instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: char *show_lowascii(const char *str)
{
char *ret, *p;
ret = p = g_malloc(strlen(str)*2+1);
while (*str != '\0') {
if ((unsigned char) *str >= 32)
*p++ = *str;
else {
*p++ = '^';
*p++ = *str + 'A'-1;
}
str++;
}
*p = '\0';
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'security' into 'master'
Security
Closes #10
See merge request !17
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 63,666
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int read_interrupt_descriptor(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
u16 index, struct desc_struct *desc)
{
struct desc_ptr dt;
ulong addr;
ctxt->ops->get_idt(ctxt, &dt);
if (dt.size < index * 8 + 7)
return emulate_gp(ctxt, index << 3 | 0x2);
addr = dt.address + index * 8;
return ctxt->ops->read_std(ctxt, addr, desc, sizeof *desc,
&ctxt->exception);
}
Commit Message: KVM: emulate: avoid accessing NULL ctxt->memopp
A failure to decode the instruction can cause a NULL pointer access.
This is fixed simply by moving the "done" label as close as possible
to the return.
This fixes CVE-2014-8481.
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 41061cdb98a0bec464278b4db8e894a3121671f5
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 35,588
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int GahpClient::dcloud_start_auto( const char *service_url,
const char *username,
const char *password,
bool *autostart )
{
static const char* command = "DELTACLOUD_START_AUTO";
if ( server->m_commands_supported->contains_anycase( command ) == FALSE ) {
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
if ( !service_url ) service_url = NULLSTRING;
if ( !username ) username = NULLSTRING;
if ( !password ) password = NULLSTRING;
MyString reqline;
char* esc1 = strdup( escapeGahpString(service_url) );
char* esc2 = strdup( escapeGahpString(username) );
char* esc3 = strdup( escapeGahpString(password) );
bool x = reqline.sprintf("%s %s %s", esc1, esc2, esc3);
free( esc1 );
free( esc2 );
free( esc3 );
ASSERT( x == true );
const char *buf = reqline.Value();
if ( !is_pending(command,buf) ) {
if ( m_mode == results_only ) {
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_NOT_SUBMITTED;
}
now_pending(command, buf, deleg_proxy);
}
Gahp_Args* result = get_pending_result(command, buf);
if ( result ) {
int rc = 0;
if ( result->argc < 2 || result->argc > 3 ) {
EXCEPT( "Bad %s result", command );
} else if ( result->argc == 2 ) {
if ( !strcmp( result->argv[1], NULLSTRING ) ) {
EXCEPT( "Bad %s result", command );
}
error_string = result->argv[1];
rc = 1;
} else {
if ( strcmp( result->argv[1], NULLSTRING ) ) {
EXCEPT( "Bad %s result", command );
}
if ( strcmp( result->argv[2], "TRUE" ) == 0 ) {
*autostart = TRUE;
} else if ( strcmp( result->argv[2], "FALSE" ) == 0 ) {
*autostart = FALSE;
} else {
EXCEPT( "Bad %s result", command );
}
}
delete result;
return rc;
}
if ( check_pending_timeout(command, buf) )
{
sprintf( error_string, "%s timed out", command );
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_TIMED_OUT;
}
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_PENDING;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134
| 0
| 16,168
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void perf_event_task_output(struct perf_event *event,
struct perf_task_event *task_event)
{
struct perf_output_handle handle;
struct perf_sample_data sample;
struct task_struct *task = task_event->task;
int ret, size = task_event->event_id.header.size;
perf_event_header__init_id(&task_event->event_id.header, &sample, event);
ret = perf_output_begin(&handle, event,
task_event->event_id.header.size);
if (ret)
goto out;
task_event->event_id.pid = perf_event_pid(event, task);
task_event->event_id.ppid = perf_event_pid(event, current);
task_event->event_id.tid = perf_event_tid(event, task);
task_event->event_id.ptid = perf_event_tid(event, current);
perf_output_put(&handle, task_event->event_id);
perf_event__output_id_sample(event, &handle, &sample);
perf_output_end(&handle);
out:
task_event->event_id.header.size = size;
}
Commit Message: perf: Treat attr.config as u64 in perf_swevent_init()
Trinity discovered that we fail to check all 64 bits of
attr.config passed by user space, resulting to out-of-bounds
access of the perf_swevent_enabled array in
sw_perf_event_destroy().
Introduced in commit b0a873ebb ("perf: Register PMU
implementations").
Signed-off-by: Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: davej@redhat.com
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@ghostprotocols.net>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365882554-30259-1-git-send-email-tt.rantala@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 31,954
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int GpuChannel::TakeRendererFileDescriptor() {
if (!channel_.get()) {
NOTREACHED();
return -1;
}
return channel_->TakeClientFileDescriptor();
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 106,878
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleEndQueryEXT(
uint32 immediate_data_size, const cmds::EndQueryEXT& c) {
GLenum target = static_cast<GLenum>(c.target);
uint32 submit_count = static_cast<GLuint>(c.submit_count);
ContextState::QueryMap::iterator it = state_.current_queries.find(target);
if (it == state_.current_queries.end()) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "glEndQueryEXT", "No active query");
return error::kNoError;
}
QueryManager::Query* query = it->second.get();
if (!query_manager_->EndQuery(query, submit_count)) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
query_manager_->ProcessPendingTransferQueries();
state_.current_queries.erase(it);
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 120,941
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameImpl::CommitNavigationWithParams(
const CommonNavigationParams& common_params,
const CommitNavigationParams& commit_params,
std::unique_ptr<blink::URLLoaderFactoryBundleInfo>
subresource_loader_factories,
base::Optional<std::vector<mojom::TransferrableURLLoaderPtr>>
subresource_overrides,
blink::mojom::ControllerServiceWorkerInfoPtr controller_service_worker_info,
blink::mojom::ServiceWorkerProviderInfoForWindowPtr provider_info,
network::mojom::URLLoaderFactoryPtr prefetch_loader_factory,
std::unique_ptr<DocumentState> document_state,
std::unique_ptr<WebNavigationParams> navigation_params) {
if (ShouldIgnoreCommitNavigation(commit_params)) {
browser_side_navigation_pending_url_ = GURL();
return;
}
if (common_params.url.SchemeIs(content::kChromeUIScheme)) {
blink::WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableShadowDOMV0(true);
blink::WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableCustomElementsV0(true);
blink::WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableHTMLImports(true);
}
SetupLoaderFactoryBundle(std::move(subresource_loader_factories),
std::move(subresource_overrides),
std::move(prefetch_loader_factory));
if (commit_params.is_view_source)
frame_->EnableViewSourceMode(true);
PrepareFrameForCommit(common_params.url, commit_params);
blink::WebFrameLoadType load_type = NavigationTypeToLoadType(
common_params.navigation_type, common_params.should_replace_current_entry,
commit_params.page_state.IsValid());
WebHistoryItem item_for_history_navigation;
blink::mojom::CommitResult commit_status = blink::mojom::CommitResult::Ok;
if (load_type == WebFrameLoadType::kBackForward) {
DCHECK_NE(0, commit_params.nav_entry_id);
commit_status = PrepareForHistoryNavigationCommit(
common_params.navigation_type, commit_params,
&item_for_history_navigation, &load_type);
}
if (commit_status != blink::mojom::CommitResult::Ok) {
if (frame_ && !frame_->IsLoading())
Send(new FrameHostMsg_DidStopLoading(routing_id_));
return;
}
navigation_params->frame_load_type = load_type;
navigation_params->history_item = item_for_history_navigation;
navigation_params->service_worker_network_provider =
BuildServiceWorkerNetworkProviderForNavigation(
std::move(controller_service_worker_info), std::move(provider_info));
frame_->CommitNavigation(std::move(navigation_params),
std::move(document_state));
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 139,541
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: InlineBox* RenderBox::createInlineBox()
{
return new (renderArena()) InlineBox(this);
}
Commit Message: Source/WebCore: Fix for bug 64046 - Wrong image height in absolutely positioned div in
relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
Test: fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html
* rendering/RenderBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBox::availableLogicalHeightUsing):
LayoutTests: Test to cover absolutely positioned child with percentage height
in relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent-expected.txt: Added.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html: Added.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@91533 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 101,574
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void php_zip_get_from(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS, int type) /* {{{ */
{
struct zip *intern;
zval *this = getThis();
struct zip_stat sb;
struct zip_file *zf;
char *filename;
int filename_len;
long index = -1;
long flags = 0;
long len = 0;
char *buffer;
int n = 0;
if (!this) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZIP_FROM_OBJECT(intern, this);
if (type == 1) {
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "p|ll", &filename, &filename_len, &len, &flags) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
PHP_ZIP_STAT_PATH(intern, filename, filename_len, flags, sb);
} else {
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "l|ll", &index, &len, &flags) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
PHP_ZIP_STAT_INDEX(intern, index, 0, sb);
}
if (sb.size < 1) {
RETURN_EMPTY_STRING();
}
if (len < 1) {
len = sb.size;
}
if (index >= 0) {
zf = zip_fopen_index(intern, index, flags);
} else {
zf = zip_fopen(intern, filename, flags);
}
if (zf == NULL) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
buffer = safe_emalloc(len, 1, 2);
n = zip_fread(zf, buffer, len);
if (n < 1) {
efree(buffer);
RETURN_EMPTY_STRING();
}
zip_fclose(zf);
buffer[n] = 0;
RETURN_STRINGL(buffer, n, 0);
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Fix bug #72434: ZipArchive class Use After Free Vulnerability in PHP's GC algorithm and unserialize
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 51,293
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void process_smb(struct smbd_server_connection *conn,
uint8_t *inbuf, size_t nread, size_t unread_bytes,
uint32_t seqnum, bool encrypted,
struct smb_perfcount_data *deferred_pcd)
{
int msg_type = CVAL(inbuf,0);
DO_PROFILE_INC(smb_count);
DEBUG( 6, ( "got message type 0x%x of len 0x%x\n", msg_type,
smb_len(inbuf) ) );
DEBUG( 3, ( "Transaction %d of length %d (%u toread)\n", trans_num,
(int)nread,
(unsigned int)unread_bytes ));
if (msg_type != 0) {
/*
* NetBIOS session request, keepalive, etc.
*/
reply_special((char *)inbuf);
goto done;
}
if (smbd_server_conn->allow_smb2) {
if (smbd_is_smb2_header(inbuf, nread)) {
smbd_smb2_first_negprot(smbd_server_conn, inbuf, nread);
return;
}
smbd_server_conn->allow_smb2 = false;
}
show_msg((char *)inbuf);
construct_reply((char *)inbuf,nread,unread_bytes,seqnum,encrypted,deferred_pcd);
trans_num++;
done:
conn->smb1.num_requests++;
/* The timeout_processing function isn't run nearly
often enough to implement 'max log size' without
overrunning the size of the file by many megabytes.
This is especially true if we are running at debug
level 10. Checking every 50 SMBs is a nice
tradeoff of performance vs log file size overrun. */
if ((conn->smb1.num_requests % 50) == 0 &&
need_to_check_log_size()) {
change_to_root_user();
check_log_size();
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 11,062
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void convertTimeToDate(int64_t time_1904, String8 *s) {
time_t time_1970 = time_1904 - (((66 * 365 + 17) * 24) * 3600);
char tmp[32];
strftime(tmp, sizeof(tmp), "%Y%m%dT%H%M%S.000Z", gmtime(&time_1970));
s->setTo(tmp);
}
Commit Message: MPEG4Extractor.cpp: handle chunk_size > SIZE_MAX
chunk_size is a uint64_t, so it can legitimately be bigger
than SIZE_MAX, which would cause the subtraction to underflow.
https://code.google.com/p/android/issues/detail?id=182251
Bug: 23034759
Change-Id: Ic1637fb26bf6edb0feb1bcf2876fd370db1ed547
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 157,180
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ip_vs_set_timeout(struct net *net, struct ip_vs_timeout_user *u)
{
#if defined(CONFIG_IP_VS_PROTO_TCP) || defined(CONFIG_IP_VS_PROTO_UDP)
struct ip_vs_proto_data *pd;
#endif
IP_VS_DBG(2, "Setting timeout tcp:%d tcpfin:%d udp:%d\n",
u->tcp_timeout,
u->tcp_fin_timeout,
u->udp_timeout);
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_VS_PROTO_TCP
if (u->tcp_timeout) {
pd = ip_vs_proto_data_get(net, IPPROTO_TCP);
pd->timeout_table[IP_VS_TCP_S_ESTABLISHED]
= u->tcp_timeout * HZ;
}
if (u->tcp_fin_timeout) {
pd = ip_vs_proto_data_get(net, IPPROTO_TCP);
pd->timeout_table[IP_VS_TCP_S_FIN_WAIT]
= u->tcp_fin_timeout * HZ;
}
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_VS_PROTO_UDP
if (u->udp_timeout) {
pd = ip_vs_proto_data_get(net, IPPROTO_UDP);
pd->timeout_table[IP_VS_UDP_S_NORMAL]
= u->udp_timeout * HZ;
}
#endif
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ipvs: fix info leak in getsockopt(IP_VS_SO_GET_TIMEOUT)
If at least one of CONFIG_IP_VS_PROTO_TCP or CONFIG_IP_VS_PROTO_UDP is
not set, __ip_vs_get_timeouts() does not fully initialize the structure
that gets copied to userland and that for leaks up to 12 bytes of kernel
stack. Add an explicit memset(0) before passing the structure to
__ip_vs_get_timeouts() to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Wensong Zhang <wensong@linux-vs.org>
Cc: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au>
Cc: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 34,228
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE2(old_getrlimit, unsigned int, resource,
struct rlimit __user *, rlim)
{
struct rlimit x;
if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS)
return -EINVAL;
task_lock(current->group_leader);
x = current->signal->rlim[resource];
task_unlock(current->group_leader);
if (x.rlim_cur > 0x7FFFFFFF)
x.rlim_cur = 0x7FFFFFFF;
if (x.rlim_max > 0x7FFFFFFF)
x.rlim_max = 0x7FFFFFFF;
return copy_to_user(rlim, &x, sizeof(x))?-EFAULT:0;
}
Commit Message: mm: fix prctl_set_vma_anon_name
prctl_set_vma_anon_name could attempt to set the name across
two vmas at the same time due to a typo, which might corrupt
the vma list. Fix it to use tmp instead of end to limit
the name setting to a single vma at a time.
Change-Id: Ie32d8ddb0fd547efbeedd6528acdab5ca5b308b4
Reported-by: Jed Davis <jld@mozilla.com>
Signed-off-by: Colin Cross <ccross@android.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 162,033
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ipip_tunnel_setup(struct net_device *dev)
{
dev->netdev_ops = &ipip_netdev_ops;
dev->destructor = ipip_dev_free;
dev->type = ARPHRD_TUNNEL;
dev->hard_header_len = LL_MAX_HEADER + sizeof(struct iphdr);
dev->mtu = ETH_DATA_LEN - sizeof(struct iphdr);
dev->flags = IFF_NOARP;
dev->iflink = 0;
dev->addr_len = 4;
dev->features |= NETIF_F_NETNS_LOCAL;
dev->features |= NETIF_F_LLTX;
dev->priv_flags &= ~IFF_XMIT_DST_RELEASE;
}
Commit Message: net: don't allow CAP_NET_ADMIN to load non-netdev kernel modules
Since a8f80e8ff94ecba629542d9b4b5f5a8ee3eb565c any process with
CAP_NET_ADMIN may load any module from /lib/modules/. This doesn't mean
that CAP_NET_ADMIN is a superset of CAP_SYS_MODULE as modules are
limited to /lib/modules/**. However, CAP_NET_ADMIN capability shouldn't
allow anybody load any module not related to networking.
This patch restricts an ability of autoloading modules to netdev modules
with explicit aliases. This fixes CVE-2011-1019.
Arnd Bergmann suggested to leave untouched the old pre-v2.6.32 behavior
of loading netdev modules by name (without any prefix) for processes
with CAP_SYS_MODULE to maintain the compatibility with network scripts
that use autoloading netdev modules by aliases like "eth0", "wlan0".
Currently there are only three users of the feature in the upstream
kernel: ipip, ip_gre and sit.
root@albatros:~# capsh --drop=$(seq -s, 0 11),$(seq -s, 13 34) --
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: fffffff800001000
CapEff: fffffff800001000
CapBnd: fffffff800001000
root@albatros:~# modprobe xfs
FATAL: Error inserting xfs
(/lib/modules/2.6.38-rc6-00001-g2bf4ca3/kernel/fs/xfs/xfs.ko): Operation not permitted
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit
sit: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit0
sit0 Link encap:IPv6-in-IPv4
NOARP MTU:1480 Metric:1
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
sit 10457 0
tunnel4 2957 1 sit
For CAP_SYS_MODULE module loading is still relaxed:
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: ffffffffffffffff
CapEff: ffffffffffffffff
CapBnd: ffffffffffffffff
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
xfs 745319 0
Reference: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/24/203
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 35,352
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int crypto_init_shash_ops_async(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
{
struct crypto_alg *calg = tfm->__crt_alg;
struct shash_alg *alg = __crypto_shash_alg(calg);
struct crypto_ahash *crt = __crypto_ahash_cast(tfm);
struct crypto_shash **ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
struct crypto_shash *shash;
if (!crypto_mod_get(calg))
return -EAGAIN;
shash = crypto_create_tfm(calg, &crypto_shash_type);
if (IS_ERR(shash)) {
crypto_mod_put(calg);
return PTR_ERR(shash);
}
*ctx = shash;
tfm->exit = crypto_exit_shash_ops_async;
crt->init = shash_async_init;
crt->update = shash_async_update;
crt->final = shash_async_final;
crt->finup = shash_async_finup;
crt->digest = shash_async_digest;
crt->setkey = shash_async_setkey;
crt->has_setkey = alg->setkey != shash_no_setkey;
if (alg->export)
crt->export = shash_async_export;
if (alg->import)
crt->import = shash_async_import;
crt->reqsize = sizeof(struct shash_desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(shash);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: hmac - require that the underlying hash algorithm is unkeyed
Because the HMAC template didn't check that its underlying hash
algorithm is unkeyed, trying to use "hmac(hmac(sha3-512-generic))"
through AF_ALG or through KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE resulted in the inner HMAC
being used without having been keyed, resulting in sha3_update() being
called without sha3_init(), causing a stack buffer overflow.
This is a very old bug, but it seems to have only started causing real
problems when SHA-3 support was added (requires CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA3)
because the innermost hash's state is ->import()ed from a zeroed buffer,
and it just so happens that other hash algorithms are fine with that,
but SHA-3 is not. However, there could be arch or hardware-dependent
hash algorithms also affected; I couldn't test everything.
Fix the bug by introducing a function crypto_shash_alg_has_setkey()
which tests whether a shash algorithm is keyed. Then update the HMAC
template to require that its underlying hash algorithm is unkeyed.
Here is a reproducer:
#include <linux/if_alg.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
int main()
{
int algfd;
struct sockaddr_alg addr = {
.salg_type = "hash",
.salg_name = "hmac(hmac(sha3-512-generic))",
};
char key[4096] = { 0 };
algfd = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
bind(algfd, (const struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr));
setsockopt(algfd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, key, sizeof(key));
}
Here was the KASAN report from syzbot:
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in memcpy include/linux/string.h:341 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in sha3_update+0xdf/0x2e0 crypto/sha3_generic.c:161
Write of size 4096 at addr ffff8801cca07c40 by task syzkaller076574/3044
CPU: 1 PID: 3044 Comm: syzkaller076574 Not tainted 4.14.0-mm1+ #25
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline]
dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:53
print_address_description+0x73/0x250 mm/kasan/report.c:252
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351 [inline]
kasan_report+0x25b/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:409
check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/kasan.c:260 [inline]
check_memory_region+0x137/0x190 mm/kasan/kasan.c:267
memcpy+0x37/0x50 mm/kasan/kasan.c:303
memcpy include/linux/string.h:341 [inline]
sha3_update+0xdf/0x2e0 crypto/sha3_generic.c:161
crypto_shash_update+0xcb/0x220 crypto/shash.c:109
shash_finup_unaligned+0x2a/0x60 crypto/shash.c:151
crypto_shash_finup+0xc4/0x120 crypto/shash.c:165
hmac_finup+0x182/0x330 crypto/hmac.c:152
crypto_shash_finup+0xc4/0x120 crypto/shash.c:165
shash_digest_unaligned+0x9e/0xd0 crypto/shash.c:172
crypto_shash_digest+0xc4/0x120 crypto/shash.c:186
hmac_setkey+0x36a/0x690 crypto/hmac.c:66
crypto_shash_setkey+0xad/0x190 crypto/shash.c:64
shash_async_setkey+0x47/0x60 crypto/shash.c:207
crypto_ahash_setkey+0xaf/0x180 crypto/ahash.c:200
hash_setkey+0x40/0x90 crypto/algif_hash.c:446
alg_setkey crypto/af_alg.c:221 [inline]
alg_setsockopt+0x2a1/0x350 crypto/af_alg.c:254
SYSC_setsockopt net/socket.c:1851 [inline]
SyS_setsockopt+0x189/0x360 net/socket.c:1830
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0x96
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 59,198
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool fetch_seccomp(const char *name, const char *lxcpath,
struct lxc_proc_context_info *i, lxc_attach_options_t *options)
{
struct lxc_container *c;
if (!(options->namespaces & CLONE_NEWNS) || !(options->attach_flags & LXC_ATTACH_LSM))
return true;
c = lxc_container_new(name, lxcpath);
if (!c)
return false;
i->container = c;
if (!c->lxc_conf)
return false;
if (lxc_read_seccomp_config(c->lxc_conf) < 0) {
ERROR("Error reading seccomp policy");
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1334: Don't use the container's /proc during attach
A user could otherwise over-mount /proc and prevent the apparmor profile
or selinux label from being written which combined with a modified
/bin/sh or other commonly used binary would lead to unconfined code
execution.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-17
| 0
| 44,711
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static BOOLEAN CheckRunningDpc(PARANDIS_ADAPTER *pContext)
{
BOOLEAN bStopped;
BOOLEAN bReportHang = FALSE;
bStopped = 0 != InterlockedExchange(&pContext->bDPCInactive, TRUE);
if (bStopped)
{
pContext->nDetectedInactivity++;
}
else
{
pContext->nDetectedInactivity = 0;
}
for (UINT i = 0; i < pContext->nPathBundles; i++)
{
if (pContext->pPathBundles[i].txPath.HasHWBuffersIsUse())
{
if (pContext->nDetectedStoppedTx++ > 1)
{
DPrintf(0, ("[%s] - Suspicious Tx inactivity (%d)!\n", __FUNCTION__, pContext->pPathBundles[i].txPath.GetFreeHWBuffers()));
#ifdef DBG_USE_VIRTIO_PCI_ISR_FOR_HOST_REPORT
WriteVirtIODeviceByte(pContext->IODevice->addr + VIRTIO_PCI_ISR, 0);
#endif
break;
}
}
}
if (pContext->Limits.nPrintDiagnostic &&
++pContext->Counters.nPrintDiagnostic >= pContext->Limits.nPrintDiagnostic)
{
pContext->Counters.nPrintDiagnostic = 0;
PrintStatistics(pContext);
}
if (pContext->Statistics.ifHCInOctets == pContext->Counters.prevIn)
{
pContext->Counters.nRxInactivity++;
if (pContext->Counters.nRxInactivity >= 10)
{
#if defined(CRASH_ON_NO_RX)
ONPAUSECOMPLETEPROC proc = (ONPAUSECOMPLETEPROC)(PVOID)1;
proc(pContext);
#endif
}
}
else
{
pContext->Counters.nRxInactivity = 0;
pContext->Counters.prevIn = pContext->Statistics.ifHCInOctets;
}
return bReportHang;
}
Commit Message: NetKVM: BZ#1169718: More rigoruous testing of incoming packet
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <yhindin@rehat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 74,349
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: process_polyline(STREAM s, POLYLINE_ORDER * os, uint32 present, RD_BOOL delta)
{
int index, next, data;
uint8 flags = 0;
PEN pen;
RD_POINT *points;
if (present & 0x01)
rdp_in_coord(s, &os->x, delta);
if (present & 0x02)
rdp_in_coord(s, &os->y, delta);
if (present & 0x04)
in_uint8(s, os->opcode);
if (present & 0x10)
rdp_in_colour(s, &os->fgcolour);
if (present & 0x20)
in_uint8(s, os->lines);
if (present & 0x40)
{
in_uint8(s, os->datasize);
in_uint8a(s, os->data, os->datasize);
}
logger(Graphics, Debug, "process_polyline(), x=%d, y=%d, op=0x%x, fg=0x%x, n=%d, sz=%d)",
os->x, os->y, os->opcode, os->fgcolour, os->lines, os->datasize);
if (os->opcode < 0x01 || os->opcode > 0x10)
{
logger(Graphics, Error, "process_polyline(), bad ROP2 0x%x", os->opcode);
return;
}
points = (RD_POINT *) xmalloc((os->lines + 1) * sizeof(RD_POINT));
memset(points, 0, (os->lines + 1) * sizeof(RD_POINT));
points[0].x = os->x;
points[0].y = os->y;
pen.style = pen.width = 0;
pen.colour = os->fgcolour;
index = 0;
data = ((os->lines - 1) / 4) + 1;
for (next = 1; (next <= os->lines) && (data < os->datasize); next++)
{
if ((next - 1) % 4 == 0)
flags = os->data[index++];
if (~flags & 0x80)
points[next].x = parse_delta(os->data, &data);
if (~flags & 0x40)
points[next].y = parse_delta(os->data, &data);
flags <<= 2;
}
if (next - 1 == os->lines)
ui_polyline(os->opcode - 1, points, os->lines + 1, &pen);
else
logger(Graphics, Error, "process_polyline(), parse error");
xfree(points);
}
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 92,975
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int GetQuicMaxTimeBeforeCryptoHandshakeSeconds(
const VariationParameters& quic_trial_params) {
int value;
if (base::StringToInt(
GetVariationParam(quic_trial_params,
"max_time_before_crypto_handshake_seconds"),
&value)) {
return value;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix a bug in network_session_configurator.cc in which support for HTTPS URLS in QUIC proxies was always set to false.
BUG=914497
Change-Id: I56ad16088168302598bb448553ba32795eee3756
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1417356
Auto-Submit: Ryan Hamilton <rch@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhongyi Shi <zhongyi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Zhongyi Shi <zhongyi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#623763}
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 152,706
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virDomainMigratePrepare2(virConnectPtr dconn,
char **cookie,
int *cookielen,
const char *uri_in,
char **uri_out,
unsigned long flags,
const char *dname,
unsigned long bandwidth,
const char *dom_xml)
{
VIR_DEBUG("dconn=%p, cookie=%p, cookielen=%p, uri_in=%s, uri_out=%p,"
"flags=%lx, dname=%s, bandwidth=%lu, dom_xml=%s", dconn,
cookie, cookielen, NULLSTR(uri_in), uri_out, flags, NULLSTR(dname),
bandwidth, NULLSTR(dom_xml));
virResetLastError();
virCheckConnectReturn(dconn, -1);
virCheckReadOnlyGoto(dconn->flags, error);
if (dconn->driver->domainMigratePrepare2) {
int ret;
ret = dconn->driver->domainMigratePrepare2(dconn, cookie, cookielen,
uri_in, uri_out,
flags, dname, bandwidth,
dom_xml);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
return ret;
}
virReportUnsupportedError();
error:
virDispatchError(dconn);
return -1;
}
Commit Message: virDomainGetTime: Deny on RO connections
We have a policy that if API may end up talking to a guest agent
it should require RW connection. We don't obey the rule in
virDomainGetTime().
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 93,866
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int strlen16 (unsigned short *s)
{
int len = 0;
while (*s) {
s++;
len++;
}
return len;
}
Commit Message: iFixed bug #72446 - Integer Overflow in gdImagePaletteToTrueColor() resulting in heap overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 51,466
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void remote_function(void *data)
{
struct remote_function_call *tfc = data;
struct task_struct *p = tfc->p;
if (p) {
tfc->ret = -EAGAIN;
if (task_cpu(p) != smp_processor_id() || !task_curr(p))
return;
}
tfc->ret = tfc->func(tfc->info);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 26,194
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ip6_finish_output(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
if ((skb->len > ip6_skb_dst_mtu(skb) && !skb_is_gso(skb)) ||
dst_allfrag(skb_dst(skb)) ||
(IP6CB(skb)->frag_max_size && skb->len > IP6CB(skb)->frag_max_size))
return ip6_fragment(skb, ip6_finish_output2);
else
return ip6_finish_output2(skb);
}
Commit Message: inet: update the IP ID generation algorithm to higher standards.
Commit 355b98553789 ("netns: provide pure entropy for net_hash_mix()")
makes net_hash_mix() return a true 32 bits of entropy. When used in the
IP ID generation algorithm, this has the effect of extending the IP ID
generation key from 32 bits to 64 bits.
However, net_hash_mix() is only used for IP ID generation starting with
kernel version 4.1. Therefore, earlier kernels remain with 32-bit key
no matter what the net_hash_mix() return value is.
This change addresses the issue by explicitly extending the key to 64
bits for kernels older than 4.1.
Signed-off-by: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 97,044
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int nl80211_trigger_scan(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
{
struct cfg80211_registered_device *rdev = info->user_ptr[0];
struct net_device *dev = info->user_ptr[1];
struct cfg80211_scan_request *request;
struct nlattr *attr;
struct wiphy *wiphy;
int err, tmp, n_ssids = 0, n_channels, i;
enum ieee80211_band band;
size_t ie_len;
if (!is_valid_ie_attr(info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_IE]))
return -EINVAL;
wiphy = &rdev->wiphy;
if (!rdev->ops->scan)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (rdev->scan_req)
return -EBUSY;
if (info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_SCAN_FREQUENCIES]) {
n_channels = validate_scan_freqs(
info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_SCAN_FREQUENCIES]);
if (!n_channels)
return -EINVAL;
} else {
n_channels = 0;
for (band = 0; band < IEEE80211_NUM_BANDS; band++)
if (wiphy->bands[band])
n_channels += wiphy->bands[band]->n_channels;
}
if (info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_SCAN_SSIDS])
nla_for_each_nested(attr, info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_SCAN_SSIDS], tmp)
n_ssids++;
if (n_ssids > wiphy->max_scan_ssids)
return -EINVAL;
if (info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_IE])
ie_len = nla_len(info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_IE]);
else
ie_len = 0;
if (ie_len > wiphy->max_scan_ie_len)
return -EINVAL;
request = kzalloc(sizeof(*request)
+ sizeof(*request->ssids) * n_ssids
+ sizeof(*request->channels) * n_channels
+ ie_len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!request)
return -ENOMEM;
if (n_ssids)
request->ssids = (void *)&request->channels[n_channels];
request->n_ssids = n_ssids;
if (ie_len) {
if (request->ssids)
request->ie = (void *)(request->ssids + n_ssids);
else
request->ie = (void *)(request->channels + n_channels);
}
i = 0;
if (info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_SCAN_FREQUENCIES]) {
/* user specified, bail out if channel not found */
nla_for_each_nested(attr, info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_SCAN_FREQUENCIES], tmp) {
struct ieee80211_channel *chan;
chan = ieee80211_get_channel(wiphy, nla_get_u32(attr));
if (!chan) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_free;
}
/* ignore disabled channels */
if (chan->flags & IEEE80211_CHAN_DISABLED)
continue;
request->channels[i] = chan;
i++;
}
} else {
/* all channels */
for (band = 0; band < IEEE80211_NUM_BANDS; band++) {
int j;
if (!wiphy->bands[band])
continue;
for (j = 0; j < wiphy->bands[band]->n_channels; j++) {
struct ieee80211_channel *chan;
chan = &wiphy->bands[band]->channels[j];
if (chan->flags & IEEE80211_CHAN_DISABLED)
continue;
request->channels[i] = chan;
i++;
}
}
}
if (!i) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_free;
}
request->n_channels = i;
i = 0;
if (info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_SCAN_SSIDS]) {
nla_for_each_nested(attr, info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_SCAN_SSIDS], tmp) {
if (request->ssids[i].ssid_len > IEEE80211_MAX_SSID_LEN) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_free;
}
memcpy(request->ssids[i].ssid, nla_data(attr), nla_len(attr));
request->ssids[i].ssid_len = nla_len(attr);
i++;
}
}
if (info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_IE]) {
request->ie_len = nla_len(info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_IE]);
memcpy((void *)request->ie,
nla_data(info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_IE]),
request->ie_len);
}
request->dev = dev;
request->wiphy = &rdev->wiphy;
rdev->scan_req = request;
err = rdev->ops->scan(&rdev->wiphy, dev, request);
if (!err) {
nl80211_send_scan_start(rdev, dev);
dev_hold(dev);
} else {
out_free:
rdev->scan_req = NULL;
kfree(request);
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: nl80211: fix check for valid SSID size in scan operations
In both trigger_scan and sched_scan operations, we were checking for
the SSID length before assigning the value correctly. Since the
memory was just kzalloc'ed, the check was always failing and SSID with
over 32 characters were allowed to go through.
This was causing a buffer overflow when copying the actual SSID to the
proper place.
This bug has been there since 2.6.29-rc4.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Luciano Coelho <coelho@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 165,858
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pp::Buffer_Dev PDFiumEngine::GetFlattenedPrintData(FPDF_DOCUMENT doc) {
pp::Buffer_Dev buffer;
ScopedSubstFont scoped_subst_font(this);
int page_count = FPDF_GetPageCount(doc);
for (int i = 0; i < page_count; ++i) {
FPDF_PAGE page = FPDF_LoadPage(doc, i);
DCHECK(page);
int flatten_ret = FPDFPage_Flatten(page, FLAT_PRINT);
FPDF_ClosePage(page);
if (flatten_ret == FLATTEN_FAIL)
return buffer;
}
PDFiumMemBufferFileWrite output_file_write;
if (FPDF_SaveAsCopy(doc, &output_file_write, 0)) {
size_t size = output_file_write.size();
buffer = pp::Buffer_Dev(client_->GetPluginInstance(), size);
if (!buffer.is_null())
memcpy(buffer.data(), output_file_write.buffer().c_str(), size);
}
return buffer;
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Use a temporary list when unloading pages
When traversing the |deferred_page_unloads_| list and handling the
unloads it's possible for new pages to get added to the list which will
invalidate the iterator.
This CL swaps the list with an empty list and does the iteration on the
list copy. New items that are unloaded while handling the defers will be
unloaded at a later point.
Bug: 780450
Change-Id: Ic7ced1c82227109784fb536ce19a4dd51b9119ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758916
Commit-Queue: dsinclair <dsinclair@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#515056}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 146,132
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftVideoDecoderOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamVideoPortFormat:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *formatParams =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *)params;
if (formatParams->nPortIndex > kMaxPortIndex) {
return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
if (formatParams->nIndex != 0) {
return OMX_ErrorNoMore;
}
if (formatParams->nPortIndex == kInputPortIndex) {
formatParams->eCompressionFormat = mCodingType;
formatParams->eColorFormat = OMX_COLOR_FormatUnused;
formatParams->xFramerate = 0;
} else {
CHECK_EQ(formatParams->nPortIndex, 1u);
formatParams->eCompressionFormat = OMX_VIDEO_CodingUnused;
formatParams->eColorFormat = OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420Planar;
formatParams->xFramerate = 0;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoProfileLevelQuerySupported:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PROFILELEVELTYPE *profileLevel =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PROFILELEVELTYPE *) params;
if (profileLevel->nPortIndex != kInputPortIndex) {
ALOGE("Invalid port index: %" PRIu32, profileLevel->nPortIndex);
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
}
if (profileLevel->nProfileIndex >= mNumProfileLevels) {
return OMX_ErrorNoMore;
}
profileLevel->eProfile = mProfileLevels[profileLevel->nProfileIndex].mProfile;
profileLevel->eLevel = mProfileLevels[profileLevel->nProfileIndex].mLevel;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(index, params);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 174,225
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: LayoutRect LayoutBlockFlow::selectionRectForPaintInvalidation(const LayoutBoxModelObject* paintInvalidationContainer) const
{
LayoutRect rect = selectionGapRectsForPaintInvalidation(paintInvalidationContainer);
if (paintInvalidationContainer->layer()->groupedMapping())
PaintLayer::mapRectToPaintBackingCoordinates(paintInvalidationContainer, rect);
return rect;
}
Commit Message: Consistently check if a block can handle pagination strut propagation.
https://codereview.chromium.org/1360753002 got it right for inline child
layout, but did nothing for block child layout.
BUG=329421
R=jchaffraix@chromium.org,leviw@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1387553002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#352429}
CWE ID: CWE-22
| 0
| 123,043
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct dentry *__d_instantiate_unique(struct dentry *entry,
struct inode *inode)
{
struct dentry *alias;
int len = entry->d_name.len;
const char *name = entry->d_name.name;
unsigned int hash = entry->d_name.hash;
if (!inode) {
__d_instantiate(entry, NULL);
return NULL;
}
hlist_for_each_entry(alias, &inode->i_dentry, d_u.d_alias) {
/*
* Don't need alias->d_lock here, because aliases with
* d_parent == entry->d_parent are not subject to name or
* parent changes, because the parent inode i_mutex is held.
*/
if (alias->d_name.hash != hash)
continue;
if (alias->d_parent != entry->d_parent)
continue;
if (alias->d_name.len != len)
continue;
if (dentry_cmp(alias, name, len))
continue;
__dget(alias);
return alias;
}
__d_instantiate(entry, inode);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: dcache: Handle escaped paths in prepend_path
A rename can result in a dentry that by walking up d_parent
will never reach it's mnt_root. For lack of a better term
I call this an escaped path.
prepend_path is called by four different functions __d_path,
d_absolute_path, d_path, and getcwd.
__d_path only wants to see paths are connected to the root it passes
in. So __d_path needs prepend_path to return an error.
d_absolute_path similarly wants to see paths that are connected to
some root. Escaped paths are not connected to any mnt_root so
d_absolute_path needs prepend_path to return an error greater
than 1. So escaped paths will be treated like paths on lazily
unmounted mounts.
getcwd needs to prepend "(unreachable)" so getcwd also needs
prepend_path to return an error.
d_path is the interesting hold out. d_path just wants to print
something, and does not care about the weird cases. Which raises
the question what should be printed?
Given that <escaped_path>/<anything> should result in -ENOENT I
believe it is desirable for escaped paths to be printed as empty
paths. As there are not really any meaninful path components when
considered from the perspective of a mount tree.
So tweak prepend_path to return an empty path with an new error
code of 3 when it encounters an escaped path.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 94,574
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FrameLoader::stopLoading()
{
m_isComplete = true; // to avoid calling completed() in finishedParsing()
if (m_frame->document() && m_frame->document()->parsing()) {
finishedParsing();
m_frame->document()->setParsing(false);
}
if (Document* doc = m_frame->document()) {
doc->setReadyState(Document::Complete);
DatabaseManager::manager().stopDatabases(doc, 0);
}
m_frame->navigationScheduler()->cancel();
}
Commit Message: Don't wait to notify client of spoof attempt if a modal dialog is created.
BUG=281256
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23620020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@157196 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 111,684
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Label::UpdateContainsMouse(const MouseEvent& event) {
SetContainsMouse(GetTextBounds().Contains(event.x(), event.y()));
}
Commit Message: wstring: remove wstring version of SplitString
Retry of r84336.
BUG=23581
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6930047
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@84355 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 100,936
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: donote(struct magic_set *ms, void *vbuf, size_t offset, size_t size,
int clazz, int swap, size_t align, int *flags)
{
Elf32_Nhdr nh32;
Elf64_Nhdr nh64;
size_t noff, doff;
#ifdef ELFCORE
int os_style = -1;
#endif
uint32_t namesz, descsz;
unsigned char *nbuf = CAST(unsigned char *, vbuf);
char sbuf[512];
if (xnh_sizeof + offset > size) {
/*
* We're out of note headers.
*/
return xnh_sizeof + offset;
}
(void)memcpy(xnh_addr, &nbuf[offset], xnh_sizeof);
offset += xnh_sizeof;
namesz = xnh_namesz;
descsz = xnh_descsz;
if ((namesz == 0) && (descsz == 0)) {
/*
* We're out of note headers.
*/
return (offset >= size) ? offset : size;
}
if (namesz & 0x80000000) {
(void)file_printf(ms, ", bad note name size 0x%lx",
(unsigned long)namesz);
return 0;
}
if (descsz & 0x80000000) {
(void)file_printf(ms, ", bad note description size 0x%lx",
(unsigned long)descsz);
return 0;
}
noff = offset;
doff = ELF_ALIGN(offset + namesz);
if (offset + namesz > size) {
/*
* We're past the end of the buffer.
*/
return doff;
}
offset = ELF_ALIGN(doff + descsz);
if (doff + descsz > size) {
/*
* We're past the end of the buffer.
*/
return (offset >= size) ? offset : size;
}
if ((*flags & (FLAGS_DID_NOTE|FLAGS_DID_BUILD_ID)) ==
(FLAGS_DID_NOTE|FLAGS_DID_BUILD_ID))
goto core;
if (namesz == 5 && strcmp((char *)&nbuf[noff], "SuSE") == 0 &&
xnh_type == NT_GNU_VERSION && descsz == 2) {
file_printf(ms, ", for SuSE %d.%d", nbuf[doff], nbuf[doff + 1]);
}
if (namesz == 4 && strcmp((char *)&nbuf[noff], "GNU") == 0 &&
xnh_type == NT_GNU_VERSION && descsz == 16) {
uint32_t desc[4];
(void)memcpy(desc, &nbuf[doff], sizeof(desc));
if (file_printf(ms, ", for GNU/") == -1)
return size;
switch (elf_getu32(swap, desc[0])) {
case GNU_OS_LINUX:
if (file_printf(ms, "Linux") == -1)
return size;
break;
case GNU_OS_HURD:
if (file_printf(ms, "Hurd") == -1)
return size;
break;
case GNU_OS_SOLARIS:
if (file_printf(ms, "Solaris") == -1)
return size;
break;
case GNU_OS_KFREEBSD:
if (file_printf(ms, "kFreeBSD") == -1)
return size;
break;
case GNU_OS_KNETBSD:
if (file_printf(ms, "kNetBSD") == -1)
return size;
break;
default:
if (file_printf(ms, "<unknown>") == -1)
return size;
}
if (file_printf(ms, " %d.%d.%d", elf_getu32(swap, desc[1]),
elf_getu32(swap, desc[2]), elf_getu32(swap, desc[3])) == -1)
return size;
*flags |= FLAGS_DID_NOTE;
return size;
}
if (namesz == 4 && strcmp((char *)&nbuf[noff], "GNU") == 0 &&
xnh_type == NT_GNU_BUILD_ID && (descsz == 16 || descsz == 20)) {
uint8_t desc[20];
uint32_t i;
if (file_printf(ms, ", BuildID[%s]=", descsz == 16 ? "md5/uuid" :
"sha1") == -1)
return size;
(void)memcpy(desc, &nbuf[doff], descsz);
for (i = 0; i < descsz; i++)
if (file_printf(ms, "%02x", desc[i]) == -1)
return size;
*flags |= FLAGS_DID_BUILD_ID;
}
if (namesz == 4 && strcmp((char *)&nbuf[noff], "PaX") == 0 &&
xnh_type == NT_NETBSD_PAX && descsz == 4) {
static const char *pax[] = {
"+mprotect",
"-mprotect",
"+segvguard",
"-segvguard",
"+ASLR",
"-ASLR",
};
uint32_t desc;
size_t i;
int did = 0;
(void)memcpy(&desc, &nbuf[doff], sizeof(desc));
desc = elf_getu32(swap, desc);
if (desc && file_printf(ms, ", PaX: ") == -1)
return size;
for (i = 0; i < __arraycount(pax); i++) {
if (((1 << i) & desc) == 0)
continue;
if (file_printf(ms, "%s%s", did++ ? "," : "",
pax[i]) == -1)
return size;
}
}
if (namesz == 7 && strcmp((char *)&nbuf[noff], "NetBSD") == 0) {
switch (xnh_type) {
case NT_NETBSD_VERSION:
if (descsz == 4) {
do_note_netbsd_version(ms, swap, &nbuf[doff]);
*flags |= FLAGS_DID_NOTE;
return size;
}
break;
case NT_NETBSD_MARCH:
if (file_printf(ms, ", compiled for: %.*s", (int)descsz,
(const char *)&nbuf[doff]) == -1)
return size;
break;
case NT_NETBSD_CMODEL:
if (file_printf(ms, ", compiler model: %.*s",
(int)descsz, (const char *)&nbuf[doff]) == -1)
return size;
break;
default:
if (file_printf(ms, ", note=%u", xnh_type) == -1)
return size;
break;
}
return size;
}
if (namesz == 8 && strcmp((char *)&nbuf[noff], "FreeBSD") == 0) {
if (xnh_type == NT_FREEBSD_VERSION && descsz == 4) {
do_note_freebsd_version(ms, swap, &nbuf[doff]);
*flags |= FLAGS_DID_NOTE;
return size;
}
}
if (namesz == 8 && strcmp((char *)&nbuf[noff], "OpenBSD") == 0 &&
xnh_type == NT_OPENBSD_VERSION && descsz == 4) {
if (file_printf(ms, ", for OpenBSD") == -1)
return size;
/* Content of note is always 0 */
*flags |= FLAGS_DID_NOTE;
return size;
}
if (namesz == 10 && strcmp((char *)&nbuf[noff], "DragonFly") == 0 &&
xnh_type == NT_DRAGONFLY_VERSION && descsz == 4) {
uint32_t desc;
if (file_printf(ms, ", for DragonFly") == -1)
return size;
(void)memcpy(&desc, &nbuf[doff], sizeof(desc));
desc = elf_getu32(swap, desc);
if (file_printf(ms, " %d.%d.%d", desc / 100000,
desc / 10000 % 10, desc % 10000) == -1)
return size;
*flags |= FLAGS_DID_NOTE;
return size;
}
core:
/*
* Sigh. The 2.0.36 kernel in Debian 2.1, at
* least, doesn't correctly implement name
* sections, in core dumps, as specified by
* the "Program Linking" section of "UNIX(R) System
* V Release 4 Programmer's Guide: ANSI C and
* Programming Support Tools", because my copy
* clearly says "The first 'namesz' bytes in 'name'
* contain a *null-terminated* [emphasis mine]
* character representation of the entry's owner
* or originator", but the 2.0.36 kernel code
* doesn't include the terminating null in the
* name....
*/
if ((namesz == 4 && strncmp((char *)&nbuf[noff], "CORE", 4) == 0) ||
(namesz == 5 && strcmp((char *)&nbuf[noff], "CORE") == 0)) {
os_style = OS_STYLE_SVR4;
}
if ((namesz == 8 && strcmp((char *)&nbuf[noff], "FreeBSD") == 0)) {
os_style = OS_STYLE_FREEBSD;
}
if ((namesz >= 11 && strncmp((char *)&nbuf[noff], "NetBSD-CORE", 11)
== 0)) {
os_style = OS_STYLE_NETBSD;
}
#ifdef ELFCORE
if ((*flags & FLAGS_DID_CORE) != 0)
return size;
if (os_style != -1 && (*flags & FLAGS_DID_CORE_STYLE) == 0) {
if (file_printf(ms, ", %s-style", os_style_names[os_style])
== -1)
return size;
*flags |= FLAGS_DID_CORE_STYLE;
}
switch (os_style) {
case OS_STYLE_NETBSD:
if (xnh_type == NT_NETBSD_CORE_PROCINFO) {
uint32_t signo;
/*
* Extract the program name. It is at
* offset 0x7c, and is up to 32-bytes,
* including the terminating NUL.
*/
if (file_printf(ms, ", from '%.31s'",
file_printable(sbuf, sizeof(sbuf),
(const char *)&nbuf[doff + 0x7c])) == -1)
return size;
/*
* Extract the signal number. It is at
* offset 0x08.
*/
(void)memcpy(&signo, &nbuf[doff + 0x08],
sizeof(signo));
if (file_printf(ms, " (signal %u)",
elf_getu32(swap, signo)) == -1)
return size;
*flags |= FLAGS_DID_CORE;
return size;
}
break;
default:
if (xnh_type == NT_PRPSINFO && *flags & FLAGS_IS_CORE) {
size_t i, j;
unsigned char c;
/*
* Extract the program name. We assume
* it to be 16 characters (that's what it
* is in SunOS 5.x and Linux).
*
* Unfortunately, it's at a different offset
* in various OSes, so try multiple offsets.
* If the characters aren't all printable,
* reject it.
*/
for (i = 0; i < NOFFSETS; i++) {
unsigned char *cname, *cp;
size_t reloffset = prpsoffsets(i);
size_t noffset = doff + reloffset;
size_t k;
for (j = 0; j < 16; j++, noffset++,
reloffset++) {
/*
* Make sure we're not past
* the end of the buffer; if
* we are, just give up.
*/
if (noffset >= size)
goto tryanother;
/*
* Make sure we're not past
* the end of the contents;
* if we are, this obviously
* isn't the right offset.
*/
if (reloffset >= descsz)
goto tryanother;
c = nbuf[noffset];
if (c == '\0') {
/*
* A '\0' at the
* beginning is
* obviously wrong.
* Any other '\0'
* means we're done.
*/
if (j == 0)
goto tryanother;
else
break;
} else {
/*
* A nonprintable
* character is also
* wrong.
*/
if (!isprint(c) || isquote(c))
goto tryanother;
}
}
/*
* Well, that worked.
*/
/*
* Try next offsets, in case this match is
* in the middle of a string.
*/
for (k = i + 1 ; k < NOFFSETS ; k++) {
size_t no;
int adjust = 1;
if (prpsoffsets(k) >= prpsoffsets(i))
continue;
for (no = doff + prpsoffsets(k);
no < doff + prpsoffsets(i); no++)
adjust = adjust
&& isprint(nbuf[no]);
if (adjust)
i = k;
}
cname = (unsigned char *)
&nbuf[doff + prpsoffsets(i)];
for (cp = cname; *cp && isprint(*cp); cp++)
continue;
/*
* Linux apparently appends a space at the end
* of the command line: remove it.
*/
while (cp > cname && isspace(cp[-1]))
cp--;
if (file_printf(ms, ", from '%.*s'",
(int)(cp - cname), cname) == -1)
return size;
*flags |= FLAGS_DID_CORE;
return size;
tryanother:
;
}
}
break;
}
#endif
return offset;
}
Commit Message: Bail out on partial reads, from Alexander Cherepanov
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 45,454
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void IRCView::voidLineBlock(QTextBlock rem)
{
QTextCursor c(rem);
c.select(QTextCursor::BlockUnderCursor);
c.removeSelectedText();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 1,778
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FLAC__StreamDecoderLengthStatus file_length_callback_(const FLAC__StreamDecoder *decoder, FLAC__uint64 *stream_length, void *client_data)
{
struct flac_stat_s filestats;
(void)client_data;
if(decoder->private_->file == stdin)
return FLAC__STREAM_DECODER_LENGTH_STATUS_UNSUPPORTED;
else if(flac_fstat(fileno(decoder->private_->file), &filestats) != 0)
return FLAC__STREAM_DECODER_LENGTH_STATUS_ERROR;
else {
*stream_length = (FLAC__uint64)filestats.st_size;
return FLAC__STREAM_DECODER_LENGTH_STATUS_OK;
}
}
Commit Message: Avoid free-before-initialize vulnerability in heap
Bug: 27211885
Change-Id: Ib9c93bd9ffdde2a5f8d31a86f06e267dc9c152db
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 161,216
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: double HTMLMediaElement::duration() const {
return m_duration;
}
Commit Message: [Blink>Media] Allow autoplay muted on Android by default
There was a mistake causing autoplay muted is shipped on Android
but it will be disabled if the chromium embedder doesn't specify
content setting for "AllowAutoplay" preference. This CL makes the
AllowAutoplay preference true by default so that it is allowed by
embedders (including AndroidWebView) unless they explicitly
disable it.
Intent to ship:
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/Q1cnzNI2GpI/AL_eyUNABgAJ
BUG=689018
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2677173002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#448423}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 128,788
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: inline void ImageLoader::clearFailedLoadURL() {
m_failedLoadURL = AtomicString();
}
Commit Message: Move ImageLoader timer to frame-specific TaskRunnerTimer.
Move ImageLoader timer m_derefElementTimer to frame-specific TaskRunnerTimer.
This associates it with the frame's Networking timer task queue.
BUG=624694
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2642103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#444927}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 128,108
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: tokenize(apr_pool_t *pool, const char *str, bool ignore_whitespace,
char **error)
{
apr_array_header_t *tokens = apr_array_make(pool, 10, sizeof(Token));
const char *p, *start;
*error = NULL;
p = start = str;
while(*p) {
if (apr_isspace(*p)) { /* whitespace */
p++;
while(*p && apr_isspace(*p)) p++;
if (!ignore_whitespace) {
push_token(tokens, TOKEN_WHITESPACE, str, start, p);
}
start = p;
}
else if (apr_isalpha(*p)) { /* identifier: must begin with
alpha then any alphanumeric or
underscore */
p++;
while(*p && (apr_isalnum(*p) || *p == '_')) p++;
push_token(tokens, TOKEN_IDENTIFIER, str, start, p);
start = p;
}
else if (*p == '"') { /* double quoted string */
p++; /* step over double quote */
while(*p) {
if (*p == '\\') { /* backslash escape */
p++; /* step over backslash */
if (*p) {
p++; /* step over escaped character */
} else {
break; /* backslash at end of string, stop */
}
}
if (*p == '\"') break; /* terminating quote delimiter */
p++; /* keep scanning */
}
if (*p != '\"') {
*error = apr_psprintf(pool,
"unterminated string beginning at "
"position %" APR_SIZE_T_FMT " in \"%s\"",
start-str, str);
break;
}
p++;
push_token(tokens, TOKEN_DBL_QUOTE_STRING, str, start, p);
start = p;
}
else if (*p == '=') { /* equals */
p++;
push_token(tokens, TOKEN_EQUAL, str, start, p);
start = p;
}
else if (*p == ',') { /* comma */
p++;
push_token(tokens, TOKEN_COMMA, str, start, p);
start = p;
}
else if (*p == ';') { /* semicolon */
p++;
push_token(tokens, TOKEN_SEMICOLON, str, start, p);
start = p;
}
else { /* unrecognized token */
*error = apr_psprintf(pool,
"unknown token at "
"position %" APR_SIZE_T_FMT " in string \"%s\"",
p-str, str);
break;
}
}
return tokens;
}
Commit Message: Fix redirect URL validation bypass
It turns out that browsers silently convert backslash characters into
forward slashes, while apr_uri_parse() does not.
This mismatch allows an attacker to bypass the redirect URL validation
by using an URL like:
https://sp.example.org/mellon/logout?ReturnTo=https:%5c%5cmalicious.example.org/
mod_auth_mellon will assume that it is a relative URL and allow the
request to pass through, while the browsers will use it as an absolute
url and redirect to https://malicious.example.org/ .
This patch fixes this issue by rejecting all redirect URLs with
backslashes.
CWE ID: CWE-601
| 0
| 91,738
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DBusHelperProxy::executeAction(const QString &action, const QString &helperID, const QVariantMap &arguments, int timeout)
{
QByteArray blob;
{
QDataStream stream(&blob, QIODevice::WriteOnly);
stream << arguments;
}
const auto reply = m_busConnection.interface()->startService(helperID);
if (!reply.isValid() && !m_busConnection.interface()->isServiceRegistered(helperID)) {
ActionReply errorReply = ActionReply::DBusErrorReply();
errorReply.setErrorDescription(tr("DBus Backend error: service start %1 failed: %2").arg(helperID, reply.error().message()));
emit actionPerformed(action, errorReply);
return;
}
const bool connected = m_busConnection.connect(helperID, QLatin1String("/"), QLatin1String("org.kde.kf5auth"), QLatin1String("remoteSignal"), this, SLOT(remoteSignalReceived(int,QString,QByteArray)));
if (!connected && m_busConnection.lastError().isValid()) {
ActionReply errorReply = ActionReply::DBusErrorReply();
errorReply.setErrorDescription(tr("DBus Backend error: connection to helper failed. %1\n(application: %2 helper: %3)").arg(
m_busConnection.lastError().message(),
qApp->applicationName(),
helperID));
emit actionPerformed(action, errorReply);
return;
}
QDBusMessage message;
message = QDBusMessage::createMethodCall(helperID, QLatin1String("/"), QLatin1String("org.kde.kf5auth"), QLatin1String("performAction"));
QList<QVariant> args;
args << action << BackendsManager::authBackend()->callerID() << blob;
message.setArguments(args);
m_actionsInProgress.push_back(action);
QDBusPendingCall pendingCall = m_busConnection.asyncCall(message, timeout);
auto watcher = new QDBusPendingCallWatcher(pendingCall, this);
connect(watcher, &QDBusPendingCallWatcher::finished, this, [this, action, watcher]() {
watcher->deleteLater();
const QDBusMessage reply = watcher->reply();
if (reply.type() == QDBusMessage::ErrorMessage) {
ActionReply r = ActionReply::DBusErrorReply();
r.setErrorDescription(tr("DBus Backend error: could not contact the helper. "
"Connection error: %1. Message error: %2").arg(reply.errorMessage(), m_busConnection.lastError().message()));
qCWarning(KAUTH) << reply.errorMessage();
emit actionPerformed(action, r);
}
});
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-290
| 0
| 7,190
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void inv_predict_11(uint8_t *p, const uint8_t *p_l, const uint8_t *p_tl,
const uint8_t *p_t, const uint8_t *p_tr)
{
int diff = (FFABS(p_l[0] - p_tl[0]) - FFABS(p_t[0] - p_tl[0])) +
(FFABS(p_l[1] - p_tl[1]) - FFABS(p_t[1] - p_tl[1])) +
(FFABS(p_l[2] - p_tl[2]) - FFABS(p_t[2] - p_tl[2])) +
(FFABS(p_l[3] - p_tl[3]) - FFABS(p_t[3] - p_tl[3]));
if (diff <= 0)
AV_COPY32(p, p_t);
else
AV_COPY32(p, p_l);
}
Commit Message: avcodec/webp: Always set pix_fmt
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: 1434/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6314998085189632
Fixes: 1435/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6483783723253760
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Reviewed-by: "Ronald S. Bultje" <rsbultje@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 64,041
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void mptsas_process_scsi_task_mgmt(MPTSASState *s, MPIMsgSCSITaskMgmt *req)
{
MPIMsgSCSITaskMgmtReply reply;
MPIMsgSCSITaskMgmtReply *reply_async;
int status, count;
SCSIDevice *sdev;
SCSIRequest *r, *next;
BusChild *kid;
mptsas_fix_scsi_task_mgmt_endianness(req);
QEMU_BUILD_BUG_ON(MPTSAS_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE < sizeof(*req));
QEMU_BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(s->doorbell_msg) < sizeof(*req));
QEMU_BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(s->doorbell_reply) < sizeof(reply));
memset(&reply, 0, sizeof(reply));
reply.TargetID = req->TargetID;
reply.Bus = req->Bus;
reply.MsgLength = sizeof(reply) / 4;
reply.Function = req->Function;
reply.TaskType = req->TaskType;
reply.MsgContext = req->MsgContext;
switch (req->TaskType) {
case MPI_SCSITASKMGMT_TASKTYPE_ABORT_TASK:
case MPI_SCSITASKMGMT_TASKTYPE_QUERY_TASK:
status = mptsas_scsi_device_find(s, req->Bus, req->TargetID,
req->LUN, &sdev);
if (status) {
reply.IOCStatus = status;
goto out;
}
if (sdev->lun != req->LUN[1]) {
reply.ResponseCode = MPI_SCSITASKMGMT_RSP_TM_INVALID_LUN;
goto out;
}
QTAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(r, &sdev->requests, next, next) {
MPTSASRequest *cmd_req = r->hba_private;
if (cmd_req && cmd_req->scsi_io.MsgContext == req->TaskMsgContext) {
break;
}
}
if (r) {
/*
* Assert that the request has not been completed yet, we
* check for it in the loop above.
*/
assert(r->hba_private);
if (req->TaskType == MPI_SCSITASKMGMT_TASKTYPE_QUERY_TASK) {
/* "If the specified command is present in the task set, then
* return a service response set to FUNCTION SUCCEEDED".
*/
reply.ResponseCode = MPI_SCSITASKMGMT_RSP_TM_SUCCEEDED;
} else {
MPTSASCancelNotifier *notifier;
reply_async = g_memdup(&reply, sizeof(MPIMsgSCSITaskMgmtReply));
reply_async->IOCLogInfo = INT_MAX;
count = 1;
notifier = g_new(MPTSASCancelNotifier, 1);
notifier->s = s;
notifier->reply = reply_async;
notifier->notifier.notify = mptsas_cancel_notify;
scsi_req_cancel_async(r, ¬ifier->notifier);
goto reply_maybe_async;
}
}
break;
case MPI_SCSITASKMGMT_TASKTYPE_ABRT_TASK_SET:
case MPI_SCSITASKMGMT_TASKTYPE_CLEAR_TASK_SET:
status = mptsas_scsi_device_find(s, req->Bus, req->TargetID,
req->LUN, &sdev);
if (status) {
reply.IOCStatus = status;
goto out;
}
if (sdev->lun != req->LUN[1]) {
reply.ResponseCode = MPI_SCSITASKMGMT_RSP_TM_INVALID_LUN;
goto out;
}
reply_async = g_memdup(&reply, sizeof(MPIMsgSCSITaskMgmtReply));
reply_async->IOCLogInfo = INT_MAX;
count = 0;
QTAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(r, &sdev->requests, next, next) {
if (r->hba_private) {
MPTSASCancelNotifier *notifier;
count++;
notifier = g_new(MPTSASCancelNotifier, 1);
notifier->s = s;
notifier->reply = reply_async;
notifier->notifier.notify = mptsas_cancel_notify;
scsi_req_cancel_async(r, ¬ifier->notifier);
}
}
reply_maybe_async:
if (reply_async->TerminationCount < count) {
reply_async->IOCLogInfo = count;
return;
}
g_free(reply_async);
reply.TerminationCount = count;
break;
case MPI_SCSITASKMGMT_TASKTYPE_LOGICAL_UNIT_RESET:
status = mptsas_scsi_device_find(s, req->Bus, req->TargetID,
req->LUN, &sdev);
if (status) {
reply.IOCStatus = status;
goto out;
}
if (sdev->lun != req->LUN[1]) {
reply.ResponseCode = MPI_SCSITASKMGMT_RSP_TM_INVALID_LUN;
goto out;
}
qdev_reset_all(&sdev->qdev);
break;
case MPI_SCSITASKMGMT_TASKTYPE_TARGET_RESET:
if (req->Bus != 0) {
reply.IOCStatus = MPI_IOCSTATUS_SCSI_INVALID_BUS;
goto out;
}
if (req->TargetID > s->max_devices) {
reply.IOCStatus = MPI_IOCSTATUS_SCSI_INVALID_TARGETID;
goto out;
}
QTAILQ_FOREACH(kid, &s->bus.qbus.children, sibling) {
sdev = SCSI_DEVICE(kid->child);
if (sdev->channel == 0 && sdev->id == req->TargetID) {
qdev_reset_all(kid->child);
}
}
break;
case MPI_SCSITASKMGMT_TASKTYPE_RESET_BUS:
qbus_reset_all(&s->bus.qbus);
break;
default:
reply.ResponseCode = MPI_SCSITASKMGMT_RSP_TM_NOT_SUPPORTED;
break;
}
out:
mptsas_fix_scsi_task_mgmt_reply_endianness(&reply);
mptsas_post_reply(s, (MPIDefaultReply *)&reply);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 8,377
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int SSL_CTX_remove_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c)
{
return remove_session_lock(ctx, c, 1);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 12,771
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ssh_packet_set_alive_timeouts(struct ssh *ssh, int ka)
{
ssh->state->keep_alive_timeouts = ka;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 12,982
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void UrlmonUrlRequestManager::StopAll() {
DVLOG(1) << __FUNCTION__;
if (stopping_)
return;
stopping_ = true;
DVLOG(1) << __FUNCTION__ << " stopping " << request_map_.size()
<< " requests";
for (RequestMap::iterator it = request_map_.begin();
it != request_map_.end(); ++it) {
DCHECK(it->second != NULL);
it->second->Stop();
}
request_map_.clear();
}
Commit Message: iwyu: Include callback_old.h where appropriate, final.
BUG=82098
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@85003 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 100,975
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sched_rt_global_constraints(void)
{
unsigned long flags;
int i;
if (sysctl_sched_rt_period <= 0)
return -EINVAL;
/*
* There's always some RT tasks in the root group
* -- migration, kstopmachine etc..
*/
if (sysctl_sched_rt_runtime == 0)
return -EBUSY;
raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&def_rt_bandwidth.rt_runtime_lock, flags);
for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
struct rt_rq *rt_rq = &cpu_rq(i)->rt;
raw_spin_lock(&rt_rq->rt_runtime_lock);
rt_rq->rt_runtime = global_rt_runtime();
raw_spin_unlock(&rt_rq->rt_runtime_lock);
}
raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&def_rt_bandwidth.rt_runtime_lock, flags);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 22,567
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static Image *ReadGROUP4Image(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
filename[MagickPathExtent];
FILE
*file;
Image
*image;
ImageInfo
*read_info;
int
c,
unique_file;
MagickBooleanType
status;
size_t
length;
ssize_t
offset,
strip_offset;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Write raw CCITT Group 4 wrapped as a TIFF image file.
*/
file=(FILE *) NULL;
unique_file=AcquireUniqueFileResource(filename);
if (unique_file != -1)
file=fdopen(unique_file,"wb");
if ((unique_file == -1) || (file == (FILE *) NULL))
ThrowImageException(FileOpenError,"UnableToCreateTemporaryFile");
length=fwrite("\111\111\052\000\010\000\000\000\016\000",1,10,file);
if (length != 10)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
length=fwrite("\376\000\003\000\001\000\000\000\000\000\000\000",1,12,file);
length=fwrite("\000\001\004\000\001\000\000\000",1,8,file);
length=WriteLSBLong(file,(unsigned int) image->columns);
length=fwrite("\001\001\004\000\001\000\000\000",1,8,file);
length=WriteLSBLong(file,(unsigned int) image->rows);
length=fwrite("\002\001\003\000\001\000\000\000\001\000\000\000",1,12,file);
length=fwrite("\003\001\003\000\001\000\000\000\004\000\000\000",1,12,file);
length=fwrite("\006\001\003\000\001\000\000\000\000\000\000\000",1,12,file);
length=fwrite("\021\001\003\000\001\000\000\000",1,8,file);
strip_offset=10+(12*14)+4+8;
length=WriteLSBLong(file,(unsigned int) strip_offset);
length=fwrite("\022\001\003\000\001\000\000\000",1,8,file);
length=WriteLSBLong(file,(unsigned int) image_info->orientation);
length=fwrite("\025\001\003\000\001\000\000\000\001\000\000\000",1,12,file);
length=fwrite("\026\001\004\000\001\000\000\000",1,8,file);
length=WriteLSBLong(file,(unsigned int) image->rows);
length=fwrite("\027\001\004\000\001\000\000\000\000\000\000\000",1,12,file);
offset=(ssize_t) ftell(file)-4;
length=fwrite("\032\001\005\000\001\000\000\000",1,8,file);
length=WriteLSBLong(file,(unsigned int) (strip_offset-8));
length=fwrite("\033\001\005\000\001\000\000\000",1,8,file);
length=WriteLSBLong(file,(unsigned int) (strip_offset-8));
length=fwrite("\050\001\003\000\001\000\000\000\002\000\000\000",1,12,file);
length=fwrite("\000\000\000\000",1,4,file);
length=WriteLSBLong(file,(unsigned int) image->resolution.x);
length=WriteLSBLong(file,1);
status=MagickTrue;
for (length=0; (c=ReadBlobByte(image)) != EOF; length++)
if (fputc(c,file) != c)
status=MagickFalse;
offset=(ssize_t) fseek(file,(ssize_t) offset,SEEK_SET);
length=WriteLSBLong(file,(unsigned int) length);
if (ferror(file) != 0)
{
(void) fclose(file);
ThrowImageException(FileOpenError,"UnableToCreateTemporaryFile");
}
(void) fclose(file);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
image=DestroyImage(image);
/*
Read TIFF image.
*/
read_info=CloneImageInfo((ImageInfo *) NULL);
(void) FormatLocaleString(read_info->filename,MagickPathExtent,"%s",filename);
image=ReadTIFFImage(read_info,exception);
read_info=DestroyImageInfo(read_info);
if (image != (Image *) NULL)
{
(void) CopyMagickString(image->filename,image_info->filename,
MagickPathExtent);
(void) CopyMagickString(image->magick_filename,image_info->filename,
MagickPathExtent);
(void) CopyMagickString(image->magick,"GROUP4",MagickPathExtent);
}
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(filename);
if (status == MagickFalse)
image=DestroyImage(image);
return(image);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1602
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 89,262
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool MessageLoop::DeferOrRunPendingTask(PendingTask pending_task) {
if (pending_task.nestable || !run_loop_client_->IsNested()) {
RunTask(&pending_task);
return true;
}
deferred_non_nestable_work_queue_.push(std::move(pending_task));
return false;
}
Commit Message: Introduce RunLoop::Type::NESTABLE_TASKS_ALLOWED to replace MessageLoop::ScopedNestableTaskAllower.
(as well as MessageLoop::SetNestableTasksAllowed())
Surveying usage: the scoped object is always instantiated right before
RunLoop().Run(). The intent is really to allow nestable tasks in that
RunLoop so it's better to explicitly label that RunLoop as such and it
allows us to break the last dependency that forced some RunLoop users
to use MessageLoop APIs.
There's also the odd case of allowing nestable tasks for loops that are
reentrant from a native task (without going through RunLoop), these
are the minority but will have to be handled (after cleaning up the
majority of cases that are RunLoop induced).
As highlighted by robliao@ in https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/600517
(which was merged in this CL).
R=danakj@chromium.org
Bug: 750779
Change-Id: I43d122c93ec903cff3a6fe7b77ec461ea0656448
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/594713
Commit-Queue: Gabriel Charette <gab@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Liao <robliao@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: danakj <danakj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492263}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 126,537
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void skb_split_no_header(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct sk_buff* skb1,
const u32 len, int pos)
{
int i, k = 0;
const int nfrags = skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags;
skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags = 0;
skb1->len = skb1->data_len = skb->len - len;
skb->len = len;
skb->data_len = len - pos;
for (i = 0; i < nfrags; i++) {
int size = skb_frag_size(&skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[i]);
if (pos + size > len) {
skb_shinfo(skb1)->frags[k] = skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[i];
if (pos < len) {
/* Split frag.
* We have two variants in this case:
* 1. Move all the frag to the second
* part, if it is possible. F.e.
* this approach is mandatory for TUX,
* where splitting is expensive.
* 2. Split is accurately. We make this.
*/
skb_frag_ref(skb, i);
skb_shinfo(skb1)->frags[0].page_offset += len - pos;
skb_frag_size_sub(&skb_shinfo(skb1)->frags[0], len - pos);
skb_frag_size_set(&skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[i], len - pos);
skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags++;
}
k++;
} else
skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags++;
pos += size;
}
skb_shinfo(skb1)->nr_frags = k;
}
Commit Message: skbuff: skb_segment: orphan frags before copying
skb_segment copies frags around, so we need
to copy them carefully to avoid accessing
user memory after reporting completion to userspace
through a callback.
skb_segment doesn't normally happen on datapath:
TSO needs to be disabled - so disabling zero copy
in this case does not look like a big deal.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 39,925
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::SubmitCompositorFrame(
const cc::LocalSurfaceId& local_surface_id,
cc::CompositorFrame frame) {
TRACE_EVENT0("content", "RenderWidgetHostViewAura::OnSwapCompositorFrame");
UpdateBackgroundColorFromRenderer(frame.metadata.root_background_color);
last_scroll_offset_ = frame.metadata.root_scroll_offset;
cc::Selection<gfx::SelectionBound> selection = frame.metadata.selection;
if (IsUseZoomForDSFEnabled()) {
float viewportToDIPScale = 1.0f / current_device_scale_factor_;
gfx::PointF start_edge_top = selection.start.edge_top();
gfx::PointF start_edge_bottom = selection.start.edge_bottom();
gfx::PointF end_edge_top = selection.end.edge_top();
gfx::PointF end_edge_bottom = selection.end.edge_bottom();
start_edge_top.Scale(viewportToDIPScale);
start_edge_bottom.Scale(viewportToDIPScale);
end_edge_top.Scale(viewportToDIPScale);
end_edge_bottom.Scale(viewportToDIPScale);
selection.start.SetEdge(start_edge_top, start_edge_bottom);
selection.end.SetEdge(end_edge_top, end_edge_bottom);
}
if (delegated_frame_host_) {
delegated_frame_host_->SubmitCompositorFrame(local_surface_id,
std::move(frame));
}
selection_controller_->OnSelectionBoundsChanged(selection.start,
selection.end);
}
Commit Message: Allocate a FrameSinkId for RenderWidgetHostViewAura in mus+ash
RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame expects its parent to have a valid
FrameSinkId. Make sure RenderWidgetHostViewAura has a FrameSinkId even
if DelegatedFrameHost is not used (in mus+ash).
BUG=706553
TBR=jam@chromium.org
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2847253003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468179}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 132,310
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void NavigationControllerImpl::SetTransientEntry(NavigationEntry* entry) {
int index = 0;
if (last_committed_entry_index_ != -1)
index = last_committed_entry_index_ + 1;
DiscardTransientEntry();
entries_.insert(
entries_.begin() + index, linked_ptr<NavigationEntryImpl>(
NavigationEntryImpl::FromNavigationEntry(entry)));
transient_entry_index_ = index;
web_contents_->NotifyNavigationStateChanged(kInvalidateAll);
}
Commit Message: Delete unneeded pending entries in DidFailProvisionalLoad to prevent a spoof.
BUG=280512
BUG=278899
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23978003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@222146 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 111,571
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void impeg2d_dec_p_mb_params(dec_state_t *ps_dec)
{
stream_t *ps_stream = &ps_dec->s_bit_stream;
UWORD16 u2_mb_addr_incr;
UWORD16 u2_total_len;
UWORD16 u2_len;
UWORD16 u2_mb_type;
UWORD32 u4_next_word;
const dec_mb_params_t *ps_dec_mb_params;
if(impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,1) == 1)
{
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,1);
}
else
{
u2_mb_addr_incr = impeg2d_get_mb_addr_incr(ps_stream);
if(0 == ps_dec->u2_first_mb)
{
/****************************************************************/
/* If the 2nd member of a field picture pair is a P picture and */
/* the first one was an I picture, there cannot be any skipped */
/* MBs in the second field picture */
/****************************************************************/
/*
if((dec->picture_structure != FRAME_PICTURE) &&
(dec->f->FieldFuncCall != 0) &&
(dec->las->u1_last_coded_vop_type == I))
{
core0_err_handler((void *)(VOLParams),
ITTMPEG2_ERR_INVALID_MB_SKIP);
}
*/
/****************************************************************/
/* In MPEG-2, the last MB of the row cannot be skipped and the */
/* MBAddrIncr cannot be such that it will take the current MB */
/* beyond the current row */
/* In MPEG-1, the slice could start and end anywhere and is not */
/* restricted to a row like in MPEG-2. Hence this check should */
/* not be done for MPEG-1 streams. */
/****************************************************************/
if(ps_dec->u2_is_mpeg2 && ((ps_dec->u2_mb_x + u2_mb_addr_incr) > ps_dec->u2_num_horiz_mb) )
{
u2_mb_addr_incr = ps_dec->u2_num_horiz_mb - ps_dec->u2_mb_x;
}
impeg2d_dec_skip_mbs(ps_dec, (UWORD16)(u2_mb_addr_incr - 1));
}
}
u4_next_word = (UWORD16)impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,16);
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* MB type */
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
{
u2_mb_type = ps_dec->pu2_mb_type[BITS((UWORD16)u4_next_word,15,10)];
u2_len = BITS(u2_mb_type,15,8);
u2_total_len = u2_len;
u4_next_word = (UWORD16)LSW((UWORD16)u4_next_word << u2_len);
}
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* motion type */
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
{
if((u2_mb_type & MB_FORW_OR_BACK) && ps_dec->u2_read_motion_type)
{
WORD32 i4_motion_type;
ps_dec->u2_motion_type = BITS((UWORD16)u4_next_word,15,14);
u2_total_len += MB_MOTION_TYPE_LEN;
u4_next_word = (UWORD16)LSW((UWORD16)u4_next_word << MB_MOTION_TYPE_LEN);
i4_motion_type = ps_dec->u2_motion_type;
if((i4_motion_type == 0) ||
(i4_motion_type == 4) ||
(i4_motion_type > 7))
{
i4_motion_type = 1;
}
}
}
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* dct type */
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
{
if((u2_mb_type & MB_CODED) && ps_dec->u2_read_dct_type)
{
ps_dec->u2_field_dct = BIT((UWORD16)u4_next_word,15);
u2_total_len += MB_DCT_TYPE_LEN;
u4_next_word = (UWORD16)LSW((UWORD16)u4_next_word << MB_DCT_TYPE_LEN);
}
}
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Quant scale code */
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
if(u2_mb_type & MB_QUANT)
{
UWORD16 u2_quant_scale_code;
u2_quant_scale_code = BITS((UWORD16)u4_next_word,15,11);
ps_dec->u1_quant_scale = (ps_dec->u2_q_scale_type) ?
gau1_impeg2_non_linear_quant_scale[u2_quant_scale_code] : (u2_quant_scale_code << 1);
u2_total_len += MB_QUANT_SCALE_CODE_LEN;
}
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,u2_total_len);
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Set the function pointers */
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
ps_dec->u2_coded_mb = (UWORD16)(u2_mb_type & MB_CODED);
if(u2_mb_type & MB_FORW_OR_BACK)
{
UWORD16 refPic = !(u2_mb_type & MB_MV_FORW);
UWORD16 index = (ps_dec->u2_motion_type);
ps_dec->u2_prev_intra_mb = 0;
ps_dec->e_mb_pred = (e_pred_direction_t)refPic;
ps_dec_mb_params = &ps_dec->ps_func_forw_or_back[index];
ps_dec->s_mb_type = ps_dec_mb_params->s_mb_type;
ps_dec_mb_params->pf_func_mb_params(ps_dec);
}
else if(u2_mb_type & MB_TYPE_INTRA)
{
ps_dec->u2_prev_intra_mb = 1;
impeg2d_dec_intra_mb(ps_dec);
}
else
{
ps_dec->u2_prev_intra_mb = 0;
ps_dec->e_mb_pred = FORW;
ps_dec->u2_motion_type = 0;
impeg2d_dec_0mv_coded_mb(ps_dec);
}
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* decode cbp */
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
if((u2_mb_type & MB_TYPE_INTRA))
{
ps_dec->u2_cbp = 0x3f;
ps_dec->u2_prev_intra_mb = 1;
}
else
{
ps_dec->u2_prev_intra_mb = 0;
ps_dec->u2_def_dc_pred[Y_LUMA] = 128 << ps_dec->u2_intra_dc_precision;
ps_dec->u2_def_dc_pred[U_CHROMA] = 128 << ps_dec->u2_intra_dc_precision;
ps_dec->u2_def_dc_pred[V_CHROMA] = 128 << ps_dec->u2_intra_dc_precision;
if((ps_dec->u2_coded_mb))
{
UWORD16 cbpValue;
cbpValue = gau2_impeg2d_cbp_code[impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,MB_CBP_LEN)];
ps_dec->u2_cbp = cbpValue & 0xFF;
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,(cbpValue >> 8) & 0x0FF);
}
else
{
ps_dec->u2_cbp = 0;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Return error for wrong mb_type
If mb_type decoded returns an invalid type of MB, then return error
Bug: 26070014
Change-Id: I66abcad5de1352dd42d05b1a13bb4176153b133c
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 174,609
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CreateTestCreditCards(ScopedVector<CreditCard>* credit_cards) {
CreditCard* credit_card = new CreditCard;
autofill_test::SetCreditCardInfo(credit_card, "First", "Elvis Presley",
"4234567890123456", // Visa
"04", "2012");
credit_card->set_guid("00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000004");
credit_cards->push_back(credit_card);
credit_card = new CreditCard;
autofill_test::SetCreditCardInfo(credit_card, "Second", "Buddy Holly",
"5187654321098765", // Mastercard
"10", "2014");
credit_card->set_guid("00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000005");
credit_cards->push_back(credit_card);
credit_card = new CreditCard;
autofill_test::SetCreditCardInfo(credit_card, "Empty", "", "", "", "");
credit_card->set_guid("00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000006");
credit_cards->push_back(credit_card);
}
Commit Message: Add support for autofill server experiments
BUG=none
TEST=unit_tests --gtest_filter=AutoFillMetricsTest.QualityMetricsWithExperimentId:AutoFillQueryXmlParserTest.ParseExperimentId
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6260027
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@73216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 101,910
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ProCamera2Client::~ProCamera2Client() {
}
Commit Message: Camera: Disallow dumping clients directly
Camera service dumps should only be initiated through
ICameraService::dump.
Bug: 26265403
Change-Id: If3ca4718ed74bf33ad8a416192689203029e2803
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 161,841
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void post_init_entity_util_avg(struct sched_entity *se)
{
struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq = cfs_rq_of(se);
struct sched_avg *sa = &se->avg;
long cpu_scale = arch_scale_cpu_capacity(NULL, cpu_of(rq_of(cfs_rq)));
long cap = (long)(cpu_scale - cfs_rq->avg.util_avg) / 2;
if (cap > 0) {
if (cfs_rq->avg.util_avg != 0) {
sa->util_avg = cfs_rq->avg.util_avg * se->load.weight;
sa->util_avg /= (cfs_rq->avg.load_avg + 1);
if (sa->util_avg > cap)
sa->util_avg = cap;
} else {
sa->util_avg = cap;
}
}
if (entity_is_task(se)) {
struct task_struct *p = task_of(se);
if (p->sched_class != &fair_sched_class) {
/*
* For !fair tasks do:
*
update_cfs_rq_load_avg(now, cfs_rq);
attach_entity_load_avg(cfs_rq, se, 0);
switched_from_fair(rq, p);
*
* such that the next switched_to_fair() has the
* expected state.
*/
se->avg.last_update_time = cfs_rq_clock_task(cfs_rq);
return;
}
}
attach_entity_cfs_rq(se);
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 92,632
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: base::TimeTicks GetEventTimeTicks(const Maybe<double>& timestamp) {
return timestamp.isJust()
? base::TimeDelta::FromSecondsD(timestamp.fromJust()) +
base::TimeTicks::UnixEpoch()
: base::TimeTicks::Now();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 148,464
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static u32 ccid3_hc_tx_idle_rtt(struct ccid3_hc_tx_sock *hc, ktime_t now)
{
u32 delta = ktime_us_delta(now, hc->tx_t_last_win_count);
return delta / hc->tx_rtt;
}
Commit Message: dccp: fix info leak via getsockopt(DCCP_SOCKOPT_CCID_TX_INFO)
The CCID3 code fails to initialize the trailing padding bytes of struct
tfrc_tx_info added for alignment on 64 bit architectures. It that for
potentially leaks four bytes kernel stack via the getsockopt() syscall.
Add an explicit memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the
info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Gerrit Renker <gerrit@erg.abdn.ac.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 34,157
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::Observe(int type,
const NotificationSource& source,
const NotificationDetails& details) {
switch (type) {
case NOTIFICATION_RENDER_WIDGET_HOST_DESTROYED: {
RenderWidgetHost* host = Source<RenderWidgetHost>(source).ptr();
for (PendingWidgetViews::iterator i = pending_widget_views_.begin();
i != pending_widget_views_.end(); ++i) {
if (host->GetView() == i->second) {
pending_widget_views_.erase(i);
break;
}
}
break;
}
default:
NOTREACHED();
}
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 110,711
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int fuse_file_lock(struct file *file, int cmd, struct file_lock *fl)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct fuse_conn *fc = get_fuse_conn(inode);
int err;
if (cmd == F_CANCELLK) {
err = 0;
} else if (cmd == F_GETLK) {
if (fc->no_lock) {
posix_test_lock(file, fl);
err = 0;
} else
err = fuse_getlk(file, fl);
} else {
if (fc->no_lock)
err = posix_lock_file(file, fl, NULL);
else
err = fuse_setlk(file, fl, 0);
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: fuse: break infinite loop in fuse_fill_write_pages()
I got a report about unkillable task eating CPU. Further
investigation shows, that the problem is in the fuse_fill_write_pages()
function. If iov's first segment has zero length, we get an infinite
loop, because we never reach iov_iter_advance() call.
Fix this by calling iov_iter_advance() before repeating an attempt to
copy data from userspace.
A similar problem is described in 124d3b7041f ("fix writev regression:
pan hanging unkillable and un-straceable"). If zero-length segmend
is followed by segment with invalid address,
iov_iter_fault_in_readable() checks only first segment (zero-length),
iov_iter_copy_from_user_atomic() skips it, fails at second and
returns zero -> goto again without skipping zero-length segment.
Patch calls iov_iter_advance() before goto again: we'll skip zero-length
segment at second iteraction and iov_iter_fault_in_readable() will detect
invalid address.
Special thanks to Konstantin Khlebnikov, who helped a lot with the commit
description.
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Maxim Patlasov <mpatlasov@parallels.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <klamm@yandex-team.ru>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Fixes: ea9b9907b82a ("fuse: implement perform_write")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 56,932
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FS_FreeFileList( char **list ) {
int i;
if ( !fs_searchpaths ) {
Com_Error( ERR_FATAL, "Filesystem call made without initialization" );
}
if ( !list ) {
return;
}
for ( i = 0 ; list[i] ; i++ ) {
Z_Free( list[i] );
}
Z_Free( list );
}
Commit Message: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s.
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 96,028
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void irda_connect_indication(void *instance, void *sap,
struct qos_info *qos, __u32 max_sdu_size,
__u8 max_header_size, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct irda_sock *self;
struct sock *sk;
self = instance;
IRDA_DEBUG(2, "%s(%p)\n", __func__, self);
sk = instance;
if (sk == NULL) {
dev_kfree_skb(skb);
return;
}
/* How much header space do we need to reserve */
self->max_header_size = max_header_size;
/* IrTTP max SDU size in transmit direction */
self->max_sdu_size_tx = max_sdu_size;
/* Find out what the largest chunk of data that we can transmit is */
switch (sk->sk_type) {
case SOCK_STREAM:
if (max_sdu_size != 0) {
IRDA_ERROR("%s: max_sdu_size must be 0\n",
__func__);
kfree_skb(skb);
return;
}
self->max_data_size = irttp_get_max_seg_size(self->tsap);
break;
case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
if (max_sdu_size == 0) {
IRDA_ERROR("%s: max_sdu_size cannot be 0\n",
__func__);
kfree_skb(skb);
return;
}
self->max_data_size = max_sdu_size;
break;
default:
self->max_data_size = irttp_get_max_seg_size(self->tsap);
}
IRDA_DEBUG(2, "%s(), max_data_size=%d\n", __func__,
self->max_data_size);
memcpy(&self->qos_tx, qos, sizeof(struct qos_info));
skb_queue_tail(&sk->sk_receive_queue, skb);
sk->sk_state_change(sk);
}
Commit Message: irda: Fix missing msg_namelen update in irda_recvmsg_dgram()
The current code does not fill the msg_name member in case it is set.
It also does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore makes
net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable
to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory.
Fix that by simply setting msg_namelen to 0 as obviously nobody cared
about irda_recvmsg_dgram() not filling the msg_name in case it was
set.
Cc: Samuel Ortiz <samuel@sortiz.org>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 30,637
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cifs_parse_mount_options(char *options, const char *devname,
struct smb_vol *vol)
{
char *value;
char *data;
unsigned int temp_len, i, j;
char separator[2];
short int override_uid = -1;
short int override_gid = -1;
bool uid_specified = false;
bool gid_specified = false;
separator[0] = ',';
separator[1] = 0;
if (Local_System_Name[0] != 0)
memcpy(vol->source_rfc1001_name, Local_System_Name, 15);
else {
char *nodename = utsname()->nodename;
int n = strnlen(nodename, 15);
memset(vol->source_rfc1001_name, 0x20, 15);
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
/* does not have to be perfect mapping since field is
informational, only used for servers that do not support
port 445 and it can be overridden at mount time */
vol->source_rfc1001_name[i] = toupper(nodename[i]);
}
}
vol->source_rfc1001_name[15] = 0;
/* null target name indicates to use *SMBSERVR default called name
if we end up sending RFC1001 session initialize */
vol->target_rfc1001_name[0] = 0;
vol->linux_uid = current_uid(); /* use current_euid() instead? */
vol->linux_gid = current_gid();
/* default to only allowing write access to owner of the mount */
vol->dir_mode = vol->file_mode = S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO | S_IWUSR;
/* vol->retry default is 0 (i.e. "soft" limited retry not hard retry) */
/* default is always to request posix paths. */
vol->posix_paths = 1;
/* default to using server inode numbers where available */
vol->server_ino = 1;
if (!options)
return 1;
if (strncmp(options, "sep=", 4) == 0) {
if (options[4] != 0) {
separator[0] = options[4];
options += 5;
} else {
cFYI(1, "Null separator not allowed");
}
}
while ((data = strsep(&options, separator)) != NULL) {
if (!*data)
continue;
if ((value = strchr(data, '=')) != NULL)
*value++ = '\0';
/* Have to parse this before we parse for "user" */
if (strnicmp(data, "user_xattr", 10) == 0) {
vol->no_xattr = 0;
} else if (strnicmp(data, "nouser_xattr", 12) == 0) {
vol->no_xattr = 1;
} else if (strnicmp(data, "user", 4) == 0) {
if (!value) {
printk(KERN_WARNING
"CIFS: invalid or missing username\n");
return 1; /* needs_arg; */
} else if (!*value) {
/* null user, ie anonymous, authentication */
vol->nullauth = 1;
}
if (strnlen(value, 200) < 200) {
vol->username = value;
} else {
printk(KERN_WARNING "CIFS: username too long\n");
return 1;
}
} else if (strnicmp(data, "pass", 4) == 0) {
if (!value) {
vol->password = NULL;
continue;
} else if (value[0] == 0) {
/* check if string begins with double comma
since that would mean the password really
does start with a comma, and would not
indicate an empty string */
if (value[1] != separator[0]) {
vol->password = NULL;
continue;
}
}
temp_len = strlen(value);
/* removed password length check, NTLM passwords
can be arbitrarily long */
/* if comma in password, the string will be
prematurely null terminated. Commas in password are
specified across the cifs mount interface by a double
comma ie ,, and a comma used as in other cases ie ','
as a parameter delimiter/separator is single and due
to the strsep above is temporarily zeroed. */
/* NB: password legally can have multiple commas and
the only illegal character in a password is null */
if ((value[temp_len] == 0) &&
(value[temp_len+1] == separator[0])) {
/* reinsert comma */
value[temp_len] = separator[0];
temp_len += 2; /* move after second comma */
while (value[temp_len] != 0) {
if (value[temp_len] == separator[0]) {
if (value[temp_len+1] ==
separator[0]) {
/* skip second comma */
temp_len++;
} else {
/* single comma indicating start
of next parm */
break;
}
}
temp_len++;
}
if (value[temp_len] == 0) {
options = NULL;
} else {
value[temp_len] = 0;
/* point option to start of next parm */
options = value + temp_len + 1;
}
/* go from value to value + temp_len condensing
double commas to singles. Note that this ends up
allocating a few bytes too many, which is ok */
vol->password = kzalloc(temp_len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (vol->password == NULL) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "CIFS: no memory "
"for password\n");
return 1;
}
for (i = 0, j = 0; i < temp_len; i++, j++) {
vol->password[j] = value[i];
if (value[i] == separator[0]
&& value[i+1] == separator[0]) {
/* skip second comma */
i++;
}
}
vol->password[j] = 0;
} else {
vol->password = kzalloc(temp_len+1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (vol->password == NULL) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "CIFS: no memory "
"for password\n");
return 1;
}
strcpy(vol->password, value);
}
} else if (!strnicmp(data, "ip", 2) ||
!strnicmp(data, "addr", 4)) {
if (!value || !*value) {
vol->UNCip = NULL;
} else if (strnlen(value, INET6_ADDRSTRLEN) <
INET6_ADDRSTRLEN) {
vol->UNCip = value;
} else {
printk(KERN_WARNING "CIFS: ip address "
"too long\n");
return 1;
}
} else if (strnicmp(data, "sec", 3) == 0) {
if (!value || !*value) {
cERROR(1, "no security value specified");
continue;
} else if (strnicmp(value, "krb5i", 5) == 0) {
vol->secFlg |= CIFSSEC_MAY_KRB5 |
CIFSSEC_MUST_SIGN;
} else if (strnicmp(value, "krb5p", 5) == 0) {
/* vol->secFlg |= CIFSSEC_MUST_SEAL |
CIFSSEC_MAY_KRB5; */
cERROR(1, "Krb5 cifs privacy not supported");
return 1;
} else if (strnicmp(value, "krb5", 4) == 0) {
vol->secFlg |= CIFSSEC_MAY_KRB5;
#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_EXPERIMENTAL
} else if (strnicmp(value, "ntlmsspi", 8) == 0) {
vol->secFlg |= CIFSSEC_MAY_NTLMSSP |
CIFSSEC_MUST_SIGN;
} else if (strnicmp(value, "ntlmssp", 7) == 0) {
vol->secFlg |= CIFSSEC_MAY_NTLMSSP;
#endif
} else if (strnicmp(value, "ntlmv2i", 7) == 0) {
vol->secFlg |= CIFSSEC_MAY_NTLMV2 |
CIFSSEC_MUST_SIGN;
} else if (strnicmp(value, "ntlmv2", 6) == 0) {
vol->secFlg |= CIFSSEC_MAY_NTLMV2;
} else if (strnicmp(value, "ntlmi", 5) == 0) {
vol->secFlg |= CIFSSEC_MAY_NTLM |
CIFSSEC_MUST_SIGN;
} else if (strnicmp(value, "ntlm", 4) == 0) {
/* ntlm is default so can be turned off too */
vol->secFlg |= CIFSSEC_MAY_NTLM;
} else if (strnicmp(value, "nontlm", 6) == 0) {
/* BB is there a better way to do this? */
vol->secFlg |= CIFSSEC_MAY_NTLMV2;
#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_WEAK_PW_HASH
} else if (strnicmp(value, "lanman", 6) == 0) {
vol->secFlg |= CIFSSEC_MAY_LANMAN;
#endif
} else if (strnicmp(value, "none", 4) == 0) {
vol->nullauth = 1;
} else {
cERROR(1, "bad security option: %s", value);
return 1;
}
} else if ((strnicmp(data, "unc", 3) == 0)
|| (strnicmp(data, "target", 6) == 0)
|| (strnicmp(data, "path", 4) == 0)) {
if (!value || !*value) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "CIFS: invalid path to "
"network resource\n");
return 1; /* needs_arg; */
}
if ((temp_len = strnlen(value, 300)) < 300) {
vol->UNC = kmalloc(temp_len+1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (vol->UNC == NULL)
return 1;
strcpy(vol->UNC, value);
if (strncmp(vol->UNC, "//", 2) == 0) {
vol->UNC[0] = '\\';
vol->UNC[1] = '\\';
} else if (strncmp(vol->UNC, "\\\\", 2) != 0) {
printk(KERN_WARNING
"CIFS: UNC Path does not begin "
"with // or \\\\ \n");
return 1;
}
} else {
printk(KERN_WARNING "CIFS: UNC name too long\n");
return 1;
}
} else if ((strnicmp(data, "domain", 3) == 0)
|| (strnicmp(data, "workgroup", 5) == 0)) {
if (!value || !*value) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "CIFS: invalid domain name\n");
return 1; /* needs_arg; */
}
/* BB are there cases in which a comma can be valid in
a domain name and need special handling? */
if (strnlen(value, 256) < 256) {
vol->domainname = value;
cFYI(1, "Domain name set");
} else {
printk(KERN_WARNING "CIFS: domain name too "
"long\n");
return 1;
}
} else if (strnicmp(data, "prefixpath", 10) == 0) {
if (!value || !*value) {
printk(KERN_WARNING
"CIFS: invalid path prefix\n");
return 1; /* needs_argument */
}
if ((temp_len = strnlen(value, 1024)) < 1024) {
if (value[0] != '/')
temp_len++; /* missing leading slash */
vol->prepath = kmalloc(temp_len+1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (vol->prepath == NULL)
return 1;
if (value[0] != '/') {
vol->prepath[0] = '/';
strcpy(vol->prepath+1, value);
} else
strcpy(vol->prepath, value);
cFYI(1, "prefix path %s", vol->prepath);
} else {
printk(KERN_WARNING "CIFS: prefix too long\n");
return 1;
}
} else if (strnicmp(data, "iocharset", 9) == 0) {
if (!value || !*value) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "CIFS: invalid iocharset "
"specified\n");
return 1; /* needs_arg; */
}
if (strnlen(value, 65) < 65) {
if (strnicmp(value, "default", 7))
vol->iocharset = value;
/* if iocharset not set then load_nls_default
is used by caller */
cFYI(1, "iocharset set to %s", value);
} else {
printk(KERN_WARNING "CIFS: iocharset name "
"too long.\n");
return 1;
}
} else if (!strnicmp(data, "uid", 3) && value && *value) {
vol->linux_uid = simple_strtoul(value, &value, 0);
uid_specified = true;
} else if (!strnicmp(data, "forceuid", 8)) {
override_uid = 1;
} else if (!strnicmp(data, "noforceuid", 10)) {
override_uid = 0;
} else if (!strnicmp(data, "gid", 3) && value && *value) {
vol->linux_gid = simple_strtoul(value, &value, 0);
gid_specified = true;
} else if (!strnicmp(data, "forcegid", 8)) {
override_gid = 1;
} else if (!strnicmp(data, "noforcegid", 10)) {
override_gid = 0;
} else if (strnicmp(data, "file_mode", 4) == 0) {
if (value && *value) {
vol->file_mode =
simple_strtoul(value, &value, 0);
}
} else if (strnicmp(data, "dir_mode", 4) == 0) {
if (value && *value) {
vol->dir_mode =
simple_strtoul(value, &value, 0);
}
} else if (strnicmp(data, "dirmode", 4) == 0) {
if (value && *value) {
vol->dir_mode =
simple_strtoul(value, &value, 0);
}
} else if (strnicmp(data, "port", 4) == 0) {
if (value && *value) {
vol->port =
simple_strtoul(value, &value, 0);
}
} else if (strnicmp(data, "rsize", 5) == 0) {
if (value && *value) {
vol->rsize =
simple_strtoul(value, &value, 0);
}
} else if (strnicmp(data, "wsize", 5) == 0) {
if (value && *value) {
vol->wsize =
simple_strtoul(value, &value, 0);
}
} else if (strnicmp(data, "sockopt", 5) == 0) {
if (!value || !*value) {
cERROR(1, "no socket option specified");
continue;
} else if (strnicmp(value, "TCP_NODELAY", 11) == 0) {
vol->sockopt_tcp_nodelay = 1;
}
} else if (strnicmp(data, "netbiosname", 4) == 0) {
if (!value || !*value || (*value == ' ')) {
cFYI(1, "invalid (empty) netbiosname");
} else {
memset(vol->source_rfc1001_name, 0x20, 15);
for (i = 0; i < 15; i++) {
/* BB are there cases in which a comma can be
valid in this workstation netbios name (and need
special handling)? */
/* We do not uppercase netbiosname for user */
if (value[i] == 0)
break;
else
vol->source_rfc1001_name[i] =
value[i];
}
/* The string has 16th byte zero still from
set at top of the function */
if ((i == 15) && (value[i] != 0))
printk(KERN_WARNING "CIFS: netbiosname"
" longer than 15 truncated.\n");
}
} else if (strnicmp(data, "servern", 7) == 0) {
/* servernetbiosname specified override *SMBSERVER */
if (!value || !*value || (*value == ' ')) {
cFYI(1, "empty server netbiosname specified");
} else {
/* last byte, type, is 0x20 for servr type */
memset(vol->target_rfc1001_name, 0x20, 16);
for (i = 0; i < 15; i++) {
/* BB are there cases in which a comma can be
valid in this workstation netbios name
(and need special handling)? */
/* user or mount helper must uppercase
the netbiosname */
if (value[i] == 0)
break;
else
vol->target_rfc1001_name[i] =
value[i];
}
/* The string has 16th byte zero still from
set at top of the function */
if ((i == 15) && (value[i] != 0))
printk(KERN_WARNING "CIFS: server net"
"biosname longer than 15 truncated.\n");
}
} else if (strnicmp(data, "credentials", 4) == 0) {
/* ignore */
} else if (strnicmp(data, "version", 3) == 0) {
/* ignore */
} else if (strnicmp(data, "guest", 5) == 0) {
/* ignore */
} else if (strnicmp(data, "rw", 2) == 0) {
/* ignore */
} else if (strnicmp(data, "ro", 2) == 0) {
/* ignore */
} else if (strnicmp(data, "noblocksend", 11) == 0) {
vol->noblocksnd = 1;
} else if (strnicmp(data, "noautotune", 10) == 0) {
vol->noautotune = 1;
} else if ((strnicmp(data, "suid", 4) == 0) ||
(strnicmp(data, "nosuid", 6) == 0) ||
(strnicmp(data, "exec", 4) == 0) ||
(strnicmp(data, "noexec", 6) == 0) ||
(strnicmp(data, "nodev", 5) == 0) ||
(strnicmp(data, "noauto", 6) == 0) ||
(strnicmp(data, "dev", 3) == 0)) {
/* The mount tool or mount.cifs helper (if present)
uses these opts to set flags, and the flags are read
by the kernel vfs layer before we get here (ie
before read super) so there is no point trying to
parse these options again and set anything and it
is ok to just ignore them */
continue;
} else if (strnicmp(data, "hard", 4) == 0) {
vol->retry = 1;
} else if (strnicmp(data, "soft", 4) == 0) {
vol->retry = 0;
} else if (strnicmp(data, "perm", 4) == 0) {
vol->noperm = 0;
} else if (strnicmp(data, "noperm", 6) == 0) {
vol->noperm = 1;
} else if (strnicmp(data, "mapchars", 8) == 0) {
vol->remap = 1;
} else if (strnicmp(data, "nomapchars", 10) == 0) {
vol->remap = 0;
} else if (strnicmp(data, "sfu", 3) == 0) {
vol->sfu_emul = 1;
} else if (strnicmp(data, "nosfu", 5) == 0) {
vol->sfu_emul = 0;
} else if (strnicmp(data, "nodfs", 5) == 0) {
vol->nodfs = 1;
} else if (strnicmp(data, "posixpaths", 10) == 0) {
vol->posix_paths = 1;
} else if (strnicmp(data, "noposixpaths", 12) == 0) {
vol->posix_paths = 0;
} else if (strnicmp(data, "nounix", 6) == 0) {
vol->no_linux_ext = 1;
} else if (strnicmp(data, "nolinux", 7) == 0) {
vol->no_linux_ext = 1;
} else if ((strnicmp(data, "nocase", 6) == 0) ||
(strnicmp(data, "ignorecase", 10) == 0)) {
vol->nocase = 1;
} else if (strnicmp(data, "brl", 3) == 0) {
vol->nobrl = 0;
} else if ((strnicmp(data, "nobrl", 5) == 0) ||
(strnicmp(data, "nolock", 6) == 0)) {
vol->nobrl = 1;
/* turn off mandatory locking in mode
if remote locking is turned off since the
local vfs will do advisory */
if (vol->file_mode ==
(S_IALLUGO & ~(S_ISUID | S_IXGRP)))
vol->file_mode = S_IALLUGO;
} else if (strnicmp(data, "forcemandatorylock", 9) == 0) {
/* will take the shorter form "forcemand" as well */
/* This mount option will force use of mandatory
(DOS/Windows style) byte range locks, instead of
using posix advisory byte range locks, even if the
Unix extensions are available and posix locks would
be supported otherwise. If Unix extensions are not
negotiated this has no effect since mandatory locks
would be used (mandatory locks is all that those
those servers support) */
vol->mand_lock = 1;
} else if (strnicmp(data, "setuids", 7) == 0) {
vol->setuids = 1;
} else if (strnicmp(data, "nosetuids", 9) == 0) {
vol->setuids = 0;
} else if (strnicmp(data, "dynperm", 7) == 0) {
vol->dynperm = true;
} else if (strnicmp(data, "nodynperm", 9) == 0) {
vol->dynperm = false;
} else if (strnicmp(data, "nohard", 6) == 0) {
vol->retry = 0;
} else if (strnicmp(data, "nosoft", 6) == 0) {
vol->retry = 1;
} else if (strnicmp(data, "nointr", 6) == 0) {
vol->intr = 0;
} else if (strnicmp(data, "intr", 4) == 0) {
vol->intr = 1;
} else if (strnicmp(data, "nostrictsync", 12) == 0) {
vol->nostrictsync = 1;
} else if (strnicmp(data, "strictsync", 10) == 0) {
vol->nostrictsync = 0;
} else if (strnicmp(data, "serverino", 7) == 0) {
vol->server_ino = 1;
} else if (strnicmp(data, "noserverino", 9) == 0) {
vol->server_ino = 0;
} else if (strnicmp(data, "cifsacl", 7) == 0) {
vol->cifs_acl = 1;
} else if (strnicmp(data, "nocifsacl", 9) == 0) {
vol->cifs_acl = 0;
} else if (strnicmp(data, "acl", 3) == 0) {
vol->no_psx_acl = 0;
} else if (strnicmp(data, "noacl", 5) == 0) {
vol->no_psx_acl = 1;
#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_EXPERIMENTAL
} else if (strnicmp(data, "locallease", 6) == 0) {
vol->local_lease = 1;
#endif
} else if (strnicmp(data, "sign", 4) == 0) {
vol->secFlg |= CIFSSEC_MUST_SIGN;
} else if (strnicmp(data, "seal", 4) == 0) {
/* we do not do the following in secFlags because seal
is a per tree connection (mount) not a per socket
or per-smb connection option in the protocol */
/* vol->secFlg |= CIFSSEC_MUST_SEAL; */
vol->seal = 1;
} else if (strnicmp(data, "direct", 6) == 0) {
vol->direct_io = 1;
} else if (strnicmp(data, "forcedirectio", 13) == 0) {
vol->direct_io = 1;
} else if (strnicmp(data, "noac", 4) == 0) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "CIFS: Mount option noac not "
"supported. Instead set "
"/proc/fs/cifs/LookupCacheEnabled to 0\n");
} else
printk(KERN_WARNING "CIFS: Unknown mount option %s\n",
data);
}
if (vol->UNC == NULL) {
if (devname == NULL) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "CIFS: Missing UNC name for mount "
"target\n");
return 1;
}
if ((temp_len = strnlen(devname, 300)) < 300) {
vol->UNC = kmalloc(temp_len+1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (vol->UNC == NULL)
return 1;
strcpy(vol->UNC, devname);
if (strncmp(vol->UNC, "//", 2) == 0) {
vol->UNC[0] = '\\';
vol->UNC[1] = '\\';
} else if (strncmp(vol->UNC, "\\\\", 2) != 0) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "CIFS: UNC Path does not "
"begin with // or \\\\ \n");
return 1;
}
value = strpbrk(vol->UNC+2, "/\\");
if (value)
*value = '\\';
} else {
printk(KERN_WARNING "CIFS: UNC name too long\n");
return 1;
}
}
if (vol->UNCip == NULL)
vol->UNCip = &vol->UNC[2];
if (uid_specified)
vol->override_uid = override_uid;
else if (override_uid == 1)
printk(KERN_NOTICE "CIFS: ignoring forceuid mount option "
"specified with no uid= option.\n");
if (gid_specified)
vol->override_gid = override_gid;
else if (override_gid == 1)
printk(KERN_NOTICE "CIFS: ignoring forcegid mount option "
"specified with no gid= option.\n");
return 0;
}
Commit Message: cifs: clean up cifs_find_smb_ses (try #2)
This patch replaces the earlier patch by the same name. The only
difference is that MAX_PASSWORD_SIZE has been increased to attempt to
match the limits that windows enforces.
Do a better job of matching sessions by authtype. Matching by username
for a Kerberos session is incorrect, and anonymous sessions need special
handling.
Also, in the case where we do match by username, we also need to match
by password. That ensures that someone else doesn't "borrow" an existing
session without needing to know the password.
Finally, passwords can be longer than 16 bytes. Bump MAX_PASSWORD_SIZE
to 512 to match the size that the userspace mount helper allows.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 35,146
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: R_API int r_flag_unset_name(RFlag *f, const char *name) {
RFlagItem *item = ht_find (f->ht_name, name, NULL);
return item && r_flag_unset (f, item);
}
Commit Message: Fix crash in wasm disassembler
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 60,492
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int cmd_system(void *data, const char *input) {
RCore *core = (RCore*)data;
ut64 n;
int ret = 0;
switch (*input) {
case '-': //!-
if (input[1]) {
r_line_hist_free();
r_line_hist_save (R2_HOME_HISTORY);
} else {
r_line_hist_free();
}
break;
case '=': //!=
if (input[1] == '?') {
r_cons_printf ("Usage: !=[!] - enable/disable remote commands\n");
} else {
if (!r_sandbox_enable (0)) {
core->cmdremote = input[1]? 1: 0;
r_cons_println (r_str_bool (core->cmdremote));
}
}
break;
case '!': //!!
if (input[1] == '!') { // !!! & !!!-
cmd_autocomplete (core, input + 2);
} else if (input[1] == '?') {
cmd_help_exclamation (core);
} else if (input[1] == '*') {
char *cmd = r_str_trim_dup (input + 1);
(void)r_core_cmdf (core, "\"#!pipe %s\"", cmd);
free (cmd);
} else {
if (r_sandbox_enable (0)) {
eprintf ("This command is disabled in sandbox mode\n");
return 0;
}
if (input[1]) {
int olen;
char *out = NULL;
char *cmd = r_core_sysenv_begin (core, input);
if (cmd) {
void *bed = r_cons_sleep_begin ();
ret = r_sys_cmd_str_full (cmd + 1, NULL, &out, &olen, NULL);
r_cons_sleep_end (bed);
r_core_sysenv_end (core, input);
r_cons_memcat (out, olen);
free (out);
free (cmd);
} //else eprintf ("Error setting up system environment\n");
} else {
eprintf ("History saved to "R2_HOME_HISTORY"\n");
r_line_hist_save (R2_HOME_HISTORY);
}
}
break;
case '\0':
r_line_hist_list ();
break;
case '?': //!?
cmd_help_exclamation (core);
break;
case '*':
{
char *cmd = r_str_trim_dup (input + 1);
cmd = r_str_replace (cmd, " ", "\\ ", true);
cmd = r_str_replace (cmd, "\\ ", " ", false);
cmd = r_str_replace (cmd, "\"", "'", false);
ret = r_core_cmdf (core, "\"#!pipe %s\"", cmd);
free (cmd);
}
break;
default:
n = atoi (input);
if (*input == '0' || n > 0) {
const char *cmd = r_line_hist_get (n);
if (cmd) {
r_core_cmd0 (core, cmd);
}
} else {
char *cmd = r_core_sysenv_begin (core, input);
if (cmd) {
void *bed = r_cons_sleep_begin ();
ret = r_sys_cmd (cmd);
r_cons_sleep_end (bed);
r_core_sysenv_end (core, input);
free (cmd);
} else {
eprintf ("Error setting up system environment\n");
}
}
break;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix #14990 - multiple quoted command parsing issue ##core
> "?e hello""?e world"
hello
world"
> "?e hello";"?e world"
hello
world
CWE ID: CWE-78
| 0
| 87,792
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::SendViolationReport(
mojom::blink::CSPViolationParamsPtr violation_params) {
std::unique_ptr<SourceLocation> source_location = SourceLocation::Create(
violation_params->source_location->url,
violation_params->source_location->line_number,
violation_params->source_location->column_number, nullptr);
Vector<String> report_endpoints;
for (const WebString& end_point : violation_params->report_endpoints)
report_endpoints.push_back(end_point);
AddConsoleMessage(ConsoleMessage::Create(kSecurityMessageSource,
kErrorMessageLevel,
violation_params->console_message));
GetContentSecurityPolicy()->ReportViolation(
violation_params->directive,
ContentSecurityPolicy::GetDirectiveType(
violation_params->effective_directive),
violation_params->console_message, KURL(violation_params->blocked_url),
report_endpoints, violation_params->use_reporting_api,
violation_params->header,
static_cast<ContentSecurityPolicyHeaderType>(
violation_params->disposition),
ContentSecurityPolicy::ViolationType::kURLViolation,
std::move(source_location), nullptr /* LocalFrame */,
violation_params->after_redirect ? RedirectStatus::kFollowedRedirect
: RedirectStatus::kNoRedirect,
nullptr /* Element */);
}
Commit Message: Inherit the navigation initiator when navigating instead of the parent/opener
Spec PR: https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-csp/pull/358
Bug: 905301, 894228, 836148
Change-Id: I43ada2266d42d1cd56dbe3c6dd89d115e878a83a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1314633
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#610850}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 152,427
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::removeFocusedNodeOfSubtree(Node* node, bool amongChildrenOnly)
{
if (!m_focusedNode || this->inPageCache()) // If the document is in the page cache, then we don't need to clear out the focused node.
return;
Node* focusedNode = node->treeScope()->focusedNode();
if (!focusedNode)
return;
bool nodeInSubtree = false;
if (amongChildrenOnly)
nodeInSubtree = focusedNode->isDescendantOf(node);
else
nodeInSubtree = (focusedNode == node) || focusedNode->isDescendantOf(node);
if (nodeInSubtree)
document()->focusedNodeRemoved();
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 105,582
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: JsVar *jsvMakeIntoVariableName(JsVar *var, JsVar *valueOrZero) {
if (!var) return 0;
assert(jsvGetRefs(var)==0); // make sure it's unused
assert(jsvIsSimpleInt(var) || jsvIsString(var));
JsVarFlags varType = (var->flags & JSV_VARTYPEMASK);
if (varType==JSV_INTEGER) {
int t = JSV_NAME_INT;
if ((jsvIsInt(valueOrZero) || jsvIsBoolean(valueOrZero)) && !jsvIsPin(valueOrZero)) {
JsVarInt v = valueOrZero->varData.integer;
if (v>=JSVARREF_MIN && v<=JSVARREF_MAX) {
t = jsvIsInt(valueOrZero) ? JSV_NAME_INT_INT : JSV_NAME_INT_BOOL;
jsvSetFirstChild(var, (JsVarRef)v);
valueOrZero = 0;
}
}
var->flags = (JsVarFlags)(var->flags & ~JSV_VARTYPEMASK) | t;
} else if (varType>=_JSV_STRING_START && varType<=_JSV_STRING_END) {
if (jsvGetCharactersInVar(var) > JSVAR_DATA_STRING_NAME_LEN) {
/* Argh. String is too large to fit in a JSV_NAME! We must chomp make
* new STRINGEXTs to put the data in
*/
JsvStringIterator it;
jsvStringIteratorNew(&it, var, JSVAR_DATA_STRING_NAME_LEN);
JsVar *startExt = jsvNewWithFlags(JSV_STRING_EXT_0);
JsVar *ext = jsvLockAgainSafe(startExt);
size_t nChars = 0;
while (ext && jsvStringIteratorHasChar(&it)) {
if (nChars >= JSVAR_DATA_STRING_MAX_LEN) {
jsvSetCharactersInVar(ext, nChars);
JsVar *ext2 = jsvNewWithFlags(JSV_STRING_EXT_0);
if (ext2) {
jsvSetLastChild(ext, jsvGetRef(ext2));
}
jsvUnLock(ext);
ext = ext2;
nChars = 0;
}
ext->varData.str[nChars++] = jsvStringIteratorGetChar(&it);
jsvStringIteratorNext(&it);
}
jsvStringIteratorFree(&it);
if (ext) {
jsvSetCharactersInVar(ext, nChars);
jsvUnLock(ext);
}
jsvSetCharactersInVar(var, JSVAR_DATA_STRING_NAME_LEN);
JsVarRef oldRef = jsvGetLastChild(var);
while (oldRef) {
JsVar *v = jsvGetAddressOf(oldRef);
oldRef = jsvGetLastChild(v);
jsvFreePtrInternal(v);
}
jsvSetLastChild(var, jsvGetRef(startExt));
jsvSetNextSibling(var, 0);
jsvSetPrevSibling(var, 0);
jsvSetFirstChild(var, 0);
jsvUnLock(startExt);
}
size_t t = JSV_NAME_STRING_0;
if (jsvIsInt(valueOrZero) && !jsvIsPin(valueOrZero)) {
JsVarInt v = valueOrZero->varData.integer;
if (v>=JSVARREF_MIN && v<=JSVARREF_MAX) {
t = JSV_NAME_STRING_INT_0;
jsvSetFirstChild(var, (JsVarRef)v);
valueOrZero = 0;
}
} else
jsvSetFirstChild(var, 0);
var->flags = (var->flags & (JsVarFlags)~JSV_VARTYPEMASK) | (t+jsvGetCharactersInVar(var));
} else assert(0);
if (valueOrZero)
jsvSetFirstChild(var, jsvGetRef(jsvRef(valueOrZero)));
return var;
}
Commit Message: fix jsvGetString regression
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 82,503
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: safe_delay_show(struct mddev *mddev, char *page)
{
int msec = (mddev->safemode_delay*1000)/HZ;
return sprintf(page, "%d.%03d\n", msec/1000, msec%1000);
}
Commit Message: md: use kzalloc() when bitmap is disabled
In drivers/md/md.c get_bitmap_file() uses kmalloc() for creating a
mdu_bitmap_file_t called "file".
5769 file = kmalloc(sizeof(*file), GFP_NOIO);
5770 if (!file)
5771 return -ENOMEM;
This structure is copied to user space at the end of the function.
5786 if (err == 0 &&
5787 copy_to_user(arg, file, sizeof(*file)))
5788 err = -EFAULT
But if bitmap is disabled only the first byte of "file" is initialized
with zero, so it's possible to read some bytes (up to 4095) of kernel
space memory from user space. This is an information leak.
5775 /* bitmap disabled, zero the first byte and copy out */
5776 if (!mddev->bitmap_info.file)
5777 file->pathname[0] = '\0';
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Randazzo <benjamin@randazzo.fr>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 42,526
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void perf_swevent_overflow(struct perf_event *event, u64 overflow,
int nmi, struct perf_sample_data *data,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct hw_perf_event *hwc = &event->hw;
int throttle = 0;
data->period = event->hw.last_period;
if (!overflow)
overflow = perf_swevent_set_period(event);
if (hwc->interrupts == MAX_INTERRUPTS)
return;
for (; overflow; overflow--) {
if (__perf_event_overflow(event, nmi, throttle,
data, regs)) {
/*
* We inhibit the overflow from happening when
* hwc->interrupts == MAX_INTERRUPTS.
*/
break;
}
throttle = 1;
}
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 1
| 165,839
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int netif_alloc_netdev_queues(struct net_device *dev)
{
unsigned int count = dev->num_tx_queues;
struct netdev_queue *tx;
size_t sz = count * sizeof(*tx);
if (count < 1 || count > 0xffff)
return -EINVAL;
tx = kvzalloc(sz, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL);
if (!tx)
return -ENOMEM;
dev->_tx = tx;
netdev_for_each_tx_queue(dev, netdev_init_one_queue, NULL);
spin_lock_init(&dev->tx_global_lock);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: tun: call dev_get_valid_name() before register_netdevice()
register_netdevice() could fail early when we have an invalid
dev name, in which case ->ndo_uninit() is not called. For tun
device, this is a problem because a timer etc. are already
initialized and it expects ->ndo_uninit() to clean them up.
We could move these initializations into a ->ndo_init() so
that register_netdevice() knows better, however this is still
complicated due to the logic in tun_detach().
Therefore, I choose to just call dev_get_valid_name() before
register_netdevice(), which is quicker and much easier to audit.
And for this specific case, it is already enough.
Fixes: 96442e42429e ("tuntap: choose the txq based on rxq")
Reported-by: Dmitry Alexeev <avekceeb@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 93,439
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BrowserPluginGuest::DidCommitProvisionalLoadForFrame(
int64 frame_id,
bool is_main_frame,
const GURL& url,
PageTransition transition_type,
RenderViewHost* render_view_host) {
BrowserPluginMsg_LoadCommit_Params params;
params.url = url;
params.is_top_level = is_main_frame;
params.process_id = render_view_host->GetProcess()->GetID();
params.current_entry_index =
web_contents()->GetController().GetCurrentEntryIndex();
params.entry_count =
web_contents()->GetController().GetEntryCount();
SendMessageToEmbedder(
new BrowserPluginMsg_LoadCommit(embedder_routing_id(),
instance_id(),
params));
RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("BrowserPlugin.Guest.DidNavigate"));
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 114,396
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void attachBackupObject(sqlite3_backup *p){
sqlite3_backup **pp;
assert( sqlite3BtreeHoldsMutex(p->pSrc) );
pp = sqlite3PagerBackupPtr(sqlite3BtreePager(p->pSrc));
p->pNext = *pp;
*pp = p;
p->isAttached = 1;
}
Commit Message: sqlite: safely move pointer values through SQL.
This lands https://www.sqlite.org/src/timeline?c=d6a44b35 in
third_party/sqlite/src/ and
third_party/sqlite/patches/0013-Add-new-interfaces-sqlite3_bind_pointer-sqlite3_resu.patch
and re-generates third_party/sqlite/amalgamation/* using the script at
third_party/sqlite/google_generate_amalgamation.sh.
The CL also adds a layout test that verifies the patch works as intended.
BUG=742407
Change-Id: I2e1a457459cd2e975e6241b630e7b79c82545981
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/572976
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#487275}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 136,311
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: OMX::buffer_id OMXNodeInstance::makeBufferID(OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *bufferHeader) {
return (OMX::buffer_id)bufferHeader;
}
Commit Message: IOMX: Enable buffer ptr to buffer id translation for arm32
Bug: 20634516
Change-Id: Iac9eac3cb251eccd9bbad5df7421a07edc21da0c
(cherry picked from commit 2d6b6601743c3c6960c6511a2cb774ef902759f4)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 173,360
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool ExecuteSelectWord(LocalFrame& frame,
Event*,
EditorCommandSource,
const String&) {
return ExpandSelectionToGranularity(frame, TextGranularity::kWord);
}
Commit Message: Move Editor::Transpose() out of Editor class
This patch moves |Editor::Transpose()| out of |Editor| class as preparation of
expanding it into |ExecutTranspose()| in "EditorCommand.cpp" to make |Editor|
class simpler for improving code health.
Following patch will expand |Transpose()| into |ExecutTranspose()|.
Bug: 672405
Change-Id: Icde253623f31813d2b4517c4da7d4798bd5fadf6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/583880
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#489518}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 128,608
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::OnSelectionChanged(const base::string16& text,
uint32_t offset,
const gfx::Range& range) {
has_selection_ = !text.empty();
GetRenderWidgetHost()->SelectionChanged(text, offset, range);
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 127,864
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool InspectorNetworkAgent::FetchResourceContent(Document* document,
const KURL& url,
String* content,
bool* base64_encoded) {
DCHECK(document);
DCHECK(IsMainThread());
Resource* cached_resource = document->Fetcher()->CachedResource(url);
if (!cached_resource) {
cached_resource = GetMemoryCache()->ResourceForURL(
url, document->Fetcher()->GetCacheIdentifier());
}
if (cached_resource && InspectorPageAgent::CachedResourceContent(
cached_resource, content, base64_encoded))
return true;
for (auto& resource : resources_data_->Resources()) {
if (resource->RequestedURL() == url) {
*content = resource->Content();
*base64_encoded = resource->Base64Encoded();
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 138,502
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Notification::show()
{
ASSERT(m_state == NotificationStateIdle);
if (Notification::checkPermission(executionContext()) != WebNotificationPermissionAllowed) {
dispatchErrorEvent();
return;
}
SecurityOrigin* origin = executionContext()->securityOrigin();
ASSERT(origin);
notificationManager()->show(WebSecurityOrigin(origin), m_data, this);
m_state = NotificationStateShowing;
}
Commit Message: Notification actions may have an icon url.
This is behind a runtime flag for two reasons:
* The implementation is incomplete.
* We're still evaluating the API design.
Intent to Implement and Ship: Notification Action Icons
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/IM0HxOP7HOA/y8tu6iq1CgAJ
BUG=581336
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1644573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#374649}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 119,788
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gx_dc_colored_masked_equal(const gx_device_color * pdevc1,
const gx_device_color * pdevc2)
{
return (*gx_dc_type_ht_colored->equal) (pdevc1, pdevc2) &&
pdevc1->mask.id == pdevc2->mask.id;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 1,667
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: mm_answer_sign(int sock, Buffer *m)
{
struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
extern int auth_sock; /* XXX move to state struct? */
struct sshkey *key;
struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL;
u_char *p = NULL, *signature = NULL;
char *alg = NULL;
size_t datlen, siglen, alglen;
int r, is_proof = 0;
u_int keyid;
const char proof_req[] = "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com";
debug3("%s", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &keyid)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &datlen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &alg, &alglen)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (keyid > INT_MAX)
fatal("%s: invalid key ID", __func__);
/*
* Supported KEX types use SHA1 (20 bytes), SHA256 (32 bytes),
* SHA384 (48 bytes) and SHA512 (64 bytes).
*
* Otherwise, verify the signature request is for a hostkey
* proof.
*
* XXX perform similar check for KEX signature requests too?
* it's not trivial, since what is signed is the hash, rather
* than the full kex structure...
*/
if (datlen != 20 && datlen != 32 && datlen != 48 && datlen != 64) {
/*
* Construct expected hostkey proof and compare it to what
* the client sent us.
*/
if (session_id2_len == 0) /* hostkeys is never first */
fatal("%s: bad data length: %zu", __func__, datlen);
if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: no hostkey for index %d", __func__, keyid);
if ((sigbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sigbuf, proof_req)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(sigbuf, session_id2,
session_id2_len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_puts(key, sigbuf)) != 0)
fatal("%s: couldn't prepare private key "
"proof buffer: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (datlen != sshbuf_len(sigbuf) ||
memcmp(p, sshbuf_ptr(sigbuf), sshbuf_len(sigbuf)) != 0)
fatal("%s: bad data length: %zu, hostkey proof len %zu",
__func__, datlen, sshbuf_len(sigbuf));
sshbuf_free(sigbuf);
is_proof = 1;
}
/* save session id, it will be passed on the first call */
if (session_id2_len == 0) {
session_id2_len = datlen;
session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len);
memcpy(session_id2, p, session_id2_len);
}
if ((key = get_hostkey_by_index(keyid)) != NULL) {
if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen, alg,
datafellows)) != 0)
fatal("%s: sshkey_sign failed: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
} else if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) != NULL &&
auth_sock > 0) {
if ((r = ssh_agent_sign(auth_sock, key, &signature, &siglen,
p, datlen, alg, datafellows)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: ssh_agent_sign failed: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
}
} else
fatal("%s: no hostkey from index %d", __func__, keyid);
debug3("%s: %s signature %p(%zu)", __func__,
is_proof ? "KEX" : "hostkey proof", signature, siglen);
sshbuf_reset(m);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, signature, siglen)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
free(alg);
free(p);
free(signature);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN, m);
/* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
return (0);
}
Commit Message: Remove support for pre-authentication compression. Doing compression
early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s, but
today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf.
multiple compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface.
Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed
the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the
required attack surface considerably larger.
Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security
check in the shared memory manager found by Stack
(http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@
NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd
for >10 years.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 72,181
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RootInlineBox* endLine() const { return m_endLine; }
Commit Message: Update containtingIsolate to go back all the way to top isolate from current root, rather than stopping at the first isolate it finds. This works because the current root is always updated with each isolate run.
BUG=279277
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23972003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@157268 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 111,343
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const ComputedStyle* SVGElement::EnsureComputedStyle(
PseudoId pseudo_element_specifier) {
if (!HasSVGRareData() || !SvgRareData()->UseOverrideComputedStyle())
return Element::EnsureComputedStyle(pseudo_element_specifier);
const ComputedStyle* parent_style = nullptr;
if (Element* parent = ParentOrShadowHostElement()) {
if (LayoutObject* layout_object = parent->GetLayoutObject())
parent_style = layout_object->Style();
}
return SvgRareData()->OverrideComputedStyle(this, parent_style);
}
Commit Message: Fix SVG crash for v0 distribution into foreignObject.
We require a parent element to be an SVG element for non-svg-root
elements in order to create a LayoutObject for them. However, we checked
the light tree parent element, not the flat tree one which is the parent
for the layout tree construction. Note that this is just an issue in
Shadow DOM v0 since v1 does not allow shadow roots on SVG elements.
Bug: 915469
Change-Id: Id81843abad08814fae747b5bc81c09666583f130
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1382494
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <fs@opera.com>
Commit-Queue: Rune Lillesveen <futhark@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#617487}
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 152,756
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void VoidMethodNodeArgMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() < 1)) {
V8ThrowException::ThrowTypeError(info.GetIsolate(), ExceptionMessages::FailedToExecute("voidMethodNodeArg", "TestObject", ExceptionMessages::NotEnoughArguments(1, info.Length())));
return;
}
Node* node_arg;
node_arg = V8Node::ToImplWithTypeCheck(info.GetIsolate(), info[0]);
if (!node_arg) {
V8ThrowException::ThrowTypeError(info.GetIsolate(), ExceptionMessages::FailedToExecute("voidMethodNodeArg", "TestObject", ExceptionMessages::ArgumentNotOfType(0, "Node")));
return;
}
impl->voidMethodNodeArg(node_arg);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 135,443
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::write(v8::Isolate* isolate,
TrustedHTML* text,
ExceptionState& exception_state) {
DCHECK(origin_trials::TrustedDOMTypesEnabled(this));
write(text->toString(), EnteredDOMWindow(isolate)->document(),
exception_state);
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 130,010
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void o2nm_node_get(struct o2nm_node *node)
{
config_item_get(&node->nd_item);
}
Commit Message: ocfs2: subsystem.su_mutex is required while accessing the item->ci_parent
The subsystem.su_mutex is required while accessing the item->ci_parent,
otherwise, NULL pointer dereference to the item->ci_parent will be
triggered in the following situation:
add node delete node
sys_write
vfs_write
configfs_write_file
o2nm_node_store
o2nm_node_local_write
do_rmdir
vfs_rmdir
configfs_rmdir
mutex_lock(&subsys->su_mutex);
unlink_obj
item->ci_group = NULL;
item->ci_parent = NULL;
to_o2nm_cluster_from_node
node->nd_item.ci_parent->ci_parent
BUG since of NULL pointer dereference to nd_item.ci_parent
Moreover, the o2nm_cluster also should be protected by the
subsystem.su_mutex.
[alex.chen@huawei.com: v2]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59EEAA69.9080703@huawei.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59E9B36A.10700@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Alex Chen <alex.chen@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@versity.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 85,756
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: perf_output_sample_ustack(struct perf_output_handle *handle, u64 dump_size,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
/* Case of a kernel thread, nothing to dump */
if (!regs) {
u64 size = 0;
perf_output_put(handle, size);
} else {
unsigned long sp;
unsigned int rem;
u64 dyn_size;
/*
* We dump:
* static size
* - the size requested by user or the best one we can fit
* in to the sample max size
* data
* - user stack dump data
* dynamic size
* - the actual dumped size
*/
/* Static size. */
perf_output_put(handle, dump_size);
/* Data. */
sp = perf_user_stack_pointer(regs);
rem = __output_copy_user(handle, (void *) sp, dump_size);
dyn_size = dump_size - rem;
perf_output_skip(handle, rem);
/* Dynamic size. */
perf_output_put(handle, dyn_size);
}
}
Commit Message: perf: Treat attr.config as u64 in perf_swevent_init()
Trinity discovered that we fail to check all 64 bits of
attr.config passed by user space, resulting to out-of-bounds
access of the perf_swevent_enabled array in
sw_perf_event_destroy().
Introduced in commit b0a873ebb ("perf: Register PMU
implementations").
Signed-off-by: Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: davej@redhat.com
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@ghostprotocols.net>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365882554-30259-1-git-send-email-tt.rantala@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 31,969
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline bool isValidNamePart(UChar32 c)
{
if (isValidNameStart(c))
return true;
if (c == 0x00B7 || c == 0x0387)
return true;
if (c == '-' || c == '.')
return true;
const uint32_t otherNamePartMask = Mark_NonSpacing | Mark_Enclosing | Mark_SpacingCombining | Letter_Modifier | Number_DecimalDigit;
if (!(Unicode::category(c) & otherNamePartMask))
return false;
if (c >= 0xF900 && c < 0xFFFE)
return false;
DecompositionType decompType = decompositionType(c);
if (decompType == DecompositionFont || decompType == DecompositionCompat)
return false;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 102,774
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void IPCThreadState::disableBackgroundScheduling(bool disable)
{
gDisableBackgroundScheduling = disable;
}
Commit Message: Fix issue #27252896: Security Vulnerability -- weak binder
Sending transaction to freed BBinder through weak handle
can cause use of a (mostly) freed object. We need to try to
safely promote to a strong reference first.
Change-Id: Ic9c6940fa824980472e94ed2dfeca52a6b0fd342
(cherry picked from commit c11146106f94e07016e8e26e4f8628f9a0c73199)
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 161,139
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameImpl::OnAddMessageToConsole(
blink::mojom::ConsoleMessageLevel level,
const std::string& message) {
AddMessageToConsole(level, message);
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 139,737
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: enum delta_result_type do_add_delta(conn *c, item *it, const bool incr,
const int64_t delta, char *buf) {
char *ptr;
uint64_t value;
int res;
ptr = ITEM_data(it);
if (!safe_strtoull(ptr, &value)) {
return NON_NUMERIC;
}
if (incr) {
value += delta;
MEMCACHED_COMMAND_INCR(c->sfd, ITEM_key(it), it->nkey, value);
} else {
if(delta > value) {
value = 0;
} else {
value -= delta;
}
MEMCACHED_COMMAND_DECR(c->sfd, ITEM_key(it), it->nkey, value);
}
pthread_mutex_lock(&c->thread->stats.mutex);
if (incr) {
c->thread->stats.slab_stats[it->slabs_clsid].incr_hits++;
} else {
c->thread->stats.slab_stats[it->slabs_clsid].decr_hits++;
}
pthread_mutex_unlock(&c->thread->stats.mutex);
snprintf(buf, INCR_MAX_STORAGE_LEN, "%llu", (unsigned long long)value);
res = strlen(buf);
if (res + 2 > it->nbytes) { /* need to realloc */
item *new_it;
new_it = do_item_alloc(ITEM_key(it), it->nkey, atoi(ITEM_suffix(it) + 1), it->exptime, res + 2 );
if (new_it == 0) {
return EOM;
}
memcpy(ITEM_data(new_it), buf, res);
memcpy(ITEM_data(new_it) + res, "\r\n", 2);
item_replace(it, new_it);
do_item_remove(new_it); /* release our reference */
} else { /* replace in-place */
/* When changing the value without replacing the item, we
need to update the CAS on the existing item. */
ITEM_set_cas(it, (settings.use_cas) ? get_cas_id() : 0);
memcpy(ITEM_data(it), buf, res);
memset(ITEM_data(it) + res, ' ', it->nbytes - res - 2);
}
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Use strncmp when checking for large ascii multigets.
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 18,248
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int handle_lan_get_msg_rsp(struct ipmi_smi *intf,
struct ipmi_smi_msg *msg)
{
struct ipmi_lan_addr lan_addr;
struct ipmi_recv_msg *recv_msg;
/*
* This is 13, not 12, because the response must contain a
* completion code.
*/
if (msg->rsp_size < 13) {
/* Message not big enough, just ignore it. */
ipmi_inc_stat(intf, invalid_lan_responses);
return 0;
}
if (msg->rsp[2] != 0) {
/* An error getting the response, just ignore it. */
return 0;
}
lan_addr.addr_type = IPMI_LAN_ADDR_TYPE;
lan_addr.session_handle = msg->rsp[4];
lan_addr.remote_SWID = msg->rsp[8];
lan_addr.local_SWID = msg->rsp[5];
lan_addr.channel = msg->rsp[3] & 0x0f;
lan_addr.privilege = msg->rsp[3] >> 4;
lan_addr.lun = msg->rsp[9] & 3;
/*
* It's a response from a remote entity. Look up the sequence
* number and handle the response.
*/
if (intf_find_seq(intf,
msg->rsp[9] >> 2,
msg->rsp[3] & 0x0f,
msg->rsp[10],
(msg->rsp[6] >> 2) & (~1),
(struct ipmi_addr *) &lan_addr,
&recv_msg)) {
/*
* We were unable to find the sequence number,
* so just nuke the message.
*/
ipmi_inc_stat(intf, unhandled_lan_responses);
return 0;
}
memcpy(recv_msg->msg_data, &msg->rsp[11], msg->rsp_size - 11);
/*
* The other fields matched, so no need to set them, except
* for netfn, which needs to be the response that was
* returned, not the request value.
*/
recv_msg->msg.netfn = msg->rsp[6] >> 2;
recv_msg->msg.data = recv_msg->msg_data;
recv_msg->msg.data_len = msg->rsp_size - 12;
recv_msg->recv_type = IPMI_RESPONSE_RECV_TYPE;
if (deliver_response(intf, recv_msg))
ipmi_inc_stat(intf, unhandled_lan_responses);
else
ipmi_inc_stat(intf, handled_lan_responses);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ipmi: fix use-after-free of user->release_barrier.rda
When we do the following test, we got oops in ipmi_msghandler driver
while((1))
do
service ipmievd restart & service ipmievd restart
done
---------------------------------------------------------------
[ 294.230186] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000803fea6ea008
[ 294.230188] Mem abort info:
[ 294.230190] ESR = 0x96000004
[ 294.230191] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 294.230193] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 294.230194] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 294.230195] Data abort info:
[ 294.230196] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004
[ 294.230197] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 294.230199] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000a1c1b75a
[ 294.230201] [0000803fea6ea008] pgd=0000000000000000
[ 294.230204] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP
[ 294.235211] Modules linked in: nls_utf8 isofs rpcrdma ib_iser ib_srpt target_core_mod ib_srp scsi_transport_srp ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm iw_cm dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce sha2_ce ses sha256_arm64 sha1_ce hibmc_drm hisi_sas_v2_hw enclosure sg hisi_sas_main sbsa_gwdt ip_tables mlx5_ib ib_uverbs marvell ib_core mlx5_core ixgbe ipmi_si mdio hns_dsaf ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler hns_enet_drv hns_mdio
[ 294.277745] CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.0.0-rc2+ #113
[ 294.285511] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.37 11/21/2017
[ 294.292835] pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO)
[ 294.297695] pc : __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.301940] lr : acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.307853] sp : ffff00001001bc80
[ 294.311208] x29: ffff00001001bc80 x28: ffff0000117e5000
[ 294.316594] x27: 0000000000000000 x26: dead000000000100
[ 294.321980] x25: dead000000000200 x24: ffff803f6bd06800
[ 294.327366] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000000
[ 294.332752] x21: ffff00001001bd04 x20: ffff80df33d19018
[ 294.338137] x19: ffff80df33d19018 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 294.343523] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 294.348908] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000002
[ 294.354293] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 294.359679] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000100000
[ 294.365065] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 0000000000000004
[ 294.370451] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffff80df34558678
[ 294.375836] x5 : 000000000000000c x4 : 0000000000000000
[ 294.381221] x3 : 0000000000000001 x2 : 0000803fea6ea000
[ 294.386607] x1 : 0000803fea6ea008 x0 : 0000000000000001
[ 294.391994] Process swapper/3 (pid: 0, stack limit = 0x0000000083087293)
[ 294.398791] Call trace:
[ 294.401266] __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.405154] acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.410716] deliver_response+0x80/0xf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.416189] deliver_local_response+0x28/0x68 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.422193] handle_one_recv_msg+0x158/0xcf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.432050] handle_new_recv_msgs+0xc0/0x210 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.441984] smi_recv_tasklet+0x8c/0x158 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.451618] tasklet_action_common.isra.5+0x88/0x138
[ 294.460661] tasklet_action+0x2c/0x38
[ 294.468191] __do_softirq+0x120/0x2f8
[ 294.475561] irq_exit+0x134/0x140
[ 294.482445] __handle_domain_irq+0x6c/0xc0
[ 294.489954] gic_handle_irq+0xb8/0x178
[ 294.497037] el1_irq+0xb0/0x140
[ 294.503381] arch_cpu_idle+0x34/0x1a8
[ 294.510096] do_idle+0x1d4/0x290
[ 294.516322] cpu_startup_entry+0x28/0x30
[ 294.523230] secondary_start_kernel+0x184/0x1d0
[ 294.530657] Code: d538d082 d2800023 8b010c81 8b020021 (c85f7c25)
[ 294.539746] ---[ end trace 8a7a880dee570b29 ]---
[ 294.547341] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
[ 294.556837] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 294.563996] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 294.570515] CPU features: 0x002,21006008
[ 294.577638] Memory Limit: none
[ 294.587178] Starting crashdump kernel...
[ 294.594314] Bye!
Because the user->release_barrier.rda is freed in ipmi_destroy_user(), but
the refcount is not zero, when acquire_ipmi_user() uses user->release_barrier.rda
in __srcu_read_lock(), it causes oops.
Fix this by calling cleanup_srcu_struct() when the refcount is zero.
Fixes: e86ee2d44b44 ("ipmi: Rework locking and shutdown for hot remove")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.18
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 91,246
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int XfrmController::fillNlAttrXfrmOutputMark(const __u32 output_mark_value,
nlattr_xfrm_output_mark* output_mark) {
if (output_mark_value == 0) {
return 0;
}
output_mark->outputMark = output_mark_value;
int len = NLA_HDRLEN + sizeof(__u32);
fillXfrmNlaHdr(&output_mark->hdr, XFRMA_OUTPUT_MARK, len);
return len;
}
Commit Message: Set optlen for UDP-encap check in XfrmController
When setting the socket owner for an encap socket XfrmController will
first attempt to verify that the socket has the UDP-encap socket option
set. When doing so it would pass in an uninitialized optlen parameter
which could cause the call to not modify the option value if the optlen
happened to be too short. So for example if the stack happened to
contain a zero where optlen was located the check would fail and the
socket owner would not be changed.
Fix this by setting optlen to the size of the option value parameter.
Test: run cts -m CtsNetTestCases
BUG: 111650288
Change-Id: I57b6e9dba09c1acda71e3ec2084652e961667bd9
(cherry picked from commit fc42a105147310bd680952d4b71fe32974bd8506)
CWE ID: CWE-909
| 0
| 162,698
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int group_balance_cpu(struct sched_group *sg)
{
return cpumask_first_and(sched_group_cpus(sg), sched_group_mask(sg));
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 55,541
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: long FS_ReadFileDir(const char *qpath, void *searchPath, qboolean unpure, void **buffer)
{
fileHandle_t h;
searchpath_t *search;
byte* buf;
qboolean isConfig;
long len;
if ( !fs_searchpaths ) {
Com_Error( ERR_FATAL, "Filesystem call made without initialization" );
}
if ( !qpath || !qpath[0] ) {
Com_Error( ERR_FATAL, "FS_ReadFile with empty name" );
}
buf = NULL; // quiet compiler warning
if ( strstr( qpath, ".cfg" ) ) {
isConfig = qtrue;
if ( com_journal && com_journal->integer == 2 ) {
int r;
Com_DPrintf( "Loading %s from journal file.\n", qpath );
r = FS_Read( &len, sizeof( len ), com_journalDataFile );
if ( r != sizeof( len ) ) {
if (buffer != NULL) *buffer = NULL;
return -1;
}
if (!len) {
if (buffer == NULL) {
return 1; // hack for old journal files
}
*buffer = NULL;
return -1;
}
if (buffer == NULL) {
return len;
}
buf = Hunk_AllocateTempMemory(len+1);
*buffer = buf;
r = FS_Read( buf, len, com_journalDataFile );
if ( r != len ) {
Com_Error( ERR_FATAL, "Read from journalDataFile failed" );
}
fs_loadCount++;
fs_loadStack++;
buf[len] = 0;
return len;
}
} else {
isConfig = qfalse;
}
search = searchPath;
if(search == NULL)
{
len = FS_FOpenFileRead(qpath, &h, qfalse);
}
else
{
len = FS_FOpenFileReadDir(qpath, search, &h, qfalse, unpure);
}
if ( h == 0 ) {
if ( buffer ) {
*buffer = NULL;
}
if ( isConfig && com_journal && com_journal->integer == 1 ) {
Com_DPrintf( "Writing zero for %s to journal file.\n", qpath );
len = 0;
FS_Write( &len, sizeof( len ), com_journalDataFile );
FS_Flush( com_journalDataFile );
}
return -1;
}
if ( !buffer ) {
if ( isConfig && com_journal && com_journal->integer == 1 ) {
Com_DPrintf( "Writing len for %s to journal file.\n", qpath );
FS_Write( &len, sizeof( len ), com_journalDataFile );
FS_Flush( com_journalDataFile );
}
FS_FCloseFile( h);
return len;
}
fs_loadCount++;
fs_loadStack++;
buf = Hunk_AllocateTempMemory(len+1);
*buffer = buf;
FS_Read (buf, len, h);
buf[len] = 0;
FS_FCloseFile( h );
if ( isConfig && com_journal && com_journal->integer == 1 ) {
Com_DPrintf( "Writing %s to journal file.\n", qpath );
FS_Write( &len, sizeof( len ), com_journalDataFile );
FS_Write( buf, len, com_journalDataFile );
FS_Flush( com_journalDataFile );
}
return len;
}
Commit Message: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s.
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 96,050
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool WebContentsImpl::IsTreeOnlyAccessibilityModeForTesting() const {
return accessibility_mode_ == AccessibilityModeTreeOnly;
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 131,897
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: vrrp_unicast_peer_handler(vector_t *strvec)
{
alloc_value_block(alloc_vrrp_unicast_peer, vector_slot(strvec, 0));
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 76,048
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void NtlmClient::GenerateNegotiateMessage() {
NtlmBufferWriter writer(kNegotiateMessageLen);
bool result =
writer.WriteMessageHeader(MessageType::kNegotiate) &&
writer.WriteFlags(negotiate_flags_) &&
writer.WriteSecurityBuffer(SecurityBuffer(kNegotiateMessageLen, 0)) &&
writer.WriteSecurityBuffer(SecurityBuffer(kNegotiateMessageLen, 0)) &&
writer.IsEndOfBuffer();
DCHECK(result);
negotiate_message_ = writer.Pass();
}
Commit Message: [base] Make dynamic container to static span conversion explicit
This change disallows implicit conversions from dynamic containers to
static spans. This conversion can cause CHECK failures, and thus should
be done carefully. Requiring explicit construction makes it more obvious
when this happens. To aid usability, appropriate base::make_span<size_t>
overloads are added.
Bug: 877931
Change-Id: Id9f526bc57bfd30a52d14df827b0445ca087381d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1189985
Reviewed-by: Ryan Sleevi <rsleevi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Balazs Engedy <engedy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jan Wilken Dörrie <jdoerrie@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586657}
CWE ID: CWE-22
| 0
| 132,910
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: image_pixel_init(image_pixel *this, png_const_bytep row, png_byte colour_type,
png_byte bit_depth, png_uint_32 x, store_palette palette)
{
PNG_CONST png_byte sample_depth = (png_byte)(colour_type ==
PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE ? 8 : bit_depth);
PNG_CONST unsigned int max = (1U<<sample_depth)-1;
/* Initially just set everything to the same number and the alpha to opaque.
* Note that this currently assumes a simple palette where entry x has colour
* rgb(x,x,x)!
*/
this->palette_index = this->red = this->green = this->blue =
sample(row, colour_type, bit_depth, x, 0);
this->alpha = max;
this->red_sBIT = this->green_sBIT = this->blue_sBIT = this->alpha_sBIT =
sample_depth;
/* Then override as appropriate: */
if (colour_type == 3) /* palette */
{
/* This permits the caller to default to the sample value. */
if (palette != 0)
{
PNG_CONST unsigned int i = this->palette_index;
this->red = palette[i].red;
this->green = palette[i].green;
this->blue = palette[i].blue;
this->alpha = palette[i].alpha;
}
}
else /* not palette */
{
unsigned int i = 0;
if (colour_type & 2)
{
this->green = sample(row, colour_type, bit_depth, x, 1);
this->blue = sample(row, colour_type, bit_depth, x, 2);
i = 2;
}
if (colour_type & 4)
this->alpha = sample(row, colour_type, bit_depth, x, ++i);
}
/* Calculate the scaled values, these are simply the values divided by
* 'max' and the error is initialized to the double precision epsilon value
* from the header file.
*/
image_pixel_setf(this, max);
/* Store the input information for use in the transforms - these will
* modify the information.
*/
this->colour_type = colour_type;
this->bit_depth = bit_depth;
this->sample_depth = sample_depth;
this->have_tRNS = 0;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
| 1
| 173,617
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::setFullScreenRendererSize(const IntSize& size)
{
ASSERT(m_fullScreenRenderer);
if (!m_fullScreenRenderer)
return;
if (m_fullScreenRenderer) {
RefPtr<RenderStyle> newStyle = RenderStyle::clone(m_fullScreenRenderer->style());
newStyle->setWidth(Length(size.width(), WebCore::Fixed));
newStyle->setHeight(Length(size.height(), WebCore::Fixed));
newStyle->setTop(Length(0, WebCore::Fixed));
newStyle->setLeft(Length(0, WebCore::Fixed));
m_fullScreenRenderer->setStyle(newStyle);
updateLayout();
}
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 105,614
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int mp_unpack_one(lua_State *L) {
int offset = luaL_optinteger(L, 2, 0);
/* Variable pop because offset may not exist */
lua_pop(L, lua_gettop(L)-1);
return mp_unpack_full(L, 1, offset);
}
Commit Message: Security: more cmsgpack fixes by @soloestoy.
@soloestoy sent me this additional fixes, after searching for similar
problems to the one reported in mp_pack(). I'm committing the changes
because it was not possible during to make a public PR to protect Redis
users and give Redis providers some time to patch their systems.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 83,070
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: getcode(CompressedFile *file)
{
register code_int code;
register int r_off, bits;
register char_type *bp = file->buf;
register BufFilePtr raw;
if ( file->clear_flg > 0 || file->offset >= file->size ||
file->free_ent > file->maxcode )
{
/*
* If the next entry will be too big for the current code
* size, then we must increase the size. This implies reading
* a new buffer full, too.
*/
if ( file->free_ent > file->maxcode ) {
file->n_bits++;
if ( file->n_bits == file->maxbits )
file->maxcode = file->maxmaxcode; /* won't get any bigger now */
else
file->maxcode = MAXCODE(file->n_bits);
}
if ( file->clear_flg > 0) {
file->maxcode = MAXCODE (file->n_bits = INIT_BITS);
file->clear_flg = 0;
}
bits = file->n_bits;
raw = file->file;
while (bits > 0 && (code = BufFileGet (raw)) != BUFFILEEOF)
{
*bp++ = code;
--bits;
}
bp = file->buf;
if (bits == file->n_bits)
return -1; /* end of file */
file->size = file->n_bits - bits;
file->offset = 0;
/* Round size down to integral number of codes */
file->size = (file->size << 3) - (file->n_bits - 1);
}
r_off = file->offset;
bits = file->n_bits;
/*
* Get to the first byte.
*/
bp += (r_off >> 3);
r_off &= 7;
/* Get first part (low order bits) */
#ifdef NO_UCHAR
code = ((*bp++ >> r_off) & rmask[8 - r_off]) & 0xff;
#else
code = (*bp++ >> r_off);
#endif /* NO_UCHAR */
bits -= (8 - r_off);
r_off = 8 - r_off; /* now, offset into code word */
/* Get any 8 bit parts in the middle (<=1 for up to 16 bits). */
if ( bits >= 8 ) {
#ifdef NO_UCHAR
code |= (*bp++ & 0xff) << r_off;
#else
code |= *bp++ << r_off;
#endif /* NO_UCHAR */
r_off += 8;
bits -= 8;
}
/* high order bits. */
code |= (*bp & rmask[bits]) << r_off;
file->offset += file->n_bits;
return code;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 1,793
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Node::InsertionNotificationRequest HTMLCanvasElement::InsertedInto(
ContainerNode& node) {
SetIsInCanvasSubtree(true);
return HTMLElement::InsertedInto(node);
}
Commit Message: Clean up CanvasResourceDispatcher on finalizer
We may have pending mojo messages after GC, so we want to drop the
dispatcher as soon as possible.
Bug: 929757,913964
Change-Id: I5789bcbb55aada4a74c67a28758f07686f8911c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489175
Reviewed-by: Ken Rockot <rockot@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#635833}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 152,091
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int sock_map_fd(struct socket *sock, int flags)
{
struct file *newfile;
int fd = sock_alloc_file(sock, &newfile, flags);
if (likely(fd >= 0))
fd_install(fd, newfile);
return fd;
}
Commit Message: Fix order of arguments to compat_put_time[spec|val]
Commit 644595f89620 ("compat: Handle COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME in
net/socket.c") introduced a bug where the helper functions to take
either a 64-bit or compat time[spec|val] got the arguments in the wrong
order, passing the kernel stack pointer off as a user pointer (and vice
versa).
Because of the user address range check, that in turn then causes an
EFAULT due to the user pointer range checking failing for the kernel
address. Incorrectly resuling in a failed system call for 32-bit
processes with a 64-bit kernel.
On odder architectures like HP-PA (with separate user/kernel address
spaces), it can be used read kernel memory.
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 18,690
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: check_execute_dir()
{
time_t now = time(NULL);
const char *f;
bool busy;
State s = get_machine_state();
switch( s ) {
case owner_state:
case unclaimed_state:
case matched_state:
busy = false;
break;
case claimed_state:
case preempting_state:
busy = true;
break;
default:
dprintf( D_ALWAYS,
"Error getting startd state, not cleaning execute directory.\n" );
return;
}
ExecuteDirs.rewind();
char const *Execute;
while( (Execute=ExecuteDirs.next()) ) {
Directory dir( Execute, PRIV_ROOT );
while( (f = dir.Next()) ) {
if( busy ) {
good_file( Execute, f ); // let anything go here
} else {
if( dir.GetCreateTime() < now ) {
bad_file( Execute, f, dir ); // junk it
}
else {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG, "In %s, found %s with recent "
"creation time. Not removing.\n", Execute, f );
good_file( Execute, f ); // too young to kill
}
}
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134
| 0
| 16,461
|
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.