instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool shouldInvalidateNodeListCachesForAttr<numNodeListInvalidationTypes>(const unsigned[], const QualifiedName&)
{
return false;
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 124,527
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool QQuickWebView::canGoForward() const
{
Q_D(const QQuickWebView);
return d->webPageProxy->canGoForward();
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] Allow transparent WebViews
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=80608
Reviewed by Tor Arne Vestbø.
Added support for transparentBackground in QQuickWebViewExperimental.
This uses the existing drawsTransparentBackground property in WebKit2.
Also, changed LayerTreeHostQt to set the contentsOpaque flag when the root layer changes,
otherwise the change doesn't take effect.
A new API test was added.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::setTransparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::setTransparentBackground):
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p.h:
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
* UIProcess/API/qt/tests/qquickwebview/tst_qquickwebview.cpp:
(tst_QQuickWebView):
(tst_QQuickWebView::transparentWebViews):
* WebProcess/WebPage/qt/LayerTreeHostQt.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::LayerTreeHostQt):
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::setRootCompositingLayer):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@110254 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 101,677
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ati_remote2_setkeycode(struct input_dev *idev,
const struct input_keymap_entry *ke,
unsigned int *old_keycode)
{
struct ati_remote2 *ar2 = input_get_drvdata(idev);
unsigned int mode;
int offset;
unsigned int index;
unsigned int scancode;
if (ke->flags & INPUT_KEYMAP_BY_INDEX) {
if (ke->index >= ATI_REMOTE2_MODES *
ARRAY_SIZE(ati_remote2_key_table))
return -EINVAL;
mode = ke->index / ARRAY_SIZE(ati_remote2_key_table);
offset = ke->index % ARRAY_SIZE(ati_remote2_key_table);
} else {
if (input_scancode_to_scalar(ke, &scancode))
return -EINVAL;
mode = scancode >> 8;
if (mode > ATI_REMOTE2_PC)
return -EINVAL;
offset = ati_remote2_lookup(scancode & 0xff);
if (offset < 0)
return -EINVAL;
}
*old_keycode = ar2->keycode[mode][offset];
ar2->keycode[mode][offset] = ke->keycode;
__set_bit(ke->keycode, idev->keybit);
for (mode = 0; mode < ATI_REMOTE2_MODES; mode++) {
for (index = 0; index < ARRAY_SIZE(ati_remote2_key_table); index++) {
if (ar2->keycode[mode][index] == *old_keycode)
return 0;
}
}
__clear_bit(*old_keycode, idev->keybit);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Input: ati_remote2 - fix crashes on detecting device with invalid descriptor
The ati_remote2 driver expects at least two interfaces with one
endpoint each. If given malicious descriptor that specify one
interface or no endpoints, it will crash in the probe function.
Ensure there is at least two interfaces and one endpoint for each
interface before using it.
The full disclosure: http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2016/Mar/90
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <ralf@spenneberg.net>
Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 55,226
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pdf_tos_set_matrix(pdf_text_object_state *tos, float a, float b, float c, float d, float e, float f)
{
tos->tm.a = a;
tos->tm.b = b;
tos->tm.c = c;
tos->tm.d = d;
tos->tm.e = e;
tos->tm.f = f;
tos->tlm = tos->tm;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 598
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ImeObserver::ConvertInputContextSpellCheck(
ui::IMEEngineHandlerInterface::InputContext input_context) {
return !(input_context.flags & ui::TEXT_INPUT_FLAG_SPELLCHECK_OFF);
}
Commit Message: Fix the regression caused by http://crrev.com/c/1288350.
Bug: 900124,856135
Change-Id: Ie11ad406bd1ea383dc2a83cc8661076309154865
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1317010
Reviewed-by: Lan Wei <azurewei@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Shu Chen <shuchen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#605282}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 144,846
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool SendTabToSelfEntry::IsExpired(base::Time current_time) const {
return (current_time.ToDeltaSinceWindowsEpoch() -
GetSharedTime().ToDeltaSinceWindowsEpoch() >=
kExpiryTime);
}
Commit Message: [SendTabToSelf] Added logic to display an infobar for the feature.
This CL is one of many to come. It covers:
* Creation of the infobar from the SendTabToSelfInfoBarController
* Plumbed the call to create the infobar to the native code.
* Open the link when user taps on the link
In follow-up CLs, the following will be done:
* Instantiate the InfobarController in the ChromeActivity
* Listen for Model changes in the Controller
Bug: 949233,963193
Change-Id: I5df1359debb5f0f35c32c2df3b691bf9129cdeb8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1604406
Reviewed-by: Tommy Nyquist <nyquist@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mikel Astiz <mastiz@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: sebsg <sebsg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeffrey Cohen <jeffreycohen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Jones <mdjones@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Tanya Gupta <tgupta@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660854}
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 142,397
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: encode_SET_L4_DST_PORT(const struct ofpact_l4_port *l4_port,
enum ofp_version ofp_version,
struct ofpbuf *out)
{
uint8_t proto = l4_port->flow_ip_proto;
enum mf_field_id field = (proto == IPPROTO_TCP ? MFF_TCP_DST
: proto == IPPROTO_UDP ? MFF_UDP_DST
: proto == IPPROTO_SCTP ? MFF_SCTP_DST
: MFF_N_IDS);
encode_SET_L4_port(l4_port, ofp_version, OFPAT_RAW_SET_TP_DST, field, out);
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 76,894
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool CSPSourceList::allowEval() const
{
return m_allowEval;
}
Commit Message: Disallow CSP source * matching of data:, blob:, and filesystem: URLs
The CSP spec specifically excludes matching of data:, blob:, and
filesystem: URLs with the source '*' wildcard. This adds checks to make
sure that doesn't happen, along with tests.
BUG=534570
R=mkwst@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1361763005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#350950}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 125,386
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pdf_drop_document(fz_context *ctx, pdf_document *doc)
{
fz_drop_document(ctx, &doc->super);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 16,697
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: wb_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const void *hdr, register u_int len)
{
register const struct pkt_hdr *ph;
ph = (const struct pkt_hdr *)hdr;
if (len < sizeof(*ph) || !ND_TTEST(*ph)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return;
}
len -= sizeof(*ph);
if (ph->ph_flags)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "*"));
switch (ph->ph_type) {
case PT_KILL:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " wb-kill"));
return;
case PT_ID:
if (wb_id(ndo, (const struct pkt_id *)(ph + 1), len) >= 0)
return;
break;
case PT_RREQ:
if (wb_rreq(ndo, (const struct pkt_rreq *)(ph + 1), len) >= 0)
return;
break;
case PT_RREP:
if (wb_rrep(ndo, (const struct pkt_rrep *)(ph + 1), len) >= 0)
return;
break;
case PT_DRAWOP:
if (wb_drawop(ndo, (const struct pkt_dop *)(ph + 1), len) >= 0)
return;
break;
case PT_PREQ:
if (wb_preq(ndo, (const struct pkt_preq *)(ph + 1), len) >= 0)
return;
break;
case PT_PREP:
if (wb_prep(ndo, (const struct pkt_prep *)(ph + 1), len) >= 0)
return;
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " wb-%d!", ph->ph_type));
return;
}
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13014/White Board: Do more bounds checks.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Yannick Formaggio.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
While we're at it, print a truncation error if the packets are
truncated, rather than just, in effect, ignoring the result of the
routines that print particular packet types.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 1
| 167,879
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: blink::WebDisplayMode Browser::GetDisplayMode(
const WebContents* web_contents) const {
if (window_->IsFullscreen())
return blink::WebDisplayModeFullscreen;
if (is_type_popup())
return blink::WebDisplayModeStandalone;
return blink::WebDisplayModeBrowser;
}
Commit Message: Don't focus the location bar for NTP navigations in non-selected tabs.
BUG=677716
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2624373002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#443338}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 138,998
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void sycc420_to_rgb(opj_image_t *img)
{
int *d0, *d1, *d2, *r, *g, *b, *nr, *ng, *nb;
const int *y, *cb, *cr, *ny;
size_t maxw, maxh, max, offx, loopmaxw, offy, loopmaxh;
int offset, upb;
size_t i;
upb = (int)img->comps[0].prec;
offset = 1 << (upb - 1);
upb = (1 << upb) - 1;
maxw = (size_t)img->comps[0].w;
maxh = (size_t)img->comps[0].h;
max = maxw * maxh;
y = img->comps[0].data;
cb = img->comps[1].data;
cr = img->comps[2].data;
d0 = r = (int*)opj_image_data_alloc(sizeof(int) * max);
d1 = g = (int*)opj_image_data_alloc(sizeof(int) * max);
d2 = b = (int*)opj_image_data_alloc(sizeof(int) * max);
if (r == NULL || g == NULL || b == NULL) {
goto fails;
}
/* if img->x0 is odd, then first column shall use Cb/Cr = 0 */
offx = img->x0 & 1U;
loopmaxw = maxw - offx;
/* if img->y0 is odd, then first line shall use Cb/Cr = 0 */
offy = img->y0 & 1U;
loopmaxh = maxh - offy;
if (offy > 0U) {
size_t j;
for (j = 0; j < maxw; ++j) {
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *y, 0, 0, r, g, b);
++y;
++r;
++g;
++b;
}
}
for (i = 0U; i < (loopmaxh & ~(size_t)1U); i += 2U) {
size_t j;
ny = y + maxw;
nr = r + maxw;
ng = g + maxw;
nb = b + maxw;
if (offx > 0U) {
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *y, 0, 0, r, g, b);
++y;
++r;
++g;
++b;
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *ny, *cb, *cr, nr, ng, nb);
++ny;
++nr;
++ng;
++nb;
}
for (j = 0; j < (loopmaxw & ~(size_t)1U); j += 2U) {
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *y, *cb, *cr, r, g, b);
++y;
++r;
++g;
++b;
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *y, *cb, *cr, r, g, b);
++y;
++r;
++g;
++b;
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *ny, *cb, *cr, nr, ng, nb);
++ny;
++nr;
++ng;
++nb;
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *ny, *cb, *cr, nr, ng, nb);
++ny;
++nr;
++ng;
++nb;
++cb;
++cr;
}
if (j < loopmaxw) {
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *y, *cb, *cr, r, g, b);
++y;
++r;
++g;
++b;
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *ny, *cb, *cr, nr, ng, nb);
++ny;
++nr;
++ng;
++nb;
++cb;
++cr;
}
y += maxw;
r += maxw;
g += maxw;
b += maxw;
}
if (i < loopmaxh) {
size_t j;
for (j = 0U; j < (maxw & ~(size_t)1U); j += 2U) {
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *y, *cb, *cr, r, g, b);
++y;
++r;
++g;
++b;
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *y, *cb, *cr, r, g, b);
++y;
++r;
++g;
++b;
++cb;
++cr;
}
if (j < maxw) {
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *y, *cb, *cr, r, g, b);
}
}
opj_image_data_free(img->comps[0].data);
img->comps[0].data = d0;
opj_image_data_free(img->comps[1].data);
img->comps[1].data = d1;
opj_image_data_free(img->comps[2].data);
img->comps[2].data = d2;
img->comps[1].w = img->comps[2].w = img->comps[0].w;
img->comps[1].h = img->comps[2].h = img->comps[0].h;
img->comps[1].dx = img->comps[2].dx = img->comps[0].dx;
img->comps[1].dy = img->comps[2].dy = img->comps[0].dy;
img->color_space = OPJ_CLRSPC_SRGB;
return;
fails:
opj_image_data_free(r);
opj_image_data_free(g);
opj_image_data_free(b);
}/* sycc420_to_rgb() */
Commit Message: color_apply_icc_profile: avoid potential heap buffer overflow
Derived from a patch by Thuan Pham
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 91,909
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: irc_server_get_prefix_char_index (struct t_irc_server *server,
char prefix_char)
{
const char *prefix_chars;
char *pos;
if (server)
{
prefix_chars = irc_server_get_prefix_chars (server);
pos = strchr (prefix_chars, prefix_char);
if (pos)
return pos - prefix_chars;
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 3,487
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: circle_div_pt(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
CIRCLE *circle = PG_GETARG_CIRCLE_P(0);
Point *point = PG_GETARG_POINT_P(1);
CIRCLE *result;
Point *p;
result = circle_copy(circle);
p = DatumGetPointP(DirectFunctionCall2(point_div,
PointPGetDatum(&circle->center),
PointPGetDatum(point)));
result->center.x = p->x;
result->center.y = p->y;
result->radius /= HYPOT(point->x, point->y);
PG_RETURN_CIRCLE_P(result);
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 38,847
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool HasAccessorsImpl(JSObject* holder,
FixedArrayBase* backing_store) {
FixedArray* parameter_map = FixedArray::cast(backing_store);
FixedArrayBase* arguments = FixedArrayBase::cast(parameter_map->get(1));
return ArgumentsAccessor::HasAccessorsImpl(holder, arguments);
}
Commit Message: Backport: Fix Object.entries/values with changing elements
Bug: 111274046
Test: m -j proxy_resolver_v8_unittest && adb sync && adb shell \
/data/nativetest64/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest
Change-Id: I705fc512cc5837e9364ed187559cc75d079aa5cb
(cherry picked from commit d8be9a10287afed07705ac8af027d6a46d4def99)
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 163,129
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: sp<MediaPlayerBase> MediaPlayerService::Client::setDataSource_pre(
player_type playerType)
{
ALOGV("player type = %d", playerType);
sp<MediaPlayerBase> p = createPlayer(playerType);
if (p == NULL) {
return p;
}
sp<IServiceManager> sm = defaultServiceManager();
sp<IBinder> binder = sm->getService(String16("media.extractor"));
mExtractorDeathListener = new ServiceDeathNotifier(binder, p, MEDIAEXTRACTOR_PROCESS_DEATH);
binder->linkToDeath(mExtractorDeathListener);
binder = sm->getService(String16("media.codec"));
mCodecDeathListener = new ServiceDeathNotifier(binder, p, MEDIACODEC_PROCESS_DEATH);
binder->linkToDeath(mCodecDeathListener);
if (!p->hardwareOutput()) {
Mutex::Autolock l(mLock);
mAudioOutput = new AudioOutput(mAudioSessionId, IPCThreadState::self()->getCallingUid(),
mPid, mAudioAttributes);
static_cast<MediaPlayerInterface*>(p.get())->setAudioSink(mAudioOutput);
}
return p;
}
Commit Message: MediaPlayerService: avoid invalid static cast
Bug: 30204103
Change-Id: Ie0dd3568a375f1e9fed8615ad3d85184bcc99028
(cherry picked from commit ee0a0e39acdcf8f97e0d6945c31ff36a06a36e9d)
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 158,032
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void voidMethodSequenceStringArgMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::voidMethodSequenceStringArgMethod(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 122,877
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void UserCloudPolicyManagerChromeOS::OnClientError(
CloudPolicyClient* cloud_policy_client) {
DCHECK_EQ(client(), cloud_policy_client);
if (wait_for_policy_fetch_) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_SPARSE_SLOWLY(kUMAInitialFetchClientError,
cloud_policy_client->status());
}
CancelWaitForPolicyFetch();
}
Commit Message: Make the policy fetch for first time login blocking
The CL makes policy fetching for first time login blocking for all users, except the ones that are known to be non-enterprise users.
BUG=334584
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/330843002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@282925 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 110,392
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int handle_vmptrld(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
gpa_t vmptr;
u32 exec_control;
if (!nested_vmx_check_permission(vcpu))
return 1;
if (nested_vmx_check_vmptr(vcpu, EXIT_REASON_VMPTRLD, &vmptr))
return 1;
if (vmx->nested.current_vmptr != vmptr) {
struct vmcs12 *new_vmcs12;
struct page *page;
page = nested_get_page(vcpu, vmptr);
if (page == NULL) {
nested_vmx_failInvalid(vcpu);
skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
return 1;
}
new_vmcs12 = kmap(page);
if (new_vmcs12->revision_id != VMCS12_REVISION) {
kunmap(page);
nested_release_page_clean(page);
nested_vmx_failValid(vcpu,
VMXERR_VMPTRLD_INCORRECT_VMCS_REVISION_ID);
skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
return 1;
}
nested_release_vmcs12(vmx);
vmx->nested.current_vmptr = vmptr;
vmx->nested.current_vmcs12 = new_vmcs12;
vmx->nested.current_vmcs12_page = page;
if (enable_shadow_vmcs) {
exec_control = vmcs_read32(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL);
exec_control |= SECONDARY_EXEC_SHADOW_VMCS;
vmcs_write32(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, exec_control);
vmcs_write64(VMCS_LINK_POINTER,
__pa(vmx->nested.current_shadow_vmcs));
vmx->nested.sync_shadow_vmcs = true;
}
}
nested_vmx_succeed(vcpu);
skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 37,095
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void btif_av_event_deep_copy(uint16_t event, char* p_dest, char* p_src) {
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
tBTA_AV* av_src = (tBTA_AV*)p_src;
tBTA_AV* av_dest = (tBTA_AV*)p_dest;
maybe_non_aligned_memcpy(av_dest, av_src, sizeof(*av_src));
switch (event) {
case BTA_AV_META_MSG_EVT:
if (av_src->meta_msg.p_data && av_src->meta_msg.len) {
av_dest->meta_msg.p_data = (uint8_t*)osi_calloc(av_src->meta_msg.len);
memcpy(av_dest->meta_msg.p_data, av_src->meta_msg.p_data,
av_src->meta_msg.len);
}
if (av_src->meta_msg.p_msg) {
av_dest->meta_msg.p_msg = (tAVRC_MSG*)osi_calloc(sizeof(tAVRC_MSG));
memcpy(av_dest->meta_msg.p_msg, av_src->meta_msg.p_msg,
sizeof(tAVRC_MSG));
tAVRC_MSG* p_msg_src = av_src->meta_msg.p_msg;
tAVRC_MSG* p_msg_dest = av_dest->meta_msg.p_msg;
if ((p_msg_src->hdr.opcode == AVRC_OP_VENDOR) &&
(p_msg_src->vendor.p_vendor_data && p_msg_src->vendor.vendor_len)) {
p_msg_dest->vendor.p_vendor_data =
(uint8_t*)osi_calloc(p_msg_src->vendor.vendor_len);
memcpy(p_msg_dest->vendor.p_vendor_data,
p_msg_src->vendor.p_vendor_data, p_msg_src->vendor.vendor_len);
}
}
break;
default:
break;
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE AVRC: Copy browse.p_browse_data in btif_av_event_deep_copy
p_msg_src->browse.p_browse_data is not copied, but used after the
original pointer is freed
Bug: 109699112
Test: manual
Change-Id: I1d014eb9a8911da6913173a9b11218bf1c89e16e
(cherry picked from commit 1d9a58768e6573899c7e80c2b3f52e22f2d8f58b)
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 1
| 174,100
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void reflectUrlStringAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
TestInterfaceNode* impl = V8TestInterfaceNode::toImpl(holder);
v8SetReturnValueString(info, impl->getURLAttribute(HTMLNames::reflecturlstringattributeAttr), info.GetIsolate());
}
Commit Message: binding: Removes unused code in templates/attributes.cpp.
Faking {{cpp_class}} and {{c8_class}} doesn't make sense.
Probably it made sense before the introduction of virtual
ScriptWrappable::wrap().
Checking the existence of window->document() doesn't seem
making sense to me, and CQ tests seem passing without the
check.
BUG=
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2268433002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#413375}
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 119,283
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int load_segment_descriptor(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
u16 selector, int seg)
{
u8 cpl = ctxt->ops->cpl(ctxt);
return __load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, selector, seg, cpl, false, NULL);
}
Commit Message: KVM: emulate: avoid accessing NULL ctxt->memopp
A failure to decode the instruction can cause a NULL pointer access.
This is fixed simply by moving the "done" label as close as possible
to the return.
This fixes CVE-2014-8481.
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 41061cdb98a0bec464278b4db8e894a3121671f5
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 35,581
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int netlink_allowed(const struct socket *sock, unsigned int flag)
{
return (nl_table[sock->sk->sk_protocol].flags & flag) ||
ns_capable(sock_net(sock->sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN);
}
Commit Message: netlink: Fix dump skb leak/double free
When we free cb->skb after a dump, we do it after releasing the
lock. This means that a new dump could have started in the time
being and we'll end up freeing their skb instead of ours.
This patch saves the skb and module before we unlock so we free
the right memory.
Fixes: 16b304f3404f ("netlink: Eliminate kmalloc in netlink dump operation.")
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Acked-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 47,734
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void op_attr_value_clear(void *attr)
{
uint32_t *v = attr;
*v = 0;
}
Commit Message: svc: check for allocation overflow in crypto calls part 2
Without checking for overflow there is a risk of allocating a buffer
with size smaller than anticipated and as a consequence of that it might
lead to a heap based overflow with attacker controlled data written
outside the boundaries of the buffer.
Fixes: OP-TEE-2018-0011: "Integer overflow in crypto system calls (x2)"
Signed-off-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org> (QEMU v7, v8)
Reviewed-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Riscure <inforequest@riscure.com>
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <a.a.milburn@vu.nl>
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@linaro.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 86,850
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DownloadRequestLimiter::GetDownloadState(
content::WebContents* web_contents,
content::WebContents* originating_web_contents,
bool create) {
DCHECK(web_contents);
StateMap::iterator i = state_map_.find(web_contents);
if (i != state_map_.end())
return i->second;
if (!create)
return nullptr;
TabDownloadState* state =
new TabDownloadState(this, web_contents, originating_web_contents);
state_map_[web_contents] = state;
return state;
}
Commit Message: Don't reset TabDownloadState on history back/forward
Currently performing forward/backward on a tab will reset the TabDownloadState.
Which allows javascript code to do trigger multiple downloads.
This CL disables that behavior by not resetting the TabDownloadState on
forward/back.
It is still possible to reset the TabDownloadState through user gesture
or using browser initiated download.
BUG=848535
Change-Id: I7f9bf6e8fb759b4dcddf5ac0c214e8c6c9f48863
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1108959
Commit-Queue: Min Qin <qinmin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#574437}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 154,724
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void booleanAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
v8SetReturnValueBool(info, imp->booleanAttribute());
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 122,154
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int er_supported(ERContext *s)
{
if(s->avctx->hwaccel && s->avctx->hwaccel->decode_slice ||
!s->cur_pic.f ||
s->cur_pic.field_picture ||
s->avctx->profile == FF_PROFILE_MPEG4_SIMPLE_STUDIO
)
return 0;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/mpeg4videodec: Remove use of FF_PROFILE_MPEG4_SIMPLE_STUDIO as indicator of studio profile
The profile field is changed by code inside and outside the decoder,
its not a reliable indicator of the internal codec state.
Maintaining it consistency with studio_profile is messy.
Its easier to just avoid it and use only studio_profile
Fixes: assertion failure
Fixes: ffmpeg_crash_9.avi
Found-by: Thuan Pham, Marcel Böhme, Andrew Santosa and Alexandru Razvan Caciulescu with AFLSmart
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 1
| 169,154
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: rule_criteria_init(struct rule_criteria *criteria, uint8_t table_id,
const struct match *match, int priority,
ovs_version_t version, ovs_be64 cookie,
ovs_be64 cookie_mask, ofp_port_t out_port,
uint32_t out_group)
{
criteria->table_id = table_id;
cls_rule_init(&criteria->cr, match, priority);
criteria->version = version;
criteria->cookie = cookie;
criteria->cookie_mask = cookie_mask;
criteria->out_port = out_port;
criteria->out_group = out_group;
/* We ordinarily want to skip hidden rules, but there has to be a way for
* code internal to OVS to modify and delete them, so if the criteria
* specify a priority that can only be for a hidden flow, then allow hidden
* rules to be selected. (This doesn't allow OpenFlow clients to meddle
* with hidden flows because OpenFlow uses only a 16-bit field to specify
* priority.) */
criteria->include_hidden = priority > UINT16_MAX;
/* We assume that the criteria are being used to collect flows for reading
* but not modification. Thus, we should collect read-only flows. */
criteria->include_readonly = true;
}
Commit Message: ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <vishal.deep.ajmera@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 77,427
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xmlErrAttributeDup(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, const xmlChar * prefix,
const xmlChar * localname)
{
if ((ctxt != NULL) && (ctxt->disableSAX != 0) &&
(ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF))
return;
if (ctxt != NULL)
ctxt->errNo = XML_ERR_ATTRIBUTE_REDEFINED;
if (prefix == NULL)
__xmlRaiseError(NULL, NULL, NULL, ctxt, NULL, XML_FROM_PARSER,
XML_ERR_ATTRIBUTE_REDEFINED, XML_ERR_FATAL, NULL, 0,
(const char *) localname, NULL, NULL, 0, 0,
"Attribute %s redefined\n", localname);
else
__xmlRaiseError(NULL, NULL, NULL, ctxt, NULL, XML_FROM_PARSER,
XML_ERR_ATTRIBUTE_REDEFINED, XML_ERR_FATAL, NULL, 0,
(const char *) prefix, (const char *) localname,
NULL, 0, 0, "Attribute %s:%s redefined\n", prefix,
localname);
if (ctxt != NULL) {
ctxt->wellFormed = 0;
if (ctxt->recovery == 0)
ctxt->disableSAX = 1;
}
}
Commit Message: Detect infinite recursion in parameter entities
When expanding a parameter entity in a DTD, infinite recursion could
lead to an infinite loop or memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Wei Lei for the first of many reports.
Fixes bug 759579.
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 59,430
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void MeasureOverloadedMethod2Method(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
ExceptionState exception_state(info.GetIsolate(), ExceptionState::kExecutionContext, "TestObject", "measureOverloadedMethod");
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
int32_t arg;
arg = NativeValueTraits<IDLLong>::NativeValue(info.GetIsolate(), info[0], exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return;
impl->measureOverloadedMethod(arg);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 134,872
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void NavigateToURLImpl(const GURL& dest_url) const {
EXPECT_TRUE(prerender_manager()->FindEntry(dest_url_) != NULL);
ui_test_utils::NavigateToURL(browser(), dest_url);
EXPECT_TRUE(prerender_manager()->FindEntry(dest_url_) == NULL);
if (call_javascript_) {
bool display_test_result = false;
ASSERT_TRUE(ui_test_utils::ExecuteJavaScriptAndExtractBool(
browser()->GetSelectedTabContents()->render_view_host(), L"",
L"window.domAutomationController.send(DidDisplayPass())",
&display_test_result));
EXPECT_TRUE(display_test_result);
}
}
Commit Message: Update PrerenderBrowserTests to work with new
PrerenderContents.
Also update PrerenderContents to pass plugin
and HTML5 prerender tests.
BUG=81229
TEST=PrerenderBrowserTests (Once the new code is enabled)
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6905169
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83841 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 99,959
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ath_tx_aggr_sleep(struct ieee80211_sta *sta, struct ath_softc *sc,
struct ath_node *an)
{
struct ath_atx_tid *tid;
struct ath_atx_ac *ac;
struct ath_txq *txq;
bool buffered;
int tidno;
for (tidno = 0, tid = &an->tid[tidno];
tidno < IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS; tidno++, tid++) {
if (!tid->sched)
continue;
ac = tid->ac;
txq = ac->txq;
ath_txq_lock(sc, txq);
buffered = ath_tid_has_buffered(tid);
tid->sched = false;
list_del(&tid->list);
if (ac->sched) {
ac->sched = false;
list_del(&ac->list);
}
ath_txq_unlock(sc, txq);
ieee80211_sta_set_buffered(sta, tidno, buffered);
}
}
Commit Message: ath9k: protect tid->sched check
We check tid->sched without a lock taken on ath_tx_aggr_sleep(). That
is race condition which can result of doing list_del(&tid->list) twice
(second time with poisoned list node) and cause crash like shown below:
[424271.637220] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00100104
[424271.637328] IP: [<f90fc072>] ath_tx_aggr_sleep+0x62/0xe0 [ath9k]
...
[424271.639953] Call Trace:
[424271.639998] [<f90f6900>] ? ath9k_get_survey+0x110/0x110 [ath9k]
[424271.640083] [<f90f6942>] ath9k_sta_notify+0x42/0x50 [ath9k]
[424271.640177] [<f809cfef>] sta_ps_start+0x8f/0x1c0 [mac80211]
[424271.640258] [<c10f730e>] ? free_compound_page+0x2e/0x40
[424271.640346] [<f809e915>] ieee80211_rx_handlers+0x9d5/0x2340 [mac80211]
[424271.640437] [<c112f048>] ? kmem_cache_free+0x1d8/0x1f0
[424271.640510] [<c1345a84>] ? kfree_skbmem+0x34/0x90
[424271.640578] [<c10fc23c>] ? put_page+0x2c/0x40
[424271.640640] [<c1345a84>] ? kfree_skbmem+0x34/0x90
[424271.640706] [<c1345a84>] ? kfree_skbmem+0x34/0x90
[424271.640787] [<f809dde3>] ? ieee80211_rx_handlers_result+0x73/0x1d0 [mac80211]
[424271.640897] [<f80a07a0>] ieee80211_prepare_and_rx_handle+0x520/0xad0 [mac80211]
[424271.641009] [<f809e22d>] ? ieee80211_rx_handlers+0x2ed/0x2340 [mac80211]
[424271.641104] [<c13846ce>] ? ip_output+0x7e/0xd0
[424271.641182] [<f80a1057>] ieee80211_rx+0x307/0x7c0 [mac80211]
[424271.641266] [<f90fa6ee>] ath_rx_tasklet+0x88e/0xf70 [ath9k]
[424271.641358] [<f80a0f2c>] ? ieee80211_rx+0x1dc/0x7c0 [mac80211]
[424271.641445] [<f90f82db>] ath9k_tasklet+0xcb/0x130 [ath9k]
Bug report:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=70551
Reported-and-tested-by: Max Sydorenko <maxim.stargazer@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 1
| 166,395
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RebuildState(const std::vector<flags_ui::FeatureEntry>& entries) {
flags_state_ = std::make_unique<flags_ui::FlagsState>(entries, this);
}
Commit Message: Add feature and flag to enable incognito Chrome Custom Tabs
kCCTIncognito feature and flag are added to enable/disable incognito
Chrome Custom Tabs. The default is set to disabled.
Bug: 1023759
Change-Id: If32d256e3e9eaa94bcc09f7538c85e2dab53c589
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1911201
Reviewed-by: Peter Conn <peconn@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <dtrainor@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ramin Halavati <rhalavati@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#714849}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 137,033
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: prism_if_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, const u_char *p)
{
u_int caplen = h->caplen;
u_int length = h->len;
uint32_t msgcode;
if (caplen < 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return caplen;
}
msgcode = EXTRACT_32BITS(p);
if (msgcode == WLANCAP_MAGIC_COOKIE_V1 ||
msgcode == WLANCAP_MAGIC_COOKIE_V2)
return ieee802_11_avs_radio_print(ndo, p, length, caplen);
if (caplen < PRISM_HDR_LEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return caplen;
}
return PRISM_HDR_LEN + ieee802_11_print(ndo, p + PRISM_HDR_LEN,
length - PRISM_HDR_LEN, caplen - PRISM_HDR_LEN, 0, 0);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13008/IEEE 802.11: Fix TIM bitmap copy to copy from p + offset.
offset has already been advanced to point to the bitmap; we shouldn't
add the amount to advance again.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Brian 'geeknik' Carpenter.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
While we're at it, remove some redundant tests - we've already checked,
before the case statement, whether we have captured the entire
information element and whether the entire information element is
present in the on-the-wire packet; in the cases for particular IEs, we
only need to make sure we don't go past the end of the IE.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 62,432
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DocumentLoader::DidCommitNavigation() {
if (GetFrameLoader().StateMachine()->CreatingInitialEmptyDocument())
return;
if (!frame_->Loader().StateMachine()->CommittedMultipleRealLoads() &&
load_type_ == kFrameLoadTypeStandard) {
frame_->Loader().StateMachine()->AdvanceTo(
FrameLoaderStateMachine::kCommittedMultipleRealLoads);
}
HistoryCommitType commit_type = LoadTypeToCommitType(load_type_);
frame_->FrameScheduler()->DidCommitProvisionalLoad(
commit_type == kHistoryInertCommit, load_type_ == kFrameLoadTypeReload,
frame_->IsLocalRoot());
GetLocalFrameClient().DispatchDidCommitLoad(history_item_.Get(), commit_type);
frame_->GetSecurityContext()
->GetContentSecurityPolicy()
->ReportAccumulatedHeaders(&GetLocalFrameClient());
if (service_worker_network_provider_ &&
service_worker_network_provider_->IsControlledByServiceWorker()) {
GetLocalFrameClient().DidObserveLoadingBehavior(
kWebLoadingBehaviorServiceWorkerControlled);
}
DispatchLinkHeaderPreloads(nullptr, LinkLoader::kOnlyLoadNonMedia);
TRACE_EVENT1("devtools.timeline", "CommitLoad", "data",
InspectorCommitLoadEvent::Data(frame_));
probe::didCommitLoad(frame_, this);
frame_->GetPage()->DidCommitLoad(frame_);
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 134,443
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __init wp512_mod_init(void)
{
return crypto_register_shashes(wp_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(wp_algs));
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 47,407
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xmlParseXMLDecl(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
xmlChar *version;
/*
* This value for standalone indicates that the document has an
* XML declaration but it does not have a standalone attribute.
* It will be overwritten later if a standalone attribute is found.
*/
ctxt->input->standalone = -2;
/*
* We know that '<?xml' is here.
*/
SKIP(5);
if (!IS_BLANK_CH(RAW)) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_SPACE_REQUIRED,
"Blank needed after '<?xml'\n");
}
SKIP_BLANKS;
/*
* We must have the VersionInfo here.
*/
version = xmlParseVersionInfo(ctxt);
if (version == NULL) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_VERSION_MISSING, NULL);
} else {
if (!xmlStrEqual(version, (const xmlChar *) XML_DEFAULT_VERSION)) {
/*
* Changed here for XML-1.0 5th edition
*/
if (ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_OLD10) {
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_UNKNOWN_VERSION,
"Unsupported version '%s'\n",
version);
} else {
if ((version[0] == '1') && ((version[1] == '.'))) {
xmlWarningMsg(ctxt, XML_WAR_UNKNOWN_VERSION,
"Unsupported version '%s'\n",
version, NULL);
} else {
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_UNKNOWN_VERSION,
"Unsupported version '%s'\n",
version);
}
}
}
if (ctxt->version != NULL)
xmlFree((void *) ctxt->version);
ctxt->version = version;
}
/*
* We may have the encoding declaration
*/
if (!IS_BLANK_CH(RAW)) {
if ((RAW == '?') && (NXT(1) == '>')) {
SKIP(2);
return;
}
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_SPACE_REQUIRED, "Blank needed here\n");
}
xmlParseEncodingDecl(ctxt);
if ((ctxt->errNo == XML_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ENCODING) ||
(ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)) {
/*
* The XML REC instructs us to stop parsing right here
*/
return;
}
/*
* We may have the standalone status.
*/
if ((ctxt->input->encoding != NULL) && (!IS_BLANK_CH(RAW))) {
if ((RAW == '?') && (NXT(1) == '>')) {
SKIP(2);
return;
}
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_SPACE_REQUIRED, "Blank needed here\n");
}
/*
* We can grow the input buffer freely at that point
*/
GROW;
SKIP_BLANKS;
ctxt->input->standalone = xmlParseSDDecl(ctxt);
SKIP_BLANKS;
if ((RAW == '?') && (NXT(1) == '>')) {
SKIP(2);
} else if (RAW == '>') {
/* Deprecated old WD ... */
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_XMLDECL_NOT_FINISHED, NULL);
NEXT;
} else {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_XMLDECL_NOT_FINISHED, NULL);
MOVETO_ENDTAG(CUR_PTR);
NEXT;
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Add validation for eternal enities
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=780691
Bug: 36556310
Change-Id: I9450743e167c3c73af5e4071f3fc85e81d061648
(cherry picked from commit bef9af3d89d241bcb518c20cba6da2a2fd9ba049)
CWE ID: CWE-611
| 0
| 163,506
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool FrameSelection::SelectionHasFocus() const {
GetDocument().UpdateStyleAndLayoutIgnorePendingStylesheets();
if (ComputeVisibleSelectionInFlatTree().IsNone())
return false;
const Node* current =
ComputeVisibleSelectionInFlatTree().Start().ComputeContainerNode();
if (!current)
return false;
Element* const focused_element = GetDocument().FocusedElement()
? GetDocument().FocusedElement()
: GetDocument().documentElement();
if (!focused_element)
return false;
if (focused_element->IsTextControl())
return focused_element->ContainsIncludingHostElements(*current);
const PositionInFlatTree& focused_position =
PositionInFlatTree::FirstPositionInNode(*focused_element);
if (ComputeVisibleSelectionInFlatTree().Start() <= focused_position &&
ComputeVisibleSelectionInFlatTree().End() >= focused_position)
return true;
bool has_editable_style = HasEditableStyle(*current);
do {
if (has_editable_style && !HasEditableStyle(*current))
return false;
if (current == focused_element)
return true;
current = current->ParentOrShadowHostNode();
} while (current);
return false;
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 125,861
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: HandleCacheRedirectRequest(const net::test_server::HttpRequest& request) {
if (!base::StartsWith(request.relative_url, "/cached-redirect?",
base::CompareCase::INSENSITIVE_ASCII)) {
return std::unique_ptr<net::test_server::HttpResponse>();
}
GURL request_url = request.GetURL();
std::string dest =
net::UnescapeBinaryURLComponent(request_url.query_piece());
auto http_response =
std::make_unique<net::test_server::BasicHttpResponse>();
http_response->set_code(net::HTTP_MOVED_PERMANENTLY);
http_response->AddCustomHeader("Location", dest);
http_response->set_content_type("text/html");
http_response->set_content(base::StringPrintf(
"<html><head></head><body>Redirecting to %s</body></html>",
dest.c_str()));
http_response->AddCustomHeader("Cache-Control", "max-age=6000");
return http_response;
}
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311}
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 136,877
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderView::didClearWindowObject(WebFrame* frame) {
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(RenderViewObserver, observers_,
DidClearWindowObject(frame));
GURL frame_url = frame->document().url();
if (BindingsPolicy::is_web_ui_enabled(enabled_bindings_) &&
(frame_url.SchemeIs(chrome::kChromeUIScheme) ||
frame_url.SchemeIs(chrome::kDataScheme))) {
GetWebUIBindings()->set_message_sender(this);
GetWebUIBindings()->set_routing_id(routing_id_);
GetWebUIBindings()->BindToJavascript(frame, "chrome");
}
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 99,002
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct tcp_md5sig_key *tcp_v6_md5_do_lookup(const struct sock *sk,
const struct in6_addr *addr)
{
return tcp_md5_do_lookup(sk, (union tcp_md5_addr *)addr, AF_INET6);
}
Commit Message: tcp: take care of truncations done by sk_filter()
With syzkaller help, Marco Grassi found a bug in TCP stack,
crashing in tcp_collapse()
Root cause is that sk_filter() can truncate the incoming skb,
but TCP stack was not really expecting this to happen.
It probably was expecting a simple DROP or ACCEPT behavior.
We first need to make sure no part of TCP header could be removed.
Then we need to adjust TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq
Many thanks to syzkaller team and Marco for giving us a reproducer.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <marco.gra@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 49,297
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ssh_pkt_addstring(struct Packet *pkt, const char *data)
{
ssh_pkt_addstring_start(pkt);
ssh_pkt_addstring_str(pkt, data);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 8,571
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: EntrySync* EntrySync::moveTo(DirectoryEntrySync* parent, const String& name, ExceptionState& exceptionState) const
{
RefPtr<EntrySyncCallbackHelper> helper = EntrySyncCallbackHelper::create();
m_fileSystem->move(this, parent, name, helper->successCallback(), helper->errorCallback(), DOMFileSystemBase::Synchronous);
return helper->getResult(exceptionState);
}
Commit Message: Oilpan: Ship Oilpan for SyncCallbackHelper, CreateFileResult and CallbackWrapper in filesystem/
These are leftovers when we shipped Oilpan for filesystem/ once.
BUG=340522
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/501263003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180909 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 171,422
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void btm_sec_clr_temp_auth_service (BD_ADDR bda)
{
tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC *p_dev_rec;
if ((p_dev_rec = btm_find_dev (bda)) == NULL)
{
BTM_TRACE_WARNING ("btm_sec_clr_temp_auth_service() - no dev CB");
return;
}
/* Reset the temporary authorized flag so that next time (untrusted) service is accessed autorization will take place */
if (p_dev_rec->last_author_service_id != BTM_SEC_NO_LAST_SERVICE_ID && p_dev_rec->p_cur_service)
{
BTM_TRACE_DEBUG ("btm_sec_clr_auth_service_by_psm [clearing device: %02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x]",
bda[0], bda[1], bda[2], bda[3], bda[4], bda[5]);
p_dev_rec->last_author_service_id = BTM_SEC_NO_LAST_SERVICE_ID;
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Remove Porsche car-kit pairing workaround
Bug: 26551752
Change-Id: I14c5e3fcda0849874c8a94e48aeb7d09585617e1
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 161,427
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BrowserCommandController::TabDetachedAt(TabContents* contents, int index) {
RemoveInterstitialObservers(contents);
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 171,511
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(file)
{
char *filename;
int filename_len;
char *target_buf=NULL, *p, *s, *e;
register int i = 0;
int target_len;
char eol_marker = '\n';
long flags = 0;
zend_bool use_include_path;
zend_bool include_new_line;
zend_bool skip_blank_lines;
php_stream *stream;
zval *zcontext = NULL;
php_stream_context *context = NULL;
/* Parse arguments */
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "p|lr!", &filename, &filename_len, &flags, &zcontext) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (flags < 0 || flags > (PHP_FILE_USE_INCLUDE_PATH | PHP_FILE_IGNORE_NEW_LINES | PHP_FILE_SKIP_EMPTY_LINES | PHP_FILE_NO_DEFAULT_CONTEXT)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "'%ld' flag is not supported", flags);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
use_include_path = flags & PHP_FILE_USE_INCLUDE_PATH;
include_new_line = !(flags & PHP_FILE_IGNORE_NEW_LINES);
skip_blank_lines = flags & PHP_FILE_SKIP_EMPTY_LINES;
context = php_stream_context_from_zval(zcontext, flags & PHP_FILE_NO_DEFAULT_CONTEXT);
stream = php_stream_open_wrapper_ex(filename, "rb", (use_include_path ? USE_PATH : 0) | REPORT_ERRORS, NULL, context);
if (!stream) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
/* Initialize return array */
array_init(return_value);
if ((target_len = php_stream_copy_to_mem(stream, &target_buf, PHP_STREAM_COPY_ALL, 0))) {
s = target_buf;
e = target_buf + target_len;
if (!(p = php_stream_locate_eol(stream, target_buf, target_len TSRMLS_CC))) {
p = e;
goto parse_eol;
}
if (stream->flags & PHP_STREAM_FLAG_EOL_MAC) {
eol_marker = '\r';
}
/* for performance reasons the code is duplicated, so that the if (include_new_line)
* will not need to be done for every single line in the file. */
if (include_new_line) {
do {
p++;
parse_eol:
add_index_stringl(return_value, i++, estrndup(s, p-s), p-s, 0);
s = p;
} while ((p = memchr(p, eol_marker, (e-p))));
} else {
do {
int windows_eol = 0;
if (p != target_buf && eol_marker == '\n' && *(p - 1) == '\r') {
windows_eol++;
}
if (skip_blank_lines && !(p-s-windows_eol)) {
s = ++p;
continue;
}
add_index_stringl(return_value, i++, estrndup(s, p-s-windows_eol), p-s-windows_eol, 0);
s = ++p;
} while ((p = memchr(p, eol_marker, (e-p))));
}
/* handle any left overs of files without new lines */
if (s != e) {
p = e;
goto parse_eol;
}
}
if (target_buf) {
efree(target_buf);
}
php_stream_close(stream);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72114 - int/size_t confusion in fread
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 52,149
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RenderThreadImpl::~RenderThreadImpl() {
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(
RenderProcessObserver, observers_, OnRenderProcessShutdown());
if (web_database_observer_impl_.get())
web_database_observer_impl_->WaitForAllDatabasesToClose();
RemoveFilter(devtools_agent_message_filter_.get());
devtools_agent_message_filter_ = NULL;
RemoveFilter(audio_input_message_filter_.get());
audio_input_message_filter_ = NULL;
RemoveFilter(audio_message_filter_.get());
audio_message_filter_ = NULL;
RemoveFilter(vc_manager_->video_capture_message_filter());
RemoveFilter(db_message_filter_.get());
db_message_filter_ = NULL;
if (file_thread_.get())
file_thread_->Stop();
if (compositor_initialized_) {
WebKit::WebCompositor::shutdown();
compositor_initialized_ = false;
}
if (compositor_thread_.get()) {
RemoveFilter(compositor_thread_->GetMessageFilter());
compositor_thread_.reset();
}
if (webkit_platform_support_.get())
WebKit::shutdown();
lazy_tls.Pointer()->Set(NULL);
#if defined(OS_WIN)
NPChannelBase::CleanupChannels();
#endif
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 107,124
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ZEND_API int _object_init_ex(zval *arg, zend_class_entry *class_type ZEND_FILE_LINE_DC TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
return _object_and_properties_init(arg, class_type, 0 ZEND_FILE_LINE_RELAY_CC TSRMLS_CC);
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 13,714
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int nl80211_valid_4addr(struct cfg80211_registered_device *rdev,
struct net_device *netdev, u8 use_4addr,
enum nl80211_iftype iftype)
{
if (!use_4addr) {
if (netdev && (netdev->priv_flags & IFF_BRIDGE_PORT))
return -EBUSY;
return 0;
}
switch (iftype) {
case NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN:
if (rdev->wiphy.flags & WIPHY_FLAG_4ADDR_AP)
return 0;
break;
case NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION:
if (rdev->wiphy.flags & WIPHY_FLAG_4ADDR_STATION)
return 0;
break;
default:
break;
}
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
Commit Message: nl80211: fix check for valid SSID size in scan operations
In both trigger_scan and sched_scan operations, we were checking for
the SSID length before assigning the value correctly. Since the
memory was just kzalloc'ed, the check was always failing and SSID with
over 32 characters were allowed to go through.
This was causing a buffer overflow when copying the actual SSID to the
proper place.
This bug has been there since 2.6.29-rc4.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Luciano Coelho <coelho@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 26,781
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LargeObjectPage::removeFromHeap() {
static_cast<LargeObjectArena*>(arena())->freeLargeObjectPage(this);
}
Commit Message: Call HeapObjectHeader::checkHeader solely for its side-effect.
This requires changing its signature. This is a preliminary stage to making it
private.
BUG=633030
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2698673003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#460489}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 147,585
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ignorableWhitespaceDebug(void *ctx ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, const xmlChar *ch, int len)
{
char output[40];
int i;
callbacks++;
if (quiet)
return;
for (i = 0;(i<len) && (i < 30);i++)
output[i] = ch[i];
output[i] = 0;
fprintf(SAXdebug, "SAX.ignorableWhitespace(%s, %d)\n", output, len);
}
Commit Message: Fix handling of parameter-entity references
There were two bugs where parameter-entity references could lead to an
unexpected change of the input buffer in xmlParseNameComplex and
xmlDictLookup being called with an invalid pointer.
Percent sign in DTD Names
=========================
The NEXTL macro used to call xmlParserHandlePEReference. When parsing
"complex" names inside the DTD, this could result in entity expansion
which created a new input buffer. The fix is to simply remove the call
to xmlParserHandlePEReference from the NEXTL macro. This is safe because
no users of the macro require expansion of parameter entities.
- xmlParseNameComplex
- xmlParseNCNameComplex
- xmlParseNmtoken
The percent sign is not allowed in names, which are grammatical tokens.
- xmlParseEntityValue
Parameter-entity references in entity values are expanded but this
happens in a separate step in this function.
- xmlParseSystemLiteral
Parameter-entity references are ignored in the system literal.
- xmlParseAttValueComplex
- xmlParseCharDataComplex
- xmlParseCommentComplex
- xmlParsePI
- xmlParseCDSect
Parameter-entity references are ignored outside the DTD.
- xmlLoadEntityContent
This function is only called from xmlStringLenDecodeEntities and
entities are replaced in a separate step immediately after the function
call.
This bug could also be triggered with an internal subset and double
entity expansion.
This fixes bug 766956 initially reported by Wei Lei and independently by
Chromium's ClusterFuzz, Hanno Böck, and Marco Grassi. Thanks to everyone
involved.
xmlParseNameComplex with XML_PARSE_OLD10
========================================
When parsing Names inside an expanded parameter entity with the
XML_PARSE_OLD10 option, xmlParseNameComplex would call xmlGROW via the
GROW macro if the input buffer was exhausted. At the end of the
parameter entity's replacement text, this function would then call
xmlPopInput which invalidated the input buffer.
There should be no need to invoke GROW in this situation because the
buffer is grown periodically every XML_PARSER_CHUNK_SIZE characters and,
at least for UTF-8, in xmlCurrentChar. This also matches the code path
executed when XML_PARSE_OLD10 is not set.
This fixes bugs 781205 (CVE-2017-9049) and 781361 (CVE-2017-9050).
Thanks to Marcel Böhme and Thuan Pham for the report.
Additional hardening
====================
A separate check was added in xmlParseNameComplex to validate the
buffer size.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 59,592
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: TestingProfile* GetProfile() {
return profile_.get();
}
Commit Message: Don't downcast DownloadManagerDelegate to ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate.
DownloadManager has public SetDelegate method and tests and or other subsystems
can install their own implementations of the delegate.
Bug: 805905
Change-Id: Iecf1e0aceada0e1048bed1e2d2ceb29ca64295b8
TBR: tests updated to follow the API change.
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/894702
Reviewed-by: David Vallet <dvallet@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Min Qin <qinmin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533515}
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 154,274
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LayerWebKitThread::setBounds(const IntSize& size)
{
if (m_bounds == size)
return;
bool firstResize = !m_bounds.width() && !m_bounds.height() && size.width() && size.height();
m_bounds = size;
boundsChanged();
if (firstResize)
setNeedsDisplay();
else
setNeedsCommit();
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] GraphicsLayer: rename notifySyncRequired to notifyFlushRequired
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=111997
Patch by Alberto Garcia <agarcia@igalia.com> on 2013-03-11
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
This changed in r130439 but the old name was introduced again by
mistake in r144465.
* platform/graphics/blackberry/GraphicsLayerBlackBerry.h:
(WebCore::GraphicsLayerBlackBerry::notifyFlushRequired):
* platform/graphics/blackberry/LayerWebKitThread.cpp:
(WebCore::LayerWebKitThread::setNeedsCommit):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@145363 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 119,116
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: QuicPacket* ConstructDataPacket(QuicPacketSequenceNumber number,
QuicFecGroupNumber fec_group) {
header_.packet_sequence_number = number;
header_.flags = PACKET_FLAGS_NONE;
header_.fec_group = fec_group;
QuicFrames frames;
QuicFrame frame(&frame1_);
frames.push_back(frame);
QuicPacket* packet;
framer_.ConstructFragementDataPacket(header_, frames, &packet);
return packet;
}
Commit Message: Fix uninitialized access in QuicConnectionHelperTest
BUG=159928
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11360153
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@166708 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 171,410
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int igmp_marksources(struct ip_mc_list *pmc, int nsrcs, __be32 *srcs)
{
struct ip_sf_list *psf;
int i, scount;
if (pmc->sfmode == MCAST_EXCLUDE)
return igmp_xmarksources(pmc, nsrcs, srcs);
/* mark INCLUDE-mode sources */
scount = 0;
for (psf=pmc->sources; psf; psf=psf->sf_next) {
if (scount == nsrcs)
break;
for (i=0; i<nsrcs; i++)
if (srcs[i] == psf->sf_inaddr) {
psf->sf_gsresp = 1;
scount++;
break;
}
}
if (!scount) {
pmc->gsquery = 0;
return 0;
}
pmc->gsquery = 1;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: igmp: Avoid zero delay when receiving odd mixture of IGMP queries
Commit 5b7c84066733c5dfb0e4016d939757b38de189e4 ('ipv4: correct IGMP
behavior on v3 query during v2-compatibility mode') added yet another
case for query parsing, which can result in max_delay = 0. Substitute
a value of 1, as in the usual v3 case.
Reported-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@debian.org>
References: http://bugs.debian.org/654876
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 21,594
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: do_trap_no_signal(struct task_struct *tsk, int trapnr, char *str,
struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
{
if (v8086_mode(regs)) {
/*
* Traps 0, 1, 3, 4, and 5 should be forwarded to vm86.
* On nmi (interrupt 2), do_trap should not be called.
*/
if (trapnr < X86_TRAP_UD) {
if (!handle_vm86_trap((struct kernel_vm86_regs *) regs,
error_code, trapnr))
return 0;
}
return -1;
}
if (!user_mode(regs)) {
if (fixup_exception(regs, trapnr))
return 0;
tsk->thread.error_code = error_code;
tsk->thread.trap_nr = trapnr;
die(str, regs, error_code);
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message: x86/entry/64: Don't use IST entry for #BP stack
There's nothing IST-worthy about #BP/int3. We don't allow kprobes
in the small handful of places in the kernel that run at CPL0 with
an invalid stack, and 32-bit kernels have used normal interrupt
gates for #BP forever.
Furthermore, we don't allow kprobes in places that have usergs while
in kernel mode, so "paranoid" is also unnecessary.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 83,496
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BpMemory::~BpMemory()
{
}
Commit Message: Sanity check IMemory access versus underlying mmap
Bug 26877992
Change-Id: Ibbf4b1061e4675e4e96bc944a865b53eaf6984fe
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 161,498
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AudioOutputDeviceTest::WaitUntilRenderCallback() {
io_loop_.PostDelayedTask(FROM_HERE, MessageLoop::QuitClosure(),
TestTimeouts::action_timeout());
io_loop_.Run();
}
Commit Message: Revert r157378 as it caused WebRTC to dereference null pointers when restarting a call.
I've kept my unit test changes intact but disabled until I get a proper fix.
BUG=147499,150805
TBR=henrika
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/10946040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@157626 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 103,040
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChromePluginServiceFilter::RegisterResourceContext(
PluginPrefs* plugin_prefs,
const void* context) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
resource_context_map_[context] = plugin_prefs;
}
Commit Message: Follow-on fixes and naming changes for https://codereview.chromium.org/12086077/
BUG=172573
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12177018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180600 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-287
| 0
| 116,747
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SendKeyEvent(ui::KeyboardCode key_code) {
SendKeyEvent(key_code, false, false);
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 126,495
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: do_rc_files(Session *s, const char *shell)
{
FILE *f = NULL;
char cmd[1024];
int do_xauth;
struct stat st;
do_xauth =
s->display != NULL && s->auth_proto != NULL && s->auth_data != NULL;
/* ignore _PATH_SSH_USER_RC for subsystems and admin forced commands */
if (!s->is_subsystem && options.adm_forced_command == NULL &&
!no_user_rc && options.permit_user_rc &&
stat(_PATH_SSH_USER_RC, &st) >= 0) {
snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "%s -c '%s %s'",
shell, _PATH_BSHELL, _PATH_SSH_USER_RC);
if (debug_flag)
fprintf(stderr, "Running %s\n", cmd);
f = popen(cmd, "w");
if (f) {
if (do_xauth)
fprintf(f, "%s %s\n", s->auth_proto,
s->auth_data);
pclose(f);
} else
fprintf(stderr, "Could not run %s\n",
_PATH_SSH_USER_RC);
} else if (stat(_PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC, &st) >= 0) {
if (debug_flag)
fprintf(stderr, "Running %s %s\n", _PATH_BSHELL,
_PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC);
f = popen(_PATH_BSHELL " " _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC, "w");
if (f) {
if (do_xauth)
fprintf(f, "%s %s\n", s->auth_proto,
s->auth_data);
pclose(f);
} else
fprintf(stderr, "Could not run %s\n",
_PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC);
} else if (do_xauth && options.xauth_location != NULL) {
/* Add authority data to .Xauthority if appropriate. */
if (debug_flag) {
fprintf(stderr,
"Running %.500s remove %.100s\n",
options.xauth_location, s->auth_display);
fprintf(stderr,
"%.500s add %.100s %.100s %.100s\n",
options.xauth_location, s->auth_display,
s->auth_proto, s->auth_data);
}
snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "%s -q -",
options.xauth_location);
f = popen(cmd, "w");
if (f) {
fprintf(f, "remove %s\n",
s->auth_display);
fprintf(f, "add %s %s %s\n",
s->auth_display, s->auth_proto,
s->auth_data);
pclose(f);
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "Could not run %s\n",
cmd);
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 14,395
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct ctl_table * __net_init ipv6_icmp_sysctl_init(struct net *net)
{
struct ctl_table *table;
table = kmemdup(ipv6_icmp_table_template,
sizeof(ipv6_icmp_table_template),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (table)
table[0].data = &net->ipv6.sysctl.icmpv6_time;
return table;
}
Commit Message: net: handle no dst on skb in icmp6_send
Andrey reported the following while fuzzing the kernel with syzkaller:
kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 3859 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.9.0-rc6+ #429
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
task: ffff8800666d4200 task.stack: ffff880067348000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff833617ec>] [<ffffffff833617ec>]
icmp6_send+0x5fc/0x1e30 net/ipv6/icmp.c:451
RSP: 0018:ffff88006734f2c0 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: ffff8800666d4200 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: 0000000000000018
RBP: ffff88006734f630 R08: ffff880064138418 R09: 0000000000000003
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: 0000000000000005 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffffffff84e7e200 R14: ffff880064138484 R15: ffff8800641383c0
FS: 00007fb3887a07c0(0000) GS:ffff88006cc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000020000000 CR3: 000000006b040000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Stack:
ffff8800666d4200 ffff8800666d49f8 ffff8800666d4200 ffffffff84c02460
ffff8800666d4a1a 1ffff1000ccdaa2f ffff88006734f498 0000000000000046
ffff88006734f440 ffffffff832f4269 ffff880064ba7456 0000000000000000
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff83364ddc>] icmpv6_param_prob+0x2c/0x40 net/ipv6/icmp.c:557
[< inline >] ip6_tlvopt_unknown net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:88
[<ffffffff83394405>] ip6_parse_tlv+0x555/0x670 net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:157
[<ffffffff8339a759>] ipv6_parse_hopopts+0x199/0x460 net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:663
[<ffffffff832ee773>] ipv6_rcv+0xfa3/0x1dc0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:191
...
icmp6_send / icmpv6_send is invoked for both rx and tx paths. In both
cases the dst->dev should be preferred for determining the L3 domain
if the dst has been set on the skb. Fallback to the skb->dev if it has
not. This covers the case reported here where icmp6_send is invoked on
Rx before the route lookup.
Fixes: 5d41ce29e ("net: icmp6_send should use dst dev to determine L3 domain")
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsa@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 47,695
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int unix_dgram_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
size_t len)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(sk);
DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_un *, sunaddr, msg->msg_name);
struct sock *other = NULL;
int namelen = 0; /* fake GCC */
int err;
unsigned int hash;
struct sk_buff *skb;
long timeo;
struct scm_cookie scm;
int max_level;
int data_len = 0;
int sk_locked;
wait_for_unix_gc();
err = scm_send(sock, msg, &scm, false);
if (err < 0)
return err;
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (msg->msg_flags&MSG_OOB)
goto out;
if (msg->msg_namelen) {
err = unix_mkname(sunaddr, msg->msg_namelen, &hash);
if (err < 0)
goto out;
namelen = err;
} else {
sunaddr = NULL;
err = -ENOTCONN;
other = unix_peer_get(sk);
if (!other)
goto out;
}
if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &sock->flags) && !u->addr
&& (err = unix_autobind(sock)) != 0)
goto out;
err = -EMSGSIZE;
if (len > sk->sk_sndbuf - 32)
goto out;
if (len > SKB_MAX_ALLOC) {
data_len = min_t(size_t,
len - SKB_MAX_ALLOC,
MAX_SKB_FRAGS * PAGE_SIZE);
data_len = PAGE_ALIGN(data_len);
BUILD_BUG_ON(SKB_MAX_ALLOC < PAGE_SIZE);
}
skb = sock_alloc_send_pskb(sk, len - data_len, data_len,
msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &err,
PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER);
if (skb == NULL)
goto out;
err = unix_scm_to_skb(&scm, skb, true);
if (err < 0)
goto out_free;
max_level = err + 1;
skb_put(skb, len - data_len);
skb->data_len = data_len;
skb->len = len;
err = skb_copy_datagram_from_iter(skb, 0, &msg->msg_iter, len);
if (err)
goto out_free;
timeo = sock_sndtimeo(sk, msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
restart:
if (!other) {
err = -ECONNRESET;
if (sunaddr == NULL)
goto out_free;
other = unix_find_other(net, sunaddr, namelen, sk->sk_type,
hash, &err);
if (other == NULL)
goto out_free;
}
if (sk_filter(other, skb) < 0) {
/* Toss the packet but do not return any error to the sender */
err = len;
goto out_free;
}
sk_locked = 0;
unix_state_lock(other);
restart_locked:
err = -EPERM;
if (!unix_may_send(sk, other))
goto out_unlock;
if (unlikely(sock_flag(other, SOCK_DEAD))) {
/*
* Check with 1003.1g - what should
* datagram error
*/
unix_state_unlock(other);
sock_put(other);
if (!sk_locked)
unix_state_lock(sk);
err = 0;
if (unix_peer(sk) == other) {
unix_peer(sk) = NULL;
unix_dgram_peer_wake_disconnect_wakeup(sk, other);
unix_state_unlock(sk);
unix_dgram_disconnected(sk, other);
sock_put(other);
err = -ECONNREFUSED;
} else {
unix_state_unlock(sk);
}
other = NULL;
if (err)
goto out_free;
goto restart;
}
err = -EPIPE;
if (other->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN)
goto out_unlock;
if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_SEQPACKET) {
err = security_unix_may_send(sk->sk_socket, other->sk_socket);
if (err)
goto out_unlock;
}
if (unlikely(unix_peer(other) != sk && unix_recvq_full(other))) {
if (timeo) {
timeo = unix_wait_for_peer(other, timeo);
err = sock_intr_errno(timeo);
if (signal_pending(current))
goto out_free;
goto restart;
}
if (!sk_locked) {
unix_state_unlock(other);
unix_state_double_lock(sk, other);
}
if (unix_peer(sk) != other ||
unix_dgram_peer_wake_me(sk, other)) {
err = -EAGAIN;
sk_locked = 1;
goto out_unlock;
}
if (!sk_locked) {
sk_locked = 1;
goto restart_locked;
}
}
if (unlikely(sk_locked))
unix_state_unlock(sk);
if (sock_flag(other, SOCK_RCVTSTAMP))
__net_timestamp(skb);
maybe_add_creds(skb, sock, other);
skb_queue_tail(&other->sk_receive_queue, skb);
if (max_level > unix_sk(other)->recursion_level)
unix_sk(other)->recursion_level = max_level;
unix_state_unlock(other);
other->sk_data_ready(other);
sock_put(other);
scm_destroy(&scm);
return len;
out_unlock:
if (sk_locked)
unix_state_unlock(sk);
unix_state_unlock(other);
out_free:
kfree_skb(skb);
out:
if (other)
sock_put(other);
scm_destroy(&scm);
return err;
}
Commit Message: unix: correctly track in-flight fds in sending process user_struct
The commit referenced in the Fixes tag incorrectly accounted the number
of in-flight fds over a unix domain socket to the original opener
of the file-descriptor. This allows another process to arbitrary
deplete the original file-openers resource limit for the maximum of
open files. Instead the sending processes and its struct cred should
be credited.
To do so, we add a reference counted struct user_struct pointer to the
scm_fp_list and use it to account for the number of inflight unix fds.
Fixes: 712f4aad406bb1 ("unix: properly account for FDs passed over unix sockets")
Reported-by: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Cc: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 54,588
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RunCloseWithAppMenuCallback(Browser* browser) {
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::BindOnce(&CloseWindowCallback, browser));
chrome::ShowAppMenu(browser);
}
Commit Message: If a dialog is shown, drop fullscreen.
BUG=875066, 817809, 792876, 812769, 813815
TEST=included
Change-Id: Ic3d697fa3c4b01f5d7fea77391857177ada660db
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1185208
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <sdy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586418}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 146,079
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cf2_builder_moveTo( CF2_OutlineCallbacks callbacks,
const CF2_CallbackParams params )
{
/* downcast the object pointer */
CF2_Outline outline = (CF2_Outline)callbacks;
CFF_Builder* builder;
(void)params; /* only used in debug mode */
FT_ASSERT( outline && outline->decoder );
FT_ASSERT( params->op == CF2_PathOpMoveTo );
builder = &outline->decoder->builder;
/* note: two successive moves simply close the contour twice */
cff_builder_close_contour( builder );
builder->path_begun = 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 13,076
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void check_mutex_acquired(void)
{
BUG_ON(!mutex_is_locked(&slab_mutex));
}
Commit Message: mm/slab.c: fix SLAB freelist randomization duplicate entries
This patch fixes a bug in the freelist randomization code. When a high
random number is used, the freelist will contain duplicate entries. It
will result in different allocations sharing the same chunk.
It will result in odd behaviours and crashes. It should be uncommon but
it depends on the machines. We saw it happening more often on some
machines (every few hours of running tests).
Fixes: c7ce4f60ac19 ("mm: SLAB freelist randomization")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170103181908.143178-1-thgarnie@google.com
Signed-off-by: John Sperbeck <jsperbeck@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 68,855
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int codeEqualityTerm(
Parse *pParse, /* The parsing context */
WhereTerm *pTerm, /* The term of the WHERE clause to be coded */
WhereLevel *pLevel, /* The level of the FROM clause we are working on */
int iEq, /* Index of the equality term within this level */
int bRev, /* True for reverse-order IN operations */
int iTarget /* Attempt to leave results in this register */
){
Expr *pX = pTerm->pExpr;
Vdbe *v = pParse->pVdbe;
int iReg; /* Register holding results */
assert( pLevel->pWLoop->aLTerm[iEq]==pTerm );
assert( iTarget>0 );
if( pX->op==TK_EQ || pX->op==TK_IS ){
iReg = sqlite3ExprCodeTarget(pParse, pX->pRight, iTarget);
}else if( pX->op==TK_ISNULL ){
iReg = iTarget;
sqlite3VdbeAddOp2(v, OP_Null, 0, iReg);
#ifndef SQLITE_OMIT_SUBQUERY
}else{
int eType = IN_INDEX_NOOP;
int iTab;
struct InLoop *pIn;
WhereLoop *pLoop = pLevel->pWLoop;
int i;
int nEq = 0;
int *aiMap = 0;
if( (pLoop->wsFlags & WHERE_VIRTUALTABLE)==0
&& pLoop->u.btree.pIndex!=0
&& pLoop->u.btree.pIndex->aSortOrder[iEq]
){
testcase( iEq==0 );
testcase( bRev );
bRev = !bRev;
}
assert( pX->op==TK_IN );
iReg = iTarget;
for(i=0; i<iEq; i++){
if( pLoop->aLTerm[i] && pLoop->aLTerm[i]->pExpr==pX ){
disableTerm(pLevel, pTerm);
return iTarget;
}
}
for(i=iEq;i<pLoop->nLTerm; i++){
assert( pLoop->aLTerm[i]!=0 );
if( pLoop->aLTerm[i]->pExpr==pX ) nEq++;
}
iTab = 0;
if( (pX->flags & EP_xIsSelect)==0 || pX->x.pSelect->pEList->nExpr==1 ){
eType = sqlite3FindInIndex(pParse, pX, IN_INDEX_LOOP, 0, 0, &iTab);
}else{
sqlite3 *db = pParse->db;
pX = removeUnindexableInClauseTerms(pParse, iEq, pLoop, pX);
if( !db->mallocFailed ){
aiMap = (int*)sqlite3DbMallocZero(pParse->db, sizeof(int)*nEq);
eType = sqlite3FindInIndex(pParse, pX, IN_INDEX_LOOP, 0, aiMap, &iTab);
pTerm->pExpr->iTable = iTab;
}
sqlite3ExprDelete(db, pX);
pX = pTerm->pExpr;
}
if( eType==IN_INDEX_INDEX_DESC ){
testcase( bRev );
bRev = !bRev;
}
sqlite3VdbeAddOp2(v, bRev ? OP_Last : OP_Rewind, iTab, 0);
VdbeCoverageIf(v, bRev);
VdbeCoverageIf(v, !bRev);
assert( (pLoop->wsFlags & WHERE_MULTI_OR)==0 );
pLoop->wsFlags |= WHERE_IN_ABLE;
if( pLevel->u.in.nIn==0 ){
pLevel->addrNxt = sqlite3VdbeMakeLabel(pParse);
}
i = pLevel->u.in.nIn;
pLevel->u.in.nIn += nEq;
pLevel->u.in.aInLoop =
sqlite3DbReallocOrFree(pParse->db, pLevel->u.in.aInLoop,
sizeof(pLevel->u.in.aInLoop[0])*pLevel->u.in.nIn);
pIn = pLevel->u.in.aInLoop;
if( pIn ){
int iMap = 0; /* Index in aiMap[] */
pIn += i;
for(i=iEq;i<pLoop->nLTerm; i++){
if( pLoop->aLTerm[i]->pExpr==pX ){
int iOut = iReg + i - iEq;
if( eType==IN_INDEX_ROWID ){
pIn->addrInTop = sqlite3VdbeAddOp2(v, OP_Rowid, iTab, iOut);
}else{
int iCol = aiMap ? aiMap[iMap++] : 0;
pIn->addrInTop = sqlite3VdbeAddOp3(v,OP_Column,iTab, iCol, iOut);
}
sqlite3VdbeAddOp1(v, OP_IsNull, iOut); VdbeCoverage(v);
if( i==iEq ){
pIn->iCur = iTab;
pIn->eEndLoopOp = bRev ? OP_Prev : OP_Next;
if( iEq>0 && (pLoop->wsFlags & WHERE_VIRTUALTABLE)==0 ){
pIn->iBase = iReg - i;
pIn->nPrefix = i;
pLoop->wsFlags |= WHERE_IN_EARLYOUT;
}else{
pIn->nPrefix = 0;
}
}else{
pIn->eEndLoopOp = OP_Noop;
}
pIn++;
}
}
}else{
pLevel->u.in.nIn = 0;
}
sqlite3DbFree(pParse->db, aiMap);
#endif
}
disableTerm(pLevel, pTerm);
return iReg;
}
Commit Message: sqlite: backport bugfixes for dbfuzz2
Bug: 952406
Change-Id: Icbec429742048d6674828726c96d8e265c41b595
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1568152
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Darwin Huang <huangdarwin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#651030}
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 151,711
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void IncrementRefCount(const std::string& uuid) {
context_->IncrementBlobRefCount(uuid);
}
Commit Message: [BlobStorage] Fixing potential overflow
Bug: 779314
Change-Id: I74612639d20544e4c12230569c7b88fbe669ec03
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747725
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#512977}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 150,313
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: blink::WebInputEvent::Type GetTouchEventType(const std::string& type) {
if (type == Input::DispatchTouchEvent::TypeEnum::TouchStart)
return blink::WebInputEvent::kTouchStart;
if (type == Input::DispatchTouchEvent::TypeEnum::TouchEnd)
return blink::WebInputEvent::kTouchEnd;
if (type == Input::DispatchTouchEvent::TypeEnum::TouchMove)
return blink::WebInputEvent::kTouchMove;
if (type == Input::DispatchTouchEvent::TypeEnum::TouchCancel)
return blink::WebInputEvent::kTouchCancel;
return blink::WebInputEvent::kUndefined;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 148,467
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void vmx_enable_log_dirty_pt_masked(struct kvm *kvm,
struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot,
gfn_t offset, unsigned long mask)
{
kvm_mmu_clear_dirty_pt_masked(kvm, memslot, offset, mask);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: work around infinite loop in microcode when #AC is delivered
It was found that a guest can DoS a host by triggering an infinite
stream of "alignment check" (#AC) exceptions. This causes the
microcode to enter an infinite loop where the core never receives
another interrupt. The host kernel panics pretty quickly due to the
effects (CVE-2015-5307).
Signed-off-by: Eric Northup <digitaleric@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 42,743
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void RuntimeEnabledOverloadedVoidMethod2Method(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
ExceptionState exception_state(info.GetIsolate(), ExceptionState::kExecutionContext, "TestObject", "runtimeEnabledOverloadedVoidMethod");
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
int32_t long_arg;
long_arg = NativeValueTraits<IDLLong>::NativeValue(info.GetIsolate(), info[0], exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return;
impl->runtimeEnabledOverloadedVoidMethod(long_arg);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 135,130
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cifs_find_tcon(struct cifsSesInfo *ses, const char *unc)
{
struct list_head *tmp;
struct cifsTconInfo *tcon;
spin_lock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock);
list_for_each(tmp, &ses->tcon_list) {
tcon = list_entry(tmp, struct cifsTconInfo, tcon_list);
if (tcon->tidStatus == CifsExiting)
continue;
if (strncmp(tcon->treeName, unc, MAX_TREE_SIZE))
continue;
++tcon->tc_count;
spin_unlock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock);
return tcon;
}
spin_unlock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: cifs: always do is_path_accessible check in cifs_mount
Currently, we skip doing the is_path_accessible check in cifs_mount if
there is no prefixpath. I have a report of at least one server however
that allows a TREE_CONNECT to a share that has a DFS referral at its
root. The reporter in this case was using a UNC that had no prefixpath,
so the is_path_accessible check was not triggered and the box later hit
a BUG() because we were chasing a DFS referral on the root dentry for
the mount.
This patch fixes this by removing the check for a zero-length
prefixpath. That should make the is_path_accessible check be done in
this situation and should allow the client to chase the DFS referral at
mount time instead.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Reported-and-Tested-by: Yogesh Sharma <ysharma@cymer.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 24,482
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gboolean webkit_web_view_can_show_mime_type(WebKitWebView* webView, const gchar* mimeType)
{
g_return_val_if_fail(WEBKIT_IS_WEB_VIEW(webView), FALSE);
Frame* frame = core(webkit_web_view_get_main_frame(webView));
if (FrameLoader* loader = frame->loader())
return loader->canShowMIMEType(String::fromUTF8(mimeType));
else
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message: 2011-06-02 Joone Hur <joone.hur@collabora.co.uk>
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
[GTK] Only load dictionaries if spell check is enabled
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32879
We don't need to call enchant if enable-spell-checking is false.
* webkit/webkitwebview.cpp:
(webkit_web_view_update_settings): Skip loading dictionaries when enable-spell-checking is false.
(webkit_web_view_settings_notify): Ditto.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@87925 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 100,527
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int open_handlers(void)
{
struct dirent **dirent_list;
int num_handlers;
int num_good = 0;
int i;
num_handlers = scandir(handler_path, &dirent_list, is_handler, alphasort);
if (num_handlers == -1)
return -1;
for (i = 0; i < num_handlers; i++) {
char *path;
void *handle;
int (*handler_init)(void);
int ret;
ret = asprintf(&path, "%s/%s", handler_path, dirent_list[i]->d_name);
if (ret == -1) {
tcmu_err("ENOMEM\n");
continue;
}
handle = dlopen(path, RTLD_NOW|RTLD_LOCAL);
if (!handle) {
tcmu_err("Could not open handler at %s: %s\n", path, dlerror());
free(path);
continue;
}
handler_init = dlsym(handle, "handler_init");
if (!handler_init) {
tcmu_err("dlsym failure on %s\n", path);
free(path);
continue;
}
ret = handler_init();
free(path);
if (ret == 0)
num_good++;
}
for (i = 0; i < num_handlers; i++)
free(dirent_list[i]);
free(dirent_list);
return num_good;
}
Commit Message: fixed local DoS when UnregisterHandler was called for a not existing handler
Any user with DBUS access could cause a SEGFAULT in tcmu-runner by
running something like this:
dbus-send --system --print-reply --dest=org.kernel.TCMUService1 /org/kernel/TCMUService1/HandlerManager1 org.kernel.TCMUService1.HandlerManager1.UnregisterHandler string:123
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 59,046
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ACodec::UninitializedState::onSetup(
const sp<AMessage> &msg) {
if (onAllocateComponent(msg)
&& mCodec->mLoadedState->onConfigureComponent(msg)) {
mCodec->mLoadedState->onStart();
}
}
Commit Message: Fix initialization of AAC presentation struct
Otherwise the new size checks trip on this.
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I1f8f01097e3a88ff041b69279a6121be842f1766
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 164,113
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::ScheduleComposite() {
if (is_hidden_ || !is_accelerated_compositing_active_) {
return;
}
if (!repaint_ack_pending_ && !resize_ack_pending_ && !view_being_painted_) {
repaint_start_time_ = TimeTicks::Now();
repaint_ack_pending_ = true;
Send(new ViewMsg_Repaint(routing_id_, current_size_));
}
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 114,697
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DOMHighResTimeStamp PerformanceNavigationTiming::unloadEventStart() const {
bool allow_redirect_details = GetAllowRedirectDetails();
DocumentLoadTiming* timing = GetDocumentLoadTiming();
if (!allow_redirect_details || !timing ||
!timing->HasSameOriginAsPreviousDocument())
return 0;
return Performance::MonotonicTimeToDOMHighResTimeStamp(
TimeOrigin(), timing->UnloadEventStart(),
false /* allow_negative_value */);
}
Commit Message: Fix the |name| of PerformanceNavigationTiming
Previously, the |name| of a PerformanceNavigationTiming entry was the initial
URL (the request URL). After this CL, it is the response URL, so for example
a url of the form 'redirect?location=newLoc' will have 'newLoc' as the |name|.
Bug: 797465
Change-Id: Icab53ad8027d066422562c82bcf0354c264fea40
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/996579
Reviewed-by: Yoav Weiss <yoav@yoav.ws>
Commit-Queue: Nicolás Peña Moreno <npm@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#548773}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 155,558
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gray_cubic_to( const FT_Vector* control1,
const FT_Vector* control2,
const FT_Vector* to,
PWorker worker )
{
gray_render_cubic( RAS_VAR_ control1, control2, to );
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 10,298
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::string GetInputValue(RenderFrameHostImpl* frame) {
std::string result;
EXPECT_TRUE(ExecuteScriptAndExtractString(
frame, "window.domAutomationController.send(input.value);", &result));
return result;
}
Commit Message: Avoid sharing process for blob URLs with null origin.
Previously, when a frame with a unique origin, such as from a data
URL, created a blob URL, the blob URL looked like blob:null/guid and
resulted in a site URL of "blob:" when navigated to. This incorrectly
allowed all such blob URLs to share a process, even if they were
created by different sites.
This CL changes the site URL assigned in such cases to be the full
blob URL, which includes the GUID. This avoids process sharing for
all blob URLs with unique origins.
This fix is conservative in the sense that it would also isolate
different blob URLs created by the same unique origin from each other.
This case isn't expected to be common, so it's unlikely to affect
process count. There's ongoing work to maintain a GUID for unique
origins, so longer-term, we could try using that to track down the
creator and potentially use that GUID in the site URL instead of the
blob URL's GUID, to avoid unnecessary process isolation in scenarios
like this.
Note that as part of this, we discovered a bug where data URLs aren't
able to script blob URLs that they create: https://crbug.com/865254.
This scripting bug should be fixed independently of this CL, and as
far as we can tell, this CL doesn't regress scripting cases like this
further.
Bug: 863623
Change-Id: Ib50407adbba3d5ee0cf6d72d3df7f8d8f24684ee
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1142389
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#576318}
CWE ID: CWE-285
| 0
| 154,554
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool WebContentsImpl::ShouldTransferNavigation(bool is_main_frame_navigation) {
if (!delegate_)
return true;
return delegate_->ShouldTransferNavigation(is_main_frame_navigation);
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 135,893
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ArcVoiceInteractionFrameworkServiceFactory* GetInstance() {
return base::Singleton<ArcVoiceInteractionFrameworkServiceFactory>::get();
}
Commit Message: arc: add test for blocking incognito windows in screenshot
BUG=778852
TEST=ArcVoiceInteractionFrameworkServiceUnittest.
CapturingScreenshotBlocksIncognitoWindows
Change-Id: I0bfa5a486759783d7c8926a309c6b5da9b02dcc6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/914983
Commit-Queue: Muyuan Li <muyuanli@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Luis Hector Chavez <lhchavez@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#536438}
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 152,300
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int rsa_item_verify(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *asn,
X509_ALGOR *sigalg, ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig,
EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
int rv = -1;
int saltlen;
const EVP_MD *mgf1md = NULL, *md = NULL;
RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss;
X509_ALGOR *maskHash;
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx;
/* Sanity check: make sure it is PSS */
if (OBJ_obj2nid(sigalg->algorithm) != NID_rsassaPss) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY, RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
return -1;
}
/* Decode PSS parameters */
pss = rsa_pss_decode(sigalg, &maskHash);
if (pss == NULL) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY, RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_PARAMETERS);
goto err;
}
/* Check mask and lookup mask hash algorithm */
if (pss->maskGenAlgorithm) {
if (OBJ_obj2nid(pss->maskGenAlgorithm->algorithm) != NID_mgf1) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY, RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_MASK_ALGORITHM);
goto err;
}
if (!maskHash) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY, RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_MASK_PARAMETER);
goto err;
}
mgf1md = EVP_get_digestbyobj(maskHash->algorithm);
if (mgf1md == NULL) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_MASK_DIGEST);
goto err;
}
} else
mgf1md = EVP_sha1();
if (pss->hashAlgorithm) {
md = EVP_get_digestbyobj(pss->hashAlgorithm->algorithm);
if (md == NULL) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PSS_DIGEST);
goto err;
}
} else
md = EVP_sha1();
if (pss->saltLength) {
saltlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(pss->saltLength);
/*
* Could perform more salt length sanity checks but the main RSA
* routines will trap other invalid values anyway.
*/
if (saltlen < 0) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY, RSA_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH);
goto err;
}
} else
saltlen = 20;
/*
* low-level routines support only trailer field 0xbc (value 1) and
* PKCS#1 says we should reject any other value anyway.
*/
if (pss->trailerField && ASN1_INTEGER_get(pss->trailerField) != 1) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY, RSA_R_INVALID_TRAILER);
goto err;
}
/* We have all parameters now set up context */
if (!EVP_DigestVerifyInit(ctx, &pkctx, md, NULL, pkey))
goto err;
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pkctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0)
goto err;
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pkctx, saltlen) <= 0)
goto err;
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md(pkctx, mgf1md) <= 0)
goto err;
/* Carry on */
rv = 2;
err:
RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(pss);
if (maskHash)
X509_ALGOR_free(maskHash);
return rv;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 3,615
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int cma_check_linklocal(struct rdma_dev_addr *dev_addr,
struct sockaddr *addr)
{
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6;
if (addr->sa_family != AF_INET6)
return 0;
sin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) addr;
if (!(ipv6_addr_type(&sin6->sin6_addr) & IPV6_ADDR_LINKLOCAL))
return 0;
if (!sin6->sin6_scope_id)
return -EINVAL;
dev_addr->bound_dev_if = sin6->sin6_scope_id;
#endif
return 0;
}
Commit Message: IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <monis@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 38,462
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void pirlvl_destroy(jpc_pirlvl_t *rlvl)
{
if (rlvl->prclyrnos) {
jas_free(rlvl->prclyrnos);
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed an integer overflow problem in the JPC codec that later resulted
in the use of uninitialized data.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 70,368
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void js_replace(js_State* J, int idx)
{
idx = idx < 0 ? TOP + idx : BOT + idx;
if (idx < BOT || idx >= TOP)
js_error(J, "stack error!");
STACK[idx] = STACK[--TOP];
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 13,474
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: v8::Local<v8::Object> Document::wrap(v8::Isolate* isolate, v8::Local<v8::Object> creationContext)
{
RefPtrWillBeRawPtr<Document> protect(this);
ASSERT(!DOMDataStore::containsWrapper(this, isolate));
const WrapperTypeInfo* wrapperType = wrapperTypeInfo();
if (frame() && frame()->script().initializeMainWorld()) {
v8::Local<v8::Object> wrapper = DOMDataStore::getWrapper(this, isolate);
if (!wrapper.IsEmpty())
return wrapper;
}
v8::Local<v8::Object> wrapper = V8DOMWrapper::createWrapper(isolate, creationContext, wrapperType, this);
if (UNLIKELY(wrapper.IsEmpty()))
return wrapper;
wrapperType->installConditionallyEnabledProperties(wrapper, isolate);
return associateWithWrapper(isolate, wrapperType, wrapper);
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 124,576
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderViewHostImpl::OnUpdateState(int32 page_id,
const std::string& state) {
delegate_->UpdateState(this, page_id, state);
}
Commit Message: Filter more incoming URLs in the CreateWindow path.
BUG=170532
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12036002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@178728 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 117,282
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void h2_session_ev_stream_ready(h2_session *session, int arg, const char *msg)
{
switch (session->state) {
case H2_SESSION_ST_WAIT:
transit(session, "stream ready", H2_SESSION_ST_BUSY);
break;
default:
/* nop */
break;
}
}
Commit Message: SECURITY: CVE-2016-8740
mod_http2: properly crafted, endless HTTP/2 CONTINUATION frames could be used to exhaust all server's memory.
Reported by: Naveen Tiwari <naveen.tiwari@asu.edu> and CDF/SEFCOM at Arizona State University
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1772576 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 48,652
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: read_colormap(bmp_source_ptr sinfo, int cmaplen, int mapentrysize)
/* Read the colormap from a BMP file */
{
int i, gray = 1;
switch (mapentrysize) {
case 3:
/* BGR format (occurs in OS/2 files) */
for (i = 0; i < cmaplen; i++) {
sinfo->colormap[2][i] = (JSAMPLE)read_byte(sinfo);
sinfo->colormap[1][i] = (JSAMPLE)read_byte(sinfo);
sinfo->colormap[0][i] = (JSAMPLE)read_byte(sinfo);
if (sinfo->colormap[2][i] != sinfo->colormap[1][i] ||
sinfo->colormap[1][i] != sinfo->colormap[0][i])
gray = 0;
}
break;
case 4:
/* BGR0 format (occurs in MS Windows files) */
for (i = 0; i < cmaplen; i++) {
sinfo->colormap[2][i] = (JSAMPLE)read_byte(sinfo);
sinfo->colormap[1][i] = (JSAMPLE)read_byte(sinfo);
sinfo->colormap[0][i] = (JSAMPLE)read_byte(sinfo);
(void)read_byte(sinfo);
if (sinfo->colormap[2][i] != sinfo->colormap[1][i] ||
sinfo->colormap[1][i] != sinfo->colormap[0][i])
gray = 0;
}
break;
default:
ERREXIT(sinfo->cinfo, JERR_BMP_BADCMAP);
break;
}
if (sinfo->cinfo->in_color_space == JCS_UNKNOWN && gray)
sinfo->cinfo->in_color_space = JCS_GRAYSCALE;
if (sinfo->cinfo->in_color_space == JCS_GRAYSCALE && !gray)
ERREXIT(sinfo->cinfo, JERR_BAD_IN_COLORSPACE);
}
Commit Message: tjLoadImage(): Fix FPE triggered by malformed BMP
In rdbmp.c, it is necessary to guard against 32-bit overflow/wraparound
when allocating the row buffer, because since BMP files have 32-bit
width and height fields, the value of biWidth can be up to 4294967295.
Specifically, if biWidth is 1073741824 and cinfo->input_components = 4,
then the samplesperrow argument in alloc_sarray() would wrap around to
0, and a division by zero error would occur at line 458 in jmemmgr.c.
If biWidth is set to a higher value, then samplesperrow would wrap
around to a small number, which would likely cause a buffer overflow
(this has not been tested or verified.)
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 84,769
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: http_PutStatus(struct http *to, uint16_t status)
{
assert(status >= 100 && status <= 999);
to->status = status;
}
Commit Message: Check for duplicate Content-Length headers in requests
If a duplicate CL header is in the request, we fail the request with a
400 (Bad Request)
Fix a test case that was sending duplicate CL by misstake and would
not fail because of that.
CWE ID:
| 0
| 56,431
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FPSObserver::FPSObserver(
AutomationProvider* automation,
IPC::Message* reply_message,
base::ProcessId renderer_id,
int routing_id)
: automation_(automation->AsWeakPtr()),
reply_message_(reply_message),
renderer_id_(renderer_id),
routing_id_(routing_id) {
registrar_.Add(
this,
chrome::NOTIFICATION_RENDERER_FPS_COMPUTED,
content::NotificationService::AllSources());
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 117,527
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct fib_nh_exception *fnhe_oldest(struct fnhe_hash_bucket *hash)
{
struct fib_nh_exception *fnhe, *oldest;
oldest = rcu_dereference(hash->chain);
for (fnhe = rcu_dereference(oldest->fnhe_next); fnhe;
fnhe = rcu_dereference(fnhe->fnhe_next)) {
if (time_before(fnhe->fnhe_stamp, oldest->fnhe_stamp))
oldest = fnhe;
}
fnhe_flush_routes(oldest);
return oldest;
}
Commit Message: ipv4: try to cache dst_entries which would cause a redirect
Not caching dst_entries which cause redirects could be exploited by hosts
on the same subnet, causing a severe DoS attack. This effect aggravated
since commit f88649721268999 ("ipv4: fix dst race in sk_dst_get()").
Lookups causing redirects will be allocated with DST_NOCACHE set which
will force dst_release to free them via RCU. Unfortunately waiting for
RCU grace period just takes too long, we can end up with >1M dst_entries
waiting to be released and the system will run OOM. rcuos threads cannot
catch up under high softirq load.
Attaching the flag to emit a redirect later on to the specific skb allows
us to cache those dst_entries thus reducing the pressure on allocation
and deallocation.
This issue was discovered by Marcelo Leitner.
Cc: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-17
| 0
| 44,317
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void toggle_fpga_eeprom_bus(bool cpu_own)
{
qrio_gpio_direction_output(GPIO_A, PROM_SEL_L, !cpu_own);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch '2020-01-22-master-imports'
- Re-add U8500 platform support
- Add bcm968360bg support
- Assorted Keymile fixes
- Other assorted bugfixes
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 1
| 169,634
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: XRenderHasDepths (Display *dpy)
{
int s;
for (s = 0; s < ScreenCount (dpy); s++)
{
CARD32 depths = 0;
CARD32 missing;
Screen *scr = ScreenOfDisplay (dpy, s);
int d;
for (d = 0; d < scr->ndepths; d++)
depths |= DEPTH_MASK(scr->depths[d].depth);
missing = ~depths & REQUIRED_DEPTHS;
if (missing)
{
DepthCheckRec dc, **dp;
XErrorHandler previousHandler;
/*
* Ok, this is ugly. It should be sufficient at this
* point to just return False, but Xinerama is broken at
* this point and only advertises depths which have an
* associated visual. Of course, the other depths still
* work, but the only way to find out is to try them.
*/
dc.dpy = dpy;
dc.missing = 0;
dc.serial = XNextRequest (dpy);
_XLockMutex(_Xglobal_lock);
dc.next = depthChecks;
depthChecks = &dc;
_XUnlockMutex (_Xglobal_lock);
/*
* I suspect this is not really thread safe, but Xlib doesn't
* provide a lot of options here
*/
previousHandler = XSetErrorHandler (XRenderDepthCheckErrorHandler);
/*
* Try each missing depth and see if pixmap creation succeeds
*/
for (d = 1; d <= 32; d++)
/* don't check depth 1 == Xcursor recurses... */
if ((missing & DEPTH_MASK(d)) && d != 1)
{
Pixmap p;
p = XCreatePixmap (dpy, RootWindow (dpy, s), 1, 1, d);
XFreePixmap (dpy, p);
}
XSync (dpy, False);
XSetErrorHandler (previousHandler);
/*
* Unhook from the list of depth check records
*/
_XLockMutex(_Xglobal_lock);
for (dp = &depthChecks; *dp; dp = &(*dp)->next)
{
if (*dp == &dc)
{
*dp = dc.next;
break;
}
}
_XUnlockMutex (_Xglobal_lock);
if (dc.missing)
return False;
}
}
return True;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 8,278
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int mpeg4_get_block_length(MpegEncContext *s,
int16_t *block, int n,
int intra_dc, uint8_t *scan_table)
{
int i, last_non_zero;
uint8_t *len_tab;
const int last_index = s->block_last_index[n];
int len = 0;
if (s->mb_intra) { // Note gcc (3.2.1 at least) will optimize this away
/* MPEG-4 based DC predictor */
len += mpeg4_get_dc_length(intra_dc, n);
if (last_index < 1)
return len;
i = 1;
len_tab = uni_mpeg4_intra_rl_len;
} else {
if (last_index < 0)
return 0;
i = 0;
len_tab = uni_mpeg4_inter_rl_len;
}
/* AC coefs */
last_non_zero = i - 1;
for (; i < last_index; i++) {
int level = block[scan_table[i]];
if (level) {
int run = i - last_non_zero - 1;
level += 64;
if ((level & (~127)) == 0) {
const int index = UNI_MPEG4_ENC_INDEX(0, run, level);
len += len_tab[index];
} else { // ESC3
len += 7 + 2 + 1 + 6 + 1 + 12 + 1;
}
last_non_zero = i;
}
}
/* if (i <= last_index) */ {
int level = block[scan_table[i]];
int run = i - last_non_zero - 1;
level += 64;
if ((level & (~127)) == 0) {
const int index = UNI_MPEG4_ENC_INDEX(1, run, level);
len += len_tab[index];
} else { // ESC3
len += 7 + 2 + 1 + 6 + 1 + 12 + 1;
}
}
return len;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/mpeg4videoenc: Use 64 bit for times in mpeg4_encode_gop_header()
Fixes truncation
Fixes Assertion n <= 31 && value < (1U << n) failed at libavcodec/put_bits.h:169
Fixes: ffmpeg_crash_2.avi
Found-by: Thuan Pham <thuanpv@comp.nus.edu.sg>, Marcel Böhme, Andrew Santosa and Alexandru RazvanCaciulescu with AFLSmart
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 81,776
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static irqreturn_t irq_handler(int intno, void *dev_id)
{
int irq_bit;
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&irqbits_lock, flags);
irq_bit = 1 << intno;
if ((irqbits & irq_bit) || !vm86_irqs[intno].tsk)
goto out;
irqbits |= irq_bit;
if (vm86_irqs[intno].sig)
send_sig(vm86_irqs[intno].sig, vm86_irqs[intno].tsk, 1);
/*
* IRQ will be re-enabled when user asks for the irq (whether
* polling or as a result of the signal)
*/
disable_irq_nosync(intno);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&irqbits_lock, flags);
return IRQ_HANDLED;
out:
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&irqbits_lock, flags);
return IRQ_NONE;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 20,965
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int no_givdecrypt(struct skcipher_givcrypt_request *req)
{
return -ENOSYS;
}
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 31,202
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline struct task_struct *task_of(struct sched_entity *se)
{
return container_of(se, struct task_struct, se);
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 92,720
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: list_del_event(struct perf_event *event, struct perf_event_context *ctx)
{
struct perf_cpu_context *cpuctx;
/*
* We can have double detach due to exit/hot-unplug + close.
*/
if (!(event->attach_state & PERF_ATTACH_CONTEXT))
return;
event->attach_state &= ~PERF_ATTACH_CONTEXT;
if (is_cgroup_event(event)) {
ctx->nr_cgroups--;
cpuctx = __get_cpu_context(ctx);
/*
* if there are no more cgroup events
* then cler cgrp to avoid stale pointer
* in update_cgrp_time_from_cpuctx()
*/
if (!ctx->nr_cgroups)
cpuctx->cgrp = NULL;
}
if (has_branch_stack(event))
ctx->nr_branch_stack--;
ctx->nr_events--;
if (event->attr.inherit_stat)
ctx->nr_stat--;
list_del_rcu(&event->event_entry);
if (event->group_leader == event)
list_del_init(&event->group_entry);
update_group_times(event);
/*
* If event was in error state, then keep it
* that way, otherwise bogus counts will be
* returned on read(). The only way to get out
* of error state is by explicit re-enabling
* of the event
*/
if (event->state > PERF_EVENT_STATE_OFF)
event->state = PERF_EVENT_STATE_OFF;
}
Commit Message: perf: Treat attr.config as u64 in perf_swevent_init()
Trinity discovered that we fail to check all 64 bits of
attr.config passed by user space, resulting to out-of-bounds
access of the perf_swevent_enabled array in
sw_perf_event_destroy().
Introduced in commit b0a873ebb ("perf: Register PMU
implementations").
Signed-off-by: Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: davej@redhat.com
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@ghostprotocols.net>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365882554-30259-1-git-send-email-tt.rantala@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 31,917
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t MediaPlayer::setDataSource(const sp<IStreamSource> &source)
{
ALOGV("setDataSource");
status_t err = UNKNOWN_ERROR;
const sp<IMediaPlayerService>& service(getMediaPlayerService());
if (service != 0) {
sp<IMediaPlayer> player(service->create(this, mAudioSessionId));
if ((NO_ERROR != doSetRetransmitEndpoint(player)) ||
(NO_ERROR != player->setDataSource(source))) {
player.clear();
}
err = attachNewPlayer(player);
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: Don't use sp<>&
because they may end up pointing to NULL after a NULL check was performed.
Bug: 28166152
Change-Id: Iab2ea30395b620628cc6f3d067dd4f6fcda824fe
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 1
| 173,539
|
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