instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OfflinePageModelImpl::DeletePagesMissingArchiveFile(
const std::set<base::FilePath>& archive_paths) {
std::vector<int64_t> ids_of_pages_missing_archive_file;
for (const auto& id_page_pair : offline_pages_) {
if (archive_paths.count(id_page_pair.second.file_path) == 0UL)
ids_of_pages_missing_archive_file.push_back(id_page_pair.first);
}
if (ids_of_pages_missing_archive_file.empty())
return;
DeletePagesByOfflineId(
ids_of_pages_missing_archive_file,
base::Bind(&OfflinePageModelImpl::OnDeletePagesMissingArchiveFileDone,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
ids_of_pages_missing_archive_file));
}
Commit Message: Add the method to check if offline archive is in internal dir
Bug: 758690
Change-Id: I8bb4283fc40a87fa7a87df2c7e513e2e16903290
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/828049
Reviewed-by: Filip Gorski <fgorski@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jian Li <jianli@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#524232}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 155,871
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline bool npidentifier_cache_find(NPIdentifierFindArgs *args, NPIdentifier *pident)
{
args->ident = NULL;
#if defined(HAVE_G_HASH_TABLE_FIND) && !defined(BUILD_GENERIC)
if (!g_hash_table_find(g_npidentifier_cache, npidentifier_cache_find_info, args))
return false;
#else
g_hash_table_foreach(g_npidentifier_cache, (GHFunc)npidentifier_cache_find_info, args);
if (args->ident == NULL)
return false;
#endif
if (pident)
*pident = args->ident;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 27,155
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::UpdateActiveStyle() {
DCHECK(IsActive());
DCHECK(IsMainThread());
TRACE_EVENT0("blink", "Document::updateActiveStyle");
GetStyleEngine().UpdateActiveStyle();
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 129,910
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MagickExport MagickBooleanType SetQuantumFormat(const Image *image,
QuantumInfo *quantum_info,const QuantumFormatType format)
{
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(quantum_info != (QuantumInfo *) NULL);
assert(quantum_info->signature == MagickSignature);
quantum_info->format=format;
return(SetQuantumDepth(image,quantum_info,quantum_info->depth));
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/110
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 96,174
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int hfs_decompress_lzvn_attr(char* rawBuf, uint32_t rawSize, uint64_t uncSize, char** dstBuf, uint64_t* dstSize, int* dstBufFree)
{
if (rawBuf[0] == 0x06) {
return hfs_decompress_noncompressed_attr(
rawBuf, rawSize, uncSize, dstBuf, dstSize, dstBufFree);
}
char* uncBuf = (char *) tsk_malloc((size_t) uncSize);
*dstSize = lzvn_decode_buffer(uncBuf, uncSize, rawBuf, rawSize);
*dstBuf = uncBuf;
*dstBufFree = TRUE;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #1374 from JordyZomer/develop
Fix CVE-2018-19497.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 75,684
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: size_t xmp_string_len(XmpStringPtr s)
{
CHECK_PTR(s, 0);
return reinterpret_cast<const std::string *>(s)->size();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 16,058
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int x86_setup_perfctr(struct perf_event *event)
{
struct perf_event_attr *attr = &event->attr;
struct hw_perf_event *hwc = &event->hw;
u64 config;
if (!is_sampling_event(event)) {
hwc->sample_period = x86_pmu.max_period;
hwc->last_period = hwc->sample_period;
local64_set(&hwc->period_left, hwc->sample_period);
} else {
/*
* If we have a PMU initialized but no APIC
* interrupts, we cannot sample hardware
* events (user-space has to fall back and
* sample via a hrtimer based software event):
*/
if (!x86_pmu.apic)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
/*
* Do not allow config1 (extended registers) to propagate,
* there's no sane user-space generalization yet:
*/
if (attr->type == PERF_TYPE_RAW)
return 0;
if (attr->type == PERF_TYPE_HW_CACHE)
return set_ext_hw_attr(hwc, event);
if (attr->config >= x86_pmu.max_events)
return -EINVAL;
/*
* The generic map:
*/
config = x86_pmu.event_map(attr->config);
if (config == 0)
return -ENOENT;
if (config == -1LL)
return -EINVAL;
/*
* Branch tracing:
*/
if (attr->config == PERF_COUNT_HW_BRANCH_INSTRUCTIONS &&
!attr->freq && hwc->sample_period == 1) {
/* BTS is not supported by this architecture. */
if (!x86_pmu.bts_active)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
/* BTS is currently only allowed for user-mode. */
if (!attr->exclude_kernel)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
hwc->config |= config;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 25,801
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType WritePCDImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image)
{
Image
*pcd_image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register ssize_t
i;
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
pcd_image=image;
if (image->columns < image->rows)
{
Image
*rotate_image;
/*
Rotate portrait to landscape.
*/
rotate_image=RotateImage(image,90.0,&image->exception);
if (rotate_image == (Image *) NULL)
return(MagickFalse);
pcd_image=rotate_image;
}
/*
Open output image file.
*/
status=OpenBlob(image_info,pcd_image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
if (IssRGBCompatibleColorspace(image->colorspace) == MagickFalse)
(void) TransformImageColorspace(pcd_image,sRGBColorspace);
/*
Write PCD image header.
*/
for (i=0; i < 32; i++)
(void) WriteBlobByte(pcd_image,0xff);
for (i=0; i < 4; i++)
(void) WriteBlobByte(pcd_image,0x0e);
for (i=0; i < 8; i++)
(void) WriteBlobByte(pcd_image,'\0');
for (i=0; i < 4; i++)
(void) WriteBlobByte(pcd_image,0x01);
for (i=0; i < 4; i++)
(void) WriteBlobByte(pcd_image,0x05);
for (i=0; i < 8; i++)
(void) WriteBlobByte(pcd_image,'\0');
for (i=0; i < 4; i++)
(void) WriteBlobByte(pcd_image,0x0A);
for (i=0; i < 36; i++)
(void) WriteBlobByte(pcd_image,'\0');
for (i=0; i < 4; i++)
(void) WriteBlobByte(pcd_image,0x01);
for (i=0; i < 1944; i++)
(void) WriteBlobByte(pcd_image,'\0');
(void) WriteBlob(pcd_image,7,(const unsigned char *) "PCD_IPI");
(void) WriteBlobByte(pcd_image,0x06);
for (i=0; i < 1530; i++)
(void) WriteBlobByte(pcd_image,'\0');
if (image->columns < image->rows)
(void) WriteBlobByte(pcd_image,'\1');
else
(void) WriteBlobByte(pcd_image,'\0');
for (i=0; i < (3*0x800-1539); i++)
(void) WriteBlobByte(pcd_image,'\0');
/*
Write PCD tiles.
*/
status=WritePCDTile(pcd_image,"768x512>","192x128");
status=WritePCDTile(pcd_image,"768x512>","384x256");
status=WritePCDTile(pcd_image,"768x512>","768x512");
(void) CloseBlob(pcd_image);
if (pcd_image != image)
pcd_image=DestroyImage(pcd_image);
return(status);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 71,630
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __chksum_finup(u32 *crcp, const u8 *data, unsigned int len, u8 *out)
{
*(__le32 *)out = ~cpu_to_le32(__crc32c_le(*crcp, data, len));
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 47,198
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PrintWebViewHelper::OnFramePreparedForPreviewDocument() {
if (reset_prep_frame_view_) {
PrepareFrameForPreviewDocument();
return;
}
DidFinishPrinting(CreatePreviewDocument() ? OK : FAIL_PREVIEW);
}
Commit Message: Crash on nested IPC handlers in PrintWebViewHelper
Class is not designed to handle nested IPC. Regular flows also does not
expect them. Still during printing of plugging them may show message
boxes and start nested message loops.
For now we are going just crash. If stats show us that this case is
frequent we will have to do something more complicated.
BUG=502562
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1228693002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338100}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 126,649
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Browser::ShowCollectedCookiesDialog(TabContentsWrapper* wrapper) {
window()->ShowCollectedCookiesDialog(wrapper);
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 97,374
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_6_3_3_rtx(struct net *net,
const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const sctp_subtype_t type,
void *arg,
sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands)
{
struct sctp_transport *transport = arg;
SCTP_INC_STATS(net, SCTP_MIB_T3_RTX_EXPIREDS);
if (asoc->overall_error_count >= asoc->max_retrans) {
if (asoc->state == SCTP_STATE_SHUTDOWN_PENDING) {
/*
* We are here likely because the receiver had its rwnd
* closed for a while and we have not been able to
* transmit the locally queued data within the maximum
* retransmission attempts limit. Start the T5
* shutdown guard timer to give the receiver one last
* chance and some additional time to recover before
* aborting.
*/
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_TIMER_START_ONCE,
SCTP_TO(SCTP_EVENT_TIMEOUT_T5_SHUTDOWN_GUARD));
} else {
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_SET_SK_ERR,
SCTP_ERROR(ETIMEDOUT));
/* CMD_ASSOC_FAILED calls CMD_DELETE_TCB. */
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_ASSOC_FAILED,
SCTP_PERR(SCTP_ERROR_NO_ERROR));
SCTP_INC_STATS(net, SCTP_MIB_ABORTEDS);
SCTP_DEC_STATS(net, SCTP_MIB_CURRESTAB);
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_DELETE_TCB;
}
}
/* E1) For the destination address for which the timer
* expires, adjust its ssthresh with rules defined in Section
* 7.2.3 and set the cwnd <- MTU.
*/
/* E2) For the destination address for which the timer
* expires, set RTO <- RTO * 2 ("back off the timer"). The
* maximum value discussed in rule C7 above (RTO.max) may be
* used to provide an upper bound to this doubling operation.
*/
/* E3) Determine how many of the earliest (i.e., lowest TSN)
* outstanding DATA chunks for the address for which the
* T3-rtx has expired will fit into a single packet, subject
* to the MTU constraint for the path corresponding to the
* destination transport address to which the retransmission
* is being sent (this may be different from the address for
* which the timer expires [see Section 6.4]). Call this
* value K. Bundle and retransmit those K DATA chunks in a
* single packet to the destination endpoint.
*
* Note: Any DATA chunks that were sent to the address for
* which the T3-rtx timer expired but did not fit in one MTU
* (rule E3 above), should be marked for retransmission and
* sent as soon as cwnd allows (normally when a SACK arrives).
*/
/* Do some failure management (Section 8.2). */
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_STRIKE, SCTP_TRANSPORT(transport));
/* NB: Rules E4 and F1 are implicit in R1. */
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_RETRAN, SCTP_TRANSPORT(transport));
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_CONSUME;
}
Commit Message: sctp: Use correct sideffect command in duplicate cookie handling
When SCTP is done processing a duplicate cookie chunk, it tries
to delete a newly created association. For that, it has to set
the right association for the side-effect processing to work.
However, when it uses the SCTP_CMD_NEW_ASOC command, that performs
more work then really needed (like hashing the associationa and
assigning it an id) and there is no point to do that only to
delete the association as a next step. In fact, it also creates
an impossible condition where an association may be found by
the getsockopt() call, and that association is empty. This
causes a crash in some sctp getsockopts.
The solution is rather simple. We simply use SCTP_CMD_SET_ASOC
command that doesn't have all the overhead and does exactly
what we need.
Reported-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
CC: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 31,588
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Browser* Browser::GetBrowserForController(
const NavigationController* controller, int* index_result) {
BrowserList::const_iterator it;
for (it = BrowserList::begin(); it != BrowserList::end(); ++it) {
int index = (*it)->tab_handler_->GetTabStripModel()->GetIndexOfController(
controller);
if (index != TabStripModel::kNoTab) {
if (index_result)
*index_result = index;
return *it;
}
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 97,215
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: size_t GetReadSocketCount() const {
size_t read_sockets = 0;
for (const auto& socket : sockets_) {
if (socket.second == SocketStatus::kReadFrom)
++read_sockets;
}
return read_sockets;
}
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311}
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 136,876
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ~SplashOutFontFileID() {}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 877
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void vga_get_resolution(VGACommonState *s, int *pwidth, int *pheight)
{
int width, height;
if (vbe_enabled(s)) {
width = s->vbe_regs[VBE_DISPI_INDEX_XRES];
height = s->vbe_regs[VBE_DISPI_INDEX_YRES];
} else {
width = (s->cr[VGA_CRTC_H_DISP] + 1) * 8;
height = s->cr[VGA_CRTC_V_DISP_END] |
((s->cr[VGA_CRTC_OVERFLOW] & 0x02) << 7) |
((s->cr[VGA_CRTC_OVERFLOW] & 0x40) << 3);
height = (height + 1);
}
*pwidth = width;
*pheight = height;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 3,008
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: nsPush(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, const xmlChar *prefix, const xmlChar *URL)
{
if (ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_NSCLEAN) {
int i;
for (i = ctxt->nsNr - 2;i >= 0;i -= 2) {
if (ctxt->nsTab[i] == prefix) {
/* in scope */
if (ctxt->nsTab[i + 1] == URL)
return(-2);
/* out of scope keep it */
break;
}
}
}
if ((ctxt->nsMax == 0) || (ctxt->nsTab == NULL)) {
ctxt->nsMax = 10;
ctxt->nsNr = 0;
ctxt->nsTab = (const xmlChar **)
xmlMalloc(ctxt->nsMax * sizeof(xmlChar *));
if (ctxt->nsTab == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
ctxt->nsMax = 0;
return (-1);
}
} else if (ctxt->nsNr >= ctxt->nsMax) {
const xmlChar ** tmp;
ctxt->nsMax *= 2;
tmp = (const xmlChar **) xmlRealloc((char *) ctxt->nsTab,
ctxt->nsMax * sizeof(ctxt->nsTab[0]));
if (tmp == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
ctxt->nsMax /= 2;
return (-1);
}
ctxt->nsTab = tmp;
}
ctxt->nsTab[ctxt->nsNr++] = prefix;
ctxt->nsTab[ctxt->nsNr++] = URL;
return (ctxt->nsNr);
}
Commit Message: Detect infinite recursion in parameter entities
When expanding a parameter entity in a DTD, infinite recursion could
lead to an infinite loop or memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Wei Lei for the first of many reports.
Fixes bug 759579.
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 59,400
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool AXNodeObject::isModal() const {
if (roleValue() != DialogRole && roleValue() != AlertDialogRole)
return false;
if (hasAttribute(aria_modalAttr)) {
const AtomicString& modal = getAttribute(aria_modalAttr);
if (equalIgnoringCase(modal, "true"))
return true;
if (equalIgnoringCase(modal, "false"))
return false;
}
if (getNode() && isHTMLDialogElement(*getNode()))
return toElement(getNode())->isInTopLayer();
return false;
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 1
| 171,916
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: zgetdevice(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p)
{
os_ptr op = osp;
const gx_device *dev;
check_type(*op, t_integer);
if (op->value.intval != (int)(op->value.intval))
return_error(gs_error_rangecheck); /* won't fit in an int */
dev = gs_getdevice((int)(op->value.intval));
if (dev == 0) /* index out of range */
return_error(gs_error_rangecheck);
/* Device prototypes are read-only; */
/* the cast is logically unnecessary. */
make_tav(op, t_device, avm_foreign | a_readonly, pdevice,
(gx_device *) dev);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 1,552
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool HTMLCanvasElement::PaintsIntoCanvasBuffer() const {
if (PlaceholderFrame())
return false;
DCHECK(context_);
if (!context_->IsComposited())
return true;
if (GetLayoutBox() && GetLayoutBox()->HasAcceleratedCompositing())
return false;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Clean up CanvasResourceDispatcher on finalizer
We may have pending mojo messages after GC, so we want to drop the
dispatcher as soon as possible.
Bug: 929757,913964
Change-Id: I5789bcbb55aada4a74c67a28758f07686f8911c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489175
Reviewed-by: Ken Rockot <rockot@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#635833}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 152,105
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RList* MACH0_(mach_fields)(RBinFile *arch) {
struct MACH0_(mach_header) *mh = MACH0_(get_hdr_from_bytes)(arch->buf);
if (!mh) {
return NULL;
}
RList *ret = r_list_new ();
if (!ret) {
return NULL;
}
ret->free = free;
ut64 addr = 0;
#define ROW(nam,siz,val,fmt) \
r_list_append (ret, r_bin_field_new (addr, addr, siz, nam, sdb_fmt (0, "0x%08x", val), fmt)); \
addr += 4;
ROW("hdr.magic", 4, mh->magic, "x");
ROW("hdr.cputype", 4, mh->cputype, NULL);
ROW("hdr.cpusubtype", 4, mh->cpusubtype, NULL);
ROW("hdr.filetype", 4, mh->filetype, NULL);
ROW("hdr.ncmds", 4, mh->ncmds, NULL);
ROW("hdr.sizeofcmds", 4, mh->sizeofcmds, NULL);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix null deref and uaf in mach0 parser
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 66,833
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void UDPSocketWin::Core::WatchForWrite() {
AddRef();
write_watcher_.StartWatching(write_overlapped_.hEvent, &writer_);
}
Commit Message: Map posix error codes in bind better, and fix one windows mapping.
r=wtc
BUG=330233
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/101193008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@242224 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 113,466
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int follow_up(struct path *path)
{
struct mount *mnt = real_mount(path->mnt);
struct mount *parent;
struct dentry *mountpoint;
read_seqlock_excl(&mount_lock);
parent = mnt->mnt_parent;
if (parent == mnt) {
read_sequnlock_excl(&mount_lock);
return 0;
}
mntget(&parent->mnt);
mountpoint = dget(mnt->mnt_mountpoint);
read_sequnlock_excl(&mount_lock);
dput(path->dentry);
path->dentry = mountpoint;
mntput(path->mnt);
path->mnt = &parent->mnt;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: fs: umount on symlink leaks mnt count
Currently umount on symlink blocks following umount:
/vz is separate mount
# ls /vz/ -al | grep test
drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root 4096 Jul 19 01:14 testdir
lrwxrwxrwx. 1 root root 11 Jul 19 01:16 testlink -> /vz/testdir
# umount -l /vz/testlink
umount: /vz/testlink: not mounted (expected)
# lsof /vz
# umount /vz
umount: /vz: device is busy. (unexpected)
In this case mountpoint_last() gets an extra refcount on path->mnt
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 36,318
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: IW_IMPL(void) iw_snprintf(char *buf, size_t buflen, const char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list ap;
va_start(ap, fmt);
iw_vsnprintf(buf,buflen,fmt,ap);
va_end(ap);
}
Commit Message: Trying to fix some invalid left shift operations
Fixes issue #16
CWE ID: CWE-682
| 0
| 66,293
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: list_del_event(struct perf_event *event, struct perf_event_context *ctx)
{
struct perf_cpu_context *cpuctx;
WARN_ON_ONCE(event->ctx != ctx);
lockdep_assert_held(&ctx->lock);
/*
* We can have double detach due to exit/hot-unplug + close.
*/
if (!(event->attach_state & PERF_ATTACH_CONTEXT))
return;
event->attach_state &= ~PERF_ATTACH_CONTEXT;
if (is_cgroup_event(event)) {
ctx->nr_cgroups--;
cpuctx = __get_cpu_context(ctx);
/*
* if there are no more cgroup events
* then cler cgrp to avoid stale pointer
* in update_cgrp_time_from_cpuctx()
*/
if (!ctx->nr_cgroups)
cpuctx->cgrp = NULL;
}
ctx->nr_events--;
if (event->attr.inherit_stat)
ctx->nr_stat--;
list_del_rcu(&event->event_entry);
if (event->group_leader == event)
list_del_init(&event->group_entry);
update_group_times(event);
/*
* If event was in error state, then keep it
* that way, otherwise bogus counts will be
* returned on read(). The only way to get out
* of error state is by explicit re-enabling
* of the event
*/
if (event->state > PERF_EVENT_STATE_OFF)
event->state = PERF_EVENT_STATE_OFF;
ctx->generation++;
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix race in swevent hash
There's a race on CPU unplug where we free the swevent hash array
while it can still have events on. This will result in a
use-after-free which is BAD.
Simply do not free the hash array on unplug. This leaves the thing
around and no use-after-free takes place.
When the last swevent dies, we do a for_each_possible_cpu() iteration
anyway to clean these up, at which time we'll free it, so no leakage
will occur.
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 56,053
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::ResetOverrideEncoding() {
encoding_.clear();
Send(new ViewMsg_ResetPageEncodingToDefault(GetRoutingID()));
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 110,767
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ReferrerPolicy FrameFetchContext::GetReferrerPolicy() const {
if (IsDetached())
return frozen_state_->referrer_policy;
return document_->GetReferrerPolicy();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 138,749
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void t1_check_end(PDF pdf)
{
if (t1_eof())
return;
t1_getline();
if (t1_prefix("{restore}"))
t1_putline(pdf);
}
Commit Message: writet1 protection against buffer overflow
git-svn-id: svn://tug.org/texlive/trunk/Build/source@48697 c570f23f-e606-0410-a88d-b1316a301751
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 76,690
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void NullableLongMethodMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
base::Optional<int32_t> result = impl->nullableLongMethod();
if (!result)
V8SetReturnValueNull(info);
else
V8SetReturnValueInt(info, result.value());
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 134,915
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void update_blocked_averages(int cpu)
{
struct rq *rq = cpu_rq(cpu);
struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq = &rq->cfs;
const struct sched_class *curr_class;
struct rq_flags rf;
rq_lock_irqsave(rq, &rf);
update_rq_clock(rq);
update_cfs_rq_load_avg(cfs_rq_clock_task(cfs_rq), cfs_rq);
curr_class = rq->curr->sched_class;
update_rt_rq_load_avg(rq_clock_task(rq), rq, curr_class == &rt_sched_class);
update_dl_rq_load_avg(rq_clock_task(rq), rq, curr_class == &dl_sched_class);
update_irq_load_avg(rq, 0);
#ifdef CONFIG_NO_HZ_COMMON
rq->last_blocked_load_update_tick = jiffies;
if (!cfs_rq_has_blocked(cfs_rq) && !others_have_blocked(rq))
rq->has_blocked_load = 0;
#endif
rq_unlock_irqrestore(rq, &rf);
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 92,746
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void auth_gssapi_display_status_1(
char *m,
OM_uint32 code,
int type,
int rec)
{
OM_uint32 gssstat, minor_stat;
gss_buffer_desc msg;
OM_uint32 msg_ctx;
msg_ctx = 0;
while (1) {
gssstat = gss_display_status(&minor_stat, code,
type, GSS_C_NULL_OID,
&msg_ctx, &msg);
if (gssstat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
if (!rec) {
auth_gssapi_display_status_1(m,gssstat,GSS_C_GSS_CODE,1);
auth_gssapi_display_status_1(m, minor_stat,
GSS_C_MECH_CODE, 1);
} else {
fputs ("GSS-API authentication error ", stderr);
fwrite (msg.value, msg.length, 1, stderr);
fputs (": recursive failure!\n", stderr);
}
return;
}
fprintf (stderr, "GSS-API authentication error %s: ", m);
fwrite (msg.value, msg.length, 1, stderr);
putc ('\n', stderr);
if (misc_debug_gssapi)
gssrpcint_printf("GSS-API authentication error %s: %*s\n",
m, (int)msg.length, (char *) msg.value);
(void) gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &msg);
if (!msg_ctx)
break;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix kadm5/gssrpc XDR double free [CVE-2014-9421]
[MITKRB5-SA-2015-001] In auth_gssapi_unwrap_data(), do not free
partial deserialization results upon failure to deserialize. This
responsibility belongs to the callers, svctcp_getargs() and
svcudp_getargs(); doing it in the unwrap function results in freeing
the results twice.
In xdr_krb5_tl_data() and xdr_krb5_principal(), null out the pointers
we are freeing, as other XDR functions such as xdr_bytes() and
xdr_string().
ticket: 8056 (new)
target_version: 1.13.1
tags: pullup
CWE ID:
| 0
| 46,093
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: VisiblePosition ApplyBlockElementCommand::endOfNextParagrahSplittingTextNodesIfNeeded(VisiblePosition& endOfCurrentParagraph, Position& start, Position& end)
{
VisiblePosition endOfNextParagraph = endOfParagraph(endOfCurrentParagraph.next());
Position position = endOfNextParagraph.deepEquivalent();
RenderStyle* style = renderStyleOfEnclosingTextNode(position);
if (!style)
return endOfNextParagraph;
RefPtr<Text> text = position.containerText();
if (!style->preserveNewline() || !position.offsetInContainerNode() || !isNewLineAtPosition(firstPositionInNode(text.get())))
return endOfNextParagraph;
splitTextNode(text, 1);
if (text == start.containerNode() && text->previousSibling() && text->previousSibling()->isTextNode()) {
ASSERT(start.offsetInContainerNode() < position.offsetInContainerNode());
start = Position(toText(text->previousSibling()), start.offsetInContainerNode());
}
if (text == end.containerNode() && text->previousSibling() && text->previousSibling()->isTextNode()) {
ASSERT(end.offsetInContainerNode() < position.offsetInContainerNode());
end = Position(toText(text->previousSibling()), end.offsetInContainerNode());
}
if (text == m_endOfLastParagraph.containerNode()) {
if (m_endOfLastParagraph.offsetInContainerNode() < position.offsetInContainerNode()) {
if (text->previousSibling()->isTextNode()
&& static_cast<unsigned>(m_endOfLastParagraph.offsetInContainerNode()) <= toText(text->previousSibling())->length())
m_endOfLastParagraph = Position(toText(text->previousSibling()), m_endOfLastParagraph.offsetInContainerNode());
} else
m_endOfLastParagraph = Position(text.get(), m_endOfLastParagraph.offsetInContainerNode() - 1);
}
return Position(text.get(), position.offsetInContainerNode() - 1);
}
Commit Message: Remove false assertion in ApplyBlockElementCommand::formatSelection()
Note: This patch is preparation of fixing issue 294456.
This patch removes false assertion in ApplyBlockElementCommand::formatSelection(), when contents of being indent is modified, e.g. mutation event, |endOfNextParagraph| can hold removed contents.
BUG=294456
TEST=n/a
R=tkent@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/25657004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@158701 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 110,968
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void udf_update_extent_cache(struct inode *inode, loff_t estart,
struct extent_position *pos, int next_epos)
{
struct udf_inode_info *iinfo = UDF_I(inode);
spin_lock(&iinfo->i_extent_cache_lock);
/* Invalidate previously cached extent */
__udf_clear_extent_cache(inode);
if (pos->bh)
get_bh(pos->bh);
memcpy(&iinfo->cached_extent.epos, pos,
sizeof(struct extent_position));
iinfo->cached_extent.lstart = estart;
if (next_epos)
switch (iinfo->i_alloc_type) {
case ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_SHORT:
iinfo->cached_extent.epos.offset -=
sizeof(struct short_ad);
break;
case ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_LONG:
iinfo->cached_extent.epos.offset -=
sizeof(struct long_ad);
}
spin_unlock(&iinfo->i_extent_cache_lock);
}
Commit Message: udf: Avoid infinite loop when processing indirect ICBs
We did not implement any bound on number of indirect ICBs we follow when
loading inode. Thus corrupted medium could cause kernel to go into an
infinite loop, possibly causing a stack overflow.
Fix the possible stack overflow by removing recursion from
__udf_read_inode() and limit number of indirect ICBs we follow to avoid
infinite loops.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 36,065
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int deflate_decomp_init(struct deflate_ctx *ctx)
{
int ret = 0;
struct z_stream_s *stream = &ctx->decomp_stream;
stream->workspace = vzalloc(zlib_inflate_workspacesize());
if (!stream->workspace) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
ret = zlib_inflateInit2(stream, -DEFLATE_DEF_WINBITS);
if (ret != Z_OK) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out_free;
}
out:
return ret;
out_free:
vfree(stream->workspace);
goto out;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 47,225
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool PrintWebViewHelper::CopyAndPrint(WebKit::WebFrame* web_frame) {
webkit_glue::WebPreferences prefs = render_view()->GetWebkitPreferences();
prefs.javascript_enabled = false;
prefs.java_enabled = false;
print_web_view_ = WebView::create(this);
prefs.Apply(print_web_view_);
print_web_view_->initializeMainFrame(this);
print_pages_params_->pages.clear(); // Print all pages of selection.
std::string html = web_frame->selectionAsMarkup().utf8();
std::string url_str = "data:text/html;charset=utf-8,";
url_str.append(html);
GURL url(url_str);
print_web_view_->mainFrame()->loadRequest(WebURLRequest(url));
return true;
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 105,873
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xmlHaltParser(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
if (ctxt == NULL)
return;
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_EOF;
ctxt->disableSAX = 1;
if (ctxt->input != NULL) {
/*
* in case there was a specific allocation deallocate before
* overriding base
*/
if (ctxt->input->free != NULL) {
ctxt->input->free((xmlChar *) ctxt->input->base);
ctxt->input->free = NULL;
}
ctxt->input->cur = BAD_CAST"";
ctxt->input->base = ctxt->input->cur;
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Add validation for eternal enities
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=780691
Bug: 36556310
Change-Id: I9450743e167c3c73af5e4071f3fc85e81d061648
(cherry picked from commit bef9af3d89d241bcb518c20cba6da2a2fd9ba049)
CWE ID: CWE-611
| 0
| 163,418
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: TIFFOpenW(const wchar_t* name, const char* mode)
{
static const char module[] = "TIFFOpenW";
thandle_t fd;
int m;
DWORD dwMode;
int mbsize;
char *mbname;
TIFF *tif;
m = _TIFFgetMode(mode, module);
switch(m) {
case O_RDONLY: dwMode = OPEN_EXISTING; break;
case O_RDWR: dwMode = OPEN_ALWAYS; break;
case O_RDWR|O_CREAT: dwMode = OPEN_ALWAYS; break;
case O_RDWR|O_TRUNC: dwMode = CREATE_ALWAYS; break;
case O_RDWR|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC: dwMode = CREATE_ALWAYS; break;
default: return ((TIFF*)0);
}
fd = (thandle_t)CreateFileW(name,
(m == O_RDONLY)?GENERIC_READ:(GENERIC_READ|GENERIC_WRITE),
FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE, NULL, dwMode,
(m == O_RDONLY)?FILE_ATTRIBUTE_READONLY:FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL,
NULL);
if (fd == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
TIFFErrorExt(0, module, "%S: Cannot open", name);
return ((TIFF *)0);
}
mbname = NULL;
mbsize = WideCharToMultiByte(CP_ACP, 0, name, -1, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
if (mbsize > 0) {
mbname = (char *)_TIFFmalloc(mbsize);
if (!mbname) {
TIFFErrorExt(0, module,
"Can't allocate space for filename conversion buffer");
return ((TIFF*)0);
}
WideCharToMultiByte(CP_ACP, 0, name, -1, mbname, mbsize,
NULL, NULL);
}
tif = TIFFFdOpen((int)fd,
(mbname != NULL) ? mbname : "<unknown>", mode);
if(!tif)
CloseHandle(fd);
_TIFFfree(mbname);
return tif;
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_{unix,vms,win32}.c (_TIFFmalloc): ANSI C does not
require malloc() to return NULL pointer if requested allocation
size is zero. Assure that _TIFFmalloc does.
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 86,803
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GpuVideoDecodeAccelerator::GpuVideoDecodeAccelerator(
IPC::Message::Sender* sender,
int32 host_route_id,
GpuCommandBufferStub* stub)
: sender_(sender),
init_done_msg_(NULL),
host_route_id_(host_route_id),
stub_(stub),
video_decode_accelerator_(NULL) {
}
Commit Message: Revert 137988 - VAVDA is the hardware video decode accelerator for Chrome on Linux and ChromeOS for Intel CPUs (Sandy Bridge and newer).
This CL enables VAVDA acceleration for ChromeOS, both for HTML5 video and Flash.
The feature is currently hidden behind a command line flag and can be enabled by adding the --enable-vaapi parameter to command line.
BUG=117062
TEST=Manual runs of test streams.
Change-Id: I386e16739e2ef2230f52a0a434971b33d8654699
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9814001
This is causing crbug.com/129103
TBR=posciak@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10411066
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@138208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 102,982
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Err gf_sm_load_init(GF_SceneLoader *load)
{
GF_Err e = GF_NOT_SUPPORTED;
char *ext, szExt[50];
/*we need at least a scene graph*/
if (!load || (!load->ctx && !load->scene_graph)
#ifndef GPAC_DISABLE_ISOM
|| (!load->fileName && !load->isom && !(load->flags & GF_SM_LOAD_FOR_PLAYBACK) )
#endif
) return GF_BAD_PARAM;
if (!load->type) {
#ifndef GPAC_DISABLE_ISOM
if (load->isom) {
load->type = GF_SM_LOAD_MP4;
} else
#endif
{
ext = (char *)strrchr(load->fileName, '.');
if (!ext) return GF_NOT_SUPPORTED;
if (!stricmp(ext, ".gz")) {
char *anext;
ext[0] = 0;
anext = (char *)strrchr(load->fileName, '.');
ext[0] = '.';
ext = anext;
}
strcpy(szExt, &ext[1]);
strlwr(szExt);
if (strstr(szExt, "bt")) load->type = GF_SM_LOAD_BT;
else if (strstr(szExt, "wrl")) load->type = GF_SM_LOAD_VRML;
else if (strstr(szExt, "x3dv")) load->type = GF_SM_LOAD_X3DV;
#ifndef GPAC_DISABLE_LOADER_XMT
else if (strstr(szExt, "xmt") || strstr(szExt, "xmta")) load->type = GF_SM_LOAD_XMTA;
else if (strstr(szExt, "x3d")) load->type = GF_SM_LOAD_X3D;
#endif
else if (strstr(szExt, "swf")) load->type = GF_SM_LOAD_SWF;
else if (strstr(szExt, "mov")) load->type = GF_SM_LOAD_QT;
else if (strstr(szExt, "svg")) load->type = GF_SM_LOAD_SVG;
else if (strstr(szExt, "xsr")) load->type = GF_SM_LOAD_XSR;
else if (strstr(szExt, "xbl")) load->type = GF_SM_LOAD_XBL;
else if (strstr(szExt, "xml")) {
char *rtype = gf_xml_get_root_type(load->fileName, &e);
if (rtype) {
if (!strcmp(rtype, "SAFSession")) load->type = GF_SM_LOAD_XSR;
else if (!strcmp(rtype, "XMT-A")) load->type = GF_SM_LOAD_XMTA;
else if (!strcmp(rtype, "X3D")) load->type = GF_SM_LOAD_X3D;
else if (!strcmp(rtype, "bindings")) load->type = GF_SM_LOAD_XBL;
gf_free(rtype);
}
}
}
}
if (!load->type) return e;
if (!load->scene_graph) load->scene_graph = load->ctx->scene_graph;
switch (load->type) {
#ifndef GPAC_DISABLE_LOADER_BT
case GF_SM_LOAD_BT:
case GF_SM_LOAD_VRML:
case GF_SM_LOAD_X3DV:
return gf_sm_load_init_bt(load);
#endif
#ifndef GPAC_DISABLE_LOADER_XMT
case GF_SM_LOAD_XMTA:
case GF_SM_LOAD_X3D:
return gf_sm_load_init_xmt(load);
#endif
#ifndef GPAC_DISABLE_SVG
case GF_SM_LOAD_SVG:
case GF_SM_LOAD_XSR:
case GF_SM_LOAD_DIMS:
return gf_sm_load_init_svg(load);
case GF_SM_LOAD_XBL:
e = gf_sm_load_init_xbl(load);
load->process = gf_sm_load_run_xbl;
load->done = gf_sm_load_done_xbl;
return e;
#endif
#ifndef GPAC_DISABLE_SWF_IMPORT
case GF_SM_LOAD_SWF:
return gf_sm_load_init_swf(load);
#endif
#ifndef GPAC_DISABLE_LOADER_ISOM
case GF_SM_LOAD_MP4:
return gf_sm_load_init_isom(load);
#endif
#ifndef GPAC_DISABLE_QTVR
case GF_SM_LOAD_QT:
return gf_sm_load_init_qt(load);
#endif
default:
return GF_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
return GF_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
Commit Message: fix some overflows due to strcpy
fixes #1184, #1186, #1187 among other things
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 169,793
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual void PSNRPktHook(const vpx_codec_cx_pkt_t *pkt) {
if (!frame0_psnr_)
frame0_psnr_ = pkt->data.psnr.psnr[0];
EXPECT_NEAR(pkt->data.psnr.psnr[0], frame0_psnr_, 2.0);
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 164,487
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int net_set_channel(struct wif *wi, int chan)
{
uint32_t c = htonl(chan);
return net_cmd(wi_priv(wi), NET_SET_CHAN, &c, sizeof(c));
}
Commit Message: OSdep: Fixed segmentation fault that happens with a malicious server sending a negative length (Closes #16 on GitHub).
git-svn-id: http://svn.aircrack-ng.org/trunk@2419 28c6078b-6c39-48e3-add9-af49d547ecab
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 74,660
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
{
unsigned int type;
int renegotiate_seen = 0;
PACKET extensions;
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
s->servername_done = 0;
s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
#endif
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0;
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed);
s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL;
s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
ssl_check_for_safari(s, pkt);
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
/* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
#endif
s->srtp_profile = NULL;
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)
goto ri_check;
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions))
return 0;
if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions))
return 0;
/*
* We parse all extensions to ensure the ClientHello is well-formed but,
* unless an extension specifies otherwise, we ignore extensions upon
* resumption.
*/
while (PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type)) {
PACKET extension;
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension))
return 0;
if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, PACKET_data(&extension),
PACKET_remaining(&extension),
s->tlsext_debug_arg);
if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, &extension, al))
return 0;
renegotiate_seen = 1;
} else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
}
/*-
* The servername extension is treated as follows:
*
* - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
* - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
* in which case an fatal alert is generated.
* - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
* - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
* to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
* - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
* it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
* Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
* set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
* case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
* a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
* presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
* the value of the Host: field.
* - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
* if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
* session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
* extension.
* - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
*
*/
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
unsigned int servname_type;
PACKET sni, hostname;
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &sni)
/* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
|| PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
return 0;
}
/*
* Although the server_name extension was intended to be
* extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the
* syntax inextensibility and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as
* such.
* RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
* is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
* SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
*
* Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type,
* i.e., we can only have a single hostname.
*/
if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type)
|| servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
|| !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) {
return 0;
}
if (!s->hit) {
if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
*al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
return 0;
}
if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) {
*al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
return 0;
}
if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->tlsext_hostname)) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
s->servername_done = 1;
} else {
/*
* TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST
* fall back to a full handshake.
*/
s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
&& PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->tlsext_hostname,
strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname));
}
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
PACKET srp_I;
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, &srp_I))
return 0;
if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I))
return 0;
/*
* TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user
* upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login.
*/
if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
PACKET ec_point_format_list;
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, &ec_point_format_list)
|| PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) {
return 0;
}
if (!s->hit) {
if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
&s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
&s->
session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
}
} else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
PACKET elliptic_curve_list;
/* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &elliptic_curve_list)
|| PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) == 0
|| (PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) % 2) != 0) {
return 0;
}
if (!s->hit) {
if (!PACKET_memdup(&elliptic_curve_list,
&s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
&s->
session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
}
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
!s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, PACKET_data(&extension),
PACKET_remaining(&extension),
s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
{
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
} else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
PACKET supported_sig_algs;
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &supported_sig_algs)
|| (PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) % 2) != 0
|| PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
return 0;
}
if (!s->hit) {
if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, PACKET_data(&supported_sig_algs),
PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs))) {
return 0;
}
}
} else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension,
(unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type)) {
return 0;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
const unsigned char *ext_data;
PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2
(&extension, &responder_id_list))
return 0;
while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
OCSP_RESPID *id;
PACKET responder_id;
const unsigned char *id_data;
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list,
&responder_id)
|| PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
return 0;
}
if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL
&& (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()) == NULL) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
if (id == NULL)
return 0;
if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
return 0;
}
if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
}
/* Read in request_extensions */
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &exts))
return 0;
if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
X509_EXTENSION_free);
s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data,
PACKET_remaining(&exts));
if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts == NULL
|| ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
return 0;
}
}
} else
#endif
{
/*
* We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it.
*/
s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
}
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
unsigned int hbtype;
if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension, &hbtype)
|| PACKET_remaining(&extension)) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
switch (hbtype) {
case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
break;
case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
break;
default:
*al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
return 0;
}
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
/*-
* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
* renegotiation.
*
* s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
* probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
* the initial renegotiation too in certain cases (when
* there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
* earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
* anything like that, but this might change).
*
* A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
* in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
* 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
* in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
* Finished message could have been computed.)
*/
s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
}
#endif
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, &extension, al))
return 0;
}
/* session ticket processed earlier */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
&& type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, &extension, al))
return 0;
}
#endif
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
/*
* Note: extended master secret extension handled in
* tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early()
*/
/*
* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
* nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
* TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
* callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
* ServerHello may be later returned.
*/
else if (!s->hit) {
if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, PACKET_data(&extension),
PACKET_remaining(&extension), al) <= 0)
return 0;
}
}
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
/*
* tls1_check_duplicate_extensions should ensure this never happens.
*/
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
ri_check:
/* Need RI if renegotiating */
if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
!(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
return 0;
}
/*
* This function currently has no state to clean up, so it returns directly.
* If parsing fails at any point, the function returns early.
* The SSL object may be left with partial data from extensions, but it must
* then no longer be used, and clearing it up will free the leftovers.
*/
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 9,431
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BrowserEventRouter::PageActionExecuted(Profile* profile,
const ExtensionAction& page_action,
int tab_id,
const std::string& url,
int button) {
DispatchOldPageActionEvent(profile, page_action.extension_id(),
page_action.id(), tab_id, url, button);
WebContents* web_contents = NULL;
if (!ExtensionTabUtil::GetTabById(tab_id, profile, profile->IsOffTheRecord(),
NULL, NULL, &web_contents, NULL)) {
return;
}
ExtensionActionExecuted(profile, page_action, web_contents);
}
Commit Message: Do not pass URLs in onUpdated events to extensions unless they have the
"tabs" permission.
BUG=168442
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11824004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176406 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 116,019
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TabSpecificContentSettings::GeolocationDidNavigate(
const content::LoadCommittedDetails& details) {
geolocation_settings_state_.DidNavigate(details);
}
Commit Message: Check the content setting type is valid.
BUG=169770
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11875013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176687 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 117,331
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ar6000_connect_to_ap(struct ar6_softc *ar)
{
/* The ssid length check prevents second "essid off" from the user,
to be treated as a connect cmd. The second "essid off" is ignored.
*/
if((ar->arWmiReady == true) && (ar->arSsidLen > 0) && ar->arNetworkType!=AP_NETWORK)
{
int status;
if((ADHOC_NETWORK != ar->arNetworkType) &&
(NONE_AUTH==ar->arAuthMode) &&
(WEP_CRYPT==ar->arPairwiseCrypto)) {
ar6000_install_static_wep_keys(ar);
}
if (!ar->arUserBssFilter) {
if (wmi_bssfilter_cmd(ar->arWmi, ALL_BSS_FILTER, 0) != 0) {
return -EIO;
}
}
#ifdef WAPI_ENABLE
if (ar->arWapiEnable) {
ar->arPairwiseCrypto = WAPI_CRYPT;
ar->arPairwiseCryptoLen = 0;
ar->arGroupCrypto = WAPI_CRYPT;
ar->arGroupCryptoLen = 0;
ar->arAuthMode = NONE_AUTH;
ar->arConnectCtrlFlags |= CONNECT_IGNORE_WPAx_GROUP_CIPHER;
}
#endif
AR_DEBUG_PRINTF(ATH_DEBUG_WLAN_CONNECT,("Connect called with authmode %d dot11 auth %d"\
" PW crypto %d PW crypto Len %d GRP crypto %d"\
" GRP crypto Len %d\n",
ar->arAuthMode, ar->arDot11AuthMode,
ar->arPairwiseCrypto, ar->arPairwiseCryptoLen,
ar->arGroupCrypto, ar->arGroupCryptoLen));
reconnect_flag = 0;
/* Set the listen interval into 1000TUs or more. This value will be indicated to Ap in the conn.
later set it back locally at the STA to 100/1000 TUs depending on the power mode */
if ((ar->arNetworkType == INFRA_NETWORK)) {
wmi_listeninterval_cmd(ar->arWmi, max(ar->arListenIntervalT, (u16)A_MAX_WOW_LISTEN_INTERVAL), 0);
}
status = wmi_connect_cmd(ar->arWmi, ar->arNetworkType,
ar->arDot11AuthMode, ar->arAuthMode,
ar->arPairwiseCrypto, ar->arPairwiseCryptoLen,
ar->arGroupCrypto,ar->arGroupCryptoLen,
ar->arSsidLen, ar->arSsid,
ar->arReqBssid, ar->arChannelHint,
ar->arConnectCtrlFlags);
if (status) {
wmi_listeninterval_cmd(ar->arWmi, ar->arListenIntervalT, ar->arListenIntervalB);
if (!ar->arUserBssFilter) {
wmi_bssfilter_cmd(ar->arWmi, NONE_BSS_FILTER, 0);
}
return status;
}
if ((!(ar->arConnectCtrlFlags & CONNECT_DO_WPA_OFFLOAD)) &&
((WPA_PSK_AUTH == ar->arAuthMode) || (WPA2_PSK_AUTH == ar->arAuthMode)))
{
A_TIMEOUT_MS(&ar->disconnect_timer, A_DISCONNECT_TIMER_INTERVAL, 0);
}
ar->arConnectCtrlFlags &= ~CONNECT_DO_WPA_OFFLOAD;
ar->arConnectPending = true;
return status;
}
return A_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 24,165
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SPL_METHOD(Array, exchangeArray)
{
zval *object = getThis(), *tmp, **array;
spl_array_object *intern = (spl_array_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(object TSRMLS_CC);
array_init(return_value);
zend_hash_copy(HASH_OF(return_value), spl_array_get_hash_table(intern, 0 TSRMLS_CC), (copy_ctor_func_t) zval_add_ref, &tmp, sizeof(zval*));
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "Z", &array) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
spl_array_set_array(object, intern, array, 0L, 1 TSRMLS_CC);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #73029 - Missing type check when unserializing SplArray
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 49,855
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void dn_keepalive(struct sock *sk)
{
struct dn_scp *scp = DN_SK(sk);
/*
* By checking the other_data transmit queue is empty
* we are double checking that we are not sending too
* many of these keepalive frames.
*/
if (skb_queue_empty(&scp->other_xmit_queue))
dn_nsp_send_link(sk, DN_NOCHANGE, 0);
}
Commit Message: net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument
郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:
int socket_fd;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
addr.sin_port = 0;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
addr.sin_family = 10;
socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
connect(socket_fd , &addr,16);
AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
store a zero in the protocol fields.
This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
is NULL for raw sockets.
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: [<ffffffff816db90e>] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
kernel: [<ffffffff816db9a4>] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff81645069>] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
kernel: [<ffffffff810ac51b>] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff810236d8>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
kernel: [<ffffffff81645e0e>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
kernel: [<ffffffff81779515>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89
I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.
CVE: CVE-2015-8543
Cc: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
Reported-by: 郭永刚 <guoyonggang@360.cn>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 41,491
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: EventQueue* Document::GetEventQueue() const {
if (!dom_window_)
return nullptr;
return dom_window_->GetEventQueue();
}
Commit Message: Fixed bug where PlzNavigate CSP in a iframe did not get the inherited CSP
When inheriting the CSP from a parent document to a local-scheme CSP,
it does not always get propagated to the PlzNavigate CSP. This means
that PlzNavigate CSP checks (like `frame-src`) would be ran against
a blank policy instead of the proper inherited policy.
Bug: 778658
Change-Id: I61bb0d432e1cea52f199e855624cb7b3078f56a9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/765969
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#518245}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 146,754
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: unsigned long probe_memory(void)
{
unsigned long total = 0;
int i;
for (i = 0; sp_banks[i].num_bytes; i++)
total += sp_banks[i].num_bytes;
return total;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 25,732
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void add_header_grep(struct rev_info *revs, enum grep_header_field field, const char *pattern)
{
append_header_grep_pattern(&revs->grep_filter, field, pattern);
}
Commit Message: list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 54,962
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void php_build_argv(char *s, zval *track_vars_array TSRMLS_DC)
{
zval *arr, *argc, *tmp;
int count = 0;
char *ss, *space;
if (!(SG(request_info).argc || track_vars_array)) {
return;
}
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(arr);
array_init(arr);
/* Prepare argv */
if (SG(request_info).argc) { /* are we in cli sapi? */
int i;
for (i = 0; i < SG(request_info).argc; i++) {
ALLOC_ZVAL(tmp);
Z_TYPE_P(tmp) = IS_STRING;
Z_STRLEN_P(tmp) = strlen(SG(request_info).argv[i]);
Z_STRVAL_P(tmp) = estrndup(SG(request_info).argv[i], Z_STRLEN_P(tmp));
INIT_PZVAL(tmp);
if (zend_hash_next_index_insert(Z_ARRVAL_P(arr), &tmp, sizeof(zval *), NULL) == FAILURE) {
if (Z_TYPE_P(tmp) == IS_STRING) {
efree(Z_STRVAL_P(tmp));
}
}
}
} else if (s && *s) {
ss = s;
while (ss) {
space = strchr(ss, '+');
if (space) {
*space = '\0';
}
/* auto-type */
ALLOC_ZVAL(tmp);
Z_TYPE_P(tmp) = IS_STRING;
Z_STRLEN_P(tmp) = strlen(ss);
Z_STRVAL_P(tmp) = estrndup(ss, Z_STRLEN_P(tmp));
INIT_PZVAL(tmp);
count++;
if (zend_hash_next_index_insert(Z_ARRVAL_P(arr), &tmp, sizeof(zval *), NULL) == FAILURE) {
if (Z_TYPE_P(tmp) == IS_STRING) {
efree(Z_STRVAL_P(tmp));
}
}
if (space) {
*space = '+';
ss = space + 1;
} else {
ss = space;
}
}
}
/* prepare argc */
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(argc);
if (SG(request_info).argc) {
Z_LVAL_P(argc) = SG(request_info).argc;
} else {
Z_LVAL_P(argc) = count;
}
Z_TYPE_P(argc) = IS_LONG;
if (SG(request_info).argc) {
Z_ADDREF_P(arr);
Z_ADDREF_P(argc);
zend_hash_update(&EG(symbol_table), "argv", sizeof("argv"), &arr, sizeof(zval *), NULL);
zend_hash_update(&EG(symbol_table), "argc", sizeof("argc"), &argc, sizeof(zval *), NULL);
}
if (track_vars_array) {
Z_ADDREF_P(arr);
Z_ADDREF_P(argc);
zend_hash_update(Z_ARRVAL_P(track_vars_array), "argv", sizeof("argv"), &arr, sizeof(zval *), NULL);
zend_hash_update(Z_ARRVAL_P(track_vars_array), "argc", sizeof("argc"), &argc, sizeof(zval *), NULL);
}
zval_ptr_dtor(&arr);
zval_ptr_dtor(&argc);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #73807
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 63,618
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
{
int i,idx;
long alg_k,alg_a;
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
SESS_CERT *sc;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
RSA *rsa;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
DH *dh;
#endif
alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
/* we don't have a certificate */
if ((alg_a & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aKRB5)) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
return(1);
sc=s->session->sess_cert;
if (sc == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
dh=s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
#endif
/* This is the passed certificate */
idx=sc->peer_cert_type;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC)
{
if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509,
s) == 0)
{ /* check failed */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
goto f_err;
}
else
{
return 1;
}
}
else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT);
goto f_err;
}
else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_ECDH_CERT);
goto f_err;
}
#endif
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509);
i=X509_certificate_type(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509,pkey);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
/* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_RSA|EVP_PKT_SIGN))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
goto f_err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DSA|EVP_PKT_SIGN))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);
goto f_err;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) &&
!(has_bits(i,EVP_PK_RSA|EVP_PKT_ENC) || (rsa != NULL)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
goto f_err;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) &&
!(has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKT_EXCH) || (dh != NULL)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DH_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) &&
!has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKS_RSA))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT);
goto f_err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHd) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) &&
!has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKS_DSA))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT);
goto f_err;
}
#endif
#endif
if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PKT_EXP))
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
{
if (rsa == NULL
|| RSA_size(rsa)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
}
else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
{
if (dh == NULL
|| DH_size(dh)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
}
else
#endif
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
}
return(1);
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
err:
return(0);
}
Commit Message: Only allow ephemeral RSA keys in export ciphersuites.
OpenSSL clients would tolerate temporary RSA keys in non-export
ciphersuites. It also had an option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA which
enabled this server side. Remove both options as they are a
protocol violation.
Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue.
(CVE-2015-0204)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 45,191
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: to_json(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
Datum val = PG_GETARG_DATUM(0);
Oid val_type = get_fn_expr_argtype(fcinfo->flinfo, 0);
StringInfo result;
JsonTypeCategory tcategory;
Oid outfuncoid;
if (val_type == InvalidOid)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
errmsg("could not determine input data type")));
json_categorize_type(val_type,
&tcategory, &outfuncoid);
result = makeStringInfo();
datum_to_json(val, false, result, tcategory, outfuncoid, false);
PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(cstring_to_text_with_len(result->data, result->len));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 2,557
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WebKitWebInspector* webkit_web_view_get_inspector(WebKitWebView* webView)
{
g_return_val_if_fail(WEBKIT_IS_WEB_VIEW(webView), 0);
return webView->priv->webInspector.get();
}
Commit Message: 2011-06-02 Joone Hur <joone.hur@collabora.co.uk>
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
[GTK] Only load dictionaries if spell check is enabled
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32879
We don't need to call enchant if enable-spell-checking is false.
* webkit/webkitwebview.cpp:
(webkit_web_view_update_settings): Skip loading dictionaries when enable-spell-checking is false.
(webkit_web_view_settings_notify): Ditto.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@87925 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 100,563
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int listenToPort(int port, int *fds, int *count) {
int j;
/* Force binding of 0.0.0.0 if no bind address is specified, always
* entering the loop if j == 0. */
if (server.bindaddr_count == 0) server.bindaddr[0] = NULL;
for (j = 0; j < server.bindaddr_count || j == 0; j++) {
if (server.bindaddr[j] == NULL) {
int unsupported = 0;
/* Bind * for both IPv6 and IPv4, we enter here only if
* server.bindaddr_count == 0. */
fds[*count] = anetTcp6Server(server.neterr,port,NULL,
server.tcp_backlog);
if (fds[*count] != ANET_ERR) {
anetNonBlock(NULL,fds[*count]);
(*count)++;
} else if (errno == EAFNOSUPPORT) {
unsupported++;
serverLog(LL_WARNING,"Not listening to IPv6: unsupproted");
}
if (*count == 1 || unsupported) {
/* Bind the IPv4 address as well. */
fds[*count] = anetTcpServer(server.neterr,port,NULL,
server.tcp_backlog);
if (fds[*count] != ANET_ERR) {
anetNonBlock(NULL,fds[*count]);
(*count)++;
} else if (errno == EAFNOSUPPORT) {
unsupported++;
serverLog(LL_WARNING,"Not listening to IPv4: unsupproted");
}
}
/* Exit the loop if we were able to bind * on IPv4 and IPv6,
* otherwise fds[*count] will be ANET_ERR and we'll print an
* error and return to the caller with an error. */
if (*count + unsupported == 2) break;
} else if (strchr(server.bindaddr[j],':')) {
/* Bind IPv6 address. */
fds[*count] = anetTcp6Server(server.neterr,port,server.bindaddr[j],
server.tcp_backlog);
} else {
/* Bind IPv4 address. */
fds[*count] = anetTcpServer(server.neterr,port,server.bindaddr[j],
server.tcp_backlog);
}
if (fds[*count] == ANET_ERR) {
serverLog(LL_WARNING,
"Creating Server TCP listening socket %s:%d: %s",
server.bindaddr[j] ? server.bindaddr[j] : "*",
port, server.neterr);
return C_ERR;
}
anetNonBlock(NULL,fds[*count]);
(*count)++;
}
return C_OK;
}
Commit Message: Security: Cross Protocol Scripting protection.
This is an attempt at mitigating problems due to cross protocol
scripting, an attack targeting services using line oriented protocols
like Redis that can accept HTTP requests as valid protocol, by
discarding the invalid parts and accepting the payloads sent, for
example, via a POST request.
For this to be effective, when we detect POST and Host: and terminate
the connection asynchronously, the networking code was modified in order
to never process further input. It was later verified that in a
pipelined request containing a POST command, the successive commands are
not executed.
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 70,039
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AXObjectCacheImpl::notificationPostTimerFired(TimerBase*) {
m_notificationPostTimer.stop();
unsigned i = 0, count = m_notificationsToPost.size();
for (i = 0; i < count; ++i) {
AXObject* obj = m_notificationsToPost[i].first;
if (!obj->axObjectID())
continue;
if (obj->isDetached())
continue;
#if DCHECK_IS_ON()
if (obj->isAXLayoutObject()) {
AXLayoutObject* layoutObj = toAXLayoutObject(obj);
LayoutObject* layoutObject = layoutObj->getLayoutObject();
if (layoutObject && layoutObject->view())
DCHECK(!layoutObject->view()->layoutState());
}
#endif
AXNotification notification = m_notificationsToPost[i].second;
postPlatformNotification(obj, notification);
if (notification == AXChildrenChanged && obj->parentObjectIfExists() &&
obj->lastKnownIsIgnoredValue() != obj->accessibilityIsIgnored())
childrenChanged(obj->parentObject());
}
m_notificationsToPost.clear();
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 127,370
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int Equalizer_setParameter (EffectContext *pContext, void *pParam, void *pValue){
int status = 0;
int32_t preset;
int32_t band;
int32_t level;
int32_t *pParamTemp = (int32_t *)pParam;
int32_t param = *pParamTemp++;
switch (param) {
case EQ_PARAM_CUR_PRESET:
preset = (int32_t)(*(uint16_t *)pValue);
if ((preset >= EqualizerGetNumPresets())||(preset < 0)) {
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
EqualizerSetPreset(pContext, preset);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_BAND_LEVEL:
band = *pParamTemp;
level = (int32_t)(*(int16_t *)pValue);
if (band >= FIVEBAND_NUMBANDS) {
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
EqualizerSetBandLevel(pContext, band, level);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_PROPERTIES: {
int16_t *p = (int16_t *)pValue;
if ((int)p[0] >= EqualizerGetNumPresets()) {
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
if (p[0] >= 0) {
EqualizerSetPreset(pContext, (int)p[0]);
} else {
if ((int)p[1] != FIVEBAND_NUMBANDS) {
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
for (int i = 0; i < FIVEBAND_NUMBANDS; i++) {
EqualizerSetBandLevel(pContext, i, (int)p[2 + i]);
}
}
} break;
default:
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Equalizer_setParameter() invalid param %d", param);
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
return status;
} /* end Equalizer_setParameter */
Commit Message: audio effects: fix heap overflow
Check consistency of effect command reply sizes before
copying to reply address.
Also add null pointer check on reply size.
Also remove unused parameter warning.
Bug: 21953516.
Change-Id: I4cf00c12eaed696af28f3b7613f7e36f47a160c4
(cherry picked from commit 0f714a464d2425afe00d6450535e763131b40844)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 157,401
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sha1_import(struct shash_desc *desc, const void *in)
{
struct s390_sha_ctx *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
const struct sha1_state *ictx = in;
sctx->count = ictx->count;
memcpy(sctx->state, ictx->state, sizeof(ictx->state));
memcpy(sctx->buf, ictx->buffer, sizeof(ictx->buffer));
sctx->func = KIMD_SHA_1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 46,712
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static char* tcmu_get_path( struct tcmu_device *dev)
{
char *config;
config = strchr(tcmu_get_dev_cfgstring(dev), '/');
if (!config) {
tcmu_err("no configuration found in cfgstring\n");
return NULL;
}
config += 1; /* get past '/' */
return config;
}
Commit Message: glfs: discard glfs_check_config
Signed-off-by: Prasanna Kumar Kalever <prasanna.kalever@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 59,067
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int normalize_ioctl(unsigned int *cmd, int *size)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(ioctl_table); i++) {
if ((*cmd & 0xffff) == (ioctl_table[i] & 0xffff)) {
*size = _IOC_SIZE(*cmd);
*cmd = ioctl_table[i];
if (*size > _IOC_SIZE(*cmd)) {
pr_info("ioctl not yet supported\n");
return -EFAULT;
}
return 0;
}
}
return -EINVAL;
}
Commit Message: floppy: don't write kernel-only members to FDRAWCMD ioctl output
Do not leak kernel-only floppy_raw_cmd structure members to userspace.
This includes the linked-list pointer and the pointer to the allocated
DMA space.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattd@bugfuzz.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 39,401
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool IDNSpoofChecker::SimilarToTopDomains(base::StringPiece16 hostname) {
size_t hostname_length = hostname.length() - (hostname.back() == '.' ? 1 : 0);
icu::UnicodeString ustr_host(FALSE, hostname.data(), hostname_length);
if (lgc_letters_n_ascii_.span(ustr_host, 0, USET_SPAN_CONTAINED) ==
ustr_host.length())
diacritic_remover_.get()->transliterate(ustr_host);
extra_confusable_mapper_.get()->transliterate(ustr_host);
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
icu::UnicodeString ustr_skeleton;
uspoof_getSkeletonUnicodeString(checker_, 0, ustr_host, ustr_skeleton,
&status);
if (U_FAILURE(status))
return false;
std::string skeleton;
return LookupMatchInTopDomains(ustr_skeleton.toUTF8String(skeleton));
}
Commit Message: Add more entries to the confusability mapping
U+014B (ŋ) => n
U+1004 (င) => c
U+100c (ဌ) => g
U+1042 (၂) => j
U+1054 (ၔ) => e
Bug: 811117,808316
Test: components_unittests -gtest_filter=*IDN*
Change-Id: I29f73c48d665bd9070050bd7f0080563635b9c63
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/919423
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jungshik Shin <jshin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#536955}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 148,243
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void aes_encrypt(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *out, const u8 *in)
{
const struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
const __le32 *src = (const __le32 *)in;
__le32 *dst = (__le32 *)out;
u32 b0[4], b1[4];
const u32 *kp = ctx->key_enc + 4;
const int key_len = ctx->key_length;
b0[0] = le32_to_cpu(src[0]) ^ ctx->key_enc[0];
b0[1] = le32_to_cpu(src[1]) ^ ctx->key_enc[1];
b0[2] = le32_to_cpu(src[2]) ^ ctx->key_enc[2];
b0[3] = le32_to_cpu(src[3]) ^ ctx->key_enc[3];
if (key_len > 24) {
f_nround(b1, b0, kp);
f_nround(b0, b1, kp);
}
if (key_len > 16) {
f_nround(b1, b0, kp);
f_nround(b0, b1, kp);
}
f_nround(b1, b0, kp);
f_nround(b0, b1, kp);
f_nround(b1, b0, kp);
f_nround(b0, b1, kp);
f_nround(b1, b0, kp);
f_nround(b0, b1, kp);
f_nround(b1, b0, kp);
f_nround(b0, b1, kp);
f_nround(b1, b0, kp);
f_lround(b0, b1, kp);
dst[0] = cpu_to_le32(b0[0]);
dst[1] = cpu_to_le32(b0[1]);
dst[2] = cpu_to_le32(b0[2]);
dst[3] = cpu_to_le32(b0[3]);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 47,101
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void pdf_set_populating_xref_trailer(fz_context *ctx, pdf_document *doc, pdf_obj *trailer)
{
/* Update the trailer of the xref section being populated */
pdf_xref *xref = &doc->xref_sections[doc->num_xref_sections - 1];
if (xref->trailer)
{
pdf_drop_obj(ctx, xref->pre_repair_trailer);
xref->pre_repair_trailer = xref->trailer;
}
xref->trailer = pdf_keep_obj(ctx, trailer);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 16,724
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::EnterFullscreenMode(
const GURL& origin,
const blink::WebFullscreenOptions& options) {
RenderWidgetHostView* const widget_view = GetFullscreenRenderWidgetHostView();
if (widget_view) {
RenderWidgetHostImpl::From(widget_view->GetRenderWidgetHost())
->ShutdownAndDestroyWidget(true);
}
if (delegate_) {
delegate_->EnterFullscreenModeForTab(this, origin, options);
if (keyboard_lock_widget_)
delegate_->RequestKeyboardLock(this, esc_key_locked_);
}
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.DidToggleFullscreenModeForTab(IsFullscreenForCurrentTab(), false);
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 144,944
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static __u32 tpacket_get_timestamp(struct sk_buff *skb, struct timespec *ts,
unsigned int flags)
{
struct skb_shared_hwtstamps *shhwtstamps = skb_hwtstamps(skb);
if (shhwtstamps &&
(flags & SOF_TIMESTAMPING_RAW_HARDWARE) &&
ktime_to_timespec_cond(shhwtstamps->hwtstamp, ts))
return TP_STATUS_TS_RAW_HARDWARE;
if (ktime_to_timespec_cond(skb->tstamp, ts))
return TP_STATUS_TS_SOFTWARE;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: packet: fix race condition in packet_set_ring
When packet_set_ring creates a ring buffer it will initialize a
struct timer_list if the packet version is TPACKET_V3. This value
can then be raced by a different thread calling setsockopt to
set the version to TPACKET_V1 before packet_set_ring has finished.
This leads to a use-after-free on a function pointer in the
struct timer_list when the socket is closed as the previously
initialized timer will not be deleted.
The bug is fixed by taking lock_sock(sk) in packet_setsockopt when
changing the packet version while also taking the lock at the start
of packet_set_ring.
Fixes: f6fb8f100b80 ("af-packet: TPACKET_V3 flexible buffer implementation.")
Signed-off-by: Philip Pettersson <philip.pettersson@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 49,221
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ModuleSystem::NativesEnabledScope::NativesEnabledScope(
ModuleSystem* module_system)
: module_system_(module_system) {
module_system_->natives_enabled_++;
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Don't allow built-in extensions code to be overridden
BUG=546677
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417513003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356654}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 133,061
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int php_zip_get_num_files(struct zip *za TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
return zip_get_num_files(za);
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Fix bug #72434: ZipArchive class Use After Free Vulnerability in PHP's GC algorithm and unserialize
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 51,294
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void QueryManager::Query::RunCallbacks() {
for (size_t i = 0; i < callbacks_.size(); i++) {
callbacks_[i].Run();
}
callbacks_.clear();
}
Commit Message: Add bounds validation to AsyncPixelTransfersCompletedQuery::End
BUG=351852
R=jbauman@chromium.org, jorgelo@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/198253002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@256723 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 121,467
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int snd_timer_global_new(char *id, int device, struct snd_timer **rtimer)
{
struct snd_timer_id tid;
tid.dev_class = SNDRV_TIMER_CLASS_GLOBAL;
tid.dev_sclass = SNDRV_TIMER_SCLASS_NONE;
tid.card = -1;
tid.device = device;
tid.subdevice = 0;
return snd_timer_new(NULL, id, &tid, rtimer);
}
Commit Message: ALSA: timer: Fix leak in events via snd_timer_user_tinterrupt
The stack object “r1” has a total size of 32 bytes. Its field
“event” and “val” both contain 4 bytes padding. These 8 bytes
padding bytes are sent to user without being initialized.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 52,695
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int is_handler(const struct dirent *dirent)
{
if (strncmp(dirent->d_name, "handler_", 8))
return 0;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: only allow dynamic UnregisterHandler for external handlers, thereby fixing DoS
Trying to unregister an internal handler ended up in a SEGFAULT, because
the tcmur_handler->opaque was NULL. Way to reproduce:
dbus-send --system --print-reply --dest=org.kernel.TCMUService1 /org/kernel/TCMUService1/HandlerManager1 org.kernel.TCMUService1.HandlerManager1.UnregisterHandler string:qcow
we use a newly introduced boolean in struct tcmur_handler for keeping
track of external handlers. As suggested by mikechristie adjusting the
public data structure is acceptable.
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 59,054
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AwFeatureListCreator::SetUpFieldTrials() {
auto* metrics_client = AwMetricsServiceClient::GetInstance();
DCHECK(!field_trial_list_);
field_trial_list_ = std::make_unique<base::FieldTrialList>(
metrics_client->CreateLowEntropyProvider());
std::unique_ptr<variations::SeedResponse> seed = GetAndClearJavaSeed();
base::Time null_time;
base::Time seed_date =
seed ? base::Time::FromJavaTime(seed->date) : null_time;
variations::UIStringOverrider ui_string_overrider;
client_ = std::make_unique<AwVariationsServiceClient>();
auto seed_store = std::make_unique<variations::VariationsSeedStore>(
local_state_.get(), /*initial_seed=*/std::move(seed),
/*on_initial_seed_stored=*/base::DoNothing());
if (!seed_date.is_null())
seed_store->RecordLastFetchTime(seed_date);
variations_field_trial_creator_ =
std::make_unique<variations::VariationsFieldTrialCreator>(
local_state_.get(), client_.get(), std::move(seed_store),
ui_string_overrider);
variations_field_trial_creator_->OverrideVariationsPlatform(
variations::Study::PLATFORM_ANDROID_WEBVIEW);
std::set<std::string> unforceable_field_trials;
variations::SafeSeedManager ignored_safe_seed_manager(true,
local_state_.get());
variations_field_trial_creator_->SetupFieldTrials(
cc::switches::kEnableGpuBenchmarking, switches::kEnableFeatures,
switches::kDisableFeatures, unforceable_field_trials,
std::vector<std::string>(),
content::GetSwitchDependentFeatureOverrides(
*base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()),
/*low_entropy_provider=*/nullptr, std::make_unique<base::FeatureList>(),
aw_field_trials_.get(), &ignored_safe_seed_manager);
}
Commit Message: [AW] Add Variations.RestartsWithStaleSeed metric.
This metric records the number of consecutive times the WebView browser
process starts with a stale seed. It's written when a fresh seed is
loaded after previously loading a stale seed.
Test: Manually verified with logging that the metric was written.
Bug: 1010625
Change-Id: Iadedb45af08d59ecd6662472670f848e8e99a8d9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1851126
Commit-Queue: Robbie McElrath <rmcelrath@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nate Fischer <ntfschr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <isherman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Changwan Ryu <changwan@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#709417}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 172,360
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int unhex4(char* hex) {
int r = 0;
for (int i=0; i<4; i++) {
char c = *hex++;
int n;
if ('0' <= c && c <= '9') n = c - '0';
else if ('a' <= c && c <= 'f') n = c - 'a' + 10;
else if ('A' <= c && c <= 'F') n = c - 'A' + 10;
else return -1;
r <<= 4;
r |= n;
}
return r;
}
Commit Message: Heap buffer overflow in tokenadd() (fix #105)
This was an off-by one: the NUL terminator byte was not allocated on
resize. This was triggered by JSON-encoded numbers longer than 256
bytes.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 56,403
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: mrb_cloexec_open(mrb_state *mrb, const char *pathname, mrb_int flags, mrb_int mode)
{
mrb_value emsg;
int fd, retry = FALSE;
char* fname = mrb_locale_from_utf8(pathname, -1);
#ifdef O_CLOEXEC
/* O_CLOEXEC is available since Linux 2.6.23. Linux 2.6.18 silently ignore it. */
flags |= O_CLOEXEC;
#elif defined O_NOINHERIT
flags |= O_NOINHERIT;
#endif
reopen:
fd = open(fname, (int)flags, (fmode_t)mode);
if (fd == -1) {
if (!retry) {
switch (errno) {
case ENFILE:
case EMFILE:
mrb_garbage_collect(mrb);
retry = TRUE;
goto reopen;
}
}
emsg = mrb_format(mrb, "open %S", mrb_str_new_cstr(mrb, pathname));
mrb_str_modify(mrb, mrb_str_ptr(emsg));
mrb_sys_fail(mrb, RSTRING_PTR(emsg));
}
mrb_utf8_free(fname);
if (fd <= 2) {
mrb_fd_cloexec(mrb, fd);
}
return fd;
}
Commit Message: Fix `use after free in File#initilialize_copy`; fix #4001
The bug and the fix were reported by https://hackerone.com/pnoltof
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 83,132
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool HTMLInputElement::ShouldAutocomplete() const {
if (autocomplete_ != kUninitialized)
return autocomplete_ == kOn;
return TextControlElement::ShouldAutocomplete();
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 126,109
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChromeClientImpl::setToolbarsVisible(bool value)
{
m_toolbarsVisible = value;
}
Commit Message: Delete apparently unused geolocation declarations and include.
BUG=336263
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/139743014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165601 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 118,661
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Err stsh_Size(GF_Box *s)
{
GF_ShadowSyncBox *ptr = (GF_ShadowSyncBox *)s;
ptr->size += 4 + (8 * gf_list_count(ptr->entries));
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,484
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::inheritHtmlAndBodyElementStyles(StyleRecalcChange change)
{
ASSERT(inStyleRecalc());
ASSERT(documentElement());
bool didRecalcDocumentElement = false;
RefPtr<ComputedStyle> documentElementStyle = documentElement()->mutableComputedStyle();
if (change == Force)
documentElement()->clearAnimationStyleChange();
if (!documentElementStyle || documentElement()->needsStyleRecalc() || change == Force) {
documentElementStyle = ensureStyleResolver().styleForElement(documentElement());
didRecalcDocumentElement = true;
}
WritingMode rootWritingMode = documentElementStyle->writingMode();
TextDirection rootDirection = documentElementStyle->direction();
HTMLElement* body = this->body();
RefPtr<ComputedStyle> bodyStyle;
if (body) {
bodyStyle = body->mutableComputedStyle();
if (didRecalcDocumentElement)
body->clearAnimationStyleChange();
if (!bodyStyle || body->needsStyleRecalc() || didRecalcDocumentElement)
bodyStyle = ensureStyleResolver().styleForElement(body, documentElementStyle.get());
rootWritingMode = bodyStyle->writingMode();
rootDirection = bodyStyle->direction();
}
RefPtr<ComputedStyle> overflowStyle;
if (Element* element = viewportDefiningElement(documentElementStyle.get())) {
if (element == body) {
overflowStyle = bodyStyle;
} else {
ASSERT(element == documentElement());
overflowStyle = documentElementStyle;
}
}
if (styleEngine().usesRemUnits() && (documentElement()->needsAttach() || documentElement()->ensureComputedStyle()->fontSize() != documentElementStyle->fontSize())) {
ensureStyleResolver().invalidateMatchedPropertiesCache();
documentElement()->setNeedsStyleRecalc(SubtreeStyleChange, StyleChangeReasonForTracing::create(StyleChangeReason::FontSizeChange));
}
EOverflow overflowX = OAUTO;
EOverflow overflowY = OAUTO;
float columnGap = 0;
if (overflowStyle) {
overflowX = overflowStyle->overflowX();
overflowY = overflowStyle->overflowY();
if (overflowX == OVISIBLE)
overflowX = OAUTO;
if (overflowY == OVISIBLE)
overflowY = OAUTO;
columnGap = overflowStyle->columnGap();
}
WebScrollBlocksOn scrollBlocksOn = documentElementStyle->scrollBlocksOn();
RefPtr<ComputedStyle> documentStyle = layoutView()->mutableStyle();
if (documentStyle->writingMode() != rootWritingMode
|| documentStyle->direction() != rootDirection
|| documentStyle->overflowX() != overflowX
|| documentStyle->overflowY() != overflowY
|| documentStyle->columnGap() != columnGap
|| documentStyle->scrollBlocksOn() != scrollBlocksOn) {
RefPtr<ComputedStyle> newStyle = ComputedStyle::clone(*documentStyle);
newStyle->setWritingMode(rootWritingMode);
newStyle->setDirection(rootDirection);
newStyle->setColumnGap(columnGap);
newStyle->setOverflowX(overflowX);
newStyle->setOverflowY(overflowY);
newStyle->setScrollBlocksOn(scrollBlocksOn);
layoutView()->setStyle(newStyle);
setupFontBuilder(*newStyle);
}
if (body) {
if (const ComputedStyle* style = body->computedStyle()) {
if (style->direction() != rootDirection || style->writingMode() != rootWritingMode)
body->setNeedsStyleRecalc(SubtreeStyleChange, StyleChangeReasonForTracing::create(StyleChangeReason::WritingModeChange));
}
}
if (const ComputedStyle* style = documentElement()->computedStyle()) {
if (style->direction() != rootDirection || style->writingMode() != rootWritingMode)
documentElement()->setNeedsStyleRecalc(SubtreeStyleChange, StyleChangeReasonForTracing::create(StyleChangeReason::WritingModeChange));
}
}
Commit Message: Correctly keep track of isolates for microtask execution
BUG=487155
R=haraken@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1161823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@195985 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 127,525
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: LRUCanvasResourceProviderCache(size_t capacity)
: resource_providers_(capacity) {}
Commit Message: Validate all incoming WebGLObjects.
A few entry points were missing the correct validation.
Tested with improved conformance tests in
https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2654 .
Bug: 848914
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ib98a61cc5bf378d1b3338b04acd7e1bc4c2fe008
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1086718
Reviewed-by: Kai Ninomiya <kainino@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#565016}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 153,612
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool vmci_transport_dgram_allow(u32 cid, u32 port)
{
if (cid == VMADDR_CID_HYPERVISOR) {
/* Registrations of PBRPC Servers do not modify VMX/Hypervisor
* state and are allowed.
*/
return port == VMCI_UNITY_PBRPC_REGISTER;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: VSOCK: vmci - fix possible info leak in vmci_transport_dgram_dequeue()
In case we received no data on the call to skb_recv_datagram(), i.e.
skb->data is NULL, vmci_transport_dgram_dequeue() will return with 0
without updating msg_namelen leading to net/socket.c leaking the local,
uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable to userland -- 128 bytes of
kernel stack memory.
Fix this by moving the already existing msg_namelen assignment a few
lines above.
Cc: Andy King <acking@vmware.com>
Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <dtor@vmware.com>
Cc: George Zhang <georgezhang@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 30,372
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct sched_entity *__pick_first_entity(struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq)
{
struct rb_node *left = rb_first_cached(&cfs_rq->tasks_timeline);
if (!left)
return NULL;
return rb_entry(left, struct sched_entity, run_node);
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 92,441
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FakeCrosDisksClient::NotifyRenameCompleted(
RenameError error_code,
const std::string& device_path) {
for (auto& observer : observer_list_)
observer.OnRenameCompleted(error_code, device_path);
}
Commit Message: Add a fake DriveFS launcher client.
Using DriveFS requires building and deploying ChromeOS. Add a client for
the fake DriveFS launcher to allow the use of a real DriveFS from a
ChromeOS chroot to be used with a target_os="chromeos" build of chrome.
This connects to the fake DriveFS launcher using mojo over a unix domain
socket named by a command-line flag, using the launcher to create
DriveFS instances.
Bug: 848126
Change-Id: I22dcca154d41bda196dd7c1782bb503f6bcba5b1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1098434
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <xiyuan@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sam McNally <sammc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567513}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 124,109
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DeliverOneEvent(InternalEvent *event, DeviceIntPtr dev, enum InputLevel level,
WindowPtr win, Window child, GrabPtr grab)
{
xEvent *xE = NULL;
int count = 0;
int deliveries = 0;
int rc;
switch (level) {
case XI2:
rc = EventToXI2(event, &xE);
count = 1;
break;
case XI:
rc = EventToXI(event, &xE, &count);
break;
case CORE:
rc = EventToCore(event, &xE, &count);
break;
default:
rc = BadImplementation;
break;
}
if (rc == Success) {
deliveries = DeliverEvent(dev, xE, count, win, child, grab);
free(xE);
}
else
BUG_WARN_MSG(rc != BadMatch,
"%s: conversion to level %d failed with rc %d\n",
dev->name, level, rc);
return deliveries;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 4,818
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct lxc_proc_context_info *lxc_proc_get_context_info(pid_t pid)
{
struct lxc_proc_context_info *info = calloc(1, sizeof(*info));
FILE *proc_file;
char proc_fn[MAXPATHLEN];
char *line = NULL;
size_t line_bufsz = 0;
int ret, found;
if (!info) {
SYSERROR("Could not allocate memory.");
return NULL;
}
/* read capabilities */
snprintf(proc_fn, MAXPATHLEN, "/proc/%d/status", pid);
proc_file = fopen(proc_fn, "r");
if (!proc_file) {
SYSERROR("Could not open %s", proc_fn);
goto out_error;
}
found = 0;
while (getline(&line, &line_bufsz, proc_file) != -1) {
ret = sscanf(line, "CapBnd: %llx", &info->capability_mask);
if (ret != EOF && ret > 0) {
found = 1;
break;
}
}
free(line);
fclose(proc_file);
if (!found) {
SYSERROR("Could not read capability bounding set from %s", proc_fn);
errno = ENOENT;
goto out_error;
}
info->lsm_label = lsm_process_label_get(pid);
return info;
out_error:
free(info);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1334: Don't use the container's /proc during attach
A user could otherwise over-mount /proc and prevent the apparmor profile
or selinux label from being written which combined with a modified
/bin/sh or other commonly used binary would lead to unconfined code
execution.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-17
| 0
| 44,721
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void flush_tmregs_to_thread(struct task_struct *tsk) { }
Commit Message: powerpc/tm: Flush TM only if CPU has TM feature
Commit cd63f3c ("powerpc/tm: Fix saving of TM SPRs in core dump")
added code to access TM SPRs in flush_tmregs_to_thread(). However
flush_tmregs_to_thread() does not check if TM feature is available on
CPU before trying to access TM SPRs in order to copy live state to
thread structures. flush_tmregs_to_thread() is indeed guarded by
CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM but it might be the case that kernel
was compiled with CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM enabled and ran on
a CPU without TM feature available, thus rendering the execution
of TM instructions that are treated by the CPU as illegal instructions.
The fix is just to add proper checking in flush_tmregs_to_thread()
if CPU has the TM feature before accessing any TM-specific resource,
returning immediately if TM is no available on the CPU. Adding
that checking in flush_tmregs_to_thread() instead of in places
where it is called, like in vsr_get() and vsr_set(), is better because
avoids the same problem cropping up elsewhere.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.13+
Fixes: cd63f3c ("powerpc/tm: Fix saving of TM SPRs in core dump")
Signed-off-by: Gustavo Romero <gromero@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Cyril Bur <cyrilbur@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 84,782
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: evdns_server_request_format_response(struct server_request *req, int err)
{
unsigned char buf[1500];
size_t buf_len = sizeof(buf);
off_t j = 0, r;
u16 t_;
u32 t32_;
int i;
u16 flags;
struct dnslabel_table table;
if (err < 0 || err > 15) return -1;
/* Set response bit and error code; copy OPCODE and RD fields from
* question; copy RA and AA if set by caller. */
flags = req->base.flags;
flags |= (0x8000 | err);
dnslabel_table_init(&table);
APPEND16(req->trans_id);
APPEND16(flags);
APPEND16(req->base.nquestions);
APPEND16(req->n_answer);
APPEND16(req->n_authority);
APPEND16(req->n_additional);
/* Add questions. */
for (i=0; i < req->base.nquestions; ++i) {
const char *s = req->base.questions[i]->name;
j = dnsname_to_labels(buf, buf_len, j, s, strlen(s), &table);
if (j < 0) {
dnslabel_clear(&table);
return (int) j;
}
APPEND16(req->base.questions[i]->type);
APPEND16(req->base.questions[i]->dns_question_class);
}
/* Add answer, authority, and additional sections. */
for (i=0; i<3; ++i) {
struct server_reply_item *item;
if (i==0)
item = req->answer;
else if (i==1)
item = req->authority;
else
item = req->additional;
while (item) {
r = dnsname_to_labels(buf, buf_len, j, item->name, strlen(item->name), &table);
if (r < 0)
goto overflow;
j = r;
APPEND16(item->type);
APPEND16(item->dns_question_class);
APPEND32(item->ttl);
if (item->is_name) {
off_t len_idx = j, name_start;
j += 2;
name_start = j;
r = dnsname_to_labels(buf, buf_len, j, item->data, strlen(item->data), &table);
if (r < 0)
goto overflow;
j = r;
t_ = htons( (short) (j-name_start) );
memcpy(buf+len_idx, &t_, 2);
} else {
APPEND16(item->datalen);
if (j+item->datalen > (off_t)buf_len)
goto overflow;
memcpy(buf+j, item->data, item->datalen);
j += item->datalen;
}
item = item->next;
}
}
if (j > 512) {
overflow:
j = 512;
buf[2] |= 0x02; /* set the truncated bit. */
}
req->response_len = j;
if (!(req->response = mm_malloc(req->response_len))) {
server_request_free_answers(req);
dnslabel_clear(&table);
return (-1);
}
memcpy(req->response, buf, req->response_len);
server_request_free_answers(req);
dnslabel_clear(&table);
return (0);
}
Commit Message: evdns: fix searching empty hostnames
From #332:
Here follows a bug report by **Guido Vranken** via the _Tor bug bounty program_. Please credit Guido accordingly.
## Bug report
The DNS code of Libevent contains this rather obvious OOB read:
```c
static char *
search_make_new(const struct search_state *const state, int n, const char *const base_name) {
const size_t base_len = strlen(base_name);
const char need_to_append_dot = base_name[base_len - 1] == '.' ? 0 : 1;
```
If the length of ```base_name``` is 0, then line 3125 reads 1 byte before the buffer. This will trigger a crash on ASAN-protected builds.
To reproduce:
Build libevent with ASAN:
```
$ CFLAGS='-fomit-frame-pointer -fsanitize=address' ./configure && make -j4
```
Put the attached ```resolv.conf``` and ```poc.c``` in the source directory and then do:
```
$ gcc -fsanitize=address -fomit-frame-pointer poc.c .libs/libevent.a
$ ./a.out
=================================================================
==22201== ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60060000efdf at pc 0x4429da bp 0x7ffe1ed47300 sp 0x7ffe1ed472f8
READ of size 1 at 0x60060000efdf thread T0
```
P.S. we can add a check earlier, but since this is very uncommon, I didn't add it.
Fixes: #332
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 70,647
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static char *parse_errorlog_item(apr_pool_t *p, ap_errorlog_format_item *it,
const char **sa)
{
const char *s = *sa;
ap_errorlog_handler *handler;
int i;
if (*s != '%') {
if (*s == ' ') {
it->flags |= AP_ERRORLOG_FLAG_FIELD_SEP;
}
return parse_errorlog_misc_string(p, it, sa);
}
++s;
if (*s == ' ') {
/* percent-space (% ) is a field separator */
it->flags |= AP_ERRORLOG_FLAG_FIELD_SEP;
*sa = ++s;
/* recurse */
return parse_errorlog_item(p, it, sa);
}
else if (*s == '%') {
it->arg = "%";
it->func = log_constant_item;
*sa = ++s;
return NULL;
}
while (*s) {
switch (*s) {
case '{':
++s;
it->arg = ap_getword(p, &s, '}');
break;
case '+':
++s;
it->flags |= AP_ERRORLOG_FLAG_REQUIRED;
break;
case '-':
++s;
it->flags |= AP_ERRORLOG_FLAG_NULL_AS_HYPHEN;
break;
case '0':
case '1':
case '2':
case '3':
case '4':
case '5':
case '6':
case '7':
case '8':
case '9':
i = *s - '0';
while (apr_isdigit(*++s))
i = i * 10 + (*s) - '0';
it->min_loglevel = i;
break;
case 'M':
it->func = NULL;
it->flags |= AP_ERRORLOG_FLAG_MESSAGE;
*sa = ++s;
return NULL;
default:
handler = (ap_errorlog_handler *)apr_hash_get(errorlog_hash, s, 1);
if (!handler) {
char dummy[2];
dummy[0] = *s;
dummy[1] = '\0';
return apr_pstrcat(p, "Unrecognized error log format directive %",
dummy, NULL);
}
it->func = handler->func;
*sa = ++s;
return NULL;
}
}
return "Ran off end of error log format parsing args to some directive";
}
Commit Message: core: Disallow Methods' registration at run time (.htaccess), they may be
used only if registered at init time (httpd.conf).
Calling ap_method_register() in children processes is not the right scope
since it won't be shared for all requests.
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1807655 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 64,254
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: dophn_core(struct magic_set *ms, int clazz, int swap, int fd, off_t off,
int num, size_t size, off_t fsize, int *flags)
{
Elf32_Phdr ph32;
Elf64_Phdr ph64;
size_t offset, len;
unsigned char nbuf[BUFSIZ];
ssize_t bufsize;
if (size != xph_sizeof) {
if (file_printf(ms, ", corrupted program header size") == -1)
return -1;
return 0;
}
/*
* Loop through all the program headers.
*/
for ( ; num; num--) {
if (pread(fd, xph_addr, xph_sizeof, off) == -1) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
off += size;
if (xph_offset > fsize) {
/* Perhaps warn here */
continue;
}
if (xph_type != PT_NOTE)
continue;
/*
* This is a PT_NOTE section; loop through all the notes
* in the section.
*/
len = xph_filesz < sizeof(nbuf) ? xph_filesz : sizeof(nbuf);
if ((bufsize = pread(fd, nbuf, len, xph_offset)) == -1) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
offset = 0;
for (;;) {
if (offset >= (size_t)bufsize)
break;
offset = donote(ms, nbuf, offset, (size_t)bufsize,
clazz, swap, 4, flags);
if (offset == 0)
break;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Stop reporting bad capabilities after the first few.
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 35,668
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline unsigned long rb_page_entries(struct buffer_page *bpage)
{
return local_read(&bpage->entries) & RB_WRITE_MASK;
}
Commit Message: ring-buffer: Prevent overflow of size in ring_buffer_resize()
If the size passed to ring_buffer_resize() is greater than MAX_LONG - BUF_PAGE_SIZE
then the DIV_ROUND_UP() will return zero.
Here's the details:
# echo 18014398509481980 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_size_kb
tracing_entries_write() processes this and converts kb to bytes.
18014398509481980 << 10 = 18446744073709547520
and this is passed to ring_buffer_resize() as unsigned long size.
size = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE);
Where DIV_ROUND_UP(a, b) is (a + b - 1)/b
BUF_PAGE_SIZE is 4080 and here
18446744073709547520 + 4080 - 1 = 18446744073709551599
where 18446744073709551599 is still smaller than 2^64
2^64 - 18446744073709551599 = 17
But now 18446744073709551599 / 4080 = 4521260802379792
and size = size * 4080 = 18446744073709551360
This is checked to make sure its still greater than 2 * 4080,
which it is.
Then we convert to the number of buffer pages needed.
nr_page = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE)
but this time size is 18446744073709551360 and
2^64 - (18446744073709551360 + 4080 - 1) = -3823
Thus it overflows and the resulting number is less than 4080, which makes
3823 / 4080 = 0
an nr_pages is set to this. As we already checked against the minimum that
nr_pages may be, this causes the logic to fail as well, and we crash the
kernel.
There's no reason to have the two DIV_ROUND_UP() (that's just result of
historical code changes), clean up the code and fix this bug.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.5+
Fixes: 83f40318dab00 ("ring-buffer: Make removal of ring buffer pages atomic")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 72,565
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bits_next (int bits)
{
bits++;
if (bits > 8) bits = 5;
return bits;
}
Commit Message: Do not use "/bin/sh" to run external commands.
Picocom no longer uses /bin/sh to run external commands for
file-transfer operations. Parsing the command line and spliting it into
arguments is now performed internally by picocom, using quoting rules
very similar to those of the Unix shell. Hopefully, this makes it
impossible to inject shell-commands when supplying filenames or
extra arguments to the send- and receive-file commands.
CWE ID: CWE-77
| 0
| 73,967
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GraphicsLayer* FrameView::layerForHorizontalScrollbar() const
{
RenderView* renderView = this->renderView();
if (!renderView)
return 0;
return renderView->compositor()->layerForHorizontalScrollbar();
}
Commit Message: Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
R=vollick@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 119,861
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: NPObjectAccessorWithIdentifier::~NPObjectAccessorWithIdentifier() {
Var::PluginReleasePPVar(identifier_);
}
Commit Message: Fix invalid read in ppapi code
BUG=77493
TEST=attached test
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6883059
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@82172 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 100,879
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HTMLSelectElement::defaultEventHandler(Event* event)
{
if (!renderer())
return;
if (isDisabledFormControl()) {
HTMLFormControlElementWithState::defaultEventHandler(event);
return;
}
if (usesMenuList())
menuListDefaultEventHandler(event);
else
listBoxDefaultEventHandler(event);
if (event->defaultHandled())
return;
if (event->type() == eventNames().keypressEvent && event->isKeyboardEvent()) {
KeyboardEvent* keyboardEvent = toKeyboardEvent(event);
if (!keyboardEvent->ctrlKey() && !keyboardEvent->altKey() && !keyboardEvent->metaKey() && isPrintableChar(keyboardEvent->charCode())) {
typeAheadFind(keyboardEvent);
event->setDefaultHandled();
return;
}
}
HTMLFormControlElementWithState::defaultEventHandler(event);
}
Commit Message: SelectElement should remove an option when null is assigned by indexed setter
Fix bug embedded in r151449
see
http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?revision=151449&view=revision
R=haraken@chromium.org, tkent@chromium.org, eseidel@chromium.org
BUG=262365
TEST=fast/forms/select/select-assign-null.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/19947008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@154743 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 103,058
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool RenderProcessImpl::PutSharedMemInCache(TransportDIB* mem) {
const int slot = FindFreeCacheSlot(mem->size());
if (slot == -1)
return false;
shared_mem_cache_[slot] = mem;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 108,340
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: krb5_gss_wrap_size_limit(minor_status, context_handle, conf_req_flag,
qop_req, req_output_size, max_input_size)
OM_uint32 *minor_status;
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle;
int conf_req_flag;
gss_qop_t qop_req;
OM_uint32 req_output_size;
OM_uint32 *max_input_size;
{
krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *ctx;
OM_uint32 data_size, conflen;
OM_uint32 ohlen;
int overhead;
/* only default qop is allowed */
if (qop_req != GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT) {
*minor_status = (OM_uint32) G_UNKNOWN_QOP;
return(GSS_S_FAILURE);
}
ctx = (krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *) context_handle;
if (! ctx->established) {
*minor_status = KG_CTX_INCOMPLETE;
return(GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
}
if (ctx->proto == 1) {
/* No pseudo-ASN.1 wrapper overhead, so no sequence length and
OID. */
OM_uint32 sz = req_output_size;
/* Token header: 16 octets. */
if (conf_req_flag) {
krb5_key key;
krb5_enctype enctype;
key = ctx->have_acceptor_subkey ? ctx->acceptor_subkey
: ctx->subkey;
enctype = key->keyblock.enctype;
while (sz > 0 && krb5_encrypt_size(sz, enctype) + 16 > req_output_size)
sz--;
/* Allow for encrypted copy of header. */
if (sz > 16)
sz -= 16;
else
sz = 0;
#ifdef CFX_EXERCISE
/* Allow for EC padding. In the MIT implementation, only
added while testing. */
if (sz > 65535)
sz -= 65535;
else
sz = 0;
#endif
} else {
krb5_cksumtype cksumtype;
krb5_error_code err;
size_t cksumsize;
cksumtype = ctx->have_acceptor_subkey ? ctx->acceptor_subkey_cksumtype
: ctx->cksumtype;
err = krb5_c_checksum_length(ctx->k5_context, cksumtype, &cksumsize);
if (err) {
*minor_status = err;
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
/* Allow for token header and checksum. */
if (sz < 16 + cksumsize)
sz = 0;
else
sz -= (16 + cksumsize);
}
*max_input_size = sz;
*minor_status = 0;
return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
}
/* Calculate the token size and subtract that from the output size */
overhead = 7 + ctx->mech_used->length;
data_size = req_output_size;
conflen = kg_confounder_size(ctx->k5_context, ctx->enc->keyblock.enctype);
data_size = (conflen + data_size + 8) & (~(OM_uint32)7);
ohlen = g_token_size(ctx->mech_used,
(unsigned int) (data_size + ctx->cksum_size + 14))
- req_output_size;
if (ohlen+overhead < req_output_size)
/*
* Cannot have trailer length that will cause us to pad over our
* length.
*/
*max_input_size = (req_output_size - ohlen - overhead) & (~(OM_uint32)7);
else
*max_input_size = 0;
*minor_status = 0;
return(GSS_S_COMPLETE);
}
Commit Message: Fix gss_process_context_token() [CVE-2014-5352]
[MITKRB5-SA-2015-001] The krb5 gss_process_context_token() should not
actually delete the context; that leaves the caller with a dangling
pointer and no way to know that it is invalid. Instead, mark the
context as terminated, and check for terminated contexts in the GSS
functions which expect established contexts. Also add checks in
export_sec_context and pseudo_random, and adjust t_prf.c for the
pseudo_random check.
ticket: 8055 (new)
target_version: 1.13.1
tags: pullup
CWE ID:
| 1
| 166,824
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: netdutils::Status XfrmController::allocateSpi(const XfrmSaInfo& record, uint32_t minSpi,
uint32_t maxSpi, uint32_t* outSpi,
const XfrmSocket& sock) {
xfrm_userspi_info spiInfo{};
enum { NLMSG_HDR, USERSAID, USERSAID_PAD };
std::vector<iovec> iov = {
{NULL, 0}, // reserved for the eventual addition of a NLMSG_HDR
{&spiInfo, 0}, // main userspi_info struct
{kPadBytes, 0}, // up to NLMSG_ALIGNTO pad bytes of padding
};
int len;
if (fillUserSaInfo(record, &spiInfo.info) == 0) {
ALOGE("Failed to fill transport SA Info");
}
len = iov[USERSAID].iov_len = sizeof(spiInfo);
iov[USERSAID_PAD].iov_len = NLMSG_ALIGN(len) - len;
RandomSpi spiGen = RandomSpi(minSpi, maxSpi);
int spi;
netdutils::Status ret;
while ((spi = spiGen.next()) != INVALID_SPI) {
spiInfo.min = spi;
spiInfo.max = spi;
ret = sock.sendMessage(XFRM_MSG_ALLOCSPI, NETLINK_REQUEST_FLAGS, 0, &iov);
/* If the SPI is in use, we'll get ENOENT */
if (netdutils::equalToErrno(ret, ENOENT))
continue;
if (isOk(ret)) {
*outSpi = spi;
ALOGD("Allocated an SPI: %x", *outSpi);
} else {
*outSpi = INVALID_SPI;
ALOGE("SPI Allocation Failed with error %d", ret.code());
}
return ret;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Set optlen for UDP-encap check in XfrmController
When setting the socket owner for an encap socket XfrmController will
first attempt to verify that the socket has the UDP-encap socket option
set. When doing so it would pass in an uninitialized optlen parameter
which could cause the call to not modify the option value if the optlen
happened to be too short. So for example if the stack happened to
contain a zero where optlen was located the check would fail and the
socket owner would not be changed.
Fix this by setting optlen to the size of the option value parameter.
Test: run cts -m CtsNetTestCases
BUG: 111650288
Change-Id: I57b6e9dba09c1acda71e3ec2084652e961667bd9
(cherry picked from commit fc42a105147310bd680952d4b71fe32974bd8506)
CWE ID: CWE-909
| 0
| 162,684
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OnSetIsInert(bool is_inert) {
base::PostTaskWithTraits(
FROM_HERE, {content::BrowserThread::UI},
base::BindOnce(&SetIsInertMessageFilter::OnSetIsInertOnUI, this,
is_inert));
}
Commit Message: Add a check for disallowing remote frame navigations to local resources.
Previously, RemoteFrame navigations did not perform any renderer-side
checks and relied solely on the browser-side logic to block disallowed
navigations via mechanisms like FilterURL. This means that blocked
remote frame navigations were silently navigated to about:blank
without any console error message.
This CL adds a CanDisplay check to the remote navigation path to match
an equivalent check done for local frame navigations. This way, the
renderer can consistently block disallowed navigations in both cases
and output an error message.
Bug: 894399
Change-Id: I172f68f77c1676f6ca0172d2a6c78f7edc0e3b7a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1282390
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#601022}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 143,867
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int kvm_arm_sys_reg_set_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const struct kvm_one_reg *reg)
{
const struct sys_reg_desc *r;
void __user *uaddr = (void __user *)(unsigned long)reg->addr;
if ((reg->id & KVM_REG_ARM_COPROC_MASK) == KVM_REG_ARM_DEMUX)
return demux_c15_set(reg->id, uaddr);
if (KVM_REG_SIZE(reg->id) != sizeof(__u64))
return -ENOENT;
r = index_to_sys_reg_desc(vcpu, reg->id);
if (!r)
return set_invariant_sys_reg(reg->id, uaddr);
if (r->set_user)
return (r->set_user)(vcpu, r, reg, uaddr);
return reg_from_user(&vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, r->reg), uaddr, reg->id);
}
Commit Message: arm64: KVM: pmu: Fix AArch32 cycle counter access
We're missing the handling code for the cycle counter accessed
from a 32bit guest, leading to unexpected results.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.6+
Signed-off-by: Wei Huang <wei@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 62,895
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int vfat_create_shortname(struct inode *dir, struct nls_table *nls,
wchar_t *uname, int ulen,
unsigned char *name_res, unsigned char *lcase)
{
struct fat_mount_options *opts = &MSDOS_SB(dir->i_sb)->options;
wchar_t *ip, *ext_start, *end, *name_start;
unsigned char base[9], ext[4], buf[5], *p;
unsigned char charbuf[NLS_MAX_CHARSET_SIZE];
int chl, chi;
int sz = 0, extlen, baselen, i, numtail_baselen, numtail2_baselen;
int is_shortname;
struct shortname_info base_info, ext_info;
is_shortname = 1;
INIT_SHORTNAME_INFO(&base_info);
INIT_SHORTNAME_INFO(&ext_info);
/* Now, we need to create a shortname from the long name */
ext_start = end = &uname[ulen];
while (--ext_start >= uname) {
if (*ext_start == 0x002E) { /* is `.' */
if (ext_start == end - 1) {
sz = ulen;
ext_start = NULL;
}
break;
}
}
if (ext_start == uname - 1) {
sz = ulen;
ext_start = NULL;
} else if (ext_start) {
/*
* Names which start with a dot could be just
* an extension eg. "...test". In this case Win95
* uses the extension as the name and sets no extension.
*/
name_start = &uname[0];
while (name_start < ext_start) {
if (!vfat_skip_char(*name_start))
break;
name_start++;
}
if (name_start != ext_start) {
sz = ext_start - uname;
ext_start++;
} else {
sz = ulen;
ext_start = NULL;
}
}
numtail_baselen = 6;
numtail2_baselen = 2;
for (baselen = i = 0, p = base, ip = uname; i < sz; i++, ip++) {
chl = to_shortname_char(nls, charbuf, sizeof(charbuf),
ip, &base_info);
if (chl == 0)
continue;
if (baselen < 2 && (baselen + chl) > 2)
numtail2_baselen = baselen;
if (baselen < 6 && (baselen + chl) > 6)
numtail_baselen = baselen;
for (chi = 0; chi < chl; chi++) {
*p++ = charbuf[chi];
baselen++;
if (baselen >= 8)
break;
}
if (baselen >= 8) {
if ((chi < chl - 1) || (ip + 1) - uname < sz)
is_shortname = 0;
break;
}
}
if (baselen == 0) {
return -EINVAL;
}
extlen = 0;
if (ext_start) {
for (p = ext, ip = ext_start; extlen < 3 && ip < end; ip++) {
chl = to_shortname_char(nls, charbuf, sizeof(charbuf),
ip, &ext_info);
if (chl == 0)
continue;
if ((extlen + chl) > 3) {
is_shortname = 0;
break;
}
for (chi = 0; chi < chl; chi++) {
*p++ = charbuf[chi];
extlen++;
}
if (extlen >= 3) {
if (ip + 1 != end)
is_shortname = 0;
break;
}
}
}
ext[extlen] = '\0';
base[baselen] = '\0';
/* Yes, it can happen. ".\xe5" would do it. */
if (base[0] == DELETED_FLAG)
base[0] = 0x05;
/* OK, at this point we know that base is not longer than 8 symbols,
* ext is not longer than 3, base is nonempty, both don't contain
* any bad symbols (lowercase transformed to uppercase).
*/
memset(name_res, ' ', MSDOS_NAME);
memcpy(name_res, base, baselen);
memcpy(name_res + 8, ext, extlen);
*lcase = 0;
if (is_shortname && base_info.valid && ext_info.valid) {
if (vfat_find_form(dir, name_res) == 0)
return -EEXIST;
if (opts->shortname & VFAT_SFN_CREATE_WIN95) {
return (base_info.upper && ext_info.upper);
} else if (opts->shortname & VFAT_SFN_CREATE_WINNT) {
if ((base_info.upper || base_info.lower) &&
(ext_info.upper || ext_info.lower)) {
if (!base_info.upper && base_info.lower)
*lcase |= CASE_LOWER_BASE;
if (!ext_info.upper && ext_info.lower)
*lcase |= CASE_LOWER_EXT;
return 1;
}
return 0;
} else {
BUG();
}
}
if (opts->numtail == 0)
if (vfat_find_form(dir, name_res) < 0)
return 0;
/*
* Try to find a unique extension. This used to
* iterate through all possibilities sequentially,
* but that gave extremely bad performance. Windows
* only tries a few cases before using random
* values for part of the base.
*/
if (baselen > 6) {
baselen = numtail_baselen;
name_res[7] = ' ';
}
name_res[baselen] = '~';
for (i = 1; i < 10; i++) {
name_res[baselen + 1] = i + '0';
if (vfat_find_form(dir, name_res) < 0)
return 0;
}
i = jiffies;
sz = (jiffies >> 16) & 0x7;
if (baselen > 2) {
baselen = numtail2_baselen;
name_res[7] = ' ';
}
name_res[baselen + 4] = '~';
name_res[baselen + 5] = '1' + sz;
while (1) {
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%04X", i & 0xffff);
memcpy(&name_res[baselen], buf, 4);
if (vfat_find_form(dir, name_res) < 0)
break;
i -= 11;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: NLS: improve UTF8 -> UTF16 string conversion routine
The utf8s_to_utf16s conversion routine needs to be improved. Unlike
its utf16s_to_utf8s sibling, it doesn't accept arguments specifying
the maximum length of the output buffer or the endianness of its
16-bit output.
This patch (as1501) adds the two missing arguments, and adjusts the
only two places in the kernel where the function is called. A
follow-on patch will add a third caller that does utilize the new
capabilities.
The two conversion routines are still annoyingly inconsistent in the
way they handle invalid byte combinations. But that's a subject for a
different patch.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
CC: Clemens Ladisch <clemens@ladisch.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 33,392
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void set_task_rq_fair(struct sched_entity *se,
struct cfs_rq *prev, struct cfs_rq *next)
{
u64 p_last_update_time;
u64 n_last_update_time;
if (!sched_feat(ATTACH_AGE_LOAD))
return;
/*
* We are supposed to update the task to "current" time, then its up to
* date and ready to go to new CPU/cfs_rq. But we have difficulty in
* getting what current time is, so simply throw away the out-of-date
* time. This will result in the wakee task is less decayed, but giving
* the wakee more load sounds not bad.
*/
if (!(se->avg.last_update_time && prev))
return;
#ifndef CONFIG_64BIT
{
u64 p_last_update_time_copy;
u64 n_last_update_time_copy;
do {
p_last_update_time_copy = prev->load_last_update_time_copy;
n_last_update_time_copy = next->load_last_update_time_copy;
smp_rmb();
p_last_update_time = prev->avg.last_update_time;
n_last_update_time = next->avg.last_update_time;
} while (p_last_update_time != p_last_update_time_copy ||
n_last_update_time != n_last_update_time_copy);
}
#else
p_last_update_time = prev->avg.last_update_time;
n_last_update_time = next->avg.last_update_time;
#endif
__update_load_avg_blocked_se(p_last_update_time, cpu_of(rq_of(prev)), se);
se->avg.last_update_time = n_last_update_time;
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 92,682
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int find_next_descriptor(unsigned char *buffer, int size,
int dt1, int dt2, int *num_skipped)
{
struct usb_descriptor_header *h;
int n = 0;
unsigned char *buffer0 = buffer;
/* Find the next descriptor of type dt1 or dt2 */
while (size > 0) {
h = (struct usb_descriptor_header *) buffer;
if (h->bDescriptorType == dt1 || h->bDescriptorType == dt2)
break;
buffer += h->bLength;
size -= h->bLength;
++n;
}
/* Store the number of descriptors skipped and return the
* number of bytes skipped */
if (num_skipped)
*num_skipped = n;
return buffer - buffer0;
}
Commit Message: USB: core: fix out-of-bounds access bug in usb_get_bos_descriptor()
Andrey used the syzkaller fuzzer to find an out-of-bounds memory
access in usb_get_bos_descriptor(). The code wasn't checking that the
next usb_dev_cap_header structure could fit into the remaining buffer
space.
This patch fixes the error and also reduces the bNumDeviceCaps field
in the header to match the actual number of capabilities found, in
cases where there are fewer than expected.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 59,743
|
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