instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void V8TestObject::MeasuredLongAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_measuredLongAttribute_Getter");
ExecutionContext* execution_context_for_measurement = CurrentExecutionContext(info.GetIsolate());
UseCounter::Count(execution_context_for_measurement, WebFeature::kV8TestObject_MeasuredLongAttribute_AttributeGetter);
test_object_v8_internal::MeasuredLongAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 134,876
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void show_snapshot_percpu_help(struct seq_file *m)
{
seq_puts(m, "# echo 0 > snapshot : Invalid for per_cpu snapshot file.\n");
#ifdef CONFIG_RING_BUFFER_ALLOW_SWAP
seq_puts(m, "# echo 1 > snapshot : Allocates snapshot buffer, if not already allocated.\n"
"# Takes a snapshot of the main buffer for this cpu.\n");
#else
seq_puts(m, "# echo 1 > snapshot : Not supported with this kernel.\n"
"# Must use main snapshot file to allocate.\n");
#endif
seq_puts(m, "# echo 2 > snapshot : Clears this cpu's snapshot buffer (but does not allocate)\n"
"# (Doesn't have to be '2' works with any number that\n"
"# is not a '0' or '1')\n");
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 81,352
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static char *savemem(struct nfsd4_compoundargs *argp, __be32 *p, int nbytes)
{
void *ret;
ret = svcxdr_tmpalloc(argp, nbytes);
if (!ret)
return NULL;
memcpy(ret, p, nbytes);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 65,843
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int wdm_pre_reset(struct usb_interface *intf)
{
struct wdm_device *desc = wdm_find_device(intf);
/*
* we notify everybody using poll of
* an exceptional situation
* must be done before recovery lest a spontaneous
* message from the device is lost
*/
spin_lock_irq(&desc->iuspin);
set_bit(WDM_RESETTING, &desc->flags); /* inform read/write */
set_bit(WDM_READ, &desc->flags); /* unblock read */
clear_bit(WDM_IN_USE, &desc->flags); /* unblock write */
desc->rerr = -EINTR;
spin_unlock_irq(&desc->iuspin);
wake_up_all(&desc->wait);
mutex_lock(&desc->rlock);
mutex_lock(&desc->wlock);
kill_urbs(desc);
cancel_work_sync(&desc->rxwork);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: USB: cdc-wdm: fix buffer overflow
The buffer for responses must not overflow.
If this would happen, set a flag, drop the data and return
an error after user space has read all remaining data.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <oliver@neukum.org>
CC: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 32,846
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static CLIENT* handle_export_name(uint32_t opt, int net, GArray* servers, uint32_t cflags) {
uint32_t namelen;
char* name;
int i;
if (read(net, &namelen, sizeof(namelen)) < 0) {
err("Negotiation failed/7: %m");
return NULL;
}
namelen = ntohl(namelen);
name = malloc(namelen+1);
name[namelen]=0;
if (read(net, name, namelen) < 0) {
err("Negotiation failed/8: %m");
free(name);
return NULL;
}
for(i=0; i<servers->len; i++) {
SERVER* serve = &(g_array_index(servers, SERVER, i));
if(!strcmp(serve->servename, name)) {
CLIENT* client = g_new0(CLIENT, 1);
client->server = serve;
client->exportsize = OFFT_MAX;
client->net = net;
client->modern = TRUE;
client->transactionlogfd = -1;
client->clientfeats = cflags;
free(name);
return client;
}
}
err("Negotiation failed/8a: Requested export not found");
free(name);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: nbd-server: handle modern-style negotiation in a child process
Previously, the modern style negotiation was carried out in the root
server (listener) process before forking the actual client handler. This
made it possible for a malfunctioning or evil client to terminate the
root process simply by querying a non-existent export or aborting in the
middle of the negotation process (caused SIGPIPE in the server).
This commit moves the negotiation process to the child to keep the root
process up and running no matter what happens during the negotiation.
See http://sourceforge.net/mailarchive/message.php?msg_id=30410146
Signed-off-by: Tuomas Räsänen <tuomasjjrasanen@tjjr.fi>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 46,573
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int posix_cpu_clock_get(const clockid_t which_clock, struct timespec64 *tp)
{
const pid_t pid = CPUCLOCK_PID(which_clock);
int err = -EINVAL;
if (pid == 0) {
/*
* Special case constant value for our own clocks.
* We don't have to do any lookup to find ourselves.
*/
err = posix_cpu_clock_get_task(current, which_clock, tp);
} else {
/*
* Find the given PID, and validate that the caller
* should be able to see it.
*/
struct task_struct *p;
rcu_read_lock();
p = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
if (p)
err = posix_cpu_clock_get_task(p, which_clock, tp);
rcu_read_unlock();
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: posix-timers: Sanitize overrun handling
The posix timer overrun handling is broken because the forwarding functions
can return a huge number of overruns which does not fit in an int. As a
consequence timer_getoverrun(2) and siginfo::si_overrun can turn into
random number generators.
The k_clock::timer_forward() callbacks return a 64 bit value now. Make
k_itimer::ti_overrun[_last] 64bit as well, so the kernel internal
accounting is correct. 3Remove the temporary (int) casts.
Add a helper function which clamps the overrun value returned to user space
via timer_getoverrun(2) or siginfo::si_overrun limited to a positive value
between 0 and INT_MAX. INT_MAX is an indicator for user space that the
overrun value has been clamped.
Reported-by: Team OWL337 <icytxw@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180626132705.018623573@linutronix.de
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 81,108
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::ClearRealGLErrors() {
GLenum error;
while ((error = glGetError()) != GL_NO_ERROR) {
if (error != GL_OUT_OF_MEMORY) {
NOTREACHED() << "GL error " << error << " was unhandled.";
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 103,489
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static __inline__ void fib6_start_gc(struct net *net, struct rt6_info *rt)
{
if (!timer_pending(&net->ipv6.ip6_fib_timer) &&
(rt->rt6i_flags & (RTF_EXPIRES | RTF_CACHE)))
mod_timer(&net->ipv6.ip6_fib_timer,
jiffies + net->ipv6.sysctl.ip6_rt_gc_interval);
}
Commit Message: net: fib: fib6_add: fix potential NULL pointer dereference
When the kernel is compiled with CONFIG_IPV6_SUBTREES, and we return
with an error in fn = fib6_add_1(), then error codes are encoded into
the return pointer e.g. ERR_PTR(-ENOENT). In such an error case, we
write the error code into err and jump to out, hence enter the if(err)
condition. Now, if CONFIG_IPV6_SUBTREES is enabled, we check for:
if (pn != fn && pn->leaf == rt)
...
if (pn != fn && !pn->leaf && !(pn->fn_flags & RTN_RTINFO))
...
Since pn is NULL and fn is f.e. ERR_PTR(-ENOENT), then pn != fn
evaluates to true and causes a NULL-pointer dereference on further
checks on pn. Fix it, by setting both NULL in error case, so that
pn != fn already evaluates to false and no further dereference
takes place.
This was first correctly implemented in 4a287eba2 ("IPv6 routing,
NLM_F_* flag support: REPLACE and EXCL flags support, warn about
missing CREATE flag"), but the bug got later on introduced by
188c517a0 ("ipv6: return errno pointers consistently for fib6_add_1()").
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Lin Ming <mlin@ss.pku.edu.cn>
Cc: Matti Vaittinen <matti.vaittinen@nsn.com>
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Matti Vaittinen <matti.vaittinen@nsn.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 28,428
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void get_strl(AVIOContext *pb, char *buf, int buf_size, int len)
{
int read = avio_get_str(pb, len, buf, buf_size);
if (read > 0)
avio_skip(pb, len - read);
}
Commit Message: avformat/rmdec: Do not pass mime type in rm_read_multi() to ff_rm_read_mdpr_codecdata()
Fixes: use after free()
Fixes: rmdec-crash-ffe85b4cab1597d1cfea6955705e53f1f5c8a362
Found-by: Paul Ch <paulcher@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 74,853
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int i2d_DSAPrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, DSA *dsa)
{
return ASN1_i2d_bio_of_const(DSA,i2d_DSAPrivateKey,bp,dsa);
}
Commit Message: Fix various certificate fingerprint issues.
By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a
certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature.
Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed
this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the
certificate fingerprint for blacklists.
1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits.
If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject
the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits.
2. Check certificate algorithm consistency.
Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the
certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure
errors for some broken certificates.
3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER.
Reencode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received
signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch.
This will reject various cases including garbage after signature
(thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS
program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs
(negative or with leading zeroes).
CVE-2014-8275
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 94,664
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: EC_KEY *d2i_EC_PUBKEY_bio(BIO *bp, EC_KEY **eckey)
{
return ASN1_d2i_bio_of(EC_KEY,EC_KEY_new,d2i_EC_PUBKEY,bp,eckey);
}
Commit Message: Fix various certificate fingerprint issues.
By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a
certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature.
Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed
this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the
certificate fingerprint for blacklists.
1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits.
If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject
the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits.
2. Check certificate algorithm consistency.
Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the
certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure
errors for some broken certificates.
3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER.
Reencode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received
signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch.
This will reject various cases including garbage after signature
(thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS
program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs
(negative or with leading zeroes).
CVE-2014-8275
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 94,641
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct file *get_mm_exe_file(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
struct file *exe_file;
rcu_read_lock();
exe_file = rcu_dereference(mm->exe_file);
if (exe_file && !get_file_rcu(exe_file))
exe_file = NULL;
rcu_read_unlock();
return exe_file;
}
Commit Message: fork: fix incorrect fput of ->exe_file causing use-after-free
Commit 7c051267931a ("mm, fork: make dup_mmap wait for mmap_sem for
write killable") made it possible to kill a forking task while it is
waiting to acquire its ->mmap_sem for write, in dup_mmap().
However, it was overlooked that this introduced an new error path before
a reference is taken on the mm_struct's ->exe_file. Since the
->exe_file of the new mm_struct was already set to the old ->exe_file by
the memcpy() in dup_mm(), it was possible for the mmput() in the error
path of dup_mm() to drop a reference to ->exe_file which was never
taken.
This caused the struct file to later be freed prematurely.
Fix it by updating mm_init() to NULL out the ->exe_file, in the same
place it clears other things like the list of mmaps.
This bug was found by syzkaller. It can be reproduced using the
following C program:
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <pthread.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <unistd.h>
static void *mmap_thread(void *_arg)
{
for (;;) {
mmap(NULL, 0x1000000, PROT_READ,
MAP_POPULATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0);
}
}
static void *fork_thread(void *_arg)
{
usleep(rand() % 10000);
fork();
}
int main(void)
{
fork();
fork();
fork();
for (;;) {
if (fork() == 0) {
pthread_t t;
pthread_create(&t, NULL, mmap_thread, NULL);
pthread_create(&t, NULL, fork_thread, NULL);
usleep(rand() % 10000);
syscall(__NR_exit_group, 0);
}
wait(NULL);
}
}
No special kernel config options are needed. It usually causes a NULL
pointer dereference in __remove_shared_vm_struct() during exit, or in
dup_mmap() (which is usually inlined into copy_process()) during fork.
Both are due to a vm_area_struct's ->vm_file being used after it's
already been freed.
Google Bug Id: 64772007
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170823211408.31198-1-ebiggers3@gmail.com
Fixes: 7c051267931a ("mm, fork: make dup_mmap wait for mmap_sem for write killable")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Tested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [v4.7+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 59,284
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: parse_DFS_referrals(TRANSACTION2_GET_DFS_REFER_RSP *pSMBr,
unsigned int *num_of_nodes,
struct dfs_info3_param **target_nodes,
const struct nls_table *nls_codepage, int remap,
const char *searchName)
{
int i, rc = 0;
char *data_end;
bool is_unicode;
struct dfs_referral_level_3 *ref;
if (pSMBr->hdr.Flags2 & SMBFLG2_UNICODE)
is_unicode = true;
else
is_unicode = false;
*num_of_nodes = le16_to_cpu(pSMBr->NumberOfReferrals);
if (*num_of_nodes < 1) {
cERROR(1, "num_referrals: must be at least > 0,"
"but we get num_referrals = %d\n", *num_of_nodes);
rc = -EINVAL;
goto parse_DFS_referrals_exit;
}
ref = (struct dfs_referral_level_3 *) &(pSMBr->referrals);
if (ref->VersionNumber != cpu_to_le16(3)) {
cERROR(1, "Referrals of V%d version are not supported,"
"should be V3", le16_to_cpu(ref->VersionNumber));
rc = -EINVAL;
goto parse_DFS_referrals_exit;
}
/* get the upper boundary of the resp buffer */
data_end = (char *)(&(pSMBr->PathConsumed)) +
le16_to_cpu(pSMBr->t2.DataCount);
cFYI(1, "num_referrals: %d dfs flags: 0x%x ...\n",
*num_of_nodes,
le32_to_cpu(pSMBr->DFSFlags));
*target_nodes = kzalloc(sizeof(struct dfs_info3_param) *
*num_of_nodes, GFP_KERNEL);
if (*target_nodes == NULL) {
cERROR(1, "Failed to allocate buffer for target_nodes\n");
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto parse_DFS_referrals_exit;
}
/* collect necessary data from referrals */
for (i = 0; i < *num_of_nodes; i++) {
char *temp;
int max_len;
struct dfs_info3_param *node = (*target_nodes)+i;
node->flags = le32_to_cpu(pSMBr->DFSFlags);
if (is_unicode) {
__le16 *tmp = kmalloc(strlen(searchName)*2 + 2,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (tmp == NULL) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto parse_DFS_referrals_exit;
}
cifsConvertToUCS((__le16 *) tmp, searchName,
PATH_MAX, nls_codepage, remap);
node->path_consumed = cifs_ucs2_bytes(tmp,
le16_to_cpu(pSMBr->PathConsumed),
nls_codepage);
kfree(tmp);
} else
node->path_consumed = le16_to_cpu(pSMBr->PathConsumed);
node->server_type = le16_to_cpu(ref->ServerType);
node->ref_flag = le16_to_cpu(ref->ReferralEntryFlags);
/* copy DfsPath */
temp = (char *)ref + le16_to_cpu(ref->DfsPathOffset);
max_len = data_end - temp;
node->path_name = cifs_strndup_from_ucs(temp, max_len,
is_unicode, nls_codepage);
if (!node->path_name) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto parse_DFS_referrals_exit;
}
/* copy link target UNC */
temp = (char *)ref + le16_to_cpu(ref->NetworkAddressOffset);
max_len = data_end - temp;
node->node_name = cifs_strndup_from_ucs(temp, max_len,
is_unicode, nls_codepage);
if (!node->node_name)
rc = -ENOMEM;
}
parse_DFS_referrals_exit:
if (rc) {
free_dfs_info_array(*target_nodes, *num_of_nodes);
*target_nodes = NULL;
*num_of_nodes = 0;
}
return rc;
}
Commit Message: cifs: fix possible memory corruption in CIFSFindNext
The name_len variable in CIFSFindNext is a signed int that gets set to
the resume_name_len in the cifs_search_info. The resume_name_len however
is unsigned and for some infolevels is populated directly from a 32 bit
value sent by the server.
If the server sends a very large value for this, then that value could
look negative when converted to a signed int. That would make that
value pass the PATH_MAX check later in CIFSFindNext. The name_len would
then be used as a length value for a memcpy. It would then be treated
as unsigned again, and the memcpy scribbles over a ton of memory.
Fix this by making the name_len an unsigned value in CIFSFindNext.
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Darren Lavender <dcl@hppine99.gbr.hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 25,021
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int speed_max(struct mddev *mddev)
{
return mddev->sync_speed_max ?
mddev->sync_speed_max : sysctl_speed_limit_max;
}
Commit Message: md: use kzalloc() when bitmap is disabled
In drivers/md/md.c get_bitmap_file() uses kmalloc() for creating a
mdu_bitmap_file_t called "file".
5769 file = kmalloc(sizeof(*file), GFP_NOIO);
5770 if (!file)
5771 return -ENOMEM;
This structure is copied to user space at the end of the function.
5786 if (err == 0 &&
5787 copy_to_user(arg, file, sizeof(*file)))
5788 err = -EFAULT
But if bitmap is disabled only the first byte of "file" is initialized
with zero, so it's possible to read some bytes (up to 4095) of kernel
space memory from user space. This is an information leak.
5775 /* bitmap disabled, zero the first byte and copy out */
5776 if (!mddev->bitmap_info.file)
5777 file->pathname[0] = '\0';
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Randazzo <benjamin@randazzo.fr>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 42,537
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::OnTextInputStateChanged(
const TextInputState& params) {
if (view_)
view_->TextInputStateChanged(params);
}
Commit Message: Start rendering timer after first navigation
Currently the new content rendering timer in the browser process,
which clears an old page's contents 4 seconds after a navigation if the
new page doesn't draw in that time, is not set on the first navigation
for a top-level frame.
This is problematic because content can exist before the first
navigation, for instance if it was created by a javascript: URL.
This CL removes the code that skips the timer activation on the first
navigation.
Bug: 844881
Change-Id: I19b3ad1ff62c69ded3a5f7b1c0afde191aaf4584
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1188589
Reviewed-by: Fady Samuel <fsamuel@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: ccameron <ccameron@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586913}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 145,520
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GDataDirectory* GDataEntry::AsGDataDirectory() {
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 117,073
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void raw_err(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 info)
{
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
const int type = icmp_hdr(skb)->type;
const int code = icmp_hdr(skb)->code;
int err = 0;
int harderr = 0;
if (type == ICMP_DEST_UNREACH && code == ICMP_FRAG_NEEDED)
ipv4_sk_update_pmtu(skb, sk, info);
else if (type == ICMP_REDIRECT) {
ipv4_sk_redirect(skb, sk);
return;
}
/* Report error on raw socket, if:
1. User requested ip_recverr.
2. Socket is connected (otherwise the error indication
is useless without ip_recverr and error is hard.
*/
if (!inet->recverr && sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
return;
switch (type) {
default:
case ICMP_TIME_EXCEEDED:
err = EHOSTUNREACH;
break;
case ICMP_SOURCE_QUENCH:
return;
case ICMP_PARAMETERPROB:
err = EPROTO;
harderr = 1;
break;
case ICMP_DEST_UNREACH:
err = EHOSTUNREACH;
if (code > NR_ICMP_UNREACH)
break;
err = icmp_err_convert[code].errno;
harderr = icmp_err_convert[code].fatal;
if (code == ICMP_FRAG_NEEDED) {
harderr = inet->pmtudisc != IP_PMTUDISC_DONT;
err = EMSGSIZE;
}
}
if (inet->recverr) {
const struct iphdr *iph = (const struct iphdr *)skb->data;
u8 *payload = skb->data + (iph->ihl << 2);
if (inet->hdrincl)
payload = skb->data;
ip_icmp_error(sk, skb, err, 0, info, payload);
}
if (inet->recverr || harderr) {
sk->sk_err = err;
sk->sk_error_report(sk);
}
}
Commit Message: inet: prevent leakage of uninitialized memory to user in recv syscalls
Only update *addr_len when we actually fill in sockaddr, otherwise we
can return uninitialized memory from the stack to the caller in the
recvfrom, recvmmsg and recvmsg syscalls. Drop the the (addr_len == NULL)
checks because we only get called with a valid addr_len pointer either
from sock_common_recvmsg or inet_recvmsg.
If a blocking read waits on a socket which is concurrently shut down we
now return zero and set msg_msgnamelen to 0.
Reported-by: mpb <mpb.mail@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 40,152
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: deprecated_websocket_ready_wrapper(struct mg_connection *conn, void *cbdata)
{
struct mg_callbacks *pcallbacks = (struct mg_callbacks *)cbdata;
if (pcallbacks->websocket_ready) {
pcallbacks->websocket_ready(conn);
}
}
Commit Message: Check length of memcmp
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 81,647
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static enum hrtimer_restart posix_timer_fn(struct hrtimer *timer)
{
struct k_itimer *timr;
unsigned long flags;
int si_private = 0;
enum hrtimer_restart ret = HRTIMER_NORESTART;
timr = container_of(timer, struct k_itimer, it.real.timer);
spin_lock_irqsave(&timr->it_lock, flags);
timr->it_active = 0;
if (timr->it_interval != 0)
si_private = ++timr->it_requeue_pending;
if (posix_timer_event(timr, si_private)) {
/*
* signal was not sent because of sig_ignor
* we will not get a call back to restart it AND
* it should be restarted.
*/
if (timr->it_interval != 0) {
ktime_t now = hrtimer_cb_get_time(timer);
/*
* FIXME: What we really want, is to stop this
* timer completely and restart it in case the
* SIG_IGN is removed. This is a non trivial
* change which involves sighand locking
* (sigh !), which we don't want to do late in
* the release cycle.
*
* For now we just let timers with an interval
* less than a jiffie expire every jiffie to
* avoid softirq starvation in case of SIG_IGN
* and a very small interval, which would put
* the timer right back on the softirq pending
* list. By moving now ahead of time we trick
* hrtimer_forward() to expire the timer
* later, while we still maintain the overrun
* accuracy, but have some inconsistency in
* the timer_gettime() case. This is at least
* better than a starved softirq. A more
* complex fix which solves also another related
* inconsistency is already in the pipeline.
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_HIGH_RES_TIMERS
{
ktime_t kj = NSEC_PER_SEC / HZ;
if (timr->it_interval < kj)
now = ktime_add(now, kj);
}
#endif
timr->it_overrun += (unsigned int)
hrtimer_forward(timer, now,
timr->it_interval);
ret = HRTIMER_RESTART;
++timr->it_requeue_pending;
timr->it_active = 1;
}
}
unlock_timer(timr, flags);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: posix-timers: Sanitize overrun handling
The posix timer overrun handling is broken because the forwarding functions
can return a huge number of overruns which does not fit in an int. As a
consequence timer_getoverrun(2) and siginfo::si_overrun can turn into
random number generators.
The k_clock::timer_forward() callbacks return a 64 bit value now. Make
k_itimer::ti_overrun[_last] 64bit as well, so the kernel internal
accounting is correct. 3Remove the temporary (int) casts.
Add a helper function which clamps the overrun value returned to user space
via timer_getoverrun(2) or siginfo::si_overrun limited to a positive value
between 0 and INT_MAX. INT_MAX is an indicator for user space that the
overrun value has been clamped.
Reported-by: Team OWL337 <icytxw@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180626132705.018623573@linutronix.de
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 1
| 169,182
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void init_filter(APEContext *ctx, APEFilter *f, int16_t *buf, int order)
{
do_init_filter(&f[0], buf, order);
do_init_filter(&f[1], buf + order * 3 + HISTORY_SIZE, order);
}
Commit Message: avcodec/apedec: Fix integer overflow
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: PoC.ape and others
Found-by: Bingchang, Liu@VARAS of IIE
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 63,416
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RunEmptyFormatsCallback(
mojom::VideoCaptureHost::GetDeviceSupportedFormatsCallback& callback) {
media::VideoCaptureFormats formats;
std::move(callback).Run(formats);
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 149,402
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pdf14_buf_new(gs_int_rect *rect, bool has_tags, bool has_alpha_g,
bool has_shape, bool idle, int n_chan, int num_spots,
gs_memory_t *memory)
{
/* Note that alpha_g is the alpha for the GROUP */
/* This is distinct from the alpha that may also exist */
/* for the objects within the group. Hence it can introduce */
/* yet another plane */
pdf14_buf *result;
pdf14_parent_color_t *new_parent_color;
int rowstride = (rect->q.x - rect->p.x + 3) & -4;
int height = (rect->q.y - rect->p.y);
int n_planes = n_chan + (has_shape ? 1 : 0) + (has_alpha_g ? 1 : 0) +
(has_tags ? 1 : 0);
int planestride;
double dsize = (((double) rowstride) * height) * n_planes;
if (dsize > (double)max_uint)
return NULL;
result = gs_alloc_struct(memory, pdf14_buf, &st_pdf14_buf,
"pdf14_buf_new");
if (result == NULL)
return result;
result->backdrop = NULL;
result->saved = NULL;
result->isolated = false;
result->knockout = false;
result->has_alpha_g = has_alpha_g;
result->has_shape = has_shape;
result->has_tags = has_tags;
result->rect = *rect;
result->n_chan = n_chan;
result->n_planes = n_planes;
result->rowstride = rowstride;
result->transfer_fn = NULL;
result->matte_num_comps = 0;
result->matte = NULL;
result->mask_stack = NULL;
result->idle = idle;
result->mask_id = 0;
result->num_spots = num_spots;
new_parent_color = gs_alloc_struct(memory, pdf14_parent_color_t, &st_pdf14_clr,
"pdf14_buf_new");
if (new_parent_color == NULL) {
gs_free_object(memory, result, "pdf14_buf_new");
return NULL;
}
result->parent_color_info_procs = new_parent_color;
result->parent_color_info_procs->get_cmap_procs = NULL;
result->parent_color_info_procs->parent_color_mapping_procs = NULL;
result->parent_color_info_procs->parent_color_comp_index = NULL;
result->parent_color_info_procs->icc_profile = NULL;
result->parent_color_info_procs->previous = NULL;
result->parent_color_info_procs->encode = NULL;
result->parent_color_info_procs->decode = NULL;
if (height <= 0) {
/* Empty clipping - will skip all drawings. */
result->planestride = 0;
result->data = 0;
} else {
planestride = rowstride * height;
result->planestride = planestride;
result->data = gs_alloc_bytes(memory, planestride * n_planes,
"pdf14_buf_new");
if (result->data == NULL) {
gs_free_object(memory, result, "pdf14_buf_new");
return NULL;
}
if (has_alpha_g) {
int alpha_g_plane = n_chan + (has_shape ? 1 : 0);
memset (result->data + alpha_g_plane * planestride, 0, planestride);
}
if (has_tags) {
int tags_plane = n_chan + (has_shape ? 1 : 0) + (has_alpha_g ? 1 : 0);
memset (result->data + tags_plane * planestride,
GS_UNTOUCHED_TAG, planestride);
}
}
/* Initialize dirty box with an invalid rectangle (the reversed rectangle).
* Any future drawing will make it valid again, so we won't blend back
* more than we need. */
result->dirty.p.x = rect->q.x;
result->dirty.p.y = rect->q.y;
result->dirty.q.x = rect->p.x;
result->dirty.q.y = rect->p.y;
return result;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 13,280
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct scm_fp_list *scm_fp_dup(struct scm_fp_list *fpl)
{
struct scm_fp_list *new_fpl;
int i;
if (!fpl)
return NULL;
new_fpl = kmemdup(fpl, offsetof(struct scm_fp_list, fp[fpl->count]),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (new_fpl) {
for (i = 0; i < fpl->count; i++)
get_file(fpl->fp[i]);
new_fpl->max = new_fpl->count;
}
return new_fpl;
}
Commit Message: net: Check the correct namespace when spoofing pid over SCM_RIGHTS
This is a security bug.
The follow-up will fix nsproxy to discourage this type of issue from
happening again.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Reviewed-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 29,663
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void NavigationControllerImpl::DiscardNonCommittedEntriesInternal() {
DiscardPendingEntry(false);
DiscardTransientEntry();
}
Commit Message: Add DumpWithoutCrashing in RendererDidNavigateToExistingPage
This is intended to be reverted after investigating the linked bug.
BUG=688425
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2701523004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450900}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 137,768
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int GetReceivedMessages(FrameTreeNode* ftn) {
int received_messages = 0;
EXPECT_TRUE(ExecuteScriptAndExtractInt(
ftn, "window.domAutomationController.send(window.receivedMessages);",
&received_messages));
return received_messages;
}
Commit Message: Avoid sharing process for blob URLs with null origin.
Previously, when a frame with a unique origin, such as from a data
URL, created a blob URL, the blob URL looked like blob:null/guid and
resulted in a site URL of "blob:" when navigated to. This incorrectly
allowed all such blob URLs to share a process, even if they were
created by different sites.
This CL changes the site URL assigned in such cases to be the full
blob URL, which includes the GUID. This avoids process sharing for
all blob URLs with unique origins.
This fix is conservative in the sense that it would also isolate
different blob URLs created by the same unique origin from each other.
This case isn't expected to be common, so it's unlikely to affect
process count. There's ongoing work to maintain a GUID for unique
origins, so longer-term, we could try using that to track down the
creator and potentially use that GUID in the site URL instead of the
blob URL's GUID, to avoid unnecessary process isolation in scenarios
like this.
Note that as part of this, we discovered a bug where data URLs aren't
able to script blob URLs that they create: https://crbug.com/865254.
This scripting bug should be fixed independently of this CL, and as
far as we can tell, this CL doesn't regress scripting cases like this
further.
Bug: 863623
Change-Id: Ib50407adbba3d5ee0cf6d72d3df7f8d8f24684ee
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1142389
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#576318}
CWE ID: CWE-285
| 0
| 154,556
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: AccessibilityRole AXNodeObject::determineAccessibilityRole() {
if (!getNode())
return UnknownRole;
if ((m_ariaRole = determineAriaRoleAttribute()) != UnknownRole)
return m_ariaRole;
if (getNode()->isTextNode())
return StaticTextRole;
AccessibilityRole role = nativeAccessibilityRoleIgnoringAria();
if (role != UnknownRole)
return role;
if (getNode()->isElementNode()) {
Element* element = toElement(getNode());
if (element->isInCanvasSubtree() && element->supportsFocus())
return GroupRole;
}
return UnknownRole;
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 127,141
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: tsize_t t2p_write_pdf_obj_end(TIFF* output){
tsize_t written=0;
written += t2pWriteFile(output, (tdata_t) "endobj\n", 7);
return(written);
}
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcrop.c: fix various out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities
in heap or stack allocated buffers. Reported as MSVR 35093,
MSVR 35096 and MSVR 35097. Discovered by Axel Souchet and Vishal
Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
* tools/tiff2pdf.c: fix out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities in
heap allocate buffer in t2p_process_jpeg_strip(). Reported as MSVR
35098. Discovered by Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC
Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
* libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c: fix out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities
in heap allocated buffers. Reported as MSVR 35094. Discovered by
Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities &
Mitigations team.
* libtiff/tif_write.c: fix issue in error code path of TIFFFlushData1()
that didn't reset the tif_rawcc and tif_rawcp members. I'm not
completely sure if that could happen in practice outside of the odd
behaviour of t2p_seekproc() of tiff2pdf). The report points that a
better fix could be to check the return value of TIFFFlushData1() in
places where it isn't done currently, but it seems this patch is enough.
Reported as MSVR 35095. Discovered by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan &
Suha Can from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 48,374
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SessionService::RecordUpdatedTabClosed(base::TimeDelta delta,
bool use_long_period) {
std::string name("SessionRestore.TabClosedPeriod");
UMA_HISTOGRAM_CUSTOM_TIMES(name,
delta,
save_delay_in_millis_,
save_delay_in_mins_,
50);
if (use_long_period) {
std::string long_name_("SessionRestore.TabClosedLongPeriod");
UMA_HISTOGRAM_CUSTOM_TIMES(long_name_,
delta,
save_delay_in_mins_,
save_delay_in_hrs_,
50);
}
}
Commit Message: Metrics for measuring how much overhead reading compressed content states adds.
BUG=104293
TEST=NONE
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9426039
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@123733 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 108,826
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::BeginSaveFile(const GURL& url,
const Referrer& referrer,
SaveItemId save_item_id,
SavePackageId save_package_id,
int child_id,
int render_view_route_id,
int render_frame_route_id,
ResourceContext* context) {
if (is_shutdown_)
return;
char url_buf[128];
base::strlcpy(url_buf, url.spec().c_str(), arraysize(url_buf));
base::debug::Alias(url_buf);
CHECK(ContainsKey(active_resource_contexts_, context));
request_id_--;
const net::URLRequestContext* request_context = context->GetRequestContext();
bool known_proto =
request_context->job_factory()->IsHandledURL(url);
if (!known_proto) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
scoped_ptr<net::URLRequest> request(
request_context->CreateRequest(url, net::DEFAULT_PRIORITY, NULL));
request->set_method("GET");
SetReferrerForRequest(request.get(), referrer);
request->SetLoadFlags(net::LOAD_PREFERRING_CACHE);
ResourceRequestInfoImpl* extra_info =
CreateRequestInfo(child_id, render_view_route_id,
render_frame_route_id, false, context);
extra_info->AssociateWithRequest(request.get()); // Request takes ownership.
scoped_ptr<ResourceHandler> handler(new SaveFileResourceHandler(
request.get(), save_item_id, save_package_id, child_id,
render_frame_route_id, url, save_file_manager_.get()));
BeginRequestInternal(std::move(request), std::move(handler));
}
Commit Message: Block a compromised renderer from reusing request ids.
BUG=578882
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1608573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#372547}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 132,799
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Node::NodeType Element::nodeType() const
{
return ELEMENT_NODE;
}
Commit Message: Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 112,315
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __init tun_init(void)
{
int ret = 0;
pr_info("%s, %s\n", DRV_DESCRIPTION, DRV_VERSION);
pr_info("%s\n", DRV_COPYRIGHT);
ret = rtnl_link_register(&tun_link_ops);
if (ret) {
pr_err("Can't register link_ops\n");
goto err_linkops;
}
ret = misc_register(&tun_miscdev);
if (ret) {
pr_err("Can't register misc device %d\n", TUN_MINOR);
goto err_misc;
}
return 0;
err_misc:
rtnl_link_unregister(&tun_link_ops);
err_linkops:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 23,862
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int sr_drive_status(struct cdrom_device_info *cdi, int slot)
{
struct scsi_cd *cd = cdi->handle;
struct scsi_sense_hdr sshdr;
struct media_event_desc med;
if (CDSL_CURRENT != slot) {
/* we have no changer support */
return -EINVAL;
}
if (!scsi_test_unit_ready(cd->device, SR_TIMEOUT, MAX_RETRIES, &sshdr))
return CDS_DISC_OK;
/* SK/ASC/ASCQ of 2/4/1 means "unit is becoming ready" */
if (scsi_sense_valid(&sshdr) && sshdr.sense_key == NOT_READY
&& sshdr.asc == 0x04 && sshdr.ascq == 0x01)
return CDS_DRIVE_NOT_READY;
if (!cdrom_get_media_event(cdi, &med)) {
if (med.media_present)
return CDS_DISC_OK;
else if (med.door_open)
return CDS_TRAY_OPEN;
else
return CDS_NO_DISC;
}
/*
* SK/ASC/ASCQ of 2/4/2 means "initialization required"
* Using CD_TRAY_OPEN results in an START_STOP_UNIT to close
* the tray, which resolves the initialization requirement.
*/
if (scsi_sense_valid(&sshdr) && sshdr.sense_key == NOT_READY
&& sshdr.asc == 0x04 && sshdr.ascq == 0x02)
return CDS_TRAY_OPEN;
/*
* 0x04 is format in progress .. but there must be a disc present!
*/
if (sshdr.sense_key == NOT_READY && sshdr.asc == 0x04)
return CDS_DISC_OK;
/*
* If not using Mt Fuji extended media tray reports,
* just return TRAY_OPEN since ATAPI doesn't provide
* any other way to detect this...
*/
if (scsi_sense_valid(&sshdr) &&
/* 0x3a is medium not present */
sshdr.asc == 0x3a)
return CDS_NO_DISC;
else
return CDS_TRAY_OPEN;
return CDS_DRIVE_NOT_READY;
}
Commit Message: sr: pass down correctly sized SCSI sense buffer
We're casting the CDROM layer request_sense to the SCSI sense
buffer, but the former is 64 bytes and the latter is 96 bytes.
As we generally allocate these on the stack, we end up blowing
up the stack.
Fix this by wrapping the scsi_execute() call with a properly
sized sense buffer, and copying back the bits for the CDROM
layer.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Piotr Gabriel Kosinski <pg.kosinski@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Daniel Shapira <daniel@twistlock.com>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Fixes: 82ed4db499b8 ("block: split scsi_request out of struct request")
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 82,656
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int stack_trace_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
return seq_open(file, &stack_trace_seq_ops);
}
Commit Message: tracing: Fix possible NULL pointer dereferences
Currently set_ftrace_pid and set_graph_function files use seq_lseek
for their fops. However seq_open() is called only for FMODE_READ in
the fops->open() so that if an user tries to seek one of those file
when she open it for writing, it sees NULL seq_file and then panic.
It can be easily reproduced with following command:
$ cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
$ echo 1234 | sudo tee -a set_ftrace_pid
In this example, GNU coreutils' tee opens the file with fopen(, "a")
and then the fopen() internally calls lseek().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365663302-2170-1-git-send-email-namhyung@kernel.org
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung.kim@lge.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 30,303
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: iakerb_alloc_context(iakerb_ctx_id_t *pctx)
{
iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx;
krb5_error_code code;
*pctx = NULL;
ctx = k5alloc(sizeof(*ctx), &code);
if (ctx == NULL)
goto cleanup;
ctx->defcred = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
ctx->magic = KG_IAKERB_CONTEXT;
ctx->state = IAKERB_AS_REQ;
ctx->count = 0;
code = krb5_gss_init_context(&ctx->k5c);
if (code != 0)
goto cleanup;
*pctx = ctx;
cleanup:
if (code != 0)
iakerb_release_context(ctx);
return code;
}
Commit Message: Fix IAKERB context aliasing bugs [CVE-2015-2696]
The IAKERB mechanism currently replaces its context handle with the
krb5 mechanism handle upon establishment, under the assumption that
most GSS functions are only called after context establishment. This
assumption is incorrect, and can lead to aliasing violations for some
programs. Maintain the IAKERB context structure after context
establishment and add new IAKERB entry points to refer to it with that
type. Add initiate and established flags to the IAKERB context
structure for use in gss_inquire_context() prior to context
establishment.
CVE-2015-2696:
In MIT krb5 1.9 and later, applications which call
gss_inquire_context() on a partially-established IAKERB context can
cause the GSS-API library to read from a pointer using the wrong type,
generally causing a process crash. Java server applications using the
native JGSS provider are vulnerable to this bug. A carefully crafted
IAKERB packet might allow the gss_inquire_context() call to succeed
with attacker-determined results, but applications should not make
access control decisions based on gss_inquire_context() results prior
to context establishment.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[ghudson@mit.edu: several bugfixes, style changes, and edge-case
behavior changes; commit message and CVE description]
ticket: 8244
target_version: 1.14
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-18
| 1
| 166,643
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void row_prop_write(zval *object, zval *member, zval *value, const zend_literal *key TSRMLS_DC)
{
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "This PDORow is not from a writable result set");
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #73331 - do not try to serialize/unserialize objects wddx can not handle
Proper soltion would be to call serialize/unserialize and deal with the result,
but this requires more work that should be done by wddx maintainer (not me).
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 72,457
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool arcmsr_hbaB_get_config(struct AdapterControlBlock *acb)
{
struct MessageUnit_B *reg = acb->pmuB;
char *acb_firm_model = acb->firm_model;
char *acb_firm_version = acb->firm_version;
char *acb_device_map = acb->device_map;
char __iomem *iop_firm_model;
/*firm_model,15,60-67*/
char __iomem *iop_firm_version;
/*firm_version,17,68-83*/
char __iomem *iop_device_map;
/*firm_version,21,84-99*/
int count;
iop_firm_model = (char __iomem *)(®->message_rwbuffer[15]); /*firm_model,15,60-67*/
iop_firm_version = (char __iomem *)(®->message_rwbuffer[17]); /*firm_version,17,68-83*/
iop_device_map = (char __iomem *)(®->message_rwbuffer[21]); /*firm_version,21,84-99*/
arcmsr_wait_firmware_ready(acb);
writel(ARCMSR_MESSAGE_START_DRIVER_MODE, reg->drv2iop_doorbell);
if (!arcmsr_hbaB_wait_msgint_ready(acb)) {
printk(KERN_ERR "arcmsr%d: can't set driver mode.\n", acb->host->host_no);
return false;
}
writel(ARCMSR_MESSAGE_GET_CONFIG, reg->drv2iop_doorbell);
if (!arcmsr_hbaB_wait_msgint_ready(acb)) {
printk(KERN_NOTICE "arcmsr%d: wait 'get adapter firmware \
miscellaneous data' timeout \n", acb->host->host_no);
return false;
}
count = 8;
while (count){
*acb_firm_model = readb(iop_firm_model);
acb_firm_model++;
iop_firm_model++;
count--;
}
count = 16;
while (count){
*acb_firm_version = readb(iop_firm_version);
acb_firm_version++;
iop_firm_version++;
count--;
}
count = 16;
while(count){
*acb_device_map = readb(iop_device_map);
acb_device_map++;
iop_device_map++;
count--;
}
pr_notice("Areca RAID Controller%d: Model %s, F/W %s\n",
acb->host->host_no,
acb->firm_model,
acb->firm_version);
acb->signature = readl(®->message_rwbuffer[0]);
/*firm_signature,1,00-03*/
acb->firm_request_len = readl(®->message_rwbuffer[1]);
/*firm_request_len,1,04-07*/
acb->firm_numbers_queue = readl(®->message_rwbuffer[2]);
/*firm_numbers_queue,2,08-11*/
acb->firm_sdram_size = readl(®->message_rwbuffer[3]);
/*firm_sdram_size,3,12-15*/
acb->firm_hd_channels = readl(®->message_rwbuffer[4]);
/*firm_ide_channels,4,16-19*/
acb->firm_cfg_version = readl(®->message_rwbuffer[25]); /*firm_cfg_version,25,100-103*/
/*firm_ide_channels,4,16-19*/
return true;
}
Commit Message: scsi: arcmsr: Buffer overflow in arcmsr_iop_message_xfer()
We need to put an upper bound on "user_len" so the memcpy() doesn't
overflow.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <marco.gra@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Henzl <thenzl@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 49,773
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual ~PrintPreviewUIUnitTest() {}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 105,856
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ViewportAnchor(LayerImpl* inner_scroll, LayerImpl* outer_scroll)
: inner_(inner_scroll), outer_(outer_scroll) {
viewport_in_content_coordinates_ = inner_->CurrentScrollOffset();
if (outer_)
viewport_in_content_coordinates_ += outer_->CurrentScrollOffset();
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 137,399
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: mrb_init_class(mrb_state *mrb)
{
struct RClass *bob; /* BasicObject */
struct RClass *obj; /* Object */
struct RClass *mod; /* Module */
struct RClass *cls; /* Class */
/* boot class hierarchy */
bob = boot_defclass(mrb, 0);
obj = boot_defclass(mrb, bob); mrb->object_class = obj;
mod = boot_defclass(mrb, obj); mrb->module_class = mod;/* obj -> mod */
cls = boot_defclass(mrb, mod); mrb->class_class = cls; /* obj -> cls */
/* fix-up loose ends */
bob->c = obj->c = mod->c = cls->c = cls;
make_metaclass(mrb, bob);
make_metaclass(mrb, obj);
make_metaclass(mrb, mod);
make_metaclass(mrb, cls);
/* name basic classes */
mrb_define_const(mrb, bob, "BasicObject", mrb_obj_value(bob));
mrb_define_const(mrb, obj, "BasicObject", mrb_obj_value(bob));
mrb_define_const(mrb, obj, "Object", mrb_obj_value(obj));
mrb_define_const(mrb, obj, "Module", mrb_obj_value(mod));
mrb_define_const(mrb, obj, "Class", mrb_obj_value(cls));
/* name each classes */
mrb_class_name_class(mrb, NULL, bob, mrb_intern_lit(mrb, "BasicObject"));
mrb_class_name_class(mrb, NULL, obj, mrb_intern_lit(mrb, "Object")); /* 15.2.1 */
mrb_class_name_class(mrb, NULL, mod, mrb_intern_lit(mrb, "Module")); /* 15.2.2 */
mrb_class_name_class(mrb, NULL, cls, mrb_intern_lit(mrb, "Class")); /* 15.2.3 */
mrb->proc_class = mrb_define_class(mrb, "Proc", mrb->object_class); /* 15.2.17 */
MRB_SET_INSTANCE_TT(mrb->proc_class, MRB_TT_PROC);
MRB_SET_INSTANCE_TT(cls, MRB_TT_CLASS);
mrb_define_method(mrb, bob, "initialize", mrb_bob_init, MRB_ARGS_NONE());
mrb_define_method(mrb, bob, "!", mrb_bob_not, MRB_ARGS_NONE());
mrb_define_method(mrb, bob, "==", mrb_obj_equal_m, MRB_ARGS_REQ(1)); /* 15.3.1.3.1 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, bob, "!=", mrb_obj_not_equal_m, MRB_ARGS_REQ(1));
mrb_define_method(mrb, bob, "__id__", mrb_obj_id_m, MRB_ARGS_NONE()); /* 15.3.1.3.3 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, bob, "__send__", mrb_f_send, MRB_ARGS_ANY()); /* 15.3.1.3.4 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, bob, "instance_eval", mrb_obj_instance_eval, MRB_ARGS_ANY()); /* 15.3.1.3.18 */
mrb_define_class_method(mrb, cls, "new", mrb_class_new_class, MRB_ARGS_OPT(1));
mrb_define_method(mrb, cls, "superclass", mrb_class_superclass, MRB_ARGS_NONE()); /* 15.2.3.3.4 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, cls, "new", mrb_instance_new, MRB_ARGS_ANY()); /* 15.2.3.3.3 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, cls, "initialize", mrb_class_initialize, MRB_ARGS_OPT(1)); /* 15.2.3.3.1 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, cls, "inherited", mrb_bob_init, MRB_ARGS_REQ(1));
MRB_SET_INSTANCE_TT(mod, MRB_TT_MODULE);
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "class_variable_defined?", mrb_mod_cvar_defined, MRB_ARGS_REQ(1)); /* 15.2.2.4.16 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "class_variable_get", mrb_mod_cvar_get, MRB_ARGS_REQ(1)); /* 15.2.2.4.17 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "class_variable_set", mrb_mod_cvar_set, MRB_ARGS_REQ(2)); /* 15.2.2.4.18 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "extend_object", mrb_mod_extend_object, MRB_ARGS_REQ(1)); /* 15.2.2.4.25 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "extended", mrb_bob_init, MRB_ARGS_REQ(1)); /* 15.2.2.4.26 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "prepended", mrb_bob_init, MRB_ARGS_REQ(1));
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "prepend_features", mrb_mod_prepend_features, MRB_ARGS_REQ(1));
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "include?", mrb_mod_include_p, MRB_ARGS_REQ(1)); /* 15.2.2.4.28 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "append_features", mrb_mod_append_features, MRB_ARGS_REQ(1)); /* 15.2.2.4.10 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "class_eval", mrb_mod_module_eval, MRB_ARGS_ANY()); /* 15.2.2.4.15 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "included", mrb_bob_init, MRB_ARGS_REQ(1)); /* 15.2.2.4.29 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "included_modules", mrb_mod_included_modules, MRB_ARGS_NONE()); /* 15.2.2.4.30 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "initialize", mrb_mod_initialize, MRB_ARGS_NONE()); /* 15.2.2.4.31 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "instance_methods", mrb_mod_instance_methods, MRB_ARGS_ANY()); /* 15.2.2.4.33 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "method_defined?", mrb_mod_method_defined, MRB_ARGS_REQ(1)); /* 15.2.2.4.34 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "module_eval", mrb_mod_module_eval, MRB_ARGS_ANY()); /* 15.2.2.4.35 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "module_function", mrb_mod_module_function, MRB_ARGS_ANY());
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "private", mrb_mod_dummy_visibility, MRB_ARGS_ANY()); /* 15.2.2.4.36 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "protected", mrb_mod_dummy_visibility, MRB_ARGS_ANY()); /* 15.2.2.4.37 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "public", mrb_mod_dummy_visibility, MRB_ARGS_ANY()); /* 15.2.2.4.38 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "remove_class_variable", mrb_mod_remove_cvar, MRB_ARGS_REQ(1)); /* 15.2.2.4.39 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "remove_method", mrb_mod_remove_method, MRB_ARGS_ANY()); /* 15.2.2.4.41 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "method_removed", mrb_bob_init, MRB_ARGS_REQ(1));
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "attr_reader", mrb_mod_attr_reader, MRB_ARGS_ANY()); /* 15.2.2.4.13 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "attr_writer", mrb_mod_attr_writer, MRB_ARGS_ANY()); /* 15.2.2.4.14 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "to_s", mrb_mod_to_s, MRB_ARGS_NONE());
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "inspect", mrb_mod_to_s, MRB_ARGS_NONE());
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "alias_method", mrb_mod_alias, MRB_ARGS_ANY()); /* 15.2.2.4.8 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "ancestors", mrb_mod_ancestors, MRB_ARGS_NONE()); /* 15.2.2.4.9 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "undef_method", mrb_mod_undef, MRB_ARGS_ANY()); /* 15.2.2.4.41 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "const_defined?", mrb_mod_const_defined, MRB_ARGS_ARG(1,1)); /* 15.2.2.4.20 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "const_get", mrb_mod_const_get, MRB_ARGS_REQ(1)); /* 15.2.2.4.21 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "const_set", mrb_mod_const_set, MRB_ARGS_REQ(2)); /* 15.2.2.4.23 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "constants", mrb_mod_constants, MRB_ARGS_OPT(1)); /* 15.2.2.4.24 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "remove_const", mrb_mod_remove_const, MRB_ARGS_REQ(1)); /* 15.2.2.4.40 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "const_missing", mrb_mod_const_missing, MRB_ARGS_REQ(1));
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "define_method", mod_define_method, MRB_ARGS_ARG(1,1));
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "class_variables", mrb_mod_class_variables, MRB_ARGS_NONE()); /* 15.2.2.4.19 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, mod, "===", mrb_mod_eqq, MRB_ARGS_REQ(1));
mrb_define_class_method(mrb, mod, "constants", mrb_mod_s_constants, MRB_ARGS_ANY()); /* 15.2.2.3.1 */
mrb_define_class_method(mrb, mod, "nesting", mrb_mod_s_nesting, MRB_ARGS_REQ(0)); /* 15.2.2.3.2 */
mrb_undef_method(mrb, cls, "append_features");
mrb_undef_method(mrb, cls, "extend_object");
mrb->top_self = (struct RObject*)mrb_obj_alloc(mrb, MRB_TT_OBJECT, mrb->object_class);
mrb_define_singleton_method(mrb, mrb->top_self, "inspect", inspect_main, MRB_ARGS_NONE());
mrb_define_singleton_method(mrb, mrb->top_self, "to_s", inspect_main, MRB_ARGS_NONE());
mrb_define_singleton_method(mrb, mrb->top_self, "define_method", top_define_method, MRB_ARGS_ARG(1,1));
}
Commit Message: `mrb_class_real()` did not work for `BasicObject`; fix #4037
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 82,096
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AXLayoutObject::clearChildren() {
AXObject::clearChildren();
m_childrenDirty = false;
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 127,021
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FilePath DownloadItemImpl::GetTargetName() const {
return target_path_.BaseName();
}
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
R=asanka@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 106,112
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FilePath NaClProcessHost::GetManifestPath() {
const extensions::Extension* extension = extension_info_map_->extensions()
.GetExtensionOrAppByURL(ExtensionURLInfo(manifest_url_));
if (extension != NULL && manifest_url_.SchemeIs(chrome::kExtensionScheme)) {
std::string path = manifest_url_.path();
TrimString(path, "/", &path); // Remove first slash
return extension->path().AppendASCII(path);
}
return FilePath();
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 103,261
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __init gate_vma_init(void)
{
gate_vma.vm_page_prot = PAGE_READONLY_EXEC;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ARM: 7735/2: Preserve the user r/w register TPIDRURW on context switch and fork
Since commit 6a1c53124aa1 the user writeable TLS register was zeroed to
prevent it from being used as a covert channel between two tasks.
There are more and more applications coming to Windows RT,
Wine could support them, but mostly they expect to have
the thread environment block (TEB) in TPIDRURW.
This patch preserves that register per thread instead of clearing it.
Unlike the TPIDRURO, which is already switched, the TPIDRURW
can be updated from userspace so needs careful treatment in the case that we
modify TPIDRURW and call fork(). To avoid this we must always read
TPIDRURW in copy_thread.
Signed-off-by: André Hentschel <nerv@dawncrow.de>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Austin <jonathan.austin@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 58,337
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int rfcomm_sock_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr, int alen, int flags)
{
struct sockaddr_rc *sa = (struct sockaddr_rc *) addr;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct rfcomm_dlc *d = rfcomm_pi(sk)->dlc;
int err = 0;
BT_DBG("sk %p", sk);
if (alen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_rc) ||
addr->sa_family != AF_BLUETOOTH)
return -EINVAL;
lock_sock(sk);
if (sk->sk_state != BT_OPEN && sk->sk_state != BT_BOUND) {
err = -EBADFD;
goto done;
}
if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_STREAM) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto done;
}
sk->sk_state = BT_CONNECT;
bacpy(&rfcomm_pi(sk)->dst, &sa->rc_bdaddr);
rfcomm_pi(sk)->channel = sa->rc_channel;
d->sec_level = rfcomm_pi(sk)->sec_level;
d->role_switch = rfcomm_pi(sk)->role_switch;
err = rfcomm_dlc_open(d, &rfcomm_pi(sk)->src, &sa->rc_bdaddr,
sa->rc_channel);
if (!err)
err = bt_sock_wait_state(sk, BT_CONNECTED,
sock_sndtimeo(sk, flags & O_NONBLOCK));
done:
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 40,378
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void encode_string(struct xdr_stream *xdr, unsigned int len, const char *str)
{
__be32 *p;
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 4 + len);
BUG_ON(p == NULL);
xdr_encode_opaque(p, str, len);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 23,092
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MojoResult Core::EndWriteData(MojoHandle data_pipe_producer_handle,
uint32_t num_bytes_written) {
RequestContext request_context;
scoped_refptr<Dispatcher> dispatcher(
GetDispatcher(data_pipe_producer_handle));
if (!dispatcher)
return MOJO_RESULT_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
return dispatcher->EndWriteData(num_bytes_written);
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 149,591
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned long mem_cgroup_nr_lru_pages(struct mem_cgroup *memcg,
unsigned int lru_mask)
{
int nid;
u64 total = 0;
for_each_node_state(nid, N_HIGH_MEMORY)
total += mem_cgroup_node_nr_lru_pages(memcg, nid, lru_mask);
return total;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 21,096
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: AP_DECLARE(int) ap_rputc(int c, request_rec *r)
{
char c2 = (char)c;
if (r->connection->aborted) {
return -1;
}
if (buffer_output(r, &c2, 1) != APR_SUCCESS)
return -1;
return c;
}
Commit Message: *) SECURITY: CVE-2015-0253 (cve.mitre.org)
core: Fix a crash introduced in with ErrorDocument 400 pointing
to a local URL-path with the INCLUDES filter active, introduced
in 2.4.11. PR 57531. [Yann Ylavic]
Submitted By: ylavic
Committed By: covener
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1664205 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID:
| 0
| 44,996
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const struct user_regset_view *task_user_regset_view(struct task_struct *task)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
if (test_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_31BIT))
return &user_s390_compat_view;
#endif
return &user_s390_view;
}
Commit Message: s390/ptrace: fix PSW mask check
The PSW mask check of the PTRACE_POKEUSR_AREA command is incorrect.
The PSW_MASK_USER define contains the PSW_MASK_ASC bits, the ptrace
interface accepts all combinations for the address-space-control
bits. To protect the kernel space the PSW mask check in ptrace needs
to reject the address-space-control bit combination for home space.
Fixes CVE-2014-3534
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 38,046
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t show_country_rel_date
(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
struct usb_interface *intf = to_usb_interface(dev);
struct acm *acm = usb_get_intfdata(intf);
return sprintf(buf, "%d", acm->country_rel_date);
}
Commit Message: USB: cdc-acm: more sanity checking
An attack has become available which pretends to be a quirky
device circumventing normal sanity checks and crashes the kernel
by an insufficient number of interfaces. This patch adds a check
to the code path for quirky devices.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 54,230
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int WebFrame::InstanceCount() {
return g_frame_count;
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 134,334
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void setup_cifs_sb(struct smb_vol *pvolume_info,
struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb)
{
INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&cifs_sb->prune_tlinks, cifs_prune_tlinks);
if (pvolume_info->rsize > CIFSMaxBufSize) {
cERROR(1, "rsize %d too large, using MaxBufSize",
pvolume_info->rsize);
cifs_sb->rsize = CIFSMaxBufSize;
} else if ((pvolume_info->rsize) &&
(pvolume_info->rsize <= CIFSMaxBufSize))
cifs_sb->rsize = pvolume_info->rsize;
else /* default */
cifs_sb->rsize = CIFSMaxBufSize;
if (pvolume_info->wsize > PAGEVEC_SIZE * PAGE_CACHE_SIZE) {
cERROR(1, "wsize %d too large, using 4096 instead",
pvolume_info->wsize);
cifs_sb->wsize = 4096;
} else if (pvolume_info->wsize)
cifs_sb->wsize = pvolume_info->wsize;
else
cifs_sb->wsize = min_t(const int,
PAGEVEC_SIZE * PAGE_CACHE_SIZE,
127*1024);
/* old default of CIFSMaxBufSize was too small now
that SMB Write2 can send multiple pages in kvec.
RFC1001 does not describe what happens when frame
bigger than 128K is sent so use that as max in
conjunction with 52K kvec constraint on arch with 4K
page size */
if (cifs_sb->rsize < 2048) {
cifs_sb->rsize = 2048;
/* Windows ME may prefer this */
cFYI(1, "readsize set to minimum: 2048");
}
/* calculate prepath */
cifs_sb->prepath = pvolume_info->prepath;
if (cifs_sb->prepath) {
cifs_sb->prepathlen = strlen(cifs_sb->prepath);
/* we can not convert the / to \ in the path
separators in the prefixpath yet because we do not
know (until reset_cifs_unix_caps is called later)
whether POSIX PATH CAP is available. We normalize
the / to \ after reset_cifs_unix_caps is called */
pvolume_info->prepath = NULL;
} else
cifs_sb->prepathlen = 0;
cifs_sb->mnt_uid = pvolume_info->linux_uid;
cifs_sb->mnt_gid = pvolume_info->linux_gid;
cifs_sb->mnt_file_mode = pvolume_info->file_mode;
cifs_sb->mnt_dir_mode = pvolume_info->dir_mode;
cFYI(1, "file mode: 0x%x dir mode: 0x%x",
cifs_sb->mnt_file_mode, cifs_sb->mnt_dir_mode);
cifs_sb->actimeo = pvolume_info->actimeo;
if (pvolume_info->noperm)
cifs_sb->mnt_cifs_flags |= CIFS_MOUNT_NO_PERM;
if (pvolume_info->setuids)
cifs_sb->mnt_cifs_flags |= CIFS_MOUNT_SET_UID;
if (pvolume_info->server_ino)
cifs_sb->mnt_cifs_flags |= CIFS_MOUNT_SERVER_INUM;
if (pvolume_info->remap)
cifs_sb->mnt_cifs_flags |= CIFS_MOUNT_MAP_SPECIAL_CHR;
if (pvolume_info->no_xattr)
cifs_sb->mnt_cifs_flags |= CIFS_MOUNT_NO_XATTR;
if (pvolume_info->sfu_emul)
cifs_sb->mnt_cifs_flags |= CIFS_MOUNT_UNX_EMUL;
if (pvolume_info->nobrl)
cifs_sb->mnt_cifs_flags |= CIFS_MOUNT_NO_BRL;
if (pvolume_info->nostrictsync)
cifs_sb->mnt_cifs_flags |= CIFS_MOUNT_NOSSYNC;
if (pvolume_info->mand_lock)
cifs_sb->mnt_cifs_flags |= CIFS_MOUNT_NOPOSIXBRL;
if (pvolume_info->cifs_acl)
cifs_sb->mnt_cifs_flags |= CIFS_MOUNT_CIFS_ACL;
if (pvolume_info->override_uid)
cifs_sb->mnt_cifs_flags |= CIFS_MOUNT_OVERR_UID;
if (pvolume_info->override_gid)
cifs_sb->mnt_cifs_flags |= CIFS_MOUNT_OVERR_GID;
if (pvolume_info->dynperm)
cifs_sb->mnt_cifs_flags |= CIFS_MOUNT_DYNPERM;
if (pvolume_info->fsc)
cifs_sb->mnt_cifs_flags |= CIFS_MOUNT_FSCACHE;
if (pvolume_info->multiuser)
cifs_sb->mnt_cifs_flags |= (CIFS_MOUNT_MULTIUSER |
CIFS_MOUNT_NO_PERM);
if (pvolume_info->strict_io)
cifs_sb->mnt_cifs_flags |= CIFS_MOUNT_STRICT_IO;
if (pvolume_info->direct_io) {
cFYI(1, "mounting share using direct i/o");
cifs_sb->mnt_cifs_flags |= CIFS_MOUNT_DIRECT_IO;
}
if (pvolume_info->mfsymlinks) {
if (pvolume_info->sfu_emul) {
cERROR(1, "mount option mfsymlinks ignored if sfu "
"mount option is used");
} else {
cifs_sb->mnt_cifs_flags |= CIFS_MOUNT_MF_SYMLINKS;
}
}
if ((pvolume_info->cifs_acl) && (pvolume_info->dynperm))
cERROR(1, "mount option dynperm ignored if cifsacl "
"mount option supported");
}
Commit Message: cifs: always do is_path_accessible check in cifs_mount
Currently, we skip doing the is_path_accessible check in cifs_mount if
there is no prefixpath. I have a report of at least one server however
that allows a TREE_CONNECT to a share that has a DFS referral at its
root. The reporter in this case was using a UNC that had no prefixpath,
so the is_path_accessible check was not triggered and the box later hit
a BUG() because we were chasing a DFS referral on the root dentry for
the mount.
This patch fixes this by removing the check for a zero-length
prefixpath. That should make the is_path_accessible check be done in
this situation and should allow the client to chase the DFS referral at
mount time instead.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Reported-and-Tested-by: Yogesh Sharma <ysharma@cymer.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 24,519
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static const char *req_range_field(request_rec *r)
{
return r->range;
}
Commit Message: *) SECURITY: CVE-2015-0228 (cve.mitre.org)
mod_lua: A maliciously crafted websockets PING after a script
calls r:wsupgrade() can cause a child process crash.
[Edward Lu <Chaosed0 gmail.com>]
Discovered by Guido Vranken <guidovranken gmail.com>
Submitted by: Edward Lu
Committed by: covener
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1657261 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 45,150
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ID3::parseV1(const sp<DataSource> &source) {
const size_t V1_TAG_SIZE = 128;
off64_t size;
if (source->getSize(&size) != OK || size < (off64_t)V1_TAG_SIZE) {
return false;
}
mData = (uint8_t *)malloc(V1_TAG_SIZE);
if (source->readAt(size - V1_TAG_SIZE, mData, V1_TAG_SIZE)
!= (ssize_t)V1_TAG_SIZE) {
free(mData);
mData = NULL;
return false;
}
if (memcmp("TAG", mData, 3)) {
free(mData);
mData = NULL;
return false;
}
mSize = V1_TAG_SIZE;
mFirstFrameOffset = 3;
if (mData[V1_TAG_SIZE - 3] != 0) {
mVersion = ID3_V1;
} else {
mVersion = ID3_V1_1;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: better validation lengths of strings in ID3 tags
Validate lengths on strings in ID3 tags, particularly around 0.
Also added code to handle cases when we can't get memory for
copies of strings we want to extract from these tags.
Affects L/M/N/master, same patch for all of them.
Bug: 30744884
Change-Id: I2675a817a39f0927ec1f7e9f9c09f2e61020311e
Test: play mp3 file which caused a <0 length.
(cherry picked from commit d23c01546c4f82840a01a380def76ab6cae5d43f)
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 157,907
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType WritePICTImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
Image *image)
{
#define MaxCount 128
#define PictCropRegionOp 0x01
#define PictEndOfPictureOp 0xff
#define PictJPEGOp 0x8200
#define PictInfoOp 0x0C00
#define PictInfoSize 512
#define PictPixmapOp 0x9A
#define PictPICTOp 0x98
#define PictVersion 0x11
const StringInfo
*profile;
double
x_resolution,
y_resolution;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
offset;
PICTPixmap
pixmap;
PICTRectangle
bounds,
crop_rectangle,
destination_rectangle,
frame_rectangle,
size_rectangle,
source_rectangle;
register const IndexPacket
*indexes;
register const PixelPacket
*p;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
size_t
bytes_per_line,
count,
storage_class;
ssize_t
y;
unsigned char
*buffer,
*packed_scanline,
*scanline;
unsigned short
base_address,
row_bytes,
transfer_mode;
/*
Open output image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
if ((image->columns > 65535L) || (image->rows > 65535L))
ThrowWriterException(ImageError,"WidthOrHeightExceedsLimit");
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
if (IssRGBCompatibleColorspace(image->colorspace) == MagickFalse)
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
/*
Initialize image info.
*/
size_rectangle.top=0;
size_rectangle.left=0;
size_rectangle.bottom=(short) image->rows;
size_rectangle.right=(short) image->columns;
frame_rectangle=size_rectangle;
crop_rectangle=size_rectangle;
source_rectangle=size_rectangle;
destination_rectangle=size_rectangle;
base_address=0xff;
row_bytes=(unsigned short) (image->columns | 0x8000);
bounds.top=0;
bounds.left=0;
bounds.bottom=(short) image->rows;
bounds.right=(short) image->columns;
pixmap.version=0;
pixmap.pack_type=0;
pixmap.pack_size=0;
pixmap.pixel_type=0;
pixmap.bits_per_pixel=8;
pixmap.component_count=1;
pixmap.component_size=8;
pixmap.plane_bytes=0;
pixmap.table=0;
pixmap.reserved=0;
transfer_mode=0;
x_resolution=image->x_resolution != 0.0 ? image->x_resolution :
DefaultResolution;
y_resolution=image->y_resolution != 0.0 ? image->y_resolution :
DefaultResolution;
storage_class=image->storage_class;
if (image_info->compression == JPEGCompression)
storage_class=DirectClass;
if (storage_class == DirectClass)
{
pixmap.component_count=image->matte != MagickFalse ? 4 : 3;
pixmap.pixel_type=16;
pixmap.bits_per_pixel=32;
pixmap.pack_type=0x04;
transfer_mode=0x40;
row_bytes=(unsigned short) ((4*image->columns) | 0x8000);
}
/*
Allocate memory.
*/
bytes_per_line=image->columns;
if (storage_class == DirectClass)
bytes_per_line*=image->matte != MagickFalse ? 4 : 3;
buffer=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(PictInfoSize,sizeof(*buffer));
packed_scanline=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t)
(row_bytes+MaxCount),sizeof(*packed_scanline));
scanline=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(row_bytes,sizeof(*scanline));
if ((buffer == (unsigned char *) NULL) ||
(packed_scanline == (unsigned char *) NULL) ||
(scanline == (unsigned char *) NULL))
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) ResetMagickMemory(scanline,0,row_bytes);
(void) ResetMagickMemory(packed_scanline,0,(size_t) (row_bytes+MaxCount));
/*
Write header, header size, size bounding box, version, and reserved.
*/
(void) ResetMagickMemory(buffer,0,PictInfoSize);
(void) WriteBlob(image,PictInfoSize,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) size_rectangle.top);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) size_rectangle.left);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) size_rectangle.bottom);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) size_rectangle.right);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,PictVersion);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0x02ff); /* version #2 */
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,PictInfoOp);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0xFFFE0000UL);
/*
Write full size of the file, resolution, frame bounding box, and reserved.
*/
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) x_resolution);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0x0000);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) y_resolution);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0x0000);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) frame_rectangle.top);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) frame_rectangle.left);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) frame_rectangle.bottom);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) frame_rectangle.right);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000L);
profile=GetImageProfile(image,"iptc");
if (profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0xa1);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0x1f2);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short)
(GetStringInfoLength(profile)+4));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"8BIM");
(void) WriteBlob(image,GetStringInfoLength(profile),
GetStringInfoDatum(profile));
}
profile=GetImageProfile(image,"icc");
if (profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0xa1);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0xe0);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short)
(GetStringInfoLength(profile)+4));
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlob(image,GetStringInfoLength(profile),
GetStringInfoDatum(profile));
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0xa1);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0xe0);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,4);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000002UL);
}
/*
Write crop region opcode and crop bounding box.
*/
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,PictCropRegionOp);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0xa);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) crop_rectangle.top);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) crop_rectangle.left);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) crop_rectangle.bottom);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) crop_rectangle.right);
if (image_info->compression == JPEGCompression)
{
Image
*jpeg_image;
ImageInfo
*jpeg_info;
size_t
length;
unsigned char
*blob;
jpeg_image=CloneImage(image,0,0,MagickTrue,&image->exception);
if (jpeg_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickFalse);
}
jpeg_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
(void) CopyMagickString(jpeg_info->magick,"JPEG",MaxTextExtent);
length=0;
blob=(unsigned char *) ImageToBlob(jpeg_info,jpeg_image,&length,
&image->exception);
jpeg_info=DestroyImageInfo(jpeg_info);
if (blob == (unsigned char *) NULL)
return(MagickFalse);
jpeg_image=DestroyImage(jpeg_image);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,PictJPEGOp);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) length+154);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0x0000);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00010000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00010000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x40000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00400000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0x0000);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) image->rows);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) image->columns);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0x0000);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,768);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0x0000);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00566A70UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x65670000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000001UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00016170UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x706C0000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,768);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) image->columns);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) image->rows);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) x_resolution);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0x0000);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) y_resolution);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x87AC0001UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x0B466F74UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x6F202D20UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x4A504547UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x0018FFFFUL);
(void) WriteBlob(image,length,blob);
if ((length & 0x01) != 0)
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,'\0');
blob=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(blob);
}
/*
Write picture opcode, row bytes, and picture bounding box, and version.
*/
if (storage_class == PseudoClass)
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,PictPICTOp);
else
{
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,PictPixmapOp);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(size_t) base_address);
}
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) (row_bytes | 0x8000));
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) bounds.top);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) bounds.left);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) bounds.bottom);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) bounds.right);
/*
Write pack type, pack size, resolution, pixel type, and pixel size.
*/
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) pixmap.version);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) pixmap.pack_type);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) pixmap.pack_size);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) (x_resolution+0.5));
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0x0000);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) (y_resolution+0.5));
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0x0000);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) pixmap.pixel_type);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) pixmap.bits_per_pixel);
/*
Write component count, size, plane bytes, table size, and reserved.
*/
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) pixmap.component_count);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) pixmap.component_size);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) pixmap.plane_bytes);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) pixmap.table);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) pixmap.reserved);
if (storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
/*
Write image colormap.
*/
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000L); /* color seed */
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0L); /* color flags */
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) (image->colors-1));
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) i);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,ScaleQuantumToShort(
image->colormap[i].red));
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,ScaleQuantumToShort(
image->colormap[i].green));
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,ScaleQuantumToShort(
image->colormap[i].blue));
}
}
/*
Write source and destination rectangle.
*/
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) source_rectangle.top);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) source_rectangle.left);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) source_rectangle.bottom);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) source_rectangle.right);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) destination_rectangle.top);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) destination_rectangle.left);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) destination_rectangle.bottom);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) destination_rectangle.right);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) transfer_mode);
/*
Write picture data.
*/
count=0;
if (storage_class == PseudoClass)
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetVirtualIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
scanline[x]=(unsigned char) GetPixelIndex(indexes+x);
count+=EncodeImage(image,scanline,(size_t) (row_bytes & 0x7FFF),
packed_scanline);
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
else
if (image_info->compression == JPEGCompression)
{
(void) ResetMagickMemory(scanline,0,row_bytes);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
count+=EncodeImage(image,scanline,(size_t) (row_bytes & 0x7FFF),
packed_scanline);
}
else
{
register unsigned char
*blue,
*green,
*opacity,
*red;
red=scanline;
green=scanline+image->columns;
blue=scanline+2*image->columns;
opacity=scanline+3*image->columns;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
red=scanline;
green=scanline+image->columns;
blue=scanline+2*image->columns;
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
opacity=scanline;
red=scanline+image->columns;
green=scanline+2*image->columns;
blue=scanline+3*image->columns;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
*red++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelRed(p));
*green++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelGreen(p));
*blue++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelBlue(p));
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
*opacity++=ScaleQuantumToChar((Quantum)
(GetPixelAlpha(p)));
p++;
}
count+=EncodeImage(image,scanline,bytes_per_line & 0x7FFF,
packed_scanline);
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
if ((count & 0x01) != 0)
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,'\0');
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,PictEndOfPictureOp);
offset=TellBlob(image);
offset=SeekBlob(image,512,SEEK_SET);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) offset);
scanline=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(scanline);
packed_scanline=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(packed_scanline);
buffer=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(buffer);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 71,642
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RunTestFunction(DevToolsWindow* window, const char* test_name) {
std::string result;
ASSERT_TRUE(
content::ExecuteScriptAndExtractString(
window->GetRenderViewHost(),
"window.domAutomationController.send("
" '' + (window.uiTests && (typeof uiTests.runTest)));",
&result));
if (result == "function") {
ASSERT_TRUE(
content::ExecuteScriptAndExtractString(
window->GetRenderViewHost(),
base::StringPrintf("uiTests.runTest('%s')", test_name),
&result));
EXPECT_EQ("[OK]", result);
} else {
FAIL() << "DevTools front-end is broken.";
}
}
Commit Message: DevTools: handle devtools renderer unresponsiveness during beforeunload event interception
This patch fixes the crash which happenes under the following conditions:
1. DevTools window is in undocked state
2. DevTools renderer is unresponsive
3. User attempts to close inspected page
BUG=322380
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/84883002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@237611 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 113,106
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ZEND_GET_MODULE (curl)
#endif
/* {{{ PHP_INI_BEGIN */
PHP_INI_BEGIN()
PHP_INI_ENTRY("curl.cainfo", "", PHP_INI_SYSTEM, NULL)
PHP_INI_END()
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Fix bug #72674 - check both curl_escape and curl_unescape
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 50,131
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChromeDownloadDelegate::RequestFileAccess(intptr_t callback_id) {
JNIEnv* env = base::android::AttachCurrentThread();
Java_ChromeDownloadDelegate_requestFileAccess(
env, java_ref_, callback_id);
}
Commit Message: Clean up Android DownloadManager code as most download now go through Chrome Network stack
The only exception is OMA DRM download.
And it only applies to context menu download interception.
Clean up the remaining unused code now.
BUG=647755
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2371773003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#421332}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 126,704
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int tg3_test_registers(struct tg3 *tp)
{
int i, is_5705, is_5750;
u32 offset, read_mask, write_mask, val, save_val, read_val;
static struct {
u16 offset;
u16 flags;
#define TG3_FL_5705 0x1
#define TG3_FL_NOT_5705 0x2
#define TG3_FL_NOT_5788 0x4
#define TG3_FL_NOT_5750 0x8
u32 read_mask;
u32 write_mask;
} reg_tbl[] = {
/* MAC Control Registers */
{ MAC_MODE, TG3_FL_NOT_5705,
0x00000000, 0x00ef6f8c },
{ MAC_MODE, TG3_FL_5705,
0x00000000, 0x01ef6b8c },
{ MAC_STATUS, TG3_FL_NOT_5705,
0x03800107, 0x00000000 },
{ MAC_STATUS, TG3_FL_5705,
0x03800100, 0x00000000 },
{ MAC_ADDR_0_HIGH, 0x0000,
0x00000000, 0x0000ffff },
{ MAC_ADDR_0_LOW, 0x0000,
0x00000000, 0xffffffff },
{ MAC_RX_MTU_SIZE, 0x0000,
0x00000000, 0x0000ffff },
{ MAC_TX_MODE, 0x0000,
0x00000000, 0x00000070 },
{ MAC_TX_LENGTHS, 0x0000,
0x00000000, 0x00003fff },
{ MAC_RX_MODE, TG3_FL_NOT_5705,
0x00000000, 0x000007fc },
{ MAC_RX_MODE, TG3_FL_5705,
0x00000000, 0x000007dc },
{ MAC_HASH_REG_0, 0x0000,
0x00000000, 0xffffffff },
{ MAC_HASH_REG_1, 0x0000,
0x00000000, 0xffffffff },
{ MAC_HASH_REG_2, 0x0000,
0x00000000, 0xffffffff },
{ MAC_HASH_REG_3, 0x0000,
0x00000000, 0xffffffff },
/* Receive Data and Receive BD Initiator Control Registers. */
{ RCVDBDI_JUMBO_BD+0, TG3_FL_NOT_5705,
0x00000000, 0xffffffff },
{ RCVDBDI_JUMBO_BD+4, TG3_FL_NOT_5705,
0x00000000, 0xffffffff },
{ RCVDBDI_JUMBO_BD+8, TG3_FL_NOT_5705,
0x00000000, 0x00000003 },
{ RCVDBDI_JUMBO_BD+0xc, TG3_FL_NOT_5705,
0x00000000, 0xffffffff },
{ RCVDBDI_STD_BD+0, 0x0000,
0x00000000, 0xffffffff },
{ RCVDBDI_STD_BD+4, 0x0000,
0x00000000, 0xffffffff },
{ RCVDBDI_STD_BD+8, 0x0000,
0x00000000, 0xffff0002 },
{ RCVDBDI_STD_BD+0xc, 0x0000,
0x00000000, 0xffffffff },
/* Receive BD Initiator Control Registers. */
{ RCVBDI_STD_THRESH, TG3_FL_NOT_5705,
0x00000000, 0xffffffff },
{ RCVBDI_STD_THRESH, TG3_FL_5705,
0x00000000, 0x000003ff },
{ RCVBDI_JUMBO_THRESH, TG3_FL_NOT_5705,
0x00000000, 0xffffffff },
/* Host Coalescing Control Registers. */
{ HOSTCC_MODE, TG3_FL_NOT_5705,
0x00000000, 0x00000004 },
{ HOSTCC_MODE, TG3_FL_5705,
0x00000000, 0x000000f6 },
{ HOSTCC_RXCOL_TICKS, TG3_FL_NOT_5705,
0x00000000, 0xffffffff },
{ HOSTCC_RXCOL_TICKS, TG3_FL_5705,
0x00000000, 0x000003ff },
{ HOSTCC_TXCOL_TICKS, TG3_FL_NOT_5705,
0x00000000, 0xffffffff },
{ HOSTCC_TXCOL_TICKS, TG3_FL_5705,
0x00000000, 0x000003ff },
{ HOSTCC_RXMAX_FRAMES, TG3_FL_NOT_5705,
0x00000000, 0xffffffff },
{ HOSTCC_RXMAX_FRAMES, TG3_FL_5705 | TG3_FL_NOT_5788,
0x00000000, 0x000000ff },
{ HOSTCC_TXMAX_FRAMES, TG3_FL_NOT_5705,
0x00000000, 0xffffffff },
{ HOSTCC_TXMAX_FRAMES, TG3_FL_5705 | TG3_FL_NOT_5788,
0x00000000, 0x000000ff },
{ HOSTCC_RXCOAL_TICK_INT, TG3_FL_NOT_5705,
0x00000000, 0xffffffff },
{ HOSTCC_TXCOAL_TICK_INT, TG3_FL_NOT_5705,
0x00000000, 0xffffffff },
{ HOSTCC_RXCOAL_MAXF_INT, TG3_FL_NOT_5705,
0x00000000, 0xffffffff },
{ HOSTCC_RXCOAL_MAXF_INT, TG3_FL_5705 | TG3_FL_NOT_5788,
0x00000000, 0x000000ff },
{ HOSTCC_TXCOAL_MAXF_INT, TG3_FL_NOT_5705,
0x00000000, 0xffffffff },
{ HOSTCC_TXCOAL_MAXF_INT, TG3_FL_5705 | TG3_FL_NOT_5788,
0x00000000, 0x000000ff },
{ HOSTCC_STAT_COAL_TICKS, TG3_FL_NOT_5705,
0x00000000, 0xffffffff },
{ HOSTCC_STATS_BLK_HOST_ADDR, TG3_FL_NOT_5705,
0x00000000, 0xffffffff },
{ HOSTCC_STATS_BLK_HOST_ADDR+4, TG3_FL_NOT_5705,
0x00000000, 0xffffffff },
{ HOSTCC_STATUS_BLK_HOST_ADDR, 0x0000,
0x00000000, 0xffffffff },
{ HOSTCC_STATUS_BLK_HOST_ADDR+4, 0x0000,
0x00000000, 0xffffffff },
{ HOSTCC_STATS_BLK_NIC_ADDR, 0x0000,
0xffffffff, 0x00000000 },
{ HOSTCC_STATUS_BLK_NIC_ADDR, 0x0000,
0xffffffff, 0x00000000 },
/* Buffer Manager Control Registers. */
{ BUFMGR_MB_POOL_ADDR, TG3_FL_NOT_5750,
0x00000000, 0x007fff80 },
{ BUFMGR_MB_POOL_SIZE, TG3_FL_NOT_5750,
0x00000000, 0x007fffff },
{ BUFMGR_MB_RDMA_LOW_WATER, 0x0000,
0x00000000, 0x0000003f },
{ BUFMGR_MB_MACRX_LOW_WATER, 0x0000,
0x00000000, 0x000001ff },
{ BUFMGR_MB_HIGH_WATER, 0x0000,
0x00000000, 0x000001ff },
{ BUFMGR_DMA_DESC_POOL_ADDR, TG3_FL_NOT_5705,
0xffffffff, 0x00000000 },
{ BUFMGR_DMA_DESC_POOL_SIZE, TG3_FL_NOT_5705,
0xffffffff, 0x00000000 },
/* Mailbox Registers */
{ GRCMBOX_RCVSTD_PROD_IDX+4, 0x0000,
0x00000000, 0x000001ff },
{ GRCMBOX_RCVJUMBO_PROD_IDX+4, TG3_FL_NOT_5705,
0x00000000, 0x000001ff },
{ GRCMBOX_RCVRET_CON_IDX_0+4, 0x0000,
0x00000000, 0x000007ff },
{ GRCMBOX_SNDHOST_PROD_IDX_0+4, 0x0000,
0x00000000, 0x000001ff },
{ 0xffff, 0x0000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000 },
};
is_5705 = is_5750 = 0;
if (tg3_flag(tp, 5705_PLUS)) {
is_5705 = 1;
if (tg3_flag(tp, 5750_PLUS))
is_5750 = 1;
}
for (i = 0; reg_tbl[i].offset != 0xffff; i++) {
if (is_5705 && (reg_tbl[i].flags & TG3_FL_NOT_5705))
continue;
if (!is_5705 && (reg_tbl[i].flags & TG3_FL_5705))
continue;
if (tg3_flag(tp, IS_5788) &&
(reg_tbl[i].flags & TG3_FL_NOT_5788))
continue;
if (is_5750 && (reg_tbl[i].flags & TG3_FL_NOT_5750))
continue;
offset = (u32) reg_tbl[i].offset;
read_mask = reg_tbl[i].read_mask;
write_mask = reg_tbl[i].write_mask;
/* Save the original register content */
save_val = tr32(offset);
/* Determine the read-only value. */
read_val = save_val & read_mask;
/* Write zero to the register, then make sure the read-only bits
* are not changed and the read/write bits are all zeros.
*/
tw32(offset, 0);
val = tr32(offset);
/* Test the read-only and read/write bits. */
if (((val & read_mask) != read_val) || (val & write_mask))
goto out;
/* Write ones to all the bits defined by RdMask and WrMask, then
* make sure the read-only bits are not changed and the
* read/write bits are all ones.
*/
tw32(offset, read_mask | write_mask);
val = tr32(offset);
/* Test the read-only bits. */
if ((val & read_mask) != read_val)
goto out;
/* Test the read/write bits. */
if ((val & write_mask) != write_mask)
goto out;
tw32(offset, save_val);
}
return 0;
out:
if (netif_msg_hw(tp))
netdev_err(tp->dev,
"Register test failed at offset %x\n", offset);
tw32(offset, save_val);
return -EIO;
}
Commit Message: tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <oded@privatecore.com>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matt Carlson <mcarlson@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 32,783
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline float lerp(float a, float b, float x)
{
return a + (b - a) * x;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 13,171
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct inode *ilookup5(struct super_block *sb, unsigned long hashval,
int (*test)(struct inode *, void *), void *data)
{
struct inode *inode = ilookup5_nowait(sb, hashval, test, data);
if (inode)
wait_on_inode(inode);
return inode;
}
Commit Message: fs,userns: Change inode_capable to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid
The kernel has no concept of capabilities with respect to inodes; inodes
exist independently of namespaces. For example, inode_capable(inode,
CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) would be nonsense.
This patch changes inode_capable to check for uid and gid mappings and
renames it to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid, which should make it more
obvious what it does.
Fixes CVE-2014-4014.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 36,858
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Extension::can_be_incognito_enabled() const {
return !is_platform_app();
}
Commit Message: Tighten restrictions on hosted apps calling extension APIs
Only allow component apps to make any API calls, and for them only allow the namespaces they explicitly have permission for (plus chrome.test - I need to see if I can rework some WebStore tests to remove even this).
BUG=172369
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12095095
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180426 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 114,383
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: __releases(__ip_vs_svc_lock)
{
read_unlock_bh(&__ip_vs_svc_lock);
}
Commit Message: ipvs: Add boundary check on ioctl arguments
The ipvs code has a nifty system for doing the size of ioctl command
copies; it defines an array with values into which it indexes the cmd
to find the right length.
Unfortunately, the ipvs code forgot to check if the cmd was in the
range that the array provides, allowing for an index outside of the
array, which then gives a "garbage" result into the length, which
then gets used for copying into a stack buffer.
Fix this by adding sanity checks on these as well as the copy size.
[ horms@verge.net.au: adjusted limit to IP_VS_SO_GET_MAX ]
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 29,235
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ipip_dev_free(struct net_device *dev)
{
free_percpu(dev->tstats);
free_netdev(dev);
}
Commit Message: net: don't allow CAP_NET_ADMIN to load non-netdev kernel modules
Since a8f80e8ff94ecba629542d9b4b5f5a8ee3eb565c any process with
CAP_NET_ADMIN may load any module from /lib/modules/. This doesn't mean
that CAP_NET_ADMIN is a superset of CAP_SYS_MODULE as modules are
limited to /lib/modules/**. However, CAP_NET_ADMIN capability shouldn't
allow anybody load any module not related to networking.
This patch restricts an ability of autoloading modules to netdev modules
with explicit aliases. This fixes CVE-2011-1019.
Arnd Bergmann suggested to leave untouched the old pre-v2.6.32 behavior
of loading netdev modules by name (without any prefix) for processes
with CAP_SYS_MODULE to maintain the compatibility with network scripts
that use autoloading netdev modules by aliases like "eth0", "wlan0".
Currently there are only three users of the feature in the upstream
kernel: ipip, ip_gre and sit.
root@albatros:~# capsh --drop=$(seq -s, 0 11),$(seq -s, 13 34) --
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: fffffff800001000
CapEff: fffffff800001000
CapBnd: fffffff800001000
root@albatros:~# modprobe xfs
FATAL: Error inserting xfs
(/lib/modules/2.6.38-rc6-00001-g2bf4ca3/kernel/fs/xfs/xfs.ko): Operation not permitted
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit
sit: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit0
sit0 Link encap:IPv6-in-IPv4
NOARP MTU:1480 Metric:1
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
sit 10457 0
tunnel4 2957 1 sit
For CAP_SYS_MODULE module loading is still relaxed:
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: ffffffffffffffff
CapEff: ffffffffffffffff
CapBnd: ffffffffffffffff
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
xfs 745319 0
Reference: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/24/203
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 35,340
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(sys_get_temp_dir)
{
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETURN_STRING((char *)php_get_temporary_directory(TSRMLS_C), 1);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72114 - int/size_t confusion in fread
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 52,176
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int acm_tty_tiocmset(struct tty_struct *tty,
unsigned int set, unsigned int clear)
{
struct acm *acm = tty->driver_data;
unsigned int newctrl;
newctrl = acm->ctrlout;
set = (set & TIOCM_DTR ? ACM_CTRL_DTR : 0) |
(set & TIOCM_RTS ? ACM_CTRL_RTS : 0);
clear = (clear & TIOCM_DTR ? ACM_CTRL_DTR : 0) |
(clear & TIOCM_RTS ? ACM_CTRL_RTS : 0);
newctrl = (newctrl & ~clear) | set;
if (acm->ctrlout == newctrl)
return 0;
return acm_set_control(acm, acm->ctrlout = newctrl);
}
Commit Message: USB: cdc-acm: more sanity checking
An attack has become available which pretends to be a quirky
device circumventing normal sanity checks and crashes the kernel
by an insufficient number of interfaces. This patch adds a check
to the code path for quirky devices.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 54,215
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ipmi_thread(void *data)
{
struct smi_info *smi_info = data;
unsigned long flags;
enum si_sm_result smi_result;
struct timespec64 busy_until;
ipmi_si_set_not_busy(&busy_until);
set_user_nice(current, MAX_NICE);
while (!kthread_should_stop()) {
int busy_wait;
spin_lock_irqsave(&(smi_info->si_lock), flags);
smi_result = smi_event_handler(smi_info, 0);
/*
* If the driver is doing something, there is a possible
* race with the timer. If the timer handler see idle,
* and the thread here sees something else, the timer
* handler won't restart the timer even though it is
* required. So start it here if necessary.
*/
if (smi_result != SI_SM_IDLE && !smi_info->timer_running)
smi_mod_timer(smi_info, jiffies + SI_TIMEOUT_JIFFIES);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&(smi_info->si_lock), flags);
busy_wait = ipmi_thread_busy_wait(smi_result, smi_info,
&busy_until);
if (smi_result == SI_SM_CALL_WITHOUT_DELAY)
; /* do nothing */
else if (smi_result == SI_SM_CALL_WITH_DELAY && busy_wait)
schedule();
else if (smi_result == SI_SM_IDLE) {
if (atomic_read(&smi_info->need_watch)) {
schedule_timeout_interruptible(100);
} else {
/* Wait to be woken up when we are needed. */
__set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
schedule();
}
} else
schedule_timeout_interruptible(1);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ipmi_si: fix use-after-free of resource->name
When we excute the following commands, we got oops
rmmod ipmi_si
cat /proc/ioports
[ 1623.482380] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff00000901d478
[ 1623.482382] Mem abort info:
[ 1623.482383] ESR = 0x96000007
[ 1623.482385] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 1623.482386] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 1623.482387] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 1623.482388] Data abort info:
[ 1623.482389] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000007
[ 1623.482390] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 1623.482393] swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000d7d94a66
[ 1623.482395] [ffff00000901d478] pgd=000000dffbfff003, pud=000000dffbffe003, pmd=0000003f5d06e003, pte=0000000000000000
[ 1623.482399] Internal error: Oops: 96000007 [#1] SMP
[ 1623.487407] Modules linked in: ipmi_si(E) nls_utf8 isofs rpcrdma ib_iser ib_srpt target_core_mod ib_srp scsi_transport_srp ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log iw_cm dm_mod aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ses ghash_ce sha2_ce enclosure sha256_arm64 sg sha1_ce hisi_sas_v2_hw hibmc_drm sbsa_gwdt hisi_sas_main ip_tables mlx5_ib ib_uverbs marvell ib_core mlx5_core ixgbe mdio hns_dsaf ipmi_devintf hns_enet_drv ipmi_msghandler hns_mdio [last unloaded: ipmi_si]
[ 1623.532410] CPU: 30 PID: 11438 Comm: cat Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E 5.0.0-rc3+ #168
[ 1623.541498] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.37 11/21/2017
[ 1623.548822] pstate: a0000005 (NzCv daif -PAN -UAO)
[ 1623.553684] pc : string+0x28/0x98
[ 1623.557040] lr : vsnprintf+0x368/0x5e8
[ 1623.560837] sp : ffff000013213a80
[ 1623.564191] x29: ffff000013213a80 x28: ffff00001138abb5
[ 1623.569577] x27: ffff000013213c18 x26: ffff805f67d06049
[ 1623.574963] x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffff00001138abb5
[ 1623.580349] x23: 0000000000000fb7 x22: ffff0000117ed000
[ 1623.585734] x21: ffff000011188fd8 x20: ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.591119] x19: ffff805f67d06061 x18: ffffffffffffffff
[ 1623.596505] x17: 0000000000000200 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.601890] x15: ffff0000117ed748 x14: ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.607276] x13: ffff805f67d0605e x12: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.612661] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.618046] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 000000000000000f
[ 1623.623432] x7 : ffff805f67d06061 x6 : fffffffffffffffe
[ 1623.628817] x5 : 0000000000000012 x4 : ffff00000901d478
[ 1623.634203] x3 : ffff0a00ffffff04 x2 : ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.639588] x1 : ffff805f67d07000 x0 : ffffffffffffffff
[ 1623.644974] Process cat (pid: 11438, stack limit = 0x000000008d4cbc10)
[ 1623.651592] Call trace:
[ 1623.654068] string+0x28/0x98
[ 1623.657071] vsnprintf+0x368/0x5e8
[ 1623.660517] seq_vprintf+0x70/0x98
[ 1623.668009] seq_printf+0x7c/0xa0
[ 1623.675530] r_show+0xc8/0xf8
[ 1623.682558] seq_read+0x330/0x440
[ 1623.689877] proc_reg_read+0x78/0xd0
[ 1623.697346] __vfs_read+0x60/0x1a0
[ 1623.704564] vfs_read+0x94/0x150
[ 1623.711339] ksys_read+0x6c/0xd8
[ 1623.717939] __arm64_sys_read+0x24/0x30
[ 1623.725077] el0_svc_common+0x120/0x148
[ 1623.732035] el0_svc_handler+0x30/0x40
[ 1623.738757] el0_svc+0x8/0xc
[ 1623.744520] Code: d1000406 aa0103e2 54000149 b4000080 (39400085)
[ 1623.753441] ---[ end trace f91b6a4937de9835 ]---
[ 1623.760871] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
[ 1623.768935] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 1623.775718] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 1623.781998] CPU features: 0x002,21006008
[ 1623.788777] Memory Limit: none
[ 1623.798329] Starting crashdump kernel...
[ 1623.805202] Bye!
If io_setup is called successful in try_smi_init() but try_smi_init()
goes out_err before calling ipmi_register_smi(), so ipmi_unregister_smi()
will not be called while removing module. It leads to the resource that
allocated in io_setup() can not be freed, but the name(DEVICE_NAME) of
resource is freed while removing the module. It causes use-after-free
when cat /proc/ioports.
Fix this by calling io_cleanup() while try_smi_init() goes to out_err.
and don't call io_cleanup() until io_setup() returns successful to avoid
warning prints.
Fixes: 93c303d2045b ("ipmi_si: Clean up shutdown a bit")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: NuoHan Qiao <qiaonuohan@huawei.com>
Suggested-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 90,235
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void free_request_size(void *element, void *data)
{
struct request_queue *q = data;
if (q->exit_rq_fn)
q->exit_rq_fn(q, element);
kfree(element);
}
Commit Message: block: blk_init_allocated_queue() set q->fq as NULL in the fail case
We find the memory use-after-free issue in __blk_drain_queue()
on the kernel 4.14. After read the latest kernel 4.18-rc6 we
think it has the same problem.
Memory is allocated for q->fq in the blk_init_allocated_queue().
If the elevator init function called with error return, it will
run into the fail case to free the q->fq.
Then the __blk_drain_queue() uses the same memory after the free
of the q->fq, it will lead to the unpredictable event.
The patch is to set q->fq as NULL in the fail case of
blk_init_allocated_queue().
Fixes: commit 7c94e1c157a2 ("block: introduce blk_flush_queue to drive flush machinery")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: xiao jin <jin.xiao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 92,050
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int piv_general_mutual_authenticate(sc_card_t *card,
unsigned int key_ref, unsigned int alg_id)
{
int r;
#ifdef ENABLE_OPENSSL
int N;
int locked = 0;
u8 *rbuf = NULL;
size_t rbuflen;
u8 *nonce = NULL;
size_t nonce_len;
u8 *p;
u8 *key = NULL;
size_t keylen;
u8 *plain_text = NULL;
size_t plain_text_len = 0;
u8 *tmp;
size_t tmplen, tmplen2;
u8 *built = NULL;
size_t built_len;
const u8 *body = NULL;
size_t body_len;
const u8 *witness_data = NULL;
size_t witness_len;
const u8 *challenge_response = NULL;
size_t challenge_response_len;
u8 *decrypted_reponse = NULL;
size_t decrypted_reponse_len;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX * ctx = NULL;
u8 sbuf[255];
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
SC_FUNC_CALLED(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE);
ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
r = SC_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
goto err;
}
cipher = get_cipher_for_algo(alg_id);
if(!cipher) {
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE, "Invalid cipher selector, none found for: %02x\n", alg_id);
r = SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS;
goto err;
}
r = piv_get_key(card, alg_id, &key, &keylen);
if (r) {
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE, "Error getting General Auth key\n");
goto err;
}
r = sc_lock(card);
if (r != SC_SUCCESS) {
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE, "sc_lock failed\n");
goto err; /* cleanup */
}
locked = 1;
p = sbuf;
*p++ = 0x7C;
*p++ = 0x02;
*p++ = 0x80;
*p++ = 0x00;
/* get the encrypted nonce */
r = piv_general_io(card, 0x87, alg_id, key_ref, sbuf, p - sbuf, &rbuf, &rbuflen);
if (r < 0) goto err;
/* Remove the encompassing outer TLV of 0x7C and get the data */
body = sc_asn1_find_tag(card->ctx, rbuf,
r, 0x7C, &body_len);
if (!body) {
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE, "Invalid Witness Data response of NULL\n");
r = SC_ERROR_INVALID_DATA;
goto err;
}
/* Get the witness data indicated by the TAG 0x80 */
witness_data = sc_asn1_find_tag(card->ctx, body,
body_len, 0x80, &witness_len);
if (!witness_len) {
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE, "Invalid Challenge Data none found in TLV\n");
r = SC_ERROR_INVALID_DATA;
goto err;
}
/* Allocate an output buffer for openssl */
plain_text = malloc(witness_len);
if (!plain_text) {
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE, "Could not allocate buffer for plain text\n");
r = SC_ERROR_INTERNAL;
goto err;
}
/* decrypt the data from the card */
if (!EVP_DecryptInit(ctx, cipher, key, NULL)) {
/* may fail if des parity of key is wrong. depends on OpenSSL options */
r = SC_ERROR_INTERNAL;
goto err;
}
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx,0);
p = plain_text;
if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, p, &N, witness_data, witness_len)) {
r = SC_ERROR_INTERNAL;
goto err;
}
plain_text_len = tmplen = N;
p += tmplen;
if(!EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, p, &N)) {
r = SC_ERROR_INTERNAL;
goto err;
}
tmplen = N;
plain_text_len += tmplen;
if (plain_text_len != witness_len) {
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE,
"Encrypted and decrypted lengths do not match: %"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u:%"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u\n",
witness_len, plain_text_len);
r = SC_ERROR_INTERNAL;
goto err;
}
/* Build a response to the card of:
* [GEN AUTH][ 80<decrypted witness>81 <challenge> ]
* Start by computing the nonce for <challenge> the
* nonce length should match the witness length of
* the card.
*/
nonce = malloc(witness_len);
if(!nonce) {
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE,
"OOM allocating nonce (%"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u : %"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u)\n",
witness_len, plain_text_len);
r = SC_ERROR_INTERNAL;
goto err;
}
nonce_len = witness_len;
r = RAND_bytes(nonce, witness_len);
if(!r) {
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE,
"Generating random for nonce (%"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u : %"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u)\n",
witness_len, plain_text_len);
r = SC_ERROR_INTERNAL;
goto err;
}
/* nonce for challenge */
tmplen = put_tag_and_len(0x81, witness_len, NULL);
/* plain text witness keep a length separate for the 0x7C tag */
tmplen += put_tag_and_len(0x80, witness_len, NULL);
tmplen2 = tmplen;
/* outside 7C tag with 81:80 as innards */
tmplen = put_tag_and_len(0x7C, tmplen, NULL);
built_len = tmplen;
/* Build the response buffer */
p = built = malloc(built_len);
if(!built) {
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE, "OOM Building witness response and challenge\n");
r = SC_ERROR_INTERNAL;
goto err;
}
p = built;
/* Start with the 7C Tag */
put_tag_and_len(0x7C, tmplen2, &p);
/* Add the DECRYPTED witness, tag 0x80 */
put_tag_and_len(0x80, witness_len, &p);
memcpy(p, plain_text, witness_len);
p += witness_len;
/* Add the challenge, tag 0x81 */
put_tag_and_len(0x81, witness_len, &p);
memcpy(p, nonce, witness_len);
/* Don't leak rbuf from above */
free(rbuf);
rbuf = NULL;
/* Send constructed data */
r = piv_general_io(card, 0x87, alg_id, key_ref, built,built_len, &rbuf, &rbuflen);
if (r < 0) goto err;
/* Remove the encompassing outer TLV of 0x7C and get the data */
body = sc_asn1_find_tag(card->ctx, rbuf,
r, 0x7C, &body_len);
if(!body) {
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE, "Could not find outer tag 0x7C in response");
r = SC_ERROR_INVALID_DATA;
goto err;
}
/* SP800-73 not clear if 80 or 82 */
challenge_response = sc_asn1_find_tag(card->ctx, body,
body_len, 0x82, &challenge_response_len);
if(!challenge_response) {
challenge_response = sc_asn1_find_tag(card->ctx, body,
body_len, 0x80, &challenge_response_len);
if(!challenge_response) {
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE, "Could not find tag 0x82 or 0x80 in response");
r = SC_ERROR_INVALID_DATA;
goto err;
}
}
/* Decrypt challenge and check against nonce */
decrypted_reponse = malloc(challenge_response_len);
if(!decrypted_reponse) {
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE, "OOM Allocating decryption buffer");
r = SC_ERROR_INVALID_DATA;
goto err;
}
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
if (!EVP_DecryptInit(ctx, cipher, key, NULL)) {
r = SC_ERROR_INTERNAL;
goto err;
}
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx,0);
tmp = decrypted_reponse;
if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, tmp, &N, challenge_response, challenge_response_len)) {
r = SC_ERROR_INTERNAL;
goto err;
}
decrypted_reponse_len = tmplen = N;
tmp += tmplen;
if(!EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, tmp, &N)) {
r = SC_ERROR_INTERNAL;
goto err;
}
tmplen = N;
decrypted_reponse_len += tmplen;
if (decrypted_reponse_len != nonce_len || memcmp(nonce, decrypted_reponse, nonce_len) != 0) {
sc_log(card->ctx,
"mutual authentication failed, card returned wrong value %"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u:%"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u",
decrypted_reponse_len, nonce_len);
r = SC_ERROR_DECRYPT_FAILED;
goto err;
}
r = SC_SUCCESS;
err:
if (ctx)
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
if (locked)
sc_unlock(card);
if (rbuf)
free(rbuf);
if (decrypted_reponse)
free(decrypted_reponse);
if (built)
free(built);
if (plain_text)
free(plain_text);
if (nonce)
free(nonce);
if (key)
free(key);
#else
sc_log(card->ctx, "OpenSSL Required");
r = SC_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
#endif /* ENABLE_OPENSSL */
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, r);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 78,634
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ioctx_add_table(struct kioctx *ctx, struct mm_struct *mm)
{
unsigned i, new_nr;
struct kioctx_table *table, *old;
struct aio_ring *ring;
spin_lock(&mm->ioctx_lock);
table = rcu_dereference_raw(mm->ioctx_table);
while (1) {
if (table)
for (i = 0; i < table->nr; i++)
if (!table->table[i]) {
ctx->id = i;
table->table[i] = ctx;
spin_unlock(&mm->ioctx_lock);
/* While kioctx setup is in progress,
* we are protected from page migration
* changes ring_pages by ->ring_lock.
*/
ring = kmap_atomic(ctx->ring_pages[0]);
ring->id = ctx->id;
kunmap_atomic(ring);
return 0;
}
new_nr = (table ? table->nr : 1) * 4;
spin_unlock(&mm->ioctx_lock);
table = kzalloc(sizeof(*table) + sizeof(struct kioctx *) *
new_nr, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!table)
return -ENOMEM;
table->nr = new_nr;
spin_lock(&mm->ioctx_lock);
old = rcu_dereference_raw(mm->ioctx_table);
if (!old) {
rcu_assign_pointer(mm->ioctx_table, table);
} else if (table->nr > old->nr) {
memcpy(table->table, old->table,
old->nr * sizeof(struct kioctx *));
rcu_assign_pointer(mm->ioctx_table, table);
kfree_rcu(old, rcu);
} else {
kfree(table);
table = old;
}
}
}
Commit Message: aio: mark AIO pseudo-fs noexec
This ensures that do_mmap() won't implicitly make AIO memory mappings
executable if the READ_IMPLIES_EXEC personality flag is set. Such
behavior is problematic because the security_mmap_file LSM hook doesn't
catch this case, potentially permitting an attacker to bypass a W^X
policy enforced by SELinux.
I have tested the patch on my machine.
To test the behavior, compile and run this:
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/personality.h>
#include <linux/aio_abi.h>
#include <err.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
int main(void) {
personality(READ_IMPLIES_EXEC);
aio_context_t ctx = 0;
if (syscall(__NR_io_setup, 1, &ctx))
err(1, "io_setup");
char cmd[1000];
sprintf(cmd, "cat /proc/%d/maps | grep -F '/[aio]'",
(int)getpid());
system(cmd);
return 0;
}
In the output, "rw-s" is good, "rwxs" is bad.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 72,036
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void msg_join(IRC_SERVER_REC *server, const char *channel,
const char *nick, const char *address)
{
NETSPLIT_REC *split;
NETJOIN_REC *netjoin;
GSList *channels;
int rejoin = 1;
if (!IS_IRC_SERVER(server))
return;
if (ignore_check(SERVER(server), nick, address,
channel, NULL, MSGLEVEL_JOINS))
return;
split = netsplit_find(server, nick, address);
netjoin = netjoin_find(server, nick);
if (split == NULL && netjoin == NULL)
return;
/* if this was not a channel they split from, treat it normally */
if (netjoin != NULL) {
if (!gslist_find_icase_string(netjoin->old_channels, channel))
return;
} else {
channels = split->channels;
while (channels != NULL) {
NETSPLIT_CHAN_REC *schannel = channels->data;
if (!strcasecmp(schannel->name, channel))
break;
channels = channels->next;
}
/* we still need to create a NETJOIN_REC now as the
* NETSPLIT_REC will be destroyed */
if (channels == NULL)
rejoin = 0;
}
if (join_tag == -1) {
join_tag = g_timeout_add(1000, (GSourceFunc)
sig_check_netjoins, NULL);
signal_add("print starting", (SIGNAL_FUNC) sig_print_starting);
}
if (netjoin == NULL)
netjoin = netjoin_add(server, nick, split->channels);
if (rejoin)
{
netjoin->now_channels = g_slist_append(netjoin->now_channels,
g_strconcat(" ", channel, NULL));
signal_stop();
}
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'netjoin-timeout' into 'master'
fe-netjoin: remove irc servers on "server disconnected" signal
Closes #7
See merge request !10
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 67,784
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: _pango_Is_Emoji_Text_Default (gunichar ch)
{
return _pango_Is_Emoji (ch) && !_pango_Is_Emoji_Presentation (ch);
}
Commit Message: Prevent an assertion with invalid Unicode sequences
Invalid Unicode sequences, such as 0x2665 0xfe0e 0xfe0f,
can trick the Emoji iter code into returning an empty
segment, which then triggers an assertion in the itemizer.
Prevent this by ensuring that we make progress.
This issue was reported by Jeffrey M.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 79,119
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Segment::DoneParsing() const {
if (m_size < 0) {
long long total, avail;
const int status = m_pReader->Length(&total, &avail);
if (status < 0) // error
return true; // must assume done
if (total < 0)
return false; // assume live stream
return (m_pos >= total);
}
const long long stop = m_start + m_size;
return (m_pos >= stop);
}
Commit Message: Fix ParseElementHeader to support 0 payload elements
Cherry-pick'ing Change 5c83bbec9a5f6f00a349674ddad85b753d2ea219
from upstream. This fixes regression in some edge cases for mkv
playback.
BUG=26499283
Change-Id: I88de03219a3d941b6b2f251d384e29c36bdd4d9b
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 164,201
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Packet *PacketGetFromQueueOrAlloc(void)
{
/* try the pool first */
Packet *p = PacketPoolGetPacket();
if (p == NULL) {
/* non fatal, we're just not processing a packet then */
p = PacketGetFromAlloc();
} else {
PACKET_PROFILING_START(p);
}
return p;
}
Commit Message: teredo: be stricter on what to consider valid teredo
Invalid Teredo can lead to valid DNS traffic (or other UDP traffic)
being misdetected as Teredo. This leads to false negatives in the
UDP payload inspection.
Make the teredo code only consider a packet teredo if the encapsulated
data was decoded without any 'invalid' events being set.
Bug #2736.
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 87,042
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ModuleExport void UnregisterICONImage(void)
{
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("CUR");
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("ICO");
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("ICON");
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 71,575
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int xts_encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc, struct scatterlist *dst,
struct scatterlist *src, unsigned int nbytes)
{
struct aesni_xts_ctx *ctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
be128 buf[8];
struct xts_crypt_req req = {
.tbuf = buf,
.tbuflen = sizeof(buf),
.tweak_ctx = aes_ctx(ctx->raw_tweak_ctx),
.tweak_fn = aesni_xts_tweak,
.crypt_ctx = aes_ctx(ctx->raw_crypt_ctx),
.crypt_fn = lrw_xts_encrypt_callback,
};
int ret;
desc->flags &= ~CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
kernel_fpu_begin();
ret = xts_crypt(desc, dst, src, nbytes, &req);
kernel_fpu_end();
return ret;
}
Commit Message: crypto: aesni - fix memory usage in GCM decryption
The kernel crypto API logic requires the caller to provide the
length of (ciphertext || authentication tag) as cryptlen for the
AEAD decryption operation. Thus, the cipher implementation must
calculate the size of the plaintext output itself and cannot simply use
cryptlen.
The RFC4106 GCM decryption operation tries to overwrite cryptlen memory
in req->dst. As the destination buffer for decryption only needs to hold
the plaintext memory but cryptlen references the input buffer holding
(ciphertext || authentication tag), the assumption of the destination
buffer length in RFC4106 GCM operation leads to a too large size. This
patch simply uses the already calculated plaintext size.
In addition, this patch fixes the offset calculation of the AAD buffer
pointer: as mentioned before, cryptlen already includes the size of the
tag. Thus, the tag does not need to be added. With the addition, the AAD
will be written beyond the already allocated buffer.
Note, this fixes a kernel crash that can be triggered from user space
via AF_ALG(aead) -- simply use the libkcapi test application
from [1] and update it to use rfc4106-gcm-aes.
Using [1], the changes were tested using CAVS vectors to demonstrate
that the crypto operation still delivers the right results.
[1] http://www.chronox.de/libkcapi.html
CC: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 43,499
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool FrameFetchContext::ShouldBlockRequestByInspector(const KURL& url) const {
if (IsDetached())
return false;
bool should_block_request = false;
probe::shouldBlockRequest(GetFrame()->GetDocument(), url,
&should_block_request);
return should_block_request;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 138,776
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void *load_bytes(RBinFile *arch, const ut8 *buf, ut64 sz, ut64 loaddr, Sdb *sdb) {
if (!buf || !sz || sz == UT64_MAX) {
return NULL;
}
RBuffer *tbuf = r_buf_new ();
r_buf_set_bytes (tbuf, buf, sz);
struct r_bin_bflt_obj *res = r_bin_bflt_new_buf (tbuf);
r_buf_free (tbuf);
return res ? res : NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fix #6829 oob write because of using wrong struct
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 168,363
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ehci_queues_rip_device(EHCIState *ehci, USBDevice *dev, int async)
{
EHCIQueueHead *head = async ? &ehci->aqueues : &ehci->pqueues;
EHCIQueue *q, *tmp;
QTAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(q, head, next, tmp) {
if (q->dev != dev) {
continue;
}
ehci_free_queue(q, NULL);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 5,806
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: find_opening_op(int opening_op, gs_composite_t **ppcte,
gs_compositor_closing_state return_code)
{
/* Assuming a right *BEGIN* - *END* operation balance. */
gs_composite_t *pcte = *ppcte;
for (;;) {
if (pcte->type->comp_id == GX_COMPOSITOR_PDF14_TRANS) {
gs_pdf14trans_t *pct = (gs_pdf14trans_t *)pcte;
int op = pct->params.pdf14_op;
*ppcte = pcte;
if (op == opening_op)
return return_code;
if (op != PDF14_SET_BLEND_PARAMS) {
if (opening_op == PDF14_BEGIN_TRANS_MASK)
return COMP_ENQUEUE;
if (opening_op == PDF14_BEGIN_TRANS_GROUP) {
if (op != PDF14_BEGIN_TRANS_MASK && op != PDF14_END_TRANS_MASK)
return COMP_ENQUEUE;
}
if (opening_op == PDF14_PUSH_DEVICE) {
if (op != PDF14_BEGIN_TRANS_MASK && op != PDF14_END_TRANS_MASK &&
op != PDF14_BEGIN_TRANS_GROUP && op != PDF14_END_TRANS_GROUP)
return COMP_ENQUEUE;
}
}
} else
return COMP_ENQUEUE;
pcte = pcte->prev;
if (pcte == NULL)
return COMP_EXEC_QUEUE; /* Not in queue. */
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 13,265
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void kvm_vcpu_kick(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
int me;
int cpu = vcpu->cpu;
if (kvm_vcpu_wake_up(vcpu))
return;
me = get_cpu();
if (cpu != me && (unsigned)cpu < nr_cpu_ids && cpu_online(cpu))
if (kvm_arch_vcpu_should_kick(vcpu))
smp_send_reschedule(cpu);
put_cpu();
}
Commit Message: kvm: fix kvm_ioctl_create_device() reference counting (CVE-2019-6974)
kvm_ioctl_create_device() does the following:
1. creates a device that holds a reference to the VM object (with a borrowed
reference, the VM's refcount has not been bumped yet)
2. initializes the device
3. transfers the reference to the device to the caller's file descriptor table
4. calls kvm_get_kvm() to turn the borrowed reference to the VM into a real
reference
The ownership transfer in step 3 must not happen before the reference to the VM
becomes a proper, non-borrowed reference, which only happens in step 4.
After step 3, an attacker can close the file descriptor and drop the borrowed
reference, which can cause the refcount of the kvm object to drop to zero.
This means that we need to grab a reference for the device before
anon_inode_getfd(), otherwise the VM can disappear from under us.
Fixes: 852b6d57dc7f ("kvm: add device control API")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 91,591
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int result(void)
{
int i;
int status = 0;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_REPLIES; i++) {
status = wait_til_ready();
if (status < 0)
break;
status &= STATUS_DIR | STATUS_READY | STATUS_BUSY | STATUS_DMA;
if ((status & ~STATUS_BUSY) == STATUS_READY) {
resultjiffies = jiffies;
resultsize = i;
return i;
}
if (status == (STATUS_DIR | STATUS_READY | STATUS_BUSY))
reply_buffer[i] = fd_inb(FD_DATA);
else
break;
}
if (initialized) {
DPRINT("get result error. Fdc=%d Last status=%x Read bytes=%d\n",
fdc, status, i);
show_floppy();
}
FDCS->reset = 1;
return -1;
}
Commit Message: floppy: don't write kernel-only members to FDRAWCMD ioctl output
Do not leak kernel-only floppy_raw_cmd structure members to userspace.
This includes the linked-list pointer and the pointer to the allocated
DMA space.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattd@bugfuzz.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 39,423
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xdr_setkey3_arg(XDR *xdrs, setkey3_arg *objp)
{
if (!xdr_ui_4(xdrs, &objp->api_version)) {
return (FALSE);
}
if (!xdr_krb5_principal(xdrs, &objp->princ)) {
return (FALSE);
}
if (!xdr_krb5_boolean(xdrs, &objp->keepold)) {
return (FALSE);
}
if (!xdr_array(xdrs, (caddr_t *) &objp->ks_tuple,
(unsigned int *) &objp->n_ks_tuple, ~0,
sizeof(krb5_key_salt_tuple), xdr_krb5_key_salt_tuple)) {
return (FALSE);
}
if (!xdr_array(xdrs, (caddr_t *) &objp->keyblocks,
(unsigned int *) &objp->n_keys, ~0,
sizeof(krb5_keyblock), xdr_krb5_keyblock)) {
return (FALSE);
}
return (TRUE);
}
Commit Message: Fix kadm5/gssrpc XDR double free [CVE-2014-9421]
[MITKRB5-SA-2015-001] In auth_gssapi_unwrap_data(), do not free
partial deserialization results upon failure to deserialize. This
responsibility belongs to the callers, svctcp_getargs() and
svcudp_getargs(); doing it in the unwrap function results in freeing
the results twice.
In xdr_krb5_tl_data() and xdr_krb5_principal(), null out the pointers
we are freeing, as other XDR functions such as xdr_bytes() and
xdr_string().
ticket: 8056 (new)
target_version: 1.13.1
tags: pullup
CWE ID:
| 0
| 46,087
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int DSA_set0_pqg(DSA *d, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g)
{
d->p = p;
d->q = q;
d->g = g;
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-754
| 0
| 4,480
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PixelBufferRasterWorkerPool::Shutdown() {
shutdown_ = true;
RasterWorkerPool::Shutdown();
CheckForCompletedWorkerTasks();
CheckForCompletedUploads();
check_for_completed_raster_tasks_callback_.Cancel();
check_for_completed_raster_tasks_pending_ = false;
for (TaskMap::iterator it = pixel_buffer_tasks_.begin();
it != pixel_buffer_tasks_.end(); ++it) {
internal::RasterWorkerPoolTask* task = it->first;
internal::WorkerPoolTask* pixel_buffer_task = it->second.get();
if (!pixel_buffer_task && !task->HasFinishedRunning()) {
task->DidRun(true);
completed_tasks_.push_back(task);
}
}
DCHECK_EQ(completed_tasks_.size(), pixel_buffer_tasks_.size());
}
Commit Message: cc: Simplify raster task completion notification logic
(Relanding after missing activation bug fixed in https://codereview.chromium.org/131763003/)
Previously the pixel buffer raster worker pool used a combination of
polling and explicit notifications from the raster worker pool to decide
when to tell the client about the completion of 1) all tasks or 2) the
subset of tasks required for activation. This patch simplifies the logic
by only triggering the notification based on the OnRasterTasksFinished
and OnRasterTasksRequiredForActivationFinished calls from the worker
pool.
BUG=307841,331534
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/99873007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@243991 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 112,820
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int sock_tx_timestamp(struct sock *sk, __u8 *tx_flags)
{
*tx_flags = 0;
if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_TIMESTAMPING_TX_HARDWARE))
*tx_flags |= SKBTX_HW_TSTAMP;
if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_TIMESTAMPING_TX_SOFTWARE))
*tx_flags |= SKBTX_SW_TSTAMP;
if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_WIFI_STATUS))
*tx_flags |= SKBTX_WIFI_STATUS;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix order of arguments to compat_put_time[spec|val]
Commit 644595f89620 ("compat: Handle COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME in
net/socket.c") introduced a bug where the helper functions to take
either a 64-bit or compat time[spec|val] got the arguments in the wrong
order, passing the kernel stack pointer off as a user pointer (and vice
versa).
Because of the user address range check, that in turn then causes an
EFAULT due to the user pointer range checking failing for the kernel
address. Incorrectly resuling in a failed system call for 32-bit
processes with a 64-bit kernel.
On odder architectures like HP-PA (with separate user/kernel address
spaces), it can be used read kernel memory.
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 18,703
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool BaseMultipleFieldsDateAndTimeInputType::shouldSpinButtonRespondToWheelEvents()
{
if (!shouldSpinButtonRespondToMouseEvents())
return false;
return m_dateTimeEditElement && m_dateTimeEditElement->hasFocusedField();
}
Commit Message: Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 112,847
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int idle_cpu(int cpu)
{
return cpu_curr(cpu) == cpu_rq(cpu)->idle;
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 22,451
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SPL_METHOD(SplFileObject, fgetcsv)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
char delimiter = intern->u.file.delimiter, enclosure = intern->u.file.enclosure, escape = intern->u.file.escape;
char *delim = NULL, *enclo = NULL, *esc = NULL;
int d_len = 0, e_len = 0, esc_len = 0;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "|sss", &delim, &d_len, &enclo, &e_len, &esc, &esc_len) == SUCCESS) {
switch(ZEND_NUM_ARGS())
{
case 3:
if (esc_len != 1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "escape must be a character");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
escape = esc[0];
/* no break */
case 2:
if (e_len != 1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "enclosure must be a character");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
enclosure = enclo[0];
/* no break */
case 1:
if (d_len != 1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "delimiter must be a character");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
delimiter = delim[0];
/* no break */
case 0:
break;
}
spl_filesystem_file_read_csv(intern, delimiter, enclosure, escape, return_value TSRMLS_CC);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 1
| 167,061
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static u32 atl2_hash_mc_addr(struct atl2_hw *hw, u8 *mc_addr)
{
u32 crc32, value;
int i;
value = 0;
crc32 = ether_crc_le(6, mc_addr);
for (i = 0; i < 32; i++)
value |= (((crc32 >> i) & 1) << (31 - i));
return value;
}
Commit Message: atl2: Disable unimplemented scatter/gather feature
atl2 includes NETIF_F_SG in hw_features even though it has no support
for non-linear skbs. This bug was originally harmless since the
driver does not claim to implement checksum offload and that used to
be a requirement for SG.
Now that SG and checksum offload are independent features, if you
explicitly enable SG *and* use one of the rare protocols that can use
SG without checkusm offload, this potentially leaks sensitive
information (before you notice that it just isn't working). Therefore
this obscure bug has been designated CVE-2016-2117.
Reported-by: Justin Yackoski <jyackoski@crypto-nite.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Fixes: ec5f06156423 ("net: Kill link between CSUM and SG features.")
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 55,305
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void update_child_status(h2_session *session, int status, const char *msg)
{
/* Assume that we also change code/msg when something really happened and
* avoid updating the scoreboard in between */
if (session->last_status_code != status
|| session->last_status_msg != msg) {
apr_snprintf(session->status, sizeof(session->status),
"%s, streams: %d/%d/%d/%d/%d (open/recv/resp/push/rst)",
msg? msg : "-",
(int)session->open_streams,
(int)session->remote.emitted_count,
(int)session->responses_submitted,
(int)session->pushes_submitted,
(int)session->pushes_reset + session->streams_reset);
ap_update_child_status_descr(session->c->sbh, status, session->status);
}
}
Commit Message: SECURITY: CVE-2016-8740
mod_http2: properly crafted, endless HTTP/2 CONTINUATION frames could be used to exhaust all server's memory.
Reported by: Naveen Tiwari <naveen.tiwari@asu.edu> and CDF/SEFCOM at Arizona State University
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1772576 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 48,690
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __attribute__((no_instrument_function)) add_ftrace(void *func_ptr,
void *caller, ulong flags)
{
if (hdr->depth > hdr->depth_limit) {
hdr->ftrace_too_deep_count++;
return;
}
if (hdr->ftrace_count < hdr->ftrace_size) {
struct trace_call *rec = &hdr->ftrace[hdr->ftrace_count];
rec->func = func_ptr_to_num(func_ptr);
rec->caller = func_ptr_to_num(caller);
rec->flags = flags | (timer_get_us() & FUNCF_TIMESTAMP_MASK);
}
hdr->ftrace_count++;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch '2020-01-22-master-imports'
- Re-add U8500 platform support
- Add bcm968360bg support
- Assorted Keymile fixes
- Other assorted bugfixes
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 89,393
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BOOL transport_tsg_connect(rdpTransport* transport, const char* hostname, UINT16 port)
{
rdpTsg* tsg = tsg_new(transport);
tsg->transport = transport;
transport->tsg = tsg;
transport->SplitInputOutput = TRUE;
if (transport->TlsIn == NULL)
transport->TlsIn = tls_new(transport->settings);
transport->TlsIn->sockfd = transport->TcpIn->sockfd;
if (transport->TlsOut == NULL)
transport->TlsOut = tls_new(transport->settings);
transport->TlsOut->sockfd = transport->TcpOut->sockfd;
if (tls_connect(transport->TlsIn) != TRUE)
return FALSE;
if (tls_connect(transport->TlsOut) != TRUE)
return FALSE;
if (!tsg_connect(tsg, hostname, port))
return FALSE;
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: nla: invalidate sec handle after creation
If sec pointer isn't invalidated after creation it is not possible
to check if the upper and lower pointers are valid.
This fixes a segfault in the server part if the client disconnects before
the authentication was finished.
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 58,568
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MediaStreamAudioSourceNode* BaseAudioContext::createMediaStreamSource(
MediaStream* media_stream,
ExceptionState& exception_state) {
DCHECK(IsMainThread());
return MediaStreamAudioSourceNode::Create(*this, *media_stream,
exception_state);
}
Commit Message: Redirect should not circumvent same-origin restrictions
Check whether we have access to the audio data when the format is set.
At this point we have enough information to determine this. The old approach
based on when the src was changed was incorrect because at the point, we
only know the new src; none of the response headers have been read yet.
This new approach also removes the incorrect message reported in 619114.
Bug: 826552, 619114
Change-Id: I95119b3a1e399c05d0fbd2da71f87967978efff6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1069540
Commit-Queue: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Hongchan Choi <hongchan@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#564313}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 153,915
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: String WebPageSerializerImpl::preActionBeforeSerializeOpenTag(
const Element* element, SerializeDomParam* param, bool* needSkip)
{
StringBuilder result;
*needSkip = false;
if (param->isHTMLDocument) {
ASSERT(element);
if (isHTMLMetaElement(*element)) {
const HTMLMetaElement& meta = toHTMLMetaElement(*element);
String equiv = meta.httpEquiv();
if (equalIgnoringCase(equiv, "content-type")) {
String content = meta.content();
if (content.length() && content.contains("charset", TextCaseInsensitive)) {
param->skipMetaElement = element;
*needSkip = true;
}
}
} else if (isHTMLHtmlElement(*element)) {
if (!param->haveSeenDocType) {
param->haveSeenDocType = true;
result.append(createMarkup(param->document->doctype()));
}
result.append(WebPageSerializer::generateMarkOfTheWebDeclaration(param->url));
} else if (isHTMLBaseElement(*element)) {
result.appendLiteral("<!--");
}
} else {
if (!param->haveAddedXMLProcessingDirective) {
param->haveAddedXMLProcessingDirective = true;
String xmlEncoding = param->document->xmlEncoding();
if (xmlEncoding.isEmpty())
xmlEncoding = param->document->encodingName();
if (xmlEncoding.isEmpty())
xmlEncoding = UTF8Encoding().name();
result.appendLiteral("<?xml version=\"");
result.append(param->document->xmlVersion());
result.appendLiteral("\" encoding=\"");
result.append(xmlEncoding);
if (param->document->xmlStandalone())
result.appendLiteral("\" standalone=\"yes");
result.appendLiteral("\"?>\n");
}
if (!param->haveSeenDocType) {
param->haveSeenDocType = true;
result.append(createMarkup(param->document->doctype()));
}
}
return result.toString();
}
Commit Message: Make WebPageSerializerImpl to escape URL attribute values in result.
This patch makes |WebPageSerializerImpl| to escape URL attribute values rather
than directly output URL attribute values into result.
BUG=542054
TEST=webkit_unit_tests --gtest_filter=WebPageSerializerTest.URLAttributeValues
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1398453005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#353712}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 124,018
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RefCustomXCursor(::Cursor cursor) {
XCustomCursorCache::GetInstance()->Ref(cursor);
}
Commit Message: Make shared memory segments writable only by their rightful owners.
BUG=143859
TEST=Chrome's UI still works on Linux and Chrome OS
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854242
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@158289 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 119,206
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebGLObject::setObject(Platform3DObject object)
{
ASSERT(!m_object && !m_deleted);
m_object = object;
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, build fix for unused argument warning after r104954.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=75906
Also fixed up somebody's bad merge in Source/WebCore/ChangeLog.
* html/canvas/WebGLObject.cpp:
(WebCore::WebGLObject::WebGLObject):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@104959 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 97,123
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static EVP_PKEY * php_openssl_evp_from_zval(zval ** val, int public_key, char * passphrase, int makeresource, long * resourceval TSRMLS_DC)
{
EVP_PKEY * key = NULL;
X509 * cert = NULL;
int free_cert = 0;
long cert_res = -1;
char * filename = NULL;
zval tmp;
Z_TYPE(tmp) = IS_NULL;
#define TMP_CLEAN \
if (Z_TYPE(tmp) == IS_STRING) {\
zval_dtor(&tmp); \
} \
return NULL;
if (resourceval) {
*resourceval = -1;
}
if (Z_TYPE_PP(val) == IS_ARRAY) {
zval ** zphrase;
/* get passphrase */
if (zend_hash_index_find(HASH_OF(*val), 1, (void **)&zphrase) == FAILURE) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "key array must be of the form array(0 => key, 1 => phrase)");
return NULL;
}
if (Z_TYPE_PP(zphrase) == IS_STRING) {
passphrase = Z_STRVAL_PP(zphrase);
} else {
tmp = **zphrase;
zval_copy_ctor(&tmp);
convert_to_string(&tmp);
passphrase = Z_STRVAL(tmp);
}
/* now set val to be the key param and continue */
if (zend_hash_index_find(HASH_OF(*val), 0, (void **)&val) == FAILURE) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "key array must be of the form array(0 => key, 1 => phrase)");
TMP_CLEAN;
}
}
if (Z_TYPE_PP(val) == IS_RESOURCE) {
void * what;
int type;
what = zend_fetch_resource(val TSRMLS_CC, -1, "OpenSSL X.509/key", &type, 2, le_x509, le_key);
if (!what) {
TMP_CLEAN;
}
if (resourceval) {
*resourceval = Z_LVAL_PP(val);
}
if (type == le_x509) {
/* extract key from cert, depending on public_key param */
cert = (X509*)what;
free_cert = 0;
} else if (type == le_key) {
int is_priv;
is_priv = php_openssl_is_private_key((EVP_PKEY*)what TSRMLS_CC);
/* check whether it is actually a private key if requested */
if (!public_key && !is_priv) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "supplied key param is a public key");
TMP_CLEAN;
}
if (public_key && is_priv) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Don't know how to get public key from this private key");
TMP_CLEAN;
} else {
if (Z_TYPE(tmp) == IS_STRING) {
zval_dtor(&tmp);
}
/* got the key - return it */
return (EVP_PKEY*)what;
}
} else {
/* other types could be used here - eg: file pointers and read in the data from them */
TMP_CLEAN;
}
} else {
/* force it to be a string and check if it refers to a file */
/* passing non string values leaks, object uses toString, it returns NULL
* See bug38255.phpt
*/
if (!(Z_TYPE_PP(val) == IS_STRING || Z_TYPE_PP(val) == IS_OBJECT)) {
TMP_CLEAN;
}
convert_to_string_ex(val);
if (Z_STRLEN_PP(val) > 7 && memcmp(Z_STRVAL_PP(val), "file://", sizeof("file://") - 1) == 0) {
filename = Z_STRVAL_PP(val) + (sizeof("file://") - 1);
}
/* it's an X509 file/cert of some kind, and we need to extract the data from that */
if (public_key) {
cert = php_openssl_x509_from_zval(val, 0, &cert_res TSRMLS_CC);
free_cert = (cert_res == -1);
/* actual extraction done later */
if (!cert) {
/* not a X509 certificate, try to retrieve public key */
BIO* in;
if (filename) {
in = BIO_new_file(filename, "r");
} else {
in = BIO_new_mem_buf(Z_STRVAL_PP(val), Z_STRLEN_PP(val));
}
if (in == NULL) {
TMP_CLEAN;
}
key = PEM_read_bio_PUBKEY(in, NULL,NULL, NULL);
BIO_free(in);
}
} else {
/* we want the private key */
BIO *in;
if (filename) {
if (php_openssl_open_base_dir_chk(filename TSRMLS_CC)) {
TMP_CLEAN;
}
in = BIO_new_file(filename, "r");
} else {
in = BIO_new_mem_buf(Z_STRVAL_PP(val), Z_STRLEN_PP(val));
}
if (in == NULL) {
TMP_CLEAN;
}
key = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(in, NULL,NULL, passphrase);
BIO_free(in);
}
}
if (public_key && cert && key == NULL) {
/* extract public key from X509 cert */
key = (EVP_PKEY *) X509_get_pubkey(cert);
}
if (free_cert && cert) {
X509_free(cert);
}
if (key && makeresource && resourceval) {
*resourceval = ZEND_REGISTER_RESOURCE(NULL, key, le_key);
}
if (Z_TYPE(tmp) == IS_STRING) {
zval_dtor(&tmp);
}
return key;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-754
| 0
| 4,681
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static size_t ZSTD_initCDict_internal(
ZSTD_CDict* cdict,
const void* dictBuffer, size_t dictSize,
ZSTD_dictLoadMethod_e dictLoadMethod,
ZSTD_dictContentType_e dictContentType,
ZSTD_compressionParameters cParams)
{
DEBUGLOG(3, "ZSTD_initCDict_internal (dictContentType:%u)", (U32)dictContentType);
assert(!ZSTD_checkCParams(cParams));
cdict->matchState.cParams = cParams;
if ((dictLoadMethod == ZSTD_dlm_byRef) || (!dictBuffer) || (!dictSize)) {
cdict->dictBuffer = NULL;
cdict->dictContent = dictBuffer;
} else {
void* const internalBuffer = ZSTD_malloc(dictSize, cdict->customMem);
cdict->dictBuffer = internalBuffer;
cdict->dictContent = internalBuffer;
if (!internalBuffer) return ERROR(memory_allocation);
memcpy(internalBuffer, dictBuffer, dictSize);
}
cdict->dictContentSize = dictSize;
/* Reset the state to no dictionary */
ZSTD_reset_compressedBlockState(&cdict->cBlockState);
{ void* const end = ZSTD_reset_matchState(
&cdict->matchState,
(U32*)cdict->workspace + HUF_WORKSPACE_SIZE_U32,
&cParams, ZSTDcrp_continue, /* forCCtx */ 0);
assert(end == (char*)cdict->workspace + cdict->workspaceSize);
(void)end;
}
/* (Maybe) load the dictionary
* Skips loading the dictionary if it is <= 8 bytes.
*/
{ ZSTD_CCtx_params params;
memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
params.compressionLevel = ZSTD_CLEVEL_DEFAULT;
params.fParams.contentSizeFlag = 1;
params.cParams = cParams;
{ size_t const dictID = ZSTD_compress_insertDictionary(
&cdict->cBlockState, &cdict->matchState, ¶ms,
cdict->dictContent, cdict->dictContentSize,
dictContentType, ZSTD_dtlm_full, cdict->workspace);
if (ZSTD_isError(dictID)) return dictID;
assert(dictID <= (size_t)(U32)-1);
cdict->dictID = (U32)dictID;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fixed T36302429
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 90,079
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftAVC::setFrameRate() {
ive_ctl_set_frame_rate_ip_t s_frame_rate_ip;
ive_ctl_set_frame_rate_op_t s_frame_rate_op;
IV_STATUS_T status;
s_frame_rate_ip.e_cmd = IVE_CMD_VIDEO_CTL;
s_frame_rate_ip.e_sub_cmd = IVE_CMD_CTL_SET_FRAMERATE;
s_frame_rate_ip.u4_src_frame_rate = mFramerate >> 16;
s_frame_rate_ip.u4_tgt_frame_rate = mFramerate >> 16;
s_frame_rate_ip.u4_timestamp_high = -1;
s_frame_rate_ip.u4_timestamp_low = -1;
s_frame_rate_ip.u4_size = sizeof(ive_ctl_set_frame_rate_ip_t);
s_frame_rate_op.u4_size = sizeof(ive_ctl_set_frame_rate_op_t);
status = ive_api_function(mCodecCtx, &s_frame_rate_ip, &s_frame_rate_op);
if (status != IV_SUCCESS) {
ALOGE("Unable to set frame rate = 0x%x\n",
s_frame_rate_op.u4_error_code);
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 163,967
|
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