instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void gen_op_st_v(DisasContext *s, int idx, TCGv t0, TCGv a0)
{
tcg_gen_qemu_st_tl(t0, a0, s->mem_index, idx | MO_LE);
}
Commit Message: tcg/i386: Check the size of instruction being translated
This fixes the bug: 'user-to-root privesc inside VM via bad translation
caching' reported by Jann Horn here:
https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1122
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
CC: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
CC: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Pranith Kumar <bobby.prani@gmail.com>
Message-Id: <20170323175851.14342-1-bobby.prani@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-94
| 0
| 66,381
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct cm_timewait_info * cm_insert_remote_id(struct cm_timewait_info
*timewait_info)
{
struct rb_node **link = &cm.remote_id_table.rb_node;
struct rb_node *parent = NULL;
struct cm_timewait_info *cur_timewait_info;
__be64 remote_ca_guid = timewait_info->remote_ca_guid;
__be32 remote_id = timewait_info->work.remote_id;
while (*link) {
parent = *link;
cur_timewait_info = rb_entry(parent, struct cm_timewait_info,
remote_id_node);
if (be32_lt(remote_id, cur_timewait_info->work.remote_id))
link = &(*link)->rb_left;
else if (be32_gt(remote_id, cur_timewait_info->work.remote_id))
link = &(*link)->rb_right;
else if (be64_lt(remote_ca_guid, cur_timewait_info->remote_ca_guid))
link = &(*link)->rb_left;
else if (be64_gt(remote_ca_guid, cur_timewait_info->remote_ca_guid))
link = &(*link)->rb_right;
else
return cur_timewait_info;
}
timewait_info->inserted_remote_id = 1;
rb_link_node(&timewait_info->remote_id_node, parent, link);
rb_insert_color(&timewait_info->remote_id_node, &cm.remote_id_table);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <monis@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 38,397
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __xfrm6_tunnel_spi_check(struct net *net, u32 spi)
{
struct xfrm6_tunnel_net *xfrm6_tn = xfrm6_tunnel_pernet(net);
struct xfrm6_tunnel_spi *x6spi;
int index = xfrm6_tunnel_spi_hash_byspi(spi);
struct hlist_node *pos;
hlist_for_each_entry(x6spi, pos,
&xfrm6_tn->spi_byspi[index],
list_byspi) {
if (x6spi->spi == spi)
return -1;
}
return index;
}
Commit Message: tunnels: fix netns vs proto registration ordering
Same stuff as in ip_gre patch: receive hook can be called before netns
setup is done, oopsing in net_generic().
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 27,461
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void vmx_set_virtual_x2apic_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool set)
{
u32 sec_exec_control;
/* Postpone execution until vmcs01 is the current VMCS. */
if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.change_vmcs01_virtual_x2apic_mode = true;
return;
}
if (!cpu_has_vmx_virtualize_x2apic_mode())
return;
if (!cpu_need_tpr_shadow(vcpu))
return;
sec_exec_control = vmcs_read32(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL);
if (set) {
sec_exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES;
sec_exec_control |= SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE;
} else {
sec_exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE;
sec_exec_control |= SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES;
vmx_flush_tlb_ept_only(vcpu);
}
vmcs_write32(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, sec_exec_control);
vmx_set_msr_bitmap(vcpu);
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Don't allow L2 to access the hardware CR8
If L1 does not specify the "use TPR shadow" VM-execution control in
vmcs12, then L0 must specify the "CR8-load exiting" and "CR8-store
exiting" VM-execution controls in vmcs02. Failure to do so will give
the L2 VM unrestricted read/write access to the hardware CR8.
This fixes CVE-2017-12154.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 63,061
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SyncManager::SyncInternal::OnIPAddressChanged() {
DVLOG(1) << "IP address change detected";
if (!observing_ip_address_changes_) {
DVLOG(1) << "IP address change dropped.";
return;
}
OnIPAddressChangedImpl();
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 105,144
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void php_rshutdown_session_globals(TSRMLS_D) /* {{{ */
{
if (PS(http_session_vars)) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&PS(http_session_vars));
PS(http_session_vars) = NULL;
}
/* Do NOT destroy PS(mod_user_names) here! */
if (PS(mod_data) || PS(mod_user_implemented)) {
zend_try {
PS(mod)->s_close(&PS(mod_data) TSRMLS_CC);
} zend_end_try();
}
if (PS(id)) {
efree(PS(id));
PS(id) = NULL;
}
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 9,623
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void sk_filter_charge(struct sock *sk, struct sk_filter *fp)
{
atomic_inc(&fp->refcnt);
atomic_add(sk_filter_size(fp->len), &sk->sk_omem_alloc);
}
Commit Message: filter: prevent nla extensions to peek beyond the end of the message
The BPF_S_ANC_NLATTR and BPF_S_ANC_NLATTR_NEST extensions fail to check
for a minimal message length before testing the supplied offset to be
within the bounds of the message. This allows the subtraction of the nla
header to underflow and therefore -- as the data type is unsigned --
allowing far to big offset and length values for the search of the
netlink attribute.
The remainder calculation for the BPF_S_ANC_NLATTR_NEST extension is
also wrong. It has the minuend and subtrahend mixed up, therefore
calculates a huge length value, allowing to overrun the end of the
message while looking for the netlink attribute.
The following three BPF snippets will trigger the bugs when attached to
a UNIX datagram socket and parsing a message with length 1, 2 or 3.
,-[ PoC for missing size check in BPF_S_ANC_NLATTR ]--
| ld #0x87654321
| ldx #42
| ld #nla
| ret a
`---
,-[ PoC for the same bug in BPF_S_ANC_NLATTR_NEST ]--
| ld #0x87654321
| ldx #42
| ld #nlan
| ret a
`---
,-[ PoC for wrong remainder calculation in BPF_S_ANC_NLATTR_NEST ]--
| ; (needs a fake netlink header at offset 0)
| ld #0
| ldx #42
| ld #nlan
| ret a
`---
Fix the first issue by ensuring the message length fulfills the minimal
size constrains of a nla header. Fix the second bug by getting the math
for the remainder calculation right.
Fixes: 4738c1db15 ("[SKFILTER]: Add SKF_ADF_NLATTR instruction")
Fixes: d214c7537b ("filter: add SKF_AD_NLATTR_NEST to look for nested..")
Cc: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 38,250
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Browser::ShouldCloseWindow() {
if (!CanCloseWithInProgressDownloads())
return false;
if (HasCompletedUnloadProcessing())
return IsClosingPermitted();
is_attempting_to_close_browser_ = true;
if (!TabsNeedBeforeUnloadFired())
return IsClosingPermitted();
ProcessPendingTabs();
return false;
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 97,369
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void InspectorClientImpl::clearBrowserCache()
{
if (WebDevToolsAgentImpl* agent = devToolsAgent())
agent->clearBrowserCache();
}
Commit Message: [4/4] Process clearBrowserCahce/cookies commands in browser.
BUG=366585
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/251183005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172984 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 1
| 171,346
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_rle4_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData, OPJ_UINT32 stride, OPJ_UINT32 width, OPJ_UINT32 height)
{
OPJ_UINT32 x, y;
OPJ_UINT8 *pix;
const OPJ_UINT8 *beyond;
beyond = pData + stride * height;
pix = pData;
x = y = 0U;
while(y < height)
{
int c = getc(IN);
if(c == EOF) break;
if(c) {/* encoded mode */
int j;
OPJ_UINT8 c1 = (OPJ_UINT8)getc(IN);
for (j = 0; (j < c) && (x < width) && ((OPJ_SIZE_T)pix < (OPJ_SIZE_T)beyond); j++, x++, pix++) {
*pix = (OPJ_UINT8)((j&1) ? (c1 & 0x0fU) : ((c1>>4)&0x0fU));
}
}
else { /* absolute mode */
c = getc(IN);
if(c == EOF) break;
if(c == 0x00) { /* EOL */
x = 0; y++; pix = pData + y * stride;
}
else if(c == 0x01) { /* EOP */
break;
}
else if(c == 0x02) { /* MOVE by dxdy */
c = getc(IN); x += (OPJ_UINT32)c;
c = getc(IN); y += (OPJ_UINT32)c;
pix = pData + y * stride + x;
}
else { /* 03 .. 255 : absolute mode */
int j;
OPJ_UINT8 c1 = 0U;
for (j = 0; (j < c) && (x < width) && ((OPJ_SIZE_T)pix < (OPJ_SIZE_T)beyond); j++, x++, pix++) {
if((j&1) == 0) {
c1 = (OPJ_UINT8)getc(IN);
}
*pix = (OPJ_UINT8)((j&1) ? (c1 & 0x0fU) : ((c1>>4)&0x0fU));
}
if(((c&3) == 1) || ((c&3) == 2)) { /* skip padding byte */
getc(IN);
}
}
}
} /* while(y < height) */
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #834 from trylab/issue833
Fix issue 833.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 70,086
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ptrace_getxregs(struct task_struct *child, void __user *uregs)
{
struct pt_regs *regs = task_pt_regs(child);
struct thread_info *ti = task_thread_info(child);
elf_xtregs_t __user *xtregs = uregs;
int ret = 0;
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, uregs, sizeof(elf_xtregs_t)))
return -EIO;
#if XTENSA_HAVE_COPROCESSORS
/* Flush all coprocessor registers to memory. */
coprocessor_flush_all(ti);
ret |= __copy_to_user(&xtregs->cp0, &ti->xtregs_cp,
sizeof(xtregs_coprocessor_t));
#endif
ret |= __copy_to_user(&xtregs->opt, ®s->xtregs_opt,
sizeof(xtregs->opt));
ret |= __copy_to_user(&xtregs->user,&ti->xtregs_user,
sizeof(xtregs->user));
return ret ? -EFAULT : 0;
}
Commit Message: xtensa: prevent arbitrary read in ptrace
Prevent an arbitrary kernel read. Check the user pointer with access_ok()
before copying data in.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: s/EIO/EFAULT/]
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: Christian Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 26,591
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gen_svm_check_intercept_param(DisasContext *s, target_ulong pc_start,
uint32_t type, uint64_t param)
{
/* no SVM activated; fast case */
if (likely(!(s->flags & HF_SVMI_MASK)))
return;
gen_update_cc_op(s);
gen_jmp_im(pc_start - s->cs_base);
gen_helper_svm_check_intercept_param(cpu_env, tcg_const_i32(type),
tcg_const_i64(param));
}
Commit Message: tcg/i386: Check the size of instruction being translated
This fixes the bug: 'user-to-root privesc inside VM via bad translation
caching' reported by Jann Horn here:
https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1122
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
CC: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
CC: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Pranith Kumar <bobby.prani@gmail.com>
Message-Id: <20170323175851.14342-1-bobby.prani@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-94
| 0
| 66,419
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t MediaPlayerService::Client::setDataSource(
const sp<IStreamSource> &source) {
player_type playerType = MediaPlayerFactory::getPlayerType(this, source);
sp<MediaPlayerBase> p = setDataSource_pre(playerType);
if (p == NULL) {
return NO_INIT;
}
setDataSource_post(p, p->setDataSource(source));
return mStatus;
}
Commit Message: MediaPlayerService: avoid invalid static cast
Bug: 30204103
Change-Id: Ie0dd3568a375f1e9fed8615ad3d85184bcc99028
(cherry picked from commit ee0a0e39acdcf8f97e0d6945c31ff36a06a36e9d)
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 158,029
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void virtio_net_set_netclient_name(VirtIONet *n, const char *name,
const char *type)
{
/*
* The name can be NULL, the netclient name will be type.x.
*/
assert(type != NULL);
if (n->netclient_name) {
g_free(n->netclient_name);
n->netclient_name = NULL;
}
if (n->netclient_type) {
g_free(n->netclient_type);
n->netclient_type = NULL;
}
if (name != NULL) {
n->netclient_name = g_strdup(name);
}
n->netclient_type = g_strdup(type);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 15,857
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void JBIG2Stream::readProfilesSeg(Guint length) {
Guint i;
for (i = 0; i < length; ++i) {
curStr->getChar();
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 1,213
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: krb5_encode_histkey(osa_princ_ent_rec *princ_ent)
{
unsigned int i;
krb5_error_code err = 0;
struct berval **ret = NULL;
if (princ_ent->old_key_len <= 0)
return NULL;
ret = k5calloc(princ_ent->old_key_len + 1, sizeof(struct berval *), &err);
if (ret == NULL)
goto cleanup;
for (i = 0; i < princ_ent->old_key_len; i++) {
if (princ_ent->old_keys[i].n_key_data <= 0) {
err = EINVAL;
goto cleanup;
}
err = encode_keys(princ_ent->old_keys[i].key_data,
princ_ent->old_keys[i].n_key_data,
princ_ent->admin_history_kvno, &ret[i]);
if (err)
goto cleanup;
}
ret[princ_ent->old_key_len] = NULL;
cleanup:
if (err != 0) {
free_berdata(ret);
ret = NULL;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix LDAP null deref on empty arg [CVE-2016-3119]
In the LDAP KDB module's process_db_args(), strtok_r() may return NULL
if there is an empty string in the db_args array. Check for this case
and avoid dereferencing a null pointer.
CVE-2016-3119:
In MIT krb5 1.6 and later, an authenticated attacker with permission
to modify a principal entry can cause kadmind to dereference a null
pointer by supplying an empty DB argument to the modify_principal
command, if kadmind is configured to use the LDAP KDB module.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:H/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:H/RL:OF/RC:ND
ticket: 8383 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
tags: pullup
CWE ID:
| 0
| 54,374
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CoordinatorImpl::RequestGlobalMemoryDumpAndAppendToTrace(
MemoryDumpType dump_type,
MemoryDumpLevelOfDetail level_of_detail,
const RequestGlobalMemoryDumpAndAppendToTraceCallback& callback) {
auto adapter =
[](const RequestGlobalMemoryDumpAndAppendToTraceCallback& callback,
bool success, uint64_t dump_guid,
mojom::GlobalMemoryDumpPtr) { callback.Run(success, dump_guid); };
QueuedRequest::Args args(dump_type, level_of_detail, {},
true /* add_to_trace */, base::kNullProcessId);
RequestGlobalMemoryDumpInternal(args, base::BindRepeating(adapter, callback));
}
Commit Message: memory-infra: split up memory-infra coordinator service into two
This allows for heap profiler to use its own service with correct
capabilities and all other instances to use the existing coordinator
service.
Bug: 792028
Change-Id: I84e4ec71f5f1d00991c0516b1424ce7334bcd3cd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/836896
Commit-Queue: Lalit Maganti <lalitm@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: oysteine <oysteine@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Albert J. Wong <ajwong@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Hector Dearman <hjd@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529059}
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 1
| 172,916
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: entry_guard_add_to_sample(guard_selection_t *gs,
const node_t *node)
{
log_info(LD_GUARD, "Adding %s as to the entry guard sample set.",
node_describe(node));
/* make sure that the guard is not already sampled. */
if (BUG(have_sampled_guard_with_id(gs, (const uint8_t*)node->identity)))
return NULL; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
return entry_guard_add_to_sample_impl(gs,
(const uint8_t*)node->identity,
node_get_nickname(node),
NULL);
}
Commit Message: Consider the exit family when applying guard restrictions.
When the new path selection logic went into place, I accidentally
dropped the code that considered the _family_ of the exit node when
deciding if the guard was usable, and we didn't catch that during
code review.
This patch makes the guard_restriction_t code consider the exit
family as well, and adds some (hopefully redundant) checks for the
case where we lack a node_t for a guard but we have a bridge_info_t
for it.
Fixes bug 22753; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha. Tracked as TROVE-2016-006
and CVE-2017-0377.
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 69,662
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void sd_read_protection_type(struct scsi_disk *sdkp, unsigned char *buffer)
{
struct scsi_device *sdp = sdkp->device;
u8 type;
if (scsi_device_protection(sdp) == 0 || (buffer[12] & 1) == 0)
return;
type = ((buffer[12] >> 1) & 7) + 1; /* P_TYPE 0 = Type 1 */
if (type == sdkp->protection_type || !sdkp->first_scan)
return;
sdkp->protection_type = type;
if (type > SD_DIF_TYPE3_PROTECTION) {
sd_printk(KERN_ERR, sdkp, "formatted with unsupported " \
"protection type %u. Disabling disk!\n", type);
sdkp->capacity = 0;
return;
}
if (scsi_host_dif_capable(sdp->host, type))
sd_printk(KERN_NOTICE, sdkp,
"Enabling DIF Type %u protection\n", type);
else
sd_printk(KERN_NOTICE, sdkp,
"Disabling DIF Type %u protection\n", type);
}
Commit Message: block: fail SCSI passthrough ioctls on partition devices
Linux allows executing the SG_IO ioctl on a partition or LVM volume, and
will pass the command to the underlying block device. This is
well-known, but it is also a large security problem when (via Unix
permissions, ACLs, SELinux or a combination thereof) a program or user
needs to be granted access only to part of the disk.
This patch lets partitions forward a small set of harmless ioctls;
others are logged with printk so that we can see which ioctls are
actually sent. In my tests only CDROM_GET_CAPABILITY actually occurred.
Of course it was being sent to a (partition on a) hard disk, so it would
have failed with ENOTTY and the patch isn't changing anything in
practice. Still, I'm treating it specially to avoid spamming the logs.
In principle, this restriction should include programs running with
CAP_SYS_RAWIO. If for example I let a program access /dev/sda2 and
/dev/sdb, it still should not be able to read/write outside the
boundaries of /dev/sda2 independent of the capabilities. However, for
now programs with CAP_SYS_RAWIO will still be allowed to send the
ioctls. Their actions will still be logged.
This patch does not affect the non-libata IDE driver. That driver
however already tests for bd != bd->bd_contains before issuing some
ioctl; it could be restricted further to forbid these ioctls even for
programs running with CAP_SYS_ADMIN/CAP_SYS_RAWIO.
Cc: linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: James Bottomley <JBottomley@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
[ Make it also print the command name when warning - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 94,406
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: image_pixel_setf(image_pixel *this, unsigned int max)
{
this->redf = this->red / (double)max;
this->greenf = this->green / (double)max;
this->bluef = this->blue / (double)max;
this->alphaf = this->alpha / (double)max;
if (this->red < max)
this->rede = this->redf * DBL_EPSILON;
else
this->rede = 0;
if (this->green < max)
this->greene = this->greenf * DBL_EPSILON;
else
this->greene = 0;
if (this->blue < max)
this->bluee = this->bluef * DBL_EPSILON;
else
this->bluee = 0;
if (this->alpha < max)
this->alphae = this->alphaf * DBL_EPSILON;
else
this->alphae = 0;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
| 1
| 173,618
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int Track::Info::Copy(Info& dst) const {
if (&dst == this)
return 0;
dst.type = type;
dst.number = number;
dst.defaultDuration = defaultDuration;
dst.codecDelay = codecDelay;
dst.seekPreRoll = seekPreRoll;
dst.uid = uid;
dst.lacing = lacing;
dst.settings = settings;
if (int status = CopyStr(&Info::nameAsUTF8, dst))
return status;
if (int status = CopyStr(&Info::language, dst))
return status;
if (int status = CopyStr(&Info::codecId, dst))
return status;
if (int status = CopyStr(&Info::codecNameAsUTF8, dst))
return status;
if (codecPrivateSize > 0) {
if (codecPrivate == NULL)
return -1;
if (dst.codecPrivate)
return -1;
if (dst.codecPrivateSize != 0)
return -1;
dst.codecPrivate = SafeArrayAlloc<unsigned char>(1, codecPrivateSize);
if (dst.codecPrivate == NULL)
return -1;
memcpy(dst.codecPrivate, codecPrivate, codecPrivateSize);
dst.codecPrivateSize = codecPrivateSize;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix ParseElementHeader to support 0 payload elements
Cherry-pick'ing Change 5c83bbec9a5f6f00a349674ddad85b753d2ea219
from upstream. This fixes regression in some edge cases for mkv
playback.
BUG=26499283
Change-Id: I88de03219a3d941b6b2f251d384e29c36bdd4d9b
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 164,190
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BrowserView::Activate() {
frame_->Activate();
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 118,298
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void cmd_getquotaroot(const char *tag, const char *name)
{
mbentry_t *mbentry = NULL;
struct mailbox *mailbox = NULL;
int myrights;
int r, doclose = 0;
char *intname = mboxname_from_external(name, &imapd_namespace, imapd_userid);
r = mlookup(tag, name, intname, &mbentry);
if (r == IMAP_MAILBOX_MOVED) {
free(intname);
return;
}
if (!r && (mbentry->mbtype & MBTYPE_REMOTE)) {
/* remote mailbox */
struct backend *s;
s = proxy_findserver(mbentry->server, &imap_protocol,
proxy_userid, &backend_cached,
&backend_current, &backend_inbox, imapd_in);
if (!s) r = IMAP_SERVER_UNAVAILABLE;
imapd_check(s, 0);
if (!r) {
prot_printf(s->out, "%s Getquotaroot {" SIZE_T_FMT "+}\r\n%s\r\n",
tag, strlen(name), name);
pipe_including_tag(s, tag, 0);
} else {
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s NO %s\r\n", tag, error_message(r));
}
mboxlist_entry_free(&mbentry);
free(intname);
return;
}
mboxlist_entry_free(&mbentry);
/* local mailbox */
if (!r) {
r = mailbox_open_irl(intname, &mailbox);
if (!r) {
doclose = 1;
myrights = cyrus_acl_myrights(imapd_authstate, mailbox->acl);
}
}
if (!r) {
if (!imapd_userisadmin && !(myrights & ACL_READ)) {
r = (myrights & ACL_LOOKUP) ?
IMAP_PERMISSION_DENIED : IMAP_MAILBOX_NONEXISTENT;
}
}
if (!r) {
prot_printf(imapd_out, "* QUOTAROOT ");
prot_printastring(imapd_out, name);
if (mailbox->quotaroot) {
struct quota q;
char *extname = mboxname_to_external(mailbox->quotaroot, &imapd_namespace, imapd_userid);
prot_printf(imapd_out, " ");
prot_printastring(imapd_out, extname);
quota_init(&q, mailbox->quotaroot);
r = quota_read(&q, NULL, 0);
if (!r) {
prot_printf(imapd_out, "\r\n* QUOTA ");
prot_printastring(imapd_out, extname);
prot_putc(' ', imapd_out);
print_quota_used(imapd_out, &q);
}
quota_free(&q);
free(extname);
}
prot_printf(imapd_out, "\r\n");
}
if (doclose) mailbox_close(&mailbox);
free(intname);
if (r) {
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s NO %s\r\n", tag, error_message(r));
return;
}
imapd_check(NULL, 0);
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s OK %s\r\n", tag,
error_message(IMAP_OK_COMPLETED));
}
Commit Message: imapd: check for isadmin BEFORE parsing sync lines
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 95,148
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct crypto_ahash *mcryptd_ahash_child(struct mcryptd_ahash *tfm)
{
struct mcryptd_hash_ctx *ctx = crypto_ahash_ctx(&tfm->base);
return ctx->child;
}
Commit Message: crypto: mcryptd - Check mcryptd algorithm compatibility
Algorithms not compatible with mcryptd could be spawned by mcryptd
with a direct crypto_alloc_tfm invocation using a "mcryptd(alg)" name
construct. This causes mcryptd to crash the kernel if an arbitrary
"alg" is incompatible and not intended to be used with mcryptd. It is
an issue if AF_ALG tries to spawn mcryptd(alg) to expose it externally.
But such algorithms must be used internally and not be exposed.
We added a check to enforce that only internal algorithms are allowed
with mcryptd at the time mcryptd is spawning an algorithm.
Link: http://marc.info/?l=linux-crypto-vger&m=148063683310477&w=2
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 71,289
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FileSystemOperation::CreateDirectory(const GURL& path_url,
bool exclusive,
bool recursive,
const StatusCallback& callback) {
DCHECK(SetPendingOperationType(kOperationCreateDirectory));
base::PlatformFileError result = SetUpFileSystemPath(
path_url, &src_path_, &src_util_, PATH_FOR_CREATE);
if (result != base::PLATFORM_FILE_OK) {
callback.Run(result);
delete this;
return;
}
GetUsageAndQuotaThenRunTask(
src_path_.origin(), src_path_.type(),
base::Bind(&FileSystemOperation::DoCreateDirectory,
base::Unretained(this), callback, exclusive, recursive),
base::Bind(callback, base::PLATFORM_FILE_ERROR_FAILED));
}
Commit Message: Crash fix in fileapi::FileSystemOperation::DidGetUsageAndQuotaAndRunTask
https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10008047 introduced delete-with-inflight-tasks in Write sequence but I failed to convert this callback to use WeakPtr().
BUG=128178
TEST=manual test
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10408006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137635 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 104,051
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BluetoothApiSocket* BluetoothSocketAsyncApiFunction::GetSocket(
int api_resource_id) {
return manager_->Get(extension_id(), api_resource_id);
}
Commit Message: chrome.bluetoothSocket: Fix regression in send()
In https://crrev.com/c/997098, params_ was changed to a local variable,
but it needs to last longer than that since net::WrappedIOBuffer may use
the data after the local variable goes out of scope.
This CL changed it back to be an instance variable.
Bug: 851799
Change-Id: I392f8acaef4c6473d6ea4fbee7209445aa09112e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1103676
Reviewed-by: Toni Barzic <tbarzic@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sonny Sasaka <sonnysasaka@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#568137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 154,064
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int perf_event_init_context(struct task_struct *child, int ctxn)
{
struct perf_event_context *child_ctx, *parent_ctx;
struct perf_event_context *cloned_ctx;
struct perf_event *event;
struct task_struct *parent = current;
int inherited_all = 1;
unsigned long flags;
int ret = 0;
if (likely(!parent->perf_event_ctxp[ctxn]))
return 0;
/*
* If the parent's context is a clone, pin it so it won't get
* swapped under us.
*/
parent_ctx = perf_pin_task_context(parent, ctxn);
/*
* No need to check if parent_ctx != NULL here; since we saw
* it non-NULL earlier, the only reason for it to become NULL
* is if we exit, and since we're currently in the middle of
* a fork we can't be exiting at the same time.
*/
/*
* Lock the parent list. No need to lock the child - not PID
* hashed yet and not running, so nobody can access it.
*/
mutex_lock(&parent_ctx->mutex);
/*
* We dont have to disable NMIs - we are only looking at
* the list, not manipulating it:
*/
list_for_each_entry(event, &parent_ctx->pinned_groups, group_entry) {
ret = inherit_task_group(event, parent, parent_ctx,
child, ctxn, &inherited_all);
if (ret)
break;
}
/*
* We can't hold ctx->lock when iterating the ->flexible_group list due
* to allocations, but we need to prevent rotation because
* rotate_ctx() will change the list from interrupt context.
*/
raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&parent_ctx->lock, flags);
parent_ctx->rotate_disable = 1;
raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&parent_ctx->lock, flags);
list_for_each_entry(event, &parent_ctx->flexible_groups, group_entry) {
ret = inherit_task_group(event, parent, parent_ctx,
child, ctxn, &inherited_all);
if (ret)
break;
}
raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&parent_ctx->lock, flags);
parent_ctx->rotate_disable = 0;
child_ctx = child->perf_event_ctxp[ctxn];
if (child_ctx && inherited_all) {
/*
* Mark the child context as a clone of the parent
* context, or of whatever the parent is a clone of.
*
* Note that if the parent is a clone, the holding of
* parent_ctx->lock avoids it from being uncloned.
*/
cloned_ctx = parent_ctx->parent_ctx;
if (cloned_ctx) {
child_ctx->parent_ctx = cloned_ctx;
child_ctx->parent_gen = parent_ctx->parent_gen;
} else {
child_ctx->parent_ctx = parent_ctx;
child_ctx->parent_gen = parent_ctx->generation;
}
get_ctx(child_ctx->parent_ctx);
}
raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&parent_ctx->lock, flags);
mutex_unlock(&parent_ctx->mutex);
perf_unpin_context(parent_ctx);
put_ctx(parent_ctx);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 26,088
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: KURL Element::getNonEmptyURLAttribute(const QualifiedName& name) const
{
#if !ASSERT_DISABLED
if (elementData()) {
if (const Attribute* attribute = getAttributeItem(name))
ASSERT(isURLAttribute(*attribute));
}
#endif
String value = stripLeadingAndTrailingHTMLSpaces(getAttribute(name));
if (value.isEmpty())
return KURL();
return document()->completeURL(value);
}
Commit Message: Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 112,278
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void rtnl_fdb_notify(struct net_device *dev, u8 *addr, u16 vid, int type,
u16 ndm_state)
{
struct net *net = dev_net(dev);
struct sk_buff *skb;
int err = -ENOBUFS;
skb = nlmsg_new(rtnl_fdb_nlmsg_size(), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!skb)
goto errout;
err = nlmsg_populate_fdb_fill(skb, dev, addr, vid,
0, 0, type, NTF_SELF, 0, ndm_state);
if (err < 0) {
kfree_skb(skb);
goto errout;
}
rtnl_notify(skb, net, 0, RTNLGRP_NEIGH, NULL, GFP_ATOMIC);
return;
errout:
rtnl_set_sk_err(net, RTNLGRP_NEIGH, err);
}
Commit Message: net: fix infoleak in rtnetlink
The stack object “map” has a total size of 32 bytes. Its last 4
bytes are padding generated by compiler. These padding bytes are
not initialized and sent out via “nla_put”.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 53,155
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SafeBrowsingState::~SafeBrowsingState() {}
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
R=asanka@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 106,032
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void switch_booke_debug_regs(struct debug_reg *new_debug)
{
if ((current->thread.debug.dbcr0 & DBCR0_IDM)
|| (new_debug->dbcr0 & DBCR0_IDM))
prime_debug_regs(new_debug);
}
Commit Message: powerpc/tm: Fix crash when forking inside a transaction
When we fork/clone we currently don't copy any of the TM state to the new
thread. This results in a TM bad thing (program check) when the new process is
switched in as the kernel does a tmrechkpt with TEXASR FS not set. Also, since
R1 is from userspace, we trigger the bad kernel stack pointer detection. So we
end up with something like this:
Bad kernel stack pointer 0 at c0000000000404fc
cpu 0x2: Vector: 700 (Program Check) at [c00000003ffefd40]
pc: c0000000000404fc: restore_gprs+0xc0/0x148
lr: 0000000000000000
sp: 0
msr: 9000000100201030
current = 0xc000001dd1417c30
paca = 0xc00000000fe00800 softe: 0 irq_happened: 0x01
pid = 0, comm = swapper/2
WARNING: exception is not recoverable, can't continue
The below fixes this by flushing the TM state before we copy the task_struct to
the clone. To do this we go through the tmreclaim patch, which removes the
checkpointed registers from the CPU and transitions the CPU out of TM suspend
mode. Hence we need to call tmrechkpt after to restore the checkpointed state
and the TM mode for the current task.
To make this fail from userspace is simply:
tbegin
li r0, 2
sc
<boom>
Kudos to Adhemerval Zanella Neto for finding this.
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
cc: Adhemerval Zanella Neto <azanella@br.ibm.com>
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 38,653
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void *Type_MPEmatrix_Read(struct _cms_typehandler_struct* self, cmsIOHANDLER* io, cmsUInt32Number* nItems, cmsUInt32Number SizeOfTag)
{
cmsStage* mpe;
cmsUInt16Number InputChans, OutputChans;
cmsUInt32Number nElems, i;
cmsFloat64Number* Matrix;
cmsFloat64Number* Offsets;
if (!_cmsReadUInt16Number(io, &InputChans)) return NULL;
if (!_cmsReadUInt16Number(io, &OutputChans)) return NULL;
nElems = InputChans * OutputChans;
Matrix = (cmsFloat64Number*) _cmsCalloc(self ->ContextID, nElems, sizeof(cmsFloat64Number));
if (Matrix == NULL) return NULL;
Offsets = (cmsFloat64Number*) _cmsCalloc(self ->ContextID, OutputChans, sizeof(cmsFloat64Number));
if (Offsets == NULL) {
_cmsFree(self ->ContextID, Matrix);
return NULL;
}
for (i=0; i < nElems; i++) {
cmsFloat32Number v;
if (!_cmsReadFloat32Number(io, &v)) return NULL;
Matrix[i] = v;
}
for (i=0; i < OutputChans; i++) {
cmsFloat32Number v;
if (!_cmsReadFloat32Number(io, &v)) return NULL;
Offsets[i] = v;
}
mpe = cmsStageAllocMatrix(self ->ContextID, OutputChans, InputChans, Matrix, Offsets);
_cmsFree(self ->ContextID, Matrix);
_cmsFree(self ->ContextID, Offsets);
*nItems = 1;
return mpe;
cmsUNUSED_PARAMETER(SizeOfTag);
}
Commit Message: Added an extra check to MLU bounds
Thanks to Ibrahim el-sayed for spotting the bug
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 71,022
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: nbt_udp137_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *data, int length)
{
const u_char *maxbuf = data + length;
int name_trn_id, response, opcode, nm_flags, rcode;
int qdcount, ancount, nscount, arcount;
const u_char *p;
int total, i;
ND_TCHECK2(data[10], 2);
name_trn_id = EXTRACT_16BITS(data);
response = (data[2] >> 7);
opcode = (data[2] >> 3) & 0xF;
nm_flags = ((data[2] & 0x7) << 4) + (data[3] >> 4);
rcode = data[3] & 0xF;
qdcount = EXTRACT_16BITS(data + 4);
ancount = EXTRACT_16BITS(data + 6);
nscount = EXTRACT_16BITS(data + 8);
arcount = EXTRACT_16BITS(data + 10);
startbuf = data;
if (maxbuf <= data)
return;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n>>> "));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "NBT UDP PACKET(137): %s", tok2str(opcode_str, "OPUNKNOWN", opcode)));
if (response) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "; %s", rcode ? "NEGATIVE" : "POSITIVE"));
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "; %s; %s", response ? "RESPONSE" : "REQUEST",
(nm_flags & 1) ? "BROADCAST" : "UNICAST"));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag < 2)
return;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\nTrnID=0x%X\nOpCode=%d\nNmFlags=0x%X\nRcode=%d\nQueryCount=%d\nAnswerCount=%d\nAuthorityCount=%d\nAddressRecCount=%d\n",
name_trn_id, opcode, nm_flags, rcode, qdcount, ancount, nscount,
arcount));
p = data + 12;
total = ancount + nscount + arcount;
if (qdcount > 100 || total > 100) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Corrupt packet??\n"));
return;
}
if (qdcount) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "QuestionRecords:\n"));
for (i = 0; i < qdcount; i++) {
p = smb_fdata(ndo, p,
"|Name=[n1]\nQuestionType=[rw]\nQuestionClass=[rw]\n#",
maxbuf, 0);
if (p == NULL)
goto out;
}
}
if (total) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\nResourceRecords:\n"));
for (i = 0; i < total; i++) {
int rdlen;
int restype;
p = smb_fdata(ndo, p, "Name=[n1]\n#", maxbuf, 0);
if (p == NULL)
goto out;
ND_TCHECK_16BITS(p);
restype = EXTRACT_16BITS(p);
p = smb_fdata(ndo, p, "ResType=[rw]\nResClass=[rw]\nTTL=[rD]\n", p + 8, 0);
if (p == NULL)
goto out;
ND_TCHECK_16BITS(p);
rdlen = EXTRACT_16BITS(p);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "ResourceLength=%d\nResourceData=\n", rdlen));
p += 2;
if (rdlen == 6) {
p = smb_fdata(ndo, p, "AddrType=[rw]\nAddress=[b.b.b.b]\n", p + rdlen, 0);
if (p == NULL)
goto out;
} else {
if (restype == 0x21) {
int numnames;
ND_TCHECK(*p);
numnames = p[0];
p = smb_fdata(ndo, p, "NumNames=[B]\n", p + 1, 0);
if (p == NULL)
goto out;
while (numnames--) {
p = smb_fdata(ndo, p, "Name=[n2]\t#", maxbuf, 0);
if (p == NULL)
goto out;
ND_TCHECK(*p);
if (p[0] & 0x80)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "<GROUP> "));
switch (p[0] & 0x60) {
case 0x00: ND_PRINT((ndo, "B ")); break;
case 0x20: ND_PRINT((ndo, "P ")); break;
case 0x40: ND_PRINT((ndo, "M ")); break;
case 0x60: ND_PRINT((ndo, "_ ")); break;
}
if (p[0] & 0x10)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "<DEREGISTERING> "));
if (p[0] & 0x08)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "<CONFLICT> "));
if (p[0] & 0x04)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "<ACTIVE> "));
if (p[0] & 0x02)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "<PERMANENT> "));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n"));
p += 2;
}
} else {
smb_print_data(ndo, p, min(rdlen, length - (p - data)));
p += rdlen;
}
}
}
}
if (p < maxbuf)
smb_fdata(ndo, p, "AdditionalData:\n", maxbuf, 0);
out:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n"));
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
}
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) SMB: Add two missing bounds checks
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 93,140
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: inconsistent_match(enum ofputil_protocol *usable_protocols)
{
*usable_protocols &= OFPUTIL_P_OF10_ANY;
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 76,972
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void RaisesExceptionVoidMethodTestCallbackInterfaceArgMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
ExceptionState exception_state(info.GetIsolate(), ExceptionState::kExecutionContext, "TestObject", "raisesExceptionVoidMethodTestCallbackInterfaceArg");
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() < 1)) {
exception_state.ThrowTypeError(ExceptionMessages::NotEnoughArguments(1, info.Length()));
return;
}
V8TestCallbackInterface* test_callback_interface_arg;
if (info[0]->IsObject()) {
test_callback_interface_arg = V8TestCallbackInterface::Create(info[0].As<v8::Object>());
} else {
exception_state.ThrowTypeError("The callback provided as parameter 1 is not an object.");
return;
}
impl->raisesExceptionVoidMethodTestCallbackInterfaceArg(test_callback_interface_arg, exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException()) {
return;
}
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 135,058
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: __xmlDefaultSAXHandler(void) {
if (IS_MAIN_THREAD)
return (&xmlDefaultSAXHandler);
else
return (&xmlGetGlobalState()->xmlDefaultSAXHandler);
}
Commit Message: Attempt to address libxml crash.
BUG=129930
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10458051
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@142822 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 107,290
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: exsltCryptoGcryptRc4Decrypt (xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt,
const unsigned char *key,
const unsigned char *msg, int msglen,
unsigned char *dest, int destlen) {
gcry_cipher_hd_t cipher;
gcry_error_t rc = 0;
exsltCryptoGcryptInit ();
rc = gcry_cipher_open (&cipher, GCRY_CIPHER_ARCFOUR,
GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM, 0);
if (rc) {
xsltTransformError (xsltXPathGetTransformContext (ctxt), NULL,
NULL,
"exslt:crypto internal error %s (gcry_cipher_open)\n",
gcry_strerror (rc));
}
rc = gcry_cipher_setkey (cipher, key, RC4_KEY_LENGTH);
if (rc) {
xsltTransformError (xsltXPathGetTransformContext (ctxt), NULL,
NULL,
"exslt:crypto internal error %s (gcry_cipher_setkey)\n",
gcry_strerror (rc));
}
rc = gcry_cipher_decrypt (cipher, (unsigned char *) dest, destlen,
(const unsigned char *) msg, msglen);
if (rc) {
xsltTransformError (xsltXPathGetTransformContext (ctxt), NULL,
NULL,
"exslt:crypto internal error %s (gcry_cipher_decrypt)\n",
gcry_strerror (rc));
}
gcry_cipher_close (cipher);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 156,570
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int OPENSSL_atexit(void (*handler)(void))
{
OPENSSL_INIT_STOP *newhand;
#if !defined(OPENSSL_USE_NODELETE)\
&& !defined(OPENSSL_NO_PINSHARED)
{
union {
void *sym;
void (*func)(void);
} handlersym;
handlersym.func = handler;
# if defined(DSO_WIN32) && !defined(_WIN32_WCE)
{
HMODULE handle = NULL;
BOOL ret;
/*
* We don't use the DSO route for WIN32 because there is a better
* way
*/
ret = GetModuleHandleEx(GET_MODULE_HANDLE_EX_FLAG_FROM_ADDRESS
| GET_MODULE_HANDLE_EX_FLAG_PIN,
handlersym.sym, &handle);
if (!ret)
return 0;
}
# elif !defined(DSO_NONE)
/*
* Deliberately leak a reference to the handler. This will force the
* library/code containing the handler to remain loaded until we run the
* atexit handler. If -znodelete has been used then this is
* unnecessary.
*/
{
DSO *dso = NULL;
ERR_set_mark();
dso = DSO_dsobyaddr(handlersym.sym, DSO_FLAG_NO_UNLOAD_ON_FREE);
# ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr,
"OPENSSL_INIT: OPENSSL_atexit: obtained DSO reference? %s\n",
(dso == NULL ? "No!" : "Yes."));
/* See same code above in ossl_init_base() for an explanation. */
# endif
DSO_free(dso);
ERR_pop_to_mark();
}
# endif
}
#endif
if ((newhand = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*newhand))) == NULL) {
CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_OPENSSL_ATEXIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
newhand->handler = handler;
newhand->next = stop_handlers;
stop_handlers = newhand;
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-330
| 0
| 12,011
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void __init early_trap_pf_init(void)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
set_intr_gate(X86_TRAP_PF, page_fault);
#endif
}
Commit Message: x86_64, traps: Stop using IST for #SS
On a 32-bit kernel, this has no effect, since there are no IST stacks.
On a 64-bit kernel, #SS can only happen in user code, on a failed iret
to user space, a canonical violation on access via RSP or RBP, or a
genuine stack segment violation in 32-bit kernel code. The first two
cases don't need IST, and the latter two cases are unlikely fatal bugs,
and promoting them to double faults would be fine.
This fixes a bug in which the espfix64 code mishandles a stack segment
violation.
This saves 4k of memory per CPU and a tiny bit of code.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 35,420
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void InFlightBackendIO::DoomEntry(const std::string& key,
const net::CompletionCallback& callback) {
scoped_refptr<BackendIO> operation(new BackendIO(this, backend_, callback));
operation->DoomEntry(key);
PostOperation(FROM_HERE, operation.get());
}
Commit Message: Blockfile cache: fix long-standing sparse + evict reentrancy problem
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for an alternative perspective
plus a reduction to make fixing this much easier.
Bug: 826626, 518908, 537063, 802886
Change-Id: Ibfa01416f9a8e7f7b361e4f93b4b6b134728b85f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/985052
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547103}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 147,315
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void doWriteAlgorithmId(blink::WebCryptoAlgorithmId id)
{
switch (id) {
case blink::WebCryptoAlgorithmIdAesCbc:
return doWriteUint32(AesCbcTag);
case blink::WebCryptoAlgorithmIdHmac:
return doWriteUint32(HmacTag);
case blink::WebCryptoAlgorithmIdRsaSsaPkcs1v1_5:
return doWriteUint32(RsaSsaPkcs1v1_5Tag);
case blink::WebCryptoAlgorithmIdSha1:
return doWriteUint32(Sha1Tag);
case blink::WebCryptoAlgorithmIdSha256:
return doWriteUint32(Sha256Tag);
case blink::WebCryptoAlgorithmIdSha384:
return doWriteUint32(Sha384Tag);
case blink::WebCryptoAlgorithmIdSha512:
return doWriteUint32(Sha512Tag);
case blink::WebCryptoAlgorithmIdAesGcm:
return doWriteUint32(AesGcmTag);
case blink::WebCryptoAlgorithmIdRsaOaep:
return doWriteUint32(RsaOaepTag);
case blink::WebCryptoAlgorithmIdAesCtr:
return doWriteUint32(AesCtrTag);
case blink::WebCryptoAlgorithmIdAesKw:
return doWriteUint32(AesKwTag);
}
ASSERT_NOT_REACHED();
}
Commit Message: Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings
BUG=390928
R=dcarney@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 120,466
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static RBinElfSymbol *Elf_(r_bin_elf_get_phdr_symbols)(ELFOBJ *bin) {
if (!bin) {
return NULL;
}
if (bin->phdr_symbols) {
return bin->phdr_symbols;
}
bin->phdr_symbols = get_symbols_from_phdr (bin, R_BIN_ELF_SYMBOLS);
return bin->phdr_symbols;
}
Commit Message: Fix #8764 - huge vd_aux caused pointer wraparound
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 60,065
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void MediaStreamManager::StopDevice(MediaStreamType type, int session_id) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
DVLOG(1) << "StopDevice"
<< "{type = " << type << "}"
<< "{session_id = " << session_id << "}";
auto request_it = requests_.begin();
while (request_it != requests_.end()) {
DeviceRequest* request = request_it->second;
MediaStreamDevices* devices = &request->devices;
if (devices->empty()) {
++request_it;
continue;
}
auto device_it = devices->begin();
while (device_it != devices->end()) {
if (device_it->type != type || device_it->session_id != session_id) {
++device_it;
continue;
}
if (request->state(type) == MEDIA_REQUEST_STATE_DONE)
CloseDevice(type, session_id);
device_it = devices->erase(device_it);
}
if (devices->empty()) {
std::string label = request_it->first;
++request_it;
DeleteRequest(label);
} else {
++request_it;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <olka@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 153,207
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SetConfig(const ClientConfig& config) {
config_run_loop_ = std::make_unique<base::RunLoop>();
config_ = config;
}
Commit Message: Disable all DRP URL fetches when holdback is enabled
Disable secure proxy checker, warmup url fetcher
and client config fetch when the client is in DRP
(Data Reduction Proxy) holdback.
This CL does not disable pingbacks when client is in the
holdback, but the pingback code is going away soon.
Change-Id: Icbb59d814d1452123869c609e0770d1439c1db51
Bug: 984964
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1709965
Commit-Queue: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#679649}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 137,849
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HTMLMediaElement::FinishSeek() {
BLINK_MEDIA_LOG << "finishSeek(" << (void*)this << ")";
seeking_ = false;
SetOfficialPlaybackPosition(CurrentPlaybackPosition());
ScheduleTimeupdateEvent(false);
ScheduleEvent(EventTypeNames::seeked);
SetDisplayMode(kVideo);
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 144,553
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int decode_attr_fs_locations(struct xdr_stream *xdr, uint32_t *bitmap, struct nfs4_fs_locations *res)
{
int n;
__be32 *p;
int status = -EIO;
if (unlikely(bitmap[0] & (FATTR4_WORD0_FS_LOCATIONS -1U)))
goto out;
status = 0;
if (unlikely(!(bitmap[0] & FATTR4_WORD0_FS_LOCATIONS)))
goto out;
dprintk("%s: fsroot ", __func__);
status = decode_pathname(xdr, &res->fs_path);
if (unlikely(status != 0))
goto out;
p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, 4);
if (unlikely(!p))
goto out_overflow;
n = be32_to_cpup(p);
if (n <= 0)
goto out_eio;
res->nlocations = 0;
while (res->nlocations < n) {
u32 m;
struct nfs4_fs_location *loc = &res->locations[res->nlocations];
p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, 4);
if (unlikely(!p))
goto out_overflow;
m = be32_to_cpup(p);
loc->nservers = 0;
dprintk("%s: servers ", __func__);
while (loc->nservers < m) {
struct nfs4_string *server = &loc->servers[loc->nservers];
status = decode_opaque_inline(xdr, &server->len, &server->data);
if (unlikely(status != 0))
goto out_eio;
dprintk("%s ", server->data);
if (loc->nservers < NFS4_FS_LOCATION_MAXSERVERS)
loc->nservers++;
else {
unsigned int i;
dprintk("%s: using first %u of %u servers "
"returned for location %u\n",
__func__,
NFS4_FS_LOCATION_MAXSERVERS,
m, res->nlocations);
for (i = loc->nservers; i < m; i++) {
unsigned int len;
char *data;
status = decode_opaque_inline(xdr, &len, &data);
if (unlikely(status != 0))
goto out_eio;
}
}
}
status = decode_pathname(xdr, &loc->rootpath);
if (unlikely(status != 0))
goto out_eio;
if (res->nlocations < NFS4_FS_LOCATIONS_MAXENTRIES)
res->nlocations++;
}
if (res->nlocations != 0)
status = NFS_ATTR_FATTR_V4_REFERRAL;
out:
dprintk("%s: fs_locations done, error = %d\n", __func__, status);
return status;
out_overflow:
print_overflow_msg(__func__, xdr);
out_eio:
status = -EIO;
goto out;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 23,263
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: mgmt_body_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
uint16_t fc, const uint8_t *src, const u_char *p, u_int length)
{
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tok2str(st_str, "Unhandled Management subtype(%x)", FC_SUBTYPE(fc))));
/* There may be a problem w/ AP not having this bit set */
if (FC_PROTECTED(fc))
return wep_print(ndo, p);
switch (FC_SUBTYPE(fc)) {
case ST_ASSOC_REQUEST:
return handle_assoc_request(ndo, p, length);
case ST_ASSOC_RESPONSE:
return handle_assoc_response(ndo, p, length);
case ST_REASSOC_REQUEST:
return handle_reassoc_request(ndo, p, length);
case ST_REASSOC_RESPONSE:
return handle_reassoc_response(ndo, p, length);
case ST_PROBE_REQUEST:
return handle_probe_request(ndo, p, length);
case ST_PROBE_RESPONSE:
return handle_probe_response(ndo, p, length);
case ST_BEACON:
return handle_beacon(ndo, p, length);
case ST_ATIM:
return handle_atim();
case ST_DISASSOC:
return handle_disassoc(ndo, p, length);
case ST_AUTH:
return handle_auth(ndo, p, length);
case ST_DEAUTH:
return handle_deauth(ndo, src, p, length);
case ST_ACTION:
return handle_action(ndo, src, p, length);
default:
return 1;
}
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13008/IEEE 802.11: Fix TIM bitmap copy to copy from p + offset.
offset has already been advanced to point to the bitmap; we shouldn't
add the amount to advance again.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Brian 'geeknik' Carpenter.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
While we're at it, remove some redundant tests - we've already checked,
before the case statement, whether we have captured the entire
information element and whether the entire information element is
present in the on-the-wire packet; in the cases for particular IEs, we
only need to make sure we don't go past the end of the IE.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 62,427
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void InterstitialPageImpl::FocusThroughTabTraversal(bool reverse) {
if (!enabled())
return;
render_view_host_->SetInitialFocus(reverse);
}
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 136,092
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t CameraService::removeListener(
const sp<ICameraServiceListener>& listener) {
ALOGV("%s: Remove listener %p", __FUNCTION__, listener.get());
if (listener == 0) {
ALOGE("%s: Listener must not be null", __FUNCTION__);
return BAD_VALUE;
}
Mutex::Autolock lock(mServiceLock);
Vector<sp<ICameraServiceListener> >::iterator it;
for (it = mListenerList.begin(); it != mListenerList.end(); ++it) {
if ((*it)->asBinder() == listener->asBinder()) {
mListenerList.erase(it);
return OK;
}
}
ALOGW("%s: Tried to remove a listener %p which was not subscribed",
__FUNCTION__, listener.get());
return BAD_VALUE;
}
Commit Message: Camera: Disallow dumping clients directly
Camera service dumps should only be initiated through
ICameraService::dump.
Bug: 26265403
Change-Id: If3ca4718ed74bf33ad8a416192689203029e2803
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 161,699
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void vrend_set_stencil_ref(struct vrend_context *ctx,
struct pipe_stencil_ref *ref)
{
if (ctx->sub->stencil_refs[0] != ref->ref_value[0] ||
ctx->sub->stencil_refs[1] != ref->ref_value[1]) {
ctx->sub->stencil_refs[0] = ref->ref_value[0];
ctx->sub->stencil_refs[1] = ref->ref_value[1];
ctx->sub->stencil_state_dirty = true;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 8,943
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool GLES2Implementation::GetInteger64i_vHelper(GLenum pname,
GLuint index,
GLint64* data) {
return false;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 140,997
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool InspectorPageAgent::CachedResourceContent(Resource* cached_resource,
String* result,
bool* base64_encoded) {
bool has_zero_size;
if (!PrepareResourceBuffer(cached_resource, &has_zero_size))
return false;
if (!HasTextContent(cached_resource)) {
RefPtr<const SharedBuffer> buffer = has_zero_size
? SharedBuffer::Create()
: cached_resource->ResourceBuffer();
if (!buffer)
return false;
const SharedBuffer::DeprecatedFlatData flat_buffer(std::move(buffer));
*result = Base64Encode(flat_buffer.Data(), flat_buffer.size());
*base64_encoded = true;
return true;
}
if (has_zero_size) {
*result = "";
*base64_encoded = false;
return true;
}
DCHECK(cached_resource);
switch (cached_resource->GetType()) {
case Resource::kCSSStyleSheet:
MaybeEncodeTextContent(
ToCSSStyleSheetResource(cached_resource)
->SheetText(CSSStyleSheetResource::MIMETypeCheck::kLax),
cached_resource->ResourceBuffer(), result, base64_encoded);
return true;
case Resource::kScript:
MaybeEncodeTextContent(
cached_resource->ResourceBuffer()
? ToScriptResource(cached_resource)->DecodedText()
: ToScriptResource(cached_resource)->SourceText(),
cached_resource->ResourceBuffer(), result, base64_encoded);
return true;
default:
String text_encoding_name =
cached_resource->GetResponse().TextEncodingName();
if (text_encoding_name.IsEmpty() &&
cached_resource->GetType() != Resource::kRaw)
text_encoding_name = "WinLatin1";
return InspectorPageAgent::SharedBufferContent(
cached_resource->ResourceBuffer(),
cached_resource->GetResponse().MimeType(), text_encoding_name, result,
base64_encoded);
}
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 138,549
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ConvertYUY2ToYUV(const uint8* src,
uint8* yplane,
uint8* uplane,
uint8* vplane,
int width,
int height) {
ConvertYUY2ToYUV_C(src, yplane, uplane, vplane, width, height);
}
Commit Message: Add check for zero-sized source YUV + tests.
Took the time to clean up said tests for improved coverage.
BUG=90173
TEST=media_unittests
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7794016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@99113 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 98,485
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int udf_CS0toUTF8(struct ustr *utf_o, const struct ustr *ocu_i)
{
const uint8_t *ocu;
uint8_t cmp_id, ocu_len;
int i;
ocu_len = ocu_i->u_len;
if (ocu_len == 0) {
memset(utf_o, 0, sizeof(struct ustr));
return 0;
}
cmp_id = ocu_i->u_cmpID;
if (cmp_id != 8 && cmp_id != 16) {
memset(utf_o, 0, sizeof(struct ustr));
pr_err("unknown compression code (%d) stri=%s\n",
cmp_id, ocu_i->u_name);
return 0;
}
ocu = ocu_i->u_name;
utf_o->u_len = 0;
for (i = 0; (i < ocu_len) && (utf_o->u_len <= (UDF_NAME_LEN - 3));) {
/* Expand OSTA compressed Unicode to Unicode */
uint32_t c = ocu[i++];
if (cmp_id == 16)
c = (c << 8) | ocu[i++];
/* Compress Unicode to UTF-8 */
if (c < 0x80U)
utf_o->u_name[utf_o->u_len++] = (uint8_t)c;
else if (c < 0x800U) {
utf_o->u_name[utf_o->u_len++] =
(uint8_t)(0xc0 | (c >> 6));
utf_o->u_name[utf_o->u_len++] =
(uint8_t)(0x80 | (c & 0x3f));
} else {
utf_o->u_name[utf_o->u_len++] =
(uint8_t)(0xe0 | (c >> 12));
utf_o->u_name[utf_o->u_len++] =
(uint8_t)(0x80 |
((c >> 6) & 0x3f));
utf_o->u_name[utf_o->u_len++] =
(uint8_t)(0x80 | (c & 0x3f));
}
}
utf_o->u_cmpID = 8;
return utf_o->u_len;
}
Commit Message: udf: Check path length when reading symlink
Symlink reading code does not check whether the resulting path fits into
the page provided by the generic code. This isn't as easy as just
checking the symlink size because of various encoding conversions we
perform on path. So we have to check whether there is still enough space
in the buffer on the fly.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Carl Henrik Lunde <chlunde@ping.uio.no>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-17
| 0
| 45,268
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PermissionsData::AccessType PermissionsData::GetPageAccess(
const Extension* extension,
const GURL& document_url,
int tab_id,
std::string* error) const {
base::AutoLock auto_lock(runtime_lock_);
const PermissionSet* tab_permissions = GetTabSpecificPermissions(tab_id);
return CanRunOnPage(
extension, document_url, tab_id,
active_permissions_unsafe_->explicit_hosts(),
withheld_permissions_unsafe_->explicit_hosts(),
tab_permissions ? &tab_permissions->explicit_hosts() : nullptr, error);
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Restrict tabs.captureVisibleTab()
Modify the permissions for tabs.captureVisibleTab(). Instead of just
checking for <all_urls> and assuming its safe, do the following:
- If the page is a "normal" web page (e.g., http/https), allow the
capture if the extension has activeTab granted or <all_urls>.
- If the page is a file page (file:///), allow the capture if the
extension has file access *and* either of the <all_urls> or
activeTab permissions.
- If the page is a chrome:// page, allow the capture only if the
extension has activeTab granted.
Bug: 810220
Change-Id: I1e2f71281e2f331d641ba0e435df10d66d721304
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/981195
Commit-Queue: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Karan Bhatia <karandeepb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#548891}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 155,689
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
{
Buffer m;
OM_uint32 major;
buffer_init(&m);
buffer_put_string(&m, gssbuf->value, gssbuf->length);
buffer_put_string(&m, gssmic->value, gssmic->length);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, &m);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC,
&m);
major = buffer_get_int(&m);
buffer_free(&m);
return(major);
}
Commit Message: Don't resend username to PAM; it already has it.
Pointed out by Moritz Jodeit; ok dtucker@
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 42,166
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int adev_set_master_volume(struct audio_hw_device *dev, float volume)
{
UNUSED(dev);
UNUSED(volume);
FNLOG();
return -ENOSYS;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 158,463
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void lock_buffer_pool(BufferPool *const pool) {
#if CONFIG_MULTITHREAD
pthread_mutex_lock(&pool->pool_mutex);
#else
(void)pool;
#endif
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE libvpx: Cherry-pick 8b4c315 from upstream
Description from upstream:
vp9_alloc_context_buffers: clear cm->mi* on failure
this fixes a crash in vp9_dec_setup_mi() via
vp9_init_context_buffers() should decoding continue and the decoder
resyncs on a smaller frame
Bug: 30593752
Change-Id: Iafbf1c4114062bf796f51a6b03be71328f7bcc69
(cherry picked from commit 737c8493693243838128788fe9c3abc51f17338e)
(cherry picked from commit 3e88ffac8c80b76e15286ef8a7b3bd8fa246c761)
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 157,757
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ValidatePCPMsg(pcp_info_t *pcp_msg_info)
{
if (pcp_msg_info->result_code) {
return 0;
}
/* RFC 6887, section 8.2: MUST return address mismatch if NAT
* in middle. */
if (memcmp(pcp_msg_info->int_ip,
&pcp_msg_info->sender_ip,
sizeof(pcp_msg_info->sender_ip)) != 0) {
pcp_msg_info->result_code = PCP_ERR_ADDRESS_MISMATCH;
return 0;
}
if (pcp_msg_info->thirdp_ip) {
if (!GETFLAG(PCP_ALLOWTHIRDPARTYMASK)) {
pcp_msg_info->result_code = PCP_ERR_UNSUPP_OPTION;
return 0;
}
/* RFC687, section 13.1 - if sender ip == THIRD_PARTY,
* it's an error. */
if (memcmp(pcp_msg_info->thirdp_ip,
&pcp_msg_info->sender_ip,
sizeof(pcp_msg_info->sender_ip)) == 0) {
pcp_msg_info->result_code = PCP_ERR_MALFORMED_REQUEST;
return 0;
}
}
/* Produce mapped_str for future use. */
if (!inet_n46top(pcp_msg_info->mapped_ip, pcp_msg_info->mapped_str,
sizeof(pcp_msg_info->mapped_str))) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "inet_ntop(pcpserver): %m");
return 0;
}
/* protocol zero means 'all protocols' : internal port MUST be zero */
if (pcp_msg_info->protocol == 0 && pcp_msg_info->int_port != 0) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "PCP %s: Protocol was ZERO, but internal port "
"has non-ZERO value.", getPCPOpCodeStr(pcp_msg_info->opcode));
pcp_msg_info->result_code = PCP_ERR_MALFORMED_REQUEST;
return 0;
}
if (pcp_msg_info->pfailure_present) {
if ( (IN6_IS_ADDR_UNSPECIFIED(pcp_msg_info->ext_ip) ||
((IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(pcp_msg_info->ext_ip)) &&
(((uint32_t*)pcp_msg_info->ext_ip->s6_addr)[3] == 0))) &&
(pcp_msg_info->ext_port == 0)
)
{
pcp_msg_info->result_code = PCP_ERR_MALFORMED_OPTION;
return 0;
}
}
if (CheckExternalAddress(pcp_msg_info)) {
return 0;
}
/* Fill in the desc that describes uniquely what flow we're
* dealing with (same code used in both create + delete of
* MAP/PEER) */
switch (pcp_msg_info->opcode) {
case PCP_OPCODE_MAP:
case PCP_OPCODE_PEER:
snprintf(pcp_msg_info->desc, sizeof(pcp_msg_info->desc),
"PCP %s %08x%08x%08x",
getPCPOpCodeStr(pcp_msg_info->opcode),
pcp_msg_info->nonce[0],
pcp_msg_info->nonce[1], pcp_msg_info->nonce[2]);
break;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: pcpserver.c: copyIPv6IfDifferent() check for NULL src argument
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 89,811
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void collectTargetNodes(Node* node, NodeVector& nodes)
{
if (node->nodeType() != Node::DOCUMENT_FRAGMENT_NODE) {
nodes.append(node);
return;
}
getChildNodes(node, nodes);
}
Commit Message: https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=93587
Node::replaceChild() can create bad DOM topology with MutationEvent, Part 2
Reviewed by Kent Tamura.
Source/WebCore:
This is a followup of r124156. replaceChild() has yet another hidden
MutationEvent trigger. This change added a guard for it.
Test: fast/events/mutation-during-replace-child-2.html
* dom/ContainerNode.cpp:
(WebCore::ContainerNode::replaceChild):
LayoutTests:
* fast/events/mutation-during-replace-child-2-expected.txt: Added.
* fast/events/mutation-during-replace-child-2.html: Added.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@125237 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 98,686
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: daemon_linux_lvm2_vg_set_name_authorized_cb (Daemon *daemon,
Device *device,
DBusGMethodInvocation *context,
const gchar *action_id,
guint num_user_data,
gpointer *user_data_elements)
{
const gchar *uuid = user_data_elements[0];
const gchar *new_name = user_data_elements[1];
const gchar *vg_name;
guint n;
gchar *argv[10];
/* Unfortunately vgchange does not (yet - file a bug) accept UUIDs - so find the VG name for this
* UUID by looking at PVs
*/
vg_name = find_lvm2_vg_name_for_uuid (daemon, uuid);
if (vg_name == NULL)
{
throw_error (context, ERROR_FAILED, "Cannot find VG with UUID `%s'", uuid);
goto out;
}
n = 0;
argv[n++] = "vgrename";
argv[n++] = (gchar *) vg_name;
argv[n++] = (gchar *) new_name;
argv[n++] = NULL;
if (!job_new (context, "LinuxLvm2VGSetName", TRUE, NULL, argv, NULL, linux_lvm2_vg_set_name_completed_cb, FALSE, NULL, NULL))
{
goto out;
}
out:
;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 11,598
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int Range::startOffset(ExceptionCode& ec) const
{
if (!m_start.container()) {
ec = INVALID_STATE_ERR;
return 0;
}
return m_start.offset();
}
Commit Message: There are too many poorly named functions to create a fragment from markup
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87339
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Source/WebCore:
Moved all functions that create a fragment from markup to markup.h/cpp.
There should be no behavioral change.
* dom/Range.cpp:
(WebCore::Range::createContextualFragment):
* dom/Range.h: Removed createDocumentFragmentForElement.
* dom/ShadowRoot.cpp:
(WebCore::ShadowRoot::setInnerHTML):
* editing/markup.cpp:
(WebCore::createFragmentFromMarkup):
(WebCore::createFragmentForInnerOuterHTML): Renamed from createFragmentFromSource.
(WebCore::createFragmentForTransformToFragment): Moved from XSLTProcessor.
(WebCore::removeElementPreservingChildren): Moved from Range.
(WebCore::createContextualFragment): Ditto.
* editing/markup.h:
* html/HTMLElement.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setInnerHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setOuterHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML):
* inspector/DOMPatchSupport.cpp:
(WebCore::DOMPatchSupport::patchNode): Added a FIXME since this code should be using
one of the functions listed in markup.h
* xml/XSLTProcessor.cpp:
(WebCore::XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment):
Source/WebKit/qt:
Replace calls to Range::createDocumentFragmentForElement by calls to
createContextualDocumentFragment.
* Api/qwebelement.cpp:
(QWebElement::appendInside):
(QWebElement::prependInside):
(QWebElement::prependOutside):
(QWebElement::appendOutside):
(QWebElement::encloseContentsWith):
(QWebElement::encloseWith):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118414 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 100,281
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void UkmPageLoadMetricsObserver::ReportMainResourceTimingMetrics(
const page_load_metrics::mojom::PageLoadTiming& timing,
ukm::builders::PageLoad* builder) {
DCHECK(main_frame_timing_.has_value());
builder->SetMainFrameResource_SocketReused(main_frame_timing_->socket_reused);
int64_t dns_start_ms =
main_frame_timing_->connect_timing.dns_start.since_origin()
.InMilliseconds();
int64_t dns_end_ms = main_frame_timing_->connect_timing.dns_end.since_origin()
.InMilliseconds();
int64_t connect_start_ms =
main_frame_timing_->connect_timing.connect_start.since_origin()
.InMilliseconds();
int64_t connect_end_ms =
main_frame_timing_->connect_timing.connect_end.since_origin()
.InMilliseconds();
int64_t request_start_ms =
main_frame_timing_->request_start.since_origin().InMilliseconds();
int64_t send_start_ms =
main_frame_timing_->send_start.since_origin().InMilliseconds();
int64_t receive_headers_end_ms =
main_frame_timing_->receive_headers_end.since_origin().InMilliseconds();
DCHECK_LE(dns_start_ms, dns_end_ms);
DCHECK_LE(dns_end_ms, connect_start_ms);
DCHECK_LE(dns_start_ms, connect_start_ms);
DCHECK_LE(connect_start_ms, connect_end_ms);
int64_t dns_duration_ms = dns_end_ms - dns_start_ms;
int64_t connect_duration_ms = connect_end_ms - connect_start_ms;
int64_t request_start_to_send_start_ms = send_start_ms - request_start_ms;
int64_t send_start_to_receive_headers_end_ms =
receive_headers_end_ms - send_start_ms;
int64_t request_start_to_receive_headers_end_ms =
receive_headers_end_ms - request_start_ms;
builder->SetMainFrameResource_DNSDelay(dns_duration_ms);
builder->SetMainFrameResource_ConnectDelay(connect_duration_ms);
if (request_start_to_send_start_ms >= 0) {
builder->SetMainFrameResource_RequestStartToSendStart(
request_start_to_send_start_ms);
}
if (send_start_to_receive_headers_end_ms >= 0) {
builder->SetMainFrameResource_SendStartToReceiveHeadersEnd(
send_start_to_receive_headers_end_ms);
}
builder->SetMainFrameResource_RequestStartToReceiveHeadersEnd(
request_start_to_receive_headers_end_ms);
if (!main_frame_timing_->request_start.is_null() &&
!navigation_start_.is_null()) {
base::TimeDelta navigation_start_to_request_start =
main_frame_timing_->request_start - navigation_start_;
builder->SetMainFrameResource_NavigationStartToRequestStart(
navigation_start_to_request_start.InMilliseconds());
}
if (main_frame_request_redirect_count_ > 0) {
builder->SetMainFrameResource_RedirectCount(
main_frame_request_redirect_count_);
}
}
Commit Message: Add boolean to UserIntiatedInfo noting if an input event led to navigation.
Also refactor UkmPageLoadMetricsObserver to use this new boolean to
report the user initiated metric in RecordPageLoadExtraInfoMetrics, so
that it works correctly in the case when the page load failed.
Bug: 925104
Change-Id: Ie08e7d3912cb1da484190d838005e95e57a209ff
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1450460
Commit-Queue: Annie Sullivan <sullivan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Bryan McQuade <bmcquade@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#630870}
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 140,179
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void __f2fs_replace_block(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, struct f2fs_summary *sum,
block_t old_blkaddr, block_t new_blkaddr,
bool recover_curseg, bool recover_newaddr)
{
struct sit_info *sit_i = SIT_I(sbi);
struct curseg_info *curseg;
unsigned int segno, old_cursegno;
struct seg_entry *se;
int type;
unsigned short old_blkoff;
segno = GET_SEGNO(sbi, new_blkaddr);
se = get_seg_entry(sbi, segno);
type = se->type;
if (!recover_curseg) {
/* for recovery flow */
if (se->valid_blocks == 0 && !IS_CURSEG(sbi, segno)) {
if (old_blkaddr == NULL_ADDR)
type = CURSEG_COLD_DATA;
else
type = CURSEG_WARM_DATA;
}
} else {
if (!IS_CURSEG(sbi, segno))
type = CURSEG_WARM_DATA;
}
curseg = CURSEG_I(sbi, type);
mutex_lock(&curseg->curseg_mutex);
mutex_lock(&sit_i->sentry_lock);
old_cursegno = curseg->segno;
old_blkoff = curseg->next_blkoff;
/* change the current segment */
if (segno != curseg->segno) {
curseg->next_segno = segno;
change_curseg(sbi, type, true);
}
curseg->next_blkoff = GET_BLKOFF_FROM_SEG0(sbi, new_blkaddr);
__add_sum_entry(sbi, type, sum);
if (!recover_curseg || recover_newaddr)
update_sit_entry(sbi, new_blkaddr, 1);
if (GET_SEGNO(sbi, old_blkaddr) != NULL_SEGNO)
update_sit_entry(sbi, old_blkaddr, -1);
locate_dirty_segment(sbi, GET_SEGNO(sbi, old_blkaddr));
locate_dirty_segment(sbi, GET_SEGNO(sbi, new_blkaddr));
locate_dirty_segment(sbi, old_cursegno);
if (recover_curseg) {
if (old_cursegno != curseg->segno) {
curseg->next_segno = old_cursegno;
change_curseg(sbi, type, true);
}
curseg->next_blkoff = old_blkoff;
}
mutex_unlock(&sit_i->sentry_lock);
mutex_unlock(&curseg->curseg_mutex);
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix a panic caused by NULL flush_cmd_control
Mount fs with option noflush_merge, boot failed for illegal address
fcc in function f2fs_issue_flush:
if (!test_opt(sbi, FLUSH_MERGE)) {
ret = submit_flush_wait(sbi);
atomic_inc(&fcc->issued_flush); -> Here, fcc illegal
return ret;
}
Signed-off-by: Yunlei He <heyunlei@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 85,329
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: internalSubsetDebug(void *ctx ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, const xmlChar *name,
const xmlChar *ExternalID, const xmlChar *SystemID)
{
callbacks++;
if (quiet)
return;
fprintf(SAXdebug, "SAX.internalSubset(%s,", name);
if (ExternalID == NULL)
fprintf(SAXdebug, " ,");
else
fprintf(SAXdebug, " %s,", ExternalID);
if (SystemID == NULL)
fprintf(SAXdebug, " )\n");
else
fprintf(SAXdebug, " %s)\n", SystemID);
}
Commit Message: Fix handling of parameter-entity references
There were two bugs where parameter-entity references could lead to an
unexpected change of the input buffer in xmlParseNameComplex and
xmlDictLookup being called with an invalid pointer.
Percent sign in DTD Names
=========================
The NEXTL macro used to call xmlParserHandlePEReference. When parsing
"complex" names inside the DTD, this could result in entity expansion
which created a new input buffer. The fix is to simply remove the call
to xmlParserHandlePEReference from the NEXTL macro. This is safe because
no users of the macro require expansion of parameter entities.
- xmlParseNameComplex
- xmlParseNCNameComplex
- xmlParseNmtoken
The percent sign is not allowed in names, which are grammatical tokens.
- xmlParseEntityValue
Parameter-entity references in entity values are expanded but this
happens in a separate step in this function.
- xmlParseSystemLiteral
Parameter-entity references are ignored in the system literal.
- xmlParseAttValueComplex
- xmlParseCharDataComplex
- xmlParseCommentComplex
- xmlParsePI
- xmlParseCDSect
Parameter-entity references are ignored outside the DTD.
- xmlLoadEntityContent
This function is only called from xmlStringLenDecodeEntities and
entities are replaced in a separate step immediately after the function
call.
This bug could also be triggered with an internal subset and double
entity expansion.
This fixes bug 766956 initially reported by Wei Lei and independently by
Chromium's ClusterFuzz, Hanno Böck, and Marco Grassi. Thanks to everyone
involved.
xmlParseNameComplex with XML_PARSE_OLD10
========================================
When parsing Names inside an expanded parameter entity with the
XML_PARSE_OLD10 option, xmlParseNameComplex would call xmlGROW via the
GROW macro if the input buffer was exhausted. At the end of the
parameter entity's replacement text, this function would then call
xmlPopInput which invalidated the input buffer.
There should be no need to invoke GROW in this situation because the
buffer is grown periodically every XML_PARSER_CHUNK_SIZE characters and,
at least for UTF-8, in xmlCurrentChar. This also matches the code path
executed when XML_PARSE_OLD10 is not set.
This fixes bugs 781205 (CVE-2017-9049) and 781361 (CVE-2017-9050).
Thanks to Marcel Böhme and Thuan Pham for the report.
Additional hardening
====================
A separate check was added in xmlParseNameComplex to validate the
buffer size.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 59,595
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ofproto_port_get_stats(const struct ofport *port, struct netdev_stats *stats)
{
struct ofproto *ofproto = port->ofproto;
int error;
if (ofproto->ofproto_class->port_get_stats) {
error = ofproto->ofproto_class->port_get_stats(port, stats);
} else {
error = EOPNOTSUPP;
}
return error;
}
Commit Message: ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <vishal.deep.ajmera@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 77,355
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SocketStreamDispatcherHost::OnClose(net::SocketStream* socket) {
int socket_id = SocketStreamHost::SocketIdFromSocketStream(socket);
DVLOG(1) << "SocketStreamDispatcherHost::OnClosed socket_id=" << socket_id;
if (socket_id == content::kNoSocketId) {
LOG(ERROR) << "NoSocketId in OnClose";
return;
}
DeleteSocketStreamHost(socket_id);
}
Commit Message: Inherits SupportsWeakPtr<T> instead of having WeakPtrFactory<T>
This change refines r137676.
BUG=122654
TEST=browser_test
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332233
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139771 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 107,921
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void pdf_run_G(fz_context *ctx, pdf_processor *proc, float g)
{
pdf_run_processor *pr = (pdf_run_processor *)proc;
pr->dev->flags &= ~FZ_DEVFLAG_STROKECOLOR_UNDEFINED;
pdf_set_colorspace(ctx, pr, PDF_STROKE, fz_device_gray(ctx));
pdf_set_color(ctx, pr, PDF_STROKE, &g);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 484
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct commit *get_revision(struct rev_info *revs)
{
struct commit *c;
struct commit_list *reversed;
if (revs->reverse) {
reversed = NULL;
while ((c = get_revision_internal(revs)))
commit_list_insert(c, &reversed);
revs->commits = reversed;
revs->reverse = 0;
revs->reverse_output_stage = 1;
}
if (revs->reverse_output_stage) {
c = pop_commit(&revs->commits);
if (revs->track_linear)
revs->linear = !!(c && c->object.flags & TRACK_LINEAR);
return c;
}
c = get_revision_internal(revs);
if (c && revs->graph)
graph_update(revs->graph, c);
if (!c) {
free_saved_parents(revs);
if (revs->previous_parents) {
free_commit_list(revs->previous_parents);
revs->previous_parents = NULL;
}
}
return c;
}
Commit Message: list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 54,996
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ContainerNode::willRemoveChild(Node& child)
{
ASSERT(child.parentNode() == this);
ChildListMutationScope(*this).willRemoveChild(child);
child.notifyMutationObserversNodeWillDetach();
dispatchChildRemovalEvents(child);
ChildFrameDisconnector(child).disconnect();
if (document() != child.document()) {
return;
}
ScriptForbiddenScope scriptForbiddenScope;
EventDispatchForbiddenScope assertNoEventDispatch;
document().nodeWillBeRemoved(child);
}
Commit Message: Fix an optimisation in ContainerNode::notifyNodeInsertedInternal
R=tkent@chromium.org
BUG=544020
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1420653003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#355240}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 125,109
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void kvm_arch_vcpu_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
kvm_arm_set_running_vcpu(NULL);
}
Commit Message: ARM: KVM: prevent NULL pointer dereferences with KVM VCPU ioctl
Some ARM KVM VCPU ioctls require the vCPU to be properly initialized
with the KVM_ARM_VCPU_INIT ioctl before being used with further
requests. KVM_RUN checks whether this initialization has been
done, but other ioctls do not.
Namely KVM_GET_REG_LIST will dereference an array with index -1
without initialization and thus leads to a kernel oops.
Fix this by adding checks before executing the ioctl handlers.
[ Removed superflous comment from static function - Christoffer ]
Changes from v1:
* moved check into a static function with a meaningful name
Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <cdall@cs.columbia.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 28,963
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xfs_init_security(
struct inode *inode,
struct inode *dir,
const struct qstr *qstr)
{
return security_inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr,
&xfs_initxattrs, NULL);
}
Commit Message: xfs: fix missing ILOCK unlock when xfs_setattr_nonsize fails due to EDQUOT
Benjamin Moody reported to Debian that XFS partially wedges when a chgrp
fails on account of being out of disk quota. I ran his reproducer
script:
# adduser dummy
# adduser dummy plugdev
# dd if=/dev/zero bs=1M count=100 of=test.img
# mkfs.xfs test.img
# mount -t xfs -o gquota test.img /mnt
# mkdir -p /mnt/dummy
# chown -c dummy /mnt/dummy
# xfs_quota -xc 'limit -g bsoft=100k bhard=100k plugdev' /mnt
(and then as user dummy)
$ dd if=/dev/urandom bs=1M count=50 of=/mnt/dummy/foo
$ chgrp plugdev /mnt/dummy/foo
and saw:
================================================
WARNING: lock held when returning to user space!
5.3.0-rc5 #rc5 Tainted: G W
------------------------------------------------
chgrp/47006 is leaving the kernel with locks still held!
1 lock held by chgrp/47006:
#0: 000000006664ea2d (&xfs_nondir_ilock_class){++++}, at: xfs_ilock+0xd2/0x290 [xfs]
...which is clearly caused by xfs_setattr_nonsize failing to unlock the
ILOCK after the xfs_qm_vop_chown_reserve call fails. Add the missing
unlock.
Reported-by: benjamin.moody@gmail.com
Fixes: 253f4911f297 ("xfs: better xfs_trans_alloc interface")
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 88,330
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int load_balance(int this_cpu, struct rq *this_rq,
struct sched_domain *sd, enum cpu_idle_type idle,
int *continue_balancing)
{
int ld_moved, cur_ld_moved, active_balance = 0;
struct sched_domain *sd_parent = sd->parent;
struct sched_group *group;
struct rq *busiest;
struct rq_flags rf;
struct cpumask *cpus = this_cpu_cpumask_var_ptr(load_balance_mask);
struct lb_env env = {
.sd = sd,
.dst_cpu = this_cpu,
.dst_rq = this_rq,
.dst_grpmask = sched_group_span(sd->groups),
.idle = idle,
.loop_break = sched_nr_migrate_break,
.cpus = cpus,
.fbq_type = all,
.tasks = LIST_HEAD_INIT(env.tasks),
};
cpumask_and(cpus, sched_domain_span(sd), cpu_active_mask);
schedstat_inc(sd->lb_count[idle]);
redo:
if (!should_we_balance(&env)) {
*continue_balancing = 0;
goto out_balanced;
}
group = find_busiest_group(&env);
if (!group) {
schedstat_inc(sd->lb_nobusyg[idle]);
goto out_balanced;
}
busiest = find_busiest_queue(&env, group);
if (!busiest) {
schedstat_inc(sd->lb_nobusyq[idle]);
goto out_balanced;
}
BUG_ON(busiest == env.dst_rq);
schedstat_add(sd->lb_imbalance[idle], env.imbalance);
env.src_cpu = busiest->cpu;
env.src_rq = busiest;
ld_moved = 0;
if (busiest->nr_running > 1) {
/*
* Attempt to move tasks. If find_busiest_group has found
* an imbalance but busiest->nr_running <= 1, the group is
* still unbalanced. ld_moved simply stays zero, so it is
* correctly treated as an imbalance.
*/
env.flags |= LBF_ALL_PINNED;
env.loop_max = min(sysctl_sched_nr_migrate, busiest->nr_running);
more_balance:
rq_lock_irqsave(busiest, &rf);
update_rq_clock(busiest);
/*
* cur_ld_moved - load moved in current iteration
* ld_moved - cumulative load moved across iterations
*/
cur_ld_moved = detach_tasks(&env);
/*
* We've detached some tasks from busiest_rq. Every
* task is masked "TASK_ON_RQ_MIGRATING", so we can safely
* unlock busiest->lock, and we are able to be sure
* that nobody can manipulate the tasks in parallel.
* See task_rq_lock() family for the details.
*/
rq_unlock(busiest, &rf);
if (cur_ld_moved) {
attach_tasks(&env);
ld_moved += cur_ld_moved;
}
local_irq_restore(rf.flags);
if (env.flags & LBF_NEED_BREAK) {
env.flags &= ~LBF_NEED_BREAK;
goto more_balance;
}
/*
* Revisit (affine) tasks on src_cpu that couldn't be moved to
* us and move them to an alternate dst_cpu in our sched_group
* where they can run. The upper limit on how many times we
* iterate on same src_cpu is dependent on number of CPUs in our
* sched_group.
*
* This changes load balance semantics a bit on who can move
* load to a given_cpu. In addition to the given_cpu itself
* (or a ilb_cpu acting on its behalf where given_cpu is
* nohz-idle), we now have balance_cpu in a position to move
* load to given_cpu. In rare situations, this may cause
* conflicts (balance_cpu and given_cpu/ilb_cpu deciding
* _independently_ and at _same_ time to move some load to
* given_cpu) causing exceess load to be moved to given_cpu.
* This however should not happen so much in practice and
* moreover subsequent load balance cycles should correct the
* excess load moved.
*/
if ((env.flags & LBF_DST_PINNED) && env.imbalance > 0) {
/* Prevent to re-select dst_cpu via env's CPUs */
cpumask_clear_cpu(env.dst_cpu, env.cpus);
env.dst_rq = cpu_rq(env.new_dst_cpu);
env.dst_cpu = env.new_dst_cpu;
env.flags &= ~LBF_DST_PINNED;
env.loop = 0;
env.loop_break = sched_nr_migrate_break;
/*
* Go back to "more_balance" rather than "redo" since we
* need to continue with same src_cpu.
*/
goto more_balance;
}
/*
* We failed to reach balance because of affinity.
*/
if (sd_parent) {
int *group_imbalance = &sd_parent->groups->sgc->imbalance;
if ((env.flags & LBF_SOME_PINNED) && env.imbalance > 0)
*group_imbalance = 1;
}
/* All tasks on this runqueue were pinned by CPU affinity */
if (unlikely(env.flags & LBF_ALL_PINNED)) {
cpumask_clear_cpu(cpu_of(busiest), cpus);
/*
* Attempting to continue load balancing at the current
* sched_domain level only makes sense if there are
* active CPUs remaining as possible busiest CPUs to
* pull load from which are not contained within the
* destination group that is receiving any migrated
* load.
*/
if (!cpumask_subset(cpus, env.dst_grpmask)) {
env.loop = 0;
env.loop_break = sched_nr_migrate_break;
goto redo;
}
goto out_all_pinned;
}
}
if (!ld_moved) {
schedstat_inc(sd->lb_failed[idle]);
/*
* Increment the failure counter only on periodic balance.
* We do not want newidle balance, which can be very
* frequent, pollute the failure counter causing
* excessive cache_hot migrations and active balances.
*/
if (idle != CPU_NEWLY_IDLE)
sd->nr_balance_failed++;
if (need_active_balance(&env)) {
unsigned long flags;
raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&busiest->lock, flags);
/*
* Don't kick the active_load_balance_cpu_stop,
* if the curr task on busiest CPU can't be
* moved to this_cpu:
*/
if (!cpumask_test_cpu(this_cpu, &busiest->curr->cpus_allowed)) {
raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&busiest->lock,
flags);
env.flags |= LBF_ALL_PINNED;
goto out_one_pinned;
}
/*
* ->active_balance synchronizes accesses to
* ->active_balance_work. Once set, it's cleared
* only after active load balance is finished.
*/
if (!busiest->active_balance) {
busiest->active_balance = 1;
busiest->push_cpu = this_cpu;
active_balance = 1;
}
raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&busiest->lock, flags);
if (active_balance) {
stop_one_cpu_nowait(cpu_of(busiest),
active_load_balance_cpu_stop, busiest,
&busiest->active_balance_work);
}
/* We've kicked active balancing, force task migration. */
sd->nr_balance_failed = sd->cache_nice_tries+1;
}
} else
sd->nr_balance_failed = 0;
if (likely(!active_balance)) {
/* We were unbalanced, so reset the balancing interval */
sd->balance_interval = sd->min_interval;
} else {
/*
* If we've begun active balancing, start to back off. This
* case may not be covered by the all_pinned logic if there
* is only 1 task on the busy runqueue (because we don't call
* detach_tasks).
*/
if (sd->balance_interval < sd->max_interval)
sd->balance_interval *= 2;
}
goto out;
out_balanced:
/*
* We reach balance although we may have faced some affinity
* constraints. Clear the imbalance flag if it was set.
*/
if (sd_parent) {
int *group_imbalance = &sd_parent->groups->sgc->imbalance;
if (*group_imbalance)
*group_imbalance = 0;
}
out_all_pinned:
/*
* We reach balance because all tasks are pinned at this level so
* we can't migrate them. Let the imbalance flag set so parent level
* can try to migrate them.
*/
schedstat_inc(sd->lb_balanced[idle]);
sd->nr_balance_failed = 0;
out_one_pinned:
ld_moved = 0;
/*
* idle_balance() disregards balance intervals, so we could repeatedly
* reach this code, which would lead to balance_interval skyrocketting
* in a short amount of time. Skip the balance_interval increase logic
* to avoid that.
*/
if (env.idle == CPU_NEWLY_IDLE)
goto out;
/* tune up the balancing interval */
if ((env.flags & LBF_ALL_PINNED &&
sd->balance_interval < MAX_PINNED_INTERVAL) ||
sd->balance_interval < sd->max_interval)
sd->balance_interval *= 2;
out:
return ld_moved;
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 92,603
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void setJSTestObjVoidSequenceAttr(ExecState* exec, JSObject* thisObject, JSValue value)
{
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(thisObject);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
impl->setVoidSequenceAttr(toNativeArray<void>(exec, value));
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 101,365
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int mov_write_fiel_tag(AVIOContext *pb, MOVTrack *track, int field_order)
{
unsigned mov_field_order = 0;
if (field_order < FF_ARRAY_ELEMS(fiel_data))
mov_field_order = fiel_data[field_order];
else
return 0;
avio_wb32(pb, 10);
ffio_wfourcc(pb, "fiel");
avio_wb16(pb, mov_field_order);
return 10;
}
Commit Message: avformat/movenc: Write version 2 of audio atom if channels is not known
The version 1 needs the channel count and would divide by 0
Fixes: division by 0
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_1.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_2.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_3.wav
Found-by: #CHEN HONGXU# <HCHEN017@e.ntu.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 79,351
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void webkit_web_view_select_all(WebKitWebView* webView)
{
g_return_if_fail(WEBKIT_IS_WEB_VIEW(webView));
g_signal_emit(webView, webkit_web_view_signals[SELECT_ALL], 0);
}
Commit Message: 2011-06-02 Joone Hur <joone.hur@collabora.co.uk>
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
[GTK] Only load dictionaries if spell check is enabled
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32879
We don't need to call enchant if enable-spell-checking is false.
* webkit/webkitwebview.cpp:
(webkit_web_view_update_settings): Skip loading dictionaries when enable-spell-checking is false.
(webkit_web_view_settings_notify): Ditto.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@87925 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 100,632
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ClientDiscardableSharedMemoryManager::ReleaseSpan(
std::unique_ptr<DiscardableSharedMemoryHeap::Span> span) {
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
if (!span->shared_memory())
return;
heap_->MergeIntoFreeLists(std::move(span));
MemoryUsageChanged(heap_->GetSize(), heap_->GetSizeOfFreeLists());
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 149,036
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static jboolean android_net_wifi_set_log_handler(JNIEnv *env, jclass cls, jint iface, jint id) {
JNIHelper helper(env);
wifi_interface_handle handle = getIfaceHandle(helper, cls, iface);
ALOGD("android_net_wifi_set_log_handler = %p", handle);
wifi_ring_buffer_data_handler handler;
handler.on_ring_buffer_data = &on_ring_buffer_data;
int result = hal_fn.wifi_set_log_handler(id, handle, handler);
if (result != WIFI_SUCCESS) {
ALOGE("Fail to set logging handler");
return false;
}
wifi_alert_handler alert_handler;
alert_handler.on_alert = &on_alert_data;
result = hal_fn.wifi_set_alert_handler(id, handle, alert_handler);
if (result != WIFI_SUCCESS) {
ALOGE(" Fail to set alert handler");
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Deal correctly with short strings
The parseMacAddress function anticipates only properly formed
MAC addresses (6 hexadecimal octets separated by ":"). This
change properly deals with situations where the string is
shorter than expected, making sure that the passed in char*
reference in parseHexByte never exceeds the end of the string.
BUG: 28164077
TEST: Added a main function:
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
unsigned char addr[6];
if (argc > 1) {
memset(addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
parseMacAddress(argv[1], addr);
printf("Result: %02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x\n",
addr[0], addr[1], addr[2], addr[3], addr[4], addr[5]);
}
}
Tested with "", "a" "ab" "ab:c" "abxc".
Change-Id: I0db8d0037e48b62333d475296a45b22ab0efe386
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 159,104
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void authenc_esn_geniv_ahash_done(struct crypto_async_request *areq,
int err)
{
struct aead_request *req = areq->data;
struct crypto_aead *authenc_esn = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
struct crypto_authenc_esn_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(authenc_esn);
struct authenc_esn_request_ctx *areq_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
struct ahash_request *ahreq = (void *)(areq_ctx->tail + ctx->reqoff);
if (err)
goto out;
scatterwalk_map_and_copy(ahreq->result, areq_ctx->sg,
areq_ctx->cryptlen,
crypto_aead_authsize(authenc_esn), 1);
out:
aead_request_complete(req, err);
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 45,534
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void SetterRaisesExceptionLongAttributeAttributeSetter(
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value, const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Isolate* isolate = info.GetIsolate();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(holder);
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
ExceptionState exception_state(isolate, ExceptionState::kSetterContext, "TestObject", "setterRaisesExceptionLongAttribute");
int32_t cpp_value = NativeValueTraits<IDLLong>::NativeValue(info.GetIsolate(), v8_value, exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return;
impl->setSetterRaisesExceptionLongAttribute(cpp_value, exception_state);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 135,160
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sparc_pmu_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
{
struct perf_event_attr *attr = &event->attr;
struct perf_event *evts[MAX_HWEVENTS];
struct hw_perf_event *hwc = &event->hw;
unsigned long events[MAX_HWEVENTS];
int current_idx_dmy[MAX_HWEVENTS];
const struct perf_event_map *pmap;
int n;
if (atomic_read(&nmi_active) < 0)
return -ENODEV;
switch (attr->type) {
case PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE:
if (attr->config >= sparc_pmu->max_events)
return -EINVAL;
pmap = sparc_pmu->event_map(attr->config);
break;
case PERF_TYPE_HW_CACHE:
pmap = sparc_map_cache_event(attr->config);
if (IS_ERR(pmap))
return PTR_ERR(pmap);
break;
case PERF_TYPE_RAW:
pmap = NULL;
break;
default:
return -ENOENT;
}
if (pmap) {
hwc->event_base = perf_event_encode(pmap);
} else {
/*
* User gives us "(encoding << 16) | pic_mask" for
* PERF_TYPE_RAW events.
*/
hwc->event_base = attr->config;
}
/* We save the enable bits in the config_base. */
hwc->config_base = sparc_pmu->irq_bit;
if (!attr->exclude_user)
hwc->config_base |= PCR_UTRACE;
if (!attr->exclude_kernel)
hwc->config_base |= PCR_STRACE;
if (!attr->exclude_hv)
hwc->config_base |= sparc_pmu->hv_bit;
n = 0;
if (event->group_leader != event) {
n = collect_events(event->group_leader,
MAX_HWEVENTS - 1,
evts, events, current_idx_dmy);
if (n < 0)
return -EINVAL;
}
events[n] = hwc->event_base;
evts[n] = event;
if (check_excludes(evts, n, 1))
return -EINVAL;
if (sparc_check_constraints(evts, events, n + 1))
return -EINVAL;
hwc->idx = PIC_NO_INDEX;
/* Try to do all error checking before this point, as unwinding
* state after grabbing the PMC is difficult.
*/
perf_event_grab_pmc();
event->destroy = hw_perf_event_destroy;
if (!hwc->sample_period) {
hwc->sample_period = MAX_PERIOD;
hwc->last_period = hwc->sample_period;
local64_set(&hwc->period_left, hwc->sample_period);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 25,669
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FramebufferManager::RemoveFramebuffer(GLuint client_id) {
FramebufferMap::iterator it = framebuffers_.find(client_id);
if (it != framebuffers_.end()) {
it->second->MarkAsDeleted();
framebuffers_.erase(it);
}
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 120,711
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::string MockGetHostName() {
return "WTC-WIN7";
}
Commit Message: Sanitize headers in Proxy Authentication Required responses
BUG=431504
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/769043003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#310014}
CWE ID: CWE-19
| 0
| 129,283
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned char *read_chunk(struct mschm_decompressor_p *self,
struct mschmd_header *chm,
struct mspack_file *fh,
unsigned int chunk_num)
{
struct mspack_system *sys = self->system;
unsigned char *buf;
/* check arguments - most are already checked by chmd_fast_find */
if (chunk_num >= chm->num_chunks) return NULL;
/* ensure chunk cache is available */
if (!chm->chunk_cache) {
size_t size = sizeof(unsigned char *) * chm->num_chunks;
if (!(chm->chunk_cache = (unsigned char **) sys->alloc(sys, size))) {
self->error = MSPACK_ERR_NOMEMORY;
return NULL;
}
memset(chm->chunk_cache, 0, size);
}
/* try to answer out of chunk cache */
if (chm->chunk_cache[chunk_num]) return chm->chunk_cache[chunk_num];
/* need to read chunk - allocate memory for it */
if (!(buf = (unsigned char *) sys->alloc(sys, chm->chunk_size))) {
self->error = MSPACK_ERR_NOMEMORY;
return NULL;
}
/* seek to block and read it */
if (sys->seek(fh, (off_t) (chm->dir_offset + (chunk_num * chm->chunk_size)),
MSPACK_SYS_SEEK_START))
{
self->error = MSPACK_ERR_SEEK;
sys->free(buf);
return NULL;
}
if (sys->read(fh, buf, (int)chm->chunk_size) != (int)chm->chunk_size) {
self->error = MSPACK_ERR_READ;
sys->free(buf);
return NULL;
}
/* check the signature. Is is PMGL or PMGI? */
if (!((buf[0] == 0x50) && (buf[1] == 0x4D) && (buf[2] == 0x47) &&
((buf[3] == 0x4C) || (buf[3] == 0x49))))
{
self->error = MSPACK_ERR_SEEK;
sys->free(buf);
return NULL;
}
/* all OK. Store chunk in cache and return it */
return chm->chunk_cache[chunk_num] = buf;
}
Commit Message: Avoid returning CHM file entries that are "blank" because they have embedded null bytes
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 76,341
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ExpectLabelsAndTypes(const char* html,
const std::vector<base::string16>& id_attributes,
const std::vector<base::string16>& name_attributes,
const std::vector<base::string16>& labels,
const std::vector<base::string16>& names,
const std::vector<base::string16>& values,
const std::vector<std::string>& control_types) {
ASSERT_EQ(labels.size(), id_attributes.size());
ASSERT_EQ(labels.size(), name_attributes.size());
ASSERT_EQ(labels.size(), names.size());
ASSERT_EQ(labels.size(), values.size());
ASSERT_EQ(labels.size(), control_types.size());
LoadHTML(html);
WebLocalFrame* web_frame = GetMainFrame();
ASSERT_NE(nullptr, web_frame);
FormCache form_cache(web_frame);
std::vector<FormData> forms = form_cache.ExtractNewForms();
ASSERT_EQ(1U, forms.size());
const FormData& form = forms[0];
EXPECT_EQ(ASCIIToUTF16("TestForm"), form.name);
EXPECT_EQ(GetCanonicalOriginForDocument(web_frame->GetDocument()),
form.origin);
EXPECT_EQ(GURL("http://cnn.com"), form.action);
const std::vector<FormFieldData>& fields = form.fields;
ASSERT_EQ(labels.size(), fields.size());
for (size_t i = 0; i < labels.size(); ++i) {
int max_length =
control_types[i] == "text" ? WebInputElement::DefaultMaxLength() : 0;
FormFieldData expected;
expected.id_attribute = id_attributes[i];
expected.name_attribute = name_attributes[i];
expected.label = labels[i];
expected.name = names[i];
expected.value = values[i];
expected.form_control_type = control_types[i];
expected.max_length = max_length;
SCOPED_TRACE(base::StringPrintf("i: %" PRIuS, i));
EXPECT_FORM_FIELD_DATA_EQUALS(expected, fields[i]);
}
}
Commit Message: [autofill] Pin preview font-family to a system font
Bug: 916838
Change-Id: I4e874105262f2e15a11a7a18a7afd204e5827400
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1423109
Reviewed-by: Fabio Tirelo <ftirelo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Koji Ishii <kojii@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Roger McFarlane <rogerm@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#640884}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 151,804
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: R_API RBinFile *r_bin_file_new_from_bytes(RBin *bin, const char *file, const ut8 *bytes, ut64 sz, ut64 file_sz, int rawstr, ut64 baseaddr, ut64 loadaddr, int fd, const char *pluginname, const char *xtrname, ut64 offset, bool steal_ptr) {
ut8 binfile_created = false;
RBinPlugin *plugin = NULL;
RBinXtrPlugin *xtr = NULL;
RBinObject *o = NULL;
if (sz == UT64_MAX) {
return NULL;
}
if (xtrname) {
xtr = r_bin_get_xtrplugin_by_name (bin, xtrname);
}
if (xtr && xtr->check_bytes (bytes, sz)) {
return r_bin_file_xtr_load_bytes (bin, xtr, file,
bytes, sz, file_sz, baseaddr, loadaddr, 0,
fd, rawstr);
}
RBinFile *bf = r_bin_file_create_append (bin, file, bytes, sz, file_sz,
rawstr, fd, xtrname, steal_ptr);
if (!bf) {
if (!steal_ptr) { // we own the ptr, free on error
free ((void*) bytes);
}
return NULL;
}
binfile_created = true;
if (bin->force) {
plugin = r_bin_get_binplugin_by_name (bin, bin->force);
}
if (!plugin) {
if (pluginname) {
plugin = r_bin_get_binplugin_by_name (bin, pluginname);
}
if (!plugin) {
plugin = r_bin_get_binplugin_by_bytes (bin, bytes, sz);
if (!plugin) {
plugin = r_bin_get_binplugin_any (bin);
}
}
}
o = r_bin_object_new (bf, plugin, baseaddr, loadaddr, 0, r_buf_size (bf->buf));
if (o && !o->size) {
o->size = file_sz;
}
if (!o) {
if (bf && binfile_created) {
r_list_delete_data (bin->binfiles, bf);
}
return NULL;
}
#if 0
/* WTF */
if (strcmp (plugin->name, "any")) {
bf->narch = 1;
}
#endif
/* free unnecessary rbuffer (???) */
return bf;
}
Commit Message: Fix #9902 - Fix oobread in RBin.string_scan_range
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 82,813
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(curl_error)
{
zval *zid;
php_curl *ch;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "r", &zid) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if ((ch = (php_curl*)zend_fetch_resource(Z_RES_P(zid), le_curl_name, le_curl)) == NULL) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ch->err.str[CURL_ERROR_SIZE] = 0;
RETURN_STRING(ch->err.str);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72674 - check both curl_escape and curl_unescape
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 50,125
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void crypto_rfc4106_free(struct crypto_instance *inst)
{
crypto_drop_spawn(crypto_instance_ctx(inst));
kfree(inst);
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 45,751
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ExtensionTtsPlatformImplWin* ExtensionTtsPlatformImplWin::GetInstance() {
return Singleton<ExtensionTtsPlatformImplWin>::get();
}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 99,676
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void close_connection(h2o_http2_conn_t *conn)
{
conn->state = H2O_HTTP2_CONN_STATE_IS_CLOSING;
if (conn->_write.buf_in_flight != NULL || h2o_timeout_is_linked(&conn->_write.timeout_entry)) {
/* there is a pending write, let on_write_complete actually close the connection */
} else {
close_connection_now(conn);
}
}
Commit Message: h2: use after free on premature connection close #920
lib/http2/connection.c:on_read() calls parse_input(), which might free
`conn`. It does so in particular if the connection preface isn't
the expected one in expect_preface(). `conn` is then used after the free
in `if (h2o_timeout_is_linked(&conn->_write.timeout_entry)`.
We fix this by adding a return value to close_connection that returns a
negative value if `conn` has been free'd and can't be used anymore.
Credits for finding the bug to Tim Newsham.
CWE ID:
| 1
| 167,225
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int nfs4_lookup_root(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs_fh *fhandle,
struct nfs_fsinfo *info)
{
struct nfs4_exception exception = { };
int err;
do {
err = _nfs4_lookup_root(server, fhandle, info);
switch (err) {
case 0:
case -NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC:
goto out;
default:
err = nfs4_handle_exception(server, err, &exception);
}
} while (exception.retry);
out:
return err;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Check for buffer length in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
Commit 1f1ea6c "NFSv4: Fix buffer overflow checking in
__nfs4_get_acl_uncached" accidently dropped the checking for too small
result buffer length.
If someone uses getxattr on "system.nfs4_acl" on an NFSv4 mount
supporting ACLs, the ACL has not been cached and the buffer suplied is
too short, we still copy the complete ACL, resulting in kernel and user
space memory corruption.
Signed-off-by: Sven Wegener <sven.wegener@stealer.net>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 29,177
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int perf_event_set_bpf_handler(struct perf_event *event, u32 prog_fd)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
Commit Message: perf/core: Fix concurrent sys_perf_event_open() vs. 'move_group' race
Di Shen reported a race between two concurrent sys_perf_event_open()
calls where both try and move the same pre-existing software group
into a hardware context.
The problem is exactly that described in commit:
f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
... where, while we wait for a ctx->mutex acquisition, the event->ctx
relation can have changed under us.
That very same commit failed to recognise sys_perf_event_context() as an
external access vector to the events and thereby didn't apply the
established locking rules correctly.
So while one sys_perf_event_open() call is stuck waiting on
mutex_lock_double(), the other (which owns said locks) moves the group
about. So by the time the former sys_perf_event_open() acquires the
locks, the context we've acquired is stale (and possibly dead).
Apply the established locking rules as per perf_event_ctx_lock_nested()
to the mutex_lock_double() for the 'move_group' case. This obviously means
we need to validate state after we acquire the locks.
Reported-by: Di Shen (Keen Lab)
Tested-by: John Dias <joaodias@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Min Chong <mchong@google.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Fixes: f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170106131444.GZ3174@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 68,379
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int active_load_balance_cpu_stop(void *data)
{
struct rq *busiest_rq = data;
int busiest_cpu = cpu_of(busiest_rq);
int target_cpu = busiest_rq->push_cpu;
struct rq *target_rq = cpu_rq(target_cpu);
struct sched_domain *sd;
struct task_struct *p = NULL;
struct rq_flags rf;
rq_lock_irq(busiest_rq, &rf);
/*
* Between queueing the stop-work and running it is a hole in which
* CPUs can become inactive. We should not move tasks from or to
* inactive CPUs.
*/
if (!cpu_active(busiest_cpu) || !cpu_active(target_cpu))
goto out_unlock;
/* Make sure the requested CPU hasn't gone down in the meantime: */
if (unlikely(busiest_cpu != smp_processor_id() ||
!busiest_rq->active_balance))
goto out_unlock;
/* Is there any task to move? */
if (busiest_rq->nr_running <= 1)
goto out_unlock;
/*
* This condition is "impossible", if it occurs
* we need to fix it. Originally reported by
* Bjorn Helgaas on a 128-CPU setup.
*/
BUG_ON(busiest_rq == target_rq);
/* Search for an sd spanning us and the target CPU. */
rcu_read_lock();
for_each_domain(target_cpu, sd) {
if ((sd->flags & SD_LOAD_BALANCE) &&
cpumask_test_cpu(busiest_cpu, sched_domain_span(sd)))
break;
}
if (likely(sd)) {
struct lb_env env = {
.sd = sd,
.dst_cpu = target_cpu,
.dst_rq = target_rq,
.src_cpu = busiest_rq->cpu,
.src_rq = busiest_rq,
.idle = CPU_IDLE,
/*
* can_migrate_task() doesn't need to compute new_dst_cpu
* for active balancing. Since we have CPU_IDLE, but no
* @dst_grpmask we need to make that test go away with lying
* about DST_PINNED.
*/
.flags = LBF_DST_PINNED,
};
schedstat_inc(sd->alb_count);
update_rq_clock(busiest_rq);
p = detach_one_task(&env);
if (p) {
schedstat_inc(sd->alb_pushed);
/* Active balancing done, reset the failure counter. */
sd->nr_balance_failed = 0;
} else {
schedstat_inc(sd->alb_failed);
}
}
rcu_read_unlock();
out_unlock:
busiest_rq->active_balance = 0;
rq_unlock(busiest_rq, &rf);
if (p)
attach_one_task(target_rq, p);
local_irq_enable();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 92,458
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: trace_recursive_lock(struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer)
{
unsigned int val = cpu_buffer->current_context;
int bit;
if (in_interrupt()) {
if (in_nmi())
bit = RB_CTX_NMI;
else if (in_irq())
bit = RB_CTX_IRQ;
else
bit = RB_CTX_SOFTIRQ;
} else
bit = RB_CTX_NORMAL;
if (unlikely(val & (1 << bit)))
return 1;
val |= (1 << bit);
cpu_buffer->current_context = val;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ring-buffer: Prevent overflow of size in ring_buffer_resize()
If the size passed to ring_buffer_resize() is greater than MAX_LONG - BUF_PAGE_SIZE
then the DIV_ROUND_UP() will return zero.
Here's the details:
# echo 18014398509481980 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_size_kb
tracing_entries_write() processes this and converts kb to bytes.
18014398509481980 << 10 = 18446744073709547520
and this is passed to ring_buffer_resize() as unsigned long size.
size = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE);
Where DIV_ROUND_UP(a, b) is (a + b - 1)/b
BUF_PAGE_SIZE is 4080 and here
18446744073709547520 + 4080 - 1 = 18446744073709551599
where 18446744073709551599 is still smaller than 2^64
2^64 - 18446744073709551599 = 17
But now 18446744073709551599 / 4080 = 4521260802379792
and size = size * 4080 = 18446744073709551360
This is checked to make sure its still greater than 2 * 4080,
which it is.
Then we convert to the number of buffer pages needed.
nr_page = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE)
but this time size is 18446744073709551360 and
2^64 - (18446744073709551360 + 4080 - 1) = -3823
Thus it overflows and the resulting number is less than 4080, which makes
3823 / 4080 = 0
an nr_pages is set to this. As we already checked against the minimum that
nr_pages may be, this causes the logic to fail as well, and we crash the
kernel.
There's no reason to have the two DIV_ROUND_UP() (that's just result of
historical code changes), clean up the code and fix this bug.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.5+
Fixes: 83f40318dab00 ("ring-buffer: Make removal of ring buffer pages atomic")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 72,642
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Element* Document::getElementById(const AtomicString& id) const
{
return TreeScope::getElementById(id);
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 105,522
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Handle<JSArray> ElementsAccessor::Concat(Isolate* isolate, Arguments* args,
uint32_t concat_size,
uint32_t result_len) {
ElementsKind result_elements_kind = GetInitialFastElementsKind();
bool has_raw_doubles = false;
{
DisallowHeapAllocation no_gc;
bool is_holey = false;
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < concat_size; i++) {
Object* arg = (*args)[i];
ElementsKind arg_kind = JSArray::cast(arg)->GetElementsKind();
has_raw_doubles = has_raw_doubles || IsFastDoubleElementsKind(arg_kind);
is_holey = is_holey || IsFastHoleyElementsKind(arg_kind);
result_elements_kind =
GetMoreGeneralElementsKind(result_elements_kind, arg_kind);
}
if (is_holey) {
result_elements_kind = GetHoleyElementsKind(result_elements_kind);
}
}
bool requires_double_boxing =
has_raw_doubles && !IsFastDoubleElementsKind(result_elements_kind);
ArrayStorageAllocationMode mode = requires_double_boxing
? INITIALIZE_ARRAY_ELEMENTS_WITH_HOLE
: DONT_INITIALIZE_ARRAY_ELEMENTS;
Handle<JSArray> result_array = isolate->factory()->NewJSArray(
result_elements_kind, result_len, result_len, mode);
if (result_len == 0) return result_array;
uint32_t insertion_index = 0;
Handle<FixedArrayBase> storage(result_array->elements(), isolate);
ElementsAccessor* accessor = ElementsAccessor::ForKind(result_elements_kind);
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < concat_size; i++) {
JSArray* array = JSArray::cast((*args)[i]);
uint32_t len = 0;
array->length()->ToArrayLength(&len);
if (len == 0) continue;
ElementsKind from_kind = array->GetElementsKind();
accessor->CopyElements(array, 0, from_kind, storage, insertion_index, len);
insertion_index += len;
}
DCHECK_EQ(insertion_index, result_len);
return result_array;
}
Commit Message: Backport: Fix Object.entries/values with changing elements
Bug: 111274046
Test: m -j proxy_resolver_v8_unittest && adb sync && adb shell \
/data/nativetest64/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest
Change-Id: I705fc512cc5837e9364ed187559cc75d079aa5cb
(cherry picked from commit d8be9a10287afed07705ac8af027d6a46d4def99)
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 163,042
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int __btrfs_submit_dio_bio(struct bio *bio, struct inode *inode,
int rw, u64 file_offset, int skip_sum,
int async_submit)
{
int write = rw & REQ_WRITE;
struct btrfs_root *root = BTRFS_I(inode)->root;
int ret;
if (async_submit)
async_submit = !atomic_read(&BTRFS_I(inode)->sync_writers);
bio_get(bio);
if (!write) {
ret = btrfs_bio_wq_end_io(root->fs_info, bio, 0);
if (ret)
goto err;
}
if (skip_sum)
goto map;
if (write && async_submit) {
ret = btrfs_wq_submit_bio(root->fs_info,
inode, rw, bio, 0, 0,
file_offset,
__btrfs_submit_bio_start_direct_io,
__btrfs_submit_bio_done);
goto err;
} else if (write) {
/*
* If we aren't doing async submit, calculate the csum of the
* bio now.
*/
ret = btrfs_csum_one_bio(root, inode, bio, file_offset, 1);
if (ret)
goto err;
} else if (!skip_sum) {
ret = btrfs_lookup_bio_sums_dio(root, inode, bio, file_offset);
if (ret)
goto err;
}
map:
ret = btrfs_map_bio(root, rw, bio, 0, async_submit);
err:
bio_put(bio);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <chris.mason@fusionio.com>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <pascal@junod.info>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 34,269
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: magic_setparam(struct magic_set *ms, int param, const void *val)
{
switch (param) {
case MAGIC_PARAM_INDIR_MAX:
ms->indir_max = *(const size_t *)val;
return 0;
case MAGIC_PARAM_NAME_MAX:
ms->name_max = *(const size_t *)val;
return 0;
case MAGIC_PARAM_ELF_PHNUM_MAX:
ms->elf_phnum_max = *(const size_t *)val;
return 0;
case MAGIC_PARAM_ELF_SHNUM_MAX:
ms->elf_shnum_max = *(const size_t *)val;
return 0;
default:
errno = EINVAL;
return -1;
}
}
Commit Message: - Add a limit to the number of ELF notes processed (Suggested by Alexander
Cherepanov)
- Restructure ELF note printing so that we don't print the same message
multiple times on repeated notes of the same kind.
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 1
| 166,775
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CWebServer::RType_Users(WebEmSession & session, const request& req, Json::Value &root)
{
bool bHaveUser = (session.username != "");
int urights = 3;
if (bHaveUser)
{
int iUser = FindUser(session.username.c_str());
if (iUser != -1)
urights = static_cast<int>(m_users[iUser].userrights);
}
if (urights < 2)
return;
root["status"] = "OK";
root["title"] = "Users";
std::vector<std::vector<std::string> > result;
result = m_sql.safe_query("SELECT ID, Active, Username, Password, Rights, RemoteSharing, TabsEnabled FROM USERS ORDER BY ID ASC");
if (!result.empty())
{
int ii = 0;
for (const auto & itt : result)
{
std::vector<std::string> sd = itt;
root["result"][ii]["idx"] = sd[0];
root["result"][ii]["Enabled"] = (sd[1] == "1") ? "true" : "false";
root["result"][ii]["Username"] = base64_decode(sd[2]);
root["result"][ii]["Password"] = sd[3];
root["result"][ii]["Rights"] = atoi(sd[4].c_str());
root["result"][ii]["RemoteSharing"] = atoi(sd[5].c_str());
root["result"][ii]["TabsEnabled"] = atoi(sd[6].c_str());
ii++;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed possible SQL Injection Vulnerability (Thanks to Fabio Carretto!)
CWE ID: CWE-89
| 0
| 91,067
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: UsbTabHelper::~UsbTabHelper() {}
Commit Message: Ensure device choosers are closed on navigation
The requestDevice() IPCs can race with navigation. This change ensures
that choosers are closed on navigation and adds browser tests to
exercise this for Web Bluetooth and WebUSB.
Bug: 723503
Change-Id: I66760161220e17bd2be9309cca228d161fe76e9c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1099961
Commit-Queue: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Wasserman <msw@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeffrey Yasskin <jyasskin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#569900}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 155,096
|
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