instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Sample::Sample(int sampleID, const char* url)
{
init();
mSampleID = sampleID;
mUrl = strdup(url);
ALOGV("create sampleID=%d, url=%s", mSampleID, mUrl);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE SoundPool: add lock for findSample access from SoundPoolThread
Sample decoding still occurs in SoundPoolThread
without holding the SoundPool lock.
Bug: 25781119
Change-Id: I11fde005aa9cf5438e0390a0d2dfe0ec1dd282e8
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 161,885
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void get_fat(FAT_ENTRY * entry, void *fat, uint32_t cluster, DOS_FS * fs)
{
unsigned char *ptr;
switch (fs->fat_bits) {
case 12:
ptr = &((unsigned char *)fat)[cluster * 3 / 2];
entry->value = 0xfff & (cluster & 1 ? (ptr[0] >> 4) | (ptr[1] << 4) :
(ptr[0] | ptr[1] << 8));
break;
case 16:
entry->value = le16toh(((unsigned short *)fat)[cluster]);
break;
case 32:
/* According to M$, the high 4 bits of a FAT32 entry are reserved and
* are not part of the cluster number. So we cut them off. */
{
uint32_t e = le32toh(((unsigned int *)fat)[cluster]);
entry->value = e & 0xfffffff;
entry->reserved = e >> 28;
}
break;
default:
die("Bad FAT entry size: %d bits.", fs->fat_bits);
}
}
Commit Message: set_fat(): Fix off-by-2 error leading to corruption in FAT12
In FAT12 two 12 bit entries are combined to a 24 bit value (three
bytes). Therefore, when an even numbered FAT entry is set in FAT12, it
must be be combined with the following entry. To prevent accessing
beyond the end of the FAT array, it must be checked that the cluster is
not the last one.
Previously, the check tested that the requested cluster was equal to
fs->clusters - 1. However, fs->clusters is the number of data clusters
not including the two reserved FAT entries at the start so the test
triggered two clusters early.
If the third to last entry was written on a FAT12 filesystem with an
odd number of clusters, the second to last entry would be corrupted.
This corruption may also lead to invalid memory accesses when the
corrupted entry becomes out of bounds and is used later.
Change the test to fs->clusters + 1 to fix.
Reported-by: Hanno Böck
Signed-off-by: Andreas Bombe <aeb@debian.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 56,362
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LayoutBlockFlow::invalidatePaintForOverhangingFloats(bool paintAllDescendants)
{
if (!hasOverhangingFloats())
return;
const FloatingObjectSet& floatingObjectSet = m_floatingObjects->set();
FloatingObjectSetIterator end = floatingObjectSet.end();
for (FloatingObjectSetIterator it = floatingObjectSet.begin(); it != end; ++it) {
const FloatingObject& floatingObject = *it->get();
if (logicalBottomForFloat(floatingObject) > logicalHeight()
&& !floatingObject.layoutObject()->hasSelfPaintingLayer()
&& (floatingObject.isDirectlyContained() || (paintAllDescendants && floatingObject.isDescendant()))) {
LayoutBox* floatingLayoutBox = floatingObject.layoutObject();
floatingLayoutBox->setShouldDoFullPaintInvalidation();
floatingLayoutBox->invalidatePaintForOverhangingFloats(false);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Consistently check if a block can handle pagination strut propagation.
https://codereview.chromium.org/1360753002 got it right for inline child
layout, but did nothing for block child layout.
BUG=329421
R=jchaffraix@chromium.org,leviw@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1387553002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#352429}
CWE ID: CWE-22
| 0
| 122,999
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte(struct mm_struct *dst_mm,
pte_t *dst_pte,
struct vm_area_struct *dst_vma,
unsigned long dst_addr,
unsigned long src_addr,
struct page **pagep)
{
int vm_shared = dst_vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED;
struct hstate *h = hstate_vma(dst_vma);
pte_t _dst_pte;
spinlock_t *ptl;
int ret;
struct page *page;
if (!*pagep) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
page = alloc_huge_page(dst_vma, dst_addr, 0);
if (IS_ERR(page))
goto out;
ret = copy_huge_page_from_user(page,
(const void __user *) src_addr,
pages_per_huge_page(h), false);
/* fallback to copy_from_user outside mmap_sem */
if (unlikely(ret)) {
ret = -EFAULT;
*pagep = page;
/* don't free the page */
goto out;
}
} else {
page = *pagep;
*pagep = NULL;
}
/*
* The memory barrier inside __SetPageUptodate makes sure that
* preceding stores to the page contents become visible before
* the set_pte_at() write.
*/
__SetPageUptodate(page);
set_page_huge_active(page);
/*
* If shared, add to page cache
*/
if (vm_shared) {
struct address_space *mapping = dst_vma->vm_file->f_mapping;
pgoff_t idx = vma_hugecache_offset(h, dst_vma, dst_addr);
ret = huge_add_to_page_cache(page, mapping, idx);
if (ret)
goto out_release_nounlock;
}
ptl = huge_pte_lockptr(h, dst_mm, dst_pte);
spin_lock(ptl);
ret = -EEXIST;
if (!huge_pte_none(huge_ptep_get(dst_pte)))
goto out_release_unlock;
if (vm_shared) {
page_dup_rmap(page, true);
} else {
ClearPagePrivate(page);
hugepage_add_new_anon_rmap(page, dst_vma, dst_addr);
}
_dst_pte = make_huge_pte(dst_vma, page, dst_vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE);
if (dst_vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)
_dst_pte = huge_pte_mkdirty(_dst_pte);
_dst_pte = pte_mkyoung(_dst_pte);
set_huge_pte_at(dst_mm, dst_addr, dst_pte, _dst_pte);
(void)huge_ptep_set_access_flags(dst_vma, dst_addr, dst_pte, _dst_pte,
dst_vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE);
hugetlb_count_add(pages_per_huge_page(h), dst_mm);
/* No need to invalidate - it was non-present before */
update_mmu_cache(dst_vma, dst_addr, dst_pte);
spin_unlock(ptl);
if (vm_shared)
unlock_page(page);
ret = 0;
out:
return ret;
out_release_unlock:
spin_unlock(ptl);
out_release_nounlock:
if (vm_shared)
unlock_page(page);
put_page(page);
goto out;
}
Commit Message: userfaultfd: hugetlbfs: remove superfluous page unlock in VM_SHARED case
huge_add_to_page_cache->add_to_page_cache implicitly unlocks the page
before returning in case of errors.
The error returned was -EEXIST by running UFFDIO_COPY on a non-hole
offset of a VM_SHARED hugetlbfs mapping. It was an userland bug that
triggered it and the kernel must cope with it returning -EEXIST from
ioctl(UFFDIO_COPY) as expected.
page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!PageLocked(page))
kernel BUG at mm/filemap.c:964!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
CPU: 1 PID: 22582 Comm: qemu-system-x86 Not tainted 4.11.11-300.fc26.x86_64 #1
RIP: unlock_page+0x4a/0x50
Call Trace:
hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte+0xc0/0x320
mcopy_atomic+0x96f/0xbe0
userfaultfd_ioctl+0x218/0xe90
do_vfs_ioctl+0xa5/0x600
SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1a/0xa9
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170802165145.22628-2-aarcange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Maxime Coquelin <maxime.coquelin@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Alexey Perevalov <a.perevalov@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 1
| 169,429
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: handleURI(const char *str, const char *base, FILE *o) {
int ret;
xmlURIPtr uri;
xmlChar *res = NULL;
uri = xmlCreateURI();
if (base == NULL) {
ret = xmlParseURIReference(uri, str);
if (ret != 0)
fprintf(o, "%s : error %d\n", str, ret);
else {
xmlNormalizeURIPath(uri->path);
xmlPrintURI(o, uri);
fprintf(o, "\n");
}
} else {
res = xmlBuildURI((xmlChar *)str, (xmlChar *) base);
if (res != NULL) {
fprintf(o, "%s\n", (char *) res);
}
else
fprintf(o, "::ERROR::\n");
}
if (res != NULL)
xmlFree(res);
xmlFreeURI(uri);
}
Commit Message: Fix handling of parameter-entity references
There were two bugs where parameter-entity references could lead to an
unexpected change of the input buffer in xmlParseNameComplex and
xmlDictLookup being called with an invalid pointer.
Percent sign in DTD Names
=========================
The NEXTL macro used to call xmlParserHandlePEReference. When parsing
"complex" names inside the DTD, this could result in entity expansion
which created a new input buffer. The fix is to simply remove the call
to xmlParserHandlePEReference from the NEXTL macro. This is safe because
no users of the macro require expansion of parameter entities.
- xmlParseNameComplex
- xmlParseNCNameComplex
- xmlParseNmtoken
The percent sign is not allowed in names, which are grammatical tokens.
- xmlParseEntityValue
Parameter-entity references in entity values are expanded but this
happens in a separate step in this function.
- xmlParseSystemLiteral
Parameter-entity references are ignored in the system literal.
- xmlParseAttValueComplex
- xmlParseCharDataComplex
- xmlParseCommentComplex
- xmlParsePI
- xmlParseCDSect
Parameter-entity references are ignored outside the DTD.
- xmlLoadEntityContent
This function is only called from xmlStringLenDecodeEntities and
entities are replaced in a separate step immediately after the function
call.
This bug could also be triggered with an internal subset and double
entity expansion.
This fixes bug 766956 initially reported by Wei Lei and independently by
Chromium's ClusterFuzz, Hanno Böck, and Marco Grassi. Thanks to everyone
involved.
xmlParseNameComplex with XML_PARSE_OLD10
========================================
When parsing Names inside an expanded parameter entity with the
XML_PARSE_OLD10 option, xmlParseNameComplex would call xmlGROW via the
GROW macro if the input buffer was exhausted. At the end of the
parameter entity's replacement text, this function would then call
xmlPopInput which invalidated the input buffer.
There should be no need to invoke GROW in this situation because the
buffer is grown periodically every XML_PARSER_CHUNK_SIZE characters and,
at least for UTF-8, in xmlCurrentChar. This also matches the code path
executed when XML_PARSE_OLD10 is not set.
This fixes bugs 781205 (CVE-2017-9049) and 781361 (CVE-2017-9050).
Thanks to Marcel Böhme and Thuan Pham for the report.
Additional hardening
====================
A separate check was added in xmlParseNameComplex to validate the
buffer size.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 59,586
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const char *page_follow_link_light(struct dentry *dentry, void **cookie)
{
struct page *page = NULL;
char *res = page_getlink(dentry, &page);
if (!IS_ERR(res))
*cookie = page;
return res;
}
Commit Message: vfs: Test for and handle paths that are unreachable from their mnt_root
In rare cases a directory can be renamed out from under a bind mount.
In those cases without special handling it becomes possible to walk up
the directory tree to the root dentry of the filesystem and down
from the root dentry to every other file or directory on the filesystem.
Like division by zero .. from an unconnected path can not be given
a useful semantic as there is no predicting at which path component
the code will realize it is unconnected. We certainly can not match
the current behavior as the current behavior is a security hole.
Therefore when encounting .. when following an unconnected path
return -ENOENT.
- Add a function path_connected to verify path->dentry is reachable
from path->mnt.mnt_root. AKA to validate that rename did not do
something nasty to the bind mount.
To avoid races path_connected must be called after following a path
component to it's next path component.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 43,673
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void hns_nic_service_task(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct hns_nic_priv *priv
= container_of(work, struct hns_nic_priv, service_task);
struct hnae_handle *h = priv->ae_handle;
hns_nic_update_link_status(priv->netdev);
h->dev->ops->update_led_status(h);
hns_nic_update_stats(priv->netdev);
hns_nic_reset_subtask(priv);
hns_nic_service_event_complete(priv);
}
Commit Message: net: hns: Fix a skb used after free bug
skb maybe freed in hns_nic_net_xmit_hw() and return NETDEV_TX_OK,
which cause hns_nic_net_xmit to use a freed skb.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hns_nic_net_xmit_hw+0x62c/0x940...
[17659.112635] alloc_debug_processing+0x18c/0x1a0
[17659.117208] __slab_alloc+0x52c/0x560
[17659.120909] kmem_cache_alloc_node+0xac/0x2c0
[17659.125309] __alloc_skb+0x6c/0x260
[17659.128837] tcp_send_ack+0x8c/0x280
[17659.132449] __tcp_ack_snd_check+0x9c/0xf0
[17659.136587] tcp_rcv_established+0x5a4/0xa70
[17659.140899] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x27c/0x620
[17659.144687] tcp_prequeue_process+0x108/0x170
[17659.149085] tcp_recvmsg+0x940/0x1020
[17659.152787] inet_recvmsg+0x124/0x180
[17659.156488] sock_recvmsg+0x64/0x80
[17659.160012] SyS_recvfrom+0xd8/0x180
[17659.163626] __sys_trace_return+0x0/0x4
[17659.167506] INFO: Freed in kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0 age=23 cpu=1 pid=13
[17659.174000] free_debug_processing+0x1d4/0x2c0
[17659.178486] __slab_free+0x240/0x390
[17659.182100] kmem_cache_free+0x24c/0x270
[17659.186062] kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0
[17659.189587] __kfree_skb+0x28/0x40
[17659.193025] napi_gro_receive+0x168/0x1c0
[17659.197074] hns_nic_rx_up_pro+0x58/0x90
[17659.201038] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x518/0xbc0
[17659.205352] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17659.209576] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17659.213363] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17659.217062] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17659.220679] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17659.224821] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17659.228084] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hns_nic_net_xmit+0x8c/0xc0...
[17751.080490] __slab_alloc+0x52c/0x560
[17751.084188] kmem_cache_alloc+0x244/0x280
[17751.088238] __build_skb+0x40/0x150
[17751.091764] build_skb+0x28/0x100
[17751.095115] __alloc_rx_skb+0x94/0x150
[17751.098900] __napi_alloc_skb+0x34/0x90
[17751.102776] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x180/0xbc0
[17751.107097] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17751.111333] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17751.115123] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17751.118823] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17751.122437] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17751.126575] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17751.129838] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
[17751.133454] INFO: Freed in kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0 age=19 cpu=7 pid=43
[17751.139951] free_debug_processing+0x1d4/0x2c0
[17751.144436] __slab_free+0x240/0x390
[17751.148051] kmem_cache_free+0x24c/0x270
[17751.152014] kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0
[17751.155543] __kfree_skb+0x28/0x40
[17751.159022] napi_gro_receive+0x168/0x1c0
[17751.163074] hns_nic_rx_up_pro+0x58/0x90
[17751.167041] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x518/0xbc0
[17751.171358] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17751.175585] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17751.179373] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17751.183076] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17751.186691] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17751.190826] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17751.194093] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
Fixes: 13ac695e7ea1 ("net:hns: Add support of Hip06 SoC to the Hislicon Network Subsystem")
Signed-off-by: Yunsheng Lin <linyunsheng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: lipeng <lipeng321@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Jun He <hjat2005@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 85,717
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ofputil_port_stats_to_ofp11(const struct ofputil_port_stats *ops,
struct ofp11_port_stats *ps11)
{
ps11->port_no = ofputil_port_to_ofp11(ops->port_no);
memset(ps11->pad, 0, sizeof ps11->pad);
ps11->rx_packets = htonll(ops->stats.rx_packets);
ps11->tx_packets = htonll(ops->stats.tx_packets);
ps11->rx_bytes = htonll(ops->stats.rx_bytes);
ps11->tx_bytes = htonll(ops->stats.tx_bytes);
ps11->rx_dropped = htonll(ops->stats.rx_dropped);
ps11->tx_dropped = htonll(ops->stats.tx_dropped);
ps11->rx_errors = htonll(ops->stats.rx_errors);
ps11->tx_errors = htonll(ops->stats.tx_errors);
ps11->rx_frame_err = htonll(ops->stats.rx_frame_errors);
ps11->rx_over_err = htonll(ops->stats.rx_over_errors);
ps11->rx_crc_err = htonll(ops->stats.rx_crc_errors);
ps11->collisions = htonll(ops->stats.collisions);
}
Commit Message: ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <pkusunyifeng@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 77,654
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool CommandBufferProxyImpl::OnMessageReceived(const IPC::Message& message) {
base::Optional<base::AutoLock> lock;
if (lock_)
lock.emplace(*lock_);
bool handled = true;
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP(CommandBufferProxyImpl, message)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(GpuCommandBufferMsg_Destroyed, OnDestroyed);
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(GpuCommandBufferMsg_ConsoleMsg, OnConsoleMessage);
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(GpuCommandBufferMsg_SignalAck, OnSignalAck);
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(GpuCommandBufferMsg_SwapBuffersCompleted,
OnSwapBuffersCompleted);
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(GpuCommandBufferMsg_UpdateVSyncParameters,
OnUpdateVSyncParameters);
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(GpuCommandBufferMsg_BufferPresented, OnBufferPresented);
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(GpuCommandBufferMsg_GetGpuFenceHandleComplete,
OnGetGpuFenceHandleComplete);
IPC_MESSAGE_UNHANDLED(handled = false)
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP()
if (!handled) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Gpu process sent invalid message.";
base::AutoLock last_state_lock(last_state_lock_);
OnGpuAsyncMessageError(gpu::error::kInvalidGpuMessage,
gpu::error::kLostContext);
}
return handled;
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 149,465
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderProcessHostImpl::CreateStoragePartitionService(
mojom::StoragePartitionServiceRequest request) {
if (!base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kDisableMojoLocalStorage)) {
if (g_create_storage_partition) {
g_create_storage_partition(this, std::move(request));
return;
}
storage_partition_impl_->Bind(id_, std::move(request));
}
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 149,257
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WebString GetFormSignatureAsWebString(const PasswordForm& password_form) {
return WebString::FromUTF8(
base::NumberToString(CalculateFormSignature(password_form.form_data)));
}
Commit Message: [Android][TouchToFill] Use FindPasswordInfoForElement for triggering
Use for TouchToFill the same triggering logic that is used for regular
suggestions.
Bug: 1010233
Change-Id: I111d4eac4ce94dd94b86097b6b6c98e08875e11a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1834230
Commit-Queue: Boris Sazonov <bsazonov@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vadym Doroshenko <dvadym@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#702058}
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 137,624
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void do_drain(void *arg)
{
struct kmem_cache *cachep = arg;
struct array_cache *ac;
int node = numa_mem_id();
struct kmem_cache_node *n;
LIST_HEAD(list);
check_irq_off();
ac = cpu_cache_get(cachep);
n = get_node(cachep, node);
spin_lock(&n->list_lock);
free_block(cachep, ac->entry, ac->avail, node, &list);
spin_unlock(&n->list_lock);
slabs_destroy(cachep, &list);
ac->avail = 0;
}
Commit Message: mm/slab.c: fix SLAB freelist randomization duplicate entries
This patch fixes a bug in the freelist randomization code. When a high
random number is used, the freelist will contain duplicate entries. It
will result in different allocations sharing the same chunk.
It will result in odd behaviours and crashes. It should be uncommon but
it depends on the machines. We saw it happening more often on some
machines (every few hours of running tests).
Fixes: c7ce4f60ac19 ("mm: SLAB freelist randomization")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170103181908.143178-1-thgarnie@google.com
Signed-off-by: John Sperbeck <jsperbeck@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 68,866
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int blk_fill_sgv4_hdr_rq(struct request_queue *q, struct request *rq,
struct sg_io_v4 *hdr, struct bsg_device *bd,
fmode_t has_write_perm)
{
if (hdr->request_len > BLK_MAX_CDB) {
rq->cmd = kzalloc(hdr->request_len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!rq->cmd)
return -ENOMEM;
}
if (copy_from_user(rq->cmd, (void __user *)(unsigned long)hdr->request,
hdr->request_len))
return -EFAULT;
if (hdr->subprotocol == BSG_SUB_PROTOCOL_SCSI_CMD) {
if (blk_verify_command(rq->cmd, has_write_perm))
return -EPERM;
} else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
return -EPERM;
/*
* fill in request structure
*/
rq->cmd_len = hdr->request_len;
rq->timeout = msecs_to_jiffies(hdr->timeout);
if (!rq->timeout)
rq->timeout = q->sg_timeout;
if (!rq->timeout)
rq->timeout = BLK_DEFAULT_SG_TIMEOUT;
if (rq->timeout < BLK_MIN_SG_TIMEOUT)
rq->timeout = BLK_MIN_SG_TIMEOUT;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: sg_write()/bsg_write() is not fit to be called under KERNEL_DS
Both damn things interpret userland pointers embedded into the payload;
worse, they are actually traversing those. Leaving aside the bad
API design, this is very much _not_ safe to call with KERNEL_DS.
Bail out early if that happens.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 47,647
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DataURLWarningConsoleObserverDelegate(
WebContents* web_contents,
ExpectedNavigationStatus expected_navigation_status)
: web_contents_(web_contents),
success_filter_(expected_navigation_status == NAVIGATION_ALLOWED
? kDataUrlSuccessfulMessage
: kDataUrlBlockedPattern),
fail_filter_(expected_navigation_status == NAVIGATION_ALLOWED
? kDataUrlBlockedPattern
: kDataUrlSuccessfulMessage),
message_loop_runner_(
new MessageLoopRunner(MessageLoopRunner::QuitMode::IMMEDIATE)),
saw_failure_message_(false) {}
Commit Message: Do not use NavigationEntry to block history navigations.
This is no longer necessary after r477371.
BUG=777419
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: I701e4d4853858281b43e3743b12274dbeadfbf18
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/733959
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511942}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 150,362
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoBlendFuncSeparate(GLenum srcRGB,
GLenum dstRGB,
GLenum srcAlpha,
GLenum dstAlpha) {
api()->glBlendFuncSeparateFn(srcRGB, dstRGB, srcAlpha, dstAlpha);
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,888
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLES2Implementation::CopyBufferSubData(GLenum readtarget,
GLenum writetarget,
GLintptr readoffset,
GLintptr writeoffset,
GLsizeiptr size) {
GPU_CLIENT_SINGLE_THREAD_CHECK();
GPU_CLIENT_LOG("[" << GetLogPrefix() << "] glCopyBufferSubData("
<< GLES2Util::GetStringBufferTarget(readtarget) << ", "
<< GLES2Util::GetStringBufferTarget(writetarget) << ", "
<< readoffset << ", " << writeoffset << ", " << size
<< ")");
if (readoffset < 0) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glCopyBufferSubData", "readoffset < 0");
return;
}
if (writeoffset < 0) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glCopyBufferSubData", "writeoffset < 0");
return;
}
if (size < 0) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glCopyBufferSubData", "size < 0");
return;
}
helper_->CopyBufferSubData(readtarget, writetarget, readoffset, writeoffset,
size);
InvalidateReadbackBufferShadowDataCHROMIUM(GetBoundBufferHelper(writetarget));
CheckGLError();
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 140,903
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::SetFramebuffer(GLenum target,
WebGLFramebuffer* buffer) {
if (buffer)
buffer->SetHasEverBeenBound();
if (target == GL_FRAMEBUFFER || target == GL_DRAW_FRAMEBUFFER) {
framebuffer_binding_ = buffer;
ApplyStencilTest();
}
if (!buffer) {
GetDrawingBuffer()->Bind(target);
} else {
ContextGL()->BindFramebuffer(target, buffer->Object());
}
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 133,695
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: LayoutUnit RenderLayerScrollableArea::scrollWidth() const
{
if (m_scrollDimensionsDirty)
const_cast<RenderLayerScrollableArea*>(this)->computeScrollDimensions();
return m_overflowRect.width();
}
Commit Message: Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
R=vollick@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 120,027
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ParamTraits<base::TimeTicks>::Read(const Message* m,
PickleIterator* iter,
param_type* r) {
int64 value;
bool ret = ParamTraits<int64>::Read(m, iter, &value);
if (ret)
*r = base::TimeTicks::FromInternalValue(value);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Validate that paths don't contain embedded NULLs at deserialization.
BUG=166867
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11743009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@174935 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 117,397
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(pg_set_error_verbosity)
{
zval *pgsql_link = NULL;
zend_long verbosity;
int id = -1, argc = ZEND_NUM_ARGS();
PGconn *pgsql;
if (argc == 1) {
if (zend_parse_parameters(argc, "l", &verbosity) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
id = FETCH_DEFAULT_LINK();
CHECK_DEFAULT_LINK(id);
} else {
if (zend_parse_parameters(argc, "rl", &pgsql_link, &verbosity) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
}
if (pgsql_link == NULL && id == -1) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE2(pgsql, PGconn *, pgsql_link, id, "PostgreSQL link", le_link, le_plink);
if (verbosity & (PQERRORS_TERSE|PQERRORS_DEFAULT|PQERRORS_VERBOSE)) {
RETURN_LONG(PQsetErrorVerbosity(pgsql, verbosity));
} else {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 5,168
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HTMLMediaElement::SetLoop(bool b) {
BLINK_MEDIA_LOG << "setLoop(" << (void*)this << ", " << BoolString(b) << ")";
SetBooleanAttribute(loopAttr, b);
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 144,583
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void spl_filesystem_dir_it_move_forward(zend_object_iterator *iter TSRMLS_DC)
{
spl_filesystem_object *object = spl_filesystem_iterator_to_object((spl_filesystem_iterator *)iter);
object->u.dir.index++;
spl_filesystem_dir_read(object TSRMLS_CC);
if (object->file_name) {
efree(object->file_name);
object->file_name = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 1
| 167,071
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: archive_read_set_skip_callback(struct archive *_a,
archive_skip_callback *client_skipper)
{
struct archive_read *a = (struct archive_read *)_a;
archive_check_magic(_a, ARCHIVE_READ_MAGIC, ARCHIVE_STATE_NEW,
"archive_read_set_skip_callback");
a->client.skipper = client_skipper;
return ARCHIVE_OK;
}
Commit Message: Fix a potential crash issue discovered by Alexander Cherepanov:
It seems bsdtar automatically handles stacked compression. This is a
nice feature but it could be problematic when it's completely
unlimited. Most clearly it's illustrated with quines:
$ curl -sRO http://www.maximumcompression.com/selfgz.gz
$ (ulimit -v 10000000 && bsdtar -tvf selfgz.gz)
bsdtar: Error opening archive: Can't allocate data for gzip decompression
Without ulimit, bsdtar will eat all available memory. This could also
be a problem for other applications using libarchive.
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 50,031
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ScreenSaverHandle(ScreenPtr pScreen, int xstate, Bool force)
{
int state = 0;
Bool ret = FALSE;
ScreenSaverScreenPrivatePtr pPriv;
switch (xstate) {
case SCREEN_SAVER_ON:
state = ScreenSaverOn;
ret = CreateSaverWindow(pScreen);
break;
case SCREEN_SAVER_OFF:
state = ScreenSaverOff;
ret = DestroySaverWindow(pScreen);
break;
case SCREEN_SAVER_CYCLE:
state = ScreenSaverCycle;
pPriv = GetScreenPrivate(pScreen);
if (pPriv && pPriv->hasWindow)
ret = TRUE;
}
#ifdef PANORAMIX
if (noPanoramiXExtension || !pScreen->myNum)
#endif
SendScreenSaverNotify(pScreen, state, force);
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,420
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int perf_tp_filter_match(struct perf_event *event,
struct perf_sample_data *data)
{
void *record = data->raw->frag.data;
/* only top level events have filters set */
if (event->parent)
event = event->parent;
if (likely(!event->filter) || filter_match_preds(event->filter, record))
return 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: perf/core: Fix concurrent sys_perf_event_open() vs. 'move_group' race
Di Shen reported a race between two concurrent sys_perf_event_open()
calls where both try and move the same pre-existing software group
into a hardware context.
The problem is exactly that described in commit:
f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
... where, while we wait for a ctx->mutex acquisition, the event->ctx
relation can have changed under us.
That very same commit failed to recognise sys_perf_event_context() as an
external access vector to the events and thereby didn't apply the
established locking rules correctly.
So while one sys_perf_event_open() call is stuck waiting on
mutex_lock_double(), the other (which owns said locks) moves the group
about. So by the time the former sys_perf_event_open() acquires the
locks, the context we've acquired is stale (and possibly dead).
Apply the established locking rules as per perf_event_ctx_lock_nested()
to the mutex_lock_double() for the 'move_group' case. This obviously means
we need to validate state after we acquire the locks.
Reported-by: Di Shen (Keen Lab)
Tested-by: John Dias <joaodias@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Min Chong <mchong@google.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Fixes: f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170106131444.GZ3174@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 68,417
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cmsBool Type_Text_Write(struct _cms_typehandler_struct* self, cmsIOHANDLER* io, void* Ptr, cmsUInt32Number nItems)
{
cmsMLU* mlu = (cmsMLU*) Ptr;
cmsUInt32Number size;
cmsBool rc;
char* Text;
size = cmsMLUgetASCII(mlu, cmsNoLanguage, cmsNoCountry, NULL, 0);
if (size == 0) return FALSE; // Cannot be zero!
Text = (char*) _cmsMalloc(self ->ContextID, size);
if (Text == NULL) return FALSE;
cmsMLUgetASCII(mlu, cmsNoLanguage, cmsNoCountry, Text, size);
rc = io ->Write(io, size, Text);
_cmsFree(self ->ContextID, Text);
return rc;
cmsUNUSED_PARAMETER(nItems);
}
Commit Message: Added an extra check to MLU bounds
Thanks to Ibrahim el-sayed for spotting the bug
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 71,063
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SandboxIPCHandler::Run() {
struct pollfd pfds[2];
pfds[0].fd = lifeline_fd_;
pfds[0].events = POLLIN;
pfds[1].fd = browser_socket_;
pfds[1].events = POLLIN;
int failed_polls = 0;
for (;;) {
const int r =
HANDLE_EINTR(poll(pfds, arraysize(pfds), -1 /* no timeout */));
DCHECK_NE(0, r);
if (r < 0) {
PLOG(WARNING) << "poll";
if (failed_polls++ == 3) {
LOG(FATAL) << "poll(2) failing. SandboxIPCHandler aborting.";
return;
}
continue;
}
failed_polls = 0;
if (pfds[0].revents) {
break;
}
if (pfds[1].revents & (POLLERR | POLLHUP)) {
break;
}
if (pfds[1].revents & POLLIN) {
HandleRequestFromChild(browser_socket_);
}
}
VLOG(1) << "SandboxIPCHandler stopping.";
}
Commit Message: Serialize struct tm in a safe way.
BUG=765512
Change-Id: If235b8677eb527be2ac0fe621fc210e4116a7566
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/679441
Commit-Queue: Chris Palmer <palmer@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Julien Tinnes <jln@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#503948}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 150,250
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: size_t WallpaperManager::GetPendingListSizeForTesting() const {
return loading_.size();
}
Commit Message: [reland] Do not set default wallpaper unless it should do so.
TBR=bshe@chromium.org, alemate@chromium.org
Bug: 751382
Change-Id: Id0793dfe467f737526a95b1e66ed01fbb8860bda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/619754
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <xdai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Alekseev <alemate@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Biao She <bshe@chromium.org>
Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498325}
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/646430
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498982}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 127,982
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int adev_get_mic_mute(const struct audio_hw_device *dev, bool *state)
{
UNUSED(dev);
UNUSED(state);
FNLOG();
return -ENOSYS;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 158,458
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct mem_cgroup *mem_cgroup_lookup(unsigned short id)
{
struct cgroup_subsys_state *css;
/* ID 0 is unused ID */
if (!id)
return NULL;
css = css_lookup(&mem_cgroup_subsys, id);
if (!css)
return NULL;
return container_of(css, struct mem_cgroup, css);
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 21,078
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void arcmsr_flush_adapter_cache(struct AdapterControlBlock *acb)
{
switch (acb->adapter_type) {
case ACB_ADAPTER_TYPE_A: {
arcmsr_hbaA_flush_cache(acb);
}
break;
case ACB_ADAPTER_TYPE_B: {
arcmsr_hbaB_flush_cache(acb);
}
break;
case ACB_ADAPTER_TYPE_C: {
arcmsr_hbaC_flush_cache(acb);
}
break;
case ACB_ADAPTER_TYPE_D:
arcmsr_hbaD_flush_cache(acb);
break;
}
}
Commit Message: scsi: arcmsr: Buffer overflow in arcmsr_iop_message_xfer()
We need to put an upper bound on "user_len" so the memcpy() doesn't
overflow.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <marco.gra@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Henzl <thenzl@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 49,749
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: explicit DummyImeControlDelegate(bool consume)
: consume_(consume),
handle_next_ime_count_(0),
handle_previous_ime_count_(0),
handle_switch_ime_count_(0) {
}
Commit Message: accelerators: Remove deprecated Accelerator ctor that takes booleans.
BUG=128242
R=ben@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10399085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137957 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 106,505
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ServiceManagerConnection::~ServiceManagerConnection() {}
Commit Message: media: Support hosting mojo CDM in a standalone service
Currently when mojo CDM is enabled it is hosted in the MediaService
running in the process specified by "mojo_media_host". However, on
some platforms we need to run mojo CDM and other mojo media services in
different processes. For example, on desktop platforms, we want to run
mojo video decoder in the GPU process, but run the mojo CDM in the
utility process.
This CL adds a new build flag "enable_standalone_cdm_service". When
enabled, the mojo CDM service will be hosted in a standalone "cdm"
service running in the utility process. All other mojo media services
will sill be hosted in the "media" servie running in the process
specified by "mojo_media_host".
BUG=664364
TEST=Encrypted media browser tests using mojo CDM is still working.
Change-Id: I95be6e05adc9ebcff966b26958ef1d7becdfb487
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/567172
Commit-Queue: Xiaohan Wang <xhwang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dan Sanders <sandersd@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486947}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 127,486
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void compat_sig_setmask(sigset_t *blocked, compat_sigset_word set)
{
memcpy(blocked->sig, &set, sizeof(set));
}
Commit Message: compat: fix 4-byte infoleak via uninitialized struct field
Commit 3a4d44b61625 ("ntp: Move adjtimex related compat syscalls to
native counterparts") removed the memset() in compat_get_timex(). Since
then, the compat adjtimex syscall can invoke do_adjtimex() with an
uninitialized ->tai.
If do_adjtimex() doesn't write to ->tai (e.g. because the arguments are
invalid), compat_put_timex() then copies the uninitialized ->tai field
to userspace.
Fix it by adding the memset() back.
Fixes: 3a4d44b61625 ("ntp: Move adjtimex related compat syscalls to native counterparts")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 82,646
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::unscheduleStyleRecalc()
{
ASSERT(!confusingAndOftenMisusedAttached() || (!needsStyleRecalc() && !childNeedsStyleRecalc()));
m_styleRecalcTimer.stop();
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 102,906
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool IsResizeComplete(aura::test::WindowEventDispatcherTestApi* dispatcher_test,
RenderWidgetHostImpl* widget_host) {
dispatcher_test->WaitUntilPointerMovesDispatched();
widget_host->SynchronizeVisualProperties();
return !widget_host->resize_ack_pending_for_testing();
}
Commit Message: Apply ExtensionNavigationThrottle filesystem/blob checks to all frames.
BUG=836858
Change-Id: I34333a72501129fd40b5a9aa6378c9f35f1e7fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1028511
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nick Carter <nick@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553867}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 156,091
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AddAuthToCache() {
const base::string16 kFoo(ASCIIToUTF16("foo"));
const base::string16 kBar(ASCIIToUTF16("bar"));
GURL proxy_url(GetParam() == HTTP ? "http://proxy" : "https://proxy:80");
session_->http_auth_cache()->Add(proxy_url,
"MyRealm1",
HttpAuth::AUTH_SCHEME_BASIC,
"Basic realm=MyRealm1",
AuthCredentials(kFoo, kBar),
"/");
}
Commit Message: net: don't process truncated headers on HTTPS connections.
This change causes us to not process any headers unless they are correctly
terminated with a \r\n\r\n sequence.
BUG=244260
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15688012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@202927 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 112,753
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __iommu_map_sg(struct device *dev, struct scatterlist *sg, int nents,
enum dma_data_direction dir, struct dma_attrs *attrs,
bool is_coherent)
{
struct scatterlist *s = sg, *dma = sg, *start = sg;
int i, count = 0;
unsigned int offset = s->offset;
unsigned int size = s->offset + s->length;
unsigned int max = dma_get_max_seg_size(dev);
for (i = 1; i < nents; i++) {
s = sg_next(s);
s->dma_address = DMA_ERROR_CODE;
s->dma_length = 0;
if (s->offset || (size & ~PAGE_MASK) || size + s->length > max) {
if (__map_sg_chunk(dev, start, size, &dma->dma_address,
dir, attrs, is_coherent) < 0)
goto bad_mapping;
dma->dma_address += offset;
dma->dma_length = size - offset;
size = offset = s->offset;
start = s;
dma = sg_next(dma);
count += 1;
}
size += s->length;
}
if (__map_sg_chunk(dev, start, size, &dma->dma_address, dir, attrs,
is_coherent) < 0)
goto bad_mapping;
dma->dma_address += offset;
dma->dma_length = size - offset;
return count+1;
bad_mapping:
for_each_sg(sg, s, count, i)
__iommu_remove_mapping(dev, sg_dma_address(s), sg_dma_len(s));
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ARM: dma-mapping: don't allow DMA mappings to be marked executable
DMA mapping permissions were being derived from pgprot_kernel directly
without using PAGE_KERNEL. This causes them to be marked with executable
permission, which is not what we want. Fix this.
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 58,280
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: explicit RemoveAutofillTester(TestingProfile* profile)
: personal_data_manager_(
autofill::PersonalDataManagerFactory::GetForProfile(profile)) {
autofill::test::DisableSystemServices(profile->GetPrefs());
personal_data_manager_->AddObserver(this);
}
Commit Message: Don't downcast DownloadManagerDelegate to ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate.
DownloadManager has public SetDelegate method and tests and or other subsystems
can install their own implementations of the delegate.
Bug: 805905
Change-Id: Iecf1e0aceada0e1048bed1e2d2ceb29ca64295b8
TBR: tests updated to follow the API change.
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/894702
Reviewed-by: David Vallet <dvallet@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Min Qin <qinmin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533515}
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 154,290
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int read_next_command(void)
{
static int stdin_eof = 0;
if (stdin_eof) {
unread_command_buf = 0;
return EOF;
}
for (;;) {
const char *p;
if (unread_command_buf) {
unread_command_buf = 0;
} else {
struct recent_command *rc;
strbuf_detach(&command_buf, NULL);
stdin_eof = strbuf_getline(&command_buf, stdin, '\n');
if (stdin_eof)
return EOF;
if (!seen_data_command
&& !starts_with(command_buf.buf, "feature ")
&& !starts_with(command_buf.buf, "option ")) {
parse_argv();
}
rc = rc_free;
if (rc)
rc_free = rc->next;
else {
rc = cmd_hist.next;
cmd_hist.next = rc->next;
cmd_hist.next->prev = &cmd_hist;
free(rc->buf);
}
rc->buf = command_buf.buf;
rc->prev = cmd_tail;
rc->next = cmd_hist.prev;
rc->prev->next = rc;
cmd_tail = rc;
}
if (skip_prefix(command_buf.buf, "get-mark ", &p)) {
parse_get_mark(p);
continue;
}
if (skip_prefix(command_buf.buf, "cat-blob ", &p)) {
parse_cat_blob(p);
continue;
}
if (command_buf.buf[0] == '#')
continue;
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message: prefer memcpy to strcpy
When we already know the length of a string (e.g., because
we just malloc'd to fit it), it's nicer to use memcpy than
strcpy, as it makes it more obvious that we are not going to
overflow the buffer (because the size we pass matches the
size in the allocation).
This also eliminates calls to strcpy, which make auditing
the code base harder.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 55,130
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ras_getint(jas_stream_t *in, int_fast32_t *val)
{
int_fast32_t x;
int c;
int i;
x = 0;
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
if ((c = jas_stream_getc(in)) == EOF) {
return -1;
}
x = (x << 8) | (c & 0xff);
}
*val = x;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 72,975
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static CURLcode smtp_perform_auth(struct connectdata *conn,
const char *mech,
const char *initresp)
{
CURLcode result = CURLE_OK;
struct smtp_conn *smtpc = &conn->proto.smtpc;
if(initresp) { /* AUTH <mech> ...<crlf> */
/* Send the AUTH command with the initial response */
result = Curl_pp_sendf(&smtpc->pp, "AUTH %s %s", mech, initresp);
}
else {
/* Send the AUTH command */
result = Curl_pp_sendf(&smtpc->pp, "AUTH %s", mech);
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: smtp: use the upload buffer size for scratch buffer malloc
... not the read buffer size, as that can be set smaller and thus cause
a buffer overflow! CVE-2018-0500
Reported-by: Peter Wu
Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_2018-70a2.html
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 85,052
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sctp_init_sock(struct sock *sk)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
struct sctp_sock *sp;
pr_debug("%s: sk:%p\n", __func__, sk);
sp = sctp_sk(sk);
/* Initialize the SCTP per socket area. */
switch (sk->sk_type) {
case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
sp->type = SCTP_SOCKET_UDP;
break;
case SOCK_STREAM:
sp->type = SCTP_SOCKET_TCP;
break;
default:
return -ESOCKTNOSUPPORT;
}
sk->sk_gso_type = SKB_GSO_SCTP;
/* Initialize default send parameters. These parameters can be
* modified with the SCTP_DEFAULT_SEND_PARAM socket option.
*/
sp->default_stream = 0;
sp->default_ppid = 0;
sp->default_flags = 0;
sp->default_context = 0;
sp->default_timetolive = 0;
sp->default_rcv_context = 0;
sp->max_burst = net->sctp.max_burst;
sp->sctp_hmac_alg = net->sctp.sctp_hmac_alg;
/* Initialize default setup parameters. These parameters
* can be modified with the SCTP_INITMSG socket option or
* overridden by the SCTP_INIT CMSG.
*/
sp->initmsg.sinit_num_ostreams = sctp_max_outstreams;
sp->initmsg.sinit_max_instreams = sctp_max_instreams;
sp->initmsg.sinit_max_attempts = net->sctp.max_retrans_init;
sp->initmsg.sinit_max_init_timeo = net->sctp.rto_max;
/* Initialize default RTO related parameters. These parameters can
* be modified for with the SCTP_RTOINFO socket option.
*/
sp->rtoinfo.srto_initial = net->sctp.rto_initial;
sp->rtoinfo.srto_max = net->sctp.rto_max;
sp->rtoinfo.srto_min = net->sctp.rto_min;
/* Initialize default association related parameters. These parameters
* can be modified with the SCTP_ASSOCINFO socket option.
*/
sp->assocparams.sasoc_asocmaxrxt = net->sctp.max_retrans_association;
sp->assocparams.sasoc_number_peer_destinations = 0;
sp->assocparams.sasoc_peer_rwnd = 0;
sp->assocparams.sasoc_local_rwnd = 0;
sp->assocparams.sasoc_cookie_life = net->sctp.valid_cookie_life;
/* Initialize default event subscriptions. By default, all the
* options are off.
*/
memset(&sp->subscribe, 0, sizeof(struct sctp_event_subscribe));
/* Default Peer Address Parameters. These defaults can
* be modified via SCTP_PEER_ADDR_PARAMS
*/
sp->hbinterval = net->sctp.hb_interval;
sp->pathmaxrxt = net->sctp.max_retrans_path;
sp->pathmtu = 0; /* allow default discovery */
sp->sackdelay = net->sctp.sack_timeout;
sp->sackfreq = 2;
sp->param_flags = SPP_HB_ENABLE |
SPP_PMTUD_ENABLE |
SPP_SACKDELAY_ENABLE;
/* If enabled no SCTP message fragmentation will be performed.
* Configure through SCTP_DISABLE_FRAGMENTS socket option.
*/
sp->disable_fragments = 0;
/* Enable Nagle algorithm by default. */
sp->nodelay = 0;
sp->recvrcvinfo = 0;
sp->recvnxtinfo = 0;
/* Enable by default. */
sp->v4mapped = 1;
/* Auto-close idle associations after the configured
* number of seconds. A value of 0 disables this
* feature. Configure through the SCTP_AUTOCLOSE socket option,
* for UDP-style sockets only.
*/
sp->autoclose = 0;
/* User specified fragmentation limit. */
sp->user_frag = 0;
sp->adaptation_ind = 0;
sp->pf = sctp_get_pf_specific(sk->sk_family);
/* Control variables for partial data delivery. */
atomic_set(&sp->pd_mode, 0);
skb_queue_head_init(&sp->pd_lobby);
sp->frag_interleave = 0;
/* Create a per socket endpoint structure. Even if we
* change the data structure relationships, this may still
* be useful for storing pre-connect address information.
*/
sp->ep = sctp_endpoint_new(sk, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sp->ep)
return -ENOMEM;
sp->hmac = NULL;
sk->sk_destruct = sctp_destruct_sock;
SCTP_DBG_OBJCNT_INC(sock);
local_bh_disable();
percpu_counter_inc(&sctp_sockets_allocated);
sock_prot_inuse_add(net, sk->sk_prot, 1);
/* Nothing can fail after this block, otherwise
* sctp_destroy_sock() will be called without addr_wq_lock held
*/
if (net->sctp.default_auto_asconf) {
spin_lock(&sock_net(sk)->sctp.addr_wq_lock);
list_add_tail(&sp->auto_asconf_list,
&net->sctp.auto_asconf_splist);
sp->do_auto_asconf = 1;
spin_unlock(&sock_net(sk)->sctp.addr_wq_lock);
} else {
sp->do_auto_asconf = 0;
}
local_bh_enable();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: sctp: do not peel off an assoc from one netns to another one
Now when peeling off an association to the sock in another netns, all
transports in this assoc are not to be rehashed and keep use the old
key in hashtable.
As a transport uses sk->net as the hash key to insert into hashtable,
it would miss removing these transports from hashtable due to the new
netns when closing the sock and all transports are being freeed, then
later an use-after-free issue could be caused when looking up an asoc
and dereferencing those transports.
This is a very old issue since very beginning, ChunYu found it with
syzkaller fuzz testing with this series:
socket$inet6_sctp()
bind$inet6()
sendto$inet6()
unshare(0x40000000)
getsockopt$inet_sctp6_SCTP_GET_ASSOC_ID_LIST()
getsockopt$inet_sctp6_SCTP_SOCKOPT_PEELOFF()
This patch is to block this call when peeling one assoc off from one
netns to another one, so that the netns of all transport would not
go out-sync with the key in hashtable.
Note that this patch didn't fix it by rehashing transports, as it's
difficult to handle the situation when the tuple is already in use
in the new netns. Besides, no one would like to peel off one assoc
to another netns, considering ipaddrs, ifaces, etc. are usually
different.
Reported-by: ChunYu Wang <chunwang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 60,681
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void mmtimer_clr_int_pending(int comparator)
{
HUB_S((u64 *)LOCAL_MMR_ADDR(SH_EVENT_OCCURRED_ALIAS),
SH_EVENT_OCCURRED_RTC1_INT_MASK << comparator);
}
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 24,647
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ciebasecolor(i_ctx_t * i_ctx_p, ref *space, int base, int *stage, int *cont, int *stack_depth)
{
os_ptr op;
ref *spacename, nref;
int i, components=1, code;
/* If the spaece is an array, the first element is always the name */
if (r_is_array(space))
spacename = space->value.refs;
else
spacename = space;
/* Check that it really is a name */
if (!r_has_type(spacename, t_name))
return_error(gs_error_typecheck);
/* Find the relevant color space object */
for (i=0;i<4;i++) {
code = names_ref(imemory->gs_lib_ctx->gs_name_table, (const byte *)CIESpaces[i], strlen(CIESpaces[i]), &nref, 0);
if (code < 0)
return code;
if (name_eq(spacename, &nref)) {
break;
}
}
/* Find out how many values are on the stack, which depends
* on what kind of CIEBased space this is.
*/
switch(i){
case 0:
components = 1;
break;
case 1:
case 2:
components = 3;
break;
case 3:
components = 4;
break;
}
/* Remove teh requisite number of values */
pop(components);
op = osp;
/* Find out how many values we need to return, which
* depends on the requested space.
*/
switch(base) {
case 0:
components = 1;
break;
case 1:
case 2:
components = 3;
break;
case 3:
components = 4;
break;
}
push(components);
/* The PLRM says that all the components should be returned as 0.0 */
op -= components-1;
for (i=0;i<components;i++) {
make_real(op, (float)0);
op++;
}
/* However, Adobe implementations actually return 1.0 for the black
* channel of CMYK...
*/
if (components == 4) {
op--;
make_real(op, (float)1);
}
*stage = 0;
*cont = 0;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 3,045
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static const char *parse_number(cJSON *item,const char *num)
{
double n=0,sign=1,scale=0;int subscale=0,signsubscale=1;
if (*num=='-') sign=-1,num++; /* Has sign? */
if (*num=='0') num++; /* is zero */
if (*num>='1' && *num<='9') do n=(n*10.0)+(*num++ -'0'); while (*num>='0' && *num<='9'); /* Number? */
if (*num=='.' && num[1]>='0' && num[1]<='9') {num++; do n=(n*10.0)+(*num++ -'0'),scale--; while (*num>='0' && *num<='9');} /* Fractional part? */
if (*num=='e' || *num=='E') /* Exponent? */
{ num++;if (*num=='+') num++; else if (*num=='-') signsubscale=-1,num++; /* With sign? */
while (*num>='0' && *num<='9') subscale=(subscale*10)+(*num++ - '0'); /* Number? */
}
n=sign*n*pow(10.0,(scale+subscale*signsubscale)); /* number = +/- number.fraction * 10^+/- exponent */
item->valuedouble=n;
item->valueint=(int)n;
item->type=cJSON_Number;
return num;
}
Commit Message: fix buffer overflow (#30)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 93,733
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void pdf_drop_xref_sections(fz_context *ctx, pdf_document *doc)
{
pdf_drop_xref_sections_imp(ctx, doc, doc->saved_xref_sections, doc->saved_num_xref_sections);
pdf_drop_xref_sections_imp(ctx, doc, doc->xref_sections, doc->num_xref_sections);
doc->saved_xref_sections = NULL;
doc->saved_num_xref_sections = 0;
doc->xref_sections = NULL;
doc->num_xref_sections = 0;
doc->num_incremental_sections = 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 16,699
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewGtk::Show() {
gtk_widget_show(view_.get());
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 114,997
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool V4L2JpegEncodeAccelerator::EncodedInstanceDmaBuf::RequestInputBuffers() {
DCHECK(parent_->encoder_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
struct v4l2_format format;
memset(&format, 0, sizeof(format));
format.type = V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_OUTPUT_MPLANE;
format.fmt.pix_mp.pixelformat = input_buffer_pixelformat_;
IOCTL_OR_ERROR_RETURN_FALSE(VIDIOC_G_FMT, &format);
struct v4l2_requestbuffers reqbufs;
memset(&reqbufs, 0, sizeof(reqbufs));
reqbufs.count = kBufferCount;
reqbufs.type = V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_OUTPUT_MPLANE;
reqbufs.memory = V4L2_MEMORY_DMABUF;
IOCTL_OR_ERROR_RETURN_FALSE(VIDIOC_REQBUFS, &reqbufs);
DCHECK(free_input_buffers_.empty());
for (size_t i = 0; i < reqbufs.count; ++i) {
free_input_buffers_.push_back(i);
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: media: remove base::SharedMemoryHandle usage in v4l2 encoder
This replaces a use of the legacy UnalignedSharedMemory ctor
taking a SharedMemoryHandle with the current ctor taking a
PlatformSharedMemoryRegion.
Bug: 849207
Change-Id: Iea24ebdcd941cf2fa97e19cf2aeac1a18f9773d9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1697602
Commit-Queue: Matthew Cary (CET) <mattcary@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ricky Liang <jcliang@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#681740}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 136,057
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void __init early_trace_init(void)
{
if (tracepoint_printk) {
tracepoint_print_iter =
kmalloc(sizeof(*tracepoint_print_iter), GFP_KERNEL);
if (WARN_ON(!tracepoint_print_iter))
tracepoint_printk = 0;
else
static_key_enable(&tracepoint_printk_key.key);
}
tracer_alloc_buffers();
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 81,268
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void cxusb_d680_dmb_drain_message(struct dvb_usb_device *d)
{
int ep = d->props.generic_bulk_ctrl_endpoint;
const int timeout = 100;
const int junk_len = 32;
u8 *junk;
int rd_count;
/* Discard remaining data in video pipe */
junk = kmalloc(junk_len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!junk)
return;
while (1) {
if (usb_bulk_msg(d->udev,
usb_rcvbulkpipe(d->udev, ep),
junk, junk_len, &rd_count, timeout) < 0)
break;
if (!rd_count)
break;
}
kfree(junk);
}
Commit Message: [media] cxusb: Use a dma capable buffer also for reading
Commit 17ce039b4e54 ("[media] cxusb: don't do DMA on stack")
added a kmalloc'ed bounce buffer for writes, but missed to do the same
for reads. As the read only happens after the write is finished, we can
reuse the same buffer.
As dvb_usb_generic_rw handles a read length of 0 by itself, avoid calling
it using the dvb_usb_generic_read wrapper function.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Brüns <stefan.bruens@rwth-aachen.de>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 66,714
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool tcp_skb_spurious_retrans(const struct tcp_sock *tp,
const struct sk_buff *skb)
{
return (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->sacked & TCPCB_RETRANS) &&
tcp_tsopt_ecr_before(tp, tcp_skb_timestamp(skb));
}
Commit Message: tcp: make challenge acks less predictable
Yue Cao claims that current host rate limiting of challenge ACKS
(RFC 5961) could leak enough information to allow a patient attacker
to hijack TCP sessions. He will soon provide details in an academic
paper.
This patch increases the default limit from 100 to 1000, and adds
some randomization so that the attacker can no longer hijack
sessions without spending a considerable amount of probes.
Based on initial analysis and patch from Linus.
Note that we also have per socket rate limiting, so it is tempting
to remove the host limit in the future.
v2: randomize the count of challenge acks per second, not the period.
Fixes: 282f23c6ee34 ("tcp: implement RFC 5961 3.2")
Reported-by: Yue Cao <ycao009@ucr.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 51,616
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: base::TimeDelta WarmupURLFetcher::GetFetchWaitTime() const {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_SEQUENCE(sequence_checker_);
DCHECK_LT(0u, previous_attempt_counts_);
DCHECK_GE(2u, previous_attempt_counts_);
if (previous_attempt_counts_ == 1)
return base::TimeDelta::FromSeconds(1);
return base::TimeDelta::FromSeconds(30);
}
Commit Message: Disable all DRP URL fetches when holdback is enabled
Disable secure proxy checker, warmup url fetcher
and client config fetch when the client is in DRP
(Data Reduction Proxy) holdback.
This CL does not disable pingbacks when client is in the
holdback, but the pingback code is going away soon.
Change-Id: Icbb59d814d1452123869c609e0770d1439c1db51
Bug: 984964
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1709965
Commit-Queue: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#679649}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 137,948
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: resolveEmphasisSingleSymbols(
EmphasisInfo *buffer, const EmphasisClass class, const InString *input) {
int i;
for (i = 0; i < input->length; i++) {
if (buffer[i].begin & class)
if (buffer[i + 1].end & class) {
buffer[i].begin &= ~class;
buffer[i + 1].end &= ~class;
buffer[i].symbol |= class;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow
Fixes #635
Thanks to HongxuChen for reporting it
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 76,775
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: return_pkinit_kx(krb5_context context, krb5_kdc_req *request,
krb5_kdc_rep *reply, krb5_keyblock *encrypting_key,
krb5_pa_data **out_padata)
{
krb5_error_code ret = 0;
krb5_keyblock *session = reply->ticket->enc_part2->session;
krb5_keyblock *new_session = NULL;
krb5_pa_data *pa = NULL;
krb5_enc_data enc;
krb5_data *scratch = NULL;
*out_padata = NULL;
enc.ciphertext.data = NULL;
if (!krb5_principal_compare(context, request->client,
krb5_anonymous_principal()))
return 0;
/*
* The KDC contribution key needs to be a fresh key of an enctype supported
* by the client and server. The existing session key meets these
* requirements so we use it.
*/
ret = krb5_c_fx_cf2_simple(context, session, "PKINIT",
encrypting_key, "KEYEXCHANGE",
&new_session);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
ret = encode_krb5_encryption_key( session, &scratch);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
ret = krb5_encrypt_helper(context, encrypting_key,
KRB5_KEYUSAGE_PA_PKINIT_KX, scratch, &enc);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
memset(scratch->data, 0, scratch->length);
krb5_free_data(context, scratch);
scratch = NULL;
ret = encode_krb5_enc_data(&enc, &scratch);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
pa = malloc(sizeof(krb5_pa_data));
if (pa == NULL) {
ret = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
pa->pa_type = KRB5_PADATA_PKINIT_KX;
pa->length = scratch->length;
pa->contents = (krb5_octet *) scratch->data;
*out_padata = pa;
scratch->data = NULL;
memset(session->contents, 0, session->length);
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, session);
*session = *new_session;
new_session->contents = NULL;
cleanup:
krb5_free_data_contents(context, &enc.ciphertext);
krb5_free_keyblock(context, new_session);
krb5_free_data(context, scratch);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: PKINIT (draft9) null ptr deref [CVE-2012-1016]
Don't check for an agility KDF identifier in the non-draft9 reply
structure when we're building a draft9 reply, because it'll be NULL.
The KDC plugin for PKINIT can dereference a null pointer when handling
a draft9 request, leading to a crash of the KDC process. An attacker
would need to have a valid PKINIT certificate, or an unauthenticated
attacker could execute the attack if anonymous PKINIT is enabled.
CVSSv2 vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P/E:P/RL:O/RC:C
[tlyu@mit.edu: reformat comment and edit log message]
(back ported from commit cd5ff932c9d1439c961b0cf9ccff979356686aff)
ticket: 7527 (new)
version_fixed: 1.10.4
status: resolved
CWE ID:
| 0
| 34,598
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int FLTCheckFeatureIdFilters(FilterEncodingNode *psFilterNode,
mapObj *map, int i)
{
int status = MS_SUCCESS;
if (psFilterNode->eType == FILTER_NODE_TYPE_FEATUREID)
{
char** tokens;
int nTokens = 0;
layerObj* lp;
int j;
lp = GET_LAYER(map, i);
tokens = msStringSplit(psFilterNode->pszValue,',', &nTokens);
for (j=0; j<nTokens; j++) {
const char* pszId = tokens[j];
const char* pszDot = strchr(pszId, '.');
if( pszDot )
{
if( pszDot - pszId != strlen(lp->name) ||
strncasecmp(pszId, lp->name, strlen(lp->name)) != 0 )
{
msSetError(MS_MISCERR, "Feature id %s not consistent with feature type name %s.",
"FLTPreParseFilterForAlias()", pszId, lp->name);
status = MS_FAILURE;
break;
}
}
}
msFreeCharArray(tokens, nTokens);
}
if (psFilterNode->psLeftNode)
{
status = FLTCheckFeatureIdFilters(psFilterNode->psLeftNode, map, i);
if( status == MS_SUCCESS )
{
if (psFilterNode->psRightNode)
status = FLTCheckFeatureIdFilters(psFilterNode->psRightNode, map, i);
}
}
return status;
}
Commit Message: security fix (patch by EvenR)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 68,965
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static u32 cxusb_i2c_func(struct i2c_adapter *adapter)
{
return I2C_FUNC_I2C;
}
Commit Message: [media] cxusb: Use a dma capable buffer also for reading
Commit 17ce039b4e54 ("[media] cxusb: don't do DMA on stack")
added a kmalloc'ed bounce buffer for writes, but missed to do the same
for reads. As the read only happens after the write is finished, we can
reuse the same buffer.
As dvb_usb_generic_rw handles a read length of 0 by itself, avoid calling
it using the dvb_usb_generic_read wrapper function.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Brüns <stefan.bruens@rwth-aachen.de>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 66,733
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int rtnetlink_put_metrics(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *metrics)
{
struct nlattr *mx;
int i, valid = 0;
mx = nla_nest_start(skb, RTA_METRICS);
if (mx == NULL)
return -ENOBUFS;
for (i = 0; i < RTAX_MAX; i++) {
if (metrics[i]) {
if (i == RTAX_CC_ALGO - 1) {
char tmp[TCP_CA_NAME_MAX], *name;
name = tcp_ca_get_name_by_key(metrics[i], tmp);
if (!name)
continue;
if (nla_put_string(skb, i + 1, name))
goto nla_put_failure;
} else if (i == RTAX_FEATURES - 1) {
u32 user_features = metrics[i] & RTAX_FEATURE_MASK;
BUILD_BUG_ON(RTAX_FEATURE_MASK & DST_FEATURE_MASK);
if (nla_put_u32(skb, i + 1, user_features))
goto nla_put_failure;
} else {
if (nla_put_u32(skb, i + 1, metrics[i]))
goto nla_put_failure;
}
valid++;
}
}
if (!valid) {
nla_nest_cancel(skb, mx);
return 0;
}
return nla_nest_end(skb, mx);
nla_put_failure:
nla_nest_cancel(skb, mx);
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
Commit Message: net: fix infoleak in rtnetlink
The stack object “map” has a total size of 32 bytes. Its last 4
bytes are padding generated by compiler. These padding bytes are
not initialized and sent out via “nla_put”.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 53,138
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AutofillDialogViews::ShowErrorBubbleForViewIfNecessary(views::View* view) {
if (!view->GetWidget())
return;
if (!delegate_->ShouldShowErrorBubble()) {
DCHECK(!error_bubble_);
return;
}
if (view->GetClassName() == DecoratedTextfield::kViewClassName &&
!static_cast<DecoratedTextfield*>(view)->invalid()) {
return;
}
views::View* input_view = GetAncestralInputView(view);
std::map<views::View*, base::string16>::iterator error_message =
validity_map_.find(input_view);
if (error_message != validity_map_.end()) {
input_view->ScrollRectToVisible(input_view->GetLocalBounds());
if (!error_bubble_ || error_bubble_->anchor() != view) {
HideErrorBubble();
error_bubble_ = new InfoBubble(view, error_message->second);
error_bubble_->set_align_to_anchor_edge(true);
error_bubble_->set_preferred_width(
(kSectionContainerWidth - views::kRelatedControlVerticalSpacing) / 2);
bool show_above = view->GetClassName() == views::Combobox::kViewClassName;
error_bubble_->set_show_above_anchor(show_above);
error_bubble_->Show();
observer_.Add(error_bubble_->GetWidget());
}
}
}
Commit Message: Clear out some minor TODOs.
BUG=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1047063002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#322959}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 110,053
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void nfs4_proc_rename_setup(struct rpc_message *msg, struct inode *dir)
{
struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(dir);
struct nfs_renameargs *arg = msg->rpc_argp;
struct nfs_renameres *res = msg->rpc_resp;
msg->rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_RENAME];
arg->bitmask = server->attr_bitmask;
res->server = server;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 23,231
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static noinline int search_ioctl(struct inode *inode,
struct btrfs_ioctl_search_args *args)
{
struct btrfs_root *root;
struct btrfs_key key;
struct btrfs_key max_key;
struct btrfs_path *path;
struct btrfs_ioctl_search_key *sk = &args->key;
struct btrfs_fs_info *info = BTRFS_I(inode)->root->fs_info;
int ret;
int num_found = 0;
unsigned long sk_offset = 0;
path = btrfs_alloc_path();
if (!path)
return -ENOMEM;
if (sk->tree_id == 0) {
/* search the root of the inode that was passed */
root = BTRFS_I(inode)->root;
} else {
key.objectid = sk->tree_id;
key.type = BTRFS_ROOT_ITEM_KEY;
key.offset = (u64)-1;
root = btrfs_read_fs_root_no_name(info, &key);
if (IS_ERR(root)) {
printk(KERN_ERR "could not find root %llu\n",
sk->tree_id);
btrfs_free_path(path);
return -ENOENT;
}
}
key.objectid = sk->min_objectid;
key.type = sk->min_type;
key.offset = sk->min_offset;
max_key.objectid = sk->max_objectid;
max_key.type = sk->max_type;
max_key.offset = sk->max_offset;
path->keep_locks = 1;
while(1) {
ret = btrfs_search_forward(root, &key, &max_key, path, 0,
sk->min_transid);
if (ret != 0) {
if (ret > 0)
ret = 0;
goto err;
}
ret = copy_to_sk(root, path, &key, sk, args->buf,
&sk_offset, &num_found);
btrfs_release_path(path);
if (ret || num_found >= sk->nr_items)
break;
}
ret = 0;
err:
sk->nr_items = num_found;
btrfs_free_path(path);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <chris.mason@fusionio.com>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <pascal@junod.info>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 34,457
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: u32 usbnet_get_link (struct net_device *net)
{
struct usbnet *dev = netdev_priv(net);
/* If a check_connect is defined, return its result */
if (dev->driver_info->check_connect)
return dev->driver_info->check_connect (dev) == 0;
/* if the device has mii operations, use those */
if (dev->mii.mdio_read)
return mii_link_ok(&dev->mii);
/* Otherwise, dtrt for drivers calling netif_carrier_{on,off} */
return ethtool_op_get_link(net);
}
Commit Message: usbnet: cleanup after bind() in probe()
In case bind() works, but a later error forces bailing
in probe() in error cases work and a timer may be scheduled.
They must be killed. This fixes an error case related to
the double free reported in
http://www.spinics.net/lists/netdev/msg367669.html
and needs to go on top of Linus' fix to cdc-ncm.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 94,899
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ScriptPromise VRDisplay::requestPresent(ScriptState* script_state,
const HeapVector<VRLayer>& layers) {
ExecutionContext* execution_context = ExecutionContext::From(script_state);
UseCounter::Count(execution_context, UseCounter::kVRRequestPresent);
if (!execution_context->IsSecureContext()) {
UseCounter::Count(execution_context,
UseCounter::kVRRequestPresentInsecureOrigin);
}
ReportPresentationResult(PresentationResult::kRequested);
ScriptPromiseResolver* resolver = ScriptPromiseResolver::Create(script_state);
ScriptPromise promise = resolver->Promise();
if (!capabilities_->canPresent()) {
DOMException* exception =
DOMException::Create(kInvalidStateError, "VRDisplay cannot present.");
resolver->Reject(exception);
ReportPresentationResult(PresentationResult::kVRDisplayCannotPresent);
return promise;
}
bool first_present = !is_presenting_;
if (first_present && !UserGestureIndicator::UtilizeUserGesture() &&
!in_display_activate_) {
DOMException* exception = DOMException::Create(
kInvalidStateError, "API can only be initiated by a user gesture.");
resolver->Reject(exception);
ReportPresentationResult(PresentationResult::kNotInitiatedByUserGesture);
return promise;
}
if (layers.size() == 0 || layers.size() > capabilities_->maxLayers()) {
ForceExitPresent();
DOMException* exception =
DOMException::Create(kInvalidStateError, "Invalid number of layers.");
resolver->Reject(exception);
ReportPresentationResult(PresentationResult::kInvalidNumberOfLayers);
return promise;
}
if (layers[0].source().isNull()) {
ForceExitPresent();
DOMException* exception =
DOMException::Create(kInvalidStateError, "Invalid layer source.");
resolver->Reject(exception);
ReportPresentationResult(PresentationResult::kInvalidLayerSource);
return promise;
}
layer_ = layers[0];
CanvasRenderingContext* rendering_context;
if (layer_.source().isHTMLCanvasElement()) {
rendering_context =
layer_.source().getAsHTMLCanvasElement()->RenderingContext();
} else {
DCHECK(layer_.source().isOffscreenCanvas());
rendering_context =
layer_.source().getAsOffscreenCanvas()->RenderingContext();
}
if (!rendering_context || !rendering_context->Is3d()) {
ForceExitPresent();
DOMException* exception = DOMException::Create(
kInvalidStateError, "Layer source must have a WebGLRenderingContext");
resolver->Reject(exception);
ReportPresentationResult(
PresentationResult::kLayerSourceMissingWebGLContext);
return promise;
}
rendering_context_ = ToWebGLRenderingContextBase(rendering_context);
context_gl_ = rendering_context_->ContextGL();
if ((layer_.leftBounds().size() != 0 && layer_.leftBounds().size() != 4) ||
(layer_.rightBounds().size() != 0 && layer_.rightBounds().size() != 4)) {
ForceExitPresent();
DOMException* exception = DOMException::Create(
kInvalidStateError,
"Layer bounds must either be an empty array or have 4 values");
resolver->Reject(exception);
ReportPresentationResult(PresentationResult::kInvalidLayerBounds);
return promise;
}
if (!pending_present_resolvers_.IsEmpty()) {
pending_present_resolvers_.push_back(resolver);
} else if (first_present) {
bool secure_context =
ExecutionContext::From(script_state)->IsSecureContext();
if (!display_) {
ForceExitPresent();
DOMException* exception = DOMException::Create(
kInvalidStateError, "The service is no longer active.");
resolver->Reject(exception);
return promise;
}
pending_present_resolvers_.push_back(resolver);
submit_frame_client_binding_.Close();
display_->RequestPresent(
secure_context,
submit_frame_client_binding_.CreateInterfacePtrAndBind(),
ConvertToBaseCallback(
WTF::Bind(&VRDisplay::OnPresentComplete, WrapPersistent(this))));
} else {
UpdateLayerBounds();
resolver->Resolve();
ReportPresentationResult(PresentationResult::kSuccessAlreadyPresenting);
}
return promise;
}
Commit Message: WebVR: fix initial vsync
Applications sometimes use window.rAF while not presenting, then switch to
vrDisplay.rAF after presentation starts. Depending on the animation loop's
timing, this can cause a race condition where presentation has been started
but there's no vrDisplay.rAF pending yet. Ensure there's at least vsync
being processed after presentation starts so that a queued window.rAF
can run and schedule a vrDisplay.rAF.
BUG=711789
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2848483003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468167}
CWE ID:
| 1
| 172,003
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned swaps_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
{
struct seq_file *seq = file->private_data;
poll_wait(file, &proc_poll_wait, wait);
if (seq->poll_event != atomic_read(&proc_poll_event)) {
seq->poll_event = atomic_read(&proc_poll_event);
return POLLIN | POLLRDNORM | POLLERR | POLLPRI;
}
return POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 21,418
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static Image *ReadPSDImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
has_merged_image,
skip_layers;
MagickOffsetType
offset;
MagickSizeType
length;
MagickBooleanType
status;
PSDInfo
psd_info;
register ssize_t
i;
ssize_t
count;
unsigned char
*data;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read image header.
*/
image->endian=MSBEndian;
count=ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) psd_info.signature);
psd_info.version=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
if ((count == 0) || (LocaleNCompare(psd_info.signature,"8BPS",4) != 0) ||
((psd_info.version != 1) && (psd_info.version != 2)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
(void) ReadBlob(image,6,psd_info.reserved);
psd_info.channels=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
if (psd_info.channels > MaxPSDChannels)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"MaximumChannelsExceeded");
psd_info.rows=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
psd_info.columns=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
if ((psd_info.version == 1) && ((psd_info.rows > 30000) ||
(psd_info.columns > 30000)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
psd_info.depth=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
if ((psd_info.depth != 1) && (psd_info.depth != 8) && (psd_info.depth != 16))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
psd_info.mode=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Image is %.20g x %.20g with channels=%.20g, depth=%.20g, mode=%s",
(double) psd_info.columns,(double) psd_info.rows,(double)
psd_info.channels,(double) psd_info.depth,ModeToString((PSDImageType)
psd_info.mode));
/*
Initialize image.
*/
image->depth=psd_info.depth;
image->columns=psd_info.columns;
image->rows=psd_info.rows;
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
if (SetImageBackgroundColor(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
if (psd_info.mode == LabMode)
SetImageColorspace(image,LabColorspace,exception);
if (psd_info.mode == CMYKMode)
{
SetImageColorspace(image,CMYKColorspace,exception);
if (psd_info.channels > 4)
SetImageAlphaChannel(image,ActivateAlphaChannel,exception);
}
else if ((psd_info.mode == BitmapMode) || (psd_info.mode == GrayscaleMode) ||
(psd_info.mode == DuotoneMode))
{
status=AcquireImageColormap(image,psd_info.depth != 16 ? 256 : 65536,
exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Image colormap allocated");
SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace,exception);
if (psd_info.channels > 1)
SetImageAlphaChannel(image,ActivateAlphaChannel,exception);
}
else
if (psd_info.channels > 3)
SetImageAlphaChannel(image,ActivateAlphaChannel,exception);
/*
Read PSD raster colormap only present for indexed and duotone images.
*/
length=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
if (length != 0)
{
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" reading colormap");
if (psd_info.mode == DuotoneMode)
{
/*
Duotone image data; the format of this data is undocumented.
*/
data=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) length,
sizeof(*data));
if (data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) ReadBlob(image,(size_t) length,data);
data=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(data);
}
else
{
size_t
number_colors;
/*
Read PSD raster colormap.
*/
number_colors=length/3;
if (number_colors > 65536)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,number_colors,exception) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
image->alpha_trait=UndefinedPixelTrait;
}
}
if ((image->depth == 1) && (image->storage_class != PseudoClass))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError, "ImproperImageHeader");
has_merged_image=MagickTrue;
length=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
if (length != 0)
{
unsigned char
*blocks;
/*
Image resources block.
*/
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" reading image resource blocks - %.20g bytes",(double)
((MagickOffsetType) length));
if (length > GetBlobSize(image))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
blocks=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) length,
sizeof(*blocks));
if (blocks == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=ReadBlob(image,(size_t) length,blocks);
if ((count != (ssize_t) length) || (length < 4) ||
(LocaleNCompare((char *) blocks,"8BIM",4) != 0))
{
blocks=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(blocks);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
ParseImageResourceBlocks(image,blocks,(size_t) length,&has_merged_image,
exception);
blocks=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(blocks);
}
/*
Layer and mask block.
*/
length=GetPSDSize(&psd_info,image);
if (length == 8)
{
length=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
length=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
}
offset=TellBlob(image);
skip_layers=MagickFalse;
if ((image_info->number_scenes == 1) && (image_info->scene == 0) &&
(has_merged_image != MagickFalse))
{
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" read composite only");
skip_layers=MagickTrue;
}
if (length == 0)
{
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" image has no layers");
}
else
{
if (ReadPSDLayersInternal(image,image_info,&psd_info,skip_layers,
exception) != MagickTrue)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Skip the rest of the layer and mask information.
*/
SeekBlob(image,offset+length,SEEK_SET);
}
/*
If we are only "pinging" the image, then we're done - so return.
*/
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
/*
Read the precombined layer, present for PSD < 4 compatibility.
*/
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" reading the precombined layer");
if ((has_merged_image != MagickFalse) || (GetImageListLength(image) == 1))
has_merged_image=(MagickBooleanType) ReadPSDMergedImage(image_info,image,
&psd_info,exception);
if ((has_merged_image == MagickFalse) && (GetImageListLength(image) == 1) &&
(length != 0))
{
SeekBlob(image,offset,SEEK_SET);
status=ReadPSDLayersInternal(image,image_info,&psd_info,MagickFalse,
exception);
if (status != MagickTrue)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
}
if (has_merged_image == MagickFalse)
{
Image
*merged;
if (GetImageListLength(image) == 1)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
SetImageAlphaChannel(image,TransparentAlphaChannel,exception);
image->background_color.alpha=TransparentAlpha;
image->background_color.alpha_trait=BlendPixelTrait;
merged=MergeImageLayers(image,FlattenLayer,exception);
ReplaceImageInList(&image,merged);
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Commit Message: Slightly different fix for #714
CWE ID: CWE-834
| 0
| 95,084
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: _gdScaleOneAxis(gdImagePtr pSrc, gdImagePtr dst,
unsigned int dst_len, unsigned int row, LineContribType *contrib,
gdAxis axis)
{
unsigned int ndx;
for (ndx = 0; ndx < dst_len; ndx++) {
double r = 0, g = 0, b = 0, a = 0;
const int left = contrib->ContribRow[ndx].Left;
const int right = contrib->ContribRow[ndx].Right;
int *dest = (axis == HORIZONTAL) ?
&dst->tpixels[row][ndx] :
&dst->tpixels[ndx][row];
int i;
/* Accumulate each channel */
for (i = left; i <= right; i++) {
const int left_channel = i - left;
const int srcpx = (axis == HORIZONTAL) ?
pSrc->tpixels[row][i] :
pSrc->tpixels[i][row];
r += contrib->ContribRow[ndx].Weights[left_channel]
* (double)(gdTrueColorGetRed(srcpx));
g += contrib->ContribRow[ndx].Weights[left_channel]
* (double)(gdTrueColorGetGreen(srcpx));
b += contrib->ContribRow[ndx].Weights[left_channel]
* (double)(gdTrueColorGetBlue(srcpx));
a += contrib->ContribRow[ndx].Weights[left_channel]
* (double)(gdTrueColorGetAlpha(srcpx));
}/* for */
*dest = gdTrueColorAlpha(uchar_clamp(r, 0xFF), uchar_clamp(g, 0xFF),
uchar_clamp(b, 0xFF),
uchar_clamp(a, 0x7F)); /* alpha is 0..127 */
}/* for */
}/* _gdScaleOneAxis*/
Commit Message: gdImageScaleTwoPass memory leak fix
Fixing memory leak in gdImageScaleTwoPass, as reported by @cmb69 and
confirmed by @vapier. This bug actually bit me in production and I'm
very thankful that it was reported with an easy fix.
Fixes #173.
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 56,311
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void trace_packet(struct net *net,
const struct sk_buff *skb,
unsigned int hook,
const struct net_device *in,
const struct net_device *out,
const char *tablename,
const struct xt_table_info *private,
const struct ipt_entry *e)
{
const struct ipt_entry *root;
const char *hookname, *chainname, *comment;
const struct ipt_entry *iter;
unsigned int rulenum = 0;
root = get_entry(private->entries, private->hook_entry[hook]);
hookname = chainname = hooknames[hook];
comment = comments[NF_IP_TRACE_COMMENT_RULE];
xt_entry_foreach(iter, root, private->size - private->hook_entry[hook])
if (get_chainname_rulenum(iter, e, hookname,
&chainname, &comment, &rulenum) != 0)
break;
nf_log_trace(net, AF_INET, hook, skb, in, out, &trace_loginfo,
"TRACE: %s:%s:%s:%u ",
tablename, chainname, comment, rulenum);
}
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: make sure e->next_offset covers remaining blob size
Otherwise this function may read data beyond the ruleset blob.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 52,317
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ChromeContentBrowserClient::LogWebUIUrl(const GURL& web_ui_url) const {
return webui::LogWebUIUrl(web_ui_url);
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 142,721
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void init_alloc_cpu(void) {}
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 24,815
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ExtensionService::UpdateActiveExtensionsInCrashReporter() {
std::set<std::string> extension_ids;
for (size_t i = 0; i < extensions_.size(); ++i) {
if (!extensions_[i]->is_theme() &&
extensions_[i]->location() != Extension::COMPONENT)
extension_ids.insert(extensions_[i]->id());
}
child_process_logging::SetActiveExtensions(extension_ids);
}
Commit Message: Unrevert: Show the install dialog for the initial load of an unpacked extension
with plugins.
First landing broke some browser tests.
BUG=83273
TEST=in the extensions managmenet page, with developer mode enabled, Load an unpacked extension on an extension with NPAPI plugins. You should get an install dialog.
TBR=mihaip
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87738 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 99,949
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MagickExport PixelPacket *QueueAuthenticPixels(Image *image,const ssize_t x,
const ssize_t y,const size_t columns,const size_t rows,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
CacheInfo
*magick_restrict cache_info;
const int
id = GetOpenMPThreadId();
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(image->cache != (Cache) NULL);
cache_info=(CacheInfo *) image->cache;
assert(cache_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (cache_info->methods.queue_authentic_pixels_handler !=
(QueueAuthenticPixelsHandler) NULL)
return(cache_info->methods.queue_authentic_pixels_handler(image,x,y,columns,
rows,exception));
assert(id < (int) cache_info->number_threads);
return(QueueAuthenticPixelCacheNexus(image,x,y,columns,rows,MagickFalse,
cache_info->nexus_info[id],exception));
}
Commit Message: http://www.imagemagick.org/discourse-server/viewtopic.php?f=2&t=28946
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 73,497
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual ~WebFrameTest()
{
Platform::current()->unitTestSupport()->unregisterAllMockedURLs();
}
Commit Message: Revert 162155 "This review merges the two existing page serializ..."
Change r162155 broke the world even though it was landed using the CQ.
> This review merges the two existing page serializers, WebPageSerializerImpl and
> PageSerializer, into one, PageSerializer. In addition to this it moves all
> the old tests from WebPageNewSerializerTest and WebPageSerializerTest to the
> PageSerializerTest structure and splits out one test for MHTML into a new
> MHTMLTest file.
>
> Saving as 'Webpage, Complete', 'Webpage, HTML Only' and as MHTML when the
> 'Save Page as MHTML' flag is enabled now uses the same code, and should thus
> have the same feature set. Meaning that both modes now should be a bit better.
>
> Detailed list of changes:
>
> - PageSerializerTest: Prepare for more DTD test
> - PageSerializerTest: Remove now unneccesary input image test
> - PageSerializerTest: Remove unused WebPageSerializer/Impl code
> - PageSerializerTest: Move data URI morph test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move data URI test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move namespace test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move SVG Image test
> - MHTMLTest: Move MHTML specific test to own test file
> - PageSerializerTest: Delete duplicate XML header test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move blank frame test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move CSS test
> - PageSerializerTest: Add frameset/frame test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move old iframe test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move old elements test
> - Use PageSerizer for saving web pages
> - PageSerializerTest: Test for rewriting links
> - PageSerializer: Add rewrite link accumulator
> - PageSerializer: Serialize images in iframes/frames src
> - PageSerializer: XHTML fix for meta tags
> - PageSerializer: Add presentation CSS
> - PageSerializer: Rename out parameter
>
> BUG=
> R=abarth@chromium.org
>
> Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/68613003
TBR=tiger@opera.com
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73673003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162156 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 118,927
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: server_getlocation(struct client *clt, const char *path)
{
struct server *srv = clt->clt_srv;
struct server_config *srv_conf = clt->clt_srv_conf, *location;
const char *errstr = NULL;
int ret;
/* Now search for the location */
TAILQ_FOREACH(location, &srv->srv_hosts, entry) {
#ifdef DEBUG
if (location->flags & SRVFLAG_LOCATION) {
DPRINTF("%s: location \"%s\" path \"%s\"",
__func__, location->location, path);
}
#endif
if ((location->flags & SRVFLAG_LOCATION) &&
location->parent_id == srv_conf->parent_id) {
errstr = NULL;
if (location->flags & SRVFLAG_LOCATION_MATCH) {
ret = str_match(path, location->location,
&clt->clt_srv_match, &errstr);
} else {
ret = fnmatch(location->location,
path, FNM_CASEFOLD);
}
if (ret == 0 && errstr == NULL) {
/* Replace host configuration */
clt->clt_srv_conf = srv_conf = location;
break;
}
}
}
return (srv_conf);
}
Commit Message: Reimplement httpd's support for byte ranges.
The previous implementation loaded all the output into a single output
buffer and used its size to determine the Content-Length of the body.
The new implementation calculates the body length first and writes the
individual ranges in an async way using the bufferevent mechanism.
This prevents httpd from using too much memory and applies the
watermark and throttling mechanisms to range requests.
Problem reported by Pierre Kim (pierre.kim.sec at gmail.com)
OK benno@ sunil@
CWE ID: CWE-770
| 0
| 68,493
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool HTMLFormControlElement::shouldShowFocusRingOnMouseFocus() const
{
return false;
}
Commit Message: Add HTMLFormControlElement::supportsAutofocus to fix a FIXME comment.
This virtual function should return true if the form control can hanlde
'autofocucs' attribute if it is specified.
Note: HTMLInputElement::supportsAutofocus reuses InputType::isInteractiveContent
because interactiveness is required for autofocus capability.
BUG=none
TEST=none; no behavior changes.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/143343003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165432 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 113,945
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PushMessagingServiceImpl::DidDeleteID(const std::string& app_id,
bool was_subscribed,
InstanceID::Result result) {
RecordUnsubscribeIIDResult(result);
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&PushMessagingServiceImpl::DidUnsubscribe,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), app_id, was_subscribed));
}
Commit Message: Remove some senseless indirection from the Push API code
Four files to call one Java function. Let's just call it directly.
BUG=
Change-Id: I6e988e9a000051dd7e3dd2b517a33a09afc2fff6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/749147
Reviewed-by: Anita Woodruff <awdf@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Peter Beverloo <peter@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513464}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 150,673
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int mov_read_smi(MOVContext *c, AVIOContext *pb, MOVAtom atom)
{
AVStream *st;
if (c->fc->nb_streams < 1)
return 0;
st = c->fc->streams[c->fc->nb_streams-1];
if ((uint64_t)atom.size > (1<<30))
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
av_free(st->codec->extradata);
st->codec->extradata_size = 0;
st->codec->extradata = av_mallocz(atom.size + 0x5a + FF_INPUT_BUFFER_PADDING_SIZE);
if (!st->codec->extradata)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
st->codec->extradata_size = 0x5a + atom.size;
memcpy(st->codec->extradata, "SVQ3", 4); // fake
avio_read(pb, st->codec->extradata + 0x5a, atom.size);
av_dlog(c->fc, "Reading SMI %"PRId64" %s\n", atom.size, st->codec->extradata + 0x5a);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mov: reset dref_count on realloc to keep values consistent.
This fixes a potential crash.
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 54,538
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void VoidMethodDoubleOrNullOrDOMStringArgMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
ExceptionState exception_state(info.GetIsolate(), ExceptionState::kExecutionContext, "TestObject", "voidMethodDoubleOrNullOrDOMStringArg");
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() < 1)) {
exception_state.ThrowTypeError(ExceptionMessages::NotEnoughArguments(1, info.Length()));
return;
}
DoubleOrString arg;
V8DoubleOrString::ToImpl(info.GetIsolate(), info[0], arg, UnionTypeConversionMode::kNullable, exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return;
impl->voidMethodDoubleOrNullOrDOMStringArg(arg);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 135,412
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ldb_dn_get_comp_num(struct ldb_dn *dn)
{
if ( ! ldb_dn_validate(dn)) {
return -1;
}
return dn->comp_num;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 2,343
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void longMethodWithArgsMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
ExceptionState exceptionState(ExceptionState::ExecutionContext, "longMethodWithArgs", "TestObject", info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate());
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() < 3)) {
exceptionState.throwTypeError(ExceptionMessages::notEnoughArguments(3, info.Length()));
exceptionState.throwIfNeeded();
return;
}
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_EXCEPTION_VOID(int, longArg, toInt32(info[0], exceptionState), exceptionState);
V8TRYCATCH_FOR_V8STRINGRESOURCE_VOID(V8StringResource<>, strArg, info[1]);
V8TRYCATCH_VOID(TestObject*, objArg, V8TestObject::toNativeWithTypeCheck(info.GetIsolate(), info[2]));
v8SetReturnValueInt(info, imp->longMethodWithArgs(longArg, strArg, objArg));
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 121,759
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: map_engine_set_talk_button(int button_id)
{
s_talk_button = button_id;
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c (#268)
* Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c
There's a buffer overflow bug in the function layer_resize. It allocates
a buffer `tilemap` with size `x_size * y_size * sizeof(struct map_tile)`.
But it didn't check for integer overflow, so if x_size and y_size are
very large, it's possible that the buffer size is smaller than needed,
causing a buffer overflow later.
PoC: `SetLayerSize(0, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF);`
* move malloc to a separate line
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 75,043
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::string PDFiumEngine::GetSelectedText() {
if (!HasPermission(PDFEngine::PERMISSION_COPY))
return std::string();
base::string16 result;
for (size_t i = 0; i < selection_.size(); ++i) {
static constexpr base::char16 kNewLineChar = L'\n';
base::string16 current_selection_text = selection_[i].GetText();
if (i != 0) {
if (selection_[i - 1].page_index() > selection_[i].page_index())
std::swap(current_selection_text, result);
result.push_back(kNewLineChar);
}
result.append(current_selection_text);
}
FormatStringWithHyphens(&result);
FormatStringForOS(&result);
return base::UTF16ToUTF8(result);
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Use a temporary list when unloading pages
When traversing the |deferred_page_unloads_| list and handling the
unloads it's possible for new pages to get added to the list which will
invalidate the iterator.
This CL swaps the list with an empty list and does the iteration on the
list copy. New items that are unloaded while handling the defers will be
unloaded at a later point.
Bug: 780450
Change-Id: Ic7ced1c82227109784fb536ce19a4dd51b9119ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758916
Commit-Queue: dsinclair <dsinclair@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#515056}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 146,144
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: AP_CORE_DECLARE_NONSTD(apr_status_t) ap_old_write_filter(
ap_filter_t *f, apr_bucket_brigade *bb)
{
old_write_filter_ctx *ctx = f->ctx;
AP_DEBUG_ASSERT(ctx);
if (ctx->bb != NULL) {
/* whatever is coming down the pipe (we don't care), we
* can simply insert our buffered data at the front and
* pass the whole bundle down the chain.
*/
APR_BRIGADE_PREPEND(bb, ctx->bb);
}
return ap_pass_brigade(f->next, bb);
}
Commit Message: *) SECURITY: CVE-2015-0253 (cve.mitre.org)
core: Fix a crash introduced in with ErrorDocument 400 pointing
to a local URL-path with the INCLUDES filter active, introduced
in 2.4.11. PR 57531. [Yann Ylavic]
Submitted By: ylavic
Committed By: covener
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1664205 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID:
| 0
| 44,977
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WebRunnerBrowserContext::~WebRunnerBrowserContext() {
if (resource_context_) {
content::BrowserThread::DeleteSoon(content::BrowserThread::IO, FROM_HERE,
std::move(resource_context_));
}
}
Commit Message: [fuchsia] Implement browser tests for WebRunner Context service.
Tests may interact with the WebRunner FIDL services and the underlying
browser objects for end to end testing of service and browser
functionality.
* Add a browser test launcher main() for WebRunner.
* Add some simple navigation tests.
* Wire up GoBack()/GoForward() FIDL calls.
* Add embedded test server resources and initialization logic.
* Add missing deletion & notification calls to BrowserContext dtor.
* Use FIDL events for navigation state changes.
* Bug fixes:
** Move BrowserContext and Screen deletion to PostMainMessageLoopRun(),
so that they may use the MessageLoop during teardown.
** Fix Frame dtor to allow for null WindowTreeHosts (headless case)
** Fix std::move logic in Frame ctor which lead to no WebContents
observer being registered.
Bug: 871594
Change-Id: I36bcbd2436d534d366c6be4eeb54b9f9feadd1ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1164539
Commit-Queue: Kevin Marshall <kmarshall@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Wez <wez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabrice de Gans-Riberi <fdegans@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Scott Violet <sky@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#584155}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 1
| 172,156
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int nfsaclsvc_release_getacl(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *p,
struct nfsd3_getaclres *resp)
{
fh_put(&resp->fh);
posix_acl_release(resp->acl_access);
posix_acl_release(resp->acl_default);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: nfsd: check permissions when setting ACLs
Use set_posix_acl, which includes proper permission checks, instead of
calling ->set_acl directly. Without this anyone may be able to grant
themselves permissions to a file by setting the ACL.
Lock the inode to make the new checks atomic with respect to set_acl.
(Also, nfsd was the only caller of set_acl not locking the inode, so I
suspect this may fix other races.)
This also simplifies the code, and ensures our ACLs are checked by
posix_acl_valid.
The permission checks and the inode locking were lost with commit
4ac7249e, which changed nfsd to use the set_acl inode operation directly
instead of going through xattr handlers.
Reported-by: David Sinquin <david@sinquin.eu>
[agreunba@redhat.com: use set_posix_acl]
Fixes: 4ac7249e
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 55,753
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void dbgrect(struct video_device *vfd, char *s,
struct v4l2_rect *r)
{
dbgarg2("%sRect start at %dx%d, size=%dx%d\n", s, r->left, r->top,
r->width, r->height);
};
Commit Message: [media] v4l: Share code between video_usercopy and video_ioctl2
The two functions are mostly identical. They handle the copy_from_user
and copy_to_user operations related with V4L2 ioctls and call the real
ioctl handler.
Create a __video_usercopy function that implements the core of
video_usercopy and video_ioctl2, and call that function from both.
Signed-off-by: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart@ideasonboard.com>
Acked-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil@xs4all.nl>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 74,694
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Err stsz_Size(GF_Box *s)
{
u32 i, fieldSize, size;
GF_SampleSizeBox *ptr = (GF_SampleSizeBox *)s;
ptr->size += 8;
if (!ptr->sampleCount) return GF_OK;
if (ptr->type == GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_STSZ) {
if (ptr->sampleSize) return GF_OK;
ptr->size += (4 * ptr->sampleCount);
return GF_OK;
}
fieldSize = 4;
size = ptr->sizes[0];
for (i=0; i < ptr->sampleCount; i++) {
if (ptr->sizes[i] <= 0xF) continue;
else if (ptr->sizes[i] <= 0xFF) {
fieldSize = 8;
}
else if (ptr->sizes[i] <= 0xFFFF) {
fieldSize = 16;
}
else {
fieldSize = 32;
}
if (size != ptr->sizes[i]) size = 0;
}
if (size) {
ptr->type = GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_STSZ;
ptr->sampleSize = size;
gf_free(ptr->sizes);
ptr->sizes = NULL;
}
if (fieldSize == 32) {
ptr->type = GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_STSZ;
ptr->size += (4 * ptr->sampleCount);
return GF_OK;
}
ptr->type = GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_STZ2;
ptr->sampleSize = fieldSize;
if (fieldSize == 4) {
ptr->size += (ptr->sampleCount + 1) / 2;
} else {
ptr->size += (ptr->sampleCount) * (fieldSize/8);
}
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,493
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cms_envelopeddata_verify(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
krb5_preauthtype pa_type,
int require_crl_checking,
unsigned char *enveloped_data,
unsigned int enveloped_data_len,
unsigned char **data,
unsigned int *data_len)
{
krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
PKCS7 *p7 = NULL;
BIO *out = NULL;
int i = 0;
unsigned int size = 0;
const unsigned char *p = enveloped_data;
unsigned int tmp_buf_len = 0, tmp_buf2_len = 0, vfy_buf_len = 0;
unsigned char *tmp_buf = NULL, *tmp_buf2 = NULL, *vfy_buf = NULL;
int msg_type = 0;
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
print_buffer_bin(enveloped_data, enveloped_data_len,
"/tmp/client_envelopeddata");
#endif
/* decode received PKCS7 message */
if ((p7 = d2i_PKCS7(NULL, &p, (int)enveloped_data_len)) == NULL) {
retval = oerr(context, 0, _("Failed to decode PKCS7"));
goto cleanup;
}
/* verify that the received message is PKCS7 EnvelopedData message */
if (OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type) != NID_pkcs7_enveloped) {
pkiDebug("Expected id-enveloped PKCS7 msg (received type = %d)\n",
OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type));
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, "wrong oid\n");
goto cleanup;
}
/* decrypt received PKCS7 message */
out = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
if (pkcs7_decrypt(context, id_cryptoctx, p7, out)) {
pkiDebug("PKCS7 decryption successful\n");
} else {
retval = oerr(context, 0, _("Failed to decrypt PKCS7 message"));
goto cleanup;
}
/* transfer the decoded PKCS7 SignedData message into a separate buffer */
for (;;) {
if ((tmp_buf = realloc(tmp_buf, size + 1024 * 10)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
i = BIO_read(out, &(tmp_buf[size]), 1024 * 10);
if (i <= 0)
break;
else
size += i;
}
tmp_buf_len = size;
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
print_buffer_bin(tmp_buf, tmp_buf_len, "/tmp/client_enc_keypack");
#endif
/* verify PKCS7 SignedData message */
switch (pa_type) {
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REP:
msg_type = CMS_ENVEL_SERVER;
break;
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REP_OLD:
msg_type = CMS_SIGN_DRAFT9;
break;
default:
pkiDebug("%s: unrecognized pa_type = %d\n", __FUNCTION__, pa_type);
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* If this is the RFC style, wrap the signed data to make
* decoding easier in the verify routine.
* For draft9-compatible, we don't do anything because it
* is already wrapped.
*/
if (msg_type == CMS_ENVEL_SERVER) {
retval = wrap_signeddata(tmp_buf, tmp_buf_len,
&tmp_buf2, &tmp_buf2_len);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("failed to encode signeddata\n");
goto cleanup;
}
vfy_buf = tmp_buf2;
vfy_buf_len = tmp_buf2_len;
} else {
vfy_buf = tmp_buf;
vfy_buf_len = tmp_buf_len;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
print_buffer_bin(vfy_buf, vfy_buf_len, "/tmp/client_enc_keypack2");
#endif
retval = cms_signeddata_verify(context, plg_cryptoctx, req_cryptoctx,
id_cryptoctx, msg_type,
require_crl_checking,
vfy_buf, vfy_buf_len,
data, data_len, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (!retval)
pkiDebug("PKCS7 Verification Success\n");
else {
pkiDebug("PKCS7 Verification Failure\n");
goto cleanup;
}
retval = 0;
cleanup:
if (p7 != NULL)
PKCS7_free(p7);
if (out != NULL)
BIO_free(out);
free(tmp_buf);
free(tmp_buf2);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: Fix PKINIT cert matching data construction
Rewrite X509_NAME_oneline_ex() and its call sites to use dynamic
allocation and to perform proper error checking.
ticket: 8617
target_version: 1.16
target_version: 1.15-next
target_version: 1.14-next
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 60,726
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool tcp_v6_inbound_md5_hash(const struct sock *sk,
const struct sk_buff *skb)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG
const __u8 *hash_location = NULL;
struct tcp_md5sig_key *hash_expected;
const struct ipv6hdr *ip6h = ipv6_hdr(skb);
const struct tcphdr *th = tcp_hdr(skb);
int genhash;
u8 newhash[16];
hash_expected = tcp_v6_md5_do_lookup(sk, &ip6h->saddr);
hash_location = tcp_parse_md5sig_option(th);
/* We've parsed the options - do we have a hash? */
if (!hash_expected && !hash_location)
return false;
if (hash_expected && !hash_location) {
NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPMD5NOTFOUND);
return true;
}
if (!hash_expected && hash_location) {
NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPMD5UNEXPECTED);
return true;
}
/* check the signature */
genhash = tcp_v6_md5_hash_skb(newhash,
hash_expected,
NULL, skb);
if (genhash || memcmp(hash_location, newhash, 16) != 0) {
net_info_ratelimited("MD5 Hash %s for [%pI6c]:%u->[%pI6c]:%u\n",
genhash ? "failed" : "mismatch",
&ip6h->saddr, ntohs(th->source),
&ip6h->daddr, ntohs(th->dest));
return true;
}
#endif
return false;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: add complete rcu protection around np->opt
This patch addresses multiple problems :
UDP/RAW sendmsg() need to get a stable struct ipv6_txoptions
while socket is not locked : Other threads can change np->opt
concurrently. Dmitry posted a syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller) program desmonstrating
use-after-free.
Starting with TCP/DCCP lockless listeners, tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock()
and dccp_v6_request_recv_sock() also need to use RCU protection
to dereference np->opt once (before calling ipv6_dup_options())
This patch adds full RCU protection to np->opt
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 53,725
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GC_API void * GC_CALL GC_realloc(void * p, size_t lb)
{
struct hblk * h;
hdr * hhdr;
size_t sz; /* Current size in bytes */
size_t orig_sz; /* Original sz in bytes */
int obj_kind;
if (p == 0) return(GC_malloc(lb)); /* Required by ANSI */
h = HBLKPTR(p);
hhdr = HDR(h);
sz = hhdr -> hb_sz;
obj_kind = hhdr -> hb_obj_kind;
orig_sz = sz;
if (sz > MAXOBJBYTES) {
/* Round it up to the next whole heap block */
word descr;
sz = (sz+HBLKSIZE-1) & (~HBLKMASK);
hhdr -> hb_sz = sz;
descr = GC_obj_kinds[obj_kind].ok_descriptor;
if (GC_obj_kinds[obj_kind].ok_relocate_descr) descr += sz;
hhdr -> hb_descr = descr;
# ifdef MARK_BIT_PER_OBJ
GC_ASSERT(hhdr -> hb_inv_sz == LARGE_INV_SZ);
# else
GC_ASSERT(hhdr -> hb_large_block &&
hhdr -> hb_map[ANY_INDEX] == 1);
# endif
if (IS_UNCOLLECTABLE(obj_kind)) GC_non_gc_bytes += (sz - orig_sz);
/* Extra area is already cleared by GC_alloc_large_and_clear. */
}
if (ADD_SLOP(lb) <= sz) {
if (lb >= (sz >> 1)) {
# ifdef STUBBORN_ALLOC
if (obj_kind == STUBBORN) GC_change_stubborn(p);
# endif
if (orig_sz > lb) {
/* Clear unneeded part of object to avoid bogus pointer */
/* tracing. */
/* Safe for stubborn objects. */
BZERO(((ptr_t)p) + lb, orig_sz - lb);
}
return(p);
} else {
/* shrink */
void * result =
GC_generic_or_special_malloc((word)lb, obj_kind);
if (result == 0) return(0);
/* Could also return original object. But this */
/* gives the client warning of imminent disaster. */
BCOPY(p, result, lb);
# ifndef IGNORE_FREE
GC_free(p);
# endif
return(result);
}
} else {
/* grow */
void * result =
GC_generic_or_special_malloc((word)lb, obj_kind);
if (result == 0) return(0);
BCOPY(p, result, sz);
# ifndef IGNORE_FREE
GC_free(p);
# endif
return(result);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix allocation size overflows due to rounding.
* malloc.c (GC_generic_malloc): Check if the allocation size is
rounded to a smaller value.
* mallocx.c (GC_generic_malloc_ignore_off_page): Likewise.
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 94,302
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::RunJavaScriptMessage(
RenderViewHost* rvh,
const string16& message,
const string16& default_prompt,
const GURL& frame_url,
JavaScriptMessageType javascript_message_type,
bool user_gesture,
IPC::Message* reply_msg,
bool* did_suppress_message) {
bool suppress_this_message =
static_cast<RenderViewHostImpl*>(rvh)->is_swapped_out() ||
ShowingInterstitialPage() ||
!delegate_ ||
delegate_->ShouldSuppressDialogs() ||
!delegate_->GetJavaScriptDialogManager();
if (!suppress_this_message) {
std::string accept_lang = GetContentClient()->browser()->
GetAcceptLangs(GetBrowserContext());
dialog_manager_ = delegate_->GetJavaScriptDialogManager();
dialog_manager_->RunJavaScriptDialog(
this,
frame_url.GetOrigin(),
accept_lang,
javascript_message_type,
message,
default_prompt,
user_gesture,
base::Bind(&WebContentsImpl::OnDialogClosed,
base::Unretained(this),
rvh,
reply_msg),
&suppress_this_message);
}
if (suppress_this_message) {
OnDialogClosed(rvh, reply_msg, false, string16());
}
*did_suppress_message = suppress_this_message;
}
Commit Message: Delete unneeded pending entries in DidFailProvisionalLoad to prevent a spoof.
BUG=280512
BUG=278899
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23978003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@222146 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 111,599
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ptrace_unfreeze_traced(struct task_struct *task)
{
if (task->state != __TASK_TRACED)
return;
WARN_ON(!task->ptrace || task->parent != current);
spin_lock_irq(&task->sighand->siglock);
if (__fatal_signal_pending(task))
wake_up_state(task, __TASK_TRACED);
else
task->state = TASK_TRACED;
spin_unlock_irq(&task->sighand->siglock);
}
Commit Message: exec/ptrace: fix get_dumpable() incorrect tests
The get_dumpable() return value is not boolean. Most users of the
function actually want to be testing for non-SUID_DUMP_USER(1) rather than
SUID_DUMP_DISABLE(0). The SUID_DUMP_ROOT(2) is also considered a
protected state. Almost all places did this correctly, excepting the two
places fixed in this patch.
Wrong logic:
if (dumpable == SUID_DUMP_DISABLE) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (dumpable == 0) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (!dumpable) { /* be protective */ }
Correct logic:
if (dumpable != SUID_DUMP_USER) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (dumpable != 1) { /* be protective */ }
Without this patch, if the system had set the sysctl fs/suid_dumpable=2, a
user was able to ptrace attach to processes that had dropped privileges to
that user. (This may have been partially mitigated if Yama was enabled.)
The macros have been moved into the file that declares get/set_dumpable(),
which means things like the ia64 code can see them too.
CVE-2013-2929
Reported-by: Vasily Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 30,958
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GURL GetFileResourceUrl(const std::string& resource_id,
const std::string& file_name) {
std::string url(base::StringPrintf(
"%s:%s",
chrome::kDriveScheme,
net::EscapePath(resource_id).c_str()));
return GURL(url);
}
Commit Message: Revert 144993 - gdata: Remove invalid files in the cache directories
Broke linux_chromeos_valgrind:
http://build.chromium.org/p/chromium.memory.fyi/builders/Chromium%20OS%20%28valgrind%29%285%29/builds/8628/steps/memory%20test%3A%20unit/logs/stdio
In theory, we shouldn't have any invalid files left in the
cache directories, but things can go wrong and invalid files
may be left if the device shuts down unexpectedly, for instance.
Besides, it's good to be defensive.
BUG=134862
TEST=added unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10693020
TBR=satorux@chromium.org
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145029 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 105,981
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int netdev_walk_all_lower_dev_rcu(struct net_device *dev,
int (*fn)(struct net_device *dev,
void *data),
void *data)
{
struct net_device *ldev;
struct list_head *iter;
int ret;
for (iter = &dev->adj_list.lower,
ldev = netdev_next_lower_dev_rcu(dev, &iter);
ldev;
ldev = netdev_next_lower_dev_rcu(dev, &iter)) {
/* first is the lower device itself */
ret = fn(ldev, data);
if (ret)
return ret;
/* then look at all of its lower devices */
ret = netdev_walk_all_lower_dev_rcu(ldev, fn, data);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: tun: call dev_get_valid_name() before register_netdevice()
register_netdevice() could fail early when we have an invalid
dev name, in which case ->ndo_uninit() is not called. For tun
device, this is a problem because a timer etc. are already
initialized and it expects ->ndo_uninit() to clean them up.
We could move these initializations into a ->ndo_init() so
that register_netdevice() knows better, however this is still
complicated due to the logic in tun_detach().
Therefore, I choose to just call dev_get_valid_name() before
register_netdevice(), which is quicker and much easier to audit.
And for this specific case, it is already enough.
Fixes: 96442e42429e ("tuntap: choose the txq based on rxq")
Reported-by: Dmitry Alexeev <avekceeb@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 93,437
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pipe_iov_copy_from_user(void *to, struct iovec *iov, unsigned long len,
int atomic)
{
unsigned long copy;
while (len > 0) {
while (!iov->iov_len)
iov++;
copy = min_t(unsigned long, len, iov->iov_len);
if (atomic) {
if (__copy_from_user_inatomic(to, iov->iov_base, copy))
return -EFAULT;
} else {
if (copy_from_user(to, iov->iov_base, copy))
return -EFAULT;
}
to += copy;
len -= copy;
iov->iov_base += copy;
iov->iov_len -= copy;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: switch pipe_read() to copy_page_to_iter()
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-17
| 0
| 94,614
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: trace_event_buffer_lock_reserve(struct ring_buffer **current_rb,
struct trace_event_file *trace_file,
int type, unsigned long len,
unsigned long flags, int pc)
{
struct ring_buffer_event *entry;
int val;
*current_rb = trace_file->tr->trace_buffer.buffer;
if (!ring_buffer_time_stamp_abs(*current_rb) && (trace_file->flags &
(EVENT_FILE_FL_SOFT_DISABLED | EVENT_FILE_FL_FILTERED)) &&
(entry = this_cpu_read(trace_buffered_event))) {
/* Try to use the per cpu buffer first */
val = this_cpu_inc_return(trace_buffered_event_cnt);
if (val == 1) {
trace_event_setup(entry, type, flags, pc);
entry->array[0] = len;
return entry;
}
this_cpu_dec(trace_buffered_event_cnt);
}
entry = __trace_buffer_lock_reserve(*current_rb,
type, len, flags, pc);
/*
* If tracing is off, but we have triggers enabled
* we still need to look at the event data. Use the temp_buffer
* to store the trace event for the tigger to use. It's recusive
* safe and will not be recorded anywhere.
*/
if (!entry && trace_file->flags & EVENT_FILE_FL_TRIGGER_COND) {
*current_rb = temp_buffer;
entry = __trace_buffer_lock_reserve(*current_rb,
type, len, flags, pc);
}
return entry;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 81,392
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChromeContentClient::SetGpuInfo(const content::GPUInfo& gpu_info) {
child_process_logging::SetGpuInfo(gpu_info);
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 106,677
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int finish_port_resume(struct usb_device *udev)
{
int status = 0;
u16 devstatus = 0;
/* caller owns the udev device lock */
dev_dbg(&udev->dev, "%s\n",
udev->reset_resume ? "finish reset-resume" : "finish resume");
/* usb ch9 identifies four variants of SUSPENDED, based on what
* state the device resumes to. Linux currently won't see the
* first two on the host side; they'd be inside hub_port_init()
* during many timeouts, but hub_wq can't suspend until later.
*/
usb_set_device_state(udev, udev->actconfig
? USB_STATE_CONFIGURED
: USB_STATE_ADDRESS);
/* 10.5.4.5 says not to reset a suspended port if the attached
* device is enabled for remote wakeup. Hence the reset
* operation is carried out here, after the port has been
* resumed.
*/
if (udev->reset_resume) {
/*
* If the device morphs or switches modes when it is reset,
* we don't want to perform a reset-resume. We'll fail the
* resume, which will cause a logical disconnect, and then
* the device will be rediscovered.
*/
retry_reset_resume:
if (udev->quirks & USB_QUIRK_RESET)
status = -ENODEV;
else
status = usb_reset_and_verify_device(udev);
}
/* 10.5.4.5 says be sure devices in the tree are still there.
* For now let's assume the device didn't go crazy on resume,
* and device drivers will know about any resume quirks.
*/
if (status == 0) {
devstatus = 0;
status = usb_get_status(udev, USB_RECIP_DEVICE, 0, &devstatus);
/* If a normal resume failed, try doing a reset-resume */
if (status && !udev->reset_resume && udev->persist_enabled) {
dev_dbg(&udev->dev, "retry with reset-resume\n");
udev->reset_resume = 1;
goto retry_reset_resume;
}
}
if (status) {
dev_dbg(&udev->dev, "gone after usb resume? status %d\n",
status);
/*
* There are a few quirky devices which violate the standard
* by claiming to have remote wakeup enabled after a reset,
* which crash if the feature is cleared, hence check for
* udev->reset_resume
*/
} else if (udev->actconfig && !udev->reset_resume) {
if (udev->speed < USB_SPEED_SUPER) {
if (devstatus & (1 << USB_DEVICE_REMOTE_WAKEUP))
status = usb_disable_remote_wakeup(udev);
} else {
status = usb_get_status(udev, USB_RECIP_INTERFACE, 0,
&devstatus);
if (!status && devstatus & (USB_INTRF_STAT_FUNC_RW_CAP
| USB_INTRF_STAT_FUNC_RW))
status = usb_disable_remote_wakeup(udev);
}
if (status)
dev_dbg(&udev->dev,
"disable remote wakeup, status %d\n",
status);
status = 0;
}
return status;
}
Commit Message: USB: fix invalid memory access in hub_activate()
Commit 8520f38099cc ("USB: change hub initialization sleeps to
delayed_work") changed the hub_activate() routine to make part of it
run in a workqueue. However, the commit failed to take a reference to
the usb_hub structure or to lock the hub interface while doing so. As
a result, if a hub is plugged in and quickly unplugged before the work
routine can run, the routine will try to access memory that has been
deallocated. Or, if the hub is unplugged while the routine is
running, the memory may be deallocated while it is in active use.
This patch fixes the problem by taking a reference to the usb_hub at
the start of hub_activate() and releasing it at the end (when the work
is finished), and by locking the hub interface while the work routine
is running. It also adds a check at the start of the routine to see
if the hub has already been disconnected, in which nothing should be
done.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Reported-by: Alexandru Cornea <alexandru.cornea@intel.com>
Tested-by: Alexandru Cornea <alexandru.cornea@intel.com>
Fixes: 8520f38099cc ("USB: change hub initialization sleeps to delayed_work")
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 56,737
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: spawn_sh_sync(WebKitWebView *web_view, GArray *argv, GString *result) {
(void)web_view; (void)result;
if (!uzbl.behave.shell_cmd) {
g_printerr ("spawn_sh_sync: shell_cmd is not set!\n");
return;
}
guint i;
gchar *spacer = g_strdup("");
g_array_insert_val(argv, 1, spacer);
gchar **cmd = split_quoted(uzbl.behave.shell_cmd, TRUE);
for (i = 1; i < g_strv_length(cmd); i++)
g_array_prepend_val(argv, cmd[i]);
if (cmd) run_command(cmd[0], g_strv_length(cmd) + 1, (const gchar **) argv->data,
TRUE, &uzbl.comm.sync_stdout);
g_free (spacer);
g_strfreev (cmd);
}
Commit Message: disable Uzbl javascript object because of security problem.
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 18,407
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void inet_csk_delete_keepalive_timer(struct sock *sk)
{
sk_stop_timer(sk, &sk->sk_timer);
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 18,876
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: blink::WebPlugin* RenderFrameImpl::CreatePlugin(
blink::WebFrame* frame,
const WebPluginInfo& info,
const blink::WebPluginParams& params) {
DCHECK_EQ(frame_, frame);
#if defined(ENABLE_PLUGINS)
bool pepper_plugin_was_registered = false;
scoped_refptr<PluginModule> pepper_module(PluginModule::Create(
this, info, &pepper_plugin_was_registered));
if (pepper_plugin_was_registered) {
if (pepper_module.get()) {
return new PepperWebPluginImpl(pepper_module.get(), params, this);
}
}
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
LOG(WARNING) << "Pepper module/plugin creation failed.";
return NULL;
#else
return new WebPluginImpl(frame, params, info.path, render_view_, this);
#endif
#else
return NULL;
#endif
}
Commit Message: Add logging to figure out which IPC we're failing to deserialize in RenderFrame.
BUG=369553
R=creis@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/263833020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@268565 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 110,143
|
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