instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GDataFileSystem::OnCreateDirectoryCompleted(
const CreateDirectoryParams& params,
GDataErrorCode status,
scoped_ptr<base::Value> data) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
GDataFileError error = util::GDataToGDataFileError(status);
if (error != GDATA_FILE_OK) {
if (!params.callback.is_null())
params.callback.Run(error);
return;
}
base::DictionaryValue* dict_value = NULL;
base::Value* created_entry = NULL;
if (data.get() && data->GetAsDictionary(&dict_value) && dict_value)
dict_value->Get("entry", &created_entry);
error = AddNewDirectory(params.created_directory_path.DirName(),
created_entry);
if (error != GDATA_FILE_OK) {
if (!params.callback.is_null())
params.callback.Run(error);
return;
}
if (params.target_directory_path != params.created_directory_path &&
params.is_recursive) {
CreateDirectory(params.target_directory_path,
params.is_exclusive,
params.is_recursive,
params.callback);
return;
}
if (!params.callback.is_null()) {
params.callback.Run(GDATA_FILE_OK);
}
}
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 116,978
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::unique_ptr<HeadlessWebContentsImpl> HeadlessWebContentsImpl::Create(
HeadlessWebContents::Builder* builder) {
content::WebContents::CreateParams create_params(builder->browser_context_,
nullptr);
create_params.initial_size = builder->window_size_;
std::unique_ptr<HeadlessWebContentsImpl> headless_web_contents =
base::WrapUnique(new HeadlessWebContentsImpl(
content::WebContents::Create(create_params),
builder->browser_context_));
if (builder->tab_sockets_allowed_) {
headless_web_contents->headless_tab_socket_ =
base::MakeUnique<HeadlessTabSocketImpl>(
headless_web_contents->web_contents_.get());
headless_web_contents->inject_mojo_services_into_isolated_world_ = true;
builder->mojo_services_.emplace_back(
TabSocket::Name_, base::Bind(&CreateTabSocketMojoServiceForContents));
}
headless_web_contents->mojo_services_ = std::move(builder->mojo_services_);
headless_web_contents->begin_frame_control_enabled_ =
builder->enable_begin_frame_control_;
headless_web_contents->InitializeWindow(gfx::Rect(builder->window_size_));
if (!headless_web_contents->OpenURL(builder->initial_url_))
return nullptr;
return headless_web_contents;
}
Commit Message: Use pdf compositor service for printing when OOPIF is enabled
When OOPIF is enabled (by site-per-process flag or
top-document-isolation feature), use the pdf compositor service for
converting PaintRecord to PDF on renderers.
In the future, this will make compositing PDF from multiple renderers
possible.
TBR=jzfeng@chromium.org
BUG=455764
Change-Id: I3c28f03f4358e4228239fe1a33384f85e7716e8f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/699765
Commit-Queue: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511616}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 126,841
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xfs_attr3_leaf_figure_balance(
struct xfs_da_state *state,
struct xfs_da_state_blk *blk1,
struct xfs_attr3_icleaf_hdr *ichdr1,
struct xfs_da_state_blk *blk2,
struct xfs_attr3_icleaf_hdr *ichdr2,
int *countarg,
int *usedbytesarg)
{
struct xfs_attr_leafblock *leaf1 = blk1->bp->b_addr;
struct xfs_attr_leafblock *leaf2 = blk2->bp->b_addr;
struct xfs_attr_leaf_entry *entry;
int count;
int max;
int index;
int totallen = 0;
int half;
int lastdelta;
int foundit = 0;
int tmp;
/*
* Examine entries until we reduce the absolute difference in
* byte usage between the two blocks to a minimum.
*/
max = ichdr1->count + ichdr2->count;
half = (max + 1) * sizeof(*entry);
half += ichdr1->usedbytes + ichdr2->usedbytes +
xfs_attr_leaf_newentsize(state->args, NULL);
half /= 2;
lastdelta = state->args->geo->blksize;
entry = xfs_attr3_leaf_entryp(leaf1);
for (count = index = 0; count < max; entry++, index++, count++) {
#define XFS_ATTR_ABS(A) (((A) < 0) ? -(A) : (A))
/*
* The new entry is in the first block, account for it.
*/
if (count == blk1->index) {
tmp = totallen + sizeof(*entry) +
xfs_attr_leaf_newentsize(state->args, NULL);
if (XFS_ATTR_ABS(half - tmp) > lastdelta)
break;
lastdelta = XFS_ATTR_ABS(half - tmp);
totallen = tmp;
foundit = 1;
}
/*
* Wrap around into the second block if necessary.
*/
if (count == ichdr1->count) {
leaf1 = leaf2;
entry = xfs_attr3_leaf_entryp(leaf1);
index = 0;
}
/*
* Figure out if next leaf entry would be too much.
*/
tmp = totallen + sizeof(*entry) + xfs_attr_leaf_entsize(leaf1,
index);
if (XFS_ATTR_ABS(half - tmp) > lastdelta)
break;
lastdelta = XFS_ATTR_ABS(half - tmp);
totallen = tmp;
#undef XFS_ATTR_ABS
}
/*
* Calculate the number of usedbytes that will end up in lower block.
* If new entry not in lower block, fix up the count.
*/
totallen -= count * sizeof(*entry);
if (foundit) {
totallen -= sizeof(*entry) +
xfs_attr_leaf_newentsize(state->args, NULL);
}
*countarg = count;
*usedbytesarg = totallen;
return foundit;
}
Commit Message: xfs: don't call xfs_da_shrink_inode with NULL bp
xfs_attr3_leaf_create may have errored out before instantiating a buffer,
for example if the blkno is out of range. In that case there is no work
to do to remove it, and in fact xfs_da_shrink_inode will lead to an oops
if we try.
This also seems to fix a flaw where the original error from
xfs_attr3_leaf_create gets overwritten in the cleanup case, and it
removes a pointless assignment to bp which isn't used after this.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199969
Reported-by: Xu, Wen <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Tested-by: Xu, Wen <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 79,911
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(snmp2_real_walk)
{
php_snmp(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, SNMP_CMD_WALK, SNMP_VERSION_2c);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 11,206
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Framebuffer::UnbindRenderbuffer(
GLenum target, Renderbuffer* renderbuffer) {
bool done;
do {
done = true;
for (AttachmentMap::const_iterator it = attachments_.begin();
it != attachments_.end(); ++it) {
Attachment* attachment = it->second.get();
if (attachment->IsRenderbuffer(renderbuffer)) {
AttachRenderbuffer(it->first, NULL);
done = false;
break;
}
}
} while (!done);
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 120,718
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TabStripGtk::LayoutNewTabButton(double last_tab_right,
double unselected_width) {
GtkWidget* toplevel = gtk_widget_get_ancestor(widget(), GTK_TYPE_WINDOW);
bool is_maximized = false;
if (toplevel) {
GdkWindow* gdk_window = gtk_widget_get_window(toplevel);
is_maximized = (gdk_window_get_state(gdk_window) &
GDK_WINDOW_STATE_MAXIMIZED) != 0;
}
int y = is_maximized ? 0 : kNewTabButtonVOffset;
int height = newtab_surface_bounds_.height() + kNewTabButtonVOffset - y;
gfx::Rect bounds(0, y, newtab_surface_bounds_.width(), height);
int delta = abs(Round(unselected_width) - TabGtk::GetStandardSize().width());
if (delta > 1 && !needs_resize_layout_) {
bounds.set_x(bounds_.width() - newtab_button_->WidgetAllocation().width);
} else {
bounds.set_x(Round(last_tab_right - kTabHOffset) + kNewTabButtonHOffset);
}
bounds.set_x(gtk_util::MirroredLeftPointForRect(tabstrip_.get(), bounds));
gtk_fixed_move(GTK_FIXED(tabstrip_.get()), newtab_button_->widget(),
bounds.x(), bounds.y());
gtk_widget_set_size_request(newtab_button_->widget(), bounds.width(),
bounds.height());
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 118,128
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void customElementCallbacksVoidMethodMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::customElementCallbacksVoidMethodMethod(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 122,233
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: String HTMLElement::innerHTML() const
{
return createMarkup(this, ChildrenOnly);
}
Commit Message: There are too many poorly named functions to create a fragment from markup
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87339
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Source/WebCore:
Moved all functions that create a fragment from markup to markup.h/cpp.
There should be no behavioral change.
* dom/Range.cpp:
(WebCore::Range::createContextualFragment):
* dom/Range.h: Removed createDocumentFragmentForElement.
* dom/ShadowRoot.cpp:
(WebCore::ShadowRoot::setInnerHTML):
* editing/markup.cpp:
(WebCore::createFragmentFromMarkup):
(WebCore::createFragmentForInnerOuterHTML): Renamed from createFragmentFromSource.
(WebCore::createFragmentForTransformToFragment): Moved from XSLTProcessor.
(WebCore::removeElementPreservingChildren): Moved from Range.
(WebCore::createContextualFragment): Ditto.
* editing/markup.h:
* html/HTMLElement.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setInnerHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setOuterHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML):
* inspector/DOMPatchSupport.cpp:
(WebCore::DOMPatchSupport::patchNode): Added a FIXME since this code should be using
one of the functions listed in markup.h
* xml/XSLTProcessor.cpp:
(WebCore::XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment):
Source/WebKit/qt:
Replace calls to Range::createDocumentFragmentForElement by calls to
createContextualDocumentFragment.
* Api/qwebelement.cpp:
(QWebElement::appendInside):
(QWebElement::prependInside):
(QWebElement::prependOutside):
(QWebElement::appendOutside):
(QWebElement::encloseContentsWith):
(QWebElement::encloseWith):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118414 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 100,372
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: NetworkThrottleManagerImpl::ThrottleImpl::~ThrottleImpl() {
manager_->OnThrottleDestroyed(this);
}
Commit Message: Replace base::MakeUnique with std::make_unique in net/.
base/memory/ptr_util.h includes will be cleaned up later.
Bug: 755727
Change-Id: Ibaf46f05c9b02b76f9a91e819984b087a8c0d434
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/627300
Commit-Queue: Jeremy Roman <jbroman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Bence Béky <bnc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498123}
CWE ID: CWE-311
| 0
| 156,324
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline struct packet_sock *pkt_sk(struct sock *sk)
{
return (struct packet_sock *)sk;
}
Commit Message: af_packet: prevent information leak
In 2.6.27, commit 393e52e33c6c2 (packet: deliver VLAN TCI to userspace)
added a small information leak.
Add padding field and make sure its zeroed before copy to user.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 26,580
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DownloadItemImpl::DownloadItemImpl(DownloadItemImplDelegate* delegate,
uint32_t download_id,
const DownloadCreateInfo& info)
: request_info_(info.url_chain,
info.referrer_url,
info.site_url,
info.tab_url,
info.tab_referrer_url,
base::UTF16ToUTF8(info.save_info->suggested_name),
info.save_info->file_path,
info.transition_type ? info.transition_type.value()
: ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_LINK,
info.has_user_gesture,
info.remote_address,
info.start_time),
guid_(info.guid.empty() ? base::GenerateGUID() : info.guid),
download_id_(download_id),
response_headers_(info.response_headers),
content_disposition_(info.content_disposition),
mime_type_(info.mime_type),
original_mime_type_(info.original_mime_type),
total_bytes_(info.total_bytes),
last_reason_(info.result),
start_tick_(base::TimeTicks::Now()),
state_(INITIAL_INTERNAL),
delegate_(delegate),
is_temporary_(!info.transient && !info.save_info->file_path.empty()),
transient_(info.transient),
destination_info_(info.save_info->prompt_for_save_location
? TARGET_DISPOSITION_PROMPT
: TARGET_DISPOSITION_OVERWRITE),
last_modified_time_(info.last_modified),
etag_(info.etag),
is_updating_observers_(false),
fetch_error_body_(info.fetch_error_body),
weak_ptr_factory_(this) {
delegate_->Attach();
Init(true /* actively downloading */, TYPE_ACTIVE_DOWNLOAD);
TRACE_EVENT_INSTANT0("download", "DownloadStarted", TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_THREAD);
}
Commit Message: Downloads : Fixed an issue of opening incorrect download file
When one download overwrites another completed download, calling download.open in the old download causes the new download to open, which could be dangerous and undesirable. In this CL, we are trying to avoid this by blocking the opening of the old download.
Bug: 793620
Change-Id: Ic948175756700ad7c08489c3cc347330daedb6f8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/826477
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <dtrainor@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Shakti Sahu <shaktisahu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525810}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 146,301
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoGenFramebuffers(
GLsizei n,
volatile GLuint* framebuffers) {
return GenHelper(n, framebuffers, &framebuffer_id_map_,
[this](GLsizei n, GLuint* framebuffers) {
api()->glGenFramebuffersEXTFn(n, framebuffers);
});
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,971
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xdr_krb5_ui_4(XDR *xdrs, krb5_ui_4 *objp)
{
if (!xdr_u_int32(xdrs, (uint32_t *) objp)) {
return (FALSE);
}
return (TRUE);
}
Commit Message: Fix kadm5/gssrpc XDR double free [CVE-2014-9421]
[MITKRB5-SA-2015-001] In auth_gssapi_unwrap_data(), do not free
partial deserialization results upon failure to deserialize. This
responsibility belongs to the callers, svctcp_getargs() and
svcudp_getargs(); doing it in the unwrap function results in freeing
the results twice.
In xdr_krb5_tl_data() and xdr_krb5_principal(), null out the pointers
we are freeing, as other XDR functions such as xdr_bytes() and
xdr_string().
ticket: 8056 (new)
target_version: 1.13.1
tags: pullup
CWE ID:
| 0
| 46,080
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: nautilus_mime_types_group_get_mimetypes (gint group_index)
{
GList *mimetypes;
gint i;
g_return_val_if_fail (group_index < G_N_ELEMENTS (mimetype_groups), NULL);
mimetypes = NULL;
/* Setup the new mimetypes set */
for (i = 0; mimetype_groups[group_index].mimetypes[i]; i++)
{
mimetypes = g_list_append (mimetypes, mimetype_groups[group_index].mimetypes[i]);
}
return mimetypes;
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 61,210
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xmlParseEnumerationType(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
xmlChar *name;
xmlEnumerationPtr ret = NULL, last = NULL, cur, tmp;
if (RAW != '(') {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_ATTLIST_NOT_STARTED, NULL);
return(NULL);
}
SHRINK;
do {
NEXT;
SKIP_BLANKS;
name = xmlParseNmtoken(ctxt);
if (name == NULL) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_NMTOKEN_REQUIRED, NULL);
return(ret);
}
tmp = ret;
while (tmp != NULL) {
if (xmlStrEqual(name, tmp->name)) {
xmlValidityError(ctxt, XML_DTD_DUP_TOKEN,
"standalone: attribute enumeration value token %s duplicated\n",
name, NULL);
if (!xmlDictOwns(ctxt->dict, name))
xmlFree(name);
break;
}
tmp = tmp->next;
}
if (tmp == NULL) {
cur = xmlCreateEnumeration(name);
if (!xmlDictOwns(ctxt->dict, name))
xmlFree(name);
if (cur == NULL) {
xmlFreeEnumeration(ret);
return(NULL);
}
if (last == NULL) ret = last = cur;
else {
last->next = cur;
last = cur;
}
}
SKIP_BLANKS;
} while (RAW == '|');
if (RAW != ')') {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_ATTLIST_NOT_FINISHED, NULL);
return(ret);
}
NEXT;
return(ret);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Add validation for eternal enities
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=780691
Bug: 36556310
Change-Id: I9450743e167c3c73af5e4071f3fc85e81d061648
(cherry picked from commit bef9af3d89d241bcb518c20cba6da2a2fd9ba049)
CWE ID: CWE-611
| 0
| 163,470
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: String Document::userAgent() const
{
return frame() ? frame()->loader().userAgent() : String();
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 124,571
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int netdev_boot_setup_add(char *name, struct ifmap *map)
{
struct netdev_boot_setup *s;
int i;
s = dev_boot_setup;
for (i = 0; i < NETDEV_BOOT_SETUP_MAX; i++) {
if (s[i].name[0] == '\0' || s[i].name[0] == ' ') {
memset(s[i].name, 0, sizeof(s[i].name));
strlcpy(s[i].name, name, IFNAMSIZ);
memcpy(&s[i].map, map, sizeof(s[i].map));
break;
}
}
return i >= NETDEV_BOOT_SETUP_MAX ? 0 : 1;
}
Commit Message: veth: Dont kfree_skb() after dev_forward_skb()
In case of congestion, netif_rx() frees the skb, so we must assume
dev_forward_skb() also consume skb.
Bug introduced by commit 445409602c092
(veth: move loopback logic to common location)
We must change dev_forward_skb() to always consume skb, and veth to not
double free it.
Bug report : http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=127310770900442&w=3
Reported-by: Martín Ferrari <martin.ferrari@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 32,183
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void blk_queue_flag_set(unsigned int flag, struct request_queue *q)
{
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(q->queue_lock, flags);
queue_flag_set(flag, q);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(q->queue_lock, flags);
}
Commit Message: block: blk_init_allocated_queue() set q->fq as NULL in the fail case
We find the memory use-after-free issue in __blk_drain_queue()
on the kernel 4.14. After read the latest kernel 4.18-rc6 we
think it has the same problem.
Memory is allocated for q->fq in the blk_init_allocated_queue().
If the elevator init function called with error return, it will
run into the fail case to free the q->fq.
Then the __blk_drain_queue() uses the same memory after the free
of the q->fq, it will lead to the unpredictable event.
The patch is to set q->fq as NULL in the fail case of
blk_init_allocated_queue().
Fixes: commit 7c94e1c157a2 ("block: introduce blk_flush_queue to drive flush machinery")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: xiao jin <jin.xiao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 92,015
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void tty_hangup(struct tty_struct *tty)
{
tty_debug_hangup(tty, "hangup\n");
schedule_work(&tty->hangup_work);
}
Commit Message: tty: Fix unsafe ldisc reference via ioctl(TIOCGETD)
ioctl(TIOCGETD) retrieves the line discipline id directly from the
ldisc because the line discipline id (c_line) in termios is untrustworthy;
userspace may have set termios via ioctl(TCSETS*) without actually
changing the line discipline via ioctl(TIOCSETD).
However, directly accessing the current ldisc via tty->ldisc is
unsafe; the ldisc ptr dereferenced may be stale if the line discipline
is changing via ioctl(TIOCSETD) or hangup.
Wait for the line discipline reference (just like read() or write())
to retrieve the "current" line discipline id.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 55,921
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: size_t git_index_entrycount(const git_index *index)
{
assert(index);
return index->entries.length;
}
Commit Message: index: convert `read_entry` to return entry size via an out-param
The function `read_entry` does not conform to our usual coding style of
returning stuff via the out parameter and to use the return value for
reporting errors. Due to most of our code conforming to that pattern, it
has become quite natural for us to actually return `-1` in case there is
any error, which has also slipped in with commit 5625d86b9 (index:
support index v4, 2016-05-17). As the function returns an `size_t` only,
though, the return value is wrapped around, causing the caller of
`read_tree` to continue with an invalid index entry. Ultimately, this
can lead to a double-free.
Improve code and fix the bug by converting the function to return the
index entry size via an out parameter and only using the return value to
indicate errors.
Reported-by: Krishna Ram Prakash R <krp@gtux.in>
Reported-by: Vivek Parikh <viv0411.parikh@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 83,676
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool CmapCoverage::getCoverage(SparseBitSet& coverage, const uint8_t* cmap_data, size_t cmap_size) {
vector<uint32_t> coverageVec;
const size_t kHeaderSize = 4;
const size_t kNumTablesOffset = 2;
const size_t kTableSize = 8;
const size_t kPlatformIdOffset = 0;
const size_t kEncodingIdOffset = 2;
const size_t kOffsetOffset = 4;
const uint16_t kMicrosoftPlatformId = 3;
const uint16_t kUnicodeBmpEncodingId = 1;
const uint16_t kUnicodeUcs4EncodingId = 10;
const uint32_t kNoTable = UINT32_MAX;
if (kHeaderSize > cmap_size) {
return false;
}
uint32_t numTables = readU16(cmap_data, kNumTablesOffset);
if (kHeaderSize + numTables * kTableSize > cmap_size) {
return false;
}
uint32_t bestTable = kNoTable;
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < numTables; i++) {
uint16_t platformId = readU16(cmap_data, kHeaderSize + i * kTableSize + kPlatformIdOffset);
uint16_t encodingId = readU16(cmap_data, kHeaderSize + i * kTableSize + kEncodingIdOffset);
if (platformId == kMicrosoftPlatformId && encodingId == kUnicodeUcs4EncodingId) {
bestTable = i;
break;
} else if (platformId == kMicrosoftPlatformId && encodingId == kUnicodeBmpEncodingId) {
bestTable = i;
}
}
#ifdef VERBOSE_DEBUG
ALOGD("best table = %d\n", bestTable);
#endif
if (bestTable == kNoTable) {
return false;
}
uint32_t offset = readU32(cmap_data, kHeaderSize + bestTable * kTableSize + kOffsetOffset);
if (offset > cmap_size - 2) {
return false;
}
uint16_t format = readU16(cmap_data, offset);
bool success = false;
const uint8_t* tableData = cmap_data + offset;
const size_t tableSize = cmap_size - offset;
if (format == 4) {
success = getCoverageFormat4(coverageVec, tableData, tableSize);
} else if (format == 12) {
success = getCoverageFormat12(coverageVec, tableData, tableSize);
}
if (success) {
coverage.initFromRanges(&coverageVec.front(), coverageVec.size() >> 1);
}
#ifdef VERBOSE_DEBUG
for (size_t i = 0; i < coverageVec.size(); i += 2) {
ALOGD("%x:%x\n", coverageVec[i], coverageVec[i + 1]);
}
ALOGD("success = %d", success);
#endif
return success;
}
Commit Message: Add error logging on invalid cmap - DO NOT MERGE
This patch logs instances of fonts with invalid cmap tables.
Bug: 25645298
Bug: 26413177
Change-Id: I183985e9784a97a2b4307a22e036382b1fc90e5e
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 161,341
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void f_midi_out_trigger(struct snd_rawmidi_substream *substream, int up)
{
struct f_midi *midi = substream->rmidi->private_data;
VDBG(midi, "%s()\n", __func__);
if (up)
set_bit(substream->number, &midi->out_triggered);
else
clear_bit(substream->number, &midi->out_triggered);
}
Commit Message: USB: gadget: f_midi: fixing a possible double-free in f_midi
It looks like there is a possibility of a double-free vulnerability on an
error path of the f_midi_set_alt function in the f_midi driver. If the
path is feasible then free_ep_req gets called twice:
req->complete = f_midi_complete;
err = usb_ep_queue(midi->out_ep, req, GFP_ATOMIC);
=> ...
usb_gadget_giveback_request
=>
f_midi_complete (CALLBACK)
(inside f_midi_complete, for various cases of status)
free_ep_req(ep, req); // first kfree
if (err) {
ERROR(midi, "%s: couldn't enqueue request: %d\n",
midi->out_ep->name, err);
free_ep_req(midi->out_ep, req); // second kfree
return err;
}
The double-free possibility was introduced with commit ad0d1a058eac
("usb: gadget: f_midi: fix leak on failed to enqueue out requests").
Found by MOXCAFE tool.
Signed-off-by: Tuba Yavuz <tuba@ece.ufl.edu>
Fixes: ad0d1a058eac ("usb: gadget: f_midi: fix leak on failed to enqueue out requests")
Acked-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 91,930
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WORD32 ih264d_parse_islice(dec_struct_t *ps_dec,
UWORD16 u2_first_mb_in_slice)
{
dec_pic_params_t * ps_pps = ps_dec->ps_cur_pps;
dec_slice_params_t * ps_slice = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice;
UWORD32 *pu4_bitstrm_buf = ps_dec->ps_bitstrm->pu4_buffer;
UWORD32 *pu4_bitstrm_ofst = &ps_dec->ps_bitstrm->u4_ofst;
UWORD32 u4_temp;
WORD32 i_temp;
WORD32 ret;
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Read remaining contents of the slice header */
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* dec_ref_pic_marking function */
/* G050 */
if(ps_slice->u1_nal_ref_idc != 0)
{
if(!ps_dec->ps_dpb_cmds->u1_dpb_commands_read)
ps_dec->u4_bitoffset = ih264d_read_mmco_commands(
ps_dec);
else
ps_dec->ps_bitstrm->u4_ofst += ps_dec->u4_bitoffset;
}
/* G050 */
/* Read slice_qp_delta */
i_temp = ps_pps->u1_pic_init_qp
+ ih264d_sev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
if((i_temp < 0) || (i_temp > 51))
return ERROR_INV_RANGE_QP_T;
ps_slice->u1_slice_qp = i_temp;
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: slice_qp_delta",
ps_slice->u1_slice_qp - ps_pps->u1_pic_init_qp);
if(ps_pps->u1_deblocking_filter_parameters_present_flag == 1)
{
u4_temp = ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: disable_deblocking_filter_idc", u4_temp);
if(u4_temp > SLICE_BOUNDARY_DBLK_DISABLED)
{
return ERROR_INV_SLICE_HDR_T;
}
ps_slice->u1_disable_dblk_filter_idc = u4_temp;
if(u4_temp != 1)
{
i_temp = ih264d_sev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf)
<< 1;
if((MIN_DBLK_FIL_OFF > i_temp) || (i_temp > MAX_DBLK_FIL_OFF))
{
return ERROR_INV_SLICE_HDR_T;
}
ps_slice->i1_slice_alpha_c0_offset = i_temp;
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: slice_alpha_c0_offset_div2",
ps_slice->i1_slice_alpha_c0_offset >> 1);
i_temp = ih264d_sev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf)
<< 1;
if((MIN_DBLK_FIL_OFF > i_temp) || (i_temp > MAX_DBLK_FIL_OFF))
{
return ERROR_INV_SLICE_HDR_T;
}
ps_slice->i1_slice_beta_offset = i_temp;
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: slice_beta_offset_div2",
ps_slice->i1_slice_beta_offset >> 1);
}
else
{
ps_slice->i1_slice_alpha_c0_offset = 0;
ps_slice->i1_slice_beta_offset = 0;
}
}
else
{
ps_slice->u1_disable_dblk_filter_idc = 0;
ps_slice->i1_slice_alpha_c0_offset = 0;
ps_slice->i1_slice_beta_offset = 0;
}
/* Initialization to check if number of motion vector per 2 Mbs */
/* are exceeding the range or not */
ps_dec->u2_mv_2mb[0] = 0;
ps_dec->u2_mv_2mb[1] = 0;
/*set slice header cone to 2 ,to indicate correct header*/
ps_dec->u1_slice_header_done = 2;
if(ps_pps->u1_entropy_coding_mode)
{
SWITCHOFFTRACE; SWITCHONTRACECABAC;
if(ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag)
{
ps_dec->pf_get_mb_info = ih264d_get_mb_info_cabac_mbaff;
}
else
ps_dec->pf_get_mb_info = ih264d_get_mb_info_cabac_nonmbaff;
ret = ih264d_parse_islice_data_cabac(ps_dec, ps_slice,
u2_first_mb_in_slice);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
SWITCHONTRACE; SWITCHOFFTRACECABAC;
}
else
{
if(ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag)
{
ps_dec->pf_get_mb_info = ih264d_get_mb_info_cavlc_mbaff;
}
else
ps_dec->pf_get_mb_info = ih264d_get_mb_info_cavlc_nonmbaff;
ret = ih264d_parse_islice_data_cavlc(ps_dec, ps_slice,
u2_first_mb_in_slice);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
}
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Decoder Update mb count after mb map is set.
Bug: 25928803
Change-Id: Iccc58a7dd1c5c6ea656dfca332cfb8dddba4de37
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 161,852
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool IsImageCursor(gfx::NativeCursor native_cursor) {
return cursors_.find(native_cursor.native_type()) != cursors_.end();
}
Commit Message: Introduce XGetImage() for GrabWindowSnapshot() in ChromeOS.
BUG=119492
TEST=manually done
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10386124
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137556 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 103,996
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WORD32 ih264d_allocate_static_bufs(iv_obj_t **dec_hdl, void *pv_api_ip, void *pv_api_op)
{
ih264d_create_ip_t *ps_create_ip;
ih264d_create_op_t *ps_create_op;
void *pv_buf;
UWORD8 *pu1_buf;
dec_struct_t *ps_dec;
void *(*pf_aligned_alloc)(void *pv_mem_ctxt, WORD32 alignment, WORD32 size);
void (*pf_aligned_free)(void *pv_mem_ctxt, void *pv_buf);
void *pv_mem_ctxt;
WORD32 size;
ps_create_ip = (ih264d_create_ip_t *)pv_api_ip;
ps_create_op = (ih264d_create_op_t *)pv_api_op;
ps_create_op->s_ivd_create_op_t.u4_error_code = 0;
pf_aligned_alloc = ps_create_ip->s_ivd_create_ip_t.pf_aligned_alloc;
pf_aligned_free = ps_create_ip->s_ivd_create_ip_t.pf_aligned_free;
pv_mem_ctxt = ps_create_ip->s_ivd_create_ip_t.pv_mem_ctxt;
/* Initialize return handle to NULL */
ps_create_op->s_ivd_create_op_t.pv_handle = NULL;
pv_buf = pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, sizeof(iv_obj_t));
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
*dec_hdl = (iv_obj_t *)pv_buf;
ps_create_op->s_ivd_create_op_t.pv_handle = *dec_hdl;
(*dec_hdl)->pv_codec_handle = NULL;
pv_buf = pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, sizeof(dec_struct_t));
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
(*dec_hdl)->pv_codec_handle = (dec_struct_t *)pv_buf;
ps_dec = (dec_struct_t *)pv_buf;
memset(ps_dec, 0, sizeof(dec_struct_t));
#ifndef LOGO_EN
ps_dec->u4_share_disp_buf = ps_create_ip->s_ivd_create_ip_t.u4_share_disp_buf;
#else
ps_dec->u4_share_disp_buf = 0;
#endif
ps_dec->u1_chroma_format =
(UWORD8)(ps_create_ip->s_ivd_create_ip_t.e_output_format);
if((ps_dec->u1_chroma_format != IV_YUV_420P)
&& (ps_dec->u1_chroma_format
!= IV_YUV_420SP_UV)
&& (ps_dec->u1_chroma_format
!= IV_YUV_420SP_VU))
{
ps_dec->u4_share_disp_buf = 0;
}
ps_dec->pf_aligned_alloc = pf_aligned_alloc;
ps_dec->pf_aligned_free = pf_aligned_free;
ps_dec->pv_mem_ctxt = pv_mem_ctxt;
size = ((sizeof(dec_seq_params_t)) * MAX_NUM_SEQ_PARAMS);
pv_buf = pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
ps_dec->ps_sps = pv_buf;
size = (sizeof(dec_pic_params_t)) * MAX_NUM_PIC_PARAMS;
pv_buf = pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
ps_dec->ps_pps = pv_buf;
size = ithread_get_handle_size();
pv_buf = pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
ps_dec->pv_dec_thread_handle = pv_buf;
size = ithread_get_handle_size();
pv_buf = pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
ps_dec->pv_bs_deblk_thread_handle = pv_buf;
size = sizeof(dpb_manager_t);
pv_buf = pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
ps_dec->ps_dpb_mgr = pv_buf;
size = sizeof(pred_info_t) * 2 * 32;
pv_buf = pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
ps_dec->ps_pred = pv_buf;
size = sizeof(disp_mgr_t);
pv_buf = pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
ps_dec->pv_disp_buf_mgr = pv_buf;
size = sizeof(buf_mgr_t) + ithread_get_mutex_lock_size();
pv_buf = pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr = pv_buf;
size = sizeof(struct pic_buffer_t) * (H264_MAX_REF_PICS * 2);
pv_buf = pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
ps_dec->ps_pic_buf_base = pv_buf;
size = sizeof(dec_err_status_t);
pv_buf = pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status = (dec_err_status_t *)pv_buf;
size = sizeof(sei);
pv_buf = pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
ps_dec->ps_sei = (sei *)pv_buf;
size = sizeof(dpb_commands_t);
pv_buf = pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
ps_dec->ps_dpb_cmds = (dpb_commands_t *)pv_buf;
size = sizeof(dec_bit_stream_t);
pv_buf = pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
ps_dec->ps_bitstrm = (dec_bit_stream_t *)pv_buf;
size = sizeof(dec_slice_params_t);
pv_buf = pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice = (dec_slice_params_t *)pv_buf;
size = MAX(sizeof(dec_seq_params_t), sizeof(dec_pic_params_t));
pv_buf = pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
ps_dec->pv_scratch_sps_pps = pv_buf;
ps_dec->u4_static_bits_buf_size = 256000;
pv_buf = pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, ps_dec->u4_static_bits_buf_size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
ps_dec->pu1_bits_buf_static = pv_buf;
size = ((TOTAL_LIST_ENTRIES + PAD_MAP_IDX_POC)
* sizeof(void *));
pv_buf = pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
ps_dec->ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_base = pv_buf;
memset(ps_dec->ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_base, 0, size);
ps_dec->ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc = ps_dec->ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_base + OFFSET_MAP_IDX_POC;
size = (sizeof(bin_ctxt_model_t) * NUM_CABAC_CTXTS);
pv_buf = pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
ps_dec->p_cabac_ctxt_table_t = pv_buf;
size = sizeof(ctxt_inc_mb_info_t);
pv_buf = pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
ps_dec->ps_left_mb_ctxt_info = pv_buf;
size = MAX_REF_BUF_SIZE * 2;
pv_buf = pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
ps_dec->pu1_ref_buff_base = pv_buf;
ps_dec->pu1_ref_buff = ps_dec->pu1_ref_buff_base + MAX_REF_BUF_SIZE;
size = ((sizeof(WORD16)) * PRED_BUFFER_WIDTH
* PRED_BUFFER_HEIGHT * 2);
pv_buf = pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
ps_dec->pi2_pred1 = pv_buf;
size = sizeof(UWORD8) * (MB_LUM_SIZE);
pv_buf = pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
ps_dec->pu1_temp_mc_buffer = pv_buf;
size = 8 * MAX_REF_BUFS * sizeof(struct pic_buffer_t);
pv_buf = pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
ps_dec->pu1_init_dpb_base = pv_buf;
pu1_buf = pv_buf;
ps_dec->ps_dpb_mgr->ps_init_dpb[0][0] = (struct pic_buffer_t *)pu1_buf;
pu1_buf += size / 2;
ps_dec->ps_dpb_mgr->ps_init_dpb[1][0] = (struct pic_buffer_t *)pu1_buf;
size = (sizeof(UWORD32) * 2 * 3
* ((MAX_FRAMES << 1) * (MAX_FRAMES << 1)) * 2);
pv_buf = pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
ps_dec->pu4_mbaff_wt_mat = pv_buf;
size = sizeof(UWORD32) * 2 * 3
* ((MAX_FRAMES << 1) * (MAX_FRAMES << 1));
pv_buf = pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
ps_dec->pu4_wts_ofsts_mat = pv_buf;
size = (sizeof(neighbouradd_t) << 2);
pv_buf = pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
ps_dec->ps_left_mvpred_addr = pv_buf;
size = sizeof(buf_mgr_t) + ithread_get_mutex_lock_size();
pv_buf = pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
ps_dec->pv_mv_buf_mgr = pv_buf;
size = sizeof(col_mv_buf_t) * (H264_MAX_REF_PICS * 2);
pv_buf = pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
ps_dec->ps_col_mv_base = pv_buf;
memset(ps_dec->ps_col_mv_base, 0, size);
{
UWORD8 i;
struct pic_buffer_t *ps_init_dpb;
ps_init_dpb = ps_dec->ps_dpb_mgr->ps_init_dpb[0][0];
for(i = 0; i < 2 * MAX_REF_BUFS; i++)
{
ps_init_dpb->pu1_buf1 = NULL;
ps_init_dpb->u1_long_term_frm_idx = MAX_REF_BUFS + 1;
ps_dec->ps_dpb_mgr->ps_init_dpb[0][i] = ps_init_dpb;
ps_dec->ps_dpb_mgr->ps_mod_dpb[0][i] = ps_init_dpb;
ps_init_dpb++;
}
ps_init_dpb = ps_dec->ps_dpb_mgr->ps_init_dpb[1][0];
for(i = 0; i < 2 * MAX_REF_BUFS; i++)
{
ps_init_dpb->pu1_buf1 = NULL;
ps_init_dpb->u1_long_term_frm_idx = MAX_REF_BUFS + 1;
ps_dec->ps_dpb_mgr->ps_init_dpb[1][i] = ps_init_dpb;
ps_dec->ps_dpb_mgr->ps_mod_dpb[1][i] = ps_init_dpb;
ps_init_dpb++;
}
}
ih264d_init_decoder(ps_dec);
return IV_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Decoder: Increased allocation and added checks in sei parsing.
This prevents heap overflow while parsing sei_message.
Bug: 63122634
Test: ran PoC on unpatched/patched
Change-Id: I61c1ff4ac053a060be8c24da4671db985cac628c
(cherry picked from commit f2b70d353768af8d4ead7f32497be05f197925ef)
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 163,265
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: aiff_get_chunk_data (SF_PRIVATE *psf, const SF_CHUNK_ITERATOR * iterator, SF_CHUNK_INFO * chunk_info)
{ sf_count_t pos ;
int indx ;
if ((indx = psf_find_read_chunk_iterator (&psf->rchunks, iterator)) < 0)
return SFE_UNKNOWN_CHUNK ;
if (chunk_info->data == NULL)
return SFE_BAD_CHUNK_DATA_PTR ;
chunk_info->id_size = psf->rchunks.chunks [indx].id_size ;
memcpy (chunk_info->id, psf->rchunks.chunks [indx].id, sizeof (chunk_info->id) / sizeof (*chunk_info->id)) ;
pos = psf_ftell (psf) ;
psf_fseek (psf, psf->rchunks.chunks [indx].offset, SEEK_SET) ;
psf_fread (chunk_info->data, SF_MIN (chunk_info->datalen, psf->rchunks.chunks [indx].len), 1, psf) ;
psf_fseek (psf, pos, SEEK_SET) ;
return SFE_NO_ERROR ;
} /* aiff_get_chunk_data */
Commit Message: src/aiff.c: Fix a buffer read overflow
Secunia Advisory SA76717.
Found by: Laurent Delosieres, Secunia Research at Flexera Software
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 67,866
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void vmxnet3_set_variable_mac(VMXNET3State *s, uint32_t h, uint32_t l)
{
s->conf.macaddr.a[0] = VMXNET3_GET_BYTE(l, 0);
s->conf.macaddr.a[1] = VMXNET3_GET_BYTE(l, 1);
s->conf.macaddr.a[2] = VMXNET3_GET_BYTE(l, 2);
s->conf.macaddr.a[3] = VMXNET3_GET_BYTE(l, 3);
s->conf.macaddr.a[4] = VMXNET3_GET_BYTE(h, 0);
s->conf.macaddr.a[5] = VMXNET3_GET_BYTE(h, 1);
VMW_CFPRN("Variable MAC: " MAC_FMT, MAC_ARG(s->conf.macaddr.a));
qemu_format_nic_info_str(qemu_get_queue(s->nic), s->conf.macaddr.a);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 9,063
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: JSValue jsTestObjAttrWithGetterException(ExecState* exec, JSValue slotBase, const Identifier&)
{
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(asObject(slotBase));
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
JSC::JSValue result = jsNumber(impl->attrWithGetterException(ec));
setDOMException(exec, ec);
return result;
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 101,211
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: asmlinkage void do_address_error_load(unsigned long error_code, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
if (misaligned_fixup(regs) < 0) {
do_unhandled_exception(7, SIGSEGV, "address error(load)",
"do_address_error_load",
error_code, regs, current);
}
return;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 25,568
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int fill_note_info(struct elfhdr *elf, int phdrs,
struct elf_note_info *info,
const siginfo_t *siginfo, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct list_head *t;
struct core_thread *ct;
struct elf_thread_status *ets;
if (!elf_note_info_init(info))
return 0;
for (ct = current->mm->core_state->dumper.next;
ct; ct = ct->next) {
ets = kzalloc(sizeof(*ets), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ets)
return 0;
ets->thread = ct->task;
list_add(&ets->list, &info->thread_list);
}
list_for_each(t, &info->thread_list) {
int sz;
ets = list_entry(t, struct elf_thread_status, list);
sz = elf_dump_thread_status(siginfo->si_signo, ets);
info->thread_status_size += sz;
}
/* now collect the dump for the current */
memset(info->prstatus, 0, sizeof(*info->prstatus));
fill_prstatus(info->prstatus, current, siginfo->si_signo);
elf_core_copy_regs(&info->prstatus->pr_reg, regs);
/* Set up header */
fill_elf_header(elf, phdrs, ELF_ARCH, ELF_CORE_EFLAGS);
/*
* Set up the notes in similar form to SVR4 core dumps made
* with info from their /proc.
*/
fill_note(info->notes + 0, "CORE", NT_PRSTATUS,
sizeof(*info->prstatus), info->prstatus);
fill_psinfo(info->psinfo, current->group_leader, current->mm);
fill_note(info->notes + 1, "CORE", NT_PRPSINFO,
sizeof(*info->psinfo), info->psinfo);
fill_siginfo_note(info->notes + 2, &info->csigdata, siginfo);
fill_auxv_note(info->notes + 3, current->mm);
info->numnote = 4;
if (fill_files_note(info->notes + info->numnote) == 0) {
info->notes_files = info->notes + info->numnote;
info->numnote++;
}
/* Try to dump the FPU. */
info->prstatus->pr_fpvalid = elf_core_copy_task_fpregs(current, regs,
info->fpu);
if (info->prstatus->pr_fpvalid)
fill_note(info->notes + info->numnote++,
"CORE", NT_PRFPREG, sizeof(*info->fpu), info->fpu);
#ifdef ELF_CORE_COPY_XFPREGS
if (elf_core_copy_task_xfpregs(current, info->xfpu))
fill_note(info->notes + info->numnote++,
"LINUX", ELF_CORE_XFPREG_TYPE,
sizeof(*info->xfpu), info->xfpu);
#endif
return 1;
}
Commit Message: x86, mm/ASLR: Fix stack randomization on 64-bit systems
The issue is that the stack for processes is not properly randomized on
64 bit architectures due to an integer overflow.
The affected function is randomize_stack_top() in file
"fs/binfmt_elf.c":
static unsigned long randomize_stack_top(unsigned long stack_top)
{
unsigned int random_variable = 0;
if ((current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE) &&
!(current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE)) {
random_variable = get_random_int() & STACK_RND_MASK;
random_variable <<= PAGE_SHIFT;
}
return PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top) + random_variable;
return PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top) - random_variable;
}
Note that, it declares the "random_variable" variable as "unsigned int".
Since the result of the shifting operation between STACK_RND_MASK (which
is 0x3fffff on x86_64, 22 bits) and PAGE_SHIFT (which is 12 on x86_64):
random_variable <<= PAGE_SHIFT;
then the two leftmost bits are dropped when storing the result in the
"random_variable". This variable shall be at least 34 bits long to hold
the (22+12) result.
These two dropped bits have an impact on the entropy of process stack.
Concretely, the total stack entropy is reduced by four: from 2^28 to
2^30 (One fourth of expected entropy).
This patch restores back the entropy by correcting the types involved
in the operations in the functions randomize_stack_top() and
stack_maxrandom_size().
The successful fix can be tested with:
$ for i in `seq 1 10`; do cat /proc/self/maps | grep stack; done
7ffeda566000-7ffeda587000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
7fff5a332000-7fff5a353000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
7ffcdb7a1000-7ffcdb7c2000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
7ffd5e2c4000-7ffd5e2e5000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
...
Once corrected, the leading bytes should be between 7ffc and 7fff,
rather than always being 7fff.
Signed-off-by: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es>
Signed-off-by: Ismael Ripoll <iripoll@upv.es>
[ Rebased, fixed 80 char bugs, cleaned up commit message, added test example and CVE ]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Fixes: CVE-2015-1593
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150214173350.GA18393@www.outflux.net
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 44,286
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int cifs_strict_fsync(struct file *file, loff_t start, loff_t end,
int datasync)
{
unsigned int xid;
int rc = 0;
struct cifs_tcon *tcon;
struct TCP_Server_Info *server;
struct cifsFileInfo *smbfile = file->private_data;
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb = CIFS_SB(inode->i_sb);
rc = filemap_write_and_wait_range(inode->i_mapping, start, end);
if (rc)
return rc;
mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
xid = get_xid();
cifs_dbg(FYI, "Sync file - name: %s datasync: 0x%x\n",
file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name, datasync);
if (!CIFS_CACHE_READ(CIFS_I(inode))) {
rc = cifs_invalidate_mapping(inode);
if (rc) {
cifs_dbg(FYI, "rc: %d during invalidate phase\n", rc);
rc = 0; /* don't care about it in fsync */
}
}
tcon = tlink_tcon(smbfile->tlink);
if (!(cifs_sb->mnt_cifs_flags & CIFS_MOUNT_NOSSYNC)) {
server = tcon->ses->server;
if (server->ops->flush)
rc = server->ops->flush(xid, tcon, &smbfile->fid);
else
rc = -ENOSYS;
}
free_xid(xid);
mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: cifs: ensure that uncached writes handle unmapped areas correctly
It's possible for userland to pass down an iovec via writev() that has a
bogus user pointer in it. If that happens and we're doing an uncached
write, then we can end up getting less bytes than we expect from the
call to iov_iter_copy_from_user. This is CVE-2014-0069
cifs_iovec_write isn't set up to handle that situation however. It'll
blindly keep chugging through the page array and not filling those pages
with anything useful. Worse yet, we'll later end up with a negative
number in wdata->tailsz, which will confuse the sending routines and
cause an oops at the very least.
Fix this by having the copy phase of cifs_iovec_write stop copying data
in this situation and send the last write as a short one. At the same
time, we want to avoid sending a zero-length write to the server, so
break out of the loop and set rc to -EFAULT if that happens. This also
allows us to handle the case where no address in the iovec is valid.
[Note: Marking this for stable on v3.4+ kernels, but kernels as old as
v2.6.38 may have a similar problem and may need similar fix]
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.4+
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 40,013
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LogClientServiceMapping(
const char* /* function_name */,
GLuint /* client_id */,
GLuint /* service_id */) {
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 120,992
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void TerminateSource(j_decompress_ptr cinfo)
{
(void) cinfo;
}
Commit Message: ...
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 63,378
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ExtensionOptionsGuest::CreateWebContents(
const base::DictionaryValue& create_params,
const WebContentsCreatedCallback& callback) {
std::string extension_id;
create_params.GetString(extensionoptions::kExtensionId, &extension_id);
if (!crx_file::id_util::IdIsValid(extension_id)) {
callback.Run(nullptr);
return;
}
std::string embedder_extension_id = GetOwnerSiteURL().host();
if (crx_file::id_util::IdIsValid(embedder_extension_id) &&
extension_id != embedder_extension_id) {
callback.Run(nullptr);
return;
}
GURL extension_url =
extensions::Extension::GetBaseURLFromExtensionId(extension_id);
if (!extension_url.is_valid()) {
callback.Run(nullptr);
return;
}
extensions::ExtensionRegistry* registry =
extensions::ExtensionRegistry::Get(browser_context());
const extensions::Extension* extension =
registry->enabled_extensions().GetByID(extension_id);
if (!extension) {
callback.Run(nullptr);
return;
}
options_page_ = extensions::OptionsPageInfo::GetOptionsPage(extension);
if (!options_page_.is_valid()) {
callback.Run(nullptr);
return;
}
content::SiteInstance* options_site_instance =
content::SiteInstance::CreateForURL(browser_context(), extension_url);
WebContents::CreateParams params(browser_context(), options_site_instance);
params.guest_delegate = this;
WebContents* wc = WebContents::Create(params);
SetViewType(wc, VIEW_TYPE_EXTENSION_GUEST);
callback.Run(wc);
}
Commit Message: Make extensions use a correct same-origin check.
GURL::GetOrigin does not do the right thing for all types of URLs.
BUG=573317
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1658913002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373381}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 132,975
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int lua_ap_unescape(lua_State *L)
{
const char *escaped;
char *plain;
size_t x,
y;
request_rec *r;
r = ap_lua_check_request_rec(L, 1);
luaL_checktype(L, 2, LUA_TSTRING);
escaped = lua_tolstring(L, 2, &x);
plain = apr_pstrdup(r->pool, escaped);
y = ap_unescape_urlencoded(plain);
if (!y) {
lua_pushstring(L, plain);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: *) SECURITY: CVE-2015-0228 (cve.mitre.org)
mod_lua: A maliciously crafted websockets PING after a script
calls r:wsupgrade() can cause a child process crash.
[Edward Lu <Chaosed0 gmail.com>]
Discovered by Guido Vranken <guidovranken gmail.com>
Submitted by: Edward Lu
Committed by: covener
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1657261 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 45,089
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ImageDataPlatformBackend::Unmap() {
}
Commit Message: Security fix: integer overflow on checking image size
Test is left in another CL (codereview.chromiu,.org/11274036) to avoid conflict there. Hope it's fine.
BUG=160926
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11410081
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167882 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 102,396
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: kex_input_kexinit(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
{
struct ssh *ssh = ctxt;
struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
const u_char *ptr;
u_int i;
size_t dlen;
int r;
debug("SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT received");
if (kex == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
ptr = sshpkt_ptr(ssh, &dlen);
if ((r = sshbuf_put(kex->peer, ptr, dlen)) != 0)
return r;
/* discard packet */
for (i = 0; i < KEX_COOKIE_LEN; i++)
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, NULL)) != 0)
return r;
for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++)
if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0)
return r;
/*
* XXX RFC4253 sec 7: "each side MAY guess" - currently no supported
* KEX method has the server move first, but a server might be using
* a custom method or one that we otherwise don't support. We should
* be prepared to remember first_kex_follows here so we can eat a
* packet later.
* XXX2 - RFC4253 is kind of ambiguous on what first_kex_follows means
* for cases where the server *doesn't* go first. I guess we should
* ignore it when it is set for these cases, which is what we do now.
*/
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, NULL)) != 0 || /* first_kex_follows */
(r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, NULL)) != 0 || /* reserved */
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
if (!(kex->flags & KEX_INIT_SENT))
if ((r = kex_send_kexinit(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
if ((r = kex_choose_conf(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
if (kex->kex_type < KEX_MAX && kex->kex[kex->kex_type] != NULL)
return (kex->kex[kex->kex_type])(ssh);
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: upstream commit
Unregister the KEXINIT handler after message has been
received. Otherwise an unauthenticated peer can repeat the KEXINIT and cause
allocation of up to 128MB -- until the connection is closed. Reported by
shilei-c at 360.cn
Upstream-ID: 43649ae12a27ef94290db16d1a98294588b75c05
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 1
| 166,902
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AppCacheHost::NotifyMainResourceBlocked(const GURL& manifest_url) {
main_resource_blocked_ = true;
blocked_manifest_url_ = manifest_url;
}
Commit Message: Fix possible map::end() dereference in AppCacheUpdateJob triggered by a compromised renderer.
BUG=551044
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1418783005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#358815}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 124,208
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLES2Implementation::DestroyImageCHROMIUMHelper(GLuint image_id) {
helper_->CommandBufferHelper::Flush();
gpu_control_->DestroyImage(image_id);
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 140,936
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DEFINE_TRACE(AXObject) {
visitor->trace(m_children);
visitor->trace(m_parent);
visitor->trace(m_cachedLiveRegionRoot);
visitor->trace(m_axObjectCache);
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 127,221
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool doReadAlgorithmId(blink::WebCryptoAlgorithmId& id)
{
uint32_t rawId;
if (!doReadUint32(&rawId))
return false;
switch (static_cast<CryptoKeyAlgorithmTag>(rawId)) {
case AesCbcTag:
id = blink::WebCryptoAlgorithmIdAesCbc;
return true;
case HmacTag:
id = blink::WebCryptoAlgorithmIdHmac;
return true;
case RsaSsaPkcs1v1_5Tag:
id = blink::WebCryptoAlgorithmIdRsaSsaPkcs1v1_5;
return true;
case Sha1Tag:
id = blink::WebCryptoAlgorithmIdSha1;
return true;
case Sha256Tag:
id = blink::WebCryptoAlgorithmIdSha256;
return true;
case Sha384Tag:
id = blink::WebCryptoAlgorithmIdSha384;
return true;
case Sha512Tag:
id = blink::WebCryptoAlgorithmIdSha512;
return true;
case AesGcmTag:
id = blink::WebCryptoAlgorithmIdAesGcm;
return true;
case RsaOaepTag:
id = blink::WebCryptoAlgorithmIdRsaOaep;
return true;
case AesCtrTag:
id = blink::WebCryptoAlgorithmIdAesCtr;
return true;
case AesKwTag:
id = blink::WebCryptoAlgorithmIdAesKw;
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings
BUG=390928
R=dcarney@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 120,455
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void crypto_larval_kill(struct crypto_alg *alg)
{
struct crypto_larval *larval = (void *)alg;
down_write(&crypto_alg_sem);
list_del(&alg->cra_list);
up_write(&crypto_alg_sem);
complete_all(&larval->completion);
crypto_alg_put(alg);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 47,142
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t MPEG4DataSource::getSize(off64_t *size) {
return mSource->getSize(size);
}
Commit Message: MPEG4Extractor.cpp: handle chunk_size > SIZE_MAX
chunk_size is a uint64_t, so it can legitimately be bigger
than SIZE_MAX, which would cause the subtraction to underflow.
https://code.google.com/p/android/issues/detail?id=182251
Bug: 23034759
Change-Id: Ic1637fb26bf6edb0feb1bcf2876fd370db1ed547
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 157,188
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
{
int ret;
ret=ssl3_write_bytes(s,type,&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
s->init_num);
if (ret < 0) return(-1);
if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
/* should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case
* we'll ignore the result anyway */
ssl3_finish_mac(s,(unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],ret);
if (ret == s->init_num)
{
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data, (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s, s->msg_callback_arg);
return(1);
}
s->init_off+=ret;
s->init_num-=ret;
return(0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 15,793
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct sock *tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct request_sock *req,
struct dst_entry *dst,
struct request_sock *req_unhash,
bool *own_req)
{
struct inet_request_sock *ireq;
struct ipv6_pinfo *newnp;
const struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct ipv6_txoptions *opt;
struct tcp6_sock *newtcp6sk;
struct inet_sock *newinet;
struct tcp_sock *newtp;
struct sock *newsk;
#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG
struct tcp_md5sig_key *key;
#endif
struct flowi6 fl6;
if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) {
/*
* v6 mapped
*/
newsk = tcp_v4_syn_recv_sock(sk, skb, req, dst,
req_unhash, own_req);
if (!newsk)
return NULL;
newtcp6sk = (struct tcp6_sock *)newsk;
inet_sk(newsk)->pinet6 = &newtcp6sk->inet6;
newinet = inet_sk(newsk);
newnp = inet6_sk(newsk);
newtp = tcp_sk(newsk);
memcpy(newnp, np, sizeof(struct ipv6_pinfo));
newnp->saddr = newsk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr;
inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_af_ops = &ipv6_mapped;
newsk->sk_backlog_rcv = tcp_v4_do_rcv;
#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG
newtp->af_specific = &tcp_sock_ipv6_mapped_specific;
#endif
newnp->ipv6_ac_list = NULL;
newnp->ipv6_fl_list = NULL;
newnp->pktoptions = NULL;
newnp->opt = NULL;
newnp->mcast_oif = tcp_v6_iif(skb);
newnp->mcast_hops = ipv6_hdr(skb)->hop_limit;
newnp->rcv_flowinfo = ip6_flowinfo(ipv6_hdr(skb));
if (np->repflow)
newnp->flow_label = ip6_flowlabel(ipv6_hdr(skb));
/*
* No need to charge this sock to the relevant IPv6 refcnt debug socks count
* here, tcp_create_openreq_child now does this for us, see the comment in
* that function for the gory details. -acme
*/
/* It is tricky place. Until this moment IPv4 tcp
worked with IPv6 icsk.icsk_af_ops.
Sync it now.
*/
tcp_sync_mss(newsk, inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_pmtu_cookie);
return newsk;
}
ireq = inet_rsk(req);
if (sk_acceptq_is_full(sk))
goto out_overflow;
if (!dst) {
dst = inet6_csk_route_req(sk, &fl6, req, IPPROTO_TCP);
if (!dst)
goto out;
}
newsk = tcp_create_openreq_child(sk, req, skb);
if (!newsk)
goto out_nonewsk;
/*
* No need to charge this sock to the relevant IPv6 refcnt debug socks
* count here, tcp_create_openreq_child now does this for us, see the
* comment in that function for the gory details. -acme
*/
newsk->sk_gso_type = SKB_GSO_TCPV6;
ip6_dst_store(newsk, dst, NULL, NULL);
inet6_sk_rx_dst_set(newsk, skb);
newtcp6sk = (struct tcp6_sock *)newsk;
inet_sk(newsk)->pinet6 = &newtcp6sk->inet6;
newtp = tcp_sk(newsk);
newinet = inet_sk(newsk);
newnp = inet6_sk(newsk);
memcpy(newnp, np, sizeof(struct ipv6_pinfo));
newsk->sk_v6_daddr = ireq->ir_v6_rmt_addr;
newnp->saddr = ireq->ir_v6_loc_addr;
newsk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr = ireq->ir_v6_loc_addr;
newsk->sk_bound_dev_if = ireq->ir_iif;
/* Now IPv6 options...
First: no IPv4 options.
*/
newinet->inet_opt = NULL;
newnp->ipv6_ac_list = NULL;
newnp->ipv6_fl_list = NULL;
/* Clone RX bits */
newnp->rxopt.all = np->rxopt.all;
newnp->pktoptions = NULL;
newnp->opt = NULL;
newnp->mcast_oif = tcp_v6_iif(skb);
newnp->mcast_hops = ipv6_hdr(skb)->hop_limit;
newnp->rcv_flowinfo = ip6_flowinfo(ipv6_hdr(skb));
if (np->repflow)
newnp->flow_label = ip6_flowlabel(ipv6_hdr(skb));
/* Clone native IPv6 options from listening socket (if any)
Yes, keeping reference count would be much more clever,
but we make one more one thing there: reattach optmem
to newsk.
*/
opt = ireq->ipv6_opt;
if (!opt)
opt = rcu_dereference(np->opt);
if (opt) {
opt = ipv6_dup_options(newsk, opt);
RCU_INIT_POINTER(newnp->opt, opt);
}
inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_ext_hdr_len = 0;
if (opt)
inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_ext_hdr_len = opt->opt_nflen +
opt->opt_flen;
tcp_ca_openreq_child(newsk, dst);
tcp_sync_mss(newsk, dst_mtu(dst));
newtp->advmss = tcp_mss_clamp(tcp_sk(sk), dst_metric_advmss(dst));
tcp_initialize_rcv_mss(newsk);
newinet->inet_daddr = newinet->inet_saddr = LOOPBACK4_IPV6;
newinet->inet_rcv_saddr = LOOPBACK4_IPV6;
#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG
/* Copy over the MD5 key from the original socket */
key = tcp_v6_md5_do_lookup(sk, &newsk->sk_v6_daddr);
if (key) {
/* We're using one, so create a matching key
* on the newsk structure. If we fail to get
* memory, then we end up not copying the key
* across. Shucks.
*/
tcp_md5_do_add(newsk, (union tcp_md5_addr *)&newsk->sk_v6_daddr,
AF_INET6, key->key, key->keylen,
sk_gfp_mask(sk, GFP_ATOMIC));
}
#endif
if (__inet_inherit_port(sk, newsk) < 0) {
inet_csk_prepare_forced_close(newsk);
tcp_done(newsk);
goto out;
}
*own_req = inet_ehash_nolisten(newsk, req_to_sk(req_unhash));
if (*own_req) {
tcp_move_syn(newtp, req);
/* Clone pktoptions received with SYN, if we own the req */
if (ireq->pktopts) {
newnp->pktoptions = skb_clone(ireq->pktopts,
sk_gfp_mask(sk, GFP_ATOMIC));
consume_skb(ireq->pktopts);
ireq->pktopts = NULL;
if (newnp->pktoptions) {
tcp_v6_restore_cb(newnp->pktoptions);
skb_set_owner_r(newnp->pktoptions, newsk);
}
}
}
return newsk;
out_overflow:
__NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_LISTENOVERFLOWS);
out_nonewsk:
dst_release(dst);
out:
tcp_listendrop(sk);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: ipv6/dccp: do not inherit ipv6_mc_list from parent
Like commit 657831ffc38e ("dccp/tcp: do not inherit mc_list from parent")
we should clear ipv6_mc_list etc. for IPv6 sockets too.
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 1
| 168,128
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: devzvol_handle_ioctl(int cmd, zfs_cmd_t *zc, size_t *alloc_size)
{
uint64_t cookie;
int size = 8000;
int unused;
int rc;
if (cmd != ZFS_IOC_POOL_CONFIGS)
mutex_enter(&devzvol_mtx);
if (!devzvol_isopen) {
if ((rc = devzvol_open_zfs()) == 0) {
devzvol_isopen = B_TRUE;
} else {
if (cmd != ZFS_IOC_POOL_CONFIGS)
mutex_exit(&devzvol_mtx);
return (ENXIO);
}
}
cookie = zc->zc_cookie;
again:
zc->zc_nvlist_dst = (uint64_t)(intptr_t)kmem_alloc(size,
KM_SLEEP);
zc->zc_nvlist_dst_size = size;
rc = ldi_ioctl(devzvol_lh, cmd, (intptr_t)zc, FKIOCTL, kcred,
&unused);
if (rc == ENOMEM) {
int newsize;
newsize = zc->zc_nvlist_dst_size;
ASSERT(newsize > size);
kmem_free((void *)(uintptr_t)zc->zc_nvlist_dst, size);
size = newsize;
zc->zc_cookie = cookie;
goto again;
}
if (alloc_size == NULL)
kmem_free((void *)(uintptr_t)zc->zc_nvlist_dst, size);
else
*alloc_size = size;
if (cmd != ZFS_IOC_POOL_CONFIGS)
mutex_exit(&devzvol_mtx);
return (rc);
}
Commit Message: 5421 devzvol_readdir() needs to be more careful with strchr
Reviewed by: Keith Wesolowski <keith.wesolowski@joyent.com>
Reviewed by: Jerry Jelinek <jerry.jelinek@joyent.com>
Approved by: Dan McDonald <danmcd@omniti.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 46,005
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void notrace __ppc64_runlatch_off(void)
{
struct thread_info *ti = current_thread_info();
unsigned long ctrl;
ti->local_flags &= ~_TLF_RUNLATCH;
ctrl = mfspr(SPRN_CTRLF);
ctrl &= ~CTRL_RUNLATCH;
mtspr(SPRN_CTRLT, ctrl);
}
Commit Message: powerpc/tm: Fix crash when forking inside a transaction
When we fork/clone we currently don't copy any of the TM state to the new
thread. This results in a TM bad thing (program check) when the new process is
switched in as the kernel does a tmrechkpt with TEXASR FS not set. Also, since
R1 is from userspace, we trigger the bad kernel stack pointer detection. So we
end up with something like this:
Bad kernel stack pointer 0 at c0000000000404fc
cpu 0x2: Vector: 700 (Program Check) at [c00000003ffefd40]
pc: c0000000000404fc: restore_gprs+0xc0/0x148
lr: 0000000000000000
sp: 0
msr: 9000000100201030
current = 0xc000001dd1417c30
paca = 0xc00000000fe00800 softe: 0 irq_happened: 0x01
pid = 0, comm = swapper/2
WARNING: exception is not recoverable, can't continue
The below fixes this by flushing the TM state before we copy the task_struct to
the clone. To do this we go through the tmreclaim patch, which removes the
checkpointed registers from the CPU and transitions the CPU out of TM suspend
mode. Hence we need to call tmrechkpt after to restore the checkpointed state
and the TM mode for the current task.
To make this fail from userspace is simply:
tbegin
li r0, 2
sc
<boom>
Kudos to Adhemerval Zanella Neto for finding this.
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
cc: Adhemerval Zanella Neto <azanella@br.ibm.com>
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 38,605
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void cpu_load_update(struct rq *this_rq, unsigned long this_load,
unsigned long pending_updates)
{
unsigned long __maybe_unused tickless_load = this_rq->cpu_load[0];
int i, scale;
this_rq->nr_load_updates++;
/* Update our load: */
this_rq->cpu_load[0] = this_load; /* Fasttrack for idx 0 */
for (i = 1, scale = 2; i < CPU_LOAD_IDX_MAX; i++, scale += scale) {
unsigned long old_load, new_load;
/* scale is effectively 1 << i now, and >> i divides by scale */
old_load = this_rq->cpu_load[i];
#ifdef CONFIG_NO_HZ_COMMON
old_load = decay_load_missed(old_load, pending_updates - 1, i);
if (tickless_load) {
old_load -= decay_load_missed(tickless_load, pending_updates - 1, i);
/*
* old_load can never be a negative value because a
* decayed tickless_load cannot be greater than the
* original tickless_load.
*/
old_load += tickless_load;
}
#endif
new_load = this_load;
/*
* Round up the averaging division if load is increasing. This
* prevents us from getting stuck on 9 if the load is 10, for
* example.
*/
if (new_load > old_load)
new_load += scale - 1;
this_rq->cpu_load[i] = (old_load * (scale - 1) + new_load) >> i;
}
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 92,509
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static NTSTATUS smbXcli_negprot_dispatch_incoming(struct smbXcli_conn *conn,
TALLOC_CTX *tmp_mem,
uint8_t *inbuf)
{
size_t num_pending = talloc_array_length(conn->pending);
struct tevent_req *subreq;
struct smbXcli_req_state *substate;
struct tevent_req *req;
uint32_t protocol_magic;
size_t inbuf_len = smb_len_nbt(inbuf);
if (num_pending != 1) {
return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
if (inbuf_len < 4) {
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_NETWORK_RESPONSE;
}
subreq = conn->pending[0];
substate = tevent_req_data(subreq, struct smbXcli_req_state);
req = tevent_req_callback_data(subreq, struct tevent_req);
protocol_magic = IVAL(inbuf, 4);
switch (protocol_magic) {
case SMB_MAGIC:
tevent_req_set_callback(subreq, smbXcli_negprot_smb1_done, req);
conn->dispatch_incoming = smb1cli_conn_dispatch_incoming;
return smb1cli_conn_dispatch_incoming(conn, tmp_mem, inbuf);
case SMB2_MAGIC:
if (substate->smb2.recv_iov == NULL) {
/*
* For the SMB1 negprot we have move it.
*/
substate->smb2.recv_iov = substate->smb1.recv_iov;
substate->smb1.recv_iov = NULL;
}
/*
* we got an SMB2 answer, which consumed sequence number 0
* so we need to use 1 as the next one.
*
* we also need to set the current credits to 0
* as we consumed the initial one. The SMB2 answer
* hopefully grant us a new credit.
*/
conn->smb2.mid = 1;
conn->smb2.cur_credits = 0;
tevent_req_set_callback(subreq, smbXcli_negprot_smb2_done, req);
conn->dispatch_incoming = smb2cli_conn_dispatch_incoming;
return smb2cli_conn_dispatch_incoming(conn, tmp_mem, inbuf);
}
DEBUG(10, ("Got non-SMB PDU\n"));
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_NETWORK_RESPONSE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 2,479
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChromeContentRendererClient::OnPurgeMemory() {
DVLOG(1) << "Resetting spellcheck in renderer client";
RenderThread* thread = RenderThread::Get();
if (spellcheck_.get())
thread->RemoveObserver(spellcheck_.get());
spellcheck_.reset(new SpellCheck());
thread->AddObserver(spellcheck_.get());
}
Commit Message: Do not require DevTools extension resources to be white-listed in manifest.
Currently, resources used by DevTools extensions need to be white-listed as web_accessible_resources in manifest. This is quite inconvenitent and appears to be an overkill, given the fact that DevTools front-end is
(a) trusted and
(b) picky on the frames it loads.
This change adds resources that belong to DevTools extensions and are being loaded into a DevTools front-end page to the list of exceptions from web_accessible_resources check.
BUG=none
TEST=DevToolsExtensionTest.*
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9663076
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126378 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 108,148
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int SSL_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
const char *label, size_t llen, const unsigned char *p, size_t plen,
int use_context)
{
if (s->version < TLS1_VERSION)
return -1;
return s->method->ssl3_enc->export_keying_material(s, out, olen, label,
llen, p, plen,
use_context);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 10,770
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ScriptProcessorNode* ScriptProcessorNode::Create(
BaseAudioContext& context,
size_t buffer_size,
unsigned number_of_input_channels,
unsigned number_of_output_channels,
ExceptionState& exception_state) {
DCHECK(IsMainThread());
if (context.IsContextClosed()) {
context.ThrowExceptionForClosedState(exception_state);
return nullptr;
}
if (number_of_input_channels == 0 && number_of_output_channels == 0) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
kIndexSizeError,
"number of input channels and output channels cannot both be zero.");
return nullptr;
}
if (number_of_input_channels > BaseAudioContext::MaxNumberOfChannels()) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
kIndexSizeError,
"number of input channels (" +
String::Number(number_of_input_channels) + ") exceeds maximum (" +
String::Number(BaseAudioContext::MaxNumberOfChannels()) + ").");
return nullptr;
}
if (number_of_output_channels > BaseAudioContext::MaxNumberOfChannels()) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
kIndexSizeError,
"number of output channels (" +
String::Number(number_of_output_channels) + ") exceeds maximum (" +
String::Number(BaseAudioContext::MaxNumberOfChannels()) + ").");
return nullptr;
}
switch (buffer_size) {
case 0:
buffer_size =
context.HasRealtimeConstraint()
? ChooseBufferSize(context.destination()->CallbackBufferSize())
: 256;
break;
case 256:
case 512:
case 1024:
case 2048:
case 4096:
case 8192:
case 16384:
break;
default:
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
kIndexSizeError,
"buffer size (" + String::Number(buffer_size) +
") must be 0 or a power of two between 256 and 16384.");
return nullptr;
}
ScriptProcessorNode* node = new ScriptProcessorNode(
context, context.sampleRate(), buffer_size, number_of_input_channels,
number_of_output_channels);
if (!node)
return nullptr;
context.NotifySourceNodeStartedProcessing(node);
return node;
}
Commit Message: Keep ScriptProcessorHandler alive across threads
When posting a task from the ScriptProcessorHandler::Process to fire a
process event, we need to keep the handler alive in case the
ScriptProcessorNode goes away (because it has no onaudioprocess
handler) and removes the its handler.
Bug: 765495
Test:
Change-Id: Ib4fa39d7b112c7051897700a1eff9f59a4a7a054
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/677137
Reviewed-by: Hongchan Choi <hongchan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#503629}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 150,730
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p,
int len)
{
if (s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS) {
unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2];
int hashlen;
/*
* Digest cached records keeping record buffer (if present): this wont
* affect client auth because we're freezing the buffer at the same
* point (after client key exchange and before certificate verify)
*/
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1))
return -1;
hashlen = ssl_handshake_hash(s, hash, sizeof(hash));
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "Handshake hashes:\n");
BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)hash, hashlen);
#endif
tls1_PRF(s,
TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE,
hash, hashlen,
NULL, 0,
NULL, 0,
NULL, 0, p, len, s->session->master_key,
SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE);
OPENSSL_cleanse(hash, hashlen);
} else {
tls1_PRF(s,
TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE,
s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
NULL, 0,
s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
NULL, 0, p, len, s->session->master_key,
SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE);
}
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "Premaster Secret:\n");
BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)p, len);
fprintf(stderr, "Client Random:\n");
BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
fprintf(stderr, "Server Random:\n");
BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
fprintf(stderr, "Master Secret:\n");
BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->session->master_key,
SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE);
#endif
#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_TRACE_CRYPTO
if (s->msg_callback) {
s->msg_callback(2, s->version, TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_PREMASTER,
p, len, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
s->msg_callback(2, s->version, TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_CLIENT_RANDOM,
s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
s, s->msg_callback_arg);
s->msg_callback(2, s->version, TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_SERVER_RANDOM,
s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
s, s->msg_callback_arg);
s->msg_callback(2, s->version, TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_MASTER,
s->session->master_key,
SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
}
#endif
return (SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE);
}
Commit Message: Don't change the state of the ETM flags until CCS processing
Changing the ciphersuite during a renegotiation can result in a crash
leading to a DoS attack. ETM has not been implemented in 1.1.0 for DTLS
so this is TLS only.
The problem is caused by changing the flag indicating whether to use ETM
or not immediately on negotiation of ETM, rather than at CCS. Therefore,
during a renegotiation, if the ETM state is changing (usually due to a
change of ciphersuite), then an error/crash will occur.
Due to the fact that there are separate CCS messages for read and write
we actually now need two flags to determine whether to use ETM or not.
CVE-2017-3733
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 69,297
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ZEND_API int zend_ts_hash_index_find(TsHashTable *ht, ulong h, void **pData)
{
int retval;
begin_read(ht);
retval = zend_hash_index_find(TS_HASH(ht), h, pData);
end_read(ht);
return retval;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 7,452
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void chpl_del(GF_Box *s)
{
GF_ChapterListBox *ptr = (GF_ChapterListBox *) s;
if (ptr == NULL) return;
while (gf_list_count(ptr->list)) {
GF_ChapterEntry *ce = (GF_ChapterEntry *)gf_list_get(ptr->list, 0);
if (ce->name) gf_free(ce->name);
gf_free(ce);
gf_list_rem(ptr->list, 0);
}
gf_list_del(ptr->list);
gf_free(ptr);
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,009
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderViewImpl::OnCustomContextMenuAction(
const CustomContextMenuContext& custom_context,
unsigned action) {
if (custom_context.request_id) {
ContextMenuClient* client =
pending_context_menus_.Lookup(custom_context.request_id);
if (client)
client->OnMenuAction(custom_context.request_id, action);
} else {
webview()->performCustomContextMenuAction(action);
}
}
Commit Message: Let the browser handle external navigations from DevTools.
BUG=180555
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12531004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@186793 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 115,535
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::DidFinishNavigation(NavigationHandle* navigation_handle) {
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(WebContentsObserver, observers_,
DidFinishNavigation(navigation_handle));
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 131,800
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void InterstitialPageImpl::InterstitialPageRVHDelegateView::OnFindReply(
int request_id, int number_of_matches, const gfx::Rect& selection_rect,
int active_match_ordinal, bool final_update) {
}
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 136,118
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool SharedMemory::Unmap() {
if (memory_ == NULL)
return false;
munmap(memory_, mapped_size_);
memory_ = NULL;
mapped_size_ = 0;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Posix: fix named SHM mappings permissions.
Make sure that named mappings in /dev/shm/ aren't created with
broad permissions.
BUG=254159
R=mark@chromium.org, markus@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/17779002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@209814 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 111,831
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int fmt_mp_to_sp(const struct v4l2_format *f_mp,
struct v4l2_format *f_sp)
{
const struct v4l2_pix_format_mplane *pix_mp = &f_mp->fmt.pix_mp;
struct v4l2_pix_format *pix = &f_sp->fmt.pix;
if (f_mp->type == V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_CAPTURE_MPLANE)
f_sp->type = V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_CAPTURE;
else if (f_mp->type == V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_OUTPUT_MPLANE)
f_sp->type = V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_OUTPUT;
else
return -EINVAL;
pix->width = pix_mp->width;
pix->height = pix_mp->height;
pix->pixelformat = pix_mp->pixelformat;
pix->field = pix_mp->field;
pix->colorspace = pix_mp->colorspace;
pix->sizeimage = pix_mp->plane_fmt[0].sizeimage;
pix->bytesperline = pix_mp->plane_fmt[0].bytesperline;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: [media] v4l: Share code between video_usercopy and video_ioctl2
The two functions are mostly identical. They handle the copy_from_user
and copy_to_user operations related with V4L2 ioctls and call the real
ioctl handler.
Create a __video_usercopy function that implements the core of
video_usercopy and video_ioctl2, and call that function from both.
Signed-off-by: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart@ideasonboard.com>
Acked-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil@xs4all.nl>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 74,695
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: base::PlatformFile PlatformFileFromPlatformHandleValue(uint64_t value) {
#if defined(OS_WIN)
return reinterpret_cast<base::PlatformFile>(value);
#else
return static_cast<base::PlatformFile>(value);
#endif
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 149,623
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void mvex_del(GF_Box *s)
{
GF_MovieExtendsBox *ptr = (GF_MovieExtendsBox *)s;
if (ptr == NULL) return;
if (ptr->mehd) gf_isom_box_del((GF_Box*)ptr->mehd);
gf_isom_box_array_del(ptr->TrackExList);
gf_isom_box_array_del(ptr->TrackExPropList);
gf_free(ptr);
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,276
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void inode_lru_list_add(struct inode *inode)
{
if (list_lru_add(&inode->i_sb->s_inode_lru, &inode->i_lru))
this_cpu_inc(nr_unused);
else
inode->i_state |= I_REFERENCED;
}
Commit Message: Fix up non-directory creation in SGID directories
sgid directories have special semantics, making newly created files in
the directory belong to the group of the directory, and newly created
subdirectories will also become sgid. This is historically used for
group-shared directories.
But group directories writable by non-group members should not imply
that such non-group members can magically join the group, so make sure
to clear the sgid bit on non-directories for non-members (but remember
that sgid without group execute means "mandatory locking", just to
confuse things even more).
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 79,843
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static __be32 nfsd4_get_session_locked(struct nfsd4_session *ses)
{
__be32 status;
if (is_session_dead(ses))
return nfserr_badsession;
status = get_client_locked(ses->se_client);
if (status)
return status;
atomic_inc(&ses->se_ref);
return nfs_ok;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 65,600
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: String HTMLInputElement::selectionDirectionForBinding(ExceptionCode& ec) const
{
if (!canHaveSelection()) {
ec = INVALID_STATE_ERR;
return String();
}
return HTMLTextFormControlElement::selectionDirection();
}
Commit Message: Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 112,982
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int hwahc_probe(struct usb_interface *usb_iface,
const struct usb_device_id *id)
{
int result;
struct usb_hcd *usb_hcd;
struct wusbhc *wusbhc;
struct hwahc *hwahc;
struct device *dev = &usb_iface->dev;
result = -ENOMEM;
usb_hcd = usb_create_hcd(&hwahc_hc_driver, &usb_iface->dev, "wusb-hwa");
if (usb_hcd == NULL) {
dev_err(dev, "unable to allocate instance\n");
goto error_alloc;
}
usb_hcd->wireless = 1;
usb_hcd->self.sg_tablesize = ~0;
wusbhc = usb_hcd_to_wusbhc(usb_hcd);
hwahc = container_of(wusbhc, struct hwahc, wusbhc);
hwahc_init(hwahc);
result = hwahc_create(hwahc, usb_iface, id->driver_info);
if (result < 0) {
dev_err(dev, "Cannot initialize internals: %d\n", result);
goto error_hwahc_create;
}
result = usb_add_hcd(usb_hcd, 0, 0);
if (result < 0) {
dev_err(dev, "Cannot add HCD: %d\n", result);
goto error_add_hcd;
}
device_wakeup_enable(usb_hcd->self.controller);
result = wusbhc_b_create(&hwahc->wusbhc);
if (result < 0) {
dev_err(dev, "Cannot setup phase B of WUSBHC: %d\n", result);
goto error_wusbhc_b_create;
}
return 0;
error_wusbhc_b_create:
usb_remove_hcd(usb_hcd);
error_add_hcd:
hwahc_destroy(hwahc);
error_hwahc_create:
usb_put_hcd(usb_hcd);
error_alloc:
return result;
}
Commit Message: USB: check usb_get_extra_descriptor for proper size
When reading an extra descriptor, we need to properly check the minimum
and maximum size allowed, to prevent from invalid data being sent by a
device.
Reported-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Co-developed-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 75,592
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::DidChangeLoadProgress() {
double load_progress = frame_tree_.load_progress();
base::TimeDelta min_delay =
base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(kMinimumDelayBetweenLoadingUpdatesMS);
bool delay_elapsed = loading_last_progress_update_.is_null() ||
base::TimeTicks::Now() - loading_last_progress_update_ > min_delay;
if (load_progress == 0.0 || load_progress == 1.0 || delay_elapsed) {
loading_weak_factory_.InvalidateWeakPtrs();
SendChangeLoadProgress();
if (load_progress == 1.0)
ResetLoadProgressState();
return;
}
if (loading_weak_factory_.HasWeakPtrs())
return;
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostDelayedTask(
FROM_HERE, base::Bind(&WebContentsImpl::SendChangeLoadProgress,
loading_weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()),
min_delay);
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 131,792
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct iriap_cb *iriap_open(__u8 slsap_sel, int mode, void *priv,
CONFIRM_CALLBACK callback)
{
struct iriap_cb *self;
IRDA_DEBUG(2, "%s()\n", __func__);
self = kzalloc(sizeof(*self), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!self) {
IRDA_WARNING("%s: Unable to kmalloc!\n", __func__);
return NULL;
}
/*
* Initialize instance
*/
self->magic = IAS_MAGIC;
self->mode = mode;
if (mode == IAS_CLIENT)
iriap_register_lsap(self, slsap_sel, mode);
self->confirm = callback;
self->priv = priv;
/* iriap_getvaluebyclass_request() will construct packets before
* we connect, so this must have a sane value... Jean II */
self->max_header_size = LMP_MAX_HEADER;
init_timer(&self->watchdog_timer);
hashbin_insert(iriap, (irda_queue_t *) self, (long) self, NULL);
/* Initialize state machines */
iriap_next_client_state(self, S_DISCONNECT);
iriap_next_call_state(self, S_MAKE_CALL);
iriap_next_server_state(self, R_DISCONNECT);
iriap_next_r_connect_state(self, R_WAITING);
return self;
}
Commit Message: irda: validate peer name and attribute lengths
Length fields provided by a peer for names and attributes may be longer
than the destination array sizes. Validate lengths to prevent stack
buffer overflows.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 35,211
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void *fpid_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos)
{
mutex_lock(&ftrace_lock);
if (list_empty(&ftrace_pids) && (!*pos))
return (void *) 1;
return seq_list_start(&ftrace_pids, *pos);
}
Commit Message: tracing: Fix possible NULL pointer dereferences
Currently set_ftrace_pid and set_graph_function files use seq_lseek
for their fops. However seq_open() is called only for FMODE_READ in
the fops->open() so that if an user tries to seek one of those file
when she open it for writing, it sees NULL seq_file and then panic.
It can be easily reproduced with following command:
$ cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
$ echo 1234 | sudo tee -a set_ftrace_pid
In this example, GNU coreutils' tee opens the file with fopen(, "a")
and then the fopen() internally calls lseek().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365663302-2170-1-git-send-email-namhyung@kernel.org
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung.kim@lge.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 30,127
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool IsReparentedNode(const AXNode* node) {
return IsNewNode(node) && IsRemovedNode(node);
}
Commit Message: Position info (item n of m) incorrect if hidden focusable items in list
Bug: 836997
Change-Id: I971fa7076f72d51829b36af8e379260d48ca25ec
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1450235
Commit-Queue: Aaron Leventhal <aleventhal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nektarios Paisios <nektar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#628890}
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 130,269
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool RenderMessageFilter::OffTheRecord() const {
return incognito_;
}
Commit Message: Follow-on fixes and naming changes for https://codereview.chromium.org/12086077/
BUG=172573
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12177018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180600 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-287
| 0
| 116,839
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool ovl_workdir_ok(struct dentry *workdir, struct dentry *upperdir)
{
bool ok = false;
if (workdir != upperdir) {
ok = (lock_rename(workdir, upperdir) == NULL);
unlock_rename(workdir, upperdir);
}
return ok;
}
Commit Message: fs: limit filesystem stacking depth
Add a simple read-only counter to super_block that indicates how deep this
is in the stack of filesystems. Previously ecryptfs was the only stackable
filesystem and it explicitly disallowed multiple layers of itself.
Overlayfs, however, can be stacked recursively and also may be stacked
on top of ecryptfs or vice versa.
To limit the kernel stack usage we must limit the depth of the
filesystem stack. Initially the limit is set to 2.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 74,610
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int qeth_check_qdio_errors(struct qeth_card *card, struct qdio_buffer *buf,
unsigned int qdio_error, const char *dbftext)
{
if (qdio_error) {
QETH_CARD_TEXT(card, 2, dbftext);
QETH_CARD_TEXT_(card, 2, " F15=%02X",
buf->element[15].sflags);
QETH_CARD_TEXT_(card, 2, " F14=%02X",
buf->element[14].sflags);
QETH_CARD_TEXT_(card, 2, " qerr=%X", qdio_error);
if ((buf->element[15].sflags) == 0x12) {
card->stats.rx_dropped++;
return 0;
} else
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: qeth: avoid buffer overflow in snmp ioctl
Check user-defined length in snmp ioctl request and allow request
only if it fits into a qeth command buffer.
Signed-off-by: Ursula Braun <ursula.braun@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Frank Blaschka <frank.blaschka@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heicars2@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 28,486
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static const char *register_type_checker_block(cmd_parms *cmd, void *_cfg,
const char *line)
{
return register_named_block_function_hook("type_checker", cmd, _cfg,
line);
}
Commit Message: Merge r1642499 from trunk:
*) SECURITY: CVE-2014-8109 (cve.mitre.org)
mod_lua: Fix handling of the Require line when a LuaAuthzProvider is
used in multiple Require directives with different arguments.
PR57204 [Edward Lu <Chaosed0 gmail.com>]
Submitted By: Edward Lu
Committed By: covener
Submitted by: covener
Reviewed/backported by: jim
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/branches/2.4.x@1642861 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 35,745
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SettingLevelBubbleView* view() { return view_; }
Commit Message: chromeos: Move audio, power, and UI files into subdirs.
This moves more files from chrome/browser/chromeos/ into
subdirectories.
BUG=chromium-os:22896
TEST=did chrome os builds both with and without aura
TBR=sky
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9125006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 109,331
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void cprt_del(GF_Box *s)
{
GF_CopyrightBox *ptr = (GF_CopyrightBox *) s;
if (ptr == NULL) return;
if (ptr->notice)
gf_free(ptr->notice);
gf_free(ptr);
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,024
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void process_get_command(conn *c, token_t *tokens, size_t ntokens, bool return_cas) {
char *key;
size_t nkey;
int i = 0;
item *it;
token_t *key_token = &tokens[KEY_TOKEN];
char *suffix;
assert(c != NULL);
do {
while(key_token->length != 0) {
key = key_token->value;
nkey = key_token->length;
if(nkey > KEY_MAX_LENGTH) {
out_string(c, "CLIENT_ERROR bad command line format");
while (i-- > 0) {
item_remove(*(c->ilist + i));
}
return;
}
it = item_get(key, nkey, c, DO_UPDATE);
if (settings.detail_enabled) {
stats_prefix_record_get(key, nkey, NULL != it);
}
if (it) {
if (i >= c->isize) {
item **new_list = realloc(c->ilist, sizeof(item *) * c->isize * 2);
if (new_list) {
c->isize *= 2;
c->ilist = new_list;
} else {
STATS_LOCK();
stats.malloc_fails++;
STATS_UNLOCK();
item_remove(it);
break;
}
}
/*
* Construct the response. Each hit adds three elements to the
* outgoing data list:
* "VALUE "
* key
* " " + flags + " " + data length + "\r\n" + data (with \r\n)
*/
if (return_cas || !settings.inline_ascii_response)
{
MEMCACHED_COMMAND_GET(c->sfd, ITEM_key(it), it->nkey,
it->nbytes, ITEM_get_cas(it));
/* Goofy mid-flight realloc. */
if (i >= c->suffixsize) {
char **new_suffix_list = realloc(c->suffixlist,
sizeof(char *) * c->suffixsize * 2);
if (new_suffix_list) {
c->suffixsize *= 2;
c->suffixlist = new_suffix_list;
} else {
STATS_LOCK();
stats.malloc_fails++;
STATS_UNLOCK();
item_remove(it);
break;
}
}
suffix = do_cache_alloc(c->thread->suffix_cache);
if (suffix == NULL) {
STATS_LOCK();
stats.malloc_fails++;
STATS_UNLOCK();
out_of_memory(c, "SERVER_ERROR out of memory making CAS suffix");
item_remove(it);
while (i-- > 0) {
item_remove(*(c->ilist + i));
}
return;
}
*(c->suffixlist + i) = suffix;
int suffix_len = make_ascii_get_suffix(suffix, it, return_cas);
if (add_iov(c, "VALUE ", 6) != 0 ||
add_iov(c, ITEM_key(it), it->nkey) != 0 ||
(settings.inline_ascii_response && add_iov(c, ITEM_suffix(it), it->nsuffix - 2) != 0) ||
add_iov(c, suffix, suffix_len) != 0)
{
item_remove(it);
break;
}
if ((it->it_flags & ITEM_CHUNKED) == 0) {
add_iov(c, ITEM_data(it), it->nbytes);
} else if (add_chunked_item_iovs(c, it, it->nbytes) != 0) {
item_remove(it);
break;
}
}
else
{
MEMCACHED_COMMAND_GET(c->sfd, ITEM_key(it), it->nkey,
it->nbytes, ITEM_get_cas(it));
if (add_iov(c, "VALUE ", 6) != 0 ||
add_iov(c, ITEM_key(it), it->nkey) != 0)
{
item_remove(it);
break;
}
if ((it->it_flags & ITEM_CHUNKED) == 0)
{
if (add_iov(c, ITEM_suffix(it), it->nsuffix + it->nbytes) != 0)
{
item_remove(it);
break;
}
} else if (add_iov(c, ITEM_suffix(it), it->nsuffix) != 0 ||
add_chunked_item_iovs(c, it, it->nbytes) != 0) {
item_remove(it);
break;
}
}
if (settings.verbose > 1) {
int ii;
fprintf(stderr, ">%d sending key ", c->sfd);
for (ii = 0; ii < it->nkey; ++ii) {
fprintf(stderr, "%c", key[ii]);
}
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
}
/* item_get() has incremented it->refcount for us */
pthread_mutex_lock(&c->thread->stats.mutex);
c->thread->stats.slab_stats[ITEM_clsid(it)].get_hits++;
c->thread->stats.get_cmds++;
pthread_mutex_unlock(&c->thread->stats.mutex);
*(c->ilist + i) = it;
i++;
} else {
pthread_mutex_lock(&c->thread->stats.mutex);
c->thread->stats.get_misses++;
c->thread->stats.get_cmds++;
pthread_mutex_unlock(&c->thread->stats.mutex);
MEMCACHED_COMMAND_GET(c->sfd, key, nkey, -1, 0);
}
key_token++;
}
/*
* If the command string hasn't been fully processed, get the next set
* of tokens.
*/
if(key_token->value != NULL) {
ntokens = tokenize_command(key_token->value, tokens, MAX_TOKENS);
key_token = tokens;
}
} while(key_token->value != NULL);
c->icurr = c->ilist;
c->ileft = i;
if (return_cas || !settings.inline_ascii_response) {
c->suffixcurr = c->suffixlist;
c->suffixleft = i;
}
if (settings.verbose > 1)
fprintf(stderr, ">%d END\n", c->sfd);
/*
If the loop was terminated because of out-of-memory, it is not
reliable to add END\r\n to the buffer, because it might not end
in \r\n. So we send SERVER_ERROR instead.
*/
if (key_token->value != NULL || add_iov(c, "END\r\n", 5) != 0
|| (IS_UDP(c->transport) && build_udp_headers(c) != 0)) {
out_of_memory(c, "SERVER_ERROR out of memory writing get response");
}
else {
conn_set_state(c, conn_mwrite);
c->msgcurr = 0;
}
}
Commit Message: Don't overflow item refcount on get
Counts as a miss if the refcount is too high. ASCII multigets are the only
time refcounts can be held for so long.
doing a dirty read of refcount. is aligned.
trying to avoid adding an extra refcount branch for all calls of item_get due
to performance. might be able to move it in there after logging refactoring
simplifies some of the branches.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 1
| 168,943
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int crypto_register_shashes(struct shash_alg *algs, int count)
{
int i, ret;
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
ret = crypto_register_shash(&algs[i]);
if (ret)
goto err;
}
return 0;
err:
for (--i; i >= 0; --i)
crypto_unregister_shash(&algs[i]);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 31,336
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int RenderBox::pixelSnappedOffsetHeight() const
{
return snapSizeToPixel(offsetHeight(), y() + clientTop());
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 116,581
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void vpid_sync_vcpu_global(void)
{
if (cpu_has_vmx_invvpid_global())
__invvpid(VMX_VPID_EXTENT_ALL_CONTEXT, 0, 0);
}
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 37,322
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool nested_svm_vmrun_msrpm(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
{
/*
* This function merges the msr permission bitmaps of kvm and the
* nested vmcb. It is optimized in that it only merges the parts where
* the kvm msr permission bitmap may contain zero bits
*/
int i;
if (!(svm->nested.intercept & (1ULL << INTERCEPT_MSR_PROT)))
return true;
for (i = 0; i < MSRPM_OFFSETS; i++) {
u32 value, p;
u64 offset;
if (msrpm_offsets[i] == 0xffffffff)
break;
p = msrpm_offsets[i];
offset = svm->nested.vmcb_msrpm + (p * 4);
if (kvm_read_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm, offset, &value, 4))
return false;
svm->nested.msrpm[p] = svm->msrpm[p] | value;
}
svm->vmcb->control.msrpm_base_pa = __pa(svm->nested.msrpm);
return true;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Check non-canonical addresses upon WRMSR
Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).
Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD. To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.
Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:
According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."
According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers. If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."
This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 37,798
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void StoreExistingGroup() {
PushNextTask(
base::BindOnce(&AppCacheStorageImplTest::Verify_StoreExistingGroup,
base::Unretained(this)));
MakeCacheAndGroup(kManifestUrl, 1, 1, true);
EXPECT_EQ(kDefaultEntrySize, storage()->usage_map_[kOrigin]);
cache2_ = new AppCache(storage(), 2);
cache2_->AddEntry(kEntryUrl, AppCacheEntry(AppCacheEntry::MASTER, 1,
kDefaultEntrySize + 100));
storage()->StoreGroupAndNewestCache(group_.get(), cache2_.get(),
delegate());
EXPECT_FALSE(delegate()->stored_group_success_);
}
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 1
| 172,989
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void nfsd4_bump_seqid(struct nfsd4_compound_state *cstate, __be32 nfserr)
{
struct nfs4_stateowner *so = cstate->replay_owner;
if (nfserr == nfserr_replay_me)
return;
if (!seqid_mutating_err(ntohl(nfserr))) {
nfsd4_cstate_clear_replay(cstate);
return;
}
if (!so)
return;
if (so->so_is_open_owner)
release_last_closed_stateid(openowner(so));
so->so_seqid++;
return;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 65,558
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: uint64_t address_space_ldq_le(AddressSpace *as, hwaddr addr,
MemTxAttrs attrs, MemTxResult *result)
{
return address_space_ldq_internal(as, addr, attrs, result,
DEVICE_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 14,295
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PrintPreviewHandler::HandleClosePreviewTab(const ListValue* /*args*/) {
ReportStats();
ReportUserActionHistogram(CANCEL);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS("PrintPreview.RegeneratePreviewRequest.BeforeCancel",
regenerate_preview_request_count_);
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 105,800
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::IncrementCapturerCount(const gfx::Size& capture_size) {
DCHECK(!is_being_destroyed_);
++capturer_count_;
DVLOG(1) << "There are now " << capturer_count_
<< " capturing(s) of WebContentsImpl@" << this;
if (!capture_size.IsEmpty() && preferred_size_for_capture_.IsEmpty()) {
preferred_size_for_capture_ = capture_size;
OnPreferredSizeChanged(preferred_size_);
}
WasUnOccluded();
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 131,887
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void tg3_self_test(struct net_device *dev, struct ethtool_test *etest,
u64 *data)
{
struct tg3 *tp = netdev_priv(dev);
bool doextlpbk = etest->flags & ETH_TEST_FL_EXTERNAL_LB;
if ((tp->phy_flags & TG3_PHYFLG_IS_LOW_POWER) &&
tg3_power_up(tp)) {
etest->flags |= ETH_TEST_FL_FAILED;
memset(data, 1, sizeof(u64) * TG3_NUM_TEST);
return;
}
memset(data, 0, sizeof(u64) * TG3_NUM_TEST);
if (tg3_test_nvram(tp) != 0) {
etest->flags |= ETH_TEST_FL_FAILED;
data[TG3_NVRAM_TEST] = 1;
}
if (!doextlpbk && tg3_test_link(tp)) {
etest->flags |= ETH_TEST_FL_FAILED;
data[TG3_LINK_TEST] = 1;
}
if (etest->flags & ETH_TEST_FL_OFFLINE) {
int err, err2 = 0, irq_sync = 0;
if (netif_running(dev)) {
tg3_phy_stop(tp);
tg3_netif_stop(tp);
irq_sync = 1;
}
tg3_full_lock(tp, irq_sync);
tg3_halt(tp, RESET_KIND_SUSPEND, 1);
err = tg3_nvram_lock(tp);
tg3_halt_cpu(tp, RX_CPU_BASE);
if (!tg3_flag(tp, 5705_PLUS))
tg3_halt_cpu(tp, TX_CPU_BASE);
if (!err)
tg3_nvram_unlock(tp);
if (tp->phy_flags & TG3_PHYFLG_MII_SERDES)
tg3_phy_reset(tp);
if (tg3_test_registers(tp) != 0) {
etest->flags |= ETH_TEST_FL_FAILED;
data[TG3_REGISTER_TEST] = 1;
}
if (tg3_test_memory(tp) != 0) {
etest->flags |= ETH_TEST_FL_FAILED;
data[TG3_MEMORY_TEST] = 1;
}
if (doextlpbk)
etest->flags |= ETH_TEST_FL_EXTERNAL_LB_DONE;
if (tg3_test_loopback(tp, data, doextlpbk))
etest->flags |= ETH_TEST_FL_FAILED;
tg3_full_unlock(tp);
if (tg3_test_interrupt(tp) != 0) {
etest->flags |= ETH_TEST_FL_FAILED;
data[TG3_INTERRUPT_TEST] = 1;
}
tg3_full_lock(tp, 0);
tg3_halt(tp, RESET_KIND_SHUTDOWN, 1);
if (netif_running(dev)) {
tg3_flag_set(tp, INIT_COMPLETE);
err2 = tg3_restart_hw(tp, 1);
if (!err2)
tg3_netif_start(tp);
}
tg3_full_unlock(tp);
if (irq_sync && !err2)
tg3_phy_start(tp);
}
if (tp->phy_flags & TG3_PHYFLG_IS_LOW_POWER)
tg3_power_down(tp);
}
Commit Message: tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <oded@privatecore.com>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matt Carlson <mcarlson@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 32,739
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void __init sched_init(void)
{
int i, j;
unsigned long alloc_size = 0, ptr;
#ifdef CONFIG_FAIR_GROUP_SCHED
alloc_size += 2 * nr_cpu_ids * sizeof(void **);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_RT_GROUP_SCHED
alloc_size += 2 * nr_cpu_ids * sizeof(void **);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK
alloc_size += num_possible_cpus() * cpumask_size();
#endif
if (alloc_size) {
ptr = (unsigned long)kzalloc(alloc_size, GFP_NOWAIT);
#ifdef CONFIG_FAIR_GROUP_SCHED
root_task_group.se = (struct sched_entity **)ptr;
ptr += nr_cpu_ids * sizeof(void **);
root_task_group.cfs_rq = (struct cfs_rq **)ptr;
ptr += nr_cpu_ids * sizeof(void **);
#endif /* CONFIG_FAIR_GROUP_SCHED */
#ifdef CONFIG_RT_GROUP_SCHED
root_task_group.rt_se = (struct sched_rt_entity **)ptr;
ptr += nr_cpu_ids * sizeof(void **);
root_task_group.rt_rq = (struct rt_rq **)ptr;
ptr += nr_cpu_ids * sizeof(void **);
#endif /* CONFIG_RT_GROUP_SCHED */
#ifdef CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK
for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
per_cpu(load_balance_tmpmask, i) = (void *)ptr;
ptr += cpumask_size();
}
#endif /* CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK */
}
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
init_defrootdomain();
#endif
init_rt_bandwidth(&def_rt_bandwidth,
global_rt_period(), global_rt_runtime());
#ifdef CONFIG_RT_GROUP_SCHED
init_rt_bandwidth(&root_task_group.rt_bandwidth,
global_rt_period(), global_rt_runtime());
#endif /* CONFIG_RT_GROUP_SCHED */
#ifdef CONFIG_CGROUP_SCHED
list_add(&root_task_group.list, &task_groups);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&root_task_group.children);
autogroup_init(&init_task);
#endif /* CONFIG_CGROUP_SCHED */
for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
struct rq *rq;
rq = cpu_rq(i);
raw_spin_lock_init(&rq->lock);
rq->nr_running = 0;
rq->calc_load_active = 0;
rq->calc_load_update = jiffies + LOAD_FREQ;
init_cfs_rq(&rq->cfs, rq);
init_rt_rq(&rq->rt, rq);
#ifdef CONFIG_FAIR_GROUP_SCHED
root_task_group.shares = root_task_group_load;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list);
/*
* How much cpu bandwidth does root_task_group get?
*
* In case of task-groups formed thr' the cgroup filesystem, it
* gets 100% of the cpu resources in the system. This overall
* system cpu resource is divided among the tasks of
* root_task_group and its child task-groups in a fair manner,
* based on each entity's (task or task-group's) weight
* (se->load.weight).
*
* In other words, if root_task_group has 10 tasks of weight
* 1024) and two child groups A0 and A1 (of weight 1024 each),
* then A0's share of the cpu resource is:
*
* A0's bandwidth = 1024 / (10*1024 + 1024 + 1024) = 8.33%
*
* We achieve this by letting root_task_group's tasks sit
* directly in rq->cfs (i.e root_task_group->se[] = NULL).
*/
init_tg_cfs_entry(&root_task_group, &rq->cfs, NULL, i, NULL);
#endif /* CONFIG_FAIR_GROUP_SCHED */
rq->rt.rt_runtime = def_rt_bandwidth.rt_runtime;
#ifdef CONFIG_RT_GROUP_SCHED
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&rq->leaf_rt_rq_list);
init_tg_rt_entry(&root_task_group, &rq->rt, NULL, i, NULL);
#endif
for (j = 0; j < CPU_LOAD_IDX_MAX; j++)
rq->cpu_load[j] = 0;
rq->last_load_update_tick = jiffies;
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
rq->sd = NULL;
rq->rd = NULL;
rq->cpu_power = SCHED_POWER_SCALE;
rq->post_schedule = 0;
rq->active_balance = 0;
rq->next_balance = jiffies;
rq->push_cpu = 0;
rq->cpu = i;
rq->online = 0;
rq->idle_stamp = 0;
rq->avg_idle = 2*sysctl_sched_migration_cost;
rq_attach_root(rq, &def_root_domain);
#ifdef CONFIG_NO_HZ
rq->nohz_balance_kick = 0;
init_sched_softirq_csd(&per_cpu(remote_sched_softirq_cb, i));
#endif
#endif
init_rq_hrtick(rq);
atomic_set(&rq->nr_iowait, 0);
}
set_load_weight(&init_task);
#ifdef CONFIG_PREEMPT_NOTIFIERS
INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&init_task.preempt_notifiers);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
open_softirq(SCHED_SOFTIRQ, run_rebalance_domains);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_RT_MUTEXES
plist_head_init_raw(&init_task.pi_waiters, &init_task.pi_lock);
#endif
/*
* The boot idle thread does lazy MMU switching as well:
*/
atomic_inc(&init_mm.mm_count);
enter_lazy_tlb(&init_mm, current);
/*
* Make us the idle thread. Technically, schedule() should not be
* called from this thread, however somewhere below it might be,
* but because we are the idle thread, we just pick up running again
* when this runqueue becomes "idle".
*/
init_idle(current, smp_processor_id());
calc_load_update = jiffies + LOAD_FREQ;
/*
* During early bootup we pretend to be a normal task:
*/
current->sched_class = &fair_sched_class;
/* Allocate the nohz_cpu_mask if CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK */
zalloc_cpumask_var(&nohz_cpu_mask, GFP_NOWAIT);
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
zalloc_cpumask_var(&sched_domains_tmpmask, GFP_NOWAIT);
#ifdef CONFIG_NO_HZ
zalloc_cpumask_var(&nohz.idle_cpus_mask, GFP_NOWAIT);
alloc_cpumask_var(&nohz.grp_idle_mask, GFP_NOWAIT);
atomic_set(&nohz.load_balancer, nr_cpu_ids);
atomic_set(&nohz.first_pick_cpu, nr_cpu_ids);
atomic_set(&nohz.second_pick_cpu, nr_cpu_ids);
#endif
/* May be allocated at isolcpus cmdline parse time */
if (cpu_isolated_map == NULL)
zalloc_cpumask_var(&cpu_isolated_map, GFP_NOWAIT);
#endif /* SMP */
scheduler_running = 1;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 26,332
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: H264PictureToVaapiDecodeSurface(const scoped_refptr<H264Picture>& pic) {
VaapiH264Picture* vaapi_pic = pic->AsVaapiH264Picture();
CHECK(vaapi_pic);
return vaapi_pic->dec_surface();
}
Commit Message: vaapi vda: Delete owned objects on worker thread in Cleanup()
This CL adds a SEQUENCE_CHECKER to Vaapi*Accelerator classes, and
posts the destruction of those objects to the appropriate thread on
Cleanup().
Also makes {H264,VP8,VP9}Picture RefCountedThreadSafe, see miu@
comment in
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/794091#message-a64bed985cfaf8a19499a517bb110a7ce581dc0f
TEST=play back VP9/VP8/H264 w/ simplechrome on soraka, Release build
unstripped, let video play for a few seconds then navigate back; no
crashes. Unittests as before:
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp9:320:240:250:250:35:150:12
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp8:320:240:250:250:35:150:11
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.h264:320:240:250:258:35:150:1
Bug: 789160
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I7d96aaf89c92bf46f00c8b8b36798e057a842ed2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/794091
Reviewed-by: Pawel Osciak <posciak@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Miguel Casas <mcasas@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#523372}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 1
| 172,803
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: get_user_groups (const gchar *user,
gid_t group,
gid_t **groups)
{
gint res;
gint ngroups;
ngroups = 0;
res = getgrouplist (user, group, NULL, &ngroups);
g_debug ("user %s has %d groups\n", user, ngroups);
*groups = g_new (gid_t, ngroups);
res = getgrouplist (user, group, *groups, &ngroups);
return res;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 10,384
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool omx_video::omx_cmd_queue::insert_entry(unsigned long p1, unsigned long p2, unsigned long id)
{
bool ret = true;
if (m_size < OMX_CORE_CONTROL_CMDQ_SIZE) {
m_q[m_write].id = id;
m_q[m_write].param1 = p1;
m_q[m_write].param2 = p2;
m_write++;
m_size ++;
if (m_write >= OMX_CORE_CONTROL_CMDQ_SIZE) {
m_write = 0;
}
} else {
ret = false;
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR!!! Command Queue Full");
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: add checks before accessing heap pointers
Heap pointers do not point to user virtual addresses in case
of secure session.
Set them to NULL and add checks to avoid accesing them
Bug: 28815329
Bug: 28920116
Change-Id: I94fd5808e753b58654d65e175d3857ef46ffba26
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 159,186
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cleanup (pam_handle_t *pamh UNUSED, void *data, int err UNUSED)
{
free (data);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 5,596
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int do_sigtimedwait(const sigset_t *which, siginfo_t *info,
const struct timespec *ts)
{
ktime_t *to = NULL, timeout = KTIME_MAX;
struct task_struct *tsk = current;
sigset_t mask = *which;
int sig, ret = 0;
if (ts) {
if (!timespec_valid(ts))
return -EINVAL;
timeout = timespec_to_ktime(*ts);
to = &timeout;
}
/*
* Invert the set of allowed signals to get those we want to block.
*/
sigdelsetmask(&mask, sigmask(SIGKILL) | sigmask(SIGSTOP));
signotset(&mask);
spin_lock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
sig = dequeue_signal(tsk, &mask, info);
if (!sig && timeout) {
/*
* None ready, temporarily unblock those we're interested
* while we are sleeping in so that we'll be awakened when
* they arrive. Unblocking is always fine, we can avoid
* set_current_blocked().
*/
tsk->real_blocked = tsk->blocked;
sigandsets(&tsk->blocked, &tsk->blocked, &mask);
recalc_sigpending();
spin_unlock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
__set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
ret = freezable_schedule_hrtimeout_range(to, tsk->timer_slack_ns,
HRTIMER_MODE_REL);
spin_lock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
__set_task_blocked(tsk, &tsk->real_blocked);
sigemptyset(&tsk->real_blocked);
sig = dequeue_signal(tsk, &mask, info);
}
spin_unlock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
if (sig)
return sig;
return ret ? -EINTR : -EAGAIN;
}
Commit Message: kernel/signal.c: avoid undefined behaviour in kill_something_info
When running kill(72057458746458112, 0) in userspace I hit the following
issue.
UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in kernel/signal.c:1462:11
negation of -2147483648 cannot be represented in type 'int':
CPU: 226 PID: 9849 Comm: test Tainted: G B ---- ------- 3.10.0-327.53.58.70.x86_64_ubsan+ #116
Hardware name: Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. RH8100 V3/BC61PBIA, BIOS BLHSV028 11/11/2014
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x19/0x1b
ubsan_epilogue+0xd/0x50
__ubsan_handle_negate_overflow+0x109/0x14e
SYSC_kill+0x43e/0x4d0
SyS_kill+0xe/0x10
system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Add code to avoid the UBSAN detection.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: tweak comment]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1496670008-59084-1-git-send-email-zhongjiang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: zhongjiang <zhongjiang@huawei.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Xishi Qiu <qiuxishi@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 83,224
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool NeedsClipPathClip(const LayoutObject& object) {
if (!object.StyleRef().ClipPath())
return false;
return object.FirstFragment().ClipPathPath();
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 125,430
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool HTMLMediaElement::HasSelectedVideoTrack() {
DCHECK(RuntimeEnabledFeatures::BackgroundVideoTrackOptimizationEnabled());
return video_tracks_ && video_tracks_->selectedIndex() != -1;
}
Commit Message: defeat cors attacks on audio/video tags
Neutralize error messages and fire no progress events
until media metadata has been loaded for media loaded
from cross-origin locations.
Bug: 828265, 826187
Change-Id: Iaf15ef38676403687d6a913cbdc84f2d70a6f5c6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1015794
Reviewed-by: Mounir Lamouri <mlamouri@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dale Curtis <dalecurtis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#557312}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 154,124
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: explicit ProtocolHandlerThrottle(
const scoped_refptr<ProtocolHandlerRegistry::IOThreadDelegate>&
protocol_handler_registry)
: protocol_handler_registry_(protocol_handler_registry) {}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 142,735
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::string DevToolsAgentHostImpl::GetOpenerId() {
return std::string();
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow chrome.debugger to attach to web ui pages
If the page navigates to web ui, we force detach the debugger extension.
TBR=alexclarke@chromium.org
Bug: 798222
Change-Id: Idb46c2f59e839388397a8dfa6ce2e2a897698df3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/935961
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540916}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 155,752
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BlockUntilBrowsingDataRemoved(const base::Time& delete_begin,
const base::Time& delete_end,
int remove_mask,
bool include_protected_origins) {
int origin_type_mask =
content::BrowsingDataRemover::ORIGIN_TYPE_UNPROTECTED_WEB;
if (include_protected_origins) {
origin_type_mask |=
content::BrowsingDataRemover::ORIGIN_TYPE_PROTECTED_WEB;
}
content::BrowsingDataRemoverCompletionObserver completion_observer(
remover_);
remover_->RemoveAndReply(
delete_begin, delete_end, remove_mask, origin_type_mask,
&completion_observer);
base::TaskScheduler::GetInstance()->FlushForTesting();
completion_observer.BlockUntilCompletion();
}
Commit Message: Don't downcast DownloadManagerDelegate to ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate.
DownloadManager has public SetDelegate method and tests and or other subsystems
can install their own implementations of the delegate.
Bug: 805905
Change-Id: Iecf1e0aceada0e1048bed1e2d2ceb29ca64295b8
TBR: tests updated to follow the API change.
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/894702
Reviewed-by: David Vallet <dvallet@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Min Qin <qinmin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533515}
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 154,255
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SetupMockReader(
bool valid_info, bool valid_data, bool valid_size) {
net::HttpResponseInfo* info = valid_info ? MakeMockResponseInfo() : nullptr;
int info_size = info ? GetResponseInfoSize(info) : 0;
const char* data = valid_data ? kMockBody : nullptr;
int data_size = valid_size ? kMockBodySize : 3;
mock_storage()->SimulateResponseReader(
new MockResponseReader(kMockResponseId, info, info_size,
data, data_size));
}
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 151,320
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: sshpkt_get_u32(struct ssh *ssh, u_int32_t *valp)
{
return sshbuf_get_u32(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 13,014
|
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.