instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int decode_pathname(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct nfs4_pathname *path)
{
u32 n;
__be32 *p;
int status = 0;
p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, 4);
if (unlikely(!p))
goto out_overflow;
n = be32_to_cpup(p);
if (n == 0)
goto root_path;
dprintk("path ");
path->ncomponents = 0;
while (path->ncomponents < n) {
struct nfs4_string *component = &path->components[path->ncomponents];
status = decode_opaque_inline(xdr, &component->len, &component->data);
if (unlikely(status != 0))
goto out_eio;
if (path->ncomponents != n)
dprintk("/");
dprintk("%s", component->data);
if (path->ncomponents < NFS4_PATHNAME_MAXCOMPONENTS)
path->ncomponents++;
else {
dprintk("cannot parse %d components in path\n", n);
goto out_eio;
}
}
out:
dprintk("\n");
return status;
root_path:
/* a root pathname is sent as a zero component4 */
path->ncomponents = 1;
path->components[0].len=0;
path->components[0].data=NULL;
dprintk("path /\n");
goto out;
out_eio:
dprintk(" status %d", status);
status = -EIO;
goto out;
out_overflow:
print_overflow_msg(__func__, xdr);
return -EIO;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 23,322
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int WebContentsImpl::GetCrashedErrorCode() const {
return crashed_error_code_;
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 135,703
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: store_storenew(png_store *ps)
{
png_store_buffer *pb;
if (ps->writepos != STORE_BUFFER_SIZE)
png_error(ps->pwrite, "invalid store call");
pb = voidcast(png_store_buffer*, malloc(sizeof *pb));
if (pb == NULL)
png_error(ps->pwrite, "store new: OOM");
*pb = ps->new;
ps->new.prev = pb;
ps->writepos = 0;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
| 0
| 160,074
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ofputil_versions_from_strings(char ** const s, size_t count)
{
uint32_t bitmap = 0;
while (count--) {
int version = ofputil_version_from_string(s[count]);
if (!version) {
VLOG_WARN("Unknown OpenFlow version: \"%s\"", s[count]);
} else {
bitmap |= 1u << version;
}
}
return bitmap;
}
Commit Message: ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <pkusunyifeng@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 77,717
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: isoent_gen_iso9660_identifier(struct archive_write *a, struct isoent *isoent,
struct idr *idr)
{
struct iso9660 *iso9660;
struct isoent *np;
char *p;
int l, r;
const char *char_map;
char allow_ldots, allow_multidot, allow_period, allow_vernum;
int fnmax, ffmax, dnmax;
static const struct archive_rb_tree_ops rb_ops = {
isoent_cmp_node_iso9660, isoent_cmp_key_iso9660
};
if (isoent->children.cnt == 0)
return (0);
iso9660 = a->format_data;
char_map = idr->char_map;
if (iso9660->opt.iso_level <= 3) {
allow_ldots = 0;
allow_multidot = 0;
allow_period = 1;
allow_vernum = iso9660->opt.allow_vernum;
if (iso9660->opt.iso_level == 1) {
fnmax = 8;
ffmax = 12;/* fnmax + '.' + 3 */
dnmax = 8;
} else {
fnmax = 30;
ffmax = 31;
dnmax = 31;
}
} else {
allow_ldots = allow_multidot = 1;
allow_period = allow_vernum = 0;
if (iso9660->opt.rr)
/*
* MDR : The maximum size of Directory Record(254).
* DRL : A Directory Record Length(33).
* CE : A size of SUSP CE System Use Entry(28).
* MDR - DRL - CE = 254 - 33 - 28 = 193.
*/
fnmax = ffmax = dnmax = 193;
else
/*
* XA : CD-ROM XA System Use Extension
* Information(14).
* MDR - DRL - XA = 254 - 33 -14 = 207.
*/
fnmax = ffmax = dnmax = 207;
}
r = idr_start(a, idr, isoent->children.cnt, ffmax, 3, 1, &rb_ops);
if (r < 0)
return (r);
for (np = isoent->children.first; np != NULL; np = np->chnext) {
char *dot, *xdot;
int ext_off, noff, weight;
l = (int)np->file->basename.length;
p = malloc(l+31+2+1);
if (p == NULL) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM,
"Can't allocate memory");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
memcpy(p, np->file->basename.s, l);
p[l] = '\0';
np->identifier = p;
dot = xdot = NULL;
if (!allow_ldots) {
/*
* If there is a '.' character at the first byte,
* it has to be replaced by '_' character.
*/
if (*p == '.')
*p++ = '_';
}
for (;*p; p++) {
if (*p & 0x80) {
*p = '_';
continue;
}
if (char_map[(unsigned char)*p]) {
/* if iso-level is '4', a character '.' is
* allowed by char_map. */
if (*p == '.') {
xdot = dot;
dot = p;
}
continue;
}
if (*p >= 'a' && *p <= 'z') {
*p -= 'a' - 'A';
continue;
}
if (*p == '.') {
xdot = dot;
dot = p;
if (allow_multidot)
continue;
}
*p = '_';
}
p = np->identifier;
weight = -1;
if (dot == NULL) {
int nammax;
if (np->dir)
nammax = dnmax;
else
nammax = fnmax;
if (l > nammax) {
p[nammax] = '\0';
weight = nammax;
ext_off = nammax;
} else
ext_off = l;
} else {
*dot = '.';
ext_off = (int)(dot - p);
if (iso9660->opt.iso_level == 1) {
if (dot - p <= 8) {
if (strlen(dot) > 4) {
/* A length of a file extension
* must be less than 4 */
dot[4] = '\0';
weight = 0;
}
} else {
p[8] = dot[0];
p[9] = dot[1];
p[10] = dot[2];
p[11] = dot[3];
p[12] = '\0';
weight = 8;
ext_off = 8;
}
} else if (np->dir) {
if (l > dnmax) {
p[dnmax] = '\0';
weight = dnmax;
if (ext_off > dnmax)
ext_off = dnmax;
}
} else if (l > ffmax) {
int extlen = (int)strlen(dot);
int xdoff;
if (xdot != NULL)
xdoff = (int)(xdot - p);
else
xdoff = 0;
if (extlen > 1 && xdoff < fnmax-1) {
int off;
if (extlen > ffmax)
extlen = ffmax;
off = ffmax - extlen;
if (off == 0) {
/* A dot('.') character
* does't place to the first
* byte of identifier. */
off ++;
extlen --;
}
memmove(p+off, dot, extlen);
p[ffmax] = '\0';
ext_off = off;
weight = off;
#ifdef COMPAT_MKISOFS
} else if (xdoff >= fnmax-1) {
/* Simulate a bug(?) of mkisofs. */
p[fnmax-1] = '\0';
ext_off = fnmax-1;
weight = fnmax-1;
#endif
} else {
p[fnmax] = '\0';
ext_off = fnmax;
weight = fnmax;
}
}
}
/* Save an offset of a file name extension to sort files. */
np->ext_off = ext_off;
np->ext_len = (int)strlen(&p[ext_off]);
np->id_len = l = ext_off + np->ext_len;
/* Make an offset of the number which is used to be set
* hexadecimal number to avoid duplicate identififier. */
if (iso9660->opt.iso_level == 1) {
if (ext_off >= 5)
noff = 5;
else
noff = ext_off;
} else {
if (l == ffmax)
noff = ext_off - 3;
else if (l == ffmax-1)
noff = ext_off - 2;
else if (l == ffmax-2)
noff = ext_off - 1;
else
noff = ext_off;
}
/* Register entry to the identifier resolver. */
idr_register(idr, np, weight, noff);
}
/* Resolve duplicate identifier. */
idr_resolve(idr, idr_set_num);
/* Add a period and a version number to identifiers. */
for (np = isoent->children.first; np != NULL; np = np->chnext) {
if (!np->dir && np->rr_child == NULL) {
p = np->identifier + np->ext_off + np->ext_len;
if (np->ext_len == 0 && allow_period) {
*p++ = '.';
np->ext_len = 1;
}
if (np->ext_len == 1 && !allow_period) {
*--p = '\0';
np->ext_len = 0;
}
np->id_len = np->ext_off + np->ext_len;
if (allow_vernum) {
*p++ = ';';
*p++ = '1';
np->id_len += 2;
}
*p = '\0';
} else
np->id_len = np->ext_off + np->ext_len;
np->mb_len = np->id_len;
}
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
Commit Message: Issue 711: Be more careful about verifying filename lengths when writing ISO9660 archives
* Don't cast size_t to int, since this can lead to overflow
on machines where sizeof(int) < sizeof(size_t)
* Check a + b > limit by writing it as
a > limit || b > limit || a + b > limit
to avoid problems when a + b wraps around.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 50,836
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: nfsd4_decode_delegreturn(struct nfsd4_compoundargs *argp, struct nfsd4_delegreturn *dr)
{
return nfsd4_decode_stateid(argp, &dr->dr_stateid);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 65,742
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: on_auth_ok(void *user_data, Evas_Object *obj, void *event_info)
{
AuthData *auth_data = (AuthData *)user_data;
const char *username = elm_entry_entry_get(auth_data->username_entry);
const char *password = elm_entry_entry_get(auth_data->password_entry);
ewk_auth_request_authenticate(auth_data->request, username, password);
auth_popup_close(auth_data);
}
Commit Message: [EFL][WK2] Add --window-size command line option to EFL MiniBrowser
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=100942
Patch by Mikhail Pozdnyakov <mikhail.pozdnyakov@intel.com> on 2012-11-05
Reviewed by Kenneth Rohde Christiansen.
Added window-size (-s) command line option to EFL MiniBrowser.
* MiniBrowser/efl/main.c:
(window_create):
(parse_window_size):
(elm_main):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@133450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 106,608
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: long Segment::ParseNext(
const Cluster* pCurr,
const Cluster*& pResult,
long long& pos,
long& len)
{
assert(pCurr);
assert(!pCurr->EOS());
assert(m_clusters);
pResult = 0;
if (pCurr->m_index >= 0) //loaded (not merely preloaded)
{
assert(m_clusters[pCurr->m_index] == pCurr);
const long next_idx = pCurr->m_index + 1;
if (next_idx < m_clusterCount)
{
pResult = m_clusters[next_idx];
return 0; //success
}
const long result = LoadCluster(pos, len);
if (result < 0) //error or underflow
return result;
if (result > 0) //no more clusters
{
return 1;
}
pResult = GetLast();
return 0; //success
}
assert(m_pos > 0);
long long total, avail;
long status = m_pReader->Length(&total, &avail);
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
assert((total < 0) || (avail <= total));
const long long segment_stop = (m_size < 0) ? -1 : m_start + m_size;
pos = pCurr->m_element_start;
if (pCurr->m_element_size >= 0)
pos += pCurr->m_element_size;
else
{
if ((pos + 1) > avail)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
long long result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) //weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long id = ReadUInt(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (id != 0x0F43B675) //weird: not Cluster ID
return -1;
pos += len; //consume ID
if ((pos + 1) > avail)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) //weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long size = ReadUInt(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(size);
pos += len; //consume size field
const long long unknown_size = (1LL << (7 * len)) - 1;
if (size == unknown_size) //TODO: should never happen
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; //TODO: resolve this
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + size) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
pos += size; //consume payload (that is, the current cluster)
assert((segment_stop < 0) || (pos <= segment_stop));
}
for (;;)
{
const long status = DoParseNext(pResult, pos, len);
if (status <= 1)
return status;
}
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 174,428
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool WebContentsImpl::ShouldIgnoreUnresponsiveRenderer() {
return DevToolsAgentHost::IsDebuggerAttached(this);
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 135,892
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void __sched sleep_on(wait_queue_head_t *q)
{
sleep_on_common(q, TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE, MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT);
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 22,601
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PDFiumEngine::LoadForm() {
if (form_)
return;
DCHECK(doc_);
form_status_ = FPDFAvail_IsFormAvail(fpdf_availability_, &download_hints_);
if (form_status_ != PDF_FORM_NOTAVAIL || doc_loader_->IsDocumentComplete()) {
form_ = FPDFDOC_InitFormFillEnvironment(
doc_, static_cast<FPDF_FORMFILLINFO*>(this));
#if defined(PDF_ENABLE_XFA)
FPDF_LoadXFA(doc_);
#endif
FPDF_SetFormFieldHighlightColor(form_, FPDF_FORMFIELD_UNKNOWN,
kFormHighlightColor);
FPDF_SetFormFieldHighlightAlpha(form_, kFormHighlightAlpha);
}
} // namespace chrome_pdf
Commit Message: Copy visible_pages_ when iterating over it.
On this case, a call inside the loop may cause visible_pages_ to
change.
Bug: 822091
Change-Id: I41b0715faa6fe3e39203cd9142cf5ea38e59aefb
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/964592
Reviewed-by: dsinclair <dsinclair@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Henrique Nakashima <hnakashima@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#543494}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 147,400
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void tty_del_file(struct file *file)
{
struct tty_file_private *priv = file->private_data;
spin_lock(&tty_files_lock);
list_del(&priv->list);
spin_unlock(&tty_files_lock);
file->private_data = NULL;
kfree(priv);
}
Commit Message: TTY: drop driver reference in tty_open fail path
When tty_driver_lookup_tty fails in tty_open, we forget to drop a
reference to the tty driver. This was added by commit 4a2b5fddd5 (Move
tty lookup/reopen to caller).
Fix that by adding tty_driver_kref_put to the fail path.
I will refactor the code later. This is for the ease of backporting to
stable.
Introduced-in: v2.6.28-rc2
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Acked-by: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 58,749
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int valid_request(int offset, int size)
{
/* Validate request (no un-aligned requests) */
if ((size == 1 || size == 2 || size == 4) && (offset % size) == 0)
return 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: xen-pciback: limit guest control of command register
Otherwise the guest can abuse that control to cause e.g. PCIe
Unsupported Request responses by disabling memory and/or I/O decoding
and subsequently causing (CPU side) accesses to the respective address
ranges, which (depending on system configuration) may be fatal to the
host.
Note that to alter any of the bits collected together as
PCI_COMMAND_GUEST permissive mode is now required to be enabled
globally or on the specific device.
This is CVE-2015-2150 / XSA-120.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 43,948
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ImageData* BaseRenderingContext2D::getImageData(
int sx,
int sy,
int sw,
int sh,
ExceptionState& exception_state) {
if (!WTF::CheckMul(sw, sh).IsValid<int>()) {
exception_state.ThrowRangeError("Out of memory at ImageData creation");
return nullptr;
}
usage_counters_.num_get_image_data_calls++;
usage_counters_.area_get_image_data_calls += sw * sh;
if (!OriginClean()) {
exception_state.ThrowSecurityError(
"The canvas has been tainted by cross-origin data.");
} else if (!sw || !sh) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
kIndexSizeError,
String::Format("The source %s is 0.", sw ? "height" : "width"));
}
if (exception_state.HadException())
return nullptr;
if (sw < 0) {
sx += sw;
sw = -sw;
}
if (sh < 0) {
sy += sh;
sh = -sh;
}
if (!WTF::CheckAdd(sx, sw).IsValid<int>() ||
!WTF::CheckAdd(sy, sh).IsValid<int>()) {
exception_state.ThrowRangeError("Out of memory at ImageData creation");
return nullptr;
}
Optional<ScopedUsHistogramTimer> timer;
if (!IsPaint2D()) {
if (GetImageBuffer() && GetImageBuffer()->IsAccelerated()) {
DEFINE_THREAD_SAFE_STATIC_LOCAL(
CustomCountHistogram, scoped_us_counter_gpu,
("Blink.Canvas.GetImageData.GPU", 0, 10000000, 50));
timer.emplace(scoped_us_counter_gpu);
} else {
DEFINE_THREAD_SAFE_STATIC_LOCAL(
CustomCountHistogram, scoped_us_counter_cpu,
("Blink.Canvas.GetImageData.CPU", 0, 10000000, 50));
timer.emplace(scoped_us_counter_cpu);
}
}
IntRect image_data_rect(sx, sy, sw, sh);
ImageBuffer* buffer = GetImageBuffer();
ImageDataColorSettings color_settings =
GetColorSettingsAsImageDataColorSettings();
if (!buffer || isContextLost()) {
ImageData* result =
ImageData::Create(image_data_rect.Size(), &color_settings);
if (!result)
exception_state.ThrowRangeError("Out of memory at ImageData creation");
return result;
}
WTF::ArrayBufferContents contents;
bool is_gpu_readback_invoked = false;
if (!buffer->GetImageData(image_data_rect, contents,
&is_gpu_readback_invoked)) {
exception_state.ThrowRangeError("Out of memory at ImageData creation");
return nullptr;
}
if (is_gpu_readback_invoked) {
DidInvokeGPUReadbackInCurrentFrame();
}
NeedsFinalizeFrame();
if (PixelFormat() != kRGBA8CanvasPixelFormat) {
ImageDataStorageFormat storage_format =
ImageData::GetImageDataStorageFormat(color_settings.storageFormat());
DOMArrayBufferView* array_buffer_view =
ImageData::ConvertPixelsFromCanvasPixelFormatToImageDataStorageFormat(
contents, PixelFormat(), storage_format);
return ImageData::Create(image_data_rect.Size(),
NotShared<DOMArrayBufferView>(array_buffer_view),
&color_settings);
}
DOMArrayBuffer* array_buffer = DOMArrayBuffer::Create(contents);
return ImageData::Create(
image_data_rect.Size(),
NotShared<DOMUint8ClampedArray>(DOMUint8ClampedArray::Create(
array_buffer, 0, array_buffer->ByteLength())),
&color_settings);
}
Commit Message: [PE] Distinguish between tainting due to canvas content and filter.
A filter on a canvas can itself lead to origin tainting, for reasons
other than that the canvas contents are tainted. This CL changes
to distinguish these two causes, so that we recompute filters
on content-tainting change.
Bug: 778506
Change-Id: I3cec8ef3b2772f2af78cdd4b290520113092cca6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/811767
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <fs@opera.com>
Commit-Queue: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522274}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 149,922
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: acpi_status __init acpi_os_initialize(void)
{
acpi_os_map_generic_address(&acpi_gbl_FADT.xpm1a_event_block);
acpi_os_map_generic_address(&acpi_gbl_FADT.xpm1b_event_block);
acpi_os_map_generic_address(&acpi_gbl_FADT.xgpe0_block);
acpi_os_map_generic_address(&acpi_gbl_FADT.xgpe1_block);
if (acpi_gbl_FADT.flags & ACPI_FADT_RESET_REGISTER) {
/*
* Use acpi_os_map_generic_address to pre-map the reset
* register if it's in system memory.
*/
int rv;
rv = acpi_os_map_generic_address(&acpi_gbl_FADT.reset_register);
pr_debug(PREFIX "%s: map reset_reg status %d\n", __func__, rv);
}
acpi_os_initialized = true;
return AE_OK;
}
Commit Message: acpi: Disable ACPI table override if securelevel is set
From the kernel documentation (initrd_table_override.txt):
If the ACPI_INITRD_TABLE_OVERRIDE compile option is true, it is possible
to override nearly any ACPI table provided by the BIOS with an
instrumented, modified one.
When securelevel is set, the kernel should disallow any unauthenticated
changes to kernel space. ACPI tables contain code invoked by the kernel, so
do not allow ACPI tables to be overridden if securelevel is set.
Signed-off-by: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 53,846
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SplashError Splash::stroke(SplashPath *path) {
SplashPath *path2, *dPath;
SplashCoord d1, d2, t1, t2, w;
if (debugMode) {
printf("stroke [dash:%d] [width:%.2f]:\n",
state->lineDashLength, (double)state->lineWidth);
dumpPath(path);
}
opClipRes = splashClipAllOutside;
if (path->length == 0) {
return splashErrEmptyPath;
}
path2 = flattenPath(path, state->matrix, state->flatness);
if (state->lineDashLength > 0) {
dPath = makeDashedPath(path2);
delete path2;
path2 = dPath;
if (path2->length == 0) {
delete path2;
return splashErrEmptyPath;
}
}
t1 = state->matrix[0] + state->matrix[2];
t2 = state->matrix[1] + state->matrix[3];
d1 = t1 * t1 + t2 * t2;
t1 = state->matrix[0] - state->matrix[2];
t2 = state->matrix[1] - state->matrix[3];
d2 = t1 * t1 + t2 * t2;
if (d2 > d1) {
d1 = d2;
}
d1 *= 0.5;
if (d1 > 0 &&
d1 * state->lineWidth * state->lineWidth < minLineWidth * minLineWidth) {
w = minLineWidth / splashSqrt(d1);
strokeWide(path2, w);
} else if (bitmap->mode == splashModeMono1) {
if (d1 * state->lineWidth <= 2) {
strokeNarrow(path2);
} else {
strokeWide(path2, state->lineWidth);
}
} else {
if (state->lineWidth == 0) {
strokeNarrow(path2);
} else {
strokeWide(path2, state->lineWidth);
}
}
delete path2;
return splashOk;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 4,150
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DownloadFileManager::CreateDownloadFile(
scoped_ptr<DownloadCreateInfo> info,
scoped_ptr<content::ByteStreamReader> stream,
scoped_refptr<DownloadManager> download_manager, bool get_hash,
const net::BoundNetLog& bound_net_log,
const CreateDownloadFileCallback& callback) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::FILE));
DCHECK(info.get());
VLOG(20) << __FUNCTION__ << "()" << " info = " << info->DebugString();
scoped_ptr<DownloadFile> download_file(download_file_factory_->CreateFile(
info.get(), stream.Pass(), download_manager, get_hash, bound_net_log));
content::DownloadInterruptReason interrupt_reason(
content::ConvertNetErrorToInterruptReason(
download_file->Initialize(), content::DOWNLOAD_INTERRUPT_FROM_DISK));
if (interrupt_reason == content::DOWNLOAD_INTERRUPT_REASON_NONE) {
DCHECK(GetDownloadFile(info->download_id) == NULL);
downloads_[info->download_id] = download_file.release();
}
BrowserThread::PostTask(BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(callback, interrupt_reason));
}
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
R=asanka@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 106,034
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void icmpv6_cleanup(void)
{
inet6_unregister_icmp_sender(icmp6_send);
unregister_pernet_subsys(&icmpv6_sk_ops);
inet6_del_protocol(&icmpv6_protocol, IPPROTO_ICMPV6);
}
Commit Message: net: handle no dst on skb in icmp6_send
Andrey reported the following while fuzzing the kernel with syzkaller:
kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 3859 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.9.0-rc6+ #429
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
task: ffff8800666d4200 task.stack: ffff880067348000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff833617ec>] [<ffffffff833617ec>]
icmp6_send+0x5fc/0x1e30 net/ipv6/icmp.c:451
RSP: 0018:ffff88006734f2c0 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: ffff8800666d4200 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: 0000000000000018
RBP: ffff88006734f630 R08: ffff880064138418 R09: 0000000000000003
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: 0000000000000005 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffffffff84e7e200 R14: ffff880064138484 R15: ffff8800641383c0
FS: 00007fb3887a07c0(0000) GS:ffff88006cc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000020000000 CR3: 000000006b040000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Stack:
ffff8800666d4200 ffff8800666d49f8 ffff8800666d4200 ffffffff84c02460
ffff8800666d4a1a 1ffff1000ccdaa2f ffff88006734f498 0000000000000046
ffff88006734f440 ffffffff832f4269 ffff880064ba7456 0000000000000000
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff83364ddc>] icmpv6_param_prob+0x2c/0x40 net/ipv6/icmp.c:557
[< inline >] ip6_tlvopt_unknown net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:88
[<ffffffff83394405>] ip6_parse_tlv+0x555/0x670 net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:157
[<ffffffff8339a759>] ipv6_parse_hopopts+0x199/0x460 net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:663
[<ffffffff832ee773>] ipv6_rcv+0xfa3/0x1dc0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:191
...
icmp6_send / icmpv6_send is invoked for both rx and tx paths. In both
cases the dst->dev should be preferred for determining the L3 domain
if the dst has been set on the skb. Fallback to the skb->dev if it has
not. This covers the case reported here where icmp6_send is invoked on
Rx before the route lookup.
Fixes: 5d41ce29e ("net: icmp6_send should use dst dev to determine L3 domain")
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsa@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 47,677
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int tun_queue_resize(struct tun_struct *tun)
{
struct net_device *dev = tun->dev;
struct tun_file *tfile;
struct skb_array **arrays;
int n = tun->numqueues + tun->numdisabled;
int ret, i;
arrays = kmalloc_array(n, sizeof(*arrays), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!arrays)
return -ENOMEM;
for (i = 0; i < tun->numqueues; i++) {
tfile = rtnl_dereference(tun->tfiles[i]);
arrays[i] = &tfile->tx_array;
}
list_for_each_entry(tfile, &tun->disabled, next)
arrays[i++] = &tfile->tx_array;
ret = skb_array_resize_multiple(arrays, n,
dev->tx_queue_len, GFP_KERNEL);
kfree(arrays);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: tun: call dev_get_valid_name() before register_netdevice()
register_netdevice() could fail early when we have an invalid
dev name, in which case ->ndo_uninit() is not called. For tun
device, this is a problem because a timer etc. are already
initialized and it expects ->ndo_uninit() to clean them up.
We could move these initializations into a ->ndo_init() so
that register_netdevice() knows better, however this is still
complicated due to the logic in tun_detach().
Therefore, I choose to just call dev_get_valid_name() before
register_netdevice(), which is quicker and much easier to audit.
And for this specific case, it is already enough.
Fixes: 96442e42429e ("tuntap: choose the txq based on rxq")
Reported-by: Dmitry Alexeev <avekceeb@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 93,318
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ProcAllocColorPlanes(ClientPtr client)
{
ColormapPtr pcmp;
int rc;
REQUEST(xAllocColorPlanesReq);
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xAllocColorPlanesReq);
rc = dixLookupResourceByType((void **) &pcmp, stuff->cmap, RT_COLORMAP,
client, DixAddAccess);
if (rc == Success) {
xAllocColorPlanesReply acpr;
int npixels;
long length;
Pixel *ppixels;
npixels = stuff->colors;
if (!npixels) {
client->errorValue = npixels;
return BadValue;
}
if (stuff->contiguous != xTrue && stuff->contiguous != xFalse) {
client->errorValue = stuff->contiguous;
return BadValue;
}
acpr = (xAllocColorPlanesReply) {
.type = X_Reply,
.sequenceNumber = client->sequence,
.nPixels = npixels
};
length = (long) npixels *sizeof(Pixel);
ppixels = malloc(length);
if (!ppixels)
return BadAlloc;
if ((rc = AllocColorPlanes(client->index, pcmp, npixels,
(int) stuff->red, (int) stuff->green,
(int) stuff->blue, (Bool) stuff->contiguous,
ppixels, &acpr.redMask, &acpr.greenMask,
&acpr.blueMask))) {
free(ppixels);
return rc;
}
acpr.length = bytes_to_int32(length);
#ifdef PANORAMIX
if (noPanoramiXExtension || !pcmp->pScreen->myNum)
#endif
{
WriteReplyToClient(client, sizeof(xAllocColorPlanesReply), &acpr);
client->pSwapReplyFunc = (ReplySwapPtr) Swap32Write;
WriteSwappedDataToClient(client, length, ppixels);
}
free(ppixels);
return Success;
}
else {
client->errorValue = stuff->cmap;
return rc;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 14,946
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void timer_free_values(Timer *t) {
TimerValue *v;
assert(t);
while ((v = t->values)) {
LIST_REMOVE(value, t->values, v);
calendar_spec_free(v->calendar_spec);
free(v);
}
}
Commit Message: util-lib: use MODE_INVALID as invalid value for mode_t everywhere
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 96,127
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: size_t smb1cli_req_wct_ofs(struct tevent_req **reqs, int num_reqs)
{
size_t wct_ofs;
int i;
wct_ofs = HDR_WCT;
for (i=0; i<num_reqs; i++) {
struct smbXcli_req_state *state;
state = tevent_req_data(reqs[i], struct smbXcli_req_state);
wct_ofs += smbXcli_iov_len(state->smb1.iov+2,
state->smb1.iov_count-2);
wct_ofs = (wct_ofs + 3) & ~3;
}
return wct_ofs;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 2,421
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PDFiumEngine::CalculateVisiblePages() {
pending_pages_.clear();
doc_loader_.ClearPendingRequests();
visible_pages_.clear();
pp::Rect visible_rect(plugin_size_);
for (size_t i = 0; i < pages_.size(); ++i) {
if (visible_rect.Intersects(GetPageScreenRect(i))) {
visible_pages_.push_back(i);
CheckPageAvailable(i, &pending_pages_);
} else {
if (defer_page_unload_) {
deferred_page_unloads_.push_back(i);
} else {
pages_[i]->Unload();
}
if (static_cast<int>(i) == last_page_mouse_down_)
last_page_mouse_down_ = -1;
}
}
form_highlights_.clear();
int most_visible_page = visible_pages_.empty() ? -1 : visible_pages_.front();
if (most_visible_page != -1 && !pages_.empty() &&
most_visible_page < static_cast<int>(pages_.size()) - 1) {
pp::Rect rc_first =
visible_rect.Intersect(GetPageScreenRect(most_visible_page));
pp::Rect rc_next =
visible_rect.Intersect(GetPageScreenRect(most_visible_page + 1));
if (rc_next.height() > rc_first.height())
most_visible_page++;
}
SetCurrentPage(most_visible_page);
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Defer page unloading in JS callback.
One of the callbacks from PDFium JavaScript into the embedder is to get the
current page number. In Chromium, this will trigger a call to
CalculateMostVisiblePage that method will determine the visible pages and unload
any non-visible pages. But, if the originating JS is on a non-visible page
we'll delete the page and annotations associated with that page. This will
cause issues as we are currently working with those objects when the JavaScript
returns.
This Cl defers the page unloading triggered by getting the most visible page
until the next event is handled by the Chromium embedder.
BUG=chromium:653090
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2418533002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#424781}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 140,262
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool GetValueFromVersionResource(const char* version_resource,
const std::wstring& name,
std::wstring* value_str) {
assert(value_str);
value_str->clear();
WORD language = 0;
WORD code_page = 0;
if (!GetLanguageAndCodePageFromVersionResource(version_resource, &language,
&code_page)) {
return false;
}
const size_t array_size = 8;
WORD lang_codepage[array_size] = {};
size_t i = 0;
lang_codepage[i++] = language;
lang_codepage[i++] = code_page;
lang_codepage[i++] = ::GetUserDefaultLangID();
lang_codepage[i++] = code_page;
lang_codepage[i++] = language;
lang_codepage[i++] = 1252;
lang_codepage[i++] = ::GetUserDefaultLangID();
lang_codepage[i++] = 1252;
static_assert((array_size % 2) == 0,
"Language code page size should be a multiple of 2");
assert(array_size == i);
for (i = 0; i < array_size;) {
wchar_t sub_block[MAX_PATH];
WORD language = lang_codepage[i++];
WORD code_page = lang_codepage[i++];
_snwprintf_s(sub_block, MAX_PATH, MAX_PATH,
L"\\StringFileInfo\\%04hx%04hx\\%ls", language, code_page,
name.c_str());
void* value = nullptr;
uint32_t size = 0;
BOOL r = ::VerQueryValueW(version_resource, sub_block, &value, &size);
if (r && value) {
value_str->assign(static_cast<wchar_t*>(value));
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Ignore switches following "--" when parsing a command line.
BUG=933004
R=wfh@chromium.org
Change-Id: I911be4cbfc38a4d41dec85d85f7fe0f50ddca392
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1481210
Auto-Submit: Greg Thompson <grt@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Julian Pastarmov <pastarmovj@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Julian Pastarmov <pastarmovj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#634604}
CWE ID: CWE-77
| 0
| 152,642
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void keep_sockalive(SOCKETTYPE fd)
{
const int tcp_one = 1;
#ifndef WIN32
const int tcp_keepidle = 45;
const int tcp_keepintvl = 30;
int flags = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL, 0);
fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK | flags);
#else
u_long flags = 1;
ioctlsocket(fd, FIONBIO, &flags);
#endif
setsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, (const void *)&tcp_one, sizeof(tcp_one));
if (!opt_delaynet)
#ifndef __linux
setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_NODELAY, (const void *)&tcp_one, sizeof(tcp_one));
#else /* __linux */
setsockopt(fd, SOL_TCP, TCP_NODELAY, (const void *)&tcp_one, sizeof(tcp_one));
setsockopt(fd, SOL_TCP, TCP_KEEPCNT, &tcp_one, sizeof(tcp_one));
setsockopt(fd, SOL_TCP, TCP_KEEPIDLE, &tcp_keepidle, sizeof(tcp_keepidle));
setsockopt(fd, SOL_TCP, TCP_KEEPINTVL, &tcp_keepintvl, sizeof(tcp_keepintvl));
#endif /* __linux */
#ifdef __APPLE_CC__
setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_KEEPALIVE, &tcp_keepintvl, sizeof(tcp_keepintvl));
#endif /* __APPLE_CC__ */
}
Commit Message: Do some random sanity checking for stratum message parsing
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 36,666
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: _dbus_check_dir_is_private_to_user (DBusString *dir, DBusError *error)
{
/* TODO */
_DBUS_ASSERT_ERROR_IS_CLEAR (error);
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 3,766
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t Parcel::writeFileDescriptor(int fd, bool takeOwnership)
{
flat_binder_object obj;
obj.type = BINDER_TYPE_FD;
obj.flags = 0x7f | FLAT_BINDER_FLAG_ACCEPTS_FDS;
obj.binder = 0; /* Don't pass uninitialized stack data to a remote process */
obj.handle = fd;
obj.cookie = takeOwnership ? 1 : 0;
return writeObject(obj, true);
}
Commit Message: Disregard alleged binder entities beyond parcel bounds
When appending one parcel's contents to another, ignore binder
objects within the source Parcel that appear to lie beyond the
formal bounds of that Parcel's data buffer.
Bug 17312693
Change-Id: If592a260f3fcd9a56fc160e7feb2c8b44c73f514
(cherry picked from commit 27182be9f20f4f5b48316666429f09b9ecc1f22e)
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 157,339
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MagickExport VirtualPixelMethod SetImageVirtualPixelMethod(Image *image,
const VirtualPixelMethod virtual_pixel_method,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
assert(image != (const Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
return(SetPixelCacheVirtualMethod(image,virtual_pixel_method,exception));
}
Commit Message: Set pixel cache to undefined if any resource limit is exceeded
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 94,857
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void smbd_process(void)
{
TALLOC_CTX *frame = talloc_stackframe();
char remaddr[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
if (lp_maxprotocol() == PROTOCOL_SMB2 &&
lp_security() != SEC_SHARE) {
smbd_server_conn->allow_smb2 = true;
}
/* Ensure child is set to blocking mode */
set_blocking(smbd_server_fd(),True);
set_socket_options(smbd_server_fd(),"SO_KEEPALIVE");
set_socket_options(smbd_server_fd(), lp_socket_options());
/* this is needed so that we get decent entries
in smbstatus for port 445 connects */
set_remote_machine_name(get_peer_addr(smbd_server_fd(),
remaddr,
sizeof(remaddr)),
false);
reload_services(true);
/*
* Before the first packet, check the global hosts allow/ hosts deny
* parameters before doing any parsing of packets passed to us by the
* client. This prevents attacks on our parsing code from hosts not in
* the hosts allow list.
*/
if (!check_access(smbd_server_fd(), lp_hostsallow(-1),
lp_hostsdeny(-1))) {
char addr[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
/*
* send a negative session response "not listening on calling
* name"
*/
unsigned char buf[5] = {0x83, 0, 0, 1, 0x81};
DEBUG( 1, ("Connection denied from %s\n",
client_addr(get_client_fd(),addr,sizeof(addr)) ) );
(void)srv_send_smb(smbd_server_fd(),(char *)buf, false,
0, false, NULL);
exit_server_cleanly("connection denied");
}
static_init_rpc;
init_modules();
smb_perfcount_init();
if (!init_account_policy()) {
exit_server("Could not open account policy tdb.\n");
}
if (*lp_rootdir()) {
if (chroot(lp_rootdir()) != 0) {
DEBUG(0,("Failed to change root to %s\n", lp_rootdir()));
exit_server("Failed to chroot()");
}
if (chdir("/") == -1) {
DEBUG(0,("Failed to chdir to / on chroot to %s\n", lp_rootdir()));
exit_server("Failed to chroot()");
}
DEBUG(0,("Changed root to %s\n", lp_rootdir()));
}
if (!srv_init_signing(smbd_server_conn)) {
exit_server("Failed to init smb_signing");
}
/* Setup oplocks */
if (!init_oplocks(smbd_messaging_context()))
exit_server("Failed to init oplocks");
/* Setup aio signal handler. */
initialize_async_io_handler();
/* register our message handlers */
messaging_register(smbd_messaging_context(), NULL,
MSG_SMB_FORCE_TDIS, msg_force_tdis);
messaging_register(smbd_messaging_context(), NULL,
MSG_SMB_RELEASE_IP, msg_release_ip);
messaging_register(smbd_messaging_context(), NULL,
MSG_SMB_CLOSE_FILE, msg_close_file);
/*
* Use the default MSG_DEBUG handler to avoid rebroadcasting
* MSGs to all child processes
*/
messaging_deregister(smbd_messaging_context(),
MSG_DEBUG, NULL);
messaging_register(smbd_messaging_context(), NULL,
MSG_DEBUG, debug_message);
if ((lp_keepalive() != 0)
&& !(event_add_idle(smbd_event_context(), NULL,
timeval_set(lp_keepalive(), 0),
"keepalive", keepalive_fn,
NULL))) {
DEBUG(0, ("Could not add keepalive event\n"));
exit(1);
}
if (!(event_add_idle(smbd_event_context(), NULL,
timeval_set(IDLE_CLOSED_TIMEOUT, 0),
"deadtime", deadtime_fn, NULL))) {
DEBUG(0, ("Could not add deadtime event\n"));
exit(1);
}
if (!(event_add_idle(smbd_event_context(), NULL,
timeval_set(SMBD_SELECT_TIMEOUT, 0),
"housekeeping", housekeeping_fn, NULL))) {
DEBUG(0, ("Could not add housekeeping event\n"));
exit(1);
}
#ifdef CLUSTER_SUPPORT
if (lp_clustering()) {
/*
* We need to tell ctdb about our client's TCP
* connection, so that for failover ctdbd can send
* tickle acks, triggering a reconnection by the
* client.
*/
struct sockaddr_storage srv, clnt;
if (client_get_tcp_info(&srv, &clnt) == 0) {
NTSTATUS status;
status = ctdbd_register_ips(
messaging_ctdbd_connection(),
&srv, &clnt, release_ip, NULL);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
DEBUG(0, ("ctdbd_register_ips failed: %s\n",
nt_errstr(status)));
}
} else
{
DEBUG(0,("Unable to get tcp info for "
"CTDB_CONTROL_TCP_CLIENT: %s\n",
strerror(errno)));
}
}
#endif
smbd_server_conn->nbt.got_session = false;
smbd_server_conn->smb1.negprot.max_recv = MIN(lp_maxxmit(),BUFFER_SIZE);
smbd_server_conn->smb1.sessions.done_sesssetup = false;
smbd_server_conn->smb1.sessions.max_send = BUFFER_SIZE;
smbd_server_conn->smb1.sessions.last_session_tag = UID_FIELD_INVALID;
/* users from session setup */
smbd_server_conn->smb1.sessions.session_userlist = NULL;
/* workgroup from session setup. */
smbd_server_conn->smb1.sessions.session_workgroup = NULL;
/* this holds info on user ids that are already validated for this VC */
smbd_server_conn->smb1.sessions.validated_users = NULL;
smbd_server_conn->smb1.sessions.next_vuid = VUID_OFFSET;
smbd_server_conn->smb1.sessions.num_validated_vuids = 0;
#ifdef HAVE_NETGROUP
smbd_server_conn->smb1.sessions.my_yp_domain = NULL;
#endif
conn_init(smbd_server_conn);
if (!init_dptrs(smbd_server_conn)) {
exit_server("init_dptrs() failed");
}
smbd_server_conn->smb1.fde = event_add_fd(smbd_event_context(),
smbd_server_conn,
smbd_server_fd(),
EVENT_FD_READ,
smbd_server_connection_handler,
smbd_server_conn);
if (!smbd_server_conn->smb1.fde) {
exit_server("failed to create smbd_server_connection fde");
}
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
while (True) {
NTSTATUS status;
frame = talloc_stackframe_pool(8192);
errno = 0;
status = smbd_server_connection_loop_once(smbd_server_conn);
if (!NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_RETRY) &&
!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
DEBUG(3, ("smbd_server_connection_loop_once failed: %s,"
" exiting\n", nt_errstr(status)));
break;
}
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
}
exit_server_cleanly(NULL);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 11,080
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HideHostCursor() {
CR_DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(XScopedCursor, invisible_cursor,
(CreateInvisibleCursor(), ui::GetXDisplay()));
XDefineCursor(ui::GetXDisplay(), DefaultRootWindow(ui::GetXDisplay()),
invisible_cursor.get());
}
Commit Message: Make shared memory segments writable only by their rightful owners.
BUG=143859
TEST=Chrome's UI still works on Linux and Chrome OS
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854242
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@158289 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 119,193
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int nfc_genl_se_transaction(struct nfc_dev *dev, u8 se_idx,
struct nfc_evt_transaction *evt_transaction)
{
struct nfc_se *se;
struct sk_buff *msg;
void *hdr;
msg = nlmsg_new(NLMSG_DEFAULT_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!msg)
return -ENOMEM;
hdr = genlmsg_put(msg, 0, 0, &nfc_genl_family, 0,
NFC_EVENT_SE_TRANSACTION);
if (!hdr)
goto free_msg;
se = nfc_find_se(dev, se_idx);
if (!se)
goto free_msg;
if (nla_put_u32(msg, NFC_ATTR_DEVICE_INDEX, dev->idx) ||
nla_put_u32(msg, NFC_ATTR_SE_INDEX, se_idx) ||
nla_put_u8(msg, NFC_ATTR_SE_TYPE, se->type) ||
nla_put(msg, NFC_ATTR_SE_AID, evt_transaction->aid_len,
evt_transaction->aid) ||
nla_put(msg, NFC_ATTR_SE_PARAMS, evt_transaction->params_len,
evt_transaction->params))
goto nla_put_failure;
/* evt_transaction is no more used */
devm_kfree(&dev->dev, evt_transaction);
genlmsg_end(msg, hdr);
genlmsg_multicast(&nfc_genl_family, msg, 0, 0, GFP_KERNEL);
return 0;
nla_put_failure:
free_msg:
/* evt_transaction is no more used */
devm_kfree(&dev->dev, evt_transaction);
nlmsg_free(msg);
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
Commit Message: nfc: Ensure presence of required attributes in the deactivate_target handler
Check that the NFC_ATTR_TARGET_INDEX attributes (in addition to
NFC_ATTR_DEVICE_INDEX) are provided by the netlink client prior to
accessing them. This prevents potential unhandled NULL pointer dereference
exceptions which can be triggered by malicious user-mode programs,
if they omit one or both of these attributes.
Signed-off-by: Young Xiao <92siuyang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 89,459
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: float BaseRenderingContext2D::GetFontBaseline(
const FontMetrics& font_metrics) const {
return TextMetrics::GetFontBaseline(GetState().GetTextBaseline(),
font_metrics);
}
Commit Message: [PE] Distinguish between tainting due to canvas content and filter.
A filter on a canvas can itself lead to origin tainting, for reasons
other than that the canvas contents are tainted. This CL changes
to distinguish these two causes, so that we recompute filters
on content-tainting change.
Bug: 778506
Change-Id: I3cec8ef3b2772f2af78cdd4b290520113092cca6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/811767
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <fs@opera.com>
Commit-Queue: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522274}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 149,879
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Box *srpp_New()
{
ISOM_DECL_BOX_ALLOC(GF_SRTPProcessBox, GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_SRPP);
return (GF_Box *)tmp;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,424
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: get_bridge_info_for_guard(const entry_guard_t *guard)
{
const uint8_t *identity = NULL;
if (! tor_digest_is_zero(guard->identity)) {
identity = (const uint8_t *)guard->identity;
}
if (BUG(guard->bridge_addr == NULL))
return NULL;
return get_configured_bridge_by_exact_addr_port_digest(
&guard->bridge_addr->addr,
guard->bridge_addr->port,
(const char*)identity);
}
Commit Message: Consider the exit family when applying guard restrictions.
When the new path selection logic went into place, I accidentally
dropped the code that considered the _family_ of the exit node when
deciding if the guard was usable, and we didn't catch that during
code review.
This patch makes the guard_restriction_t code consider the exit
family as well, and adds some (hopefully redundant) checks for the
case where we lack a node_t for a guard but we have a bridge_info_t
for it.
Fixes bug 22753; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha. Tracked as TROVE-2016-006
and CVE-2017-0377.
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 69,704
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameImpl::DidEnforceInsecureNavigationsSet(
const std::vector<uint32_t>& set) {
GetFrameHost()->EnforceInsecureNavigationsSet(set);
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 139,593
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool AppCacheDatabase::CreateSchema() {
sql::Transaction transaction(db_.get());
if (!transaction.Begin())
return false;
if (!meta_table_->Init(db_.get(), kCurrentVersion, kCompatibleVersion))
return false;
if (!meta_table_->SetValue(kExperimentFlagsKey,
GetActiveExperimentFlags())) {
return false;
}
for (int i = 0; i < kTableCount; ++i) {
if (!CreateTable(db_.get(), kTables[i]))
return false;
}
for (int i = 0; i < kIndexCount; ++i) {
if (!CreateIndex(db_.get(), kIndexes[i]))
return false;
}
return transaction.Commit();
}
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 151,264
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::CreateNewWidget(int32_t render_process_id,
int32_t route_id,
bool is_fullscreen,
blink::WebPopupType popup_type) {
RenderProcessHost* process = RenderProcessHost::FromID(render_process_id);
if (!HasMatchingProcess(&frame_tree_, render_process_id)) {
base::ProcessHandle process_handle = process->GetHandle();
if (process_handle != base::kNullProcessHandle) {
RecordAction(
base::UserMetricsAction("Terminate_ProcessMismatch_CreateNewWidget"));
process->Shutdown(RESULT_CODE_KILLED, false);
}
return;
}
RenderWidgetHostImpl* widget_host =
new RenderWidgetHostImpl(this, process, route_id, IsHidden());
RenderWidgetHostViewBase* widget_view =
static_cast<RenderWidgetHostViewBase*>(
view_->CreateViewForPopupWidget(widget_host));
if (!widget_view)
return;
if (!is_fullscreen) {
widget_view->SetPopupType(popup_type);
}
pending_widget_views_[route_id] = widget_view;
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
base::mac::NSObjectRetain(widget_view->GetNativeView());
#endif
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 131,776
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cib_remote_set_connection_dnotify(cib_t * cib, void (*dnotify) (gpointer user_data))
{
return -EPROTONOSUPPORT;
}
Commit Message: High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 33,893
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void print_liveness(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
enum bpf_reg_liveness live)
{
if (live & (REG_LIVE_READ | REG_LIVE_WRITTEN))
verbose(env, "_");
if (live & REG_LIVE_READ)
verbose(env, "r");
if (live & REG_LIVE_WRITTEN)
verbose(env, "w");
}
Commit Message: bpf: 32-bit RSH verification must truncate input before the ALU op
When I wrote commit 468f6eafa6c4 ("bpf: fix 32-bit ALU op verification"), I
assumed that, in order to emulate 64-bit arithmetic with 32-bit logic, it
is sufficient to just truncate the output to 32 bits; and so I just moved
the register size coercion that used to be at the start of the function to
the end of the function.
That assumption is true for almost every op, but not for 32-bit right
shifts, because those can propagate information towards the least
significant bit. Fix it by always truncating inputs for 32-bit ops to 32
bits.
Also get rid of the coerce_reg_to_size() after the ALU op, since that has
no effect.
Fixes: 468f6eafa6c4 ("bpf: fix 32-bit ALU op verification")
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 76,418
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(imagecopymergegray)
{
zval *SIM, *DIM;
long SX, SY, SW, SH, DX, DY, PCT;
gdImagePtr im_dst, im_src;
int srcH, srcW, srcY, srcX, dstY, dstX, pct;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rrlllllll", &DIM, &SIM, &DX, &DY, &SX, &SY, &SW, &SH, &PCT) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(im_src, gdImagePtr, &SIM, -1, "Image", le_gd);
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(im_dst, gdImagePtr, &DIM, -1, "Image", le_gd);
srcX = SX;
srcY = SY;
srcH = SH;
srcW = SW;
dstX = DX;
dstY = DY;
pct = PCT;
gdImageCopyMergeGray(im_dst, im_src, dstX, dstY, srcX, srcY, srcW, srcH, pct);
RETURN_TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 15,161
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int decode_splitmvs(VP8Context *s, VP56RangeCoder *c, VP8Macroblock *mb,
int layout, int is_vp7)
{
int part_idx;
int n, num;
VP8Macroblock *top_mb;
VP8Macroblock *left_mb = &mb[-1];
const uint8_t *mbsplits_left = vp8_mbsplits[left_mb->partitioning];
const uint8_t *mbsplits_top, *mbsplits_cur, *firstidx;
VP56mv *top_mv;
VP56mv *left_mv = left_mb->bmv;
VP56mv *cur_mv = mb->bmv;
if (!layout) // layout is inlined, s->mb_layout is not
top_mb = &mb[2];
else
top_mb = &mb[-s->mb_width - 1];
mbsplits_top = vp8_mbsplits[top_mb->partitioning];
top_mv = top_mb->bmv;
if (vp56_rac_get_prob_branchy(c, vp8_mbsplit_prob[0])) {
if (vp56_rac_get_prob_branchy(c, vp8_mbsplit_prob[1]))
part_idx = VP8_SPLITMVMODE_16x8 + vp56_rac_get_prob(c, vp8_mbsplit_prob[2]);
else
part_idx = VP8_SPLITMVMODE_8x8;
} else {
part_idx = VP8_SPLITMVMODE_4x4;
}
num = vp8_mbsplit_count[part_idx];
mbsplits_cur = vp8_mbsplits[part_idx],
firstidx = vp8_mbfirstidx[part_idx];
mb->partitioning = part_idx;
for (n = 0; n < num; n++) {
int k = firstidx[n];
uint32_t left, above;
const uint8_t *submv_prob;
if (!(k & 3))
left = AV_RN32A(&left_mv[mbsplits_left[k + 3]]);
else
left = AV_RN32A(&cur_mv[mbsplits_cur[k - 1]]);
if (k <= 3)
above = AV_RN32A(&top_mv[mbsplits_top[k + 12]]);
else
above = AV_RN32A(&cur_mv[mbsplits_cur[k - 4]]);
submv_prob = get_submv_prob(left, above, is_vp7);
if (vp56_rac_get_prob_branchy(c, submv_prob[0])) {
if (vp56_rac_get_prob_branchy(c, submv_prob[1])) {
if (vp56_rac_get_prob_branchy(c, submv_prob[2])) {
mb->bmv[n].y = mb->mv.y +
read_mv_component(c, s->prob->mvc[0], is_vp7);
mb->bmv[n].x = mb->mv.x +
read_mv_component(c, s->prob->mvc[1], is_vp7);
} else {
AV_ZERO32(&mb->bmv[n]);
}
} else {
AV_WN32A(&mb->bmv[n], above);
}
} else {
AV_WN32A(&mb->bmv[n], left);
}
}
return num;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/webp: Always set pix_fmt
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: 1434/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6314998085189632
Fixes: 1435/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6483783723253760
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Reviewed-by: "Ronald S. Bultje" <rsbultje@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 63,958
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SyncBackendHost::Initialize(
SyncFrontend* frontend,
const WeakHandle<JsEventHandler>& event_handler,
const GURL& sync_service_url,
syncable::ModelTypeSet initial_types,
const SyncCredentials& credentials,
bool delete_sync_data_folder,
UnrecoverableErrorHandler* unrecoverable_error_handler,
ReportUnrecoverableErrorFunction report_unrecoverable_error_function) {
if (!sync_thread_.Start())
return;
frontend_ = frontend;
DCHECK(frontend);
syncable::ModelTypeSet initial_types_with_nigori(initial_types);
CHECK(sync_prefs_.get());
if (sync_prefs_->HasSyncSetupCompleted()) {
initial_types_with_nigori.Put(syncable::NIGORI);
}
registrar_.reset(new SyncBackendRegistrar(initial_types_with_nigori,
name_,
profile_,
sync_thread_.message_loop()));
initialization_state_ = CREATING_SYNC_MANAGER;
InitCore(DoInitializeOptions(
sync_thread_.message_loop(),
registrar_.get(),
&extensions_activity_monitor_,
event_handler,
sync_service_url,
base::Bind(&MakeHttpBridgeFactory,
make_scoped_refptr(profile_->GetRequestContext())),
credentials,
&chrome_sync_notification_bridge_,
&sync_notifier_factory_,
delete_sync_data_folder,
sync_prefs_->GetEncryptionBootstrapToken(),
sync_api::SyncManager::NON_TEST,
unrecoverable_error_handler,
report_unrecoverable_error_function));
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 104,859
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xfs_vn_ci_lookup(
struct inode *dir,
struct dentry *dentry,
unsigned int flags)
{
struct xfs_inode *ip;
struct xfs_name xname;
struct xfs_name ci_name;
struct qstr dname;
int error;
if (dentry->d_name.len >= MAXNAMELEN)
return ERR_PTR(-ENAMETOOLONG);
xfs_dentry_to_name(&xname, dentry);
error = xfs_lookup(XFS_I(dir), &xname, &ip, &ci_name);
if (unlikely(error)) {
if (unlikely(error != -ENOENT))
return ERR_PTR(error);
/*
* call d_add(dentry, NULL) here when d_drop_negative_children
* is called in xfs_vn_mknod (ie. allow negative dentries
* with CI filesystems).
*/
return NULL;
}
/* if exact match, just splice and exit */
if (!ci_name.name)
return d_splice_alias(VFS_I(ip), dentry);
/* else case-insensitive match... */
dname.name = ci_name.name;
dname.len = ci_name.len;
dentry = d_add_ci(dentry, VFS_I(ip), &dname);
kmem_free(ci_name.name);
return dentry;
}
Commit Message: xfs: fix missing ILOCK unlock when xfs_setattr_nonsize fails due to EDQUOT
Benjamin Moody reported to Debian that XFS partially wedges when a chgrp
fails on account of being out of disk quota. I ran his reproducer
script:
# adduser dummy
# adduser dummy plugdev
# dd if=/dev/zero bs=1M count=100 of=test.img
# mkfs.xfs test.img
# mount -t xfs -o gquota test.img /mnt
# mkdir -p /mnt/dummy
# chown -c dummy /mnt/dummy
# xfs_quota -xc 'limit -g bsoft=100k bhard=100k plugdev' /mnt
(and then as user dummy)
$ dd if=/dev/urandom bs=1M count=50 of=/mnt/dummy/foo
$ chgrp plugdev /mnt/dummy/foo
and saw:
================================================
WARNING: lock held when returning to user space!
5.3.0-rc5 #rc5 Tainted: G W
------------------------------------------------
chgrp/47006 is leaving the kernel with locks still held!
1 lock held by chgrp/47006:
#0: 000000006664ea2d (&xfs_nondir_ilock_class){++++}, at: xfs_ilock+0xd2/0x290 [xfs]
...which is clearly caused by xfs_setattr_nonsize failing to unlock the
ILOCK after the xfs_qm_vop_chown_reserve call fails. Add the missing
unlock.
Reported-by: benjamin.moody@gmail.com
Fixes: 253f4911f297 ("xfs: better xfs_trans_alloc interface")
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 88,338
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void V8ValueConverterImpl::SetDateAllowed(bool val) {
date_allowed_ = val;
}
Commit Message: V8ValueConverter::ToV8Value should not trigger setters
BUG=606390
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1918793003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#390045}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 156,520
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GLvoid StubGLUniform1i(GLint location, GLint v) {
glUniform1i(location, v);
}
Commit Message: Add chromium_code: 1 to surface.gyp and gl.gyp to pick up -Werror.
It looks like this was dropped accidentally in http://codereview.chromium.org/6718027 (surface.gyp) and http://codereview.chromium.org/6722026 (gl.gyp)
Remove now-redudant code that's implied by chromium_code: 1.
Fix the warnings that have crept in since chromium_code: 1 was removed.
BUG=none
TEST=none
Committed: http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome?view=rev&revision=91598
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7227009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91813 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 99,602
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: XRecordQueryVersion(Display *dpy, int *cmajor_return, int *cminor_return)
{
XExtDisplayInfo *info = find_display (dpy);
register xRecordQueryVersionReq *req;
xRecordQueryVersionReply rep;
XRecordCheckExtension (dpy, info, False);
LockDisplay(dpy);
GetReq(RecordQueryVersion, req);
req->reqType = info->codes->major_opcode;
req->recordReqType = X_RecordQueryVersion;
req->majorVersion = RECORD_MAJOR_VERSION;
req->minorVersion = RECORD_MINOR_VERSION;
if (!_XReply(dpy,(xReply *)&rep, 0, True)) {
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return False;
}
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
*cmajor_return = rep.majorVersion;
*cminor_return = rep.minorVersion;
return ((rep.majorVersion == RECORD_MAJOR_VERSION) &&
(rep.minorVersion >= RECORD_LOWEST_MINOR_VERSION));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 8,266
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline u32 armv8pmu_pmcr_read(void)
{
u32 val;
asm volatile("mrs %0, pmcr_el0" : "=r" (val));
return val;
}
Commit Message: arm64: perf: reject groups spanning multiple HW PMUs
The perf core implicitly rejects events spanning multiple HW PMUs, as in
these cases the event->ctx will differ. However this validation is
performed after pmu::event_init() is called in perf_init_event(), and
thus pmu::event_init() may be called with a group leader from a
different HW PMU.
The ARM64 PMU driver does not take this fact into account, and when
validating groups assumes that it can call to_arm_pmu(event->pmu) for
any HW event. When the event in question is from another HW PMU this is
wrong, and results in dereferencing garbage.
This patch updates the ARM64 PMU driver to first test for and reject
events from other PMUs, moving the to_arm_pmu and related logic after
this test. Fixes a crash triggered by perf_fuzzer on Linux-4.0-rc2, with
a CCI PMU present:
Bad mode in Synchronous Abort handler detected, code 0x86000006 -- IABT (current EL)
CPU: 0 PID: 1371 Comm: perf_fuzzer Not tainted 3.19.0+ #249
Hardware name: V2F-1XV7 Cortex-A53x2 SMM (DT)
task: ffffffc07c73a280 ti: ffffffc07b0a0000 task.ti: ffffffc07b0a0000
PC is at 0x0
LR is at validate_event+0x90/0xa8
pc : [<0000000000000000>] lr : [<ffffffc000090228>] pstate: 00000145
sp : ffffffc07b0a3ba0
[< (null)>] (null)
[<ffffffc0000907d8>] armpmu_event_init+0x174/0x3cc
[<ffffffc00015d870>] perf_try_init_event+0x34/0x70
[<ffffffc000164094>] perf_init_event+0xe0/0x10c
[<ffffffc000164348>] perf_event_alloc+0x288/0x358
[<ffffffc000164c5c>] SyS_perf_event_open+0x464/0x98c
Code: bad PC value
Also cleans up the code to use the arm_pmu only when we know
that we are dealing with an arm pmu event.
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Peter Ziljstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K. Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 56,213
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void tg3_phy_eee_adjust(struct tg3 *tp, u32 current_link_up)
{
u32 val;
if (!(tp->phy_flags & TG3_PHYFLG_EEE_CAP))
return;
tp->setlpicnt = 0;
if (tp->link_config.autoneg == AUTONEG_ENABLE &&
current_link_up == 1 &&
tp->link_config.active_duplex == DUPLEX_FULL &&
(tp->link_config.active_speed == SPEED_100 ||
tp->link_config.active_speed == SPEED_1000)) {
u32 eeectl;
if (tp->link_config.active_speed == SPEED_1000)
eeectl = TG3_CPMU_EEE_CTRL_EXIT_16_5_US;
else
eeectl = TG3_CPMU_EEE_CTRL_EXIT_36_US;
tw32(TG3_CPMU_EEE_CTRL, eeectl);
tg3_phy_cl45_read(tp, MDIO_MMD_AN,
TG3_CL45_D7_EEERES_STAT, &val);
if (val == TG3_CL45_D7_EEERES_STAT_LP_1000T ||
val == TG3_CL45_D7_EEERES_STAT_LP_100TX)
tp->setlpicnt = 2;
}
if (!tp->setlpicnt) {
if (current_link_up == 1 &&
!tg3_phy_toggle_auxctl_smdsp(tp, true)) {
tg3_phydsp_write(tp, MII_TG3_DSP_TAP26, 0x0000);
tg3_phy_toggle_auxctl_smdsp(tp, false);
}
val = tr32(TG3_CPMU_EEE_MODE);
tw32(TG3_CPMU_EEE_MODE, val & ~TG3_CPMU_EEEMD_LPI_ENABLE);
}
}
Commit Message: tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <oded@privatecore.com>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matt Carlson <mcarlson@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 32,655
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void init_poll(int h)
{
int i;
ts[h].poll_count = 0;
ts[h].thread_id = -1;
ts[h].callback = NULL;
ts[h].cmd_callback = NULL;
for(i = 0; i < MAX_POLL; i++)
{
ts[h].ps[i].pfd.fd = -1;
ts[h].psi[i] = -1;
}
init_cmd_fd(h);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 158,909
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __always_inline vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(unsigned long *msr_bitmap,
u32 msr, int type)
{
int f = sizeof(unsigned long);
if (!cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap())
return;
if (static_branch_unlikely(&enable_evmcs))
evmcs_touch_msr_bitmap();
/*
* See Intel PRM Vol. 3, 20.6.9 (MSR-Bitmap Address). Early manuals
* have the write-low and read-high bitmap offsets the wrong way round.
* We can control MSRs 0x00000000-0x00001fff and 0xc0000000-0xc0001fff.
*/
if (msr <= 0x1fff) {
if (type & MSR_TYPE_R)
/* read-low */
__set_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x000 / f);
if (type & MSR_TYPE_W)
/* write-low */
__set_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x800 / f);
} else if ((msr >= 0xc0000000) && (msr <= 0xc0001fff)) {
msr &= 0x1fff;
if (type & MSR_TYPE_R)
/* read-high */
__set_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x400 / f);
if (type & MSR_TYPE_W)
/* write-high */
__set_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0xc00 / f);
}
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Enforce cpl=0 for VMX instructions
VMX instructions executed inside a L1 VM will always trigger a VM exit
even when executed with cpl 3. This means we must perform the
privilege check in software.
Fixes: 70f3aac964ae("kvm: nVMX: Remove superfluous VMX instruction fault checks")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Felix Wilhelm <fwilhelm@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 81,031
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static uint64_t mptsas_diag_read(void *opaque, hwaddr addr,
unsigned size)
{
MPTSASState *s = opaque;
trace_mptsas_diag_read(s, addr, 0);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 8,355
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void open_init(int count)
{
open_count = count;
open_unlimited = count == -1;
}
Commit Message: unsquashfs-4: Add more sanity checks + fix CVE-2015-4645/6
Add more filesystem table sanity checks to Unsquashfs-4 and
also properly fix CVE-2015-4645 and CVE-2015-4646.
The CVEs were raised due to Unsquashfs having variable
oveflow and stack overflow in a number of vulnerable
functions.
The suggested patch only "fixed" one such function and fixed
it badly, and so it was buggy and introduced extra bugs!
The suggested patch was not only buggy, but, it used the
essentially wrong approach too. It was "fixing" the
symptom but not the cause. The symptom is wrong values
causing overflow, the cause is filesystem corruption.
This corruption should be detected and the filesystem
rejected *before* trying to allocate memory.
This patch applies the following fixes:
1. The filesystem super-block tables are checked, and the values
must match across the filesystem.
This will trap corrupted filesystems created by Mksquashfs.
2. The maximum (theorectical) size the filesystem tables could grow
to, were analysed, and some variables were increased from int to
long long.
This analysis has been added as comments.
3. Stack allocation was removed, and a shared buffer (which is
checked and increased as necessary) is used to read the
table indexes.
Signed-off-by: Phillip Lougher <phillip@squashfs.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 74,279
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int prctl_set_vma(unsigned long opt, unsigned long start,
unsigned long len_in, unsigned long arg)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
int error;
unsigned long len;
unsigned long end;
if (start & ~PAGE_MASK)
return -EINVAL;
len = (len_in + ~PAGE_MASK) & PAGE_MASK;
/* Check to see whether len was rounded up from small -ve to zero */
if (len_in && !len)
return -EINVAL;
end = start + len;
if (end < start)
return -EINVAL;
if (end == start)
return 0;
down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
switch (opt) {
case PR_SET_VMA_ANON_NAME:
error = prctl_set_vma_anon_name(start, end, arg);
break;
default:
error = -EINVAL;
}
up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
return error;
}
Commit Message: mm: fix prctl_set_vma_anon_name
prctl_set_vma_anon_name could attempt to set the name across
two vmas at the same time due to a typo, which might corrupt
the vma list. Fix it to use tmp instead of end to limit
the name setting to a single vma at a time.
Change-Id: Ie32d8ddb0fd547efbeedd6528acdab5ca5b308b4
Reported-by: Jed Davis <jld@mozilla.com>
Signed-off-by: Colin Cross <ccross@android.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 162,060
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftFlacEncoder::configureEncoder() {
ALOGV("SoftFlacEncoder::configureEncoder() numChannel=%d, sampleRate=%d",
mNumChannels, mSampleRate);
if (mSignalledError || (mFlacStreamEncoder == NULL)) {
ALOGE("can't configure encoder: no encoder or invalid state");
return OMX_ErrorInvalidState;
}
FLAC__bool ok = true;
ok = ok && FLAC__stream_encoder_set_channels(mFlacStreamEncoder, mNumChannels);
ok = ok && FLAC__stream_encoder_set_sample_rate(mFlacStreamEncoder, mSampleRate);
ok = ok && FLAC__stream_encoder_set_bits_per_sample(mFlacStreamEncoder, 16);
ok = ok && FLAC__stream_encoder_set_compression_level(mFlacStreamEncoder,
(unsigned)mCompressionLevel);
ok = ok && FLAC__stream_encoder_set_verify(mFlacStreamEncoder, false);
if (!ok) { goto return_result; }
ok &= FLAC__STREAM_ENCODER_INIT_STATUS_OK ==
FLAC__stream_encoder_init_stream(mFlacStreamEncoder,
flacEncoderWriteCallback /*write_callback*/,
NULL /*seek_callback*/,
NULL /*tell_callback*/,
NULL /*metadata_callback*/,
(void *) this /*client_data*/);
return_result:
if (ok) {
ALOGV("encoder successfully configured");
return OMX_ErrorNone;
} else {
ALOGE("unknown error when configuring encoder");
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 163,977
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool needInterchangeNewlineAfter(const VisiblePosition& v)
{
VisiblePosition next = v.next();
Node* upstreamNode = next.deepEquivalent().upstream().deprecatedNode();
Node* downstreamNode = v.deepEquivalent().downstream().deprecatedNode();
return isEndOfParagraph(v) && isStartOfParagraph(next) && !(upstreamNode->hasTagName(brTag) && upstreamNode == downstreamNode);
}
Commit Message: There are too many poorly named functions to create a fragment from markup
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87339
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Source/WebCore:
Moved all functions that create a fragment from markup to markup.h/cpp.
There should be no behavioral change.
* dom/Range.cpp:
(WebCore::Range::createContextualFragment):
* dom/Range.h: Removed createDocumentFragmentForElement.
* dom/ShadowRoot.cpp:
(WebCore::ShadowRoot::setInnerHTML):
* editing/markup.cpp:
(WebCore::createFragmentFromMarkup):
(WebCore::createFragmentForInnerOuterHTML): Renamed from createFragmentFromSource.
(WebCore::createFragmentForTransformToFragment): Moved from XSLTProcessor.
(WebCore::removeElementPreservingChildren): Moved from Range.
(WebCore::createContextualFragment): Ditto.
* editing/markup.h:
* html/HTMLElement.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setInnerHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setOuterHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML):
* inspector/DOMPatchSupport.cpp:
(WebCore::DOMPatchSupport::patchNode): Added a FIXME since this code should be using
one of the functions listed in markup.h
* xml/XSLTProcessor.cpp:
(WebCore::XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment):
Source/WebKit/qt:
Replace calls to Range::createDocumentFragmentForElement by calls to
createContextualDocumentFragment.
* Api/qwebelement.cpp:
(QWebElement::appendInside):
(QWebElement::prependInside):
(QWebElement::prependOutside):
(QWebElement::appendOutside):
(QWebElement::encloseContentsWith):
(QWebElement::encloseWith):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118414 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 100,333
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void put_ldops(struct tty_ldisc_ops *ldops)
{
unsigned long flags;
raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&tty_ldiscs_lock, flags);
ldops->refcount--;
module_put(ldops->owner);
raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tty_ldiscs_lock, flags);
}
Commit Message: tty: Prevent ldisc drivers from re-using stale tty fields
Line discipline drivers may mistakenly misuse ldisc-related fields
when initializing. For example, a failure to initialize tty->receive_room
in the N_GIGASET_M101 line discipline was recently found and fixed [1].
Now, the N_X25 line discipline has been discovered accessing the previous
line discipline's already-freed private data [2].
Harden the ldisc interface against misuse by initializing revelant
tty fields before instancing the new line discipline.
[1]
commit fd98e9419d8d622a4de91f76b306af6aa627aa9c
Author: Tilman Schmidt <tilman@imap.cc>
Date: Tue Jul 14 00:37:13 2015 +0200
isdn/gigaset: reset tty->receive_room when attaching ser_gigaset
[2] Report from Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
[ 634.336761] ==================================================================
[ 634.338226] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in x25_asy_open_tty+0x13d/0x490 at addr ffff8800a743efd0
[ 634.339558] Read of size 4 by task syzkaller_execu/8981
[ 634.340359] =============================================================================
[ 634.341598] BUG kmalloc-512 (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
...
[ 634.405018] Call Trace:
[ 634.405277] dump_stack (lib/dump_stack.c:52)
[ 634.405775] print_trailer (mm/slub.c:655)
[ 634.406361] object_err (mm/slub.c:662)
[ 634.406824] kasan_report_error (mm/kasan/report.c:138 mm/kasan/report.c:236)
[ 634.409581] __asan_report_load4_noabort (mm/kasan/report.c:279)
[ 634.411355] x25_asy_open_tty (drivers/net/wan/x25_asy.c:559 (discriminator 1))
[ 634.413997] tty_ldisc_open.isra.2 (drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:447)
[ 634.414549] tty_set_ldisc (drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:567)
[ 634.415057] tty_ioctl (drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2646 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2879)
[ 634.423524] do_vfs_ioctl (fs/ioctl.c:43 fs/ioctl.c:607)
[ 634.427491] SyS_ioctl (fs/ioctl.c:622 fs/ioctl.c:613)
[ 634.427945] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:188)
Cc: Tilman Schmidt <tilman@imap.cc>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 55,985
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void opj_pi_update_decode_poc (opj_pi_iterator_t * p_pi,
opj_tcp_t * p_tcp,
OPJ_UINT32 p_max_precision,
OPJ_UINT32 p_max_res)
{
/* loop*/
OPJ_UINT32 pino;
/* encoding prameters to set*/
OPJ_UINT32 l_bound;
opj_pi_iterator_t * l_current_pi = 00;
opj_poc_t* l_current_poc = 0;
OPJ_ARG_NOT_USED(p_max_res);
/* preconditions in debug*/
assert(p_pi != 00);
assert(p_tcp != 00);
/* initializations*/
l_bound = p_tcp->numpocs+1;
l_current_pi = p_pi;
l_current_poc = p_tcp->pocs;
for (pino = 0;pino<l_bound;++pino) {
l_current_pi->poc.prg = l_current_poc->prg; /* Progression Order #0 */
l_current_pi->first = 1;
l_current_pi->poc.resno0 = l_current_poc->resno0; /* Resolution Level Index #0 (Start) */
l_current_pi->poc.compno0 = l_current_poc->compno0; /* Component Index #0 (Start) */
l_current_pi->poc.layno0 = 0;
l_current_pi->poc.precno0 = 0;
l_current_pi->poc.resno1 = l_current_poc->resno1; /* Resolution Level Index #0 (End) */
l_current_pi->poc.compno1 = l_current_poc->compno1; /* Component Index #0 (End) */
l_current_pi->poc.layno1 = l_current_poc->layno1; /* Layer Index #0 (End) */
l_current_pi->poc.precno1 = p_max_precision;
++l_current_pi;
++l_current_poc;
}
}
Commit Message: [trunk] fixed a buffer overflow in opj_tcd_init_decode_tile
Update issue 431
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 97,078
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void *tq_pop(struct thread_q *tq, const struct timespec *abstime)
{
struct tq_ent *ent;
void *rval = NULL;
int rc;
mutex_lock(&tq->mutex);
if (!list_empty(&tq->q))
goto pop;
if (abstime)
rc = pthread_cond_timedwait(&tq->cond, &tq->mutex, abstime);
else
rc = pthread_cond_wait(&tq->cond, &tq->mutex);
if (rc)
goto out;
if (list_empty(&tq->q))
goto out;
pop:
ent = list_entry(tq->q.next, struct tq_ent*, q_node);
rval = ent->data;
list_del(&ent->q_node);
free(ent);
out:
mutex_unlock(&tq->mutex);
return rval;
}
Commit Message: stratum: parse_notify(): Don't die on malformed bbversion/prev_hash/nbit/ntime.
Might have introduced a memory leak, don't have time to check. :(
Should the other hex2bin()'s be checked?
Thanks to Mick Ayzenberg <mick.dejavusecurity.com> for finding this.
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 36,644
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int usb_parse_configuration(struct usb_device *dev, int cfgidx,
struct usb_host_config *config, unsigned char *buffer, int size)
{
struct device *ddev = &dev->dev;
unsigned char *buffer0 = buffer;
int cfgno;
int nintf, nintf_orig;
int i, j, n;
struct usb_interface_cache *intfc;
unsigned char *buffer2;
int size2;
struct usb_descriptor_header *header;
int len, retval;
u8 inums[USB_MAXINTERFACES], nalts[USB_MAXINTERFACES];
unsigned iad_num = 0;
memcpy(&config->desc, buffer, USB_DT_CONFIG_SIZE);
if (config->desc.bDescriptorType != USB_DT_CONFIG ||
config->desc.bLength < USB_DT_CONFIG_SIZE ||
config->desc.bLength > size) {
dev_err(ddev, "invalid descriptor for config index %d: "
"type = 0x%X, length = %d\n", cfgidx,
config->desc.bDescriptorType, config->desc.bLength);
return -EINVAL;
}
cfgno = config->desc.bConfigurationValue;
buffer += config->desc.bLength;
size -= config->desc.bLength;
nintf = nintf_orig = config->desc.bNumInterfaces;
if (nintf > USB_MAXINTERFACES) {
dev_warn(ddev, "config %d has too many interfaces: %d, "
"using maximum allowed: %d\n",
cfgno, nintf, USB_MAXINTERFACES);
nintf = USB_MAXINTERFACES;
}
/* Go through the descriptors, checking their length and counting the
* number of altsettings for each interface */
n = 0;
for ((buffer2 = buffer, size2 = size);
size2 > 0;
(buffer2 += header->bLength, size2 -= header->bLength)) {
if (size2 < sizeof(struct usb_descriptor_header)) {
dev_warn(ddev, "config %d descriptor has %d excess "
"byte%s, ignoring\n",
cfgno, size2, plural(size2));
break;
}
header = (struct usb_descriptor_header *) buffer2;
if ((header->bLength > size2) || (header->bLength < 2)) {
dev_warn(ddev, "config %d has an invalid descriptor "
"of length %d, skipping remainder of the config\n",
cfgno, header->bLength);
break;
}
if (header->bDescriptorType == USB_DT_INTERFACE) {
struct usb_interface_descriptor *d;
int inum;
d = (struct usb_interface_descriptor *) header;
if (d->bLength < USB_DT_INTERFACE_SIZE) {
dev_warn(ddev, "config %d has an invalid "
"interface descriptor of length %d, "
"skipping\n", cfgno, d->bLength);
continue;
}
inum = d->bInterfaceNumber;
if ((dev->quirks & USB_QUIRK_HONOR_BNUMINTERFACES) &&
n >= nintf_orig) {
dev_warn(ddev, "config %d has more interface "
"descriptors, than it declares in "
"bNumInterfaces, ignoring interface "
"number: %d\n", cfgno, inum);
continue;
}
if (inum >= nintf_orig)
dev_warn(ddev, "config %d has an invalid "
"interface number: %d but max is %d\n",
cfgno, inum, nintf_orig - 1);
/* Have we already encountered this interface?
* Count its altsettings */
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
if (inums[i] == inum)
break;
}
if (i < n) {
if (nalts[i] < 255)
++nalts[i];
} else if (n < USB_MAXINTERFACES) {
inums[n] = inum;
nalts[n] = 1;
++n;
}
} else if (header->bDescriptorType ==
USB_DT_INTERFACE_ASSOCIATION) {
struct usb_interface_assoc_descriptor *d;
d = (struct usb_interface_assoc_descriptor *)header;
if (d->bLength < USB_DT_INTERFACE_ASSOCIATION_SIZE) {
dev_warn(ddev,
"config %d has an invalid interface association descriptor of length %d, skipping\n",
cfgno, d->bLength);
continue;
}
if (iad_num == USB_MAXIADS) {
dev_warn(ddev, "found more Interface "
"Association Descriptors "
"than allocated for in "
"configuration %d\n", cfgno);
} else {
config->intf_assoc[iad_num] = d;
iad_num++;
}
} else if (header->bDescriptorType == USB_DT_DEVICE ||
header->bDescriptorType == USB_DT_CONFIG)
dev_warn(ddev, "config %d contains an unexpected "
"descriptor of type 0x%X, skipping\n",
cfgno, header->bDescriptorType);
} /* for ((buffer2 = buffer, size2 = size); ...) */
size = buffer2 - buffer;
config->desc.wTotalLength = cpu_to_le16(buffer2 - buffer0);
if (n != nintf)
dev_warn(ddev, "config %d has %d interface%s, different from "
"the descriptor's value: %d\n",
cfgno, n, plural(n), nintf_orig);
else if (n == 0)
dev_warn(ddev, "config %d has no interfaces?\n", cfgno);
config->desc.bNumInterfaces = nintf = n;
/* Check for missing interface numbers */
for (i = 0; i < nintf; ++i) {
for (j = 0; j < nintf; ++j) {
if (inums[j] == i)
break;
}
if (j >= nintf)
dev_warn(ddev, "config %d has no interface number "
"%d\n", cfgno, i);
}
/* Allocate the usb_interface_caches and altsetting arrays */
for (i = 0; i < nintf; ++i) {
j = nalts[i];
if (j > USB_MAXALTSETTING) {
dev_warn(ddev, "too many alternate settings for "
"config %d interface %d: %d, "
"using maximum allowed: %d\n",
cfgno, inums[i], j, USB_MAXALTSETTING);
nalts[i] = j = USB_MAXALTSETTING;
}
len = sizeof(*intfc) + sizeof(struct usb_host_interface) * j;
config->intf_cache[i] = intfc = kzalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!intfc)
return -ENOMEM;
kref_init(&intfc->ref);
}
/* FIXME: parse the BOS descriptor */
/* Skip over any Class Specific or Vendor Specific descriptors;
* find the first interface descriptor */
config->extra = buffer;
i = find_next_descriptor(buffer, size, USB_DT_INTERFACE,
USB_DT_INTERFACE, &n);
config->extralen = i;
if (n > 0)
dev_dbg(ddev, "skipped %d descriptor%s after %s\n",
n, plural(n), "configuration");
buffer += i;
size -= i;
/* Parse all the interface/altsetting descriptors */
while (size > 0) {
retval = usb_parse_interface(ddev, cfgno, config,
buffer, size, inums, nalts);
if (retval < 0)
return retval;
buffer += retval;
size -= retval;
}
/* Check for missing altsettings */
for (i = 0; i < nintf; ++i) {
intfc = config->intf_cache[i];
for (j = 0; j < intfc->num_altsetting; ++j) {
for (n = 0; n < intfc->num_altsetting; ++n) {
if (intfc->altsetting[n].desc.
bAlternateSetting == j)
break;
}
if (n >= intfc->num_altsetting)
dev_warn(ddev, "config %d interface %d has no "
"altsetting %d\n", cfgno, inums[i], j);
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: USB: core: fix out-of-bounds access bug in usb_get_bos_descriptor()
Andrey used the syzkaller fuzzer to find an out-of-bounds memory
access in usb_get_bos_descriptor(). The code wasn't checking that the
next usb_dev_cap_header structure could fit into the remaining buffer
space.
This patch fixes the error and also reduces the bNumDeviceCaps field
in the header to match the actual number of capabilities found, in
cases where there are fewer than expected.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 59,747
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: IW_IMPL(void) iw_set_resize_alg(struct iw_context *ctx, int dimension, int family,
double blur, double param1, double param2)
{
struct iw_resize_settings *rs;
if(dimension<0 || dimension>1) dimension=0;
rs=&ctx->resize_settings[dimension];
rs->family = family;
rs->blur_factor = blur;
rs->param1 = param1;
rs->param2 = param2;
}
Commit Message: Double-check that the input image's density is valid
Fixes a bug that could result in division by zero, at least for a JPEG
source image.
Fixes issues #19, #20
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 65,010
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: unix_sck_send_conn(hsm_com_client_hdl_t *hdl, int timeout)
{
hsm_com_con_data_t msg;
memset(&msg,0,sizeof(msg));
msg.header.cmd = HSM_COM_CMD_CONN;
msg.header.ver = HSM_COM_VER;
msg.header.trans_id = hdl->trans_id++;
msg.header.payload_len = sizeof(msg.key);
msg.key = HSM_COM_KEY;
if(unix_sck_send_msg(hdl, (char*)&msg, sizeof(msg), (char*)&msg,
sizeof(msg), timeout) != sizeof(msg))
{
close(hdl->client_fd);
hdl->client_state = HSM_COM_C_STATE_IN;
return HSM_COM_BAD;
}
if(msg.header.resp_code == HSM_COM_RESP_OK){
return HSM_COM_OK;
}
return HSM_COM_BAD;
}
Commit Message: Fix scripts and code that use well-known tmp files.
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 96,224
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void vcbprintf(
vcbprintf_callback user_callback, //!< Unknown
void *user_data, //!< Unknown
const char *fmt, //!< The format specified
va_list argp //!< List of parameter values
) {
char buf[32];
while (*fmt) {
if (*fmt == '%') {
fmt++;
char fmtChar = *fmt++;
switch (fmtChar) {
case '0':
case '1':
case '2':
case '3':
case '4':
case '5':
case '6':
case '7':
case '8':
case '9':
{
const char *pad = " ";
if (fmtChar=='0') {
pad = "0";
fmtChar = *fmt++;
}
int digits = fmtChar - '0';
int v = va_arg(argp, int);
if (*fmt=='x') itostr_extra(v, buf, false, 16);
else { assert('d' == *fmt); itostr(v, buf, 10); }
fmt++; // skip over 'd'
int len = (int)strlen(buf);
while (len < digits) {
user_callback(pad,user_data);
len++;
}
user_callback(buf,user_data);
break;
}
case 'd': itostr(va_arg(argp, int), buf, 10); user_callback(buf,user_data); break;
case 'x': itostr_extra(va_arg(argp, int), buf, false, 16); user_callback(buf,user_data); break;
case 'L': {
unsigned int rad = 10;
bool signedVal = true;
if (*fmt=='x') { rad=16; fmt++; signedVal = false; }
itostr_extra(va_arg(argp, JsVarInt), buf, signedVal, rad); user_callback(buf,user_data);
} break;
case 'f': ftoa_bounded(va_arg(argp, JsVarFloat), buf, sizeof(buf)); user_callback(buf,user_data); break;
case 's': user_callback(va_arg(argp, char *), user_data); break;
case 'c': buf[0]=(char)va_arg(argp, int/*char*/);buf[1]=0; user_callback(buf, user_data); break;
case 'q':
case 'v': {
bool quoted = fmtChar=='q';
if (quoted) user_callback("\"",user_data);
JsVar *v = jsvAsString(va_arg(argp, JsVar*), false/*no unlock*/);
buf[1] = 0;
if (jsvIsString(v)) {
JsvStringIterator it;
jsvStringIteratorNew(&it, v, 0);
while (jsvStringIteratorHasChar(&it)) {
buf[0] = jsvStringIteratorGetChar(&it);
if (quoted) {
user_callback(escapeCharacter(buf[0]), user_data);
} else {
user_callback(buf,user_data);
}
jsvStringIteratorNext(&it);
}
jsvStringIteratorFree(&it);
jsvUnLock(v);
}
if (quoted) user_callback("\"",user_data);
} break;
case 'j': {
JsVar *v = va_arg(argp, JsVar*);
jsfGetJSONWithCallback(v, JSON_SOME_NEWLINES | JSON_PRETTY | JSON_SHOW_DEVICES, 0, user_callback, user_data);
break;
}
case 't': {
JsVar *v = va_arg(argp, JsVar*);
const char *n = jsvIsNull(v)?"null":jswGetBasicObjectName(v);
if (!n) n = jsvGetTypeOf(v);
user_callback(n, user_data);
break;
}
case 'p': jshGetPinString(buf, (Pin)va_arg(argp, int/*Pin*/)); user_callback(buf, user_data); break;
default: assert(0); return; // eep
}
} else {
buf[0] = *(fmt++);
buf[1] = 0;
user_callback(&buf[0], user_data);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fix stack size detection on Linux (fix #1427)
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 82,624
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int irda_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, unsigned int optlen)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct irda_sock *self = irda_sk(sk);
struct irda_ias_set *ias_opt;
struct ias_object *ias_obj;
struct ias_attrib * ias_attr; /* Attribute in IAS object */
int opt, free_ias = 0, err = 0;
pr_debug("%s(%p)\n", __func__, self);
if (level != SOL_IRLMP)
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
lock_sock(sk);
switch (optname) {
case IRLMP_IAS_SET:
/* The user want to add an attribute to an existing IAS object
* (in the IAS database) or to create a new object with this
* attribute.
* We first query IAS to know if the object exist, and then
* create the right attribute...
*/
if (optlen != sizeof(struct irda_ias_set)) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
ias_opt = kmalloc(sizeof(struct irda_ias_set), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (ias_opt == NULL) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
/* Copy query to the driver. */
if (copy_from_user(ias_opt, optval, optlen)) {
kfree(ias_opt);
err = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
/* Find the object we target.
* If the user gives us an empty string, we use the object
* associated with this socket. This will workaround
* duplicated class name - Jean II */
if(ias_opt->irda_class_name[0] == '\0') {
if(self->ias_obj == NULL) {
kfree(ias_opt);
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
ias_obj = self->ias_obj;
} else
ias_obj = irias_find_object(ias_opt->irda_class_name);
/* Only ROOT can mess with the global IAS database.
* Users can only add attributes to the object associated
* with the socket they own - Jean II */
if((!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) &&
((ias_obj == NULL) || (ias_obj != self->ias_obj))) {
kfree(ias_opt);
err = -EPERM;
goto out;
}
/* If the object doesn't exist, create it */
if(ias_obj == (struct ias_object *) NULL) {
/* Create a new object */
ias_obj = irias_new_object(ias_opt->irda_class_name,
jiffies);
if (ias_obj == NULL) {
kfree(ias_opt);
err = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
free_ias = 1;
}
/* Do we have the attribute already ? */
if(irias_find_attrib(ias_obj, ias_opt->irda_attrib_name)) {
kfree(ias_opt);
if (free_ias) {
kfree(ias_obj->name);
kfree(ias_obj);
}
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
/* Look at the type */
switch(ias_opt->irda_attrib_type) {
case IAS_INTEGER:
/* Add an integer attribute */
irias_add_integer_attrib(
ias_obj,
ias_opt->irda_attrib_name,
ias_opt->attribute.irda_attrib_int,
IAS_USER_ATTR);
break;
case IAS_OCT_SEQ:
/* Check length */
if(ias_opt->attribute.irda_attrib_octet_seq.len >
IAS_MAX_OCTET_STRING) {
kfree(ias_opt);
if (free_ias) {
kfree(ias_obj->name);
kfree(ias_obj);
}
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
/* Add an octet sequence attribute */
irias_add_octseq_attrib(
ias_obj,
ias_opt->irda_attrib_name,
ias_opt->attribute.irda_attrib_octet_seq.octet_seq,
ias_opt->attribute.irda_attrib_octet_seq.len,
IAS_USER_ATTR);
break;
case IAS_STRING:
/* Should check charset & co */
/* Check length */
/* The length is encoded in a __u8, and
* IAS_MAX_STRING == 256, so there is no way
* userspace can pass us a string too large.
* Jean II */
/* NULL terminate the string (avoid troubles) */
ias_opt->attribute.irda_attrib_string.string[ias_opt->attribute.irda_attrib_string.len] = '\0';
/* Add a string attribute */
irias_add_string_attrib(
ias_obj,
ias_opt->irda_attrib_name,
ias_opt->attribute.irda_attrib_string.string,
IAS_USER_ATTR);
break;
default :
kfree(ias_opt);
if (free_ias) {
kfree(ias_obj->name);
kfree(ias_obj);
}
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
irias_insert_object(ias_obj);
kfree(ias_opt);
break;
case IRLMP_IAS_DEL:
/* The user want to delete an object from our local IAS
* database. We just need to query the IAS, check is the
* object is not owned by the kernel and delete it.
*/
if (optlen != sizeof(struct irda_ias_set)) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
ias_opt = kmalloc(sizeof(struct irda_ias_set), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (ias_opt == NULL) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
/* Copy query to the driver. */
if (copy_from_user(ias_opt, optval, optlen)) {
kfree(ias_opt);
err = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
/* Find the object we target.
* If the user gives us an empty string, we use the object
* associated with this socket. This will workaround
* duplicated class name - Jean II */
if(ias_opt->irda_class_name[0] == '\0')
ias_obj = self->ias_obj;
else
ias_obj = irias_find_object(ias_opt->irda_class_name);
if(ias_obj == (struct ias_object *) NULL) {
kfree(ias_opt);
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
/* Only ROOT can mess with the global IAS database.
* Users can only del attributes from the object associated
* with the socket they own - Jean II */
if((!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) &&
((ias_obj == NULL) || (ias_obj != self->ias_obj))) {
kfree(ias_opt);
err = -EPERM;
goto out;
}
/* Find the attribute (in the object) we target */
ias_attr = irias_find_attrib(ias_obj,
ias_opt->irda_attrib_name);
if(ias_attr == (struct ias_attrib *) NULL) {
kfree(ias_opt);
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
/* Check is the user space own the object */
if(ias_attr->value->owner != IAS_USER_ATTR) {
pr_debug("%s(), attempting to delete a kernel attribute\n",
__func__);
kfree(ias_opt);
err = -EPERM;
goto out;
}
/* Remove the attribute (and maybe the object) */
irias_delete_attrib(ias_obj, ias_attr, 1);
kfree(ias_opt);
break;
case IRLMP_MAX_SDU_SIZE:
if (optlen < sizeof(int)) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if (get_user(opt, (int __user *)optval)) {
err = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
/* Only possible for a seqpacket service (TTP with SAR) */
if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_SEQPACKET) {
pr_debug("%s(), setting max_sdu_size = %d\n",
__func__, opt);
self->max_sdu_size_rx = opt;
} else {
net_warn_ratelimited("%s: not allowed to set MAXSDUSIZE for this socket type!\n",
__func__);
err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
goto out;
}
break;
case IRLMP_HINTS_SET:
if (optlen < sizeof(int)) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
/* The input is really a (__u8 hints[2]), easier as an int */
if (get_user(opt, (int __user *)optval)) {
err = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
/* Unregister any old registration */
irlmp_unregister_service(self->skey);
self->skey = irlmp_register_service((__u16) opt);
break;
case IRLMP_HINT_MASK_SET:
/* As opposed to the previous case which set the hint bits
* that we advertise, this one set the filter we use when
* making a discovery (nodes which don't match any hint
* bit in the mask are not reported).
*/
if (optlen < sizeof(int)) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
/* The input is really a (__u8 hints[2]), easier as an int */
if (get_user(opt, (int __user *)optval)) {
err = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
/* Set the new hint mask */
self->mask.word = (__u16) opt;
/* Mask out extension bits */
self->mask.word &= 0x7f7f;
/* Check if no bits */
if(!self->mask.word)
self->mask.word = 0xFFFF;
break;
default:
err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
break;
}
out:
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
Commit Message: net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument
郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:
int socket_fd;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
addr.sin_port = 0;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
addr.sin_family = 10;
socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
connect(socket_fd , &addr,16);
AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
store a zero in the protocol fields.
This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
is NULL for raw sockets.
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: [<ffffffff816db90e>] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
kernel: [<ffffffff816db9a4>] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff81645069>] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
kernel: [<ffffffff810ac51b>] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff810236d8>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
kernel: [<ffffffff81645e0e>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
kernel: [<ffffffff81779515>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89
I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.
CVE: CVE-2015-8543
Cc: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
Reported-by: 郭永刚 <guoyonggang@360.cn>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 41,600
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ChromeServiceWorkerTest() {
EXPECT_TRUE(service_worker_dir_.CreateUniqueTempDir());
EXPECT_TRUE(base::CreateDirectoryAndGetError(
service_worker_dir_.GetPath().Append(
FILE_PATH_LITERAL("scope")), nullptr));
}
Commit Message: Skip Service workers in requests for mime handler plugins
BUG=808838
TEST=./browser_tests --gtest_filter=*/ServiceWorkerTest.MimeHandlerView*
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_mojo
Change-Id: I82e75c200091babbab648a04232db47e2938d914
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/914150
Commit-Queue: Rob Wu <rob@robwu.nl>
Reviewed-by: Istiaque Ahmed <lazyboy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Falkenhagen <falken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#537386}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 147,418
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline u16 evmcs_read16(unsigned long field) { return 0; }
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Enforce cpl=0 for VMX instructions
VMX instructions executed inside a L1 VM will always trigger a VM exit
even when executed with cpl 3. This means we must perform the
privilege check in software.
Fixes: 70f3aac964ae("kvm: nVMX: Remove superfluous VMX instruction fault checks")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Felix Wilhelm <fwilhelm@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 80,929
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool AccessibilityUIElement::isAttributeSettable(JSStringRef attribute)
{
return false;
}
Commit Message: [GTK][WTR] Implement AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=102951
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
Implement AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue in the ATK backend
in the same manner it is implemented in DumpRenderTree.
* WebKitTestRunner/InjectedBundle/atk/AccessibilityUIElementAtk.cpp:
(WTR::replaceCharactersForResults):
(WTR):
(WTR::AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@135485 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 106,364
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int gx_ttfReader__Tell(ttfReader *self)
{
gx_ttfReader *r = (gx_ttfReader *)self;
return r->pos;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 5,525
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool LocalFrame::ShouldReuseDefaultView(const KURL& url) const {
if (!Loader().StateMachine()->IsDisplayingInitialEmptyDocument())
return false;
return GetDocument()->IsSecureTransitionTo(url);
}
Commit Message: Prevent sandboxed documents from reusing the default window
Bug: 377995
Change-Id: Iff66c6d214dfd0cb7ea9c80f83afeedfff703541
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/983558
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567663}
CWE ID: CWE-285
| 1
| 173,196
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int proxy_ioc_getversion(FsContext *fs_ctx, V9fsPath *path,
mode_t st_mode, uint64_t *st_gen)
{
int err;
/* Do not try to open special files like device nodes, fifos etc
* we can get fd for regular files and directories only
*/
if (!S_ISREG(st_mode) && !S_ISDIR(st_mode)) {
errno = ENOTTY;
return -1;
}
err = v9fs_request(fs_ctx->private, T_GETVERSION, st_gen, path);
if (err < 0) {
errno = -err;
err = -1;
}
return err;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 7,631
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void voidMethodLongArgOptionalLongArgOptionalLongArgMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::voidMethodLongArgOptionalLongArgOptionalLongArgMethod(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 122,839
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MODRET set_useftpusers(cmd_rec *cmd) {
int bool = -1;
config_rec *c = NULL;
CHECK_ARGS(cmd, 1);
CHECK_CONF(cmd, CONF_ROOT|CONF_VIRTUAL|CONF_GLOBAL|CONF_ANON);
bool = get_boolean(cmd, 1);
if (bool == -1)
CONF_ERROR(cmd, "expected Boolean parameter");
c = add_config_param(cmd->argv[0], 1, NULL);
c->argv[0] = pcalloc(c->pool, sizeof(unsigned char));
*((unsigned char *) c->argv[0]) = bool;
c->flags |= CF_MERGEDOWN;
return PR_HANDLED(cmd);
}
Commit Message: Walk the entire DefaultRoot path, checking for symlinks of any component,
when AllowChrootSymlinks is disabled.
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 67,627
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int lrw_decrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc, struct scatterlist *dst,
struct scatterlist *src, unsigned int nbytes)
{
struct serpent_lrw_ctx *ctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
be128 buf[SERPENT_AVX2_PARALLEL_BLOCKS];
struct crypt_priv crypt_ctx = {
.ctx = &ctx->serpent_ctx,
.fpu_enabled = false,
};
struct lrw_crypt_req req = {
.tbuf = buf,
.tbuflen = sizeof(buf),
.table_ctx = &ctx->lrw_table,
.crypt_ctx = &crypt_ctx,
.crypt_fn = decrypt_callback,
};
int ret;
desc->flags &= ~CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
ret = lrw_crypt(desc, dst, src, nbytes, &req);
serpent_fpu_end(crypt_ctx.fpu_enabled);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 46,996
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void red_channel_client_pipe_add(RedChannelClient *rcc, PipeItem *item)
{
spice_assert(rcc && item);
rcc->pipe_size++;
ring_add(&rcc->pipe, &item->link);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 2,110
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType DecodeImage(Image *image,const ssize_t opacity,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
int
c;
LZWInfo
*lzw_info;
size_t
pass;
ssize_t
index,
offset,
y;
unsigned char
data_size;
/*
Allocate decoder tables.
*/
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
data_size=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (data_size > MaximumLZWBits)
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage",image->filename);
lzw_info=AcquireLZWInfo(image,data_size);
if (lzw_info == (LZWInfo *) NULL)
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
pass=0;
offset=0;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register ssize_t
x;
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,offset,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; )
{
c=ReadBlobLZWByte(lzw_info);
if (c < 0)
break;
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(ssize_t) c,exception);
SetPixelIndex(image,(Quantum) index,q);
SetPixelViaPixelInfo(image,image->colormap+index,q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,index == opacity ? TransparentAlpha : OpaqueAlpha,q);
x++;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (x < (ssize_t) image->columns)
break;
if (image->interlace == NoInterlace)
offset++;
else
{
switch (pass)
{
case 0:
default:
{
offset+=8;
break;
}
case 1:
{
offset+=8;
break;
}
case 2:
{
offset+=4;
break;
}
case 3:
{
offset+=2;
break;
}
}
if ((pass == 0) && (offset >= (ssize_t) image->rows))
{
pass++;
offset=4;
}
if ((pass == 1) && (offset >= (ssize_t) image->rows))
{
pass++;
offset=2;
}
if ((pass == 2) && (offset >= (ssize_t) image->rows))
{
pass++;
offset=1;
}
}
}
lzw_info=RelinquishLZWInfo(lzw_info);
if (y < (ssize_t) image->rows)
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage",image->filename);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/592
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 60,563
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::ResizeRectChanged(const gfx::Rect& new_rect) {
Send(new ViewMsg_ChangeResizeRect(routing_id_, new_rect));
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 114,695
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bbuf_free(BBuf* bbuf)
{
if (IS_NOT_NULL(bbuf)) {
if (IS_NOT_NULL(bbuf->p)) xfree(bbuf->p);
xfree(bbuf);
}
}
Commit Message: fix #60 : invalid state(CCS_VALUE) in parse_char_class()
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 64,705
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void VerifyPageCount(int count) {
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
#else
const IPC::Message* page_cnt_msg =
render_thread_.sink().GetUniqueMessageMatching(
PrintHostMsg_DidGetPrintedPagesCount::ID);
ASSERT_TRUE(page_cnt_msg);
PrintHostMsg_DidGetPrintedPagesCount::Param post_page_count_param;
PrintHostMsg_DidGetPrintedPagesCount::Read(page_cnt_msg,
&post_page_count_param);
EXPECT_EQ(count, post_page_count_param.b);
#endif // defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
}
Commit Message: Fix print preview workflow to reflect settings of selected printer.
BUG=95110
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7831041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@102242 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 97,552
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int check_i2c_image(struct edgeport_serial *serial)
{
struct device *dev = &serial->serial->dev->dev;
int status = 0;
struct ti_i2c_desc *rom_desc;
int start_address = 2;
__u8 *buffer;
__u16 ttype;
rom_desc = kmalloc(sizeof(*rom_desc), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!rom_desc)
return -ENOMEM;
buffer = kmalloc(TI_MAX_I2C_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buffer) {
kfree(rom_desc);
return -ENOMEM;
}
/* Read the first byte (Signature0) must be 0x52 or 0x10 */
status = read_rom(serial, 0, 1, buffer);
if (status)
goto out;
if (*buffer != UMP5152 && *buffer != UMP3410) {
dev_err(dev, "%s - invalid buffer signature\n", __func__);
status = -ENODEV;
goto out;
}
do {
/* Validate the I2C */
status = read_rom(serial,
start_address,
sizeof(struct ti_i2c_desc),
(__u8 *)rom_desc);
if (status)
break;
if ((start_address + sizeof(struct ti_i2c_desc) +
le16_to_cpu(rom_desc->Size)) > TI_MAX_I2C_SIZE) {
status = -ENODEV;
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - structure too big, erroring out.\n", __func__);
break;
}
dev_dbg(dev, "%s Type = 0x%x\n", __func__, rom_desc->Type);
/* Skip type 2 record */
ttype = rom_desc->Type & 0x0f;
if (ttype != I2C_DESC_TYPE_FIRMWARE_BASIC
&& ttype != I2C_DESC_TYPE_FIRMWARE_AUTO) {
/* Read the descriptor data */
status = read_rom(serial, start_address +
sizeof(struct ti_i2c_desc),
le16_to_cpu(rom_desc->Size),
buffer);
if (status)
break;
status = valid_csum(rom_desc, buffer);
if (status)
break;
}
start_address = start_address + sizeof(struct ti_i2c_desc) +
le16_to_cpu(rom_desc->Size);
} while ((rom_desc->Type != I2C_DESC_TYPE_ION) &&
(start_address < TI_MAX_I2C_SIZE));
if ((rom_desc->Type != I2C_DESC_TYPE_ION) ||
(start_address > TI_MAX_I2C_SIZE))
status = -ENODEV;
out:
kfree(buffer);
kfree(rom_desc);
return status;
}
Commit Message: USB: serial: io_ti: fix information leak in completion handler
Add missing sanity check to the bulk-in completion handler to avoid an
integer underflow that can be triggered by a malicious device.
This avoids leaking 128 kB of memory content from after the URB transfer
buffer to user space.
Fixes: 8c209e6782ca ("USB: make actual_length in struct urb field u32")
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 2.6.30
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-191
| 0
| 66,067
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: krb5_get_init_creds_keytab(krb5_context context,
krb5_creds *creds,
krb5_principal client,
krb5_keytab keytab,
krb5_deltat start_time,
const char *in_tkt_service,
krb5_get_init_creds_opt *options)
{
krb5_init_creds_context ctx;
krb5_keytab_entry ktent;
krb5_error_code ret;
memset(&ktent, 0, sizeof(ktent));
memset(creds, 0, sizeof(*creds));
if (strcmp(client->realm, "") == 0) {
/*
* Referral realm. We have a keytab, so pick a realm by
* matching in the keytab.
*/
ret = krb5_kt_get_entry(context, keytab, client, 0, 0, &ktent);
if (ret == 0)
client = ktent.principal;
}
ret = krb5_init_creds_init(context, client, NULL, NULL, start_time, options, &ctx);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = krb5_init_creds_set_service(context, ctx, in_tkt_service);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = krb5_init_creds_set_keytab(context, ctx, keytab);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = krb5_init_creds_get(context, ctx);
if (ret == 0)
krb5_process_last_request(context, options, ctx);
out:
krb5_kt_free_entry(context, &ktent);
if (ret == 0)
krb5_init_creds_get_creds(context, ctx, creds);
if (ctx)
krb5_init_creds_free(context, ctx);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2019-12098: krb5: always confirm PA-PKINIT-KX for anon PKINIT
RFC8062 Section 7 requires verification of the PA-PKINIT-KX key excahnge
when anonymous PKINIT is used. Failure to do so can permit an active
attacker to become a man-in-the-middle.
Introduced by a1ef548600c5bb51cf52a9a9ea12676506ede19f. First tagged
release Heimdal 1.4.0.
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N (4.8)
Change-Id: I6cc1c0c24985936468af08693839ac6c3edda133
Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
Approved-by: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auritor.com>
(cherry picked from commit 38c797e1ae9b9c8f99ae4aa2e73957679031fd2b)
CWE ID: CWE-320
| 0
| 89,917
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool UseBackgroundMode() {
base::CommandLine* command_line = base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
if (command_line->HasSwitch(switches::kDisablePushApiBackgroundMode))
return false;
if (command_line->HasSwitch(switches::kEnablePushApiBackgroundMode))
return true;
return base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kPushMessagingBackgroundMode);
}
Commit Message: Remove some senseless indirection from the Push API code
Four files to call one Java function. Let's just call it directly.
BUG=
Change-Id: I6e988e9a000051dd7e3dd2b517a33a09afc2fff6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/749147
Reviewed-by: Anita Woodruff <awdf@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Peter Beverloo <peter@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513464}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 150,722
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void VaapiVideoDecodeAccelerator::OutputPicture(
const scoped_refptr<VASurface>& va_surface,
int32_t input_id,
gfx::Rect visible_rect,
VaapiPicture* picture) {
DCHECK(task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
int32_t output_id = picture->picture_buffer_id();
VLOGF(4) << "Outputting VASurface " << va_surface->id()
<< " into pixmap bound to picture buffer id " << output_id;
{
TRACE_EVENT2("Video Decoder", "VAVDA::DownloadFromSurface", "input_id",
input_id, "output_id", output_id);
RETURN_AND_NOTIFY_ON_FAILURE(picture->DownloadFromSurface(va_surface),
"Failed putting surface into pixmap",
PLATFORM_FAILURE, );
}
++num_frames_at_client_;
TRACE_COUNTER1("Video Decoder", "Textures at client", num_frames_at_client_);
VLOGF(4) << "Notifying output picture id " << output_id << " for input "
<< input_id
<< " is ready. visible rect: " << visible_rect.ToString();
if (client_) {
client_->PictureReady(Picture(output_id, input_id, visible_rect,
gfx::ColorSpace(), picture->AllowOverlay()));
}
}
Commit Message: vaapi vda: Delete owned objects on worker thread in Cleanup()
This CL adds a SEQUENCE_CHECKER to Vaapi*Accelerator classes, and
posts the destruction of those objects to the appropriate thread on
Cleanup().
Also makes {H264,VP8,VP9}Picture RefCountedThreadSafe, see miu@
comment in
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/794091#message-a64bed985cfaf8a19499a517bb110a7ce581dc0f
TEST=play back VP9/VP8/H264 w/ simplechrome on soraka, Release build
unstripped, let video play for a few seconds then navigate back; no
crashes. Unittests as before:
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp9:320:240:250:250:35:150:12
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp8:320:240:250:250:35:150:11
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.h264:320:240:250:258:35:150:1
Bug: 789160
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I7d96aaf89c92bf46f00c8b8b36798e057a842ed2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/794091
Reviewed-by: Pawel Osciak <posciak@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Miguel Casas <mcasas@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#523372}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 148,875
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
kvm_inject_nmi(vcpu);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 20,830
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoBufferSubData(
GLenum target, GLintptr offset, GLsizeiptr size, const GLvoid * data) {
BufferManager::BufferInfo* info = GetBufferInfoForTarget(target);
if (!info) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glBufferSubData: unknown buffer");
return;
}
if (!info->SetRange(offset, size, data)) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glBufferSubData: out of range");
return;
}
if (bufferdata_faster_than_buffersubdata_ &&
offset == 0 && size == info->size()) {
glBufferData(target, size, data, info->usage());
return;
}
glBufferSubData(target, offset, size, data);
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 99,124
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int handle_wbinvd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
return kvm_emulate_wbinvd(vcpu);
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Allow L1 to intercept software exceptions (#BP and #OF)
When L2 exits to L0 due to "exception or NMI", software exceptions
(#BP and #OF) for which L1 has requested an intercept should be
handled by L1 rather than L0. Previously, only hardware exceptions
were forwarded to L1.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-388
| 0
| 48,046
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WaitForLoadStop() {
if (load_stop_observed_)
return;
message_loop_runner_ = new content::MessageLoopRunner;
message_loop_runner_->Run();
}
Commit Message: Skip Service workers in requests for mime handler plugins
BUG=808838
TEST=./browser_tests --gtest_filter=*/ServiceWorkerTest.MimeHandlerView*
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_mojo
Change-Id: I82e75c200091babbab648a04232db47e2938d914
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/914150
Commit-Queue: Rob Wu <rob@robwu.nl>
Reviewed-by: Istiaque Ahmed <lazyboy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Falkenhagen <falken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#537386}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 147,451
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: raptor_rss_emit_type_triple(raptor_parser* rdf_parser,
raptor_term *resource,
raptor_uri *type_uri)
{
raptor_rss_parser* rss_parser = (raptor_rss_parser*)rdf_parser->context;
raptor_term *predicate_term;
raptor_term *object_term;
if(!resource) {
raptor_parser_error(rdf_parser, "RSS node has no identifier");
return 1;
}
rss_parser->statement.subject = resource;
predicate_term = raptor_new_term_from_uri(rdf_parser->world,
RAPTOR_RDF_type_URI(rdf_parser->world));
rss_parser->statement.predicate = predicate_term;
object_term = raptor_new_term_from_uri(rdf_parser->world, type_uri);
rss_parser->statement.object = object_term;
/* Generate the statement */
(*rdf_parser->statement_handler)(rdf_parser->user_data, &rss_parser->statement);
raptor_free_term(predicate_term);
raptor_free_term(object_term);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2012-0037
Enforce entity loading policy in raptor_libxml_resolveEntity
and raptor_libxml_getEntity by checking for file URIs and network URIs.
Add RAPTOR_OPTION_LOAD_EXTERNAL_ENTITIES / loadExternalEntities for
turning on loading of XML external entity loading, disabled by default.
This affects all the parsers that use SAX2: rdfxml, rss-tag-soup (and
aliases) and rdfa.
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 22,037
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int jpc_tsfb_analyze2(jpc_tsfb_t *tsfb, int *a, int xstart, int ystart,
int width, int height, int stride, int numlvls)
{
if (width > 0 && height > 0) {
if ((*tsfb->qmfb->analyze)(a, xstart, ystart, width, height, stride))
return -1;
if (numlvls > 0) {
if (jpc_tsfb_analyze2(tsfb, a, JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(xstart,
1), JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(ystart, 1), JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(
xstart + width, 1) - JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(xstart, 1),
JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(ystart + height, 1) -
JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(ystart, 1), stride, numlvls - 1)) {
return -1;
}
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed an integral type promotion problem by adding a JAS_CAST.
Modified the jpc_tsfb_synthesize function so that it will be a noop for
an empty sequence (in order to avoid dereferencing a null pointer).
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 70,466
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void hsr_dev_destroy(struct net_device *hsr_dev)
{
struct hsr_priv *hsr;
struct hsr_port *port;
hsr = netdev_priv(hsr_dev);
rtnl_lock();
hsr_for_each_port(hsr, port)
hsr_del_port(port);
rtnl_unlock();
del_timer_sync(&hsr->prune_timer);
del_timer_sync(&hsr->announce_timer);
synchronize_rcu();
}
Commit Message: net: hsr: fix memory leak in hsr_dev_finalize()
If hsr_add_port(hsr, hsr_dev, HSR_PT_MASTER) failed to
add port, it directly returns res and forgets to free the node
that allocated in hsr_create_self_node(), and forgets to delete
the node->mac_list linked in hsr->self_node_db.
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff8881cfa0c780 (size 64):
comm "syz-executor.0", pid 2077, jiffies 4294717969 (age 2415.377s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
e0 c7 a0 cf 81 88 ff ff 00 02 00 00 00 00 ad de ................
00 e6 49 cd 81 88 ff ff c0 9b 87 d0 81 88 ff ff ..I.............
backtrace:
[<00000000e2ff5070>] hsr_dev_finalize+0x736/0x960 [hsr]
[<000000003ed2e597>] hsr_newlink+0x2b2/0x3e0 [hsr]
[<000000003fa8c6b6>] __rtnl_newlink+0xf1f/0x1600 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3182
[<000000001247a7ad>] rtnl_newlink+0x66/0x90 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3240
[<00000000e7d1b61d>] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x54e/0xb90 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5130
[<000000005556bd3a>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x129/0x340 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2477
[<00000000741d5ee6>] netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1310 [inline]
[<00000000741d5ee6>] netlink_unicast+0x49a/0x650 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1336
[<000000009d56f9b7>] netlink_sendmsg+0x88b/0xdf0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1917
[<0000000046b35c59>] sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline]
[<0000000046b35c59>] sock_sendmsg+0xc3/0x100 net/socket.c:631
[<00000000d208adc9>] __sys_sendto+0x33e/0x560 net/socket.c:1786
[<00000000b582837a>] __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1798 [inline]
[<00000000b582837a>] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1794 [inline]
[<00000000b582837a>] __x64_sys_sendto+0xdd/0x1b0 net/socket.c:1794
[<00000000c866801d>] do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
[<00000000fea382d9>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[<00000000e01dacb3>] 0xffffffffffffffff
Fixes: c5a759117210 ("net/hsr: Use list_head (and rcu) instead of array for slave devices.")
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mao Wenan <maowenan@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 87,660
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ssl_legacy_renegotiation( ssl_context *ssl, int allow_legacy )
{
ssl->allow_legacy_renegotiation = allow_legacy;
}
Commit Message: ssl_parse_certificate() now calls x509parse_crt_der() directly
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 29,008
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::setViewportDescription(const ViewportDescription& viewportDescription)
{
if (viewportDescription.isLegacyViewportType()) {
m_legacyViewportDescription = viewportDescription;
if (m_viewportDescription.type == ViewportDescription::AuthorStyleSheet)
return;
m_viewportDescription = viewportDescription;
} else {
if (!shouldOverrideLegacyViewport(viewportDescription.type))
m_viewportDescription = m_legacyViewportDescription;
else
m_viewportDescription = viewportDescription;
}
updateViewportDescription();
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 102,881
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void nfc_llcp_sock_unlink(struct llcp_sock_list *l, struct sock *sk)
{
write_lock(&l->lock);
sk_del_node_init(sk);
write_unlock(&l->lock);
}
Commit Message: net: nfc: Fix NULL dereference on nfc_llcp_build_tlv fails
KASAN report this:
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in nfc_llcp_build_gb+0x37f/0x540 [nfc]
Read of size 3 at addr 0000000000000000 by task syz-executor.0/5401
CPU: 0 PID: 5401 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc7+ #45
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0xfa/0x1ce lib/dump_stack.c:113
kasan_report+0x171/0x18d mm/kasan/report.c:321
memcpy+0x1f/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:130
nfc_llcp_build_gb+0x37f/0x540 [nfc]
nfc_llcp_register_device+0x6eb/0xb50 [nfc]
nfc_register_device+0x50/0x1d0 [nfc]
nfcsim_device_new+0x394/0x67d [nfcsim]
? 0xffffffffc1080000
nfcsim_init+0x6b/0x1000 [nfcsim]
do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887
do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460
load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808
__do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902
do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f9cb79dcc58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000280 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f9cb79dcc70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f9cb79dd6bc
R13: 00000000004bcefb R14: 00000000006f7030 R15: 0000000000000004
nfc_llcp_build_tlv will return NULL on fails, caller should check it,
otherwise will trigger a NULL dereference.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: eda21f16a5ed ("NFC: Set MIU and RW values from CONNECT and CC LLCP frames")
Fixes: d646960f7986 ("NFC: Initial LLCP support")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 89,728
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: iter_next (DBusMessageDataIter *iter)
{
iter->sequence_nos[iter->depth] += 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 7,498
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TaskManagerTableModel::OnItemsRemoved(int start, int length) {
if (observer_)
observer_->OnItemsRemoved(start, length);
OnModelChanged();
}
Commit Message: accelerators: Remove deprecated Accelerator ctor that takes booleans.
BUG=128242
R=ben@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10399085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137957 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 106,561
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t picolcd_operation_mode_show(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
struct picolcd_data *data = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
if (data->status & PICOLCD_BOOTLOADER)
return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "[bootloader] lcd\n");
else
return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "bootloader [lcd]\n");
}
Commit Message: HID: picolcd: sanity check report size in raw_event() callback
The report passed to us from transport driver could potentially be
arbitrarily large, therefore we better sanity-check it so that raw_data
that we hold in picolcd_pending structure are always kept within proper
bounds.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Steven Vittitoe <scvitti@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 38,070
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: aspath_key_make (void *p)
{
struct aspath *aspath = (struct aspath *) p;
unsigned int key = 0;
if (!aspath->str)
aspath_str_update (aspath);
key = jhash (aspath->str, aspath->str_len, 2334325);
return key;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 1,590
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int setup_revisions(int argc, const char **argv, struct rev_info *revs, struct setup_revision_opt *opt)
{
int i, flags, left, seen_dashdash, read_from_stdin, got_rev_arg = 0, revarg_opt;
struct cmdline_pathspec prune_data;
const char *submodule = NULL;
memset(&prune_data, 0, sizeof(prune_data));
if (opt)
submodule = opt->submodule;
/* First, search for "--" */
if (opt && opt->assume_dashdash) {
seen_dashdash = 1;
} else {
seen_dashdash = 0;
for (i = 1; i < argc; i++) {
const char *arg = argv[i];
if (strcmp(arg, "--"))
continue;
argv[i] = NULL;
argc = i;
if (argv[i + 1])
append_prune_data(&prune_data, argv + i + 1);
seen_dashdash = 1;
break;
}
}
/* Second, deal with arguments and options */
flags = 0;
revarg_opt = opt ? opt->revarg_opt : 0;
if (seen_dashdash)
revarg_opt |= REVARG_CANNOT_BE_FILENAME;
read_from_stdin = 0;
for (left = i = 1; i < argc; i++) {
const char *arg = argv[i];
if (*arg == '-') {
int opts;
opts = handle_revision_pseudo_opt(submodule,
revs, argc - i, argv + i,
&flags);
if (opts > 0) {
i += opts - 1;
continue;
}
if (!strcmp(arg, "--stdin")) {
if (revs->disable_stdin) {
argv[left++] = arg;
continue;
}
if (read_from_stdin++)
die("--stdin given twice?");
read_revisions_from_stdin(revs, &prune_data);
continue;
}
opts = handle_revision_opt(revs, argc - i, argv + i, &left, argv);
if (opts > 0) {
i += opts - 1;
continue;
}
if (opts < 0)
exit(128);
continue;
}
if (handle_revision_arg(arg, revs, flags, revarg_opt)) {
int j;
if (seen_dashdash || *arg == '^')
die("bad revision '%s'", arg);
/* If we didn't have a "--":
* (1) all filenames must exist;
* (2) all rev-args must not be interpretable
* as a valid filename.
* but the latter we have checked in the main loop.
*/
for (j = i; j < argc; j++)
verify_filename(revs->prefix, argv[j], j == i);
append_prune_data(&prune_data, argv + i);
break;
}
else
got_rev_arg = 1;
}
if (prune_data.nr) {
/*
* If we need to introduce the magic "a lone ':' means no
* pathspec whatsoever", here is the place to do so.
*
* if (prune_data.nr == 1 && !strcmp(prune_data[0], ":")) {
* prune_data.nr = 0;
* prune_data.alloc = 0;
* free(prune_data.path);
* prune_data.path = NULL;
* } else {
* terminate prune_data.alloc with NULL and
* call init_pathspec() to set revs->prune_data here.
* }
*/
ALLOC_GROW(prune_data.path, prune_data.nr + 1, prune_data.alloc);
prune_data.path[prune_data.nr++] = NULL;
parse_pathspec(&revs->prune_data, 0, 0,
revs->prefix, prune_data.path);
}
if (revs->def == NULL)
revs->def = opt ? opt->def : NULL;
if (opt && opt->tweak)
opt->tweak(revs, opt);
if (revs->show_merge)
prepare_show_merge(revs);
if (revs->def && !revs->pending.nr && !got_rev_arg) {
unsigned char sha1[20];
struct object *object;
struct object_context oc;
if (get_sha1_with_context(revs->def, 0, sha1, &oc))
diagnose_missing_default(revs->def);
object = get_reference(revs, revs->def, sha1, 0);
add_pending_object_with_mode(revs, object, revs->def, oc.mode);
}
/* Did the user ask for any diff output? Run the diff! */
if (revs->diffopt.output_format & ~DIFF_FORMAT_NO_OUTPUT)
revs->diff = 1;
/* Pickaxe, diff-filter and rename following need diffs */
if (revs->diffopt.pickaxe ||
revs->diffopt.filter ||
DIFF_OPT_TST(&revs->diffopt, FOLLOW_RENAMES))
revs->diff = 1;
if (revs->topo_order)
revs->limited = 1;
if (revs->prune_data.nr) {
copy_pathspec(&revs->pruning.pathspec, &revs->prune_data);
/* Can't prune commits with rename following: the paths change.. */
if (!DIFF_OPT_TST(&revs->diffopt, FOLLOW_RENAMES))
revs->prune = 1;
if (!revs->full_diff)
copy_pathspec(&revs->diffopt.pathspec,
&revs->prune_data);
}
if (revs->combine_merges)
revs->ignore_merges = 0;
revs->diffopt.abbrev = revs->abbrev;
if (revs->line_level_traverse) {
revs->limited = 1;
revs->topo_order = 1;
}
diff_setup_done(&revs->diffopt);
grep_commit_pattern_type(GREP_PATTERN_TYPE_UNSPECIFIED,
&revs->grep_filter);
compile_grep_patterns(&revs->grep_filter);
if (revs->reverse && revs->reflog_info)
die("cannot combine --reverse with --walk-reflogs");
if (revs->rewrite_parents && revs->children.name)
die("cannot combine --parents and --children");
/*
* Limitations on the graph functionality
*/
if (revs->reverse && revs->graph)
die("cannot combine --reverse with --graph");
if (revs->reflog_info && revs->graph)
die("cannot combine --walk-reflogs with --graph");
if (revs->no_walk && revs->graph)
die("cannot combine --no-walk with --graph");
if (!revs->reflog_info && revs->grep_filter.use_reflog_filter)
die("cannot use --grep-reflog without --walk-reflogs");
if (revs->first_parent_only && revs->bisect)
die(_("--first-parent is incompatible with --bisect"));
return left;
}
Commit Message: list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 55,040
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ScopedTexture2DBindingReset::~ScopedTexture2DBindingReset() {
api_->glBindTextureFn(GL_TEXTURE_2D, texture_);
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,853
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: add_code_range_to_buf(BBuf** pbuf, ScanEnv* env, OnigCodePoint from, OnigCodePoint to)
{
return add_code_range_to_buf0(pbuf, env, from, to, 1);
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #134 from k-takata/fix-segv-in-error-str
Fix SEGV in onig_error_code_to_str() (Fix #132)
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 87,866
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void kvm_free_vmm_area(void)
{
if (kvm_vmm_base) {
/*Zero this area before free to avoid bits leak!!*/
memset((void *)kvm_vmm_base, 0, KVM_VMM_SIZE);
free_pages(kvm_vmm_base, get_order(KVM_VMM_SIZE));
kvm_vmm_base = 0;
kvm_vm_buffer = 0;
kvm_vsa_base = 0;
}
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 20,621
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHPAPI PHP_FUNCTION(ftell)
{
zval *arg1;
long ret;
php_stream *stream;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "r", &arg1) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
PHP_STREAM_TO_ZVAL(stream, &arg1);
ret = php_stream_tell(stream);
if (ret == -1) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETURN_LONG(ret);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72114 - int/size_t confusion in fread
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 52,162
|
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