instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: mrb_fiber_alive_p(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_value self)
{
struct mrb_context *c = fiber_check(mrb, self);
return mrb_bool_value(c->status != MRB_FIBER_TERMINATED);
}
Commit Message: Extend stack when pushing arguments that does not fit in; fix #4038
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 82,164
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MagickExport void *RelinquishAlignedMemory(void *memory)
{
if (memory == (void *) NULL)
return((void *) NULL);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_HAVE_POSIX_MEMALIGN)
free(memory);
#elif defined(MAGICKCORE_HAVE__ALIGNED_MALLOC)
_aligned_free(memory);
#else
free(*((void **) memory-1));
#endif
return(NULL);
}
Commit Message: Suspend exception processing if there are too many exceptions
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 71,435
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void NextCh(cmsIT8* it8)
{
if (it8 -> FileStack[it8 ->IncludeSP]->Stream) {
it8 ->ch = fgetc(it8 ->FileStack[it8 ->IncludeSP]->Stream);
if (feof(it8 -> FileStack[it8 ->IncludeSP]->Stream)) {
if (it8 ->IncludeSP > 0) {
fclose(it8 ->FileStack[it8->IncludeSP--]->Stream);
it8 -> ch = ' '; // Whitespace to be ignored
} else
it8 ->ch = 0; // EOF
}
}
else {
it8->ch = *it8->Source;
if (it8->ch) it8->Source++;
}
}
Commit Message: Upgrade Visual studio 2017 15.8
- Upgrade to 15.8
- Add check on CGATS memory allocation (thanks to Quang Nguyen for
pointing out this)
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 78,040
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::CountDetachingNodeAccessInDOMNodeRemovedHandler() {
auto state = GetInDOMNodeRemovedHandlerState();
DCHECK_NE(state, InDOMNodeRemovedHandlerState::kNone);
UseCounter::Count(
*this,
state == InDOMNodeRemovedHandlerState::kDOMNodeRemoved
? WebFeature::kDOMNodeRemovedEventHandlerAccessDetachingNode
: WebFeature::
kDOMNodeRemovedFromDocumentEventHandlerAccessDetachingNode);
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 129,628
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Document::HaveRenderBlockingResourcesLoaded() const {
if (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::CSSInBodyDoesNotBlockPaintEnabled()) {
return HaveImportsLoaded() &&
style_engine_->HaveRenderBlockingStylesheetsLoaded();
}
return HaveImportsLoaded() &&
style_engine_->HaveScriptBlockingStylesheetsLoaded();
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when self-navigating to local-scheme URL
As the linked bug example shows, we should inherit CSP when we navigate
to a local-scheme URL (even if we are in a main browsing context).
Bug: 799747
Change-Id: I8413aa8e8049461ebcf0ffbf7b04c41d1340af02
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1234337
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597889}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 143,993
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FileAPIMessageFilter::OnExists(
int request_id, const GURL& path, bool is_directory) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
base::PlatformFileError error;
FileSystemURL url(path);
if (!HasPermissionsForFile(url, kReadFilePermissions, &error)) {
Send(new FileSystemMsg_DidFail(request_id, error));
return;
}
FileSystemOperation* operation = GetNewOperation(url, request_id);
if (!operation)
return;
if (is_directory) {
operation->DirectoryExists(
url,
base::Bind(&FileAPIMessageFilter::DidFinish, this, request_id));
} else {
operation->FileExists(
url,
base::Bind(&FileAPIMessageFilter::DidFinish, this, request_id));
}
}
Commit Message: File permission fix: now we selectively grant read permission for Sandboxed files
We also need to check the read permission and call GrantReadFile() for
sandboxed files for CreateSnapshotFile().
BUG=162114
TEST=manual
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11280231
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@170181 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 119,027
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DownloadManagerImpl::SetDelegate(DownloadManagerDelegate* delegate) {
delegate_ = delegate;
if (initialized_ || in_progress_cache_initialized_)
return;
base::RepeatingClosure post_init_callback = base::BindRepeating(
&DownloadManagerImpl::PostInitialization, weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
DOWNLOAD_INITIALIZATION_DEPENDENCY_IN_PROGRESS_CACHE);
if (delegate_) {
download::InProgressCache* in_progress_cache =
delegate_->GetInProgressCache();
if (in_progress_cache) {
in_progress_cache->Initialize(post_init_callback);
return;
}
}
BrowserThread::PostTask(BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE, post_init_callback);
}
Commit Message: Downloads : Fixed an issue of opening incorrect download file
When one download overwrites another completed download, calling download.open in the old download causes the new download to open, which could be dangerous and undesirable. In this CL, we are trying to avoid this by blocking the opening of the old download.
Bug: 793620
Change-Id: Ic948175756700ad7c08489c3cc347330daedb6f8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/826477
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <dtrainor@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Shakti Sahu <shaktisahu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525810}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 146,457
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool TabStripModel::IsNewTabAtEndOfTabStrip(TabContents* contents) const {
const GURL& url = contents->web_contents()->GetURL();
return url.SchemeIs(chrome::kChromeUIScheme) &&
url.host() == chrome::kChromeUINewTabHost &&
contents == GetTabContentsAtImpl(count() - 1) &&
contents->web_contents()->GetController().GetEntryCount() == 1;
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 118,227
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void update_group_shares_cpu(struct task_group *tg, int cpu,
unsigned long sd_shares,
unsigned long sd_rq_weight,
unsigned long *usd_rq_weight)
{
unsigned long shares, rq_weight;
int boost = 0;
rq_weight = usd_rq_weight[cpu];
if (!rq_weight) {
boost = 1;
rq_weight = NICE_0_LOAD;
}
/*
* \Sum_j shares_j * rq_weight_i
* shares_i = -----------------------------
* \Sum_j rq_weight_j
*/
shares = (sd_shares * rq_weight) / sd_rq_weight;
shares = clamp_t(unsigned long, shares, MIN_SHARES, MAX_SHARES);
if (abs(shares - tg->se[cpu]->load.weight) >
sysctl_sched_shares_thresh) {
struct rq *rq = cpu_rq(cpu);
unsigned long flags;
raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&rq->lock, flags);
tg->cfs_rq[cpu]->rq_weight = boost ? 0 : rq_weight;
tg->cfs_rq[cpu]->shares = boost ? 0 : shares;
__set_se_shares(tg->se[cpu], shares);
raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&rq->lock, flags);
}
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 22,649
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: VP8PictureToVaapiDecodeSurface(const scoped_refptr<VP8Picture>& pic) {
VaapiVP8Picture* vaapi_pic = pic->AsVaapiVP8Picture();
CHECK(vaapi_pic);
return vaapi_pic->dec_surface();
}
Commit Message: vaapi vda: Delete owned objects on worker thread in Cleanup()
This CL adds a SEQUENCE_CHECKER to Vaapi*Accelerator classes, and
posts the destruction of those objects to the appropriate thread on
Cleanup().
Also makes {H264,VP8,VP9}Picture RefCountedThreadSafe, see miu@
comment in
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/794091#message-a64bed985cfaf8a19499a517bb110a7ce581dc0f
TEST=play back VP9/VP8/H264 w/ simplechrome on soraka, Release build
unstripped, let video play for a few seconds then navigate back; no
crashes. Unittests as before:
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp9:320:240:250:250:35:150:12
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp8:320:240:250:250:35:150:11
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.h264:320:240:250:258:35:150:1
Bug: 789160
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I7d96aaf89c92bf46f00c8b8b36798e057a842ed2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/794091
Reviewed-by: Pawel Osciak <posciak@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Miguel Casas <mcasas@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#523372}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 1
| 172,813
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void svm_cpu_uninit(int cpu)
{
struct svm_cpu_data *sd = per_cpu(svm_data, raw_smp_processor_id());
if (!sd)
return;
per_cpu(svm_data, raw_smp_processor_id()) = NULL;
__free_page(sd->save_area);
kfree(sd);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Check non-canonical addresses upon WRMSR
Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).
Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD. To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.
Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:
According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."
According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers. If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."
This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 37,833
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MagickExport void GetBlobInfo(BlobInfo *blob_info)
{
assert(blob_info != (BlobInfo *) NULL);
(void) memset(blob_info,0,sizeof(*blob_info));
blob_info->type=UndefinedStream;
blob_info->quantum=(size_t) MagickMaxBlobExtent;
blob_info->properties.st_mtime=GetMagickTime();
blob_info->properties.st_ctime=blob_info->properties.st_mtime;
blob_info->debug=IsEventLogging();
blob_info->reference_count=1;
blob_info->semaphore=AllocateSemaphoreInfo();
blob_info->signature=MagickCoreSignature;
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick6/issues/43
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 88,519
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: raptor_object_options_clear(raptor_object_options* options)
{
int i;
for(i = 0; i <= RAPTOR_OPTION_LAST; i++) {
if(raptor_option_value_is_numeric((raptor_option)i))
continue;
if(options->options[i].string)
RAPTOR_FREE(char*, options->options[i].string);
}
}
Commit Message: CVE-2012-0037
Enforce entity loading policy in raptor_libxml_resolveEntity
and raptor_libxml_getEntity by checking for file URIs and network URIs.
Add RAPTOR_OPTION_LOAD_EXTERNAL_ENTITIES / loadExternalEntities for
turning on loading of XML external entity loading, disabled by default.
This affects all the parsers that use SAX2: rdfxml, rss-tag-soup (and
aliases) and rdfa.
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 21,985
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: local unsigned long put_header(void)
{
unsigned long len;
unsigned char head[30];
if (g.form > 1) { /* zip */
/* write local header */
PUT4L(head, 0x04034b50UL); /* local header signature */
PUT2L(head + 4, 20); /* version needed to extract (2.0) */
PUT2L(head + 6, 8); /* flags: data descriptor follows data */
PUT2L(head + 8, 8); /* deflate */
PUT4L(head + 10, time2dos(g.mtime));
PUT4L(head + 14, 0); /* crc (not here) */
PUT4L(head + 18, 0); /* compressed length (not here) */
PUT4L(head + 22, 0); /* uncompressed length (not here) */
PUT2L(head + 26, g.name == NULL ? 1 : /* length of name */
strlen(g.name));
PUT2L(head + 28, 9); /* length of extra field (see below) */
writen(g.outd, head, 30); /* write local header */
len = 30;
/* write file name (use "-" for stdin) */
if (g.name == NULL)
writen(g.outd, (unsigned char *)"-", 1);
else
writen(g.outd, (unsigned char *)g.name, strlen(g.name));
len += g.name == NULL ? 1 : strlen(g.name);
/* write extended timestamp extra field block (9 bytes) */
PUT2L(head, 0x5455); /* extended timestamp signature */
PUT2L(head + 2, 5); /* number of data bytes in this block */
head[4] = 1; /* flag presence of mod time */
PUT4L(head + 5, g.mtime); /* mod time */
writen(g.outd, head, 9); /* write extra field block */
len += 9;
}
else if (g.form) { /* zlib */
head[0] = 0x78; /* deflate, 32K window */
head[1] = (g.level >= 9 ? 3 :
(g.level == 1 ? 0 :
(g.level >= 6 || g.level == Z_DEFAULT_COMPRESSION ?
1 : 2))) << 6;
head[1] += 31 - (((head[0] << 8) + head[1]) % 31);
writen(g.outd, head, 2);
len = 2;
}
else { /* gzip */
head[0] = 31;
head[1] = 139;
head[2] = 8; /* deflate */
head[3] = g.name != NULL ? 8 : 0;
PUT4L(head + 4, g.mtime);
head[8] = g.level >= 9 ? 2 : (g.level == 1 ? 4 : 0);
head[9] = 3; /* unix */
writen(g.outd, head, 10);
len = 10;
if (g.name != NULL)
writen(g.outd, (unsigned char *)g.name, strlen(g.name) + 1);
if (g.name != NULL)
len += strlen(g.name) + 1;
}
return len;
}
Commit Message: When decompressing with -N or -NT, strip any path from header name.
This uses the path of the compressed file combined with the name
from the header as the name of the decompressed output file. Any
path information in the header name is stripped. This avoids a
possible vulnerability where absolute or descending paths are put
in the gzip header.
CWE ID: CWE-22
| 0
| 44,823
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AppListControllerDelegateImpl::PinApp(const std::string& extension_id) {
NOTREACHED();
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 123,883
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: CoreFocusEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, int type, int mode, int detail, WindowPtr pWin)
{
xEvent event = {
.u.u.type = type,
.u.u.detail = detail
};
event.u.focus.mode = mode;
event.u.focus.window = pWin->drawable.id;
DeliverEventsToWindow(dev, pWin, &event, 1,
GetEventFilter(dev, &event), NullGrab);
if ((type == FocusIn) &&
((pWin->eventMask | wOtherEventMasks(pWin)) & KeymapStateMask)) {
xKeymapEvent ke = {
.type = KeymapNotify
};
ClientPtr client = wClient(pWin);
int rc;
rc = XaceHook(XACE_DEVICE_ACCESS, client, dev, DixReadAccess);
if (rc == Success)
memcpy((char *) &ke.map[0], (char *) &dev->key->down[1], 31);
DeliverEventsToWindow(dev, pWin, (xEvent *) &ke, 1,
KeymapStateMask, NullGrab);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 4,805
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int string_to_context_struct(struct policydb *pol,
struct sidtab *sidtabp,
char *scontext,
u32 scontext_len,
struct context *ctx,
u32 def_sid)
{
struct role_datum *role;
struct type_datum *typdatum;
struct user_datum *usrdatum;
char *scontextp, *p, oldc;
int rc = 0;
context_init(ctx);
/* Parse the security context. */
rc = -EINVAL;
scontextp = (char *) scontext;
/* Extract the user. */
p = scontextp;
while (*p && *p != ':')
p++;
if (*p == 0)
goto out;
*p++ = 0;
usrdatum = hashtab_search(pol->p_users.table, scontextp);
if (!usrdatum)
goto out;
ctx->user = usrdatum->value;
/* Extract role. */
scontextp = p;
while (*p && *p != ':')
p++;
if (*p == 0)
goto out;
*p++ = 0;
role = hashtab_search(pol->p_roles.table, scontextp);
if (!role)
goto out;
ctx->role = role->value;
/* Extract type. */
scontextp = p;
while (*p && *p != ':')
p++;
oldc = *p;
*p++ = 0;
typdatum = hashtab_search(pol->p_types.table, scontextp);
if (!typdatum || typdatum->attribute)
goto out;
ctx->type = typdatum->value;
rc = mls_context_to_sid(pol, oldc, &p, ctx, sidtabp, def_sid);
if (rc)
goto out;
rc = -EINVAL;
if ((p - scontext) < scontext_len)
goto out;
/* Check the validity of the new context. */
if (!policydb_context_isvalid(pol, ctx))
goto out;
rc = 0;
out:
if (rc)
context_destroy(ctx);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: SELinux: Fix kernel BUG on empty security contexts.
Setting an empty security context (length=0) on a file will
lead to incorrectly dereferencing the type and other fields
of the security context structure, yielding a kernel BUG.
As a zero-length security context is never valid, just reject
all such security contexts whether coming from userspace
via setxattr or coming from the filesystem upon a getxattr
request by SELinux.
Setting a security context value (empty or otherwise) unknown to
SELinux in the first place is only possible for a root process
(CAP_MAC_ADMIN), and, if running SELinux in enforcing mode, only
if the corresponding SELinux mac_admin permission is also granted
to the domain by policy. In Fedora policies, this is only allowed for
specific domains such as livecd for setting down security contexts
that are not defined in the build host policy.
Reproducer:
su
setenforce 0
touch foo
setfattr -n security.selinux foo
Caveat:
Relabeling or removing foo after doing the above may not be possible
without booting with SELinux disabled. Any subsequent access to foo
after doing the above will also trigger the BUG.
BUG output from Matthew Thode:
[ 473.893141] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 473.962110] kernel BUG at security/selinux/ss/services.c:654!
[ 473.995314] invalid opcode: 0000 [#6] SMP
[ 474.027196] Modules linked in:
[ 474.058118] CPU: 0 PID: 8138 Comm: ls Tainted: G D I
3.13.0-grsec #1
[ 474.116637] Hardware name: Supermicro X8ST3/X8ST3, BIOS 2.0
07/29/10
[ 474.149768] task: ffff8805f50cd010 ti: ffff8805f50cd488 task.ti:
ffff8805f50cd488
[ 474.183707] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff814681c7>] [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 474.219954] RSP: 0018:ffff8805c0ac3c38 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 474.252253] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8805c0ac3d94 RCX:
0000000000000100
[ 474.287018] RDX: ffff8805e8aac000 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI:
ffff8805e8aaa000
[ 474.321199] RBP: ffff8805c0ac3cb8 R08: 0000000000000010 R09:
0000000000000006
[ 474.357446] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8805c567a000 R12:
0000000000000006
[ 474.419191] R13: ffff8805c2b74e88 R14: 00000000000001da R15:
0000000000000000
[ 474.453816] FS: 00007f2e75220800(0000) GS:ffff88061fc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 474.489254] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 474.522215] CR2: 00007f2e74716090 CR3: 00000005c085e000 CR4:
00000000000207f0
[ 474.556058] Stack:
[ 474.584325] ffff8805c0ac3c98 ffffffff811b549b ffff8805c0ac3c98
ffff8805f1190a40
[ 474.618913] ffff8805a6202f08 ffff8805c2b74e88 00068800d0464990
ffff8805e8aac860
[ 474.653955] ffff8805c0ac3cb8 000700068113833a ffff880606c75060
ffff8805c0ac3d94
[ 474.690461] Call Trace:
[ 474.723779] [<ffffffff811b549b>] ? lookup_fast+0x1cd/0x22a
[ 474.778049] [<ffffffff81468824>] security_compute_av+0xf4/0x20b
[ 474.811398] [<ffffffff8196f419>] avc_compute_av+0x2a/0x179
[ 474.843813] [<ffffffff8145727b>] avc_has_perm+0x45/0xf4
[ 474.875694] [<ffffffff81457d0e>] inode_has_perm+0x2a/0x31
[ 474.907370] [<ffffffff81457e76>] selinux_inode_getattr+0x3c/0x3e
[ 474.938726] [<ffffffff81455cf6>] security_inode_getattr+0x1b/0x22
[ 474.970036] [<ffffffff811b057d>] vfs_getattr+0x19/0x2d
[ 475.000618] [<ffffffff811b05e5>] vfs_fstatat+0x54/0x91
[ 475.030402] [<ffffffff811b063b>] vfs_lstat+0x19/0x1b
[ 475.061097] [<ffffffff811b077e>] SyS_newlstat+0x15/0x30
[ 475.094595] [<ffffffff8113c5c1>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xa1/0xc3
[ 475.148405] [<ffffffff8197791e>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[ 475.179201] Code: 00 48 85 c0 48 89 45 b8 75 02 0f 0b 48 8b 45 a0 48
8b 3d 45 d0 b6 00 8b 40 08 89 c6 ff ce e8 d1 b0 06 00 48 85 c0 49 89 c7
75 02 <0f> 0b 48 8b 45 b8 4c 8b 28 eb 1e 49 8d 7d 08 be 80 01 00 00 e8
[ 475.255884] RIP [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 475.296120] RSP <ffff8805c0ac3c38>
[ 475.328734] ---[ end trace f076482e9d754adc ]---
Reported-by: Matthew Thode <mthode@mthode.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 39,307
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebBluetoothServiceImpl::OnDiscoverySessionError() {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
device_scanning_prompt_controller_.reset();
auto result = blink::mojom::RequestScanningStartResult::NewErrorResult(
blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult::NO_BLUETOOTH_ADAPTER);
std::move(discovery_callback_).Run(std::move(result));
}
Commit Message: bluetooth: Implement getAvailability()
This change implements the getAvailability() method for
navigator.bluetooth as defined in the specification.
Bug: 707640
Change-Id: I9e9b3e7f8ea7f259e975f71cb6d9570e5f04b479
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1651516
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Giovanni Ortuño Urquidi <ortuno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#688987}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 138,124
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ClipboardMessageFilter::OnReadFilenames(
ui::Clipboard::Buffer buffer, bool* succeeded,
std::vector<string16>* filenames) {
*succeeded = ClipboardDispatcher::ReadFilenames(buffer, filenames);
}
Commit Message: Fixing Coverity bugs (DEAD_CODE and PASS_BY_VALUE)
CIDs 16230, 16439, 16610, 16635
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7215029
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@90134 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 98,452
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BaseSettingChange::Discard(Browser* browser) {
}
Commit Message: [protector] Refactoring of --no-protector code.
*) On DSE change, new provider is not pushed to Sync.
*) Simplified code in BrowserInit.
BUG=None
TEST=protector.py
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/10065016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132398 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 103,766
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: mgmt_header_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *p)
{
const struct mgmt_header_t *hp = (const struct mgmt_header_t *) p;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "BSSID:%s DA:%s SA:%s ",
etheraddr_string(ndo, (hp)->bssid), etheraddr_string(ndo, (hp)->da),
etheraddr_string(ndo, (hp)->sa)));
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13008/IEEE 802.11: Fix TIM bitmap copy to copy from p + offset.
offset has already been advanced to point to the bitmap; we shouldn't
add the amount to advance again.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Brian 'geeknik' Carpenter.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
While we're at it, remove some redundant tests - we've already checked,
before the case statement, whether we have captured the entire
information element and whether the entire information element is
present in the on-the-wire packet; in the cases for particular IEs, we
only need to make sure we don't go past the end of the IE.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 62,428
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static size_t smbXcli_iov_len(const struct iovec *iov, int count)
{
ssize_t ret = iov_buflen(iov, count);
/* Ignore the overflow case for now ... */
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 2,477
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xsltElement(xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt, xmlNodePtr node,
xmlNodePtr inst, xsltStylePreCompPtr castedComp) {
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
xsltStyleItemElementPtr comp = (xsltStyleItemElementPtr) castedComp;
#else
xsltStylePreCompPtr comp = castedComp;
#endif
xmlChar *prop = NULL;
const xmlChar *name, *prefix = NULL, *nsName = NULL;
xmlNodePtr copy;
xmlNodePtr oldInsert;
if (ctxt->insert == NULL)
return;
/*
* A comp->has_name == 0 indicates that we need to skip this instruction,
* since it was evaluated to be invalid already during compilation.
*/
if (!comp->has_name)
return;
/*
* stack and saves
*/
oldInsert = ctxt->insert;
if (comp->name == NULL) {
/* TODO: fix attr acquisition wrt to the XSLT namespace */
prop = xsltEvalAttrValueTemplate(ctxt, inst,
(const xmlChar *) "name", XSLT_NAMESPACE);
if (prop == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, inst,
"xsl:element: The attribute 'name' is missing.\n");
goto error;
}
if (xmlValidateQName(prop, 0)) {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, inst,
"xsl:element: The effective name '%s' is not a "
"valid QName.\n", prop);
/* we fall through to catch any further errors, if possible */
}
name = xsltSplitQName(ctxt->dict, prop, &prefix);
xmlFree(prop);
} else {
/*
* The "name" value was static.
*/
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
prefix = comp->nsPrefix;
name = comp->name;
#else
name = xsltSplitQName(ctxt->dict, comp->name, &prefix);
#endif
}
/*
* Create the new element
*/
if (ctxt->output->dict == ctxt->dict) {
copy = xmlNewDocNodeEatName(ctxt->output, NULL, (xmlChar *)name, NULL);
} else {
copy = xmlNewDocNode(ctxt->output, NULL, (xmlChar *)name, NULL);
}
if (copy == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, inst,
"xsl:element : creation of %s failed\n", name);
return;
}
copy = xsltAddChild(ctxt->insert, copy);
/*
* Namespace
* ---------
*/
if (comp->has_ns) {
if (comp->ns != NULL) {
/*
* No AVT; just plain text for the namespace name.
*/
if (comp->ns[0] != 0)
nsName = comp->ns;
} else {
xmlChar *tmpNsName;
/*
* Eval the AVT.
*/
/* TODO: check attr acquisition wrt to the XSLT namespace */
tmpNsName = xsltEvalAttrValueTemplate(ctxt, inst,
(const xmlChar *) "namespace", XSLT_NAMESPACE);
/*
* SPEC XSLT 1.0:
* "If the string is empty, then the expanded-name of the
* attribute has a null namespace URI."
*/
if ((tmpNsName != NULL) && (tmpNsName[0] != 0))
nsName = xmlDictLookup(ctxt->dict, BAD_CAST tmpNsName, -1);
xmlFree(tmpNsName);
}
if (xmlStrEqual(nsName, BAD_CAST "http://www.w3.org/2000/xmlns/")) {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, inst,
"xsl:attribute: Namespace http://www.w3.org/2000/xmlns/ "
"forbidden.\n");
goto error;
}
if (xmlStrEqual(nsName, XML_XML_NAMESPACE)) {
prefix = BAD_CAST "xml";
} else if (xmlStrEqual(prefix, BAD_CAST "xml")) {
prefix = NULL;
}
} else {
xmlNsPtr ns;
/*
* SPEC XSLT 1.0:
* "If the namespace attribute is not present, then the QName is
* expanded into an expanded-name using the namespace declarations
* in effect for the xsl:element element, including any default
* namespace declaration.
*/
ns = xmlSearchNs(inst->doc, inst, prefix);
if (ns == NULL) {
/*
* TODO: Check this in the compilation layer in case it's a
* static value.
*/
if (prefix != NULL) {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, inst,
"xsl:element: The QName '%s:%s' has no "
"namespace binding in scope in the stylesheet; "
"this is an error, since the namespace was not "
"specified by the instruction itself.\n", prefix, name);
}
} else
nsName = ns->href;
}
/*
* Find/create a matching ns-decl in the result tree.
*/
if (nsName != NULL) {
if (xmlStrEqual(prefix, BAD_CAST "xmlns")) {
/* Don't use a prefix of "xmlns" */
xmlChar *pref = xmlStrdup(BAD_CAST "ns_1");
copy->ns = xsltGetSpecialNamespace(ctxt, inst, nsName, pref, copy);
xmlFree(pref);
} else {
copy->ns = xsltGetSpecialNamespace(ctxt, inst, nsName, prefix,
copy);
}
} else if ((copy->parent != NULL) &&
(copy->parent->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE) &&
(copy->parent->ns != NULL))
{
/*
* "Undeclare" the default namespace.
*/
xsltGetSpecialNamespace(ctxt, inst, NULL, NULL, copy);
}
ctxt->insert = copy;
if (comp->has_use) {
if (comp->use != NULL) {
xsltApplyAttributeSet(ctxt, node, inst, comp->use);
} else {
xmlChar *attrSets = NULL;
/*
* BUG TODO: use-attribute-sets is not a value template.
* use-attribute-sets = qnames
*/
attrSets = xsltEvalAttrValueTemplate(ctxt, inst,
(const xmlChar *)"use-attribute-sets", NULL);
if (attrSets != NULL) {
xsltApplyAttributeSet(ctxt, node, inst, attrSets);
xmlFree(attrSets);
}
}
}
/*
* Instantiate the sequence constructor.
*/
if (inst->children != NULL)
xsltApplySequenceConstructor(ctxt, ctxt->node, inst->children,
NULL);
error:
ctxt->insert = oldInsert;
return;
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 173,326
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::NotifyWebContentsFocused() {
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.OnWebContentsFocused();
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 135,779
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CapturerMac::ClearInvalidRects() {
helper_.ClearInvalidRects();
}
Commit Message: Workaround for bad driver issue with NVIDIA GeForce 7300 GT on Mac 10.5.
BUG=87283
TEST=Run on a machine with NVIDIA GeForce 7300 GT on Mac 10.5 immediately after booting.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7373018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@92651 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 98,500
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void camellia_decrypt_cbc_2way(void *ctx, u128 *dst, const u128 *src)
{
u128 iv = *src;
camellia_dec_blk_2way(ctx, (u8 *)dst, (u8 *)src);
u128_xor(&dst[1], &dst[1], &iv);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 46,870
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int BackendImpl::MaxBuffersSize() {
static int64_t total_memory = base::SysInfo::AmountOfPhysicalMemory();
static bool done = false;
if (!done) {
const int kMaxBuffersSize = 30 * 1024 * 1024;
total_memory = total_memory * 2 / 100;
if (total_memory > kMaxBuffersSize || total_memory <= 0)
total_memory = kMaxBuffersSize;
done = true;
}
return static_cast<int>(total_memory);
}
Commit Message: Blockfile cache: fix long-standing sparse + evict reentrancy problem
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for an alternative perspective
plus a reduction to make fixing this much easier.
Bug: 826626, 518908, 537063, 802886
Change-Id: Ibfa01416f9a8e7f7b361e4f93b4b6b134728b85f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/985052
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547103}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 147,250
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xps_parse_digits(char *s, int *digit)
{
*digit = 0;
while (*s >= '0' && *s <= '9')
{
*digit = *digit * 10 + (*s - '0');
s ++;
}
return s;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 5,573
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool xmp_set_property(XmpPtr xmp, const char *schema, const char *name,
const char *value, uint32_t optionBits)
{
CHECK_PTR(xmp, false);
RESET_ERROR;
bool ret = false;
auto txmp = reinterpret_cast<SXMPMeta *>(xmp);
if ((optionBits & (XMP_PROP_VALUE_IS_STRUCT | XMP_PROP_VALUE_IS_ARRAY)) &&
(*value == 0)) {
value = NULL;
}
try {
txmp->SetProperty(schema, name, value, optionBits);
ret = true;
}
catch (const XMP_Error &e) {
set_error(e);
}
catch (...) {
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 16,050
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RedirectNotificationObserver::RedirectNotificationObserver(
int notification_type,
const NotificationSource& source)
: seen_(false),
running_(false),
source_(NotificationService::AllSources()) {
registrar_.Add(this, notification_type, source);
}
Commit Message: Add a check for disallowing remote frame navigations to local resources.
Previously, RemoteFrame navigations did not perform any renderer-side
checks and relied solely on the browser-side logic to block disallowed
navigations via mechanisms like FilterURL. This means that blocked
remote frame navigations were silently navigated to about:blank
without any console error message.
This CL adds a CanDisplay check to the remote navigation path to match
an equivalent check done for local frame navigations. This way, the
renderer can consistently block disallowed navigations in both cases
and output an error message.
Bug: 894399
Change-Id: I172f68f77c1676f6ca0172d2a6c78f7edc0e3b7a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1282390
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#601022}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 143,879
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DataReductionProxyConfigServiceClient::InitializeOnIOThread(
scoped_refptr<network::SharedURLLoaderFactory> url_loader_factory) {
DCHECK(url_loader_factory);
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
app_status_listener_ =
base::android::ApplicationStatusListener::New(base::BindRepeating(
&DataReductionProxyConfigServiceClient::OnApplicationStateChange,
base::Unretained(this)));
#endif
url_loader_factory_ = std::move(url_loader_factory);
network_connection_tracker_->AddNetworkConnectionObserver(this);
}
Commit Message: Disable all DRP URL fetches when holdback is enabled
Disable secure proxy checker, warmup url fetcher
and client config fetch when the client is in DRP
(Data Reduction Proxy) holdback.
This CL does not disable pingbacks when client is in the
holdback, but the pingback code is going away soon.
Change-Id: Icbb59d814d1452123869c609e0770d1439c1db51
Bug: 984964
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1709965
Commit-Queue: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#679649}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 137,901
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ArthurOutputDev::updateLineJoin(GfxState *state)
{
switch (state->getLineJoin()) {
case 0:
m_currentPen.setJoinStyle(Qt::MiterJoin);
break;
case 1:
m_currentPen.setJoinStyle(Qt::RoundJoin);
break;
case 2:
m_currentPen.setJoinStyle(Qt::BevelJoin);
break;
}
m_painter->setPen(m_currentPen);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 872
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: snd_compr_get_caps(struct snd_compr_stream *stream, unsigned long arg)
{
int retval;
struct snd_compr_caps caps;
if (!stream->ops->get_caps)
return -ENXIO;
memset(&caps, 0, sizeof(caps));
retval = stream->ops->get_caps(stream, &caps);
if (retval)
goto out;
if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg, &caps, sizeof(caps)))
retval = -EFAULT;
out:
return retval;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: compress: fix an integer overflow check
I previously added an integer overflow check here but looking at it now,
it's still buggy.
The bug happens in snd_compr_allocate_buffer(). We multiply
".fragments" and ".fragment_size" and that doesn't overflow but then we
save it in an unsigned int so it truncates the high bits away and we
allocate a smaller than expected size.
Fixes: b35cc8225845 ('ALSA: compress_core: integer overflow in snd_compr_allocate_buffer()')
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 58,076
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
{
struct policydb *oldpolicydb, *newpolicydb;
struct sidtab oldsidtab, newsidtab;
struct selinux_mapping *oldmap, *map = NULL;
struct convert_context_args args;
u32 seqno;
u16 map_size;
int rc = 0;
struct policy_file file = { data, len }, *fp = &file;
oldpolicydb = kzalloc(2 * sizeof(*oldpolicydb), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!oldpolicydb) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
newpolicydb = oldpolicydb + 1;
if (!ss_initialized) {
avtab_cache_init();
rc = policydb_read(&policydb, fp);
if (rc) {
avtab_cache_destroy();
goto out;
}
policydb.len = len;
rc = selinux_set_mapping(&policydb, secclass_map,
¤t_mapping,
¤t_mapping_size);
if (rc) {
policydb_destroy(&policydb);
avtab_cache_destroy();
goto out;
}
rc = policydb_load_isids(&policydb, &sidtab);
if (rc) {
policydb_destroy(&policydb);
avtab_cache_destroy();
goto out;
}
security_load_policycaps();
ss_initialized = 1;
seqno = ++latest_granting;
selinux_complete_init();
avc_ss_reset(seqno);
selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
selinux_status_update_policyload(seqno);
selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate();
selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
goto out;
}
#if 0
sidtab_hash_eval(&sidtab, "sids");
#endif
rc = policydb_read(newpolicydb, fp);
if (rc)
goto out;
newpolicydb->len = len;
/* If switching between different policy types, log MLS status */
if (policydb.mls_enabled && !newpolicydb->mls_enabled)
printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabling MLS support...\n");
else if (!policydb.mls_enabled && newpolicydb->mls_enabled)
printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Enabling MLS support...\n");
rc = policydb_load_isids(newpolicydb, &newsidtab);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to load the initial SIDs\n");
policydb_destroy(newpolicydb);
goto out;
}
rc = selinux_set_mapping(newpolicydb, secclass_map, &map, &map_size);
if (rc)
goto err;
rc = security_preserve_bools(newpolicydb);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to preserve booleans\n");
goto err;
}
/* Clone the SID table. */
sidtab_shutdown(&sidtab);
rc = sidtab_map(&sidtab, clone_sid, &newsidtab);
if (rc)
goto err;
/*
* Convert the internal representations of contexts
* in the new SID table.
*/
args.oldp = &policydb;
args.newp = newpolicydb;
rc = sidtab_map(&newsidtab, convert_context, &args);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to convert the internal"
" representation of contexts in the new SID"
" table\n");
goto err;
}
/* Save the old policydb and SID table to free later. */
memcpy(oldpolicydb, &policydb, sizeof(policydb));
sidtab_set(&oldsidtab, &sidtab);
/* Install the new policydb and SID table. */
write_lock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
memcpy(&policydb, newpolicydb, sizeof(policydb));
sidtab_set(&sidtab, &newsidtab);
security_load_policycaps();
oldmap = current_mapping;
current_mapping = map;
current_mapping_size = map_size;
seqno = ++latest_granting;
write_unlock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
/* Free the old policydb and SID table. */
policydb_destroy(oldpolicydb);
sidtab_destroy(&oldsidtab);
kfree(oldmap);
avc_ss_reset(seqno);
selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
selinux_status_update_policyload(seqno);
selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate();
selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
rc = 0;
goto out;
err:
kfree(map);
sidtab_destroy(&newsidtab);
policydb_destroy(newpolicydb);
out:
kfree(oldpolicydb);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: SELinux: Fix kernel BUG on empty security contexts.
Setting an empty security context (length=0) on a file will
lead to incorrectly dereferencing the type and other fields
of the security context structure, yielding a kernel BUG.
As a zero-length security context is never valid, just reject
all such security contexts whether coming from userspace
via setxattr or coming from the filesystem upon a getxattr
request by SELinux.
Setting a security context value (empty or otherwise) unknown to
SELinux in the first place is only possible for a root process
(CAP_MAC_ADMIN), and, if running SELinux in enforcing mode, only
if the corresponding SELinux mac_admin permission is also granted
to the domain by policy. In Fedora policies, this is only allowed for
specific domains such as livecd for setting down security contexts
that are not defined in the build host policy.
Reproducer:
su
setenforce 0
touch foo
setfattr -n security.selinux foo
Caveat:
Relabeling or removing foo after doing the above may not be possible
without booting with SELinux disabled. Any subsequent access to foo
after doing the above will also trigger the BUG.
BUG output from Matthew Thode:
[ 473.893141] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 473.962110] kernel BUG at security/selinux/ss/services.c:654!
[ 473.995314] invalid opcode: 0000 [#6] SMP
[ 474.027196] Modules linked in:
[ 474.058118] CPU: 0 PID: 8138 Comm: ls Tainted: G D I
3.13.0-grsec #1
[ 474.116637] Hardware name: Supermicro X8ST3/X8ST3, BIOS 2.0
07/29/10
[ 474.149768] task: ffff8805f50cd010 ti: ffff8805f50cd488 task.ti:
ffff8805f50cd488
[ 474.183707] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff814681c7>] [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 474.219954] RSP: 0018:ffff8805c0ac3c38 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 474.252253] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8805c0ac3d94 RCX:
0000000000000100
[ 474.287018] RDX: ffff8805e8aac000 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI:
ffff8805e8aaa000
[ 474.321199] RBP: ffff8805c0ac3cb8 R08: 0000000000000010 R09:
0000000000000006
[ 474.357446] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8805c567a000 R12:
0000000000000006
[ 474.419191] R13: ffff8805c2b74e88 R14: 00000000000001da R15:
0000000000000000
[ 474.453816] FS: 00007f2e75220800(0000) GS:ffff88061fc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 474.489254] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 474.522215] CR2: 00007f2e74716090 CR3: 00000005c085e000 CR4:
00000000000207f0
[ 474.556058] Stack:
[ 474.584325] ffff8805c0ac3c98 ffffffff811b549b ffff8805c0ac3c98
ffff8805f1190a40
[ 474.618913] ffff8805a6202f08 ffff8805c2b74e88 00068800d0464990
ffff8805e8aac860
[ 474.653955] ffff8805c0ac3cb8 000700068113833a ffff880606c75060
ffff8805c0ac3d94
[ 474.690461] Call Trace:
[ 474.723779] [<ffffffff811b549b>] ? lookup_fast+0x1cd/0x22a
[ 474.778049] [<ffffffff81468824>] security_compute_av+0xf4/0x20b
[ 474.811398] [<ffffffff8196f419>] avc_compute_av+0x2a/0x179
[ 474.843813] [<ffffffff8145727b>] avc_has_perm+0x45/0xf4
[ 474.875694] [<ffffffff81457d0e>] inode_has_perm+0x2a/0x31
[ 474.907370] [<ffffffff81457e76>] selinux_inode_getattr+0x3c/0x3e
[ 474.938726] [<ffffffff81455cf6>] security_inode_getattr+0x1b/0x22
[ 474.970036] [<ffffffff811b057d>] vfs_getattr+0x19/0x2d
[ 475.000618] [<ffffffff811b05e5>] vfs_fstatat+0x54/0x91
[ 475.030402] [<ffffffff811b063b>] vfs_lstat+0x19/0x1b
[ 475.061097] [<ffffffff811b077e>] SyS_newlstat+0x15/0x30
[ 475.094595] [<ffffffff8113c5c1>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xa1/0xc3
[ 475.148405] [<ffffffff8197791e>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[ 475.179201] Code: 00 48 85 c0 48 89 45 b8 75 02 0f 0b 48 8b 45 a0 48
8b 3d 45 d0 b6 00 8b 40 08 89 c6 ff ce e8 d1 b0 06 00 48 85 c0 49 89 c7
75 02 <0f> 0b 48 8b 45 b8 4c 8b 28 eb 1e 49 8d 7d 08 be 80 01 00 00 e8
[ 475.255884] RIP [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 475.296120] RSP <ffff8805c0ac3c38>
[ 475.328734] ---[ end trace f076482e9d754adc ]---
Reported-by: Matthew Thode <mthode@mthode.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 39,280
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: R_API int r_core_cmd_file(RCore *core, const char *file) {
char *data, *odata;
data = r_file_abspath (file);
if (!data) return false;
odata = r_file_slurp (data, NULL);
free (data);
if (!odata) return false;
if (!r_core_cmd_lines (core, odata)) {
eprintf ("Failed to run script '%s'\n", file);
free (odata);
return false;
}
free (odata);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix #7727 - undefined pointers and out of band string access fixes
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 64,369
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int dcbnl_setnumtcs(struct net_device *netdev, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
u32 seq, struct nlattr **tb, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct nlattr *data[DCB_NUMTCS_ATTR_MAX + 1];
int ret;
u8 value;
int i;
if (!tb[DCB_ATTR_NUMTCS])
return -EINVAL;
if (!netdev->dcbnl_ops->setnumtcs)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
ret = nla_parse_nested(data, DCB_NUMTCS_ATTR_MAX, tb[DCB_ATTR_NUMTCS],
dcbnl_numtcs_nest);
if (ret)
return ret;
for (i = DCB_NUMTCS_ATTR_ALL+1; i <= DCB_NUMTCS_ATTR_MAX; i++) {
if (data[i] == NULL)
continue;
value = nla_get_u8(data[i]);
ret = netdev->dcbnl_ops->setnumtcs(netdev, i, value);
if (ret)
break;
}
return nla_put_u8(skb, DCB_ATTR_NUMTCS, !!ret);
}
Commit Message: dcbnl: fix various netlink info leaks
The dcb netlink interface leaks stack memory in various places:
* perm_addr[] buffer is only filled at max with 12 of the 32 bytes but
copied completely,
* no in-kernel driver fills all fields of an IEEE 802.1Qaz subcommand,
so we're leaking up to 58 bytes for ieee_ets structs, up to 136 bytes
for ieee_pfc structs, etc.,
* the same is true for CEE -- no in-kernel driver fills the whole
struct,
Prevent all of the above stack info leaks by properly initializing the
buffers/structures involved.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 31,116
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::OnOutOfMemoryError() {
if (lose_context_when_out_of_memory_ && !WasContextLost()) {
error::ContextLostReason other = error::kOutOfMemory;
if (CheckResetStatus()) {
other = error::kUnknown;
} else {
MarkContextLost(error::kOutOfMemory);
}
group_->LoseContexts(other);
}
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,627
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Type_vcgt_Free(struct _cms_typehandler_struct* self, void* Ptr)
{
cmsFreeToneCurveTriple((cmsToneCurve**) Ptr);
_cmsFree(self ->ContextID, Ptr);
}
Commit Message: Added an extra check to MLU bounds
Thanks to Ibrahim el-sayed for spotting the bug
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 71,081
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool AutofillManager::ShouldParseForms(const std::vector<FormData>& forms,
const base::TimeTicks timestamp) {
bool enabled = IsAutofillEnabled();
if (!has_logged_autofill_enabled_) {
AutofillMetrics::LogIsAutofillEnabledAtPageLoad(enabled);
has_logged_autofill_enabled_ = true;
}
return enabled;
}
Commit Message: [AF] Don't simplify/dedupe suggestions for (partially) filled sections.
Since Autofill does not fill field by field anymore, this simplifying
and deduping of suggestions is not useful anymore.
Bug: 858820
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:ios-simulator-full-configs;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
Change-Id: I36f7cfe425a0bdbf5ba7503a3d96773b405cc19b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1128255
Reviewed-by: Roger McFarlane <rogerm@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sebastien Seguin-Gagnon <sebsg@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#573315}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 154,998
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Verify_MarkEntryAsForeignWithLoadInProgress() {
EXPECT_EQ(1, delegate()->loaded_cache_id_);
EXPECT_TRUE(delegate()->loaded_cache_.get());
EXPECT_TRUE(delegate()->loaded_cache_->GetEntry(kEntryUrl)->IsForeign());
EXPECT_TRUE(delegate()->loaded_cache_->GetEntry(kEntryUrl)->IsExplicit());
FlushAllTasks();
AppCacheDatabase::EntryRecord entry_record;
EXPECT_TRUE(database()->FindEntry(1, kEntryUrl, &entry_record));
EXPECT_EQ(AppCacheEntry::EXPLICIT | AppCacheEntry::FOREIGN,
entry_record.flags);
TestFinished();
}
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 151,396
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int fuse_check_page(struct page *page)
{
if (page_mapcount(page) ||
page->mapping != NULL ||
page_count(page) != 1 ||
(page->flags & PAGE_FLAGS_CHECK_AT_PREP &
~(1 << PG_locked |
1 << PG_referenced |
1 << PG_uptodate |
1 << PG_lru |
1 << PG_active |
1 << PG_reclaim))) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "fuse: trying to steal weird page\n");
printk(KERN_WARNING " page=%p index=%li flags=%08lx, count=%i, mapcount=%i, mapping=%p\n", page, page->index, page->flags, page_count(page), page_mapcount(page), page->mapping);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fuse: check size of FUSE_NOTIFY_INVAL_ENTRY message
FUSE_NOTIFY_INVAL_ENTRY didn't check the length of the write so the
message processing could overrun and result in a "kernel BUG at
fs/fuse/dev.c:629!"
Reported-by: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwenn@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
CC: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 24,590
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void usb_ehci_vm_state_change(void *opaque, int running, RunState state)
{
EHCIState *ehci = opaque;
/*
* We don't migrate the EHCIQueue-s, instead we rebuild them for the
* schedule in guest memory. We must do the rebuilt ASAP, so that
* USB-devices which have async handled packages have a packet in the
* ep queue to match the completion with.
*/
if (state == RUN_STATE_RUNNING) {
ehci_advance_async_state(ehci);
}
/*
* The schedule rebuilt from guest memory could cause the migration dest
* to miss a QH unlink, and fail to cancel packets, since the unlinked QH
* will never have existed on the destination. Therefor we must flush the
* async schedule on savevm to catch any not yet noticed unlinks.
*/
if (state == RUN_STATE_SAVE_VM) {
ehci_advance_async_state(ehci);
ehci_queues_rip_unseen(ehci, 1);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 5,852
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GetTestDataDirectory(base::FilePath* test_data_directory) {
ASSERT_TRUE(
base::PathService::Get(chrome::DIR_TEST_DATA, test_data_directory));
}
Commit Message: Enforce the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy
This change modifies UsbChooserContext to use the UsbAllowDevicesForUrls
class to consider devices allowed by the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls
policy. The WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy overrides the other WebUSB
policies. Unit tests are also added to ensure that the policy is being
enforced correctly.
The design document for this feature is found at:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1MPvsrWiVD_jAC8ELyk8njFpy6j1thfVU5aWT3TCWE8w
Bug: 854329
Change-Id: I5f82e662ca9dc544da5918eae766b5535a31296b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1259289
Commit-Queue: Ovidio Henriquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Julian Pastarmov <pastarmovj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597926}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 157,054
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: long kernel_wait4(pid_t upid, int __user *stat_addr, int options,
struct rusage *ru)
{
struct wait_opts wo;
struct pid *pid = NULL;
enum pid_type type;
long ret;
if (options & ~(WNOHANG|WUNTRACED|WCONTINUED|
__WNOTHREAD|__WCLONE|__WALL))
return -EINVAL;
if (upid == -1)
type = PIDTYPE_MAX;
else if (upid < 0) {
type = PIDTYPE_PGID;
pid = find_get_pid(-upid);
} else if (upid == 0) {
type = PIDTYPE_PGID;
pid = get_task_pid(current, PIDTYPE_PGID);
} else /* upid > 0 */ {
type = PIDTYPE_PID;
pid = find_get_pid(upid);
}
wo.wo_type = type;
wo.wo_pid = pid;
wo.wo_flags = options | WEXITED;
wo.wo_info = NULL;
wo.wo_stat = 0;
wo.wo_rusage = ru;
ret = do_wait(&wo);
put_pid(pid);
if (ret > 0 && stat_addr && put_user(wo.wo_stat, stat_addr))
ret = -EFAULT;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: kernel/exit.c: avoid undefined behaviour when calling wait4()
wait4(-2147483648, 0x20, 0, 0xdd0000) triggers:
UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in kernel/exit.c:1651:9
The related calltrace is as follows:
negation of -2147483648 cannot be represented in type 'int':
CPU: 9 PID: 16482 Comm: zj Tainted: G B ---- ------- 3.10.0-327.53.58.71.x86_64+ #66
Hardware name: Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. Tecal RH2285 /BC11BTSA , BIOS CTSAV036 04/27/2011
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x19/0x1b
ubsan_epilogue+0xd/0x50
__ubsan_handle_negate_overflow+0x109/0x14e
SyS_wait4+0x1cb/0x1e0
system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Exclude the overflow to avoid the UBSAN warning.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1497264618-20212-1-git-send-email-zhongjiang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: zhongjiang <zhongjiang@huawei.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Xishi Qiu <qiuxishi@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 169,258
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GraphicsContext::translate(float tx, float ty)
{
#if USE(WXGC)
if (m_data->context) {
wxGraphicsContext* gc = m_data->context->GetGraphicsContext();
gc->Translate(tx, ty);
}
#endif
}
Commit Message: Reviewed by Kevin Ollivier.
[wx] Fix strokeArc and fillRoundedRect drawing, and add clipPath support.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=60847
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@86502 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 100,119
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void vga_mem_write(void *opaque, hwaddr addr,
uint64_t data, unsigned size)
{
VGACommonState *s = opaque;
vga_mem_writeb(s, addr, data);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 3,020
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void __bin2hex(char *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
{
int i;
static const char hex[16] = {'0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', 'a', 'b', 'c', 'd', 'e', 'f'};
for (i = 0; i < (int)len; i++) {
*s++ = hex[p[i] >> 4];
*s++ = hex[p[i] & 0xF];
}
*s++ = '\0';
}
Commit Message: stratum: parse_notify(): Don't die on malformed bbversion/prev_hash/nbit/ntime.
Might have introduced a memory leak, don't have time to check. :(
Should the other hex2bin()'s be checked?
Thanks to Mick Ayzenberg <mick.dejavusecurity.com> for finding this.
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 36,543
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void mov_free(AVFormatContext *s)
{
MOVMuxContext *mov = s->priv_data;
int i;
if (mov->chapter_track) {
if (mov->tracks[mov->chapter_track].par)
av_freep(&mov->tracks[mov->chapter_track].par->extradata);
av_freep(&mov->tracks[mov->chapter_track].par);
}
for (i = 0; i < mov->nb_streams; i++) {
if (mov->tracks[i].tag == MKTAG('r','t','p',' '))
ff_mov_close_hinting(&mov->tracks[i]);
else if (mov->tracks[i].tag == MKTAG('t','m','c','d') && mov->nb_meta_tmcd)
av_freep(&mov->tracks[i].par);
av_freep(&mov->tracks[i].cluster);
av_freep(&mov->tracks[i].frag_info);
av_packet_unref(&mov->tracks[i].cover_image);
if (mov->tracks[i].vos_len)
av_freep(&mov->tracks[i].vos_data);
ff_mov_cenc_free(&mov->tracks[i].cenc);
}
av_freep(&mov->tracks);
}
Commit Message: avformat/movenc: Write version 2 of audio atom if channels is not known
The version 1 needs the channel count and would divide by 0
Fixes: division by 0
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_1.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_2.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_3.wav
Found-by: #CHEN HONGXU# <HCHEN017@e.ntu.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 79,310
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DesktopWindowTreeHostX11::ReleaseCapture() {
if (g_current_capture == this) {
g_current_capture = nullptr;
ui::UngrabPointer();
has_pointer_grab_ = false;
OnHostLostWindowCapture();
}
}
Commit Message: Fix PIP window being blank after minimize/show
DesktopWindowTreeHostX11::SetVisible only made the call into
OnNativeWidgetVisibilityChanged when transitioning from shown
to minimized and not vice versa. This is because this change
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1437263
considered IsVisible to be true when minimized, which made
IsVisible always true in this case. This caused layers to be hidden
but never shown again.
This is a reland of:
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1580103
Bug: 949199
Change-Id: I2151cd09e537d8ce8781897f43a3b8e9cec75996
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1584617
Reviewed-by: Scott Violet <sky@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: enne <enne@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654280}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 140,578
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void JNI_ForeignSessionHelper_CopyWindowToJava(
JNIEnv* env,
const sessions::SessionWindow& window,
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jobject>& j_window) {
for (const auto& tab_ptr : window.tabs) {
const sessions::SessionTab& session_tab = *(tab_ptr.get());
if (ShouldSkipTab(session_tab))
return;
JNI_ForeignSessionHelper_CopyTabToJava(env, session_tab, j_window);
}
}
Commit Message: Prefer SyncService over ProfileSyncService in foreign_session_helper
SyncService is the interface, ProfileSyncService is the concrete
implementation. Generally no clients should need to use the conrete
implementation - for one, testing will be much easier once everyone
uses the interface only.
Bug: 924508
Change-Id: Ia210665f8f02512053d1a60d627dea0f22758387
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1461119
Auto-Submit: Marc Treib <treib@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yaron Friedman <yfriedman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yaron Friedman <yfriedman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#630662}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 130,213
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct net_device *dev_get_by_name_rcu(struct net *net, const char *name)
{
struct hlist_node *p;
struct net_device *dev;
struct hlist_head *head = dev_name_hash(net, name);
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(dev, p, head, name_hlist)
if (!strncmp(dev->name, name, IFNAMSIZ))
return dev;
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: veth: Dont kfree_skb() after dev_forward_skb()
In case of congestion, netif_rx() frees the skb, so we must assume
dev_forward_skb() also consume skb.
Bug introduced by commit 445409602c092
(veth: move loopback logic to common location)
We must change dev_forward_skb() to always consume skb, and veth to not
double free it.
Bug report : http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=127310770900442&w=3
Reported-by: Martín Ferrari <martin.ferrari@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 32,110
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void setFunctionBreakpoint(ConsoleHelper& helper, v8::Local<v8::Function> function, V8DebuggerAgentImpl::BreakpointSource source, const String16& condition, bool enable)
{
V8DebuggerAgentImpl* debuggerAgent = helper.debuggerAgent();
if (!debuggerAgent)
return;
String16 scriptId = String16::fromInteger(function->ScriptId());
int lineNumber = function->GetScriptLineNumber();
int columnNumber = function->GetScriptColumnNumber();
if (lineNumber == v8::Function::kLineOffsetNotFound || columnNumber == v8::Function::kLineOffsetNotFound)
return;
if (enable)
debuggerAgent->setBreakpointAt(scriptId, lineNumber, columnNumber, source, condition);
else
debuggerAgent->removeBreakpointAt(scriptId, lineNumber, columnNumber, source);
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Copy objects from debugger context to inspected context properly.
BUG=637594
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2253643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#412436}
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 130,333
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static char* find_and_open_tombstone(int* fd) {
char path[128];
int oldest = -1;
struct stat oldest_sb;
for (int i = 0; i < MAX_TOMBSTONES; i++) {
snprintf(path, sizeof(path), TOMBSTONE_TEMPLATE, i);
struct stat sb;
if (!stat(path, &sb)) {
if (oldest < 0 || sb.st_mtime < oldest_sb.st_mtime) {
oldest = i;
oldest_sb.st_mtime = sb.st_mtime;
}
continue;
}
if (errno != ENOENT)
continue;
*fd = open(path, O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_WRONLY | O_NOFOLLOW | O_CLOEXEC, 0600);
if (*fd < 0)
continue; // raced ?
fchown(*fd, AID_SYSTEM, AID_SYSTEM);
return strdup(path);
}
if (oldest < 0) {
ALOGE("Failed to find a valid tombstone, default to using tombstone 0.\n");
oldest = 0;
}
snprintf(path, sizeof(path), TOMBSTONE_TEMPLATE, oldest);
*fd = open(path, O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_WRONLY | O_NOFOLLOW | O_CLOEXEC, 0600);
if (*fd < 0) {
ALOGE("failed to open tombstone file '%s': %s\n", path, strerror(errno));
return NULL;
}
fchown(*fd, AID_SYSTEM, AID_SYSTEM);
return strdup(path);
}
Commit Message: Don't create tombstone directory.
Partial backport of cf79748.
Bug: http://b/26403620
Change-Id: Ib877ab6cfab6aef079830c5a50ba81141ead35ee
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 161,275
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int pick_link(struct nameidata *nd, struct path *link,
struct inode *inode, unsigned seq)
{
int error;
struct saved *last;
if (unlikely(nd->total_link_count++ >= MAXSYMLINKS)) {
path_to_nameidata(link, nd);
return -ELOOP;
}
if (!(nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU)) {
if (link->mnt == nd->path.mnt)
mntget(link->mnt);
}
error = nd_alloc_stack(nd);
if (unlikely(error)) {
if (error == -ECHILD) {
if (unlikely(unlazy_link(nd, link, seq)))
return -ECHILD;
error = nd_alloc_stack(nd);
}
if (error) {
path_put(link);
return error;
}
}
last = nd->stack + nd->depth++;
last->link = *link;
clear_delayed_call(&last->done);
nd->link_inode = inode;
last->seq = seq;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: vfs: rename: check backing inode being equal
If a file is renamed to a hardlink of itself POSIX specifies that rename(2)
should do nothing and return success.
This condition is checked in vfs_rename(). However it won't detect hard
links on overlayfs where these are given separate inodes on the overlayfs
layer.
Overlayfs itself detects this condition and returns success without doing
anything, but then vfs_rename() will proceed as if this was a successful
rename (detach_mounts(), d_move()).
The correct thing to do is to detect this condition before even calling
into overlayfs. This patch does this by calling vfs_select_inode() to get
the underlying inodes.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.2+
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 51,042
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void *keyring_key_to_ptr(struct key *key)
{
if (key->type == &key_type_keyring)
return (void *)((unsigned long)key | KEYRING_PTR_SUBTYPE);
return key;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: ensure we free the assoc array edit if edit is valid
__key_link_end is not freeing the associated array edit structure
and this leads to a 512 byte memory leak each time an identical
existing key is added with add_key().
The reason the add_key() system call returns okay is that
key_create_or_update() calls __key_link_begin() before checking to see
whether it can update a key directly rather than adding/replacing - which
it turns out it can. Thus __key_link() is not called through
__key_instantiate_and_link() and __key_link_end() must cancel the edit.
CVE-2015-1333
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 44,747
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void kvm_arch_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
{
/* Address WBINVD may be executed by guest */
if (need_emulate_wbinvd(vcpu)) {
if (kvm_x86_ops->has_wbinvd_exit())
cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, vcpu->arch.wbinvd_dirty_mask);
else if (vcpu->cpu != -1 && vcpu->cpu != cpu)
smp_call_function_single(vcpu->cpu,
wbinvd_ipi, NULL, 1);
}
kvm_x86_ops->vcpu_load(vcpu, cpu);
if (unlikely(vcpu->cpu != cpu) || check_tsc_unstable()) {
/* Make sure TSC doesn't go backwards */
s64 tsc_delta = !vcpu->arch.last_host_tsc ? 0 :
native_read_tsc() - vcpu->arch.last_host_tsc;
if (tsc_delta < 0)
mark_tsc_unstable("KVM discovered backwards TSC");
if (check_tsc_unstable()) {
kvm_x86_ops->adjust_tsc_offset(vcpu, -tsc_delta);
vcpu->arch.tsc_catchup = 1;
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_CLOCK_UPDATE, vcpu);
}
if (vcpu->cpu != cpu)
kvm_migrate_timers(vcpu);
vcpu->cpu = cpu;
}
}
Commit Message: KVM: X86: Don't report L2 emulation failures to user-space
This patch prevents that emulation failures which result
from emulating an instruction for an L2-Guest results in
being reported to userspace.
Without this patch a malicious L2-Guest would be able to
kill the L1 by triggering a race-condition between an vmexit
and the instruction emulator.
With this patch the L2 will most likely only kill itself in
this situation.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <joerg.roedel@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 41,365
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void choose_devnum(struct usb_device *udev)
{
int devnum;
struct usb_bus *bus = udev->bus;
/* be safe when more hub events are proceed in parallel */
mutex_lock(&bus->usb_address0_mutex);
if (udev->wusb) {
devnum = udev->portnum + 1;
BUG_ON(test_bit(devnum, bus->devmap.devicemap));
} else {
/* Try to allocate the next devnum beginning at
* bus->devnum_next. */
devnum = find_next_zero_bit(bus->devmap.devicemap, 128,
bus->devnum_next);
if (devnum >= 128)
devnum = find_next_zero_bit(bus->devmap.devicemap,
128, 1);
bus->devnum_next = (devnum >= 127 ? 1 : devnum + 1);
}
if (devnum < 128) {
set_bit(devnum, bus->devmap.devicemap);
udev->devnum = devnum;
}
mutex_unlock(&bus->usb_address0_mutex);
}
Commit Message: USB: fix invalid memory access in hub_activate()
Commit 8520f38099cc ("USB: change hub initialization sleeps to
delayed_work") changed the hub_activate() routine to make part of it
run in a workqueue. However, the commit failed to take a reference to
the usb_hub structure or to lock the hub interface while doing so. As
a result, if a hub is plugged in and quickly unplugged before the work
routine can run, the routine will try to access memory that has been
deallocated. Or, if the hub is unplugged while the routine is
running, the memory may be deallocated while it is in active use.
This patch fixes the problem by taking a reference to the usb_hub at
the start of hub_activate() and releasing it at the end (when the work
is finished), and by locking the hub interface while the work routine
is running. It also adds a check at the start of the routine to see
if the hub has already been disconnected, in which nothing should be
done.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Reported-by: Alexandru Cornea <alexandru.cornea@intel.com>
Tested-by: Alexandru Cornea <alexandru.cornea@intel.com>
Fixes: 8520f38099cc ("USB: change hub initialization sleeps to delayed_work")
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 56,733
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void MaybeHandleDebugURL(const GURL& url) {
if (!url.SchemeIs(kChromeUIScheme))
return;
if (url == GURL(kChromeUIBadCastCrashURL)) {
BadCastCrashIntentionally();
} else if (url == GURL(kChromeUICrashURL)) {
CrashIntentionally();
} else if (url == GURL(kChromeUIDumpURL)) {
base::debug::DumpWithoutCrashing();
} else if (url == GURL(kChromeUIKillURL)) {
base::Process::Current().Terminate(1, false);
} else if (url == GURL(kChromeUIHangURL)) {
for (;;) {
base::PlatformThread::Sleep(base::TimeDelta::FromSeconds(1));
}
} else if (url == GURL(kChromeUIShorthangURL)) {
base::PlatformThread::Sleep(base::TimeDelta::FromSeconds(20));
}
#if defined(ADDRESS_SANITIZER) || defined(SYZYASAN)
MaybeTriggerAsanError(url);
#endif // ADDRESS_SANITIZER || SYZYASAN
}
Commit Message: Connect WebUSB client interface to the devices app
This provides a basic WebUSB client interface in
content/renderer. Most of the interface is unimplemented,
but this CL hooks up navigator.usb.getDevices() to the
browser's Mojo devices app to enumerate available USB
devices.
BUG=492204
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1293253002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344881}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 123,149
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int vb2_fop_release(struct file *file)
{
struct video_device *vdev = video_devdata(file);
struct mutex *lock = vdev->queue->lock ? vdev->queue->lock : vdev->lock;
return _vb2_fop_release(file, lock);
}
Commit Message: [media] videobuf2-v4l2: Verify planes array in buffer dequeueing
When a buffer is being dequeued using VIDIOC_DQBUF IOCTL, the exact buffer
which will be dequeued is not known until the buffer has been removed from
the queue. The number of planes is specific to a buffer, not to the queue.
This does lead to the situation where multi-plane buffers may be requested
and queued with n planes, but VIDIOC_DQBUF IOCTL may be passed an argument
struct with fewer planes.
__fill_v4l2_buffer() however uses the number of planes from the dequeued
videobuf2 buffer, overwriting kernel memory (the m.planes array allocated
in video_usercopy() in v4l2-ioctl.c) if the user provided fewer
planes than the dequeued buffer had. Oops!
Fixes: b0e0e1f83de3 ("[media] media: videobuf2: Prepare to divide videobuf2")
Signed-off-by: Sakari Ailus <sakari.ailus@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Hans Verkuil <hans.verkuil@cisco.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # for v4.4 and later
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@osg.samsung.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 52,755
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ff_h264_alloc_tables(H264Context *h)
{
const int big_mb_num = h->mb_stride * (h->mb_height + 1);
const int row_mb_num = 2*h->mb_stride*FFMAX(h->avctx->thread_count, 1);
int x, y, i;
FF_ALLOCZ_ARRAY_OR_GOTO(h->avctx, h->intra4x4_pred_mode,
row_mb_num, 8 * sizeof(uint8_t), fail)
FF_ALLOCZ_OR_GOTO(h->avctx, h->non_zero_count,
big_mb_num * 48 * sizeof(uint8_t), fail)
FF_ALLOCZ_OR_GOTO(h->avctx, h->slice_table_base,
(big_mb_num + h->mb_stride) * sizeof(*h->slice_table_base), fail)
FF_ALLOCZ_OR_GOTO(h->avctx, h->cbp_table,
big_mb_num * sizeof(uint16_t), fail)
FF_ALLOCZ_OR_GOTO(h->avctx, h->chroma_pred_mode_table,
big_mb_num * sizeof(uint8_t), fail)
FF_ALLOCZ_ARRAY_OR_GOTO(h->avctx, h->mvd_table[0],
row_mb_num, 16 * sizeof(uint8_t), fail);
FF_ALLOCZ_ARRAY_OR_GOTO(h->avctx, h->mvd_table[1],
row_mb_num, 16 * sizeof(uint8_t), fail);
FF_ALLOCZ_OR_GOTO(h->avctx, h->direct_table,
4 * big_mb_num * sizeof(uint8_t), fail);
FF_ALLOCZ_OR_GOTO(h->avctx, h->list_counts,
big_mb_num * sizeof(uint8_t), fail)
memset(h->slice_table_base, -1,
(big_mb_num + h->mb_stride) * sizeof(*h->slice_table_base));
h->slice_table = h->slice_table_base + h->mb_stride * 2 + 1;
FF_ALLOCZ_OR_GOTO(h->avctx, h->mb2b_xy,
big_mb_num * sizeof(uint32_t), fail);
FF_ALLOCZ_OR_GOTO(h->avctx, h->mb2br_xy,
big_mb_num * sizeof(uint32_t), fail);
for (y = 0; y < h->mb_height; y++)
for (x = 0; x < h->mb_width; x++) {
const int mb_xy = x + y * h->mb_stride;
const int b_xy = 4 * x + 4 * y * h->b_stride;
h->mb2b_xy[mb_xy] = b_xy;
h->mb2br_xy[mb_xy] = 8 * (FMO ? mb_xy : (mb_xy % (2 * h->mb_stride)));
}
if (!h->dequant4_coeff[0])
h264_init_dequant_tables(h);
if (!h->DPB) {
h->DPB = av_mallocz_array(H264_MAX_PICTURE_COUNT, sizeof(*h->DPB));
if (!h->DPB)
goto fail;
for (i = 0; i < H264_MAX_PICTURE_COUNT; i++)
av_frame_unref(&h->DPB[i].f);
av_frame_unref(&h->cur_pic.f);
}
return 0;
fail:
ff_h264_free_tables(h, 1);
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
Commit Message: avcodec/h264: Clear delayed_pic on deallocation
Fixes use of freed memory
Fixes: case5_av_frame_copy_props.mp4
Found-by: Michal Zalewski <lcamtuf@coredump.cx>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 43,406
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int CIFSFindNext(const int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon,
__u16 searchHandle, struct cifs_search_info *psrch_inf)
{
TRANSACTION2_FNEXT_REQ *pSMB = NULL;
TRANSACTION2_FNEXT_RSP *pSMBr = NULL;
T2_FNEXT_RSP_PARMS *parms;
char *response_data;
int rc = 0;
int bytes_returned, name_len;
__u16 params, byte_count;
cFYI(1, "In FindNext");
if (psrch_inf->endOfSearch)
return -ENOENT;
rc = smb_init(SMB_COM_TRANSACTION2, 15, tcon, (void **) &pSMB,
(void **) &pSMBr);
if (rc)
return rc;
params = 14; /* includes 2 bytes of null string, converted to LE below*/
byte_count = 0;
pSMB->TotalDataCount = 0; /* no EAs */
pSMB->MaxParameterCount = cpu_to_le16(8);
pSMB->MaxDataCount =
cpu_to_le16((tcon->ses->server->maxBuf - MAX_CIFS_HDR_SIZE) &
0xFFFFFF00);
pSMB->MaxSetupCount = 0;
pSMB->Reserved = 0;
pSMB->Flags = 0;
pSMB->Timeout = 0;
pSMB->Reserved2 = 0;
pSMB->ParameterOffset = cpu_to_le16(
offsetof(struct smb_com_transaction2_fnext_req,SearchHandle) - 4);
pSMB->DataCount = 0;
pSMB->DataOffset = 0;
pSMB->SetupCount = 1;
pSMB->Reserved3 = 0;
pSMB->SubCommand = cpu_to_le16(TRANS2_FIND_NEXT);
pSMB->SearchHandle = searchHandle; /* always kept as le */
pSMB->SearchCount =
cpu_to_le16(CIFSMaxBufSize / sizeof(FILE_UNIX_INFO));
pSMB->InformationLevel = cpu_to_le16(psrch_inf->info_level);
pSMB->ResumeKey = psrch_inf->resume_key;
pSMB->SearchFlags =
cpu_to_le16(CIFS_SEARCH_CLOSE_AT_END | CIFS_SEARCH_RETURN_RESUME);
name_len = psrch_inf->resume_name_len;
params += name_len;
if (name_len < PATH_MAX) {
memcpy(pSMB->ResumeFileName, psrch_inf->presume_name, name_len);
byte_count += name_len;
/* 14 byte parm len above enough for 2 byte null terminator */
pSMB->ResumeFileName[name_len] = 0;
pSMB->ResumeFileName[name_len+1] = 0;
} else {
rc = -EINVAL;
goto FNext2_err_exit;
}
byte_count = params + 1 /* pad */ ;
pSMB->TotalParameterCount = cpu_to_le16(params);
pSMB->ParameterCount = pSMB->TotalParameterCount;
inc_rfc1001_len(pSMB, byte_count);
pSMB->ByteCount = cpu_to_le16(byte_count);
rc = SendReceive(xid, tcon->ses, (struct smb_hdr *) pSMB,
(struct smb_hdr *) pSMBr, &bytes_returned, 0);
cifs_stats_inc(&tcon->num_fnext);
if (rc) {
if (rc == -EBADF) {
psrch_inf->endOfSearch = true;
cifs_buf_release(pSMB);
rc = 0; /* search probably was closed at end of search*/
} else
cFYI(1, "FindNext returned = %d", rc);
} else { /* decode response */
rc = validate_t2((struct smb_t2_rsp *)pSMBr);
if (rc == 0) {
unsigned int lnoff;
/* BB fixme add lock for file (srch_info) struct here */
if (pSMBr->hdr.Flags2 & SMBFLG2_UNICODE)
psrch_inf->unicode = true;
else
psrch_inf->unicode = false;
response_data = (char *) &pSMBr->hdr.Protocol +
le16_to_cpu(pSMBr->t2.ParameterOffset);
parms = (T2_FNEXT_RSP_PARMS *)response_data;
response_data = (char *)&pSMBr->hdr.Protocol +
le16_to_cpu(pSMBr->t2.DataOffset);
if (psrch_inf->smallBuf)
cifs_small_buf_release(
psrch_inf->ntwrk_buf_start);
else
cifs_buf_release(psrch_inf->ntwrk_buf_start);
psrch_inf->srch_entries_start = response_data;
psrch_inf->ntwrk_buf_start = (char *)pSMB;
psrch_inf->smallBuf = 0;
if (parms->EndofSearch)
psrch_inf->endOfSearch = true;
else
psrch_inf->endOfSearch = false;
psrch_inf->entries_in_buffer =
le16_to_cpu(parms->SearchCount);
psrch_inf->index_of_last_entry +=
psrch_inf->entries_in_buffer;
lnoff = le16_to_cpu(parms->LastNameOffset);
if (tcon->ses->server->maxBuf - MAX_CIFS_HDR_SIZE <
lnoff) {
cERROR(1, "ignoring corrupt resume name");
psrch_inf->last_entry = NULL;
return rc;
} else
psrch_inf->last_entry =
psrch_inf->srch_entries_start + lnoff;
/* cFYI(1, "fnxt2 entries in buf %d index_of_last %d",
psrch_inf->entries_in_buffer, psrch_inf->index_of_last_entry); */
/* BB fixme add unlock here */
}
}
/* BB On error, should we leave previous search buf (and count and
last entry fields) intact or free the previous one? */
/* Note: On -EAGAIN error only caller can retry on handle based calls
since file handle passed in no longer valid */
FNext2_err_exit:
if (rc != 0)
cifs_buf_release(pSMB);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: cifs: fix possible memory corruption in CIFSFindNext
The name_len variable in CIFSFindNext is a signed int that gets set to
the resume_name_len in the cifs_search_info. The resume_name_len however
is unsigned and for some infolevels is populated directly from a 32 bit
value sent by the server.
If the server sends a very large value for this, then that value could
look negative when converted to a signed int. That would make that
value pass the PATH_MAX check later in CIFSFindNext. The name_len would
then be used as a length value for a memcpy. It would then be treated
as unsigned again, and the memcpy scribbles over a ton of memory.
Fix this by making the name_len an unsigned value in CIFSFindNext.
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Darren Lavender <dcl@hppine99.gbr.hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 1
| 165,759
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int seqiv_aead_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
{
struct crypto_aead *geniv = __crypto_aead_cast(tfm);
struct seqiv_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(geniv);
spin_lock_init(&ctx->lock);
tfm->crt_aead.reqsize = sizeof(struct aead_request);
return aead_geniv_init(tfm);
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 45,891
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct file *open_exec(const char *name)
{
struct file *file;
int err;
struct filename tmp = { .name = name };
static const struct open_flags open_exec_flags = {
.open_flag = O_LARGEFILE | O_RDONLY | __FMODE_EXEC,
.acc_mode = MAY_EXEC | MAY_OPEN,
.intent = LOOKUP_OPEN,
.lookup_flags = LOOKUP_FOLLOW,
};
file = do_filp_open(AT_FDCWD, &tmp, &open_exec_flags);
if (IS_ERR(file))
goto out;
err = -EACCES;
if (!S_ISREG(file_inode(file)->i_mode))
goto exit;
if (file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC)
goto exit;
fsnotify_open(file);
err = deny_write_access(file);
if (err)
goto exit;
out:
return file;
exit:
fput(file);
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
Commit Message: exec/ptrace: fix get_dumpable() incorrect tests
The get_dumpable() return value is not boolean. Most users of the
function actually want to be testing for non-SUID_DUMP_USER(1) rather than
SUID_DUMP_DISABLE(0). The SUID_DUMP_ROOT(2) is also considered a
protected state. Almost all places did this correctly, excepting the two
places fixed in this patch.
Wrong logic:
if (dumpable == SUID_DUMP_DISABLE) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (dumpable == 0) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (!dumpable) { /* be protective */ }
Correct logic:
if (dumpable != SUID_DUMP_USER) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (dumpable != 1) { /* be protective */ }
Without this patch, if the system had set the sysctl fs/suid_dumpable=2, a
user was able to ptrace attach to processes that had dropped privileges to
that user. (This may have been partially mitigated if Yama was enabled.)
The macros have been moved into the file that declares get/set_dumpable(),
which means things like the ia64 code can see them too.
CVE-2013-2929
Reported-by: Vasily Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 30,915
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: TestRenderFrame::TestRenderFrame(RenderFrameImpl::CreateParams params)
: RenderFrameImpl(std::move(params)),
mock_frame_host_(std::make_unique<MockFrameHost>()) {
MockRenderThread* mock_render_thread =
static_cast<MockRenderThread*>(RenderThread::Get());
mock_frame_host_->PassLastInterfaceProviderRequest(
mock_render_thread->TakeInitialInterfaceProviderRequestForFrame(
params.routing_id));
mock_frame_host_->PassLastDocumentInterfaceBrokerRequest(
mock_render_thread->TakeInitialDocumentInterfaceBrokerRequestForFrame(
params.routing_id));
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 139,941
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate::IsDangerousFile(
const DownloadItem& download,
const FilePath& suggested_path,
bool visited_referrer_before) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
if (download.GetTransitionType() & content::PAGE_TRANSITION_FROM_ADDRESS_BAR)
return false;
if (extensions::switch_utils::IsEasyOffStoreInstallEnabled() &&
download_crx_util::IsExtensionDownload(download) &&
!WebstoreInstaller::GetAssociatedApproval(download)) {
return true;
}
if (ShouldOpenFileBasedOnExtension(suggested_path) &&
download.HasUserGesture())
return false;
download_util::DownloadDangerLevel danger_level =
download_util::GetFileDangerLevel(suggested_path.BaseName());
if (danger_level == download_util::AllowOnUserGesture)
return !download.HasUserGesture() || !visited_referrer_before;
return danger_level == download_util::Dangerous;
}
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
R=asanka@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 106,009
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RunGetCacheEntryCallback(
const GDataCache::GetCacheEntryCallback& callback,
bool* success,
GDataCache::CacheEntry* cache_entry) {
DCHECK(success);
DCHECK(cache_entry);
if (!callback.is_null())
callback.Run(*success, *cache_entry);
}
Commit Message: Revert 144993 - gdata: Remove invalid files in the cache directories
Broke linux_chromeos_valgrind:
http://build.chromium.org/p/chromium.memory.fyi/builders/Chromium%20OS%20%28valgrind%29%285%29/builds/8628/steps/memory%20test%3A%20unit/logs/stdio
In theory, we shouldn't have any invalid files left in the
cache directories, but things can go wrong and invalid files
may be left if the device shuts down unexpectedly, for instance.
Besides, it's good to be defensive.
BUG=134862
TEST=added unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10693020
TBR=satorux@chromium.org
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145029 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 105,951
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int dns_packet_extend(DnsPacket *p, size_t add, void **ret, size_t *start) {
assert(p);
if (p->size + add > p->allocated) {
size_t a;
a = PAGE_ALIGN((p->size + add) * 2);
if (a > DNS_PACKET_SIZE_MAX)
a = DNS_PACKET_SIZE_MAX;
if (p->size + add > a)
return -EMSGSIZE;
if (p->_data) {
void *d;
d = realloc(p->_data, a);
if (!d)
return -ENOMEM;
p->_data = d;
} else {
p->_data = malloc(a);
if (!p->_data)
return -ENOMEM;
memcpy(p->_data, (uint8_t*) p + ALIGN(sizeof(DnsPacket)), p->size);
memzero((uint8_t*) p->_data + p->size, a - p->size);
}
p->allocated = a;
}
if (start)
*start = p->size;
if (ret)
*ret = (uint8_t*) DNS_PACKET_DATA(p) + p->size;
p->size += add;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: resolved: bugfix of null pointer p->question dereferencing (#6020)
See https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/systemd/+bug/1621396
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 64,738
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void warp_clock(void)
{
write_seqlock_irq(&xtime_lock);
wall_to_monotonic.tv_sec -= sys_tz.tz_minuteswest * 60;
xtime.tv_sec += sys_tz.tz_minuteswest * 60;
update_xtime_cache(0);
write_sequnlock_irq(&xtime_lock);
clock_was_set();
}
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 24,729
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Vector<FileChooserFileInfo> HTMLInputElement::filesFromFileInputFormControlState(const FormControlState& state)
{
return FileInputType::filesFromFormControlState(state);
}
Commit Message: Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 112,894
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void UDPSocketWin::Core::WatchForRead() {
AddRef();
read_watcher_.StartWatching(read_overlapped_.hEvent, &reader_);
}
Commit Message: Map posix error codes in bind better, and fix one windows mapping.
r=wtc
BUG=330233
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/101193008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@242224 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 113,465
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void sanitize_format(union cdrom_addr *addr,
u_char * curr, u_char requested)
{
if (*curr == requested)
return; /* nothing to be done! */
if (requested == CDROM_LBA) {
addr->lba = (int) addr->msf.frame +
75 * (addr->msf.second - 2 + 60 * addr->msf.minute);
} else { /* CDROM_MSF */
int lba = addr->lba;
addr->msf.frame = lba % 75;
lba /= 75;
lba += 2;
addr->msf.second = lba % 60;
addr->msf.minute = lba / 60;
}
*curr = requested;
}
Commit Message: cdrom: fix improper type cast, which can leat to information leak.
There is another cast from unsigned long to int which causes
a bounds check to fail with specially crafted input. The value is
then used as an index in the slot array in cdrom_slot_status().
This issue is similar to CVE-2018-16658 and CVE-2018-10940.
Signed-off-by: Young_X <YangX92@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 76,309
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void kvmclock_update_fn(struct work_struct *work)
{
int i;
struct delayed_work *dwork = to_delayed_work(work);
struct kvm_arch *ka = container_of(dwork, struct kvm_arch,
kvmclock_update_work);
struct kvm *kvm = container_of(ka, struct kvm, arch);
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm) {
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_CLOCK_UPDATE, vcpu);
kvm_vcpu_kick(vcpu);
}
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Don't report guest userspace emulation error to userspace
Commit fc3a9157d314 ("KVM: X86: Don't report L2 emulation failures to
user-space") disabled the reporting of L2 (nested guest) emulation failures to
userspace due to race-condition between a vmexit and the instruction emulator.
The same rational applies also to userspace applications that are permitted by
the guest OS to access MMIO area or perform PIO.
This patch extends the current behavior - of injecting a #UD instead of
reporting it to userspace - also for guest userspace code.
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 35,817
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GfxDeviceRGBColorSpace::~GfxDeviceRGBColorSpace() {
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 1,134
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate::ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate(Profile* profile)
: profile_(profile),
next_download_id_(0),
download_prefs_(new DownloadPrefs(profile->GetPrefs())) {
}
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
R=asanka@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 106,002
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void readonlyStringAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::readonlyStringAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 122,568
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FFmpegVideoDecoder::FFmpegVideoDecoder(
const scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner>& task_runner)
: task_runner_(task_runner), state_(kUninitialized) {}
Commit Message: Replicate FFmpeg's video frame allocation strategy.
This should avoid accidental overreads and overwrites due to our
VideoFrame's not being as large as FFmpeg expects.
BUG=368980
TEST=new regression test
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/270193002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@268831 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 121,353
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int hci_uart_setup(struct hci_dev *hdev)
{
struct hci_uart *hu = hci_get_drvdata(hdev);
struct hci_rp_read_local_version *ver;
struct sk_buff *skb;
unsigned int speed;
int err;
/* Init speed if any */
if (hu->init_speed)
speed = hu->init_speed;
else if (hu->proto->init_speed)
speed = hu->proto->init_speed;
else
speed = 0;
if (speed)
hci_uart_set_baudrate(hu, speed);
/* Operational speed if any */
if (hu->oper_speed)
speed = hu->oper_speed;
else if (hu->proto->oper_speed)
speed = hu->proto->oper_speed;
else
speed = 0;
if (hu->proto->set_baudrate && speed) {
err = hu->proto->set_baudrate(hu, speed);
if (!err)
hci_uart_set_baudrate(hu, speed);
}
if (hu->proto->setup)
return hu->proto->setup(hu);
if (!test_bit(HCI_UART_VND_DETECT, &hu->hdev_flags))
return 0;
skb = __hci_cmd_sync(hdev, HCI_OP_READ_LOCAL_VERSION, 0, NULL,
HCI_INIT_TIMEOUT);
if (IS_ERR(skb)) {
BT_ERR("%s: Reading local version information failed (%ld)",
hdev->name, PTR_ERR(skb));
return 0;
}
if (skb->len != sizeof(*ver)) {
BT_ERR("%s: Event length mismatch for version information",
hdev->name);
goto done;
}
ver = (struct hci_rp_read_local_version *)skb->data;
switch (le16_to_cpu(ver->manufacturer)) {
#ifdef CONFIG_BT_HCIUART_INTEL
case 2:
hdev->set_bdaddr = btintel_set_bdaddr;
btintel_check_bdaddr(hdev);
break;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_BT_HCIUART_BCM
case 15:
hdev->set_bdaddr = btbcm_set_bdaddr;
btbcm_check_bdaddr(hdev);
break;
#endif
default:
break;
}
done:
kfree_skb(skb);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: hci_ldisc: Postpone HCI_UART_PROTO_READY bit set in hci_uart_set_proto()
task A: task B:
hci_uart_set_proto flush_to_ldisc
- p->open(hu) -> h5_open //alloc h5 - receive_buf
- set_bit HCI_UART_PROTO_READY - tty_port_default_receive_buf
- hci_uart_register_dev - tty_ldisc_receive_buf
- hci_uart_tty_receive
- test_bit HCI_UART_PROTO_READY
- h5_recv
- clear_bit HCI_UART_PROTO_READY while() {
- p->open(hu) -> h5_close //free h5
- h5_rx_3wire_hdr
- h5_reset() //use-after-free
}
It could use ioctl to set hci uart proto, but there is
a use-after-free issue when hci_uart_register_dev() fail in
hci_uart_set_proto(), see stack above, fix this by setting
HCI_UART_PROTO_READY bit only when hci_uart_register_dev()
return success.
Reported-by: syzbot+899a33dc0fa0dbaf06a6@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Cline <jcline@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 88,164
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ip_route_input_slow(struct sk_buff *skb, __be32 daddr, __be32 saddr,
u8 tos, struct net_device *dev)
{
struct fib_result res;
struct in_device *in_dev = __in_dev_get_rcu(dev);
struct flowi4 fl4;
unsigned flags = 0;
u32 itag = 0;
struct rtable * rth;
unsigned hash;
__be32 spec_dst;
int err = -EINVAL;
struct net * net = dev_net(dev);
/* IP on this device is disabled. */
if (!in_dev)
goto out;
/* Check for the most weird martians, which can be not detected
by fib_lookup.
*/
if (ipv4_is_multicast(saddr) || ipv4_is_lbcast(saddr) ||
ipv4_is_loopback(saddr))
goto martian_source;
if (ipv4_is_lbcast(daddr) || (saddr == 0 && daddr == 0))
goto brd_input;
/* Accept zero addresses only to limited broadcast;
* I even do not know to fix it or not. Waiting for complains :-)
*/
if (ipv4_is_zeronet(saddr))
goto martian_source;
if (ipv4_is_zeronet(daddr) || ipv4_is_loopback(daddr))
goto martian_destination;
/*
* Now we are ready to route packet.
*/
fl4.flowi4_oif = 0;
fl4.flowi4_iif = dev->ifindex;
fl4.flowi4_mark = skb->mark;
fl4.flowi4_tos = tos;
fl4.flowi4_scope = RT_SCOPE_UNIVERSE;
fl4.daddr = daddr;
fl4.saddr = saddr;
err = fib_lookup(net, &fl4, &res);
if (err != 0) {
if (!IN_DEV_FORWARD(in_dev))
goto e_hostunreach;
goto no_route;
}
RT_CACHE_STAT_INC(in_slow_tot);
if (res.type == RTN_BROADCAST)
goto brd_input;
if (res.type == RTN_LOCAL) {
err = fib_validate_source(skb, saddr, daddr, tos,
net->loopback_dev->ifindex,
dev, &spec_dst, &itag);
if (err < 0)
goto martian_source_keep_err;
if (err)
flags |= RTCF_DIRECTSRC;
spec_dst = daddr;
goto local_input;
}
if (!IN_DEV_FORWARD(in_dev))
goto e_hostunreach;
if (res.type != RTN_UNICAST)
goto martian_destination;
err = ip_mkroute_input(skb, &res, &fl4, in_dev, daddr, saddr, tos);
out: return err;
brd_input:
if (skb->protocol != htons(ETH_P_IP))
goto e_inval;
if (ipv4_is_zeronet(saddr))
spec_dst = inet_select_addr(dev, 0, RT_SCOPE_LINK);
else {
err = fib_validate_source(skb, saddr, 0, tos, 0, dev, &spec_dst,
&itag);
if (err < 0)
goto martian_source_keep_err;
if (err)
flags |= RTCF_DIRECTSRC;
}
flags |= RTCF_BROADCAST;
res.type = RTN_BROADCAST;
RT_CACHE_STAT_INC(in_brd);
local_input:
rth = rt_dst_alloc(net->loopback_dev,
IN_DEV_CONF_GET(in_dev, NOPOLICY), false);
if (!rth)
goto e_nobufs;
rth->dst.input= ip_local_deliver;
rth->dst.output= ip_rt_bug;
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_ROUTE_CLASSID
rth->dst.tclassid = itag;
#endif
rth->rt_key_dst = daddr;
rth->rt_key_src = saddr;
rth->rt_genid = rt_genid(net);
rth->rt_flags = flags|RTCF_LOCAL;
rth->rt_type = res.type;
rth->rt_key_tos = tos;
rth->rt_dst = daddr;
rth->rt_src = saddr;
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_ROUTE_CLASSID
rth->dst.tclassid = itag;
#endif
rth->rt_route_iif = dev->ifindex;
rth->rt_iif = dev->ifindex;
rth->rt_oif = 0;
rth->rt_mark = skb->mark;
rth->rt_gateway = daddr;
rth->rt_spec_dst= spec_dst;
rth->rt_peer_genid = 0;
rth->peer = NULL;
rth->fi = NULL;
if (res.type == RTN_UNREACHABLE) {
rth->dst.input= ip_error;
rth->dst.error= -err;
rth->rt_flags &= ~RTCF_LOCAL;
}
hash = rt_hash(daddr, saddr, fl4.flowi4_iif, rt_genid(net));
rth = rt_intern_hash(hash, rth, skb, fl4.flowi4_iif);
err = 0;
if (IS_ERR(rth))
err = PTR_ERR(rth);
goto out;
no_route:
RT_CACHE_STAT_INC(in_no_route);
spec_dst = inet_select_addr(dev, 0, RT_SCOPE_UNIVERSE);
res.type = RTN_UNREACHABLE;
if (err == -ESRCH)
err = -ENETUNREACH;
goto local_input;
/*
* Do not cache martian addresses: they should be logged (RFC1812)
*/
martian_destination:
RT_CACHE_STAT_INC(in_martian_dst);
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_ROUTE_VERBOSE
if (IN_DEV_LOG_MARTIANS(in_dev) && net_ratelimit())
printk(KERN_WARNING "martian destination %pI4 from %pI4, dev %s\n",
&daddr, &saddr, dev->name);
#endif
e_hostunreach:
err = -EHOSTUNREACH;
goto out;
e_inval:
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
e_nobufs:
err = -ENOBUFS;
goto out;
martian_source:
err = -EINVAL;
martian_source_keep_err:
ip_handle_martian_source(dev, in_dev, skb, daddr, saddr);
goto out;
}
Commit Message: net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5.
Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.
MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)
Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic
regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and
use a full 32-bit sequence number.
For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.
Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 25,112
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int xfrm_notify_sa(struct xfrm_state *x, const struct km_event *c)
{
struct net *net = xs_net(x);
struct xfrm_usersa_info *p;
struct xfrm_usersa_id *id;
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int len = xfrm_sa_len(x);
int headlen, err;
headlen = sizeof(*p);
if (c->event == XFRM_MSG_DELSA) {
len += nla_total_size(headlen);
headlen = sizeof(*id);
len += nla_total_size(sizeof(struct xfrm_mark));
}
len += NLMSG_ALIGN(headlen);
skb = nlmsg_new(len, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (skb == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
nlh = nlmsg_put(skb, c->portid, c->seq, c->event, headlen, 0);
err = -EMSGSIZE;
if (nlh == NULL)
goto out_free_skb;
p = nlmsg_data(nlh);
if (c->event == XFRM_MSG_DELSA) {
struct nlattr *attr;
id = nlmsg_data(nlh);
memcpy(&id->daddr, &x->id.daddr, sizeof(id->daddr));
id->spi = x->id.spi;
id->family = x->props.family;
id->proto = x->id.proto;
attr = nla_reserve(skb, XFRMA_SA, sizeof(*p));
err = -EMSGSIZE;
if (attr == NULL)
goto out_free_skb;
p = nla_data(attr);
}
err = copy_to_user_state_extra(x, p, skb);
if (err)
goto out_free_skb;
nlmsg_end(skb, nlh);
return xfrm_nlmsg_multicast(net, skb, 0, XFRMNLGRP_SA);
out_free_skb:
kfree_skb(skb);
return err;
}
Commit Message: xfrm_user: validate XFRM_MSG_NEWAE incoming ESN size harder
Kees Cook has pointed out that xfrm_replay_state_esn_len() is subject to
wrapping issues. To ensure we are correctly ensuring that the two ESN
structures are the same size compare both the overall size as reported
by xfrm_replay_state_esn_len() and the internal length are the same.
CVE-2017-7184
Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 67,814
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void _gdScaleRow(gdImagePtr pSrc, unsigned int src_width, gdImagePtr dst, unsigned int dst_width, unsigned int row, LineContribType *contrib)
{
int *p_src_row = pSrc->tpixels[row];
int *p_dst_row = dst->tpixels[row];
unsigned int x;
for (x = 0; x < dst_width - 1; x++) {
register unsigned char r = 0, g = 0, b = 0, a = 0;
const int left = contrib->ContribRow[x].Left;
const int right = contrib->ContribRow[x].Right;
int i;
/* Accumulate each channel */
for (i = left; i <= right; i++) {
const int left_channel = i - left;
r += (unsigned char)(contrib->ContribRow[x].Weights[left_channel] * (double)(gdTrueColorGetRed(p_src_row[i])));
g += (unsigned char)(contrib->ContribRow[x].Weights[left_channel] * (double)(gdTrueColorGetGreen(p_src_row[i])));
b += (unsigned char)(contrib->ContribRow[x].Weights[left_channel] * (double)(gdTrueColorGetBlue(p_src_row[i])));
a += (unsigned char)(contrib->ContribRow[x].Weights[left_channel] * (double)(gdTrueColorGetAlpha(p_src_row[i])));
}
p_dst_row[x] = gdTrueColorAlpha(r, g, b, a);
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed bug #72227: imagescale out-of-bounds read
Ported from https://github.com/libgd/libgd/commit/4f65a3e4eedaffa1efcf9ee1eb08f0b504fbc31a
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 95,057
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(radius_cvt_int)
{
const void *data;
int len, val;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s", &data, &len)
== FAILURE) {
return;
}
val = rad_cvt_int(data);
RETURN_LONG(val);
}
Commit Message: Fix a security issue in radius_get_vendor_attr().
The underlying rad_get_vendor_attr() function assumed that it would always be
given valid VSA data. Indeed, the buffer length wasn't even passed in; the
assumption was that the length field within the VSA structure would be valid.
This could result in denial of service by providing a length that would be
beyond the memory limit, or potential arbitrary memory access by providing a
length greater than the actual data given.
rad_get_vendor_attr() has been changed to require the raw data length be
provided, and this is then used to check that the VSA is valid.
Conflicts:
radlib_vs.h
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 31,510
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void dump_nearby_maps(BacktraceMap* map, log_t* log, pid_t tid) {
siginfo_t si;
memset(&si, 0, sizeof(si));
if (ptrace(PTRACE_GETSIGINFO, tid, 0, &si)) {
_LOG(log, logtype::MAPS, "cannot get siginfo for %d: %s\n", tid, strerror(errno));
return;
}
bool has_fault_address = signal_has_si_addr(si.si_signo);
uintptr_t addr = reinterpret_cast<uintptr_t>(si.si_addr);
_LOG(log, logtype::MAPS, "\nmemory map: %s\n", has_fault_address ? "(fault address prefixed with --->)" : "");
if (has_fault_address && (addr < map->begin()->start)) {
_LOG(log, logtype::MAPS, "--->Fault address falls at %" PRIPTR " before any mapped regions\n", addr);
}
BacktraceMap::const_iterator prev = map->begin();
for (BacktraceMap::const_iterator it = map->begin(); it != map->end(); ++it) {
if (addr >= (*prev).end && addr < (*it).start) {
_LOG(log, logtype::MAPS, "--->Fault address falls at %" PRIPTR " between mapped regions\n", addr);
}
prev = it;
bool in_map = has_fault_address && (addr >= (*it).start) && (addr < (*it).end);
dump_map(log, &*it, in_map);
}
if (has_fault_address && (addr >= (*prev).end)) {
_LOG(log, logtype::MAPS, "--->Fault address falls at %" PRIPTR " after any mapped regions\n", addr);
}
}
Commit Message: Don't create tombstone directory.
Partial backport of cf79748.
Bug: http://b/26403620
Change-Id: Ib877ab6cfab6aef079830c5a50ba81141ead35ee
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 161,268
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: t42_loader_done( T42_Loader loader )
{
T42_Parser parser = &loader->parser;
/* finalize tables */
T1_Release_Table( &loader->encoding_table );
T1_Release_Table( &loader->charstrings );
T1_Release_Table( &loader->glyph_names );
T1_Release_Table( &loader->swap_table );
/* finalize parser */
t42_parser_done( parser );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 7,072
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
{
gss_buffer_desc in;
gss_buffer_desc out = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
OM_uint32 major, minor;
OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */
u_int len;
if (!options.gss_authentication)
fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__);
in.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
in.length = len;
major = ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gsscontext, &in, &out, &flags);
free(in.value);
buffer_clear(m);
buffer_put_int(m, major);
buffer_put_string(m, out.value, out.length);
buffer_put_int(m, flags);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP, m);
gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out);
if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0);
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
}
return (0);
}
Commit Message: Remove support for pre-authentication compression. Doing compression
early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s, but
today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf.
multiple compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface.
Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed
the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the
required attack surface considerably larger.
Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security
check in the shared memory manager found by Stack
(http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@
NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd
for >10 years.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 72,174
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: char *am_htmlencode(request_rec *r, const char *str)
{
const char *cp;
char *output;
apr_size_t outputlen;
int i;
outputlen = 0;
for (cp = str; *cp; cp++) {
switch (*cp) {
case '&':
outputlen += 5;
break;
case '"':
outputlen += 6;
break;
default:
outputlen += 1;
break;
}
}
i = 0;
output = apr_palloc(r->pool, outputlen + 1);
for (cp = str; *cp; cp++) {
switch (*cp) {
case '&':
(void)strcpy(&output[i], "&");
i += 5;
break;
case '"':
(void)strcpy(&output[i], """);
i += 6;
break;
default:
output[i] = *cp;
i += 1;
break;
}
}
output[i] = '\0';
return output;
}
Commit Message: Fix redirect URL validation bypass
It turns out that browsers silently convert backslash characters into
forward slashes, while apr_uri_parse() does not.
This mismatch allows an attacker to bypass the redirect URL validation
by using an URL like:
https://sp.example.org/mellon/logout?ReturnTo=https:%5c%5cmalicious.example.org/
mod_auth_mellon will assume that it is a relative URL and allow the
request to pass through, while the browsers will use it as an absolute
url and redirect to https://malicious.example.org/ .
This patch fixes this issue by rejecting all redirect URLs with
backslashes.
CWE ID: CWE-601
| 0
| 91,716
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static __u32 tcp_v4_init_sequence(const struct sk_buff *skb)
{
return secure_tcp_sequence_number(ip_hdr(skb)->daddr,
ip_hdr(skb)->saddr,
tcp_hdr(skb)->dest,
tcp_hdr(skb)->source);
}
Commit Message: tcp: take care of truncations done by sk_filter()
With syzkaller help, Marco Grassi found a bug in TCP stack,
crashing in tcp_collapse()
Root cause is that sk_filter() can truncate the incoming skb,
but TCP stack was not really expecting this to happen.
It probably was expecting a simple DROP or ACCEPT behavior.
We first need to make sure no part of TCP header could be removed.
Then we need to adjust TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq
Many thanks to syzkaller team and Marco for giving us a reproducer.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <marco.gra@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 49,265
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(snmp2_set)
{
php_snmp(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, SNMP_CMD_SET, SNMP_VERSION_2c);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 11,207
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BlockAIOCB *ide_issue_trim(BlockBackend *blk,
int64_t sector_num, QEMUIOVector *qiov, int nb_sectors,
BlockCompletionFunc *cb, void *opaque)
{
TrimAIOCB *iocb;
iocb = blk_aio_get(&trim_aiocb_info, blk, cb, opaque);
iocb->blk = blk;
iocb->bh = qemu_bh_new(ide_trim_bh_cb, iocb);
iocb->ret = 0;
iocb->qiov = qiov;
iocb->i = -1;
iocb->j = 0;
ide_issue_trim_cb(iocb, 0);
return &iocb->common;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 6,746
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameHostManager::CreateProxiesForNewRenderFrameHost(
SiteInstance* old_instance,
SiteInstance* new_instance) {
if (new_instance->IsRelatedSiteInstance(old_instance)) {
CreateOpenerProxies(new_instance, frame_tree_node_);
} else {
frame_tree_node_->frame_tree()->CreateProxiesForSiteInstance(
frame_tree_node_, new_instance);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix issue with pending NavigationEntry being discarded incorrectly
This CL fixes an issue where we would attempt to discard a pending
NavigationEntry when a cross-process navigation to this NavigationEntry
is interrupted by another navigation to the same NavigationEntry.
BUG=760342,797656,796135
Change-Id: I204deff1efd4d572dd2e0b20e492592d48d787d9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/850877
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528611}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 146,819
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void byte2hex(const char* data, char** str)
{
**str = hex_table[(*data >> 4) & 0xf];
++*str;
**str = hex_table[*data & 0xf];
++*str;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 158,915
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void srpt_send_done(struct ib_cq *cq, struct ib_wc *wc)
{
struct srpt_rdma_ch *ch = cq->cq_context;
struct srpt_send_ioctx *ioctx =
container_of(wc->wr_cqe, struct srpt_send_ioctx, ioctx.cqe);
enum srpt_command_state state;
state = srpt_set_cmd_state(ioctx, SRPT_STATE_DONE);
WARN_ON(state != SRPT_STATE_CMD_RSP_SENT &&
state != SRPT_STATE_MGMT_RSP_SENT);
atomic_inc(&ch->sq_wr_avail);
if (wc->status != IB_WC_SUCCESS) {
pr_info("sending response for ioctx 0x%p failed"
" with status %d\n", ioctx, wc->status);
atomic_dec(&ch->req_lim);
srpt_abort_cmd(ioctx);
goto out;
}
if (state != SRPT_STATE_DONE) {
srpt_unmap_sg_to_ib_sge(ch, ioctx);
transport_generic_free_cmd(&ioctx->cmd, 0);
} else {
pr_err("IB completion has been received too late for"
" wr_id = %u.\n", ioctx->ioctx.index);
}
out:
while (!list_empty(&ch->cmd_wait_list) &&
srpt_get_ch_state(ch) == CH_LIVE &&
(ioctx = srpt_get_send_ioctx(ch)) != NULL) {
struct srpt_recv_ioctx *recv_ioctx;
recv_ioctx = list_first_entry(&ch->cmd_wait_list,
struct srpt_recv_ioctx,
wait_list);
list_del(&recv_ioctx->wait_list);
srpt_handle_new_iu(ch, recv_ioctx, ioctx);
}
}
Commit Message: IB/srpt: Simplify srpt_handle_tsk_mgmt()
Let the target core check task existence instead of the SRP target
driver. Additionally, let the target core check the validity of the
task management request instead of the ib_srpt driver.
This patch fixes the following kernel crash:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000001
IP: [<ffffffffa0565f37>] srpt_handle_new_iu+0x6d7/0x790 [ib_srpt]
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
Call Trace:
[<ffffffffa05660ce>] srpt_process_completion+0xde/0x570 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffffa056669f>] srpt_compl_thread+0x13f/0x160 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffff8109726f>] kthread+0xcf/0xe0
[<ffffffff81613cfc>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@sandisk.com>
Fixes: 3e4f574857ee ("ib_srpt: Convert TMR path to target_submit_tmr")
Tested-by: Alex Estrin <alex.estrin@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
Cc: Sagi Grimberg <sagig@mellanox.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 50,698
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BOOLEAN btif_hl_find_app_idx_using_handle(tBTA_HL_APP_HANDLE app_handle,
UINT8 *p_app_idx){
BOOLEAN found=FALSE;
UINT8 i;
for (i=0; i < BTA_HL_NUM_APPS ; i ++)
{
if (btif_hl_cb.acb[i].in_use &&
(btif_hl_cb.acb[i].app_handle == app_handle))
{
found = TRUE;
*p_app_idx = i;
break;
}
}
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("%s status=%d handle=%d app_idx=%d ",
__FUNCTION__, found, app_handle , i);
return found;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 158,680
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned int run_filter(const struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct sock *sk,
unsigned int res)
{
struct sk_filter *filter;
rcu_read_lock();
filter = rcu_dereference(sk->sk_filter);
if (filter != NULL)
res = SK_RUN_FILTER(filter, skb);
rcu_read_unlock();
return res;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 40,663
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void g_stop(struct seq_file *m, void *p)
{
mutex_unlock(&graph_lock);
}
Commit Message: tracing: Fix possible NULL pointer dereferences
Currently set_ftrace_pid and set_graph_function files use seq_lseek
for their fops. However seq_open() is called only for FMODE_READ in
the fops->open() so that if an user tries to seek one of those file
when she open it for writing, it sees NULL seq_file and then panic.
It can be easily reproduced with following command:
$ cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
$ echo 1234 | sudo tee -a set_ftrace_pid
In this example, GNU coreutils' tee opens the file with fopen(, "a")
and then the fopen() internally calls lseek().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365663302-2170-1-git-send-email-namhyung@kernel.org
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung.kim@lge.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 30,252
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ofputil_decode_hello(const struct ofp_header *oh, uint32_t *allowed_versions)
{
struct ofpbuf msg = ofpbuf_const_initializer(oh, ntohs(oh->length));
ofpbuf_pull(&msg, sizeof *oh);
*allowed_versions = version_bitmap_from_version(oh->version);
bool ok = true;
while (msg.size) {
const struct ofp_hello_elem_header *oheh;
unsigned int len;
if (msg.size < sizeof *oheh) {
return false;
}
oheh = msg.data;
len = ntohs(oheh->length);
if (len < sizeof *oheh || !ofpbuf_try_pull(&msg, ROUND_UP(len, 8))) {
return false;
}
if (oheh->type != htons(OFPHET_VERSIONBITMAP)
|| !ofputil_decode_hello_bitmap(oheh, allowed_versions)) {
ok = false;
}
}
return ok;
}
Commit Message: ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <pkusunyifeng@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 77,509
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gpu::gles2::Logger* GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::GetLogger() {
return &logger_;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,769
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ExecuteScript(const ToRenderFrameHost& adapter,
const std::string& script) {
return ExecuteScriptWithUserGestureControl(adapter.render_frame_host(),
script, true);
}
Commit Message: Apply ExtensionNavigationThrottle filesystem/blob checks to all frames.
BUG=836858
Change-Id: I34333a72501129fd40b5a9aa6378c9f35f1e7fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1028511
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nick Carter <nick@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553867}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 156,042
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void nsc_rle_compress_data(NSC_CONTEXT* context)
{
UINT16 i;
UINT32 planeSize;
UINT32 originalSize;
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
{
originalSize = context->OrgByteCount[i];
if (originalSize == 0)
{
planeSize = 0;
}
else
{
planeSize = nsc_rle_encode(context->priv->PlaneBuffers[i],
context->priv->PlaneBuffers[4], originalSize);
if (planeSize < originalSize)
CopyMemory(context->priv->PlaneBuffers[i], context->priv->PlaneBuffers[4],
planeSize);
else
planeSize = originalSize;
}
context->PlaneByteCount[i] = planeSize;
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8788
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 83,530
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AutocompleteEditModel::OnControlKeyChanged(bool pressed) {
if (pressed == (control_key_state_ == UP)) {
ControlKeyState old_state = control_key_state_;
control_key_state_ = pressed ? DOWN_WITHOUT_CHANGE : UP;
if ((control_key_state_ == DOWN_WITHOUT_CHANGE) && has_temporary_text_) {
InternalSetUserText(UserTextFromDisplayText(view_->GetText()));
has_temporary_text_ = false;
if (KeywordIsSelected())
AcceptKeyword();
}
if ((old_state != DOWN_WITH_CHANGE) && popup_->IsOpen()) {
view_->UpdatePopup();
}
}
}
Commit Message: Adds per-provider information to omnibox UMA logs.
Adds a fairly general structure to omnibox logs that can be used to pass information (that's not per-result information) from providers to the UMA logs. Right now it's only used to pass whether the asynchronous pass of a provider has finished, but it will probably be used for other things in the future.
BUG=
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10380007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137288 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 103,850
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int dynamicSeek(struct gdIOCtx *ctx, const int pos)
{
int bytesNeeded;
dynamicPtr *dp;
dpIOCtx *dctx;
dctx = (dpIOCtx *)ctx;
dp = dctx->dp;
if(!dp->dataGood) {
return FALSE;
}
bytesNeeded = pos;
if(bytesNeeded > dp->realSize) {
/* 2.0.21 */
if(!dp->freeOK) {
return FALSE;
}
if(overflow2(dp->realSize, 2)) {
return FALSE;
}
if(!gdReallocDynamic(dp, dp->realSize * 2)) {
dp->dataGood = FALSE;
return FALSE;
}
}
/* if we get here, we can be sure that we have enough bytes
* to copy safely */
/* Extend the logical size if we seek beyond EOF. */
if(pos > dp->logicalSize) {
dp->logicalSize = pos;
};
dp->pos = pos;
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Avoid potentially dangerous signed to unsigned conversion
We make sure to never pass a negative `rlen` as size to memcpy(). See
also <https://bugs.php.net/bug.php?id=73280>.
Patch provided by Emmanuel Law.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 73,249
|
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