instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static const char *req_unparsed_uri_field(request_rec *r)
{
return r->unparsed_uri;
}
Commit Message: *) SECURITY: CVE-2015-0228 (cve.mitre.org)
mod_lua: A maliciously crafted websockets PING after a script
calls r:wsupgrade() can cause a child process crash.
[Edward Lu <Chaosed0 gmail.com>]
Discovered by Guido Vranken <guidovranken gmail.com>
Submitted by: Edward Lu
Committed by: covener
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1657261 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 45,157
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void IRCView::findPreviousText()
{
emit doSearchPrevious();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 1,762
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sd_degenerate(struct sched_domain *sd)
{
if (cpumask_weight(sched_domain_span(sd)) == 1)
return 1;
/* Following flags need at least 2 groups */
if (sd->flags & (SD_LOAD_BALANCE |
SD_BALANCE_NEWIDLE |
SD_BALANCE_FORK |
SD_BALANCE_EXEC |
SD_SHARE_CPUCAPACITY |
SD_SHARE_PKG_RESOURCES |
SD_SHARE_POWERDOMAIN)) {
if (sd->groups != sd->groups->next)
return 0;
}
/* Following flags don't use groups */
if (sd->flags & (SD_WAKE_AFFINE))
return 0;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 55,639
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_eat_auth(struct net *net,
const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const sctp_subtype_t type,
void *arg,
sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands)
{
struct sctp_authhdr *auth_hdr;
struct sctp_chunk *chunk = arg;
struct sctp_chunk *err_chunk;
sctp_ierror_t error;
/* Make sure that the peer has AUTH capable */
if (!asoc->peer.auth_capable)
return sctp_sf_unk_chunk(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
if (!sctp_vtag_verify(chunk, asoc)) {
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPORT_BAD_TAG,
SCTP_NULL());
return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
}
/* Make sure that the AUTH chunk has valid length. */
if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_auth_chunk)))
return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
commands);
auth_hdr = (struct sctp_authhdr *)chunk->skb->data;
error = sctp_sf_authenticate(net, ep, asoc, type, chunk);
switch (error) {
case SCTP_IERROR_AUTH_BAD_HMAC:
/* Generate the ERROR chunk and discard the rest
* of the packet
*/
err_chunk = sctp_make_op_error(asoc, chunk,
SCTP_ERROR_UNSUP_HMAC,
&auth_hdr->hmac_id,
sizeof(__u16), 0);
if (err_chunk) {
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPLY,
SCTP_CHUNK(err_chunk));
}
/* Fall Through */
case SCTP_IERROR_AUTH_BAD_KEYID:
case SCTP_IERROR_BAD_SIG:
return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
case SCTP_IERROR_PROTO_VIOLATION:
return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
commands);
case SCTP_IERROR_NOMEM:
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_NOMEM;
default: /* Prevent gcc warnings */
break;
}
if (asoc->active_key_id != ntohs(auth_hdr->shkey_id)) {
struct sctp_ulpevent *ev;
ev = sctp_ulpevent_make_authkey(asoc, ntohs(auth_hdr->shkey_id),
SCTP_AUTH_NEWKEY, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!ev)
return -ENOMEM;
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_EVENT_ULP,
SCTP_ULPEVENT(ev));
}
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_CONSUME;
}
Commit Message: sctp: Use correct sideffect command in duplicate cookie handling
When SCTP is done processing a duplicate cookie chunk, it tries
to delete a newly created association. For that, it has to set
the right association for the side-effect processing to work.
However, when it uses the SCTP_CMD_NEW_ASOC command, that performs
more work then really needed (like hashing the associationa and
assigning it an id) and there is no point to do that only to
delete the association as a next step. In fact, it also creates
an impossible condition where an association may be found by
the getsockopt() call, and that association is empty. This
causes a crash in some sctp getsockopts.
The solution is rather simple. We simply use SCTP_CMD_SET_ASOC
command that doesn't have all the overhead and does exactly
what we need.
Reported-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
CC: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 31,613
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int PreProcessingFx_ProcessReverse(effect_handle_t self,
audio_buffer_t *inBuffer,
audio_buffer_t *outBuffer)
{
preproc_effect_t * effect = (preproc_effect_t *)self;
int status = 0;
if (effect == NULL){
ALOGW("PreProcessingFx_ProcessReverse() ERROR effect == NULL");
return -EINVAL;
}
preproc_session_t * session = (preproc_session_t *)effect->session;
if (inBuffer == NULL || inBuffer->raw == NULL){
ALOGW("PreProcessingFx_ProcessReverse() ERROR bad pointer");
return -EINVAL;
}
session->revProcessedMsk |= (1<<effect->procId);
if ((session->revProcessedMsk & session->revEnabledMsk) == session->revEnabledMsk) {
effect->session->revProcessedMsk = 0;
if (session->revResampler != NULL) {
size_t fr = session->frameCount - session->framesRev;
if (inBuffer->frameCount < fr) {
fr = inBuffer->frameCount;
}
if (session->revBufSize < session->framesRev + fr) {
session->revBufSize = session->framesRev + fr;
session->revBuf = (int16_t *)realloc(session->revBuf,
session->revBufSize * session->inChannelCount * sizeof(int16_t));
}
memcpy(session->revBuf + session->framesRev * session->inChannelCount,
inBuffer->s16,
fr * session->inChannelCount * sizeof(int16_t));
session->framesRev += fr;
inBuffer->frameCount = fr;
if (session->framesRev < session->frameCount) {
return 0;
}
spx_uint32_t frIn = session->framesRev;
spx_uint32_t frOut = session->apmFrameCount;
if (session->inChannelCount == 1) {
speex_resampler_process_int(session->revResampler,
0,
session->revBuf,
&frIn,
session->revFrame->_payloadData,
&frOut);
} else {
speex_resampler_process_interleaved_int(session->revResampler,
session->revBuf,
&frIn,
session->revFrame->_payloadData,
&frOut);
}
memcpy(session->revBuf,
session->revBuf + frIn * session->inChannelCount,
(session->framesRev - frIn) * session->inChannelCount * sizeof(int16_t));
session->framesRev -= frIn;
} else {
size_t fr = session->frameCount - session->framesRev;
if (inBuffer->frameCount < fr) {
fr = inBuffer->frameCount;
}
memcpy(session->revFrame->_payloadData + session->framesRev * session->inChannelCount,
inBuffer->s16,
fr * session->inChannelCount * sizeof(int16_t));
session->framesRev += fr;
inBuffer->frameCount = fr;
if (session->framesRev < session->frameCount) {
return 0;
}
session->framesRev = 0;
}
session->revFrame->_payloadDataLengthInSamples =
session->apmFrameCount * session->inChannelCount;
effect->session->apm->AnalyzeReverseStream(session->revFrame);
return 0;
} else {
return -ENODATA;
}
}
Commit Message: audio effects: fix heap overflow
Check consistency of effect command reply sizes before
copying to reply address.
Also add null pointer check on reply size.
Also remove unused parameter warning.
Bug: 21953516.
Change-Id: I4cf00c12eaed696af28f3b7613f7e36f47a160c4
(cherry picked from commit 0f714a464d2425afe00d6450535e763131b40844)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 173,354
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gx_device_set_media_from_hwsize(gx_device *dev)
{
int rot = (dev->LeadingEdge & 1);
double x = dev->width * 72.0 / dev->HWResolution[0];
double y = dev->height * 72.0 / dev->HWResolution[1];
if (rot) {
dev->MediaSize[1] = x;
dev->MediaSize[0] = y;
} else {
dev->MediaSize[0] = x;
dev->MediaSize[1] = y;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-78
| 0
| 2,818
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: inline bool colorSpaceHasAlpha(J_COLOR_SPACE) { return false; }
Commit Message: Progressive JPEG outputScanlines() calls should handle failure
outputScanlines() can fail and delete |this|, so any attempt to access
members thereafter should be avoided. Copy the decoder pointer member,
and use that copy to detect and handle the failure case.
BUG=232763
R=pkasting@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/14844003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@150545 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 119,059
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static const SSL_METHOD *dtls1_get_server_method(int ver)
{
if (ver == DTLS1_VERSION)
return(DTLSv1_server_method());
else if (ver == DTLS1_2_VERSION)
return(DTLSv1_2_server_method());
else
return(NULL);
}
Commit Message: Only allow ephemeral RSA keys in export ciphersuites.
OpenSSL clients would tolerate temporary RSA keys in non-export
ciphersuites. It also had an option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA which
enabled this server side. Remove both options as they are a
protocol violation.
Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue.
(CVE-2015-0204)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 45,188
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int QQuickWebViewExperimental::preferredMinimumContentsWidth() const
{
Q_D(const QQuickWebView);
return d->webPageProxy->pageGroup()->preferences()->layoutFallbackWidth();
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] There's no way to test the gesture tap on WTR
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=92895
Reviewed by Kenneth Rohde Christiansen.
Source/WebKit2:
Add an instance of QtViewportHandler to QQuickWebViewPrivate, so it's
now available on mobile and desktop modes, as a side effect gesture tap
events can now be created and sent to WebCore.
This is needed to test tap gestures and to get tap gestures working
when you have a WebView (in desktop mode) on notebooks equipped with
touch screens.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate::onComponentComplete): Implementation
moved to QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate):
Tools:
WTR doesn't create the QQuickItem from C++, not from QML, so a call
to componentComplete() was added to mimic the QML behaviour.
* WebKitTestRunner/qt/PlatformWebViewQt.cpp:
(WTR::PlatformWebView::PlatformWebView):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124625 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 108,021
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void fm10k_reset_num_queues(struct fm10k_intfc *interface)
{
interface->num_tx_queues = 0;
interface->num_rx_queues = 0;
interface->num_q_vectors = 0;
}
Commit Message: fm10k: Fix a potential NULL pointer dereference
Syzkaller report this:
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 0 PID: 4378 Comm: syz-executor.0 Tainted: G C 5.0.0+ #5
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0x95b/0x3200 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3573
Code: 00 0f 85 28 1e 00 00 48 81 c4 08 01 00 00 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 4c 89 ea 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 cc 24 00 00 49 81 7d 00 e0 de 03 a6 41 bc 00 00
RSP: 0018:ffff8881e3c07a40 EFLAGS: 00010002
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000080
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff8881e3c07d98 R11: ffff8881c7f21f80 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: 0000000000000080 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000001
FS: 00007fce2252e700(0000) GS:ffff8881f2400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fffc7eb0228 CR3: 00000001e5bea002 CR4: 00000000007606f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
lock_acquire+0xff/0x2c0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4211
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:925 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0xdf/0x1050 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1072
drain_workqueue+0x24/0x3f0 kernel/workqueue.c:2934
destroy_workqueue+0x23/0x630 kernel/workqueue.c:4319
__do_sys_delete_module kernel/module.c:1018 [inline]
__se_sys_delete_module kernel/module.c:961 [inline]
__x64_sys_delete_module+0x30c/0x480 kernel/module.c:961
do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x450 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fce2252dc58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000b0
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000020000140
RBP: 0000000000000002 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fce2252e6bc
R13: 00000000004bcca9 R14: 00000000006f6b48 R15: 00000000ffffffff
If alloc_workqueue fails, it should return -ENOMEM, otherwise may
trigger this NULL pointer dereference while unloading drivers.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: 0a38c17a21a0 ("fm10k: Remove create_workqueue")
Signed-off-by: Yue Haibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Andrew Bowers <andrewx.bowers@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 87,941
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cc::BrowserControlsState ContentToCc(BrowserControlsState state) {
return static_cast<cc::BrowserControlsState>(state);
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 145,092
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bson_iter_next (bson_iter_t *iter) /* INOUT */
{
uint32_t bson_type;
const char *key;
bool unsupported;
return _bson_iter_next_internal (iter, 0, &key, &bson_type, &unsupported);
}
Commit Message: Fix for CVE-2018-16790 -- Verify bounds before binary length read.
As reported here: https://jira.mongodb.org/browse/CDRIVER-2819,
a heap overread occurs due a failure to correctly verify data
bounds.
In the original check, len - o returns the data left including the
sizeof(l) we just read. Instead, the comparison should check
against the data left NOT including the binary int32, i.e. just
subtype (byte*) instead of int32 subtype (byte*).
Added in test for corrupted BSON example.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 77,845
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int modify_raw_packet_qp(struct mlx5_ib_dev *dev, struct mlx5_ib_qp *qp,
const struct mlx5_modify_raw_qp_param *raw_qp_param,
u8 tx_affinity)
{
struct mlx5_ib_raw_packet_qp *raw_packet_qp = &qp->raw_packet_qp;
struct mlx5_ib_rq *rq = &raw_packet_qp->rq;
struct mlx5_ib_sq *sq = &raw_packet_qp->sq;
int modify_rq = !!qp->rq.wqe_cnt;
int modify_sq = !!qp->sq.wqe_cnt;
int rq_state;
int sq_state;
int err;
switch (raw_qp_param->operation) {
case MLX5_CMD_OP_RST2INIT_QP:
rq_state = MLX5_RQC_STATE_RDY;
sq_state = MLX5_SQC_STATE_RDY;
break;
case MLX5_CMD_OP_2ERR_QP:
rq_state = MLX5_RQC_STATE_ERR;
sq_state = MLX5_SQC_STATE_ERR;
break;
case MLX5_CMD_OP_2RST_QP:
rq_state = MLX5_RQC_STATE_RST;
sq_state = MLX5_SQC_STATE_RST;
break;
case MLX5_CMD_OP_RTR2RTS_QP:
case MLX5_CMD_OP_RTS2RTS_QP:
if (raw_qp_param->set_mask ==
MLX5_RAW_QP_RATE_LIMIT) {
modify_rq = 0;
sq_state = sq->state;
} else {
return raw_qp_param->set_mask ? -EINVAL : 0;
}
break;
case MLX5_CMD_OP_INIT2INIT_QP:
case MLX5_CMD_OP_INIT2RTR_QP:
if (raw_qp_param->set_mask)
return -EINVAL;
else
return 0;
default:
WARN_ON(1);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (modify_rq) {
err = modify_raw_packet_qp_rq(dev, rq, rq_state, raw_qp_param);
if (err)
return err;
}
if (modify_sq) {
if (tx_affinity) {
err = modify_raw_packet_tx_affinity(dev->mdev, sq,
tx_affinity);
if (err)
return err;
}
return modify_raw_packet_qp_sq(dev->mdev, sq, sq_state, raw_qp_param);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: IB/mlx5: Fix leaking stack memory to userspace
mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp was never initialized and only the first 4 bytes
were written.
Fixes: 41d902cb7c32 ("RDMA/mlx5: Fix definition of mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 92,167
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void tcp_illinois_info(struct sock *sk, u32 ext,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
const struct illinois *ca = inet_csk_ca(sk);
if (ext & (1 << (INET_DIAG_VEGASINFO - 1))) {
struct tcpvegas_info info = {
.tcpv_enabled = 1,
.tcpv_rttcnt = ca->cnt_rtt,
.tcpv_minrtt = ca->base_rtt,
};
u64 t = ca->sum_rtt;
do_div(t, ca->cnt_rtt);
info.tcpv_rtt = t;
nla_put(skb, INET_DIAG_VEGASINFO, sizeof(info), &info);
}
}
Commit Message: net: fix divide by zero in tcp algorithm illinois
Reading TCP stats when using TCP Illinois congestion control algorithm
can cause a divide by zero kernel oops.
The division by zero occur in tcp_illinois_info() at:
do_div(t, ca->cnt_rtt);
where ca->cnt_rtt can become zero (when rtt_reset is called)
Steps to Reproduce:
1. Register tcp_illinois:
# sysctl -w net.ipv4.tcp_congestion_control=illinois
2. Monitor internal TCP information via command "ss -i"
# watch -d ss -i
3. Establish new TCP conn to machine
Either it fails at the initial conn, or else it needs to wait
for a loss or a reset.
This is only related to reading stats. The function avg_delay() also
performs the same divide, but is guarded with a (ca->cnt_rtt > 0) at its
calling point in update_params(). Thus, simply fix tcp_illinois_info().
Function tcp_illinois_info() / get_info() is called without
socket lock. Thus, eliminate any race condition on ca->cnt_rtt
by using a local stack variable. Simply reuse info.tcpv_rttcnt,
as its already set to ca->cnt_rtt.
Function avg_delay() is not affected by this race condition, as
its called with the socket lock.
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@vyatta.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 1
| 165,530
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Locale& Document::getCachedLocale(const AtomicString& locale)
{
AtomicString localeKey = locale;
if (locale.isEmpty() || !RuntimeEnabledFeatures::langAttributeAwareFormControlUIEnabled())
return Locale::defaultLocale();
LocaleIdentifierToLocaleMap::AddResult result = m_localeCache.add(localeKey, nullptr);
if (result.isNewEntry)
result.storedValue->value = Locale::create(localeKey);
return *(result.storedValue->value);
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 124,388
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void prepare_lock_switch(struct rq *rq, struct task_struct *next)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
/*
* We can optimise this out completely for !SMP, because the
* SMP rebalancing from interrupt is the only thing that cares
* here.
*/
next->on_cpu = 1;
#endif
#ifdef __ARCH_WANT_INTERRUPTS_ON_CTXSW
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&rq->lock);
#else
raw_spin_unlock(&rq->lock);
#endif
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 26,316
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void add_head_to_pending(struct rev_info *revs)
{
unsigned char sha1[20];
struct object *obj;
if (get_sha1("HEAD", sha1))
return;
obj = parse_object(sha1);
if (!obj)
return;
add_pending_object(revs, obj, "HEAD");
}
Commit Message: list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 54,961
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int tcos_delete_file(sc_card_t *card, const sc_path_t *path)
{
int r;
u8 sbuf[2];
sc_apdu_t apdu;
SC_FUNC_CALLED(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE);
if (path->type != SC_PATH_TYPE_FILE_ID && path->len != 2) {
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, "File type has to be SC_PATH_TYPE_FILE_ID\n");
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS);
}
sbuf[0] = path->value[0];
sbuf[1] = path->value[1];
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_3_SHORT, 0xE4, 0x00, 0x00);
apdu.cla |= 0x80;
apdu.lc = 2;
apdu.datalen = 2;
apdu.data = sbuf;
r = sc_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, r, "APDU transmit failed");
return sc_check_sw(card, apdu.sw1, apdu.sw2);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds writes
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problems.
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 78,783
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::enqueuePopstateEvent(PassRefPtr<SerializedScriptValue> stateObject)
{
if (!ContextFeatures::pushStateEnabled(this))
return;
dispatchWindowEvent(PopStateEvent::create(stateObject, domWindow() ? domWindow()->history() : 0));
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 102,715
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ScriptValue Document::registerElement(WebCore::ScriptState* state, const AtomicString& name, const Dictionary& options, ExceptionState& es, CustomElement::NameSet validNames)
{
if (!registrationContext()) {
es.throwUninformativeAndGenericDOMException(NotSupportedError);
return ScriptValue();
}
CustomElementConstructorBuilder constructorBuilder(state, &options);
registrationContext()->registerElement(this, &constructorBuilder, name, validNames, es);
return constructorBuilder.bindingsReturnValue();
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 102,831
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __ebt_unregister_table(struct net *net, struct ebt_table *table)
{
int i;
mutex_lock(&ebt_mutex);
list_del(&table->list);
mutex_unlock(&ebt_mutex);
EBT_ENTRY_ITERATE(table->private->entries, table->private->entries_size,
ebt_cleanup_entry, net, NULL);
if (table->private->nentries)
module_put(table->me);
vfree(table->private->entries);
if (table->private->chainstack) {
for_each_possible_cpu(i)
vfree(table->private->chainstack[i]);
vfree(table->private->chainstack);
}
vfree(table->private);
kfree(table);
}
Commit Message: netfilter: ebtables: CONFIG_COMPAT: don't trust userland offsets
We need to make sure the offsets are not out of range of the
total size.
Also check that they are in ascending order.
The WARN_ON triggered by syzkaller (it sets panic_on_warn) is
changed to also bail out, no point in continuing parsing.
Briefly tested with simple ruleset of
-A INPUT --limit 1/s' --log
plus jump to custom chains using 32bit ebtables binary.
Reported-by: <syzbot+845a53d13171abf8bf29@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 84,843
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ASessionDescription::isValid() const {
return mIsValid;
}
Commit Message: Fix corruption via buffer overflow in mediaserver
change unbound sprintf() to snprintf() so network-provided values
can't overflow the buffers.
Applicable to all K/L/M/N branches.
Bug: 25747670
Change-Id: Id6a5120c2d08a6fbbd47deffb680ecf82015f4f6
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 158,296
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int aacDecoder_drcProlog (
HANDLE_AAC_DRC self,
HANDLE_FDK_BITSTREAM hBs,
CAacDecoderStaticChannelInfo *pAacDecoderStaticChannelInfo[],
UCHAR pceInstanceTag,
UCHAR channelMapping[], /* Channel mapping translating drcChannel index to canonical channel index */
int validChannels )
{
int err = 0;
if (self == NULL) {
return -1;
}
if (!self->params.bsDelayEnable)
{
err = aacDecoder_drcExtractAndMap (
self,
hBs,
pAacDecoderStaticChannelInfo,
pceInstanceTag,
channelMapping,
validChannels );
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: Fix stack corruption happening in aacDecoder_drcExtractAndMap()
In the aacDecoder_drcExtractAndMap() function, self->numThreads
can be used after having exceeded its intended max value,
MAX_DRC_THREADS, causing memory to be cleared after the
threadBs[MAX_DRC_THREADS] array.
The crash is prevented by never using self->numThreads with
a value equal to or greater than MAX_DRC_THREADS.
A proper fix will be required as there seems to be an issue as
to which entry in the threadBs array is meant to be initialized
and used.
Bug 26751339
Change-Id: I655cc40c35d4206ab72e83b2bdb751be2fe52b5a
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 161,256
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct net_device *alloc_netdev_mqs(int sizeof_priv, const char *name,
void (*setup)(struct net_device *),
unsigned int txqs, unsigned int rxqs)
{
struct net_device *dev;
size_t alloc_size;
struct net_device *p;
BUG_ON(strlen(name) >= sizeof(dev->name));
if (txqs < 1) {
pr_err("alloc_netdev: Unable to allocate device "
"with zero queues.\n");
return NULL;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_RPS
if (rxqs < 1) {
pr_err("alloc_netdev: Unable to allocate device "
"with zero RX queues.\n");
return NULL;
}
#endif
alloc_size = sizeof(struct net_device);
if (sizeof_priv) {
/* ensure 32-byte alignment of private area */
alloc_size = ALIGN(alloc_size, NETDEV_ALIGN);
alloc_size += sizeof_priv;
}
/* ensure 32-byte alignment of whole construct */
alloc_size += NETDEV_ALIGN - 1;
p = kzalloc(alloc_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!p) {
printk(KERN_ERR "alloc_netdev: Unable to allocate device.\n");
return NULL;
}
dev = PTR_ALIGN(p, NETDEV_ALIGN);
dev->padded = (char *)dev - (char *)p;
dev->pcpu_refcnt = alloc_percpu(int);
if (!dev->pcpu_refcnt)
goto free_p;
if (dev_addr_init(dev))
goto free_pcpu;
dev_mc_init(dev);
dev_uc_init(dev);
dev_net_set(dev, &init_net);
dev->gso_max_size = GSO_MAX_SIZE;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->ethtool_ntuple_list.list);
dev->ethtool_ntuple_list.count = 0;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->napi_list);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->unreg_list);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->link_watch_list);
dev->priv_flags = IFF_XMIT_DST_RELEASE;
setup(dev);
dev->num_tx_queues = txqs;
dev->real_num_tx_queues = txqs;
if (netif_alloc_netdev_queues(dev))
goto free_all;
#ifdef CONFIG_RPS
dev->num_rx_queues = rxqs;
dev->real_num_rx_queues = rxqs;
if (netif_alloc_rx_queues(dev))
goto free_all;
#endif
strcpy(dev->name, name);
return dev;
free_all:
free_netdev(dev);
return NULL;
free_pcpu:
free_percpu(dev->pcpu_refcnt);
kfree(dev->_tx);
#ifdef CONFIG_RPS
kfree(dev->_rx);
#endif
free_p:
kfree(p);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: net: don't allow CAP_NET_ADMIN to load non-netdev kernel modules
Since a8f80e8ff94ecba629542d9b4b5f5a8ee3eb565c any process with
CAP_NET_ADMIN may load any module from /lib/modules/. This doesn't mean
that CAP_NET_ADMIN is a superset of CAP_SYS_MODULE as modules are
limited to /lib/modules/**. However, CAP_NET_ADMIN capability shouldn't
allow anybody load any module not related to networking.
This patch restricts an ability of autoloading modules to netdev modules
with explicit aliases. This fixes CVE-2011-1019.
Arnd Bergmann suggested to leave untouched the old pre-v2.6.32 behavior
of loading netdev modules by name (without any prefix) for processes
with CAP_SYS_MODULE to maintain the compatibility with network scripts
that use autoloading netdev modules by aliases like "eth0", "wlan0".
Currently there are only three users of the feature in the upstream
kernel: ipip, ip_gre and sit.
root@albatros:~# capsh --drop=$(seq -s, 0 11),$(seq -s, 13 34) --
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: fffffff800001000
CapEff: fffffff800001000
CapBnd: fffffff800001000
root@albatros:~# modprobe xfs
FATAL: Error inserting xfs
(/lib/modules/2.6.38-rc6-00001-g2bf4ca3/kernel/fs/xfs/xfs.ko): Operation not permitted
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit
sit: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit0
sit0 Link encap:IPv6-in-IPv4
NOARP MTU:1480 Metric:1
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
sit 10457 0
tunnel4 2957 1 sit
For CAP_SYS_MODULE module loading is still relaxed:
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: ffffffffffffffff
CapEff: ffffffffffffffff
CapBnd: ffffffffffffffff
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
xfs 745319 0
Reference: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/24/203
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 35,235
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: maybe_make_export_env ()
{
register char **temp_array;
int new_size;
VAR_CONTEXT *tcxt;
if (array_needs_making)
{
if (export_env)
strvec_flush (export_env);
/* Make a guess based on how many shell variables and functions we
have. Since there will always be array variables, and array
variables are not (yet) exported, this will always be big enough
for the exported variables and functions. */
new_size = n_shell_variables () + HASH_ENTRIES (shell_functions) + 1 +
HASH_ENTRIES (temporary_env);
if (new_size > export_env_size)
{
export_env_size = new_size;
export_env = strvec_resize (export_env, export_env_size);
environ = export_env;
}
export_env[export_env_index = 0] = (char *)NULL;
/* Make a dummy variable context from the temporary_env, stick it on
the front of shell_variables, call make_var_export_array on the
whole thing to flatten it, and convert the list of SHELL_VAR *s
to the form needed by the environment. */
if (temporary_env)
{
tcxt = new_var_context ((char *)NULL, 0);
tcxt->table = temporary_env;
tcxt->down = shell_variables;
}
else
tcxt = shell_variables;
temp_array = make_var_export_array (tcxt);
if (temp_array)
add_temp_array_to_env (temp_array, 0, 0);
if (tcxt != shell_variables)
free (tcxt);
#if defined (RESTRICTED_SHELL)
/* Restricted shells may not export shell functions. */
temp_array = restricted ? (char **)0 : make_func_export_array ();
#else
temp_array = make_func_export_array ();
#endif
if (temp_array)
add_temp_array_to_env (temp_array, 0, 0);
array_needs_making = 0;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 17,349
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ContextState::EnableDisable(GLenum pname, bool enable) const {
if (pname == GL_PRIMITIVE_RESTART_FIXED_INDEX &&
feature_info_->feature_flags().emulate_primitive_restart_fixed_index) {
return;
}
if (enable) {
api()->glEnableFn(pname);
} else {
api()->glDisableFn(pname);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix tabs sharing TEXTURE_2D_ARRAY/TEXTURE_3D data.
In linux and android, we are seeing an issue where texture data from one
tab overwrites the texture data of another tab. This is happening for apps
which are using webgl2 texture of type TEXTURE_2D_ARRAY/TEXTURE_3D.
Due to a bug in virtual context save/restore code for above texture formats,
the texture data is not properly restored while switching tabs. Hence
texture data from one tab overwrites other.
This CL has fix for that issue, an update for existing test expectations
and a new unit test for this bug.
Bug: 788448
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ie933984cdd2d1381f42eb4638f730c8245207a28
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/930327
Reviewed-by: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: vikas soni <vikassoni@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#539111}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 149,978
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void index_existing_and_best(
git_index_entry **existing,
size_t *existing_position,
git_index_entry **best,
git_index *index,
const git_index_entry *entry)
{
git_index_entry *e;
size_t pos;
int error;
error = index_find(&pos,
index, entry->path, 0, GIT_IDXENTRY_STAGE(entry));
if (error == 0) {
*existing = index->entries.contents[pos];
*existing_position = pos;
*best = index->entries.contents[pos];
return;
}
*existing = NULL;
*existing_position = 0;
*best = NULL;
if (GIT_IDXENTRY_STAGE(entry) == 0) {
for (; pos < index->entries.length; pos++) {
int (*strcomp)(const char *a, const char *b) =
index->ignore_case ? git__strcasecmp : git__strcmp;
e = index->entries.contents[pos];
if (strcomp(entry->path, e->path) != 0)
break;
if (GIT_IDXENTRY_STAGE(e) == GIT_INDEX_STAGE_ANCESTOR) {
*best = e;
continue;
} else {
*best = e;
break;
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: index: convert `read_entry` to return entry size via an out-param
The function `read_entry` does not conform to our usual coding style of
returning stuff via the out parameter and to use the return value for
reporting errors. Due to most of our code conforming to that pattern, it
has become quite natural for us to actually return `-1` in case there is
any error, which has also slipped in with commit 5625d86b9 (index:
support index v4, 2016-05-17). As the function returns an `size_t` only,
though, the return value is wrapped around, causing the caller of
`read_tree` to continue with an invalid index entry. Ultimately, this
can lead to a double-free.
Improve code and fix the bug by converting the function to return the
index entry size via an out parameter and only using the return value to
indicate errors.
Reported-by: Krishna Ram Prakash R <krp@gtux.in>
Reported-by: Vivek Parikh <viv0411.parikh@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 83,738
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: IntSize PaintLayerScrollableArea::PixelSnappedContentsSize(
const LayoutPoint& paint_offset) const {
return PixelSnappedIntSize(overflow_rect_.Size(), paint_offset);
}
Commit Message: Always call UpdateCompositedScrollOffset, not just for the root layer
Bug: 927560
Change-Id: I1d5522aae4f11dd3f5b8947bb089bac1bf19bdb4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1452701
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mason Freed <masonfreed@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#628942}
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 130,095
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void *dupClientReplyValue(void *o) {
incrRefCount((robj*)o);
return o;
}
Commit Message: Security: Cross Protocol Scripting protection.
This is an attempt at mitigating problems due to cross protocol
scripting, an attack targeting services using line oriented protocols
like Redis that can accept HTTP requests as valid protocol, by
discarding the invalid parts and accepting the payloads sent, for
example, via a POST request.
For this to be effective, when we detect POST and Host: and terminate
the connection asynchronously, the networking code was modified in order
to never process further input. It was later verified that in a
pipelined request containing a POST command, the successive commands are
not executed.
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 69,958
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: HTMLElement& toHTMLElement(FormAssociatedElement& associatedElement)
{
return const_cast<HTMLElement&>(toHTMLElement(static_cast<const FormAssociatedElement&>(associatedElement)));
}
Commit Message: Fix a crash when a form control is in a past naems map of a demoted form element.
Note that we wanted to add the protector in FormAssociatedElement::setForm(),
but we couldn't do it because it is called from the constructor.
BUG=326854
TEST=automated.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/105693013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@163680 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-287
| 0
| 123,842
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: request_rec *ap_read_request(conn_rec *conn)
{
request_rec *r;
apr_pool_t *p;
const char *expect;
int access_status;
apr_bucket_brigade *tmp_bb;
apr_socket_t *csd;
apr_interval_time_t cur_timeout;
apr_pool_create(&p, conn->pool);
apr_pool_tag(p, "request");
r = apr_pcalloc(p, sizeof(request_rec));
AP_READ_REQUEST_ENTRY((intptr_t)r, (uintptr_t)conn);
r->pool = p;
r->connection = conn;
r->server = conn->base_server;
r->user = NULL;
r->ap_auth_type = NULL;
r->allowed_methods = ap_make_method_list(p, 2);
r->headers_in = apr_table_make(r->pool, 25);
r->trailers_in = apr_table_make(r->pool, 5);
r->subprocess_env = apr_table_make(r->pool, 25);
r->headers_out = apr_table_make(r->pool, 12);
r->err_headers_out = apr_table_make(r->pool, 5);
r->trailers_out = apr_table_make(r->pool, 5);
r->notes = apr_table_make(r->pool, 5);
r->request_config = ap_create_request_config(r->pool);
/* Must be set before we run create request hook */
r->proto_output_filters = conn->output_filters;
r->output_filters = r->proto_output_filters;
r->proto_input_filters = conn->input_filters;
r->input_filters = r->proto_input_filters;
ap_run_create_request(r);
r->per_dir_config = r->server->lookup_defaults;
r->sent_bodyct = 0; /* bytect isn't for body */
r->read_length = 0;
r->read_body = REQUEST_NO_BODY;
r->status = HTTP_OK; /* Until further notice */
r->the_request = NULL;
/* Begin by presuming any module can make its own path_info assumptions,
* until some module interjects and changes the value.
*/
r->used_path_info = AP_REQ_DEFAULT_PATH_INFO;
r->useragent_addr = conn->client_addr;
r->useragent_ip = conn->client_ip;
tmp_bb = apr_brigade_create(r->pool, r->connection->bucket_alloc);
ap_run_pre_read_request(r, conn);
/* Get the request... */
if (!read_request_line(r, tmp_bb)) {
switch (r->status) {
case HTTP_REQUEST_URI_TOO_LARGE:
case HTTP_BAD_REQUEST:
case HTTP_VERSION_NOT_SUPPORTED:
case HTTP_NOT_IMPLEMENTED:
if (r->status == HTTP_REQUEST_URI_TOO_LARGE) {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r, APLOGNO(00565)
"request failed: client's request-line exceeds LimitRequestLine (longer than %d)",
r->server->limit_req_line);
}
else if (r->method == NULL) {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r, APLOGNO(00566)
"request failed: invalid characters in URI");
}
access_status = r->status;
r->status = HTTP_OK;
ap_die(access_status, r);
ap_update_child_status(conn->sbh, SERVER_BUSY_LOG, r);
ap_run_log_transaction(r);
r = NULL;
apr_brigade_destroy(tmp_bb);
goto traceout;
case HTTP_REQUEST_TIME_OUT:
ap_update_child_status(conn->sbh, SERVER_BUSY_LOG, r);
if (!r->connection->keepalives)
ap_run_log_transaction(r);
apr_brigade_destroy(tmp_bb);
goto traceout;
default:
apr_brigade_destroy(tmp_bb);
r = NULL;
goto traceout;
}
}
/* We may have been in keep_alive_timeout mode, so toggle back
* to the normal timeout mode as we fetch the header lines,
* as necessary.
*/
csd = ap_get_conn_socket(conn);
apr_socket_timeout_get(csd, &cur_timeout);
if (cur_timeout != conn->base_server->timeout) {
apr_socket_timeout_set(csd, conn->base_server->timeout);
cur_timeout = conn->base_server->timeout;
}
if (!r->assbackwards) {
const char *tenc;
ap_get_mime_headers_core(r, tmp_bb);
if (r->status != HTTP_OK) {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r, APLOGNO(00567)
"request failed: error reading the headers");
ap_send_error_response(r, 0);
ap_update_child_status(conn->sbh, SERVER_BUSY_LOG, r);
ap_run_log_transaction(r);
apr_brigade_destroy(tmp_bb);
goto traceout;
}
tenc = apr_table_get(r->headers_in, "Transfer-Encoding");
if (tenc) {
/* http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-httpbis-p1-messaging-23
* Section 3.3.3.3: "If a Transfer-Encoding header field is
* present in a request and the chunked transfer coding is not
* the final encoding ...; the server MUST respond with the 400
* (Bad Request) status code and then close the connection".
*/
if (!(strcasecmp(tenc, "chunked") == 0 /* fast path */
|| ap_find_last_token(r->pool, tenc, "chunked"))) {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r, APLOGNO(02539)
"client sent unknown Transfer-Encoding "
"(%s): %s", tenc, r->uri);
r->status = HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
conn->keepalive = AP_CONN_CLOSE;
ap_send_error_response(r, 0);
ap_update_child_status(conn->sbh, SERVER_BUSY_LOG, r);
ap_run_log_transaction(r);
apr_brigade_destroy(tmp_bb);
goto traceout;
}
/* http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-httpbis-p1-messaging-23
* Section 3.3.3.3: "If a message is received with both a
* Transfer-Encoding and a Content-Length header field, the
* Transfer-Encoding overrides the Content-Length. ... A sender
* MUST remove the received Content-Length field".
*/
apr_table_unset(r->headers_in, "Content-Length");
}
}
else {
if (r->header_only) {
/*
* Client asked for headers only with HTTP/0.9, which doesn't send
* headers! Have to dink things just to make sure the error message
* comes through...
*/
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r, APLOGNO(00568)
"client sent invalid HTTP/0.9 request: HEAD %s",
r->uri);
r->header_only = 0;
r->status = HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
ap_send_error_response(r, 0);
ap_update_child_status(conn->sbh, SERVER_BUSY_LOG, r);
ap_run_log_transaction(r);
apr_brigade_destroy(tmp_bb);
goto traceout;
}
}
apr_brigade_destroy(tmp_bb);
/* update what we think the virtual host is based on the headers we've
* now read. may update status.
*/
ap_update_vhost_from_headers(r);
access_status = r->status;
/* Toggle to the Host:-based vhost's timeout mode to fetch the
* request body and send the response body, if needed.
*/
if (cur_timeout != r->server->timeout) {
apr_socket_timeout_set(csd, r->server->timeout);
cur_timeout = r->server->timeout;
}
/* we may have switched to another server */
r->per_dir_config = r->server->lookup_defaults;
if ((!r->hostname && (r->proto_num >= HTTP_VERSION(1, 1)))
|| ((r->proto_num == HTTP_VERSION(1, 1))
&& !apr_table_get(r->headers_in, "Host"))) {
/*
* Client sent us an HTTP/1.1 or later request without telling us the
* hostname, either with a full URL or a Host: header. We therefore
* need to (as per the 1.1 spec) send an error. As a special case,
* HTTP/1.1 mentions twice (S9, S14.23) that a request MUST contain
* a Host: header, and the server MUST respond with 400 if it doesn't.
*/
access_status = HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r, APLOGNO(00569)
"client sent HTTP/1.1 request without hostname "
"(see RFC2616 section 14.23): %s", r->uri);
}
/*
* Add the HTTP_IN filter here to ensure that ap_discard_request_body
* called by ap_die and by ap_send_error_response works correctly on
* status codes that do not cause the connection to be dropped and
* in situations where the connection should be kept alive.
*/
ap_add_input_filter_handle(ap_http_input_filter_handle,
NULL, r, r->connection);
if (access_status != HTTP_OK
|| (access_status = ap_run_post_read_request(r))) {
ap_die(access_status, r);
ap_update_child_status(conn->sbh, SERVER_BUSY_LOG, r);
ap_run_log_transaction(r);
r = NULL;
goto traceout;
}
if (((expect = apr_table_get(r->headers_in, "Expect")) != NULL)
&& (expect[0] != '\0')) {
/*
* The Expect header field was added to HTTP/1.1 after RFC 2068
* as a means to signal when a 100 response is desired and,
* unfortunately, to signal a poor man's mandatory extension that
* the server must understand or return 417 Expectation Failed.
*/
if (strcasecmp(expect, "100-continue") == 0) {
r->expecting_100 = 1;
}
else {
core_server_config *conf;
conf = ap_get_core_module_config(r->server->module_config);
if (conf->http_expect_strict != AP_HTTP_EXPECT_STRICT_DISABLE) {
r->status = HTTP_EXPECTATION_FAILED;
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r, APLOGNO(00570)
"client sent an unrecognized expectation value "
"of Expect: %s", expect);
ap_send_error_response(r, 0);
ap_update_child_status(conn->sbh, SERVER_BUSY_LOG, r);
ap_run_log_transaction(r);
goto traceout;
} else {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(02595)
"client sent an unrecognized expectation value "
"of Expect (not fatal): %s", expect);
}
}
}
AP_READ_REQUEST_SUCCESS((uintptr_t)r, (char *)r->method, (char *)r->uri, (char *)r->server->defn_name, r->status);
return r;
traceout:
AP_READ_REQUEST_FAILURE((uintptr_t)r);
return r;
}
Commit Message: *) SECURITY: CVE-2015-0253 (cve.mitre.org)
core: Fix a crash introduced in with ErrorDocument 400 pointing
to a local URL-path with the INCLUDES filter active, introduced
in 2.4.11. PR 57531. [Yann Ylavic]
Submitted By: ylavic
Committed By: covener
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1664205 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID:
| 0
| 44,993
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: enum AVPixelFormat ff_thread_get_format(AVCodecContext *avctx, const enum AVPixelFormat *fmt)
{
return ff_get_format(avctx, fmt);
}
Commit Message: avcodec/utils: correct align value for interplay
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: 452/fuzz-1-ffmpeg_VIDEO_AV_CODEC_ID_INTERPLAY_VIDEO_fuzzer
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 67,038
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: relay_lookup_conn(circuit_t *circ, cell_t *cell,
cell_direction_t cell_direction, crypt_path_t *layer_hint)
{
edge_connection_t *tmpconn;
relay_header_t rh;
relay_header_unpack(&rh, cell->payload);
if (!rh.stream_id)
return NULL;
/* IN or OUT cells could have come from either direction, now
* that we allow rendezvous *to* an OP.
*/
if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) {
for (tmpconn = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)->p_streams; tmpconn;
tmpconn=tmpconn->next_stream) {
if (rh.stream_id == tmpconn->stream_id &&
!tmpconn->base_.marked_for_close &&
tmpconn->cpath_layer == layer_hint) {
log_debug(LD_APP,"found conn for stream %d.", rh.stream_id);
return tmpconn;
}
}
} else {
for (tmpconn = TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_streams; tmpconn;
tmpconn=tmpconn->next_stream) {
if (rh.stream_id == tmpconn->stream_id &&
!tmpconn->base_.marked_for_close) {
log_debug(LD_EXIT,"found conn for stream %d.", rh.stream_id);
if (cell_direction == CELL_DIRECTION_OUT ||
connection_edge_is_rendezvous_stream(tmpconn))
return tmpconn;
}
}
for (tmpconn = TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->resolving_streams; tmpconn;
tmpconn=tmpconn->next_stream) {
if (rh.stream_id == tmpconn->stream_id &&
!tmpconn->base_.marked_for_close) {
log_debug(LD_EXIT,"found conn for stream %d.", rh.stream_id);
return tmpconn;
}
}
}
return NULL; /* probably a begin relay cell */
}
Commit Message: TROVE-2017-005: Fix assertion failure in connection_edge_process_relay_cell
On an hidden service rendezvous circuit, a BEGIN_DIR could be sent
(maliciously) which would trigger a tor_assert() because
connection_edge_process_relay_cell() thought that the circuit is an
or_circuit_t but is an origin circuit in reality.
Fixes #22494
Reported-by: Roger Dingledine <arma@torproject.org>
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 69,871
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void set_current_blocked(sigset_t *newset)
{
sigdelsetmask(newset, sigmask(SIGKILL) | sigmask(SIGSTOP));
__set_current_blocked(newset);
}
Commit Message: kernel/signal.c: stop info leak via the tkill and the tgkill syscalls
This fixes a kernel memory contents leak via the tkill and tgkill syscalls
for compat processes.
This is visible in the siginfo_t->_sifields._rt.si_sigval.sival_ptr field
when handling signals delivered from tkill.
The place of the infoleak:
int copy_siginfo_to_user32(compat_siginfo_t __user *to, siginfo_t *from)
{
...
put_user_ex(ptr_to_compat(from->si_ptr), &to->si_ptr);
...
}
Signed-off-by: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 31,794
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: stringprep_4zi (uint32_t * ucs4, size_t maxucs4len,
Stringprep_profile_flags flags,
const Stringprep_profile * profile)
{
size_t ucs4len;
for (ucs4len = 0; ucs4len < maxucs4len && ucs4[ucs4len] != 0; ucs4len++)
;
return stringprep_4zi_1 (ucs4, ucs4len, maxucs4len, flags, profile);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 4,779
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Splash::pipeRunAAMono1(SplashPipe *pipe) {
Guchar aSrc;
SplashColor cDest;
Guchar cResult0;
cDest[0] = (*pipe->destColorPtr & pipe->destColorMask) ? 0xff : 0x00;
aSrc = div255(pipe->aInput * pipe->shape);
cResult0 = state->grayTransfer[(Guchar)div255((0xff - aSrc) * cDest[0] +
aSrc * pipe->cSrc[0])];
if (state->screen->test(pipe->x, pipe->y, cResult0)) {
*pipe->destColorPtr |= pipe->destColorMask;
} else {
*pipe->destColorPtr &= ~pipe->destColorMask;
}
if (!(pipe->destColorMask >>= 1)) {
pipe->destColorMask = 0x80;
++pipe->destColorPtr;
}
++pipe->x;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 4,121
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Document::IsSecureContext(String& error_message) const {
if (!IsSecureContext()) {
error_message = SecurityOrigin::IsPotentiallyTrustworthyErrorMessage();
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 129,769
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FrameLoader::commitProvisionalLoad()
{
ASSERT(m_client->hasWebView());
ASSERT(m_state == FrameStateProvisional);
RefPtr<DocumentLoader> pdl = m_provisionalDocumentLoader;
RefPtr<Frame> protect(m_frame);
closeOldDataSources();
if (m_frame->document()) {
RefPtr<SecurityOrigin> securityOrigin = SecurityOrigin::create(pdl->request().url());
pdl->timing()->setHasSameOriginAsPreviousDocument(securityOrigin->canRequest(m_frame->document()->url()));
}
if (m_documentLoader)
closeURL();
if (pdl != m_provisionalDocumentLoader)
return;
RefPtr<DocumentLoader> loaderBeingCommitted = m_provisionalDocumentLoader.release();
detachChildren();
if (m_documentLoader)
m_documentLoader->detachFromFrame();
m_documentLoader = loaderBeingCommitted;
m_state = FrameStateCommittedPage;
if (isLoadingMainFrame())
m_frame->page()->chrome().client().needTouchEvents(false);
history()->updateForCommit();
m_client->transitionToCommittedForNewPage();
m_frame->navigationScheduler()->cancel();
m_frame->editor().clearLastEditCommand();
if (!m_stateMachine.creatingInitialEmptyDocument()) {
DOMWindow* window = m_frame->domWindow();
window->setStatus(String());
window->setDefaultStatus(String());
}
started();
}
Commit Message: Don't wait to notify client of spoof attempt if a modal dialog is created.
BUG=281256
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23620020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@157196 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 111,628
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: __init static int tracing_set_default_clock(void)
{
/* sched_clock_stable() is determined in late_initcall */
if (!trace_boot_clock && !sched_clock_stable()) {
printk(KERN_WARNING
"Unstable clock detected, switching default tracing clock to \"global\"\n"
"If you want to keep using the local clock, then add:\n"
" \"trace_clock=local\"\n"
"on the kernel command line\n");
tracing_set_clock(&global_trace, "global");
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 81,513
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void variadicNodeMethodMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() < 1)) {
throwTypeError(ExceptionMessages::failedToExecute("variadicNodeMethod", "TestObject", ExceptionMessages::notEnoughArguments(1, info.Length())), info.GetIsolate());
return;
}
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_VOID(Node*, head, V8Node::toNativeWithTypeCheck(info.GetIsolate(), info[0]));
Vector<RefPtr<Node> > tail;
for (int i = 1; i < info.Length(); ++i) {
if (!V8Node::hasInstance(info[i], info.GetIsolate())) {
throwTypeError(ExceptionMessages::failedToExecute("variadicNodeMethod", "TestObject", "parameter 2 is not of type 'Node'."), info.GetIsolate());
return;
}
tail.append(V8Node::toNative(v8::Handle<v8::Object>::Cast(info[i])));
}
imp->variadicNodeMethod(head, tail);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 122,036
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebRTCAudioDeviceTest::DestroyChannel() {
DCHECK(content::BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(content::BrowserThread::IO));
audio_render_host_->OnChannelClosing();
audio_render_host_->OnFilterRemoved();
audio_input_renderer_host_->OnChannelClosing();
audio_input_renderer_host_->OnFilterRemoved();
channel_.reset();
audio_render_host_ = NULL;
audio_input_renderer_host_ = NULL;
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 108,536
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: VOID ixheaacd_esbr_postradixcompute2(WORD32 *ptr_y, WORD32 *ptr_x,
const WORD32 *pdig_rev_tbl,
WORD32 npoints) {
WORD32 i, k;
WORD32 h2;
WORD32 x_0, x_1, x_2, x_3;
WORD32 x_4, x_5, x_6, x_7;
WORD32 x_8, x_9, x_a, x_b, x_c, x_d, x_e, x_f;
WORD32 n00, n10, n20, n30, n01, n11, n21, n31;
WORD32 n02, n12, n22, n32, n03, n13, n23, n33;
WORD32 n0, j0;
WORD32 *x2, *x0;
WORD32 *y0, *y1, *y2, *y3;
y0 = ptr_y;
y2 = ptr_y + (WORD32)npoints;
x0 = ptr_x;
x2 = ptr_x + (WORD32)(npoints >> 1);
y1 = y0 + (WORD32)(npoints >> 2);
y3 = y2 + (WORD32)(npoints >> 2);
j0 = 8;
n0 = npoints >> 1;
for (k = 0; k < 2; k++) {
for (i = 0; i<npoints>> 1; i += 8) {
h2 = *pdig_rev_tbl++ >> 2;
x_0 = *x0++;
x_1 = *x0++;
x_2 = *x0++;
x_3 = *x0++;
x_4 = *x0++;
x_5 = *x0++;
x_6 = *x0++;
x_7 = *x0++;
n00 = x_0 + x_2;
n01 = x_1 + x_3;
n20 = x_0 - x_2;
n21 = x_1 - x_3;
n10 = x_4 + x_6;
n11 = x_5 + x_7;
n30 = x_4 - x_6;
n31 = x_5 - x_7;
y0[h2] = n00;
y0[h2 + 1] = n01;
y1[h2] = n10;
y1[h2 + 1] = n11;
y2[h2] = n20;
y2[h2 + 1] = n21;
y3[h2] = n30;
y3[h2 + 1] = n31;
x_8 = *x2++;
x_9 = *x2++;
x_a = *x2++;
x_b = *x2++;
x_c = *x2++;
x_d = *x2++;
x_e = *x2++;
x_f = *x2++;
n02 = x_8 + x_a;
n03 = x_9 + x_b;
n22 = x_8 - x_a;
n23 = x_9 - x_b;
n12 = x_c + x_e;
n13 = x_d + x_f;
n32 = x_c - x_e;
n33 = x_d - x_f;
y0[h2 + 2] = n02;
y0[h2 + 3] = n03;
y1[h2 + 2] = n12;
y1[h2 + 3] = n13;
y2[h2 + 2] = n22;
y2[h2 + 3] = n23;
y3[h2 + 2] = n32;
y3[h2 + 3] = n33;
}
x0 += (WORD32)npoints >> 1;
x2 += (WORD32)npoints >> 1;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix for stack corruption in esbr
Bug: 110769924
Test: poc from bug before/after
Change-Id: I99c6e89902064849ea1310c271064bdeccf7f20e
(cherry picked from commit 7e90d745c22695236437297cd8167a9312427a4a)
(cherry picked from commit 5464927f0c1fc721fa03d1c5be77b0b43dfffc50)
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 1
| 174,087
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: freebuffer(Image *image)
{
if (image->buffer) free(image->buffer);
image->buffer = NULL;
image->bufsize = 0;
image->allocsize = 0;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
| 0
| 159,874
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int WavpackVerifySingleBlock (unsigned char *buffer, int verify_checksum)
{
WavpackHeader *wphdr = (WavpackHeader *) buffer;
uint32_t checksum_passed = 0, bcount, meta_bc;
unsigned char *dp, meta_id, c1, c2;
if (strncmp (wphdr->ckID, "wvpk", 4) || wphdr->ckSize + 8 < sizeof (WavpackHeader))
return FALSE;
bcount = wphdr->ckSize - sizeof (WavpackHeader) + 8;
dp = (unsigned char *)(wphdr + 1);
while (bcount >= 2) {
meta_id = *dp++;
c1 = *dp++;
meta_bc = c1 << 1;
bcount -= 2;
if (meta_id & ID_LARGE) {
if (bcount < 2)
return FALSE;
c1 = *dp++;
c2 = *dp++;
meta_bc += ((uint32_t) c1 << 9) + ((uint32_t) c2 << 17);
bcount -= 2;
}
if (bcount < meta_bc)
return FALSE;
if (verify_checksum && (meta_id & ID_UNIQUE) == ID_BLOCK_CHECKSUM) {
#ifdef BITSTREAM_SHORTS
uint16_t *csptr = (uint16_t*) buffer;
#else
unsigned char *csptr = buffer;
#endif
int wcount = (int)(dp - 2 - buffer) >> 1;
uint32_t csum = (uint32_t) -1;
if ((meta_id & ID_ODD_SIZE) || meta_bc < 2 || meta_bc > 4)
return FALSE;
#ifdef BITSTREAM_SHORTS
while (wcount--)
csum = (csum * 3) + *csptr++;
#else
WavpackNativeToLittleEndian ((WavpackHeader *) buffer, WavpackHeaderFormat);
while (wcount--) {
csum = (csum * 3) + csptr [0] + (csptr [1] << 8);
csptr += 2;
}
WavpackLittleEndianToNative ((WavpackHeader *) buffer, WavpackHeaderFormat);
#endif
if (meta_bc == 4) {
if (*dp++ != (csum & 0xff) || *dp++ != ((csum >> 8) & 0xff) || *dp++ != ((csum >> 16) & 0xff) || *dp++ != ((csum >> 24) & 0xff))
return FALSE;
}
else {
csum ^= csum >> 16;
if (*dp++ != (csum & 0xff) || *dp++ != ((csum >> 8) & 0xff))
return FALSE;
}
checksum_passed++;
}
bcount -= meta_bc;
dp += meta_bc;
}
return (bcount == 0) && (!verify_checksum || !(wphdr->flags & HAS_CHECKSUM) || checksum_passed);
}
Commit Message: issue #54: fix potential out-of-bounds heap read
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 1
| 168,971
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RootWindow::DispatchHeldMouseMove() {
if (held_mouse_move_.get()) {
if (!synthesize_mouse_move_)
DispatchMouseEventImpl(held_mouse_move_.get());
held_mouse_move_.reset();
}
}
Commit Message: Introduce XGetImage() for GrabWindowSnapshot() in ChromeOS.
BUG=119492
TEST=manually done
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10386124
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137556 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 103,915
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int lxc_cgroupfs_set(const char *filename, const char *value, const char *name, const char *lxcpath)
{
char *subsystem = NULL, *p, *path;
int ret = -1;
subsystem = alloca(strlen(filename) + 1);
strcpy(subsystem, filename);
if ((p = strchr(subsystem, '.')) != NULL)
*p = '\0';
path = lxc_cgroup_get_hierarchy_abs_path(subsystem, name, lxcpath);
if (path) {
ret = do_cgroup_set(path, filename, value);
free(path);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 44,510
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE2(sched_rr_get_interval, pid_t, pid,
struct timespec __user *, interval)
{
struct task_struct *p;
unsigned int time_slice;
unsigned long flags;
struct rq *rq;
int retval;
struct timespec t;
if (pid < 0)
return -EINVAL;
retval = -ESRCH;
rcu_read_lock();
p = find_process_by_pid(pid);
if (!p)
goto out_unlock;
retval = security_task_getscheduler(p);
if (retval)
goto out_unlock;
rq = task_rq_lock(p, &flags);
time_slice = p->sched_class->get_rr_interval(rq, p);
task_rq_unlock(rq, &flags);
rcu_read_unlock();
jiffies_to_timespec(time_slice, &t);
retval = copy_to_user(interval, &t, sizeof(t)) ? -EFAULT : 0;
return retval;
out_unlock:
rcu_read_unlock();
return retval;
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 22,290
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void tg3_ape_lock_init(struct tg3 *tp)
{
int i;
u32 regbase, bit;
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5761)
regbase = TG3_APE_LOCK_GRANT;
else
regbase = TG3_APE_PER_LOCK_GRANT;
/* Make sure the driver hasn't any stale locks. */
for (i = TG3_APE_LOCK_PHY0; i <= TG3_APE_LOCK_GPIO; i++) {
switch (i) {
case TG3_APE_LOCK_PHY0:
case TG3_APE_LOCK_PHY1:
case TG3_APE_LOCK_PHY2:
case TG3_APE_LOCK_PHY3:
bit = APE_LOCK_GRANT_DRIVER;
break;
default:
if (!tp->pci_fn)
bit = APE_LOCK_GRANT_DRIVER;
else
bit = 1 << tp->pci_fn;
}
tg3_ape_write32(tp, regbase + 4 * i, bit);
}
}
Commit Message: tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <oded@privatecore.com>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matt Carlson <mcarlson@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 32,499
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: String Range::toString(ExceptionCode& ec) const
{
if (!m_start.container()) {
ec = INVALID_STATE_ERR;
return String();
}
StringBuilder builder;
Node* pastLast = pastLastNode();
for (Node* n = firstNode(); n != pastLast; n = n->traverseNextNode()) {
if (n->nodeType() == Node::TEXT_NODE || n->nodeType() == Node::CDATA_SECTION_NODE) {
String data = static_cast<CharacterData*>(n)->data();
int length = data.length();
int start = (n == m_start.container()) ? min(max(0, m_start.offset()), length) : 0;
int end = (n == m_end.container()) ? min(max(start, m_end.offset()), length) : length;
builder.append(data.characters() + start, end - start);
}
}
return builder.toString();
}
Commit Message: There are too many poorly named functions to create a fragment from markup
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87339
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Source/WebCore:
Moved all functions that create a fragment from markup to markup.h/cpp.
There should be no behavioral change.
* dom/Range.cpp:
(WebCore::Range::createContextualFragment):
* dom/Range.h: Removed createDocumentFragmentForElement.
* dom/ShadowRoot.cpp:
(WebCore::ShadowRoot::setInnerHTML):
* editing/markup.cpp:
(WebCore::createFragmentFromMarkup):
(WebCore::createFragmentForInnerOuterHTML): Renamed from createFragmentFromSource.
(WebCore::createFragmentForTransformToFragment): Moved from XSLTProcessor.
(WebCore::removeElementPreservingChildren): Moved from Range.
(WebCore::createContextualFragment): Ditto.
* editing/markup.h:
* html/HTMLElement.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setInnerHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setOuterHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML):
* inspector/DOMPatchSupport.cpp:
(WebCore::DOMPatchSupport::patchNode): Added a FIXME since this code should be using
one of the functions listed in markup.h
* xml/XSLTProcessor.cpp:
(WebCore::XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment):
Source/WebKit/qt:
Replace calls to Range::createDocumentFragmentForElement by calls to
createContextualDocumentFragment.
* Api/qwebelement.cpp:
(QWebElement::appendInside):
(QWebElement::prependInside):
(QWebElement::prependOutside):
(QWebElement::appendOutside):
(QWebElement::encloseContentsWith):
(QWebElement::encloseWith):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118414 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 100,290
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: file_init(struct file *file, struct global *global, const char *file_name,
const char *out_name, void *alloc_ptr, void (*alloc)(struct file*,int))
/* Initialize a file control structure. This will open the given files as
* well. The status code returned is 0 on success, non zero (using the flags
* above) on a file open error.
*/
{
CLEAR(*file);
file->global = global;
file->file_name = file_name;
file->out_name = out_name;
file->status_code = 0;
file->read_errno = 0;
file->write_errno = 0;
file->file = NULL;
file->out = NULL;
/* jmpbuf is garbage: must be set by read_png */
file->read_count = 0;
file->state = STATE_SIGNATURE;
file->chunk = NULL;
file->idat = NULL;
file->alloc_ptr = alloc_ptr;
file->alloc = alloc;
/* Open the files: */
assert(file_name != NULL);
file->file = fopen(file_name, "rb");
if (file->file == NULL)
{
file->read_errno = errno;
file->status_code |= FILE_ERROR;
/* Always output: please give a readable file! */
perror(file_name);
return FILE_ERROR;
}
if (out_name != NULL)
{
file->out = fopen(out_name, "wb");
if (file->out == NULL)
{
file->write_errno = errno;
file->status_code |= WRITE_ERROR;
perror(out_name);
return WRITE_ERROR;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
| 0
| 160,125
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SyncManager::SyncInternal::UpdateCredentials(
const SyncCredentials& credentials) {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
DCHECK_EQ(credentials.email, share_.name);
DCHECK(!credentials.email.empty());
DCHECK(!credentials.sync_token.empty());
observing_ip_address_changes_ = true;
if (connection_manager()->set_auth_token(credentials.sync_token)) {
sync_notifier_->UpdateCredentials(
credentials.email, credentials.sync_token);
if (!setup_for_test_mode_ && initialized_) {
if (scheduler())
scheduler()->OnCredentialsUpdated();
}
}
}
Commit Message: sync: remove Chrome OS specific logic to deal with flimflam shutdown / sync race.
No longer necessary as the ProfileSyncService now aborts sync network traffic on shutdown.
BUG=chromium-os:20841
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9358007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@120912 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 107,854
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sweep(void)
{
int modified = 0;
struct ifsock *ifs, *tmp;
LIST_FOREACH_SAFE(ifs, &il, link, tmp) {
if (!ifs->stale)
continue;
modified++;
logit(LOG_DEBUG, "Removing stale ifs %s", inet_ntoa(ifs->addr.sin_addr));
LIST_REMOVE(ifs, link);
close(ifs->out);
free(ifs);
}
return modified;
}
Commit Message: Fix #1: Ensure recv buf is always NUL terminated
Signed-off-by: Joachim Nilsson <troglobit@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 88,810
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct page *dequeue_huge_page_node(struct hstate *h, int nid)
{
struct page *page;
if (list_empty(&h->hugepage_freelists[nid]))
return NULL;
page = list_entry(h->hugepage_freelists[nid].next, struct page, lru);
list_del(&page->lru);
set_page_refcounted(page);
h->free_huge_pages--;
h->free_huge_pages_node[nid]--;
return page;
}
Commit Message: hugetlb: fix resv_map leak in error path
When called for anonymous (non-shared) mappings, hugetlb_reserve_pages()
does a resv_map_alloc(). It depends on code in hugetlbfs's
vm_ops->close() to release that allocation.
However, in the mmap() failure path, we do a plain unmap_region() without
the remove_vma() which actually calls vm_ops->close().
This is a decent fix. This leak could get reintroduced if new code (say,
after hugetlb_reserve_pages() in hugetlbfs_file_mmap()) decides to return
an error. But, I think it would have to unroll the reservation anyway.
Christoph's test case:
http://marc.info/?l=linux-mm&m=133728900729735
This patch applies to 3.4 and later. A version for earlier kernels is at
https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/5/22/418.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie>
Acked-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Reported-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Tested-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [2.6.32+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 19,674
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Response TargetHandler::GetTargetInfo(
const std::string& target_id,
std::unique_ptr<Target::TargetInfo>* target_info) {
scoped_refptr<DevToolsAgentHost> agent_host(
DevToolsAgentHost::GetForId(target_id));
if (!agent_host)
return Response::InvalidParams("No target with given id found");
*target_info = CreateInfo(agent_host.get());
return Response::OK();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 148,665
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoLinkProgram(GLuint program) {
TRACE_EVENT0("gpu", "GLES2DecoderImpl::DoLinkProgram");
ProgramManager::ProgramInfo* info = GetProgramInfoNotShader(
program, "glLinkProgram");
if (!info) {
return;
}
info->Link();
};
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 99,163
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void start_ep_timer(struct iwch_ep *ep)
{
PDBG("%s ep %p\n", __func__, ep);
if (timer_pending(&ep->timer)) {
PDBG("%s stopped / restarted timer ep %p\n", __func__, ep);
del_timer_sync(&ep->timer);
} else
get_ep(&ep->com);
ep->timer.expires = jiffies + ep_timeout_secs * HZ;
ep->timer.data = (unsigned long)ep;
ep->timer.function = ep_timeout;
add_timer(&ep->timer);
}
Commit Message: iw_cxgb3: Fix incorrectly returning error on success
The cxgb3_*_send() functions return NET_XMIT_ values, which are
positive integers values. So don't treat positive return values
as an error.
Signed-off-by: Steve Wise <swise@opengridcomputing.com>
Signed-off-by: Hariprasad Shenai <hariprasad@chelsio.com>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 56,902
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ptrace_resume(struct task_struct *child, long request,
unsigned long data)
{
bool need_siglock;
if (!valid_signal(data))
return -EIO;
if (request == PTRACE_SYSCALL)
set_tsk_thread_flag(child, TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE);
else
clear_tsk_thread_flag(child, TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE);
#ifdef TIF_SYSCALL_EMU
if (request == PTRACE_SYSEMU || request == PTRACE_SYSEMU_SINGLESTEP)
set_tsk_thread_flag(child, TIF_SYSCALL_EMU);
else
clear_tsk_thread_flag(child, TIF_SYSCALL_EMU);
#endif
if (is_singleblock(request)) {
if (unlikely(!arch_has_block_step()))
return -EIO;
user_enable_block_step(child);
} else if (is_singlestep(request) || is_sysemu_singlestep(request)) {
if (unlikely(!arch_has_single_step()))
return -EIO;
user_enable_single_step(child);
} else {
user_disable_single_step(child);
}
/*
* Change ->exit_code and ->state under siglock to avoid the race
* with wait_task_stopped() in between; a non-zero ->exit_code will
* wrongly look like another report from tracee.
*
* Note that we need siglock even if ->exit_code == data and/or this
* status was not reported yet, the new status must not be cleared by
* wait_task_stopped() after resume.
*
* If data == 0 we do not care if wait_task_stopped() reports the old
* status and clears the code too; this can't race with the tracee, it
* takes siglock after resume.
*/
need_siglock = data && !thread_group_empty(current);
if (need_siglock)
spin_lock_irq(&child->sighand->siglock);
child->exit_code = data;
wake_up_state(child, __TASK_TRACED);
if (need_siglock)
spin_unlock_irq(&child->sighand->siglock);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ptrace: Fix ->ptracer_cred handling for PTRACE_TRACEME
Fix two issues:
When called for PTRACE_TRACEME, ptrace_link() would obtain an RCU
reference to the parent's objective credentials, then give that pointer
to get_cred(). However, the object lifetime rules for things like
struct cred do not permit unconditionally turning an RCU reference into
a stable reference.
PTRACE_TRACEME records the parent's credentials as if the parent was
acting as the subject, but that's not the case. If a malicious
unprivileged child uses PTRACE_TRACEME and the parent is privileged, and
at a later point, the parent process becomes attacker-controlled
(because it drops privileges and calls execve()), the attacker ends up
with control over two processes with a privileged ptrace relationship,
which can be abused to ptrace a suid binary and obtain root privileges.
Fix both of these by always recording the credentials of the process
that is requesting the creation of the ptrace relationship:
current_cred() can't change under us, and current is the proper subject
for access control.
This change is theoretically userspace-visible, but I am not aware of
any code that it will actually break.
Fixes: 64b875f7ac8a ("ptrace: Capture the ptracer's creds not PT_PTRACE_CAP")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 89,073
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void perform_release(uint32_t server_addr, uint32_t requested_ip)
{
char buffer[sizeof("255.255.255.255")];
struct in_addr temp_addr;
/* send release packet */
if (state == BOUND || state == RENEWING || state == REBINDING) {
temp_addr.s_addr = server_addr;
strcpy(buffer, inet_ntoa(temp_addr));
temp_addr.s_addr = requested_ip;
bb_info_msg("Unicasting a release of %s to %s",
inet_ntoa(temp_addr), buffer);
send_release(server_addr, requested_ip); /* unicast */
udhcp_run_script(NULL, "deconfig");
}
bb_info_msg("Entering released state");
change_listen_mode(LISTEN_NONE);
state = RELEASED;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 15,513
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: parse_SET_IPV4_DST(char *arg, struct ofpbuf *ofpacts,
enum ofputil_protocol *usable_protocols OVS_UNUSED)
{
return str_to_ip(arg, &ofpact_put_SET_IPV4_DST(ofpacts)->ipv4);
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 77,068
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool DesktopWindowTreeHostX11::ShouldCreateVisibilityController() const {
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix PIP window being blank after minimize/show
DesktopWindowTreeHostX11::SetVisible only made the call into
OnNativeWidgetVisibilityChanged when transitioning from shown
to minimized and not vice versa. This is because this change
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1437263
considered IsVisible to be true when minimized, which made
IsVisible always true in this case. This caused layers to be hidden
but never shown again.
This is a reland of:
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1580103
Bug: 949199
Change-Id: I2151cd09e537d8ce8781897f43a3b8e9cec75996
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1584617
Reviewed-by: Scott Violet <sky@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: enne <enne@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654280}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 140,601
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: calc_duration(long long int start, long long int now,
uint32_t *sec, uint32_t *nsec)
{
long long int msecs = now - start;
*sec = msecs / 1000;
*nsec = (msecs % 1000) * (1000 * 1000);
}
Commit Message: ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <vishal.deep.ajmera@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 77,216
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool AXObject::hasInheritedPresentationalRole() const {
updateCachedAttributeValuesIfNeeded();
return m_cachedHasInheritedPresentationalRole;
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 127,260
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void nfs_pageio_init_write(struct nfs_pageio_descriptor *pgio,
struct inode *inode, int ioflags,
const struct nfs_pgio_completion_ops *compl_ops)
{
nfs_pageio_init(pgio, inode, &nfs_pageio_write_ops, compl_ops,
NFS_SERVER(inode)->wsize, ioflags);
}
Commit Message: nfs: always make sure page is up-to-date before extending a write to cover the entire page
We should always make sure the cached page is up-to-date when we're
determining whether we can extend a write to cover the full page -- even
if we've received a write delegation from the server.
Commit c7559663 added logic to skip this check if we have a write
delegation, which can lead to data corruption such as the following
scenario if client B receives a write delegation from the NFS server:
Client A:
# echo 123456789 > /mnt/file
Client B:
# echo abcdefghi >> /mnt/file
# cat /mnt/file
0�D0�abcdefghi
Just because we hold a write delegation doesn't mean that we've read in
the entire page contents.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.11+
Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 39,184
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DiceResponseHandler::ProcessEnableSyncHeader(
const std::string& gaia_id,
const std::string& email,
std::unique_ptr<ProcessDiceHeaderDelegate> delegate) {
VLOG(1) << "Start processing Dice enable sync response";
RecordDiceResponseHeader(kEnableSync);
for (auto it = token_fetchers_.begin(); it != token_fetchers_.end(); ++it) {
DiceTokenFetcher* fetcher = it->get();
if (fetcher->gaia_id() == gaia_id) {
DCHECK(gaia::AreEmailsSame(fetcher->email(), email));
fetcher->set_should_enable_sync(true);
return; // There is already a request in flight with the same parameters.
}
}
std::string account_id =
account_tracker_service_->PickAccountIdForAccount(gaia_id, email);
delegate->EnableSync(account_id);
}
Commit Message: [signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <droger@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <isherman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <msarda@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 143,056
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void kvm_arch_vcpu_free(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
/* Make sure we're not using the vcpu anymore */
hrtimer_cancel(&vcpu->arch.dec_timer);
kvmppc_remove_vcpu_debugfs(vcpu);
switch (vcpu->arch.irq_type) {
case KVMPPC_IRQ_MPIC:
kvmppc_mpic_disconnect_vcpu(vcpu->arch.mpic, vcpu);
break;
case KVMPPC_IRQ_XICS:
if (xive_enabled())
kvmppc_xive_cleanup_vcpu(vcpu);
else
kvmppc_xics_free_icp(vcpu);
break;
}
kvmppc_core_vcpu_free(vcpu);
}
Commit Message: KVM: PPC: Fix oops when checking KVM_CAP_PPC_HTM
The following program causes a kernel oops:
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <linux/kvm.h>
main()
{
int fd = open("/dev/kvm", O_RDWR);
ioctl(fd, KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION, KVM_CAP_PPC_HTM);
}
This happens because when using the global KVM fd with
KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION, kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension() gets
called with a NULL kvm argument, which gets dereferenced
in is_kvmppc_hv_enabled(). Spotted while reading the code.
Let's use the hv_enabled fallback variable, like everywhere
else in this function.
Fixes: 23528bb21ee2 ("KVM: PPC: Introduce KVM_CAP_PPC_HTM")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.7+
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 60,516
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: isdn_net_reset(struct net_device *dev)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_ISDN_X25
struct concap_device_ops * dops =
((isdn_net_local *) netdev_priv(dev))->dops;
struct concap_proto * cprot =
((isdn_net_local *) netdev_priv(dev))->netdev->cprot;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_ISDN_X25
if( cprot && cprot -> pops && dops )
cprot -> pops -> restart ( cprot, dev, dops );
#endif
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 23,662
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DefragTrackerClearMemory(DefragTracker *dt)
{
DefragTrackerFreeFrags(dt);
SC_ATOMIC_DESTROY(dt->use_cnt);
}
Commit Message: defrag - take protocol into account during re-assembly
The IP protocol was not being used to match fragments with
their packets allowing a carefully constructed packet
with a different protocol to be matched, allowing re-assembly
to complete, creating a packet that would not be re-assembled
by the destination host.
CWE ID: CWE-358
| 0
| 67,826
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void pmcraid_notify_ioastate(struct pmcraid_instance *pinstance, u32 evt)
{
pinstance->scn.ioa_state = evt;
pmcraid_notify_aen(pinstance,
&pinstance->scn.msg,
sizeof(u32));
}
Commit Message: [SCSI] pmcraid: reject negative request size
There's a code path in pmcraid that can be reached via device ioctl that
causes all sorts of ugliness, including heap corruption or triggering the
OOM killer due to consecutive allocation of large numbers of pages.
First, the user can call pmcraid_chr_ioctl(), with a type
PMCRAID_PASSTHROUGH_IOCTL. This calls through to
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough(). Next, a pmcraid_passthrough_ioctl_buffer
is copied in, and the request_size variable is set to
buffer->ioarcb.data_transfer_length, which is an arbitrary 32-bit
signed value provided by the user. If a negative value is provided
here, bad things can happen. For example,
pmcraid_build_passthrough_ioadls() is called with this request_size,
which immediately calls pmcraid_alloc_sglist() with a negative size.
The resulting math on allocating a scatter list can result in an
overflow in the kzalloc() call (if num_elem is 0, the sglist will be
smaller than expected), or if num_elem is unexpectedly large the
subsequent loop will call alloc_pages() repeatedly, a high number of
pages will be allocated and the OOM killer might be invoked.
It looks like preventing this value from being negative in
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough() would be sufficient.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <JBottomley@Parallels.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 26,477
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MockWebContentsDelegate(WebContents* web_contents, ManifestBrowserTest* test)
: web_contents_(web_contents),
test_(test) {
}
Commit Message: Fail the web app manifest fetch if the document is sandboxed.
This ensures that sandboxed pages are regarded as non-PWAs, and that
other features in the browser process which trust the web manifest do
not receive the manifest at all if the document itself cannot access the
manifest.
BUG=771709
Change-Id: Ifd4d00c2fccff8cc0e5e8d2457bd55b992b0a8f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/866529
Commit-Queue: Dominick Ng <dominickn@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mounir Lamouri <mlamouri@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531121}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 150,139
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameImpl::CheckIfAudioSinkExistsAndIsAuthorized(
const blink::WebString& sink_id,
blink::WebSetSinkIdCompleteCallback completion_callback) {
std::move(
media::ConvertToOutputDeviceStatusCB(std::move(completion_callback)))
.Run(AudioDeviceFactory::GetOutputDeviceInfo(
GetRoutingID(), media::AudioSinkParameters(0, sink_id.Utf8()))
.device_status());
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 139,533
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void activityLoggingGetterPerWorldBindingsLongAttributeAttributeSetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMSetter");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::activityLoggingGetterPerWorldBindingsLongAttributeAttributeSetter(jsValue, info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 122,123
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool willBeCleared(const GraphicsControlBlock& gcb) {
return gcb.DisposalMode == DISPOSE_BACKGROUND || gcb.DisposalMode == DISPOSE_PREVIOUS;
}
Commit Message: Skip composition of frames lacking a color map
Bug:68399117
Change-Id: I32f1d6856221b8a60130633edb69da2d2986c27c
(cherry picked from commit 0dc887f70eeea8d707cb426b96c6756edd1c607d)
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 163,293
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int equalizer_set_band_level(equalizer_context_t *context, int32_t band,
int32_t level)
{
ALOGV("%s: band: %d, level: %d", __func__, band, level);
if (level > 0) {
level = (int)((level+50)/100);
} else {
level = (int)((level-50)/100);
}
context->band_levels[band] = level;
context->preset = PRESET_CUSTOM;
offload_eq_set_preset(&(context->offload_eq), PRESET_CUSTOM);
offload_eq_set_bands_level(&(context->offload_eq),
NUM_EQ_BANDS,
equalizer_band_presets_freq,
context->band_levels);
if (context->ctl)
offload_eq_send_params(context->ctl, &context->offload_eq,
OFFLOAD_SEND_EQ_ENABLE_FLAG |
OFFLOAD_SEND_EQ_BANDS_LEVEL);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix security vulnerability: Equalizer command might allow negative indexes
Bug: 32247948
Bug: 32438598
Bug: 32436341
Test: use POC on bug or cts security test
Change-Id: I56a92582687599b5b313dea1abcb8bcb19c7fc0e
(cherry picked from commit 3f37d4ef89f4f0eef9e201c5a91b7b2c77ed1071)
(cherry picked from commit ceb7b2d7a4c4cb8d03f166c61f5c7551c6c760aa)
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 164,546
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ztoken_continue(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p)
{
os_ptr op = osp;
scanner_state *pstate;
check_stype(*op, st_scanner_state_dynamic);
pstate = r_ptr(op, scanner_state);
return token_continue(i_ctx_p, pstate, false);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 4,170
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: unsigned long gfn_to_hva_memslot(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
gfn_t gfn)
{
return gfn_to_hva_many(slot, gfn, NULL);
}
Commit Message: KVM: perform an invalid memslot step for gpa base change
PPC must flush all translations before the new memory slot
is visible.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 29,063
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChromeContentBrowserClient::UpdateDevToolsBackgroundServiceExpiration(
content::BrowserContext* browser_context,
int service,
base::Time expiration_time) {
Profile* profile = Profile::FromBrowserContext(browser_context);
DCHECK(profile);
auto* pref_service = profile->GetPrefs();
DCHECK(pref_service);
DictionaryPrefUpdate pref_update(
pref_service, prefs::kDevToolsBackgroundServicesExpirationDict);
base::DictionaryValue* exp_dict = pref_update.Get();
int expiration_time_minutes =
expiration_time.ToDeltaSinceWindowsEpoch().InMinutes();
exp_dict->SetInteger(base::NumberToString(service), expiration_time_minutes);
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 142,773
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderThread::ClearCache(bool preserve_ssl_host_info) {
int rv;
Send(new ViewHostMsg_ClearCache(preserve_ssl_host_info, &rv));
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 98,866
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void MetricsWebContentsObserver::AddTestingObserver(TestingObserver* observer) {
if (!testing_observers_.HasObserver(observer))
testing_observers_.AddObserver(observer);
}
Commit Message: Add boolean to UserIntiatedInfo noting if an input event led to navigation.
Also refactor UkmPageLoadMetricsObserver to use this new boolean to
report the user initiated metric in RecordPageLoadExtraInfoMetrics, so
that it works correctly in the case when the page load failed.
Bug: 925104
Change-Id: Ie08e7d3912cb1da484190d838005e95e57a209ff
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1450460
Commit-Queue: Annie Sullivan <sullivan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Bryan McQuade <bmcquade@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#630870}
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 140,126
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void chroma_mc_uni(HEVCContext *s, uint8_t *dst0,
ptrdiff_t dststride, uint8_t *src0, ptrdiff_t srcstride, int reflist,
int x_off, int y_off, int block_w, int block_h, struct MvField *current_mv, int chroma_weight, int chroma_offset)
{
HEVCLocalContext *lc = s->HEVClc;
int pic_width = s->ps.sps->width >> s->ps.sps->hshift[1];
int pic_height = s->ps.sps->height >> s->ps.sps->vshift[1];
const Mv *mv = ¤t_mv->mv[reflist];
int weight_flag = (s->sh.slice_type == HEVC_SLICE_P && s->ps.pps->weighted_pred_flag) ||
(s->sh.slice_type == HEVC_SLICE_B && s->ps.pps->weighted_bipred_flag);
int idx = ff_hevc_pel_weight[block_w];
int hshift = s->ps.sps->hshift[1];
int vshift = s->ps.sps->vshift[1];
intptr_t mx = av_mod_uintp2(mv->x, 2 + hshift);
intptr_t my = av_mod_uintp2(mv->y, 2 + vshift);
intptr_t _mx = mx << (1 - hshift);
intptr_t _my = my << (1 - vshift);
x_off += mv->x >> (2 + hshift);
y_off += mv->y >> (2 + vshift);
src0 += y_off * srcstride + (x_off * (1 << s->ps.sps->pixel_shift));
if (x_off < EPEL_EXTRA_BEFORE || y_off < EPEL_EXTRA_AFTER ||
x_off >= pic_width - block_w - EPEL_EXTRA_AFTER ||
y_off >= pic_height - block_h - EPEL_EXTRA_AFTER) {
const int edge_emu_stride = EDGE_EMU_BUFFER_STRIDE << s->ps.sps->pixel_shift;
int offset0 = EPEL_EXTRA_BEFORE * (srcstride + (1 << s->ps.sps->pixel_shift));
int buf_offset0 = EPEL_EXTRA_BEFORE *
(edge_emu_stride + (1 << s->ps.sps->pixel_shift));
s->vdsp.emulated_edge_mc(lc->edge_emu_buffer, src0 - offset0,
edge_emu_stride, srcstride,
block_w + EPEL_EXTRA, block_h + EPEL_EXTRA,
x_off - EPEL_EXTRA_BEFORE,
y_off - EPEL_EXTRA_BEFORE,
pic_width, pic_height);
src0 = lc->edge_emu_buffer + buf_offset0;
srcstride = edge_emu_stride;
}
if (!weight_flag)
s->hevcdsp.put_hevc_epel_uni[idx][!!my][!!mx](dst0, dststride, src0, srcstride,
block_h, _mx, _my, block_w);
else
s->hevcdsp.put_hevc_epel_uni_w[idx][!!my][!!mx](dst0, dststride, src0, srcstride,
block_h, s->sh.chroma_log2_weight_denom,
chroma_weight, chroma_offset, _mx, _my, block_w);
}
Commit Message: avcodec/hevcdec: Avoid only partly skiping duplicate first slices
Fixes: NULL pointer dereference and out of array access
Fixes: 13871/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-ffmpeg_AV_CODEC_ID_HEVC_fuzzer-5746167087890432
Fixes: 13845/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-ffmpeg_AV_CODEC_ID_HEVC_fuzzer-5650370728034304
This also fixes the return code for explode mode
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/projects/ffmpeg
Reviewed-by: James Almer <jamrial@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 90,752
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: nfsd4_open_confirm(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct nfsd4_compound_state *cstate,
struct nfsd4_open_confirm *oc)
{
__be32 status;
struct nfs4_openowner *oo;
struct nfs4_ol_stateid *stp;
struct nfsd_net *nn = net_generic(SVC_NET(rqstp), nfsd_net_id);
dprintk("NFSD: nfsd4_open_confirm on file %pd\n",
cstate->current_fh.fh_dentry);
status = fh_verify(rqstp, &cstate->current_fh, S_IFREG, 0);
if (status)
return status;
status = nfs4_preprocess_seqid_op(cstate,
oc->oc_seqid, &oc->oc_req_stateid,
NFS4_OPEN_STID, &stp, nn);
if (status)
goto out;
oo = openowner(stp->st_stateowner);
status = nfserr_bad_stateid;
if (oo->oo_flags & NFS4_OO_CONFIRMED) {
mutex_unlock(&stp->st_mutex);
goto put_stateid;
}
oo->oo_flags |= NFS4_OO_CONFIRMED;
nfs4_inc_and_copy_stateid(&oc->oc_resp_stateid, &stp->st_stid);
mutex_unlock(&stp->st_mutex);
dprintk("NFSD: %s: success, seqid=%d stateid=" STATEID_FMT "\n",
__func__, oc->oc_seqid, STATEID_VAL(&stp->st_stid.sc_stateid));
nfsd4_client_record_create(oo->oo_owner.so_client);
status = nfs_ok;
put_stateid:
nfs4_put_stid(&stp->st_stid);
out:
nfsd4_bump_seqid(cstate, status);
return status;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 65,615
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: entry_guard_set_filtered_flags(const or_options_t *options,
guard_selection_t *gs,
entry_guard_t *guard)
{
unsigned was_filtered = guard->is_filtered_guard;
guard->is_filtered_guard = 0;
guard->is_usable_filtered_guard = 0;
if (entry_guard_passes_filter(options, gs, guard)) {
guard->is_filtered_guard = 1;
if (guard->is_reachable != GUARD_REACHABLE_NO)
guard->is_usable_filtered_guard = 1;
entry_guard_consider_retry(guard);
}
log_debug(LD_GUARD, "Updated sampled guard %s: filtered=%d; "
"reachable_filtered=%d.", entry_guard_describe(guard),
guard->is_filtered_guard, guard->is_usable_filtered_guard);
if (!bool_eq(was_filtered, guard->is_filtered_guard)) {
/* This guard might now be primary or nonprimary. */
gs->primary_guards_up_to_date = 0;
}
}
Commit Message: Consider the exit family when applying guard restrictions.
When the new path selection logic went into place, I accidentally
dropped the code that considered the _family_ of the exit node when
deciding if the guard was usable, and we didn't catch that during
code review.
This patch makes the guard_restriction_t code consider the exit
family as well, and adds some (hopefully redundant) checks for the
case where we lack a node_t for a guard but we have a bridge_info_t
for it.
Fixes bug 22753; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha. Tracked as TROVE-2016-006
and CVE-2017-0377.
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 69,682
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: server_log_http(struct client *clt, unsigned int code, size_t len)
{
static char tstamp[64];
static char ip[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
time_t t;
struct kv key, *agent, *referrer;
struct tm *tm;
struct server_config *srv_conf;
struct http_descriptor *desc;
int ret = -1;
char *user = NULL;
char *path = NULL;
char *query = NULL;
char *version = NULL;
char *referrer_v = NULL;
char *agent_v = NULL;
if ((srv_conf = clt->clt_srv_conf) == NULL)
return (-1);
if ((srv_conf->flags & SRVFLAG_LOG) == 0)
return (0);
if ((desc = clt->clt_descreq) == NULL)
return (-1);
if ((t = time(NULL)) == -1)
return (-1);
if ((tm = localtime(&t)) == NULL)
return (-1);
if (strftime(tstamp, sizeof(tstamp), "%d/%b/%Y:%H:%M:%S %z", tm) == 0)
return (-1);
if (print_host(&clt->clt_ss, ip, sizeof(ip)) == NULL)
return (-1);
/*
* For details on common log format, see:
* https://httpd.apache.org/docs/current/mod/mod_log_config.html
*
* httpd's format is similar to these Apache LogFormats:
* "%v %h %l %u %t \"%r\" %>s %B"
* "%v %h %l %u %t \"%r\" %>s %B \"%{Referer}i\" \"%{User-agent}i\""
*/
switch (srv_conf->logformat) {
case LOG_FORMAT_COMMON:
/* Use vis to encode input values from the header */
if (clt->clt_remote_user &&
stravis(&user, clt->clt_remote_user, HTTPD_LOGVIS) == -1)
goto done;
if (desc->http_version &&
stravis(&version, desc->http_version, HTTPD_LOGVIS) == -1)
goto done;
/* The following should be URL-encoded */
if (desc->http_path &&
(path = url_encode(desc->http_path)) == NULL)
goto done;
if (desc->http_query &&
(query = url_encode(desc->http_query)) == NULL)
goto done;
ret = evbuffer_add_printf(clt->clt_log,
"%s %s - %s [%s] \"%s %s%s%s%s%s\" %03d %zu\n",
srv_conf->name, ip, clt->clt_remote_user == NULL ? "-" :
user, tstamp,
server_httpmethod_byid(desc->http_method),
desc->http_path == NULL ? "" : path,
desc->http_query == NULL ? "" : "?",
desc->http_query == NULL ? "" : query,
desc->http_version == NULL ? "" : " ",
desc->http_version == NULL ? "" : version,
code, len);
break;
case LOG_FORMAT_COMBINED:
key.kv_key = "Referer"; /* sic */
if ((referrer = kv_find(&desc->http_headers, &key)) != NULL &&
referrer->kv_value == NULL)
referrer = NULL;
key.kv_key = "User-Agent";
if ((agent = kv_find(&desc->http_headers, &key)) != NULL &&
agent->kv_value == NULL)
agent = NULL;
/* Use vis to encode input values from the header */
if (clt->clt_remote_user &&
stravis(&user, clt->clt_remote_user, HTTPD_LOGVIS) == -1)
goto done;
if (desc->http_version &&
stravis(&version, desc->http_version, HTTPD_LOGVIS) == -1)
goto done;
if (agent &&
stravis(&agent_v, agent->kv_value, HTTPD_LOGVIS) == -1)
goto done;
/* The following should be URL-encoded */
if (desc->http_path &&
(path = url_encode(desc->http_path)) == NULL)
goto done;
if (desc->http_query &&
(query = url_encode(desc->http_query)) == NULL)
goto done;
if (referrer &&
(referrer_v = url_encode(referrer->kv_value)) == NULL)
goto done;
ret = evbuffer_add_printf(clt->clt_log,
"%s %s - %s [%s] \"%s %s%s%s%s%s\""
" %03d %zu \"%s\" \"%s\"\n",
srv_conf->name, ip, clt->clt_remote_user == NULL ? "-" :
user, tstamp,
server_httpmethod_byid(desc->http_method),
desc->http_path == NULL ? "" : path,
desc->http_query == NULL ? "" : "?",
desc->http_query == NULL ? "" : query,
desc->http_version == NULL ? "" : " ",
desc->http_version == NULL ? "" : version,
code, len,
referrer == NULL ? "" : referrer_v,
agent == NULL ? "" : agent_v);
break;
case LOG_FORMAT_CONNECTION:
/* URL-encode the path */
if (desc->http_path &&
(path = url_encode(desc->http_path)) == NULL)
goto done;
ret = evbuffer_add_printf(clt->clt_log, " [%s]",
desc->http_path == NULL ? "" : path);
break;
}
done:
free(user);
free(path);
free(query);
free(version);
free(referrer_v);
free(agent_v);
return (ret);
}
Commit Message: Reimplement httpd's support for byte ranges.
The previous implementation loaded all the output into a single output
buffer and used its size to determine the Content-Length of the body.
The new implementation calculates the body length first and writes the
individual ranges in an async way using the bufferevent mechanism.
This prevents httpd from using too much memory and applies the
watermark and throttling mechanisms to range requests.
Problem reported by Pierre Kim (pierre.kim.sec at gmail.com)
OK benno@ sunil@
CWE ID: CWE-770
| 0
| 68,508
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: asmlinkage long do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
long ret = 0;
secure_computing(regs->regs[0]);
if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE) &&
tracehook_report_syscall_entry(regs))
/*
* Tracing decided this syscall should not happen.
* We'll return a bogus call number to get an ENOSYS
* error, but leave the original number in regs->regs[0].
*/
ret = -1L;
if (unlikely(test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT)))
trace_sys_enter(regs, regs->regs[0]);
if (unlikely(current->audit_context))
audit_syscall_entry(audit_arch(), regs->regs[3],
regs->regs[4], regs->regs[5],
regs->regs[6], regs->regs[7]);
return ret ?: regs->regs[0];
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 25,528
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void zend_shared_alloc_unlock(void)
{
/* Destroy translation table */
zend_hash_destroy(&xlat_table);
ZCG(locked) = 0;
#ifndef ZEND_WIN32
if (fcntl(lock_file, F_SETLK, &mem_write_unlock) == -1) {
zend_accel_error(ACCEL_LOG_ERROR, "Cannot remove lock - %s (%d)", strerror(errno), errno);
}
#ifdef ZTS
tsrm_mutex_unlock(zts_lock);
#endif
#else
zend_shared_alloc_unlock_win32();
#endif
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 5,264
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
{
int i, j, ok, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = -1, cookie_valid = 0;
unsigned int cookie_len;
long n;
unsigned long id;
unsigned char *p, *d;
SSL_CIPHER *c;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
unsigned char *q;
SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
#endif
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C && !s->first_packet)
goto retry_cert;
/*
* We do this so that we will respond with our native type. If we are
* TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, This down
* switching should be handled by a different method. If we are SSLv3, we
* will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with TLSv1.
*/
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
}
s->first_packet = 1;
n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
if (!ok)
return ((int)n);
s->first_packet = 0;
d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
/*
* 2 bytes for client version, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE bytes for random, 1 byte
* for session id length
*/
if (n < 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
/*
* use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
* differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
*/
s->client_version = (((int)p[0]) << 8) | (int)p[1];
p += 2;
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? (s->client_version > s->version &&
s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
: (s->client_version < s->version)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
if ((s->client_version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
!s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) {
/*
* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
* number
*/
s->version = s->client_version;
}
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
goto f_err;
}
/*
* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, just
* return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. So check
* cookie length...
*/
if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
if (p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= d + n) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
if (cookie_length == 0)
return 1;
}
/* load the client random */
memcpy(s->s3->client_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
/* get the session-id */
j = *(p++);
if (p + j > d + n) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
if ((j < 0) || (j > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
s->hit = 0;
/*
* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
* renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
* ignore resumption requests with flag
* SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
* than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this
* for security won't even compile against older library versions).
* 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
* request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
* unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
* SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be ignored.
*/
if ((s->new_session
&& (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
goto err;
} else {
i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
/*
* Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
* version.
* RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
* with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
* the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
* In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
* will abort the handshake with an error.
*/
if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) { /* previous
* session */
s->hit = 1;
} else if (i == -1)
goto err;
else { /* i == 0 */
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
goto err;
}
}
p += j;
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/* cookie stuff */
if (p + 1 > d + n) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
cookie_len = *(p++);
if (p + cookie_len > d + n) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
/*
* The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
* HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
* does not cause an overflow.
*/
if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) {
/* too much data */
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
/* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && cookie_len > 0) {
memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
cookie_len) == 0) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
/* else cookie verification succeeded */
}
/* default verification */
else if (memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
cookie_valid = 1;
}
p += cookie_len;
if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
/* Select version to use */
if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION &&
!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2)) {
s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method();
} else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
s->version = s->client_version;
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
goto f_err;
} else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION &&
!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)) {
s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
s->method = DTLSv1_server_method();
} else {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
s->version = s->client_version;
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
goto f_err;
}
s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
}
}
if (p + 2 > d + n) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
n2s(p, i);
if (i == 0) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
goto f_err;
}
/* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */
if ((p + i + 1) > (d + n)) {
/* not enough data */
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, p, i, &(ciphers)) == NULL) {
goto err;
}
p += i;
/* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
if (s->hit) {
j = 0;
id = s->session->cipher->id;
#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
#endif
for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
#endif
if (c->id == id) {
j = 1;
break;
}
}
/*
* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade attack:
* CVE-2010-4180.
*/
#if 0
if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
&& (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) {
/*
* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used
* cipher may not be in the current list, the client instead
* might be trying to continue using a cipher that before wasn't
* chosen due to server preferences. We'll have to reject the
* connection if the cipher is not enabled, though.
*/
c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0) {
s->session->cipher = c;
j = 1;
}
}
#endif
if (j == 0) {
/*
* we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
* to reuse it
*/
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
goto f_err;
}
}
/* compression */
i = *(p++);
if ((p + i) > (d + n)) {
/* not enough data */
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
q = p;
#endif
for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
if (p[j] == 0)
break;
}
p += i;
if (j >= i) {
/* no compress */
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
goto f_err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
/* TLS extensions */
if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &p, d + n)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
goto err;
}
}
/*
* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
* for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
* calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
* processing to use it in key derivation.
*/
{
unsigned char *pos;
pos = s->s3->server_random;
if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
goto f_err;
}
}
if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
&s->session->master_key_length, ciphers,
&pref_cipher,
s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
s->hit = 1;
s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
ciphers = NULL;
/* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
pref_cipher =
pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s,
s->
session->ciphers,
SSL_get_ciphers
(s));
if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
goto f_err;
}
s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
if (s->cipher_list)
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
}
}
#endif
/*
* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
* options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
* algorithms from the client, starting at q.
*/
s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
/* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
/* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
/* Can't disable compression */
if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
goto f_err;
}
/* Look for resumed compression method */
for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
if (comp_id == comp->id) {
s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
break;
}
}
if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
goto f_err;
}
/* Look for resumed method in compression list */
for (m = 0; m < i; m++) {
if (q[m] == comp_id)
break;
}
if (m >= i) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
goto f_err;
}
} else if (s->hit)
comp = NULL;
else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
/* See if we have a match */
int m, nn, o, v, done = 0;
nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
v = comp->id;
for (o = 0; o < i; o++) {
if (v == q[o]) {
done = 1;
break;
}
}
if (done)
break;
}
if (done)
s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
else
comp = NULL;
}
#else
/*
* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
* using compression.
*/
if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
goto f_err;
}
#endif
/*
* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
*/
if (!s->hit) {
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
s->session->compress_meth = 0;
#else
s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
#endif
if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
if (ciphers == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto f_err;
}
ciphers = NULL;
if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
goto err;
}
/* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
retry_cert:
if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
if (rv == 0) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
goto f_err;
}
if (rv < 0) {
s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
return -1;
}
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
}
c = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
if (c == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
goto f_err;
}
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
} else {
/* Session-id reuse */
#ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
SSL_CIPHER *nc = NULL;
SSL_CIPHER *ec = NULL;
if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) {
sk = s->session->ciphers;
for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) {
c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
nc = c;
if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
ec = c;
}
if (nc != NULL)
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = nc;
else if (ec != NULL)
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = ec;
else
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
} else
#endif
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
}
if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
goto f_err;
}
/*-
* we now have the following setup.
* client_random
* cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
* ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
* compression - basically ignored right now
* ssl version is set - sslv3
* s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
* s->hit - session reuse flag
* s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
*/
/* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
goto err;
}
}
ret = cookie_valid ? 2 : 1;
if (0) {
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
err:
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
}
if (ciphers != NULL)
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 1
| 165,200
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool BrowserView::IsFullscreenBubbleVisible() const {
return fullscreen_bubble_ != NULL;
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 118,392
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ip_route_input_noref(struct sk_buff *skb, __be32 daddr, __be32 saddr,
u8 tos, struct net_device *dev)
{
int res;
tos &= IPTOS_RT_MASK;
rcu_read_lock();
/* Multicast recognition logic is moved from route cache to here.
The problem was that too many Ethernet cards have broken/missing
hardware multicast filters :-( As result the host on multicasting
network acquires a lot of useless route cache entries, sort of
SDR messages from all the world. Now we try to get rid of them.
Really, provided software IP multicast filter is organized
reasonably (at least, hashed), it does not result in a slowdown
comparing with route cache reject entries.
Note, that multicast routers are not affected, because
route cache entry is created eventually.
*/
if (ipv4_is_multicast(daddr)) {
struct in_device *in_dev = __in_dev_get_rcu(dev);
if (in_dev) {
int our = ip_check_mc_rcu(in_dev, daddr, saddr,
ip_hdr(skb)->protocol);
if (our
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_MROUTE
||
(!ipv4_is_local_multicast(daddr) &&
IN_DEV_MFORWARD(in_dev))
#endif
) {
int res = ip_route_input_mc(skb, daddr, saddr,
tos, dev, our);
rcu_read_unlock();
return res;
}
}
rcu_read_unlock();
return -EINVAL;
}
res = ip_route_input_slow(skb, daddr, saddr, tos, dev);
rcu_read_unlock();
return res;
}
Commit Message: inet: update the IP ID generation algorithm to higher standards.
Commit 355b98553789 ("netns: provide pure entropy for net_hash_mix()")
makes net_hash_mix() return a true 32 bits of entropy. When used in the
IP ID generation algorithm, this has the effect of extending the IP ID
generation key from 32 bits to 64 bits.
However, net_hash_mix() is only used for IP ID generation starting with
kernel version 4.1. Therefore, earlier kernels remain with 32-bit key
no matter what the net_hash_mix() return value is.
This change addresses the issue by explicitly extending the key to 64
bits for kernels older than 4.1.
Signed-off-by: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 97,035
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
const char *name, size_t namelen)
{
return int_x509_param_set_hosts(param->id, SET_HOST, name, namelen);
}
Commit Message: Call strlen() if name length provided is 0, like OpenSSL does.
Issue notice by Christian Heimes <christian@python.org>
ok deraadt@ jsing@
CWE ID: CWE-295
| 0
| 83,454
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WebRunnerBrowserContext::GetPermissionControllerDelegate() {
return nullptr;
}
Commit Message: [fuchsia] Implement browser tests for WebRunner Context service.
Tests may interact with the WebRunner FIDL services and the underlying
browser objects for end to end testing of service and browser
functionality.
* Add a browser test launcher main() for WebRunner.
* Add some simple navigation tests.
* Wire up GoBack()/GoForward() FIDL calls.
* Add embedded test server resources and initialization logic.
* Add missing deletion & notification calls to BrowserContext dtor.
* Use FIDL events for navigation state changes.
* Bug fixes:
** Move BrowserContext and Screen deletion to PostMainMessageLoopRun(),
so that they may use the MessageLoop during teardown.
** Fix Frame dtor to allow for null WindowTreeHosts (headless case)
** Fix std::move logic in Frame ctor which lead to no WebContents
observer being registered.
Bug: 871594
Change-Id: I36bcbd2436d534d366c6be4eeb54b9f9feadd1ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1164539
Commit-Queue: Kevin Marshall <kmarshall@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Wez <wez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabrice de Gans-Riberi <fdegans@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Scott Violet <sky@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#584155}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 131,227
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool WebContentsImpl::OnMessageReceived(RenderFrameHostImpl* render_frame_host,
const IPC::Message& message) {
{
WebUIImpl* web_ui = render_frame_host->web_ui();
if (web_ui && web_ui->OnMessageReceived(message, render_frame_host))
return true;
}
for (auto& observer : observers_) {
if (observer.OnMessageReceived(message, render_frame_host))
return true;
}
bool handled = true;
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP_WITH_PARAM(WebContentsImpl, message, render_frame_host)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DomOperationResponse,
OnDomOperationResponse)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidChangeThemeColor,
OnThemeColorChanged)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidFinishDocumentLoad,
OnDocumentLoadedInFrame)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidFinishLoad, OnDidFinishLoad)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidLoadResourceFromMemoryCache,
OnDidLoadResourceFromMemoryCache)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidDisplayInsecureContent,
OnDidDisplayInsecureContent)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidContainInsecureFormAction,
OnDidContainInsecureFormAction)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidRunInsecureContent,
OnDidRunInsecureContent)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidDisplayContentWithCertificateErrors,
OnDidDisplayContentWithCertificateErrors)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidRunContentWithCertificateErrors,
OnDidRunContentWithCertificateErrors)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_RegisterProtocolHandler,
OnRegisterProtocolHandler)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_UnregisterProtocolHandler,
OnUnregisterProtocolHandler)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_UpdatePageImportanceSignals,
OnUpdatePageImportanceSignals)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_UpdateFaviconURL, OnUpdateFaviconURL)
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_PLUGINS)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_PepperInstanceCreated,
OnPepperInstanceCreated)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_PepperInstanceDeleted,
OnPepperInstanceDeleted)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_PepperPluginHung, OnPepperPluginHung)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_PepperStartsPlayback,
OnPepperStartsPlayback)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_PepperStopsPlayback,
OnPepperStopsPlayback)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_PluginCrashed, OnPluginCrashed)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER_GENERIC(BrowserPluginHostMsg_Attach,
OnBrowserPluginMessage(render_frame_host,
message))
#endif
IPC_MESSAGE_UNHANDLED(handled = false)
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP()
return handled;
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 145,011
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int pop_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int *prev_insn_idx,
int *insn_idx)
{
struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state;
struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *elem, *head = env->head;
int err;
if (env->head == NULL)
return -ENOENT;
if (cur) {
err = copy_verifier_state(cur, &head->st);
if (err)
return err;
}
if (insn_idx)
*insn_idx = head->insn_idx;
if (prev_insn_idx)
*prev_insn_idx = head->prev_insn_idx;
elem = head->next;
free_verifier_state(&head->st, false);
kfree(head);
env->head = elem;
env->stack_size--;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix branch pruning logic
when the verifier detects that register contains a runtime constant
and it's compared with another constant it will prune exploration
of the branch that is guaranteed not to be taken at runtime.
This is all correct, but malicious program may be constructed
in such a way that it always has a constant comparison and
the other branch is never taken under any conditions.
In this case such path through the program will not be explored
by the verifier. It won't be taken at run-time either, but since
all instructions are JITed the malicious program may cause JITs
to complain about using reserved fields, etc.
To fix the issue we have to track the instructions explored by
the verifier and sanitize instructions that are dead at run time
with NOPs. We cannot reject such dead code, since llvm generates
it for valid C code, since it doesn't do as much data flow
analysis as the verifier does.
Fixes: 17a5267067f3 ("bpf: verifier (add verifier core)")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 59,154
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DiscardableSharedMemoryManager::ScheduleEnforceMemoryPolicy() {
lock_.AssertAcquired();
if (enforce_memory_policy_pending_)
return;
enforce_memory_policy_pending_ = true;
DCHECK(enforce_memory_policy_task_runner_);
enforce_memory_policy_task_runner_->PostDelayedTask(
FROM_HERE, enforce_memory_policy_callback_,
base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(kEnforceMemoryPolicyDelayMs));
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 149,062
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: size_t Parcel::getGlobalAllocCount() {
pthread_mutex_lock(&gParcelGlobalAllocSizeLock);
size_t count = gParcelGlobalAllocCount;
pthread_mutex_unlock(&gParcelGlobalAllocSizeLock);
return count;
}
Commit Message: Disregard alleged binder entities beyond parcel bounds
When appending one parcel's contents to another, ignore binder
objects within the source Parcel that appear to lie beyond the
formal bounds of that Parcel's data buffer.
Bug 17312693
Change-Id: If592a260f3fcd9a56fc160e7feb2c8b44c73f514
(cherry picked from commit 27182be9f20f4f5b48316666429f09b9ecc1f22e)
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 157,270
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void sk_setup_caps(struct sock *sk, struct dst_entry *dst)
{
__sk_dst_set(sk, dst);
sk->sk_route_caps = dst->dev->features;
if (sk->sk_route_caps & NETIF_F_GSO)
sk->sk_route_caps |= NETIF_F_GSO_SOFTWARE;
sk->sk_route_caps &= ~sk->sk_route_nocaps;
if (sk_can_gso(sk)) {
if (dst->header_len) {
sk->sk_route_caps &= ~NETIF_F_GSO_MASK;
} else {
sk->sk_route_caps |= NETIF_F_SG | NETIF_F_HW_CSUM;
sk->sk_gso_max_size = dst->dev->gso_max_size;
}
}
}
Commit Message: net: sock: validate data_len before allocating skb in sock_alloc_send_pskb()
We need to validate the number of pages consumed by data_len, otherwise frags
array could be overflowed by userspace. So this patch validate data_len and
return -EMSGSIZE when data_len may occupies more frags than MAX_SKB_FRAGS.
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 20,150
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ffs_single_dev(struct ffs_dev *dev)
{
int ret;
ret = 0;
ffs_dev_lock();
if (!list_is_singular(&ffs_devices))
ret = -EBUSY;
else
dev->single = true;
ffs_dev_unlock();
return ret;
}
Commit Message: usb: gadget: f_fs: Fix use-after-free
When using asynchronous read or write operations on the USB endpoints the
issuer of the IO request is notified by calling the ki_complete() callback
of the submitted kiocb when the URB has been completed.
Calling this ki_complete() callback will free kiocb. Make sure that the
structure is no longer accessed beyond that point, otherwise undefined
behaviour might occur.
Fixes: 2e4c7553cd6f ("usb: gadget: f_fs: add aio support")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.15+
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 49,639
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: print_dh(DH * dh, char *msg)
{
BIO *bio_err = NULL;
bio_err = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
BIO_set_fp(bio_err, stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT);
if (msg)
BIO_puts(bio_err, (const char *)msg);
if (dh)
DHparams_print(bio_err, dh);
BIO_puts(bio_err, "private key: ");
BN_print(bio_err, dh->priv_key);
BIO_puts(bio_err, (const char *)"\n");
BIO_free(bio_err);
}
Commit Message: PKINIT null pointer deref [CVE-2013-1415]
Don't dereference a null pointer when cleaning up.
The KDC plugin for PKINIT can dereference a null pointer when a
malformed packet causes processing to terminate early, leading to
a crash of the KDC process. An attacker would need to have a valid
PKINIT certificate or have observed a successful PKINIT authentication,
or an unauthenticated attacker could execute the attack if anonymous
PKINIT is enabled.
CVSSv2 vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:P/RL:O/RC:C
This is a minimal commit for pullup; style fixes in a followup.
[kaduk@mit.edu: reformat and edit commit message]
(cherry picked from commit c773d3c775e9b2d88bcdff5f8a8ba88d7ec4e8ed)
ticket: 7570
version_fixed: 1.11.1
status: resolved
CWE ID:
| 0
| 33,693
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ModuleExport void UnregisterPDBImage(void)
{
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("PDB");
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 71,637
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void EditorClientBlackBerry::checkTextOfParagraph(const UChar*, int, TextCheckingTypeMask, Vector<TextCheckingResult>&)
{
notImplemented();
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Prevent text selection inside Colour and Date/Time input fields
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=111733
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
PR 305194.
Prevent selection for popup input fields as they are buttons.
Informally Reviewed Gen Mak.
* WebCoreSupport/EditorClientBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::EditorClientBlackBerry::shouldChangeSelectedRange):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@145121 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 104,735
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int find_sys_file(struct mschm_decompressor_p *self,
struct mschmd_sec_mscompressed *sec,
struct mschmd_file **f_ptr, const char *name)
{
struct mspack_system *sys = self->system;
struct mschmd_file result;
/* already loaded */
if (*f_ptr) return MSPACK_ERR_OK;
/* try using fast_find to find the file - return DATAFORMAT error if
* it fails, or successfully doesn't find the file */
if (chmd_fast_find((struct mschm_decompressor *) self, sec->base.chm,
name, &result, (int)sizeof(result)) || !result.section)
{
return MSPACK_ERR_DATAFORMAT;
}
if (!(*f_ptr = (struct mschmd_file *) sys->alloc(sys, sizeof(result)))) {
return MSPACK_ERR_NOMEMORY;
}
/* copy result */
*(*f_ptr) = result;
(*f_ptr)->filename = (char *) name;
/* link file into sysfiles list */
(*f_ptr)->next = sec->base.chm->sysfiles;
sec->base.chm->sysfiles = *f_ptr;
return MSPACK_ERR_OK;
}
Commit Message: Avoid returning CHM file entries that are "blank" because they have embedded null bytes
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 76,338
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int cac_rsa_op(sc_card_t *card,
const u8 * data, size_t datalen,
u8 * out, size_t outlen)
{
int r;
u8 *outp, *rbuf;
size_t rbuflen, outplen;
SC_FUNC_CALLED(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE);
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,
"datalen=%"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u outlen=%"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u\n",
datalen, outlen);
outp = out;
outplen = outlen;
/* Not strictly necessary. This code requires the caller to have selected the correct PKI container
* and authenticated to that container with the verifyPin command... All of this under the reader lock.
* The PKCS #15 higher level driver code does all this correctly (it's the same for all cards, just
* different sets of APDU's that need to be called), so this call is really a little bit of paranoia */
r = sc_lock(card);
if (r != SC_SUCCESS)
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, r);
rbuf = NULL;
rbuflen = 0;
for (; datalen > CAC_MAX_CHUNK_SIZE; data += CAC_MAX_CHUNK_SIZE, datalen -= CAC_MAX_CHUNK_SIZE) {
r = cac_apdu_io(card, CAC_INS_SIGN_DECRYPT, CAC_P1_STEP, 0,
data, CAC_MAX_CHUNK_SIZE, &rbuf, &rbuflen);
if (r < 0) {
break;
}
if (rbuflen != 0) {
int n = MIN(rbuflen, outplen);
memcpy(outp,rbuf, n);
outp += n;
outplen -= n;
}
free(rbuf);
rbuf = NULL;
rbuflen = 0;
}
if (r < 0) {
goto err;
}
rbuf = NULL;
rbuflen = 0;
r = cac_apdu_io(card, CAC_INS_SIGN_DECRYPT, CAC_P1_FINAL, 0, data, datalen, &rbuf, &rbuflen);
if (r < 0) {
goto err;
}
if (rbuflen != 0) {
int n = MIN(rbuflen, outplen);
memcpy(outp,rbuf, n);
/*outp += n; unused */
outplen -= n;
}
free(rbuf);
rbuf = NULL;
r = outlen-outplen;
err:
sc_unlock(card);
if (r < 0) {
sc_mem_clear(out, outlen);
}
if (rbuf) {
free(rbuf);
}
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, r);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 78,259
|
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.