instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: handle_ppp(netdissect_options *ndo,
u_int proto, const u_char *p, int length)
{
if ((proto & 0xff00) == 0x7e00) { /* is this an escape code ? */
ppp_hdlc(ndo, p - 1, length);
return;
}
switch (proto) {
case PPP_LCP: /* fall through */
case PPP_IPCP:
case PPP_OSICP:
case PPP_MPLSCP:
case PPP_IPV6CP:
case PPP_CCP:
case PPP_BACP:
handle_ctrl_proto(ndo, proto, p, length);
break;
case PPP_ML:
handle_mlppp(ndo, p, length);
break;
case PPP_CHAP:
handle_chap(ndo, p, length);
break;
case PPP_PAP:
handle_pap(ndo, p, length);
break;
case PPP_BAP: /* XXX: not yet completed */
handle_bap(ndo, p, length);
break;
case ETHERTYPE_IP: /*XXX*/
case PPP_VJNC:
case PPP_IP:
ip_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
case ETHERTYPE_IPV6: /*XXX*/
case PPP_IPV6:
ip6_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
case ETHERTYPE_IPX: /*XXX*/
case PPP_IPX:
ipx_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
case PPP_OSI:
isoclns_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
case PPP_MPLS_UCAST:
case PPP_MPLS_MCAST:
mpls_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
case PPP_COMP:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "compressed PPP data"));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s ", tok2str(ppptype2str, "unknown PPP protocol (0x%04x)", proto)));
print_unknown_data(ndo, p, "\n\t", length);
break;
}
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13038/PPP: Do bounds checking.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Brian 'geeknik' Carpenter.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by Katie Holly.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 62,327
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void rdev_free(struct kobject *ko)
{
struct md_rdev *rdev = container_of(ko, struct md_rdev, kobj);
kfree(rdev);
}
Commit Message: md: use kzalloc() when bitmap is disabled
In drivers/md/md.c get_bitmap_file() uses kmalloc() for creating a
mdu_bitmap_file_t called "file".
5769 file = kmalloc(sizeof(*file), GFP_NOIO);
5770 if (!file)
5771 return -ENOMEM;
This structure is copied to user space at the end of the function.
5786 if (err == 0 &&
5787 copy_to_user(arg, file, sizeof(*file)))
5788 err = -EFAULT
But if bitmap is disabled only the first byte of "file" is initialized
with zero, so it's possible to read some bytes (up to 4095) of kernel
space memory from user space. This is an information leak.
5775 /* bitmap disabled, zero the first byte and copy out */
5776 if (!mddev->bitmap_info.file)
5777 file->pathname[0] = '\0';
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Randazzo <benjamin@randazzo.fr>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 42,510
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PushMessagingServiceImpl::Unsubscribe(
content::mojom::PushUnregistrationReason reason,
const GURL& requesting_origin,
int64_t service_worker_registration_id,
const std::string& sender_id,
const UnregisterCallback& callback) {
PushMessagingAppIdentifier app_identifier =
PushMessagingAppIdentifier::FindByServiceWorker(
profile_, requesting_origin, service_worker_registration_id);
UnsubscribeInternal(
reason, requesting_origin, service_worker_registration_id,
app_identifier.is_null() ? std::string() : app_identifier.app_id(),
sender_id, callback);
}
Commit Message: Remove some senseless indirection from the Push API code
Four files to call one Java function. Let's just call it directly.
BUG=
Change-Id: I6e988e9a000051dd7e3dd2b517a33a09afc2fff6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/749147
Reviewed-by: Anita Woodruff <awdf@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Peter Beverloo <peter@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513464}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 150,719
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: init_global_keywords(bool global_active)
{
/* global definitions mapping */
install_keyword_root("linkbeat_use_polling", use_polling_handler, global_active);
#if HAVE_DECL_CLONE_NEWNET
install_keyword_root("net_namespace", &net_namespace_handler, global_active);
install_keyword_root("namespace_with_ipsets", &namespace_ipsets_handler, global_active);
#endif
install_keyword_root("use_pid_dir", &use_pid_dir_handler, global_active);
install_keyword_root("instance", &instance_handler, global_active);
install_keyword_root("child_wait_time", &child_wait_handler, global_active);
install_keyword_root("global_defs", NULL, global_active);
install_keyword("router_id", &routerid_handler);
install_keyword("notification_email_from", &emailfrom_handler);
install_keyword("smtp_server", &smtpserver_handler);
install_keyword("smtp_helo_name", &smtphelo_handler);
install_keyword("smtp_connect_timeout", &smtpto_handler);
install_keyword("notification_email", &email_handler);
install_keyword("smtp_alert", &smtp_alert_handler);
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
install_keyword("smtp_alert_vrrp", &smtp_alert_vrrp_handler);
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_LVS_
install_keyword("smtp_alert_checker", &smtp_alert_checker_handler);
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
install_keyword("dynamic_interfaces", &dynamic_interfaces_handler);
install_keyword("no_email_faults", &no_email_faults_handler);
install_keyword("default_interface", &default_interface_handler);
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_LVS_
install_keyword("lvs_timeouts", &lvs_timeouts);
install_keyword("lvs_flush", &lvs_flush_handler);
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
install_keyword("lvs_sync_daemon", &lvs_syncd_handler);
#endif
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
install_keyword("vrrp_mcast_group4", &vrrp_mcast_group4_handler);
install_keyword("vrrp_mcast_group6", &vrrp_mcast_group6_handler);
install_keyword("vrrp_garp_master_delay", &vrrp_garp_delay_handler);
install_keyword("vrrp_garp_master_repeat", &vrrp_garp_rep_handler);
install_keyword("vrrp_garp_master_refresh", &vrrp_garp_refresh_handler);
install_keyword("vrrp_garp_master_refresh_repeat", &vrrp_garp_refresh_rep_handler);
install_keyword("vrrp_garp_lower_prio_delay", &vrrp_garp_lower_prio_delay_handler);
install_keyword("vrrp_garp_lower_prio_repeat", &vrrp_garp_lower_prio_rep_handler);
install_keyword("vrrp_garp_interval", &vrrp_garp_interval_handler);
install_keyword("vrrp_gna_interval", &vrrp_gna_interval_handler);
install_keyword("vrrp_lower_prio_no_advert", &vrrp_lower_prio_no_advert_handler);
install_keyword("vrrp_higher_prio_send_advert", &vrrp_higher_prio_send_advert_handler);
install_keyword("vrrp_version", &vrrp_version_handler);
install_keyword("vrrp_iptables", &vrrp_iptables_handler);
#ifdef _HAVE_LIBIPSET_
install_keyword("vrrp_ipsets", &vrrp_ipsets_handler);
#endif
install_keyword("vrrp_check_unicast_src", &vrrp_check_unicast_src_handler);
install_keyword("vrrp_skip_check_adv_addr", &vrrp_check_adv_addr_handler);
install_keyword("vrrp_strict", &vrrp_strict_handler);
install_keyword("vrrp_priority", &vrrp_prio_handler);
install_keyword("vrrp_no_swap", &vrrp_no_swap_handler);
#ifdef _HAVE_SCHED_RT_
install_keyword("vrrp_rt_priority", &vrrp_rt_priority_handler);
#if HAVE_DECL_RLIMIT_RTTIME == 1
install_keyword("vrrp_rlimit_rtime", &vrrp_rt_rlimit_handler);
#endif
#endif
#endif
install_keyword("notify_fifo", &global_notify_fifo);
install_keyword("notify_fifo_script", &global_notify_fifo_script);
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
install_keyword("vrrp_notify_fifo", &vrrp_notify_fifo);
install_keyword("vrrp_notify_fifo_script", &vrrp_notify_fifo_script);
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_LVS_
install_keyword("lvs_notify_fifo", &lvs_notify_fifo);
install_keyword("lvs_notify_fifo_script", &lvs_notify_fifo_script);
install_keyword("checker_priority", &checker_prio_handler);
install_keyword("checker_no_swap", &checker_no_swap_handler);
#ifdef _HAVE_SCHED_RT_
install_keyword("checker_rt_priority", &checker_rt_priority_handler);
#if HAVE_DECL_RLIMIT_RTTIME == 1
install_keyword("checker_rlimit_rtime", &checker_rt_rlimit_handler);
#endif
#endif
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_BFD_
install_keyword("bfd_priority", &bfd_prio_handler);
install_keyword("bfd_no_swap", &bfd_no_swap_handler);
#ifdef _HAVE_SCHED_RT_
install_keyword("bfd_rt_priority", &bfd_rt_priority_handler);
#if HAVE_DECL_RLIMIT_RTTIME == 1
install_keyword("bfd_rlimit_rtime", &bfd_rt_rlimit_handler);
#endif
#endif
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_SNMP_
install_keyword("snmp_socket", &snmp_socket_handler);
install_keyword("enable_traps", &trap_handler);
#ifdef _WITH_SNMP_VRRP_
install_keyword("enable_snmp_vrrp", &snmp_vrrp_handler);
install_keyword("enable_snmp_keepalived", &snmp_vrrp_handler); /* Deprecated v2.0.0 */
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_SNMP_RFC_
install_keyword("enable_snmp_rfc", &snmp_rfc_handler);
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_SNMP_RFCV2_
install_keyword("enable_snmp_rfcv2", &snmp_rfcv2_handler);
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_SNMP_RFCV3_
install_keyword("enable_snmp_rfcv3", &snmp_rfcv3_handler);
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_SNMP_CHECKER_
install_keyword("enable_snmp_checker", &snmp_checker_handler);
#endif
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_DBUS_
install_keyword("enable_dbus", &enable_dbus_handler);
install_keyword("dbus_service_name", &dbus_service_name_handler);
#endif
install_keyword("script_user", &script_user_handler);
install_keyword("enable_script_security", &script_security_handler);
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
install_keyword("vrrp_netlink_cmd_rcv_bufs", &vrrp_netlink_cmd_rcv_bufs_handler);
install_keyword("vrrp_netlink_cmd_rcv_bufs_force", &vrrp_netlink_cmd_rcv_bufs_force_handler);
install_keyword("vrrp_netlink_monitor_rcv_bufs", &vrrp_netlink_monitor_rcv_bufs_handler);
install_keyword("vrrp_netlink_monitor_rcv_bufs_force", &vrrp_netlink_monitor_rcv_bufs_force_handler);
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_LVS_
install_keyword("lvs_netlink_cmd_rcv_bufs", &lvs_netlink_cmd_rcv_bufs_handler);
install_keyword("lvs_netlink_cmd_rcv_bufs_force", &lvs_netlink_cmd_rcv_bufs_force_handler);
install_keyword("lvs_netlink_monitor_rcv_bufs", &lvs_netlink_monitor_rcv_bufs_handler);
install_keyword("lvs_netlink_monitor_rcv_bufs_force", &lvs_netlink_monitor_rcv_bufs_force_handler);
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_LVS_
install_keyword("rs_init_notifies", &rs_init_notifies_handler);
install_keyword("no_checker_emails", &no_checker_emails_handler);
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
install_keyword("vrrp_rx_bufs_policy", &vrrp_rx_bufs_policy_handler);
install_keyword("vrrp_rx_bufs_multiplier", &vrrp_rx_bufs_multiplier_handler);
#endif
}
Commit Message: Add command line and configuration option to set umask
Issue #1048 identified that files created by keepalived are created
with mode 0666. This commit changes the default to 0644, and also
allows the umask to be specified in the configuration or as a command
line option.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 1
| 168,981
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void prepare_vmcs02(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
u32 exec_control;
vmcs_write16(GUEST_ES_SELECTOR, vmcs12->guest_es_selector);
vmcs_write16(GUEST_CS_SELECTOR, vmcs12->guest_cs_selector);
vmcs_write16(GUEST_SS_SELECTOR, vmcs12->guest_ss_selector);
vmcs_write16(GUEST_DS_SELECTOR, vmcs12->guest_ds_selector);
vmcs_write16(GUEST_FS_SELECTOR, vmcs12->guest_fs_selector);
vmcs_write16(GUEST_GS_SELECTOR, vmcs12->guest_gs_selector);
vmcs_write16(GUEST_LDTR_SELECTOR, vmcs12->guest_ldtr_selector);
vmcs_write16(GUEST_TR_SELECTOR, vmcs12->guest_tr_selector);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_ES_LIMIT, vmcs12->guest_es_limit);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_CS_LIMIT, vmcs12->guest_cs_limit);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_SS_LIMIT, vmcs12->guest_ss_limit);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_DS_LIMIT, vmcs12->guest_ds_limit);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_FS_LIMIT, vmcs12->guest_fs_limit);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_GS_LIMIT, vmcs12->guest_gs_limit);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_LDTR_LIMIT, vmcs12->guest_ldtr_limit);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_TR_LIMIT, vmcs12->guest_tr_limit);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_GDTR_LIMIT, vmcs12->guest_gdtr_limit);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_IDTR_LIMIT, vmcs12->guest_idtr_limit);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_ES_AR_BYTES, vmcs12->guest_es_ar_bytes);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_CS_AR_BYTES, vmcs12->guest_cs_ar_bytes);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_SS_AR_BYTES, vmcs12->guest_ss_ar_bytes);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_DS_AR_BYTES, vmcs12->guest_ds_ar_bytes);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_FS_AR_BYTES, vmcs12->guest_fs_ar_bytes);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_GS_AR_BYTES, vmcs12->guest_gs_ar_bytes);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_LDTR_AR_BYTES, vmcs12->guest_ldtr_ar_bytes);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_TR_AR_BYTES, vmcs12->guest_tr_ar_bytes);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_ES_BASE, vmcs12->guest_es_base);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_CS_BASE, vmcs12->guest_cs_base);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_SS_BASE, vmcs12->guest_ss_base);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_DS_BASE, vmcs12->guest_ds_base);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_FS_BASE, vmcs12->guest_fs_base);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_GS_BASE, vmcs12->guest_gs_base);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_LDTR_BASE, vmcs12->guest_ldtr_base);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_TR_BASE, vmcs12->guest_tr_base);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_GDTR_BASE, vmcs12->guest_gdtr_base);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_IDTR_BASE, vmcs12->guest_idtr_base);
vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL, vmcs12->guest_ia32_debugctl);
vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD,
vmcs12->vm_entry_intr_info_field);
vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_EXCEPTION_ERROR_CODE,
vmcs12->vm_entry_exception_error_code);
vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_INSTRUCTION_LEN,
vmcs12->vm_entry_instruction_len);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO,
vmcs12->guest_interruptibility_info);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_SYSENTER_CS, vmcs12->guest_sysenter_cs);
kvm_set_dr(vcpu, 7, vmcs12->guest_dr7);
vmx_set_rflags(vcpu, vmcs12->guest_rflags);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS,
vmcs12->guest_pending_dbg_exceptions);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_SYSENTER_ESP, vmcs12->guest_sysenter_esp);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_SYSENTER_EIP, vmcs12->guest_sysenter_eip);
vmcs_write64(VMCS_LINK_POINTER, -1ull);
vmcs_write32(PIN_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL,
(vmcs_config.pin_based_exec_ctrl |
vmcs12->pin_based_vm_exec_control));
if (vmcs12->pin_based_vm_exec_control & PIN_BASED_VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER)
vmcs_write32(VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER_VALUE,
vmcs12->vmx_preemption_timer_value);
/*
* Whether page-faults are trapped is determined by a combination of
* 3 settings: PFEC_MASK, PFEC_MATCH and EXCEPTION_BITMAP.PF.
* If enable_ept, L0 doesn't care about page faults and we should
* set all of these to L1's desires. However, if !enable_ept, L0 does
* care about (at least some) page faults, and because it is not easy
* (if at all possible?) to merge L0 and L1's desires, we simply ask
* to exit on each and every L2 page fault. This is done by setting
* MASK=MATCH=0 and (see below) EB.PF=1.
* Note that below we don't need special code to set EB.PF beyond the
* "or"ing of the EB of vmcs01 and vmcs12, because when enable_ept,
* vmcs01's EB.PF is 0 so the "or" will take vmcs12's value, and when
* !enable_ept, EB.PF is 1, so the "or" will always be 1.
*
* A problem with this approach (when !enable_ept) is that L1 may be
* injected with more page faults than it asked for. This could have
* caused problems, but in practice existing hypervisors don't care.
* To fix this, we will need to emulate the PFEC checking (on the L1
* page tables), using walk_addr(), when injecting PFs to L1.
*/
vmcs_write32(PAGE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MASK,
enable_ept ? vmcs12->page_fault_error_code_mask : 0);
vmcs_write32(PAGE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MATCH,
enable_ept ? vmcs12->page_fault_error_code_match : 0);
if (cpu_has_secondary_exec_ctrls()) {
u32 exec_control = vmx_secondary_exec_control(vmx);
if (!vmx->rdtscp_enabled)
exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_RDTSCP;
/* Take the following fields only from vmcs12 */
exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES;
if (nested_cpu_has(vmcs12,
CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_SECONDARY_CONTROLS))
exec_control |= vmcs12->secondary_vm_exec_control;
if (exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES) {
/*
* Translate L1 physical address to host physical
* address for vmcs02. Keep the page pinned, so this
* physical address remains valid. We keep a reference
* to it so we can release it later.
*/
if (vmx->nested.apic_access_page) /* shouldn't happen */
nested_release_page(vmx->nested.apic_access_page);
vmx->nested.apic_access_page =
nested_get_page(vcpu, vmcs12->apic_access_addr);
/*
* If translation failed, no matter: This feature asks
* to exit when accessing the given address, and if it
* can never be accessed, this feature won't do
* anything anyway.
*/
if (!vmx->nested.apic_access_page)
exec_control &=
~SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES;
else
vmcs_write64(APIC_ACCESS_ADDR,
page_to_phys(vmx->nested.apic_access_page));
}
vmcs_write32(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, exec_control);
}
/*
* Set host-state according to L0's settings (vmcs12 is irrelevant here)
* Some constant fields are set here by vmx_set_constant_host_state().
* Other fields are different per CPU, and will be set later when
* vmx_vcpu_load() is called, and when vmx_save_host_state() is called.
*/
vmx_set_constant_host_state(vmx);
/*
* HOST_RSP is normally set correctly in vmx_vcpu_run() just before
* entry, but only if the current (host) sp changed from the value
* we wrote last (vmx->host_rsp). This cache is no longer relevant
* if we switch vmcs, and rather than hold a separate cache per vmcs,
* here we just force the write to happen on entry.
*/
vmx->host_rsp = 0;
exec_control = vmx_exec_control(vmx); /* L0's desires */
exec_control &= ~CPU_BASED_VIRTUAL_INTR_PENDING;
exec_control &= ~CPU_BASED_VIRTUAL_NMI_PENDING;
exec_control &= ~CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW;
exec_control |= vmcs12->cpu_based_vm_exec_control;
/*
* Merging of IO and MSR bitmaps not currently supported.
* Rather, exit every time.
*/
exec_control &= ~CPU_BASED_USE_MSR_BITMAPS;
exec_control &= ~CPU_BASED_USE_IO_BITMAPS;
exec_control |= CPU_BASED_UNCOND_IO_EXITING;
vmcs_write32(CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, exec_control);
/* EXCEPTION_BITMAP and CR0_GUEST_HOST_MASK should basically be the
* bitwise-or of what L1 wants to trap for L2, and what we want to
* trap. Note that CR0.TS also needs updating - we do this later.
*/
update_exception_bitmap(vcpu);
vcpu->arch.cr0_guest_owned_bits &= ~vmcs12->cr0_guest_host_mask;
vmcs_writel(CR0_GUEST_HOST_MASK, ~vcpu->arch.cr0_guest_owned_bits);
/* L2->L1 exit controls are emulated - the hardware exit is to L0 so
* we should use its exit controls. Note that VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_EFER
* bits are further modified by vmx_set_efer() below.
*/
vmcs_write32(VM_EXIT_CONTROLS, vmcs_config.vmexit_ctrl);
/* vmcs12's VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_EFER and VM_ENTRY_IA32E_MODE are
* emulated by vmx_set_efer(), below.
*/
vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_CONTROLS,
(vmcs12->vm_entry_controls & ~VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_EFER &
~VM_ENTRY_IA32E_MODE) |
(vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & ~VM_ENTRY_IA32E_MODE));
if (vmcs12->vm_entry_controls & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PAT)
vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_PAT, vmcs12->guest_ia32_pat);
else if (vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PAT)
vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_PAT, vmx->vcpu.arch.pat);
set_cr4_guest_host_mask(vmx);
if (vmcs12->cpu_based_vm_exec_control & CPU_BASED_USE_TSC_OFFSETING)
vmcs_write64(TSC_OFFSET,
vmx->nested.vmcs01_tsc_offset + vmcs12->tsc_offset);
else
vmcs_write64(TSC_OFFSET, vmx->nested.vmcs01_tsc_offset);
if (enable_vpid) {
/*
* Trivially support vpid by letting L2s share their parent
* L1's vpid. TODO: move to a more elaborate solution, giving
* each L2 its own vpid and exposing the vpid feature to L1.
*/
vmcs_write16(VIRTUAL_PROCESSOR_ID, vmx->vpid);
vmx_flush_tlb(vcpu);
}
if (nested_cpu_has_ept(vmcs12)) {
kvm_mmu_unload(vcpu);
nested_ept_init_mmu_context(vcpu);
}
if (vmcs12->vm_entry_controls & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_EFER)
vcpu->arch.efer = vmcs12->guest_ia32_efer;
else if (vmcs12->vm_entry_controls & VM_ENTRY_IA32E_MODE)
vcpu->arch.efer |= (EFER_LMA | EFER_LME);
else
vcpu->arch.efer &= ~(EFER_LMA | EFER_LME);
/* Note: modifies VM_ENTRY/EXIT_CONTROLS and GUEST/HOST_IA32_EFER */
vmx_set_efer(vcpu, vcpu->arch.efer);
/*
* This sets GUEST_CR0 to vmcs12->guest_cr0, with possibly a modified
* TS bit (for lazy fpu) and bits which we consider mandatory enabled.
* The CR0_READ_SHADOW is what L2 should have expected to read given
* the specifications by L1; It's not enough to take
* vmcs12->cr0_read_shadow because on our cr0_guest_host_mask we we
* have more bits than L1 expected.
*/
vmx_set_cr0(vcpu, vmcs12->guest_cr0);
vmcs_writel(CR0_READ_SHADOW, nested_read_cr0(vmcs12));
vmx_set_cr4(vcpu, vmcs12->guest_cr4);
vmcs_writel(CR4_READ_SHADOW, nested_read_cr4(vmcs12));
/* shadow page tables on either EPT or shadow page tables */
kvm_set_cr3(vcpu, vmcs12->guest_cr3);
kvm_mmu_reset_context(vcpu);
/*
* L1 may access the L2's PDPTR, so save them to construct vmcs12
*/
if (enable_ept) {
vmcs_write64(GUEST_PDPTR0, vmcs12->guest_pdptr0);
vmcs_write64(GUEST_PDPTR1, vmcs12->guest_pdptr1);
vmcs_write64(GUEST_PDPTR2, vmcs12->guest_pdptr2);
vmcs_write64(GUEST_PDPTR3, vmcs12->guest_pdptr3);
}
kvm_register_write(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RSP, vmcs12->guest_rsp);
kvm_register_write(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RIP, vmcs12->guest_rip);
}
Commit Message: nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <nyh@il.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <xinhao.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 37,656
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GetAllNotificationsObserver::Observe(
int type,
const content::NotificationSource& source,
const content::NotificationDetails& details) {
if (!automation_) {
delete this;
return;
}
if (AreActiveNotificationProcessesReady())
SendMessage();
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 117,581
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t OMX::useGraphicBuffer(
node_id node, OMX_U32 port_index,
const sp<GraphicBuffer> &graphicBuffer, buffer_id *buffer) {
return findInstance(node)->useGraphicBuffer(
port_index, graphicBuffer, buffer);
}
Commit Message: Add VPX output buffer size check
and handle dead observers more gracefully
Bug: 27597103
Change-Id: Id7acb25d5ef69b197da15ec200a9e4f9e7b03518
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 161,001
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void nfs4_init_boot_verifier(const struct nfs_client *clp,
nfs4_verifier *bootverf)
{
__be32 verf[2];
if (test_bit(NFS4CLNT_PURGE_STATE, &clp->cl_state)) {
/* An impossible timestamp guarantees this value
* will never match a generated boot time. */
verf[0] = 0;
verf[1] = cpu_to_be32(NSEC_PER_SEC + 1);
} else {
struct nfs_net *nn = net_generic(clp->cl_net, nfs_net_id);
verf[0] = cpu_to_be32(nn->boot_time.tv_sec);
verf[1] = cpu_to_be32(nn->boot_time.tv_nsec);
}
memcpy(bootverf->data, verf, sizeof(bootverf->data));
}
Commit Message: NFS: Fix a NULL pointer dereference of migration recovery ops for v4.2 client
---Steps to Reproduce--
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
<nfs-client>
# mount -t nfs nfs-server:/nfs/ /mnt/
# ll /mnt/*/
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt,refer=/nfs/old/@nfs-server)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
# service nfs restart
<nfs-client>
# ll /mnt/*/ --->>>>> oops here
[ 5123.102925] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 5123.103363] IP: [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.103752] PGD 587b9067 PUD 3cbf5067 PMD 0
[ 5123.104131] Oops: 0000 [#1]
[ 5123.104529] Modules linked in: nfsv4(OE) nfs(OE) fscache(E) nfsd(OE) xfs libcrc32c iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ppdev vmw_balloon parport_pc parport i2c_piix4 shpchp auth_rpcgss nfs_acl vmw_vmci lockd grace sunrpc vmwgfx drm_kms_helper ttm drm mptspi serio_raw scsi_transport_spi e1000 mptscsih mptbase ata_generic pata_acpi [last unloaded: nfsd]
[ 5123.105887] CPU: 0 PID: 15853 Comm: ::1-manager Tainted: G OE 4.2.0-rc6+ #214
[ 5123.106358] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/20/2014
[ 5123.106860] task: ffff88007620f300 ti: ffff88005877c000 task.ti: ffff88005877c000
[ 5123.107363] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa03ed38b>] [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.107909] RSP: 0018:ffff88005877fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 5123.108435] RAX: ffff880053f3bc00 RBX: ffff88006ce6c908 RCX: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.108968] RDX: ffffea0000e6d940 RSI: ffff8800399a0000 RDI: ffff88006ce6c908
[ 5123.109503] RBP: ffff88005877fe28 R08: ffffffff81c708a0 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 5123.110045] R10: 00000000000001a2 R11: ffff88003ba7f5c8 R12: ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.110618] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880053a0d240 R15: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.111169] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffffff81c27000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5123.111726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5123.112286] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000054cac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
[ 5123.112888] Stack:
[ 5123.113458] ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 00000000000167d0 0000000000000000
[ 5123.114049] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000a7ec82c6
[ 5123.114662] ffff88005877fe18 ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.115264] Call Trace:
[ 5123.115868] [<ffffffffa03fb44b>] nfs4_try_migration+0xbb/0x220 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.116487] [<ffffffffa03fcb3b>] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x4ab/0x7b0 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117104] [<ffffffffa03fc690>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x510/0x510 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117813] [<ffffffff810a4527>] kthread+0xd7/0xf0
[ 5123.118456] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.119108] [<ffffffff816d9cdf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 5123.119723] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.120329] Code: 4c 8b 6a 58 74 17 eb 52 48 8d 55 a8 89 c6 4c 89 e7 e8 4a b5 ff ff 8b 45 b0 85 c0 74 1c 4c 89 f9 48 8b 55 90 48 8b 75 98 48 89 df <41> ff 55 00 3d e8 d8 ff ff 41 89 c6 74 cf 48 8b 4d c8 65 48 33
[ 5123.121643] RIP [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.122308] RSP <ffff88005877fdb8>
[ 5123.122942] CR2: 0000000000000000
Fixes: ec011fe847 ("NFS: Introduce a vector of migration recovery ops")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 57,133
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ContentSecurityPolicy::AllowInlineStyle(
Element* element,
const String& context_url,
const String& nonce,
const WTF::OrdinalNumber& context_line,
const String& style_content,
InlineType inline_type,
SecurityViolationReportingPolicy reporting_policy) const {
DCHECK(element);
if (override_inline_style_allowed_)
return true;
Vector<CSPHashValue> csp_hash_values;
FillInCSPHashValues(style_content, style_hash_algorithms_used_,
&csp_hash_values);
bool is_allowed = true;
for (const auto& policy : policies_) {
is_allowed &=
CheckStyleHashAgainstPolicy(csp_hash_values, policy, inline_type) ||
policy->AllowInlineStyle(element, context_url, nonce, context_line,
reporting_policy, style_content, inline_type);
}
return is_allowed;
}
Commit Message: Inherit the navigation initiator when navigating instead of the parent/opener
Spec PR: https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-csp/pull/358
Bug: 905301, 894228, 836148
Change-Id: I43ada2266d42d1cd56dbe3c6dd89d115e878a83a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1314633
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#610850}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 152,456
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int btrfs_defrag_file(struct inode *inode, struct file *file,
struct btrfs_ioctl_defrag_range_args *range,
u64 newer_than, unsigned long max_to_defrag)
{
struct btrfs_root *root = BTRFS_I(inode)->root;
struct file_ra_state *ra = NULL;
unsigned long last_index;
u64 isize = i_size_read(inode);
u64 last_len = 0;
u64 skip = 0;
u64 defrag_end = 0;
u64 newer_off = range->start;
unsigned long i;
unsigned long ra_index = 0;
int ret;
int defrag_count = 0;
int compress_type = BTRFS_COMPRESS_ZLIB;
int extent_thresh = range->extent_thresh;
int max_cluster = (256 * 1024) >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
int cluster = max_cluster;
u64 new_align = ~((u64)128 * 1024 - 1);
struct page **pages = NULL;
if (extent_thresh == 0)
extent_thresh = 256 * 1024;
if (range->flags & BTRFS_DEFRAG_RANGE_COMPRESS) {
if (range->compress_type > BTRFS_COMPRESS_TYPES)
return -EINVAL;
if (range->compress_type)
compress_type = range->compress_type;
}
if (isize == 0)
return 0;
/*
* if we were not given a file, allocate a readahead
* context
*/
if (!file) {
ra = kzalloc(sizeof(*ra), GFP_NOFS);
if (!ra)
return -ENOMEM;
file_ra_state_init(ra, inode->i_mapping);
} else {
ra = &file->f_ra;
}
pages = kmalloc(sizeof(struct page *) * max_cluster,
GFP_NOFS);
if (!pages) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out_ra;
}
/* find the last page to defrag */
if (range->start + range->len > range->start) {
last_index = min_t(u64, isize - 1,
range->start + range->len - 1) >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
} else {
last_index = (isize - 1) >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
}
if (newer_than) {
ret = find_new_extents(root, inode, newer_than,
&newer_off, 64 * 1024);
if (!ret) {
range->start = newer_off;
/*
* we always align our defrag to help keep
* the extents in the file evenly spaced
*/
i = (newer_off & new_align) >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
} else
goto out_ra;
} else {
i = range->start >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
}
if (!max_to_defrag)
max_to_defrag = last_index + 1;
/*
* make writeback starts from i, so the defrag range can be
* written sequentially.
*/
if (i < inode->i_mapping->writeback_index)
inode->i_mapping->writeback_index = i;
while (i <= last_index && defrag_count < max_to_defrag &&
(i < (i_size_read(inode) + PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - 1) >>
PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT)) {
/*
* make sure we stop running if someone unmounts
* the FS
*/
if (!(inode->i_sb->s_flags & MS_ACTIVE))
break;
if (!should_defrag_range(inode, (u64)i << PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT,
extent_thresh, &last_len, &skip,
&defrag_end, range->flags &
BTRFS_DEFRAG_RANGE_COMPRESS)) {
unsigned long next;
/*
* the should_defrag function tells us how much to skip
* bump our counter by the suggested amount
*/
next = (skip + PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
i = max(i + 1, next);
continue;
}
if (!newer_than) {
cluster = (PAGE_CACHE_ALIGN(defrag_end) >>
PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT) - i;
cluster = min(cluster, max_cluster);
} else {
cluster = max_cluster;
}
if (range->flags & BTRFS_DEFRAG_RANGE_COMPRESS)
BTRFS_I(inode)->force_compress = compress_type;
if (i + cluster > ra_index) {
ra_index = max(i, ra_index);
btrfs_force_ra(inode->i_mapping, ra, file, ra_index,
cluster);
ra_index += max_cluster;
}
mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
ret = cluster_pages_for_defrag(inode, pages, i, cluster);
if (ret < 0) {
mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
goto out_ra;
}
defrag_count += ret;
balance_dirty_pages_ratelimited_nr(inode->i_mapping, ret);
mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
if (newer_than) {
if (newer_off == (u64)-1)
break;
if (ret > 0)
i += ret;
newer_off = max(newer_off + 1,
(u64)i << PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT);
ret = find_new_extents(root, inode,
newer_than, &newer_off,
64 * 1024);
if (!ret) {
range->start = newer_off;
i = (newer_off & new_align) >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
} else {
break;
}
} else {
if (ret > 0) {
i += ret;
last_len += ret << PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
} else {
i++;
last_len = 0;
}
}
}
if ((range->flags & BTRFS_DEFRAG_RANGE_START_IO))
filemap_flush(inode->i_mapping);
if ((range->flags & BTRFS_DEFRAG_RANGE_COMPRESS)) {
/* the filemap_flush will queue IO into the worker threads, but
* we have to make sure the IO is actually started and that
* ordered extents get created before we return
*/
atomic_inc(&root->fs_info->async_submit_draining);
while (atomic_read(&root->fs_info->nr_async_submits) ||
atomic_read(&root->fs_info->async_delalloc_pages)) {
wait_event(root->fs_info->async_submit_wait,
(atomic_read(&root->fs_info->nr_async_submits) == 0 &&
atomic_read(&root->fs_info->async_delalloc_pages) == 0));
}
atomic_dec(&root->fs_info->async_submit_draining);
mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
BTRFS_I(inode)->force_compress = BTRFS_COMPRESS_NONE;
mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
}
if (range->compress_type == BTRFS_COMPRESS_LZO) {
btrfs_set_fs_incompat(root->fs_info, COMPRESS_LZO);
}
ret = defrag_count;
out_ra:
if (!file)
kfree(ra);
kfree(pages);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <chris.mason@fusionio.com>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <pascal@junod.info>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 34,395
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HistoryQuickProvider::DoAutocomplete() {
string16 term_string = autocomplete_input_.text();
ScoredHistoryMatches matches = GetIndex()->HistoryItemsForTerms(term_string);
if (matches.empty())
return;
int max_match_score = (PreventInlineAutocomplete(autocomplete_input_) ||
!matches.begin()->can_inline) ?
(AutocompleteResult::kLowestDefaultScore - 1) :
matches.begin()->raw_score;
for (ScoredHistoryMatches::const_iterator match_iter = matches.begin();
match_iter != matches.end(); ++match_iter) {
const ScoredHistoryMatch& history_match(*match_iter);
max_match_score = std::min(max_match_score, history_match.raw_score);
matches_.push_back(QuickMatchToACMatch(history_match, max_match_score));
max_match_score--;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix icon returned for HQP matches; the two icons were reversed.
BUG=none
TEST=none
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9695022
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126296 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 108,126
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: TEE_Result syscall_cryp_derive_key(unsigned long state,
const struct utee_attribute *usr_params,
unsigned long param_count, unsigned long derived_key)
{
TEE_Result res = TEE_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
struct tee_ta_session *sess;
struct tee_obj *ko;
struct tee_obj *so;
struct tee_cryp_state *cs;
struct tee_cryp_obj_secret *sk;
const struct tee_cryp_obj_type_props *type_props;
TEE_Attribute *params = NULL;
struct user_ta_ctx *utc;
res = tee_ta_get_current_session(&sess);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
utc = to_user_ta_ctx(sess->ctx);
res = tee_svc_cryp_get_state(sess, tee_svc_uref_to_vaddr(state), &cs);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
size_t alloc_size = 0;
if (MUL_OVERFLOW(sizeof(TEE_Attribute), param_count, &alloc_size))
return TEE_ERROR_OVERFLOW;
params = malloc(alloc_size);
if (!params)
return TEE_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
res = copy_in_attrs(utc, usr_params, param_count, params);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
goto out;
/* Get key set in operation */
res = tee_obj_get(utc, cs->key1, &ko);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
goto out;
res = tee_obj_get(utc, tee_svc_uref_to_vaddr(derived_key), &so);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
goto out;
/* Find information needed about the object to initialize */
sk = so->attr;
/* Find description of object */
type_props = tee_svc_find_type_props(so->info.objectType);
if (!type_props) {
res = TEE_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
goto out;
}
if (cs->algo == TEE_ALG_DH_DERIVE_SHARED_SECRET) {
size_t alloc_size;
struct bignum *pub;
struct bignum *ss;
if (param_count != 1 ||
params[0].attributeID != TEE_ATTR_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE) {
res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
goto out;
}
alloc_size = params[0].content.ref.length * 8;
pub = crypto_bignum_allocate(alloc_size);
ss = crypto_bignum_allocate(alloc_size);
if (pub && ss) {
crypto_bignum_bin2bn(params[0].content.ref.buffer,
params[0].content.ref.length, pub);
res = crypto_acipher_dh_shared_secret(ko->attr,
pub, ss);
if (res == TEE_SUCCESS) {
sk->key_size = crypto_bignum_num_bytes(ss);
crypto_bignum_bn2bin(ss, (uint8_t *)(sk + 1));
so->info.handleFlags |=
TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_INITIALIZED;
set_attribute(so, type_props,
TEE_ATTR_SECRET_VALUE);
}
} else {
res = TEE_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
}
crypto_bignum_free(pub);
crypto_bignum_free(ss);
} else if (TEE_ALG_GET_MAIN_ALG(cs->algo) == TEE_MAIN_ALGO_ECDH) {
size_t alloc_size;
struct ecc_public_key key_public;
uint8_t *pt_secret;
unsigned long pt_secret_len;
if (param_count != 2 ||
params[0].attributeID != TEE_ATTR_ECC_PUBLIC_VALUE_X ||
params[1].attributeID != TEE_ATTR_ECC_PUBLIC_VALUE_Y) {
res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
goto out;
}
switch (cs->algo) {
case TEE_ALG_ECDH_P192:
alloc_size = 192;
break;
case TEE_ALG_ECDH_P224:
alloc_size = 224;
break;
case TEE_ALG_ECDH_P256:
alloc_size = 256;
break;
case TEE_ALG_ECDH_P384:
alloc_size = 384;
break;
case TEE_ALG_ECDH_P521:
alloc_size = 521;
break;
default:
res = TEE_ERROR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
goto out;
}
/* Create the public key */
res = crypto_acipher_alloc_ecc_public_key(&key_public,
alloc_size);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
goto out;
key_public.curve = ((struct ecc_keypair *)ko->attr)->curve;
crypto_bignum_bin2bn(params[0].content.ref.buffer,
params[0].content.ref.length,
key_public.x);
crypto_bignum_bin2bn(params[1].content.ref.buffer,
params[1].content.ref.length,
key_public.y);
pt_secret = (uint8_t *)(sk + 1);
pt_secret_len = sk->alloc_size;
res = crypto_acipher_ecc_shared_secret(ko->attr, &key_public,
pt_secret,
&pt_secret_len);
if (res == TEE_SUCCESS) {
sk->key_size = pt_secret_len;
so->info.handleFlags |= TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_INITIALIZED;
set_attribute(so, type_props, TEE_ATTR_SECRET_VALUE);
}
/* free the public key */
crypto_acipher_free_ecc_public_key(&key_public);
}
#if defined(CFG_CRYPTO_HKDF)
else if (TEE_ALG_GET_MAIN_ALG(cs->algo) == TEE_MAIN_ALGO_HKDF) {
void *salt, *info;
size_t salt_len, info_len, okm_len;
uint32_t hash_id = TEE_ALG_GET_DIGEST_HASH(cs->algo);
struct tee_cryp_obj_secret *ik = ko->attr;
const uint8_t *ikm = (const uint8_t *)(ik + 1);
res = get_hkdf_params(params, param_count, &salt, &salt_len,
&info, &info_len, &okm_len);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
goto out;
/* Requested size must fit into the output object's buffer */
if (okm_len > ik->alloc_size) {
res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
goto out;
}
res = tee_cryp_hkdf(hash_id, ikm, ik->key_size, salt, salt_len,
info, info_len, (uint8_t *)(sk + 1),
okm_len);
if (res == TEE_SUCCESS) {
sk->key_size = okm_len;
so->info.handleFlags |= TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_INITIALIZED;
set_attribute(so, type_props, TEE_ATTR_SECRET_VALUE);
}
}
#endif
#if defined(CFG_CRYPTO_CONCAT_KDF)
else if (TEE_ALG_GET_MAIN_ALG(cs->algo) == TEE_MAIN_ALGO_CONCAT_KDF) {
void *info;
size_t info_len, derived_key_len;
uint32_t hash_id = TEE_ALG_GET_DIGEST_HASH(cs->algo);
struct tee_cryp_obj_secret *ss = ko->attr;
const uint8_t *shared_secret = (const uint8_t *)(ss + 1);
res = get_concat_kdf_params(params, param_count, &info,
&info_len, &derived_key_len);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
goto out;
/* Requested size must fit into the output object's buffer */
if (derived_key_len > ss->alloc_size) {
res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
goto out;
}
res = tee_cryp_concat_kdf(hash_id, shared_secret, ss->key_size,
info, info_len, (uint8_t *)(sk + 1),
derived_key_len);
if (res == TEE_SUCCESS) {
sk->key_size = derived_key_len;
so->info.handleFlags |= TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_INITIALIZED;
set_attribute(so, type_props, TEE_ATTR_SECRET_VALUE);
}
}
#endif
#if defined(CFG_CRYPTO_PBKDF2)
else if (TEE_ALG_GET_MAIN_ALG(cs->algo) == TEE_MAIN_ALGO_PBKDF2) {
void *salt;
size_t salt_len, iteration_count, derived_key_len;
uint32_t hash_id = TEE_ALG_GET_DIGEST_HASH(cs->algo);
struct tee_cryp_obj_secret *ss = ko->attr;
const uint8_t *password = (const uint8_t *)(ss + 1);
res = get_pbkdf2_params(params, param_count, &salt, &salt_len,
&derived_key_len, &iteration_count);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
goto out;
/* Requested size must fit into the output object's buffer */
if (derived_key_len > ss->alloc_size) {
res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
goto out;
}
res = tee_cryp_pbkdf2(hash_id, password, ss->key_size, salt,
salt_len, iteration_count,
(uint8_t *)(sk + 1), derived_key_len);
if (res == TEE_SUCCESS) {
sk->key_size = derived_key_len;
so->info.handleFlags |= TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_INITIALIZED;
set_attribute(so, type_props, TEE_ATTR_SECRET_VALUE);
}
}
#endif
else
res = TEE_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
out:
free(params);
return res;
}
Commit Message: svc: check for allocation overflow in crypto calls part 2
Without checking for overflow there is a risk of allocating a buffer
with size smaller than anticipated and as a consequence of that it might
lead to a heap based overflow with attacker controlled data written
outside the boundaries of the buffer.
Fixes: OP-TEE-2018-0011: "Integer overflow in crypto system calls (x2)"
Signed-off-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org> (QEMU v7, v8)
Reviewed-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Riscure <inforequest@riscure.com>
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <a.a.milburn@vu.nl>
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@linaro.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 86,867
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void perf_pmu_start_txn(struct pmu *pmu)
{
perf_pmu_disable(pmu);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 26,151
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LoginDisplayHostWebUI::OnStartAppLaunch() {
if (features::IsAshInBrowserProcess())
finalize_animation_type_ = ANIMATION_FADE_OUT;
if (!login_window_)
LoadURL(GURL(kAppLaunchSplashURL));
login_view_->set_should_emit_login_prompt_visible(false);
}
Commit Message: cros: Check initial auth type when showing views login.
Bug: 859611
Change-Id: I0298db9bbf4aed6bd40600aef2e1c5794e8cd058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1123056
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyin Hu <xiaoyinh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jacob Dufault <jdufault@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572224}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 131,642
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: size_t ZSTD_compress_generic (ZSTD_CCtx* cctx,
ZSTD_outBuffer* output,
ZSTD_inBuffer* input,
ZSTD_EndDirective endOp)
{
DEBUGLOG(5, "ZSTD_compress_generic, endOp=%u ", (U32)endOp);
/* check conditions */
if (output->pos > output->size) return ERROR(GENERIC);
if (input->pos > input->size) return ERROR(GENERIC);
assert(cctx!=NULL);
/* transparent initialization stage */
if (cctx->streamStage == zcss_init) {
ZSTD_CCtx_params params = cctx->requestedParams;
ZSTD_prefixDict const prefixDict = cctx->prefixDict;
memset(&cctx->prefixDict, 0, sizeof(cctx->prefixDict)); /* single usage */
assert(prefixDict.dict==NULL || cctx->cdict==NULL); /* only one can be set */
DEBUGLOG(4, "ZSTD_compress_generic : transparent init stage");
if (endOp == ZSTD_e_end) cctx->pledgedSrcSizePlusOne = input->size + 1; /* auto-fix pledgedSrcSize */
params.cParams = ZSTD_getCParamsFromCCtxParams(
&cctx->requestedParams, cctx->pledgedSrcSizePlusOne-1, 0 /*dictSize*/);
#ifdef ZSTD_MULTITHREAD
if ((cctx->pledgedSrcSizePlusOne-1) <= ZSTDMT_JOBSIZE_MIN) {
params.nbWorkers = 0; /* do not invoke multi-threading when src size is too small */
}
if (params.nbWorkers > 0) {
/* mt context creation */
if (cctx->mtctx == NULL) {
DEBUGLOG(4, "ZSTD_compress_generic: creating new mtctx for nbWorkers=%u",
params.nbWorkers);
cctx->mtctx = ZSTDMT_createCCtx_advanced(params.nbWorkers, cctx->customMem);
if (cctx->mtctx == NULL) return ERROR(memory_allocation);
}
/* mt compression */
DEBUGLOG(4, "call ZSTDMT_initCStream_internal as nbWorkers=%u", params.nbWorkers);
CHECK_F( ZSTDMT_initCStream_internal(
cctx->mtctx,
prefixDict.dict, prefixDict.dictSize, ZSTD_dct_rawContent,
cctx->cdict, params, cctx->pledgedSrcSizePlusOne-1) );
cctx->streamStage = zcss_load;
cctx->appliedParams.nbWorkers = params.nbWorkers;
} else
#endif
{ CHECK_F( ZSTD_resetCStream_internal(cctx,
prefixDict.dict, prefixDict.dictSize, prefixDict.dictContentType,
cctx->cdict,
params, cctx->pledgedSrcSizePlusOne-1) );
assert(cctx->streamStage == zcss_load);
assert(cctx->appliedParams.nbWorkers == 0);
} }
/* compression stage */
#ifdef ZSTD_MULTITHREAD
if (cctx->appliedParams.nbWorkers > 0) {
if (cctx->cParamsChanged) {
ZSTDMT_updateCParams_whileCompressing(cctx->mtctx, &cctx->requestedParams);
cctx->cParamsChanged = 0;
}
{ size_t const flushMin = ZSTDMT_compressStream_generic(cctx->mtctx, output, input, endOp);
if ( ZSTD_isError(flushMin)
|| (endOp == ZSTD_e_end && flushMin == 0) ) { /* compression completed */
ZSTD_CCtx_reset(cctx);
}
DEBUGLOG(5, "completed ZSTD_compress_generic delegating to ZSTDMT_compressStream_generic");
return flushMin;
} }
#endif
CHECK_F( ZSTD_compressStream_generic(cctx, output, input, endOp) );
DEBUGLOG(5, "completed ZSTD_compress_generic");
return cctx->outBuffContentSize - cctx->outBuffFlushedSize; /* remaining to flush */
}
Commit Message: fixed T36302429
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 90,029
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SPL_METHOD(SplFileObject, getMaxLineLen)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETURN_LONG((long)intern->u.file.max_line_len);
} /* }}} */
/* {{{ proto bool SplFileObject::hasChildren()
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 1
| 167,059
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void getmetadata_response(const char *mboxname,
uint32_t uid __attribute__((unused)),
const char *entry,
struct attvaluelist *attvalues,
void *rock)
{
struct getmetadata_options *opts = (struct getmetadata_options *)rock;
if (strcmpsafe(mboxname, opts->lastname) || !entry) {
if (opts->items.count) {
char *extname = NULL;
size_t i;
if (opts->lastname)
extname = mboxname_to_external(opts->lastname, &imapd_namespace, imapd_userid);
else
extname = xstrdup("");
prot_printf(imapd_out, "* METADATA ");
prot_printastring(imapd_out, extname);
prot_putc(' ', imapd_out);
for (i = 0; i + 1 < opts->items.count; i+=2) {
prot_putc(i ? ' ' : '(', imapd_out);
const struct buf *key = bufarray_nth(&opts->items, i);
prot_printmap(imapd_out, key->s, key->len);
prot_putc(' ', imapd_out);
const struct buf *val = bufarray_nth(&opts->items, i+1);
prot_printmap(imapd_out, val->s, val->len);
}
prot_printf(imapd_out, ")\r\n");
free(extname);
}
free(opts->lastname);
opts->lastname = xstrdupnull(mboxname);
bufarray_fini(&opts->items);
}
struct attvaluelist *l;
struct buf buf = BUF_INITIALIZER;
for (l = attvalues ; l ; l = l->next) {
/* size check */
if (opts->maxsize && l->value.len >= opts->maxsize) {
if (l->value.len > opts->biggest) opts->biggest = l->value.len;
continue;
}
/* check if it's a value we print... */
buf_reset(&buf);
if (!strcmp(l->attrib, "value.shared"))
buf_appendcstr(&buf, "/shared");
else if (!strcmp(l->attrib, "value.priv"))
buf_appendcstr(&buf, "/private");
else
continue;
buf_appendcstr(&buf, entry);
bufarray_append(&opts->items, &buf);
bufarray_append(&opts->items, &l->value);
}
buf_free(&buf);
}
Commit Message: imapd: check for isadmin BEFORE parsing sync lines
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 95,214
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool DrawingBuffer::Resize(const IntSize& new_size) {
ScopedStateRestorer scoped_state_restorer(this);
return ResizeFramebufferInternal(new_size);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 133,958
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const std::string HttpBridge::GetResponseHeaderValue(
const std::string& name) const {
DCHECK_EQ(MessageLoop::current(), created_on_loop_);
base::AutoLock lock(fetch_state_lock_);
DCHECK(fetch_state_.request_completed);
std::string value;
fetch_state_.response_headers->EnumerateHeader(NULL, name, &value);
return value;
}
Commit Message: Use URLFetcher::Create instead of new in http_bridge.cc.
This change modified http_bridge so that it uses a factory to construct
the URLFetcher. Moreover, it modified sync_backend_host_unittest.cc to
use an URLFetcher factory which will prevent access to www.example.com during
the test.
BUG=none
TEST=sync_backend_host_unittest.cc
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7053011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87227 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 100,127
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ih264d_init_decoder(void * ps_dec_params)
{
dec_struct_t * ps_dec = (dec_struct_t *)ps_dec_params;
dec_slice_params_t *ps_cur_slice;
pocstruct_t *ps_prev_poc, *ps_cur_poc;
/* Free any dynamic buffers that are allocated */
ih264d_free_dynamic_bufs(ps_dec);
ps_cur_slice = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice;
ps_dec->init_done = 0;
ps_dec->u4_num_cores = 1;
ps_dec->u2_pic_ht = ps_dec->u2_pic_wd = 0;
ps_dec->u1_separate_parse = DEFAULT_SEPARATE_PARSE;
ps_dec->u4_app_disable_deblk_frm = 0;
ps_dec->i4_degrade_type = 0;
ps_dec->i4_degrade_pics = 0;
ps_dec->i4_app_skip_mode = IVD_SKIP_NONE;
ps_dec->i4_dec_skip_mode = IVD_SKIP_NONE;
memset(ps_dec->ps_pps, 0,
((sizeof(dec_pic_params_t)) * MAX_NUM_PIC_PARAMS));
memset(ps_dec->ps_sps, 0,
((sizeof(dec_seq_params_t)) * MAX_NUM_SEQ_PARAMS));
/* Initialization of function pointers ih264d_deblock_picture function*/
ps_dec->p_DeblockPicture[0] = ih264d_deblock_picture_non_mbaff;
ps_dec->p_DeblockPicture[1] = ih264d_deblock_picture_mbaff;
ps_dec->s_cab_dec_env.pv_codec_handle = ps_dec;
ps_dec->u4_num_fld_in_frm = 0;
ps_dec->ps_dpb_mgr->pv_codec_handle = ps_dec;
/* Initialize the sei validity u4_flag with zero indiacting sei is not valid*/
ps_dec->ps_sei->u1_is_valid = 0;
/* decParams Initializations */
ps_dec->ps_cur_pps = NULL;
ps_dec->ps_cur_sps = NULL;
ps_dec->u1_init_dec_flag = 0;
ps_dec->u1_first_slice_in_stream = 1;
ps_dec->u1_first_pb_nal_in_pic = 1;
ps_dec->u1_last_pic_not_decoded = 0;
ps_dec->u4_app_disp_width = 0;
ps_dec->i4_header_decoded = 0;
ps_dec->u4_total_frames_decoded = 0;
ps_dec->i4_error_code = 0;
ps_dec->i4_content_type = -1;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag = 0;
ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status->u1_err_flag = ACCEPT_ALL_PICS; //REJECT_PB_PICS;
ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status->u1_cur_pic_type = PIC_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status->u4_frm_sei_sync = SYNC_FRM_DEFAULT;
ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status->u4_cur_frm = INIT_FRAME;
ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status->u1_pic_aud_i = PIC_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
ps_dec->u1_pr_sl_type = 0xFF;
ps_dec->u2_mbx = 0xffff;
ps_dec->u2_mby = 0;
ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded = 0;
/* POC initializations */
ps_prev_poc = &ps_dec->s_prev_pic_poc;
ps_cur_poc = &ps_dec->s_cur_pic_poc;
ps_prev_poc->i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb = ps_cur_poc->i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb = 0;
ps_prev_poc->i4_pic_order_cnt_msb = ps_cur_poc->i4_pic_order_cnt_msb = 0;
ps_prev_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom =
ps_cur_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom = 0;
ps_prev_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[0] =
ps_cur_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[0] = 0;
ps_prev_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[1] =
ps_cur_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[1] = 0;
ps_prev_poc->u1_mmco_equalto5 = ps_cur_poc->u1_mmco_equalto5 = 0;
ps_prev_poc->i4_top_field_order_count = ps_cur_poc->i4_top_field_order_count =
0;
ps_prev_poc->i4_bottom_field_order_count =
ps_cur_poc->i4_bottom_field_order_count = 0;
ps_prev_poc->u1_bot_field = ps_cur_poc->u1_bot_field = 0;
ps_prev_poc->u1_mmco_equalto5 = ps_cur_poc->u1_mmco_equalto5 = 0;
ps_prev_poc->i4_prev_frame_num_ofst = ps_cur_poc->i4_prev_frame_num_ofst = 0;
ps_cur_slice->u1_mmco_equalto5 = 0;
ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num = 0;
ps_dec->i4_max_poc = 0;
ps_dec->i4_prev_max_display_seq = 0;
ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp = 4;
/* Field PIC initializations */
ps_dec->u1_second_field = 0;
ps_dec->s_prev_seq_params.u1_eoseq_pending = 0;
/* Set the cropping parameters as zero */
ps_dec->u2_crop_offset_y = 0;
ps_dec->u2_crop_offset_uv = 0;
/* The Initial Frame Rate Info is not Present */
ps_dec->i4_vui_frame_rate = -1;
ps_dec->i4_pic_type = -1;
ps_dec->i4_frametype = -1;
ps_dec->i4_content_type = -1;
ps_dec->u1_res_changed = 0;
ps_dec->u1_frame_decoded_flag = 0;
/* Set the default frame seek mask mode */
ps_dec->u4_skip_frm_mask = SKIP_NONE;
/********************************************************/
/* Initialize CAVLC residual decoding function pointers */
/********************************************************/
ps_dec->pf_cavlc_4x4res_block[0] = ih264d_cavlc_4x4res_block_totalcoeff_1;
ps_dec->pf_cavlc_4x4res_block[1] =
ih264d_cavlc_4x4res_block_totalcoeff_2to10;
ps_dec->pf_cavlc_4x4res_block[2] =
ih264d_cavlc_4x4res_block_totalcoeff_11to16;
ps_dec->pf_cavlc_parse4x4coeff[0] = ih264d_cavlc_parse4x4coeff_n0to7;
ps_dec->pf_cavlc_parse4x4coeff[1] = ih264d_cavlc_parse4x4coeff_n8;
ps_dec->pf_cavlc_parse_8x8block[0] =
ih264d_cavlc_parse_8x8block_none_available;
ps_dec->pf_cavlc_parse_8x8block[1] =
ih264d_cavlc_parse_8x8block_left_available;
ps_dec->pf_cavlc_parse_8x8block[2] =
ih264d_cavlc_parse_8x8block_top_available;
ps_dec->pf_cavlc_parse_8x8block[3] =
ih264d_cavlc_parse_8x8block_both_available;
/***************************************************************************/
/* Initialize Bs calculation function pointers for P and B, 16x16/non16x16 */
/***************************************************************************/
ps_dec->pf_fill_bs1[0][0] = ih264d_fill_bs1_16x16mb_pslice;
ps_dec->pf_fill_bs1[0][1] = ih264d_fill_bs1_non16x16mb_pslice;
ps_dec->pf_fill_bs1[1][0] = ih264d_fill_bs1_16x16mb_bslice;
ps_dec->pf_fill_bs1[1][1] = ih264d_fill_bs1_non16x16mb_bslice;
ps_dec->pf_fill_bs_xtra_left_edge[0] =
ih264d_fill_bs_xtra_left_edge_cur_frm;
ps_dec->pf_fill_bs_xtra_left_edge[1] =
ih264d_fill_bs_xtra_left_edge_cur_fld;
/* Initialize Reference Pic Buffers */
ih264d_init_ref_bufs(ps_dec->ps_dpb_mgr);
ps_dec->u2_prv_frame_num = 0;
ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded = 0;
ps_dec->u1_dangling_field = 0;
ps_dec->s_cab_dec_env.cabac_table = gau4_ih264d_cabac_table;
ps_dec->pu1_left_mv_ctxt_inc = ps_dec->u1_left_mv_ctxt_inc_arr[0];
ps_dec->pi1_left_ref_idx_ctxt_inc =
&ps_dec->i1_left_ref_idx_ctx_inc_arr[0][0];
ps_dec->pu1_left_yuv_dc_csbp = &ps_dec->u1_yuv_dc_csbp_topmb;
/* ! */
/* Initializing flush frame u4_flag */
ps_dec->u1_flushfrm = 0;
{
ps_dec->s_cab_dec_env.pv_codec_handle = (void*)ps_dec;
ps_dec->ps_bitstrm->pv_codec_handle = (void*)ps_dec;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->pv_codec_handle = (void*)ps_dec;
ps_dec->ps_dpb_mgr->pv_codec_handle = (void*)ps_dec;
}
memset(ps_dec->disp_bufs, 0, (MAX_DISP_BUFS_NEW) * sizeof(disp_buf_t));
memset(ps_dec->u4_disp_buf_mapping, 0,
(MAX_DISP_BUFS_NEW) * sizeof(UWORD32));
memset(ps_dec->u4_disp_buf_to_be_freed, 0,
(MAX_DISP_BUFS_NEW) * sizeof(UWORD32));
ih264d_init_arch(ps_dec);
ih264d_init_function_ptr(ps_dec);
ps_dec->e_frm_out_mode = IVD_DISPLAY_FRAME_OUT;
ps_dec->init_done = 1;
}
Commit Message: Decoder: Memset few structures to zero to handle error clips
Bug: 27907656
Change-Id: I671d135dd5c324c39b4ede990b7225d52ba882cd
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 173,758
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: base::string16 ExternalProtocolDialog::GetWindowTitle() const {
return delegate_->GetTitleText();
}
Commit Message: Set Cancel as the default button for the external protocol dialog.
This ensures that users holding down the Enter or Space key cannot
accidentally trigger an external protocol launch.
BUG=865202
Change-Id: I2cec7b3c216b80641200c97dec2517a66b4e0b24
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1142705
Commit-Queue: Dominick Ng <dominickn@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Trent Apted <tapted@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#576340}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 155,369
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void longAttrAttributeGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
TestObjectV8Internal::longAttrAttributeGetter(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 121,750
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SPL_METHOD(SplHeap, rewind)
{
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
/* do nothing, the iterator always points to the top element */
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 14,891
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void UrlFetcherDownloader::DoStartDownload(const GURL& url) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
base::PostTaskAndReply(
FROM_HERE, kTaskTraits,
base::BindOnce(&UrlFetcherDownloader::CreateDownloadDir,
base::Unretained(this)),
base::BindOnce(&UrlFetcherDownloader::StartURLFetch,
base::Unretained(this), url));
}
Commit Message: Fix error handling in the request sender and url fetcher downloader.
That means handling the network errors by primarily looking at net_error.
Bug: 1028369
Change-Id: I8181bced25f8b56144ea336a03883d0dceea5108
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1935428
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sorin Jianu <sorin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#719199}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 136,828
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BackFramebuffer::~BackFramebuffer() {
DCHECK_EQ(id_, 0u);
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 121,067
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: another_hunk (enum diff difftype, bool rev)
{
char *s;
lin context = 0;
size_t chars_read;
char numbuf0[LINENUM_LENGTH_BOUND + 1];
char numbuf1[LINENUM_LENGTH_BOUND + 1];
char numbuf2[LINENUM_LENGTH_BOUND + 1];
char numbuf3[LINENUM_LENGTH_BOUND + 1];
set_hunkmax();
while (p_end >= 0) {
if (p_end == p_efake)
p_end = p_bfake; /* don't free twice */
else
free(p_line[p_end]);
p_end--;
}
assert(p_end == -1);
p_efake = -1;
if (p_c_function)
{
free (p_c_function);
p_c_function = NULL;
}
p_max = hunkmax; /* gets reduced when --- found */
if (difftype == CONTEXT_DIFF || difftype == NEW_CONTEXT_DIFF) {
file_offset line_beginning = file_tell (pfp);
/* file pos of the current line */
lin repl_beginning = 0; /* index of --- line */
lin fillcnt = 0; /* #lines of missing ptrn or repl */
lin fillsrc; /* index of first line to copy */
lin filldst; /* index of first missing line */
bool ptrn_spaces_eaten = false; /* ptrn was slightly misformed */
bool some_context = false; /* (perhaps internal) context seen */
bool repl_could_be_missing = true;
bool ptrn_missing = false; /* The pattern was missing. */
bool repl_missing = false; /* Likewise for replacement. */
file_offset repl_backtrack_position = 0;
/* file pos of first repl line */
lin repl_patch_line; /* input line number for same */
lin repl_context; /* context for same */
lin ptrn_prefix_context = -1; /* lines in pattern prefix context */
lin ptrn_suffix_context = -1; /* lines in pattern suffix context */
lin repl_prefix_context = -1; /* lines in replac. prefix context */
lin ptrn_copiable = 0; /* # of copiable lines in ptrn */
lin repl_copiable = 0; /* Likewise for replacement. */
/* Pacify 'gcc -Wall'. */
fillsrc = filldst = repl_patch_line = repl_context = 0;
chars_read = get_line ();
if (chars_read == (size_t) -1
|| chars_read <= 8
|| strncmp (buf, "********", 8) != 0) {
next_intuit_at(line_beginning,p_input_line);
return chars_read == (size_t) -1 ? -1 : 0;
}
s = buf;
while (*s == '*')
s++;
if (*s == ' ')
{
p_c_function = s;
while (*s != '\n')
s++;
*s = '\0';
p_c_function = savestr (p_c_function);
if (! p_c_function)
return -1;
}
p_hunk_beg = p_input_line + 1;
while (p_end < p_max) {
chars_read = get_line ();
if (chars_read == (size_t) -1)
return -1;
if (!chars_read) {
if (repl_beginning && repl_could_be_missing) {
repl_missing = true;
goto hunk_done;
}
if (p_max - p_end < 4) {
strcpy (buf, " \n"); /* assume blank lines got chopped */
chars_read = 3;
} else {
fatal ("unexpected end of file in patch");
}
}
p_end++;
if (p_end == hunkmax)
fatal ("unterminated hunk starting at line %s; giving up at line %s: %s",
format_linenum (numbuf0, pch_hunk_beg ()),
format_linenum (numbuf1, p_input_line), buf);
assert(p_end < hunkmax);
p_Char[p_end] = *buf;
p_len[p_end] = 0;
p_line[p_end] = 0;
switch (*buf) {
case '*':
if (strnEQ(buf, "********", 8)) {
if (repl_beginning && repl_could_be_missing) {
repl_missing = true;
goto hunk_done;
}
else
fatal ("unexpected end of hunk at line %s",
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_input_line));
}
if (p_end != 0) {
if (repl_beginning && repl_could_be_missing) {
repl_missing = true;
goto hunk_done;
}
fatal ("unexpected '***' at line %s: %s",
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_input_line), buf);
}
context = 0;
p_len[p_end] = strlen (buf);
if (! (p_line[p_end] = savestr (buf))) {
p_end--;
return -1;
}
for (s = buf; *s && !ISDIGIT (*s); s++)
/* do nothing */ ;
if (strnEQ(s,"0,0",3))
remove_prefix (s, 2);
s = scan_linenum (s, &p_first);
if (*s == ',') {
while (*s && !ISDIGIT (*s))
s++;
scan_linenum (s, &p_ptrn_lines);
p_ptrn_lines += 1 - p_first;
if (p_ptrn_lines < 0)
malformed ();
}
else if (p_first)
p_ptrn_lines = 1;
else {
p_ptrn_lines = 0;
p_first = 1;
}
if (p_first >= LINENUM_MAX - p_ptrn_lines ||
p_ptrn_lines >= LINENUM_MAX - 6)
malformed ();
p_max = p_ptrn_lines + 6; /* we need this much at least */
while (p_max + 1 >= hunkmax)
if (! grow_hunkmax ())
return -1;
p_max = hunkmax;
break;
case '-':
if (buf[1] != '-')
goto change_line;
if (ptrn_prefix_context == -1)
ptrn_prefix_context = context;
ptrn_suffix_context = context;
if (repl_beginning
|| (p_end
!= p_ptrn_lines + 1 + (p_Char[p_end - 1] == '\n')))
{
if (p_end == 1)
{
/* 'Old' lines were omitted. Set up to fill
them in from 'new' context lines. */
ptrn_missing = true;
p_end = p_ptrn_lines + 1;
ptrn_prefix_context = ptrn_suffix_context = -1;
fillsrc = p_end + 1;
filldst = 1;
fillcnt = p_ptrn_lines;
}
else if (! repl_beginning)
fatal ("%s '---' at line %s; check line numbers at line %s",
(p_end <= p_ptrn_lines
? "Premature"
: "Overdue"),
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_input_line),
format_linenum (numbuf1, p_hunk_beg));
else if (! repl_could_be_missing)
fatal ("duplicate '---' at line %s; check line numbers at line %s",
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_input_line),
format_linenum (numbuf1,
p_hunk_beg + repl_beginning));
else
{
repl_missing = true;
goto hunk_done;
}
}
repl_beginning = p_end;
repl_backtrack_position = file_tell (pfp);
repl_patch_line = p_input_line;
repl_context = context;
p_len[p_end] = strlen (buf);
if (! (p_line[p_end] = savestr (buf)))
{
p_end--;
return -1;
}
p_Char[p_end] = '=';
for (s = buf; *s && ! ISDIGIT (*s); s++)
/* do nothing */ ;
s = scan_linenum (s, &p_newfirst);
if (*s == ',')
{
do
{
if (!*++s)
malformed ();
}
while (! ISDIGIT (*s));
scan_linenum (s, &p_repl_lines);
p_repl_lines += 1 - p_newfirst;
if (p_repl_lines < 0)
malformed ();
}
else if (p_newfirst)
p_repl_lines = 1;
else
{
p_repl_lines = 0;
p_newfirst = 1;
}
if (p_newfirst >= LINENUM_MAX - p_repl_lines ||
p_repl_lines >= LINENUM_MAX - p_end)
malformed ();
p_max = p_repl_lines + p_end;
while (p_max + 1 >= hunkmax)
if (! grow_hunkmax ())
return -1;
if (p_repl_lines != ptrn_copiable
&& (p_prefix_context != 0
|| context != 0
|| p_repl_lines != 1))
repl_could_be_missing = false;
context = 0;
break;
case '+': case '!':
repl_could_be_missing = false;
change_line:
s = buf + 1;
chars_read--;
if (*s == '\n' && canonicalize) {
strcpy (s, " \n");
chars_read = 2;
}
if (*s == ' ' || *s == '\t') {
s++;
chars_read--;
} else if (repl_beginning && repl_could_be_missing) {
repl_missing = true;
goto hunk_done;
}
if (! repl_beginning)
{
if (ptrn_prefix_context == -1)
ptrn_prefix_context = context;
}
else
{
if (repl_prefix_context == -1)
repl_prefix_context = context;
}
chars_read -=
(1 < chars_read
&& p_end == (repl_beginning ? p_max : p_ptrn_lines)
&& incomplete_line ());
p_len[p_end] = chars_read;
p_line[p_end] = savebuf (s, chars_read);
if (chars_read && ! p_line[p_end]) {
p_end--;
return -1;
}
context = 0;
break;
case '\t': case '\n': /* assume spaces got eaten */
s = buf;
if (*buf == '\t') {
s++;
chars_read--;
}
if (repl_beginning && repl_could_be_missing &&
(!ptrn_spaces_eaten || difftype == NEW_CONTEXT_DIFF) ) {
repl_missing = true;
goto hunk_done;
}
chars_read -=
(1 < chars_read
&& p_end == (repl_beginning ? p_max : p_ptrn_lines)
&& incomplete_line ());
p_len[p_end] = chars_read;
p_line[p_end] = savebuf (buf, chars_read);
if (chars_read && ! p_line[p_end]) {
p_end--;
return -1;
}
if (p_end != p_ptrn_lines + 1) {
ptrn_spaces_eaten |= (repl_beginning != 0);
some_context = true;
context++;
if (repl_beginning)
repl_copiable++;
else
ptrn_copiable++;
p_Char[p_end] = ' ';
}
break;
case ' ':
s = buf + 1;
chars_read--;
if (*s == '\n' && canonicalize) {
strcpy (s, "\n");
chars_read = 2;
}
if (*s == ' ' || *s == '\t') {
s++;
chars_read--;
} else if (repl_beginning && repl_could_be_missing) {
repl_missing = true;
goto hunk_done;
}
some_context = true;
context++;
if (repl_beginning)
repl_copiable++;
else
ptrn_copiable++;
chars_read -=
(1 < chars_read
&& p_end == (repl_beginning ? p_max : p_ptrn_lines)
&& incomplete_line ());
p_len[p_end] = chars_read;
p_line[p_end] = savebuf (s, chars_read);
if (chars_read && ! p_line[p_end]) {
p_end--;
return -1;
}
break;
default:
if (repl_beginning && repl_could_be_missing) {
repl_missing = true;
goto hunk_done;
}
malformed ();
}
}
hunk_done:
if (p_end >=0 && !repl_beginning)
fatal ("no '---' found in patch at line %s",
format_linenum (numbuf0, pch_hunk_beg ()));
if (repl_missing) {
/* reset state back to just after --- */
p_input_line = repl_patch_line;
context = repl_context;
for (p_end--; p_end > repl_beginning; p_end--)
free(p_line[p_end]);
Fseek (pfp, repl_backtrack_position, SEEK_SET);
/* redundant 'new' context lines were omitted - set */
/* up to fill them in from the old file context */
fillsrc = 1;
filldst = repl_beginning+1;
fillcnt = p_repl_lines;
p_end = p_max;
}
else if (! ptrn_missing && ptrn_copiable != repl_copiable)
fatal ("context mangled in hunk at line %s",
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_hunk_beg));
else if (!some_context && fillcnt == 1) {
/* the first hunk was a null hunk with no context */
/* and we were expecting one line -- fix it up. */
while (filldst < p_end) {
p_line[filldst] = p_line[filldst+1];
p_Char[filldst] = p_Char[filldst+1];
p_len[filldst] = p_len[filldst+1];
filldst++;
}
#if 0
repl_beginning--; /* this doesn't need to be fixed */
#endif
p_end--;
p_first++; /* do append rather than insert */
fillcnt = 0;
p_ptrn_lines = 0;
}
p_prefix_context = ((repl_prefix_context == -1
|| (ptrn_prefix_context != -1
&& ptrn_prefix_context < repl_prefix_context))
? ptrn_prefix_context : repl_prefix_context);
p_suffix_context = ((ptrn_suffix_context != -1
&& ptrn_suffix_context < context)
? ptrn_suffix_context : context);
if (p_prefix_context == -1 || p_suffix_context == -1)
fatal ("replacement text or line numbers mangled in hunk at line %s",
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_hunk_beg));
if (difftype == CONTEXT_DIFF
&& (fillcnt
|| (p_first > 1
&& p_prefix_context + p_suffix_context < ptrn_copiable))) {
if (verbosity == VERBOSE)
say ("%s\n%s\n%s\n",
"(Fascinating -- this is really a new-style context diff but without",
"the telltale extra asterisks on the *** line that usually indicate",
"the new style...)");
diff_type = difftype = NEW_CONTEXT_DIFF;
}
/* if there were omitted context lines, fill them in now */
if (fillcnt) {
p_bfake = filldst; /* remember where not to free() */
p_efake = filldst + fillcnt - 1;
while (fillcnt-- > 0) {
while (fillsrc <= p_end && fillsrc != repl_beginning
&& p_Char[fillsrc] != ' ')
fillsrc++;
if (p_end < fillsrc || fillsrc == repl_beginning)
{
fatal ("replacement text or line numbers mangled in hunk at line %s",
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_hunk_beg));
}
p_line[filldst] = p_line[fillsrc];
p_Char[filldst] = p_Char[fillsrc];
p_len[filldst] = p_len[fillsrc];
fillsrc++; filldst++;
}
while (fillsrc <= p_end && fillsrc != repl_beginning)
{
if (p_Char[fillsrc] == ' ')
fatal ("replacement text or line numbers mangled in hunk at line %s",
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_hunk_beg));
fillsrc++;
}
if (debug & 64)
printf ("fillsrc %s, filldst %s, rb %s, e+1 %s\n",
format_linenum (numbuf0, fillsrc),
format_linenum (numbuf1, filldst),
format_linenum (numbuf2, repl_beginning),
format_linenum (numbuf3, p_end + 1));
assert(fillsrc==p_end+1 || fillsrc==repl_beginning);
assert(filldst==p_end+1 || filldst==repl_beginning);
}
}
else if (difftype == UNI_DIFF) {
file_offset line_beginning = file_tell (pfp); /* file pos of the current line */
lin fillsrc; /* index of old lines */
lin filldst; /* index of new lines */
char ch = '\0';
chars_read = get_line ();
if (chars_read == (size_t) -1
|| chars_read <= 4
|| strncmp (buf, "@@ -", 4) != 0) {
next_intuit_at(line_beginning,p_input_line);
return chars_read == (size_t) -1 ? -1 : 0;
}
s = scan_linenum (buf + 4, &p_first);
if (*s == ',')
s = scan_linenum (s + 1, &p_ptrn_lines);
else
p_ptrn_lines = 1;
if (p_first >= LINENUM_MAX - p_ptrn_lines)
malformed ();
if (*s == ' ') s++;
if (*s != '+')
malformed ();
s = scan_linenum (s + 1, &p_newfirst);
if (*s == ',')
s = scan_linenum (s + 1, &p_repl_lines);
else
p_repl_lines = 1;
if (p_newfirst >= LINENUM_MAX - p_repl_lines)
malformed ();
if (*s == ' ') s++;
if (*s++ != '@')
malformed ();
if (*s++ == '@' && *s == ' ')
{
p_c_function = s;
while (*s != '\n')
s++;
*s = '\0';
p_c_function = savestr (p_c_function);
if (! p_c_function)
return -1;
}
if (!p_ptrn_lines)
p_first++; /* do append rather than insert */
if (!p_repl_lines)
p_newfirst++;
if (p_ptrn_lines >= LINENUM_MAX - (p_repl_lines + 1))
malformed ();
p_max = p_ptrn_lines + p_repl_lines + 1;
while (p_max + 1 >= hunkmax)
if (! grow_hunkmax ())
return -1;
fillsrc = 1;
filldst = fillsrc + p_ptrn_lines;
p_end = filldst + p_repl_lines;
sprintf (buf, "*** %s,%s ****\n",
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_first),
format_linenum (numbuf1, p_first + p_ptrn_lines - 1));
p_len[0] = strlen (buf);
if (! (p_line[0] = savestr (buf))) {
p_end = -1;
return -1;
}
p_Char[0] = '*';
sprintf (buf, "--- %s,%s ----\n",
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_newfirst),
format_linenum (numbuf1, p_newfirst + p_repl_lines - 1));
p_len[filldst] = strlen (buf);
if (! (p_line[filldst] = savestr (buf))) {
p_end = 0;
return -1;
}
p_Char[filldst++] = '=';
p_prefix_context = -1;
p_hunk_beg = p_input_line + 1;
while (fillsrc <= p_ptrn_lines || filldst <= p_end) {
chars_read = get_line ();
if (!chars_read) {
if (p_max - filldst < 3) {
strcpy (buf, " \n"); /* assume blank lines got chopped */
chars_read = 2;
} else {
fatal ("unexpected end of file in patch");
}
}
if (chars_read == (size_t) -1)
s = 0;
else if (*buf == '\t' || *buf == '\n') {
ch = ' '; /* assume the space got eaten */
s = savebuf (buf, chars_read);
}
else {
ch = *buf;
s = savebuf (buf+1, --chars_read);
}
if (chars_read && ! s)
{
while (--filldst > p_ptrn_lines)
free(p_line[filldst]);
p_end = fillsrc-1;
return -1;
}
switch (ch) {
case '-':
if (fillsrc > p_ptrn_lines) {
free(s);
p_end = filldst-1;
malformed ();
}
chars_read -= fillsrc == p_ptrn_lines && incomplete_line ();
p_Char[fillsrc] = ch;
p_line[fillsrc] = s;
p_len[fillsrc++] = chars_read;
break;
case '=':
ch = ' ';
/* FALL THROUGH */
case ' ':
if (fillsrc > p_ptrn_lines) {
free(s);
while (--filldst > p_ptrn_lines)
free(p_line[filldst]);
p_end = fillsrc-1;
malformed ();
}
context++;
chars_read -= fillsrc == p_ptrn_lines && incomplete_line ();
p_Char[fillsrc] = ch;
p_line[fillsrc] = s;
p_len[fillsrc++] = chars_read;
s = savebuf (s, chars_read);
if (chars_read && ! s) {
while (--filldst > p_ptrn_lines)
free(p_line[filldst]);
p_end = fillsrc-1;
return -1;
}
/* FALL THROUGH */
case '+':
if (filldst > p_end) {
free(s);
while (--filldst > p_ptrn_lines)
free(p_line[filldst]);
p_end = fillsrc-1;
malformed ();
}
chars_read -= filldst == p_end && incomplete_line ();
p_Char[filldst] = ch;
p_line[filldst] = s;
p_len[filldst++] = chars_read;
break;
default:
p_end = filldst;
malformed ();
}
if (ch != ' ') {
if (p_prefix_context == -1)
p_prefix_context = context;
context = 0;
}
}/* while */
if (p_prefix_context == -1)
malformed ();
p_suffix_context = context;
}
else { /* normal diff--fake it up */
char hunk_type;
int i;
lin min, max;
file_offset line_beginning = file_tell (pfp);
p_prefix_context = p_suffix_context = 0;
chars_read = get_line ();
if (chars_read == (size_t) -1 || !chars_read || !ISDIGIT (*buf)) {
next_intuit_at(line_beginning,p_input_line);
return chars_read == (size_t) -1 ? -1 : 0;
}
s = scan_linenum (buf, &p_first);
if (*s == ',') {
s = scan_linenum (s + 1, &p_ptrn_lines);
p_ptrn_lines += 1 - p_first;
}
else
p_ptrn_lines = (*s != 'a');
if (p_first >= LINENUM_MAX - p_ptrn_lines)
malformed ();
hunk_type = *s;
if (hunk_type == 'a')
p_first++; /* do append rather than insert */
s = scan_linenum (s + 1, &min);
if (*s == ',')
scan_linenum (s + 1, &max);
else
max = min;
if (min > max || max - min == LINENUM_MAX)
malformed ();
if (hunk_type == 'd')
min++;
p_newfirst = min;
p_repl_lines = max - min + 1;
if (p_newfirst >= LINENUM_MAX - p_repl_lines)
malformed ();
if (p_ptrn_lines >= LINENUM_MAX - (p_repl_lines + 1))
malformed ();
p_end = p_ptrn_lines + p_repl_lines + 1;
while (p_end + 1 >= hunkmax)
if (! grow_hunkmax ())
{
p_end = -1;
return -1;
}
sprintf (buf, "*** %s,%s\n",
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_first),
format_linenum (numbuf1, p_first + p_ptrn_lines - 1));
p_len[0] = strlen (buf);
if (! (p_line[0] = savestr (buf))) {
p_end = -1;
return -1;
}
p_Char[0] = '*';
for (i=1; i<=p_ptrn_lines; i++) {
chars_read = get_line ();
if (chars_read == (size_t) -1)
{
p_end = i - 1;
return -1;
}
if (!chars_read)
fatal ("unexpected end of file in patch at line %s",
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_input_line));
if (buf[0] != '<' || (buf[1] != ' ' && buf[1] != '\t'))
fatal ("'<' expected at line %s of patch",
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_input_line));
chars_read -= 2 + (i == p_ptrn_lines && incomplete_line ());
p_len[i] = chars_read;
p_line[i] = savebuf (buf + 2, chars_read);
if (chars_read && ! p_line[i]) {
p_end = i-1;
return -1;
}
p_Char[i] = '-';
}
if (hunk_type == 'c') {
chars_read = get_line ();
if (chars_read == (size_t) -1)
{
p_end = i - 1;
return -1;
}
if (! chars_read)
fatal ("unexpected end of file in patch at line %s",
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_input_line));
if (*buf != '-')
fatal ("'---' expected at line %s of patch",
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_input_line));
}
sprintf (buf, "--- %s,%s\n",
format_linenum (numbuf0, min),
format_linenum (numbuf1, max));
p_len[i] = strlen (buf);
if (! (p_line[i] = savestr (buf))) {
p_end = i-1;
return -1;
}
p_Char[i] = '=';
for (i++; i<=p_end; i++) {
chars_read = get_line ();
if (chars_read == (size_t) -1)
{
p_end = i - 1;
return -1;
}
if (!chars_read)
fatal ("unexpected end of file in patch at line %s",
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_input_line));
if (buf[0] != '>' || (buf[1] != ' ' && buf[1] != '\t'))
fatal ("'>' expected at line %s of patch",
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_input_line));
chars_read -= 2 + (i == p_end && incomplete_line ());
p_len[i] = chars_read;
p_line[i] = savebuf (buf + 2, chars_read);
if (chars_read && ! p_line[i]) {
p_end = i-1;
return -1;
}
p_Char[i] = '+';
}
}
if (rev) /* backwards patch? */
if (!pch_swap())
say ("Not enough memory to swap next hunk!\n");
assert (p_end + 1 < hunkmax);
p_Char[p_end + 1] = '^'; /* add a stopper for apply_hunk */
if (debug & 2) {
lin i;
for (i = 0; i <= p_end + 1; i++) {
fprintf (stderr, "%s %c",
format_linenum (numbuf0, i),
p_Char[i]);
if (p_Char[i] == '*')
fprintf (stderr, " %s,%s\n",
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_first),
format_linenum (numbuf1, p_ptrn_lines));
else if (p_Char[i] == '=')
fprintf (stderr, " %s,%s\n",
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_newfirst),
format_linenum (numbuf1, p_repl_lines));
else if (p_Char[i] != '^')
{
fputs(" |", stderr);
pch_write_line (i, stderr);
}
else
fputc('\n', stderr);
}
fflush (stderr);
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-22
| 0
| 16,739
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: e1000e_set_dlen(E1000ECore *core, int index, uint32_t val)
{
core->mac[index] = val & E1000_XDLEN_MASK;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 6,054
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ablkcipher_walk_first(struct ablkcipher_request *req,
struct ablkcipher_walk *walk)
{
struct crypto_tfm *tfm = req->base.tfm;
unsigned int alignmask;
alignmask = crypto_tfm_alg_alignmask(tfm);
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(in_irq()))
return -EDEADLK;
walk->nbytes = walk->total;
if (unlikely(!walk->total))
return 0;
walk->iv_buffer = NULL;
walk->iv = req->info;
if (unlikely(((unsigned long)walk->iv & alignmask))) {
int err = ablkcipher_copy_iv(walk, tfm, alignmask);
if (err)
return err;
}
scatterwalk_start(&walk->in, walk->in.sg);
scatterwalk_start(&walk->out, walk->out.sg);
return ablkcipher_walk_next(req, walk);
}
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 31,187
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int __init init_hw_perf_events(void)
{
pr_info("Performance events: ");
if (!supported_pmu()) {
pr_cont("No support for PMU type '%s'\n", sparc_pmu_type);
return 0;
}
pr_cont("Supported PMU type is '%s'\n", sparc_pmu_type);
perf_pmu_register(&pmu, "cpu", PERF_TYPE_RAW);
register_die_notifier(&perf_event_nmi_notifier);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 25,641
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int mailimf_time_of_day_parse(const char * message, size_t length,
size_t * indx,
int * phour, int * pmin,
int * psec)
{
int hour;
int min;
int sec;
size_t cur_token;
int r;
cur_token = * indx;
r = mailimf_hour_parse(message, length, &cur_token, &hour);
if (r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR)
return r;
r = mailimf_colon_parse(message, length, &cur_token);
if (r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR)
return r;
r = mailimf_minute_parse(message, length, &cur_token, &min);
if (r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR)
return r;
r = mailimf_colon_parse(message, length, &cur_token);
if (r == MAILIMF_NO_ERROR) {
r = mailimf_second_parse(message, length, &cur_token, &sec);
if (r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR)
return r;
}
else if (r == MAILIMF_ERROR_PARSE)
sec = 0;
else
return r;
* phour = hour;
* pmin = min;
* psec = sec;
* indx = cur_token;
return MAILIMF_NO_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: Fixed crash #274
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 66,241
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void destroy_rss_raw_qp_tir(struct mlx5_ib_dev *dev, struct mlx5_ib_qp *qp)
{
mlx5_core_destroy_tir(dev->mdev, qp->rss_qp.tirn);
}
Commit Message: IB/mlx5: Fix leaking stack memory to userspace
mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp was never initialized and only the first 4 bytes
were written.
Fixes: 41d902cb7c32 ("RDMA/mlx5: Fix definition of mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 92,105
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool SendGetTabURLJSONRequest(
AutomationMessageSender* sender,
int browser_index,
int tab_index,
std::string* url,
std::string* error_msg) {
DictionaryValue dict;
dict.SetString("command", "GetTabURL");
dict.SetInteger("windex", browser_index);
dict.SetInteger("tab_index", tab_index);
DictionaryValue reply_dict;
if (!SendAutomationJSONRequest(sender, dict, &reply_dict, error_msg))
return false;
return reply_dict.GetString("url", url);
}
Commit Message: In chromedriver, add /log url to get the contents of the chromedriver log
remotely. Also add a 'chrome.verbose' boolean startup option.
Remove usage of VLOG(1) in chromedriver. We do not need as complicated
logging as in Chrome.
BUG=85241
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7104085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88591 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 100,672
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: TestBrowserWindow::TestLocationBar::GetPageTransition() const {
return ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_LINK;
}
Commit Message: Mac: turn popups into new tabs while in fullscreen.
It's platform convention to show popups as new tabs while in
non-HTML5 fullscreen. (Popups cause tabs to lose HTML5 fullscreen.)
This was implemented for Cocoa in a BrowserWindow override, but
it makes sense to just stick it into Browser and remove a ton
of override code put in just to support this.
BUG=858929, 868416
TEST=as in bugs
Change-Id: I43471f242813ec1159d9c690bab73dab3e610b7d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1153455
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <sdy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#578755}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 155,313
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: nfsd4_decode_time(struct nfsd4_compoundargs *argp, struct timespec *tv)
{
DECODE_HEAD;
u64 sec;
READ_BUF(12);
p = xdr_decode_hyper(p, &sec);
tv->tv_sec = sec;
tv->tv_nsec = be32_to_cpup(p++);
if (tv->tv_nsec >= (u32)1000000000)
return nfserr_inval;
DECODE_TAIL;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 65,785
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HTMLFormElement::getNamedElements(
const AtomicString& name,
HeapVector<Member<Element>>& namedItems) {
elements()->namedItems(name, namedItems);
Element* elementFromPast = elementFromPastNamesMap(name);
if (namedItems.size() && namedItems.first() != elementFromPast) {
addToPastNamesMap(namedItems.first().get(), name);
} else if (elementFromPast && namedItems.isEmpty()) {
namedItems.append(elementFromPast);
UseCounter::count(document(), UseCounter::FormNameAccessForPastNamesMap);
}
}
Commit Message: Enforce form-action CSP even when form.target is present.
BUG=630332
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2464123004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#429922}
CWE ID: CWE-19
| 0
| 142,530
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: layer_get_tile(int layer, int x, int y)
{
struct map_tile* tile;
int width;
width = s_map->layers[layer].width;
tile = &s_map->layers[layer].tilemap[x + y * width];
return tile->tile_index;
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c (#268)
* Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c
There's a buffer overflow bug in the function layer_resize. It allocates
a buffer `tilemap` with size `x_size * y_size * sizeof(struct map_tile)`.
But it didn't check for integer overflow, so if x_size and y_size are
very large, it's possible that the buffer size is smaller than needed,
causing a buffer overflow later.
PoC: `SetLayerSize(0, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF);`
* move malloc to a separate line
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 75,001
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void sched_avg_update(struct rq *rq)
{
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 22,530
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool HTMLInputElement::HasCustomFocusLogic() const {
return input_type_view_->HasCustomFocusLogic();
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 126,036
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void kvm_arch_sync_events(struct kvm *kvm)
{
cancel_delayed_work_sync(&kvm->arch.kvmclock_sync_work);
cancel_delayed_work_sync(&kvm->arch.kvmclock_update_work);
kvm_free_all_assigned_devices(kvm);
kvm_free_pit(kvm);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Don't report guest userspace emulation error to userspace
Commit fc3a9157d314 ("KVM: X86: Don't report L2 emulation failures to
user-space") disabled the reporting of L2 (nested guest) emulation failures to
userspace due to race-condition between a vmexit and the instruction emulator.
The same rational applies also to userspace applications that are permitted by
the guest OS to access MMIO area or perform PIO.
This patch extends the current behavior - of injecting a #UD instead of
reporting it to userspace - also for guest userspace code.
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 35,778
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int futex_unlock_pi(u32 __user *uaddr, int fshared)
{
struct futex_hash_bucket *hb;
struct futex_q *this, *next;
u32 uval;
struct plist_head *head;
union futex_key key = FUTEX_KEY_INIT;
int ret;
retry:
if (get_user(uval, uaddr))
return -EFAULT;
/*
* We release only a lock we actually own:
*/
if ((uval & FUTEX_TID_MASK) != task_pid_vnr(current))
return -EPERM;
ret = get_futex_key(uaddr, fshared, &key);
if (unlikely(ret != 0))
goto out;
hb = hash_futex(&key);
spin_lock(&hb->lock);
/*
* To avoid races, try to do the TID -> 0 atomic transition
* again. If it succeeds then we can return without waking
* anyone else up:
*/
if (!(uval & FUTEX_OWNER_DIED))
uval = cmpxchg_futex_value_locked(uaddr, task_pid_vnr(current), 0);
if (unlikely(uval == -EFAULT))
goto pi_faulted;
/*
* Rare case: we managed to release the lock atomically,
* no need to wake anyone else up:
*/
if (unlikely(uval == task_pid_vnr(current)))
goto out_unlock;
/*
* Ok, other tasks may need to be woken up - check waiters
* and do the wakeup if necessary:
*/
head = &hb->chain;
plist_for_each_entry_safe(this, next, head, list) {
if (!match_futex (&this->key, &key))
continue;
ret = wake_futex_pi(uaddr, uval, this);
/*
* The atomic access to the futex value
* generated a pagefault, so retry the
* user-access and the wakeup:
*/
if (ret == -EFAULT)
goto pi_faulted;
goto out_unlock;
}
/*
* No waiters - kernel unlocks the futex:
*/
if (!(uval & FUTEX_OWNER_DIED)) {
ret = unlock_futex_pi(uaddr, uval);
if (ret == -EFAULT)
goto pi_faulted;
}
out_unlock:
spin_unlock(&hb->lock);
put_futex_key(fshared, &key);
out:
return ret;
pi_faulted:
spin_unlock(&hb->lock);
put_futex_key(fshared, &key);
ret = fault_in_user_writeable(uaddr);
if (!ret)
goto retry;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: futex: Fix errors in nested key ref-counting
futex_wait() is leaking key references due to futex_wait_setup()
acquiring an additional reference via the queue_lock() routine. The
nested key ref-counting has been masking bugs and complicating code
analysis. queue_lock() is only called with a previously ref-counted
key, so remove the additional ref-counting from the queue_(un)lock()
functions.
Also futex_wait_requeue_pi() drops one key reference too many in
unqueue_me_pi(). Remove the key reference handling from
unqueue_me_pi(). This was paired with a queue_lock() in
futex_lock_pi(), so the count remains unchanged.
Document remaining nested key ref-counting sites.
Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Reported-and-tested-by: Matthieu Fertré<matthieu.fertre@kerlabs.com>
Reported-by: Louis Rilling<louis.rilling@kerlabs.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: John Kacur <jkacur@redhat.com>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
LKML-Reference: <4CBB17A8.70401@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 39,634
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void MediaPlayerService::Client::disconnect()
{
ALOGV("disconnect(%d) from pid %d", mConnId, mPid);
sp<MediaPlayerBase> p;
{
Mutex::Autolock l(mLock);
p = mPlayer;
mClient.clear();
}
mPlayer.clear();
if (p != 0) {
p->setNotifyCallback(0, 0);
#if CALLBACK_ANTAGONIZER
ALOGD("kill Antagonizer");
mAntagonizer->kill();
#endif
p->reset();
}
disconnectNativeWindow();
IPCThreadState::self()->flushCommands();
}
Commit Message: MediaPlayerService: avoid invalid static cast
Bug: 30204103
Change-Id: Ie0dd3568a375f1e9fed8615ad3d85184bcc99028
(cherry picked from commit ee0a0e39acdcf8f97e0d6945c31ff36a06a36e9d)
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 157,977
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool ExecuteMakeTextWritingDirectionLeftToRight(LocalFrame& frame,
Event*,
EditorCommandSource,
const String&) {
MutableStylePropertySet* style =
MutableStylePropertySet::Create(kHTMLQuirksMode);
style->SetProperty(CSSPropertyUnicodeBidi, CSSValueIsolate);
style->SetProperty(CSSPropertyDirection, CSSValueLtr);
frame.GetEditor().ApplyStyle(
style, InputEvent::InputType::kFormatSetBlockTextDirection);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Move Editor::Transpose() out of Editor class
This patch moves |Editor::Transpose()| out of |Editor| class as preparation of
expanding it into |ExecutTranspose()| in "EditorCommand.cpp" to make |Editor|
class simpler for improving code health.
Following patch will expand |Transpose()| into |ExecutTranspose()|.
Bug: 672405
Change-Id: Icde253623f31813d2b4517c4da7d4798bd5fadf6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/583880
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#489518}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 128,545
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void SVGStartDocument(void *context)
{
SVGInfo
*svg_info;
xmlParserCtxtPtr
parser;
/*
Called when the document start being processed.
*/
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule()," SAX.startDocument()");
svg_info=(SVGInfo *) context;
parser=svg_info->parser;
svg_info->document=xmlNewDoc(parser->version);
if (svg_info->document == (xmlDocPtr) NULL)
return;
if (parser->encoding == NULL)
svg_info->document->encoding=(const xmlChar *) NULL;
else
svg_info->document->encoding=xmlStrdup(parser->encoding);
svg_info->document->standalone=parser->standalone;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 71,739
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AudioInputRendererHost::OnSetVolume(int stream_id, double volume) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
AudioEntry* entry = LookupById(stream_id);
if (!entry) {
SendErrorMessage(stream_id);
return;
}
entry->controller->SetVolume(volume);
}
Commit Message: Improve validation when creating audio streams.
BUG=166795
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11647012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@173981 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 118,550
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool AllowedScript(const Extension* extension, const GURL& url,
const GURL& top_url) {
return AllowedScript(extension, url, top_url, -1);
}
Commit Message: Have the Debugger extension api check that it has access to the tab
Check PermissionsData::CanAccessTab() prior to attaching the debugger.
BUG=367567
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/352523003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@280354 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 120,666
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: fetch_from_evbuffer_socks_client(struct evbuffer *buf, int state,
char **reason)
{
ssize_t drain = 0;
uint8_t *data;
size_t datalen;
int r;
/* Linearize the SOCKS response in the buffer, up to 128 bytes.
* (parse_socks_client shouldn't need to see anything beyond that.) */
datalen = evbuffer_get_length(buf);
if (datalen > MAX_SOCKS_MESSAGE_LEN)
datalen = MAX_SOCKS_MESSAGE_LEN;
data = evbuffer_pullup(buf, datalen);
r = parse_socks_client(data, datalen, state, reason, &drain);
if (drain > 0)
evbuffer_drain(buf, drain);
else if (drain < 0)
evbuffer_drain(buf, evbuffer_get_length(buf));
return r;
}
Commit Message: Add a one-word sentinel value of 0x0 at the end of each buf_t chunk
This helps protect against bugs where any part of a buf_t's memory
is passed to a function that expects a NUL-terminated input.
It also closes TROVE-2016-10-001 (aka bug 20384).
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 73,172
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::SetShowingContextMenu(bool showing) {
DCHECK_NE(showing_context_menu_, showing);
showing_context_menu_ = showing;
if (auto* view = GetRenderWidgetHostView()) {
static_cast<RenderWidgetHostViewBase*>(view)->SetShowingContextMenu(
showing);
}
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 135,888
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void _php_pgsql_notice_ptr_dtor(zval *el)
{
php_pgsql_notice *notice = (php_pgsql_notice *)Z_PTR_P(el);
if (notice) {
efree(notice->message);
efree(notice);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 5,217
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ResourceFetcher::decrementRequestCount(const Resource* res)
{
if (res->ignoreForRequestCount())
return;
--m_requestCount;
ASSERT(m_requestCount > -1);
}
Commit Message: Enforce SVG image security rules
SVG images have unique security rules that prevent them from loading
any external resources. This patch enforces these rules in
ResourceFetcher::canRequest for all non-data-uri resources. This locks
down our SVG resource handling and fixes two security bugs.
In the case of SVG images that reference other images, we had a bug
where a cached subresource would be used directly from the cache.
This has been fixed because the canRequest check occurs before we use
cached resources.
In the case of SVG images that use CSS imports, we had a bug where
imports were blindly requested. This has been fixed by stopping all
non-data-uri requests in SVG images.
With this patch we now match Gecko's behavior on both testcases.
BUG=380885, 382296
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/320763002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@176084 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 121,222
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: set_field_parse__(char *arg, struct ofpbuf *ofpacts,
enum ofputil_protocol *usable_protocols)
{
char *value;
char *delim;
char *key;
const struct mf_field *mf;
union mf_value sf_value, sf_mask;
char *error;
error = set_field_split_str(arg, &key, &value, &delim);
if (error) {
return error;
}
mf = mf_from_name(key);
if (!mf) {
return xasprintf("%s is not a valid OXM field name", key);
}
if (!mf->writable) {
return xasprintf("%s is read-only", key);
}
delim[0] = '\0';
error = mf_parse(mf, value, &sf_value, &sf_mask);
if (error) {
return error;
}
if (!mf_is_value_valid(mf, &sf_value)) {
return xasprintf("%s is not a valid value for field %s", value, key);
}
*usable_protocols &= mf->usable_protocols_exact;
ofpact_put_set_field(ofpacts, mf, &sf_value, &sf_mask);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 77,102
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Chunk::~Chunk()
{
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 9,957
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BubbleHeaderView::AddResetDecisionsLabel() {
std::vector<base::string16> subst;
subst.push_back(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_PAGE_INFO_INVALID_CERTIFICATE_DESCRIPTION));
subst.push_back(l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(
IDS_PAGE_INFO_RESET_INVALID_CERTIFICATE_DECISIONS_BUTTON));
std::vector<size_t> offsets;
base::string16 text = base::ReplaceStringPlaceholders(
base::ASCIIToUTF16("$1 $2"), subst, &offsets);
reset_cert_decisions_label_ =
new views::StyledLabel(text, styled_label_listener_);
reset_cert_decisions_label_->set_id(
PageInfoBubbleView::VIEW_ID_PAGE_INFO_LABEL_RESET_CERTIFICATE_DECISIONS);
gfx::Range link_range(offsets[1], text.length());
views::StyledLabel::RangeStyleInfo link_style =
views::StyledLabel::RangeStyleInfo::CreateForLink();
link_style.disable_line_wrapping = false;
reset_cert_decisions_label_->AddStyleRange(link_range, link_style);
reset_cert_decisions_label_->SizeToFit(0);
reset_decisions_label_container_->AddChildView(reset_cert_decisions_label_);
reset_decisions_label_container_->SetBorder(
views::CreateEmptyBorder(8, 0, 0, 0));
InvalidateLayout();
}
Commit Message: Desktop Page Info/Harmony: Show close button for internal pages.
The Harmony version of Page Info for internal Chrome pages (chrome://,
chrome-extension:// and view-source:// pages) show a close button. Update the
code to match this.
This patch also adds TestBrowserDialog tests for the latter two cases described
above (internal extension and view source pages).
See screenshot -
https://drive.google.com/file/d/18RZnMiHCu-rCX9N6DLUpu4mkFWguh1xm/view?usp=sharing
Bug: 535074
Change-Id: I55e5f1aa682fd4ec85f7b65ac88f5a4f5906fe53
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/759624
Commit-Queue: Patti <patricialor@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Trent Apted <tapted@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#516624}
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 133,981
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void MagickPixelCompositeMask(const MagickPixelPacket *p,
const MagickRealType alpha,const MagickPixelPacket *q,
const MagickRealType beta,MagickPixelPacket *composite)
{
double
gamma;
if (alpha == TransparentOpacity)
{
*composite=(*q);
return;
}
gamma=1.0-QuantumScale*QuantumScale*alpha*beta;
gamma=PerceptibleReciprocal(gamma);
composite->red=gamma*MagickOver_(p->red,alpha,q->red,beta);
composite->green=gamma*MagickOver_(p->green,alpha,q->green,beta);
composite->blue=gamma*MagickOver_(p->blue,alpha,q->blue,beta);
if ((p->colorspace == CMYKColorspace) && (q->colorspace == CMYKColorspace))
composite->index=gamma*MagickOver_(p->index,alpha,q->index,beta);
}
Commit Message: http://www.imagemagick.org/discourse-server/viewtopic.php?f=2&t=28946
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 73,491
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virDomainAttachDeviceFlags(virDomainPtr domain,
const char *xml, unsigned int flags)
{
virConnectPtr conn;
VIR_DOMAIN_DEBUG(domain, "xml=%s, flags=%x", xml, flags);
virResetLastError();
virCheckDomainReturn(domain, -1);
conn = domain->conn;
virCheckNonNullArgGoto(xml, error);
virCheckReadOnlyGoto(conn->flags, error);
if (conn->driver->domainAttachDeviceFlags) {
int ret;
ret = conn->driver->domainAttachDeviceFlags(domain, xml, flags);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
return ret;
}
virReportUnsupportedError();
error:
virDispatchError(domain->conn);
return -1;
}
Commit Message: virDomainGetTime: Deny on RO connections
We have a policy that if API may end up talking to a guest agent
it should require RW connection. We don't obey the rule in
virDomainGetTime().
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 93,762
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cff_builder_start_point( CFF_Builder* builder,
FT_Pos x,
FT_Pos y )
{
FT_Error error = CFF_Err_Ok;
/* test whether we are building a new contour */
if ( !builder->path_begun )
{
builder->path_begun = 1;
error = cff_builder_add_contour( builder );
if ( !error )
error = cff_builder_add_point1( builder, x, y );
}
return error;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 10,354
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: fromhex(const char *hexstr, unsigned char *out)
{
const char *p;
size_t count;
for (p = hexstr, count = 0; *p != '\0'; p += 2, count++)
sscanf(p, "%2hhx", &out[count]);
return count;
}
Commit Message: Fix gss_process_context_token() [CVE-2014-5352]
[MITKRB5-SA-2015-001] The krb5 gss_process_context_token() should not
actually delete the context; that leaves the caller with a dangling
pointer and no way to know that it is invalid. Instead, mark the
context as terminated, and check for terminated contexts in the GSS
functions which expect established contexts. Also add checks in
export_sec_context and pseudo_random, and adjust t_prf.c for the
pseudo_random check.
ticket: 8055 (new)
target_version: 1.13.1
tags: pullup
CWE ID:
| 0
| 46,478
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: png_read_filter_row_paeth_1byte_pixel(png_row_infop row_info, png_bytep row,
png_const_bytep prev_row)
{
png_bytep rp_end = row + row_info->rowbytes;
int a, c;
/* First pixel/byte */
c = *prev_row++;
a = *row + c;
*row++ = (png_byte)a;
/* Remainder */
while (row < rp_end)
{
int b, pa, pb, pc, p;
a &= 0xff; /* From previous iteration or start */
b = *prev_row++;
p = b - c;
pc = a - c;
#ifdef PNG_USE_ABS
pa = abs(p);
pb = abs(pc);
pc = abs(p + pc);
#else
pa = p < 0 ? -p : p;
pb = pc < 0 ? -pc : pc;
pc = (p + pc) < 0 ? -(p + pc) : p + pc;
#endif
/* Find the best predictor, the least of pa, pb, pc favoring the earlier
* ones in the case of a tie.
*/
if (pb < pa)
{
pa = pb; a = b;
}
if (pc < pa) a = c;
/* Calculate the current pixel in a, and move the previous row pixel to c
* for the next time round the loop
*/
c = b;
a += *row;
*row++ = (png_byte)a;
}
}
Commit Message: [libpng16] Fix the calculation of row_factor in png_check_chunk_length
(Bug report by Thuan Pham, SourceForge issue #278)
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 79,759
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool AudioNode::DisconnectFromOutputIfConnected(unsigned output_index,
AudioParam& param) {
AudioNodeOutput& output = Handler().Output(output_index);
if (!output.IsConnectedToAudioParam(param.Handler()))
return false;
output.DisconnectAudioParam(param.Handler());
connected_params_[output_index]->erase(¶m);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Revert "Keep AudioHandlers alive until they can be safely deleted."
This reverts commit 071df33edf2c8b4375fa432a83953359f93ea9e4.
Reason for revert:
This CL seems to cause an AudioNode leak on the Linux leak bot.
The log is:
https://ci.chromium.org/buildbot/chromium.webkit/WebKit%20Linux%20Trusty%20Leak/14252
* webaudio/AudioNode/audionode-connect-method-chaining.html
* webaudio/Panner/pannernode-basic.html
* webaudio/dom-exceptions.html
Original change's description:
> Keep AudioHandlers alive until they can be safely deleted.
>
> When an AudioNode is disposed, the handler is also disposed. But add
> the handler to the orphan list so that the handler stays alive until
> the context can safely delete it. If we don't do this, the handler
> may get deleted while the audio thread is processing the handler (due
> to, say, channel count changes and such).
>
> For an realtime context, always save the handler just in case the
> audio thread is running after the context is marked as closed (because
> the audio thread doesn't instantly stop when requested).
>
> For an offline context, only need to do this when the context is
> running because the context is guaranteed to be stopped if we're not
> in the running state. Hence, there's no possibility of deleting the
> handler while the graph is running.
>
> This is a revert of
> https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/860779, with
> a fix for the leak.
>
> Bug: 780919
> Change-Id: Ifb6b5fcf3fbc373f5779256688731245771da33c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/862723
> Reviewed-by: Hongchan Choi <hongchan@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528829}
TBR=rtoy@chromium.org,hongchan@chromium.org
Change-Id: Ibf406bf6ed34ea1f03e86a64a1e5ba6de0970c6f
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
Bug: 780919
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/863402
Reviewed-by: Taiju Tsuiki <tzik@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Taiju Tsuiki <tzik@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528888}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 148,802
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void android_net_wifi_waitForHalEvents(JNIEnv* env, jclass cls) {
ALOGD("waitForHalEvents called, vm = %p, obj = %p, env = %p", mVM, mCls, env);
JNIHelper helper(env);
wifi_handle halHandle = getWifiHandle(helper, cls);
hal_fn.wifi_event_loop(halHandle);
set_iface_flags("wlan0", 0);
}
Commit Message: Deal correctly with short strings
The parseMacAddress function anticipates only properly formed
MAC addresses (6 hexadecimal octets separated by ":"). This
change properly deals with situations where the string is
shorter than expected, making sure that the passed in char*
reference in parseHexByte never exceeds the end of the string.
BUG: 28164077
TEST: Added a main function:
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
unsigned char addr[6];
if (argc > 1) {
memset(addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
parseMacAddress(argv[1], addr);
printf("Result: %02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x\n",
addr[0], addr[1], addr[2], addr[3], addr[4], addr[5]);
}
}
Tested with "", "a" "ab" "ab:c" "abxc".
Change-Id: I0db8d0037e48b62333d475296a45b22ab0efe386
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 159,119
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftAMRNBEncoder::internalGetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPortFormat:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *formatParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *)params;
if (formatParams->nPortIndex > 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
if (formatParams->nIndex > 0) {
return OMX_ErrorNoMore;
}
formatParams->eEncoding =
(formatParams->nPortIndex == 0)
? OMX_AUDIO_CodingPCM : OMX_AUDIO_CodingAMR;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioAmr:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AMRTYPE *amrParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AMRTYPE *)params;
if (amrParams->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
amrParams->nChannels = 1;
amrParams->nBitRate = mBitRate;
amrParams->eAMRBandMode = (OMX_AUDIO_AMRBANDMODETYPE)(mMode + 1);
amrParams->eAMRDTXMode = OMX_AUDIO_AMRDTXModeOff;
amrParams->eAMRFrameFormat = OMX_AUDIO_AMRFrameFormatFSF;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *pcmParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *)params;
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex != 0) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
pcmParams->eNumData = OMX_NumericalDataSigned;
pcmParams->eEndian = OMX_EndianBig;
pcmParams->bInterleaved = OMX_TRUE;
pcmParams->nBitPerSample = 16;
pcmParams->ePCMMode = OMX_AUDIO_PCMModeLinear;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[0] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelCF;
pcmParams->nChannels = 1;
pcmParams->nSamplingRate = kSampleRate;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(index, params);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 174,194
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TypingCommand::insertParagraphSeparatorInQuotedContent(
EditingState* editingState) {
if (enclosingNodeOfType(endingSelection().start(), &isTableStructureNode)) {
insertParagraphSeparator(editingState);
return;
}
applyCommandToComposite(BreakBlockquoteCommand::create(document()),
editingState);
if (editingState->isAborted())
return;
typingAddedToOpenCommand(InsertParagraphSeparatorInQuotedContent);
}
Commit Message: Make TypingCommand::insertText() to take SelectionInDOMTree instead of VisibleSelection
This patch makes |TypingCommand::insertText()| to take |SelectionInDOMTree|
instead of |VisibleSelection| to reduce usage of |VisibleSelection| for
improving code health.
BUG=657237
TEST=n/a
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2733183002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#455368}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 129,217
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DocumentLoader::addSubresourceLoader(ResourceLoader* loader)
{
if (!m_gotFirstByte)
return;
ASSERT(!m_subresourceLoaders.contains(loader));
ASSERT(!mainResourceLoader() || mainResourceLoader() != loader);
m_subresourceLoaders.add(loader);
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 105,686
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: EntryInfoPairResult::EntryInfoPairResult() {
}
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 117,080
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int nf_tables_bind_check_setelem(const struct nft_ctx *ctx,
const struct nft_set *set,
const struct nft_set_iter *iter,
const struct nft_set_elem *elem)
{
enum nft_registers dreg;
dreg = nft_type_to_reg(set->dtype);
return nft_validate_data_load(ctx, dreg, &elem->data,
set->dtype == NFT_DATA_VERDICT ?
NFT_DATA_VERDICT : NFT_DATA_VALUE);
}
Commit Message: netfilter: nf_tables: fix flush ruleset chain dependencies
Jumping between chains doesn't mix well with flush ruleset. Rules
from a different chain and set elements may still refer to us.
[ 353.373791] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 353.373845] kernel BUG at net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:1159!
[ 353.373896] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 353.373942] Modules linked in: intel_powerclamp uas iwldvm iwlwifi
[ 353.374017] CPU: 0 PID: 6445 Comm: 31c3.nft Not tainted 3.18.0 #98
[ 353.374069] Hardware name: LENOVO 5129CTO/5129CTO, BIOS 6QET47WW (1.17 ) 07/14/2010
[...]
[ 353.375018] Call Trace:
[ 353.375046] [<ffffffff81964c31>] ? nf_tables_commit+0x381/0x540
[ 353.375101] [<ffffffff81949118>] nfnetlink_rcv+0x3d8/0x4b0
[ 353.375150] [<ffffffff81943fc5>] netlink_unicast+0x105/0x1a0
[ 353.375200] [<ffffffff8194438e>] netlink_sendmsg+0x32e/0x790
[ 353.375253] [<ffffffff818f398e>] sock_sendmsg+0x8e/0xc0
[ 353.375300] [<ffffffff818f36b9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel.part.20+0x19/0x70
[ 353.375357] [<ffffffff818f44f9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel+0x19/0x30
[ 353.375410] [<ffffffff819016d2>] ? verify_iovec+0x42/0xd0
[ 353.375459] [<ffffffff818f3e10>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x3f0/0x400
[ 353.375510] [<ffffffff810615fa>] ? native_sched_clock+0x2a/0x90
[ 353.375563] [<ffffffff81176697>] ? acct_account_cputime+0x17/0x20
[ 353.375616] [<ffffffff8110dc78>] ? account_user_time+0x88/0xa0
[ 353.375667] [<ffffffff818f4bbd>] __sys_sendmsg+0x3d/0x80
[ 353.375719] [<ffffffff81b184f4>] ? int_check_syscall_exit_work+0x34/0x3d
[ 353.375776] [<ffffffff818f4c0d>] SyS_sendmsg+0xd/0x20
[ 353.375823] [<ffffffff81b1826d>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Release objects in this order: rules -> sets -> chains -> tables, to
make sure no references to chains are held anymore.
Reported-by: Asbjoern Sloth Toennesen <asbjorn@asbjorn.biz>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-19
| 0
| 57,937
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void NetworkThrottleManagerImpl::UnblockThrottle(ThrottleImpl* throttle) {
DCHECK(throttle->IsBlocked());
blocked_throttles_.erase(throttle->queue_pointer());
throttle->set_start_time(tick_clock_->NowTicks());
throttle->set_queue_pointer(
outstanding_throttles_.insert(outstanding_throttles_.end(), throttle));
RecomputeOutstanding();
throttle->NotifyUnblocked();
}
Commit Message: Replace base::MakeUnique with std::make_unique in net/.
base/memory/ptr_util.h includes will be cleaned up later.
Bug: 755727
Change-Id: Ibaf46f05c9b02b76f9a91e819984b087a8c0d434
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/627300
Commit-Queue: Jeremy Roman <jbroman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Bence Béky <bnc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498123}
CWE ID: CWE-311
| 0
| 156,317
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int crc32_cra_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
{
u32 *key = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
*key = 0;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 47,189
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: AVCPBProperties *ff_add_cpb_side_data(AVCodecContext *avctx)
{
AVPacketSideData *tmp;
AVCPBProperties *props;
size_t size;
props = av_cpb_properties_alloc(&size);
if (!props)
return NULL;
tmp = av_realloc_array(avctx->coded_side_data, avctx->nb_coded_side_data + 1, sizeof(*tmp));
if (!tmp) {
av_freep(&props);
return NULL;
}
avctx->coded_side_data = tmp;
avctx->nb_coded_side_data++;
avctx->coded_side_data[avctx->nb_coded_side_data - 1].type = AV_PKT_DATA_CPB_PROPERTIES;
avctx->coded_side_data[avctx->nb_coded_side_data - 1].data = (uint8_t*)props;
avctx->coded_side_data[avctx->nb_coded_side_data - 1].size = size;
return props;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/utils: correct align value for interplay
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: 452/fuzz-1-ffmpeg_VIDEO_AV_CODEC_ID_INTERPLAY_VIDEO_fuzzer
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 67,015
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ipmi_get_smi_info(int if_num, struct ipmi_smi_info *data)
{
int rv, index;
struct ipmi_smi *intf;
index = srcu_read_lock(&ipmi_interfaces_srcu);
list_for_each_entry_rcu(intf, &ipmi_interfaces, link) {
if (intf->intf_num == if_num)
goto found;
}
srcu_read_unlock(&ipmi_interfaces_srcu, index);
/* Not found, return an error */
return -EINVAL;
found:
if (!intf->handlers->get_smi_info)
rv = -ENOTTY;
else
rv = intf->handlers->get_smi_info(intf->send_info, data);
srcu_read_unlock(&ipmi_interfaces_srcu, index);
return rv;
}
Commit Message: ipmi: fix use-after-free of user->release_barrier.rda
When we do the following test, we got oops in ipmi_msghandler driver
while((1))
do
service ipmievd restart & service ipmievd restart
done
---------------------------------------------------------------
[ 294.230186] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000803fea6ea008
[ 294.230188] Mem abort info:
[ 294.230190] ESR = 0x96000004
[ 294.230191] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 294.230193] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 294.230194] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 294.230195] Data abort info:
[ 294.230196] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004
[ 294.230197] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 294.230199] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000a1c1b75a
[ 294.230201] [0000803fea6ea008] pgd=0000000000000000
[ 294.230204] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP
[ 294.235211] Modules linked in: nls_utf8 isofs rpcrdma ib_iser ib_srpt target_core_mod ib_srp scsi_transport_srp ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm iw_cm dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce sha2_ce ses sha256_arm64 sha1_ce hibmc_drm hisi_sas_v2_hw enclosure sg hisi_sas_main sbsa_gwdt ip_tables mlx5_ib ib_uverbs marvell ib_core mlx5_core ixgbe ipmi_si mdio hns_dsaf ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler hns_enet_drv hns_mdio
[ 294.277745] CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.0.0-rc2+ #113
[ 294.285511] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.37 11/21/2017
[ 294.292835] pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO)
[ 294.297695] pc : __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.301940] lr : acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.307853] sp : ffff00001001bc80
[ 294.311208] x29: ffff00001001bc80 x28: ffff0000117e5000
[ 294.316594] x27: 0000000000000000 x26: dead000000000100
[ 294.321980] x25: dead000000000200 x24: ffff803f6bd06800
[ 294.327366] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000000
[ 294.332752] x21: ffff00001001bd04 x20: ffff80df33d19018
[ 294.338137] x19: ffff80df33d19018 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 294.343523] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 294.348908] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000002
[ 294.354293] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 294.359679] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000100000
[ 294.365065] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 0000000000000004
[ 294.370451] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffff80df34558678
[ 294.375836] x5 : 000000000000000c x4 : 0000000000000000
[ 294.381221] x3 : 0000000000000001 x2 : 0000803fea6ea000
[ 294.386607] x1 : 0000803fea6ea008 x0 : 0000000000000001
[ 294.391994] Process swapper/3 (pid: 0, stack limit = 0x0000000083087293)
[ 294.398791] Call trace:
[ 294.401266] __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.405154] acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.410716] deliver_response+0x80/0xf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.416189] deliver_local_response+0x28/0x68 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.422193] handle_one_recv_msg+0x158/0xcf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.432050] handle_new_recv_msgs+0xc0/0x210 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.441984] smi_recv_tasklet+0x8c/0x158 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.451618] tasklet_action_common.isra.5+0x88/0x138
[ 294.460661] tasklet_action+0x2c/0x38
[ 294.468191] __do_softirq+0x120/0x2f8
[ 294.475561] irq_exit+0x134/0x140
[ 294.482445] __handle_domain_irq+0x6c/0xc0
[ 294.489954] gic_handle_irq+0xb8/0x178
[ 294.497037] el1_irq+0xb0/0x140
[ 294.503381] arch_cpu_idle+0x34/0x1a8
[ 294.510096] do_idle+0x1d4/0x290
[ 294.516322] cpu_startup_entry+0x28/0x30
[ 294.523230] secondary_start_kernel+0x184/0x1d0
[ 294.530657] Code: d538d082 d2800023 8b010c81 8b020021 (c85f7c25)
[ 294.539746] ---[ end trace 8a7a880dee570b29 ]---
[ 294.547341] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
[ 294.556837] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 294.563996] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 294.570515] CPU features: 0x002,21006008
[ 294.577638] Memory Limit: none
[ 294.587178] Starting crashdump kernel...
[ 294.594314] Bye!
Because the user->release_barrier.rda is freed in ipmi_destroy_user(), but
the refcount is not zero, when acquire_ipmi_user() uses user->release_barrier.rda
in __srcu_read_lock(), it causes oops.
Fix this by calling cleanup_srcu_struct() when the refcount is zero.
Fixes: e86ee2d44b44 ("ipmi: Rework locking and shutdown for hot remove")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.18
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 91,276
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gst_asf_demux_loop (GstASFDemux * demux)
{
GstFlowReturn flow = GST_FLOW_OK;
GstBuffer *buf = NULL;
guint64 off;
if (G_UNLIKELY (demux->state == GST_ASF_DEMUX_STATE_HEADER)) {
if (!gst_asf_demux_pull_headers (demux, &flow)) {
goto pause;
}
flow = gst_asf_demux_pull_indices (demux);
if (flow != GST_FLOW_OK)
goto pause;
}
g_assert (demux->state == GST_ASF_DEMUX_STATE_DATA);
if (G_UNLIKELY (demux->num_packets != 0
&& demux->packet >= demux->num_packets))
goto eos;
GST_LOG_OBJECT (demux, "packet %u/%u", (guint) demux->packet + 1,
(guint) demux->num_packets);
off = demux->data_offset + (demux->packet * demux->packet_size);
if (G_UNLIKELY (!gst_asf_demux_pull_data (demux, off,
demux->packet_size * demux->speed_packets, &buf, &flow))) {
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (demux, "got flow %s", gst_flow_get_name (flow));
if (flow == GST_FLOW_EOS) {
goto eos;
} else if (flow == GST_FLOW_FLUSHING) {
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (demux, "Not fatal");
goto pause;
} else {
goto read_failed;
}
}
if (G_LIKELY (demux->speed_packets == 1)) {
GstAsfDemuxParsePacketError err;
err = gst_asf_demux_parse_packet (demux, buf);
if (G_UNLIKELY (err != GST_ASF_DEMUX_PARSE_PACKET_ERROR_NONE)) {
/* when we don't know when the data object ends, we should check
* for a chained asf */
if (demux->num_packets == 0) {
if (gst_asf_demux_check_buffer_is_header (demux, buf)) {
GST_INFO_OBJECT (demux, "Chained asf found");
demux->base_offset = off;
gst_asf_demux_reset (demux, TRUE);
gst_buffer_unref (buf);
return;
}
}
/* FIXME: We should tally up fatal errors and error out only
* after a few broken packets in a row? */
GST_INFO_OBJECT (demux, "Ignoring recoverable parse error");
gst_buffer_unref (buf);
if (GST_ASF_DEMUX_IS_REVERSE_PLAYBACK (demux->segment)
&& !demux->seek_to_cur_pos) {
--demux->packet;
if (demux->packet < 0) {
goto eos;
}
} else {
++demux->packet;
}
return;
}
flow = gst_asf_demux_push_complete_payloads (demux, FALSE);
if (GST_ASF_DEMUX_IS_REVERSE_PLAYBACK (demux->segment)
&& !demux->seek_to_cur_pos) {
--demux->packet;
if (demux->packet < 0) {
goto eos;
}
} else {
++demux->packet;
}
} else {
guint n;
for (n = 0; n < demux->speed_packets; n++) {
GstBuffer *sub;
GstAsfDemuxParsePacketError err;
sub =
gst_buffer_copy_region (buf, GST_BUFFER_COPY_ALL,
n * demux->packet_size, demux->packet_size);
err = gst_asf_demux_parse_packet (demux, sub);
if (G_UNLIKELY (err != GST_ASF_DEMUX_PARSE_PACKET_ERROR_NONE)) {
/* when we don't know when the data object ends, we should check
* for a chained asf */
if (demux->num_packets == 0) {
if (gst_asf_demux_check_buffer_is_header (demux, sub)) {
GST_INFO_OBJECT (demux, "Chained asf found");
demux->base_offset = off + n * demux->packet_size;
gst_asf_demux_reset (demux, TRUE);
gst_buffer_unref (sub);
gst_buffer_unref (buf);
return;
}
}
/* FIXME: We should tally up fatal errors and error out only
* after a few broken packets in a row? */
GST_INFO_OBJECT (demux, "Ignoring recoverable parse error");
flow = GST_FLOW_OK;
}
gst_buffer_unref (sub);
if (err == GST_ASF_DEMUX_PARSE_PACKET_ERROR_NONE)
flow = gst_asf_demux_push_complete_payloads (demux, FALSE);
++demux->packet;
}
/* reset speed pull */
demux->speed_packets = 1;
}
gst_buffer_unref (buf);
if (G_UNLIKELY ((demux->num_packets > 0
&& demux->packet >= demux->num_packets)
|| flow == GST_FLOW_EOS)) {
GST_LOG_OBJECT (demux, "reached EOS");
goto eos;
}
if (G_UNLIKELY (flow != GST_FLOW_OK)) {
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (demux, "pushing complete payloads failed");
goto pause;
}
/* check if we're at the end of the configured segment */
/* FIXME: check if segment end reached etc. */
return;
eos:
{
/* if we haven't activated our streams yet, this might be because we have
* less data queued than required for preroll; force stream activation and
* send any pending payloads before sending EOS */
if (!demux->activated_streams)
flow = gst_asf_demux_push_complete_payloads (demux, TRUE);
/* we want to push an eos or post a segment-done in any case */
if (demux->segment.flags & GST_SEEK_FLAG_SEGMENT) {
gint64 stop;
/* for segment playback we need to post when (in stream time)
* we stopped, this is either stop (when set) or the duration. */
if ((stop = demux->segment.stop) == -1)
stop = demux->segment.duration;
GST_INFO_OBJECT (demux, "Posting segment-done, at end of segment");
gst_element_post_message (GST_ELEMENT_CAST (demux),
gst_message_new_segment_done (GST_OBJECT (demux), GST_FORMAT_TIME,
stop));
gst_asf_demux_send_event_unlocked (demux,
gst_event_new_segment_done (GST_FORMAT_TIME, stop));
} else if (flow != GST_FLOW_EOS) {
/* check if we have a chained asf, in case, we don't eos yet */
if (gst_asf_demux_check_chained_asf (demux)) {
GST_INFO_OBJECT (demux, "Chained ASF starting");
gst_asf_demux_reset (demux, TRUE);
return;
}
}
if (!(demux->segment.flags & GST_SEEK_FLAG_SEGMENT)) {
if (demux->activated_streams) {
/* normal playback, send EOS to all linked pads */
GST_INFO_OBJECT (demux, "Sending EOS, at end of stream");
gst_asf_demux_send_event_unlocked (demux, gst_event_new_eos ());
} else {
GST_WARNING_OBJECT (demux, "EOS without exposed streams");
flow = GST_FLOW_EOS;
}
}
/* ... and fall through to pause */
}
pause:
{
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (demux, "pausing task, flow return: %s",
gst_flow_get_name (flow));
demux->segment_running = FALSE;
gst_pad_pause_task (demux->sinkpad);
/* For the error cases */
if (flow == GST_FLOW_EOS && !demux->activated_streams) {
GST_ELEMENT_ERROR (demux, STREAM, WRONG_TYPE, (NULL),
("This doesn't seem to be an ASF file"));
} else if (flow < GST_FLOW_EOS || flow == GST_FLOW_NOT_LINKED) {
/* Post an error. Hopefully something else already has, but if not... */
GST_ELEMENT_FLOW_ERROR (demux, flow);
gst_asf_demux_send_event_unlocked (demux, gst_event_new_eos ());
}
return;
}
/* ERRORS */
read_failed:
{
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (demux, "Read failed, doh");
flow = GST_FLOW_EOS;
goto pause;
}
#if 0
/* See FIXMEs above */
parse_error:
{
gst_buffer_unref (buf);
GST_ELEMENT_ERROR (demux, STREAM, DEMUX, (NULL),
("Error parsing ASF packet %u", (guint) demux->packet));
gst_asf_demux_send_event_unlocked (demux, gst_event_new_eos ());
flow = GST_FLOW_ERROR;
goto pause;
}
#endif
}
Commit Message: asfdemux: Check that we have enough data available before parsing bool/uint extended content descriptors
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777955
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 68,560
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: fill_extra_data(conn c)
{
int extra_bytes, job_data_bytes = 0, cmd_bytes;
if (!c->fd) return; /* the connection was closed */
if (!c->cmd_len) return; /* we don't have a complete command */
/* how many extra bytes did we read? */
extra_bytes = c->cmd_read - c->cmd_len;
/* how many bytes should we put into the job body? */
if (c->in_job) {
job_data_bytes = min(extra_bytes, c->in_job->body_size);
memcpy(c->in_job->body, c->cmd + c->cmd_len, job_data_bytes);
c->in_job_read = job_data_bytes;
} else if (c->in_job_read) {
/* we are in bit-bucket mode, throwing away data */
job_data_bytes = min(extra_bytes, c->in_job_read);
c->in_job_read -= job_data_bytes;
}
/* how many bytes are left to go into the future cmd? */
cmd_bytes = extra_bytes - job_data_bytes;
memmove(c->cmd, c->cmd + c->cmd_len + job_data_bytes, cmd_bytes);
c->cmd_read = cmd_bytes;
c->cmd_len = 0; /* we no longer know the length of the new command */
}
Commit Message: Discard job body bytes if the job is too big.
Previously, a malicious user could craft a job payload and inject
beanstalk commands without the client application knowing. (An
extra-careful client library could check the size of the job body before
sending the put command, but most libraries do not do this, nor should
they have to.)
Reported by Graham Barr.
CWE ID:
| 0
| 18,138
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int path_lookupat(int dfd, const char *name,
unsigned int flags, struct nameidata *nd)
{
struct file *base = NULL;
struct path path;
int err;
/*
* Path walking is largely split up into 2 different synchronisation
* schemes, rcu-walk and ref-walk (explained in
* Documentation/filesystems/path-lookup.txt). These share much of the
* path walk code, but some things particularly setup, cleanup, and
* following mounts are sufficiently divergent that functions are
* duplicated. Typically there is a function foo(), and its RCU
* analogue, foo_rcu().
*
* -ECHILD is the error number of choice (just to avoid clashes) that
* is returned if some aspect of an rcu-walk fails. Such an error must
* be handled by restarting a traditional ref-walk (which will always
* be able to complete).
*/
err = path_init(dfd, name, flags | LOOKUP_PARENT, nd, &base);
if (unlikely(err))
return err;
current->total_link_count = 0;
err = link_path_walk(name, nd);
if (!err && !(flags & LOOKUP_PARENT)) {
err = lookup_last(nd, &path);
while (err > 0) {
void *cookie;
struct path link = path;
err = may_follow_link(&link, nd);
if (unlikely(err))
break;
nd->flags |= LOOKUP_PARENT;
err = follow_link(&link, nd, &cookie);
if (err)
break;
err = lookup_last(nd, &path);
put_link(nd, &link, cookie);
}
}
if (!err)
err = complete_walk(nd);
if (!err && nd->flags & LOOKUP_DIRECTORY) {
if (!d_can_lookup(nd->path.dentry)) {
path_put(&nd->path);
err = -ENOTDIR;
}
}
if (base)
fput(base);
if (nd->root.mnt && !(nd->flags & LOOKUP_ROOT)) {
path_put(&nd->root);
nd->root.mnt = NULL;
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: fs: umount on symlink leaks mnt count
Currently umount on symlink blocks following umount:
/vz is separate mount
# ls /vz/ -al | grep test
drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root 4096 Jul 19 01:14 testdir
lrwxrwxrwx. 1 root root 11 Jul 19 01:16 testlink -> /vz/testdir
# umount -l /vz/testlink
umount: /vz/testlink: not mounted (expected)
# lsof /vz
# umount /vz
umount: /vz: device is busy. (unexpected)
In this case mountpoint_last() gets an extra refcount on path->mnt
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 36,364
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LayoutSVGResourceMarker::removeClientFromCache(LayoutObject* client, bool markForInvalidation)
{
ASSERT(client);
markClientForInvalidation(client, markForInvalidation ? BoundariesInvalidation : ParentOnlyInvalidation);
}
Commit Message: Avoid using forced layout to trigger paint invalidation for SVG containers
Currently, SVG containers in the LayoutObject hierarchy force layout of
their children if the transform changes. The main reason for this is to
trigger paint invalidation of the subtree. In some cases - changes to the
scale factor - there are other reasons to trigger layout, like computing
a new scale factor for <text> or re-layout nodes with non-scaling stroke.
Compute a "scale-factor change" in addition to the "transform change"
already computed, then use this new signal to determine if layout should
be forced for the subtree. Trigger paint invalidation using the
LayoutObject flags instead.
The downside to this is that paint invalidation will walk into "hidden"
containers which rarely require repaint (since they are not technically
visible). This will hopefully be rectified in a follow-up CL.
For the testcase from 603850, this essentially eliminates the cost of
layout (from ~350ms to ~0ms on authors machine; layout cost is related
to text metrics recalculation), bumping frame rate significantly.
BUG=603956,603850
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/1996543002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#400950}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 121,130
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoFramebufferTexture2DMultisampleEXT(
GLenum target,
GLenum attachment,
GLenum textarget,
GLuint texture,
GLint level,
GLsizei samples) {
NOTREACHED();
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,966
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: sp<MediaSource> MPEG4Extractor::getTrack(size_t index) {
status_t err;
if ((err = readMetaData()) != OK) {
return NULL;
}
Track *track = mFirstTrack;
while (index > 0) {
if (track == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
track = track->next;
--index;
}
if (track == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
ALOGV("getTrack called, pssh: %d", mPssh.size());
return new MPEG4Source(
track->meta, mDataSource, track->timescale, track->sampleTable,
mSidxEntries, mMoofOffset);
}
Commit Message: Fix out-of-bounds write
Bug: 26365349
Change-Id: Ia363d9f8c231cf255dea852e0bbf5ca466c7990b
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 161,859
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void V8TestObject::Uint8ArrayAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_uint8ArrayAttribute_Getter");
test_object_v8_internal::Uint8ArrayAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 135,263
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DevToolsWindow::UpgradeDraggedFileSystemPermissions(
const std::string& file_system_url) {
CHECK(web_contents_->GetURL().SchemeIs(chrome::kChromeDevToolsScheme));
file_helper_->UpgradeDraggedFileSystemPermissions(
file_system_url,
base::Bind(&DevToolsWindow::FileSystemAdded, weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()),
base::Bind(&DevToolsWindow::ShowDevToolsConfirmInfoBar,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
}
Commit Message: DevTools: handle devtools renderer unresponsiveness during beforeunload event interception
This patch fixes the crash which happenes under the following conditions:
1. DevTools window is in undocked state
2. DevTools renderer is unresponsive
3. User attempts to close inspected page
BUG=322380
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/84883002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@237611 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 113,218
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int mif_encode(jas_image_t *image, jas_stream_t *out, char *optstr)
{
mif_hdr_t *hdr;
jas_image_t *tmpimage;
int fmt;
int cmptno;
mif_cmpt_t *cmpt;
jas_image_cmptparm_t cmptparm;
jas_seq2d_t *data;
int_fast32_t x;
int_fast32_t y;
int bias;
hdr = 0;
tmpimage = 0;
data = 0;
if (optstr && *optstr != '\0') {
jas_eprintf("warning: ignoring unsupported options\n");
}
if ((fmt = jas_image_strtofmt("pnm")) < 0) {
jas_eprintf("error: PNM support required\n");
goto error;
}
if (!(hdr = mif_makehdrfromimage(image))) {
goto error;
}
if (mif_hdr_put(hdr, out)) {
goto error;
}
/* Output component data. */
for (cmptno = 0; cmptno < hdr->numcmpts; ++cmptno) {
cmpt = hdr->cmpts[cmptno];
if (!cmpt->data) {
if (!(tmpimage = jas_image_create0())) {
goto error;
}
cmptparm.tlx = 0;
cmptparm.tly = 0;
cmptparm.hstep = cmpt->sampperx;
cmptparm.vstep = cmpt->samppery;
cmptparm.width = cmpt->width;
cmptparm.height = cmpt->height;
cmptparm.prec = cmpt->prec;
cmptparm.sgnd = false;
if (jas_image_addcmpt(tmpimage, jas_image_numcmpts(tmpimage), &cmptparm)) {
goto error;
}
if (!(data = jas_seq2d_create(0, 0, cmpt->width, cmpt->height))) {
goto error;
}
if (jas_image_readcmpt(image, cmptno, 0, 0, cmpt->width, cmpt->height,
data)) {
goto error;
}
if (cmpt->sgnd) {
bias = 1 << (cmpt->prec - 1);
for (y = 0; y < cmpt->height; ++y) {
for (x = 0; x < cmpt->width; ++x) {
*jas_seq2d_getref(data, x, y) += bias;
}
}
}
if (jas_image_writecmpt(tmpimage, 0, 0, 0, cmpt->width, cmpt->height,
data)) {
goto error;
}
jas_seq2d_destroy(data);
data = 0;
if (jas_image_encode(tmpimage, out, fmt, 0)) {
goto error;
}
jas_image_destroy(tmpimage);
tmpimage = 0;
}
}
mif_hdr_destroy(hdr);
return 0;
error:
if (hdr) {
mif_hdr_destroy(hdr);
}
if (tmpimage) {
jas_image_destroy(tmpimage);
}
if (data) {
jas_seq2d_destroy(data);
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-5221
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 74,122
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void NavigationRequest::OnRequestFailed(
bool has_stale_copy_in_cache,
int net_error,
const base::Optional<net::SSLInfo>& ssl_info) {
RenderFrameDevToolsAgentHost::OnNavigationRequestFailed(*this, net_error);
NavigationRequest::OnRequestFailedInternal(has_stale_copy_in_cache, net_error,
ssl_info, false, base::nullopt);
}
Commit Message: Check ancestors when setting an <iframe> navigation's "site for cookies".
Currently, we're setting the "site for cookies" only by looking at the
top-level document. We ought to be verifying that the ancestor frames
are same-site before doing so. We do this correctly in Blink (see
`Document::SiteForCookies`), but didn't do so when navigating in the
browser.
This patch addresses the majority of the problem by walking the ancestor
chain when processing a NavigationRequest. If all the ancestors are
same-site, we set the "site for cookies" to the top-level document's URL.
If they aren't all same-site, we set it to an empty URL to ensure that
we don't send SameSite cookies.
Bug: 833847
Change-Id: Icd77f31fa618fa9f8b59fc3b15e1bed6ee05aabd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1025772
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553942}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 144,124
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct dentry *lookup_one_len_unlocked(const char *name,
struct dentry *base, int len)
{
struct qstr this;
unsigned int c;
int err;
struct dentry *ret;
this.name = name;
this.len = len;
this.hash = full_name_hash(name, len);
if (!len)
return ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
if (unlikely(name[0] == '.')) {
if (len < 2 || (len == 2 && name[1] == '.'))
return ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
}
while (len--) {
c = *(const unsigned char *)name++;
if (c == '/' || c == '\0')
return ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
}
/*
* See if the low-level filesystem might want
* to use its own hash..
*/
if (base->d_flags & DCACHE_OP_HASH) {
int err = base->d_op->d_hash(base, &this);
if (err < 0)
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
err = inode_permission(base->d_inode, MAY_EXEC);
if (err)
return ERR_PTR(err);
ret = lookup_dcache(&this, base, 0);
if (!ret)
ret = lookup_slow(&this, base, 0);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: vfs: rename: check backing inode being equal
If a file is renamed to a hardlink of itself POSIX specifies that rename(2)
should do nothing and return success.
This condition is checked in vfs_rename(). However it won't detect hard
links on overlayfs where these are given separate inodes on the overlayfs
layer.
Overlayfs itself detects this condition and returns success without doing
anything, but then vfs_rename() will proceed as if this was a successful
rename (detach_mounts(), d_move()).
The correct thing to do is to detect this condition before even calling
into overlayfs. This patch does this by calling vfs_select_inode() to get
the underlying inodes.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.2+
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 51,028
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLES2Implementation::MultiDrawArraysInstancedWEBGL(
GLenum mode,
const GLint* firsts,
const GLsizei* counts,
const GLsizei* instance_counts,
GLsizei drawcount) {
GPU_CLIENT_SINGLE_THREAD_CHECK();
GPU_CLIENT_LOG("[" << GetLogPrefix() << "] glMultiDrawArraysInstancedWEBGL("
<< GLES2Util::GetStringDrawMode(mode) << ", " << firsts
<< ", " << counts << ", " << instance_counts << ", "
<< drawcount << ")");
if (drawcount < 0) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glMultiDrawArraysWEBGLInstanced",
"drawcount < 0");
return;
}
if (drawcount == 0) {
return;
}
if (vertex_array_object_manager_->SupportsClientSideBuffers()) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "glMultiDrawArraysWEBGLInstanced",
"Missing array buffer for vertex attribute");
return;
}
MultiDrawArraysInstancedWEBGLHelper(mode, firsts, counts, instance_counts,
drawcount);
CheckGLError();
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,078
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void init_min_max_mtime(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi)
{
struct sit_info *sit_i = SIT_I(sbi);
unsigned int segno;
mutex_lock(&sit_i->sentry_lock);
sit_i->min_mtime = LLONG_MAX;
for (segno = 0; segno < MAIN_SEGS(sbi); segno += sbi->segs_per_sec) {
unsigned int i;
unsigned long long mtime = 0;
for (i = 0; i < sbi->segs_per_sec; i++)
mtime += get_seg_entry(sbi, segno + i)->mtime;
mtime = div_u64(mtime, sbi->segs_per_sec);
if (sit_i->min_mtime > mtime)
sit_i->min_mtime = mtime;
}
sit_i->max_mtime = get_mtime(sbi);
mutex_unlock(&sit_i->sentry_lock);
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix a panic caused by NULL flush_cmd_control
Mount fs with option noflush_merge, boot failed for illegal address
fcc in function f2fs_issue_flush:
if (!test_opt(sbi, FLUSH_MERGE)) {
ret = submit_flush_wait(sbi);
atomic_inc(&fcc->issued_flush); -> Here, fcc illegal
return ret;
}
Signed-off-by: Yunlei He <heyunlei@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 85,403
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool NetworkActionPredictor::TryDeleteOldEntries(HistoryService* service) {
if (!service)
return false;
history::URLDatabase* url_db = service->InMemoryDatabase();
if (!url_db)
return false;
DeleteOldEntries(url_db);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Removing dead code from NetworkActionPredictor.
BUG=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9358062
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@121926 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 107,213
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GpuProcessHost::OnProcessLaunched() {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_TIMES("GPU.GPUProcessLaunchTime",
base::TimeTicks::Now() - init_start_time_);
#if defined(OS_WIN)
if (kind_ == GPU_PROCESS_KIND_SANDBOXED)
RecordAppContainerStatus(sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK, crashed_before_);
#endif // defined(OS_WIN)
}
Commit Message: Fix GPU process fallback logic.
1. In GpuProcessHost::OnProcessCrashed() record the process crash first.
This means the GPU mode fallback will happen before a new GPU process
is started.
2. Don't call FallBackToNextGpuMode() if GPU process initialization
fails for an unsandboxed GPU process. The unsandboxed GPU is only
used for collect information and it's failure doesn't indicate a need
to change GPU modes.
Bug: 869419
Change-Id: I8bd0a03268f0ea8809f3df8458d4e6a92db9391f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1157164
Reviewed-by: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: kylechar <kylechar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#579625}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 132,496
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GestureRecognizerTest() {}
Commit Message: Pass ui::LatencyInfo correct with unified gesture detector on Aura.
BUG=379812
TEST=GestureRecognizerTest.LatencyPassedFromTouchEvent
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/309823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@274602 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 112,073
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ssize_t splice_to_pipe(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe,
struct splice_pipe_desc *spd)
{
unsigned int spd_pages = spd->nr_pages;
int ret = 0, page_nr = 0;
if (!spd_pages)
return 0;
if (unlikely(!pipe->readers)) {
send_sig(SIGPIPE, current, 0);
ret = -EPIPE;
goto out;
}
while (pipe->nrbufs < pipe->buffers) {
int newbuf = (pipe->curbuf + pipe->nrbufs) & (pipe->buffers - 1);
struct pipe_buffer *buf = pipe->bufs + newbuf;
buf->page = spd->pages[page_nr];
buf->offset = spd->partial[page_nr].offset;
buf->len = spd->partial[page_nr].len;
buf->private = spd->partial[page_nr].private;
buf->ops = spd->ops;
buf->flags = 0;
pipe->nrbufs++;
page_nr++;
ret += buf->len;
if (!--spd->nr_pages)
break;
}
if (!ret)
ret = -EAGAIN;
out:
while (page_nr < spd_pages)
spd->spd_release(spd, page_nr++);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 96,893
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: HeadlessDevToolsManagerDelegate::GetWindowForTarget(
content::DevToolsAgentHost* agent_host,
int session_id,
int command_id,
const base::DictionaryValue* params) {
std::string target_id;
if (!params->GetString("targetId", &target_id))
return CreateInvalidParamResponse(command_id, "targetId");
HeadlessWebContentsImpl* web_contents = HeadlessWebContentsImpl::From(
browser_->GetWebContentsForDevToolsAgentHostId(target_id));
if (!web_contents) {
return CreateErrorResponse(command_id, kErrorServerError,
"No web contents for the given target id");
}
auto result = base::MakeUnique<base::DictionaryValue>();
result->SetInteger("windowId", web_contents->window_id());
result->Set("bounds", CreateBoundsDict(web_contents));
return CreateSuccessResponse(command_id, std::move(result));
}
Commit Message: Remove some unused includes in headless/
Bug:
Change-Id: Icb5351bb6112fc89e36dab82c15f32887dab9217
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/720594
Reviewed-by: David Vallet <dvallet@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Iris Uy <irisu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#509313}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 133,161
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Ins_JROT( INS_ARG )
{
DO_JROT
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 10,122
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ComponentControllerImpl::Wait(WaitCallback callback) {
termination_wait_callbacks_.push_back(std::move(callback));
}
Commit Message: [fuchsia] Implement browser tests for WebRunner Context service.
Tests may interact with the WebRunner FIDL services and the underlying
browser objects for end to end testing of service and browser
functionality.
* Add a browser test launcher main() for WebRunner.
* Add some simple navigation tests.
* Wire up GoBack()/GoForward() FIDL calls.
* Add embedded test server resources and initialization logic.
* Add missing deletion & notification calls to BrowserContext dtor.
* Use FIDL events for navigation state changes.
* Bug fixes:
** Move BrowserContext and Screen deletion to PostMainMessageLoopRun(),
so that they may use the MessageLoop during teardown.
** Fix Frame dtor to allow for null WindowTreeHosts (headless case)
** Fix std::move logic in Frame ctor which lead to no WebContents
observer being registered.
Bug: 871594
Change-Id: I36bcbd2436d534d366c6be4eeb54b9f9feadd1ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1164539
Commit-Queue: Kevin Marshall <kmarshall@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Wez <wez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabrice de Gans-Riberi <fdegans@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Scott Violet <sky@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#584155}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 131,206
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: size_t CompositedLayerRasterInvalidator::ApproximateUnsharedMemoryUsage()
const {
return sizeof(*this) + paint_chunks_info_.capacity() * sizeof(PaintChunkInfo);
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 125,494
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::setInternalOption(
OMX_U32 portIndex,
IOMX::InternalOptionType type,
const void *data,
size_t size) {
CLOG_CONFIG(setInternalOption, "%s(%d): %s:%u %zu@%p",
asString(type), type, portString(portIndex), portIndex, size, data);
switch (type) {
case IOMX::INTERNAL_OPTION_SUSPEND:
case IOMX::INTERNAL_OPTION_REPEAT_PREVIOUS_FRAME_DELAY:
case IOMX::INTERNAL_OPTION_MAX_TIMESTAMP_GAP:
case IOMX::INTERNAL_OPTION_MAX_FPS:
case IOMX::INTERNAL_OPTION_START_TIME:
case IOMX::INTERNAL_OPTION_TIME_LAPSE:
case IOMX::INTERNAL_OPTION_COLOR_ASPECTS:
{
const sp<GraphicBufferSource> &bufferSource =
getGraphicBufferSource();
if (bufferSource == NULL || portIndex != kPortIndexInput) {
CLOGW("setInternalOption is only for Surface input");
return ERROR_UNSUPPORTED;
}
if (type == IOMX::INTERNAL_OPTION_SUSPEND) {
bool suspend;
if (!getInternalOption(data, size, &suspend)) {
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
CLOG_CONFIG(setInternalOption, "suspend=%d", suspend);
bufferSource->suspend(suspend);
} else if (type == IOMX::INTERNAL_OPTION_REPEAT_PREVIOUS_FRAME_DELAY) {
int64_t delayUs;
if (!getInternalOption(data, size, &delayUs)) {
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
CLOG_CONFIG(setInternalOption, "delayUs=%lld", (long long)delayUs);
return bufferSource->setRepeatPreviousFrameDelayUs(delayUs);
} else if (type == IOMX::INTERNAL_OPTION_MAX_TIMESTAMP_GAP) {
int64_t maxGapUs;
if (!getInternalOption(data, size, &maxGapUs)) {
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
CLOG_CONFIG(setInternalOption, "gapUs=%lld", (long long)maxGapUs);
return bufferSource->setMaxTimestampGapUs(maxGapUs);
} else if (type == IOMX::INTERNAL_OPTION_MAX_FPS) {
float maxFps;
if (!getInternalOption(data, size, &maxFps)) {
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
CLOG_CONFIG(setInternalOption, "maxFps=%f", maxFps);
return bufferSource->setMaxFps(maxFps);
} else if (type == IOMX::INTERNAL_OPTION_START_TIME) {
int64_t skipFramesBeforeUs;
if (!getInternalOption(data, size, &skipFramesBeforeUs)) {
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
CLOG_CONFIG(setInternalOption, "beforeUs=%lld", (long long)skipFramesBeforeUs);
bufferSource->setSkipFramesBeforeUs(skipFramesBeforeUs);
} else if (type == IOMX::INTERNAL_OPTION_TIME_LAPSE) {
GraphicBufferSource::TimeLapseConfig config;
if (!getInternalOption(data, size, &config)) {
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
CLOG_CONFIG(setInternalOption, "perFrameUs=%lld perCaptureUs=%lld",
(long long)config.mTimePerFrameUs, (long long)config.mTimePerCaptureUs);
return bufferSource->setTimeLapseConfig(config);
} else if (type == IOMX::INTERNAL_OPTION_COLOR_ASPECTS) {
ColorAspects aspects;
if (!getInternalOption(data, size, &aspects)) {
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
CLOG_CONFIG(setInternalOption, "setting color aspects");
bufferSource->setColorAspects(aspects);
}
return OK;
}
default:
return ERROR_UNSUPPORTED;
}
}
Commit Message: IOMX: allow configuration after going to loaded state
This was disallowed recently but we still use it as MediaCodcec.stop
only goes to loaded state, and does not free component.
Bug: 31450460
Change-Id: I72e092e4e55c9f23b1baee3e950d76e84a5ef28d
(cherry picked from commit e03b22839d78c841ce0a1a0a1ee1960932188b0b)
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 157,741
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: put_stringbuf (struct stringbuf *sb, const char *text)
{
size_t n = strlen (text);
if (sb->out_of_core)
return;
if (sb->len + n >= sb->size)
{
char *p;
sb->size += n + 100;
p = xtryrealloc (sb->buf, sb->size);
if ( !p)
{
sb->out_of_core = 1;
return;
}
sb->buf = p;
}
memcpy (sb->buf+sb->len, text, n);
sb->len += n;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 11,016
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int FLTLayerApplyPlainFilterToLayer(FilterEncodingNode *psNode, mapObj *map,
int iLayerIndex)
{
char *pszExpression =NULL;
int status =MS_FALSE;
layerObj* lp = GET_LAYER(map, iLayerIndex);
pszExpression = FLTGetCommonExpression(psNode, lp);
if (pszExpression) {
const char* pszUseDefaultExtent;
FilterEncodingNode* psTopBBOX;
rectObj rect = map->extent;
pszUseDefaultExtent = msOWSLookupMetadata(&(lp->metadata), "F",
"use_default_extent_for_getfeature");
if( pszUseDefaultExtent && !CSLTestBoolean(pszUseDefaultExtent) &&
lp->connectiontype == MS_OGR )
{
const rectObj rectInvalid = MS_INIT_INVALID_RECT;
rect = rectInvalid;
}
psTopBBOX = FLTGetTopBBOX(psNode);
if( psTopBBOX )
{
int can_remove_expression = MS_TRUE;
const char* pszEPSG = FLTGetBBOX(psNode, &rect);
if(pszEPSG && map->projection.numargs > 0) {
projectionObj sProjTmp;
msInitProjection(&sProjTmp);
/* Use the non EPSG variant since axis swapping is done in FLTDoAxisSwappingIfNecessary */
if (msLoadProjectionString(&sProjTmp, pszEPSG) == 0) {
rectObj oldRect = rect;
msProjectRect(&sProjTmp, &map->projection, &rect);
/* If reprojection is involved, do not remove the expression */
if( rect.minx != oldRect.minx ||
rect.miny != oldRect.miny ||
rect.maxx != oldRect.maxx ||
rect.maxy != oldRect.maxy )
{
can_remove_expression = MS_FALSE;
}
}
msFreeProjection(&sProjTmp);
}
/* Small optimization: if the query is just a BBOX, then do a */
/* msQueryByRect() */
if( psTopBBOX == psNode && can_remove_expression )
{
msFree(pszExpression);
pszExpression = NULL;
}
}
if(map->debug == MS_DEBUGLEVEL_VVV)
{
if( pszExpression )
msDebug("FLTLayerApplyPlainFilterToLayer(): %s, rect=%.15g,%.15g,%.15g,%.15g\n", pszExpression, rect.minx, rect.miny, rect.maxx, rect.maxy);
else
msDebug("FLTLayerApplyPlainFilterToLayer(): rect=%.15g,%.15g,%.15g,%.15g\n", rect.minx, rect.miny, rect.maxx, rect.maxy);
}
status = FLTApplyFilterToLayerCommonExpressionWithRect(map, iLayerIndex,
pszExpression, rect);
msFree(pszExpression);
}
return status;
}
Commit Message: security fix (patch by EvenR)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 69,013
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium::updateIce(PassRefPtr<RTCConfiguration> configuration, PassRefPtr<MediaConstraints> constraints)
{
if (!m_webHandler)
return false;
return m_webHandler->updateICE(configuration, constraints);
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r127612, r127660, and r127664.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127612
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127660
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127664
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95920
Source/Platform:
* Platform.gypi:
* chromium/public/WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebKit):
(WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* chromium/public/WebRTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
Source/WebCore:
* CMakeLists.txt:
* GNUmakefile.list.am:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCErrorCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnection::createOffer):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCPeerConnection):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCSessionDescriptionCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::create):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestSucceeded):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestFailed):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::clear):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.h:
(RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.cpp: Removed.
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.h: Removed.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/chromium/support/WebRTCVoidRequest.cpp: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebCore):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::~RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* platform/mediastream/RTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.cpp:
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.h:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium):
Tools:
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::SuccessCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::FailureCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::createOffer):
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(SuccessCallbackTask):
(FailureCallbackTask):
LayoutTests:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-createOffer.html:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription.html: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription.html: Removed.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@127679 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 99,421
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: setElementTypePrefix(XML_Parser parser, ELEMENT_TYPE *elementType) {
DTD *const dtd = parser->m_dtd; /* save one level of indirection */
const XML_Char *name;
for (name = elementType->name; *name; name++) {
if (*name == XML_T(ASCII_COLON)) {
PREFIX *prefix;
const XML_Char *s;
for (s = elementType->name; s != name; s++) {
if (! poolAppendChar(&dtd->pool, *s))
return 0;
}
if (! poolAppendChar(&dtd->pool, XML_T('\0')))
return 0;
prefix = (PREFIX *)lookup(parser, &dtd->prefixes, poolStart(&dtd->pool),
sizeof(PREFIX));
if (! prefix)
return 0;
if (prefix->name == poolStart(&dtd->pool))
poolFinish(&dtd->pool);
else
poolDiscard(&dtd->pool);
elementType->prefix = prefix;
break;
}
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Deny internal entities closing the doctype
CWE ID: CWE-611
| 0
| 88,307
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FindMatchingInterp(CompatInfo *info, SymInterpInfo *new)
{
SymInterpInfo *old;
darray_foreach(old, info->interps)
if (old->interp.sym == new->interp.sym &&
old->interp.mods == new->interp.mods &&
old->interp.match == new->interp.match)
return old;
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: xkbcomp: Don't crash on no-op modmask expressions
If we have an expression of the form 'l1' in an interp section, we
unconditionally try to dereference its args, even if it has none.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Stone <daniels@collabora.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 78,924
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool GetNextTest(const base::CommandLine::StringVector& args,
size_t* position,
std::string* test) {
if (*position >= args.size())
return false;
if (args[*position] == FILE_PATH_LITERAL("-"))
return !!std::getline(std::cin, *test, '\n');
#if defined(OS_WIN)
*test = base::WideToUTF8(args[(*position)++]);
#else
*test = args[(*position)++];
#endif
return true;
}
Commit Message: content: Rename webkit_test_helpers.{cc,h} to blink_test_helpers.{cc,h}
Now that webkit/ is gone, we are preparing ourselves for the merge of
third_party/WebKit into //blink.
BUG=None
BUG=content_shell && content_unittests
R=avi@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1118183003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#328202}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 123,450
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderViewTest::SetUp() {
if (!GetContentClient()->renderer())
GetContentClient()->set_renderer(&mock_content_renderer_client_);
if (!render_thread_.get())
render_thread_.reset(new MockRenderThread());
render_thread_->set_routing_id(kRouteId);
render_thread_->set_surface_id(kSurfaceId);
command_line_.reset(new CommandLine(CommandLine::NO_PROGRAM));
params_.reset(new content::MainFunctionParams(*command_line_));
platform_.reset(new RendererMainPlatformDelegate(*params_));
platform_->PlatformInitialize();
webkit_glue::SetJavaScriptFlags(" --expose-gc");
WebKit::initialize(&webkit_platform_support_);
mock_process_.reset(new MockRenderProcess);
RenderViewImpl* view = RenderViewImpl::Create(
0,
kOpenerId,
content::RendererPreferences(),
WebPreferences(),
new SharedRenderViewCounter(0),
kRouteId,
kSurfaceId,
kInvalidSessionStorageNamespaceId,
string16(),
1,
WebKit::WebScreenInfo());
view->AddRef();
view_ = view;
mock_keyboard_.reset(new MockKeyboard());
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 1
| 171,025
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: sp<IMediaRecorder> MediaPlayerService::createMediaRecorder(const String16 &opPackageName)
{
pid_t pid = IPCThreadState::self()->getCallingPid();
sp<MediaRecorderClient> recorder = new MediaRecorderClient(this, pid, opPackageName);
wp<MediaRecorderClient> w = recorder;
Mutex::Autolock lock(mLock);
mMediaRecorderClients.add(w);
ALOGV("Create new media recorder client from pid %d", pid);
return recorder;
}
Commit Message: MediaPlayerService: avoid invalid static cast
Bug: 30204103
Change-Id: Ie0dd3568a375f1e9fed8615ad3d85184bcc99028
(cherry picked from commit ee0a0e39acdcf8f97e0d6945c31ff36a06a36e9d)
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 157,973
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WebViewImpl* WebView() { return web_view_helper_->GetWebView(); }
Commit Message: [BGPT] Add a fast-path for transform-origin changes.
This patch adds a fast-path for updating composited transform-origin
changes without requiring a PaintArtifactCompositor update. This
closely follows the approach of https://crrev.com/651338.
Bug: 952473
Change-Id: I8b82909c1761a7aa16705813207739d29596b0d0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1580260
Commit-Queue: Philip Rogers <pdr@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Philip Rogers <pdr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: vmpstr <vmpstr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653749}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 140,123
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int tcp_ack_is_dubious(const struct sock *sk, const int flag)
{
return !(flag & FLAG_NOT_DUP) || (flag & FLAG_CA_ALERT) ||
inet_csk(sk)->icsk_ca_state != TCP_CA_Open;
}
Commit Message: tcp: drop SYN+FIN messages
Denys Fedoryshchenko reported that SYN+FIN attacks were bringing his
linux machines to their limits.
Dont call conn_request() if the TCP flags includes SYN flag
Reported-by: Denys Fedoryshchenko <denys@visp.net.lb>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 41,108
|
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