instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_ecne(struct net *net,
const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const sctp_subtype_t type,
void *arg,
sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands)
{
sctp_ecnehdr_t *ecne;
struct sctp_chunk *chunk = arg;
if (!sctp_vtag_verify(chunk, asoc))
return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(sctp_ecne_chunk_t)))
return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
commands);
ecne = (sctp_ecnehdr_t *) chunk->skb->data;
skb_pull(chunk->skb, sizeof(sctp_ecnehdr_t));
/* If this is a newer ECNE than the last CWR packet we sent out */
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_ECN_ECNE,
SCTP_U32(ntohl(ecne->lowest_tsn)));
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_CONSUME;
}
Commit Message: sctp: Use correct sideffect command in duplicate cookie handling
When SCTP is done processing a duplicate cookie chunk, it tries
to delete a newly created association. For that, it has to set
the right association for the side-effect processing to work.
However, when it uses the SCTP_CMD_NEW_ASOC command, that performs
more work then really needed (like hashing the associationa and
assigning it an id) and there is no point to do that only to
delete the association as a next step. In fact, it also creates
an impossible condition where an association may be found by
the getsockopt() call, and that association is empty. This
causes a crash in some sctp getsockopts.
The solution is rather simple. We simply use SCTP_CMD_SET_ASOC
command that doesn't have all the overhead and does exactly
what we need.
Reported-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
CC: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 31,606
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int mov_read_sbgp(MOVContext *c, AVIOContext *pb, MOVAtom atom)
{
AVStream *st;
MOVStreamContext *sc;
unsigned int i, entries;
uint8_t version;
uint32_t grouping_type;
if (c->fc->nb_streams < 1)
return 0;
st = c->fc->streams[c->fc->nb_streams-1];
sc = st->priv_data;
version = avio_r8(pb); /* version */
avio_rb24(pb); /* flags */
grouping_type = avio_rl32(pb);
if (grouping_type != MKTAG( 'r','a','p',' '))
return 0; /* only support 'rap ' grouping */
if (version == 1)
avio_rb32(pb); /* grouping_type_parameter */
entries = avio_rb32(pb);
if (!entries)
return 0;
if (sc->rap_group)
av_log(c->fc, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Duplicated SBGP atom\n");
av_free(sc->rap_group);
sc->rap_group_count = 0;
sc->rap_group = av_malloc_array(entries, sizeof(*sc->rap_group));
if (!sc->rap_group)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
for (i = 0; i < entries && !pb->eof_reached; i++) {
sc->rap_group[i].count = avio_rb32(pb); /* sample_count */
sc->rap_group[i].index = avio_rb32(pb); /* group_description_index */
}
sc->rap_group_count = i;
return pb->eof_reached ? AVERROR_EOF : 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/mov: Fix DoS in read_tfra()
Fixes: Missing EOF check in loop
No testcase
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-834
| 0
| 61,454
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void reflectedIdAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_FOR_V8STRINGRESOURCE_VOID(V8StringResource<>, cppValue, jsValue);
CustomElementCallbackDispatcher::CallbackDeliveryScope deliveryScope;
imp->setAttribute(HTMLNames::idAttr, cppValue);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 122,603
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_violation(struct net *net,
const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const sctp_subtype_t type,
void *arg,
sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands)
{
struct sctp_chunk *chunk = arg;
/* Make sure that the chunk has a valid length. */
if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t)))
return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
commands);
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_VIOLATION;
}
Commit Message: sctp: Use correct sideffect command in duplicate cookie handling
When SCTP is done processing a duplicate cookie chunk, it tries
to delete a newly created association. For that, it has to set
the right association for the side-effect processing to work.
However, when it uses the SCTP_CMD_NEW_ASOC command, that performs
more work then really needed (like hashing the associationa and
assigning it an id) and there is no point to do that only to
delete the association as a next step. In fact, it also creates
an impossible condition where an association may be found by
the getsockopt() call, and that association is empty. This
causes a crash in some sctp getsockopts.
The solution is rather simple. We simply use SCTP_CMD_SET_ASOC
command that doesn't have all the overhead and does exactly
what we need.
Reported-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
CC: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 31,645
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void set_curr_task_fair(struct rq *rq)
{
struct sched_entity *se = &rq->curr->se;
for_each_sched_entity(se) {
struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq = cfs_rq_of(se);
set_next_entity(cfs_rq, se);
/* ensure bandwidth has been allocated on our new cfs_rq */
account_cfs_rq_runtime(cfs_rq, 0);
}
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 92,676
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int tree_mod_dont_log(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info,
struct extent_buffer *eb) {
smp_mb();
if (list_empty(&(fs_info)->tree_mod_seq_list))
return 1;
if (eb && btrfs_header_level(eb) == 0)
return 1;
tree_mod_log_write_lock(fs_info);
if (list_empty(&(fs_info)->tree_mod_seq_list)) {
tree_mod_log_write_unlock(fs_info);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: make xattr replace operations atomic
Replacing a xattr consists of doing a lookup for its existing value, delete
the current value from the respective leaf, release the search path and then
finally insert the new value. This leaves a time window where readers (getxattr,
listxattrs) won't see any value for the xattr. Xattrs are used to store ACLs,
so this has security implications.
This change also fixes 2 other existing issues which were:
*) Deleting the old xattr value without verifying first if the new xattr will
fit in the existing leaf item (in case multiple xattrs are packed in the
same item due to name hash collision);
*) Returning -EEXIST when the flag XATTR_CREATE is given and the xattr doesn't
exist but we have have an existing item that packs muliple xattrs with
the same name hash as the input xattr. In this case we should return ENOSPC.
A test case for xfstests follows soon.
Thanks to Alexandre Oliva for reporting the non-atomicity of the xattr replace
implementation.
Reported-by: Alexandre Oliva <oliva@gnu.org>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 45,360
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::OnUpdateZoomLimits(RenderViewHostImpl* source,
int minimum_percent,
int maximum_percent) {
minimum_zoom_percent_ = minimum_percent;
maximum_zoom_percent_ = maximum_percent;
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 135,834
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DocumentLoader::setMainResourceDataBufferingPolicy(DataBufferingPolicy dataBufferingPolicy)
{
if (m_mainResource)
m_mainResource->setDataBufferingPolicy(dataBufferingPolicy);
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 105,752
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xfs_readlink_by_handle(
struct file *parfilp,
xfs_fsop_handlereq_t *hreq)
{
struct dentry *dentry;
__u32 olen;
void *link;
int error;
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -XFS_ERROR(EPERM);
dentry = xfs_handlereq_to_dentry(parfilp, hreq);
if (IS_ERR(dentry))
return PTR_ERR(dentry);
/* Restrict this handle operation to symlinks only. */
if (!S_ISLNK(dentry->d_inode->i_mode)) {
error = -XFS_ERROR(EINVAL);
goto out_dput;
}
if (copy_from_user(&olen, hreq->ohandlen, sizeof(__u32))) {
error = -XFS_ERROR(EFAULT);
goto out_dput;
}
link = kmalloc(MAXPATHLEN+1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!link) {
error = -XFS_ERROR(ENOMEM);
goto out_dput;
}
error = -xfs_readlink(XFS_I(dentry->d_inode), link);
if (error)
goto out_kfree;
error = readlink_copy(hreq->ohandle, olen, link);
if (error)
goto out_kfree;
out_kfree:
kfree(link);
out_dput:
dput(dentry);
return error;
}
Commit Message: fs,userns: Change inode_capable to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid
The kernel has no concept of capabilities with respect to inodes; inodes
exist independently of namespaces. For example, inode_capable(inode,
CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) would be nonsense.
This patch changes inode_capable to check for uid and gid mappings and
renames it to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid, which should make it more
obvious what it does.
Fixes CVE-2014-4014.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 36,928
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void Destroy(const internal::BindStateBase* self) {
delete static_cast<const FakeBindState*>(self);
}
Commit Message: Convert Uses of base::RepeatingCallback<>::Equals to Use == or != in //base
Staging this change because some conversions will have semantic changes.
BUG=937566
Change-Id: I2d4950624c0fab00e107814421a161e43da965cc
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1507245
Reviewed-by: Gabriel Charette <gab@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Gabriel Charette <gab@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#639702}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 130,649
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void S_AL_SrcLoop( alSrcPriority_t priority, sfxHandle_t sfx,
const vec3_t origin, const vec3_t velocity, int entityNum )
{
int src;
sentity_t *sent = &entityList[ entityNum ];
src_t *curSource;
vec3_t sorigin, svelocity;
if(S_AL_CheckInput(entityNum, sfx))
return;
if( !sent->srcAllocated )
{
src = S_AL_SrcAlloc( priority, entityNum, -1 );
if( src == -1 )
{
Com_DPrintf( S_COLOR_YELLOW "WARNING: Failed to allocate source "
"for loop sfx %d on entity %d\n", sfx, entityNum );
return;
}
curSource = &srcList[src];
sent->startLoopingSound = qtrue;
curSource->lastTimePos = -1.0;
curSource->lastSampleTime = Sys_Milliseconds();
}
else
{
src = sent->srcIndex;
curSource = &srcList[src];
}
sent->srcAllocated = qtrue;
sent->srcIndex = src;
sent->loopPriority = priority;
sent->loopSfx = sfx;
sent->loopAddedThisFrame = qtrue;
curSource->entity = entityNum;
curSource->isLooping = qtrue;
if( S_AL_HearingThroughEntity( entityNum ) )
{
curSource->local = qtrue;
VectorClear(sorigin);
qalSourcefv(curSource->alSource, AL_POSITION, sorigin);
qalSourcefv(curSource->alSource, AL_VELOCITY, vec3_origin);
}
else
{
curSource->local = qfalse;
if(origin)
VectorCopy(origin, sorigin);
else
VectorCopy(sent->origin, sorigin);
S_AL_SanitiseVector(sorigin);
VectorCopy(sorigin, curSource->loopSpeakerPos);
if(velocity)
{
VectorCopy(velocity, svelocity);
S_AL_SanitiseVector(svelocity);
}
else
VectorClear(svelocity);
qalSourcefv(curSource->alSource, AL_POSITION, (ALfloat *) sorigin);
qalSourcefv(curSource->alSource, AL_VELOCITY, (ALfloat *) svelocity);
}
}
Commit Message: Don't open .pk3 files as OpenAL drivers.
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 95,549
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: htmlErrMemory(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, const char *extra)
{
if ((ctxt != NULL) && (ctxt->disableSAX != 0) &&
(ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF))
return;
if (ctxt != NULL) {
ctxt->errNo = XML_ERR_NO_MEMORY;
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_EOF;
ctxt->disableSAX = 1;
}
if (extra)
__xmlRaiseError(NULL, NULL, NULL, ctxt, NULL, XML_FROM_PARSER,
XML_ERR_NO_MEMORY, XML_ERR_FATAL, NULL, 0, extra,
NULL, NULL, 0, 0,
"Memory allocation failed : %s\n", extra);
else
__xmlRaiseError(NULL, NULL, NULL, ctxt, NULL, XML_FROM_PARSER,
XML_ERR_NO_MEMORY, XML_ERR_FATAL, NULL, 0, NULL,
NULL, NULL, 0, 0, "Memory allocation failed\n");
}
Commit Message: Roll libxml to 3939178e4cb797417ff033b1e04ab4b038e224d9
Removes a few patches fixed upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=e26630548e7d138d2c560844c43820b6767251e3
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=94691dc884d1a8ada39f073408b4bb92fe7fe882
Stops using the NOXXE flag which was reverted upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=030b1f7a27c22f9237eddca49ec5e620b6258d7d
Changes the patch to uri.c to not add limits.h, which is included
upstream.
Bug: 722079
Change-Id: I4b8449ed33f95de23c54c2cde99970c2df2781ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535233
Reviewed-by: Scott Graham <scottmg@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dominic Cooney <dominicc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480755}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 150,785
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int64_t mov_read_atom_into_extradata(MOVContext *c, AVIOContext *pb, MOVAtom atom,
AVCodecParameters *par, uint8_t *buf)
{
int64_t result = atom.size;
int err;
AV_WB32(buf , atom.size + 8);
AV_WL32(buf + 4, atom.type);
err = ffio_read_size(pb, buf + 8, atom.size);
if (err < 0) {
par->extradata_size -= atom.size;
return err;
} else if (err < atom.size) {
av_log(c->fc, AV_LOG_WARNING, "truncated extradata\n");
par->extradata_size -= atom.size - err;
result = err;
}
memset(buf + 8 + err, 0, AV_INPUT_BUFFER_PADDING_SIZE);
return result;
}
Commit Message: avformat/mov: Fix DoS in read_tfra()
Fixes: Missing EOF check in loop
No testcase
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-834
| 0
| 61,409
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static uint32_t virtio_net_get_features(VirtIODevice *vdev, uint32_t features)
{
VirtIONet *n = VIRTIO_NET(vdev);
NetClientState *nc = qemu_get_queue(n->nic);
features |= (1 << VIRTIO_NET_F_MAC);
if (!peer_has_vnet_hdr(n)) {
features &= ~(0x1 << VIRTIO_NET_F_CSUM);
features &= ~(0x1 << VIRTIO_NET_F_HOST_TSO4);
features &= ~(0x1 << VIRTIO_NET_F_HOST_TSO6);
features &= ~(0x1 << VIRTIO_NET_F_HOST_ECN);
features &= ~(0x1 << VIRTIO_NET_F_GUEST_CSUM);
features &= ~(0x1 << VIRTIO_NET_F_GUEST_TSO4);
features &= ~(0x1 << VIRTIO_NET_F_GUEST_TSO6);
features &= ~(0x1 << VIRTIO_NET_F_GUEST_ECN);
}
if (!peer_has_vnet_hdr(n) || !peer_has_ufo(n)) {
features &= ~(0x1 << VIRTIO_NET_F_GUEST_UFO);
features &= ~(0x1 << VIRTIO_NET_F_HOST_UFO);
}
if (!nc->peer || nc->peer->info->type != NET_CLIENT_OPTIONS_KIND_TAP) {
return features;
}
if (!tap_get_vhost_net(nc->peer)) {
return features;
}
return vhost_net_get_features(tap_get_vhost_net(nc->peer), features);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 15,832
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Render_All( int first_glyph,
int pt_size )
{
FT_F26Dot6 start_x, start_y, step_x, step_y, x, y;
int i;
start_x = 4;
start_y = 36 + pt_size;
step_x = size->metrics.x_ppem + 4;
step_y = size->metrics.y_ppem + 10;
x = start_x;
y = start_y;
i = first_glyph;
#if 0
while ( i < first_glyph + 1 )
#else
while ( i < num_glyphs )
#endif
{
if ( !( error = LoadChar( i, hinted ) ) )
{
#ifdef DEBUG
if ( i <= first_glyph + 6 )
{
LOG(( "metrics[%02d] = [%x %x]\n",
i,
glyph->metrics.horiBearingX,
glyph->metrics.horiAdvance ));
if ( i == first_glyph + 6 )
LOG(( "-------------------------\n" ));
}
#endif
Render_Glyph( x, y );
x += ( glyph->metrics.horiAdvance >> 6 ) + 1;
if ( x + size->metrics.x_ppem > bit.width )
{
x = start_x;
y += step_y;
if ( y >= bit.rows )
return FT_Err_Ok;
}
}
else
Fail++;
i++;
}
return FT_Err_Ok;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 10,034
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int nfc_genl_llc_send_sdres(struct nfc_dev *dev, struct hlist_head *sdres_list)
{
struct sk_buff *msg;
struct nlattr *sdp_attr, *uri_attr;
struct nfc_llcp_sdp_tlv *sdres;
struct hlist_node *n;
void *hdr;
int rc = -EMSGSIZE;
int i;
msg = nlmsg_new(NLMSG_DEFAULT_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!msg)
return -ENOMEM;
hdr = genlmsg_put(msg, 0, 0, &nfc_genl_family, 0,
NFC_EVENT_LLC_SDRES);
if (!hdr)
goto free_msg;
if (nla_put_u32(msg, NFC_ATTR_DEVICE_INDEX, dev->idx))
goto nla_put_failure;
sdp_attr = nla_nest_start_noflag(msg, NFC_ATTR_LLC_SDP);
if (sdp_attr == NULL) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto nla_put_failure;
}
i = 1;
hlist_for_each_entry_safe(sdres, n, sdres_list, node) {
pr_debug("uri: %s, sap: %d\n", sdres->uri, sdres->sap);
uri_attr = nla_nest_start_noflag(msg, i++);
if (uri_attr == NULL) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto nla_put_failure;
}
if (nla_put_u8(msg, NFC_SDP_ATTR_SAP, sdres->sap))
goto nla_put_failure;
if (nla_put_string(msg, NFC_SDP_ATTR_URI, sdres->uri))
goto nla_put_failure;
nla_nest_end(msg, uri_attr);
hlist_del(&sdres->node);
nfc_llcp_free_sdp_tlv(sdres);
}
nla_nest_end(msg, sdp_attr);
genlmsg_end(msg, hdr);
return genlmsg_multicast(&nfc_genl_family, msg, 0, 0, GFP_ATOMIC);
nla_put_failure:
free_msg:
nlmsg_free(msg);
nfc_llcp_free_sdp_tlv_list(sdres_list);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: nfc: Ensure presence of required attributes in the deactivate_target handler
Check that the NFC_ATTR_TARGET_INDEX attributes (in addition to
NFC_ATTR_DEVICE_INDEX) are provided by the netlink client prior to
accessing them. This prevents potential unhandled NULL pointer dereference
exceptions which can be triggered by malicious user-mode programs,
if they omit one or both of these attributes.
Signed-off-by: Young Xiao <92siuyang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 89,452
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_MINIT_FUNCTION(spl_array)
{
REGISTER_SPL_STD_CLASS_EX(ArrayObject, spl_array_object_new, spl_funcs_ArrayObject);
REGISTER_SPL_IMPLEMENTS(ArrayObject, Aggregate);
REGISTER_SPL_IMPLEMENTS(ArrayObject, ArrayAccess);
REGISTER_SPL_IMPLEMENTS(ArrayObject, Serializable);
REGISTER_SPL_IMPLEMENTS(ArrayObject, Countable);
memcpy(&spl_handler_ArrayObject, zend_get_std_object_handlers(), sizeof(zend_object_handlers));
spl_handler_ArrayObject.clone_obj = spl_array_object_clone;
spl_handler_ArrayObject.read_dimension = spl_array_read_dimension;
spl_handler_ArrayObject.write_dimension = spl_array_write_dimension;
spl_handler_ArrayObject.unset_dimension = spl_array_unset_dimension;
spl_handler_ArrayObject.has_dimension = spl_array_has_dimension;
spl_handler_ArrayObject.count_elements = spl_array_object_count_elements;
spl_handler_ArrayObject.get_properties = spl_array_get_properties;
spl_handler_ArrayObject.get_debug_info = spl_array_get_debug_info;
spl_handler_ArrayObject.read_property = spl_array_read_property;
spl_handler_ArrayObject.write_property = spl_array_write_property;
spl_handler_ArrayObject.get_property_ptr_ptr = spl_array_get_property_ptr_ptr;
spl_handler_ArrayObject.has_property = spl_array_has_property;
spl_handler_ArrayObject.unset_property = spl_array_unset_property;
spl_handler_ArrayObject.compare_objects = spl_array_compare_objects;
REGISTER_SPL_STD_CLASS_EX(ArrayIterator, spl_array_object_new, spl_funcs_ArrayIterator);
REGISTER_SPL_IMPLEMENTS(ArrayIterator, Iterator);
REGISTER_SPL_IMPLEMENTS(ArrayIterator, ArrayAccess);
REGISTER_SPL_IMPLEMENTS(ArrayIterator, SeekableIterator);
REGISTER_SPL_IMPLEMENTS(ArrayIterator, Serializable);
REGISTER_SPL_IMPLEMENTS(ArrayIterator, Countable);
memcpy(&spl_handler_ArrayIterator, &spl_handler_ArrayObject, sizeof(zend_object_handlers));
spl_ce_ArrayIterator->get_iterator = spl_array_get_iterator;
REGISTER_SPL_SUB_CLASS_EX(RecursiveArrayIterator, ArrayIterator, spl_array_object_new, spl_funcs_RecursiveArrayIterator);
REGISTER_SPL_IMPLEMENTS(RecursiveArrayIterator, RecursiveIterator);
spl_ce_RecursiveArrayIterator->get_iterator = spl_array_get_iterator;
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(ArrayObject, "STD_PROP_LIST", SPL_ARRAY_STD_PROP_LIST);
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(ArrayObject, "ARRAY_AS_PROPS", SPL_ARRAY_ARRAY_AS_PROPS);
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(ArrayIterator, "STD_PROP_LIST", SPL_ARRAY_STD_PROP_LIST);
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(ArrayIterator, "ARRAY_AS_PROPS", SPL_ARRAY_ARRAY_AS_PROPS);
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(RecursiveArrayIterator, "CHILD_ARRAYS_ONLY", SPL_ARRAY_CHILD_ARRAYS_ONLY);
return SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Fixed ##72433: Use After Free Vulnerability in PHP's GC algorithm and unserialize
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 1
| 167,025
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: setdevicecolor_cont(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p)
{
os_ptr op = osp;
es_ptr ep = esp, pstage;
int code = 0, stage, base;
pstage = ep;
base = (int)ep[-1].value.intval;
stage = (int)pstage->value.intval;
/* If we get a continuation from a sub-procedure, we will want to come back
* here afterward, to do any remaining stages. We need to set up for that now.
* so that our continuation is ahead of the sub-proc's continuation.
*/
check_estack(1);
/* May need to push a /Device... name on the stack so make sure we have space */
check_ostack(1);
/* The push_op_estack macro increments esp before use, so we don't need to */
push_op_estack(setdevicecolor_cont);
do {
switch(stage) {
case 0:
make_int(pstage, ++stage);
push(1);
switch(base) {
case 0: /* DeviceGray */
code = name_enter_string(imemory, "DeviceGray", op);
break;
case 1: /* DeviceRGB */
code = name_enter_string(imemory, "DeviceRGB", op);
break;
case 2: /* DeviceCMYK */
code = name_enter_string(imemory, "DeviceCMYK", op);
break;
}
if (code < 0)
return code;
code = zsetcolorspace(i_ctx_p);
if (code != 0)
return code;
break;
case 1:
make_int(pstage, ++stage);
code = zsetcolor(i_ctx_p);
if (code != 0)
return code;
break;
case 2:
esp -= 3;
return o_pop_estack;
break;
}
}while(1);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 3,143
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void uivector_init(uivector* p)
{
p->data = NULL;
p->size = p->allocsize = 0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed #5645: realloc return handling
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 87,609
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: fz_colorspace_type(fz_context *ctx, fz_colorspace *cs)
{
return cs ? cs->type : FZ_COLORSPACE_NONE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 354
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PeopleHandler::OnStateChanged(syncer::SyncService* sync) {
UpdateSyncStatus();
PushSyncPrefs();
}
Commit Message: [signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <droger@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <isherman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <msarda@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 143,215
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int32_t read_s32(uint8_t *data, size_t offset)
{
return (int32_t)((data[offset] << 24) | (data[offset + 1] << 16) |
(data[offset + 2] << 8) | data[offset + 3]);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 7,978
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gsf_infile_tar_dup (GsfInput *src_input, GError **err)
{
GsfInfileTar *res, *src;
unsigned ui;
src = GSF_INFILE_TAR (src_input);
if (src->err) {
if (err)
*err = g_error_copy (src->err);
return NULL;
}
res = (GsfInfileTar *)g_object_new (GSF_INFILE_TAR_TYPE, NULL);
gsf_infile_tar_set_source (res, src->source);
for (ui = 0; ui < src->children->len; ui++) {
/* This copies the structure. */
TarChild c = g_array_index (src->children, TarChild, ui);
c.name = g_strdup (c.name);
if (c.modtime) g_date_time_ref (c.modtime);
if (c.dir) g_object_ref (c.dir);
g_array_append_val (res->children, c);
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: tar: fix crash on broken tar file.
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 47,705
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: IOSurfaceRef iosurface() { return iosurface_; }
Commit Message: Fix tabs sharing TEXTURE_2D_ARRAY/TEXTURE_3D data.
In linux and android, we are seeing an issue where texture data from one
tab overwrites the texture data of another tab. This is happening for apps
which are using webgl2 texture of type TEXTURE_2D_ARRAY/TEXTURE_3D.
Due to a bug in virtual context save/restore code for above texture formats,
the texture data is not properly restored while switching tabs. Hence
texture data from one tab overwrites other.
This CL has fix for that issue, an update for existing test expectations
and a new unit test for this bug.
Bug: 788448
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ie933984cdd2d1381f42eb4638f730c8245207a28
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/930327
Reviewed-by: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: vikas soni <vikassoni@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#539111}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 150,067
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void H264DPB::RemoveUnused() {
for (Pictures::iterator it = pics_.begin(); it != pics_.end(); ) {
if ((*it)->outputted && !(*it)->ref)
pics_.erase(it++);
else
++it;
}
}
Commit Message: Revert 137988 - VAVDA is the hardware video decode accelerator for Chrome on Linux and ChromeOS for Intel CPUs (Sandy Bridge and newer).
This CL enables VAVDA acceleration for ChromeOS, both for HTML5 video and Flash.
The feature is currently hidden behind a command line flag and can be enabled by adding the --enable-vaapi parameter to command line.
BUG=117062
TEST=Manual runs of test streams.
Change-Id: I386e16739e2ef2230f52a0a434971b33d8654699
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9814001
This is causing crbug.com/129103
TBR=posciak@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10411066
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@138208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 103,009
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char *out,
const SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned md_size)
{
#if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE)
unsigned char rotated_mac_buf[64 + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned char *rotated_mac;
#else
unsigned char rotated_mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
#endif
/*
* mac_end is the index of |rec->data| just after the end of the MAC.
*/
unsigned mac_end = rec->length;
unsigned mac_start = mac_end - md_size;
/*
* scan_start contains the number of bytes that we can ignore because the
* MAC's position can only vary by 255 bytes.
*/
unsigned scan_start = 0;
unsigned i, j;
unsigned div_spoiler;
unsigned rotate_offset;
OPENSSL_assert(rec->orig_len >= md_size);
OPENSSL_assert(md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
#if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE)
rotated_mac = rotated_mac_buf + ((0 - (size_t)rotated_mac_buf) & 63);
#endif
/* This information is public so it's safe to branch based on it. */
if (rec->orig_len > md_size + 255 + 1)
scan_start = rec->orig_len - (md_size + 255 + 1);
/*
* div_spoiler contains a multiple of md_size that is used to cause the
* modulo operation to be constant time. Without this, the time varies
* based on the amount of padding when running on Intel chips at least.
* The aim of right-shifting md_size is so that the compiler doesn't
* figure out that it can remove div_spoiler as that would require it to
* prove that md_size is always even, which I hope is beyond it.
*/
div_spoiler = md_size >> 1;
div_spoiler <<= (sizeof(div_spoiler) - 1) * 8;
rotate_offset = (div_spoiler + mac_start - scan_start) % md_size;
memset(rotated_mac, 0, md_size);
for (i = scan_start, j = 0; i < rec->orig_len; i++) {
unsigned char mac_started = constant_time_ge_8(i, mac_start);
unsigned char mac_ended = constant_time_ge_8(i, mac_end);
unsigned char b = rec->data[i];
rotated_mac[j++] |= b & mac_started & ~mac_ended;
j &= constant_time_lt(j, md_size);
}
/* Now rotate the MAC */
#if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE)
j = 0;
for (i = 0; i < md_size; i++) {
/* in case cache-line is 32 bytes, touch second line */
((volatile unsigned char *)rotated_mac)[rotate_offset ^ 32];
out[j++] = rotated_mac[rotate_offset++];
rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt(rotate_offset, md_size);
}
#else
memset(out, 0, md_size);
rotate_offset = md_size - rotate_offset;
rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt(rotate_offset, md_size);
for (i = 0; i < md_size; i++) {
for (j = 0; j < md_size; j++)
out[j] |= rotated_mac[i] & constant_time_eq_8(j, rotate_offset);
rotate_offset++;
rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt(rotate_offset, md_size);
}
#endif
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 12,695
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: long Cluster::ParseSimpleBlock(long long block_size, long long& pos,
long& len) {
const long long block_start = pos;
const long long block_stop = pos + block_size;
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
long long total, avail;
long status = pReader->Length(&total, &avail);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
assert((total < 0) || (avail <= total));
if ((pos + 1) > avail) {
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
long long result = GetUIntLength(pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) // weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((pos + len) > block_stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long track = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (track < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(track);
if (track == 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
#if 0
const Tracks* const pTracks = m_pSegment->GetTracks();
assert(pTracks);
const long tn = static_cast<long>(track);
const Track* const pTrack = pTracks->GetTrackByNumber(tn);
if (pTrack == NULL)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
#endif
pos += len; // consume track number
if ((pos + 2) > block_stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + 2) > avail) {
len = 2;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
pos += 2; // consume timecode
if ((pos + 1) > block_stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + 1) > avail) {
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
unsigned char flags;
status = pReader->Read(pos, 1, &flags);
if (status < 0) { // error or underflow
len = 1;
return status;
}
++pos; // consume flags byte
assert(pos <= avail);
if (pos >= block_stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
const int lacing = int(flags & 0x06) >> 1;
if ((lacing != 0) && (block_stop > avail)) {
len = static_cast<long>(block_stop - pos);
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
status = CreateBlock(0x23, // simple block id
block_start, block_size,
0); // DiscardPadding
if (status != 0)
return status;
m_pos = block_stop;
return 0; // success
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 173,858
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(xml_get_current_column_number)
{
xml_parser *parser;
zval *pind;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "r", &pind) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(parser,xml_parser *, &pind, -1, "XML Parser", le_xml_parser);
RETVAL_LONG(XML_GetCurrentColumnNumber(parser->parser));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 10,982
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: hfs_set_compressed_fflag(struct archive_write_disk *a)
{
int r;
if ((r = lazy_stat(a)) != ARCHIVE_OK)
return (r);
a->st.st_flags |= UF_COMPRESSED;
if (fchflags(a->fd, a->st.st_flags) != 0) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, errno,
"Failed to set UF_COMPRESSED file flag");
return (ARCHIVE_WARN);
}
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
Commit Message: Add ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS option
This fixes a directory traversal in the cpio tool.
CWE ID: CWE-22
| 0
| 43,915
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool DocumentLoader::scheduleArchiveLoad(ResourceLoader* loader, const ResourceRequest& request)
{
if (ArchiveResource* resource = archiveResourceForURL(request.url())) {
m_pendingSubstituteResources.set(loader, resource);
deliverSubstituteResourcesAfterDelay();
return true;
}
if (!m_archive)
return false;
switch (m_archive->type()) {
#if ENABLE(WEB_ARCHIVE)
case Archive::WebArchive:
return m_frame->settings() && m_frame->settings()->webArchiveDebugModeEnabled() && ArchiveFactory::isArchiveMimeType(responseMIMEType());
#endif
#if ENABLE(MHTML)
case Archive::MHTML:
return true; // Always fail the load for resources not included in the MHTML.
#endif
default:
return false;
}
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 105,747
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: views::View* TrayCast::CreateDetailedView(user::LoginStatus status) {
Shell::GetInstance()->metrics()->RecordUserMetricsAction(
ash::UMA_STATUS_AREA_DETAILED_CAST_VIEW);
CHECK(detailed_ == nullptr);
detailed_ = new tray::CastDetailedView(this, cast_config_delegate_, status);
return detailed_;
}
Commit Message: Allow the cast tray to function as expected when the installed extension is missing API methods.
BUG=489445
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1145833003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#330663}
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 119,714
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int initialize_unit_leds(void)
{
/*
* Init the unit LEDs per default they all are
* ok apart from bootstat
*/
uchar buf;
if (i2c_read(BOCO, REG_CTRL_H, 1, &buf, 1) != 0) {
printf("%s: Error reading Boco\n", __func__);
return -1;
}
buf |= MASK_WRL_UNITRUN;
if (i2c_write(BOCO, REG_CTRL_H, 1, &buf, 1) != 0) {
printf("%s: Error writing Boco\n", __func__);
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch '2020-01-22-master-imports'
- Re-add U8500 platform support
- Add bcm968360bg support
- Assorted Keymile fixes
- Other assorted bugfixes
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 89,306
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: X509_SIG *d2i_PKCS8_bio(BIO *bp, X509_SIG **p8)
{
return ASN1_d2i_bio_of(X509_SIG,X509_SIG_new,d2i_X509_SIG,bp,p8);
}
Commit Message: Fix various certificate fingerprint issues.
By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a
certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature.
Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed
this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the
certificate fingerprint for blacklists.
1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits.
If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject
the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits.
2. Check certificate algorithm consistency.
Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the
certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure
errors for some broken certificates.
3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER.
Reencode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received
signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch.
This will reject various cases including garbage after signature
(thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS
program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs
(negative or with leading zeroes).
CVE-2014-8275
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 94,646
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: vmci_transport_packet_init(struct vmci_transport_packet *pkt,
struct sockaddr_vm *src,
struct sockaddr_vm *dst,
u8 type,
u64 size,
u64 mode,
struct vmci_transport_waiting_info *wait,
u16 proto,
struct vmci_handle handle)
{
/* We register the stream control handler as an any cid handle so we
* must always send from a source address of VMADDR_CID_ANY
*/
pkt->dg.src = vmci_make_handle(VMADDR_CID_ANY,
VMCI_TRANSPORT_PACKET_RID);
pkt->dg.dst = vmci_make_handle(dst->svm_cid,
vmci_transport_peer_rid(dst->svm_cid));
pkt->dg.payload_size = sizeof(*pkt) - sizeof(pkt->dg);
pkt->version = VMCI_TRANSPORT_PACKET_VERSION;
pkt->type = type;
pkt->src_port = src->svm_port;
pkt->dst_port = dst->svm_port;
memset(&pkt->proto, 0, sizeof(pkt->proto));
memset(&pkt->_reserved2, 0, sizeof(pkt->_reserved2));
switch (pkt->type) {
case VMCI_TRANSPORT_PACKET_TYPE_INVALID:
pkt->u.size = 0;
break;
case VMCI_TRANSPORT_PACKET_TYPE_REQUEST:
case VMCI_TRANSPORT_PACKET_TYPE_NEGOTIATE:
pkt->u.size = size;
break;
case VMCI_TRANSPORT_PACKET_TYPE_OFFER:
case VMCI_TRANSPORT_PACKET_TYPE_ATTACH:
pkt->u.handle = handle;
break;
case VMCI_TRANSPORT_PACKET_TYPE_WROTE:
case VMCI_TRANSPORT_PACKET_TYPE_READ:
case VMCI_TRANSPORT_PACKET_TYPE_RST:
pkt->u.size = 0;
break;
case VMCI_TRANSPORT_PACKET_TYPE_SHUTDOWN:
pkt->u.mode = mode;
break;
case VMCI_TRANSPORT_PACKET_TYPE_WAITING_READ:
case VMCI_TRANSPORT_PACKET_TYPE_WAITING_WRITE:
memcpy(&pkt->u.wait, wait, sizeof(pkt->u.wait));
break;
case VMCI_TRANSPORT_PACKET_TYPE_REQUEST2:
case VMCI_TRANSPORT_PACKET_TYPE_NEGOTIATE2:
pkt->u.size = size;
pkt->proto = proto;
break;
}
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 40,757
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int emulate_int(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int irq)
{
switch(ctxt->mode) {
case X86EMUL_MODE_REAL:
return emulate_int_real(ctxt, irq);
case X86EMUL_MODE_VM86:
case X86EMUL_MODE_PROT16:
case X86EMUL_MODE_PROT32:
case X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64:
default:
/* Protected mode interrupts unimplemented yet */
return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
}
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: fix missing checks in syscall emulation
On hosts without this patch, 32bit guests will crash (and 64bit guests
may behave in a wrong way) for example by simply executing following
nasm-demo-application:
[bits 32]
global _start
SECTION .text
_start: syscall
(I tested it with winxp and linux - both always crashed)
Disassembly of section .text:
00000000 <_start>:
0: 0f 05 syscall
The reason seems a missing "invalid opcode"-trap (int6) for the
syscall opcode "0f05", which is not available on Intel CPUs
within non-longmodes, as also on some AMD CPUs within legacy-mode.
(depending on CPU vendor, MSR_EFER and cpuid)
Because previous mentioned OSs may not engage corresponding
syscall target-registers (STAR, LSTAR, CSTAR), they remain
NULL and (non trapping) syscalls are leading to multiple
faults and finally crashs.
Depending on the architecture (AMD or Intel) pretended by
guests, various checks according to vendor's documentation
are implemented to overcome the current issue and behave
like the CPUs physical counterparts.
[mtosatti: cleanup/beautify code]
Signed-off-by: Stephan Baerwolf <stephan.baerwolf@tu-ilmenau.de>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 21,802
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LoadingPredictor::HandleOmniboxHint(const GURL& url, bool preconnectable) {
if (!url.is_valid() || !url.has_host() || !IsPreconnectAllowed(profile_))
return;
GURL origin = url.GetOrigin();
bool is_new_origin = origin != last_omnibox_origin_;
last_omnibox_origin_ = origin;
base::TimeTicks now = base::TimeTicks::Now();
if (preconnectable) {
if (is_new_origin || now - last_omnibox_preconnect_time_ >=
kMinDelayBetweenPreconnectRequests) {
last_omnibox_preconnect_time_ = now;
url::Origin url_origin = url::Origin::Create(url);
preconnect_manager()->StartPreconnectUrl(
url, true, net::NetworkIsolationKey(url_origin, url_origin));
}
return;
}
if (is_new_origin || now - last_omnibox_preresolve_time_ >=
kMinDelayBetweenPreresolveRequests) {
last_omnibox_preresolve_time_ = now;
preconnect_manager()->StartPreresolveHost(url);
}
}
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311}
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 136,849
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int tty_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
{
struct tty_struct *tty;
int noctty, retval;
struct tty_driver *driver = NULL;
int index;
dev_t device = inode->i_rdev;
unsigned saved_flags = filp->f_flags;
nonseekable_open(inode, filp);
retry_open:
retval = tty_alloc_file(filp);
if (retval)
return -ENOMEM;
noctty = filp->f_flags & O_NOCTTY;
index = -1;
retval = 0;
tty = tty_open_current_tty(device, filp);
if (!tty) {
mutex_lock(&tty_mutex);
driver = tty_lookup_driver(device, filp, &noctty, &index);
if (IS_ERR(driver)) {
retval = PTR_ERR(driver);
goto err_unlock;
}
/* check whether we're reopening an existing tty */
tty = tty_driver_lookup_tty(driver, inode, index);
if (IS_ERR(tty)) {
retval = PTR_ERR(tty);
goto err_unlock;
}
if (tty) {
mutex_unlock(&tty_mutex);
retval = tty_lock_interruptible(tty);
if (retval) {
if (retval == -EINTR)
retval = -ERESTARTSYS;
goto err_unref;
}
/* safe to drop the kref from tty_driver_lookup_tty() */
tty_kref_put(tty);
retval = tty_reopen(tty);
if (retval < 0) {
tty_unlock(tty);
tty = ERR_PTR(retval);
}
} else { /* Returns with the tty_lock held for now */
tty = tty_init_dev(driver, index);
mutex_unlock(&tty_mutex);
}
tty_driver_kref_put(driver);
}
if (IS_ERR(tty)) {
retval = PTR_ERR(tty);
if (retval != -EAGAIN || signal_pending(current))
goto err_file;
tty_free_file(filp);
schedule();
goto retry_open;
}
tty_add_file(tty, filp);
check_tty_count(tty, __func__);
if (tty->driver->type == TTY_DRIVER_TYPE_PTY &&
tty->driver->subtype == PTY_TYPE_MASTER)
noctty = 1;
tty_debug_hangup(tty, "opening (count=%d)\n", tty->count);
if (tty->ops->open)
retval = tty->ops->open(tty, filp);
else
retval = -ENODEV;
filp->f_flags = saved_flags;
if (retval) {
tty_debug_hangup(tty, "open error %d, releasing\n", retval);
tty_unlock(tty); /* need to call tty_release without BTM */
tty_release(inode, filp);
if (retval != -ERESTARTSYS)
return retval;
if (signal_pending(current))
return retval;
schedule();
/*
* Need to reset f_op in case a hangup happened.
*/
if (tty_hung_up_p(filp))
filp->f_op = &tty_fops;
goto retry_open;
}
clear_bit(TTY_HUPPED, &tty->flags);
read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
if (!noctty &&
current->signal->leader &&
!current->signal->tty &&
tty->session == NULL) {
/*
* Don't let a process that only has write access to the tty
* obtain the privileges associated with having a tty as
* controlling terminal (being able to reopen it with full
* access through /dev/tty, being able to perform pushback).
* Many distributions set the group of all ttys to "tty" and
* grant write-only access to all terminals for setgid tty
* binaries, which should not imply full privileges on all ttys.
*
* This could theoretically break old code that performs open()
* on a write-only file descriptor. In that case, it might be
* necessary to also permit this if
* inode_permission(inode, MAY_READ) == 0.
*/
if (filp->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
__proc_set_tty(tty);
}
spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
tty_unlock(tty);
return 0;
err_unlock:
mutex_unlock(&tty_mutex);
err_unref:
/* after locks to avoid deadlock */
if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(driver))
tty_driver_kref_put(driver);
err_file:
tty_free_file(filp);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: tty: Fix unsafe ldisc reference via ioctl(TIOCGETD)
ioctl(TIOCGETD) retrieves the line discipline id directly from the
ldisc because the line discipline id (c_line) in termios is untrustworthy;
userspace may have set termios via ioctl(TCSETS*) without actually
changing the line discipline via ioctl(TIOCSETD).
However, directly accessing the current ldisc via tty->ldisc is
unsafe; the ldisc ptr dereferenced may be stale if the line discipline
is changing via ioctl(TIOCSETD) or hangup.
Wait for the line discipline reference (just like read() or write())
to retrieve the "current" line discipline id.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 55,930
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: unsigned int ipmi_addr_length(int addr_type)
{
if (addr_type == IPMI_SYSTEM_INTERFACE_ADDR_TYPE)
return sizeof(struct ipmi_system_interface_addr);
if ((addr_type == IPMI_IPMB_ADDR_TYPE)
|| (addr_type == IPMI_IPMB_BROADCAST_ADDR_TYPE))
return sizeof(struct ipmi_ipmb_addr);
if (addr_type == IPMI_LAN_ADDR_TYPE)
return sizeof(struct ipmi_lan_addr);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ipmi: fix use-after-free of user->release_barrier.rda
When we do the following test, we got oops in ipmi_msghandler driver
while((1))
do
service ipmievd restart & service ipmievd restart
done
---------------------------------------------------------------
[ 294.230186] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000803fea6ea008
[ 294.230188] Mem abort info:
[ 294.230190] ESR = 0x96000004
[ 294.230191] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 294.230193] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 294.230194] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 294.230195] Data abort info:
[ 294.230196] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004
[ 294.230197] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 294.230199] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000a1c1b75a
[ 294.230201] [0000803fea6ea008] pgd=0000000000000000
[ 294.230204] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP
[ 294.235211] Modules linked in: nls_utf8 isofs rpcrdma ib_iser ib_srpt target_core_mod ib_srp scsi_transport_srp ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm iw_cm dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce sha2_ce ses sha256_arm64 sha1_ce hibmc_drm hisi_sas_v2_hw enclosure sg hisi_sas_main sbsa_gwdt ip_tables mlx5_ib ib_uverbs marvell ib_core mlx5_core ixgbe ipmi_si mdio hns_dsaf ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler hns_enet_drv hns_mdio
[ 294.277745] CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.0.0-rc2+ #113
[ 294.285511] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.37 11/21/2017
[ 294.292835] pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO)
[ 294.297695] pc : __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.301940] lr : acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.307853] sp : ffff00001001bc80
[ 294.311208] x29: ffff00001001bc80 x28: ffff0000117e5000
[ 294.316594] x27: 0000000000000000 x26: dead000000000100
[ 294.321980] x25: dead000000000200 x24: ffff803f6bd06800
[ 294.327366] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000000
[ 294.332752] x21: ffff00001001bd04 x20: ffff80df33d19018
[ 294.338137] x19: ffff80df33d19018 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 294.343523] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 294.348908] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000002
[ 294.354293] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 294.359679] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000100000
[ 294.365065] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 0000000000000004
[ 294.370451] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffff80df34558678
[ 294.375836] x5 : 000000000000000c x4 : 0000000000000000
[ 294.381221] x3 : 0000000000000001 x2 : 0000803fea6ea000
[ 294.386607] x1 : 0000803fea6ea008 x0 : 0000000000000001
[ 294.391994] Process swapper/3 (pid: 0, stack limit = 0x0000000083087293)
[ 294.398791] Call trace:
[ 294.401266] __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.405154] acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.410716] deliver_response+0x80/0xf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.416189] deliver_local_response+0x28/0x68 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.422193] handle_one_recv_msg+0x158/0xcf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.432050] handle_new_recv_msgs+0xc0/0x210 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.441984] smi_recv_tasklet+0x8c/0x158 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.451618] tasklet_action_common.isra.5+0x88/0x138
[ 294.460661] tasklet_action+0x2c/0x38
[ 294.468191] __do_softirq+0x120/0x2f8
[ 294.475561] irq_exit+0x134/0x140
[ 294.482445] __handle_domain_irq+0x6c/0xc0
[ 294.489954] gic_handle_irq+0xb8/0x178
[ 294.497037] el1_irq+0xb0/0x140
[ 294.503381] arch_cpu_idle+0x34/0x1a8
[ 294.510096] do_idle+0x1d4/0x290
[ 294.516322] cpu_startup_entry+0x28/0x30
[ 294.523230] secondary_start_kernel+0x184/0x1d0
[ 294.530657] Code: d538d082 d2800023 8b010c81 8b020021 (c85f7c25)
[ 294.539746] ---[ end trace 8a7a880dee570b29 ]---
[ 294.547341] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
[ 294.556837] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 294.563996] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 294.570515] CPU features: 0x002,21006008
[ 294.577638] Memory Limit: none
[ 294.587178] Starting crashdump kernel...
[ 294.594314] Bye!
Because the user->release_barrier.rda is freed in ipmi_destroy_user(), but
the refcount is not zero, when acquire_ipmi_user() uses user->release_barrier.rda
in __srcu_read_lock(), it causes oops.
Fix this by calling cleanup_srcu_struct() when the refcount is zero.
Fixes: e86ee2d44b44 ("ipmi: Rework locking and shutdown for hot remove")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.18
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 91,262
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ContainerNode::setFocus(bool received)
{
if (focused() == received)
return;
Node::setFocus(received);
setNeedsStyleRecalc();
}
Commit Message: https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=93587
Node::replaceChild() can create bad DOM topology with MutationEvent, Part 2
Reviewed by Kent Tamura.
Source/WebCore:
This is a followup of r124156. replaceChild() has yet another hidden
MutationEvent trigger. This change added a guard for it.
Test: fast/events/mutation-during-replace-child-2.html
* dom/ContainerNode.cpp:
(WebCore::ContainerNode::replaceChild):
LayoutTests:
* fast/events/mutation-during-replace-child-2-expected.txt: Added.
* fast/events/mutation-during-replace-child-2.html: Added.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@125237 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 98,710
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BrowserPluginGuest* BrowserPluginGuest::Create(
int instance_id,
WebContentsImpl* web_contents,
const BrowserPluginHostMsg_CreateGuest_Params& params) {
RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("BrowserPlugin.Guest.Create"));
if (factory_) {
return factory_->CreateBrowserPluginGuest(instance_id,
web_contents,
params);
}
return new BrowserPluginGuest(instance_id, web_contents,params);
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 114,395
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: hfs_write_decmpfs_block(struct archive_write_disk *a, const char *buff,
size_t size)
{
const char *buffer_to_write;
size_t bytes_to_write;
int ret;
if (a->decmpfs_block_count == (unsigned)-1) {
void *new_block;
size_t new_size;
unsigned int block_count;
if (a->decmpfs_header_p == NULL) {
new_block = malloc(MAX_DECMPFS_XATTR_SIZE
+ sizeof(uint32_t));
if (new_block == NULL) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM,
"Can't allocate memory for decmpfs");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
a->decmpfs_header_p = new_block;
}
a->decmpfs_attr_size = DECMPFS_HEADER_SIZE;
archive_le32enc(&a->decmpfs_header_p[DECMPFS_COMPRESSION_MAGIC],
DECMPFS_MAGIC);
archive_le32enc(&a->decmpfs_header_p[DECMPFS_COMPRESSION_TYPE],
CMP_RESOURCE_FORK);
archive_le64enc(&a->decmpfs_header_p[DECMPFS_UNCOMPRESSED_SIZE],
a->filesize);
/* Calculate a block count of the file. */
block_count =
(a->filesize + MAX_DECMPFS_BLOCK_SIZE -1) /
MAX_DECMPFS_BLOCK_SIZE;
/*
* Allocate buffer for resource fork.
* Set up related pointers;
*/
new_size =
RSRC_H_SIZE + /* header */
4 + /* Block count */
(block_count * sizeof(uint32_t) * 2) +
RSRC_F_SIZE; /* footer */
if (new_size > a->resource_fork_allocated_size) {
new_block = realloc(a->resource_fork, new_size);
if (new_block == NULL) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM,
"Can't allocate memory for ResourceFork");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
a->resource_fork_allocated_size = new_size;
a->resource_fork = new_block;
}
/* Allocate uncompressed buffer */
if (a->uncompressed_buffer == NULL) {
new_block = malloc(MAX_DECMPFS_BLOCK_SIZE);
if (new_block == NULL) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM,
"Can't allocate memory for decmpfs");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
a->uncompressed_buffer = new_block;
}
a->block_remaining_bytes = MAX_DECMPFS_BLOCK_SIZE;
a->file_remaining_bytes = a->filesize;
a->compressed_buffer_remaining = a->compressed_buffer_size;
/*
* Set up a resource fork.
*/
a->rsrc_xattr_options = XATTR_CREATE;
/* Get the position where we are going to set a bunch
* of block info. */
a->decmpfs_block_info =
(uint32_t *)(a->resource_fork + RSRC_H_SIZE);
/* Set the block count to the resource fork. */
archive_le32enc(a->decmpfs_block_info++, block_count);
/* Get the position where we are goint to set compressed
* data. */
a->compressed_rsrc_position =
RSRC_H_SIZE + 4 + (block_count * 8);
a->compressed_rsrc_position_v = a->compressed_rsrc_position;
a->decmpfs_block_count = block_count;
}
/* Ignore redundant bytes. */
if (a->file_remaining_bytes == 0)
return ((ssize_t)size);
/* Do not overrun a block size. */
if (size > a->block_remaining_bytes)
bytes_to_write = a->block_remaining_bytes;
else
bytes_to_write = size;
/* Do not overrun the file size. */
if (bytes_to_write > a->file_remaining_bytes)
bytes_to_write = a->file_remaining_bytes;
/* For efficiency, if a copy length is full of the uncompressed
* buffer size, do not copy writing data to it. */
if (bytes_to_write == MAX_DECMPFS_BLOCK_SIZE)
buffer_to_write = buff;
else {
memcpy(a->uncompressed_buffer +
MAX_DECMPFS_BLOCK_SIZE - a->block_remaining_bytes,
buff, bytes_to_write);
buffer_to_write = a->uncompressed_buffer;
}
a->block_remaining_bytes -= bytes_to_write;
a->file_remaining_bytes -= bytes_to_write;
if (a->block_remaining_bytes == 0 || a->file_remaining_bytes == 0) {
ret = hfs_drive_compressor(a, buffer_to_write,
MAX_DECMPFS_BLOCK_SIZE - a->block_remaining_bytes);
if (ret < 0)
return (ret);
a->block_remaining_bytes = MAX_DECMPFS_BLOCK_SIZE;
}
/* Ignore redundant bytes. */
if (a->file_remaining_bytes == 0)
return ((ssize_t)size);
return (bytes_to_write);
}
Commit Message: Add ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS option
This fixes a directory traversal in the cpio tool.
CWE ID: CWE-22
| 0
| 43,921
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void sd_unprep_fn(struct request_queue *q, struct request *rq)
{
if (rq->cmd_flags & REQ_DISCARD) {
free_page((unsigned long)rq->buffer);
rq->buffer = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: block: fail SCSI passthrough ioctls on partition devices
Linux allows executing the SG_IO ioctl on a partition or LVM volume, and
will pass the command to the underlying block device. This is
well-known, but it is also a large security problem when (via Unix
permissions, ACLs, SELinux or a combination thereof) a program or user
needs to be granted access only to part of the disk.
This patch lets partitions forward a small set of harmless ioctls;
others are logged with printk so that we can see which ioctls are
actually sent. In my tests only CDROM_GET_CAPABILITY actually occurred.
Of course it was being sent to a (partition on a) hard disk, so it would
have failed with ENOTTY and the patch isn't changing anything in
practice. Still, I'm treating it specially to avoid spamming the logs.
In principle, this restriction should include programs running with
CAP_SYS_RAWIO. If for example I let a program access /dev/sda2 and
/dev/sdb, it still should not be able to read/write outside the
boundaries of /dev/sda2 independent of the capabilities. However, for
now programs with CAP_SYS_RAWIO will still be allowed to send the
ioctls. Their actions will still be logged.
This patch does not affect the non-libata IDE driver. That driver
however already tests for bd != bd->bd_contains before issuing some
ioctl; it could be restricted further to forbid these ioctls even for
programs running with CAP_SYS_ADMIN/CAP_SYS_RAWIO.
Cc: linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: James Bottomley <JBottomley@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
[ Make it also print the command name when warning - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 94,432
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(pg_lo_unlink)
{
zval *pgsql_link = NULL;
zend_long oid_long;
char *oid_string, *end_ptr;
size_t oid_strlen;
PGconn *pgsql;
Oid oid;
int id = -1;
int argc = ZEND_NUM_ARGS();
/* accept string type since Oid type is unsigned int */
if (zend_parse_parameters_ex(ZEND_PARSE_PARAMS_QUIET, argc,
"rs", &pgsql_link, &oid_string, &oid_strlen) == SUCCESS) {
oid = (Oid)strtoul(oid_string, &end_ptr, 10);
if ((oid_string+oid_strlen) != end_ptr) {
/* wrong integer format */
php_error_docref(NULL, E_NOTICE, "Wrong OID value passed");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
else if (zend_parse_parameters_ex(ZEND_PARSE_PARAMS_QUIET, argc,
"rl", &pgsql_link, &oid_long) == SUCCESS) {
if (oid_long <= InvalidOid) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_NOTICE, "Invalid OID specified");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
oid = (Oid)oid_long;
}
else if (zend_parse_parameters_ex(ZEND_PARSE_PARAMS_QUIET, argc,
"s", &oid_string, &oid_strlen) == SUCCESS) {
oid = (Oid)strtoul(oid_string, &end_ptr, 10);
if ((oid_string+oid_strlen) != end_ptr) {
/* wrong integer format */
php_error_docref(NULL, E_NOTICE, "Wrong OID value passed");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
id = FETCH_DEFAULT_LINK();
CHECK_DEFAULT_LINK(id);
}
else if (zend_parse_parameters_ex(ZEND_PARSE_PARAMS_QUIET, argc,
"l", &oid_long) == SUCCESS) {
if (oid_long <= InvalidOid) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_NOTICE, "Invalid OID is specified");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
oid = (Oid)oid_long;
id = FETCH_DEFAULT_LINK();
CHECK_DEFAULT_LINK(id);
}
else {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Requires 1 or 2 arguments");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (pgsql_link == NULL && id == -1) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE2(pgsql, PGconn *, pgsql_link, id, "PostgreSQL link", le_link, le_plink);
if (lo_unlink(pgsql, oid) == -1) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Unable to delete PostgreSQL large object %u", oid);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETURN_TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 5,158
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int data_source_bitrate() { return data_source_->bitrate_; }
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 144,277
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gfx::Rect RenderWidgetHostViewAndroid::GetViewBounds() const {
if (!content_view_core_)
return gfx::Rect();
return content_view_core_->GetBounds();
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 114,752
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: InspectorClientImpl::InspectorClientImpl(WebViewImpl* webView)
: m_inspectedWebView(webView)
{
ASSERT(m_inspectedWebView);
}
Commit Message: [4/4] Process clearBrowserCahce/cookies commands in browser.
BUG=366585
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/251183005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172984 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 114,168
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void vmxnet3_pci_realize(PCIDevice *pci_dev, Error **errp)
{
DeviceState *dev = DEVICE(pci_dev);
VMXNET3State *s = VMXNET3(pci_dev);
int ret;
VMW_CBPRN("Starting init...");
memory_region_init_io(&s->bar0, OBJECT(s), &b0_ops, s,
"vmxnet3-b0", VMXNET3_PT_REG_SIZE);
pci_register_bar(pci_dev, VMXNET3_BAR0_IDX,
PCI_BASE_ADDRESS_SPACE_MEMORY, &s->bar0);
memory_region_init_io(&s->bar1, OBJECT(s), &b1_ops, s,
"vmxnet3-b1", VMXNET3_VD_REG_SIZE);
pci_register_bar(pci_dev, VMXNET3_BAR1_IDX,
PCI_BASE_ADDRESS_SPACE_MEMORY, &s->bar1);
memory_region_init(&s->msix_bar, OBJECT(s), "vmxnet3-msix-bar",
VMXNET3_MSIX_BAR_SIZE);
pci_register_bar(pci_dev, VMXNET3_MSIX_BAR_IDX,
PCI_BASE_ADDRESS_SPACE_MEMORY, &s->msix_bar);
vmxnet3_reset_interrupt_states(s);
/* Interrupt pin A */
pci_dev->config[PCI_INTERRUPT_PIN] = 0x01;
ret = msi_init(pci_dev, VMXNET3_MSI_OFFSET(s), VMXNET3_MAX_NMSIX_INTRS,
VMXNET3_USE_64BIT, VMXNET3_PER_VECTOR_MASK, NULL);
/* Any error other than -ENOTSUP(board's MSI support is broken)
* is a programming error. Fall back to INTx silently on -ENOTSUP */
assert(!ret || ret == -ENOTSUP);
if (!vmxnet3_init_msix(s)) {
VMW_WRPRN("Failed to initialize MSI-X, configuration is inconsistent.");
}
vmxnet3_net_init(s);
if (pci_is_express(pci_dev)) {
if (pci_bus_is_express(pci_dev->bus)) {
pcie_endpoint_cap_init(pci_dev, VMXNET3_EXP_EP_OFFSET);
}
pcie_dev_ser_num_init(pci_dev, VMXNET3_DSN_OFFSET,
vmxnet3_device_serial_num(s));
}
register_savevm(dev, "vmxnet3-msix", -1, 1,
vmxnet3_msix_save, vmxnet3_msix_load, s);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 9,027
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void mcryptd_hash_digest(struct crypto_async_request *req_async, int err)
{
struct mcryptd_hash_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(req_async->tfm);
struct crypto_shash *child = ctx->child;
struct ahash_request *req = ahash_request_cast(req_async);
struct mcryptd_hash_request_ctx *rctx = ahash_request_ctx(req);
struct shash_desc *desc = &rctx->desc;
if (unlikely(err == -EINPROGRESS))
goto out;
desc->tfm = child;
desc->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP; /* check this again */
err = shash_ahash_mcryptd_digest(req, desc);
if (err) {
req->base.complete = rctx->complete;
goto out;
}
return;
out:
local_bh_disable();
rctx->complete(&req->base, err);
local_bh_enable();
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 45,828
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void php_image_filter_brightness(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS)
{
zval *SIM;
gdImagePtr im_src;
long brightness, tmp;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "zll", &SIM, &tmp, &brightness) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(im_src, gdImagePtr, &SIM, -1, "Image", le_gd);
if (im_src == NULL) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (gdImageBrightness(im_src, (int)brightness) == 1) {
RETURN_TRUE;
}
RETURN_FALSE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 15,195
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool LocalFrameClientImpl::AllowScriptExtensions() {
return true;
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 145,205
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void default_print_str(WriterContext *wctx, const char *key, const char *value)
{
DefaultContext *def = wctx->priv;
if (!def->nokey)
printf("%s%s=", wctx->section_pbuf[wctx->level].str, key);
printf("%s\n", value);
}
Commit Message: ffprobe: Fix null pointer dereference with color primaries
Found-by: AD-lab of venustech
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 61,327
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void destroy_pxe_menu(struct pxe_menu *cfg)
{
struct list_head *pos, *n;
struct pxe_label *label;
if (cfg->title)
free(cfg->title);
if (cfg->default_label)
free(cfg->default_label);
list_for_each_safe(pos, n, &cfg->labels) {
label = list_entry(pos, struct pxe_label, list);
label_destroy(label);
}
free(cfg);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch '2020-01-22-master-imports'
- Re-add U8500 platform support
- Add bcm968360bg support
- Assorted Keymile fixes
- Other assorted bugfixes
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 89,330
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: exsltDateDateTime (void)
{
xmlChar *ret = NULL;
#ifdef WITH_TIME
exsltDateValPtr cur;
cur = exsltDateCurrent();
if (cur != NULL) {
ret = exsltDateFormatDateTime(&(cur->value.date));
exsltDateFreeDate(cur);
}
#endif
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 156,594
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: make_next_duplicate_name (const char *base,
const char *suffix,
int count,
int max_length)
{
const char *format;
char *result;
int unshortened_length;
gboolean use_count;
if (count < 1)
{
g_warning ("bad count %d in get_duplicate_name", count);
count = 1;
}
if (count <= 2)
{
/* Handle special cases for low numbers.
* Perhaps for some locales we will need to add more.
*/
switch (count)
{
default:
{
g_assert_not_reached ();
/* fall through */
}
case 1:
{
format = FIRST_COPY_DUPLICATE_FORMAT;
}
break;
case 2:
{
format = SECOND_COPY_DUPLICATE_FORMAT;
}
break;
}
use_count = FALSE;
}
else
{
/* Handle special cases for the first few numbers of each ten.
* For locales where getting this exactly right is difficult,
* these can just be made all the same as the general case below.
*/
/* Handle special cases for x11th - x20th.
*/
switch (count % 100)
{
case 11:
{
format = X11TH_COPY_DUPLICATE_FORMAT;
}
break;
case 12:
{
format = X12TH_COPY_DUPLICATE_FORMAT;
}
break;
case 13:
{
format = X13TH_COPY_DUPLICATE_FORMAT;
}
break;
default:
{
format = NULL;
}
break;
}
if (format == NULL)
{
switch (count % 10)
{
case 1:
{
format = ST_COPY_DUPLICATE_FORMAT;
}
break;
case 2:
{
format = ND_COPY_DUPLICATE_FORMAT;
}
break;
case 3:
{
format = RD_COPY_DUPLICATE_FORMAT;
}
break;
default:
{
/* The general case. */
format = TH_COPY_DUPLICATE_FORMAT;
}
break;
}
}
use_count = TRUE;
}
#pragma GCC diagnostic push
#pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wformat-nonliteral"
if (use_count)
{
result = g_strdup_printf (format, base, count, suffix);
}
else
{
result = g_strdup_printf (format, base, suffix);
}
if (max_length > 0 && (unshortened_length = strlen (result)) > max_length)
{
char *new_base;
new_base = shorten_utf8_string (base, unshortened_length - max_length);
if (new_base)
{
g_free (result);
if (use_count)
{
result = g_strdup_printf (format, new_base, count, suffix);
}
else
{
result = g_strdup_printf (format, new_base, suffix);
}
g_assert (strlen (result) <= max_length);
g_free (new_base);
}
}
#pragma GCC diagnostic pop
return result;
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 61,091
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: JsVar *jspGetStackTrace() {
JsVar *stackTraceName = jsvFindChildFromString(execInfo.hiddenRoot, JSPARSE_STACKTRACE_VAR, false);
if (stackTraceName) {
JsVar *stackTrace = jsvSkipName(stackTraceName);
jsvRemoveChild(execInfo.hiddenRoot, stackTraceName);
jsvUnLock(stackTraceName);
return stackTrace;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug if using an undefined member of an object for for..in (fix #1437)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 82,297
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Element* Document::ElementFromPoint(int x, int y) const {
if (GetLayoutViewItem().IsNull())
return nullptr;
return TreeScope::ElementFromPoint(x, y);
}
Commit Message: Inherit referrer and policy when creating a nested browsing context
BUG=763194
R=estark@chromium.org
Change-Id: Ide3950269adf26ba221f573dfa088e95291ab676
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/732652
Reviewed-by: Emily Stark <estark@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511211}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 146,933
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void work_around_broken_dhclient(struct virtio_net_hdr *hdr,
uint8_t *buf, size_t size)
{
if ((hdr->flags & VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM) && /* missing csum */
(size > 27 && size < 1500) && /* normal sized MTU */
(buf[12] == 0x08 && buf[13] == 0x00) && /* ethertype == IPv4 */
(buf[23] == 17) && /* ip.protocol == UDP */
(buf[34] == 0 && buf[35] == 67)) { /* udp.srcport == bootps */
net_checksum_calculate(buf, size);
hdr->flags &= ~VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 15,868
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FrameView::scheduleUpdateWidgetsIfNecessary()
{
ASSERT(!isInPerformLayout());
if (m_updateWidgetsTimer.isActive() || m_widgetUpdateSet.isEmpty())
return;
m_updateWidgetsTimer.startOneShot(0, FROM_HERE);
}
Commit Message: Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
R=vollick@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 119,903
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: base::FilePath DownloadItemImpl::GetFileNameToReportUser() const {
if (!display_name_.empty())
return display_name_;
return GetTargetFilePath().BaseName();
}
Commit Message: Downloads : Fixed an issue of opening incorrect download file
When one download overwrites another completed download, calling download.open in the old download causes the new download to open, which could be dangerous and undesirable. In this CL, we are trying to avoid this by blocking the opening of the old download.
Bug: 793620
Change-Id: Ic948175756700ad7c08489c3cc347330daedb6f8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/826477
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <dtrainor@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Shakti Sahu <shaktisahu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525810}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 146,311
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void kvm_ioapic_make_eoibitmap_request(struct kvm *kvm)
{
struct kvm_ioapic *ioapic = kvm->arch.vioapic;
if (!kvm_apic_vid_enabled(kvm) || !ioapic)
return;
kvm_make_update_eoibitmap_request(kvm);
}
Commit Message: KVM: Fix bounds checking in ioapic indirect register reads (CVE-2013-1798)
If the guest specifies a IOAPIC_REG_SELECT with an invalid value and follows
that with a read of the IOAPIC_REG_WINDOW KVM does not properly validate
that request. ioapic_read_indirect contains an
ASSERT(redir_index < IOAPIC_NUM_PINS), but the ASSERT has no effect in
non-debug builds. In recent kernels this allows a guest to cause a kernel
oops by reading invalid memory. In older kernels (pre-3.3) this allows a
guest to read from large ranges of host memory.
Tested: tested against apic unit tests.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 33,257
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void impeg2d_peek_next_start_code(dec_state_t *ps_dec)
{
stream_t *ps_stream;
ps_stream = &ps_dec->s_bit_stream;
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush_to_byte_boundary(ps_stream);
while ((impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,START_CODE_PREFIX_LEN) != START_CODE_PREFIX)
&& (ps_dec->s_bit_stream.u4_offset < ps_dec->s_bit_stream.u4_max_offset))
{
impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,8);
}
return;
}
Commit Message: Fix for handling streams which resulted in negative num_mbs_left
Bug: 26070014
Change-Id: Id9f063a2c72a802d991b92abaf00ec687db5bb0f
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 161,608
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void voidMethodUnsignedShortArgMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
ExceptionState exceptionState(ExceptionState::ExecutionContext, "voidMethodUnsignedShortArg", "TestObjectPython", info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate());
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() < 1)) {
exceptionState.throwTypeError(ExceptionMessages::notEnoughArguments(1, info.Length()));
exceptionState.throwIfNeeded();
return;
}
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_EXCEPTION_VOID(unsigned, unsignedShortArg, toUInt16(info[0], exceptionState), exceptionState);
imp->voidMethodUnsignedShortArg(unsignedShortArg);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 122,911
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void rt_cache_flush(struct net *net, int delay)
{
rt_cache_invalidate(net);
if (delay >= 0)
rt_do_flush(net, !in_softirq());
}
Commit Message: net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5.
Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.
MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)
Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic
regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and
use a full 32-bit sequence number.
For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.
Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 25,149
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int req_escape_html(lua_State *L)
{
request_rec *r = ap_lua_check_request_rec(L, 1);
const char *s = luaL_checkstring(L, 2);
lua_pushstring(L, ap_escape_html(r->pool, s));
return 1;
}
Commit Message: *) SECURITY: CVE-2015-0228 (cve.mitre.org)
mod_lua: A maliciously crafted websockets PING after a script
calls r:wsupgrade() can cause a child process crash.
[Edward Lu <Chaosed0 gmail.com>]
Discovered by Guido Vranken <guidovranken gmail.com>
Submitted by: Edward Lu
Committed by: covener
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1657261 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 45,133
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void *id_lookup(int id)
{
return g_hash_table_lookup(g_ids, id_key(id));
}
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 27,199
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(imagefilledarc)
{
zval *IM;
long cx, cy, w, h, ST, E, col, style;
gdImagePtr im;
int e, st;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rllllllll", &IM, &cx, &cy, &w, &h, &ST, &E, &col, &style) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(im, gdImagePtr, &IM, -1, "Image", le_gd);
e = E;
if (e < 0) {
e %= 360;
}
st = ST;
if (st < 0) {
st %= 360;
}
gdImageFilledArc(im, cx, cy, w, h, st, e, col, style);
RETURN_TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 15,095
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: size_t AppListSyncableService::GetNumSyncItemsForTest() {
GetModel();
return sync_items_.size();
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 123,906
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void voidMethodOptionalStringArgMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() <= 0)) {
imp->voidMethodOptionalStringArg();
return;
}
V8TRYCATCH_FOR_V8STRINGRESOURCE_VOID(V8StringResource<>, optionalStringArg, info[0]);
imp->voidMethodOptionalStringArg(optionalStringArg);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 122,864
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Message(PassRefPtr<BlobDataHandle> blobDataHandle)
: type(MessageTypeBlob), blobDataHandle(blobDataHandle) {}
Commit Message: [Presentation API] Add layout test for connection.close() and fix test failures
Add layout test.
1-UA connection.close() hits NOTREACHED() in PresentationConnection::didChangeState(). Use PresentationConnection::didClose() instead.
BUG=697719
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2730123003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#455225}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 129,528
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int set_bit_to_user(int nr, void __user *addr)
{
unsigned long log = (unsigned long)addr;
struct page *page;
void *base;
int bit = nr + (log % PAGE_SIZE) * 8;
int r;
r = get_user_pages_fast(log, 1, 1, &page);
if (r < 0)
return r;
BUG_ON(r != 1);
base = kmap_atomic(page);
set_bit(bit, base);
kunmap_atomic(base);
set_page_dirty_lock(page);
put_page(page);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: vhost: fix length for cross region descriptor
If a single descriptor crosses a region, the
second chunk length should be decremented
by size translated so far, instead it includes
the full descriptor length.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 33,773
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ieee802_11_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *p, u_int length, u_int orig_caplen, int pad,
u_int fcslen)
{
uint16_t fc;
u_int caplen, hdrlen, meshdrlen;
struct lladdr_info src, dst;
int llc_hdrlen;
caplen = orig_caplen;
/* Remove FCS, if present */
if (length < fcslen) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return caplen;
}
length -= fcslen;
if (caplen > length) {
/* Amount of FCS in actual packet data, if any */
fcslen = caplen - length;
caplen -= fcslen;
ndo->ndo_snapend -= fcslen;
}
if (caplen < IEEE802_11_FC_LEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return orig_caplen;
}
fc = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(p);
hdrlen = extract_header_length(ndo, fc);
if (hdrlen == 0) {
/* Unknown frame type or control frame subtype; quit. */
return (0);
}
if (pad)
hdrlen = roundup2(hdrlen, 4);
if (ndo->ndo_Hflag && FC_TYPE(fc) == T_DATA &&
DATA_FRAME_IS_QOS(FC_SUBTYPE(fc))) {
meshdrlen = extract_mesh_header_length(p+hdrlen);
hdrlen += meshdrlen;
} else
meshdrlen = 0;
if (caplen < hdrlen) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return hdrlen;
}
if (ndo->ndo_eflag)
ieee_802_11_hdr_print(ndo, fc, p, hdrlen, meshdrlen);
/*
* Go past the 802.11 header.
*/
length -= hdrlen;
caplen -= hdrlen;
p += hdrlen;
src.addr_string = etheraddr_string;
dst.addr_string = etheraddr_string;
switch (FC_TYPE(fc)) {
case T_MGMT:
get_mgmt_src_dst_mac(p - hdrlen, &src.addr, &dst.addr);
if (!mgmt_body_print(ndo, fc, src.addr, p, length)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return hdrlen;
}
break;
case T_CTRL:
if (!ctrl_body_print(ndo, fc, p - hdrlen)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return hdrlen;
}
break;
case T_DATA:
if (DATA_FRAME_IS_NULL(FC_SUBTYPE(fc)))
return hdrlen; /* no-data frame */
/* There may be a problem w/ AP not having this bit set */
if (FC_PROTECTED(fc)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Data"));
if (!wep_print(ndo, p)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return hdrlen;
}
} else {
get_data_src_dst_mac(fc, p - hdrlen, &src.addr, &dst.addr);
llc_hdrlen = llc_print(ndo, p, length, caplen, &src, &dst);
if (llc_hdrlen < 0) {
/*
* Some kinds of LLC packet we cannot
* handle intelligently
*/
if (!ndo->ndo_suppress_default_print)
ND_DEFAULTPRINT(p, caplen);
llc_hdrlen = -llc_hdrlen;
}
hdrlen += llc_hdrlen;
}
break;
default:
/* We shouldn't get here - we should already have quit */
break;
}
return hdrlen;
}
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-16227/IEEE 802.11: add a missing bounds check
ieee802_11_print() tried to access the Mesh Flags subfield of the Mesh
Control field to find the size of the latter and increment the expected
802.11 header length before checking it is fully present in the input
buffer. Add an intermediate bounds check to make it safe.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Ryan Ackroyd.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 1
| 169,821
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void jas_icccurv_dump(jas_iccattrval_t *attrval, FILE *out)
{
int i;
jas_icccurv_t *curv = &attrval->data.curv;
fprintf(out, "number of entries = %"PRIuFAST32"\n", curv->numents);
if (curv->numents == 1) {
fprintf(out, "gamma = %f\n", curv->ents[0] / 256.0);
} else {
for (i = 0; i < JAS_CAST(int, curv->numents); ++i) {
if (i < 3 || i >= JAS_CAST(int, curv->numents) - 3) {
fprintf(out, "entry[%d] = %f\n", i, curv->ents[i] / 65535.0);
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 72,692
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: try_to_wake_up(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int state, int wake_flags)
{
unsigned long flags;
int cpu, success = 0;
smp_wmb();
raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&p->pi_lock, flags);
if (!(p->state & state))
goto out;
success = 1; /* we're going to change ->state */
cpu = task_cpu(p);
if (p->on_rq && ttwu_remote(p, wake_flags))
goto stat;
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
/*
* If the owning (remote) cpu is still in the middle of schedule() with
* this task as prev, wait until its done referencing the task.
*/
while (p->on_cpu) {
#ifdef __ARCH_WANT_INTERRUPTS_ON_CTXSW
/*
* In case the architecture enables interrupts in
* context_switch(), we cannot busy wait, since that
* would lead to deadlocks when an interrupt hits and
* tries to wake up @prev. So bail and do a complete
* remote wakeup.
*/
if (ttwu_activate_remote(p, wake_flags))
goto stat;
#else
cpu_relax();
#endif
}
/*
* Pairs with the smp_wmb() in finish_lock_switch().
*/
smp_rmb();
p->sched_contributes_to_load = !!task_contributes_to_load(p);
p->state = TASK_WAKING;
if (p->sched_class->task_waking)
p->sched_class->task_waking(p);
cpu = select_task_rq(p, SD_BALANCE_WAKE, wake_flags);
if (task_cpu(p) != cpu) {
wake_flags |= WF_MIGRATED;
set_task_cpu(p, cpu);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_SMP */
ttwu_queue(p, cpu);
stat:
ttwu_stat(p, cpu, wake_flags);
out:
raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&p->pi_lock, flags);
return success;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 26,357
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ZEND_RESULT_CODE parse_idn(struct parse_state *state, size_t prev_len)
{
char *idn = NULL;
int rv = -1;
TSRMLS_FETCH_FROM_CTX(state->ts);
if (state->flags & PHP_HTTP_URL_PARSE_MBUTF8) {
rv = idna_to_ascii_8z(state->url.host, &idn, IDNA_ALLOW_UNASSIGNED|IDNA_USE_STD3_ASCII_RULES);
}
# ifdef PHP_HTTP_HAVE_WCHAR
else if (state->flags & PHP_HTTP_URL_PARSE_MBLOC) {
rv = idna_to_ascii_lz(state->url.host, &idn, IDNA_ALLOW_UNASSIGNED|IDNA_USE_STD3_ASCII_RULES);
}
# endif
if (rv != IDNA_SUCCESS) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Failed to parse IDN; %s", idna_strerror(rv));
return FAILURE;
} else {
size_t idnlen = strlen(idn);
memcpy(state->url.host, idn, idnlen + 1);
free(idn);
state->offset += idnlen - prev_len;
return SUCCESS;
}
}
Commit Message: fix bug #71719 (Buffer overflow in HTTP url parsing functions)
The parser's offset was not reset when we softfail in scheme
parsing and continue to parse a path.
Thanks to hlt99 at blinkenshell dot org for the report.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 73,826
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::OnHostMovedInPixels(
const aura::WindowTreeHost* host,
const gfx::Point& new_origin_in_pixels) {
TRACE_EVENT1("ui", "RenderWidgetHostViewAura::OnHostMovedInPixels",
"new_origin_in_pixels", new_origin_in_pixels.ToString());
UpdateScreenInfo(window_);
}
Commit Message: Allocate a FrameSinkId for RenderWidgetHostViewAura in mus+ash
RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame expects its parent to have a valid
FrameSinkId. Make sure RenderWidgetHostViewAura has a FrameSinkId even
if DelegatedFrameHost is not used (in mus+ash).
BUG=706553
TBR=jam@chromium.org
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2847253003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468179}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 132,270
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void _convert_job_mem(slurm_msg_t *msg)
{
prolog_launch_msg_t *req = (prolog_launch_msg_t *)msg->data;
slurm_cred_arg_t arg;
hostset_t j_hset = NULL;
int rc, hi, host_index, job_cpus;
int i, i_first_bit = 0, i_last_bit = 0;
rc = slurm_cred_verify(conf->vctx, req->cred, &arg,
msg->protocol_version);
if (rc < 0) {
error("%s: slurm_cred_verify failed: %m", __func__);
req->nnodes = 1; /* best guess */
return;
}
req->nnodes = arg.job_nhosts;
if (arg.job_mem_limit == 0)
goto fini;
if ((arg.job_mem_limit & MEM_PER_CPU) == 0) {
req->job_mem_limit = arg.job_mem_limit;
goto fini;
}
/* Assume 1 CPU on error */
req->job_mem_limit = arg.job_mem_limit & (~MEM_PER_CPU);
if (!(j_hset = hostset_create(arg.job_hostlist))) {
error("%s: Unable to parse credential hostlist: `%s'",
__func__, arg.step_hostlist);
goto fini;
}
host_index = hostset_find(j_hset, conf->node_name);
hostset_destroy(j_hset);
hi = host_index + 1; /* change from 0-origin to 1-origin */
for (i = 0; hi; i++) {
if (hi > arg.sock_core_rep_count[i]) {
i_first_bit += arg.sockets_per_node[i] *
arg.cores_per_socket[i] *
arg.sock_core_rep_count[i];
i_last_bit = i_first_bit +
arg.sockets_per_node[i] *
arg.cores_per_socket[i] *
arg.sock_core_rep_count[i];
hi -= arg.sock_core_rep_count[i];
} else {
i_first_bit += arg.sockets_per_node[i] *
arg.cores_per_socket[i] * (hi - 1);
i_last_bit = i_first_bit +
arg.sockets_per_node[i] *
arg.cores_per_socket[i];
break;
}
}
/* Now count the allocated processors on this node */
job_cpus = 0;
for (i = i_first_bit; i < i_last_bit; i++) {
if (bit_test(arg.job_core_bitmap, i))
job_cpus++;
}
/* NOTE: alloc_lps is the count of allocated resources
* (typically cores). Convert to CPU count as needed */
if (i_last_bit > i_first_bit) {
i = conf->cpus / (i_last_bit - i_first_bit);
if (i > 1)
job_cpus *= i;
}
req->job_mem_limit *= job_cpus;
fini: slurm_cred_free_args(&arg);
}
Commit Message: Fix security issue in _prolog_error().
Fix security issue caused by insecure file path handling triggered by
the failure of a Prolog script. To exploit this a user needs to
anticipate or cause the Prolog to fail for their job.
(This commit is slightly different from the fix to the 15.08 branch.)
CVE-2016-10030.
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 72,057
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SetUpCommandLine(CommandLine* command_line) {
ExtensionApiTest::SetUpCommandLine(command_line);
command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kEnableExperimentalExtensionApis);
}
Commit Message: Check prefs before allowing extension file access in the permissions API.
R=mpcomplete@chromium.org
BUG=169632
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11884008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176853 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 115,920
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool InputHandler::setBatchEditingActive(bool active)
{
if (!isActiveTextEdit())
return false;
ASSERT(m_currentFocusElement->document());
ASSERT(m_currentFocusElement->document()->frame());
BackingStoreClient* backingStoreClient = m_webPage->backingStoreClient();
ASSERT(backingStoreClient);
if (!active) {
backingStoreClient->backingStore()->resumeBackingStoreUpdates();
backingStoreClient->backingStore()->resumeScreenUpdates(BackingStore::RenderAndBlit);
} else {
backingStoreClient->backingStore()->suspendBackingStoreUpdates();
backingStoreClient->backingStore()->suspendScreenUpdates();
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 104,559
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GpuCommandBufferStub::OnAsyncFlush(int32 put_offset,
uint32 flush_count) {
TRACE_EVENT1("gpu", "GpuCommandBufferStub::OnAsyncFlush",
"put_offset", put_offset);
DCHECK(command_buffer_.get());
if (flush_count - last_flush_count_ < 0x8000000U) {
last_flush_count_ = flush_count;
command_buffer_->Flush(put_offset);
} else {
NOTREACHED() << "Received a Flush message out-of-order";
}
ReportState();
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 106,887
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void inet_forward_change(struct net *net)
{
struct net_device *dev;
int on = IPV4_DEVCONF_ALL(net, FORWARDING);
IPV4_DEVCONF_ALL(net, ACCEPT_REDIRECTS) = !on;
IPV4_DEVCONF_DFLT(net, FORWARDING) = on;
inet_netconf_notify_devconf(net, NETCONFA_FORWARDING,
NETCONFA_IFINDEX_ALL,
net->ipv4.devconf_all);
inet_netconf_notify_devconf(net, NETCONFA_FORWARDING,
NETCONFA_IFINDEX_DEFAULT,
net->ipv4.devconf_dflt);
for_each_netdev(net, dev) {
struct in_device *in_dev;
if (on)
dev_disable_lro(dev);
rcu_read_lock();
in_dev = __in_dev_get_rcu(dev);
if (in_dev) {
IN_DEV_CONF_SET(in_dev, FORWARDING, on);
inet_netconf_notify_devconf(net, NETCONFA_FORWARDING,
dev->ifindex, &in_dev->cnf);
}
rcu_read_unlock();
}
}
Commit Message: ipv4: Don't do expensive useless work during inetdev destroy.
When an inetdev is destroyed, every address assigned to the interface
is removed. And in this scenerio we do two pointless things which can
be very expensive if the number of assigned interfaces is large:
1) Address promotion. We are deleting all addresses, so there is no
point in doing this.
2) A full nf conntrack table purge for every address. We only need to
do this once, as is already caught by the existing
masq_dev_notifier so masq_inet_event() can skip this.
Reported-by: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Tested-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 54,078
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Color Document::ThemeColor() const {
auto root_element = documentElement();
if (!root_element)
return Color();
for (HTMLMetaElement& meta_element :
Traversal<HTMLMetaElement>::DescendantsOf(*root_element)) {
Color color = Color::kTransparent;
if (DeprecatedEqualIgnoringCase(meta_element.GetName(), "theme-color") &&
CSSParser::ParseColor(
color, meta_element.Content().GetString().StripWhiteSpace(), true))
return color;
}
return Color();
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 134,175
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool is_blacklisted_cpu(void)
{
if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_INTEL)
return false;
if (boot_cpu_data.x86 == 0x0f) {
/*
* On Pentium 4, camellia-asm is slower than original assembler
* implementation because excessive uses of 64bit rotate and
* left-shifts (which are really slow on P4) needed to store and
* handle 128bit block in two 64bit registers.
*/
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 46,880
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct dst_entry *ip6_dst_lookup_flow(struct sock *sk, struct flowi6 *fl6,
const struct in6_addr *final_dst)
{
struct dst_entry *dst = NULL;
int err;
err = ip6_dst_lookup_tail(sk, &dst, fl6);
if (err)
return ERR_PTR(err);
if (final_dst)
fl6->daddr = *final_dst;
return xfrm_lookup_route(sock_net(sk), dst, flowi6_to_flowi(fl6), sk, 0);
}
Commit Message: inet: update the IP ID generation algorithm to higher standards.
Commit 355b98553789 ("netns: provide pure entropy for net_hash_mix()")
makes net_hash_mix() return a true 32 bits of entropy. When used in the
IP ID generation algorithm, this has the effect of extending the IP ID
generation key from 32 bits to 64 bits.
However, net_hash_mix() is only used for IP ID generation starting with
kernel version 4.1. Therefore, earlier kernels remain with 32-bit key
no matter what the net_hash_mix() return value is.
This change addresses the issue by explicitly extending the key to 64
bits for kernels older than 4.1.
Signed-off-by: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 97,042
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::applyXSLTransform(ProcessingInstruction* pi)
{
RefPtr<XSLTProcessor> processor = XSLTProcessor::create();
processor->setXSLStyleSheet(static_cast<XSLStyleSheet*>(pi->sheet()));
String resultMIMEType;
String newSource;
String resultEncoding;
if (!processor->transformToString(this, resultMIMEType, newSource, resultEncoding))
return;
Frame* ownerFrame = frame();
processor->createDocumentFromSource(newSource, resultEncoding, resultMIMEType, this, ownerFrame);
InspectorInstrumentation::frameDocumentUpdated(ownerFrame);
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 105,444
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DelegatedFrameHost::WillDrawSurface(const viz::LocalSurfaceId& id,
const gfx::Rect& damage_rect) {
if (id != local_surface_id_)
return;
AttemptFrameSubscriberCapture(damage_rect);
}
Commit Message: mac: Make RWHVMac::ClearCompositorFrame clear locks
Ensure that the BrowserCompositorMac not hold on to a compositor lock
when requested to clear its compositor frame. This lock may be held
indefinitely (if the renderer hangs) and so the frame will never be
cleared.
Bug: 739621
Change-Id: I15d0e82bdf632f3379a48e959f198afb8a4ac218
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/608239
Commit-Queue: ccameron chromium <ccameron@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#493563}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 150,986
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ComparePriority(const void *p1, const void *p2)
{
FontDirectoryPtr dir1 = (*(FontPathElementPtr*) p1)->private;
FontDirectoryPtr dir2 = (*(FontPathElementPtr*) p2)->private;
const char *pri1 = NULL;
const char *pri2 = NULL;
if (dir1->attributes != NULL)
pri1 = strstr(dir1->attributes, PriorityAttribute);
if (dir2->attributes != NULL)
pri2 = strstr(dir2->attributes, PriorityAttribute);
if (pri1 == NULL && pri2 == NULL)
return 0;
else if (pri1 == NULL)
return 1;
else if (pri2 == NULL)
return -1;
else
return
atoi(pri1 + strlen(PriorityAttribute)) -
atoi(pri2 + strlen(PriorityAttribute));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 17,260
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ssl_write_renegotiation_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *buf,
size_t *olen )
{
unsigned char *p = buf;
const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN;
*olen = 0;
/* We're always including an TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV in the
* initial ClientHello, in which case also adding the renegotiation
* info extension is NOT RECOMMENDED as per RFC 5746 Section 3.4. */
if( ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS )
return;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding renegotiation extension" ) );
if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < 5 + ssl->verify_data_len )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) );
return;
}
/*
* Secure renegotiation
*/
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO ) & 0xFF );
*p++ = 0x00;
*p++ = ( ssl->verify_data_len + 1 ) & 0xFF;
*p++ = ssl->verify_data_len & 0xFF;
memcpy( p, ssl->own_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len );
*olen = 5 + ssl->verify_data_len;
}
Commit Message: Add bounds check before length read
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 83,379
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Editor::undo() {
m_undoStack->undo();
}
Commit Message: Make TypingCommand::insertText() to take SelectionInDOMTree instead of VisibleSelection
This patch makes |TypingCommand::insertText()| to take |SelectionInDOMTree|
instead of |VisibleSelection| to reduce usage of |VisibleSelection| for
improving code health.
BUG=657237
TEST=n/a
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2733183002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#455368}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 129,191
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int unqueue_me(struct futex_q *q)
{
spinlock_t *lock_ptr;
int ret = 0;
/* In the common case we don't take the spinlock, which is nice. */
retry:
lock_ptr = q->lock_ptr;
barrier();
if (lock_ptr != NULL) {
spin_lock(lock_ptr);
/*
* q->lock_ptr can change between reading it and
* spin_lock(), causing us to take the wrong lock. This
* corrects the race condition.
*
* Reasoning goes like this: if we have the wrong lock,
* q->lock_ptr must have changed (maybe several times)
* between reading it and the spin_lock(). It can
* change again after the spin_lock() but only if it was
* already changed before the spin_lock(). It cannot,
* however, change back to the original value. Therefore
* we can detect whether we acquired the correct lock.
*/
if (unlikely(lock_ptr != q->lock_ptr)) {
spin_unlock(lock_ptr);
goto retry;
}
WARN_ON(plist_node_empty(&q->list));
plist_del(&q->list, &q->list.plist);
BUG_ON(q->pi_state);
spin_unlock(lock_ptr);
ret = 1;
}
drop_futex_key_refs(&q->key);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: futex: Fix errors in nested key ref-counting
futex_wait() is leaking key references due to futex_wait_setup()
acquiring an additional reference via the queue_lock() routine. The
nested key ref-counting has been masking bugs and complicating code
analysis. queue_lock() is only called with a previously ref-counted
key, so remove the additional ref-counting from the queue_(un)lock()
functions.
Also futex_wait_requeue_pi() drops one key reference too many in
unqueue_me_pi(). Remove the key reference handling from
unqueue_me_pi(). This was paired with a queue_lock() in
futex_lock_pi(), so the count remains unchanged.
Document remaining nested key ref-counting sites.
Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Reported-and-tested-by: Matthieu Fertré<matthieu.fertre@kerlabs.com>
Reported-by: Louis Rilling<louis.rilling@kerlabs.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: John Kacur <jkacur@redhat.com>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
LKML-Reference: <4CBB17A8.70401@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 39,651
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void r_bin_mdmp_init_parsing(struct r_bin_mdmp_obj *obj) {
/* TODO: Handle unions, can we? */
/* FIXME: Why are we getting struct missing errors when it finds them */
sdb_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_mem_state.cparse",
"enum mdmp_mem_state { MEM_COMMIT=0x1000, "
"MEM_FREE=0x10000, MEM_RESERVE=0x02000 };", 0);
sdb_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_mem_type.cparse",
"enum mdmp_mem_type { MEM_IMAGE=0x1000000, "
"MEM_MAPPED=0x40000, MEM_PRIVATE=0x20000 };", 0);
sdb_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_page_protect.cparse",
"enum mdmp_page_protect { PAGE_NOACCESS=1, "
"PAGE_READONLY=2, PAGE_READWRITE=4, PAGE_WRITECOPY=8, "
"PAGE_EXECUTE=0x10, PAGE_EXECUTE_READ=0x20, "
"PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE=0x40, PAGE_EXECUTE_WRITECOPY=0x80, "
"PAGE_GUARD=0x100, PAGE_NOCACHE=0x200, "
"PAGE_WRITECOMBINE=0x400, PAGE_TARGETS_INVALID=0x40000000 };",
0);
sdb_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_misc1_flags.cparse",
"enum mdmp_misc1_flags { MINIDUMP_MISC1_PROCESS_ID=1, "
"MINIDUMP_MISC1_PROCESS_TIMES=2, "
"MINIDUMP_MISC1_PROCESSOR_POWER_INFO=4 };", 0);
sdb_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_processor_architecture.cparse",
"enum mdmp_processor_architecture { "
"PROCESSOR_ARCHITECTURE_INTEL=0, "
"PROCESSOR_ARCHITECTURE_ARM=5, "
"PROCESSOR_ARCHITECTURE_IA64=6, "
"PROCESSOR_ARCHITECTURE_AMD64=9, "
"PROCESSOR_ARCHITECTURE_UNKNOWN=0xffff };", 0);
sdb_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_product_type.cparse",
"enum mdmp_product_type { "
"VER_NT_WORKSTATION=1, VER_NT_DOMAIN_CONTROLLER=2, "
"VER_NT_SERVER=3 };", 0);
sdb_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_platform_id.cparse",
"enum mdmp_platform_id { "
"VER_PLATFORM_WIN32s=0, "
"VER_PLATFORM_WIN32_WINDOWS=1, "
"VER_PLATFORM_WIN32_NT=2 };", 0);
sdb_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_suite_mask.cparse",
"enum mdmp_suite_mask { "
"VER_SUITE_SMALLBUSINESS=1, VER_SUITE_ENTERPRISE=2, "
"VER_SUITE_BACKOFFICE=4, VER_SUITE_TERMINAL=0x10, "
"VER_SUITE_SMALLBUSINESS_RESTRICTED=0x20, "
"VER_SUITE_EMBEDDEDNT=0x40, VER_SUITE_DATACENTER=0x80, "
"VER_SUITE_SINGLEUSERTS=0x100, VER_SUITE_PERSONAL=0x200, "
"VER_SUITE_BLADE=0x400, VER_SUITE_STORAGE_SERVER=0x2000, "
"VER_SUITE_COMPUTE_SERVER=0x4000 };", 0);
sdb_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_callback_type.cparse",
"enum mdmp_type { ModuleCallback=0,"
"ThreadCallback=1, ThreadExCallback=2, "
"IncludeThreadCallback=3, IncludeModuleCallback=4, "
"MemoryCallback=5, CancelCallback=6, "
"WriteKernelMinidumpCallback=7, "
"KernelMinidumpStatusCallback=8, "
"RemoveMemoryCallback=9, "
"IncludeVmRegionCallback=10, "
"IoStartCallback=11, IoWriteAllCallback=12, "
"IoFinishCallback=13, ReadMemoryFailureCallback=14, "
"SecondaryFlagsCallback=15 };", 0);
sdb_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_exception_code.cparse",
"enum mdmp_exception_code { "
"DBG_CONTROL_C=0x40010005, "
"EXCEPTION_GUARD_PAGE_VIOLATION=0x80000001, "
"EXCEPTION_DATATYPE_MISALIGNMENT=0x80000002, "
"EXCEPTION_BREAKPOINT=0x80000003, "
"EXCEPTION_SINGLE_STEP=0x80000004, "
"EXCEPTION_ACCESS_VIOLATION=0xc0000005, "
"EXCEPTION_IN_PAGE_ERROR=0xc0000006, "
"EXCEPTION_INVALID_HANDLE=0xc0000008, "
"EXCEPTION_ILLEGAL_INSTRUCTION=0xc000001d, "
"EXCEPTION_NONCONTINUABLE_EXCEPTION=0xc0000025, "
"EXCEPTION_INVALID_DISPOSITION=0xc0000026, "
"EXCEPTION_ARRAY_BOUNDS_EXCEEDED=0xc000008c, "
"EXCEPTION_FLOAT_DENORMAL_OPERAND=0xc000008d, "
"EXCEPTION_FLOAT_DIVIDE_BY_ZERO=0xc000008e, "
"EXCEPTION_FLOAT_INEXACT_RESULT=0xc000008f, "
"EXCEPTION_FLOAT_INVALID_OPERATION=0xc0000090, "
"EXCEPTION_FLOAT_OVERFLOW=0xc0000091, "
"EXCEPTION_FLOAT_STACK_CHECK=0xc0000092, "
"EXCEPTION_FLOAT_UNDERFLOW=0xc0000093, "
"EXCEPTION_INTEGER_DIVIDE_BY_ZERO=0xc0000094, "
"EXCEPTION_INTEGER_OVERFLOW=0xc0000095, "
"EXCEPTION_PRIVILEGED_INSTRUCTION=0xc0000096, "
"EXCEPTION_STACK_OVERFLOW=0xc00000fd, "
"EXCEPTION_POSSIBLE_DEADLOCK=0xc0000194 };", 0);
sdb_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_exception_flags.cparse",
"enum mdmp_exception_flags { "
"EXCEPTION_CONTINUABLE=0, "
"EXCEPTION_NONCONTINUABLE=1 };", 0);
sdb_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_handle_object_information_type.cparse",
"enum mdmp_handle_object_information_type { "
"MiniHandleObjectInformationNone=0, "
"MiniThreadInformation1=1, MiniMutantInformation1=2, "
"MiniMutantInformation2=3, MiniMutantProcessInformation1=4, "
"MiniProcessInformation2=5 };", 0);
sdb_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_secondary_flags.cparse",
"enum mdmp_secondary_flags { "
"MiniSecondaryWithoutPowerInfo=0 };", 0);
sdb_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_stream_type.cparse",
"enum mdmp_stream_type { UnusedStream=0, "
"ReservedStream0=1, ReservedStream1=2, "
"ThreadListStream=3, ModuleListStream=4, "
"MemoryListStream=5, ExceptionStream=6, "
"SystemInfoStream=7, ThreadExListStream=8, "
"Memory64ListStream=9, CommentStreamA=10, "
"CommentStreamW=11, HandleDataStream=12, "
"FunctionTableStream=13, UnloadedModuleListStream=14, "
"MiscInfoStream=15, MemoryInfoListStream=16, "
"ThreadInfoListStream=17, "
"HandleOperationListStream=18, "
"LastReservedStream=0xffff };", 0);
sdb_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_type.cparse", "enum mdmp_type { "
"MiniDumpNormal=0x0, "
"MiniDumpWithDataSegs=0x1, "
"MiniDumpWithFullMemory=0x2, "
"MiniDumpWithHandleData=0x4, "
"MiniDumpFilterMemory=0x8, "
"MiniDumpScanMemory=0x10, "
"MiniDumpWithUnloadedModule=0x20, "
"MiniDumpWihinDirectlyReferencedMemory=0x40, "
"MiniDumpFilterWithModulePaths=0x80,"
"MiniDumpWithProcessThreadData=0x100, "
"MiniDumpWithPrivateReadWriteMemory=0x200, "
"MiniDumpWithoutOptionalDate=0x400, "
"MiniDumpWithFullMemoryInfo=0x800, "
"MiniDumpWithThreadInfo=0x1000, "
"MiniDumpWithCodeSegs=0x2000, "
"MiniDumpWithoutAuxiliaryState=0x4000, "
"MiniDumpWithFullAuxiliaryState=0x8000, "
"MiniDumpWithPrivateWriteCopyMemory=0x10000, "
"MiniDumpIgnoreInaccessibleMemory=0x20000, "
"MiniDumpWithTokenInformation=0x40000, "
"MiniDumpWithModuleHeaders=0x80000, "
"MiniDumpFilterTriage=0x100000, "
"MiniDumpValidTypeFlags=0x1fffff };", 0);
sdb_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_module_write_flags.cparse",
"enum mdmp_module_write_flags { "
"ModuleWriteModule=0, ModuleWriteDataSeg=2, "
"ModuleWriteMiscRecord=4, ModuleWriteCvRecord=8, "
"ModuleReferencedByMemory=0x10, ModuleWriteTlsData=0x20, "
"ModuleWriteCodeSegs=0x40 };", 0);
sdb_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_thread_write_flags.cparse",
"enum mdmp_thread_write_flags { "
"ThreadWriteThread=0, ThreadWriteStack=2, "
"ThreadWriteContext=4, ThreadWriteBackingStore=8, "
"ThreadWriteInstructionWindow=0x10, "
"ThreadWriteThreadData=0x20, "
"ThreadWriteThreadInfo=0x40 };", 0);
sdb_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_context_flags.cparse",
"enum mdmp_context_flags { CONTEXT_i386=0x10000, "
"CONTEXT_CONTROL=0x10001, CONTEXT_INTEGER=0x10002, "
"CONTEXT_SEGMENTS=0x10004, CONTEXT_FLOATING_POINT=0x10008, "
"CONTEXT_DEBUG_REGISTERS=0x10010, "
"CONTEXT_EXTENDED_REGISTERS=0x10020 };", 0);
sdb_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_location_descriptor.format",
"dd DataSize RVA", 0);
sdb_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_location_descriptor64.format",
"qq DataSize RVA", 0);
sdb_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_memory_descriptor.format", "q? "
"StartOfMemoryRange "
"(mdmp_location_descriptor)Memory", 0);
sdb_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_memory_descriptor64.format", "qq "
"StartOfMemoryRange DataSize", 0);
#if 0
/* TODO: Flag dependent thus not fully implemented */
sdb_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_context.format", "[4]B "
"(mdmp_context_flags)ContextFlags", 0);
#endif
sdb_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_vs_fixedfileinfo.format", "ddddddddddddd "
"dwSignature dwStrucVersion dwFileVersionMs "
"dwFileVersionLs dwProductVersionMs "
"dwProductVersionLs dwFileFlagsMask dwFileFlags "
"dwFileOs dwFileType dwFileSubtype dwFileDateMs "
"dwFileDateLs", 0);
sdb_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_string.format", "dZ Length Buffer", 0);
}
Commit Message: Fix #10464 - oobread crash in mdmp
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 79,708
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool terminal_is_dumb(void) {
if (!on_tty())
return true;
return getenv_terminal_is_dumb();
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #12378 from rbalint/vt-kbd-reset-check
VT kbd reset check
CWE ID: CWE-255
| 0
| 92,410
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: content::BrowserContext* CheckClientDownloadRequest::GetBrowserContext() {
return content::DownloadItemUtils::GetBrowserContext(item_);
}
Commit Message: Migrate download_protection code to new DM token class.
Migrates RetrieveDMToken calls to use the new BrowserDMToken class.
Bug: 1020296
Change-Id: Icef580e243430d73b6c1c42b273a8540277481d9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1904234
Commit-Queue: Dominique Fauteux-Chapleau <domfc@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tien Mai <tienmai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Rubery <drubery@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#714196}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 136,696
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ccid3_hc_tx_packet_sent(struct sock *sk, unsigned int len)
{
struct ccid3_hc_tx_sock *hc = ccid3_hc_tx_sk(sk);
ccid3_hc_tx_update_s(hc, len);
if (tfrc_tx_hist_add(&hc->tx_hist, dccp_sk(sk)->dccps_gss))
DCCP_CRIT("packet history - out of memory!");
}
Commit Message: dccp: fix info leak via getsockopt(DCCP_SOCKOPT_CCID_TX_INFO)
The CCID3 code fails to initialize the trailing padding bytes of struct
tfrc_tx_info added for alignment on 64 bit architectures. It that for
potentially leaks four bytes kernel stack via the getsockopt() syscall.
Add an explicit memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the
info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Gerrit Renker <gerrit@erg.abdn.ac.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 34,161
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void NavigationControllerImpl::GoBack() {
GoToIndex(GetIndexForOffset(-1));
}
Commit Message: Add DumpWithoutCrashing in RendererDidNavigateToExistingPage
This is intended to be reverted after investigating the linked bug.
BUG=688425
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2701523004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450900}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 137,785
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int tracing_alloc_snapshot_instance(struct trace_array *tr)
{
int ret;
if (!tr->allocated_snapshot) {
/* allocate spare buffer */
ret = resize_buffer_duplicate_size(&tr->max_buffer,
&tr->trace_buffer, RING_BUFFER_ALL_CPUS);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
tr->allocated_snapshot = true;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 81,453
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int do_recv_NPPrint(rpc_message_t *message, void *p_value)
{
NPPrint *printInfo = (NPPrint *)p_value;
uint32_t print_mode;
int error;
if ((error = rpc_message_recv_uint32(message, &print_mode)) < 0)
return error;
switch (print_mode) {
case NP_FULL:
if ((error = do_recv_NPFullPrint(message, &printInfo->print.fullPrint)) < 0)
return error;
break;
case NP_EMBED:
if ((error = do_recv_NPEmbedPrint(message, &printInfo->print.embedPrint)) < 0)
return error;
break;
default:
return RPC_ERROR_GENERIC;
}
printInfo->mode = print_mode;
return RPC_ERROR_NO_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 26,966
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void GIFAnimEncode(gdIOCtxPtr fp, int IWidth, int IHeight, int LeftOfs, int TopOfs, int GInterlace, int Transparent, int Delay, int Disposal, int BitsPerPixel, int *Red, int *Green, int *Blue, gdImagePtr im)
{
int B;
int ColorMapSize;
int InitCodeSize;
int i;
GifCtx ctx;
memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
ctx.Interlace = GInterlace;
ctx.in_count = 1;
ColorMapSize = 1 << BitsPerPixel;
if(LeftOfs < 0) {
LeftOfs = 0;
}
if(TopOfs < 0) {
TopOfs = 0;
}
if(Delay < 0) {
Delay = 100;
}
if(Disposal < 0) {
Disposal = 1;
}
ctx.Width = IWidth;
ctx.Height = IHeight;
/* Calculate number of bits we are expecting */
ctx.CountDown = (long)ctx.Width * (long)ctx.Height;
/* Indicate which pass we are on (if interlace) */
ctx.Pass = 0;
/* The initial code size */
if(BitsPerPixel <= 1) {
InitCodeSize = 2;
} else {
InitCodeSize = BitsPerPixel;
}
/* Set up the current x and y position */
ctx.curx = ctx.cury = 0;
/* Write out extension for image animation and looping */
gdPutC('!', fp);
gdPutC(0xf9, fp);
gdPutC(4, fp);
gdPutC((Transparent >= 0 ? 1 : 0) | (Disposal << 2), fp);
gdPutC((unsigned char)(Delay & 255), fp);
gdPutC((unsigned char)((Delay >> 8) & 255), fp);
gdPutC((unsigned char) Transparent, fp);
gdPutC(0, fp);
/* Write an Image separator */
gdPutC(',', fp);
/* Write out the Image header */
gifPutWord(LeftOfs, fp);
gifPutWord(TopOfs, fp);
gifPutWord(ctx.Width, fp);
gifPutWord(ctx.Height, fp);
/* Indicate that there is a local colour map */
B = (Red && Green && Blue) ? 0x80 : 0;
/* OR in the interlacing */
B |= ctx.Interlace ? 0x40 : 0;
/* OR in the Bits per Pixel */
B |= (Red && Green && Blue) ? (BitsPerPixel - 1) : 0;
/* Write it out */
gdPutC(B, fp);
/* Write out the Local Colour Map */
if(Red && Green && Blue) {
for(i = 0; i < ColorMapSize; ++i) {
gdPutC(Red[i], fp);
gdPutC(Green[i], fp);
gdPutC(Blue[i], fp);
}
}
/* Write out the initial code size */
gdPutC(InitCodeSize, fp);
/* Go and actually compress the data */
compress(InitCodeSize + 1, fp, im, &ctx);
/* Write out a Zero-length packet (to end the series) */
gdPutC(0, fp);
}
Commit Message: Fix #492: Potential double-free in gdImage*Ptr()
Whenever `gdImage*Ptr()` calls `gdImage*Ctx()` and the latter fails, we
must not call `gdDPExtractData()`; otherwise a double-free would
happen. Since `gdImage*Ctx()` are void functions, and we can't change
that for BC reasons, we're introducing static helpers which are used
internally.
We're adding a regression test for `gdImageJpegPtr()`, but not for
`gdImageGifPtr()` and `gdImageWbmpPtr()` since we don't know how to
trigger failure of the respective `gdImage*Ctx()` calls.
This potential security issue has been reported by Solmaz Salimi (aka.
Rooney).
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 97,058
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: inline size_t SearchBuffer::search(size_t& start)
{
if (!m_isBufferFull)
return 0;
if (!m_isCharacterStartBuffer[m_cursor])
return 0;
size_t tailSpace = m_target.length() - m_cursor;
if (memcmp(&m_buffer[m_cursor], m_target.characters(), tailSpace * sizeof(UChar)) != 0)
return 0;
if (memcmp(&m_buffer[0], m_target.characters() + tailSpace, m_cursor * sizeof(UChar)) != 0)
return 0;
start = length();
m_isCharacterStartBuffer[m_cursor] = false;
return start;
}
Commit Message: Upgrade a TextIterator ASSERT to a RELEASE_ASSERT as a defensive measure.
BUG=156930,177197
R=inferno@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/15057010
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@150123 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 113,360
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SSL_set_debug(SSL *s, int debug)
{
s->debug = debug;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 10,771
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static RenderObject* firstRenderObjectForDirectionalityDetermination(RenderObject* root, RenderObject* current = 0)
{
RenderObject* next = current;
while (current) {
if (isIsolated(current->style()->unicodeBidi())
&& (current->isRenderInline() || current->isRenderBlock())) {
if (current != root)
current = 0;
else
current = next;
break;
}
current = current->parent();
}
if (!current)
current = root->firstChild();
while (current) {
next = 0;
if (isIteratorTarget(current) && !(current->isText() && toRenderText(current)->isAllCollapsibleWhitespace()))
break;
if (!isIteratorTarget(current) && !isIsolated(current->style()->unicodeBidi()))
next = current->firstChild();
if (!next) {
while (current && current != root) {
next = current->nextSibling();
if (next)
break;
current = current->parent();
}
}
if (!next)
break;
current = next;
}
return current;
}
Commit Message: Update containtingIsolate to go back all the way to top isolate from current root, rather than stopping at the first isolate it finds. This works because the current root is always updated with each isolate run.
BUG=279277
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23972003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@157268 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 111,351
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