dbg(CONN, "WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP\n");
break;
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC:
key->algo = CRYPTO_ALGO_AES_CCM;
val = AES_ENABLED;
brcmf_dbg(CONN, "WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC\n");
break;
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP:
key->algo = CRYPTO_ALGO_AES_CCM;
val = AES_ENABLED;
brcmf_dbg(CONN, "WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP\n");
break;
default:
brcmf_err("Invalid cipher (0x%x)\n", params->cipher);
err = -EINVAL;
goto done;
}
err = send_key_to_dongle(ifp, key);
if (ext_key || err)
goto done;
err = brcmf_fil_bsscfg_int_get(ifp, "wsec", &wsec);
if (err) {
brcmf_err("get wsec error (%d)\n", err);
goto done;
}
wsec |= val;
err = brcmf_fil_bsscfg_int_set(ifp, "wsec", wsec);
if (err) {
brcmf_err("set wsec error (%d)\n", err);
goto done;
}
done:
brcmf_dbg(TRACE, "Exit\n");
return err;
}
Commit Message: brcmfmac: avoid potential stack overflow in brcmf_cfg80211_start_ap()
User-space can choose to omit NL80211_ATTR_SSID and only provide raw
IE TLV data. When doing so it can provide SSID IE with length exceeding
the allowed size. The driver further processes this IE copying it
into a local variable without checking the length. Hence stack can be
corrupted and used as exploit.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.7
Reported-by: Daxing Guo <freener.gdx@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Hante Meuleman <hante.meuleman@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Pieter-Paul Giesberts <pieter-paul.giesberts@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Franky Lin <franky.lin@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Arend van Spriel <arend.vanspriel@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 48,994
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: hashTableDestroy(HASH_TABLE *table)
{
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < table->size; i++)
table->mem->free_fcn(table->v[i]);
table->mem->free_fcn(table->v);
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Fix extraction of namespace prefix from XML name (#186)
CWE ID: CWE-611
| 0
| 92,336
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void spl_dllist_it_helper_move_forward(spl_ptr_llist_element **traverse_pointer_ptr, int *traverse_position_ptr, spl_ptr_llist *llist, int flags) /* {{{ */
{
if (*traverse_pointer_ptr) {
spl_ptr_llist_element *old = *traverse_pointer_ptr;
if (flags & SPL_DLLIST_IT_LIFO) {
*traverse_pointer_ptr = old->prev;
(*traverse_position_ptr)--;
if (flags & SPL_DLLIST_IT_DELETE) {
zval prev;
spl_ptr_llist_pop(llist, &prev);
zval_ptr_dtor(&prev);
}
} else {
*traverse_pointer_ptr = old->next;
if (flags & SPL_DLLIST_IT_DELETE) {
zval prev;
spl_ptr_llist_shift(llist, &prev);
zval_ptr_dtor(&prev);
} else {
(*traverse_position_ptr)++;
}
}
SPL_LLIST_DELREF(old);
SPL_LLIST_CHECK_ADDREF(*traverse_pointer_ptr);
}
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Fix bug #71735: Double-free in SplDoublyLinkedList::offsetSet
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 54,303
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::OnRenderProcessGone(int status, int exit_code) {
base::TerminationStatus termination_status =
static_cast<base::TerminationStatus>(status);
if (frame_tree_node_->IsMainFrame()) {
render_view_host_->render_view_termination_status_ = termination_status;
}
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kCrashReporting))
MaybeGenerateCrashReport(termination_status);
ResetChildren();
SetRenderFrameCreated(false);
InvalidateMojoConnection();
document_scoped_interface_provider_binding_.Close();
SetLastCommittedUrl(GURL());
for (auto& iter : ax_tree_snapshot_callbacks_)
std::move(iter.second).Run(ui::AXTreeUpdate());
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
for (base::IDMap<std::unique_ptr<ExtractSmartClipDataCallback>>::iterator
iter(&smart_clip_callbacks_);
!iter.IsAtEnd(); iter.Advance()) {
std::move(*iter.GetCurrentValue())
.Run(base::string16(), base::string16(), gfx::Rect());
}
smart_clip_callbacks_.Clear();
#endif // defined(OS_ANDROID)
ax_tree_snapshot_callbacks_.clear();
javascript_callbacks_.clear();
visual_state_callbacks_.clear();
remote_associated_interfaces_.reset();
sudden_termination_disabler_types_enabled_ = 0;
if (unload_state_ != UnloadState::NotRun) {
unload_state_ = UnloadState::Completed;
DCHECK(children_.empty());
PendingDeletionCheckCompleted();
return;
}
frame_tree_node_->render_manager()->CancelPendingIfNecessary(this);
}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <olka@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 153,119
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: keyboard::KeyboardController* LockContentsView::GetKeyboardController() const {
return GetWidget() ? GetKeyboardControllerForWidget(GetWidget()) : nullptr;
}
Commit Message: cros: Check initial auth type when showing views login.
Bug: 859611
Change-Id: I0298db9bbf4aed6bd40600aef2e1c5794e8cd058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1123056
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyin Hu <xiaoyinh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jacob Dufault <jdufault@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572224}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 131,503
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenameFile(const DownloadId& id,
const FilePath& new_path,
const FilePath& unique_path,
net::Error rename_error,
RenameFileState state,
RenameFileOverwrite should_overwrite) {
MockDownloadFile* file = download_file_factory_->GetExistingFile(id);
ASSERT_TRUE(file != NULL);
EXPECT_CALL(*file, Rename(unique_path))
.Times(1)
.WillOnce(Return(rename_error));
if (rename_error != net::OK) {
EXPECT_CALL(*file, BytesSoFar())
.Times(AtLeast(1))
.WillRepeatedly(Return(byte_count_[id]));
EXPECT_CALL(*file, GetHashState())
.Times(AtLeast(1));
EXPECT_CALL(*file, GetDownloadManager())
.Times(AtLeast(1));
} else if (state == COMPLETE) {
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
EXPECT_CALL(*file, AnnotateWithSourceInformation());
#endif
}
if (state == IN_PROGRESS) {
download_file_manager_->RenameInProgressDownloadFile(
id, new_path, (should_overwrite == OVERWRITE),
base::Bind(&TestDownloadManager::OnDownloadRenamed,
download_manager_, id.local()));
} else { // state == COMPLETE
download_file_manager_->RenameCompletingDownloadFile(
id, new_path, (should_overwrite == OVERWRITE),
base::Bind(&TestDownloadManager::OnDownloadRenamed,
download_manager_, id.local()));
}
if (rename_error != net::OK) {
EXPECT_CALL(*download_manager_,
OnDownloadInterrupted(
id.local(),
byte_count_[id],
"",
content::ConvertNetErrorToInterruptReason(
rename_error,
content::DOWNLOAD_INTERRUPT_FROM_DISK)));
EXPECT_CALL(*download_manager_,
OnDownloadRenamed(id.local(), FilePath()));
ProcessAllPendingMessages();
++error_count_[id];
} else {
EXPECT_CALL(*download_manager_,
OnDownloadRenamed(id.local(), unique_path));
ProcessAllPendingMessages();
}
}
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
R=asanka@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 170,881
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Textfield::OnMousePressed(const ui::MouseEvent& event) {
const bool had_focus = HasFocus();
bool handled = controller_ && controller_->HandleMouseEvent(this, event);
if (!handled &&
(event.IsOnlyLeftMouseButton() || event.IsOnlyRightMouseButton())) {
if (!had_focus)
RequestFocus();
ShowImeIfNeeded();
}
#if defined(OS_LINUX) && !defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
if (!handled && !had_focus && event.IsOnlyMiddleMouseButton())
RequestFocus();
#endif
return selection_controller_.OnMousePressed(
event, handled,
had_focus ? SelectionController::FOCUSED
: SelectionController::UNFOCUSED);
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 126,396
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: R_API bool r_config_save_char(RConfigHold *h, ...) {
va_list ap;
char *key;
if (!h->list_char) {
h->list_char = r_list_newf ((RListFree) free);
if (!h->list_char) {
return false;
}
}
va_start (ap, h);
while ((key = va_arg (ap, char *))) {
RConfigHoldChar *hc = R_NEW0 (RConfigHoldChar);
if (!hc) {
continue;
}
hc->key = key;
hc->value = r_config_get (h->cfg, key);
r_list_append (h->list_char, hc);
}
va_end (ap);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix #7698 - UAF in r_config_set when loading a dex
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 64,490
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cifs_get_tcp_session(struct smb_vol *volume_info)
{
struct TCP_Server_Info *tcp_ses = NULL;
int rc;
cifs_dbg(FYI, "UNC: %s\n", volume_info->UNC);
/* see if we already have a matching tcp_ses */
tcp_ses = cifs_find_tcp_session(volume_info);
if (tcp_ses)
return tcp_ses;
tcp_ses = kzalloc(sizeof(struct TCP_Server_Info), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tcp_ses) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out_err;
}
rc = cifs_crypto_shash_allocate(tcp_ses);
if (rc) {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "could not setup hash structures rc %d\n", rc);
goto out_err;
}
tcp_ses->ops = volume_info->ops;
tcp_ses->vals = volume_info->vals;
cifs_set_net_ns(tcp_ses, get_net(current->nsproxy->net_ns));
tcp_ses->hostname = extract_hostname(volume_info->UNC);
if (IS_ERR(tcp_ses->hostname)) {
rc = PTR_ERR(tcp_ses->hostname);
goto out_err_crypto_release;
}
tcp_ses->noblocksnd = volume_info->noblocksnd;
tcp_ses->noautotune = volume_info->noautotune;
tcp_ses->tcp_nodelay = volume_info->sockopt_tcp_nodelay;
tcp_ses->in_flight = 0;
tcp_ses->credits = 1;
init_waitqueue_head(&tcp_ses->response_q);
init_waitqueue_head(&tcp_ses->request_q);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tcp_ses->pending_mid_q);
mutex_init(&tcp_ses->srv_mutex);
memcpy(tcp_ses->workstation_RFC1001_name,
volume_info->source_rfc1001_name, RFC1001_NAME_LEN_WITH_NULL);
memcpy(tcp_ses->server_RFC1001_name,
volume_info->target_rfc1001_name, RFC1001_NAME_LEN_WITH_NULL);
tcp_ses->session_estab = false;
tcp_ses->sequence_number = 0;
tcp_ses->lstrp = jiffies;
spin_lock_init(&tcp_ses->req_lock);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tcp_ses->tcp_ses_list);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tcp_ses->smb_ses_list);
INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&tcp_ses->echo, cifs_echo_request);
memcpy(&tcp_ses->srcaddr, &volume_info->srcaddr,
sizeof(tcp_ses->srcaddr));
memcpy(&tcp_ses->dstaddr, &volume_info->dstaddr,
sizeof(tcp_ses->dstaddr));
/*
* at this point we are the only ones with the pointer
* to the struct since the kernel thread not created yet
* no need to spinlock this init of tcpStatus or srv_count
*/
tcp_ses->tcpStatus = CifsNew;
++tcp_ses->srv_count;
rc = ip_connect(tcp_ses);
if (rc < 0) {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "Error connecting to socket. Aborting operation.\n");
goto out_err_crypto_release;
}
/*
* since we're in a cifs function already, we know that
* this will succeed. No need for try_module_get().
*/
__module_get(THIS_MODULE);
tcp_ses->tsk = kthread_run(cifs_demultiplex_thread,
tcp_ses, "cifsd");
if (IS_ERR(tcp_ses->tsk)) {
rc = PTR_ERR(tcp_ses->tsk);
cifs_dbg(VFS, "error %d create cifsd thread\n", rc);
module_put(THIS_MODULE);
goto out_err_crypto_release;
}
tcp_ses->tcpStatus = CifsNeedNegotiate;
/* thread spawned, put it on the list */
spin_lock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock);
list_add(&tcp_ses->tcp_ses_list, &cifs_tcp_ses_list);
spin_unlock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock);
cifs_fscache_get_client_cookie(tcp_ses);
/* queue echo request delayed work */
queue_delayed_work(cifsiod_wq, &tcp_ses->echo, SMB_ECHO_INTERVAL);
return tcp_ses;
out_err_crypto_release:
cifs_crypto_shash_release(tcp_ses);
put_net(cifs_net_ns(tcp_ses));
out_err:
if (tcp_ses) {
if (!IS_ERR(tcp_ses->hostname))
kfree(tcp_ses->hostname);
if (tcp_ses->ssocket)
sock_release(tcp_ses->ssocket);
kfree(tcp_ses);
}
return ERR_PTR(rc);
}
Commit Message: cifs: fix off-by-one bug in build_unc_path_to_root
commit 839db3d10a (cifs: fix up handling of prefixpath= option) changed
the code such that the vol->prepath no longer contained a leading
delimiter and then fixed up the places that accessed that field to
account for that change.
One spot in build_unc_path_to_root was missed however. When doing the
pointer addition on pos, that patch failed to account for the fact that
we had already incremented "pos" by one when adding the length of the
prepath. This caused a buffer overrun by one byte.
This patch fixes the problem by correcting the handling of "pos".
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.8+
Reported-by: Marcus Moeller <marcus.moeller@gmx.ch>
Reported-by: Ken Fallon <ken.fallon@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 29,818
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: htc_request_check_host_hdr(struct http *hp)
{
int u;
int seen_host = 0;
for (u = HTTP_HDR_FIRST; u < hp->nhd; u++) {
if (hp->hd[u].b == NULL)
continue;
AN(hp->hd[u].b);
AN(hp->hd[u].e);
if (http_IsHdr(&hp->hd[u], H_Host)) {
if (seen_host) {
return (400);
}
seen_host = 1;
}
}
return (0);
}
Commit Message: Check for duplicate Content-Length headers in requests
If a duplicate CL header is in the request, we fail the request with a
400 (Bad Request)
Fix a test case that was sending duplicate CL by misstake and would
not fail because of that.
CWE ID:
| 1
| 167,478
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Document::ThreadedParsingEnabledForTesting() {
return g_threaded_parsing_enabled_for_testing;
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 129,899
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: handle_role_request(struct ofconn *ofconn, const struct ofp_header *oh)
{
struct ofputil_role_request request;
struct ofputil_role_request reply;
struct ofpbuf *buf;
enum ofperr error;
error = ofputil_decode_role_message(oh, &request);
if (error) {
return error;
}
if (request.role != OFPCR12_ROLE_NOCHANGE) {
if (request.role != OFPCR12_ROLE_EQUAL
&& request.have_generation_id
&& !ofconn_set_master_election_id(ofconn, request.generation_id)) {
return OFPERR_OFPRRFC_STALE;
}
ofconn_set_role(ofconn, request.role);
}
reply.role = ofconn_get_role(ofconn);
reply.have_generation_id = ofconn_get_master_election_id(
ofconn, &reply.generation_id);
buf = ofputil_encode_role_reply(oh, &reply);
ofconn_send_reply(ofconn, buf);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <vishal.deep.ajmera@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 77,264
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: get_opthdr_from_block_data(pcap_t *p, struct block_cursor *cursor, char *errbuf)
{
struct option_header *opthdr;
opthdr = get_from_block_data(cursor, sizeof(*opthdr), errbuf);
if (opthdr == NULL) {
/*
* Option header is cut short.
*/
return (NULL);
}
/*
* Byte-swap it if necessary.
*/
if (p->swapped) {
opthdr->option_code = SWAPSHORT(opthdr->option_code);
opthdr->option_length = SWAPSHORT(opthdr->option_length);
}
return (opthdr);
}
Commit Message: Fix some format warnings.
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 88,400
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool PaintLayerScrollableArea::HasBeenDisposed() const {
return !layer_;
}
Commit Message: Always call UpdateCompositedScrollOffset, not just for the root layer
Bug: 927560
Change-Id: I1d5522aae4f11dd3f5b8947bb089bac1bf19bdb4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1452701
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mason Freed <masonfreed@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#628942}
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 130,052
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TextureManager::StopTracking(TextureManager::TextureInfo* texture) {
--texture_info_count_;
if (!texture->CanRender(feature_info_)) {
DCHECK_NE(0, num_unrenderable_textures_);
--num_unrenderable_textures_;
}
if (!texture->SafeToRenderFrom()) {
DCHECK_NE(0, num_unsafe_textures_);
--num_unsafe_textures_;
}
num_uncleared_mips_ -= texture->num_uncleared_mips();
DCHECK_GE(num_uncleared_mips_, 0);
mem_represented_ -= texture->estimated_size();
UpdateMemRepresented();
}
Commit Message: Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 103,741
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void btif_hl_release_mcl_sockets(UINT8 app_idx, UINT8 mcl_idx){
UINT8 i;
btif_hl_mdl_cb_t *p_dcb;
BOOLEAN found= FALSE;
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __FUNCTION__);
for (i=0; i < BTA_HL_NUM_MDLS_PER_MCL ; i ++)
{
p_dcb = BTIF_HL_GET_MDL_CB_PTR(app_idx, mcl_idx, i);
if (p_dcb && p_dcb->in_use && p_dcb->p_scb)
{
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("found socket for app_idx=%d mcl_id=%d, mdl_idx=%d", app_idx, mcl_idx, i);
btif_hl_set_socket_state (p_dcb->p_scb, BTIF_HL_SOC_STATE_W4_REL);
p_dcb->p_scb = NULL;
found = TRUE;
}
}
if (found)
btif_hl_select_close_connected();
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 158,740
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int handle_dots(struct nameidata *nd, int type)
{
if (type == LAST_DOTDOT) {
if (nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU) {
return follow_dotdot_rcu(nd);
} else
follow_dotdot(nd);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: vfs: Test for and handle paths that are unreachable from their mnt_root
In rare cases a directory can be renamed out from under a bind mount.
In those cases without special handling it becomes possible to walk up
the directory tree to the root dentry of the filesystem and down
from the root dentry to every other file or directory on the filesystem.
Like division by zero .. from an unconnected path can not be given
a useful semantic as there is no predicting at which path component
the code will realize it is unconnected. We certainly can not match
the current behavior as the current behavior is a security hole.
Therefore when encounting .. when following an unconnected path
return -ENOENT.
- Add a function path_connected to verify path->dentry is reachable
from path->mnt.mnt_root. AKA to validate that rename did not do
something nasty to the bind mount.
To avoid races path_connected must be called after following a path
component to it's next path component.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 1
| 166,637
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct sched_domain *__build_smt_sched_domain(struct s_data *d,
const struct cpumask *cpu_map, struct sched_domain_attr *attr,
struct sched_domain *parent, int i)
{
struct sched_domain *sd = parent;
#ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_SMT
sd = &per_cpu(cpu_domains, i).sd;
SD_INIT(sd, SIBLING);
set_domain_attribute(sd, attr);
cpumask_and(sched_domain_span(sd), cpu_map, topology_thread_cpumask(i));
sd->parent = parent;
parent->child = sd;
cpu_to_cpu_group(i, cpu_map, &sd->groups, d->tmpmask);
#endif
return sd;
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 22,298
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gdImageRotateNearestNeighbour(gdImagePtr src, const float degrees,
const int bgColor)
{
float _angle = ((float) (-degrees / 180.0f) * (float)M_PI);
const int src_w = gdImageSX(src);
const int src_h = gdImageSY(src);
const unsigned int new_width = (unsigned int)(abs((int)(src_w * cos(_angle))) + abs((int)(src_h * sin(_angle))) + 0.5f);
const unsigned int new_height = (unsigned int)(abs((int)(src_w * sin(_angle))) + abs((int)(src_h * cos(_angle))) + 0.5f);
const gdFixed f_0_5 = gd_ftofx(0.5f);
const gdFixed f_H = gd_itofx(src_h/2);
const gdFixed f_W = gd_itofx(src_w/2);
const gdFixed f_cos = gd_ftofx(cos(-_angle));
const gdFixed f_sin = gd_ftofx(sin(-_angle));
unsigned int dst_offset_x;
unsigned int dst_offset_y = 0;
unsigned int i;
gdImagePtr dst;
/* impact perf a bit, but not that much. Implementation for palette
images can be done at a later point.
*/
if (src->trueColor == 0) {
gdImagePaletteToTrueColor(src);
}
dst = gdImageCreateTrueColor(new_width, new_height);
if (!dst) {
return NULL;
}
dst->saveAlphaFlag = 1;
for (i = 0; i < new_height; i++) {
unsigned int j;
dst_offset_x = 0;
for (j = 0; j < new_width; j++) {
gdFixed f_i = gd_itofx((int)i - (int)new_height / 2);
gdFixed f_j = gd_itofx((int)j - (int)new_width / 2);
gdFixed f_m = gd_mulfx(f_j,f_sin) + gd_mulfx(f_i,f_cos) + f_0_5 + f_H;
gdFixed f_n = gd_mulfx(f_j,f_cos) - gd_mulfx(f_i,f_sin) + f_0_5 + f_W;
long m = gd_fxtoi(f_m);
long n = gd_fxtoi(f_n);
if ((m > 0) && (m < src_h-1) && (n > 0) && (n < src_w-1)) {
if (dst_offset_y < new_height) {
dst->tpixels[dst_offset_y][dst_offset_x++] = src->tpixels[m][n];
}
} else {
if (dst_offset_y < new_height) {
dst->tpixels[dst_offset_y][dst_offset_x++] = bgColor;
}
}
}
dst_offset_y++;
}
return dst;
}
Commit Message: gdImageScaleTwoPass memory leak fix
Fixing memory leak in gdImageScaleTwoPass, as reported by @cmb69 and
confirmed by @vapier. This bug actually bit me in production and I'm
very thankful that it was reported with an easy fix.
Fixes #173.
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 56,344
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline bool vmx_control_verify(u32 control, u32 low, u32 high)
{
return fixed_bits_valid(control, low, high);
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Allow L1 to intercept software exceptions (#BP and #OF)
When L2 exits to L0 due to "exception or NMI", software exceptions
(#BP and #OF) for which L1 has requested an intercept should be
handled by L1 rather than L0. Previously, only hardware exceptions
were forwarded to L1.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-388
| 0
| 48,110
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DiceResponseHandler* DiceResponseHandler::GetForProfile(Profile* profile) {
return DiceResponseHandlerFactory::GetForProfile(profile);
}
Commit Message: [signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <droger@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <isherman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <msarda@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 143,047
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const FilePath& DownloadItemImpl::GetForcedFilePath() const {
return forced_file_path_;
}
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
R=asanka@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 106,089
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RootWindowHostLinux::UnConfineCursor() {
#if XFIXES_MAJOR >= 5
if (pointer_barriers_.get()) {
XFixesDestroyPointerBarrier(xdisplay_, pointer_barriers_[0]);
XFixesDestroyPointerBarrier(xdisplay_, pointer_barriers_[1]);
XFixesDestroyPointerBarrier(xdisplay_, pointer_barriers_[2]);
XFixesDestroyPointerBarrier(xdisplay_, pointer_barriers_[3]);
pointer_barriers_.reset();
}
#endif
}
Commit Message: Introduce XGetImage() for GrabWindowSnapshot() in ChromeOS.
BUG=119492
TEST=manually done
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10386124
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137556 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 104,014
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int dexOptMkdir(const char* path, int mode)
{
#ifdef _WIN32
return mkdir(path);
#else
return mkdir(path, mode);
#endif
}
Commit Message: Fix potential buffer overrun.
BUG=27840771
Change-Id: I240f188b2e8f4b45d90138cfb3b14869cf506452
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 159,752
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void FillGifBackGround(struct ngiflib_gif * g) {
long n = (long)g->width*g->height;
#ifndef NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY
u32 bg_truecolor;
#endif /* NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY */
if((g->frbuff.p8==NULL)||(g->palette==NULL)) return;
#ifndef NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY
if(g->mode & NGIFLIB_MODE_INDEXED) {
#endif /* NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY */
ngiflib_memset(g->frbuff.p8, g->backgroundindex, n);
#ifndef NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY
} else {
u32 * p = g->frbuff.p32;
bg_truecolor = GifIndexToTrueColor(g->palette, g->backgroundindex);
while(n-->0) *p++ = bg_truecolor;
}
#endif /* NGIFLIB_INDEXED_ONLY */
}
Commit Message: fix "pixel overrun"
fixes #3
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 83,086
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int adev_dump(const audio_hw_device_t *device, int fd)
{
UNUSED(device);
UNUSED(fd);
FNLOG();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 158,456
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int decode_attr_aclsupport(struct xdr_stream *xdr, uint32_t *bitmap, uint32_t *res)
{
__be32 *p;
*res = ACL4_SUPPORT_ALLOW_ACL|ACL4_SUPPORT_DENY_ACL;
if (unlikely(bitmap[0] & (FATTR4_WORD0_ACLSUPPORT - 1U)))
return -EIO;
if (likely(bitmap[0] & FATTR4_WORD0_ACLSUPPORT)) {
p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, 4);
if (unlikely(!p))
goto out_overflow;
*res = be32_to_cpup(p);
bitmap[0] &= ~FATTR4_WORD0_ACLSUPPORT;
}
dprintk("%s: ACLs supported=%u\n", __func__, (unsigned int)*res);
return 0;
out_overflow:
print_overflow_msg(__func__, xdr);
return -EIO;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 23,254
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FindInPageNotificationObserver::FindInPageNotificationObserver(
AutomationProvider* automation, WebContents* parent_tab,
bool reply_with_json, IPC::Message* reply_message)
: automation_(automation->AsWeakPtr()),
active_match_ordinal_(-1),
reply_with_json_(reply_with_json),
reply_message_(reply_message) {
registrar_.Add(this, chrome::NOTIFICATION_FIND_RESULT_AVAILABLE,
content::Source<WebContents>(parent_tab));
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 117,528
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: LayoutUnit RenderBlockFlow::logicalLeftOffsetForPositioningFloat(LayoutUnit logicalTop, LayoutUnit fixedOffset, bool applyTextIndent, LayoutUnit* heightRemaining) const
{
LayoutUnit offset = fixedOffset;
if (m_floatingObjects && m_floatingObjects->hasLeftObjects())
offset = m_floatingObjects->logicalLeftOffsetForPositioningFloat(fixedOffset, logicalTop, heightRemaining);
return adjustLogicalLeftOffsetForLine(offset, applyTextIndent);
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 116,384
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GLES2Decoder::GLES2Decoder(DecoderClient* client,
CommandBufferServiceBase* command_buffer_service,
Outputter* outputter)
: CommonDecoder(client, command_buffer_service), outputter_(outputter) {
DCHECK(outputter_);
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,429
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned long emulator_get_cr(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int cr)
{
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = emul_to_vcpu(ctxt);
unsigned long value;
switch (cr) {
case 0:
value = kvm_read_cr0(vcpu);
break;
case 2:
value = vcpu->arch.cr2;
break;
case 3:
value = kvm_read_cr3(vcpu);
break;
case 4:
value = kvm_read_cr4(vcpu);
break;
case 8:
value = kvm_get_cr8(vcpu);
break;
default:
vcpu_printf(vcpu, "%s: unexpected cr %u\n", __func__, cr);
return 0;
}
return value;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 20,667
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __init pcd_init(void)
{
struct pcd_unit *cd;
int unit;
if (disable)
return -EINVAL;
pcd_init_units();
if (pcd_detect())
return -ENODEV;
/* get the atapi capabilities page */
pcd_probe_capabilities();
if (register_blkdev(major, name)) {
for (unit = 0, cd = pcd; unit < PCD_UNITS; unit++, cd++)
put_disk(cd->disk);
return -EBUSY;
}
for (unit = 0, cd = pcd; unit < PCD_UNITS; unit++, cd++) {
if (cd->present) {
register_cdrom(&cd->info);
cd->disk->private_data = cd;
add_disk(cd->disk);
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: paride/pcd: Fix potential NULL pointer dereference and mem leak
Syzkaller report this:
pcd: pcd version 1.07, major 46, nice 0
pcd0: Autoprobe failed
pcd: No CD-ROM drive found
kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 1 PID: 4525 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.1.0-rc3+ #8
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:pcd_init+0x95c/0x1000 [pcd]
Code: c4 ab f7 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 80 3c 28 00 74 08 48 89 df e8 56 a3 da f7 4c 8b 23 49 8d bc 24 80 05 00 00 48 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <80> 3c 28 00 74 05 e8 39 a3 da f7 49 8b bc 24 80 05 00 00 e8 cc b2
RSP: 0018:ffff8881e84df880 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 00000000000000b0 RBX: ffffffffc155a088 RCX: ffffffffc1508935
RDX: 0000000000040000 RSI: ffffc900014f0000 RDI: 0000000000000580
RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: ffffed103ee658b8 R09: ffffed103ee658b8
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed103ee658b7 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffffffffc155a778 R14: ffffffffc155a4a8 R15: 0000000000000003
FS: 00007fe71bee3700(0000) GS:ffff8881f7300000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000055a7334441a8 CR3: 00000001e9674003 CR4: 00000000007606e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
? 0xffffffffc1508000
? 0xffffffffc1508000
do_one_initcall+0xbc/0x47d init/main.c:901
do_init_module+0x1b5/0x547 kernel/module.c:3456
load_module+0x6405/0x8c10 kernel/module.c:3804
__do_sys_finit_module+0x162/0x190 kernel/module.c:3898
do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x450 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fe71bee2c58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000180 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007fe71bee2c70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fe71bee36bc
R13: 00000000004bcefa R14: 00000000006f6fb0 R15: 0000000000000004
Modules linked in: pcd(+) paride solos_pci atm ts_fsm rtc_mt6397 mac80211 nhc_mobility nhc_udp nhc_ipv6 nhc_hop nhc_dest nhc_fragment nhc_routing 6lowpan rtc_cros_ec memconsole intel_xhci_usb_role_switch roles rtc_wm8350 usbcore industrialio_triggered_buffer kfifo_buf industrialio asc7621 dm_era dm_persistent_data dm_bufio dm_mod tpm gnss_ubx gnss_serial serdev gnss max2165 cpufreq_dt hid_penmount hid menf21bmc_wdt rc_core n_tracesink ide_gd_mod cdns_csi2tx v4l2_fwnode videodev media pinctrl_lewisburg pinctrl_intel iptable_security iptable_raw iptable_mangle iptable_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 iptable_filter bpfilter ip6_vti ip_vti ip_gre ipip sit tunnel4 ip_tunnel hsr veth netdevsim vxcan batman_adv cfg80211 rfkill chnl_net caif nlmon dummy team bonding vcan bridge stp llc ip6_gre gre ip6_tunnel tunnel6 tun joydev mousedev ppdev kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel aes_x86_64 crypto_simd
ide_pci_generic piix input_leds cryptd glue_helper psmouse ide_core intel_agp serio_raw intel_gtt ata_generic i2c_piix4 agpgart pata_acpi parport_pc parport floppy rtc_cmos sch_fq_codel ip_tables x_tables sha1_ssse3 sha1_generic ipv6 [last unloaded: bmc150_magn]
Dumping ftrace buffer:
(ftrace buffer empty)
---[ end trace d873691c3cd69f56 ]---
If alloc_disk fails in pcd_init_units, cd->disk will be
NULL, however in pcd_detect and pcd_exit, it's not check
this before free.It may result a NULL pointer dereference.
Also when register_blkdev failed, blk_cleanup_queue() and
blk_mq_free_tag_set() should be called to free resources.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: 81b74ac68c28 ("paride/pcd: cleanup queues when detection fails")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 1
| 169,519
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WORD32 ih264d_start_of_pic(dec_struct_t *ps_dec,
WORD32 i4_poc,
pocstruct_t *ps_temp_poc,
UWORD16 u2_frame_num,
dec_pic_params_t *ps_pps)
{
pocstruct_t *ps_prev_poc = &ps_dec->s_cur_pic_poc;
pocstruct_t *ps_cur_poc = ps_temp_poc;
pic_buffer_t *pic_buf;
ivd_video_decode_op_t * ps_dec_output =
(ivd_video_decode_op_t *)ps_dec->pv_dec_out;
dec_slice_params_t *ps_cur_slice = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice;
dec_seq_params_t *ps_seq = ps_pps->ps_sps;
UWORD8 u1_bottom_field_flag = ps_cur_slice->u1_bottom_field_flag;
UWORD8 u1_field_pic_flag = ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag;
/* high profile related declarations */
high_profile_tools_t s_high_profile;
WORD32 ret;
H264_MUTEX_LOCK(&ps_dec->process_disp_mutex);
ps_prev_poc->i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb = ps_cur_poc->i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb;
ps_prev_poc->i4_pic_order_cnt_msb = ps_cur_poc->i4_pic_order_cnt_msb;
ps_prev_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom =
ps_cur_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom;
ps_prev_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[0] =
ps_cur_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[0];
ps_prev_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[1] =
ps_cur_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[1];
ps_prev_poc->u1_bot_field = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_bottom_field_flag;
ps_prev_poc->i4_prev_frame_num_ofst = ps_cur_poc->i4_prev_frame_num_ofst;
ps_prev_poc->u2_frame_num = u2_frame_num;
ps_dec->i1_prev_mb_qp_delta = 0;
ps_dec->i1_next_ctxt_idx = 0;
ps_dec->u4_nmb_deblk = 0;
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 1)
ps_dec->u4_nmb_deblk = 1;
if(ps_seq->u1_mb_aff_flag == 1)
{
ps_dec->u4_nmb_deblk = 0;
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores > 2)
ps_dec->u4_num_cores = 2;
}
ps_dec->u4_use_intrapred_line_copy = 0;
if (ps_seq->u1_mb_aff_flag == 0)
{
ps_dec->u4_use_intrapred_line_copy = 1;
}
ps_dec->u4_app_disable_deblk_frm = 0;
/* If degrade is enabled, set the degrade flags appropriately */
if(ps_dec->i4_degrade_type && ps_dec->i4_degrade_pics)
{
WORD32 degrade_pic;
ps_dec->i4_degrade_pic_cnt++;
degrade_pic = 0;
/* If degrade is to be done in all frames, then do not check further */
switch(ps_dec->i4_degrade_pics)
{
case 4:
{
degrade_pic = 1;
break;
}
case 3:
{
if(ps_cur_slice->u1_slice_type != I_SLICE)
degrade_pic = 1;
break;
}
case 2:
{
/* If pic count hits non-degrade interval or it is an islice, then do not degrade */
if((ps_cur_slice->u1_slice_type != I_SLICE)
&& (ps_dec->i4_degrade_pic_cnt
!= ps_dec->i4_nondegrade_interval))
degrade_pic = 1;
break;
}
case 1:
{
/* Check if the current picture is non-ref */
if(0 == ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_ref_idc)
{
degrade_pic = 1;
}
break;
}
}
if(degrade_pic)
{
if(ps_dec->i4_degrade_type & 0x2)
ps_dec->u4_app_disable_deblk_frm = 1;
/* MC degrading is done only for non-ref pictures */
if(0 == ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_ref_idc)
{
if(ps_dec->i4_degrade_type & 0x4)
ps_dec->i4_mv_frac_mask = 0;
if(ps_dec->i4_degrade_type & 0x8)
ps_dec->i4_mv_frac_mask = 0;
}
}
else
ps_dec->i4_degrade_pic_cnt = 0;
}
{
dec_err_status_t * ps_err = ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status;
if(ps_dec->u1_sl_typ_5_9
&& ((ps_cur_slice->u1_slice_type == I_SLICE)
|| (ps_cur_slice->u1_slice_type
== SI_SLICE)))
ps_err->u1_cur_pic_type = PIC_TYPE_I;
else
ps_err->u1_cur_pic_type = PIC_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
if(ps_err->u1_pic_aud_i == PIC_TYPE_I)
{
ps_err->u1_cur_pic_type = PIC_TYPE_I;
ps_err->u1_pic_aud_i = PIC_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
}
if(ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_unit_type == IDR_SLICE_NAL)
{
if(ps_err->u1_err_flag)
ih264d_reset_ref_bufs(ps_dec->ps_dpb_mgr);
ps_err->u1_err_flag = ACCEPT_ALL_PICS;
}
}
if(ps_dec->u1_init_dec_flag && ps_dec->s_prev_seq_params.u1_eoseq_pending)
{
/* Reset the decoder picture buffers */
WORD32 j;
for(j = 0; j < MAX_DISP_BUFS_NEW; j++)
{
ih264_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
j,
BUF_MGR_REF);
ih264_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_mv_buf_mgr,
ps_dec->au1_pic_buf_id_mv_buf_id_map[j],
BUF_MGR_REF);
ih264_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
j,
BUF_MGR_IO);
}
/* reset the decoder structure parameters related to buffer handling */
ps_dec->u1_second_field = 0;
ps_dec->i4_cur_display_seq = 0;
/********************************************************************/
/* indicate in the decoder output i4_status that some frames are being */
/* dropped, so that it resets timestamp and wait for a new sequence */
/********************************************************************/
ps_dec->s_prev_seq_params.u1_eoseq_pending = 0;
}
ret = ih264d_init_pic(ps_dec, u2_frame_num, i4_poc, ps_pps);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data = ps_dec->pv_pic_tu_coeff_data;
ps_dec->pv_proc_tu_coeff_data = ps_dec->pv_pic_tu_coeff_data;
ps_dec->ps_nmb_info = ps_dec->ps_frm_mb_info;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
UWORD16 pic_wd = ps_dec->u4_width_at_init;
UWORD16 pic_ht = ps_dec->u4_height_at_init;
UWORD32 num_mbs;
if((NULL != ps_dec->ps_cur_sps) && (1 == (ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u1_is_valid)))
{
pic_wd = ps_dec->u2_pic_wd;
pic_ht = ps_dec->u2_pic_ht;
}
num_mbs = (pic_wd * pic_ht) >> 8;
if(ps_dec->pu1_dec_mb_map)
{
memset((void *)ps_dec->pu1_dec_mb_map, 0, num_mbs);
}
if(ps_dec->pu1_recon_mb_map)
{
memset((void *)ps_dec->pu1_recon_mb_map, 0, num_mbs);
}
if(ps_dec->pu2_slice_num_map)
{
memset((void *)ps_dec->pu2_slice_num_map, 0,
(num_mbs * sizeof(UWORD16)));
}
}
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice = &(ps_dec->ps_dec_slice_buf[0]);
ps_dec->ps_decode_cur_slice = &(ps_dec->ps_dec_slice_buf[0]);
ps_dec->ps_computebs_cur_slice = &(ps_dec->ps_dec_slice_buf[0]);
ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num = 0;
/* Initialize all the HP toolsets to zero */
ps_dec->s_high_profile.u1_scaling_present = 0;
ps_dec->s_high_profile.u1_transform8x8_present = 0;
/* Get Next Free Picture */
if(1 == ps_dec->u4_share_disp_buf)
{
UWORD32 i;
/* Free any buffer that is in the queue to be freed */
for(i = 0; i < MAX_DISP_BUFS_NEW; i++)
{
if(0 == ps_dec->u4_disp_buf_to_be_freed[i])
continue;
ih264_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr, i,
BUF_MGR_IO);
ps_dec->u4_disp_buf_to_be_freed[i] = 0;
ps_dec->u4_disp_buf_mapping[i] = 0;
}
}
if(!(u1_field_pic_flag && 0 != ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded)) //ps_dec->u1_second_field))
{
pic_buffer_t *ps_cur_pic;
WORD32 cur_pic_buf_id, cur_mv_buf_id;
col_mv_buf_t *ps_col_mv;
while(1)
{
ps_cur_pic = (pic_buffer_t *)ih264_buf_mgr_get_next_free(
(buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
&cur_pic_buf_id);
if(ps_cur_pic == NULL)
{
ps_dec->i4_error_code = ERROR_UNAVAIL_PICBUF_T;
return ERROR_UNAVAIL_PICBUF_T;
}
if(0 == ps_dec->u4_disp_buf_mapping[cur_pic_buf_id])
{
break;
}
}
ps_col_mv = (col_mv_buf_t *)ih264_buf_mgr_get_next_free((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_mv_buf_mgr,
&cur_mv_buf_id);
if(ps_col_mv == NULL)
{
ps_dec->i4_error_code = ERROR_UNAVAIL_MVBUF_T;
return ERROR_UNAVAIL_MVBUF_T;
}
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic = ps_cur_pic;
ps_dec->u1_pic_buf_id = cur_pic_buf_id;
ps_cur_pic->u4_ts = ps_dec->u4_ts;
ps_cur_pic->u1_mv_buf_id = cur_mv_buf_id;
ps_dec->au1_pic_buf_id_mv_buf_id_map[cur_pic_buf_id] = cur_mv_buf_id;
ps_cur_pic->pu1_col_zero_flag = (UWORD8 *)ps_col_mv->pv_col_zero_flag;
ps_cur_pic->ps_mv = (mv_pred_t *)ps_col_mv->pv_mv;
ps_dec->au1_pic_buf_ref_flag[cur_pic_buf_id] = 0;
{
/*make first entry of list0 point to cur pic,so that if first Islice is in error, ref pic struct will have valid entries*/
ps_dec->ps_ref_pic_buf_lx[0] = ps_dec->ps_dpb_mgr->ps_init_dpb[0];
*(ps_dec->ps_dpb_mgr->ps_init_dpb[0][0]) = *ps_cur_pic;
/* Initialize for field reference as well */
*(ps_dec->ps_dpb_mgr->ps_init_dpb[0][MAX_REF_BUFS]) = *ps_cur_pic;
}
if(!ps_dec->ps_cur_pic)
{
WORD32 j;
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT("------- Display Buffers Reset --------\n");
for(j = 0; j < MAX_DISP_BUFS_NEW; j++)
{
ih264_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
j,
BUF_MGR_REF);
ih264_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_mv_buf_mgr,
ps_dec->au1_pic_buf_id_mv_buf_id_map[j],
BUF_MGR_REF);
ih264_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
j,
BUF_MGR_IO);
}
ps_dec->i4_cur_display_seq = 0;
ps_dec->i4_prev_max_display_seq = 0;
ps_dec->i4_max_poc = 0;
ps_cur_pic = (pic_buffer_t *)ih264_buf_mgr_get_next_free(
(buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
&cur_pic_buf_id);
if(ps_cur_pic == NULL)
{
ps_dec->i4_error_code = ERROR_UNAVAIL_PICBUF_T;
return ERROR_UNAVAIL_PICBUF_T;
}
ps_col_mv = (col_mv_buf_t *)ih264_buf_mgr_get_next_free((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_mv_buf_mgr,
&cur_mv_buf_id);
if(ps_col_mv == NULL)
{
ps_dec->i4_error_code = ERROR_UNAVAIL_MVBUF_T;
return ERROR_UNAVAIL_MVBUF_T;
}
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic = ps_cur_pic;
ps_dec->u1_pic_buf_id = cur_pic_buf_id;
ps_cur_pic->u4_ts = ps_dec->u4_ts;
ps_dec->apv_buf_id_pic_buf_map[cur_pic_buf_id] = (void *)ps_cur_pic;
ps_cur_pic->u1_mv_buf_id = cur_mv_buf_id;
ps_dec->au1_pic_buf_id_mv_buf_id_map[cur_pic_buf_id] = cur_mv_buf_id;
ps_cur_pic->pu1_col_zero_flag = (UWORD8 *)ps_col_mv->pv_col_zero_flag;
ps_cur_pic->ps_mv = (mv_pred_t *)ps_col_mv->pv_mv;
ps_dec->au1_pic_buf_ref_flag[cur_pic_buf_id] = 0;
}
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->u1_picturetype = u1_field_pic_flag;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->u4_pack_slc_typ = SKIP_NONE;
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT("got a buffer\n");
}
else
{
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT("did not get a buffer\n");
}
ps_dec->u4_pic_buf_got = 1;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_poc = i4_poc;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_frame_num = u2_frame_num;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_pic_num = u2_frame_num;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_top_field_order_cnt = ps_pps->i4_top_field_order_cnt;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_bottom_field_order_cnt =
ps_pps->i4_bottom_field_order_cnt;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_avg_poc = ps_pps->i4_avg_poc;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->u4_time_stamp = ps_dec->u4_pts;
ps_dec->s_cur_pic = *(ps_dec->ps_cur_pic);
if(u1_field_pic_flag && u1_bottom_field_flag)
{
WORD32 i4_temp_poc;
WORD32 i4_top_field_order_poc, i4_bot_field_order_poc;
/* Point to odd lines, since it's bottom field */
ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf1 += ps_dec->s_cur_pic.u2_frm_wd_y;
ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf2 += ps_dec->s_cur_pic.u2_frm_wd_uv;
ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf3 += ps_dec->s_cur_pic.u2_frm_wd_uv;
ps_dec->s_cur_pic.ps_mv +=
((ps_dec->u2_pic_ht * ps_dec->u2_pic_wd) >> 5);
ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_col_zero_flag += ((ps_dec->u2_pic_ht
* ps_dec->u2_pic_wd) >> 5);
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->u1_picturetype |= BOT_FLD;
i4_top_field_order_poc = ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_top_field_order_cnt;
i4_bot_field_order_poc = ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_bottom_field_order_cnt;
i4_temp_poc = MIN(i4_top_field_order_poc,
i4_bot_field_order_poc);
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_avg_poc = i4_temp_poc;
}
ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag = ps_seq->u1_mb_aff_flag
&& (!u1_field_pic_flag);
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->u1_picturetype |= (ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag
<< 2);
ps_dec->ps_cur_mb_row = ps_dec->ps_nbr_mb_row; //[0];
ps_dec->ps_cur_mb_row++; //Increment by 1 ,so that left mb will always be valid
ps_dec->ps_top_mb_row =
ps_dec->ps_nbr_mb_row
+ ((ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs + 1)
<< (1
- ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u1_frame_mbs_only_flag));
ps_dec->ps_top_mb_row++; //Increment by 1 ,so that left mb will always be valid
ps_dec->pu1_y = ps_dec->pu1_y_scratch[0];
ps_dec->pu1_u = ps_dec->pu1_u_scratch[0];
ps_dec->pu1_v = ps_dec->pu1_v_scratch[0];
ps_dec->u1_yuv_scratch_idx = 0;
/* CHANGED CODE */
ps_dec->ps_mv_cur = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.ps_mv;
ps_dec->ps_mv_top = ps_dec->ps_mv_top_p[0];
/* CHANGED CODE */
ps_dec->u1_mv_top_p = 0;
ps_dec->u1_mb_idx = 0;
/* CHANGED CODE */
ps_dec->ps_mv_left = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.ps_mv;
ps_dec->pu1_yleft = 0;
ps_dec->pu1_uleft = 0;
ps_dec->pu1_vleft = 0;
ps_dec->u1_not_wait_rec = 2;
ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded = 0;
ps_dec->i4_submb_ofst = -(SUB_BLK_SIZE);
ps_dec->u4_pred_info_idx = 0;
ps_dec->u4_pred_info_pkd_idx = 0;
ps_dec->u4_dma_buf_idx = 0;
ps_dec->ps_mv = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.ps_mv;
ps_dec->ps_mv_bank_cur = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.ps_mv;
ps_dec->pu1_col_zero_flag = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_col_zero_flag;
ps_dec->ps_part = ps_dec->ps_parse_part_params;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mbx = -1;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mby = 0;
ps_dec->u2_mv_2mb[0] = 0;
ps_dec->u2_mv_2mb[1] = 0;
ps_dec->u1_last_pic_not_decoded = 0;
ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num_dec_thread = 0;
ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num_bs = 0;
ps_dec->u4_intra_pred_line_ofst = 0;
ps_dec->pu1_cur_y_intra_pred_line = ps_dec->pu1_y_intra_pred_line;
ps_dec->pu1_cur_u_intra_pred_line = ps_dec->pu1_u_intra_pred_line;
ps_dec->pu1_cur_v_intra_pred_line = ps_dec->pu1_v_intra_pred_line;
ps_dec->pu1_cur_y_intra_pred_line_base = ps_dec->pu1_y_intra_pred_line;
ps_dec->pu1_cur_u_intra_pred_line_base = ps_dec->pu1_u_intra_pred_line;
ps_dec->pu1_cur_v_intra_pred_line_base = ps_dec->pu1_v_intra_pred_line;
ps_dec->pu1_prev_y_intra_pred_line = ps_dec->pu1_y_intra_pred_line
+ (ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs * MB_SIZE);
ps_dec->pu1_prev_u_intra_pred_line = ps_dec->pu1_u_intra_pred_line
+ ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs * BLK8x8SIZE * YUV420SP_FACTOR;
ps_dec->pu1_prev_v_intra_pred_line = ps_dec->pu1_v_intra_pred_line
+ ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs * BLK8x8SIZE;
ps_dec->ps_deblk_mbn = ps_dec->ps_deblk_pic;
ps_dec->ps_deblk_mbn_curr = ps_dec->ps_deblk_mbn;
ps_dec->ps_deblk_mbn_prev = ps_dec->ps_deblk_mbn + ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp;
/* Initialize The Function Pointer Depending Upon the Entropy and MbAff Flag */
{
if(ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag)
{
ps_dec->pf_compute_bs = ih264d_compute_bs_mbaff;
ps_dec->pf_mvpred = ih264d_mvpred_mbaff;
}
else
{
ps_dec->pf_compute_bs = ih264d_compute_bs_non_mbaff;
ps_dec->u1_cur_mb_fld_dec_flag = ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag;
}
}
/* Set up the Parameter for DMA transfer */
{
UWORD8 u1_field_pic_flag = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag;
UWORD8 u1_mbaff = ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag;
UWORD8 uc_lastmbs = (((ps_dec->u2_pic_wd) >> 4)
% (ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp >> u1_mbaff));
UWORD16 ui16_lastmbs_widthY =
(uc_lastmbs ? (uc_lastmbs << 4) : ((ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp
>> u1_mbaff) << 4));
UWORD16 ui16_lastmbs_widthUV =
uc_lastmbs ? (uc_lastmbs << 3) : ((ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp
>> u1_mbaff) << 3);
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.pu1_dest_y = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf1;
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.pu1_dest_u = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf2;
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.pu1_dest_v = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf3;
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.u2_frm_wd_y = ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_y
<< u1_field_pic_flag;
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.u2_frm_wd_uv = ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_uv
<< u1_field_pic_flag;
if(u1_field_pic_flag)
{
ui16_lastmbs_widthY += ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_y;
ui16_lastmbs_widthUV += ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_uv;
}
/* Normal Increment of Pointer */
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.u4_inc_y[0] = ((ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp << 4)
>> u1_mbaff);
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.u4_inc_uv[0] = ((ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp << 4)
>> u1_mbaff);
/* End of Row Increment */
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.u4_inc_y[1] = (ui16_lastmbs_widthY
+ (PAD_LEN_Y_H << 1)
+ ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.u2_frm_wd_y
* ((15 << u1_mbaff) + u1_mbaff));
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.u4_inc_uv[1] = (ui16_lastmbs_widthUV
+ (PAD_LEN_UV_H << 2)
+ ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.u2_frm_wd_uv
* ((15 << u1_mbaff) + u1_mbaff));
/* Assign picture numbers to each frame/field */
/* only once per picture. */
ih264d_assign_pic_num(ps_dec);
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.u2_mv_top_left_inc = (ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp
<< 2) - 1 - (u1_mbaff << 2);
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.u2_mv_left_inc = ((ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp
>> u1_mbaff) - 1) << (4 + u1_mbaff);
}
/**********************************************************************/
/* High profile related initialization at pictrue level */
/**********************************************************************/
if(ps_seq->u1_profile_idc == HIGH_PROFILE_IDC)
{
if((ps_seq->i4_seq_scaling_matrix_present_flag)
|| (ps_pps->i4_pic_scaling_matrix_present_flag))
{
ih264d_form_scaling_matrix_picture(ps_seq, ps_pps, ps_dec);
ps_dec->s_high_profile.u1_scaling_present = 1;
}
else
{
ih264d_form_default_scaling_matrix(ps_dec);
}
if(ps_pps->i4_transform_8x8_mode_flag)
{
ps_dec->s_high_profile.u1_transform8x8_present = 1;
}
}
else
{
ih264d_form_default_scaling_matrix(ps_dec);
}
/* required while reading the transform_size_8x8 u4_flag */
ps_dec->s_high_profile.u1_direct_8x8_inference_flag =
ps_seq->u1_direct_8x8_inference_flag;
ps_dec->s_high_profile.s_cavlc_ctxt = ps_dec->s_cavlc_ctxt;
ps_dec->i1_recon_in_thread3_flag = 1;
ps_dec->ps_frame_buf_ip_recon = &ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
memcpy(&ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon_parse, &ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon,
sizeof(tfr_ctxt_t));
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores >= 3 && ps_dec->i1_recon_in_thread3_flag)
{
memcpy(&ps_dec->s_tran_iprecon, &ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon,
sizeof(tfr_ctxt_t));
ps_dec->ps_frame_buf_ip_recon = &ps_dec->s_tran_iprecon;
}
}
ih264d_init_deblk_tfr_ctxt(ps_dec,&(ps_dec->s_pad_mgr), &(ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon),
ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs, 0);
ps_dec->ps_cur_deblk_mb = ps_dec->ps_deblk_pic;
ps_dec->u4_cur_deblk_mb_num = 0;
ps_dec->u4_deblk_mb_x = 0;
ps_dec->u4_deblk_mb_y = 0;
ps_dec->pu4_wt_ofsts = ps_dec->pu4_wts_ofsts_mat;
H264_MUTEX_UNLOCK(&ps_dec->process_disp_mutex);
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Decoder: Treat first slice in a picture as part of new picture always
This is needed to decode streams with consecutive IDRs.
Bug: 34097231
Test: successful run of POC in security bug
Change-Id: Ib737a4ef4b8c5bb7a57c90292102dd28af0615fe
CWE ID:
| 0
| 162,630
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int imap_cmd_idle(struct ImapData *idata)
{
int rc;
if (cmd_start(idata, "IDLE", IMAP_CMD_POLL) < 0)
{
cmd_handle_fatal(idata);
return -1;
}
if ((ImapPollTimeout > 0) && (mutt_socket_poll(idata->conn, ImapPollTimeout)) == 0)
{
mutt_error(_("Connection to %s timed out"), idata->conn->account.host);
cmd_handle_fatal(idata);
return -1;
}
do
rc = imap_cmd_step(idata);
while (rc == IMAP_CMD_CONTINUE);
if (rc == IMAP_CMD_RESPOND)
{
/* successfully entered IDLE state */
idata->state = IMAP_IDLE;
/* queue automatic exit when next command is issued */
mutt_buffer_printf(idata->cmdbuf, "DONE\r\n");
rc = IMAP_CMD_OK;
}
if (rc != IMAP_CMD_OK)
{
mutt_debug(1, "error starting IDLE\n");
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: quote imap strings more carefully
Co-authored-by: JerikoOne <jeriko.one@gmx.us>
CWE ID: CWE-77
| 0
| 79,567
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AXTreeSerializerTest::CreateTreeSerializer() {
if (serializer_)
return;
tree0_.reset(new AXSerializableTree(treedata0_));
tree1_.reset(new AXSerializableTree(treedata1_));
tree0_source_.reset(tree0_->CreateTreeSource());
serializer_.reset(new AXTreeSerializer<const AXNode*>(tree0_source_.get()));
AXTreeUpdate unused_update;
serializer_->SerializeChanges(tree0_->root(), &unused_update);
tree1_source_.reset(tree1_->CreateTreeSource());
serializer_->ChangeTreeSourceForTesting(tree1_source_.get());
}
Commit Message: When serializing accessibility tree, skip invalid children.
See bug for specific repro in the wild, but essentially we need to check
if the child is valid just before serializing, and not trust the list of
children of a node.
BUG=479743
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1144363004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#332748}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 127,689
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool WebGLRenderingContextBase::PaintRenderingResultsToCanvas(
SourceDrawingBuffer source_buffer) {
if (isContextLost())
return false;
bool must_clear_now = ClearIfComposited() != kSkipped;
if (!marked_canvas_dirty_ && !must_clear_now)
return false;
canvas()->ClearCopiedImage();
marked_canvas_dirty_ = false;
if (!canvas()->TryCreateImageBuffer())
return false;
ScopedTexture2DRestorer restorer(this);
ScopedFramebufferRestorer fbo_restorer(this);
GetDrawingBuffer()->ResolveAndBindForReadAndDraw();
if (!CopyRenderingResultsFromDrawingBuffer(canvas()->WebGLBuffer(),
source_buffer)) {
NOTREACHED();
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Simplify WebGL error message
The WebGL exception message text contains the full URL of a blocked
cross-origin resource. It should instead contain only a generic notice.
Bug: 799847
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I3a7f00462a4643c41882f2ee7e7767e6d631557e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/854986
Reviewed-by: Brandon Jones <bajones@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Eric Lawrence <elawrence@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528458}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 146,918
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ip6_append_data(struct sock *sk, int getfrag(void *from, char *to,
int offset, int len, int odd, struct sk_buff *skb),
void *from, int length, int transhdrlen,
int hlimit, int tclass, struct ipv6_txoptions *opt, struct flowi6 *fl6,
struct rt6_info *rt, unsigned int flags, int dontfrag)
{
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct inet_cork *cork;
struct sk_buff *skb, *skb_prev = NULL;
unsigned int maxfraglen, fragheaderlen, mtu, orig_mtu, pmtu;
int exthdrlen;
int dst_exthdrlen;
int hh_len;
int copy;
int err;
int offset = 0;
__u8 tx_flags = 0;
u32 tskey = 0;
if (flags&MSG_PROBE)
return 0;
cork = &inet->cork.base;
if (skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_write_queue)) {
/*
* setup for corking
*/
if (opt) {
if (WARN_ON(np->cork.opt))
return -EINVAL;
np->cork.opt = kzalloc(sizeof(*opt), sk->sk_allocation);
if (unlikely(np->cork.opt == NULL))
return -ENOBUFS;
np->cork.opt->tot_len = sizeof(*opt);
np->cork.opt->opt_flen = opt->opt_flen;
np->cork.opt->opt_nflen = opt->opt_nflen;
np->cork.opt->dst0opt = ip6_opt_dup(opt->dst0opt,
sk->sk_allocation);
if (opt->dst0opt && !np->cork.opt->dst0opt)
return -ENOBUFS;
np->cork.opt->dst1opt = ip6_opt_dup(opt->dst1opt,
sk->sk_allocation);
if (opt->dst1opt && !np->cork.opt->dst1opt)
return -ENOBUFS;
np->cork.opt->hopopt = ip6_opt_dup(opt->hopopt,
sk->sk_allocation);
if (opt->hopopt && !np->cork.opt->hopopt)
return -ENOBUFS;
np->cork.opt->srcrt = ip6_rthdr_dup(opt->srcrt,
sk->sk_allocation);
if (opt->srcrt && !np->cork.opt->srcrt)
return -ENOBUFS;
/* need source address above miyazawa*/
}
dst_hold(&rt->dst);
cork->dst = &rt->dst;
inet->cork.fl.u.ip6 = *fl6;
np->cork.hop_limit = hlimit;
np->cork.tclass = tclass;
if (rt->dst.flags & DST_XFRM_TUNNEL)
mtu = np->pmtudisc >= IPV6_PMTUDISC_PROBE ?
READ_ONCE(rt->dst.dev->mtu) : dst_mtu(&rt->dst);
else
mtu = np->pmtudisc >= IPV6_PMTUDISC_PROBE ?
READ_ONCE(rt->dst.dev->mtu) : dst_mtu(rt->dst.path);
if (np->frag_size < mtu) {
if (np->frag_size)
mtu = np->frag_size;
}
if (mtu < IPV6_MIN_MTU)
return -EINVAL;
cork->fragsize = mtu;
if (dst_allfrag(rt->dst.path))
cork->flags |= IPCORK_ALLFRAG;
cork->length = 0;
exthdrlen = (opt ? opt->opt_flen : 0);
length += exthdrlen;
transhdrlen += exthdrlen;
dst_exthdrlen = rt->dst.header_len - rt->rt6i_nfheader_len;
} else {
rt = (struct rt6_info *)cork->dst;
fl6 = &inet->cork.fl.u.ip6;
opt = np->cork.opt;
transhdrlen = 0;
exthdrlen = 0;
dst_exthdrlen = 0;
mtu = cork->fragsize;
}
orig_mtu = mtu;
hh_len = LL_RESERVED_SPACE(rt->dst.dev);
fragheaderlen = sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) + rt->rt6i_nfheader_len +
(opt ? opt->opt_nflen : 0);
maxfraglen = ((mtu - fragheaderlen) & ~7) + fragheaderlen -
sizeof(struct frag_hdr);
if (mtu <= sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) + IPV6_MAXPLEN) {
unsigned int maxnonfragsize, headersize;
headersize = sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) +
(opt ? opt->opt_flen + opt->opt_nflen : 0) +
(dst_allfrag(&rt->dst) ?
sizeof(struct frag_hdr) : 0) +
rt->rt6i_nfheader_len;
if (ip6_sk_ignore_df(sk))
maxnonfragsize = sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) + IPV6_MAXPLEN;
else
maxnonfragsize = mtu;
/* as per RFC 7112 section 5, the entire IPv6 Header Chain must fit
* the first fragment
*/
if (headersize + transhdrlen > mtu)
goto emsgsize;
/* dontfrag active */
if ((cork->length + length > mtu - headersize) && dontfrag &&
(sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_UDP ||
sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_RAW)) {
ipv6_local_rxpmtu(sk, fl6, mtu - headersize +
sizeof(struct ipv6hdr));
goto emsgsize;
}
if (cork->length + length > maxnonfragsize - headersize) {
emsgsize:
pmtu = max_t(int, mtu - headersize + sizeof(struct ipv6hdr), 0);
ipv6_local_error(sk, EMSGSIZE, fl6, pmtu);
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
}
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_DGRAM || sk->sk_type == SOCK_RAW) {
sock_tx_timestamp(sk, &tx_flags);
if (tx_flags & SKBTX_ANY_SW_TSTAMP &&
sk->sk_tsflags & SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_ID)
tskey = sk->sk_tskey++;
}
/*
* Let's try using as much space as possible.
* Use MTU if total length of the message fits into the MTU.
* Otherwise, we need to reserve fragment header and
* fragment alignment (= 8-15 octects, in total).
*
* Note that we may need to "move" the data from the tail of
* of the buffer to the new fragment when we split
* the message.
*
* FIXME: It may be fragmented into multiple chunks
* at once if non-fragmentable extension headers
* are too large.
* --yoshfuji
*/
skb = skb_peek_tail(&sk->sk_write_queue);
cork->length += length;
if ((skb && skb_is_gso(skb)) ||
(((length + fragheaderlen) > mtu) &&
(skb_queue_len(&sk->sk_write_queue) <= 1) &&
(sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_UDP) &&
(rt->dst.dev->features & NETIF_F_UFO) &&
(sk->sk_type == SOCK_DGRAM))) {
err = ip6_ufo_append_data(sk, getfrag, from, length,
hh_len, fragheaderlen,
transhdrlen, mtu, flags, rt);
if (err)
goto error;
return 0;
}
if (!skb)
goto alloc_new_skb;
while (length > 0) {
/* Check if the remaining data fits into current packet. */
copy = (cork->length <= mtu && !(cork->flags & IPCORK_ALLFRAG) ? mtu : maxfraglen) - skb->len;
if (copy < length)
copy = maxfraglen - skb->len;
if (copy <= 0) {
char *data;
unsigned int datalen;
unsigned int fraglen;
unsigned int fraggap;
unsigned int alloclen;
alloc_new_skb:
/* There's no room in the current skb */
if (skb)
fraggap = skb->len - maxfraglen;
else
fraggap = 0;
/* update mtu and maxfraglen if necessary */
if (skb == NULL || skb_prev == NULL)
ip6_append_data_mtu(&mtu, &maxfraglen,
fragheaderlen, skb, rt,
orig_mtu);
skb_prev = skb;
/*
* If remaining data exceeds the mtu,
* we know we need more fragment(s).
*/
datalen = length + fraggap;
if (datalen > (cork->length <= mtu && !(cork->flags & IPCORK_ALLFRAG) ? mtu : maxfraglen) - fragheaderlen)
datalen = maxfraglen - fragheaderlen - rt->dst.trailer_len;
if ((flags & MSG_MORE) &&
!(rt->dst.dev->features&NETIF_F_SG))
alloclen = mtu;
else
alloclen = datalen + fragheaderlen;
alloclen += dst_exthdrlen;
if (datalen != length + fraggap) {
/*
* this is not the last fragment, the trailer
* space is regarded as data space.
*/
datalen += rt->dst.trailer_len;
}
alloclen += rt->dst.trailer_len;
fraglen = datalen + fragheaderlen;
/*
* We just reserve space for fragment header.
* Note: this may be overallocation if the message
* (without MSG_MORE) fits into the MTU.
*/
alloclen += sizeof(struct frag_hdr);
copy = datalen - transhdrlen - fraggap;
if (copy < 0) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto error;
}
if (transhdrlen) {
skb = sock_alloc_send_skb(sk,
alloclen + hh_len,
(flags & MSG_DONTWAIT), &err);
} else {
skb = NULL;
if (atomic_read(&sk->sk_wmem_alloc) <=
2 * sk->sk_sndbuf)
skb = sock_wmalloc(sk,
alloclen + hh_len, 1,
sk->sk_allocation);
if (unlikely(skb == NULL))
err = -ENOBUFS;
}
if (skb == NULL)
goto error;
/*
* Fill in the control structures
*/
skb->protocol = htons(ETH_P_IPV6);
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
skb->csum = 0;
/* reserve for fragmentation and ipsec header */
skb_reserve(skb, hh_len + sizeof(struct frag_hdr) +
dst_exthdrlen);
/* Only the initial fragment is time stamped */
skb_shinfo(skb)->tx_flags = tx_flags;
tx_flags = 0;
skb_shinfo(skb)->tskey = tskey;
tskey = 0;
/*
* Find where to start putting bytes
*/
data = skb_put(skb, fraglen);
skb_set_network_header(skb, exthdrlen);
data += fragheaderlen;
skb->transport_header = (skb->network_header +
fragheaderlen);
if (fraggap) {
skb->csum = skb_copy_and_csum_bits(
skb_prev, maxfraglen,
data + transhdrlen, fraggap, 0);
skb_prev->csum = csum_sub(skb_prev->csum,
skb->csum);
data += fraggap;
pskb_trim_unique(skb_prev, maxfraglen);
}
if (copy > 0 &&
getfrag(from, data + transhdrlen, offset,
copy, fraggap, skb) < 0) {
err = -EFAULT;
kfree_skb(skb);
goto error;
}
offset += copy;
length -= datalen - fraggap;
transhdrlen = 0;
exthdrlen = 0;
dst_exthdrlen = 0;
/*
* Put the packet on the pending queue
*/
__skb_queue_tail(&sk->sk_write_queue, skb);
continue;
}
if (copy > length)
copy = length;
if (!(rt->dst.dev->features&NETIF_F_SG) &&
skb_tailroom(skb) >= copy) {
unsigned int off;
off = skb->len;
if (getfrag(from, skb_put(skb, copy),
offset, copy, off, skb) < 0) {
__skb_trim(skb, off);
err = -EFAULT;
goto error;
}
} else {
int i = skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags;
struct page_frag *pfrag = sk_page_frag(sk);
err = -ENOMEM;
if (!sk_page_frag_refill(sk, pfrag))
goto error;
if (!skb_can_coalesce(skb, i, pfrag->page,
pfrag->offset)) {
err = -EMSGSIZE;
if (i == MAX_SKB_FRAGS)
goto error;
__skb_fill_page_desc(skb, i, pfrag->page,
pfrag->offset, 0);
skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags = ++i;
get_page(pfrag->page);
}
copy = min_t(int, copy, pfrag->size - pfrag->offset);
if (getfrag(from,
page_address(pfrag->page) + pfrag->offset,
offset, copy, skb->len, skb) < 0)
goto error_efault;
pfrag->offset += copy;
skb_frag_size_add(&skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[i - 1], copy);
skb->len += copy;
skb->data_len += copy;
skb->truesize += copy;
atomic_add(copy, &sk->sk_wmem_alloc);
}
offset += copy;
length -= copy;
}
return 0;
error_efault:
err = -EFAULT;
error:
cork->length -= length;
IP6_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), rt->rt6i_idev, IPSTATS_MIB_OUTDISCARDS);
return err;
}
Commit Message: inet: update the IP ID generation algorithm to higher standards.
Commit 355b98553789 ("netns: provide pure entropy for net_hash_mix()")
makes net_hash_mix() return a true 32 bits of entropy. When used in the
IP ID generation algorithm, this has the effect of extending the IP ID
generation key from 32 bits to 64 bits.
However, net_hash_mix() is only used for IP ID generation starting with
kernel version 4.1. Therefore, earlier kernels remain with 32-bit key
no matter what the net_hash_mix() return value is.
This change addresses the issue by explicitly extending the key to 64
bits for kernels older than 4.1.
Signed-off-by: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 97,039
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: loff_t mem_lseek(struct file *file, loff_t offset, int orig)
{
switch (orig) {
case 0:
file->f_pos = offset;
break;
case 1:
file->f_pos += offset;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
force_successful_syscall_return();
return file->f_pos;
}
Commit Message: proc: restrict access to /proc/PID/io
/proc/PID/io may be used for gathering private information. E.g. for
openssh and vsftpd daemons wchars/rchars may be used to learn the
precise password length. Restrict it to processes being able to ptrace
the target process.
ptrace_may_access() is needed to prevent keeping open file descriptor of
"io" file, executing setuid binary and gathering io information of the
setuid'ed process.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 26,816
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int cmd_mkdir(void *data, const char *input) {
char *res = r_syscmd_mkdir (input);
if (res) {
r_cons_print (res);
free (res);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix #7723 - crash in ext2 GRUB code because of variable size array in stack
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 64,333
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __init reserve_crashkernel(void)
{
}
Commit Message: acpi: Disable ACPI table override if securelevel is set
From the kernel documentation (initrd_table_override.txt):
If the ACPI_INITRD_TABLE_OVERRIDE compile option is true, it is possible
to override nearly any ACPI table provided by the BIOS with an
instrumented, modified one.
When securelevel is set, the kernel should disallow any unauthenticated
changes to kernel space. ACPI tables contain code invoked by the kernel, so
do not allow ACPI tables to be overridden if securelevel is set.
Signed-off-by: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 53,800
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static __init void intel_clovertown_quirk(void)
{
/*
* PEBS is unreliable due to:
*
* AJ67 - PEBS may experience CPL leaks
* AJ68 - PEBS PMI may be delayed by one event
* AJ69 - GLOBAL_STATUS[62] will only be set when DEBUGCTL[12]
* AJ106 - FREEZE_LBRS_ON_PMI doesn't work in combination with PEBS
*
* AJ67 could be worked around by restricting the OS/USR flags.
* AJ69 could be worked around by setting PMU_FREEZE_ON_PMI.
*
* AJ106 could possibly be worked around by not allowing LBR
* usage from PEBS, including the fixup.
* AJ68 could possibly be worked around by always programming
* a pebs_event_reset[0] value and coping with the lost events.
*
* But taken together it might just make sense to not enable PEBS on
* these chips.
*/
pr_warn("PEBS disabled due to CPU errata\n");
x86_pmu.pebs = 0;
x86_pmu.pebs_constraints = NULL;
}
Commit Message: perf/x86: Fix offcore_rsp valid mask for SNB/IVB
The valid mask for both offcore_response_0 and
offcore_response_1 was wrong for SNB/SNB-EP,
IVB/IVB-EP. It was possible to write to
reserved bit and cause a GP fault crashing
the kernel.
This patch fixes the problem by correctly marking the
reserved bits in the valid mask for all the processors
mentioned above.
A distinction between desktop and server parts is introduced
because bits 24-30 are only available on the server parts.
This version of the patch is just a rebase to perf/urgent tree
and should apply to older kernels as well.
Signed-off-by: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: jolsa@redhat.com
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: security@kernel.org
Cc: ak@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 31,664
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AppCacheUpdateJob::LogHistogramStats(
ResultType result, const GURL& failed_resource_url) {
AppCacheHistograms::CountUpdateJobResult(result,
url::Origin::Create(manifest_url_));
if (result == UPDATE_OK)
return;
int percent_complete = 0;
if (url_file_list_.size() > 0) {
size_t actual_fetches_completed = url_fetches_completed_;
if (!failed_resource_url.is_empty() && actual_fetches_completed)
--actual_fetches_completed;
percent_complete = (static_cast<double>(actual_fetches_completed) /
static_cast<double>(url_file_list_.size())) * 100.0;
percent_complete = std::min(percent_complete, 99);
}
bool was_making_progress =
base::Time::Now() - last_progress_time_ <
base::TimeDelta::FromMinutes(5);
bool off_origin_resource_failure =
!failed_resource_url.is_empty() &&
(failed_resource_url.GetOrigin() != manifest_url_.GetOrigin());
AppCacheHistograms::LogUpdateFailureStats(
url::Origin::Create(manifest_url_), percent_complete, was_making_progress,
off_origin_resource_failure);
}
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 151,426
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned int plist_data_hash(const void* key)
{
plist_data_t data = plist_get_data((plist_t) key);
unsigned int hash = data->type;
unsigned int i = 0;
char *buff = NULL;
unsigned int size = 0;
switch (data->type)
{
case PLIST_BOOLEAN:
case PLIST_UINT:
case PLIST_REAL:
case PLIST_DATE:
case PLIST_UID:
buff = (char *) &data->intval; //works also for real as we use an union
size = 8;
break;
case PLIST_KEY:
case PLIST_STRING:
buff = data->strval;
size = data->length;
break;
case PLIST_DATA:
case PLIST_ARRAY:
case PLIST_DICT:
buff = (char *) &key;
size = sizeof(const void*);
break;
default:
break;
}
hash += 5381;
for (i = 0; i < size; buff++, i++) {
hash = ((hash << 5) + hash) + *buff;
}
return hash;
}
Commit Message: bplist: Fix data range check for string/data/dict/array nodes
Passing a size of 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF to parse_string_node() might result
in a memcpy with a size of -1, leading to undefined behavior.
This commit makes sure that the actual node data (which depends on the size)
is in the range start_of_object..start_of_object+size.
Credit to OSS-Fuzz
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 68,035
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AXNodeObject::markers(Vector<DocumentMarker::MarkerType>& markerTypes,
Vector<AXRange>& markerRanges) const {
if (!getNode() || !getDocument() || !getDocument()->view())
return;
DocumentMarkerController& markerController = getDocument()->markers();
DocumentMarkerVector markers = markerController.markersFor(getNode());
for (size_t i = 0; i < markers.size(); ++i) {
DocumentMarker* marker = markers[i];
switch (marker->type()) {
case DocumentMarker::Spelling:
case DocumentMarker::Grammar:
case DocumentMarker::TextMatch:
markerTypes.push_back(marker->type());
markerRanges.push_back(
AXRange(marker->startOffset(), marker->endOffset()));
break;
case DocumentMarker::Composition:
break;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 127,190
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool TryMatchSearchParam(base::StringPiece text,
base::StringPiece pattern,
std::string* prefix,
std::string* suffix) {
auto pos = text.find(pattern);
if (pos == base::StringPiece::npos)
return false;
text.substr(0, pos).CopyToString(prefix);
text.substr(pos + pattern.length()).CopyToString(suffix);
return true;
}
Commit Message: [Contextual Search] Change "Now on Tap" to "Contextual Cards"
BUG=644934
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2361163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#420899}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 120,320
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void EnsureCreateFIFO(const base::FilePath& path) {
unlink(path.value().c_str());
CHECK(base::android::CreateFIFO(path, 0666))
<< "Unable to create the Android's FIFO: " << path.value().c_str();
}
Commit Message: Content Shell: Move shell_layout_tests_android into layout_tests/.
BUG=420994
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/661743002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#299892}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 110,819
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ExtensionService::GarbageCollectExtensions() {
if (extension_prefs_->pref_service()->ReadOnly())
return;
scoped_ptr<ExtensionPrefs::ExtensionsInfo> info(
extension_prefs_->GetInstalledExtensionsInfo());
std::map<std::string, FilePath> extension_paths;
for (size_t i = 0; i < info->size(); ++i)
extension_paths[info->at(i)->extension_id] = info->at(i)->extension_path;
if (!BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::FILE, FROM_HERE,
NewRunnableFunction(
&extension_file_util::GarbageCollectExtensions,
install_directory_,
extension_paths)))
NOTREACHED();
if (profile_) {
ThemeServiceFactory::GetForProfile(profile_)->RemoveUnusedThemes();
}
}
Commit Message: Limit extent of webstore app to just chrome.google.com/webstore.
BUG=93497
TEST=Try installing extensions and apps from the webstore, starting both being
initially logged in, and not.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7719003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 98,568
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void MetricsWebContentsObserver::MediaStartedPlaying(
const content::WebContentsObserver::MediaPlayerInfo& video_type,
const content::WebContentsObserver::MediaPlayerId& id) {
if (GetMainFrame(id.render_frame_host) != web_contents()->GetMainFrame()) {
return;
}
if (committed_load_)
committed_load_->MediaStartedPlaying(
video_type, id.render_frame_host == web_contents()->GetMainFrame());
}
Commit Message: Add boolean to UserIntiatedInfo noting if an input event led to navigation.
Also refactor UkmPageLoadMetricsObserver to use this new boolean to
report the user initiated metric in RecordPageLoadExtraInfoMetrics, so
that it works correctly in the case when the page load failed.
Bug: 925104
Change-Id: Ie08e7d3912cb1da484190d838005e95e57a209ff
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1450460
Commit-Queue: Annie Sullivan <sullivan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Bryan McQuade <bmcquade@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#630870}
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 140,140
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: __be32 ipv6_select_ident(struct net *net,
const struct in6_addr *daddr,
const struct in6_addr *saddr)
{
static u32 ip6_idents_hashrnd __read_mostly;
u32 id;
net_get_random_once(&ip6_idents_hashrnd, sizeof(ip6_idents_hashrnd));
id = __ipv6_select_ident(net, ip6_idents_hashrnd, daddr, saddr);
return htonl(id);
}
Commit Message: inet: switch IP ID generator to siphash
According to Amit Klein and Benny Pinkas, IP ID generation is too weak
and might be used by attackers.
Even with recent net_hash_mix() fix (netns: provide pure entropy for net_hash_mix())
having 64bit key and Jenkins hash is risky.
It is time to switch to siphash and its 128bit keys.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Benny Pinkas <benny@pinkas.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 1
| 169,719
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static TEE_Result get_hkdf_params(const TEE_Attribute *params,
uint32_t param_count,
void **salt, size_t *salt_len, void **info,
size_t *info_len, size_t *okm_len)
{
size_t n;
enum { SALT = 0x1, LENGTH = 0x2, INFO = 0x4 };
uint8_t found = 0;
*salt = *info = NULL;
*salt_len = *info_len = *okm_len = 0;
for (n = 0; n < param_count; n++) {
switch (params[n].attributeID) {
case TEE_ATTR_HKDF_SALT:
if (!(found & SALT)) {
*salt = params[n].content.ref.buffer;
*salt_len = params[n].content.ref.length;
found |= SALT;
}
break;
case TEE_ATTR_HKDF_OKM_LENGTH:
if (!(found & LENGTH)) {
*okm_len = params[n].content.value.a;
found |= LENGTH;
}
break;
case TEE_ATTR_HKDF_INFO:
if (!(found & INFO)) {
*info = params[n].content.ref.buffer;
*info_len = params[n].content.ref.length;
found |= INFO;
}
break;
default:
/* Unexpected attribute */
return TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
}
}
if (!(found & LENGTH))
return TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
return TEE_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: svc: check for allocation overflow in crypto calls part 2
Without checking for overflow there is a risk of allocating a buffer
with size smaller than anticipated and as a consequence of that it might
lead to a heap based overflow with attacker controlled data written
outside the boundaries of the buffer.
Fixes: OP-TEE-2018-0011: "Integer overflow in crypto system calls (x2)"
Signed-off-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org> (QEMU v7, v8)
Reviewed-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Riscure <inforequest@riscure.com>
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <a.a.milburn@vu.nl>
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@linaro.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 86,835
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int f2fs_freeze(struct super_block *sb)
{
if (f2fs_readonly(sb))
return 0;
/* IO error happened before */
if (unlikely(f2fs_cp_error(F2FS_SB(sb))))
return -EIO;
/* must be clean, since sync_filesystem() was already called */
if (is_sbi_flag_set(F2FS_SB(sb), SBI_IS_DIRTY))
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: f2fs: sanity check checkpoint segno and blkoff
Make sure segno and blkoff read from raw image are valid.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jin Qian <jinqian@google.com>
[Jaegeuk Kim: adjust minor coding style]
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-129
| 0
| 63,865
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void addReplyBulkCBuffer(client *c, const void *p, size_t len) {
addReplyLongLongWithPrefix(c,len,'$');
addReplyString(c,p,len);
addReply(c,shared.crlf);
}
Commit Message: Security: Cross Protocol Scripting protection.
This is an attempt at mitigating problems due to cross protocol
scripting, an attack targeting services using line oriented protocols
like Redis that can accept HTTP requests as valid protocol, by
discarding the invalid parts and accepting the payloads sent, for
example, via a POST request.
For this to be effective, when we detect POST and Host: and terminate
the connection asynchronously, the networking code was modified in order
to never process further input. It was later verified that in a
pipelined request containing a POST command, the successive commands are
not executed.
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 69,932
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: String WebPagePrivate::findPatternStringForUrl(const KURL& url) const
{
if ((m_webSettings->shouldHandlePatternUrls() && protocolIs(url, "pattern"))
|| protocolIs(url, "tel")
|| protocolIs(url, "wtai")
|| protocolIs(url, "cti")
|| protocolIs(url, "mailto")
|| protocolIs(url, "sms")
|| protocolIs(url, "pin")) {
return url;
}
return String();
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 104,207
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void reflectStringAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
Element* impl = V8Element::toImpl(holder);
v8SetReturnValueString(info, impl->fastGetAttribute(HTMLNames::reflectstringattributeAttr), info.GetIsolate());
}
Commit Message: binding: Removes unused code in templates/attributes.cpp.
Faking {{cpp_class}} and {{c8_class}} doesn't make sense.
Probably it made sense before the introduction of virtual
ScriptWrappable::wrap().
Checking the existence of window->document() doesn't seem
making sense to me, and CQ tests seem passing without the
check.
BUG=
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2268433002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#413375}
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 1
| 171,597
|
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