instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
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| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OnMessage(const std::string& message) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
if (agent_host_.get())
agent_host_->DispatchProtocolMessage(this, message);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: check Host header for being IP or localhost when connecting over RDP.
Bug: 813540
Change-Id: I9338aa2475c15090b8a60729be25502eb866efb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/952522
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#541547}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 148,257
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LocalFrameClientImpl::ConsumeUserActivation() {
DCHECK(web_frame_->Client());
web_frame_->Client()->UpdateUserActivationState(
UserActivationUpdateType::kConsumeTransientActivation);
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 145,209
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MockMultibufferDataSource(
const scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner>& task_runner,
scoped_refptr<UrlData> url_data,
BufferedDataSourceHost* host)
: MultibufferDataSource(
task_runner,
std::move(url_data),
&media_log_,
host,
base::Bind(&MockMultibufferDataSource::set_downloading,
base::Unretained(this))),
downloading_(false) {}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 144,261
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderViewHostImpl::OnStartContentIntent(const GURL& content_url) {
if (GetView())
GetView()->StartContentIntent(content_url);
}
Commit Message: Filter more incoming URLs in the CreateWindow path.
BUG=170532
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12036002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@178728 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 117,273
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: _XcursorFileHeaderCreate (int ntoc)
{
XcursorFileHeader *fileHeader;
if (ntoc > 0x10000)
return NULL;
fileHeader = malloc (sizeof (XcursorFileHeader) +
ntoc * sizeof (XcursorFileToc));
if (!fileHeader)
return NULL;
fileHeader->magic = XCURSOR_MAGIC;
fileHeader->header = XCURSOR_FILE_HEADER_LEN;
fileHeader->version = XCURSOR_FILE_VERSION;
fileHeader->ntoc = ntoc;
fileHeader->tocs = (XcursorFileToc *) (fileHeader + 1);
return fileHeader;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 1,390
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: encode_UNROLL_XLATE(const struct ofpact_unroll_xlate *unroll OVS_UNUSED,
enum ofp_version ofp_version OVS_UNUSED,
struct ofpbuf *out OVS_UNUSED)
{
OVS_NOT_REACHED();
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 76,908
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Magick_Orientation_from_Exif_Orientation(const int orientation)
{
switch (orientation)
{
case 1:
return TopLeftOrientation;
case 2:
return TopRightOrientation;
case 3:
return BottomRightOrientation;
case 4:
return BottomLeftOrientation;
case 5:
return LeftTopOrientation;
case 6:
return RightTopOrientation;
case 7:
return RightBottomOrientation;
case 8:
return LeftBottomOrientation;
case 0:
default:
return UndefinedOrientation;
}
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1201
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 77,996
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: png_set_unknown_chunk_location(png_structp png_ptr, png_infop info_ptr,
int chunk, int location)
{
if (png_ptr != NULL && info_ptr != NULL && chunk >= 0 && chunk <
(int)info_ptr->unknown_chunks_num)
info_ptr->unknown_chunks[chunk].location = (png_byte)location;
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 131,419
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: mac_init (digest_hd_st * td, gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac, opaque * secret,
int secret_size, int ver)
{
int ret = 0;
if (mac == GNUTLS_MAC_NULL)
{
return GNUTLS_E_HASH_FAILED;
}
if (ver == GNUTLS_SSL3)
{ /* SSL 3.0 */
ret = _gnutls_mac_init_ssl3 (td, mac, secret, secret_size);
}
else
{ /* TLS 1.x */
ret = _gnutls_hmac_init (td, mac, secret, secret_size);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 11,316
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
{
STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
X509 *xtmp = NULL;
int i;
/* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x));
if (certs == NULL)
return NULL;
/* Look for exact match */
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x))
break;
}
if (i < sk_X509_num(certs))
CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
else
xtmp = NULL;
sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
return xtmp;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 8,735
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE2(timer_gettime, timer_t, timer_id,
struct __kernel_itimerspec __user *, setting)
{
struct itimerspec64 cur_setting;
int ret = do_timer_gettime(timer_id, &cur_setting);
if (!ret) {
if (put_itimerspec64(&cur_setting, setting))
ret = -EFAULT;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: posix-timers: Sanitize overrun handling
The posix timer overrun handling is broken because the forwarding functions
can return a huge number of overruns which does not fit in an int. As a
consequence timer_getoverrun(2) and siginfo::si_overrun can turn into
random number generators.
The k_clock::timer_forward() callbacks return a 64 bit value now. Make
k_itimer::ti_overrun[_last] 64bit as well, so the kernel internal
accounting is correct. 3Remove the temporary (int) casts.
Add a helper function which clamps the overrun value returned to user space
via timer_getoverrun(2) or siginfo::si_overrun limited to a positive value
between 0 and INT_MAX. INT_MAX is an indicator for user space that the
overrun value has been clamped.
Reported-by: Team OWL337 <icytxw@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180626132705.018623573@linutronix.de
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 81,146
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: irc_server_add_to_infolist (struct t_infolist *infolist,
struct t_irc_server *server)
{
struct t_infolist_item *ptr_item;
if (!infolist || !server)
return 0;
ptr_item = weechat_infolist_new_item (infolist);
if (!ptr_item)
return 0;
if (!weechat_infolist_new_var_string (ptr_item, "name", server->name))
return 0;
if (!weechat_infolist_new_var_pointer (ptr_item, "buffer", server->buffer))
return 0;
if (!weechat_infolist_new_var_string (ptr_item, "buffer_name",
(server->buffer) ?
weechat_buffer_get_string (server->buffer, "name") : ""))
return 0;
if (!weechat_infolist_new_var_string (ptr_item, "buffer_short_name",
(server->buffer) ?
weechat_buffer_get_string (server->buffer, "short_name") : ""))
return 0;
if (!weechat_infolist_new_var_string (ptr_item, "addresses",
IRC_SERVER_OPTION_STRING(server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_ADDRESSES)))
return 0;
if (!weechat_infolist_new_var_string (ptr_item, "proxy",
IRC_SERVER_OPTION_STRING(server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_PROXY)))
return 0;
if (!weechat_infolist_new_var_integer (ptr_item, "ipv6",
IRC_SERVER_OPTION_BOOLEAN(server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_IPV6)))
return 0;
if (!weechat_infolist_new_var_integer (ptr_item, "ssl",
IRC_SERVER_OPTION_BOOLEAN(server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_SSL)))
return 0;
if (!weechat_infolist_new_var_string (ptr_item, "ssl_cert",
IRC_SERVER_OPTION_STRING(server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_SSL_CERT)))
return 0;
if (!weechat_infolist_new_var_integer (ptr_item, "ssl_dhkey_size",
IRC_SERVER_OPTION_INTEGER(server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_SSL_DHKEY_SIZE)))
return 0;
if (!weechat_infolist_new_var_integer (ptr_item, "ssl_verify",
IRC_SERVER_OPTION_BOOLEAN(server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_SSL_VERIFY)))
return 0;
if (!weechat_infolist_new_var_string (ptr_item, "password",
IRC_SERVER_OPTION_STRING(server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_PASSWORD)))
return 0;
if (!weechat_infolist_new_var_integer (ptr_item, "sasl_mechanism",
IRC_SERVER_OPTION_INTEGER(server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_SASL_MECHANISM)))
return 0;
if (!weechat_infolist_new_var_string (ptr_item, "sasl_username",
IRC_SERVER_OPTION_STRING(server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_SASL_USERNAME)))
return 0;
if (!weechat_infolist_new_var_string (ptr_item, "sasl_password",
IRC_SERVER_OPTION_STRING(server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_SASL_PASSWORD)))
return 0;
if (!weechat_infolist_new_var_integer (ptr_item, "autoconnect",
IRC_SERVER_OPTION_BOOLEAN(server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_AUTOCONNECT)))
return 0;
if (!weechat_infolist_new_var_integer (ptr_item, "autoreconnect",
IRC_SERVER_OPTION_BOOLEAN(server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_AUTORECONNECT)))
return 0;
if (!weechat_infolist_new_var_integer (ptr_item, "autoreconnect_delay",
IRC_SERVER_OPTION_INTEGER(server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_AUTORECONNECT_DELAY)))
return 0;
if (!weechat_infolist_new_var_string (ptr_item, "nicks",
IRC_SERVER_OPTION_STRING(server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_NICKS)))
return 0;
if (!weechat_infolist_new_var_string (ptr_item, "username",
IRC_SERVER_OPTION_STRING(server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_USERNAME)))
return 0;
if (!weechat_infolist_new_var_string (ptr_item, "realname",
IRC_SERVER_OPTION_STRING(server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_REALNAME)))
return 0;
if (!weechat_infolist_new_var_string (ptr_item, "local_hostname",
IRC_SERVER_OPTION_STRING(server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_LOCAL_HOSTNAME)))
return 0;
if (!weechat_infolist_new_var_string (ptr_item, "command",
IRC_SERVER_OPTION_STRING(server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_COMMAND)))
return 0;
if (!weechat_infolist_new_var_integer (ptr_item, "command_delay",
IRC_SERVER_OPTION_INTEGER(server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_COMMAND_DELAY)))
return 0;
if (!weechat_infolist_new_var_string (ptr_item, "autojoin",
IRC_SERVER_OPTION_STRING(server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_AUTOJOIN)))
return 0;
if (!weechat_infolist_new_var_integer (ptr_item, "autorejoin",
IRC_SERVER_OPTION_BOOLEAN(server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_AUTOREJOIN)))
return 0;
if (!weechat_infolist_new_var_integer (ptr_item, "autorejoin_delay",
IRC_SERVER_OPTION_INTEGER(server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_AUTOREJOIN_DELAY)))
return 0;
if (!weechat_infolist_new_var_integer (ptr_item, "connection_timeout",
IRC_SERVER_OPTION_INTEGER(server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_CONNECTION_TIMEOUT)))
return 0;
if (!weechat_infolist_new_var_integer (ptr_item, "anti_flood_prio_high",
IRC_SERVER_OPTION_INTEGER(server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_ANTI_FLOOD_PRIO_HIGH)))
return 0;
if (!weechat_infolist_new_var_integer (ptr_item, "anti_flood_prio_low",
IRC_SERVER_OPTION_INTEGER(server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_ANTI_FLOOD_PRIO_LOW)))
return 0;
if (!weechat_infolist_new_var_integer (ptr_item, "away_check",
IRC_SERVER_OPTION_INTEGER(server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_AWAY_CHECK)))
return 0;
if (!weechat_infolist_new_var_integer (ptr_item, "away_check_max_nicks",
IRC_SERVER_OPTION_INTEGER(server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_AWAY_CHECK_MAX_NICKS)))
return 0;
if (!weechat_infolist_new_var_string (ptr_item, "default_msg_part",
IRC_SERVER_OPTION_STRING(server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_DEFAULT_MSG_PART)))
return 0;
if (!weechat_infolist_new_var_string (ptr_item, "default_msg_quit",
IRC_SERVER_OPTION_STRING(server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_DEFAULT_MSG_QUIT)))
return 0;
if (!weechat_infolist_new_var_integer (ptr_item, "temp_server", server->temp_server))
return 0;
if (!weechat_infolist_new_var_integer (ptr_item, "index_current_address", server->index_current_address))
return 0;
if (!weechat_infolist_new_var_string (ptr_item, "current_address", server->current_address))
return 0;
if (!weechat_infolist_new_var_string (ptr_item, "current_ip", server->current_ip))
return 0;
if (!weechat_infolist_new_var_integer (ptr_item, "current_port", server->current_port))
return 0;
if (!weechat_infolist_new_var_integer (ptr_item, "sock", server->sock))
return 0;
if (!weechat_infolist_new_var_integer (ptr_item, "is_connected", server->is_connected))
return 0;
if (!weechat_infolist_new_var_integer (ptr_item, "ssl_connected", server->ssl_connected))
return 0;
if (!weechat_infolist_new_var_string (ptr_item, "unterminated_message", server->unterminated_message))
return 0;
if (!weechat_infolist_new_var_string (ptr_item, "nick", server->nick))
return 0;
if (!weechat_infolist_new_var_string (ptr_item, "nick_modes", server->nick_modes))
return 0;
if (!weechat_infolist_new_var_string (ptr_item, "isupport", server->isupport))
return 0;
if (!weechat_infolist_new_var_string (ptr_item, "prefix_modes", server->prefix_modes))
return 0;
if (!weechat_infolist_new_var_string (ptr_item, "prefix_chars", server->prefix_chars))
return 0;
if (!weechat_infolist_new_var_integer (ptr_item, "reconnect_delay", server->reconnect_delay))
return 0;
if (!weechat_infolist_new_var_time (ptr_item, "reconnect_start", server->reconnect_start))
return 0;
if (!weechat_infolist_new_var_time (ptr_item, "command_time", server->command_time))
return 0;
if (!weechat_infolist_new_var_integer (ptr_item, "reconnect_join", server->reconnect_join))
return 0;
if (!weechat_infolist_new_var_integer (ptr_item, "disable_autojoin", server->disable_autojoin))
return 0;
if (!weechat_infolist_new_var_integer (ptr_item, "is_away", server->is_away))
return 0;
if (!weechat_infolist_new_var_string (ptr_item, "away_message", server->away_message))
return 0;
if (!weechat_infolist_new_var_time (ptr_item, "away_time", server->away_time))
return 0;
if (!weechat_infolist_new_var_integer (ptr_item, "lag", server->lag))
return 0;
if (!weechat_infolist_new_var_buffer (ptr_item, "lag_check_time", &(server->lag_check_time), sizeof (struct timeval)))
return 0;
if (!weechat_infolist_new_var_time (ptr_item, "lag_next_check", server->lag_next_check))
return 0;
if (!weechat_infolist_new_var_time (ptr_item, "lag_last_refresh", server->lag_last_refresh))
return 0;
if (!weechat_infolist_new_var_time (ptr_item, "last_user_message", server->last_user_message))
return 0;
if (!weechat_infolist_new_var_time (ptr_item, "last_away_check", server->last_away_check))
return 0;
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 3,464
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void boa_perror(request * req, const char *message)
{
log_error_doc(req);
perror(message); /* don't need to save errno because log_error_doc does */
send_r_error(req);
}
Commit Message: misc oom and possible memory leak fix
CWE ID:
| 0
| 91,841
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void usage(enum logcode F)
{
print_rsync_version(F);
rprintf(F,"\n");
rprintf(F,"rsync is a file transfer program capable of efficient remote update\n");
rprintf(F,"via a fast differencing algorithm.\n");
rprintf(F,"\n");
rprintf(F,"Usage: rsync [OPTION]... SRC [SRC]... DEST\n");
rprintf(F," or rsync [OPTION]... SRC [SRC]... [USER@]HOST:DEST\n");
rprintf(F," or rsync [OPTION]... SRC [SRC]... [USER@]HOST::DEST\n");
rprintf(F," or rsync [OPTION]... SRC [SRC]... rsync://[USER@]HOST[:PORT]/DEST\n");
rprintf(F," or rsync [OPTION]... [USER@]HOST:SRC [DEST]\n");
rprintf(F," or rsync [OPTION]... [USER@]HOST::SRC [DEST]\n");
rprintf(F," or rsync [OPTION]... rsync://[USER@]HOST[:PORT]/SRC [DEST]\n");
rprintf(F,"The ':' usages connect via remote shell, while '::' & 'rsync://' usages connect\n");
rprintf(F,"to an rsync daemon, and require SRC or DEST to start with a module name.\n");
rprintf(F,"\n");
rprintf(F,"Options\n");
rprintf(F," -v, --verbose increase verbosity\n");
rprintf(F," --info=FLAGS fine-grained informational verbosity\n");
rprintf(F," --debug=FLAGS fine-grained debug verbosity\n");
rprintf(F," --msgs2stderr special output handling for debugging\n");
rprintf(F," -q, --quiet suppress non-error messages\n");
rprintf(F," --no-motd suppress daemon-mode MOTD (see manpage caveat)\n");
rprintf(F," -c, --checksum skip based on checksum, not mod-time & size\n");
rprintf(F," -a, --archive archive mode; equals -rlptgoD (no -H,-A,-X)\n");
rprintf(F," --no-OPTION turn off an implied OPTION (e.g. --no-D)\n");
rprintf(F," -r, --recursive recurse into directories\n");
rprintf(F," -R, --relative use relative path names\n");
rprintf(F," --no-implied-dirs don't send implied dirs with --relative\n");
rprintf(F," -b, --backup make backups (see --suffix & --backup-dir)\n");
rprintf(F," --backup-dir=DIR make backups into hierarchy based in DIR\n");
rprintf(F," --suffix=SUFFIX set backup suffix (default %s w/o --backup-dir)\n",BACKUP_SUFFIX);
rprintf(F," -u, --update skip files that are newer on the receiver\n");
rprintf(F," --inplace update destination files in-place (SEE MAN PAGE)\n");
rprintf(F," --append append data onto shorter files\n");
rprintf(F," --append-verify like --append, but with old data in file checksum\n");
rprintf(F," -d, --dirs transfer directories without recursing\n");
rprintf(F," -l, --links copy symlinks as symlinks\n");
rprintf(F," -L, --copy-links transform symlink into referent file/dir\n");
rprintf(F," --copy-unsafe-links only \"unsafe\" symlinks are transformed\n");
rprintf(F," --safe-links ignore symlinks that point outside the source tree\n");
rprintf(F," --munge-links munge symlinks to make them safer (but unusable)\n");
rprintf(F," -k, --copy-dirlinks transform symlink to a dir into referent dir\n");
rprintf(F," -K, --keep-dirlinks treat symlinked dir on receiver as dir\n");
rprintf(F," -H, --hard-links preserve hard links\n");
rprintf(F," -p, --perms preserve permissions\n");
rprintf(F," -E, --executability preserve the file's executability\n");
rprintf(F," --chmod=CHMOD affect file and/or directory permissions\n");
#ifdef SUPPORT_ACLS
rprintf(F," -A, --acls preserve ACLs (implies --perms)\n");
#endif
#ifdef SUPPORT_XATTRS
rprintf(F," -X, --xattrs preserve extended attributes\n");
#endif
rprintf(F," -o, --owner preserve owner (super-user only)\n");
rprintf(F," -g, --group preserve group\n");
rprintf(F," --devices preserve device files (super-user only)\n");
rprintf(F," --specials preserve special files\n");
rprintf(F," -D same as --devices --specials\n");
rprintf(F," -t, --times preserve modification times\n");
rprintf(F," -O, --omit-dir-times omit directories from --times\n");
rprintf(F," -J, --omit-link-times omit symlinks from --times\n");
rprintf(F," --super receiver attempts super-user activities\n");
#ifdef SUPPORT_XATTRS
rprintf(F," --fake-super store/recover privileged attrs using xattrs\n");
#endif
rprintf(F," -S, --sparse turn sequences of nulls into sparse blocks\n");
#ifdef SUPPORT_PREALLOCATION
rprintf(F," --preallocate allocate dest files before writing them\n");
#else
rprintf(F," --preallocate pre-allocate dest files on remote receiver\n");
#endif
rprintf(F," -n, --dry-run perform a trial run with no changes made\n");
rprintf(F," -W, --whole-file copy files whole (without delta-xfer algorithm)\n");
rprintf(F," --checksum-choice=STR choose the checksum algorithms\n");
rprintf(F," -x, --one-file-system don't cross filesystem boundaries\n");
rprintf(F," -B, --block-size=SIZE force a fixed checksum block-size\n");
rprintf(F," -e, --rsh=COMMAND specify the remote shell to use\n");
rprintf(F," --rsync-path=PROGRAM specify the rsync to run on the remote machine\n");
rprintf(F," --existing skip creating new files on receiver\n");
rprintf(F," --ignore-existing skip updating files that already exist on receiver\n");
rprintf(F," --remove-source-files sender removes synchronized files (non-dirs)\n");
rprintf(F," --del an alias for --delete-during\n");
rprintf(F," --delete delete extraneous files from destination dirs\n");
rprintf(F," --delete-before receiver deletes before transfer, not during\n");
rprintf(F," --delete-during receiver deletes during the transfer\n");
rprintf(F," --delete-delay find deletions during, delete after\n");
rprintf(F," --delete-after receiver deletes after transfer, not during\n");
rprintf(F," --delete-excluded also delete excluded files from destination dirs\n");
rprintf(F," --ignore-missing-args ignore missing source args without error\n");
rprintf(F," --delete-missing-args delete missing source args from destination\n");
rprintf(F," --ignore-errors delete even if there are I/O errors\n");
rprintf(F," --force force deletion of directories even if not empty\n");
rprintf(F," --max-delete=NUM don't delete more than NUM files\n");
rprintf(F," --max-size=SIZE don't transfer any file larger than SIZE\n");
rprintf(F," --min-size=SIZE don't transfer any file smaller than SIZE\n");
rprintf(F," --partial keep partially transferred files\n");
rprintf(F," --partial-dir=DIR put a partially transferred file into DIR\n");
rprintf(F," --delay-updates put all updated files into place at transfer's end\n");
rprintf(F," -m, --prune-empty-dirs prune empty directory chains from the file-list\n");
rprintf(F," --numeric-ids don't map uid/gid values by user/group name\n");
rprintf(F," --usermap=STRING custom username mapping\n");
rprintf(F," --groupmap=STRING custom groupname mapping\n");
rprintf(F," --chown=USER:GROUP simple username/groupname mapping\n");
rprintf(F," --timeout=SECONDS set I/O timeout in seconds\n");
rprintf(F," --contimeout=SECONDS set daemon connection timeout in seconds\n");
rprintf(F," -I, --ignore-times don't skip files that match in size and mod-time\n");
rprintf(F," -M, --remote-option=OPTION send OPTION to the remote side only\n");
rprintf(F," --size-only skip files that match in size\n");
rprintf(F," -@, --modify-window=NUM set the accuracy for mod-time comparisons\n");
rprintf(F," -T, --temp-dir=DIR create temporary files in directory DIR\n");
rprintf(F," -y, --fuzzy find similar file for basis if no dest file\n");
rprintf(F," --compare-dest=DIR also compare destination files relative to DIR\n");
rprintf(F," --copy-dest=DIR ... and include copies of unchanged files\n");
rprintf(F," --link-dest=DIR hardlink to files in DIR when unchanged\n");
rprintf(F," -z, --compress compress file data during the transfer\n");
rprintf(F," --compress-level=NUM explicitly set compression level\n");
rprintf(F," --skip-compress=LIST skip compressing files with a suffix in LIST\n");
rprintf(F," -C, --cvs-exclude auto-ignore files the same way CVS does\n");
rprintf(F," -f, --filter=RULE add a file-filtering RULE\n");
rprintf(F," -F same as --filter='dir-merge /.rsync-filter'\n");
rprintf(F," repeated: --filter='- .rsync-filter'\n");
rprintf(F," --exclude=PATTERN exclude files matching PATTERN\n");
rprintf(F," --exclude-from=FILE read exclude patterns from FILE\n");
rprintf(F," --include=PATTERN don't exclude files matching PATTERN\n");
rprintf(F," --include-from=FILE read include patterns from FILE\n");
rprintf(F," --files-from=FILE read list of source-file names from FILE\n");
rprintf(F," -0, --from0 all *-from/filter files are delimited by 0s\n");
rprintf(F," -s, --protect-args no space-splitting; only wildcard special-chars\n");
rprintf(F," --address=ADDRESS bind address for outgoing socket to daemon\n");
rprintf(F," --port=PORT specify double-colon alternate port number\n");
rprintf(F," --sockopts=OPTIONS specify custom TCP options\n");
rprintf(F," --blocking-io use blocking I/O for the remote shell\n");
rprintf(F," --stats give some file-transfer stats\n");
rprintf(F," -8, --8-bit-output leave high-bit chars unescaped in output\n");
rprintf(F," -h, --human-readable output numbers in a human-readable format\n");
rprintf(F," --progress show progress during transfer\n");
rprintf(F," -P same as --partial --progress\n");
rprintf(F," -i, --itemize-changes output a change-summary for all updates\n");
rprintf(F," --out-format=FORMAT output updates using the specified FORMAT\n");
rprintf(F," --log-file=FILE log what we're doing to the specified FILE\n");
rprintf(F," --log-file-format=FMT log updates using the specified FMT\n");
rprintf(F," --password-file=FILE read daemon-access password from FILE\n");
rprintf(F," --list-only list the files instead of copying them\n");
rprintf(F," --bwlimit=RATE limit socket I/O bandwidth\n");
#ifdef HAVE_SETVBUF
rprintf(F," --outbuf=N|L|B set output buffering to None, Line, or Block\n");
#endif
rprintf(F," --write-batch=FILE write a batched update to FILE\n");
rprintf(F," --only-write-batch=FILE like --write-batch but w/o updating destination\n");
rprintf(F," --read-batch=FILE read a batched update from FILE\n");
rprintf(F," --protocol=NUM force an older protocol version to be used\n");
#ifdef ICONV_OPTION
rprintf(F," --iconv=CONVERT_SPEC request charset conversion of filenames\n");
#endif
rprintf(F," --checksum-seed=NUM set block/file checksum seed (advanced)\n");
rprintf(F," -4, --ipv4 prefer IPv4\n");
rprintf(F," -6, --ipv6 prefer IPv6\n");
rprintf(F," --version print version number\n");
rprintf(F,"(-h) --help show this help (-h is --help only if used alone)\n");
rprintf(F,"\n");
rprintf(F,"Use \"rsync --daemon --help\" to see the daemon-mode command-line options.\n");
rprintf(F,"Please see the rsync(1) and rsyncd.conf(5) man pages for full documentation.\n");
rprintf(F,"See http://rsync.samba.org/ for updates, bug reports, and answers\n");
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 11,877
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool SyncBackendHost::RequestClearServerData() {
core_thread_.message_loop()->PostTask(FROM_HERE,
NewRunnableMethod(core_.get(),
&SyncBackendHost::Core::DoRequestClearServerData));
return true;
}
Commit Message: Enable HistoryModelWorker by default, now that bug 69561 is fixed.
BUG=69561
TEST=Run sync manually and run integration tests, sync should not crash.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7016007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@85211 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 101,473
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void MessageService::PostMessageFromNativeProcess(int port_id,
const std::string& message) {
PostMessage(port_id, message);
}
Commit Message: Do not pass URLs in onUpdated events to extensions unless they have the
"tabs" permission.
BUG=168442
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11824004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176406 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 116,005
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int decode_attr_maxname(struct xdr_stream *xdr, uint32_t *bitmap, uint32_t *maxname)
{
__be32 *p;
int status = 0;
*maxname = 1024;
if (unlikely(bitmap[0] & (FATTR4_WORD0_MAXNAME - 1U)))
return -EIO;
if (likely(bitmap[0] & FATTR4_WORD0_MAXNAME)) {
READ_BUF(4);
READ32(*maxname);
bitmap[0] &= ~FATTR4_WORD0_MAXNAME;
}
dprintk("%s: maxname=%u\n", __func__, *maxname);
return status;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 22,992
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ASN1_TYPE_cmp(const ASN1_TYPE *a, const ASN1_TYPE *b)
{
int result = -1;
if (!a || !b || a->type != b->type)
return -1;
switch (a->type) {
case V_ASN1_OBJECT:
result = OBJ_cmp(a->value.object, b->value.object);
break;
case V_ASN1_BOOLEAN:
result = a->value.boolean - b->value.boolean;
break;
case V_ASN1_NULL:
result = 0; /* They do not have content. */
break;
case V_ASN1_INTEGER:
case V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER:
case V_ASN1_ENUMERATED:
case V_ASN1_NEG_ENUMERATED:
case V_ASN1_BIT_STRING:
case V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING:
case V_ASN1_SEQUENCE:
case V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING:
case V_ASN1_SEQUENCE:
case V_ASN1_SET:
case V_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING:
case V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING:
case V_ASN1_T61STRING:
case V_ASN1_VIDEOTEXSTRING:
case V_ASN1_IA5STRING:
case V_ASN1_UTCTIME:
case V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME:
case V_ASN1_GRAPHICSTRING:
case V_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING:
case V_ASN1_GENERALSTRING:
case V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING:
case V_ASN1_BMPSTRING:
case V_ASN1_UTF8STRING:
case V_ASN1_OTHER:
default:
result = ASN1_STRING_cmp((ASN1_STRING *)a->value.ptr,
(ASN1_STRING *)b->value.ptr);
break;
}
return result;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 165,211
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ffs_sb_make_inode(struct super_block *sb, void *data,
const struct file_operations *fops,
const struct inode_operations *iops,
struct ffs_file_perms *perms)
{
struct inode *inode;
ENTER();
inode = new_inode(sb);
if (likely(inode)) {
struct timespec current_time = CURRENT_TIME;
inode->i_ino = get_next_ino();
inode->i_mode = perms->mode;
inode->i_uid = perms->uid;
inode->i_gid = perms->gid;
inode->i_atime = current_time;
inode->i_mtime = current_time;
inode->i_ctime = current_time;
inode->i_private = data;
if (fops)
inode->i_fop = fops;
if (iops)
inode->i_op = iops;
}
return inode;
}
Commit Message: usb: gadget: f_fs: Fix use-after-free
When using asynchronous read or write operations on the USB endpoints the
issuer of the IO request is notified by calling the ki_complete() callback
of the submitted kiocb when the URB has been completed.
Calling this ki_complete() callback will free kiocb. Make sure that the
structure is no longer accessed beyond that point, otherwise undefined
behaviour might occur.
Fixes: 2e4c7553cd6f ("usb: gadget: f_fs: add aio support")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.15+
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 49,636
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GLuint GetShaderServiceID(GLuint client_id, PassthroughResources* resources) {
return resources->shader_id_map.GetServiceIDOrInvalid(client_id);
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 142,205
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: e1000e_intrmgr_delay_rx_causes(E1000ECore *core, uint32_t *causes)
{
uint32_t delayable_causes;
uint32_t rdtr = core->mac[RDTR];
uint32_t radv = core->mac[RADV];
uint32_t raid = core->mac[RAID];
if (msix_enabled(core->owner)) {
return false;
}
delayable_causes = E1000_ICR_RXQ0 |
E1000_ICR_RXQ1 |
E1000_ICR_RXT0;
if (!(core->mac[RFCTL] & E1000_RFCTL_ACK_DIS)) {
delayable_causes |= E1000_ICR_ACK;
}
/* Clean up all causes that may be delayed */
core->delayed_causes |= *causes & delayable_causes;
*causes &= ~delayable_causes;
/* Check if delayed RX interrupts disabled by client
or if there are causes that cannot be delayed */
if ((rdtr == 0) || (*causes != 0)) {
return false;
}
/* Check if delayed RX ACK interrupts disabled by client
and there is an ACK packet received */
if ((raid == 0) && (core->delayed_causes & E1000_ICR_ACK)) {
return false;
}
/* All causes delayed */
e1000e_intrmgr_rearm_timer(&core->rdtr);
if (!core->radv.running && (radv != 0)) {
e1000e_intrmgr_rearm_timer(&core->radv);
}
if (!core->raid.running && (core->delayed_causes & E1000_ICR_ACK)) {
e1000e_intrmgr_rearm_timer(&core->raid);
}
return true;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 5,981
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GpuCommandBufferStub::OnDestroyTransferBuffer(
int32 id,
IPC::Message* reply_message) {
TRACE_EVENT0("gpu", "GpuCommandBufferStub::OnDestroyTransferBuffer");
if (command_buffer_.get()) {
command_buffer_->DestroyTransferBuffer(id);
} else {
reply_message->set_reply_error();
}
Send(reply_message);
}
Commit Message: Sizes going across an IPC should be uint32.
BUG=164946
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11472038
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171944 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 115,314
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DownloadItemImpl::OffThreadCancel(DownloadFileManager* file_manager) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
request_handle_->CancelRequest();
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::FILE, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&DownloadFileManager::CancelDownload,
file_manager, download_id_));
}
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
R=asanka@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 106,136
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline struct userfaultfd_wait_queue *find_userfault_in(
wait_queue_head_t *wqh)
{
wait_queue_entry_t *wq;
struct userfaultfd_wait_queue *uwq;
lockdep_assert_held(&wqh->lock);
uwq = NULL;
if (!waitqueue_active(wqh))
goto out;
/* walk in reverse to provide FIFO behavior to read userfaults */
wq = list_last_entry(&wqh->head, typeof(*wq), entry);
uwq = container_of(wq, struct userfaultfd_wait_queue, wq);
out:
return uwq;
}
Commit Message: coredump: fix race condition between mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and core dumping
The core dumping code has always run without holding the mmap_sem for
writing, despite that is the only way to ensure that the entire vma
layout will not change from under it. Only using some signal
serialization on the processes belonging to the mm is not nearly enough.
This was pointed out earlier. For example in Hugh's post from Jul 2017:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1707191716030.2055@eggly.anvils
"Not strictly relevant here, but a related note: I was very surprised
to discover, only quite recently, how handle_mm_fault() may be called
without down_read(mmap_sem) - when core dumping. That seems a
misguided optimization to me, which would also be nice to correct"
In particular because the growsdown and growsup can move the
vm_start/vm_end the various loops the core dump does around the vma will
not be consistent if page faults can happen concurrently.
Pretty much all users calling mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and then
taking the mmap_sem had the potential to introduce unexpected side
effects in the core dumping code.
Adding mmap_sem for writing around the ->core_dump invocation is a
viable long term fix, but it requires removing all copy user and page
faults and to replace them with get_dump_page() for all binary formats
which is not suitable as a short term fix.
For the time being this solution manually covers the places that can
confuse the core dump either by altering the vma layout or the vma flags
while it runs. Once ->core_dump runs under mmap_sem for writing the
function mmget_still_valid() can be dropped.
Allowing mmap_sem protected sections to run in parallel with the
coredump provides some minor parallelism advantage to the swapoff code
(which seems to be safe enough by never mangling any vma field and can
keep doing swapins in parallel to the core dumping) and to some other
corner case.
In order to facilitate the backporting I added "Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6"
however the side effect of this same race condition in /proc/pid/mem
should be reproducible since before 2.6.12-rc2 so I couldn't add any
other "Fixes:" because there's no hash beyond the git genesis commit.
Because find_extend_vma() is the only location outside of the process
context that could modify the "mm" structures under mmap_sem for
reading, by adding the mmget_still_valid() check to it, all other cases
that take the mmap_sem for reading don't need the new check after
mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm(). The expand_stack() in page fault
context also doesn't need the new check, because all tasks under core
dumping are frozen.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325224949.11068-1-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 90,518
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF(const BIGNUM *b, int top,
unsigned char *buf, int idx,
int width)
{
size_t i, j;
if (top > b->top)
top = b->top; /* this works because 'buf' is explicitly
* zeroed */
for (i = 0, j = idx; i < top * sizeof b->d[0]; i++, j += width) {
buf[j] = ((unsigned char *)b->d)[i];
}
return 1;
unsigned char *buf, int idx,
static int MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_FROM_PREBUF(BIGNUM *b, int top,
unsigned char *buf, int idx,
int width)
{
size_t i, j;
if (bn_wexpand(b, top) == NULL)
return 0;
for (i = 0, j = idx; i < top * sizeof b->d[0]; i++, j += width) {
((unsigned char *)b->d)[i] = buf[j];
}
b->top = top;
if (!BN_is_odd(m)) {
BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_MONT_CONSTTIME, BN_R_CALLED_WITH_EVEN_MODULUS);
return (0);
}
top = m->top;
bits = BN_num_bits(p);
if (bits == 0) {
/* x**0 mod 1 is still zero. */
if (BN_is_one(m)) {
ret = 1;
BN_zero(rr);
} else {
ret = BN_one(rr);
}
return ret;
}
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
/*
* Allocate a montgomery context if it was not supplied by the caller. If
* this is not done, things will break in the montgomery part.
*/
if (in_mont != NULL)
mont = in_mont;
else {
if ((mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, m, ctx))
goto err;
}
#ifdef RSAZ_ENABLED
/*
* If the size of the operands allow it, perform the optimized
* RSAZ exponentiation. For further information see
* crypto/bn/rsaz_exp.c and accompanying assembly modules.
*/
if ((16 == a->top) && (16 == p->top) && (BN_num_bits(m) == 1024)
&& rsaz_avx2_eligible()) {
if (NULL == bn_wexpand(rr, 16))
goto err;
RSAZ_1024_mod_exp_avx2(rr->d, a->d, p->d, m->d, mont->RR.d,
mont->n0[0]);
rr->top = 16;
rr->neg = 0;
bn_correct_top(rr);
ret = 1;
goto err;
} else if ((8 == a->top) && (8 == p->top) && (BN_num_bits(m) == 512)) {
if (NULL == bn_wexpand(rr, 8))
goto err;
RSAZ_512_mod_exp(rr->d, a->d, p->d, m->d, mont->n0[0], mont->RR.d);
rr->top = 8;
rr->neg = 0;
bn_correct_top(rr);
ret = 1;
goto err;
}
#endif
/* Get the window size to use with size of p. */
window = BN_window_bits_for_ctime_exponent_size(bits);
#if defined(SPARC_T4_MONT)
if (window >= 5 && (top & 15) == 0 && top <= 64 &&
(OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[1] & (CFR_MONTMUL | CFR_MONTSQR)) ==
(CFR_MONTMUL | CFR_MONTSQR) && (t4 = OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[0]))
window = 5;
else
#endif
#if defined(OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT5)
if (window >= 5) {
window = 5; /* ~5% improvement for RSA2048 sign, and even
* for RSA4096 */
if ((top & 7) == 0)
powerbufLen += 2 * top * sizeof(m->d[0]);
}
#endif
(void)0;
/*
* Allocate a buffer large enough to hold all of the pre-computed powers
* of am, am itself and tmp.
*/
numPowers = 1 << window;
powerbufLen += sizeof(m->d[0]) * (top * numPowers +
((2 * top) >
numPowers ? (2 * top) : numPowers));
#ifdef alloca
if (powerbufLen < 3072)
powerbufFree =
alloca(powerbufLen + MOD_EXP_CTIME_MIN_CACHE_LINE_WIDTH);
else
#endif
if ((powerbufFree =
(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(powerbufLen +
MOD_EXP_CTIME_MIN_CACHE_LINE_WIDTH))
== NULL)
goto err;
powerbuf = MOD_EXP_CTIME_ALIGN(powerbufFree);
memset(powerbuf, 0, powerbufLen);
#ifdef alloca
if (powerbufLen < 3072)
powerbufFree = NULL;
#endif
/* lay down tmp and am right after powers table */
tmp.d = (BN_ULONG *)(powerbuf + sizeof(m->d[0]) * top * numPowers);
am.d = tmp.d + top;
tmp.top = am.top = 0;
tmp.dmax = am.dmax = top;
tmp.neg = am.neg = 0;
tmp.flags = am.flags = BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA;
/* prepare a^0 in Montgomery domain */
#if 1 /* by Shay Gueron's suggestion */
if (m->d[top - 1] & (((BN_ULONG)1) << (BN_BITS2 - 1))) {
/* 2^(top*BN_BITS2) - m */
tmp.d[0] = (0 - m->d[0]) & BN_MASK2;
for (i = 1; i < top; i++)
tmp.d[i] = (~m->d[i]) & BN_MASK2;
tmp.top = top;
} else
#endif
if (!BN_to_montgomery(&tmp, BN_value_one(), mont, ctx))
goto err;
/* prepare a^1 in Montgomery domain */
if (a->neg || BN_ucmp(a, m) >= 0) {
if (!BN_mod(&am, a, m, ctx))
goto err;
if (!BN_to_montgomery(&am, &am, mont, ctx))
goto err;
} else if (!BN_to_montgomery(&am, a, mont, ctx))
goto err;
#if defined(SPARC_T4_MONT)
if (t4) {
typedef int (*bn_pwr5_mont_f) (BN_ULONG *tp, const BN_ULONG *np,
const BN_ULONG *n0, const void *table,
int power, int bits);
int bn_pwr5_mont_t4_8(BN_ULONG *tp, const BN_ULONG *np,
const BN_ULONG *n0, const void *table,
int power, int bits);
int bn_pwr5_mont_t4_16(BN_ULONG *tp, const BN_ULONG *np,
const BN_ULONG *n0, const void *table,
int power, int bits);
int bn_pwr5_mont_t4_24(BN_ULONG *tp, const BN_ULONG *np,
const BN_ULONG *n0, const void *table,
int power, int bits);
int bn_pwr5_mont_t4_32(BN_ULONG *tp, const BN_ULONG *np,
const BN_ULONG *n0, const void *table,
int power, int bits);
static const bn_pwr5_mont_f pwr5_funcs[4] = {
bn_pwr5_mont_t4_8, bn_pwr5_mont_t4_16,
bn_pwr5_mont_t4_24, bn_pwr5_mont_t4_32
};
bn_pwr5_mont_f pwr5_worker = pwr5_funcs[top / 16 - 1];
typedef int (*bn_mul_mont_f) (BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap,
const void *bp, const BN_ULONG *np,
const BN_ULONG *n0);
int bn_mul_mont_t4_8(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const void *bp,
const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0);
int bn_mul_mont_t4_16(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap,
const void *bp, const BN_ULONG *np,
const BN_ULONG *n0);
int bn_mul_mont_t4_24(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap,
const void *bp, const BN_ULONG *np,
const BN_ULONG *n0);
int bn_mul_mont_t4_32(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap,
const void *bp, const BN_ULONG *np,
const BN_ULONG *n0);
static const bn_mul_mont_f mul_funcs[4] = {
bn_mul_mont_t4_8, bn_mul_mont_t4_16,
bn_mul_mont_t4_24, bn_mul_mont_t4_32
};
bn_mul_mont_f mul_worker = mul_funcs[top / 16 - 1];
void bn_mul_mont_vis3(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap,
const void *bp, const BN_ULONG *np,
const BN_ULONG *n0, int num);
void bn_mul_mont_t4(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap,
const void *bp, const BN_ULONG *np,
const BN_ULONG *n0, int num);
void bn_mul_mont_gather5_t4(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap,
const void *table, const BN_ULONG *np,
const BN_ULONG *n0, int num, int power);
void bn_flip_n_scatter5_t4(const BN_ULONG *inp, size_t num,
void *table, size_t power);
void bn_gather5_t4(BN_ULONG *out, size_t num,
void *table, size_t power);
void bn_flip_t4(BN_ULONG *dst, BN_ULONG *src, size_t num);
BN_ULONG *np = mont->N.d, *n0 = mont->n0;
int stride = 5 * (6 - (top / 16 - 1)); /* multiple of 5, but less
* than 32 */
/*
* BN_to_montgomery can contaminate words above .top [in
* BN_DEBUG[_DEBUG] build]...
*/
for (i = am.top; i < top; i++)
am.d[i] = 0;
for (i = tmp.top; i < top; i++)
tmp.d[i] = 0;
bn_flip_n_scatter5_t4(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, 0);
bn_flip_n_scatter5_t4(am.d, top, powerbuf, 1);
if (!(*mul_worker) (tmp.d, am.d, am.d, np, n0) &&
!(*mul_worker) (tmp.d, am.d, am.d, np, n0))
bn_mul_mont_vis3(tmp.d, am.d, am.d, np, n0, top);
bn_flip_n_scatter5_t4(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, 2);
for (i = 3; i < 32; i++) {
/* Calculate a^i = a^(i-1) * a */
if (!(*mul_worker) (tmp.d, tmp.d, am.d, np, n0) &&
!(*mul_worker) (tmp.d, tmp.d, am.d, np, n0))
bn_mul_mont_vis3(tmp.d, tmp.d, am.d, np, n0, top);
bn_flip_n_scatter5_t4(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, i);
}
/* switch to 64-bit domain */
np = alloca(top * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
top /= 2;
bn_flip_t4(np, mont->N.d, top);
bits--;
for (wvalue = 0, i = bits % 5; i >= 0; i--, bits--)
wvalue = (wvalue << 1) + BN_is_bit_set(p, bits);
bn_gather5_t4(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, wvalue);
/*
* Scan the exponent one window at a time starting from the most
* significant bits.
*/
while (bits >= 0) {
if (bits < stride)
stride = bits + 1;
bits -= stride;
wvalue = bn_get_bits(p, bits + 1);
if ((*pwr5_worker) (tmp.d, np, n0, powerbuf, wvalue, stride))
continue;
/* retry once and fall back */
if ((*pwr5_worker) (tmp.d, np, n0, powerbuf, wvalue, stride))
continue;
bits += stride - 5;
wvalue >>= stride - 5;
wvalue &= 31;
bn_mul_mont_t4(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top);
bn_mul_mont_t4(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top);
bn_mul_mont_t4(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top);
bn_mul_mont_t4(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top);
bn_mul_mont_t4(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top);
bn_mul_mont_gather5_t4(tmp.d, tmp.d, powerbuf, np, n0, top,
wvalue);
}
bn_flip_t4(tmp.d, tmp.d, top);
top *= 2;
/* back to 32-bit domain */
tmp.top = top;
bn_correct_top(&tmp);
OPENSSL_cleanse(np, top * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
} else
#endif
#if defined(OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT5)
if (window == 5 && top > 1) {
/*
* This optimization uses ideas from http://eprint.iacr.org/2011/239,
* specifically optimization of cache-timing attack countermeasures
* and pre-computation optimization.
*/
/*
* Dedicated window==4 case improves 512-bit RSA sign by ~15%, but as
* 512-bit RSA is hardly relevant, we omit it to spare size...
*/
void bn_mul_mont_gather5(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap,
const void *table, const BN_ULONG *np,
const BN_ULONG *n0, int num, int power);
void bn_scatter5(const BN_ULONG *inp, size_t num,
void *table, size_t power);
void bn_gather5(BN_ULONG *out, size_t num, void *table, size_t power);
void bn_power5(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap,
const void *table, const BN_ULONG *np,
const BN_ULONG *n0, int num, int power);
int bn_get_bits5(const BN_ULONG *ap, int off);
int bn_from_montgomery(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap,
const BN_ULONG *not_used, const BN_ULONG *np,
const BN_ULONG *n0, int num);
BN_ULONG *np = mont->N.d, *n0 = mont->n0, *np2;
/*
* BN_to_montgomery can contaminate words above .top [in
* BN_DEBUG[_DEBUG] build]...
*/
for (i = am.top; i < top; i++)
am.d[i] = 0;
for (i = tmp.top; i < top; i++)
tmp.d[i] = 0;
if (top & 7)
np2 = np;
else
for (np2 = am.d + top, i = 0; i < top; i++)
np2[2 * i] = np[i];
bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, 0);
bn_scatter5(am.d, am.top, powerbuf, 1);
bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, am.d, am.d, np, n0, top);
bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, 2);
# if 0
for (i = 3; i < 32; i++) {
/* Calculate a^i = a^(i-1) * a */
bn_mul_mont_gather5(tmp.d, am.d, powerbuf, np2, n0, top, i - 1);
bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, i);
}
# else
/* same as above, but uses squaring for 1/2 of operations */
for (i = 4; i < 32; i *= 2) {
bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top);
bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, i);
}
for (i = 3; i < 8; i += 2) {
int j;
bn_mul_mont_gather5(tmp.d, am.d, powerbuf, np2, n0, top, i - 1);
bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, i);
for (j = 2 * i; j < 32; j *= 2) {
bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top);
bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, j);
}
}
for (; i < 16; i += 2) {
bn_mul_mont_gather5(tmp.d, am.d, powerbuf, np2, n0, top, i - 1);
bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, i);
bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top);
bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, 2 * i);
}
for (; i < 32; i += 2) {
bn_mul_mont_gather5(tmp.d, am.d, powerbuf, np2, n0, top, i - 1);
bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, i);
}
# endif
bits--;
for (wvalue = 0, i = bits % 5; i >= 0; i--, bits--)
wvalue = (wvalue << 1) + BN_is_bit_set(p, bits);
bn_gather5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, wvalue);
/*
* Scan the exponent one window at a time starting from the most
* significant bits.
*/
if (top & 7)
while (bits >= 0) {
for (wvalue = 0, i = 0; i < 5; i++, bits--)
wvalue = (wvalue << 1) + BN_is_bit_set(p, bits);
bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top);
bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top);
bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top);
bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top);
bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top);
bn_mul_mont_gather5(tmp.d, tmp.d, powerbuf, np, n0, top,
wvalue);
} else {
while (bits >= 0) {
wvalue = bn_get_bits5(p->d, bits - 4);
bits -= 5;
bn_power5(tmp.d, tmp.d, powerbuf, np2, n0, top, wvalue);
}
}
ret = bn_from_montgomery(tmp.d, tmp.d, NULL, np2, n0, top);
tmp.top = top;
bn_correct_top(&tmp);
if (ret) {
if (!BN_copy(rr, &tmp))
ret = 0;
goto err; /* non-zero ret means it's not error */
}
} else
#endif
{
if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF(&tmp, top, powerbuf, 0, numPowers))
goto err;
if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF(&am, top, powerbuf, 1, numPowers))
goto err;
/*
* If the window size is greater than 1, then calculate
* val[i=2..2^winsize-1]. Powers are computed as a*a^(i-1) (even
* powers could instead be computed as (a^(i/2))^2 to use the slight
* performance advantage of sqr over mul).
*/
if (window > 1) {
if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(&tmp, &am, &am, mont, ctx))
goto err;
if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF
(&tmp, top, powerbuf, 2, numPowers))
goto err;
for (i = 3; i < numPowers; i++) {
/* Calculate a^i = a^(i-1) * a */
if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(&tmp, &am, &tmp, mont, ctx))
goto err;
if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF
(&tmp, top, powerbuf, i, numPowers))
goto err;
}
}
bits--;
for (wvalue = 0, i = bits % window; i >= 0; i--, bits--)
wvalue = (wvalue << 1) + BN_is_bit_set(p, bits);
if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_FROM_PREBUF
(&tmp, top, powerbuf, wvalue, numPowers))
goto err;
/*
* Scan the exponent one window at a time starting from the most
} else
#endif
{
if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF(&tmp, top, powerbuf, 0, numPowers))
goto err;
if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF(&am, top, powerbuf, 1, numPowers))
goto err;
/*
wvalue = (wvalue << 1) + BN_is_bit_set(p, bits);
}
/*
* Fetch the appropriate pre-computed value from the pre-buf
if (window > 1) {
if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(&tmp, &am, &am, mont, ctx))
goto err;
if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF
(&tmp, top, powerbuf, 2, numPowers))
goto err;
for (i = 3; i < numPowers; i++) {
/* Calculate a^i = a^(i-1) * a */
if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(&tmp, &am, &tmp, mont, ctx))
goto err;
if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF
(&tmp, top, powerbuf, i, numPowers))
goto err;
}
}
for (i = 1; i < top; i++)
bits--;
for (wvalue = 0, i = bits % window; i >= 0; i--, bits--)
wvalue = (wvalue << 1) + BN_is_bit_set(p, bits);
if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_FROM_PREBUF
(&tmp, top, powerbuf, wvalue, numPowers))
goto err;
/*
err:
if ((in_mont == NULL) && (mont != NULL))
BN_MONT_CTX_free(mont);
if (powerbuf != NULL) {
OPENSSL_cleanse(powerbuf, powerbufLen);
if (powerbufFree)
OPENSSL_free(powerbufFree);
}
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
return (ret);
}
int BN_mod_exp_mont_word(BIGNUM *rr, BN_ULONG a, const BIGNUM *p,
/*
* Fetch the appropriate pre-computed value from the pre-buf
*/
if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_FROM_PREBUF
(&am, top, powerbuf, wvalue, numPowers))
goto err;
/* Multiply the result into the intermediate result */
#define BN_MOD_MUL_WORD(r, w, m) \
(BN_mul_word(r, (w)) && \
(/* BN_ucmp(r, (m)) < 0 ? 1 :*/ \
(BN_mod(t, r, m, ctx) && (swap_tmp = r, r = t, t = swap_tmp, 1))))
/*
* BN_MOD_MUL_WORD is only used with 'w' large, so the BN_ucmp test is
* probably more overhead than always using BN_mod (which uses BN_copy if
* a similar test returns true).
*/
/*
* We can use BN_mod and do not need BN_nnmod because our accumulator is
* never negative (the result of BN_mod does not depend on the sign of
* the modulus).
*/
#define BN_TO_MONTGOMERY_WORD(r, w, mont) \
(BN_set_word(r, (w)) && BN_to_montgomery(r, r, (mont), ctx))
if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) {
/* BN_FLG_CONSTTIME only supported by BN_mod_exp_mont() */
BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_MONT_WORD, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return -1;
}
bn_check_top(p);
bn_check_top(m);
if (!BN_is_odd(m)) {
BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_MONT_WORD, BN_R_CALLED_WITH_EVEN_MODULUS);
return (0);
}
if (m->top == 1)
a %= m->d[0]; /* make sure that 'a' is reduced */
bits = BN_num_bits(p);
if (bits == 0) {
/* x**0 mod 1 is still zero. */
if (BN_is_one(m)) {
ret = 1;
BN_zero(rr);
} else {
ret = BN_one(rr);
}
return ret;
}
if (a == 0) {
BN_zero(rr);
ret = 1;
return ret;
}
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
d = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
r = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
t = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (d == NULL || r == NULL || t == NULL)
goto err;
if (in_mont != NULL)
mont = in_mont;
else {
if ((mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, m, ctx))
goto err;
}
r_is_one = 1; /* except for Montgomery factor */
/* bits-1 >= 0 */
/* The result is accumulated in the product r*w. */
w = a; /* bit 'bits-1' of 'p' is always set */
for (b = bits - 2; b >= 0; b--) {
/* First, square r*w. */
next_w = w * w;
if ((next_w / w) != w) { /* overflow */
if (r_is_one) {
if (!BN_TO_MONTGOMERY_WORD(r, w, mont))
goto err;
r_is_one = 0;
} else {
if (!BN_MOD_MUL_WORD(r, w, m))
goto err;
}
next_w = 1;
}
w = next_w;
if (!r_is_one) {
if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(r, r, r, mont, ctx))
goto err;
}
/* Second, multiply r*w by 'a' if exponent bit is set. */
if (BN_is_bit_set(p, b)) {
next_w = w * a;
if ((next_w / a) != w) { /* overflow */
if (r_is_one) {
if (!BN_TO_MONTGOMERY_WORD(r, w, mont))
goto err;
r_is_one = 0;
} else {
if (!BN_MOD_MUL_WORD(r, w, m))
goto err;
}
next_w = a;
}
w = next_w;
}
}
/* Finally, set r:=r*w. */
if (w != 1) {
if (r_is_one) {
if (!BN_TO_MONTGOMERY_WORD(r, w, mont))
goto err;
r_is_one = 0;
} else {
if (!BN_MOD_MUL_WORD(r, w, m))
goto err;
}
}
if (r_is_one) { /* can happen only if a == 1 */
if (!BN_one(rr))
goto err;
} else {
if (!BN_from_montgomery(rr, r, mont, ctx))
goto err;
}
ret = 1;
err:
if ((in_mont == NULL) && (mont != NULL))
BN_MONT_CTX_free(mont);
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
bn_check_top(rr);
return (ret);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 1
| 165,254
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void drop_collected_mounts(struct vfsmount *mnt)
{
namespace_lock();
lock_mount_hash();
umount_tree(real_mount(mnt), 0);
unlock_mount_hash();
namespace_unlock();
}
Commit Message: mnt: Correct permission checks in do_remount
While invesgiating the issue where in "mount --bind -oremount,ro ..."
would result in later "mount --bind -oremount,rw" succeeding even if
the mount started off locked I realized that there are several
additional mount flags that should be locked and are not.
In particular MNT_NOSUID, MNT_NODEV, MNT_NOEXEC, and the atime
flags in addition to MNT_READONLY should all be locked. These
flags are all per superblock, can all be changed with MS_BIND,
and should not be changable if set by a more privileged user.
The following additions to the current logic are added in this patch.
- nosuid may not be clearable by a less privileged user.
- nodev may not be clearable by a less privielged user.
- noexec may not be clearable by a less privileged user.
- atime flags may not be changeable by a less privileged user.
The logic with atime is that always setting atime on access is a
global policy and backup software and auditing software could break if
atime bits are not updated (when they are configured to be updated),
and serious performance degradation could result (DOS attack) if atime
updates happen when they have been explicitly disabled. Therefore an
unprivileged user should not be able to mess with the atime bits set
by a more privileged user.
The additional restrictions are implemented with the addition of
MNT_LOCK_NOSUID, MNT_LOCK_NODEV, MNT_LOCK_NOEXEC, and MNT_LOCK_ATIME
mnt flags.
Taken together these changes and the fixes for MNT_LOCK_READONLY
should make it safe for an unprivileged user to create a user
namespace and to call "mount --bind -o remount,... ..." without
the danger of mount flags being changed maliciously.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 36,199
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void recalculate_apic_map(struct kvm *kvm)
{
struct kvm_apic_map *new, *old = NULL;
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
int i;
new = kzalloc(sizeof(struct kvm_apic_map), GFP_KERNEL);
mutex_lock(&kvm->arch.apic_map_lock);
if (!new)
goto out;
new->ldr_bits = 8;
/* flat mode is default */
new->cid_shift = 8;
new->cid_mask = 0;
new->lid_mask = 0xff;
kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm) {
struct kvm_lapic *apic = vcpu->arch.apic;
u16 cid, lid;
u32 ldr;
if (!kvm_apic_present(vcpu))
continue;
/*
* All APICs have to be configured in the same mode by an OS.
* We take advatage of this while building logical id loockup
* table. After reset APICs are in xapic/flat mode, so if we
* find apic with different setting we assume this is the mode
* OS wants all apics to be in; build lookup table accordingly.
*/
if (apic_x2apic_mode(apic)) {
new->ldr_bits = 32;
new->cid_shift = 16;
new->cid_mask = new->lid_mask = 0xffff;
} else if (kvm_apic_sw_enabled(apic) &&
!new->cid_mask /* flat mode */ &&
kvm_apic_get_reg(apic, APIC_DFR) == APIC_DFR_CLUSTER) {
new->cid_shift = 4;
new->cid_mask = 0xf;
new->lid_mask = 0xf;
}
new->phys_map[kvm_apic_id(apic)] = apic;
ldr = kvm_apic_get_reg(apic, APIC_LDR);
cid = apic_cluster_id(new, ldr);
lid = apic_logical_id(new, ldr);
if (lid)
new->logical_map[cid][ffs(lid) - 1] = apic;
}
out:
old = rcu_dereference_protected(kvm->arch.apic_map,
lockdep_is_held(&kvm->arch.apic_map_lock));
rcu_assign_pointer(kvm->arch.apic_map, new);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->arch.apic_map_lock);
if (old)
kfree_rcu(old, rcu);
kvm_vcpu_request_scan_ioapic(kvm);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Convert vapic synchronization to _cached functions (CVE-2013-6368)
In kvm_lapic_sync_from_vapic and kvm_lapic_sync_to_vapic there is the
potential to corrupt kernel memory if userspace provides an address that
is at the end of a page. This patches concerts those functions to use
kvm_write_guest_cached and kvm_read_guest_cached. It also checks the
vapic_address specified by userspace during ioctl processing and returns
an error to userspace if the address is not a valid GPA.
This is generally not guest triggerable, because the required write is
done by firmware that runs before the guest. Also, it only affects AMD
processors and oldish Intel that do not have the FlexPriority feature
(unless you disable FlexPriority, of course; then newer processors are
also affected).
Fixes: b93463aa59d6 ('KVM: Accelerated apic support')
Reported-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 28,800
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: dispatch_cmd(conn c)
{
int r, i, timeout = -1;
size_t z;
unsigned int count;
job j;
unsigned char type;
char *size_buf, *delay_buf, *ttr_buf, *pri_buf, *end_buf, *name;
unsigned int pri, body_size;
usec delay, ttr;
uint64_t id;
tube t = NULL;
/* NUL-terminate this string so we can use strtol and friends */
c->cmd[c->cmd_len - 2] = '\0';
/* check for possible maliciousness */
if (strlen(c->cmd) != c->cmd_len - 2) {
return reply_msg(c, MSG_BAD_FORMAT);
}
type = which_cmd(c);
dprintf("got %s command: \"%s\"\n", op_names[(int) type], c->cmd);
switch (type) {
case OP_PUT:
r = read_pri(&pri, c->cmd + 4, &delay_buf);
if (r) return reply_msg(c, MSG_BAD_FORMAT);
r = read_delay(&delay, delay_buf, &ttr_buf);
if (r) return reply_msg(c, MSG_BAD_FORMAT);
r = read_ttr(&ttr, ttr_buf, &size_buf);
if (r) return reply_msg(c, MSG_BAD_FORMAT);
errno = 0;
body_size = strtoul(size_buf, &end_buf, 10);
if (errno) return reply_msg(c, MSG_BAD_FORMAT);
if (body_size > job_data_size_limit) {
return reply_msg(c, MSG_JOB_TOO_BIG);
}
/* don't allow trailing garbage */
if (end_buf[0] != '\0') return reply_msg(c, MSG_BAD_FORMAT);
conn_set_producer(c);
c->in_job = make_job(pri, delay, ttr ? : 1, body_size + 2, c->use);
/* OOM? */
if (!c->in_job) {
/* throw away the job body and respond with OUT_OF_MEMORY */
twarnx("server error: " MSG_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
return skip(c, body_size + 2, MSG_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
}
fill_extra_data(c);
/* it's possible we already have a complete job */
maybe_enqueue_incoming_job(c);
break;
case OP_PEEK_READY:
/* don't allow trailing garbage */
if (c->cmd_len != CMD_PEEK_READY_LEN + 2) {
return reply_msg(c, MSG_BAD_FORMAT);
}
op_ct[type]++;
j = job_copy(pq_peek(&c->use->ready));
if (!j) return reply(c, MSG_NOTFOUND, MSG_NOTFOUND_LEN, STATE_SENDWORD);
reply_job(c, j, MSG_FOUND);
break;
case OP_PEEK_DELAYED:
/* don't allow trailing garbage */
if (c->cmd_len != CMD_PEEK_DELAYED_LEN + 2) {
return reply_msg(c, MSG_BAD_FORMAT);
}
op_ct[type]++;
j = job_copy(pq_peek(&c->use->delay));
if (!j) return reply(c, MSG_NOTFOUND, MSG_NOTFOUND_LEN, STATE_SENDWORD);
reply_job(c, j, MSG_FOUND);
break;
case OP_PEEK_BURIED:
/* don't allow trailing garbage */
if (c->cmd_len != CMD_PEEK_BURIED_LEN + 2) {
return reply_msg(c, MSG_BAD_FORMAT);
}
op_ct[type]++;
j = job_copy(buried_job_p(c->use)? j = c->use->buried.next : NULL);
if (!j) return reply(c, MSG_NOTFOUND, MSG_NOTFOUND_LEN, STATE_SENDWORD);
reply_job(c, j, MSG_FOUND);
break;
case OP_PEEKJOB:
errno = 0;
id = strtoull(c->cmd + CMD_PEEKJOB_LEN, &end_buf, 10);
if (errno) return reply_msg(c, MSG_BAD_FORMAT);
op_ct[type]++;
/* So, peek is annoying, because some other connection might free the
* job while we are still trying to write it out. So we copy it and
* then free the copy when it's done sending. */
j = job_copy(peek_job(id));
if (!j) return reply(c, MSG_NOTFOUND, MSG_NOTFOUND_LEN, STATE_SENDWORD);
reply_job(c, j, MSG_FOUND);
break;
case OP_RESERVE_TIMEOUT:
errno = 0;
timeout = strtol(c->cmd + CMD_RESERVE_TIMEOUT_LEN, &end_buf, 10);
if (errno) return reply_msg(c, MSG_BAD_FORMAT);
case OP_RESERVE: /* FALLTHROUGH */
/* don't allow trailing garbage */
if (type == OP_RESERVE && c->cmd_len != CMD_RESERVE_LEN + 2) {
return reply_msg(c, MSG_BAD_FORMAT);
}
op_ct[type]++;
conn_set_worker(c);
if (conn_has_close_deadline(c) && !conn_ready(c)) {
return reply_msg(c, MSG_DEADLINE_SOON);
}
/* try to get a new job for this guy */
wait_for_job(c, timeout);
process_queue();
break;
case OP_DELETE:
errno = 0;
id = strtoull(c->cmd + CMD_DELETE_LEN, &end_buf, 10);
if (errno) return reply_msg(c, MSG_BAD_FORMAT);
op_ct[type]++;
j = job_find(id);
j = remove_reserved_job(c, j) ? :
remove_ready_job(j) ? :
remove_buried_job(j);
if (!j) return reply(c, MSG_NOTFOUND, MSG_NOTFOUND_LEN, STATE_SENDWORD);
j->state = JOB_STATE_INVALID;
r = binlog_write_job(j);
job_free(j);
if (!r) return reply_serr(c, MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR);
reply(c, MSG_DELETED, MSG_DELETED_LEN, STATE_SENDWORD);
break;
case OP_RELEASE:
errno = 0;
id = strtoull(c->cmd + CMD_RELEASE_LEN, &pri_buf, 10);
if (errno) return reply_msg(c, MSG_BAD_FORMAT);
r = read_pri(&pri, pri_buf, &delay_buf);
if (r) return reply_msg(c, MSG_BAD_FORMAT);
r = read_delay(&delay, delay_buf, NULL);
if (r) return reply_msg(c, MSG_BAD_FORMAT);
op_ct[type]++;
j = remove_reserved_job(c, job_find(id));
if (!j) return reply(c, MSG_NOTFOUND, MSG_NOTFOUND_LEN, STATE_SENDWORD);
/* We want to update the delay deadline on disk, so reserve space for
* that. */
if (delay) {
z = binlog_reserve_space_update(j);
if (!z) return reply_serr(c, MSG_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
j->reserved_binlog_space += z;
}
j->pri = pri;
j->delay = delay;
j->release_ct++;
r = enqueue_job(j, delay, !!delay);
if (r < 0) return reply_serr(c, MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR);
if (r == 1) {
return reply(c, MSG_RELEASED, MSG_RELEASED_LEN, STATE_SENDWORD);
}
/* out of memory trying to grow the queue, so it gets buried */
bury_job(j, 0);
reply(c, MSG_BURIED, MSG_BURIED_LEN, STATE_SENDWORD);
break;
case OP_BURY:
errno = 0;
id = strtoull(c->cmd + CMD_BURY_LEN, &pri_buf, 10);
if (errno) return reply_msg(c, MSG_BAD_FORMAT);
r = read_pri(&pri, pri_buf, NULL);
if (r) return reply_msg(c, MSG_BAD_FORMAT);
op_ct[type]++;
j = remove_reserved_job(c, job_find(id));
if (!j) return reply(c, MSG_NOTFOUND, MSG_NOTFOUND_LEN, STATE_SENDWORD);
j->pri = pri;
r = bury_job(j, 1);
if (!r) return reply_serr(c, MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR);
reply(c, MSG_BURIED, MSG_BURIED_LEN, STATE_SENDWORD);
break;
case OP_KICK:
errno = 0;
count = strtoul(c->cmd + CMD_KICK_LEN, &end_buf, 10);
if (end_buf == c->cmd + CMD_KICK_LEN) {
return reply_msg(c, MSG_BAD_FORMAT);
}
if (errno) return reply_msg(c, MSG_BAD_FORMAT);
op_ct[type]++;
i = kick_jobs(c->use, count);
return reply_line(c, STATE_SENDWORD, "KICKED %u\r\n", i);
case OP_TOUCH:
errno = 0;
id = strtoull(c->cmd + CMD_TOUCH_LEN, &end_buf, 10);
if (errno) return twarn("strtoull"), reply_msg(c, MSG_BAD_FORMAT);
op_ct[type]++;
j = touch_job(c, job_find(id));
if (j) {
reply(c, MSG_TOUCHED, MSG_TOUCHED_LEN, STATE_SENDWORD);
} else {
return reply(c, MSG_NOTFOUND, MSG_NOTFOUND_LEN, STATE_SENDWORD);
}
break;
case OP_STATS:
/* don't allow trailing garbage */
if (c->cmd_len != CMD_STATS_LEN + 2) {
return reply_msg(c, MSG_BAD_FORMAT);
}
op_ct[type]++;
do_stats(c, fmt_stats, NULL);
break;
case OP_JOBSTATS:
errno = 0;
id = strtoull(c->cmd + CMD_JOBSTATS_LEN, &end_buf, 10);
if (errno) return reply_msg(c, MSG_BAD_FORMAT);
op_ct[type]++;
j = peek_job(id);
if (!j) return reply(c, MSG_NOTFOUND, MSG_NOTFOUND_LEN, STATE_SENDWORD);
if (!j->tube) return reply_serr(c, MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR);
do_stats(c, (fmt_fn) fmt_job_stats, j);
break;
case OP_STATS_TUBE:
name = c->cmd + CMD_STATS_TUBE_LEN;
if (!name_is_ok(name, 200)) return reply_msg(c, MSG_BAD_FORMAT);
op_ct[type]++;
t = tube_find(name);
if (!t) return reply_msg(c, MSG_NOTFOUND);
do_stats(c, (fmt_fn) fmt_stats_tube, t);
t = NULL;
break;
case OP_LIST_TUBES:
/* don't allow trailing garbage */
if (c->cmd_len != CMD_LIST_TUBES_LEN + 2) {
return reply_msg(c, MSG_BAD_FORMAT);
}
op_ct[type]++;
do_list_tubes(c, &tubes);
break;
case OP_LIST_TUBE_USED:
/* don't allow trailing garbage */
if (c->cmd_len != CMD_LIST_TUBE_USED_LEN + 2) {
return reply_msg(c, MSG_BAD_FORMAT);
}
op_ct[type]++;
reply_line(c, STATE_SENDWORD, "USING %s\r\n", c->use->name);
break;
case OP_LIST_TUBES_WATCHED:
/* don't allow trailing garbage */
if (c->cmd_len != CMD_LIST_TUBES_WATCHED_LEN + 2) {
return reply_msg(c, MSG_BAD_FORMAT);
}
op_ct[type]++;
do_list_tubes(c, &c->watch);
break;
case OP_USE:
name = c->cmd + CMD_USE_LEN;
if (!name_is_ok(name, 200)) return reply_msg(c, MSG_BAD_FORMAT);
op_ct[type]++;
TUBE_ASSIGN(t, tube_find_or_make(name));
if (!t) return reply_serr(c, MSG_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
c->use->using_ct--;
TUBE_ASSIGN(c->use, t);
TUBE_ASSIGN(t, NULL);
c->use->using_ct++;
reply_line(c, STATE_SENDWORD, "USING %s\r\n", c->use->name);
break;
case OP_WATCH:
name = c->cmd + CMD_WATCH_LEN;
if (!name_is_ok(name, 200)) return reply_msg(c, MSG_BAD_FORMAT);
op_ct[type]++;
TUBE_ASSIGN(t, tube_find_or_make(name));
if (!t) return reply_serr(c, MSG_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
r = 1;
if (!ms_contains(&c->watch, t)) r = ms_append(&c->watch, t);
TUBE_ASSIGN(t, NULL);
if (!r) return reply_serr(c, MSG_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
reply_line(c, STATE_SENDWORD, "WATCHING %d\r\n", c->watch.used);
break;
case OP_IGNORE:
name = c->cmd + CMD_IGNORE_LEN;
if (!name_is_ok(name, 200)) return reply_msg(c, MSG_BAD_FORMAT);
op_ct[type]++;
t = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < c->watch.used; i++) {
t = c->watch.items[i];
if (strncmp(t->name, name, MAX_TUBE_NAME_LEN) == 0) break;
t = NULL;
}
if (t && c->watch.used < 2) return reply_msg(c, MSG_NOT_IGNORED);
if (t) ms_remove(&c->watch, t); /* may free t if refcount => 0 */
t = NULL;
reply_line(c, STATE_SENDWORD, "WATCHING %d\r\n", c->watch.used);
break;
case OP_QUIT:
conn_close(c);
break;
case OP_PAUSE_TUBE:
op_ct[type]++;
r = read_tube_name(&name, c->cmd + CMD_PAUSE_TUBE_LEN, &delay_buf);
if (r) return reply_msg(c, MSG_BAD_FORMAT);
r = read_delay(&delay, delay_buf, NULL);
if (r) return reply_msg(c, MSG_BAD_FORMAT);
*delay_buf = '\0';
t = tube_find(name);
if (!t) return reply_msg(c, MSG_NOTFOUND);
t->deadline_at = now_usec() + delay;
t->pause = delay;
t->stat.pause_ct++;
set_main_delay_timeout();
reply_line(c, STATE_SENDWORD, "PAUSED\r\n");
break;
default:
return reply_msg(c, MSG_UNKNOWN_COMMAND);
}
}
Commit Message: Discard job body bytes if the job is too big.
Previously, a malicious user could craft a job payload and inject
beanstalk commands without the client application knowing. (An
extra-careful client library could check the size of the job body before
sending the put command, but most libraries do not do this, nor should
they have to.)
Reported by Graham Barr.
CWE ID:
| 1
| 165,515
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: checkdone(struct magic_set *ms, int *rv)
{
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_CONTINUE) == 0)
return 1;
if (file_printf(ms, "\n- ") == -1)
*rv = -1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: PR/454: Fix memory corruption when the continuation level jumps by more than
20 in a single step.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 56,374
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int HTMLSelectElement::previousSelectableListIndex(int startIndex) const
{
if (startIndex == -1)
startIndex = listItems().size();
return nextValidIndex(startIndex, SkipBackwards, 1);
}
Commit Message: SelectElement should remove an option when null is assigned by indexed setter
Fix bug embedded in r151449
see
http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?revision=151449&view=revision
R=haraken@chromium.org, tkent@chromium.org, eseidel@chromium.org
BUG=262365
TEST=fast/forms/select/select-assign-null.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/19947008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@154743 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 103,096
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void MockDownloadController::DangerousDownloadValidated(
content::WebContents* web_contents,
const std::string& download_guid,
bool accept) {}
Commit Message: Clean up Android DownloadManager code as most download now go through Chrome Network stack
The only exception is OMA DRM download.
And it only applies to context menu download interception.
Clean up the remaining unused code now.
BUG=647755
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2371773003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#421332}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 126,730
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: base::WeakPtr<DecoderContext> GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::AsWeakPtr() {
return weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr();
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,725
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::setCSSTarget(Element* n)
{
if (m_cssTarget)
m_cssTarget->didAffectSelector(AffectedSelectorTarget);
m_cssTarget = n;
if (n)
n->didAffectSelector(AffectedSelectorTarget);
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 102,855
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DXVAVideoDecodeAccelerator::Decode(
const media::BitstreamBuffer& bitstream_buffer) {
DCHECK(CalledOnValidThread());
RETURN_AND_NOTIFY_ON_FAILURE((state_ == kNormal || state_ == kStopped),
"Invalid state: " << state_, ILLEGAL_STATE,);
base::win::ScopedComPtr<IMFSample> sample;
sample.Attach(CreateSampleFromInputBuffer(bitstream_buffer,
renderer_process_,
input_stream_info_.cbSize,
input_stream_info_.cbAlignment));
RETURN_AND_NOTIFY_ON_FAILURE(sample, "Failed to create input sample",
PLATFORM_FAILURE,);
if (!inputs_before_decode_) {
TRACE_EVENT_BEGIN_ETW("DXVAVideoDecodeAccelerator.Decoding", this, "");
}
inputs_before_decode_++;
RETURN_AND_NOTIFY_ON_FAILURE(
SendMFTMessage(MFT_MESSAGE_NOTIFY_START_OF_STREAM, 0),
"Failed to create input sample", PLATFORM_FAILURE,);
HRESULT hr = decoder_->ProcessInput(0, sample, 0);
RETURN_AND_NOTIFY_ON_HR_FAILURE(hr, "Failed to process input sample",
PLATFORM_FAILURE,);
RETURN_AND_NOTIFY_ON_FAILURE(
SendMFTMessage(MFT_MESSAGE_NOTIFY_END_OF_STREAM, 0),
"Failed to send eos message to MFT", PLATFORM_FAILURE,);
state_ = kEosDrain;
last_input_buffer_id_ = bitstream_buffer.id();
DoDecode();
RETURN_AND_NOTIFY_ON_FAILURE((state_ == kStopped || state_ == kNormal),
"Failed to process output. Unexpected decoder state: " << state_,
ILLEGAL_STATE,);
MessageLoop::current()->PostTask(FROM_HERE, base::Bind(
&DXVAVideoDecodeAccelerator::NotifyInputBufferRead, this,
bitstream_buffer.id()));
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 1
| 170,941
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void update_runtime_enabled(struct rq *rq) {}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 92,767
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void f_midi_disable(struct usb_function *f)
{
struct f_midi *midi = func_to_midi(f);
struct usb_composite_dev *cdev = f->config->cdev;
struct usb_request *req = NULL;
DBG(cdev, "disable\n");
/*
* just disable endpoints, forcing completion of pending i/o.
* all our completion handlers free their requests in this case.
*/
usb_ep_disable(midi->in_ep);
usb_ep_disable(midi->out_ep);
/* release IN requests */
while (kfifo_get(&midi->in_req_fifo, &req))
free_ep_req(midi->in_ep, req);
f_midi_drop_out_substreams(midi);
}
Commit Message: USB: gadget: f_midi: fixing a possible double-free in f_midi
It looks like there is a possibility of a double-free vulnerability on an
error path of the f_midi_set_alt function in the f_midi driver. If the
path is feasible then free_ep_req gets called twice:
req->complete = f_midi_complete;
err = usb_ep_queue(midi->out_ep, req, GFP_ATOMIC);
=> ...
usb_gadget_giveback_request
=>
f_midi_complete (CALLBACK)
(inside f_midi_complete, for various cases of status)
free_ep_req(ep, req); // first kfree
if (err) {
ERROR(midi, "%s: couldn't enqueue request: %d\n",
midi->out_ep->name, err);
free_ep_req(midi->out_ep, req); // second kfree
return err;
}
The double-free possibility was introduced with commit ad0d1a058eac
("usb: gadget: f_midi: fix leak on failed to enqueue out requests").
Found by MOXCAFE tool.
Signed-off-by: Tuba Yavuz <tuba@ece.ufl.edu>
Fixes: ad0d1a058eac ("usb: gadget: f_midi: fix leak on failed to enqueue out requests")
Acked-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 91,917
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool thread_check(void)
{
#ifdef ENABLE_THREAD_CHECK
if (is_thread_check_enabled())
return (g_main_thread == pthread_self());
#endif
return true;
}
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 27,174
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void XSLStyleSheet::loadChildSheet(const String& href)
{
OwnPtr<XSLImportRule> childRule = XSLImportRule::create(this, href);
XSLImportRule* c = childRule.get();
m_children.append(childRule.release());
c->loadSheet();
}
Commit Message: Avoid reparsing an XSLT stylesheet after the first failure.
Certain libxslt versions appear to leave the doc in an invalid state when parsing fails. We should cache this result and avoid re-parsing.
(The test cannot be converted to text-only due to its invalid stylesheet).
R=inferno@chromium.org,abarth@chromium.org,pdr@chromium.org
BUG=271939
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23103007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@156248 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 111,468
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DocumentThreadableLoader::notifyFinished(Resource* resource)
{
ASSERT(m_client);
ASSERT(resource == this->resource());
ASSERT(m_async);
if (resource->errorOccurred()) {
handleError(resource->resourceError());
} else {
handleSuccessfulFinish(resource->identifier(), resource->loadFinishTime());
}
}
Commit Message: DocumentThreadableLoader: Add guards for sync notifyFinished() in setResource()
In loadRequest(), setResource() can call clear() synchronously:
DocumentThreadableLoader::clear()
DocumentThreadableLoader::handleError()
Resource::didAddClient()
RawResource::didAddClient()
and thus |m_client| can be null while resource() isn't null after setResource(),
causing crashes (Issue 595964).
This CL checks whether |*this| is destructed and
whether |m_client| is null after setResource().
BUG=595964
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/1902683002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#391001}
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 119,497
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct sk_buff **udp4_gro_receive(struct sk_buff **head,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct udphdr *uh = udp_gro_udphdr(skb);
if (unlikely(!uh))
goto flush;
/* Don't bother verifying checksum if we're going to flush anyway. */
if (NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->flush)
goto skip;
if (skb_gro_checksum_validate_zero_check(skb, IPPROTO_UDP, uh->check,
inet_gro_compute_pseudo))
goto flush;
else if (uh->check)
skb_gro_checksum_try_convert(skb, IPPROTO_UDP, uh->check,
inet_gro_compute_pseudo);
skip:
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->is_ipv6 = 0;
return udp_gro_receive(head, skb, uh);
flush:
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->flush = 1;
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 48,972
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void scheduler_tick(void)
{
int cpu = smp_processor_id();
struct rq *rq = cpu_rq(cpu);
struct task_struct *curr = rq->curr;
sched_clock_tick();
raw_spin_lock(&rq->lock);
update_rq_clock(rq);
curr->sched_class->task_tick(rq, curr, 0);
update_cpu_load_active(rq);
raw_spin_unlock(&rq->lock);
perf_event_task_tick();
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
rq->idle_balance = idle_cpu(cpu);
trigger_load_balance(rq);
#endif
rq_last_tick_reset(rq);
}
Commit Message: sched: Fix information leak in sys_sched_getattr()
We're copying the on-stack structure to userspace, but forgot to give
the right number of bytes to copy. This allows the calling process to
obtain up to PAGE_SIZE bytes from the stack (and possibly adjacent
kernel memory).
This fix copies only as much as we actually have on the stack
(attr->size defaults to the size of the struct) and leaves the rest of
the userspace-provided buffer untouched.
Found using kmemcheck + trinity.
Fixes: d50dde5a10f30 ("sched: Add new scheduler syscalls to support an extended scheduling parameters ABI")
Cc: Dario Faggioli <raistlin@linux.it>
Cc: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1392585857-10725-1-git-send-email-vegard.nossum@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 58,217
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void unregister_control_device_interface(struct bcm_mini_adapter *Adapter)
{
if (Adapter->major > 0) {
device_destroy(bcm_class, MKDEV(Adapter->major, 0));
unregister_chrdev(Adapter->major, DEV_NAME);
}
}
Commit Message: Staging: bcm: info leak in ioctl
The DevInfo.u32Reserved[] array isn't initialized so it leaks kernel
information to user space.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 29,464
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool InitSkBitmapFromData(SkBitmap* bitmap,
const char* pixels,
size_t pixels_size) const {
if (!bitmap->tryAllocPixels(
SkImageInfo::Make(width, height, color_type, alpha_type)))
return false;
if (pixels_size != bitmap->computeByteSize())
return false;
memcpy(bitmap->getPixels(), pixels, pixels_size);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Update IPC ParamTraits for SkBitmap to follow best practices.
Using memcpy() to serialize a POD struct is highly discouraged. Just use
the standard IPC param traits macros for doing it.
Bug: 779428
Change-Id: I48f52c1f5c245ba274d595829ed92e8b3cb41334
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/899649
Reviewed-by: Tom Sepez <tsepez@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#534562}
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 1
| 172,892
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: _dbus_get_is_errno_eagain_or_ewouldblock (void)
{
return errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 3,740
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int migrate_swap(struct task_struct *cur, struct task_struct *p)
{
struct migration_swap_arg arg;
int ret = -EINVAL;
arg = (struct migration_swap_arg){
.src_task = cur,
.src_cpu = task_cpu(cur),
.dst_task = p,
.dst_cpu = task_cpu(p),
};
if (arg.src_cpu == arg.dst_cpu)
goto out;
/*
* These three tests are all lockless; this is OK since all of them
* will be re-checked with proper locks held further down the line.
*/
if (!cpu_active(arg.src_cpu) || !cpu_active(arg.dst_cpu))
goto out;
if (!cpumask_test_cpu(arg.dst_cpu, tsk_cpus_allowed(arg.src_task)))
goto out;
if (!cpumask_test_cpu(arg.src_cpu, tsk_cpus_allowed(arg.dst_task)))
goto out;
trace_sched_swap_numa(cur, arg.src_cpu, p, arg.dst_cpu);
ret = stop_two_cpus(arg.dst_cpu, arg.src_cpu, migrate_swap_stop, &arg);
out:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 55,556
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void blkcg_exit_queue(struct request_queue *q)
{
spin_lock_irq(q->queue_lock);
blkg_destroy_all(q);
spin_unlock_irq(q->queue_lock);
blk_throtl_exit(q);
}
Commit Message: blkcg: fix double free of new_blkg in blkcg_init_queue
If blkg_create fails, new_blkg passed as an argument will
be freed by blkg_create, so there is no need to free it again.
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 84,125
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FrameFetchContext::GetLoadingTaskRunner() {
if (IsDetached())
return FetchContext::GetLoadingTaskRunner();
return GetFrame()->GetTaskRunner(TaskType::kNetworking);
}
Commit Message: Do not forward resource timing to parent frame after back-forward navigation
LocalFrame has |should_send_resource_timing_info_to_parent_| flag not to
send timing info to parent except for the first navigation. This flag is
cleared when the first timing is sent to parent, however this does not happen
if iframe's first navigation was by back-forward navigation. For such
iframes, we shouldn't send timings to parent at all.
Bug: 876822
Change-Id: I128b51a82ef278c439548afc8283ae63abdef5c5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1186215
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kunihiko Sakamoto <ksakamoto@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#585736}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 145,810
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void copyMono8(
short *dst,
const int *const *src,
unsigned nSamples,
unsigned /* nChannels */) {
for (unsigned i = 0; i < nSamples; ++i) {
*dst++ = src[0][i] << 8;
}
}
Commit Message: FLACExtractor: copy protect mWriteBuffer
Bug: 30895578
Change-Id: I4cba36bbe3502678210e5925181683df9726b431
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 174,017
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void reflectedIntegralAttrAttributeGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
TestObjectV8Internal::reflectedIntegralAttrAttributeGetter(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 121,923
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int mailimf_point_parse(const char * message, size_t length,
size_t * indx)
{
return mailimf_unstrict_char_parse(message, length, indx, '.');
}
Commit Message: Fixed crash #274
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 66,221
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gst_pngdec_init (GstPngDec * pngdec)
{
pngdec->sinkpad =
gst_pad_new_from_static_template (&gst_pngdec_sink_pad_template, "sink");
gst_pad_set_activate_function (pngdec->sinkpad, gst_pngdec_sink_activate);
gst_pad_set_activatepush_function (pngdec->sinkpad,
gst_pngdec_sink_activate_push);
gst_pad_set_activatepull_function (pngdec->sinkpad,
gst_pngdec_sink_activate_pull);
gst_pad_set_chain_function (pngdec->sinkpad, gst_pngdec_chain);
gst_pad_set_event_function (pngdec->sinkpad, gst_pngdec_sink_event);
gst_pad_set_setcaps_function (pngdec->sinkpad, gst_pngdec_sink_setcaps);
gst_element_add_pad (GST_ELEMENT (pngdec), pngdec->sinkpad);
pngdec->srcpad =
gst_pad_new_from_static_template (&gst_pngdec_src_pad_template, "src");
gst_pad_use_fixed_caps (pngdec->srcpad);
gst_element_add_pad (GST_ELEMENT (pngdec), pngdec->srcpad);
pngdec->buffer_out = NULL;
pngdec->png = NULL;
pngdec->info = NULL;
pngdec->endinfo = NULL;
pngdec->setup = FALSE;
pngdec->color_type = -1;
pngdec->width = -1;
pngdec->height = -1;
pngdec->bpp = -1;
pngdec->fps_n = 0;
pngdec->fps_d = 1;
pngdec->in_timestamp = GST_CLOCK_TIME_NONE;
pngdec->in_duration = GST_CLOCK_TIME_NONE;
gst_segment_init (&pngdec->segment, GST_FORMAT_UNDEFINED);
pngdec->image_ready = FALSE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 2,855
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void StyleResolver::printStats()
{
if (!m_styleResolverStats)
return;
fprintf(stderr, "=== Style Resolver Stats (resolve #%u) (%s) ===\n", ++m_styleResolverStatsSequence, m_document.url().string().utf8().data());
fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", m_styleResolverStats->report().utf8().data());
fprintf(stderr, "== Totals ==\n");
fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", m_styleResolverStatsTotals->report().utf8().data());
}
Commit Message: Remove the Simple Default Stylesheet, it's just a foot-gun.
We've been bitten by the Simple Default Stylesheet being out
of sync with the real html.css twice this week.
The Simple Default Stylesheet was invented years ago for Mac:
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/36135
It nicely handles the case where you just want to create
a single WebView and parse some simple HTML either without
styling said HTML, or only to display a small string, etc.
Note that this optimization/complexity *only* helps for the
very first document, since the default stylesheets are
all static (process-global) variables. Since any real page
on the internet uses a tag not covered by the simple default
stylesheet, not real load benefits from this optimization.
Only uses of WebView which were just rendering small bits
of text might have benefited from this. about:blank would
also have used this sheet.
This was a common application for some uses of WebView back
in those days. These days, even with WebView on Android,
there are likely much larger overheads than parsing the
html.css stylesheet, so making it required seems like the
right tradeoff of code-simplicity for this case.
BUG=319556
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73723005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162153 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 118,984
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CWebServer::Cmd_SetPlanDeviceCoords(WebEmSession & session, const request& req, Json::Value &root)
{
std::string idx = request::findValue(&req, "idx");
std::string planidx = request::findValue(&req, "planidx");
std::string xoffset = request::findValue(&req, "xoffset");
std::string yoffset = request::findValue(&req, "yoffset");
std::string type = request::findValue(&req, "DevSceneType");
if ((idx.empty()) || (planidx.empty()) || (xoffset.empty()) || (yoffset.empty()))
return;
if (type != "1") type = "0"; // 0 = Device, 1 = Scene/Group
root["status"] = "OK";
root["title"] = "SetPlanDeviceCoords";
m_sql.safe_query("UPDATE DeviceToPlansMap SET [XOffset] = '%q', [YOffset] = '%q' WHERE (DeviceRowID='%q') and (PlanID='%q') and (DevSceneType='%q')",
xoffset.c_str(), yoffset.c_str(), idx.c_str(), planidx.c_str(), type.c_str());
_log.Log(LOG_STATUS, "(Floorplan) Device '%s' coordinates set to '%s,%s' in plan '%s'.", idx.c_str(), xoffset.c_str(), yoffset.c_str(), planidx.c_str());
}
Commit Message: Fixed possible SQL Injection Vulnerability (Thanks to Fabio Carretto!)
CWE ID: CWE-89
| 0
| 91,014
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FastEvaluateCurves16(register const cmsUInt16Number In[],
register cmsUInt16Number Out[],
register const void* D)
{
Curves16Data* Data = (Curves16Data*) D;
int i;
for (i=0; i < Data ->nCurves; i++) {
Out[i] = Data -> Curves[i][In[i]];
}
}
Commit Message: Non happy-path fixes
CWE ID:
| 0
| 41,012
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::RegisterMojoInterfaces() {
#if !defined(OS_ANDROID)
registry_->AddInterface(base::Bind(&InstalledAppProviderImplDefault::Create));
#endif // !defined(OS_ANDROID)
PermissionControllerImpl* permission_controller =
PermissionControllerImpl::FromBrowserContext(
GetProcess()->GetBrowserContext());
if (delegate_) {
auto* geolocation_context = delegate_->GetGeolocationContext();
if (geolocation_context) {
geolocation_service_.reset(new GeolocationServiceImpl(
geolocation_context, permission_controller, this));
registry_->AddInterface(
base::Bind(&GeolocationServiceImpl::Bind,
base::Unretained(geolocation_service_.get())));
}
}
registry_->AddInterface<device::mojom::WakeLock>(base::Bind(
&RenderFrameHostImpl::BindWakeLockRequest, base::Unretained(this)));
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kWebNfc)) {
registry_->AddInterface<device::mojom::NFC>(base::Bind(
&RenderFrameHostImpl::BindNFCRequest, base::Unretained(this)));
}
#endif
if (!permission_service_context_)
permission_service_context_.reset(new PermissionServiceContext(this));
registry_->AddInterface(
base::Bind(&PermissionServiceContext::CreateService,
base::Unretained(permission_service_context_.get())));
registry_->AddInterface(
base::Bind(&RenderFrameHostImpl::BindPresentationServiceRequest,
base::Unretained(this)));
registry_->AddInterface(
base::Bind(&MediaSessionServiceImpl::Create, base::Unretained(this)));
registry_->AddInterface(base::Bind(
base::IgnoreResult(&RenderFrameHostImpl::CreateWebBluetoothService),
base::Unretained(this)));
registry_->AddInterface(base::BindRepeating(
&RenderFrameHostImpl::CreateWebUsbService, base::Unretained(this)));
registry_->AddInterface<media::mojom::InterfaceFactory>(
base::Bind(&RenderFrameHostImpl::BindMediaInterfaceFactoryRequest,
base::Unretained(this)));
registry_->AddInterface(base::BindRepeating(
&RenderFrameHostImpl::CreateWebSocket, base::Unretained(this)));
registry_->AddInterface(base::BindRepeating(
&RenderFrameHostImpl::CreateDedicatedWorkerHostFactory,
base::Unretained(this)));
registry_->AddInterface(base::Bind(&SharedWorkerConnectorImpl::Create,
process_->GetID(), routing_id_));
registry_->AddInterface(base::BindRepeating(&device::GamepadMonitor::Create));
registry_->AddInterface<device::mojom::VRService>(base::Bind(
&WebvrServiceProvider::BindWebvrService, base::Unretained(this)));
registry_->AddInterface(
base::BindRepeating(&RenderFrameHostImpl::CreateAudioInputStreamFactory,
base::Unretained(this)));
registry_->AddInterface(
base::BindRepeating(&RenderFrameHostImpl::CreateAudioOutputStreamFactory,
base::Unretained(this)));
if (BrowserMainLoop::GetInstance()) {
MediaStreamManager* media_stream_manager =
BrowserMainLoop::GetInstance()->media_stream_manager();
registry_->AddInterface(
base::Bind(&MediaDevicesDispatcherHost::Create, GetProcess()->GetID(),
GetRoutingID(), base::Unretained(media_stream_manager)),
base::CreateSingleThreadTaskRunnerWithTraits({BrowserThread::IO}));
registry_->AddInterface(
base::BindRepeating(&MediaStreamDispatcherHost::Create,
GetProcess()->GetID(), GetRoutingID(),
base::Unretained(media_stream_manager)),
base::CreateSingleThreadTaskRunnerWithTraits({BrowserThread::IO}));
}
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_MEDIA_REMOTING)
registry_->AddInterface(base::Bind(&RemoterFactoryImpl::Bind,
GetProcess()->GetID(), GetRoutingID()));
#endif // BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_MEDIA_REMOTING)
registry_->AddInterface(base::BindRepeating(
&KeyboardLockServiceImpl::CreateMojoService, base::Unretained(this)));
registry_->AddInterface(base::Bind(&ImageCaptureImpl::Create));
#if !defined(OS_ANDROID)
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kWebAuth)) {
registry_->AddInterface(
base::Bind(&RenderFrameHostImpl::BindAuthenticatorRequest,
base::Unretained(this)));
if (base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kEnableWebAuthTestingAPI)) {
auto* environment_singleton =
ScopedVirtualAuthenticatorEnvironment::GetInstance();
registry_->AddInterface(base::BindRepeating(
&ScopedVirtualAuthenticatorEnvironment::AddBinding,
base::Unretained(environment_singleton)));
}
}
#endif // !defined(OS_ANDROID)
sensor_provider_proxy_.reset(
new SensorProviderProxyImpl(permission_controller, this));
registry_->AddInterface(
base::Bind(&SensorProviderProxyImpl::Bind,
base::Unretained(sensor_provider_proxy_.get())));
#if !defined(OS_ANDROID)
registry_->AddInterface(base::BindRepeating(
&RenderFrameHostImpl::BindSerialServiceRequest, base::Unretained(this)));
#endif // !defined(OS_ANDROID)
media::VideoDecodePerfHistory::SaveCallback save_stats_cb;
if (GetSiteInstance()->GetBrowserContext()->GetVideoDecodePerfHistory()) {
save_stats_cb = GetSiteInstance()
->GetBrowserContext()
->GetVideoDecodePerfHistory()
->GetSaveCallback();
}
registry_->AddInterface(base::BindRepeating(
&media::MediaMetricsProvider::Create, frame_tree_node_->IsMainFrame(),
base::BindRepeating(
&RenderFrameHostDelegate::GetUkmSourceIdForLastCommittedSource,
base::Unretained(delegate_)),
std::move(save_stats_cb)));
if (base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
cc::switches::kEnableGpuBenchmarking)) {
registry_->AddInterface(
base::Bind(&InputInjectorImpl::Create, weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
}
registry_->AddInterface(base::BindRepeating(
&QuotaDispatcherHost::CreateForFrame, GetProcess(), routing_id_));
registry_->AddInterface(
base::BindRepeating(SpeechRecognitionDispatcherHost::Create,
GetProcess()->GetID(), routing_id_),
base::CreateSingleThreadTaskRunnerWithTraits({BrowserThread::IO}));
file_system_manager_.reset(new FileSystemManagerImpl(
GetProcess()->GetID(), routing_id_,
GetProcess()->GetStoragePartition()->GetFileSystemContext(),
ChromeBlobStorageContext::GetFor(GetProcess()->GetBrowserContext())));
registry_->AddInterface(
base::BindRepeating(&FileSystemManagerImpl::BindRequest,
base::Unretained(file_system_manager_.get())),
base::CreateSingleThreadTaskRunnerWithTraits({BrowserThread::IO}));
registry_->AddInterface(base::BindRepeating(
&BackgroundFetchServiceImpl::CreateForFrame, GetProcess(), routing_id_));
registry_->AddInterface(base::BindRepeating(&ContactsManagerImpl::Create,
base::Unretained(this)));
registry_->AddInterface(
base::BindRepeating(&FileChooserImpl::Create, base::Unretained(this)));
registry_->AddInterface(base::BindRepeating(&WakeLockServiceImpl::Create,
base::Unretained(this)));
registry_->AddInterface(base::BindRepeating(
&PictureInPictureServiceImpl::Create, base::Unretained(this)));
}
Commit Message: Fix a crash on FileChooserImpl
If a renderer process is compromised, and it calls both of
FileChooserImpl::OpenFileChooser() and EnumerateChosenDirectory() via
Mojo, the browser process could crash because ResetOwner() for
the first FileChooserImpl::proxy_ instance was not called. We
should check nullness of proxy_ before updating it.
Bug: 941008
Change-Id: Ie0c1895ec46ce78d40594b543e49e43b420af675
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1520509
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#640580}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 151,783
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void update_blocked_averages(int cpu)
{
struct rq *rq = cpu_rq(cpu);
struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq, *pos;
const struct sched_class *curr_class;
struct rq_flags rf;
bool done = true;
rq_lock_irqsave(rq, &rf);
update_rq_clock(rq);
/*
* Iterates the task_group tree in a bottom up fashion, see
* list_add_leaf_cfs_rq() for details.
*/
for_each_leaf_cfs_rq_safe(rq, cfs_rq, pos) {
struct sched_entity *se;
/* throttled entities do not contribute to load */
if (throttled_hierarchy(cfs_rq))
continue;
if (update_cfs_rq_load_avg(cfs_rq_clock_task(cfs_rq), cfs_rq))
update_tg_load_avg(cfs_rq, 0);
/* Propagate pending load changes to the parent, if any: */
se = cfs_rq->tg->se[cpu];
if (se && !skip_blocked_update(se))
update_load_avg(cfs_rq_of(se), se, 0);
/*
* There can be a lot of idle CPU cgroups. Don't let fully
* decayed cfs_rqs linger on the list.
*/
if (cfs_rq_is_decayed(cfs_rq))
list_del_leaf_cfs_rq(cfs_rq);
/* Don't need periodic decay once load/util_avg are null */
if (cfs_rq_has_blocked(cfs_rq))
done = false;
}
curr_class = rq->curr->sched_class;
update_rt_rq_load_avg(rq_clock_task(rq), rq, curr_class == &rt_sched_class);
update_dl_rq_load_avg(rq_clock_task(rq), rq, curr_class == &dl_sched_class);
update_irq_load_avg(rq, 0);
/* Don't need periodic decay once load/util_avg are null */
if (others_have_blocked(rq))
done = false;
#ifdef CONFIG_NO_HZ_COMMON
rq->last_blocked_load_update_tick = jiffies;
if (done)
rq->has_blocked_load = 0;
#endif
rq_unlock_irqrestore(rq, &rf);
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 1
| 169,786
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void NavigationURLLoaderImpl::OnRequestStarted(base::TimeTicks timestamp) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
delegate_->OnRequestStarted(timestamp);
}
Commit Message: Abort navigations on 304 responses.
A recent change (https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1161479)
accidentally resulted in treating 304 responses as downloads. This CL
treats them as ERR_ABORTED instead. This doesn't exactly match old
behavior, which passed them on to the renderer, which then aborted them.
The new code results in correctly restoring the original URL in the
omnibox, and has a shiny new test to prevent future regressions.
Bug: 882270
Change-Id: Ic73dcce9e9596d43327b13acde03b4ed9bd0c82e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1252684
Commit-Queue: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#595641}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 145,383
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void decode_block(decoder_info_t *decoder_info,int size,int ypos,int xpos,int sub){
int width = decoder_info->width;
int height = decoder_info->height;
int xposY = xpos;
int yposY = ypos;
int xposC = xpos >> sub;
int yposC = ypos >> sub;
int sizeY = size;
int sizeC = size >> sub;
block_mode_t mode;
intra_mode_t intra_mode;
frame_type_t frame_type = decoder_info->frame_info.frame_type;
int bipred = decoder_info->bipred;
int qpY = decoder_info->frame_info.qpb;
int qpC = sub ? chroma_qp[qpY] : qpY;
/* Intermediate block variables */
SAMPLE *pblock_y = thor_alloc(MAX_SB_SIZE*MAX_SB_SIZE*sizeof(SAMPLE), 32);
SAMPLE *pblock_u = thor_alloc((MAX_SB_SIZE*MAX_SB_SIZE >> 2*sub)*sizeof(SAMPLE), 32);
SAMPLE *pblock_v = thor_alloc((MAX_SB_SIZE*MAX_SB_SIZE >> 2*sub)*sizeof(SAMPLE), 32);
int16_t *coeff_y = thor_alloc(2*MAX_TR_SIZE*MAX_TR_SIZE, 32);
int16_t *coeff_u = thor_alloc(2*MAX_TR_SIZE*MAX_TR_SIZE, 32);
int16_t *coeff_v = thor_alloc(2*MAX_TR_SIZE*MAX_TR_SIZE, 32);
/* Block variables for bipred */
SAMPLE *pblock0_y = thor_alloc(MAX_SB_SIZE*MAX_SB_SIZE*sizeof(SAMPLE), 32);
SAMPLE *pblock0_u = thor_alloc((MAX_SB_SIZE*MAX_SB_SIZE >> 2*sub)*sizeof(SAMPLE), 32);
SAMPLE *pblock0_v = thor_alloc((MAX_SB_SIZE*MAX_SB_SIZE >> 2*sub)*sizeof(SAMPLE), 32);
SAMPLE *pblock1_y = thor_alloc(MAX_SB_SIZE*MAX_SB_SIZE*sizeof(SAMPLE), 32);
SAMPLE *pblock1_u = thor_alloc((MAX_SB_SIZE*MAX_SB_SIZE >> 2*sub)*sizeof(SAMPLE), 32);
SAMPLE *pblock1_v = thor_alloc((MAX_SB_SIZE*MAX_SB_SIZE >> 2*sub)*sizeof(SAMPLE), 32);
yuv_frame_t *rec = decoder_info->rec;
yuv_frame_t *ref = decoder_info->ref[0];
/* Pointers to current position in reconstructed frame*/
SAMPLE *rec_y = &rec->y[yposY*rec->stride_y+xposY];
SAMPLE *rec_u = &rec->u[yposC*rec->stride_c+xposC];
SAMPLE *rec_v = &rec->v[yposC*rec->stride_c+xposC];
stream_t *stream = decoder_info->stream;
/* Read data from bitstream */
block_info_dec_t block_info;
block_info.block_pos.size = size;
block_info.block_pos.ypos = ypos;
block_info.block_pos.xpos = xpos;
block_info.coeffq_y = coeff_y;
block_info.coeffq_u = coeff_u;
block_info.coeffq_v = coeff_v;
block_info.sub = sub;
/* Used for rectangular skip blocks */
int bwidth = min(size,width - xpos);
int bheight = min(size,height - ypos);
block_info.block_pos.bwidth = bwidth;
block_info.block_pos.bheight = bheight;
read_block(decoder_info,stream,&block_info,frame_type);
mode = block_info.block_param.mode;
if (mode == MODE_INTRA){
int ql = decoder_info->qmtx ? qp_to_qlevel(qpY,decoder_info->qmtx_offset) : 0;
intra_mode = block_info.block_param.intra_mode;
int bwidth = size; //TODO: fix for non-square blocks
int bheight = size; //TODO: fix for non-square blocks
int upright_available = get_upright_available(yposY, xposY, bwidth, bheight, width, height, 1 << decoder_info->log2_sb_size);
int downleft_available = get_downleft_available(yposY, xposY, bwidth, bheight, width, height, 1 << decoder_info->log2_sb_size);
int tb_split = block_info.block_param.tb_split;
decode_and_reconstruct_block_intra(rec_y,rec->stride_y,sizeY,qpY,pblock_y,coeff_y,tb_split,upright_available,downleft_available,intra_mode,yposY,xposY,width,0,decoder_info->bitdepth,decoder_info->qmtx ? decoder_info->iwmatrix[ql][0][1] : NULL);
if (decoder_info->subsample != 400)
decode_and_reconstruct_block_intra_uv(rec_u,rec_v,rec->stride_c,sizeC,qpC,pblock_u,pblock_v,coeff_u,coeff_v,tb_split && sizeC > 4,upright_available,downleft_available,intra_mode,yposC,xposC,width>>sub,1,decoder_info->bitdepth,decoder_info->qmtx ? decoder_info->iwmatrix[ql][1][1] : NULL, decoder_info->cfl_intra ? pblock_y : 0, rec_y, rec->stride_y, sub);
}
else
{
int tb_split = block_info.block_param.tb_split;
if (mode==MODE_SKIP){
if (block_info.block_param.dir==2){
SAMPLE *pblock0_y = thor_alloc(MAX_SB_SIZE*MAX_SB_SIZE*sizeof(SAMPLE), 32);
SAMPLE *pblock0_u = thor_alloc((MAX_SB_SIZE*MAX_SB_SIZE >> 2*sub)*sizeof(SAMPLE), 32);
SAMPLE *pblock0_v = thor_alloc((MAX_SB_SIZE*MAX_SB_SIZE >> 2*sub)*sizeof(SAMPLE), 32);
SAMPLE *pblock1_y = thor_alloc(MAX_SB_SIZE*MAX_SB_SIZE*sizeof(SAMPLE), 32);
SAMPLE *pblock1_u = thor_alloc((MAX_SB_SIZE*MAX_SB_SIZE >> 2*sub)*sizeof(SAMPLE), 32);
SAMPLE *pblock1_v = thor_alloc((MAX_SB_SIZE*MAX_SB_SIZE >> 2*sub)*sizeof(SAMPLE), 32);
int r0 = decoder_info->frame_info.ref_array[block_info.block_param.ref_idx0];
yuv_frame_t *ref0 = r0 >= 0 ? decoder_info->ref[r0] : decoder_info->interp_frames[0];
int sign0 = ref0->frame_num >= rec->frame_num;
int r1 = decoder_info->frame_info.ref_array[block_info.block_param.ref_idx1];
yuv_frame_t *ref1 = r1 >= 0 ? decoder_info->ref[r1] : decoder_info->interp_frames[0];
int sign1 = ref1->frame_num >= rec->frame_num;
if (decoder_info->bit_count.stat_frame_type == B_FRAME && decoder_info->interp_ref == 2 && block_info.block_param.skip_idx==0) {
TEMPLATE(get_inter_prediction_temp)(width, height, ref0, ref1, &block_info.block_pos, decoder_info->deblock_data, decoder_info->num_reorder_pics + 1, decoder_info->frame_info.phase, pblock_y, pblock_u, pblock_v);
}
else {
TEMPLATE(get_inter_prediction_yuv)(ref0, pblock0_y, pblock0_u, pblock0_v, &block_info.block_pos, block_info.block_param.mv_arr0, sign0, width, height, bipred, 0, decoder_info->bitdepth);
TEMPLATE(get_inter_prediction_yuv)(ref1, pblock1_y, pblock1_u, pblock1_v, &block_info.block_pos, block_info.block_param.mv_arr1, sign1, width, height, bipred, 0, decoder_info->bitdepth);
TEMPLATE(average_blocks_all)(pblock_y, pblock_u, pblock_v, pblock0_y, pblock0_u, pblock0_v, pblock1_y, pblock1_u, pblock1_v, &block_info.block_pos, sub);
}
thor_free(pblock0_y);
thor_free(pblock0_u);
thor_free(pblock0_v);
thor_free(pblock1_y);
thor_free(pblock1_u);
thor_free(pblock1_v);
}
else{
int ref_idx = block_info.block_param.ref_idx0; //TODO: Move to top
int r = decoder_info->frame_info.ref_array[ref_idx];
ref = r>=0 ? decoder_info->ref[r] : decoder_info->interp_frames[0];
int sign = ref->frame_num > rec->frame_num;
TEMPLATE(get_inter_prediction_yuv)(ref, pblock_y, pblock_u, pblock_v, &block_info.block_pos, block_info.block_param.mv_arr0, sign, width, height, bipred, 0, decoder_info->bitdepth);
}
int j;
for (j = 0; j<bheight; j++) {
memcpy(&rec_y[j*rec->stride_y], &pblock_y[j*sizeY], bwidth*sizeof(SAMPLE));
}
for (j = 0; j<bheight >> sub; j++) {
memcpy(&rec_u[j*rec->stride_c], &pblock_u[j*sizeC], (bwidth >> sub)*sizeof(SAMPLE));
memcpy(&rec_v[j*rec->stride_c], &pblock_v[j*sizeC], (bwidth >> sub)*sizeof(SAMPLE));
}
copy_deblock_data(decoder_info, &block_info);
return;
}
else if (mode==MODE_MERGE){
if (block_info.block_param.dir==2){
SAMPLE *pblock0_y = thor_alloc(MAX_SB_SIZE*MAX_SB_SIZE*sizeof(SAMPLE), 32);
SAMPLE *pblock0_u = thor_alloc((MAX_SB_SIZE*MAX_SB_SIZE >> 2*sub)*sizeof(SAMPLE), 32);
SAMPLE *pblock0_v = thor_alloc((MAX_SB_SIZE*MAX_SB_SIZE >> 2*sub)*sizeof(SAMPLE), 32);
SAMPLE *pblock1_y = thor_alloc(MAX_SB_SIZE*MAX_SB_SIZE*sizeof(SAMPLE), 32);
SAMPLE *pblock1_u = thor_alloc((MAX_SB_SIZE*MAX_SB_SIZE >> 2*sub)*sizeof(SAMPLE), 32);
SAMPLE *pblock1_v = thor_alloc((MAX_SB_SIZE*MAX_SB_SIZE >> 2*sub)*sizeof(SAMPLE), 32);
int r0 = decoder_info->frame_info.ref_array[block_info.block_param.ref_idx0];
yuv_frame_t *ref0 = r0 >= 0 ? decoder_info->ref[r0] : decoder_info->interp_frames[0];
int sign0 = ref0->frame_num >= rec->frame_num;
TEMPLATE(get_inter_prediction_yuv)(ref0, pblock0_y, pblock0_u, pblock0_v, &block_info.block_pos, block_info.block_param.mv_arr0, sign0, width, height, bipred, 0, decoder_info->bitdepth);
int r1 = decoder_info->frame_info.ref_array[block_info.block_param.ref_idx1];
yuv_frame_t *ref1 = r1 >= 0 ? decoder_info->ref[r1] : decoder_info->interp_frames[0];
int sign1 = ref1->frame_num >= rec->frame_num;
TEMPLATE(get_inter_prediction_yuv)(ref1, pblock1_y, pblock1_u, pblock1_v, &block_info.block_pos, block_info.block_param.mv_arr1, sign1, width, height, bipred, 0, decoder_info->bitdepth);
TEMPLATE(average_blocks_all)(pblock_y, pblock_u, pblock_v, pblock0_y, pblock0_u, pblock0_v, pblock1_y, pblock1_u, pblock1_v, &block_info.block_pos, sub);
thor_free(pblock0_y);
thor_free(pblock0_u);
thor_free(pblock0_v);
thor_free(pblock1_y);
thor_free(pblock1_u);
thor_free(pblock1_v);
}
else{
int ref_idx = block_info.block_param.ref_idx0; //TODO: Move to top
int r = decoder_info->frame_info.ref_array[ref_idx];
ref = r>=0 ? decoder_info->ref[r] : decoder_info->interp_frames[0];
int sign = ref->frame_num > rec->frame_num;
TEMPLATE(get_inter_prediction_yuv)(ref, pblock_y, pblock_u, pblock_v, &block_info.block_pos, block_info.block_param.mv_arr0, sign, width, height, bipred, 0, decoder_info->bitdepth);
}
}
else if (mode == MODE_INTER){
int ref_idx = block_info.block_param.ref_idx0;
int r = decoder_info->frame_info.ref_array[ref_idx];
ref = r>=0 ? decoder_info->ref[r] : decoder_info->interp_frames[0];
int sign = ref->frame_num > rec->frame_num;
TEMPLATE(get_inter_prediction_yuv)(ref, pblock_y, pblock_u, pblock_v, &block_info.block_pos, block_info.block_param.mv_arr0, sign, width, height, bipred, decoder_info->pb_split, decoder_info->bitdepth);
}
else if (mode == MODE_BIPRED){
SAMPLE *pblock0_y = thor_alloc(MAX_SB_SIZE*MAX_SB_SIZE*sizeof(SAMPLE), 32);
SAMPLE *pblock0_u = thor_alloc((MAX_SB_SIZE*MAX_SB_SIZE >> 2*sub)*sizeof(SAMPLE), 32);
SAMPLE *pblock0_v = thor_alloc((MAX_SB_SIZE*MAX_SB_SIZE >> 2*sub)*sizeof(SAMPLE), 32);
SAMPLE *pblock1_y = thor_alloc(MAX_SB_SIZE*MAX_SB_SIZE*sizeof(SAMPLE), 32);
SAMPLE *pblock1_u = thor_alloc((MAX_SB_SIZE*MAX_SB_SIZE >> 2*sub)*sizeof(SAMPLE), 32);
SAMPLE *pblock1_v = thor_alloc((MAX_SB_SIZE*MAX_SB_SIZE >> 2*sub)*sizeof(SAMPLE), 32);
int r0 = decoder_info->frame_info.ref_array[block_info.block_param.ref_idx0];
yuv_frame_t *ref0 = r0 >= 0 ? decoder_info->ref[r0] : decoder_info->interp_frames[0];
int sign0 = ref0->frame_num >= rec->frame_num;
TEMPLATE(get_inter_prediction_yuv)(ref0, pblock0_y, pblock0_u, pblock0_v, &block_info.block_pos, block_info.block_param.mv_arr0, sign0, width, height, bipred, decoder_info->pb_split, decoder_info->bitdepth);
int r1 = decoder_info->frame_info.ref_array[block_info.block_param.ref_idx1];
yuv_frame_t *ref1 = r1 >= 0 ? decoder_info->ref[r1] : decoder_info->interp_frames[0];
int sign1 = ref1->frame_num >= rec->frame_num;
TEMPLATE(get_inter_prediction_yuv)(ref1, pblock1_y, pblock1_u, pblock1_v, &block_info.block_pos, block_info.block_param.mv_arr1, sign1, width, height, bipred, decoder_info->pb_split, decoder_info->bitdepth);
TEMPLATE(average_blocks_all)(pblock_y, pblock_u, pblock_v, pblock0_y, pblock0_u, pblock0_v, pblock1_y, pblock1_u, pblock1_v, &block_info.block_pos, sub);
thor_free(pblock0_y);
thor_free(pblock0_u);
thor_free(pblock0_v);
thor_free(pblock1_y);
thor_free(pblock1_u);
thor_free(pblock1_v);
}
/* Dequantize, invere tranform and reconstruct */
int ql = decoder_info->qmtx ? qp_to_qlevel(qpY,decoder_info->qmtx_offset) : 0;
decode_and_reconstruct_block_inter(rec_y,rec->stride_y,sizeY,qpY,pblock_y,coeff_y,tb_split,decoder_info->bitdepth,decoder_info->qmtx ? decoder_info->iwmatrix[ql][0][0] : NULL);
if (decoder_info->cfl_inter && decoder_info->subsample != 400)
TEMPLATE(improve_uv_prediction)(pblock_y, pblock_u, pblock_v, rec_y, sizeY, sizeY, rec->stride_y, sub, decoder_info->bitdepth);
decode_and_reconstruct_block_inter(rec_u,rec->stride_c,sizeC,qpC,pblock_u,coeff_u,tb_split&&sizeC>4,decoder_info->bitdepth,decoder_info->qmtx ? decoder_info->iwmatrix[ql][1][0] : NULL);
decode_and_reconstruct_block_inter(rec_v,rec->stride_c,sizeC,qpC,pblock_v,coeff_v,tb_split&&sizeC>4,decoder_info->bitdepth,decoder_info->qmtx ? decoder_info->iwmatrix[ql][2][0] : NULL);
}
/* Copy deblock data to frame array */
copy_deblock_data(decoder_info,&block_info);
thor_free(pblock0_y);
thor_free(pblock0_u);
thor_free(pblock0_v);
thor_free(pblock1_y);
thor_free(pblock1_u);
thor_free(pblock1_v);
thor_free(pblock_y);
thor_free(pblock_u);
thor_free(pblock_v);
thor_free(coeff_y);
thor_free(coeff_u);
thor_free(coeff_v);
}
Commit Message: Fix possible stack overflows in decoder for illegal bit streams
Fixes CVE-2018-0429
A vulnerability in the Thor decoder (available at:
https://github.com/cisco/thor) could allow an authenticated, local
attacker to cause segmentation faults and stack overflows when using a
non-conformant Thor bitstream as input.
The vulnerability is due to lack of input validation when parsing the
bitstream. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to cause a
stack overflow and potentially inject and execute arbitrary code.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 85,081
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(str_split)
{
zend_string *str;
zend_long split_length = 1;
char *p;
size_t n_reg_segments;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "S|l", &str, &split_length) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (split_length <= 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "The length of each segment must be greater than zero");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (0 == ZSTR_LEN(str) || (size_t)split_length >= ZSTR_LEN(str)) {
array_init_size(return_value, 1);
add_next_index_stringl(return_value, ZSTR_VAL(str), ZSTR_LEN(str));
return;
}
array_init_size(return_value, (uint32_t)(((ZSTR_LEN(str) - 1) / split_length) + 1));
n_reg_segments = ZSTR_LEN(str) / split_length;
p = ZSTR_VAL(str);
while (n_reg_segments-- > 0) {
add_next_index_stringl(return_value, p, split_length);
p += split_length;
}
if (p != (ZSTR_VAL(str) + ZSTR_LEN(str))) {
add_next_index_stringl(return_value, p, (ZSTR_VAL(str) + ZSTR_LEN(str) - p));
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-17
| 0
| 14,662
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Vector<String> HTMLInputElement::acceptMIMETypes()
{
return parseAcceptAttribute(fastGetAttribute(acceptAttr), isValidMIMEType);
}
Commit Message: Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 112,858
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BaseMultipleFieldsDateAndTimeInputType::disabledAttributeChanged()
{
spinButtonElement()->releaseCapture();
clearButtonElement()->releaseCapture();
if (DateTimeEditElement* edit = dateTimeEditElement())
edit->disabledStateChanged();
}
Commit Message: Fix reentrance of BaseMultipleFieldsDateAndTimeInputType::destroyShadowSubtree.
destroyShadowSubtree could dispatch 'blur' event unexpectedly because
element()->focused() had incorrect information. We make sure it has
correct information by checking if the UA shadow root contains the
focused element.
BUG=257353
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/19067004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@154086 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 112,456
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ConsoleObserverDelegate::DidAddMessageToConsole(
WebContents* source,
int32_t level,
const base::string16& message,
int32_t line_no,
const base::string16& source_id) {
DCHECK(source == web_contents_);
std::string ascii_message = base::UTF16ToASCII(message);
if (base::MatchPattern(ascii_message, filter_)) {
message_ = ascii_message;
message_loop_runner_->Quit();
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Apply ExtensionNavigationThrottle filesystem/blob checks to all frames.
BUG=836858
Change-Id: I34333a72501129fd40b5a9aa6378c9f35f1e7fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1028511
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nick Carter <nick@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553867}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 156,035
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const std::string AutoFillManager::IDToGUID(int id) {
if (id == 0)
return std::string();
std::map<int, std::string>::const_iterator iter = id_guid_map_.find(id);
if (iter == id_guid_map_.end()) {
NOTREACHED();
return std::string();
}
return iter->second;
}
Commit Message: Add support for autofill server experiments
BUG=none
TEST=unit_tests --gtest_filter=AutoFillMetricsTest.QualityMetricsWithExperimentId:AutoFillQueryXmlParserTest.ParseExperimentId
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6260027
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@73216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 101,887
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContext::DeleteCookiesCallback(int request_id, int num_deleted) {
client_->CookiesDeleted(request_id, num_deleted);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 16,955
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ContentSecurityPolicy::AllowPrefetchFromSource(
const KURL& url,
RedirectStatus redirect_status,
SecurityViolationReportingPolicy reporting_policy,
CheckHeaderType check_header_type) const {
if (ShouldBypassContentSecurityPolicy(url, execution_context_))
return true;
bool is_allowed = true;
for (const auto& policy : policies_) {
if (!CheckHeaderTypeMatches(check_header_type, policy->HeaderType()))
continue;
is_allowed &=
policy->AllowPrefetchFromSource(url, redirect_status, reporting_policy);
}
return is_allowed;
}
Commit Message: Inherit the navigation initiator when navigating instead of the parent/opener
Spec PR: https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-csp/pull/358
Bug: 905301, 894228, 836148
Change-Id: I43ada2266d42d1cd56dbe3c6dd89d115e878a83a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1314633
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#610850}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 152,462
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ReadPixels(
GLint x, GLint y, GLsizei width, GLsizei height,
GLenum format, GLenum type, void* pixels) const {
DCHECK_GE(x, 0);
DCHECK_GE(y, 0);
DCHECK_LE(x + width, width_);
DCHECK_LE(y + height, height_);
for (GLint yy = 0; yy < height; ++yy) {
const int8* src = GetPixelAddress(src_pixels_, x, y + yy);
const void* dst = ComputePackAlignmentAddress(0, yy, width, pixels);
memcpy(const_cast<void*>(dst), src, width * bytes_per_pixel_);
}
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 99,353
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: IRCView::~IRCView()
{
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 1,781
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned int inotify_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
{
struct fsnotify_group *group = file->private_data;
int ret = 0;
poll_wait(file, &group->notification_waitq, wait);
mutex_lock(&group->notification_mutex);
if (!fsnotify_notify_queue_is_empty(group))
ret = POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;
mutex_unlock(&group->notification_mutex);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: inotify: fix double free/corruption of stuct user
On an error path in inotify_init1 a normal user can trigger a double
free of struct user. This is a regression introduced by a2ae4cc9a16e
("inotify: stop kernel memory leak on file creation failure").
We fix this by making sure that if a group exists the user reference is
dropped when the group is cleaned up. We should not explictly drop the
reference on error and also drop the reference when the group is cleaned
up.
The new lifetime rules are that an inotify group lives from
inotify_new_group to the last fsnotify_put_group. Since the struct user
and inotify_devs are directly tied to this lifetime they are only
changed/updated in those two locations. We get rid of all special
casing of struct user or user->inotify_devs.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org (2.6.37 and up)
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 27,547
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: float scroll_velocity_x() const { return scroll_velocity_x_; }
Commit Message: Pass ui::LatencyInfo correct with unified gesture detector on Aura.
BUG=379812
TEST=GestureRecognizerTest.LatencyPassedFromTouchEvent
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/309823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@274602 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 112,118
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GetLastSession() {
profile()->GetSessionService()->TabClosed(controller().window_id(),
controller().session_id(),
false);
ReopenDatabase();
Time close_time;
session_helper_.ReadWindows(&windows_);
}
Commit Message: Ensure URL is updated after a cross-site navigation is pre-empted by
an "ignored" navigation.
BUG=77507
TEST=NavigationControllerTest.LoadURL_IgnorePreemptsPending
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6826015
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@81307 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 99,897
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void V8TestObject::ReflectedNameAttributeGetterCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_reflectedName_Getter");
test_object_v8_internal::ReflectedNameAttributeGetter(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 135,110
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline TCGMemOp mo_64_32(TCGMemOp ot)
{
#ifdef TARGET_X86_64
return ot == MO_64 ? MO_64 : MO_32;
#else
return MO_32;
#endif
}
Commit Message: tcg/i386: Check the size of instruction being translated
This fixes the bug: 'user-to-root privesc inside VM via bad translation
caching' reported by Jann Horn here:
https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1122
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
CC: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
CC: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Pranith Kumar <bobby.prani@gmail.com>
Message-Id: <20170323175851.14342-1-bobby.prani@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-94
| 0
| 66,423
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: png_set_text(png_structp png_ptr, png_infop info_ptr, png_textp text_ptr,
int num_text)
{
int ret;
ret = png_set_text_2(png_ptr, info_ptr, text_ptr, num_text);
if (ret)
png_error(png_ptr, "Insufficient memory to store text");
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 131,418
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CustomButton::StopThrobbing() {
if (hover_animation_->is_animating()) {
hover_animation_->Stop();
SchedulePaint();
}
}
Commit Message: Custom buttons should only handle accelerators when focused.
BUG=541415
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1437523005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#360130}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 132,353
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sctp_setsockopt_auth_chunk(struct sock *sk,
char __user *optval,
unsigned int optlen)
{
struct sctp_endpoint *ep = sctp_sk(sk)->ep;
struct sctp_authchunk val;
if (!ep->auth_enable)
return -EACCES;
if (optlen != sizeof(struct sctp_authchunk))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&val, optval, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
switch (val.sauth_chunk) {
case SCTP_CID_INIT:
case SCTP_CID_INIT_ACK:
case SCTP_CID_SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE:
case SCTP_CID_AUTH:
return -EINVAL;
}
/* add this chunk id to the endpoint */
return sctp_auth_ep_add_chunkid(ep, val.sauth_chunk);
}
Commit Message: sctp: fix ASCONF list handling
->auto_asconf_splist is per namespace and mangled by functions like
sctp_setsockopt_auto_asconf() which doesn't guarantee any serialization.
Also, the call to inet_sk_copy_descendant() was backuping
->auto_asconf_list through the copy but was not honoring
->do_auto_asconf, which could lead to list corruption if it was
different between both sockets.
This commit thus fixes the list handling by using ->addr_wq_lock
spinlock to protect the list. A special handling is done upon socket
creation and destruction for that. Error handlig on sctp_init_sock()
will never return an error after having initialized asconf, so
sctp_destroy_sock() can be called without addrq_wq_lock. The lock now
will be take on sctp_close_sock(), before locking the socket, so we
don't do it in inverse order compared to sctp_addr_wq_timeout_handler().
Instead of taking the lock on sctp_sock_migrate() for copying and
restoring the list values, it's preferred to avoid rewritting it by
implementing sctp_copy_descendant().
Issue was found with a test application that kept flipping sysctl
default_auto_asconf on and off, but one could trigger it by issuing
simultaneous setsockopt() calls on multiple sockets or by
creating/destroying sockets fast enough. This is only triggerable
locally.
Fixes: 9f7d653b67ae ("sctp: Add Auto-ASCONF support (core).")
Reported-by: Ji Jianwen <jiji@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Suggested-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 43,564
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::BindAuthenticatorRequest(
blink::mojom::AuthenticatorRequest request) {
if (!authenticator_impl_)
authenticator_impl_.reset(new AuthenticatorImpl(this));
authenticator_impl_->Bind(std::move(request));
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 139,201
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static float lite_font_stringwidth( wmfAPI* API, wmfFont* font, char* str)
{
#if 0
wmf_magick_t
*ddata = WMF_MAGICK_GetData(API);
Image
*image = ddata->image;
DrawInfo
*draw_info;
TypeMetric
metrics;
float
stringwidth = 0;
double
orig_x_resolution,
orig_y_resolution;
ResolutionType
orig_resolution_units;
orig_x_resolution = image->x_resolution;
orig_y_resolution = image->y_resolution;
orig_resolution_units = image->units;
draw_info=ddata->draw_info;
if (draw_info == (const DrawInfo *) NULL)
return 0;
draw_info->font=WMF_FONT_PSNAME(font);
draw_info->pointsize=12;
draw_info->text=str;
image->x_resolution = 72;
image->y_resolution = 72;
image->units = PixelsPerInchResolution;
if (GetTypeMetrics(image, draw_info, &metrics) != MagickFalse)
stringwidth = ((metrics.width * 72)/(image->x_resolution * draw_info->pointsize)); /* *0.916348; */
draw_info->font=NULL;
draw_info->text=NULL;
#if 0
printf("\nlite_font_stringwidth\n");
printf("string = \"%s\"\n", str);
printf("WMF_FONT_NAME = \"%s\"\n", WMF_FONT_NAME(font));
printf("WMF_FONT_PSNAME = \"%s\"\n", WMF_FONT_PSNAME(font));
printf("stringwidth = %g\n", stringwidth);
/* printf("WMF_FONT_HEIGHT = %i\n", (int)WMF_FONT_HEIGHT(font)); */
/* printf("WMF_FONT_WIDTH = %i\n", (int)WMF_FONT_WIDTH(font)); */
fflush(stdout);
#endif
image->x_resolution = orig_x_resolution;
image->y_resolution = orig_y_resolution;
image->units = orig_resolution_units;
return stringwidth;
#else
(void) API;
(void) font;
(void) str;
return 0;
#endif
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 71,844
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: camera_metadata_t *place_camera_metadata(void *dst,
size_t dst_size,
size_t entry_capacity,
size_t data_capacity) {
if (dst == NULL) return NULL;
size_t memory_needed = calculate_camera_metadata_size(entry_capacity,
data_capacity);
if (memory_needed > dst_size) return NULL;
camera_metadata_t *metadata = (camera_metadata_t*)dst;
metadata->version = CURRENT_METADATA_VERSION;
metadata->flags = 0;
metadata->entry_count = 0;
metadata->entry_capacity = entry_capacity;
metadata->entries_start =
ALIGN_TO(sizeof(camera_metadata_t), ENTRY_ALIGNMENT);
metadata->data_count = 0;
metadata->data_capacity = data_capacity;
metadata->size = memory_needed;
size_t data_unaligned = (uint8_t*)(get_entries(metadata) +
metadata->entry_capacity) - (uint8_t*)metadata;
metadata->data_start = ALIGN_TO(data_unaligned, DATA_ALIGNMENT);
assert(validate_camera_metadata_structure(metadata, NULL) == OK);
return metadata;
}
Commit Message: Camera: Prevent data size overflow
Add a function to check overflow when calculating metadata
data size.
Bug: 30741779
Change-Id: I6405fe608567a4f4113674050f826f305ecae030
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 157,943
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ptrace_disable(struct task_struct *child)
{
user_disable_single_step(child);
#ifdef TIF_SYSCALL_EMU
clear_tsk_thread_flag(child, TIF_SYSCALL_EMU);
#endif
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 25,904
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void perf_swevent_del(struct perf_event *event, int flags)
{
hlist_del_rcu(&event->hlist_entry);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 26,166
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Box *stsz_New()
{
ISOM_DECL_BOX_ALLOC(GF_SampleSizeBox, 0);
return (GF_Box *)tmp;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,491
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebMediaPlayerImpl::SetReadyState(WebMediaPlayer::ReadyState state) {
DVLOG(1) << __func__ << "(" << state << ")";
DCHECK(main_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
if (state == WebMediaPlayer::kReadyStateHaveEnoughData && data_source_ &&
data_source_->assume_fully_buffered() &&
network_state_ == WebMediaPlayer::kNetworkStateLoading)
SetNetworkState(WebMediaPlayer::kNetworkStateLoaded);
ready_state_ = state;
highest_ready_state_ = std::max(highest_ready_state_, ready_state_);
client_->ReadyStateChanged();
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 144,515
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PP_Bool ReadImageData(PP_Resource device_context_2d,
PP_Resource image,
const PP_Point* top_left) {
EnterResource<PPB_Graphics2D_API> enter(device_context_2d, true);
if (enter.failed())
return PP_FALSE;
return BoolToPPBool(static_cast<PPB_Graphics2D_Impl*>(enter.object())->
ReadImageData(image, top_left));
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 103,441
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameImpl::OnHostZoomClientRequest(
mojom::HostZoomAssociatedRequest request) {
DCHECK(!host_zoom_binding_.is_bound());
host_zoom_binding_.Bind(std::move(request),
GetTaskRunner(blink::TaskType::kInternalIPC));
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 139,757
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int readCapabilityRid(struct airo_info *ai, CapabilityRid *capr, int lock)
{
return PC4500_readrid(ai, RID_CAPABILITIES, capr, sizeof(*capr), lock);
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 24,068
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: expr_value_type_to_string(enum expr_value_type type)
{
if (type >= _EXPR_TYPE_NUM_VALUES)
return NULL;
return expr_value_type_strings[type];
}
Commit Message: xkbcomp: fix pointer value for FreeStmt
Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 79,011
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: asmlinkage int printk(const char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list args;
int r;
#ifdef CONFIG_KGDB_KDB
if (unlikely(kdb_trap_printk)) {
va_start(args, fmt);
r = vkdb_printf(fmt, args);
va_end(args);
return r;
}
#endif
va_start(args, fmt);
r = vprintk(fmt, args);
va_end(args);
return r;
}
Commit Message: printk: fix buffer overflow when calling log_prefix function from call_console_drivers
This patch corrects a buffer overflow in kernels from 3.0 to 3.4 when calling
log_prefix() function from call_console_drivers().
This bug existed in previous releases but has been revealed with commit
162a7e7500f9664636e649ba59defe541b7c2c60 (2.6.39 => 3.0) that made changes
about how to allocate memory for early printk buffer (use of memblock_alloc).
It disappears with commit 7ff9554bb578ba02166071d2d487b7fc7d860d62 (3.4 => 3.5)
that does a refactoring of printk buffer management.
In log_prefix(), the access to "p[0]", "p[1]", "p[2]" or
"simple_strtoul(&p[1], &endp, 10)" may cause a buffer overflow as this
function is called from call_console_drivers by passing "&LOG_BUF(cur_index)"
where the index must be masked to do not exceed the buffer's boundary.
The trick is to prepare in call_console_drivers() a buffer with the necessary
data (PRI field of syslog message) to be safely evaluated in log_prefix().
This patch can be applied to stable kernel branches 3.0.y, 3.2.y and 3.4.y.
Without this patch, one can freeze a server running this loop from shell :
$ export DUMMY=`cat /dev/urandom | tr -dc '12345AZERTYUIOPQSDFGHJKLMWXCVBNazertyuiopqsdfghjklmwxcvbn' | head -c255`
$ while true do ; echo $DUMMY > /dev/kmsg ; done
The "server freeze" depends on where memblock_alloc does allocate printk buffer :
if the buffer overflow is inside another kernel allocation the problem may not
be revealed, else the server may hangs up.
Signed-off-by: Alexandre SIMON <Alexandre.Simon@univ-lorraine.fr>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 33,460
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int __sched ldsem_down_read(struct ld_semaphore *sem, long timeout)
{
might_sleep();
return __ldsem_down_read_nested(sem, 0, timeout);
}
Commit Message: tty: Fix hang at ldsem_down_read()
When a controlling tty is being hung up and the hang up is
waiting for a just-signalled tty reader or writer to exit, and a new tty
reader/writer tries to acquire an ldisc reference concurrently with the
ldisc reference release from the signalled reader/writer, the hangup
can hang. The new reader/writer is sleeping in ldsem_down_read() and the
hangup is sleeping in ldsem_down_write() [1].
The new reader/writer fails to wakeup the waiting hangup because the
wrong lock count value is checked (the old lock count rather than the new
lock count) to see if the lock is unowned.
Change helper function to return the new lock count if the cmpxchg was
successful; document this behavior.
[1] edited dmesg log from reporter
SysRq : Show Blocked State
task PC stack pid father
systemd D ffff88040c4f0000 0 1 0 0x00000000
ffff88040c49fbe0 0000000000000046 ffff88040c4a0000 ffff88040c49ffd8
00000000001d3980 00000000001d3980 ffff88040c4a0000 ffff88040593d840
ffff88040c49fb40 ffffffff810a4cc0 0000000000000006 0000000000000023
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff810a4cc0>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x9f/0xe4
[<ffffffff810a4cc0>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x9f/0xe4
[<ffffffff810a4cc0>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x9f/0xe4
[<ffffffff810a4cc0>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x9f/0xe4
[<ffffffff817a6649>] schedule+0x24/0x5e
[<ffffffff817a588b>] schedule_timeout+0x15b/0x1ec
[<ffffffff810a4cc0>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x9f/0xe4
[<ffffffff817aa691>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x26
[<ffffffff817aa10c>] down_read_failed+0xe3/0x1b9
[<ffffffff817aa26d>] ldsem_down_read+0x8b/0xa5
[<ffffffff8142b5ca>] ? tty_ldisc_ref_wait+0x1b/0x44
[<ffffffff8142b5ca>] tty_ldisc_ref_wait+0x1b/0x44
[<ffffffff81423f5b>] tty_write+0x7d/0x28a
[<ffffffff814241f5>] redirected_tty_write+0x8d/0x98
[<ffffffff81424168>] ? tty_write+0x28a/0x28a
[<ffffffff8115d03f>] do_loop_readv_writev+0x56/0x79
[<ffffffff8115e604>] do_readv_writev+0x1b0/0x1ff
[<ffffffff8116ea0b>] ? do_vfs_ioctl+0x32a/0x489
[<ffffffff81167d9d>] ? final_putname+0x1d/0x3a
[<ffffffff8115e6c7>] vfs_writev+0x2e/0x49
[<ffffffff8115e7d3>] SyS_writev+0x47/0xaa
[<ffffffff817ab822>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
bash D ffffffff81c104c0 0 5469 5302 0x00000082
ffff8800cf817ac0 0000000000000046 ffff8804086b22a0 ffff8800cf817fd8
00000000001d3980 00000000001d3980 ffff8804086b22a0 ffff8800cf817a48
000000000000b9a0 ffff8800cf817a78 ffffffff81004675 ffff8800cf817a44
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81004675>] ? dump_trace+0x165/0x29c
[<ffffffff810a4cc0>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x9f/0xe4
[<ffffffff8100edda>] ? save_stack_trace+0x26/0x41
[<ffffffff817a6649>] schedule+0x24/0x5e
[<ffffffff817a588b>] schedule_timeout+0x15b/0x1ec
[<ffffffff810a4cc0>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x9f/0xe4
[<ffffffff817a9f03>] ? down_write_failed+0xa3/0x1c9
[<ffffffff817aa691>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x26
[<ffffffff817a9f0b>] down_write_failed+0xab/0x1c9
[<ffffffff817aa300>] ldsem_down_write+0x79/0xb1
[<ffffffff817aada3>] ? tty_ldisc_lock_pair_timeout+0xa5/0xd9
[<ffffffff817aada3>] tty_ldisc_lock_pair_timeout+0xa5/0xd9
[<ffffffff8142bf33>] tty_ldisc_hangup+0xc4/0x218
[<ffffffff81423ab3>] __tty_hangup+0x2e2/0x3ed
[<ffffffff81424a76>] disassociate_ctty+0x63/0x226
[<ffffffff81078aa7>] do_exit+0x79f/0xa11
[<ffffffff81086bdb>] ? get_signal_to_deliver+0x206/0x62f
[<ffffffff810b4bfb>] ? lock_release_holdtime.part.8+0xf/0x16e
[<ffffffff81079b05>] do_group_exit+0x47/0xb5
[<ffffffff81086c16>] get_signal_to_deliver+0x241/0x62f
[<ffffffff810020a7>] do_signal+0x43/0x59d
[<ffffffff810f2af7>] ? __audit_syscall_exit+0x21a/0x2a8
[<ffffffff810b4bfb>] ? lock_release_holdtime.part.8+0xf/0x16e
[<ffffffff81002655>] do_notify_resume+0x54/0x6c
[<ffffffff817abaf8>] int_signal+0x12/0x17
Reported-by: Sami Farin <sami.farin@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.12.x
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 57,839
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int cx24116_diseqc_init(struct dvb_frontend *fe)
{
struct cx24116_state *state = fe->demodulator_priv;
struct cx24116_cmd cmd;
int ret;
/* Firmware CMD 20: LNB/DiSEqC config */
cmd.args[0x00] = CMD_LNBCONFIG;
cmd.args[0x01] = 0x00;
cmd.args[0x02] = 0x10;
cmd.args[0x03] = 0x00;
cmd.args[0x04] = 0x8f;
cmd.args[0x05] = 0x28;
cmd.args[0x06] = (toneburst == CX24116_DISEQC_TONEOFF) ? 0x00 : 0x01;
cmd.args[0x07] = 0x01;
cmd.len = 0x08;
ret = cx24116_cmd_execute(fe, &cmd);
if (ret != 0)
return ret;
/* Prepare a DiSEqC command */
state->dsec_cmd.args[0x00] = CMD_LNBSEND;
/* DiSEqC burst */
state->dsec_cmd.args[CX24116_DISEQC_BURST] = CX24116_DISEQC_MINI_A;
/* Unknown */
state->dsec_cmd.args[CX24116_DISEQC_ARG2_2] = 0x02;
state->dsec_cmd.args[CX24116_DISEQC_ARG3_0] = 0x00;
/* Continuation flag? */
state->dsec_cmd.args[CX24116_DISEQC_ARG4_0] = 0x00;
/* DiSEqC message length */
state->dsec_cmd.args[CX24116_DISEQC_MSGLEN] = 0x00;
/* Command length */
state->dsec_cmd.len = CX24116_DISEQC_MSGOFS;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: [media] cx24116: fix a buffer overflow when checking userspace params
The maximum size for a DiSEqC command is 6, according to the
userspace API. However, the code allows to write up much more values:
drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cx24116.c:983 cx24116_send_diseqc_msg() error: buffer overflow 'd->msg' 6 <= 23
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@osg.samsung.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 94,048
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: i915_gem_execbuffer_relocate_entry(struct drm_i915_gem_object *obj,
struct eb_objects *eb,
struct drm_i915_gem_relocation_entry *reloc)
{
struct drm_device *dev = obj->base.dev;
struct drm_gem_object *target_obj;
uint32_t target_offset;
int ret = -EINVAL;
/* we've already hold a reference to all valid objects */
target_obj = &eb_get_object(eb, reloc->target_handle)->base;
if (unlikely(target_obj == NULL))
return -ENOENT;
target_offset = to_intel_bo(target_obj)->gtt_offset;
/* The target buffer should have appeared before us in the
* exec_object list, so it should have a GTT space bound by now.
*/
if (unlikely(target_offset == 0)) {
DRM_DEBUG("No GTT space found for object %d\n",
reloc->target_handle);
return ret;
}
/* Validate that the target is in a valid r/w GPU domain */
if (unlikely(reloc->write_domain & (reloc->write_domain - 1))) {
DRM_DEBUG("reloc with multiple write domains: "
"obj %p target %d offset %d "
"read %08x write %08x",
obj, reloc->target_handle,
(int) reloc->offset,
reloc->read_domains,
reloc->write_domain);
return ret;
}
if (unlikely((reloc->write_domain | reloc->read_domains)
& ~I915_GEM_GPU_DOMAINS)) {
DRM_DEBUG("reloc with read/write non-GPU domains: "
"obj %p target %d offset %d "
"read %08x write %08x",
obj, reloc->target_handle,
(int) reloc->offset,
reloc->read_domains,
reloc->write_domain);
return ret;
}
if (unlikely(reloc->write_domain && target_obj->pending_write_domain &&
reloc->write_domain != target_obj->pending_write_domain)) {
DRM_DEBUG("Write domain conflict: "
"obj %p target %d offset %d "
"new %08x old %08x\n",
obj, reloc->target_handle,
(int) reloc->offset,
reloc->write_domain,
target_obj->pending_write_domain);
return ret;
}
target_obj->pending_read_domains |= reloc->read_domains;
target_obj->pending_write_domain |= reloc->write_domain;
/* If the relocation already has the right value in it, no
* more work needs to be done.
*/
if (target_offset == reloc->presumed_offset)
return 0;
/* Check that the relocation address is valid... */
if (unlikely(reloc->offset > obj->base.size - 4)) {
DRM_DEBUG("Relocation beyond object bounds: "
"obj %p target %d offset %d size %d.\n",
obj, reloc->target_handle,
(int) reloc->offset,
(int) obj->base.size);
return ret;
}
if (unlikely(reloc->offset & 3)) {
DRM_DEBUG("Relocation not 4-byte aligned: "
"obj %p target %d offset %d.\n",
obj, reloc->target_handle,
(int) reloc->offset);
return ret;
}
reloc->delta += target_offset;
if (obj->base.write_domain == I915_GEM_DOMAIN_CPU) {
uint32_t page_offset = reloc->offset & ~PAGE_MASK;
char *vaddr;
vaddr = kmap_atomic(obj->pages[reloc->offset >> PAGE_SHIFT]);
*(uint32_t *)(vaddr + page_offset) = reloc->delta;
kunmap_atomic(vaddr);
} else {
struct drm_i915_private *dev_priv = dev->dev_private;
uint32_t __iomem *reloc_entry;
void __iomem *reloc_page;
/* We can't wait for rendering with pagefaults disabled */
if (obj->active && in_atomic())
return -EFAULT;
ret = i915_gem_object_set_to_gtt_domain(obj, 1);
if (ret)
return ret;
/* Map the page containing the relocation we're going to perform. */
reloc->offset += obj->gtt_offset;
reloc_page = io_mapping_map_atomic_wc(dev_priv->mm.gtt_mapping,
reloc->offset & PAGE_MASK);
reloc_entry = (uint32_t __iomem *)
(reloc_page + (reloc->offset & ~PAGE_MASK));
iowrite32(reloc->delta, reloc_entry);
io_mapping_unmap_atomic(reloc_page);
}
/* and update the user's relocation entry */
reloc->presumed_offset = target_offset;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: drm/i915: fix integer overflow in i915_gem_do_execbuffer()
On 32-bit systems, a large args->num_cliprects from userspace via ioctl
may overflow the allocation size, leading to out-of-bounds access.
This vulnerability was introduced in commit 432e58ed ("drm/i915: Avoid
allocation for execbuffer object list").
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 19,786
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: person_set_revert_delay(person_t* person, int num_frames)
{
person->revert_delay = num_frames;
person->revert_frames = num_frames;
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c (#268)
* Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c
There's a buffer overflow bug in the function layer_resize. It allocates
a buffer `tilemap` with size `x_size * y_size * sizeof(struct map_tile)`.
But it didn't check for integer overflow, so if x_size and y_size are
very large, it's possible that the buffer size is smaller than needed,
causing a buffer overflow later.
PoC: `SetLayerSize(0, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF);`
* move malloc to a separate line
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 75,113
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int copy_mm(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct * tsk)
{
struct mm_struct * mm, *oldmm;
int retval;
tsk->min_flt = tsk->maj_flt = 0;
tsk->nvcsw = tsk->nivcsw = 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_DETECT_HUNG_TASK
tsk->last_switch_count = tsk->nvcsw + tsk->nivcsw;
#endif
tsk->mm = NULL;
tsk->active_mm = NULL;
/*
* Are we cloning a kernel thread?
*
* We need to steal a active VM for that..
*/
oldmm = current->mm;
if (!oldmm)
return 0;
if (clone_flags & CLONE_VM) {
atomic_inc(&oldmm->mm_users);
mm = oldmm;
goto good_mm;
}
retval = -ENOMEM;
mm = dup_mm(tsk);
if (!mm)
goto fail_nomem;
good_mm:
/* Initializing for Swap token stuff */
mm->token_priority = 0;
mm->last_interval = 0;
tsk->mm = mm;
tsk->active_mm = mm;
return 0;
fail_nomem:
return retval;
}
Commit Message: block: Fix io_context leak after failure of clone with CLONE_IO
With CLONE_IO, parent's io_context->nr_tasks is incremented, but never
decremented whenever copy_process() fails afterwards, which prevents
exit_io_context() from calling IO schedulers exit functions.
Give a task_struct to exit_io_context(), and call exit_io_context() instead of
put_io_context() in copy_process() cleanup path.
Signed-off-by: Louis Rilling <louis.rilling@kerlabs.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <jens.axboe@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 94,346
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: u64 dma_get_required_mask(struct device *dev)
{
u32 low_totalram = ((max_pfn - 1) << PAGE_SHIFT);
u32 high_totalram = ((max_pfn - 1) >> (32 - PAGE_SHIFT));
u64 mask;
if (!high_totalram) {
/* convert to mask just covering totalram */
low_totalram = (1 << (fls(low_totalram) - 1));
low_totalram += low_totalram - 1;
mask = low_totalram;
} else {
high_totalram = (1 << (fls(high_totalram) - 1));
high_totalram += high_totalram - 1;
mask = (((u64)high_totalram) << 32) + 0xffffffff;
}
return mask;
}
Commit Message: driver core: platform: fix race condition with driver_override
The driver_override implementation is susceptible to race condition when
different threads are reading vs storing a different driver override.
Add locking to avoid race condition.
Fixes: 3d713e0e382e ("driver core: platform: add device binding path 'driver_override'")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Adrian Salido <salidoa@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 63,074
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int jas_matrix_cmp(jas_matrix_t *mat0, jas_matrix_t *mat1)
{
int i;
int j;
if (mat0->numrows_ != mat1->numrows_ || mat0->numcols_ !=
mat1->numcols_) {
return 1;
}
for (i = 0; i < mat0->numrows_; i++) {
for (j = 0; j < mat0->numcols_; j++) {
if (jas_matrix_get(mat0, i, j) != jas_matrix_get(mat1, i, j)) {
return 1;
}
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed an integer overflow problem.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 70,392
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ResourceFetcher::DeadResourceStatsRecorder::~DeadResourceStatsRecorder()
{
blink::Platform::current()->histogramCustomCounts(
"WebCore.ResourceFetcher.HitCount", m_useCount, 0, 1000, 50);
blink::Platform::current()->histogramCustomCounts(
"WebCore.ResourceFetcher.RevalidateCount", m_revalidateCount, 0, 1000, 50);
blink::Platform::current()->histogramCustomCounts(
"WebCore.ResourceFetcher.LoadCount", m_loadCount, 0, 1000, 50);
}
Commit Message: Enforce SVG image security rules
SVG images have unique security rules that prevent them from loading
any external resources. This patch enforces these rules in
ResourceFetcher::canRequest for all non-data-uri resources. This locks
down our SVG resource handling and fixes two security bugs.
In the case of SVG images that reference other images, we had a bug
where a cached subresource would be used directly from the cache.
This has been fixed because the canRequest check occurs before we use
cached resources.
In the case of SVG images that use CSS imports, we had a bug where
imports were blindly requested. This has been fixed by stopping all
non-data-uri requests in SVG images.
With this patch we now match Gecko's behavior on both testcases.
BUG=380885, 382296
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/320763002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@176084 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 121,290
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void MessageLoop::AddToDelayedWorkQueue(PendingTask pending_task) {
delayed_work_queue_.push(std::move(pending_task));
}
Commit Message: Introduce RunLoop::Type::NESTABLE_TASKS_ALLOWED to replace MessageLoop::ScopedNestableTaskAllower.
(as well as MessageLoop::SetNestableTasksAllowed())
Surveying usage: the scoped object is always instantiated right before
RunLoop().Run(). The intent is really to allow nestable tasks in that
RunLoop so it's better to explicitly label that RunLoop as such and it
allows us to break the last dependency that forced some RunLoop users
to use MessageLoop APIs.
There's also the odd case of allowing nestable tasks for loops that are
reentrant from a native task (without going through RunLoop), these
are the minority but will have to be handled (after cleaning up the
majority of cases that are RunLoop induced).
As highlighted by robliao@ in https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/600517
(which was merged in this CL).
R=danakj@chromium.org
Bug: 750779
Change-Id: I43d122c93ec903cff3a6fe7b77ec461ea0656448
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/594713
Commit-Queue: Gabriel Charette <gab@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Liao <robliao@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: danakj <danakj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492263}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 126,530
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: syncable::ModelTypeSet GetPreferredDataTypes() {
const syncable::ModelTypeSet preferred_data_types =
GetClient(0)->service()->GetPreferredDataTypes();
for (int i = 1; i < num_clients(); ++i) {
const syncable::ModelTypeSet other_preferred_data_types =
GetClient(i)->service()->GetPreferredDataTypes();
EXPECT_TRUE(preferred_data_types.Equals(other_preferred_data_types));
}
return preferred_data_types;
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 105,007
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_ootb(struct net *net,
const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const sctp_subtype_t type,
void *arg,
sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands)
{
struct sctp_chunk *chunk = arg;
struct sk_buff *skb = chunk->skb;
sctp_chunkhdr_t *ch;
sctp_errhdr_t *err;
__u8 *ch_end;
int ootb_shut_ack = 0;
int ootb_cookie_ack = 0;
SCTP_INC_STATS(net, SCTP_MIB_OUTOFBLUES);
ch = (sctp_chunkhdr_t *) chunk->chunk_hdr;
do {
/* Report violation if the chunk is less then minimal */
if (ntohs(ch->length) < sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t))
return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
commands);
/* Now that we know we at least have a chunk header,
* do things that are type appropriate.
*/
if (SCTP_CID_SHUTDOWN_ACK == ch->type)
ootb_shut_ack = 1;
/* RFC 2960, Section 3.3.7
* Moreover, under any circumstances, an endpoint that
* receives an ABORT MUST NOT respond to that ABORT by
* sending an ABORT of its own.
*/
if (SCTP_CID_ABORT == ch->type)
return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
/* RFC 8.4, 7) If the packet contains a "Stale cookie" ERROR
* or a COOKIE ACK the SCTP Packet should be silently
* discarded.
*/
if (SCTP_CID_COOKIE_ACK == ch->type)
ootb_cookie_ack = 1;
if (SCTP_CID_ERROR == ch->type) {
sctp_walk_errors(err, ch) {
if (SCTP_ERROR_STALE_COOKIE == err->cause) {
ootb_cookie_ack = 1;
break;
}
}
}
/* Report violation if chunk len overflows */
ch_end = ((__u8 *)ch) + SCTP_PAD4(ntohs(ch->length));
if (ch_end > skb_tail_pointer(skb))
return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
commands);
ch = (sctp_chunkhdr_t *) ch_end;
} while (ch_end < skb_tail_pointer(skb));
if (ootb_shut_ack)
return sctp_sf_shut_8_4_5(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
else if (ootb_cookie_ack)
return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
else
return sctp_sf_tabort_8_4_8(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
}
Commit Message: sctp: validate chunk len before actually using it
Andrey Konovalov reported that KASAN detected that SCTP was using a slab
beyond the boundaries. It was caused because when handling out of the
blue packets in function sctp_sf_ootb() it was checking the chunk len
only after already processing the first chunk, validating only for the
2nd and subsequent ones.
The fix is to just move the check upwards so it's also validated for the
1st chunk.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 1
| 166,861
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: offline_isolated_pages_cb(unsigned long start, unsigned long nr_pages,
void *data)
{
__offline_isolated_pages(start, start + nr_pages);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mm/hotplug: correctly add new zone to all other nodes' zone lists
When online_pages() is called to add new memory to an empty zone, it
rebuilds all zone lists by calling build_all_zonelists(). But there's a
bug which prevents the new zone to be added to other nodes' zone lists.
online_pages() {
build_all_zonelists()
.....
node_set_state(zone_to_nid(zone), N_HIGH_MEMORY)
}
Here the node of the zone is put into N_HIGH_MEMORY state after calling
build_all_zonelists(), but build_all_zonelists() only adds zones from
nodes in N_HIGH_MEMORY state to the fallback zone lists.
build_all_zonelists()
->__build_all_zonelists()
->build_zonelists()
->find_next_best_node()
->for_each_node_state(n, N_HIGH_MEMORY)
So memory in the new zone will never be used by other nodes, and it may
cause strange behavor when system is under memory pressure. So put node
into N_HIGH_MEMORY state before calling build_all_zonelists().
Signed-off-by: Jianguo Wu <wujianguo@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiang Liu <liuj97@gmail.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Keping Chen <chenkeping@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 18,508
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void nick_hash_remove(CHANNEL_REC *channel, NICK_REC *nick)
{
NICK_REC *list;
list = g_hash_table_lookup(channel->nicks, nick->nick);
if (list == NULL)
return;
if (list == nick || list->next == NULL) {
g_hash_table_remove(channel->nicks, nick->nick);
if (list->next != NULL) {
g_hash_table_insert(channel->nicks, nick->next->nick,
nick->next);
}
} else {
while (list->next != nick)
list = list->next;
list->next = nick->next;
}
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'security' into 'master'
Security
Closes #10
See merge request !17
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 1
| 168,057
|
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