instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PassRefPtrWillBeRawPtr<Element> Document::createElement(const QualifiedName& qName, bool createdByParser)
{
RefPtrWillBeRawPtr<Element> e = nullptr;
if (qName.namespaceURI() == xhtmlNamespaceURI)
e = HTMLElementFactory::createHTMLElement(qName.localName(), *this, 0, createdByParser);
else if (qName.namespaceURI() == SVGNames::svgNamespaceURI)
e = SVGElementFactory::createSVGElement(qName.localName(), *this, createdByParser);
if (e)
m_sawElementsInKnownNamespaces = true;
else
e = Element::create(qName, this);
if (e->prefix() != qName.prefix())
e->setTagNameForCreateElementNS(qName);
ASSERT(qName == e->tagQName());
return e.release();
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 124,317
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SPL_METHOD(SplDoublyLinkedList, valid)
{
spl_dllist_object *intern = Z_SPLDLLIST_P(getThis());
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETURN_BOOL(intern->traverse_pointer != NULL);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #71735: Double-free in SplDoublyLinkedList::offsetSet
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 54,292
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ChromeNetworkDelegate::OnBeforeSendHeaders(
net::URLRequest* request,
const net::CompletionCallback& callback,
net::HttpRequestHeaders* headers) {
TRACE_EVENT_ASYNC_STEP_PAST0("net", "URLRequest", request, "SendRequest");
return ExtensionWebRequestEventRouter::GetInstance()->OnBeforeSendHeaders(
profile_, extension_info_map_.get(), request, callback, headers);
}
Commit Message: Added daily UMA for non-data-reduction-proxy data usage when the proxy is enabled.
BUG=325325
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/106113002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@239897 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 113,563
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: NavigationRequest::TakeNavigationHandle() {
return std::move(navigation_handle_);
}
Commit Message: Use an opaque URL rather than an empty URL for request's site for cookies.
Apparently this makes a big difference to the cookie settings backend.
Bug: 881715
Change-Id: Id87fa0c6a858bae6a3f8fff4d6af3f974b00d5e4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1212846
Commit-Queue: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#589512}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 132,964
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MagickExport int LocaleUppercase(const int c)
{
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_LOCALE_SUPPORT)
if (c_locale != (locale_t) NULL)
return(toupper_l((int) ((unsigned char) c),c_locale));
#endif
return(toupper((int) ((unsigned char) c)));
}
Commit Message: ...
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 1
| 169,712
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: psf_close_rsrc (SF_PRIVATE *psf)
{ psf_close_fd (psf->rsrc.filedes) ;
psf->rsrc.filedes = -1 ;
return 0 ;
} /* psf_close_rsrc */
Commit Message: src/file_io.c : Prevent potential divide-by-zero.
Closes: https://github.com/erikd/libsndfile/issues/92
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 45,205
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: sharg_append(GArray *a, const gchar *str) {
const gchar *s = (str ? str : "");
g_array_append_val(a, s);
}
Commit Message: disable Uzbl javascript object because of security problem.
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 18,404
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE3(inotify_add_watch, int, fd, const char __user *, pathname,
u32, mask)
{
struct fsnotify_group *group;
struct inode *inode;
struct path path;
struct file *filp;
int ret, fput_needed;
unsigned flags = 0;
filp = fget_light(fd, &fput_needed);
if (unlikely(!filp))
return -EBADF;
/* verify that this is indeed an inotify instance */
if (unlikely(filp->f_op != &inotify_fops)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto fput_and_out;
}
if (!(mask & IN_DONT_FOLLOW))
flags |= LOOKUP_FOLLOW;
if (mask & IN_ONLYDIR)
flags |= LOOKUP_DIRECTORY;
ret = inotify_find_inode(pathname, &path, flags);
if (ret)
goto fput_and_out;
/* inode held in place by reference to path; group by fget on fd */
inode = path.dentry->d_inode;
group = filp->private_data;
/* create/update an inode mark */
ret = inotify_update_watch(group, inode, mask);
path_put(&path);
fput_and_out:
fput_light(filp, fput_needed);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: inotify: fix double free/corruption of stuct user
On an error path in inotify_init1 a normal user can trigger a double
free of struct user. This is a regression introduced by a2ae4cc9a16e
("inotify: stop kernel memory leak on file creation failure").
We fix this by making sure that if a group exists the user reference is
dropped when the group is cleaned up. We should not explictly drop the
reference on error and also drop the reference when the group is cleaned
up.
The new lifetime rules are that an inotify group lives from
inotify_new_group to the last fsnotify_put_group. Since the struct user
and inotify_devs are directly tied to this lifetime they are only
changed/updated in those two locations. We get rid of all special
casing of struct user or user->inotify_devs.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org (2.6.37 and up)
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 27,533
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TestRenderFrame::DeleteSurroundingText(int before, int after) {
GetFrameInputHandler()->DeleteSurroundingText(before, after);
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 139,919
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int nfsd_pool_stats_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
int ret = seq_release(inode, file);
struct net *net = inode->i_sb->s_fs_info;
mutex_lock(&nfsd_mutex);
/* this function really, really should have been called svc_put() */
nfsd_destroy(net);
mutex_unlock(&nfsd_mutex);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: nfsd: check for oversized NFSv2/v3 arguments
A client can append random data to the end of an NFSv2 or NFSv3 RPC call
without our complaining; we'll just stop parsing at the end of the
expected data and ignore the rest.
Encoded arguments and replies are stored together in an array of pages,
and if a call is too large it could leave inadequate space for the
reply. This is normally OK because NFS RPC's typically have either
short arguments and long replies (like READ) or long arguments and short
replies (like WRITE). But a client that sends an incorrectly long reply
can violate those assumptions. This was observed to cause crashes.
Also, several operations increment rq_next_page in the decode routine
before checking the argument size, which can leave rq_next_page pointing
well past the end of the page array, causing trouble later in
svc_free_pages.
So, following a suggestion from Neil Brown, add a central check to
enforce our expectation that no NFSv2/v3 call has both a large call and
a large reply.
As followup we may also want to rewrite the encoding routines to check
more carefully that they aren't running off the end of the page array.
We may also consider rejecting calls that have any extra garbage
appended. That would be safer, and within our rights by spec, but given
the age of our server and the NFS protocol, and the fact that we've
never enforced this before, we may need to balance that against the
possibility of breaking some oddball client.
Reported-by: Tuomas Haanpää <thaan@synopsys.com>
Reported-by: Ari Kauppi <ari@synopsys.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 67,146
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual void TabClosingAt(TabStripModel* tab_strip_model,
TabContentsWrapper* contents,
int index) {
states_.push_back(new State(contents, index, CLOSE));
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 98,177
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int airo_get_name(struct net_device *dev,
struct iw_request_info *info,
char *cwrq,
char *extra)
{
strcpy(cwrq, "IEEE 802.11-DS");
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 23,955
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int llc_ui_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct llc_sock *llc = llc_sk(sk);
DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_llc *, addr, msg->msg_name);
int flags = msg->msg_flags;
int noblock = flags & MSG_DONTWAIT;
struct sk_buff *skb;
size_t size = 0;
int rc = -EINVAL, copied = 0, hdrlen;
dprintk("%s: sending from %02X to %02X\n", __func__,
llc->laddr.lsap, llc->daddr.lsap);
lock_sock(sk);
if (addr) {
if (msg->msg_namelen < sizeof(*addr))
goto release;
} else {
if (llc_ui_addr_null(&llc->addr))
goto release;
addr = &llc->addr;
}
/* must bind connection to sap if user hasn't done it. */
if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED)) {
/* bind to sap with null dev, exclusive. */
rc = llc_ui_autobind(sock, addr);
if (rc)
goto release;
}
hdrlen = llc->dev->hard_header_len + llc_ui_header_len(sk, addr);
size = hdrlen + len;
if (size > llc->dev->mtu)
size = llc->dev->mtu;
copied = size - hdrlen;
release_sock(sk);
skb = sock_alloc_send_skb(sk, size, noblock, &rc);
lock_sock(sk);
if (!skb)
goto release;
skb->dev = llc->dev;
skb->protocol = llc_proto_type(addr->sllc_arphrd);
skb_reserve(skb, hdrlen);
rc = memcpy_from_msg(skb_put(skb, copied), msg, copied);
if (rc)
goto out;
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_DGRAM || addr->sllc_ua) {
llc_build_and_send_ui_pkt(llc->sap, skb, addr->sllc_mac,
addr->sllc_sap);
goto out;
}
if (addr->sllc_test) {
llc_build_and_send_test_pkt(llc->sap, skb, addr->sllc_mac,
addr->sllc_sap);
goto out;
}
if (addr->sllc_xid) {
llc_build_and_send_xid_pkt(llc->sap, skb, addr->sllc_mac,
addr->sllc_sap);
goto out;
}
rc = -ENOPROTOOPT;
if (!(sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM && !addr->sllc_ua))
goto out;
rc = llc_ui_send_data(sk, skb, noblock);
out:
if (rc) {
kfree_skb(skb);
release:
dprintk("%s: failed sending from %02X to %02X: %d\n",
__func__, llc->laddr.lsap, llc->daddr.lsap, rc);
}
release_sock(sk);
return rc ? : copied;
}
Commit Message: net: fix infoleak in llc
The stack object “info” has a total size of 12 bytes. Its last byte
is padding which is not initialized and leaked via “put_cmsg”.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 53,182
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Pause() {
host_->OnPauseStream(kStreamId);
SyncWithAudioThread();
}
Commit Message: Switching AudioOutputAuthorizationHandler from using AudioManager interface to AudioSystem one.
BUG=672468
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2692203003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450939}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 128,209
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xfs_attr_shortform_compare(const void *a, const void *b)
{
xfs_attr_sf_sort_t *sa, *sb;
sa = (xfs_attr_sf_sort_t *)a;
sb = (xfs_attr_sf_sort_t *)b;
if (sa->hash < sb->hash) {
return(-1);
} else if (sa->hash > sb->hash) {
return(1);
} else {
return(sa->entno - sb->entno);
}
}
Commit Message: xfs: remote attribute overwrite causes transaction overrun
Commit e461fcb ("xfs: remote attribute lookups require the value
length") passes the remote attribute length in the xfs_da_args
structure on lookup so that CRC calculations and validity checking
can be performed correctly by related code. This, unfortunately has
the side effect of changing the args->valuelen parameter in cases
where it shouldn't.
That is, when we replace a remote attribute, the incoming
replacement stores the value and length in args->value and
args->valuelen, but then the lookup which finds the existing remote
attribute overwrites args->valuelen with the length of the remote
attribute being replaced. Hence when we go to create the new
attribute, we create it of the size of the existing remote
attribute, not the size it is supposed to be. When the new attribute
is much smaller than the old attribute, this results in a
transaction overrun and an ASSERT() failure on a debug kernel:
XFS: Assertion failed: tp->t_blk_res_used <= tp->t_blk_res, file: fs/xfs/xfs_trans.c, line: 331
Fix this by keeping the remote attribute value length separate to
the attribute value length in the xfs_da_args structure. The enables
us to pass the length of the remote attribute to be removed without
overwriting the new attribute's length.
Also, ensure that when we save remote block contexts for a later
rename we zero the original state variables so that we don't confuse
the state of the attribute to be removes with the state of the new
attribute that we just added. [Spotted by Brain Foster.]
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
CWE ID: CWE-19
| 0
| 44,965
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::prepareForAdaptivePlayback(
OMX_U32 portIndex, OMX_BOOL enable, OMX_U32 maxFrameWidth,
OMX_U32 maxFrameHeight) {
Mutex::Autolock autolock(mLock);
CLOG_CONFIG(prepareForAdaptivePlayback, "%s:%u en=%d max=%ux%u",
portString(portIndex), portIndex, enable, maxFrameWidth, maxFrameHeight);
OMX_INDEXTYPE index;
OMX_STRING name = const_cast<OMX_STRING>(
"OMX.google.android.index.prepareForAdaptivePlayback");
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_GetExtensionIndex(mHandle, name, &index);
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
CLOG_ERROR_IF(enable, getExtensionIndex, err, "%s", name);
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
PrepareForAdaptivePlaybackParams params;
InitOMXParams(¶ms);
params.nPortIndex = portIndex;
params.bEnable = enable;
params.nMaxFrameWidth = maxFrameWidth;
params.nMaxFrameHeight = maxFrameHeight;
err = OMX_SetParameter(mHandle, index, ¶ms);
CLOG_IF_ERROR(setParameter, err, "%s(%#x): %s:%u en=%d max=%ux%u", name, index,
portString(portIndex), portIndex, enable, maxFrameWidth, maxFrameHeight);
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
Commit Message: IOMX: Enable buffer ptr to buffer id translation for arm32
Bug: 20634516
Change-Id: Iac9eac3cb251eccd9bbad5df7421a07edc21da0c
(cherry picked from commit 2d6b6601743c3c6960c6511a2cb774ef902759f4)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 157,577
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void free_event(struct perf_event *event)
{
irq_work_sync(&event->pending);
if (!event->parent) {
if (event->attach_state & PERF_ATTACH_TASK)
jump_label_dec(&perf_sched_events);
if (event->attr.mmap || event->attr.mmap_data)
atomic_dec(&nr_mmap_events);
if (event->attr.comm)
atomic_dec(&nr_comm_events);
if (event->attr.task)
atomic_dec(&nr_task_events);
if (event->attr.sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_CALLCHAIN)
put_callchain_buffers();
if (is_cgroup_event(event)) {
atomic_dec(&per_cpu(perf_cgroup_events, event->cpu));
jump_label_dec(&perf_sched_events);
}
}
if (event->rb) {
ring_buffer_put(event->rb);
event->rb = NULL;
}
if (is_cgroup_event(event))
perf_detach_cgroup(event);
if (event->destroy)
event->destroy(event);
if (event->ctx)
put_ctx(event->ctx);
call_rcu(&event->rcu_head, free_event_rcu);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 26,002
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PluginModule::PluginModule(const std::string& name,
const FilePath& path,
PluginDelegate::ModuleLifetime* lifetime_delegate)
: lifetime_delegate_(lifetime_delegate),
callback_tracker_(new ::ppapi::CallbackTracker),
is_in_destructor_(false),
is_crashed_(false),
broker_(NULL),
library_(NULL),
name_(name),
path_(path),
reserve_instance_id_(NULL),
nacl_ipc_proxy_(false) {
if (!host_globals)
host_globals = new HostGlobals;
memset(&entry_points_, 0, sizeof(entry_points_));
pp_module_ = HostGlobals::Get()->AddModule(this);
GetMainThreadMessageLoop(); // Initialize the main thread message loop.
GetLivePluginSet()->insert(this);
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 1
| 170,747
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: TEE_Result tee_mmu_user_pa2va_helper(const struct user_ta_ctx *utc,
paddr_t pa, void **va)
{
TEE_Result res;
paddr_t p;
struct vm_region *region;
TAILQ_FOREACH(region, &utc->vm_info->regions, link) {
size_t granule;
size_t size;
size_t ofs;
/* pa2va is expected only for memory tracked through mobj */
if (!region->mobj)
continue;
/* Physically granulated memory object must be scanned */
granule = region->mobj->phys_granule;
assert(!granule || IS_POWER_OF_TWO(granule));
for (ofs = region->offset; ofs < region->size; ofs += size) {
if (granule) {
/* From current offset to buffer/granule end */
size = granule - (ofs & (granule - 1));
if (size > (region->size - ofs))
size = region->size - ofs;
} else
size = region->size;
res = mobj_get_pa(region->mobj, ofs, granule, &p);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
if (core_is_buffer_inside(pa, 1, p, size)) {
/* Remove region offset (mobj phys offset) */
ofs -= region->offset;
/* Get offset-in-granule */
p = pa - p;
*va = (void *)(region->va + ofs + (vaddr_t)p);
return TEE_SUCCESS;
}
}
}
return TEE_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED;
}
Commit Message: core: tee_mmu_check_access_rights() check all pages
Prior to this patch tee_mmu_check_access_rights() checks an address in
each page of a supplied range. If both the start and length of that
range is unaligned the last page in the range is sometimes not checked.
With this patch the first address of each page in the range is checked
to simplify the logic of checking each page and the range and also to
cover the last page under all circumstances.
Fixes: OP-TEE-2018-0005: "tee_mmu_check_access_rights does not check
final page of TA buffer"
Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org> (QEMU v7, v8)
Reviewed-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Riscure <inforequest@riscure.com>
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <a.a.milburn@vu.nl>
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@linaro.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 86,978
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf,
int len, int peek)
{
int al, i, j, ret;
unsigned int n;
SSL3_RECORD *rr;
void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&s->rlayer.rbuf)) {
/* Not initialized yet */
if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
return (-1);
}
if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
(type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) ||
(peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
/*
* check whether there's a handshake message (client hello?) waiting
*/
if ((ret = have_handshake_fragment(s, type, buf, len)))
return ret;
/*
* Now s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if
* type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
*/
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
/*
* Continue handshake if it had to be interrupted to read app data with
* SCTP.
*/
if ((!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(s)) ||
(BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s))
&& ossl_statem_in_sctp_read_sock(s)
&& s->s3->in_read_app_data != 2))
#else
if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(s))
#endif
{
/* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
i = s->handshake_func(s);
if (i < 0)
return (i);
if (i == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
return (-1);
}
}
start:
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
/*-
* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
* s->s3->rrec.data, - data
* s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
* s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes.
*/
rr = s->rlayer.rrec;
/*
* We are not handshaking and have no data yet, so process data buffered
* during the last handshake in advance, if any.
*/
if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) && SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) {
pitem *item;
item = pqueue_pop(s->rlayer.d->buffered_app_data.q);
if (item) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
/* Restore bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */
if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_RCVINFO,
sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo);
}
#endif
dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
OPENSSL_free(item->data);
pitem_free(item);
}
}
/* Check for timeout */
if (dtls1_handle_timeout(s) > 0)
goto start;
/* get new packet if necessary */
if ((SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0)
|| (s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) {
ret = dtls1_get_record(s);
if (ret <= 0) {
ret = dtls1_read_failed(s, ret);
/* anything other than a timeout is an error */
if (ret <= 0)
return (ret);
else
goto start;
}
}
/* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
SSL3_RECORD_get_seq_num(rr)) < 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
goto start;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 1
| 165,262
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void dev_gso_skb_destructor(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct dev_gso_cb *cb;
do {
struct sk_buff *nskb = skb->next;
skb->next = nskb->next;
nskb->next = NULL;
kfree_skb(nskb);
} while (skb->next);
cb = DEV_GSO_CB(skb);
if (cb->destructor)
cb->destructor(skb);
}
Commit Message: veth: Dont kfree_skb() after dev_forward_skb()
In case of congestion, netif_rx() frees the skb, so we must assume
dev_forward_skb() also consume skb.
Bug introduced by commit 445409602c092
(veth: move loopback logic to common location)
We must change dev_forward_skb() to always consume skb, and veth to not
double free it.
Bug report : http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=127310770900442&w=3
Reported-by: Martín Ferrari <martin.ferrari@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 32,118
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: size_t mptsas_config_sas_io_unit_3(MPTSASState *s, uint8_t **data, int address)
{
return MPTSAS_CONFIG_PACK_EXT(3, MPI_CONFIG_EXTPAGETYPE_SAS_IO_UNIT, 0x06,
"*l*l*l*l*l*l*l*l*l");
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 8,668
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void NodeAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
V8SetReturnValueFast(info, WTF::GetPtr(impl->nodeAttribute()), impl);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 134,901
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int CreateHTTPRangeResponseHeader(
/*! String containing the range. */
char *ByteRangeSpecifier,
/*! Length of the file. */
off_t FileLength,
/*! [out] SendInstruction object where the range operations will be stored. */
struct SendInstruction *Instr)
{
off_t FirstByte, LastByte;
char *RangeInput;
char *Ptr;
int rc = 0;
Instr->IsRangeActive = 1;
Instr->ReadSendSize = FileLength;
if (!ByteRangeSpecifier)
return HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
RangeInput = strdup(ByteRangeSpecifier);
if (!RangeInput)
return HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR;
/* CONTENT-RANGE: bytes 222-3333/4000 HTTP_PARTIAL_CONTENT */
if (StrStr(RangeInput, "bytes") == NULL ||
(Ptr = StrStr(RangeInput, "=")) == NULL) {
free(RangeInput);
Instr->IsRangeActive = 0;
return HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
}
/* Jump = */
Ptr = Ptr + 1;
if (FileLength < 0) {
free(RangeInput);
return HTTP_REQUEST_RANGE_NOT_SATISFIABLE;
}
if (GetNextRange(&Ptr, &FirstByte, &LastByte) != -1) {
if (FileLength < FirstByte) {
free(RangeInput);
return HTTP_REQUEST_RANGE_NOT_SATISFIABLE;
}
if (FirstByte >= 0 && LastByte >= 0 && LastByte >= FirstByte) {
if (LastByte >= FileLength)
LastByte = FileLength - 1;
Instr->RangeOffset = FirstByte;
Instr->ReadSendSize = LastByte - FirstByte + 1;
/* Data between two range. */
rc = snprintf(Instr->RangeHeader,
sizeof(Instr->RangeHeader),
"CONTENT-RANGE: bytes %" PRId64
"-%" PRId64 "/%" PRId64 "\r\n",
(int64_t)FirstByte,
(int64_t)LastByte,
(int64_t)FileLength);
if (rc < 0 || (unsigned int) rc >= sizeof(Instr->RangeHeader)) {
free(RangeInput);
return HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR;
}
} else if (FirstByte >= 0 && LastByte == -1
&& FirstByte < FileLength) {
Instr->RangeOffset = FirstByte;
Instr->ReadSendSize = FileLength - FirstByte;
rc = snprintf(Instr->RangeHeader,
sizeof(Instr->RangeHeader),
"CONTENT-RANGE: bytes %" PRId64
"-%" PRId64 "/%" PRId64 "\r\n",
(int64_t)FirstByte,
(int64_t)(FileLength - 1),
(int64_t)FileLength);
if (rc < 0 || (unsigned int) rc >= sizeof(Instr->RangeHeader)) {
free(RangeInput);
return HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR;
}
} else if (FirstByte == -1 && LastByte > 0) {
if (LastByte >= FileLength) {
Instr->RangeOffset = 0;
Instr->ReadSendSize = FileLength;
rc = snprintf(Instr->RangeHeader,
sizeof(Instr->RangeHeader),
"CONTENT-RANGE: bytes 0-%" PRId64
"/%" PRId64 "\r\n",
(int64_t)(FileLength - 1),
(int64_t)FileLength);
} else {
Instr->RangeOffset = FileLength - LastByte;
Instr->ReadSendSize = LastByte;
rc = snprintf(Instr->RangeHeader,
sizeof(Instr->RangeHeader),
"CONTENT-RANGE: bytes %" PRId64
"-%" PRId64 "/%" PRId64 "\r\n",
(int64_t)(FileLength - LastByte),
(int64_t)FileLength - 1,
(int64_t)FileLength);
}
if (rc < 0 || (unsigned int) rc >= sizeof(Instr->RangeHeader)) {
free(RangeInput);
return HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR;
}
} else {
free(RangeInput);
return HTTP_REQUEST_RANGE_NOT_SATISFIABLE;
}
} else {
free(RangeInput);
return HTTP_REQUEST_RANGE_NOT_SATISFIABLE;
}
free(RangeInput);
return HTTP_OK;
}
Commit Message: Don't allow unhandled POSTs to write to the filesystem by default
If there's no registered handler for a POST request, the default behaviour
is to write it to the filesystem. Several million deployed devices appear
to have this behaviour, making it possible to (at least) store arbitrary
data on them. Add a configure option that enables this behaviour, and change
the default to just drop POSTs that aren't directly handled.
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 73,795
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SetGuestLocale(Profile* const profile) {
std::unique_ptr<GuestLanguageSetCallbackData> data(
new GuestLanguageSetCallbackData(profile));
locale_util::SwitchLanguageCallback callback(base::Bind(
&GuestLanguageSetCallbackData::Callback, base::Passed(std::move(data))));
const user_manager::User* const user =
ProfileHelper::Get()->GetUserByProfile(profile);
UserSessionManager::GetInstance()->RespectLocalePreference(profile, user,
callback);
}
Commit Message: Add a fake DriveFS launcher client.
Using DriveFS requires building and deploying ChromeOS. Add a client for
the fake DriveFS launcher to allow the use of a real DriveFS from a
ChromeOS chroot to be used with a target_os="chromeos" build of chrome.
This connects to the fake DriveFS launcher using mojo over a unix domain
socket named by a command-line flag, using the launcher to create
DriveFS instances.
Bug: 848126
Change-Id: I22dcca154d41bda196dd7c1782bb503f6bcba5b1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1098434
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <xiyuan@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sam McNally <sammc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567513}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 124,051
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: long kvm_arch_vm_ioctl(struct file *filp,
unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
{
struct kvm *kvm = filp->private_data;
void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
int r = -ENOTTY;
switch (ioctl) {
case KVM_SET_MEMORY_REGION: {
struct kvm_memory_region kvm_mem;
struct kvm_userspace_memory_region kvm_userspace_mem;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&kvm_mem, argp, sizeof kvm_mem))
goto out;
kvm_userspace_mem.slot = kvm_mem.slot;
kvm_userspace_mem.flags = kvm_mem.flags;
kvm_userspace_mem.guest_phys_addr =
kvm_mem.guest_phys_addr;
kvm_userspace_mem.memory_size = kvm_mem.memory_size;
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_set_memory_region(kvm,
&kvm_userspace_mem, 0);
if (r)
goto out;
break;
}
case KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP:
r = -EFAULT;
r = kvm_ioapic_init(kvm);
if (r)
goto out;
r = kvm_setup_default_irq_routing(kvm);
if (r) {
mutex_lock(&kvm->slots_lock);
kvm_ioapic_destroy(kvm);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->slots_lock);
goto out;
}
break;
case KVM_IRQ_LINE_STATUS:
case KVM_IRQ_LINE: {
struct kvm_irq_level irq_event;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&irq_event, argp, sizeof irq_event))
goto out;
r = -ENXIO;
if (irqchip_in_kernel(kvm)) {
__s32 status;
status = kvm_set_irq(kvm, KVM_USERSPACE_IRQ_SOURCE_ID,
irq_event.irq, irq_event.level);
if (ioctl == KVM_IRQ_LINE_STATUS) {
r = -EFAULT;
irq_event.status = status;
if (copy_to_user(argp, &irq_event,
sizeof irq_event))
goto out;
}
r = 0;
}
break;
}
case KVM_GET_IRQCHIP: {
/* 0: PIC master, 1: PIC slave, 2: IOAPIC */
struct kvm_irqchip chip;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&chip, argp, sizeof chip))
goto out;
r = -ENXIO;
if (!irqchip_in_kernel(kvm))
goto out;
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_get_irqchip(kvm, &chip);
if (r)
goto out;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(argp, &chip, sizeof chip))
goto out;
r = 0;
break;
}
case KVM_SET_IRQCHIP: {
/* 0: PIC master, 1: PIC slave, 2: IOAPIC */
struct kvm_irqchip chip;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&chip, argp, sizeof chip))
goto out;
r = -ENXIO;
if (!irqchip_in_kernel(kvm))
goto out;
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_set_irqchip(kvm, &chip);
if (r)
goto out;
r = 0;
break;
}
default:
;
}
out:
return r;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 20,614
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Textfield::GetTextFromRange(const gfx::Range& range,
base::string16* range_text) const {
if (!ImeEditingAllowed() || !range.IsValid())
return false;
gfx::Range text_range;
if (!GetTextRange(&text_range) || !text_range.Contains(range))
return false;
*range_text = model_->GetTextFromRange(range);
return true;
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 126,350
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void MaybeReportDownloadDeepScanningVerdict(
Profile* profile,
const GURL& url,
const std::string& file_name,
const std::string& download_digest_sha256,
BinaryUploadService::Result result,
DeepScanningClientResponse response) {
if (response.malware_scan_verdict().verdict() ==
MalwareDeepScanningVerdict::UWS ||
response.malware_scan_verdict().verdict() ==
MalwareDeepScanningVerdict::MALWARE) {
extensions::SafeBrowsingPrivateEventRouterFactory::GetForProfile(profile)
->OnDangerousDeepScanningResult(url, file_name, download_digest_sha256);
}
}
Commit Message: Add reporting for DLP deep scanning
For each triggered rule in the DLP response, we report the download as
violating that rule.
This also implements the UnsafeReportingEnabled enterprise policy, which
controls whether or not we do any reporting.
Bug: 980777
Change-Id: I48100cfb4dd5aa92ed80da1f34e64a6e393be2fa
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1772381
Commit-Queue: Daniel Rubery <drubery@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Karan Bhatia <karandeepb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Roger Tawa <rogerta@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#691371}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 1
| 172,413
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: toggle_dac_capability(int writable, int enable)
{
int rc;
cap_t caps;
cap_value_t capability = writable ? CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE : CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH;
if (getuid() != 0)
return 0;
caps = cap_get_proc();
if (caps == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unable to get current capability set: %s\n",
strerror(errno));
return EX_SYSERR;
}
if (cap_set_flag(caps, CAP_EFFECTIVE, 1, &capability,
enable ? CAP_SET : CAP_CLEAR) == -1) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unable to %s effective capabilities: %s\n",
enable ? "set" : "clear", strerror(errno));
rc = EX_SYSERR;
goto free_caps;
}
if (cap_set_proc(caps) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unable to set current process capabilities: %s\n",
strerror(errno));
rc = EX_SYSERR;
}
free_caps:
cap_free(caps);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 2,053
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: test_bson_build_child (void)
{
bson_t b;
bson_t child;
bson_t *b2;
bson_t *child2;
bson_init (&b);
BSON_ASSERT (bson_append_document_begin (&b, "foo", -1, &child));
BSON_ASSERT (bson_append_utf8 (&child, "bar", -1, "baz", -1));
BSON_ASSERT (bson_append_document_end (&b, &child));
b2 = bson_new ();
child2 = bson_new ();
BSON_ASSERT (bson_append_utf8 (child2, "bar", -1, "baz", -1));
BSON_ASSERT (bson_append_document (b2, "foo", -1, child2));
bson_destroy (child2);
BSON_ASSERT (b.len == b2->len);
BSON_ASSERT_BSON_EQUAL (&b, b2);
bson_destroy (&b);
bson_destroy (b2);
}
Commit Message: Fix for CVE-2018-16790 -- Verify bounds before binary length read.
As reported here: https://jira.mongodb.org/browse/CDRIVER-2819,
a heap overread occurs due a failure to correctly verify data
bounds.
In the original check, len - o returns the data left including the
sizeof(l) we just read. Instead, the comparison should check
against the data left NOT including the binary int32, i.e. just
subtype (byte*) instead of int32 subtype (byte*).
Added in test for corrupted BSON example.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 77,899
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CameraClient::handlePostview(const sp<IMemory>& mem) {
disableMsgType(CAMERA_MSG_POSTVIEW_FRAME);
sp<ICameraClient> c = mRemoteCallback;
mLock.unlock();
if (c != 0) {
c->dataCallback(CAMERA_MSG_POSTVIEW_FRAME, mem, NULL);
}
}
Commit Message: Camera: Disallow dumping clients directly
Camera service dumps should only be initiated through
ICameraService::dump.
Bug: 26265403
Change-Id: If3ca4718ed74bf33ad8a416192689203029e2803
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 161,781
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int WebContentsImpl::CreateSwappedOutRenderView(
SiteInstance* instance) {
int render_view_routing_id = MSG_ROUTING_NONE;
if (SiteIsolationPolicy::IsSwappedOutStateForbidden()) {
GetRenderManager()->CreateRenderFrameProxy(instance);
} else {
GetRenderManager()->CreateRenderFrame(
instance, CREATE_RF_SWAPPED_OUT | CREATE_RF_HIDDEN,
&render_view_routing_id);
}
return render_view_routing_id;
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 131,783
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Err cprt_Size(GF_Box *s)
{
GF_CopyrightBox *ptr = (GF_CopyrightBox *)s;
ptr->size += 2;
if (ptr->notice)
ptr->size += strlen(ptr->notice) + 1;
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,022
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: AP_DECLARE(const char *) ap_psignature(const char *prefix, request_rec *r)
{
char sport[20];
core_dir_config *conf;
conf = (core_dir_config *)ap_get_core_module_config(r->per_dir_config);
if ((conf->server_signature == srv_sig_off)
|| (conf->server_signature == srv_sig_unset)) {
return "";
}
apr_snprintf(sport, sizeof sport, "%u", (unsigned) ap_get_server_port(r));
if (conf->server_signature == srv_sig_withmail) {
return apr_pstrcat(r->pool, prefix, "<address>",
ap_get_server_banner(),
" Server at <a href=\"",
ap_is_url(r->server->server_admin) ? "" : "mailto:",
ap_escape_html(r->pool, r->server->server_admin),
"\">",
ap_escape_html(r->pool, ap_get_server_name(r)),
"</a> Port ", sport,
"</address>\n", NULL);
}
return apr_pstrcat(r->pool, prefix, "<address>", ap_get_server_banner(),
" Server at ",
ap_escape_html(r->pool, ap_get_server_name(r)),
" Port ", sport,
"</address>\n", NULL);
}
Commit Message: core: Disallow Methods' registration at run time (.htaccess), they may be
used only if registered at init time (httpd.conf).
Calling ap_method_register() in children processes is not the right scope
since it won't be shared for all requests.
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1807655 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 64,205
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void _xml_endNamespaceDeclHandler(void *userData, const XML_Char *prefix)
{
xml_parser *parser = (xml_parser *)userData;
if (parser && parser->endNamespaceDeclHandler) {
zval *retval, *args[2];
args[0] = _xml_resource_zval(parser->index);
args[1] = _xml_xmlchar_zval(prefix, 0, parser->target_encoding);
if ((retval = xml_call_handler(parser, parser->endNamespaceDeclHandler, parser->endNamespaceDeclPtr, 2, args))) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&retval);
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 10,989
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int select_size(struct sock *sk, int sg)
{
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
int tmp = tp->mss_cache;
if (sg) {
if (sk_can_gso(sk))
tmp = 0;
else {
int pgbreak = SKB_MAX_HEAD(MAX_TCP_HEADER);
if (tmp >= pgbreak &&
tmp <= pgbreak + (MAX_SKB_FRAGS - 1) * PAGE_SIZE)
tmp = pgbreak;
}
}
return tmp;
}
Commit Message: net: Fix oops from tcp_collapse() when using splice()
tcp_read_sock() can have a eat skbs without immediately advancing copied_seq.
This can cause a panic in tcp_collapse() if it is called as a result
of the recv_actor dropping the socket lock.
A userspace program that splices data from a socket to either another
socket or to a file can trigger this bug.
Signed-off-by: Steven J. Magnani <steve@digidescorp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 31,861
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: long vhost_dev_init(struct vhost_dev *dev,
struct vhost_virtqueue *vqs, int nvqs)
{
int i;
dev->vqs = vqs;
dev->nvqs = nvqs;
mutex_init(&dev->mutex);
dev->log_ctx = NULL;
dev->log_file = NULL;
dev->memory = NULL;
dev->mm = NULL;
spin_lock_init(&dev->work_lock);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->work_list);
dev->worker = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < dev->nvqs; ++i) {
dev->vqs[i].log = NULL;
dev->vqs[i].indirect = NULL;
dev->vqs[i].heads = NULL;
dev->vqs[i].ubuf_info = NULL;
dev->vqs[i].dev = dev;
mutex_init(&dev->vqs[i].mutex);
vhost_vq_reset(dev, dev->vqs + i);
if (dev->vqs[i].handle_kick)
vhost_poll_init(&dev->vqs[i].poll,
dev->vqs[i].handle_kick, POLLIN, dev);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: vhost: fix length for cross region descriptor
If a single descriptor crosses a region, the
second chunk length should be decremented
by size translated so far, instead it includes
the full descriptor length.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 33,784
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int restore_node_summary(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
unsigned int segno, struct f2fs_summary_block *sum)
{
struct f2fs_node *rn;
struct f2fs_summary *sum_entry;
block_t addr;
int i, idx, last_offset, nrpages;
/* scan the node segment */
last_offset = sbi->blocks_per_seg;
addr = START_BLOCK(sbi, segno);
sum_entry = &sum->entries[0];
for (i = 0; i < last_offset; i += nrpages, addr += nrpages) {
nrpages = min(last_offset - i, BIO_MAX_PAGES);
/* readahead node pages */
ra_meta_pages(sbi, addr, nrpages, META_POR, true);
for (idx = addr; idx < addr + nrpages; idx++) {
struct page *page = get_tmp_page(sbi, idx);
rn = F2FS_NODE(page);
sum_entry->nid = rn->footer.nid;
sum_entry->version = 0;
sum_entry->ofs_in_node = 0;
sum_entry++;
f2fs_put_page(page, 1);
}
invalidate_mapping_pages(META_MAPPING(sbi), addr,
addr + nrpages);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix race condition in between free nid allocator/initializer
In below concurrent case, allocated nid can be loaded into free nid cache
and be allocated again.
Thread A Thread B
- f2fs_create
- f2fs_new_inode
- alloc_nid
- __insert_nid_to_list(ALLOC_NID_LIST)
- f2fs_balance_fs_bg
- build_free_nids
- __build_free_nids
- scan_nat_page
- add_free_nid
- __lookup_nat_cache
- f2fs_add_link
- init_inode_metadata
- new_inode_page
- new_node_page
- set_node_addr
- alloc_nid_done
- __remove_nid_from_list(ALLOC_NID_LIST)
- __insert_nid_to_list(FREE_NID_LIST)
This patch makes nat cache lookup and free nid list operation being atomical
to avoid this race condition.
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 85,293
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static JSON_INLINE int isnan(double x) { return x != x; }
Commit Message: CVE-2013-6401: Change hash function, randomize hashes
Thanks to Florian Weimer and Eric Sesterhenn for reporting, reviewing
and testing.
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 40,878
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void __user *compat_alloc_user_space(unsigned long len)
{
void __user *ptr;
/* If len would occupy more than half of the entire compat space... */
if (unlikely(len > (((compat_uptr_t)~0) >> 1)))
return NULL;
ptr = arch_compat_alloc_user_space(len);
if (unlikely(!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, ptr, len)))
return NULL;
return ptr;
}
Commit Message: compat: fix 4-byte infoleak via uninitialized struct field
Commit 3a4d44b61625 ("ntp: Move adjtimex related compat syscalls to
native counterparts") removed the memset() in compat_get_timex(). Since
then, the compat adjtimex syscall can invoke do_adjtimex() with an
uninitialized ->tai.
If do_adjtimex() doesn't write to ->tai (e.g. because the arguments are
invalid), compat_put_timex() then copies the uninitialized ->tai field
to userspace.
Fix it by adding the memset() back.
Fixes: 3a4d44b61625 ("ntp: Move adjtimex related compat syscalls to native counterparts")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 82,635
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: create_initial_guard_context(void)
{
tor_assert(! curr_guard_context);
if (!guard_contexts) {
guard_contexts = smartlist_new();
}
guard_selection_type_t type = GS_TYPE_INFER;
const char *name = choose_guard_selection(
get_options(),
networkstatus_get_live_consensus(approx_time()),
NULL,
&type);
tor_assert(name); // "name" can only be NULL if we had an old name.
tor_assert(type != GS_TYPE_INFER);
log_notice(LD_GUARD, "Starting with guard context \"%s\"", name);
curr_guard_context = get_guard_selection_by_name(name, type, 1);
}
Commit Message: Consider the exit family when applying guard restrictions.
When the new path selection logic went into place, I accidentally
dropped the code that considered the _family_ of the exit node when
deciding if the guard was usable, and we didn't catch that during
code review.
This patch makes the guard_restriction_t code consider the exit
family as well, and adds some (hopefully redundant) checks for the
case where we lack a node_t for a guard but we have a bridge_info_t
for it.
Fixes bug 22753; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha. Tracked as TROVE-2016-006
and CVE-2017-0377.
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 69,660
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Browser::OpenFileManager() {
UserMetrics::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("OpenFileManager"));
ShowSingletonTabRespectRef(GURL(chrome::kChromeUIFileManagerURL));
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 97,299
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: blink::WebFrame* RenderFrameImpl::ResolveOpener(int opener_frame_routing_id) {
if (opener_frame_routing_id == MSG_ROUTING_NONE)
return nullptr;
RenderFrameProxy* opener_proxy =
RenderFrameProxy::FromRoutingID(opener_frame_routing_id);
if (opener_proxy)
return opener_proxy->web_frame();
RenderFrameImpl* opener_frame =
RenderFrameImpl::FromRoutingID(opener_frame_routing_id);
if (opener_frame)
return opener_frame->GetWebFrame();
return nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 139,822
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void set_maintenance_mode(void *send_info, bool enable)
{
struct smi_info *smi_info = send_info;
if (!enable)
atomic_set(&smi_info->req_events, 0);
}
Commit Message: ipmi_si: fix use-after-free of resource->name
When we excute the following commands, we got oops
rmmod ipmi_si
cat /proc/ioports
[ 1623.482380] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff00000901d478
[ 1623.482382] Mem abort info:
[ 1623.482383] ESR = 0x96000007
[ 1623.482385] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 1623.482386] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 1623.482387] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 1623.482388] Data abort info:
[ 1623.482389] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000007
[ 1623.482390] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 1623.482393] swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000d7d94a66
[ 1623.482395] [ffff00000901d478] pgd=000000dffbfff003, pud=000000dffbffe003, pmd=0000003f5d06e003, pte=0000000000000000
[ 1623.482399] Internal error: Oops: 96000007 [#1] SMP
[ 1623.487407] Modules linked in: ipmi_si(E) nls_utf8 isofs rpcrdma ib_iser ib_srpt target_core_mod ib_srp scsi_transport_srp ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log iw_cm dm_mod aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ses ghash_ce sha2_ce enclosure sha256_arm64 sg sha1_ce hisi_sas_v2_hw hibmc_drm sbsa_gwdt hisi_sas_main ip_tables mlx5_ib ib_uverbs marvell ib_core mlx5_core ixgbe mdio hns_dsaf ipmi_devintf hns_enet_drv ipmi_msghandler hns_mdio [last unloaded: ipmi_si]
[ 1623.532410] CPU: 30 PID: 11438 Comm: cat Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E 5.0.0-rc3+ #168
[ 1623.541498] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.37 11/21/2017
[ 1623.548822] pstate: a0000005 (NzCv daif -PAN -UAO)
[ 1623.553684] pc : string+0x28/0x98
[ 1623.557040] lr : vsnprintf+0x368/0x5e8
[ 1623.560837] sp : ffff000013213a80
[ 1623.564191] x29: ffff000013213a80 x28: ffff00001138abb5
[ 1623.569577] x27: ffff000013213c18 x26: ffff805f67d06049
[ 1623.574963] x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffff00001138abb5
[ 1623.580349] x23: 0000000000000fb7 x22: ffff0000117ed000
[ 1623.585734] x21: ffff000011188fd8 x20: ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.591119] x19: ffff805f67d06061 x18: ffffffffffffffff
[ 1623.596505] x17: 0000000000000200 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.601890] x15: ffff0000117ed748 x14: ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.607276] x13: ffff805f67d0605e x12: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.612661] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.618046] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 000000000000000f
[ 1623.623432] x7 : ffff805f67d06061 x6 : fffffffffffffffe
[ 1623.628817] x5 : 0000000000000012 x4 : ffff00000901d478
[ 1623.634203] x3 : ffff0a00ffffff04 x2 : ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.639588] x1 : ffff805f67d07000 x0 : ffffffffffffffff
[ 1623.644974] Process cat (pid: 11438, stack limit = 0x000000008d4cbc10)
[ 1623.651592] Call trace:
[ 1623.654068] string+0x28/0x98
[ 1623.657071] vsnprintf+0x368/0x5e8
[ 1623.660517] seq_vprintf+0x70/0x98
[ 1623.668009] seq_printf+0x7c/0xa0
[ 1623.675530] r_show+0xc8/0xf8
[ 1623.682558] seq_read+0x330/0x440
[ 1623.689877] proc_reg_read+0x78/0xd0
[ 1623.697346] __vfs_read+0x60/0x1a0
[ 1623.704564] vfs_read+0x94/0x150
[ 1623.711339] ksys_read+0x6c/0xd8
[ 1623.717939] __arm64_sys_read+0x24/0x30
[ 1623.725077] el0_svc_common+0x120/0x148
[ 1623.732035] el0_svc_handler+0x30/0x40
[ 1623.738757] el0_svc+0x8/0xc
[ 1623.744520] Code: d1000406 aa0103e2 54000149 b4000080 (39400085)
[ 1623.753441] ---[ end trace f91b6a4937de9835 ]---
[ 1623.760871] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
[ 1623.768935] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 1623.775718] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 1623.781998] CPU features: 0x002,21006008
[ 1623.788777] Memory Limit: none
[ 1623.798329] Starting crashdump kernel...
[ 1623.805202] Bye!
If io_setup is called successful in try_smi_init() but try_smi_init()
goes out_err before calling ipmi_register_smi(), so ipmi_unregister_smi()
will not be called while removing module. It leads to the resource that
allocated in io_setup() can not be freed, but the name(DEVICE_NAME) of
resource is freed while removing the module. It causes use-after-free
when cat /proc/ioports.
Fix this by calling io_cleanup() while try_smi_init() goes to out_err.
and don't call io_cleanup() until io_setup() returns successful to avoid
warning prints.
Fixes: 93c303d2045b ("ipmi_si: Clean up shutdown a bit")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: NuoHan Qiao <qiaonuohan@huawei.com>
Suggested-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 90,246
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: hook_modifier_exec (struct t_weechat_plugin *plugin, const char *modifier,
const char *modifier_data, const char *string)
{
struct t_hook *ptr_hook, *next_hook;
char *new_msg, *message_modified;
/* make C compiler happy */
(void) plugin;
if (!modifier || !modifier[0])
return NULL;
new_msg = NULL;
message_modified = strdup (string);
if (!message_modified)
return NULL;
hook_exec_start ();
ptr_hook = weechat_hooks[HOOK_TYPE_MODIFIER];
while (ptr_hook)
{
next_hook = ptr_hook->next_hook;
if (!ptr_hook->deleted
&& !ptr_hook->running
&& (string_strcasecmp (HOOK_MODIFIER(ptr_hook, modifier),
modifier) == 0))
{
ptr_hook->running = 1;
new_msg = (HOOK_MODIFIER(ptr_hook, callback))
(ptr_hook->callback_data, modifier, modifier_data,
message_modified);
ptr_hook->running = 0;
/* empty string returned => message dropped */
if (new_msg && !new_msg[0])
{
free (message_modified);
hook_exec_end ();
return new_msg;
}
/* new message => keep it as base for next modifier */
if (new_msg)
{
free (message_modified);
message_modified = new_msg;
}
}
ptr_hook = next_hook;
}
hook_exec_end ();
return message_modified;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 3,424
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void IndexedDBDispatcher::OnWorkerRunLoopStopped() {
delete this;
}
Commit Message: Add DCHECK to ensure IndexedDBDispatcher doesn't get re-created.
This could happen if there are IDB objects that survive the call to
didStopWorkerRunLoop.
BUG=121734
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9999035
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@131679 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 108,693
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ConvertAnswerOptionsToWebrtcAnswerOptions(
const blink::WebRTCAnswerOptions& options,
webrtc::PeerConnectionInterface::RTCOfferAnswerOptions* output) {
output->voice_activity_detection = options.VoiceActivityDetection();
}
Commit Message: Check weak pointers in RTCPeerConnectionHandler::WebRtcSetDescriptionObserverImpl
Bug: 912074
Change-Id: I8ba86751f5d5bf12db51520f985ef0d3dae63ed8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1411916
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <hbos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#622945}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 152,923
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ExtensionsAPIClient::CreateContentRulesRegistry(
content::BrowserContext* browser_context,
RulesCacheDelegate* cache_delegate) const {
return scoped_refptr<ContentRulesRegistry>();
}
Commit Message: Hide DevTools frontend from webRequest API
Prevent extensions from observing requests for remote DevTools frontends
and add regression tests.
And update ExtensionTestApi to support initializing the embedded test
server and port from SetUpCommandLine (before SetUpOnMainThread).
BUG=797497,797500
TEST=browser_test --gtest_filter=DevToolsFrontendInWebRequestApiTest.HiddenRequests
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_mojo
Change-Id: Ic8f44b5771f2d5796f8c3de128f0a7ab88a77735
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/844316
Commit-Queue: Rob Wu <rob@robwu.nl>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528187}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 146,597
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void hmac_add_misc(struct shash_desc *desc, struct inode *inode,
char *digest)
{
struct h_misc {
unsigned long ino;
__u32 generation;
uid_t uid;
gid_t gid;
umode_t mode;
} hmac_misc;
memset(&hmac_misc, 0, sizeof hmac_misc);
hmac_misc.ino = inode->i_ino;
hmac_misc.generation = inode->i_generation;
hmac_misc.uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, inode->i_uid);
hmac_misc.gid = from_kgid(&init_user_ns, inode->i_gid);
hmac_misc.mode = inode->i_mode;
crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)&hmac_misc, sizeof hmac_misc);
crypto_shash_final(desc, digest);
}
Commit Message: evm: checking if removexattr is not a NULL
The following lines of code produce a kernel oops.
fd = socket(PF_FILE, SOCK_STREAM|SOCK_CLOEXEC|SOCK_NONBLOCK, 0);
fchmod(fd, 0666);
[ 139.922364] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 139.924982] IP: [< (null)>] (null)
[ 139.924982] *pde = 00000000
[ 139.924982] Oops: 0000 [#5] SMP
[ 139.924982] Modules linked in: fuse dm_crypt dm_mod i2c_piix4 serio_raw evdev binfmt_misc button
[ 139.924982] Pid: 3070, comm: acpid Tainted: G D 3.8.0-rc2-kds+ #465 Bochs Bochs
[ 139.924982] EIP: 0060:[<00000000>] EFLAGS: 00010246 CPU: 0
[ 139.924982] EIP is at 0x0
[ 139.924982] EAX: cf5ef000 EBX: cf5ef000 ECX: c143d600 EDX: c15225f2
[ 139.924982] ESI: cf4d2a1c EDI: cf4d2a1c EBP: cc02df10 ESP: cc02dee4
[ 139.924982] DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 0033 SS: 0068
[ 139.924982] CR0: 80050033 CR2: 00000000 CR3: 0c059000 CR4: 000006d0
[ 139.924982] DR0: 00000000 DR1: 00000000 DR2: 00000000 DR3: 00000000
[ 139.924982] DR6: ffff0ff0 DR7: 00000400
[ 139.924982] Process acpid (pid: 3070, ti=cc02c000 task=d7705340 task.ti=cc02c000)
[ 139.924982] Stack:
[ 139.924982] c1203c88 00000000 cc02def4 cf4d2a1c ae21eefa 471b60d5 1083c1ba c26a5940
[ 139.924982] e891fb5e 00000041 00000004 cc02df1c c1203964 00000000 cc02df4c c10e20c3
[ 139.924982] 00000002 00000000 00000000 22222222 c1ff2222 cf5ef000 00000000 d76efb08
[ 139.924982] Call Trace:
[ 139.924982] [<c1203c88>] ? evm_update_evmxattr+0x5b/0x62
[ 139.924982] [<c1203964>] evm_inode_post_setattr+0x22/0x26
[ 139.924982] [<c10e20c3>] notify_change+0x25f/0x281
[ 139.924982] [<c10cbf56>] chmod_common+0x59/0x76
[ 139.924982] [<c10e27a1>] ? put_unused_fd+0x33/0x33
[ 139.924982] [<c10cca09>] sys_fchmod+0x39/0x5c
[ 139.924982] [<c13f4f30>] syscall_call+0x7/0xb
[ 139.924982] Code: Bad EIP value.
This happens because sockets do not define the removexattr operation.
Before removing the xattr, verify the removexattr function pointer is
not NULL.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 33,765
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *buf, *p;
int ret;
unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
/* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
return -1;
}
/* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
return -1;
}
/* ...and no handshake in progress. */
if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
return -1;
}
/* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
* must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
*/
OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
/* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
* as payload to distuingish different messages and add
* some random stuff.
* - Message Type, 1 byte
* - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
* - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
* - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
* - Padding
*/
buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
p = buf;
/* Message Type */
*p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
/* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
s2n(payload, p);
/* Sequence number */
s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
/* 16 random bytes */
RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
p += 16;
/* Random padding */
RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
if (ret >= 0)
{
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
buf, 3 + payload + padding,
s, s->msg_callback_arg);
s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
}
OPENSSL_free(buf);
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 10,825
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct timeval ns_to_timeval(const s64 nsec)
{
struct timespec ts = ns_to_timespec(nsec);
struct timeval tv;
tv.tv_sec = ts.tv_sec;
tv.tv_usec = (suseconds_t) ts.tv_nsec / 1000;
return tv;
}
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 24,717
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual void TearDown()
{
memoryCache()->evictResources();
replaceMemoryCacheForTesting(m_globalMemoryCache.release());
}
Commit Message: Add assertions that the empty Platform::cryptographicallyRandomValues() overrides are not being used.
These implementations are not safe and look scary if not accompanied by an assertion. Also one of the comments was incorrect.
BUG=552749
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1419293005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#359229}
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 132,390
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int br_mdb_fill_info(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb,
struct net_device *dev)
{
struct net_bridge *br = netdev_priv(dev);
struct net_bridge_mdb_htable *mdb;
struct nlattr *nest, *nest2;
int i, err = 0;
int idx = 0, s_idx = cb->args[1];
if (br->multicast_disabled)
return 0;
mdb = rcu_dereference(br->mdb);
if (!mdb)
return 0;
nest = nla_nest_start(skb, MDBA_MDB);
if (nest == NULL)
return -EMSGSIZE;
for (i = 0; i < mdb->max; i++) {
struct net_bridge_mdb_entry *mp;
struct net_bridge_port_group *p, **pp;
struct net_bridge_port *port;
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(mp, &mdb->mhash[i], hlist[mdb->ver]) {
if (idx < s_idx)
goto skip;
nest2 = nla_nest_start(skb, MDBA_MDB_ENTRY);
if (nest2 == NULL) {
err = -EMSGSIZE;
goto out;
}
for (pp = &mp->ports;
(p = rcu_dereference(*pp)) != NULL;
pp = &p->next) {
port = p->port;
if (port) {
struct br_mdb_entry e;
e.ifindex = port->dev->ifindex;
e.state = p->state;
if (p->addr.proto == htons(ETH_P_IP))
e.addr.u.ip4 = p->addr.u.ip4;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
if (p->addr.proto == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
e.addr.u.ip6 = p->addr.u.ip6;
#endif
e.addr.proto = p->addr.proto;
if (nla_put(skb, MDBA_MDB_ENTRY_INFO, sizeof(e), &e)) {
nla_nest_cancel(skb, nest2);
err = -EMSGSIZE;
goto out;
}
}
}
nla_nest_end(skb, nest2);
skip:
idx++;
}
}
out:
cb->args[1] = idx;
nla_nest_end(skb, nest);
return err;
}
Commit Message: bridge: fix mdb info leaks
The bridging code discloses heap and stack bytes via the RTM_GETMDB
netlink interface and via the notify messages send to group RTNLGRP_MDB
afer a successful add/del.
Fix both cases by initializing all unset members/padding bytes with
memset(0).
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 1
| 166,053
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool InputMsgWatcher::HasReceivedAck() const {
return ack_result_ != INPUT_EVENT_ACK_STATE_UNKNOWN;
}
Commit Message: Apply ExtensionNavigationThrottle filesystem/blob checks to all frames.
BUG=836858
Change-Id: I34333a72501129fd40b5a9aa6378c9f35f1e7fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1028511
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nick Carter <nick@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553867}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 156,083
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual void PreEncodeFrameHook(::libvpx_test::VideoSource *video,
::libvpx_test::Encoder *encoder) {
if (video->frame() == 1) {
encoder->Control(VP8E_SET_CPUUSED, set_cpu_used_);
}
if (cfg_.ts_number_layers > 1) {
if (video->frame() == 1) {
encoder->Control(VP9E_SET_SVC, 1);
}
vpx_svc_layer_id_t layer_id = {0, 0};
layer_id.spatial_layer_id = 0;
frame_flags_ = SetFrameFlags(video->frame(), cfg_.ts_number_layers);
layer_id.temporal_layer_id = SetLayerId(video->frame(),
cfg_.ts_number_layers);
if (video->frame() > 0) {
encoder->Control(VP9E_SET_SVC_LAYER_ID, &layer_id);
}
}
const vpx_rational_t tb = video->timebase();
timebase_ = static_cast<double>(tb.num) / tb.den;
duration_ = 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 174,516
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void EventBindings::AttachFilteredEvent(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args) {
CHECK_EQ(2, args.Length());
CHECK(args[0]->IsString());
CHECK(args[1]->IsObject());
std::string event_name = *v8::String::Utf8Value(args[0]);
if (!context()->HasAccessOrThrowError(event_name))
return;
std::unique_ptr<base::DictionaryValue> filter;
{
std::unique_ptr<content::V8ValueConverter> converter(
content::V8ValueConverter::create());
std::unique_ptr<base::Value> filter_value(converter->FromV8Value(
v8::Local<v8::Object>::Cast(args[1]), context()->v8_context()));
if (!filter_value || !filter_value->IsType(base::Value::TYPE_DICTIONARY)) {
args.GetReturnValue().Set(static_cast<int32_t>(-1));
return;
}
filter = base::DictionaryValue::From(std::move(filter_value));
}
base::DictionaryValue* filter_weak = filter.get();
int id = g_event_filter.Get().AddEventMatcher(
event_name, ParseEventMatcher(std::move(filter)));
attached_matcher_ids_.insert(id);
std::string extension_id = context()->GetExtensionID();
if (AddFilter(event_name, extension_id, *filter_weak)) {
bool lazy = ExtensionFrameHelper::IsContextForEventPage(context());
content::RenderThread::Get()->Send(new ExtensionHostMsg_AddFilteredListener(
extension_id, event_name, *filter_weak, lazy));
}
args.GetReturnValue().Set(static_cast<int32_t>(id));
}
Commit Message: Ignore filtered event if an event matcher cannot be added.
BUG=625404
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2236133002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#411472}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 1
| 172,060
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void sc_asn1_print_bit_string(const u8 * buf, size_t buflen, size_t depth)
{
#ifndef _WIN32
long long a = 0;
#else
__int64 a = 0;
#endif
int r, i;
if (buflen > sizeof(a) + 1) {
print_hex(buf, buflen, depth);
} else {
r = sc_asn1_decode_bit_string(buf, buflen, &a, sizeof(a));
if (r < 0) {
printf("decode error");
return;
}
for (i = r - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
printf("%c", ((a >> i) & 1) ? '1' : '0');
}
}
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 78,131
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void redisOpArrayInit(redisOpArray *oa) {
oa->ops = NULL;
oa->numops = 0;
}
Commit Message: Security: Cross Protocol Scripting protection.
This is an attempt at mitigating problems due to cross protocol
scripting, an attack targeting services using line oriented protocols
like Redis that can accept HTTP requests as valid protocol, by
discarding the invalid parts and accepting the payloads sent, for
example, via a POST request.
For this to be effective, when we detect POST and Host: and terminate
the connection asynchronously, the networking code was modified in order
to never process further input. It was later verified that in a
pipelined request containing a POST command, the successive commands are
not executed.
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 70,058
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PluginServiceImpl::~PluginServiceImpl() {
#if defined(OS_WIN)
hkcu_watcher_.StopWatching();
hklm_watcher_.StopWatching();
if (hkcu_event_.get())
hkcu_event_->Release();
if (hklm_event_.get())
hklm_event_->Release();
#endif
DCHECK(pending_plugin_clients_.empty());
}
Commit Message: Follow-on fixes and naming changes for https://codereview.chromium.org/12086077/
BUG=172573
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12177018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180600 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-287
| 0
| 116,808
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void *show_partition_start(struct seq_file *seqf, loff_t *pos)
{
void *p;
p = disk_seqf_start(seqf, pos);
if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(p) && !*pos)
seq_puts(seqf, "major minor #blocks name\n\n");
return p;
}
Commit Message: block: fix use-after-free in seq file
I got a KASAN report of use-after-free:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in klist_iter_exit+0x61/0x70 at addr ffff8800b6581508
Read of size 8 by task trinity-c1/315
=============================================================================
BUG kmalloc-32 (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
INFO: Allocated in disk_seqf_start+0x66/0x110 age=144 cpu=1 pid=315
___slab_alloc+0x4f1/0x520
__slab_alloc.isra.58+0x56/0x80
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x260/0x2a0
disk_seqf_start+0x66/0x110
traverse+0x176/0x860
seq_read+0x7e3/0x11a0
proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
do_preadv+0x126/0x170
SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
do_syscall_64+0x1a1/0x460
return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
INFO: Freed in disk_seqf_stop+0x42/0x50 age=160 cpu=1 pid=315
__slab_free+0x17a/0x2c0
kfree+0x20a/0x220
disk_seqf_stop+0x42/0x50
traverse+0x3b5/0x860
seq_read+0x7e3/0x11a0
proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
do_preadv+0x126/0x170
SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
do_syscall_64+0x1a1/0x460
return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
CPU: 1 PID: 315 Comm: trinity-c1 Tainted: G B 4.7.0+ #62
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
ffffea0002d96000 ffff880119b9f918 ffffffff81d6ce81 ffff88011a804480
ffff8800b6581500 ffff880119b9f948 ffffffff8146c7bd ffff88011a804480
ffffea0002d96000 ffff8800b6581500 fffffffffffffff4 ffff880119b9f970
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81d6ce81>] dump_stack+0x65/0x84
[<ffffffff8146c7bd>] print_trailer+0x10d/0x1a0
[<ffffffff814704ff>] object_err+0x2f/0x40
[<ffffffff814754d1>] kasan_report_error+0x221/0x520
[<ffffffff8147590e>] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x3e/0x40
[<ffffffff83888161>] klist_iter_exit+0x61/0x70
[<ffffffff82404389>] class_dev_iter_exit+0x9/0x10
[<ffffffff81d2e8ea>] disk_seqf_stop+0x3a/0x50
[<ffffffff8151f812>] seq_read+0x4b2/0x11a0
[<ffffffff815f8fdc>] proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
[<ffffffff814b24e4>] do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
[<ffffffff814b4c45>] do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
[<ffffffff814b8a17>] vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
[<ffffffff814b8de6>] do_preadv+0x126/0x170
[<ffffffff814b92ec>] SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
This problem can occur in the following situation:
open()
- pread()
- .seq_start()
- iter = kmalloc() // succeeds
- seqf->private = iter
- .seq_stop()
- kfree(seqf->private)
- pread()
- .seq_start()
- iter = kmalloc() // fails
- .seq_stop()
- class_dev_iter_exit(seqf->private) // boom! old pointer
As the comment in disk_seqf_stop() says, stop is called even if start
failed, so we need to reinitialise the private pointer to NULL when seq
iteration stops.
An alternative would be to set the private pointer to NULL when the
kmalloc() in disk_seqf_start() fails.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 49,721
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int kvm_vm_ioctl_set_device_addr(struct kvm *kvm,
struct kvm_arm_device_addr *dev_addr)
{
unsigned long dev_id, type;
dev_id = (dev_addr->id & KVM_ARM_DEVICE_ID_MASK) >>
KVM_ARM_DEVICE_ID_SHIFT;
type = (dev_addr->id & KVM_ARM_DEVICE_TYPE_MASK) >>
KVM_ARM_DEVICE_TYPE_SHIFT;
switch (dev_id) {
case KVM_ARM_DEVICE_VGIC_V2:
if (!vgic_present)
return -ENXIO;
return kvm_vgic_set_addr(kvm, type, dev_addr->addr);
default:
return -ENODEV;
}
}
Commit Message: ARM: KVM: prevent NULL pointer dereferences with KVM VCPU ioctl
Some ARM KVM VCPU ioctls require the vCPU to be properly initialized
with the KVM_ARM_VCPU_INIT ioctl before being used with further
requests. KVM_RUN checks whether this initialization has been
done, but other ioctls do not.
Namely KVM_GET_REG_LIST will dereference an array with index -1
without initialization and thus leads to a kernel oops.
Fix this by adding checks before executing the ioctl handlers.
[ Removed superflous comment from static function - Christoffer ]
Changes from v1:
* moved check into a static function with a meaningful name
Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <cdall@cs.columbia.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 28,975
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline SCSIDevice *virtio_scsi_device_find(VirtIOSCSI *s, uint8_t *lun)
{
if (lun[0] != 1) {
return NULL;
}
if (lun[2] != 0 && !(lun[2] >= 0x40 && lun[2] < 0x80)) {
return NULL;
}
return scsi_device_find(&s->bus, 0, lun[1], virtio_scsi_get_lun(lun));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 15,620
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FrameBuffer::Create() {
ScopedGLErrorSuppressor suppressor(decoder_);
Destroy();
glGenFramebuffersEXT(1, &id_);
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 99,098
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ThreadHeap::ReportMemoryUsageHistogram() {
static size_t supported_max_size_in_mb = 4 * 1024;
static size_t observed_max_size_in_mb = 0;
if (!IsMainThread())
return;
size_t size_in_mb =
ThreadState::Current()->Heap().HeapStats().AllocatedSpace() / 1024 /
1024 +
1;
if (size_in_mb >= supported_max_size_in_mb)
size_in_mb = supported_max_size_in_mb - 1;
if (size_in_mb > observed_max_size_in_mb) {
DEFINE_THREAD_SAFE_STATIC_LOCAL(
EnumerationHistogram, commited_size_histogram,
("BlinkGC.CommittedSize", supported_max_size_in_mb));
commited_size_histogram.Count(size_in_mb);
observed_max_size_in_mb = size_in_mb;
}
}
Commit Message: [oilpan] Fix GCInfoTable for multiple threads
Previously, grow and access from different threads could lead to a race
on the table backing; see bug.
- Rework the table to work on an existing reservation.
- Commit upon growing, avoiding any copies.
Drive-by: Fix over-allocation of table.
Bug: chromium:841280
Change-Id: I329cb6f40091e14e8c05334ba1104a9440c31d43
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1061525
Commit-Queue: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560434}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 153,677
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool DownloadItemImpl::TimeRemaining(base::TimeDelta* remaining) const {
if (total_bytes_ <= 0)
return false; // We never received the content_length for this download.
int64_t speed = CurrentSpeed();
if (speed == 0)
return false;
*remaining =
base::TimeDelta::FromSeconds((total_bytes_ - GetReceivedBytes()) / speed);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Downloads : Fixed an issue of opening incorrect download file
When one download overwrites another completed download, calling download.open in the old download causes the new download to open, which could be dangerous and undesirable. In this CL, we are trying to avoid this by blocking the opening of the old download.
Bug: 793620
Change-Id: Ic948175756700ad7c08489c3cc347330daedb6f8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/826477
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <dtrainor@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Shakti Sahu <shaktisahu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525810}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 146,389
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: sysEvent_t Com_GetEvent( void ) {
if ( com_pushedEventsHead > com_pushedEventsTail ) {
com_pushedEventsTail++;
return com_pushedEvents[ ( com_pushedEventsTail - 1 ) & ( MAX_PUSHED_EVENTS - 1 ) ];
}
return Com_GetRealEvent();
}
Commit Message: All: Merge some file writing extension checks
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 95,597
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: http_Setup(struct http *hp, struct ws *ws)
{
uint16_t shd;
txt *hd;
unsigned char *hdf;
/* XXX: This is not elegant, is it efficient ? */
shd = hp->shd;
hd = hp->hd;
hdf = hp->hdf;
memset(hp, 0, sizeof *hp);
memset(hd, 0, sizeof *hd * shd);
memset(hdf, 0, sizeof *hdf * shd);
hp->magic = HTTP_MAGIC;
hp->ws = ws;
hp->nhd = HTTP_HDR_FIRST;
hp->shd = shd;
hp->hd = hd;
hp->hdf = hdf;
}
Commit Message: Check for duplicate Content-Length headers in requests
If a duplicate CL header is in the request, we fail the request with a
400 (Bad Request)
Fix a test case that was sending duplicate CL by misstake and would
not fail because of that.
CWE ID:
| 0
| 56,435
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int XMLRPC_ServerRegisterMethod(XMLRPC_SERVER server, const char *name, XMLRPC_Callback cb) {
if(server && name && cb) {
server_method* sm = malloc(sizeof(server_method));
if(sm) {
sm->name = strdup(name);
sm->method = cb;
sm->desc = NULL;
return Q_PushTail(&server->methodlist, sm);
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 12,166
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HTMLInputElement::updateClearButtonVisibility()
{
m_inputTypeView->updateClearButtonVisibility();
}
Commit Message: Add HTMLFormControlElement::supportsAutofocus to fix a FIXME comment.
This virtual function should return true if the form control can hanlde
'autofocucs' attribute if it is specified.
Note: HTMLInputElement::supportsAutofocus reuses InputType::isInteractiveContent
because interactiveness is required for autofocus capability.
BUG=none
TEST=none; no behavior changes.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/143343003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165432 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 114,028
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool RenderFrameImpl::UniqueNameFrameAdapter::IsMainFrame() const {
return render_frame_->IsMainFrame();
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 139,710
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int perf_event_idx_default(struct perf_event *event)
{
return 0;
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix event->ctx locking
There have been a few reported issues wrt. the lack of locking around
changing event->ctx. This patch tries to address those.
It avoids the whole rwsem thing; and while it appears to work, please
give it some thought in review.
What I did fail at is sensible runtime checks on the use of
event->ctx, the RCU use makes it very hard.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150123125834.209535886@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 50,480
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PathManager* path_manager() { return group_->path_manager(); }
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,714
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void CallWithExecutionContextAndScriptStateAndIsolateAnyAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
ExecutionContext* execution_context = ExecutionContext::ForRelevantRealm(info);
ScriptState* script_state = ScriptState::ForRelevantRealm(info);
V8SetReturnValue(info, impl->callWithExecutionContextAndScriptStateAndIsolateAnyAttribute(info.GetIsolate(), script_state, execution_context).V8Value());
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 134,574
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: do_run_simple_dialog (gpointer _data)
{
RunSimpleDialogData *data = _data;
const char *button_title;
GtkWidget *dialog;
int result;
int response_id;
g_mutex_lock (&data->mutex);
/* Create the dialog. */
dialog = gtk_message_dialog_new (*data->parent_window,
0,
data->message_type,
GTK_BUTTONS_NONE,
NULL);
g_object_set (dialog,
"text", data->primary_text,
"secondary-text", data->secondary_text,
NULL);
for (response_id = 0;
data->button_titles[response_id] != NULL;
response_id++)
{
button_title = data->button_titles[response_id];
if (!data->show_all && is_all_button_text (button_title))
{
continue;
}
gtk_dialog_add_button (GTK_DIALOG (dialog), button_title, response_id);
gtk_dialog_set_default_response (GTK_DIALOG (dialog), response_id);
}
if (data->details_text)
{
eel_gtk_message_dialog_set_details_label (GTK_MESSAGE_DIALOG (dialog),
data->details_text);
}
/* Run it. */
result = gtk_dialog_run (GTK_DIALOG (dialog));
while ((result == GTK_RESPONSE_NONE || result == GTK_RESPONSE_DELETE_EVENT) && data->ignore_close_box)
{
result = gtk_dialog_run (GTK_DIALOG (dialog));
}
gtk_widget_destroy (dialog);
data->result = result;
data->completed = TRUE;
g_cond_signal (&data->cond);
g_mutex_unlock (&data->mutex);
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 61,047
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Err sdp_Read(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
u32 length;
GF_SDPBox *ptr = (GF_SDPBox *)s;
if (ptr == NULL) return GF_BAD_PARAM;
length = (u32) (ptr->size);
ptr->sdpText = (char*)gf_malloc(sizeof(char) * (length+1));
if (!ptr->sdpText) return GF_OUT_OF_MEM;
gf_bs_read_data(bs, ptr->sdpText, length);
ptr->sdpText[length] = 0;
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,387
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void DestroyXMLTreeOrdered(XMLTreeInfo *xml_info)
{
XMLTreeInfo
*node,
*ordered;
ordered=xml_info->ordered;
while(ordered != (XMLTreeInfo *) NULL)
{
node=ordered;
ordered=node->ordered;
node->ordered=(XMLTreeInfo *) NULL;
(void) DestroyXMLTree(node);
}
}
Commit Message: Coder path traversal is not authorized, bug report provided by Masaaki Chida
CWE ID: CWE-22
| 0
| 71,960
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: barrier_find_nearest(BarrierScreenPtr cs, DeviceIntPtr dev,
int dir,
int x1, int y1, int x2, int y2)
{
struct PointerBarrierClient *c, *nearest = NULL;
double min_distance = INT_MAX; /* can't get higher than that in X anyway */
xorg_list_for_each_entry(c, &cs->barriers, entry) {
struct PointerBarrier *b = &c->barrier;
struct PointerBarrierDevice *pbd;
double distance;
pbd = GetBarrierDevice(c, dev->id);
if (pbd->seen)
continue;
if (!barrier_is_blocking_direction(b, dir))
continue;
if (!barrier_blocks_device(c, dev))
continue;
if (barrier_is_blocking(b, x1, y1, x2, y2, &distance)) {
if (min_distance > distance) {
min_distance = distance;
nearest = c;
}
}
}
return nearest;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 17,754
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void _WM_do_control_data_decrement(struct _mdi *mdi,
struct _event_data *data) {
uint8_t ch = data->channel;
MIDI_EVENT_DEBUG(__FUNCTION__,ch, data->data.value);
if ((mdi->channel[ch].reg_non == 0)
&& (mdi->channel[ch].reg_data == 0x0000)) { /* Pitch Bend Range */
if (mdi->channel[ch].pitch_range > 0)
mdi->channel[ch].pitch_range--;
}
}
Commit Message: Add a new size parameter to _WM_SetupMidiEvent() so that it knows
where to stop reading, and adjust its users properly. Fixes bug #175
(CVE-2017-11661, CVE-2017-11662, CVE-2017-11663, CVE-2017-11664.)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 63,231
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ChildThread::ChildThreadMessageRouter::ChildThreadMessageRouter(
IPC::Sender* sender)
: sender_(sender) {}
Commit Message: [FileAPI] Clean up WebFileSystemImpl before Blink shutdown
WebFileSystemImpl should not outlive V8 instance, since it may have references to V8.
This CL ensures it deleted before Blink shutdown.
BUG=369525
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/270633009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@269345 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 121,297
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int kvm_hv_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
u64 param, ingpa, outgpa, ret;
uint16_t code, rep_idx, rep_cnt, res = HV_STATUS_SUCCESS, rep_done = 0;
bool fast, longmode;
/*
* hypercall generates UD from non zero cpl and real mode
* per HYPER-V spec
*/
if (kvm_x86_ops->get_cpl(vcpu) != 0 || !is_protmode(vcpu)) {
kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
return 0;
}
longmode = is_64_bit_mode(vcpu);
if (!longmode) {
param = ((u64)kvm_register_read(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RDX) << 32) |
(kvm_register_read(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RAX) & 0xffffffff);
ingpa = ((u64)kvm_register_read(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RBX) << 32) |
(kvm_register_read(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RCX) & 0xffffffff);
outgpa = ((u64)kvm_register_read(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RDI) << 32) |
(kvm_register_read(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RSI) & 0xffffffff);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
else {
param = kvm_register_read(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RCX);
ingpa = kvm_register_read(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RDX);
outgpa = kvm_register_read(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_R8);
}
#endif
code = param & 0xffff;
fast = (param >> 16) & 0x1;
rep_cnt = (param >> 32) & 0xfff;
rep_idx = (param >> 48) & 0xfff;
trace_kvm_hv_hypercall(code, fast, rep_cnt, rep_idx, ingpa, outgpa);
switch (code) {
case HV_X64_HV_NOTIFY_LONG_SPIN_WAIT:
kvm_vcpu_on_spin(vcpu);
break;
default:
res = HV_STATUS_INVALID_HYPERCALL_CODE;
break;
}
ret = res | (((u64)rep_done & 0xfff) << 32);
if (longmode) {
kvm_register_write(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RAX, ret);
} else {
kvm_register_write(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RDX, ret >> 32);
kvm_register_write(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RAX, ret & 0xffffffff);
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Don't report guest userspace emulation error to userspace
Commit fc3a9157d314 ("KVM: X86: Don't report L2 emulation failures to
user-space") disabled the reporting of L2 (nested guest) emulation failures to
userspace due to race-condition between a vmexit and the instruction emulator.
The same rational applies also to userspace applications that are permitted by
the guest OS to access MMIO area or perform PIO.
This patch extends the current behavior - of injecting a #UD instead of
reporting it to userspace - also for guest userspace code.
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 35,793
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::wstring BookmarkManagerView::GetWindowName() const {
return prefs::kBookmarkManagerPlacement;
}
Commit Message: Relands cl 16982 as it wasn't the cause of the build breakage. Here's
the description for that cl:
Lands http://codereview.chromium.org/115505 for bug
http://crbug.com/4030 for tyoshino.
BUG=http://crbug.com/4030
TEST=make sure control-w dismisses bookmark manager.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/113902
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@16987 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 109,099
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: CIFSSMBQFSUnixInfo(const int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon)
{
/* level 0x200 SMB_QUERY_CIFS_UNIX_INFO */
TRANSACTION2_QFSI_REQ *pSMB = NULL;
TRANSACTION2_QFSI_RSP *pSMBr = NULL;
FILE_SYSTEM_UNIX_INFO *response_data;
int rc = 0;
int bytes_returned = 0;
__u16 params, byte_count;
cFYI(1, "In QFSUnixInfo");
QFSUnixRetry:
rc = smb_init_no_reconnect(SMB_COM_TRANSACTION2, 15, tcon,
(void **) &pSMB, (void **) &pSMBr);
if (rc)
return rc;
params = 2; /* level */
pSMB->TotalDataCount = 0;
pSMB->DataCount = 0;
pSMB->DataOffset = 0;
pSMB->MaxParameterCount = cpu_to_le16(2);
/* BB find exact max SMB PDU from sess structure BB */
pSMB->MaxDataCount = cpu_to_le16(100);
pSMB->MaxSetupCount = 0;
pSMB->Reserved = 0;
pSMB->Flags = 0;
pSMB->Timeout = 0;
pSMB->Reserved2 = 0;
byte_count = params + 1 /* pad */ ;
pSMB->ParameterCount = cpu_to_le16(params);
pSMB->TotalParameterCount = pSMB->ParameterCount;
pSMB->ParameterOffset = cpu_to_le16(offsetof(struct
smb_com_transaction2_qfsi_req, InformationLevel) - 4);
pSMB->SetupCount = 1;
pSMB->Reserved3 = 0;
pSMB->SubCommand = cpu_to_le16(TRANS2_QUERY_FS_INFORMATION);
pSMB->InformationLevel = cpu_to_le16(SMB_QUERY_CIFS_UNIX_INFO);
inc_rfc1001_len(pSMB, byte_count);
pSMB->ByteCount = cpu_to_le16(byte_count);
rc = SendReceive(xid, tcon->ses, (struct smb_hdr *) pSMB,
(struct smb_hdr *) pSMBr, &bytes_returned, 0);
if (rc) {
cERROR(1, "Send error in QFSUnixInfo = %d", rc);
} else { /* decode response */
rc = validate_t2((struct smb_t2_rsp *)pSMBr);
if (rc || get_bcc(&pSMBr->hdr) < 13) {
rc = -EIO; /* bad smb */
} else {
__u16 data_offset = le16_to_cpu(pSMBr->t2.DataOffset);
response_data =
(FILE_SYSTEM_UNIX_INFO
*) (((char *) &pSMBr->hdr.Protocol) +
data_offset);
memcpy(&tcon->fsUnixInfo, response_data,
sizeof(FILE_SYSTEM_UNIX_INFO));
}
}
cifs_buf_release(pSMB);
if (rc == -EAGAIN)
goto QFSUnixRetry;
return rc;
}
Commit Message: cifs: fix possible memory corruption in CIFSFindNext
The name_len variable in CIFSFindNext is a signed int that gets set to
the resume_name_len in the cifs_search_info. The resume_name_len however
is unsigned and for some infolevels is populated directly from a 32 bit
value sent by the server.
If the server sends a very large value for this, then that value could
look negative when converted to a signed int. That would make that
value pass the PATH_MAX check later in CIFSFindNext. The name_len would
then be used as a length value for a memcpy. It would then be treated
as unsigned again, and the memcpy scribbles over a ton of memory.
Fix this by making the name_len an unsigned value in CIFSFindNext.
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Darren Lavender <dcl@hppine99.gbr.hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 24,975
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int ablkcipher_copy_iv(struct ablkcipher_walk *walk,
struct crypto_tfm *tfm,
unsigned int alignmask)
{
unsigned bs = walk->blocksize;
unsigned int ivsize = tfm->crt_ablkcipher.ivsize;
unsigned aligned_bs = ALIGN(bs, alignmask + 1);
unsigned int size = aligned_bs * 2 + ivsize + max(aligned_bs, ivsize) -
(alignmask + 1);
u8 *iv;
size += alignmask & ~(crypto_tfm_ctx_alignment() - 1);
walk->iv_buffer = kmalloc(size, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!walk->iv_buffer)
return -ENOMEM;
iv = (u8 *)ALIGN((unsigned long)walk->iv_buffer, alignmask + 1);
iv = ablkcipher_get_spot(iv, bs) + aligned_bs;
iv = ablkcipher_get_spot(iv, bs) + aligned_bs;
iv = ablkcipher_get_spot(iv, ivsize);
walk->iv = memcpy(iv, walk->iv, ivsize);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 31,179
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GetShortIns( TT_ExecContext exc )
{
/* Reading a byte stream so there is no endianness (DaveP) */
exc->IP += 2;
return (FT_Short)( ( exc->code[exc->IP - 2] << 8 ) +
exc->code[exc->IP - 1] );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 10,573
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void decode_sce_lfe(NeAACDecStruct *hDecoder,
NeAACDecFrameInfo *hInfo, bitfile *ld,
uint8_t id_syn_ele)
{
uint8_t channels = hDecoder->fr_channels;
uint8_t tag = 0;
if (channels+1 > MAX_CHANNELS)
{
hInfo->error = 12;
return;
}
if (hDecoder->fr_ch_ele+1 > MAX_SYNTAX_ELEMENTS)
{
hInfo->error = 13;
return;
}
/* for SCE hDecoder->element_output_channels[] is not set here because this
can become 2 when some form of Parametric Stereo coding is used
*/
if (hDecoder->frame && hDecoder->element_id[hDecoder->fr_ch_ele] != id_syn_ele) {
/* element inconsistency */
hInfo->error = 21;
return;
}
/* save the syntax element id */
hDecoder->element_id[hDecoder->fr_ch_ele] = id_syn_ele;
/* decode the element */
hInfo->error = single_lfe_channel_element(hDecoder, ld, channels, &tag);
/* map output channels position to internal data channels */
if (hDecoder->element_output_channels[hDecoder->fr_ch_ele] == 2)
{
/* this might be faulty when pce_set is true */
hDecoder->internal_channel[channels] = channels;
hDecoder->internal_channel[channels+1] = channels+1;
} else {
if (hDecoder->pce_set)
hDecoder->internal_channel[hDecoder->pce.sce_channel[tag]] = channels;
else
hDecoder->internal_channel[channels] = channels;
}
hDecoder->fr_channels += hDecoder->element_output_channels[hDecoder->fr_ch_ele];
hDecoder->fr_ch_ele++;
}
Commit Message: Fix a couple buffer overflows
https://hackerone.com/reports/502816
https://hackerone.com/reports/507858
https://github.com/videolan/vlc/blob/master/contrib/src/faad2/faad2-fix-overflows.patch
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 88,376
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PeopleHandler::UpdateSyncStatus() {
FireWebUIListener("sync-status-changed", *GetSyncStatusDictionary());
}
Commit Message: [signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <droger@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <isherman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <msarda@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 143,224
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: get_arg0_string (Buffer *buffer)
{
GDBusMessage *message = g_dbus_message_new_from_blob (buffer->data, buffer->size, 0, NULL);
GVariant *body;
g_autoptr(GVariant) arg0 = NULL;
char *name = NULL;
if (message != NULL &&
(body = g_dbus_message_get_body (message)) != NULL &&
(arg0 = g_variant_get_child_value (body, 0)) != NULL &&
g_variant_is_of_type (arg0, G_VARIANT_TYPE_STRING))
name = g_variant_dup_string (arg0, NULL);
g_object_unref (message);
return name;
}
Commit Message: Fix vulnerability in dbus proxy
During the authentication all client data is directly forwarded
to the dbus daemon as is, until we detect the BEGIN command after
which we start filtering the binary dbus protocol.
Unfortunately the detection of the BEGIN command in the proxy
did not exactly match the detection in the dbus daemon. A BEGIN
followed by a space or tab was considered ok in the daemon but
not by the proxy. This could be exploited to send arbitrary
dbus messages to the host, which can be used to break out of
the sandbox.
This was noticed by Gabriel Campana of The Google Security Team.
This fix makes the detection of the authentication phase end
match the dbus code. In addition we duplicate the authentication
line validation from dbus, which includes ensuring all data is
ASCII, and limiting the size of a line to 16k. In fact, we add
some extra stringent checks, disallowing ASCII control chars and
requiring that auth lines start with a capital letter.
CWE ID: CWE-436
| 0
| 84,394
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void NTPResourceCache::CreateNewTabIncognitoHTML() {
DictionaryValue localized_strings;
localized_strings.SetString("title",
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_NEW_TAB_TITLE));
int new_tab_message_ids = IDS_NEW_TAB_OTR_MESSAGE;
int new_tab_html_idr = IDR_INCOGNITO_TAB_HTML;
const char* new_tab_link = kLearnMoreIncognitoUrl;
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
if (CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(switches::kGuestSession)) {
new_tab_message_ids = IDS_NEW_TAB_GUEST_SESSION_MESSAGE;
new_tab_html_idr = IDR_GUEST_SESSION_TAB_HTML;
new_tab_link = kLearnMoreGuestSessionUrl;
}
#endif
localized_strings.SetString("content",
l10n_util::GetStringFUTF16(new_tab_message_ids,
GetUrlWithLang(GURL(new_tab_link))));
localized_strings.SetString("extensionsmessage",
l10n_util::GetStringFUTF16(
IDS_NEW_TAB_OTR_EXTENSIONS_MESSAGE,
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_PRODUCT_NAME),
ASCIIToUTF16(std::string(chrome::kChromeUISettingsURL) +
chrome::kExtensionsSubPage)));
bool bookmark_bar_attached = profile_->GetPrefs()->GetBoolean(
prefs::kShowBookmarkBar);
localized_strings.SetString("bookmarkbarattached",
bookmark_bar_attached ? "true" : "false");
ChromeURLDataManager::DataSource::SetFontAndTextDirection(&localized_strings);
static const base::StringPiece incognito_tab_html(
ResourceBundle::GetSharedInstance().GetRawDataResource(
new_tab_html_idr));
std::string full_html = jstemplate_builder::GetI18nTemplateHtml(
incognito_tab_html, &localized_strings);
new_tab_incognito_html_ = base::RefCountedString::TakeString(&full_html);
}
Commit Message: [i18n-fixlet] Make strings branding specific in extension code.
IDS_EXTENSIONS_UNINSTALL
IDS_EXTENSIONS_INCOGNITO_WARNING
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_HEADING
IDS_EXTENSION_ALERT_ITEM_EXTERNAL And fix a $1 $1 bug.
IDS_EXTENSION_INLINE_INSTALL_PROMPT_TITLE
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9107061
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@118018 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 107,786
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: svc_create_pooled(struct svc_program *prog, unsigned int bufsize,
struct svc_serv_ops *ops)
{
struct svc_serv *serv;
unsigned int npools = svc_pool_map_get();
serv = __svc_create(prog, bufsize, npools, ops);
if (!serv)
goto out_err;
return serv;
out_err:
svc_pool_map_put();
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 65,931
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: runtest(int i) {
int ret = 0, res;
int old_errors, old_tests, old_leaks;
old_errors = nb_errors;
old_tests = nb_tests;
old_leaks = nb_leaks;
if ((tests_quiet == 0) && (testDescriptions[i].desc != NULL))
printf("## %s\n", testDescriptions[i].desc);
res = launchTests(&testDescriptions[i]);
if (res != 0)
ret++;
if (verbose) {
if ((nb_errors == old_errors) && (nb_leaks == old_leaks))
printf("Ran %d tests, no errors\n", nb_tests - old_tests);
else
printf("Ran %d tests, %d errors, %d leaks\n",
nb_tests - old_tests,
nb_errors - old_errors,
nb_leaks - old_leaks);
}
return(ret);
}
Commit Message: Fix handling of parameter-entity references
There were two bugs where parameter-entity references could lead to an
unexpected change of the input buffer in xmlParseNameComplex and
xmlDictLookup being called with an invalid pointer.
Percent sign in DTD Names
=========================
The NEXTL macro used to call xmlParserHandlePEReference. When parsing
"complex" names inside the DTD, this could result in entity expansion
which created a new input buffer. The fix is to simply remove the call
to xmlParserHandlePEReference from the NEXTL macro. This is safe because
no users of the macro require expansion of parameter entities.
- xmlParseNameComplex
- xmlParseNCNameComplex
- xmlParseNmtoken
The percent sign is not allowed in names, which are grammatical tokens.
- xmlParseEntityValue
Parameter-entity references in entity values are expanded but this
happens in a separate step in this function.
- xmlParseSystemLiteral
Parameter-entity references are ignored in the system literal.
- xmlParseAttValueComplex
- xmlParseCharDataComplex
- xmlParseCommentComplex
- xmlParsePI
- xmlParseCDSect
Parameter-entity references are ignored outside the DTD.
- xmlLoadEntityContent
This function is only called from xmlStringLenDecodeEntities and
entities are replaced in a separate step immediately after the function
call.
This bug could also be triggered with an internal subset and double
entity expansion.
This fixes bug 766956 initially reported by Wei Lei and independently by
Chromium's ClusterFuzz, Hanno Böck, and Marco Grassi. Thanks to everyone
involved.
xmlParseNameComplex with XML_PARSE_OLD10
========================================
When parsing Names inside an expanded parameter entity with the
XML_PARSE_OLD10 option, xmlParseNameComplex would call xmlGROW via the
GROW macro if the input buffer was exhausted. At the end of the
parameter entity's replacement text, this function would then call
xmlPopInput which invalidated the input buffer.
There should be no need to invoke GROW in this situation because the
buffer is grown periodically every XML_PARSER_CHUNK_SIZE characters and,
at least for UTF-8, in xmlCurrentChar. This also matches the code path
executed when XML_PARSE_OLD10 is not set.
This fixes bugs 781205 (CVE-2017-9049) and 781361 (CVE-2017-9050).
Thanks to Marcel Böhme and Thuan Pham for the report.
Additional hardening
====================
A separate check was added in xmlParseNameComplex to validate the
buffer size.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 59,618
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int kvm_init(void *opaque, unsigned vcpu_size, unsigned vcpu_align,
struct module *module)
{
int r;
int cpu;
r = kvm_arch_init(opaque);
if (r)
goto out_fail;
/*
* kvm_arch_init makes sure there's at most one caller
* for architectures that support multiple implementations,
* like intel and amd on x86.
* kvm_arch_init must be called before kvm_irqfd_init to avoid creating
* conflicts in case kvm is already setup for another implementation.
*/
r = kvm_irqfd_init();
if (r)
goto out_irqfd;
if (!zalloc_cpumask_var(&cpus_hardware_enabled, GFP_KERNEL)) {
r = -ENOMEM;
goto out_free_0;
}
r = kvm_arch_hardware_setup();
if (r < 0)
goto out_free_0a;
for_each_online_cpu(cpu) {
smp_call_function_single(cpu,
kvm_arch_check_processor_compat,
&r, 1);
if (r < 0)
goto out_free_1;
}
r = register_cpu_notifier(&kvm_cpu_notifier);
if (r)
goto out_free_2;
register_reboot_notifier(&kvm_reboot_notifier);
/* A kmem cache lets us meet the alignment requirements of fx_save. */
if (!vcpu_align)
vcpu_align = __alignof__(struct kvm_vcpu);
kvm_vcpu_cache = kmem_cache_create("kvm_vcpu", vcpu_size, vcpu_align,
0, NULL);
if (!kvm_vcpu_cache) {
r = -ENOMEM;
goto out_free_3;
}
r = kvm_async_pf_init();
if (r)
goto out_free;
kvm_chardev_ops.owner = module;
kvm_vm_fops.owner = module;
kvm_vcpu_fops.owner = module;
r = misc_register(&kvm_dev);
if (r) {
printk(KERN_ERR "kvm: misc device register failed\n");
goto out_unreg;
}
register_syscore_ops(&kvm_syscore_ops);
kvm_preempt_ops.sched_in = kvm_sched_in;
kvm_preempt_ops.sched_out = kvm_sched_out;
r = kvm_init_debug();
if (r) {
printk(KERN_ERR "kvm: create debugfs files failed\n");
goto out_undebugfs;
}
return 0;
out_undebugfs:
unregister_syscore_ops(&kvm_syscore_ops);
misc_deregister(&kvm_dev);
out_unreg:
kvm_async_pf_deinit();
out_free:
kmem_cache_destroy(kvm_vcpu_cache);
out_free_3:
unregister_reboot_notifier(&kvm_reboot_notifier);
unregister_cpu_notifier(&kvm_cpu_notifier);
out_free_2:
out_free_1:
kvm_arch_hardware_unsetup();
out_free_0a:
free_cpumask_var(cpus_hardware_enabled);
out_free_0:
kvm_irqfd_exit();
out_irqfd:
kvm_arch_exit();
out_fail:
return r;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Improve create VCPU parameter (CVE-2013-4587)
In multiple functions the vcpu_id is used as an offset into a bitfield. Ag
malicious user could specify a vcpu_id greater than 255 in order to set or
clear bits in kernel memory. This could be used to elevate priveges in the
kernel. This patch verifies that the vcpu_id provided is less than 255.
The api documentation already specifies that the vcpu_id must be less than
max_vcpus, but this is currently not checked.
Reported-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 29,327
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline bool got_nohz_idle_kick(void)
{
int cpu = smp_processor_id();
if (!test_bit(NOHZ_BALANCE_KICK, nohz_flags(cpu)))
return false;
if (idle_cpu(cpu) && !need_resched())
return true;
/*
* We can't run Idle Load Balance on this CPU for this time so we
* cancel it and clear NOHZ_BALANCE_KICK
*/
clear_bit(NOHZ_BALANCE_KICK, nohz_flags(cpu));
return false;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 55,539
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PwnMessageHelper::FileSystemWrite(RenderProcessHost* process,
int request_id,
GURL file_path,
std::string blob_uuid,
int64_t position) {
TestFileapiOperationWaiter waiter(
process->GetStoragePartition()->GetFileSystemContext());
IPC::IpcSecurityTestUtil::PwnMessageReceived(
process->GetChannel(),
FileSystemHostMsg_Write(request_id, file_path, blob_uuid, position));
if (waiter.did_start_update())
waiter.WaitForEndUpdate();
}
Commit Message: Apply ExtensionNavigationThrottle filesystem/blob checks to all frames.
BUG=836858
Change-Id: I34333a72501129fd40b5a9aa6378c9f35f1e7fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1028511
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nick Carter <nick@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553867}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 156,060
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RenderFrameHostCreatedObserver::~RenderFrameHostCreatedObserver() {
}
Commit Message: Add a check for disallowing remote frame navigations to local resources.
Previously, RemoteFrame navigations did not perform any renderer-side
checks and relied solely on the browser-side logic to block disallowed
navigations via mechanisms like FilterURL. This means that blocked
remote frame navigations were silently navigated to about:blank
without any console error message.
This CL adds a CanDisplay check to the remote navigation path to match
an equivalent check done for local frame navigations. This way, the
renderer can consistently block disallowed navigations in both cases
and output an error message.
Bug: 894399
Change-Id: I172f68f77c1676f6ca0172d2a6c78f7edc0e3b7a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1282390
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#601022}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 143,944
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FT_Stream_New( FT_Library library,
const FT_Open_Args* args,
FT_Stream *astream )
{
FT_Error error;
FT_Memory memory;
FT_Stream stream;
*astream = 0;
if ( !library )
return FT_Err_Invalid_Library_Handle;
if ( !args )
return FT_Err_Invalid_Argument;
memory = library->memory;
if ( FT_NEW( stream ) )
goto Exit;
stream->memory = memory;
if ( args->flags & FT_OPEN_MEMORY )
{
/* create a memory-based stream */
FT_Stream_OpenMemory( stream,
(const FT_Byte*)args->memory_base,
args->memory_size );
}
else if ( args->flags & FT_OPEN_PATHNAME )
{
/* create a normal system stream */
error = FT_Stream_Open( stream, args->pathname );
stream->pathname.pointer = args->pathname;
}
else if ( ( args->flags & FT_OPEN_STREAM ) && args->stream )
{
/* use an existing, user-provided stream */
/* in this case, we do not need to allocate a new stream object */
/* since the caller is responsible for closing it himself */
FT_FREE( stream );
stream = args->stream;
}
else
error = FT_Err_Invalid_Argument;
if ( error )
FT_FREE( stream );
else
stream->memory = memory; /* just to be certain */
*astream = stream;
Exit:
return error;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 9,680
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: float _WM_GetSamplesPerTick(uint32_t divisions, uint32_t tempo) {
float microseconds_per_tick;
float secs_per_tick;
float samples_per_tick;
/* Slow but needed for accuracy */
microseconds_per_tick = (float) tempo / (float) divisions;
secs_per_tick = microseconds_per_tick / 1000000.0f;
samples_per_tick = _WM_SampleRate * secs_per_tick;
return (samples_per_tick);
}
Commit Message: Add a new size parameter to _WM_SetupMidiEvent() so that it knows
where to stop reading, and adjust its users properly. Fixes bug #175
(CVE-2017-11661, CVE-2017-11662, CVE-2017-11663, CVE-2017-11664.)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 63,219
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void IOThread::ChangedToOnTheRecord() {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::IO,
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&IOThread::ChangedToOnTheRecordOnIOThread,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
Commit Message: Added daily UMA for non-data-reduction-proxy data usage when the proxy is enabled.
BUG=325325
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/106113002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@239897 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 113,497
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderProcessHostImpl::CreateRendererHost(
mojom::RendererHostAssociatedRequest request) {
renderer_host_binding_.Bind(std::move(request));
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 149,256
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int tty_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
{
struct tty_struct *tty = file_tty(filp);
struct tty_struct *o_tty = NULL;
int do_sleep, final;
int idx;
long timeout = 0;
int once = 1;
if (tty_paranoia_check(tty, inode, __func__))
return 0;
tty_lock(tty);
check_tty_count(tty, __func__);
__tty_fasync(-1, filp, 0);
idx = tty->index;
if (tty->driver->type == TTY_DRIVER_TYPE_PTY &&
tty->driver->subtype == PTY_TYPE_MASTER)
o_tty = tty->link;
if (tty_release_checks(tty, idx)) {
tty_unlock(tty);
return 0;
}
tty_debug_hangup(tty, "releasing (count=%d)\n", tty->count);
if (tty->ops->close)
tty->ops->close(tty, filp);
/* If tty is pty master, lock the slave pty (stable lock order) */
tty_lock_slave(o_tty);
/*
* Sanity check: if tty->count is going to zero, there shouldn't be
* any waiters on tty->read_wait or tty->write_wait. We test the
* wait queues and kick everyone out _before_ actually starting to
* close. This ensures that we won't block while releasing the tty
* structure.
*
* The test for the o_tty closing is necessary, since the master and
* slave sides may close in any order. If the slave side closes out
* first, its count will be one, since the master side holds an open.
* Thus this test wouldn't be triggered at the time the slave closed,
* so we do it now.
*/
while (1) {
do_sleep = 0;
if (tty->count <= 1) {
if (waitqueue_active(&tty->read_wait)) {
wake_up_poll(&tty->read_wait, POLLIN);
do_sleep++;
}
if (waitqueue_active(&tty->write_wait)) {
wake_up_poll(&tty->write_wait, POLLOUT);
do_sleep++;
}
}
if (o_tty && o_tty->count <= 1) {
if (waitqueue_active(&o_tty->read_wait)) {
wake_up_poll(&o_tty->read_wait, POLLIN);
do_sleep++;
}
if (waitqueue_active(&o_tty->write_wait)) {
wake_up_poll(&o_tty->write_wait, POLLOUT);
do_sleep++;
}
}
if (!do_sleep)
break;
if (once) {
once = 0;
tty_warn(tty, "read/write wait queue active!\n");
}
schedule_timeout_killable(timeout);
if (timeout < 120 * HZ)
timeout = 2 * timeout + 1;
else
timeout = MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT;
}
if (o_tty) {
if (--o_tty->count < 0) {
tty_warn(tty, "bad slave count (%d)\n", o_tty->count);
o_tty->count = 0;
}
}
if (--tty->count < 0) {
tty_warn(tty, "bad tty->count (%d)\n", tty->count);
tty->count = 0;
}
/*
* We've decremented tty->count, so we need to remove this file
* descriptor off the tty->tty_files list; this serves two
* purposes:
* - check_tty_count sees the correct number of file descriptors
* associated with this tty.
* - do_tty_hangup no longer sees this file descriptor as
* something that needs to be handled for hangups.
*/
tty_del_file(filp);
/*
* Perform some housekeeping before deciding whether to return.
*
* If _either_ side is closing, make sure there aren't any
* processes that still think tty or o_tty is their controlling
* tty.
*/
if (!tty->count) {
read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
session_clear_tty(tty->session);
if (o_tty)
session_clear_tty(o_tty->session);
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
}
/* check whether both sides are closing ... */
final = !tty->count && !(o_tty && o_tty->count);
tty_unlock_slave(o_tty);
tty_unlock(tty);
/* At this point, the tty->count == 0 should ensure a dead tty
cannot be re-opened by a racing opener */
if (!final)
return 0;
tty_debug_hangup(tty, "final close\n");
/*
* Ask the line discipline code to release its structures
*/
tty_ldisc_release(tty);
/* Wait for pending work before tty destruction commmences */
tty_flush_works(tty);
tty_debug_hangup(tty, "freeing structure\n");
/*
* The release_tty function takes care of the details of clearing
* the slots and preserving the termios structure. The tty_unlock_pair
* should be safe as we keep a kref while the tty is locked (so the
* unlock never unlocks a freed tty).
*/
mutex_lock(&tty_mutex);
release_tty(tty, idx);
mutex_unlock(&tty_mutex);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: tty: Fix unsafe ldisc reference via ioctl(TIOCGETD)
ioctl(TIOCGETD) retrieves the line discipline id directly from the
ldisc because the line discipline id (c_line) in termios is untrustworthy;
userspace may have set termios via ioctl(TCSETS*) without actually
changing the line discipline via ioctl(TIOCSETD).
However, directly accessing the current ldisc via tty->ldisc is
unsafe; the ldisc ptr dereferenced may be stale if the line discipline
is changing via ioctl(TIOCSETD) or hangup.
Wait for the line discipline reference (just like read() or write())
to retrieve the "current" line discipline id.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 55,940
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoTexParameterf(
GLenum target, GLenum pname, GLfloat param) {
TextureRef* texture = texture_manager()->GetTextureInfoForTarget(
&state_, target);
if (!texture) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glTexParameterf", "unknown texture");
return;
}
texture_manager()->SetParameterf(
"glTexParameterf", GetErrorState(), texture, pname, param);
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 120,850
|
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