instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PDFiumEngine::GetTextRunInfo(int page_index,
int start_char_index,
uint32_t* out_len,
double* out_font_size,
pp::FloatRect* out_bounds) {
DCHECK(page_index >= 0 && page_index < static_cast<int>(pages_.size()));
return pages_[page_index]->GetTextRunInfo(start_char_index, out_len,
out_font_size, out_bounds);
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Defer page unloading in JS callback.
One of the callbacks from PDFium JavaScript into the embedder is to get the
current page number. In Chromium, this will trigger a call to
CalculateMostVisiblePage that method will determine the visible pages and unload
any non-visible pages. But, if the originating JS is on a non-visible page
we'll delete the page and annotations associated with that page. This will
cause issues as we are currently working with those objects when the JavaScript
returns.
This Cl defers the page unloading triggered by getting the most visible page
until the next event is handled by the Chromium embedder.
BUG=chromium:653090
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2418533002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#424781}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 140,355
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int trace_module_notify(struct notifier_block *self,
unsigned long val, void *data)
{
struct module *mod = data;
switch (val) {
case MODULE_STATE_COMING:
trace_module_add_evals(mod);
break;
case MODULE_STATE_GOING:
trace_module_remove_evals(mod);
break;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 81,414
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ExtensionViewGuest::CanRunInDetachedState() const {
return true;
}
Commit Message: Make extensions use a correct same-origin check.
GURL::GetOrigin does not do the right thing for all types of URLs.
BUG=573317
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1658913002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373381}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 132,989
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: UNCURL_EXPORT int32_t uncurl_parse_url(char *url, struct uncurl_info *uci)
{
memset(uci, 0, sizeof(struct uncurl_info));
return http_parse_url(url, &uci->scheme, &uci->host, &uci->port, &uci->path);
}
Commit Message: origin matching must come at str end
CWE ID: CWE-352
| 0
| 84,335
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static opj_bool pi_next_lrcp(opj_pi_iterator_t * pi)
{
opj_pi_comp_t *comp = NULL;
opj_pi_resolution_t *res = NULL;
long index = 0;
if (!pi->first) {
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
res = &comp->resolutions[pi->resno];
goto LABEL_SKIP;
} else {
pi->first = 0;
}
for (pi->layno = pi->poc.layno0; pi->layno < pi->poc.layno1; pi->layno++) {
for (pi->resno = pi->poc.resno0; pi->resno < pi->poc.resno1;
pi->resno++) {
for (pi->compno = pi->poc.compno0; pi->compno < pi->poc.compno1; pi->compno++) {
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
if (pi->resno >= comp->numresolutions) {
continue;
}
res = &comp->resolutions[pi->resno];
if (!pi->tp_on) {
pi->poc.precno1 = res->pw * res->ph;
}
for (pi->precno = pi->poc.precno0; pi->precno < pi->poc.precno1; pi->precno++) {
index = pi->layno * pi->step_l + pi->resno * pi->step_r + pi->compno *
pi->step_c + pi->precno * pi->step_p;
if (!pi->include[index]) {
pi->include[index] = 1;
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
LABEL_SKIP:
;
}
}
}
}
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
Commit Message: [MJ2] To avoid divisions by zero / undefined behaviour on shift
Signed-off-by: Young_X <YangX92@hotmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 92,235
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool HevcParameterSets::findParam8(uint32_t key, uint8_t *param) {
return findParam(key, param, mParams);
}
Commit Message: Validate lengths in HEVC metadata parsing
Add code to validate the size parameter passed to
HecvParameterSets::addNalUnit(). Previously vulnerable
to decrementing an unsigned past 0, yielding a huge result value.
Bug: 35467107
Test: ran POC, no crash, emitted new "bad length" log entry
Change-Id: Ia169b9edc1e0f7c5302e3c68aa90a54e8863d79e
(cherry picked from commit e0dcf097cc029d056926029a29419e1650cbdf1b)
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 162,390
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool AutocompleteEditModel::AcceptCurrentInstantPreview() {
return InstantController::CommitIfCurrent(controller_->GetInstant());
}
Commit Message: Adds per-provider information to omnibox UMA logs.
Adds a fairly general structure to omnibox logs that can be used to pass information (that's not per-result information) from providers to the UMA logs. Right now it's only used to pass whether the asynchronous pass of a provider has finished, but it will probably be used for other things in the future.
BUG=
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10380007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137288 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 103,822
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void voidMethodDocumentTypeArgMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::voidMethodDocumentTypeArgMethod(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 122,820
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static const QualifiedName& frameOwnerURLAttributeName(const HTMLFrameOwnerElement& frameOwner)
{
return isHTMLObjectElement(frameOwner) ? HTMLNames::dataAttr : HTMLNames::srcAttr;
}
Commit Message: Escape "--" in the page URL at page serialization
This patch makes page serializer to escape the page URL embed into a HTML
comment of result HTML[1] to avoid inserting text as HTML from URL by
introducing a static member function |PageSerialzier::markOfTheWebDeclaration()|
for sharing it between |PageSerialzier| and |WebPageSerialzier| classes.
[1] We use following format for serialized HTML:
saved from url=(${lengthOfURL})${URL}
BUG=503217
TEST=webkit_unit_tests --gtest_filter=PageSerializerTest.markOfTheWebDeclaration
TEST=webkit_unit_tests --gtest_filter=WebPageSerializerTest.fromUrlWithMinusMinu
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1371323003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351736}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 125,341
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: finish_info_provider (NautilusDirectory *directory,
NautilusFile *file,
NautilusInfoProvider *provider)
{
file->details->pending_info_providers =
g_list_remove (file->details->pending_info_providers,
provider);
g_object_unref (provider);
nautilus_directory_async_state_changed (directory);
if (file->details->pending_info_providers == NULL)
{
nautilus_file_info_providers_done (file);
}
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 60,904
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void addrconf_prefix_rcv(struct net_device *dev, u8 *opt, int len, bool sllao)
{
struct prefix_info *pinfo;
__u32 valid_lft;
__u32 prefered_lft;
int addr_type;
struct inet6_dev *in6_dev;
struct net *net = dev_net(dev);
pinfo = (struct prefix_info *) opt;
if (len < sizeof(struct prefix_info)) {
ADBG("addrconf: prefix option too short\n");
return;
}
/*
* Validation checks ([ADDRCONF], page 19)
*/
addr_type = ipv6_addr_type(&pinfo->prefix);
if (addr_type & (IPV6_ADDR_MULTICAST|IPV6_ADDR_LINKLOCAL))
return;
valid_lft = ntohl(pinfo->valid);
prefered_lft = ntohl(pinfo->prefered);
if (prefered_lft > valid_lft) {
net_warn_ratelimited("addrconf: prefix option has invalid lifetime\n");
return;
}
in6_dev = in6_dev_get(dev);
if (in6_dev == NULL) {
net_dbg_ratelimited("addrconf: device %s not configured\n",
dev->name);
return;
}
/*
* Two things going on here:
* 1) Add routes for on-link prefixes
* 2) Configure prefixes with the auto flag set
*/
if (pinfo->onlink) {
struct rt6_info *rt;
unsigned long rt_expires;
/* Avoid arithmetic overflow. Really, we could
* save rt_expires in seconds, likely valid_lft,
* but it would require division in fib gc, that it
* not good.
*/
if (HZ > USER_HZ)
rt_expires = addrconf_timeout_fixup(valid_lft, HZ);
else
rt_expires = addrconf_timeout_fixup(valid_lft, USER_HZ);
if (addrconf_finite_timeout(rt_expires))
rt_expires *= HZ;
rt = addrconf_get_prefix_route(&pinfo->prefix,
pinfo->prefix_len,
dev,
RTF_ADDRCONF | RTF_PREFIX_RT,
RTF_GATEWAY | RTF_DEFAULT);
if (rt) {
/* Autoconf prefix route */
if (valid_lft == 0) {
ip6_del_rt(rt);
rt = NULL;
} else if (addrconf_finite_timeout(rt_expires)) {
/* not infinity */
rt6_set_expires(rt, jiffies + rt_expires);
} else {
rt6_clean_expires(rt);
}
} else if (valid_lft) {
clock_t expires = 0;
int flags = RTF_ADDRCONF | RTF_PREFIX_RT;
if (addrconf_finite_timeout(rt_expires)) {
/* not infinity */
flags |= RTF_EXPIRES;
expires = jiffies_to_clock_t(rt_expires);
}
addrconf_prefix_route(&pinfo->prefix, pinfo->prefix_len,
dev, expires, flags);
}
ip6_rt_put(rt);
}
/* Try to figure out our local address for this prefix */
if (pinfo->autoconf && in6_dev->cnf.autoconf) {
struct inet6_ifaddr *ifp;
struct in6_addr addr;
int create = 0, update_lft = 0;
bool tokenized = false;
if (pinfo->prefix_len == 64) {
memcpy(&addr, &pinfo->prefix, 8);
if (!ipv6_addr_any(&in6_dev->token)) {
read_lock_bh(&in6_dev->lock);
memcpy(addr.s6_addr + 8,
in6_dev->token.s6_addr + 8, 8);
read_unlock_bh(&in6_dev->lock);
tokenized = true;
} else if (ipv6_generate_eui64(addr.s6_addr + 8, dev) &&
ipv6_inherit_eui64(addr.s6_addr + 8, in6_dev)) {
in6_dev_put(in6_dev);
return;
}
goto ok;
}
net_dbg_ratelimited("IPv6 addrconf: prefix with wrong length %d\n",
pinfo->prefix_len);
in6_dev_put(in6_dev);
return;
ok:
ifp = ipv6_get_ifaddr(net, &addr, dev, 1);
if (ifp == NULL && valid_lft) {
int max_addresses = in6_dev->cnf.max_addresses;
u32 addr_flags = 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_OPTIMISTIC_DAD
if (in6_dev->cnf.optimistic_dad &&
!net->ipv6.devconf_all->forwarding && sllao)
addr_flags = IFA_F_OPTIMISTIC;
#endif
/* Do not allow to create too much of autoconfigured
* addresses; this would be too easy way to crash kernel.
*/
if (!max_addresses ||
ipv6_count_addresses(in6_dev) < max_addresses)
ifp = ipv6_add_addr(in6_dev, &addr, NULL,
pinfo->prefix_len,
addr_type&IPV6_ADDR_SCOPE_MASK,
addr_flags, valid_lft,
prefered_lft);
if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(ifp)) {
in6_dev_put(in6_dev);
return;
}
update_lft = 0;
create = 1;
spin_lock_bh(&ifp->lock);
ifp->flags |= IFA_F_MANAGETEMPADDR;
ifp->cstamp = jiffies;
ifp->tokenized = tokenized;
spin_unlock_bh(&ifp->lock);
addrconf_dad_start(ifp);
}
if (ifp) {
u32 flags;
unsigned long now;
u32 stored_lft;
/* update lifetime (RFC2462 5.5.3 e) */
spin_lock(&ifp->lock);
now = jiffies;
if (ifp->valid_lft > (now - ifp->tstamp) / HZ)
stored_lft = ifp->valid_lft - (now - ifp->tstamp) / HZ;
else
stored_lft = 0;
if (!update_lft && !create && stored_lft) {
const u32 minimum_lft = min_t(u32,
stored_lft, MIN_VALID_LIFETIME);
valid_lft = max(valid_lft, minimum_lft);
/* RFC4862 Section 5.5.3e:
* "Note that the preferred lifetime of the
* corresponding address is always reset to
* the Preferred Lifetime in the received
* Prefix Information option, regardless of
* whether the valid lifetime is also reset or
* ignored."
*
* So we should always update prefered_lft here.
*/
update_lft = 1;
}
if (update_lft) {
ifp->valid_lft = valid_lft;
ifp->prefered_lft = prefered_lft;
ifp->tstamp = now;
flags = ifp->flags;
ifp->flags &= ~IFA_F_DEPRECATED;
spin_unlock(&ifp->lock);
if (!(flags&IFA_F_TENTATIVE))
ipv6_ifa_notify(0, ifp);
} else
spin_unlock(&ifp->lock);
manage_tempaddrs(in6_dev, ifp, valid_lft, prefered_lft,
create, now);
in6_ifa_put(ifp);
addrconf_verify();
}
}
inet6_prefix_notify(RTM_NEWPREFIX, in6_dev, pinfo);
in6_dev_put(in6_dev);
}
Commit Message: ipv6: addrconf: validate new MTU before applying it
Currently we don't check if the new MTU is valid or not and this allows
one to configure a smaller than minimum allowed by RFCs or even bigger
than interface own MTU, which is a problem as it may lead to packet
drops.
If you have a daemon like NetworkManager running, this may be exploited
by remote attackers by forging RA packets with an invalid MTU, possibly
leading to a DoS. (NetworkManager currently only validates for values
too small, but not for too big ones.)
The fix is just to make sure the new value is valid. That is, between
IPV6_MIN_MTU and interface's MTU.
Note that similar check is already performed at
ndisc_router_discovery(), for when kernel itself parses the RA.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 41,790
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MessageService::~MessageService() {
STLDeleteContainerPairSecondPointers(channels_.begin(), channels_.end());
channels_.clear();
}
Commit Message: Do not pass URLs in onUpdated events to extensions unless they have the
"tabs" permission.
BUG=168442
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11824004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176406 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 116,006
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Browser::UpdateToolbar(bool should_restore_state) {
window_->UpdateToolbar(chrome::GetActiveTabContents(this),
should_restore_state);
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 117,843
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int perf_event_task_disable(void)
{
struct perf_event_context *ctx;
struct perf_event *event;
mutex_lock(¤t->perf_event_mutex);
list_for_each_entry(event, ¤t->perf_event_list, owner_entry) {
ctx = perf_event_ctx_lock(event);
perf_event_for_each_child(event, _perf_event_disable);
perf_event_ctx_unlock(event, ctx);
}
mutex_unlock(¤t->perf_event_mutex);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix race in swevent hash
There's a race on CPU unplug where we free the swevent hash array
while it can still have events on. This will result in a
use-after-free which is BAD.
Simply do not free the hash array on unplug. This leaves the thing
around and no use-after-free takes place.
When the last swevent dies, we do a for_each_possible_cpu() iteration
anyway to clean these up, at which time we'll free it, so no leakage
will occur.
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 56,105
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Browser::OpenHelpWindow(Profile* profile) {
Browser* browser = Browser::Create(profile);
browser->OpenHelpTab();
browser->window()->Show();
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 98,277
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int em_bswap(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
switch (ctxt->op_bytes) {
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
case 8:
asm("bswap %0" : "+r"(ctxt->dst.val));
break;
#endif
default:
asm("bswap %0" : "+r"(*(u32 *)&ctxt->dst.val));
break;
}
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
Commit Message: KVM: emulate: avoid accessing NULL ctxt->memopp
A failure to decode the instruction can cause a NULL pointer access.
This is fixed simply by moving the "done" label as close as possible
to the return.
This fixes CVE-2014-8481.
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 41061cdb98a0bec464278b4db8e894a3121671f5
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 35,517
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PageInfoBubbleView::DidStartNavigation(content::NavigationHandle* handle) {
GetWidget()->Close();
}
Commit Message: Desktop Page Info/Harmony: Show close button for internal pages.
The Harmony version of Page Info for internal Chrome pages (chrome://,
chrome-extension:// and view-source:// pages) show a close button. Update the
code to match this.
This patch also adds TestBrowserDialog tests for the latter two cases described
above (internal extension and view source pages).
See screenshot -
https://drive.google.com/file/d/18RZnMiHCu-rCX9N6DLUpu4mkFWguh1xm/view?usp=sharing
Bug: 535074
Change-Id: I55e5f1aa682fd4ec85f7b65ac88f5a4f5906fe53
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/759624
Commit-Queue: Patti <patricialor@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Trent Apted <tapted@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#516624}
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 133,987
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct net_device *netdev_all_upper_get_next_dev_rcu(struct net_device *dev,
struct list_head **iter)
{
struct netdev_adjacent *upper;
WARN_ON_ONCE(!rcu_read_lock_held() && !lockdep_rtnl_is_held());
upper = list_entry_rcu((*iter)->next, struct netdev_adjacent, list);
if (&upper->list == &dev->all_adj_list.upper)
return NULL;
*iter = &upper->list;
return upper->dev;
}
Commit Message: tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 48,865
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool SimplifiedBackwardsTextIterator::handleTextNode()
{
m_lastTextNode = m_node;
int startOffset;
int offsetInNode;
RenderText* renderer = handleFirstLetter(startOffset, offsetInNode);
if (!renderer)
return true;
String text = renderer->text();
if (!renderer->firstTextBox() && text.length() > 0)
return true;
m_positionEndOffset = m_offset;
m_offset = startOffset + offsetInNode;
m_positionNode = m_node;
m_positionStartOffset = m_offset;
ASSERT(0 <= m_positionStartOffset - offsetInNode && m_positionStartOffset - offsetInNode <= static_cast<int>(text.length()));
ASSERT(1 <= m_positionEndOffset - offsetInNode && m_positionEndOffset - offsetInNode <= static_cast<int>(text.length()));
ASSERT(m_positionStartOffset <= m_positionEndOffset);
m_textLength = m_positionEndOffset - m_positionStartOffset;
m_textCharacters = text.characters() + (m_positionStartOffset - offsetInNode);
ASSERT(m_textCharacters >= text.characters());
ASSERT(m_textCharacters + m_textLength <= text.characters() + static_cast<int>(text.length()));
m_lastCharacter = text[m_positionEndOffset - 1];
return !m_shouldHandleFirstLetter;
}
Commit Message: Upgrade a TextIterator ASSERT to a RELEASE_ASSERT as a defensive measure.
BUG=156930,177197
R=inferno@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/15057010
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@150123 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 171,311
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ServiceWorkerContextCore::ProviderHostIterator::ProviderHostIterator(
ProviderByIdMap* map,
ProviderHostPredicate predicate)
: map_(map),
predicate_(std::move(predicate)),
provider_host_iterator_(map_->begin()) {
ForwardUntilMatchingProviderHost();
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 139,481
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: nfsd_open(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, umode_t type,
int may_flags, struct file **filp)
{
struct path path;
struct inode *inode;
struct file *file;
int flags = O_RDONLY|O_LARGEFILE;
__be32 err;
int host_err = 0;
validate_process_creds();
/*
* If we get here, then the client has already done an "open",
* and (hopefully) checked permission - so allow OWNER_OVERRIDE
* in case a chmod has now revoked permission.
*
* Arguably we should also allow the owner override for
* directories, but we never have and it doesn't seem to have
* caused anyone a problem. If we were to change this, note
* also that our filldir callbacks would need a variant of
* lookup_one_len that doesn't check permissions.
*/
if (type == S_IFREG)
may_flags |= NFSD_MAY_OWNER_OVERRIDE;
err = fh_verify(rqstp, fhp, type, may_flags);
if (err)
goto out;
path.mnt = fhp->fh_export->ex_path.mnt;
path.dentry = fhp->fh_dentry;
inode = d_inode(path.dentry);
/* Disallow write access to files with the append-only bit set
* or any access when mandatory locking enabled
*/
err = nfserr_perm;
if (IS_APPEND(inode) && (may_flags & NFSD_MAY_WRITE))
goto out;
/*
* We must ignore files (but only files) which might have mandatory
* locks on them because there is no way to know if the accesser has
* the lock.
*/
if (S_ISREG((inode)->i_mode) && mandatory_lock(inode))
goto out;
if (!inode->i_fop)
goto out;
host_err = nfsd_open_break_lease(inode, may_flags);
if (host_err) /* NOMEM or WOULDBLOCK */
goto out_nfserr;
if (may_flags & NFSD_MAY_WRITE) {
if (may_flags & NFSD_MAY_READ)
flags = O_RDWR|O_LARGEFILE;
else
flags = O_WRONLY|O_LARGEFILE;
}
file = dentry_open(&path, flags, current_cred());
if (IS_ERR(file)) {
host_err = PTR_ERR(file);
goto out_nfserr;
}
host_err = ima_file_check(file, may_flags, 0);
if (host_err) {
fput(file);
goto out_nfserr;
}
if (may_flags & NFSD_MAY_64BIT_COOKIE)
file->f_mode |= FMODE_64BITHASH;
else
file->f_mode |= FMODE_32BITHASH;
*filp = file;
out_nfserr:
err = nfserrno(host_err);
out:
validate_process_creds();
return err;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 65,897
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void XMLHttpRequest::clearResponseBuffers()
{
m_responseText.clear();
m_responseEncoding = String();
m_createdDocument = false;
m_responseDocument = 0;
m_responseBlob = 0;
m_responseStream = 0;
m_binaryResponseBuilder.clear();
m_responseArrayBuffer.clear();
}
Commit Message: Don't dispatch events when XHR is set to sync mode
Any of readystatechange, progress, abort, error, timeout and loadend
event are not specified to be dispatched in sync mode in the latest
spec. Just an exception corresponding to the failure is thrown.
Clean up for readability done in this CL
- factor out dispatchEventAndLoadEnd calling code
- make didTimeout() private
- give error handling methods more descriptive names
- set m_exceptionCode in failure type specific methods
-- Note that for didFailRedirectCheck, m_exceptionCode was not set
in networkError(), but was set at the end of createRequest()
This CL is prep for fixing crbug.com/292422
BUG=292422
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24225002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@158046 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 110,905
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void vnc_jobs_clear(VncState *vs)
{
VncJob *job, *tmp;
vnc_lock_queue(queue);
QTAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(job, &queue->jobs, next, tmp) {
if (job->vs == vs || !vs) {
QTAILQ_REMOVE(&queue->jobs, job, next);
}
}
vnc_unlock_queue(queue);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 17,906
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static double clip(void *opaque, double val)
{
LutContext *s = opaque;
double minval = s->var_values[VAR_MINVAL];
double maxval = s->var_values[VAR_MAXVAL];
return av_clip(val, minval, maxval);
}
Commit Message: avfilter: fix plane validity checks
Fixes out of array accesses
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 29,762
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: explicit ElementsAccessorBase(const char* name)
: ElementsAccessor(name) { }
Commit Message: Backport: Fix Object.entries/values with changing elements
Bug: 111274046
Test: m -j proxy_resolver_v8_unittest && adb sync && adb shell \
/data/nativetest64/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest
Change-Id: I705fc512cc5837e9364ed187559cc75d079aa5cb
(cherry picked from commit d8be9a10287afed07705ac8af027d6a46d4def99)
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 1
| 174,095
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: CJSON_PUBLIC(cJSON *) cJSON_CreateStringReference(const char *string)
{
cJSON *item = cJSON_New_Item(&global_hooks);
if (item != NULL)
{
item->type = cJSON_String | cJSON_IsReference;
item->valuestring = (char*)cast_away_const(string);
}
return item;
}
Commit Message: Fix crash of cJSON_GetObjectItemCaseSensitive when calling it on arrays
CWE ID: CWE-754
| 0
| 87,114
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: htmlAutoClose(htmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, const xmlChar * newtag)
{
while ((newtag != NULL) && (ctxt->name != NULL) &&
(htmlCheckAutoClose(newtag, ctxt->name))) {
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) && (ctxt->sax->endElement != NULL))
ctxt->sax->endElement(ctxt->userData, ctxt->name);
htmlnamePop(ctxt);
}
if (newtag == NULL) {
htmlAutoCloseOnEnd(ctxt);
return;
}
while ((newtag == NULL) && (ctxt->name != NULL) &&
((xmlStrEqual(ctxt->name, BAD_CAST "head")) ||
(xmlStrEqual(ctxt->name, BAD_CAST "body")) ||
(xmlStrEqual(ctxt->name, BAD_CAST "html")))) {
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) && (ctxt->sax->endElement != NULL))
ctxt->sax->endElement(ctxt->userData, ctxt->name);
htmlnamePop(ctxt);
}
}
Commit Message: Roll libxml to 3939178e4cb797417ff033b1e04ab4b038e224d9
Removes a few patches fixed upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=e26630548e7d138d2c560844c43820b6767251e3
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=94691dc884d1a8ada39f073408b4bb92fe7fe882
Stops using the NOXXE flag which was reverted upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=030b1f7a27c22f9237eddca49ec5e620b6258d7d
Changes the patch to uri.c to not add limits.h, which is included
upstream.
Bug: 722079
Change-Id: I4b8449ed33f95de23c54c2cde99970c2df2781ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535233
Reviewed-by: Scott Graham <scottmg@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dominic Cooney <dominicc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480755}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 150,757
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static long do_splice_to(struct file *in, loff_t *ppos,
struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, size_t len,
unsigned int flags)
{
ssize_t (*splice_read)(struct file *, loff_t *,
struct pipe_inode_info *, size_t, unsigned int);
int ret;
if (unlikely(!(in->f_mode & FMODE_READ)))
return -EBADF;
ret = rw_verify_area(READ, in, ppos, len);
if (unlikely(ret < 0))
return ret;
if (in->f_op->splice_read)
splice_read = in->f_op->splice_read;
else
splice_read = default_file_splice_read;
return splice_read(in, ppos, pipe, len, flags);
}
Commit Message: ->splice_write() via ->write_iter()
iter_file_splice_write() - a ->splice_write() instance that gathers the
pipe buffers, builds a bio_vec-based iov_iter covering those and feeds
it to ->write_iter(). A bunch of simple cases coverted to that...
[AV: fixed the braino spotted by Cyrill]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 46,369
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: poppler_page_get_thumbnail_size (PopplerPage *page,
int *width,
int *height)
{
Object thumb;
Dict *dict;
gboolean retval = FALSE;
g_return_val_if_fail (POPPLER_IS_PAGE (page), FALSE);
g_return_val_if_fail (width != NULL, FALSE);
g_return_val_if_fail (height != NULL, FALSE);
page->page->getThumb (&thumb);
if (!thumb.isStream ())
{
thumb.free ();
return FALSE;
}
dict = thumb.streamGetDict();
/* Theoretically, this could succeed and you would still fail when
* loading the thumb */
if (dict->lookupInt ("Width", "W", width) &&
dict->lookupInt ("Height", "H", height))
retval = TRUE;
thumb.free ();
return retval;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 794
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: CameraService::BasicClient::BasicClient(const sp<CameraService>& cameraService,
const sp<IBinder>& remoteCallback,
const String16& clientPackageName,
int cameraId, int cameraFacing,
int clientPid, uid_t clientUid,
int servicePid):
mClientPackageName(clientPackageName)
{
mCameraService = cameraService;
mRemoteBinder = remoteCallback;
mCameraId = cameraId;
mCameraFacing = cameraFacing;
mClientPid = clientPid;
mClientUid = clientUid;
mServicePid = servicePid;
mOpsActive = false;
mDestructionStarted = false;
}
Commit Message: Camera: Disallow dumping clients directly
Camera service dumps should only be initiated through
ICameraService::dump.
Bug: 26265403
Change-Id: If3ca4718ed74bf33ad8a416192689203029e2803
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 161,657
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit)
{
int extdatalen=0;
unsigned char *orig = buf;
unsigned char *ret = buf;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
int next_proto_neg_seen;
#endif
/* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
return orig;
ret+=2;
if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
{
if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
s2n(0,ret);
}
if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
{
int el;
if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return NULL;
}
if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
s2n(el,ret);
if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return NULL;
}
ret += el;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
{
/* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
long lenmax;
if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return NULL;
}
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
*(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
}
/* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
&& !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
{
if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
s2n(0,ret);
}
if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
{
if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
s2n(0,ret);
}
#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
{
size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
return NULL;
if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
s2n(sol + 2, ret);
s2n(sol, ret);
memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
ret += sol;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile)
{
int el;
ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
s2n(el,ret);
if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return NULL;
}
ret+=el;
}
#endif
if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
&& (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
{ const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
ret+=36;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
/* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
{
if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
s2n(1,ret);
/* Set mode:
* 1: peer may send requests
* 2: peer not allowed to send requests
*/
if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
*(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
else
*(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
{
const unsigned char *npa;
unsigned int npalen;
int r;
r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
{
if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
s2n(npalen,ret);
memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
ret += npalen;
s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
}
}
#endif
if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
return orig;
s2n(extdatalen, orig);
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 12,237
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ResourceFetcher::storeResourceTimingInitiatorInformation(Resource* resource)
{
if (resource->options().requestInitiatorContext != DocumentContext)
return;
RefPtr<ResourceTimingInfo> info = ResourceTimingInfo::create(resource->options().initiatorInfo.name, monotonicallyIncreasingTime());
if (resource->isCacheValidator()) {
const AtomicString& timingAllowOrigin = resource->resourceToRevalidate()->response().httpHeaderField("Timing-Allow-Origin");
if (!timingAllowOrigin.isEmpty())
info->setOriginalTimingAllowOrigin(timingAllowOrigin);
}
if (resource->type() == Resource::MainResource) {
if (frame()->deprecatedLocalOwner() && !frame()->deprecatedLocalOwner()->loadedNonEmptyDocument()) {
info->setInitiatorType(frame()->deprecatedLocalOwner()->localName());
m_resourceTimingInfoMap.add(resource, info);
frame()->deprecatedLocalOwner()->didLoadNonEmptyDocument();
}
} else {
m_resourceTimingInfoMap.add(resource, info);
}
}
Commit Message: Enforce SVG image security rules
SVG images have unique security rules that prevent them from loading
any external resources. This patch enforces these rules in
ResourceFetcher::canRequest for all non-data-uri resources. This locks
down our SVG resource handling and fixes two security bugs.
In the case of SVG images that reference other images, we had a bug
where a cached subresource would be used directly from the cache.
This has been fixed because the canRequest check occurs before we use
cached resources.
In the case of SVG images that use CSS imports, we had a bug where
imports were blindly requested. This has been fixed by stopping all
non-data-uri requests in SVG images.
With this patch we now match Gecko's behavior on both testcases.
BUG=380885, 382296
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/320763002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@176084 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 121,283
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void rt_set_nexthop(struct rtable *rt, __be32 daddr,
const struct fib_result *res,
struct fib_nh_exception *fnhe,
struct fib_info *fi, u16 type, u32 itag,
const bool do_cache)
{
bool cached = false;
if (fi) {
struct fib_nh *nh = &FIB_RES_NH(*res);
if (nh->nh_gw && nh->nh_scope == RT_SCOPE_LINK) {
rt->rt_gateway = nh->nh_gw;
rt->rt_uses_gateway = 1;
}
dst_init_metrics(&rt->dst, fi->fib_metrics->metrics, true);
if (fi->fib_metrics != &dst_default_metrics) {
rt->dst._metrics |= DST_METRICS_REFCOUNTED;
atomic_inc(&fi->fib_metrics->refcnt);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_ROUTE_CLASSID
rt->dst.tclassid = nh->nh_tclassid;
#endif
rt->dst.lwtstate = lwtstate_get(nh->nh_lwtstate);
if (unlikely(fnhe))
cached = rt_bind_exception(rt, fnhe, daddr, do_cache);
else if (do_cache)
cached = rt_cache_route(nh, rt);
if (unlikely(!cached)) {
/* Routes we intend to cache in nexthop exception or
* FIB nexthop have the DST_NOCACHE bit clear.
* However, if we are unsuccessful at storing this
* route into the cache we really need to set it.
*/
if (!rt->rt_gateway)
rt->rt_gateway = daddr;
rt_add_uncached_list(rt);
}
} else
rt_add_uncached_list(rt);
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_ROUTE_CLASSID
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_MULTIPLE_TABLES
set_class_tag(rt, res->tclassid);
#endif
set_class_tag(rt, itag);
#endif
}
Commit Message: net: check and errout if res->fi is NULL when RTM_F_FIB_MATCH is set
Syzkaller hit 'general protection fault in fib_dump_info' bug on
commit 4.13-rc5..
Guilty file: net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 2808 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.13.0-rc5 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
task: ffff880078562700 task.stack: ffff880078110000
RIP: 0010:fib_dump_info+0x388/0x1170 net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c:1314
RSP: 0018:ffff880078117010 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 00000000000000fe RCX: 0000000000000002
RDX: 0000000000000006 RSI: ffff880078117084 RDI: 0000000000000030
RBP: ffff880078117268 R08: 000000000000000c R09: ffff8800780d80c8
R10: 0000000058d629b4 R11: 0000000067fce681 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffff8800784bd540 R14: ffff8800780d80b5 R15: ffff8800780d80a4
FS: 00000000022fa940(0000) GS:ffff88007fc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000004387d0 CR3: 0000000079135000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Call Trace:
inet_rtm_getroute+0xc89/0x1f50 net/ipv4/route.c:2766
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x288/0x680 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4217
netlink_rcv_skb+0x340/0x470 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2397
rtnetlink_rcv+0x28/0x30 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4223
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1265 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x4c4/0x6e0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1291
netlink_sendmsg+0x8c4/0xca0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1854
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:633 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:643
___sys_sendmsg+0x779/0x8d0 net/socket.c:2035
__sys_sendmsg+0xd1/0x170 net/socket.c:2069
SYSC_sendmsg net/socket.c:2080 [inline]
SyS_sendmsg+0x2d/0x50 net/socket.c:2076
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1a/0xa5
RIP: 0033:0x4512e9
RSP: 002b:00007ffc75584cc8 EFLAGS: 00000216 ORIG_RAX:
000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 00000000004512e9
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020f2cfc8 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 000000000000000e R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000216 R12: fffffffffffffffe
R13: 0000000000718000 R14: 0000000020c44ff0 R15: 0000000000000000
Code: 00 0f b6 8d ec fd ff ff 48 8b 85 f0 fd ff ff 88 48 17 48 8b 45
28 48 8d 78 30 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03
<0f>
b6 04 02 84 c0 74 08 3c 03 0f 8e cb 0c 00 00 48 8b 45 28 44
RIP: fib_dump_info+0x388/0x1170 net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c:1314 RSP:
ffff880078117010
---[ end trace 254a7af28348f88b ]---
This patch adds a res->fi NULL check.
example run:
$ip route get 0.0.0.0 iif virt1-0
broadcast 0.0.0.0 dev lo
cache <local,brd> iif virt1-0
$ip route get 0.0.0.0 iif virt1-0 fibmatch
RTNETLINK answers: No route to host
Reported-by: idaifish <idaifish@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Fixes: b61798130f1b ("net: ipv4: RTM_GETROUTE: return matched fib result when requested")
Signed-off-by: Roopa Prabhu <roopa@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 62,080
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool FlagsState::IsRestartNeededToCommitChanges() {
return needs_restart_;
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 104,816
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void js_pushboolean(js_State *J, int v)
{
CHECKSTACK(1);
STACK[TOP].type = JS_TBOOLEAN;
STACK[TOP].u.boolean = !!v;
++TOP;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 13,458
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: acpi_map_lookup_virt(void __iomem *virt, acpi_size size)
{
struct acpi_ioremap *map;
list_for_each_entry_rcu(map, &acpi_ioremaps, list)
if (map->virt <= virt &&
virt + size <= map->virt + map->size)
return map;
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: acpi: Disable ACPI table override if securelevel is set
From the kernel documentation (initrd_table_override.txt):
If the ACPI_INITRD_TABLE_OVERRIDE compile option is true, it is possible
to override nearly any ACPI table provided by the BIOS with an
instrumented, modified one.
When securelevel is set, the kernel should disallow any unauthenticated
changes to kernel space. ACPI tables contain code invoked by the kernel, so
do not allow ACPI tables to be overridden if securelevel is set.
Signed-off-by: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 53,829
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FFmpegVideoDecoder::~FFmpegVideoDecoder() {
DCHECK_EQ(kUninitialized, state_);
DCHECK(!codec_context_);
DCHECK(!av_frame_);
}
Commit Message: Replicate FFmpeg's video frame allocation strategy.
This should avoid accidental overreads and overwrites due to our
VideoFrame's not being as large as FFmpeg expects.
BUG=368980
TEST=new regression test
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/270193002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@268831 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 121,360
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool ExecuteUnderline(LocalFrame& frame,
Event*,
EditorCommandSource source,
const String&) {
CSSIdentifierValue* underline = CSSIdentifierValue::Create(CSSValueUnderline);
return ExecuteToggleStyleInList(
frame, source, InputEvent::InputType::kFormatUnderline,
CSSPropertyWebkitTextDecorationsInEffect, underline);
}
Commit Message: Move Editor::Transpose() out of Editor class
This patch moves |Editor::Transpose()| out of |Editor| class as preparation of
expanding it into |ExecutTranspose()| in "EditorCommand.cpp" to make |Editor|
class simpler for improving code health.
Following patch will expand |Transpose()| into |ExecutTranspose()|.
Bug: 672405
Change-Id: Icde253623f31813d2b4517c4da7d4798bd5fadf6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/583880
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#489518}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 128,620
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int acm_alloc_minor(struct acm *acm)
{
int minor;
mutex_lock(&acm_minors_lock);
minor = idr_alloc(&acm_minors, acm, 0, ACM_TTY_MINORS, GFP_KERNEL);
mutex_unlock(&acm_minors_lock);
return minor;
}
Commit Message: USB: cdc-acm: more sanity checking
An attack has become available which pretends to be a quirky
device circumventing normal sanity checks and crashes the kernel
by an insufficient number of interfaces. This patch adds a check
to the code path for quirky devices.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 54,181
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: resolve_properties(fz_context *ctx, pdf_csi *csi, pdf_obj *obj)
{
if (pdf_is_name(ctx, obj))
return pdf_dict_get(ctx, pdf_dict_get(ctx, csi->rdb, PDF_NAME_Properties), obj);
else
return obj;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 600
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DocumentLoader::setDefersLoading(bool defers)
{
if (mainResourceLoader() && mainResourceLoader()->documentLoader() == this)
mainResourceLoader()->setDefersLoading(defers);
setAllDefersLoading(m_subresourceLoaders, defers);
setAllDefersLoading(m_plugInStreamLoaders, defers);
if (!defers)
deliverSubstituteResourcesAfterDelay();
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 105,750
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void decode_postinit(H264Context *h, int setup_finished)
{
H264Picture *out = h->cur_pic_ptr;
H264Picture *cur = h->cur_pic_ptr;
int i, pics, out_of_order, out_idx;
h->cur_pic_ptr->f.pict_type = h->pict_type;
if (h->next_output_pic)
return;
if (cur->field_poc[0] == INT_MAX || cur->field_poc[1] == INT_MAX) {
/* FIXME: if we have two PAFF fields in one packet, we can't start
* the next thread here. If we have one field per packet, we can.
* The check in decode_nal_units() is not good enough to find this
* yet, so we assume the worst for now. */
return;
}
cur->f.interlaced_frame = 0;
cur->f.repeat_pict = 0;
/* Signal interlacing information externally. */
/* Prioritize picture timing SEI information over used
* decoding process if it exists. */
if (h->sps.pic_struct_present_flag) {
switch (h->sei_pic_struct) {
case SEI_PIC_STRUCT_FRAME:
break;
case SEI_PIC_STRUCT_TOP_FIELD:
case SEI_PIC_STRUCT_BOTTOM_FIELD:
cur->f.interlaced_frame = 1;
break;
case SEI_PIC_STRUCT_TOP_BOTTOM:
case SEI_PIC_STRUCT_BOTTOM_TOP:
if (FIELD_OR_MBAFF_PICTURE(h))
cur->f.interlaced_frame = 1;
else
cur->f.interlaced_frame = h->prev_interlaced_frame;
break;
case SEI_PIC_STRUCT_TOP_BOTTOM_TOP:
case SEI_PIC_STRUCT_BOTTOM_TOP_BOTTOM:
/* Signal the possibility of telecined film externally
* (pic_struct 5,6). From these hints, let the applications
* decide if they apply deinterlacing. */
cur->f.repeat_pict = 1;
break;
case SEI_PIC_STRUCT_FRAME_DOUBLING:
cur->f.repeat_pict = 2;
break;
case SEI_PIC_STRUCT_FRAME_TRIPLING:
cur->f.repeat_pict = 4;
break;
}
if ((h->sei_ct_type & 3) &&
h->sei_pic_struct <= SEI_PIC_STRUCT_BOTTOM_TOP)
cur->f.interlaced_frame = (h->sei_ct_type & (1 << 1)) != 0;
} else {
/* Derive interlacing flag from used decoding process. */
cur->f.interlaced_frame = FIELD_OR_MBAFF_PICTURE(h);
}
h->prev_interlaced_frame = cur->f.interlaced_frame;
if (cur->field_poc[0] != cur->field_poc[1]) {
/* Derive top_field_first from field pocs. */
cur->f.top_field_first = cur->field_poc[0] < cur->field_poc[1];
} else {
if (cur->f.interlaced_frame || h->sps.pic_struct_present_flag) {
/* Use picture timing SEI information. Even if it is a
* information of a past frame, better than nothing. */
if (h->sei_pic_struct == SEI_PIC_STRUCT_TOP_BOTTOM ||
h->sei_pic_struct == SEI_PIC_STRUCT_TOP_BOTTOM_TOP)
cur->f.top_field_first = 1;
else
cur->f.top_field_first = 0;
} else {
/* Most likely progressive */
cur->f.top_field_first = 0;
}
}
if (h->sei_frame_packing_present &&
h->frame_packing_arrangement_type >= 0 &&
h->frame_packing_arrangement_type <= 6 &&
h->content_interpretation_type > 0 &&
h->content_interpretation_type < 3) {
AVStereo3D *stereo = av_stereo3d_create_side_data(&cur->f);
if (stereo) {
switch (h->frame_packing_arrangement_type) {
case 0:
stereo->type = AV_STEREO3D_CHECKERBOARD;
break;
case 1:
stereo->type = AV_STEREO3D_COLUMNS;
break;
case 2:
stereo->type = AV_STEREO3D_LINES;
break;
case 3:
if (h->quincunx_subsampling)
stereo->type = AV_STEREO3D_SIDEBYSIDE_QUINCUNX;
else
stereo->type = AV_STEREO3D_SIDEBYSIDE;
break;
case 4:
stereo->type = AV_STEREO3D_TOPBOTTOM;
break;
case 5:
stereo->type = AV_STEREO3D_FRAMESEQUENCE;
break;
case 6:
stereo->type = AV_STEREO3D_2D;
break;
}
if (h->content_interpretation_type == 2)
stereo->flags = AV_STEREO3D_FLAG_INVERT;
}
}
if (h->sei_display_orientation_present &&
(h->sei_anticlockwise_rotation || h->sei_hflip || h->sei_vflip)) {
double angle = h->sei_anticlockwise_rotation * 360 / (double) (1 << 16);
AVFrameSideData *rotation = av_frame_new_side_data(&cur->f,
AV_FRAME_DATA_DISPLAYMATRIX,
sizeof(int32_t) * 9);
if (rotation) {
av_display_rotation_set((int32_t *)rotation->data, angle);
av_display_matrix_flip((int32_t *)rotation->data,
h->sei_hflip, h->sei_vflip);
}
}
cur->mmco_reset = h->mmco_reset;
h->mmco_reset = 0;
/* Sort B-frames into display order */
if (h->sps.bitstream_restriction_flag &&
h->avctx->has_b_frames < h->sps.num_reorder_frames) {
h->avctx->has_b_frames = h->sps.num_reorder_frames;
h->low_delay = 0;
}
if (h->avctx->strict_std_compliance >= FF_COMPLIANCE_STRICT &&
!h->sps.bitstream_restriction_flag) {
h->avctx->has_b_frames = MAX_DELAYED_PIC_COUNT - 1;
h->low_delay = 0;
}
for (i = 0; 1; i++) {
if(i == MAX_DELAYED_PIC_COUNT || cur->poc < h->last_pocs[i]){
if(i)
h->last_pocs[i-1] = cur->poc;
break;
} else if(i) {
h->last_pocs[i-1]= h->last_pocs[i];
}
}
out_of_order = MAX_DELAYED_PIC_COUNT - i;
if( cur->f.pict_type == AV_PICTURE_TYPE_B
|| (h->last_pocs[MAX_DELAYED_PIC_COUNT-2] > INT_MIN && h->last_pocs[MAX_DELAYED_PIC_COUNT-1] - h->last_pocs[MAX_DELAYED_PIC_COUNT-2] > 2))
out_of_order = FFMAX(out_of_order, 1);
if (out_of_order == MAX_DELAYED_PIC_COUNT) {
av_log(h->avctx, AV_LOG_VERBOSE, "Invalid POC %d<%d\n", cur->poc, h->last_pocs[0]);
for (i = 1; i < MAX_DELAYED_PIC_COUNT; i++)
h->last_pocs[i] = INT_MIN;
h->last_pocs[0] = cur->poc;
cur->mmco_reset = 1;
} else if(h->avctx->has_b_frames < out_of_order && !h->sps.bitstream_restriction_flag){
av_log(h->avctx, AV_LOG_VERBOSE, "Increasing reorder buffer to %d\n", out_of_order);
h->avctx->has_b_frames = out_of_order;
h->low_delay = 0;
}
pics = 0;
while (h->delayed_pic[pics])
pics++;
av_assert0(pics <= MAX_DELAYED_PIC_COUNT);
h->delayed_pic[pics++] = cur;
if (cur->reference == 0)
cur->reference = DELAYED_PIC_REF;
out = h->delayed_pic[0];
out_idx = 0;
for (i = 1; h->delayed_pic[i] &&
!h->delayed_pic[i]->f.key_frame &&
!h->delayed_pic[i]->mmco_reset;
i++)
if (h->delayed_pic[i]->poc < out->poc) {
out = h->delayed_pic[i];
out_idx = i;
}
if (h->avctx->has_b_frames == 0 &&
(h->delayed_pic[0]->f.key_frame || h->delayed_pic[0]->mmco_reset))
h->next_outputed_poc = INT_MIN;
out_of_order = out->poc < h->next_outputed_poc;
if (out_of_order || pics > h->avctx->has_b_frames) {
out->reference &= ~DELAYED_PIC_REF;
for (i = out_idx; h->delayed_pic[i]; i++)
h->delayed_pic[i] = h->delayed_pic[i + 1];
}
if (!out_of_order && pics > h->avctx->has_b_frames) {
h->next_output_pic = out;
if (out_idx == 0 && h->delayed_pic[0] && (h->delayed_pic[0]->f.key_frame || h->delayed_pic[0]->mmco_reset)) {
h->next_outputed_poc = INT_MIN;
} else
h->next_outputed_poc = out->poc;
} else {
av_log(h->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "no picture %s\n", out_of_order ? "ooo" : "");
}
if (h->next_output_pic) {
if (h->next_output_pic->recovered) {
h->frame_recovered |= FRAME_RECOVERED_SEI;
}
h->next_output_pic->recovered |= !!(h->frame_recovered & FRAME_RECOVERED_SEI);
}
if (setup_finished && !h->avctx->hwaccel)
ff_thread_finish_setup(h->avctx);
}
Commit Message: avcodec/h264: Clear delayed_pic on deallocation
Fixes use of freed memory
Fixes: case5_av_frame_copy_props.mp4
Found-by: Michal Zalewski <lcamtuf@coredump.cx>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 43,405
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int xfrm_send_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_tmpl *xt,
struct xfrm_policy *xp, int dir)
{
struct net *net = xs_net(x);
struct sk_buff *skb;
skb = nlmsg_new(xfrm_acquire_msgsize(x, xp), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (skb == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
if (build_acquire(skb, x, xt, xp, dir) < 0)
BUG();
return nlmsg_multicast(net->xfrm.nlsk, skb, 0, XFRMNLGRP_ACQUIRE, GFP_ATOMIC);
}
Commit Message: xfrm_user: return error pointer instead of NULL
When dump_one_state() returns an error, e.g. because of a too small
buffer to dump the whole xfrm state, xfrm_state_netlink() returns NULL
instead of an error pointer. But its callers expect an error pointer
and therefore continue to operate on a NULL skbuff.
This could lead to a privilege escalation (execution of user code in
kernel context) if the attacker has CAP_NET_ADMIN and is able to map
address 0.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 33,172
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool WebContentsImpl::IsHidden() {
return !IsBeingCaptured() && visibility_ != Visibility::VISIBLE;
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 144,988
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TestRenderWidgetHostView::StopSpeaking() {}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 127,949
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ref_param_read_string_array(gs_param_list * plist, gs_param_name pkey,
gs_param_string_array * pvalue)
{
iparam_list *const iplist = (iparam_list *) plist;
iparam_loc loc;
ref aref;
int code = ref_param_read_array(iplist, pkey, &loc);
gs_param_string *psv;
uint size;
long i;
if (code != 0)
return code;
size = r_size(loc.pvalue);
psv = (gs_param_string *)
gs_alloc_byte_array(plist->memory, size, sizeof(gs_param_string),
"ref_param_read_string_array");
if (psv == 0)
return_error(gs_error_VMerror);
aref = *loc.pvalue;
if (r_has_type(&aref, t_array)) {
for (i = 0; code >= 0 && i < size; i++) {
loc.pvalue = aref.value.refs + i;
code = ref_param_read_string_value(plist->memory, &loc, psv + i);
}
} else {
ref elt;
loc.pvalue = &elt;
for (i = 0; code >= 0 && i < size; i++) {
array_get(plist->memory, &aref, i, &elt);
code = ref_param_read_string_value(plist->memory, &loc, psv + i);
}
}
if (code < 0) {
gs_free_object(plist->memory, psv, "ref_param_read_string_array");
return (*loc.presult = code);
}
pvalue->data = psv;
pvalue->size = size;
pvalue->persistent = true;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 3,278
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderProcessHostImpl::RemovePendingView() {
DCHECK(pending_views_);
pending_views_--;
UpdateProcessPriority();
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 149,325
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Browser::SaveWindowPlacement(const gfx::Rect& bounds,
ui::WindowShowState show_state) {
SessionService* session_service =
SessionServiceFactory::GetForProfileIfExisting(profile());
if (session_service)
session_service->SetWindowBounds(session_id_, bounds, show_state);
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 97,355
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool CSSStyleSheet::MatchesMediaQueries(const MediaQueryEvaluator& evaluator) {
viewport_dependent_media_query_results_.clear();
device_dependent_media_query_results_.clear();
if (!media_queries_)
return true;
return evaluator.Eval(*media_queries_,
&viewport_dependent_media_query_results_,
&device_dependent_media_query_results_);
}
Commit Message: Disallow access to opaque CSS responses.
Bug: 848786
Change-Id: Ie53fbf644afdd76d7c65649a05c939c63d89b4ec
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1088335
Reviewed-by: Kouhei Ueno <kouhei@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Matt Falkenhagen <falken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#565537}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 153,945
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SkiaOutputSurfaceImpl::CopyOutput(
RenderPassId id,
const copy_output::RenderPassGeometry& geometry,
const gfx::ColorSpace& color_space,
std::unique_ptr<CopyOutputRequest> request) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
if (!request->has_result_task_runner())
request->set_result_task_runner(base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get());
auto callback = base::BindOnce(&SkiaOutputSurfaceImplOnGpu::CopyOutput,
base::Unretained(impl_on_gpu_.get()), id,
geometry, color_space, std::move(request),
std::move(deferred_framebuffer_draw_closure_));
ScheduleGpuTask(std::move(callback), std::move(resource_sync_tokens_));
}
Commit Message: SkiaRenderer: Support changing color space
SkiaOutputSurfaceImpl did not handle the color space changing after it
was created previously. The SkSurfaceCharacterization color space was
only set during the first time Reshape() ran when the charactization is
returned from the GPU thread. If the color space was changed later the
SkSurface and SkDDL color spaces no longer matched and draw failed.
Bug: 1009452
Change-Id: Ib6d2083efc7e7eb6f94782342e92a809b69d6fdc
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1841811
Reviewed-by: Peng Huang <penghuang@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: kylechar <kylechar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#702946}
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 135,952
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OfflinePageModelTaskified::GetOfflineIdsForClientId(
const ClientId& client_id,
const MultipleOfflineIdCallback& callback) {
auto task = GetPagesTask::CreateTaskMatchingClientIds(
store_.get(), base::Bind(&WrapInMultipleItemsCallback, callback),
{client_id});
task_queue_.AddTask(std::move(task));
}
Commit Message: Add the method to check if offline archive is in internal dir
Bug: 758690
Change-Id: I8bb4283fc40a87fa7a87df2c7e513e2e16903290
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/828049
Reviewed-by: Filip Gorski <fgorski@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jian Li <jianli@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#524232}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 155,831
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Proceed() {
interstitial_page_->Proceed();
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 110,543
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void nick_hash_add(CHANNEL_REC *channel, NICK_REC *nick)
{
NICK_REC *list;
nick->next = NULL;
list = g_hash_table_lookup(channel->nicks, nick->nick);
if (list == NULL)
g_hash_table_insert(channel->nicks, nick->nick, nick);
else {
/* multiple nicks with same name */
while (list->next != NULL)
list = list->next;
list->next = nick;
}
if (nick == channel->ownnick) {
/* move our own nick to beginning of the nick list.. */
nicklist_set_own(channel, nick);
}
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'security' into 'master'
Security
Closes #10
See merge request !17
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 63,676
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cmsBool isabsolutepath(const char *path)
{
char ThreeChars[4];
if(path == NULL)
return FALSE;
if (path[0] == 0)
return FALSE;
strncpy(ThreeChars, path, 3);
ThreeChars[3] = 0;
if(ThreeChars[0] == DIR_CHAR)
return TRUE;
#ifdef CMS_IS_WINDOWS_
if (isalpha((int) ThreeChars[0]) && ThreeChars[1] == ':')
return TRUE;
#endif
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message: Upgrade Visual studio 2017 15.8
- Upgrade to 15.8
- Add check on CGATS memory allocation (thanks to Quang Nguyen for
pointing out this)
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 78,092
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void P2PSocketDispatcherHost::OnDestroySocket(const IPC::Message& msg,
int socket_id) {
SocketsMap::iterator it = sockets_.find(
ExtendedSocketId(msg.routing_id(), socket_id));
if (it != sockets_.end()) {
delete it->second;
sockets_.erase(it);
} else {
LOG(ERROR) << "Received P2PHostMsg_DestroySocket for invalid socket_id.";
}
}
Commit Message: Fixing Coverity bugs (DEAD_CODE and PASS_BY_VALUE)
CIDs 16230, 16439, 16610, 16635
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7215029
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@90134 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 98,466
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int nl80211_del_beacon(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
{
struct cfg80211_registered_device *rdev = info->user_ptr[0];
struct net_device *dev = info->user_ptr[1];
struct wireless_dev *wdev = dev->ieee80211_ptr;
int err;
if (!rdev->ops->del_beacon)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (dev->ieee80211_ptr->iftype != NL80211_IFTYPE_AP &&
dev->ieee80211_ptr->iftype != NL80211_IFTYPE_P2P_GO)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
err = rdev->ops->del_beacon(&rdev->wiphy, dev);
if (!err)
wdev->beacon_interval = 0;
return err;
}
Commit Message: nl80211: fix check for valid SSID size in scan operations
In both trigger_scan and sched_scan operations, we were checking for
the SSID length before assigning the value correctly. Since the
memory was just kzalloc'ed, the check was always failing and SSID with
over 32 characters were allowed to go through.
This was causing a buffer overflow when copying the actual SSID to the
proper place.
This bug has been there since 2.6.29-rc4.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Luciano Coelho <coelho@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 26,670
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Session* SessionManager::GetSession(const std::string& id) const {
std::map<std::string, Session*>::const_iterator it;
base::AutoLock lock(map_lock_);
it = map_.find(id);
if (it == map_.end()) {
VLOG(1) << "No such session with ID " << id;
return NULL;
}
return it->second;
}
Commit Message: In chromedriver, add /log url to get the contents of the chromedriver log
remotely. Also add a 'chrome.verbose' boolean startup option.
Remove usage of VLOG(1) in chromedriver. We do not need as complicated
logging as in Chrome.
BUG=85241
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7104085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88591 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 1
| 170,463
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: _tls_set_certificate (SSL_CTX * ctx, const char *cn)
{
#ifdef HAVE_WINCRYPT_H
PCCERT_CONTEXT pCertCtx;
X509 *cert = NULL;
HCERTSTORE hStore = CertOpenSystemStore (0, L"CA");
for (pCertCtx = CertEnumCertificatesInStore (hStore, NULL); pCertCtx != NULL; pCertCtx = CertEnumCertificatesInStore (hStore, pCertCtx)) {
char peer_CN[65];
cert = d2i_X509 (NULL, (const unsigned char **) &pCertCtx->pbCertEncoded, pCertCtx->cbCertEncoded);
if (cert == NULL) {
continue;
}
memset (peer_CN, 0, sizeof (peer_CN));
X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID (X509_get_subject_name (cert), NID_commonName, peer_CN, sizeof (peer_CN));
if (osip_strcasecmp (cn, peer_CN) == 0) {
break;
}
X509_free (cert);
cert = NULL;
}
CertCloseStore (hStore, 0);
if (cert == NULL) {
hStore = CertOpenSystemStore (0, L"ROOT");
for (pCertCtx = CertEnumCertificatesInStore (hStore, NULL); pCertCtx != NULL; pCertCtx = CertEnumCertificatesInStore (hStore, pCertCtx)) {
char peer_CN[65];
cert = d2i_X509 (NULL, (const unsigned char **) &pCertCtx->pbCertEncoded, pCertCtx->cbCertEncoded);
if (cert == NULL) {
continue;
}
memset (peer_CN, 0, sizeof (peer_CN));
X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID (X509_get_subject_name (cert), NID_commonName, peer_CN, sizeof (peer_CN));
if (osip_strcasecmp (cn, peer_CN) == 0) {
break;
}
X509_free (cert);
cert = NULL;
}
CertCloseStore (hStore, 0);
}
if (cert == NULL) {
hStore = CertOpenSystemStore (0, L"MY");
for (pCertCtx = CertEnumCertificatesInStore (hStore, NULL); pCertCtx != NULL; pCertCtx = CertEnumCertificatesInStore (hStore, pCertCtx)) {
char peer_CN[65];
cert = d2i_X509 (NULL, (const unsigned char **) &pCertCtx->pbCertEncoded, pCertCtx->cbCertEncoded);
if (cert == NULL) {
continue;
}
memset (peer_CN, 0, sizeof (peer_CN));
X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID (X509_get_subject_name (cert), NID_commonName, peer_CN, sizeof (peer_CN));
if (osip_strcasecmp (cn, peer_CN) == 0) {
break;
}
X509_free (cert);
cert = NULL;
}
CertCloseStore (hStore, 0);
}
if (cert == NULL) {
hStore = CertOpenSystemStore (0, L"Trustedpublisher");
for (pCertCtx = CertEnumCertificatesInStore (hStore, NULL); pCertCtx != NULL; pCertCtx = CertEnumCertificatesInStore (hStore, pCertCtx)) {
char peer_CN[65];
cert = d2i_X509 (NULL, (const unsigned char **) &pCertCtx->pbCertEncoded, pCertCtx->cbCertEncoded);
if (cert == NULL) {
continue;
}
memset (peer_CN, 0, sizeof (peer_CN));
X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID (X509_get_subject_name (cert), NID_commonName, peer_CN, sizeof (peer_CN));
if (osip_strcasecmp (cn, peer_CN) == 0) {
break;
}
X509_free (cert);
cert = NULL;
}
CertCloseStore (hStore, 0);
}
if (cert == NULL)
return NULL;
{
RSA *rsa = NULL, *pub_rsa;
struct rsa_ctx *priv;
RSA_METHOD *rsa_meth;
priv = osip_malloc (sizeof (*priv));
rsa_meth = osip_malloc (sizeof (*rsa_meth));
if (priv == NULL || rsa_meth == NULL) {
CertFreeCertificateContext (pCertCtx);
osip_free (priv);
osip_free (rsa_meth);
X509_free (cert);
return NULL;
}
memset (priv, 0, sizeof (*priv));
memset (rsa_meth, 0, sizeof (*rsa_meth));
priv->cert = pCertCtx;
if (CryptAcquireCertificatePrivateKey (pCertCtx, CRYPT_ACQUIRE_COMPARE_KEY_FLAG, NULL, &priv->crypt_prov, &priv->key_spec, &priv->free_crypt_prov) == 0) {
CertFreeCertificateContext (priv->cert);
osip_free (priv);
osip_free (rsa_meth);
X509_free (cert);
return NULL;
}
if (!CryptGetUserKey (priv->crypt_prov, priv->key_spec, &priv->hCryptKey)) {
CertFreeCertificateContext (priv->cert);
if (priv->crypt_prov && priv->free_crypt_prov)
CryptReleaseContext (priv->crypt_prov, 0);
osip_free (priv);
osip_free (rsa_meth);
X509_free (cert);
return NULL;
}
rsa_meth->name = "Microsoft CryptoAPI RSA Method";
rsa_meth->rsa_pub_enc = rsa_pub_enc;
rsa_meth->rsa_pub_dec = rsa_pub_dec;
rsa_meth->rsa_priv_enc = rsa_priv_enc;
rsa_meth->rsa_priv_dec = rsa_priv_dec;
rsa_meth->finish = rsa_finish;
rsa_meth->flags = RSA_METHOD_FLAG_NO_CHECK;
rsa_meth->app_data = (char *) priv;
rsa = RSA_new ();
if (rsa == NULL) {
CertFreeCertificateContext (priv->cert);
if (priv->crypt_prov && priv->free_crypt_prov)
CryptReleaseContext (priv->crypt_prov, 0);
osip_free (priv);
osip_free (rsa_meth);
X509_free (cert);
RSA_free (rsa);
return NULL;
}
if (!SSL_CTX_use_certificate (ctx, cert)) {
CertFreeCertificateContext (priv->cert);
if (priv->crypt_prov && priv->free_crypt_prov)
CryptReleaseContext (priv->crypt_prov, 0);
osip_free (priv);
osip_free (rsa_meth);
X509_free (cert);
return NULL;
}
pub_rsa = cert->cert_info->key->pkey->pkey.rsa;
rsa->n = BN_dup (pub_rsa->n);
rsa->e = BN_dup (pub_rsa->e);
if (!RSA_set_method (rsa, rsa_meth)) {
CertFreeCertificateContext (priv->cert);
if (priv->crypt_prov && priv->free_crypt_prov)
CryptReleaseContext (priv->crypt_prov, 0);
osip_free (priv);
osip_free (rsa_meth);
RSA_free (rsa);
X509_free (cert);
SSL_CTX_free (ctx);
return NULL;
}
if (!SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey (ctx, rsa)) {
RSA_free (rsa);
X509_free (cert);
SSL_CTX_free (ctx);
return NULL;
}
RSA_free (rsa);
return cert;
}
#endif
return NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 17,299
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int md5_sparc64_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
unsigned int len)
{
struct md5_state *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
unsigned int partial = sctx->byte_count % MD5_HMAC_BLOCK_SIZE;
/* Handle the fast case right here */
if (partial + len < MD5_HMAC_BLOCK_SIZE) {
sctx->byte_count += len;
memcpy((u8 *)sctx->block + partial, data, len);
} else
__md5_sparc64_update(sctx, data, len, partial);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 46,784
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DevToolsWindow::InspectedWebContentsObserver::InspectedWebContentsObserver(
content::WebContents* web_contents)
: WebContentsObserver(web_contents) {
}
Commit Message: DevTools: handle devtools renderer unresponsiveness during beforeunload event interception
This patch fixes the crash which happenes under the following conditions:
1. DevTools window is in undocked state
2. DevTools renderer is unresponsive
3. User attempts to close inspected page
BUG=322380
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/84883002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@237611 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 113,177
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Tab::ShouldRenderAsNormalTab() const {
return !data().pinned || (width() >= (TabStyle::GetPinnedWidth() +
kPinnedTabExtraWidthToRenderAsNormal));
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 140,661
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bit_overlay(VarBit *t1, VarBit *t2, int sp, int sl)
{
VarBit *result;
VarBit *s1;
VarBit *s2;
int sp_pl_sl;
/*
* Check for possible integer-overflow cases. For negative sp, throw a
* "substring length" error because that's what should be expected
* according to the spec's definition of OVERLAY().
*/
if (sp <= 0)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_SUBSTRING_ERROR),
errmsg("negative substring length not allowed")));
sp_pl_sl = sp + sl;
if (sp_pl_sl <= sl)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_NUMERIC_VALUE_OUT_OF_RANGE),
errmsg("integer out of range")));
s1 = bitsubstring(t1, 1, sp - 1, false);
s2 = bitsubstring(t1, sp_pl_sl, -1, true);
result = bit_catenate(s1, t2);
result = bit_catenate(result, s2);
return result;
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 39,072
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MagickExport MagickBooleanType LevelImage(Image *image,const double black_point,
const double white_point,const double gamma,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define LevelImageTag "Level/Image"
CacheView
*image_view;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
progress;
register ssize_t
i;
ssize_t
y;
/*
Allocate and initialize levels map.
*/
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
/*
Level colormap.
*/
if ((GetPixelRedTraits(image) & UpdatePixelTrait) != 0)
image->colormap[i].red=(double) ClampToQuantum(LevelPixel(black_point,
white_point,gamma,image->colormap[i].red));
if ((GetPixelGreenTraits(image) & UpdatePixelTrait) != 0)
image->colormap[i].green=(double) ClampToQuantum(LevelPixel(black_point,
white_point,gamma,image->colormap[i].green));
if ((GetPixelBlueTraits(image) & UpdatePixelTrait) != 0)
image->colormap[i].blue=(double) ClampToQuantum(LevelPixel(black_point,
white_point,gamma,image->colormap[i].blue));
if ((GetPixelAlphaTraits(image) & UpdatePixelTrait) != 0)
image->colormap[i].alpha=(double) ClampToQuantum(LevelPixel(black_point,
white_point,gamma,image->colormap[i].alpha));
}
/*
Level image.
*/
status=MagickTrue;
progress=0;
image_view=AcquireAuthenticCacheView(image,exception);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp parallel for schedule(static,4) shared(progress,status) \
magick_threads(image,image,image->rows,1)
#endif
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
if (status == MagickFalse)
continue;
q=GetCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
continue;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
register ssize_t
j;
if (GetPixelReadMask(image,q) == 0)
{
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
continue;
}
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) GetPixelChannels(image); j++)
{
PixelChannel channel=GetPixelChannelChannel(image,j);
PixelTrait traits=GetPixelChannelTraits(image,channel);
if ((traits & UpdatePixelTrait) == 0)
continue;
q[j]=ClampToQuantum(LevelPixel(black_point,white_point,gamma,
(double) q[j]));
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,exception) == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
if (image->progress_monitor != (MagickProgressMonitor) NULL)
{
MagickBooleanType
proceed;
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp critical (MagickCore_LevelImage)
#endif
proceed=SetImageProgress(image,LevelImageTag,progress++,image->rows);
if (proceed == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
}
}
image_view=DestroyCacheView(image_view);
(void) ClampImage(image,exception);
return(status);
}
Commit Message: Evaluate lazy pixel cache morphology to prevent buffer overflow (bug report from Ibrahim M. El-Sayed)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 50,553
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebsiteSettingsPopupView::HandleLinkClickedAsync(views::Link* source) {
if (source == cookie_dialog_link_) {
presenter_->RecordWebsiteSettingsAction(
WebsiteSettings::WEBSITE_SETTINGS_COOKIES_DIALOG_OPENED);
if (web_contents_ != NULL)
new CollectedCookiesViews(web_contents_);
} else if (source == certificate_dialog_link_) {
gfx::NativeWindow parent = GetAnchorView() ?
GetAnchorView()->GetWidget()->GetNativeWindow() : nullptr;
presenter_->RecordWebsiteSettingsAction(
WebsiteSettings::WEBSITE_SETTINGS_CERTIFICATE_DIALOG_OPENED);
ShowCertificateViewerByID(web_contents_, parent, cert_id_);
} else if (source == help_center_link_) {
web_contents_->OpenURL(content::OpenURLParams(
GURL(chrome::kPageInfoHelpCenterURL), content::Referrer(),
NEW_FOREGROUND_TAB, ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_LINK, false));
presenter_->RecordWebsiteSettingsAction(
WebsiteSettings::WEBSITE_SETTINGS_CONNECTION_HELP_OPENED);
} else if (source == site_settings_link_) {
web_contents_->OpenURL(content::OpenURLParams(
GURL(chrome::kChromeUIContentSettingsURL), content::Referrer(),
NEW_FOREGROUND_TAB, ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_LINK, false));
presenter_->RecordWebsiteSettingsAction(
WebsiteSettings::WEBSITE_SETTINGS_SITE_SETTINGS_OPENED);
} else {
NOTREACHED();
}
}
Commit Message: Fix UAF in Origin Info Bubble and permission settings UI.
In addition to fixing the UAF, will this also fix the problem of the bubble
showing over the previous tab (if the bubble is open when the tab it was opened
for closes).
BUG=490492
TBR=tedchoc
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1317443002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#346023}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 125,222
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: set_conf_from_info(struct fst_card_info *card, struct fst_port_info *port,
struct fstioc_info *info)
{
int err;
unsigned char my_framing;
/* Set things according to the user set valid flags
* Several of the old options have been invalidated/replaced by the
* generic hdlc package.
*/
err = 0;
if (info->valid & FSTVAL_PROTO) {
if (info->proto == FST_RAW)
port->mode = FST_RAW;
else
port->mode = FST_GEN_HDLC;
}
if (info->valid & FSTVAL_CABLE)
err = -EINVAL;
if (info->valid & FSTVAL_SPEED)
err = -EINVAL;
if (info->valid & FSTVAL_PHASE)
FST_WRB(card, portConfig[port->index].invertClock,
info->invertClock);
if (info->valid & FSTVAL_MODE)
FST_WRW(card, cardMode, info->cardMode);
if (info->valid & FSTVAL_TE1) {
FST_WRL(card, suConfig.dataRate, info->lineSpeed);
FST_WRB(card, suConfig.clocking, info->clockSource);
my_framing = FRAMING_E1;
if (info->framing == E1)
my_framing = FRAMING_E1;
if (info->framing == T1)
my_framing = FRAMING_T1;
if (info->framing == J1)
my_framing = FRAMING_J1;
FST_WRB(card, suConfig.framing, my_framing);
FST_WRB(card, suConfig.structure, info->structure);
FST_WRB(card, suConfig.interface, info->interface);
FST_WRB(card, suConfig.coding, info->coding);
FST_WRB(card, suConfig.lineBuildOut, info->lineBuildOut);
FST_WRB(card, suConfig.equalizer, info->equalizer);
FST_WRB(card, suConfig.transparentMode, info->transparentMode);
FST_WRB(card, suConfig.loopMode, info->loopMode);
FST_WRB(card, suConfig.range, info->range);
FST_WRB(card, suConfig.txBufferMode, info->txBufferMode);
FST_WRB(card, suConfig.rxBufferMode, info->rxBufferMode);
FST_WRB(card, suConfig.startingSlot, info->startingSlot);
FST_WRB(card, suConfig.losThreshold, info->losThreshold);
if (info->idleCode)
FST_WRB(card, suConfig.enableIdleCode, 1);
else
FST_WRB(card, suConfig.enableIdleCode, 0);
FST_WRB(card, suConfig.idleCode, info->idleCode);
#if FST_DEBUG
if (info->valid & FSTVAL_TE1) {
printk("Setting TE1 data\n");
printk("Line Speed = %d\n", info->lineSpeed);
printk("Start slot = %d\n", info->startingSlot);
printk("Clock source = %d\n", info->clockSource);
printk("Framing = %d\n", my_framing);
printk("Structure = %d\n", info->structure);
printk("interface = %d\n", info->interface);
printk("Coding = %d\n", info->coding);
printk("Line build out = %d\n", info->lineBuildOut);
printk("Equaliser = %d\n", info->equalizer);
printk("Transparent mode = %d\n",
info->transparentMode);
printk("Loop mode = %d\n", info->loopMode);
printk("Range = %d\n", info->range);
printk("Tx Buffer mode = %d\n", info->txBufferMode);
printk("Rx Buffer mode = %d\n", info->rxBufferMode);
printk("LOS Threshold = %d\n", info->losThreshold);
printk("Idle Code = %d\n", info->idleCode);
}
#endif
}
#if FST_DEBUG
if (info->valid & FSTVAL_DEBUG) {
fst_debug_mask = info->debug;
}
#endif
return err;
}
Commit Message: farsync: fix info leak in ioctl
The fst_get_iface() code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of
struct sync_serial_settings after the ->loopback member. Add an explicit
memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 39,545
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Err elst_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
GF_EditListBox *p;
u32 i;
GF_EdtsEntry *t;
p = (GF_EditListBox *)a;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "EditListBox", trace);
fprintf(trace, "EntryCount=\"%d\">\n", gf_list_count(p->entryList));
i=0;
while ((t = (GF_EdtsEntry *)gf_list_enum(p->entryList, &i))) {
fprintf(trace, "<EditListEntry Duration=\""LLD"\" MediaTime=\""LLD"\" MediaRate=\"%u\"/>\n", LLD_CAST t->segmentDuration, LLD_CAST t->mediaTime, t->mediaRate);
}
if (!p->size) {
fprintf(trace, "<EditListEntry Duration=\"\" MediaTime=\"\" MediaRate=\"\"/>\n");
}
gf_isom_box_dump_done("EditListBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,723
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ScriptPromise ImageCapture::getPhotoSettings(ScriptState* script_state) {
ScriptPromiseResolver* resolver = ScriptPromiseResolver::Create(script_state);
ScriptPromise promise = resolver->Promise();
if (!service_) {
resolver->Reject(DOMException::Create(kNotFoundError, kNoServiceError));
return promise;
}
service_requests_.insert(resolver);
auto resolver_cb =
WTF::Bind(&ImageCapture::ResolveWithPhotoSettings, WrapPersistent(this));
service_->GetPhotoState(
stream_track_->Component()->Source()->Id(),
ConvertToBaseCallback(WTF::Bind(
&ImageCapture::OnMojoGetPhotoState, WrapPersistent(this),
WrapPersistent(resolver), WTF::Passed(std::move(resolver_cb)),
false /* trigger_take_photo */)));
return promise;
}
Commit Message: Convert MediaTrackConstraints to a ScriptValue
IDLDictionaries such as MediaTrackConstraints should not be stored on
the heap which would happen when binding one as a parameter to a
callback. This change converts the object to a ScriptValue ahead of
time. This is fine because the value will be passed to a
ScriptPromiseResolver that will converted it to a V8 value if it
isn't already.
Bug: 759457
Change-Id: I3009a0f7711cc264aeaae07a36c18a6db8c915c8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/701358
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507177}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 151,104
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: X509_SIG *d2i_PKCS8_fp(FILE *fp, X509_SIG **p8)
{
return ASN1_d2i_fp_of(X509_SIG,X509_SIG_new,d2i_X509_SIG,fp,p8);
}
Commit Message: Fix various certificate fingerprint issues.
By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a
certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature.
Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed
this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the
certificate fingerprint for blacklists.
1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits.
If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject
the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits.
2. Check certificate algorithm consistency.
Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the
certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure
errors for some broken certificates.
3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER.
Reencode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received
signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch.
This will reject various cases including garbage after signature
(thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS
program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs
(negative or with leading zeroes).
CVE-2014-8275
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 94,647
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: char * SafeSock::serialize(char *buf)
{
char sinful_string[28];
char usernamebuf[128];
char *ptmp, *ptr = NULL;
ASSERT(buf);
memset(sinful_string, 0, 28);
memset(usernamebuf, 0, 128);
ptmp = Sock::serialize(buf);
ASSERT( ptmp );
int itmp;
sscanf(ptmp,"%d*",&itmp);
_special_state=safesock_state(itmp);
ptmp = strchr(ptmp, '*');
if(ptmp) ptmp++;
if (ptmp && (ptr = strchr(ptmp, '*')) != NULL) {
memcpy(sinful_string, ptmp, ptr - ptmp);
ptmp = ++ptr;
}
else if(ptmp) {
sscanf(ptmp,"%s",sinful_string);
}
_who.from_sinful(sinful_string);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134
| 0
| 16,295
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool NavigationRateLimiter::CanProceed() {
if (!enabled)
return true;
static constexpr int kStateUpdateLimit = 200;
static constexpr base::TimeDelta kStateUpdateLimitResetInterval =
base::TimeDelta::FromSeconds(10);
if (++count_ <= kStateUpdateLimit)
return true;
const base::TimeTicks now = base::TimeTicks::Now();
if (now - time_first_count_ > kStateUpdateLimitResetInterval) {
time_first_count_ = now;
count_ = 1;
error_message_sent_ = false;
return true;
}
if (!error_message_sent_) {
error_message_sent_ = true;
if (auto* local_frame = DynamicTo<LocalFrame>(frame_.Get())) {
local_frame->Console().AddMessage(ConsoleMessage::Create(
mojom::ConsoleMessageSource::kJavaScript,
mojom::ConsoleMessageLevel::kWarning,
"Throttling navigation to prevent the browser from hanging. See "
"https://crbug.com/882238. Command line switch "
"--disable-ipc-flooding-protection can be used to bypass the "
"protection"));
}
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 1
| 172,491
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: detach_vmas_to_be_unmapped(struct mm_struct *mm, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
struct vm_area_struct *prev, unsigned long end)
{
struct vm_area_struct **insertion_point;
struct vm_area_struct *tail_vma = NULL;
insertion_point = (prev ? &prev->vm_next : &mm->mmap);
vma->vm_prev = NULL;
do {
vma_rb_erase(vma, &mm->mm_rb);
mm->map_count--;
tail_vma = vma;
vma = vma->vm_next;
} while (vma && vma->vm_start < end);
*insertion_point = vma;
if (vma) {
vma->vm_prev = prev;
vma_gap_update(vma);
} else
mm->highest_vm_end = prev ? vm_end_gap(prev) : 0;
tail_vma->vm_next = NULL;
/* Kill the cache */
vmacache_invalidate(mm);
}
Commit Message: coredump: fix race condition between mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and core dumping
The core dumping code has always run without holding the mmap_sem for
writing, despite that is the only way to ensure that the entire vma
layout will not change from under it. Only using some signal
serialization on the processes belonging to the mm is not nearly enough.
This was pointed out earlier. For example in Hugh's post from Jul 2017:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1707191716030.2055@eggly.anvils
"Not strictly relevant here, but a related note: I was very surprised
to discover, only quite recently, how handle_mm_fault() may be called
without down_read(mmap_sem) - when core dumping. That seems a
misguided optimization to me, which would also be nice to correct"
In particular because the growsdown and growsup can move the
vm_start/vm_end the various loops the core dump does around the vma will
not be consistent if page faults can happen concurrently.
Pretty much all users calling mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and then
taking the mmap_sem had the potential to introduce unexpected side
effects in the core dumping code.
Adding mmap_sem for writing around the ->core_dump invocation is a
viable long term fix, but it requires removing all copy user and page
faults and to replace them with get_dump_page() for all binary formats
which is not suitable as a short term fix.
For the time being this solution manually covers the places that can
confuse the core dump either by altering the vma layout or the vma flags
while it runs. Once ->core_dump runs under mmap_sem for writing the
function mmget_still_valid() can be dropped.
Allowing mmap_sem protected sections to run in parallel with the
coredump provides some minor parallelism advantage to the swapoff code
(which seems to be safe enough by never mangling any vma field and can
keep doing swapins in parallel to the core dumping) and to some other
corner case.
In order to facilitate the backporting I added "Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6"
however the side effect of this same race condition in /proc/pid/mem
should be reproducible since before 2.6.12-rc2 so I couldn't add any
other "Fixes:" because there's no hash beyond the git genesis commit.
Because find_extend_vma() is the only location outside of the process
context that could modify the "mm" structures under mmap_sem for
reading, by adding the mmget_still_valid() check to it, all other cases
that take the mmap_sem for reading don't need the new check after
mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm(). The expand_stack() in page fault
context also doesn't need the new check, because all tasks under core
dumping are frozen.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325224949.11068-1-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 90,554
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static BOOL region16_simplify_bands(REGION16* region)
{
/** Simplify consecutive bands that touch and have the same items
*
* ==================== ====================
* | 1 | | 2 | | | | |
* ==================== | | | |
* | 1 | | 2 | ====> | 1 | | 2 |
* ==================== | | | |
* | 1 | | 2 | | | | |
* ==================== ====================
*
*/
RECTANGLE_16* band1, *band2, *endPtr, *endBand, *tmp;
int nbRects, finalNbRects;
int bandItems, toMove;
finalNbRects = nbRects = region16_n_rects(region);
if (nbRects < 2)
return TRUE;
band1 = region16_rects_noconst(region);
endPtr = band1 + nbRects;
do
{
band2 = next_band(band1, endPtr, &bandItems);
if (band2 == endPtr)
break;
if ((band1->bottom == band2->top) && band_match(band1, band2, endPtr))
{
/* adjust the bottom of band1 items */
tmp = band1;
while (tmp < band2)
{
tmp->bottom = band2->bottom;
tmp++;
}
/* override band2, we don't move band1 pointer as the band after band2
* may be merged too */
endBand = band2 + bandItems;
toMove = (endPtr - endBand) * sizeof(RECTANGLE_16);
if (toMove)
MoveMemory(band2, endBand, toMove);
finalNbRects -= bandItems;
endPtr -= bandItems;
}
else
{
band1 = band2;
}
}
while (TRUE);
if (finalNbRects != nbRects)
{
int allocSize = sizeof(REGION16_DATA) + (finalNbRects * sizeof(RECTANGLE_16));
region->data = realloc(region->data, allocSize);
if (!region->data)
{
region->data = &empty_region;
return FALSE;
}
region->data->nbRects = finalNbRects;
region->data->size = allocSize;
}
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fixed #5645: realloc return handling
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 1
| 169,497
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DocumentLoader::addPlugInStreamLoader(ResourceLoader* loader)
{
m_plugInStreamLoaders.add(loader);
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 105,684
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct hlist_head * __net_init netdev_create_hash(void)
{
int i;
struct hlist_head *hash;
hash = kmalloc(sizeof(*hash) * NETDEV_HASHENTRIES, GFP_KERNEL);
if (hash != NULL)
for (i = 0; i < NETDEV_HASHENTRIES; i++)
INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&hash[i]);
return hash;
}
Commit Message: tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 48,868
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int qeth_query_setadapterparms_cb(struct qeth_card *card,
struct qeth_reply *reply, unsigned long data)
{
struct qeth_ipa_cmd *cmd;
QETH_CARD_TEXT(card, 3, "quyadpcb");
cmd = (struct qeth_ipa_cmd *) data;
if (cmd->data.setadapterparms.data.query_cmds_supp.lan_type & 0x7f) {
card->info.link_type =
cmd->data.setadapterparms.data.query_cmds_supp.lan_type;
QETH_DBF_TEXT_(SETUP, 2, "lnk %d", card->info.link_type);
}
card->options.adp.supported_funcs =
cmd->data.setadapterparms.data.query_cmds_supp.supported_cmds;
return qeth_default_setadapterparms_cb(card, reply, (unsigned long)cmd);
}
Commit Message: qeth: avoid buffer overflow in snmp ioctl
Check user-defined length in snmp ioctl request and allow request
only if it fits into a qeth command buffer.
Signed-off-by: Ursula Braun <ursula.braun@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Frank Blaschka <frank.blaschka@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heicars2@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 28,617
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderBox::paintBoxDecorations(PaintInfo& paintInfo, const LayoutPoint& paintOffset)
{
if (!paintInfo.shouldPaintWithinRoot(this))
return;
LayoutRect paintRect(paintOffset, size());
borderFitAdjust(paintRect);
paintBoxShadow(paintInfo.context, paintRect, style(), Normal);
BackgroundBleedAvoidance bleedAvoidance = determineBackgroundBleedAvoidance(paintInfo.context);
GraphicsContextStateSaver stateSaver(*paintInfo.context, false);
if (bleedAvoidance == BackgroundBleedUseTransparencyLayer) {
RoundedRect border = style()->getRoundedBorderFor(paintRect);
stateSaver.save();
paintInfo.context->addRoundedRectClip(border);
paintInfo.context->beginTransparencyLayer(1);
}
bool themePainted = style()->hasAppearance() && !theme()->paint(this, paintInfo, paintRect);
if (!themePainted) {
if (isRoot())
paintRootBoxFillLayers(paintInfo);
else if (!isBody() || document()->documentElement()->renderer()->hasBackground()) {
paintFillLayers(paintInfo, style()->visitedDependentColor(CSSPropertyBackgroundColor), style()->backgroundLayers(), paintRect, bleedAvoidance);
}
if (style()->hasAppearance())
theme()->paintDecorations(this, paintInfo, paintRect);
}
paintBoxShadow(paintInfo.context, paintRect, style(), Inset);
if ((!style()->hasAppearance() || (!themePainted && theme()->paintBorderOnly(this, paintInfo, paintRect))) && style()->hasBorder())
paintBorder(paintInfo, paintRect, style(), bleedAvoidance);
if (bleedAvoidance == BackgroundBleedUseTransparencyLayer)
paintInfo.context->endTransparencyLayer();
}
Commit Message: Source/WebCore: Fix for bug 64046 - Wrong image height in absolutely positioned div in
relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
Test: fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html
* rendering/RenderBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBox::availableLogicalHeightUsing):
LayoutTests: Test to cover absolutely positioned child with percentage height
in relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent-expected.txt: Added.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html: Added.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@91533 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 101,616
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xmlCreateIOParserCtxt(xmlSAXHandlerPtr sax, void *user_data,
xmlInputReadCallback ioread, xmlInputCloseCallback ioclose,
void *ioctx, xmlCharEncoding enc) {
xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt;
xmlParserInputPtr inputStream;
xmlParserInputBufferPtr buf;
if (ioread == NULL) return(NULL);
buf = xmlParserInputBufferCreateIO(ioread, ioclose, ioctx, enc);
if (buf == NULL) {
if (ioclose != NULL)
ioclose(ioctx);
return (NULL);
}
ctxt = xmlNewParserCtxt();
if (ctxt == NULL) {
xmlFreeParserInputBuffer(buf);
return(NULL);
}
if (sax != NULL) {
#ifdef LIBXML_SAX1_ENABLED
if (ctxt->sax != (xmlSAXHandlerPtr) &xmlDefaultSAXHandler)
#endif /* LIBXML_SAX1_ENABLED */
xmlFree(ctxt->sax);
ctxt->sax = (xmlSAXHandlerPtr) xmlMalloc(sizeof(xmlSAXHandler));
if (ctxt->sax == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
xmlFreeParserCtxt(ctxt);
return(NULL);
}
memset(ctxt->sax, 0, sizeof(xmlSAXHandler));
if (sax->initialized == XML_SAX2_MAGIC)
memcpy(ctxt->sax, sax, sizeof(xmlSAXHandler));
else
memcpy(ctxt->sax, sax, sizeof(xmlSAXHandlerV1));
if (user_data != NULL)
ctxt->userData = user_data;
}
inputStream = xmlNewIOInputStream(ctxt, buf, enc);
if (inputStream == NULL) {
xmlFreeParserCtxt(ctxt);
return(NULL);
}
inputPush(ctxt, inputStream);
return(ctxt);
}
Commit Message: Detect infinite recursion in parameter entities
When expanding a parameter entity in a DTD, infinite recursion could
lead to an infinite loop or memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Wei Lei for the first of many reports.
Fixes bug 759579.
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 59,415
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int is_handler(const struct dirent *dirent)
{
if (strncmp(dirent->d_name, "handler_", 8))
return 0;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: fixed local DoS when UnregisterHandler was called for a not existing handler
Any user with DBUS access could cause a SEGFAULT in tcmu-runner by
running something like this:
dbus-send --system --print-reply --dest=org.kernel.TCMUService1 /org/kernel/TCMUService1/HandlerManager1 org.kernel.TCMUService1.HandlerManager1.UnregisterHandler string:123
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 59,038
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static const char *valid_domain_label(const char *label)
{
unsigned char ch;
if (label[0] == '-')
return NULL;
for (;;) {
ch = *label;
if ((ch|0x20) < 'a' || (ch|0x20) > 'z') {
if (ch < '0' || ch > '9') {
if (ch == '\0' || ch == '.')
return label;
/* DNS allows only '-', but we are more permissive */
if (ch != '-' && ch != '_')
return NULL;
}
}
label++;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 8,784
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void QQuickWebViewExperimental::setFilePicker(QQmlComponent* filePicker)
{
Q_D(QQuickWebView);
if (d->filePicker == filePicker)
return;
d->filePicker = filePicker;
emit filePickerChanged();
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] There's no way to test the gesture tap on WTR
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=92895
Reviewed by Kenneth Rohde Christiansen.
Source/WebKit2:
Add an instance of QtViewportHandler to QQuickWebViewPrivate, so it's
now available on mobile and desktop modes, as a side effect gesture tap
events can now be created and sent to WebCore.
This is needed to test tap gestures and to get tap gestures working
when you have a WebView (in desktop mode) on notebooks equipped with
touch screens.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate::onComponentComplete): Implementation
moved to QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate):
Tools:
WTR doesn't create the QQuickItem from C++, not from QML, so a call
to componentComplete() was added to mimic the QML behaviour.
* WebKitTestRunner/qt/PlatformWebViewQt.cpp:
(WTR::PlatformWebView::PlatformWebView):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124625 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 108,049
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: XGetModifierMapping(register Display *dpy)
{
xGetModifierMappingReply rep;
register xReq *req;
unsigned long nbytes;
XModifierKeymap *res;
LockDisplay(dpy);
GetEmptyReq(GetModifierMapping, req);
(void) _XReply (dpy, (xReply *)&rep, 0, xFalse);
if (rep.length < (INT_MAX >> 2)) {
nbytes = (unsigned long)rep.length << 2;
res = Xmalloc(sizeof (XModifierKeymap));
if (res)
} else
res = NULL;
if ((! res) || (! res->modifiermap)) {
Xfree(res);
res = (XModifierKeymap *) NULL;
_XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
} else {
_XReadPad(dpy, (char *) res->modifiermap, (long) nbytes);
res->max_keypermod = rep.numKeyPerModifier;
}
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (res);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 1
| 164,924
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: String HTMLFormControlElement::resultForDialogSubmit() {
return fastGetAttribute(valueAttr);
}
Commit Message: Form validation: Do not show validation bubble if the page is invisible.
BUG=673163
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2572813003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#438476}
CWE ID: CWE-1021
| 0
| 139,987
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: uint32_t virtio_config_modern_readl(VirtIODevice *vdev, uint32_t addr)
{
VirtioDeviceClass *k = VIRTIO_DEVICE_GET_CLASS(vdev);
uint32_t val;
if (addr + sizeof(val) > vdev->config_len) {
return (uint32_t)-1;
}
k->get_config(vdev, vdev->config);
val = ldl_le_p(vdev->config + addr);
return val;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 9,182
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: _movU(int n)
{
int i, m = searchKeyNum();
if (Currentbuf->firstLine == NULL)
return;
for (i = 0; i < m; i++)
cursorUp(Currentbuf, n);
displayBuffer(Currentbuf, B_NORMAL);
}
Commit Message: Make temporary directory safely when ~/.w3m is unwritable
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 84,458
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: XGetDeviceControl(
register Display *dpy,
XDevice *dev,
int control)
{
XDeviceControl *Device = NULL;
XDeviceControl *Sav = NULL;
xDeviceState *d = NULL;
xDeviceState *sav = NULL;
xGetDeviceControlReq *req;
xGetDeviceControlReply rep;
XExtDisplayInfo *info = XInput_find_display(dpy);
LockDisplay(dpy);
if (_XiCheckExtInit(dpy, XInput_Add_XChangeDeviceControl, info) == -1)
return NULL;
GetReq(GetDeviceControl, req);
req->reqType = info->codes->major_opcode;
req->ReqType = X_GetDeviceControl;
req->deviceid = dev->device_id;
req->control = control;
if (!_XReply(dpy, (xReply *) & rep, 0, xFalse))
goto out;
if (rep.length > 0) {
unsigned long nbytes;
size_t size = 0;
if (rep.length < (INT_MAX >> 2)) {
nbytes = (unsigned long) rep.length << 2;
d = Xmalloc(nbytes);
}
_XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
goto out;
}
sav = d;
_XRead(dpy, (char *)d, nbytes);
/* In theory, we should just be able to use d->length to get the size.
* Turns out that a number of X servers (up to and including server
* 1.4) sent the wrong length value down the wire. So to not break
* apps that run against older servers, we have to calculate the size
* manually.
*/
switch (d->control) {
case DEVICE_RESOLUTION:
{
xDeviceResolutionState *r;
size_t val_size;
size_t val_size;
r = (xDeviceResolutionState *) d;
if (r->num_valuators >= (INT_MAX / (3 * sizeof(int))))
goto out;
val_size = 3 * sizeof(int) * r->num_valuators;
if ((sizeof(xDeviceResolutionState) + val_size) > nbytes)
break;
}
case DEVICE_ABS_CALIB:
{
if (sizeof(xDeviceAbsCalibState) > nbytes)
goto out;
size = sizeof(XDeviceAbsCalibState);
break;
}
case DEVICE_ABS_AREA:
{
if (sizeof(xDeviceAbsAreaState) > nbytes)
goto out;
size = sizeof(XDeviceAbsAreaState);
break;
}
case DEVICE_CORE:
{
if (sizeof(xDeviceCoreState) > nbytes)
goto out;
size = sizeof(XDeviceCoreState);
break;
}
default:
if (d->length > nbytes)
goto out;
size = d->length;
break;
}
Device = Xmalloc(size);
if (!Device)
goto out;
Sav = Device;
d = sav;
switch (control) {
case DEVICE_RESOLUTION:
{
int *iptr, *iptr2;
xDeviceResolutionState *r;
XDeviceResolutionState *R;
unsigned int i;
r = (xDeviceResolutionState *) d;
R = (XDeviceResolutionState *) Device;
R->control = DEVICE_RESOLUTION;
R->length = sizeof(XDeviceResolutionState);
R->num_valuators = r->num_valuators;
iptr = (int *)(R + 1);
iptr2 = (int *)(r + 1);
R->resolutions = iptr;
R->min_resolutions = iptr + R->num_valuators;
R->max_resolutions = iptr + (2 * R->num_valuators);
for (i = 0; i < (3 * R->num_valuators); i++)
*iptr++ = *iptr2++;
break;
}
case DEVICE_ABS_CALIB:
{
xDeviceAbsCalibState *c = (xDeviceAbsCalibState *) d;
XDeviceAbsCalibState *C = (XDeviceAbsCalibState *) Device;
C->control = DEVICE_ABS_CALIB;
C->length = sizeof(XDeviceAbsCalibState);
C->min_x = c->min_x;
C->max_x = c->max_x;
C->min_y = c->min_y;
C->max_y = c->max_y;
C->flip_x = c->flip_x;
C->flip_y = c->flip_y;
C->rotation = c->rotation;
C->button_threshold = c->button_threshold;
break;
}
case DEVICE_ABS_AREA:
{
xDeviceAbsAreaState *a = (xDeviceAbsAreaState *) d;
XDeviceAbsAreaState *A = (XDeviceAbsAreaState *) Device;
A->control = DEVICE_ABS_AREA;
A->length = sizeof(XDeviceAbsAreaState);
A->offset_x = a->offset_x;
A->offset_y = a->offset_y;
A->width = a->width;
A->height = a->height;
A->screen = a->screen;
A->following = a->following;
break;
}
case DEVICE_CORE:
{
xDeviceCoreState *c = (xDeviceCoreState *) d;
XDeviceCoreState *C = (XDeviceCoreState *) Device;
C->control = DEVICE_CORE;
C->length = sizeof(XDeviceCoreState);
C->status = c->status;
C->iscore = c->iscore;
break;
}
case DEVICE_ENABLE:
{
xDeviceEnableState *e = (xDeviceEnableState *) d;
XDeviceEnableState *E = (XDeviceEnableState *) Device;
E->control = DEVICE_ENABLE;
E->length = sizeof(E);
E->enable = e->enable;
break;
}
default:
break;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 1
| 164,918
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PassRefPtr<ShadowRoot> ShadowRoot::create(Element* element, ExceptionCode& ec)
{
return create(element, CreatingAuthorShadowRoot, ec);
}
Commit Message: There are too many poorly named functions to create a fragment from markup
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87339
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Source/WebCore:
Moved all functions that create a fragment from markup to markup.h/cpp.
There should be no behavioral change.
* dom/Range.cpp:
(WebCore::Range::createContextualFragment):
* dom/Range.h: Removed createDocumentFragmentForElement.
* dom/ShadowRoot.cpp:
(WebCore::ShadowRoot::setInnerHTML):
* editing/markup.cpp:
(WebCore::createFragmentFromMarkup):
(WebCore::createFragmentForInnerOuterHTML): Renamed from createFragmentFromSource.
(WebCore::createFragmentForTransformToFragment): Moved from XSLTProcessor.
(WebCore::removeElementPreservingChildren): Moved from Range.
(WebCore::createContextualFragment): Ditto.
* editing/markup.h:
* html/HTMLElement.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setInnerHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setOuterHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML):
* inspector/DOMPatchSupport.cpp:
(WebCore::DOMPatchSupport::patchNode): Added a FIXME since this code should be using
one of the functions listed in markup.h
* xml/XSLTProcessor.cpp:
(WebCore::XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment):
Source/WebKit/qt:
Replace calls to Range::createDocumentFragmentForElement by calls to
createContextualDocumentFragment.
* Api/qwebelement.cpp:
(QWebElement::appendInside):
(QWebElement::prependInside):
(QWebElement::prependOutside):
(QWebElement::appendOutside):
(QWebElement::encloseContentsWith):
(QWebElement::encloseWith):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118414 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 100,298
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int pagemap_pte_hole(unsigned long start, unsigned long end,
struct mm_walk *walk)
{
struct pagemapread *pm = walk->private;
unsigned long addr = start;
int err = 0;
while (addr < end) {
struct vm_area_struct *vma = find_vma(walk->mm, addr);
pagemap_entry_t pme = make_pme(PM_NOT_PRESENT(pm->v2));
/* End of address space hole, which we mark as non-present. */
unsigned long hole_end;
if (vma)
hole_end = min(end, vma->vm_start);
else
hole_end = end;
for (; addr < hole_end; addr += PAGE_SIZE) {
err = add_to_pagemap(addr, &pme, pm);
if (err)
goto out;
}
if (!vma)
break;
/* Addresses in the VMA. */
if (vma->vm_flags & VM_SOFTDIRTY)
pme.pme |= PM_STATUS2(pm->v2, __PM_SOFT_DIRTY);
for (; addr < min(end, vma->vm_end); addr += PAGE_SIZE) {
err = add_to_pagemap(addr, &pme, pm);
if (err)
goto out;
}
}
out:
return err;
}
Commit Message: pagemap: do not leak physical addresses to non-privileged userspace
As pointed by recent post[1] on exploiting DRAM physical imperfection,
/proc/PID/pagemap exposes sensitive information which can be used to do
attacks.
This disallows anybody without CAP_SYS_ADMIN to read the pagemap.
[1] http://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2015/03/exploiting-dram-rowhammer-bug-to-gain.html
[ Eventually we might want to do anything more finegrained, but for now
this is the simple model. - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mark Seaborn <mseaborn@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 55,805
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CursorImpl::PrefetchReset(
int32_t used_prefetches,
int32_t unused_prefetches,
const std::vector<std::string>& unused_blob_uuids) {
for (const auto& uuid : unused_blob_uuids)
dispatcher_host_->DropBlobData(uuid);
idb_runner_->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&IDBThreadHelper::PrefetchReset, base::Unretained(helper_),
used_prefetches, unused_prefetches));
}
Commit Message: [IndexedDB] Fix Cursor UAF
If the connection is closed before we return a cursor, it dies in
IndexedDBCallbacks::IOThreadHelper::SendSuccessCursor. It's deleted on
the correct thread, but we also need to makes sure to remove it from its
transaction.
To make things simpler, we have the cursor remove itself from its
transaction on destruction.
R: pwnall@chromium.org
Bug: 728887
Change-Id: I8c76e6195c2490137a05213e47c635d12f4d3dd2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/526284
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#477504}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 135,537
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int raw_cmd_copyout(int cmd, void __user *param,
struct floppy_raw_cmd *ptr)
{
int ret;
while (ptr) {
ret = copy_to_user(param, ptr, sizeof(*ptr));
if (ret)
return -EFAULT;
param += sizeof(struct floppy_raw_cmd);
if ((ptr->flags & FD_RAW_READ) && ptr->buffer_length) {
if (ptr->length >= 0 &&
ptr->length <= ptr->buffer_length) {
long length = ptr->buffer_length - ptr->length;
ret = fd_copyout(ptr->data, ptr->kernel_data,
length);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
}
ptr = ptr->next;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: floppy: don't write kernel-only members to FDRAWCMD ioctl output
Do not leak kernel-only floppy_raw_cmd structure members to userspace.
This includes the linked-list pointer and the pointer to the allocated
DMA space.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattd@bugfuzz.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 1
| 166,434
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct nat_entry *__lookup_nat_cache(struct f2fs_nm_info *nm_i, nid_t n)
{
return radix_tree_lookup(&nm_i->nat_root, n);
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix race condition in between free nid allocator/initializer
In below concurrent case, allocated nid can be loaded into free nid cache
and be allocated again.
Thread A Thread B
- f2fs_create
- f2fs_new_inode
- alloc_nid
- __insert_nid_to_list(ALLOC_NID_LIST)
- f2fs_balance_fs_bg
- build_free_nids
- __build_free_nids
- scan_nat_page
- add_free_nid
- __lookup_nat_cache
- f2fs_add_link
- init_inode_metadata
- new_inode_page
- new_node_page
- set_node_addr
- alloc_nid_done
- __remove_nid_from_list(ALLOC_NID_LIST)
- __insert_nid_to_list(FREE_NID_LIST)
This patch makes nat cache lookup and free nid list operation being atomical
to avoid this race condition.
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 85,245
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void treatNullAsNullStringTreatUndefinedAsNullStringStringAttrAttributeSetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMSetter");
TestObjectV8Internal::treatNullAsNullStringTreatUndefinedAsNullStringStringAttrAttributeSetter(jsValue, info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 122,021
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ParamTraits<GURL>::Log(const GURL& p, std::string* l) {
l->append(p.spec());
}
Commit Message: Beware of print-read inconsistency when serializing GURLs.
BUG=165622
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11576038
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@173583 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 117,445
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool pv_eoi_get_pending(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
u8 val;
if (pv_eoi_get_user(vcpu, &val) < 0)
apic_debug("Can't read EOI MSR value: 0x%llx\n",
(unsigned long long)vcpi->arch.pv_eoi.msr_val);
return val & 0x1;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: fix guest-initiated crash with x2apic (CVE-2013-6376)
A guest can cause a BUG_ON() leading to a host kernel crash.
When the guest writes to the ICR to request an IPI, while in x2apic
mode the following things happen, the destination is read from
ICR2, which is a register that the guest can control.
kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic_fast uses the high 16 bits of ICR2 as the
cluster id. A BUG_ON is triggered, which is a protection against
accessing map->logical_map with an out-of-bounds access and manages
to avoid that anything really unsafe occurs.
The logic in the code is correct from real HW point of view. The problem
is that KVM supports only one cluster with ID 0 in clustered mode, but
the code that has the bug does not take this into account.
Reported-by: Lars Bull <larsbull@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 28,791
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DailyDataSavingUpdate(
const char* pref_original, const char* pref_received,
PrefService* pref_service)
: pref_original_(pref_original),
pref_received_(pref_received),
original_update_(pref_service, pref_original_),
received_update_(pref_service, pref_received_) {
}
Commit Message: Added daily UMA for non-data-reduction-proxy data usage when the proxy is enabled.
BUG=325325
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/106113002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@239897 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 1
| 171,322
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int parse_check_done(struct jv_parser* p, jv* out) {
if (p->stackpos == 0 && jv_is_valid(p->next)) {
*out = p->next;
p->next = jv_invalid();
return 1;
} else {
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message: Heap buffer overflow in tokenadd() (fix #105)
This was an off-by one: the NUL terminator byte was not allocated on
resize. This was triggered by JSON-encoded numbers longer than 256
bytes.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 56,390
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: browser::NavigateParams Browser::GetSingletonTabNavigateParams(
const GURL& url) {
browser::NavigateParams params(this, url, PageTransition::AUTO_BOOKMARK);
params.disposition = SINGLETON_TAB;
params.window_action = browser::NavigateParams::SHOW_WINDOW;
params.user_gesture = true;
return params;
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 97,233
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HTMLMediaElement::didRecalcStyle() {
if (layoutObject())
layoutObject()->updateFromElement();
}
Commit Message: [Blink>Media] Allow autoplay muted on Android by default
There was a mistake causing autoplay muted is shipped on Android
but it will be disabled if the chromium embedder doesn't specify
content setting for "AllowAutoplay" preference. This CL makes the
AllowAutoplay preference true by default so that it is allowed by
embedders (including AndroidWebView) unless they explicitly
disable it.
Intent to ship:
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/Q1cnzNI2GpI/AL_eyUNABgAJ
BUG=689018
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2677173002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#448423}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 128,782
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ScriptProfiler::visitNodeWrappers(WrappedNodeVisitor* visitor)
{
v8::Isolate* isolate = v8::Isolate::GetCurrent();
v8::HandleScope handleScope(isolate);
class DOMNodeWrapperVisitor : public v8::PersistentHandleVisitor {
public:
DOMNodeWrapperVisitor(WrappedNodeVisitor* visitor, v8::Isolate* isolate)
: m_visitor(visitor)
, m_isolate(isolate)
{
}
virtual void VisitPersistentHandle(v8::Persistent<v8::Value>* value, uint16_t classId) OVERRIDE
{
if (classId != v8DOMNodeClassId)
return;
v8::Handle<v8::Object>* wrapper = reinterpret_cast<v8::Handle<v8::Object>*>(value);
ASSERT(V8Node::HasInstanceInAnyWorld(*wrapper, m_isolate));
ASSERT((*wrapper)->IsObject());
m_visitor->visitNode(V8Node::toNative(*wrapper));
}
private:
WrappedNodeVisitor* m_visitor;
v8::Isolate* m_isolate;
} wrapperVisitor(visitor, isolate);
v8::V8::VisitHandlesWithClassIds(&wrapperVisitor);
}
Commit Message: Fix clobbered build issue.
TBR=jochen@chromium.org
NOTRY=true
BUG=269698
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/22425005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@155711 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 102,539
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pin_and_fence_object(struct drm_i915_gem_object *obj,
struct intel_ring_buffer *ring)
{
struct drm_i915_gem_exec_object2 *entry = obj->exec_entry;
bool has_fenced_gpu_access = INTEL_INFO(ring->dev)->gen < 4;
bool need_fence, need_mappable;
int ret;
need_fence =
has_fenced_gpu_access &&
entry->flags & EXEC_OBJECT_NEEDS_FENCE &&
obj->tiling_mode != I915_TILING_NONE;
need_mappable =
entry->relocation_count ? true : need_fence;
ret = i915_gem_object_pin(obj, entry->alignment, need_mappable);
if (ret)
return ret;
if (has_fenced_gpu_access) {
if (entry->flags & EXEC_OBJECT_NEEDS_FENCE) {
if (obj->tiling_mode) {
ret = i915_gem_object_get_fence(obj, ring);
if (ret)
goto err_unpin;
entry->flags |= __EXEC_OBJECT_HAS_FENCE;
i915_gem_object_pin_fence(obj);
} else {
ret = i915_gem_object_put_fence(obj);
if (ret)
goto err_unpin;
}
obj->pending_fenced_gpu_access = true;
}
}
entry->offset = obj->gtt_offset;
return 0;
err_unpin:
i915_gem_object_unpin(obj);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: drm/i915: fix integer overflow in i915_gem_do_execbuffer()
On 32-bit systems, a large args->num_cliprects from userspace via ioctl
may overflow the allocation size, leading to out-of-bounds access.
This vulnerability was introduced in commit 432e58ed ("drm/i915: Avoid
allocation for execbuffer object list").
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 19,797
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void led_work(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct usb_hub *hub =
container_of(work, struct usb_hub, leds.work);
struct usb_device *hdev = hub->hdev;
unsigned i;
unsigned changed = 0;
int cursor = -1;
if (hdev->state != USB_STATE_CONFIGURED || hub->quiescing)
return;
for (i = 0; i < hdev->maxchild; i++) {
unsigned selector, mode;
/* 30%-50% duty cycle */
switch (hub->indicator[i]) {
/* cycle marker */
case INDICATOR_CYCLE:
cursor = i;
selector = HUB_LED_AUTO;
mode = INDICATOR_AUTO;
break;
/* blinking green = sw attention */
case INDICATOR_GREEN_BLINK:
selector = HUB_LED_GREEN;
mode = INDICATOR_GREEN_BLINK_OFF;
break;
case INDICATOR_GREEN_BLINK_OFF:
selector = HUB_LED_OFF;
mode = INDICATOR_GREEN_BLINK;
break;
/* blinking amber = hw attention */
case INDICATOR_AMBER_BLINK:
selector = HUB_LED_AMBER;
mode = INDICATOR_AMBER_BLINK_OFF;
break;
case INDICATOR_AMBER_BLINK_OFF:
selector = HUB_LED_OFF;
mode = INDICATOR_AMBER_BLINK;
break;
/* blink green/amber = reserved */
case INDICATOR_ALT_BLINK:
selector = HUB_LED_GREEN;
mode = INDICATOR_ALT_BLINK_OFF;
break;
case INDICATOR_ALT_BLINK_OFF:
selector = HUB_LED_AMBER;
mode = INDICATOR_ALT_BLINK;
break;
default:
continue;
}
if (selector != HUB_LED_AUTO)
changed = 1;
set_port_led(hub, i + 1, selector);
hub->indicator[i] = mode;
}
if (!changed && blinkenlights) {
cursor++;
cursor %= hdev->maxchild;
set_port_led(hub, cursor + 1, HUB_LED_GREEN);
hub->indicator[cursor] = INDICATOR_CYCLE;
changed++;
}
if (changed)
queue_delayed_work(system_power_efficient_wq,
&hub->leds, LED_CYCLE_PERIOD);
}
Commit Message: USB: fix invalid memory access in hub_activate()
Commit 8520f38099cc ("USB: change hub initialization sleeps to
delayed_work") changed the hub_activate() routine to make part of it
run in a workqueue. However, the commit failed to take a reference to
the usb_hub structure or to lock the hub interface while doing so. As
a result, if a hub is plugged in and quickly unplugged before the work
routine can run, the routine will try to access memory that has been
deallocated. Or, if the hub is unplugged while the routine is
running, the memory may be deallocated while it is in active use.
This patch fixes the problem by taking a reference to the usb_hub at
the start of hub_activate() and releasing it at the end (when the work
is finished), and by locking the hub interface while the work routine
is running. It also adds a check at the start of the routine to see
if the hub has already been disconnected, in which nothing should be
done.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Reported-by: Alexandru Cornea <alexandru.cornea@intel.com>
Tested-by: Alexandru Cornea <alexandru.cornea@intel.com>
Fixes: 8520f38099cc ("USB: change hub initialization sleeps to delayed_work")
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 56,778
|
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