instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderViewImpl::didAdoptURLLoader(WebKit::WebURLLoader* loader) {
webkit_glue::WebURLLoaderImpl* loader_impl =
static_cast<webkit_glue::WebURLLoaderImpl*>(loader);
loader_impl->UpdateRoutingId(routing_id_);
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 108,420
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: CSPSourceListTest()
: csp(ContentSecurityPolicy::create())
{
}
Commit Message: Disallow CSP source * matching of data:, blob:, and filesystem: URLs
The CSP spec specifically excludes matching of data:, blob:, and
filesystem: URLs with the source '*' wildcard. This adds checks to make
sure that doesn't happen, along with tests.
BUG=534570
R=mkwst@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1361763005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#350950}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 125,400
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: lvs_flush_handler(__attribute__((unused)) vector_t *strvec)
{
global_data->lvs_flush = true;
}
Commit Message: Add command line and configuration option to set umask
Issue #1048 identified that files created by keepalived are created
with mode 0666. This commit changes the default to 0644, and also
allows the umask to be specified in the configuration or as a command
line option.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 75,828
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int is_qp0(enum ib_qp_type qp_type)
{
return qp_type == IB_QPT_SMI;
}
Commit Message: IB/mlx5: Fix leaking stack memory to userspace
mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp was never initialized and only the first 4 bytes
were written.
Fixes: 41d902cb7c32 ("RDMA/mlx5: Fix definition of mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 92,132
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SVGElement::ChildrenChanged(const ChildrenChange& change) {
Element::ChildrenChanged(change);
InvalidateInstances();
}
Commit Message: Fix SVG crash for v0 distribution into foreignObject.
We require a parent element to be an SVG element for non-svg-root
elements in order to create a LayoutObject for them. However, we checked
the light tree parent element, not the flat tree one which is the parent
for the layout tree construction. Note that this is just an issue in
Shadow DOM v0 since v1 does not allow shadow roots on SVG elements.
Bug: 915469
Change-Id: Id81843abad08814fae747b5bc81c09666583f130
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1382494
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <fs@opera.com>
Commit-Queue: Rune Lillesveen <futhark@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#617487}
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 152,741
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void MediaStreamManager::StartEnumeration(DeviceRequest* request,
const std::string& label) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
media_devices_manager_->StartMonitoring();
bool request_audio_input = request->audio_type() != MEDIA_NO_SERVICE;
if (request_audio_input)
request->SetState(request->audio_type(), MEDIA_REQUEST_STATE_REQUESTED);
bool request_video_input = request->video_type() != MEDIA_NO_SERVICE;
if (request_video_input)
request->SetState(request->video_type(), MEDIA_REQUEST_STATE_REQUESTED);
DCHECK(request_audio_input || request_video_input);
MediaDevicesManager::BoolDeviceTypes devices_to_enumerate;
devices_to_enumerate[MEDIA_DEVICE_TYPE_AUDIO_INPUT] = request_audio_input;
devices_to_enumerate[MEDIA_DEVICE_TYPE_VIDEO_INPUT] = request_video_input;
media_devices_manager_->EnumerateDevices(
devices_to_enumerate,
base::Bind(&MediaStreamManager::DevicesEnumerated, base::Unretained(this),
request_audio_input, request_video_input, label));
}
Commit Message: Fix MediaObserver notifications in MediaStreamManager.
This CL fixes the stream type used to notify MediaObserver about
cancelled MediaStream requests.
Before this CL, NUM_MEDIA_TYPES was used as stream type to indicate
that all stream types should be cancelled.
However, the MediaObserver end does not interpret NUM_MEDIA_TYPES this
way and the request to update the UI is ignored.
This CL sends a separate notification for each stream type so that the
UI actually gets updated for all stream types in use.
Bug: 816033
Change-Id: Ib7d3b3046d1dd0976627f8ab38abf086eacc9405
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/939630
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540122}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 148,354
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xps_count_font_encodings(fz_font *font)
{
FT_Face face = font->ft_face;
return face->num_charmaps;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 13,156
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: build_model (XML_Parser parser)
{
DTD * const dtd = parser->m_dtd; /* save one level of indirection */
XML_Content *ret;
XML_Content *cpos;
XML_Char * str;
int allocsize = (dtd->scaffCount * sizeof(XML_Content)
+ (dtd->contentStringLen * sizeof(XML_Char)));
ret = (XML_Content *)MALLOC(parser, allocsize);
if (!ret)
return NULL;
str = (XML_Char *) (&ret[dtd->scaffCount]);
cpos = &ret[1];
build_node(parser, 0, ret, &cpos, &str);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Fix extraction of namespace prefix from XML name (#186)
CWE ID: CWE-611
| 0
| 92,300
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool CheckDigestServerAuth(const AuthChallengeInfo* auth_challenge) {
if (!auth_challenge)
return false;
EXPECT_FALSE(auth_challenge->is_proxy);
EXPECT_EQ("http://www.example.org", auth_challenge->challenger.Serialize());
EXPECT_EQ("digestive", auth_challenge->realm);
EXPECT_EQ(kDigestAuthScheme, auth_challenge->scheme);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Implicitly bypass localhost when proxying requests.
This aligns Chrome's behavior with the Windows and macOS proxy resolvers (but not Firefox).
Concretely:
* localhost names (as determined by net::IsLocalhost) now implicitly bypass the proxy
* link-local IP addresses implicitly bypass the proxy
The implicit rules are handled by ProxyBypassRules, and it is possible to override them when manually configuring proxy settings (but not when using PAC or auto-detect).
This change also adds support for the "<-loopback>" proxy bypass rule, with similar semantics as it has on Windows (removes the implicit bypass rules for localhost and link-local).
The compatibility risk of this change should be low as proxying through localhost was not universally supported. It is however an idiom used in testing (a number of our own tests had such a dependency). Impacted users can use the "<-loopback>" bypass rule as a workaround.
Bug: 413511, 899126, 901896
Change-Id: I263ca21ef9f12d4759a20cb4751dc3261bda6ac0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1303626
Commit-Queue: Eric Roman <eroman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dominick Ng <dominickn@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sami Kyöstilä <skyostil@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606112}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 144,784
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int BackendImpl::SyncInit() {
#if defined(NET_BUILD_STRESS_CACHE)
up_ticks_ = kTrimDelay * 2;
#endif
DCHECK(!init_);
if (init_)
return net::ERR_FAILED;
bool create_files = false;
if (!InitBackingStore(&create_files)) {
ReportError(ERR_STORAGE_ERROR);
return net::ERR_FAILED;
}
num_refs_ = num_pending_io_ = max_refs_ = 0;
entry_count_ = byte_count_ = 0;
bool should_create_timer = false;
if (!restarted_) {
buffer_bytes_ = 0;
trace_object_ = TraceObject::GetTraceObject();
should_create_timer = true;
}
init_ = true;
Trace("Init");
if (data_->header.experiment != NO_EXPERIMENT &&
cache_type_ != net::DISK_CACHE) {
return net::ERR_FAILED;
}
if (!(user_flags_ & kNoRandom)) {
new_eviction_ = (cache_type_ == net::DISK_CACHE);
}
if (!CheckIndex()) {
ReportError(ERR_INIT_FAILED);
return net::ERR_FAILED;
}
if (!restarted_ && (create_files || !data_->header.num_entries))
ReportError(ERR_CACHE_CREATED);
if (!(user_flags_ & kNoRandom) && cache_type_ == net::DISK_CACHE &&
!InitExperiment(&data_->header, create_files)) {
return net::ERR_FAILED;
}
data_->header.this_id++;
if (!data_->header.this_id)
data_->header.this_id++;
bool previous_crash = (data_->header.crash != 0);
data_->header.crash = 1;
if (!block_files_.Init(create_files))
return net::ERR_FAILED;
if (cache_type() == net::APP_CACHE) {
DCHECK(!new_eviction_);
read_only_ = true;
} else if (cache_type() == net::SHADER_CACHE) {
DCHECK(!new_eviction_);
}
eviction_.Init(this);
disabled_ = false;
if (!InitStats())
return net::ERR_FAILED;
disabled_ = !rankings_.Init(this, new_eviction_);
#if defined(STRESS_CACHE_EXTENDED_VALIDATION)
trace_object_->EnableTracing(false);
int sc = SelfCheck();
if (sc < 0 && sc != ERR_NUM_ENTRIES_MISMATCH)
NOTREACHED();
trace_object_->EnableTracing(true);
#endif
if (previous_crash) {
ReportError(ERR_PREVIOUS_CRASH);
} else if (!restarted_) {
ReportError(ERR_NO_ERROR);
}
FlushIndex();
if (!disabled_ && should_create_timer) {
DCHECK(background_queue_.BackgroundIsCurrentSequence());
int timer_delay = unit_test_ ? 1000 : 30000;
timer_.reset(new base::RepeatingTimer());
timer_->Start(FROM_HERE, TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(timer_delay), this,
&BackendImpl::OnStatsTimer);
}
return disabled_ ? net::ERR_FAILED : net::OK;
}
Commit Message: Blockfile cache: fix long-standing sparse + evict reentrancy problem
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for an alternative perspective
plus a reduction to make fixing this much easier.
Bug: 826626, 518908, 537063, 802886
Change-Id: Ibfa01416f9a8e7f7b361e4f93b4b6b134728b85f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/985052
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547103}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 147,290
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void sco_conn_ready(struct sco_conn *conn)
{
struct sock *parent;
struct sock *sk = conn->sk;
BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
if (sk) {
sco_sock_clear_timer(sk);
bh_lock_sock(sk);
sk->sk_state = BT_CONNECTED;
sk->sk_state_change(sk);
bh_unlock_sock(sk);
} else {
sco_conn_lock(conn);
parent = sco_get_sock_listen(conn->src);
if (!parent) {
sco_conn_unlock(conn);
return;
}
bh_lock_sock(parent);
sk = sco_sock_alloc(sock_net(parent), NULL,
BTPROTO_SCO, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!sk) {
bh_unlock_sock(parent);
sco_conn_unlock(conn);
return;
}
sco_sock_init(sk, parent);
bacpy(&bt_sk(sk)->src, conn->src);
bacpy(&bt_sk(sk)->dst, conn->dst);
hci_conn_hold(conn->hcon);
__sco_chan_add(conn, sk, parent);
if (test_bit(BT_SK_DEFER_SETUP, &bt_sk(parent)->flags))
sk->sk_state = BT_CONNECT2;
else
sk->sk_state = BT_CONNECTED;
/* Wake up parent */
parent->sk_data_ready(parent, 1);
bh_unlock_sock(parent);
sco_conn_unlock(conn);
}
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: SCO - Fix missing msg_namelen update in sco_sock_recvmsg()
If the socket is in state BT_CONNECT2 and BT_SK_DEFER_SETUP is set in
the flags, sco_sock_recvmsg() returns early with 0 without updating the
possibly set msg_namelen member. This, in turn, leads to a 128 byte
kernel stack leak in net/socket.c.
Fix this by updating msg_namelen in this case. For all other cases it
will be handled in bt_sock_recvmsg().
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 30,700
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Action::AuthStatus PolicyKitBackend::authorizeAction(const QString &action)
{
switch (PolkitQt::Auth::computeAndObtainAuth(action)) {
case PolkitQt::Auth::Yes:
return Action::Authorized;
default:
return Action::Denied;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-290
| 0
| 7,221
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: String Document::domain() const
{
return securityOrigin()->domain();
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 102,707
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ChannelSecurityOptions *find_channel_security(int id)
{
ChannelSecurityOptions *now = channels_security;
while (now && now->channel_id != id) {
now = now->next;
}
return now;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 1,834
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int efx_register_netdev(struct efx_nic *efx)
{
struct net_device *net_dev = efx->net_dev;
struct efx_channel *channel;
int rc;
net_dev->watchdog_timeo = 5 * HZ;
net_dev->irq = efx->pci_dev->irq;
net_dev->netdev_ops = &efx_netdev_ops;
SET_ETHTOOL_OPS(net_dev, &efx_ethtool_ops);
/* Clear MAC statistics */
efx->mac_op->update_stats(efx);
memset(&efx->mac_stats, 0, sizeof(efx->mac_stats));
rtnl_lock();
rc = dev_alloc_name(net_dev, net_dev->name);
if (rc < 0)
goto fail_locked;
efx_update_name(efx);
rc = register_netdevice(net_dev);
if (rc)
goto fail_locked;
efx_for_each_channel(channel, efx) {
struct efx_tx_queue *tx_queue;
efx_for_each_channel_tx_queue(tx_queue, channel)
efx_init_tx_queue_core_txq(tx_queue);
}
/* Always start with carrier off; PHY events will detect the link */
netif_carrier_off(efx->net_dev);
rtnl_unlock();
rc = device_create_file(&efx->pci_dev->dev, &dev_attr_phy_type);
if (rc) {
netif_err(efx, drv, efx->net_dev,
"failed to init net dev attributes\n");
goto fail_registered;
}
return 0;
fail_locked:
rtnl_unlock();
netif_err(efx, drv, efx->net_dev, "could not register net dev\n");
return rc;
fail_registered:
unregister_netdev(net_dev);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: sfc: Fix maximum number of TSO segments and minimum TX queue size
[ Upstream commit 7e6d06f0de3f74ca929441add094518ae332257c ]
Currently an skb requiring TSO may not fit within a minimum-size TX
queue. The TX queue selected for the skb may stall and trigger the TX
watchdog repeatedly (since the problem skb will be retried after the
TX reset). This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3412.
Set the maximum number of TSO segments for our devices to 100. This
should make no difference to behaviour unless the actual MSS is less
than about 700. Increase the minimum TX queue size accordingly to
allow for 2 worst-case skbs, so that there will definitely be space
to add an skb after we wake a queue.
To avoid invalidating existing configurations, change
efx_ethtool_set_ringparam() to fix up values that are too small rather
than returning -EINVAL.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 1
| 165,585
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void dm_lock_md_type(struct mapped_device *md)
{
mutex_lock(&md->type_lock);
}
Commit Message: dm: fix race between dm_get_from_kobject() and __dm_destroy()
The following BUG_ON was hit when testing repeat creation and removal of
DM devices:
kernel BUG at drivers/md/dm.c:2919!
CPU: 7 PID: 750 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 4.1.44
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81649e8b>] dm_get_from_kobject+0x34/0x3a
[<ffffffff81650ef1>] dm_attr_show+0x2b/0x5e
[<ffffffff817b46d1>] ? mutex_lock+0x26/0x44
[<ffffffff811df7f5>] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x83/0xcf
[<ffffffff811de257>] kernfs_seq_show+0x23/0x25
[<ffffffff81199118>] seq_read+0x16f/0x325
[<ffffffff811de994>] kernfs_fop_read+0x3a/0x13f
[<ffffffff8117b625>] __vfs_read+0x26/0x9d
[<ffffffff8130eb59>] ? security_file_permission+0x3c/0x44
[<ffffffff8117bdb8>] ? rw_verify_area+0x83/0xd9
[<ffffffff8117be9d>] vfs_read+0x8f/0xcf
[<ffffffff81193e34>] ? __fdget_pos+0x12/0x41
[<ffffffff8117c686>] SyS_read+0x4b/0x76
[<ffffffff817b606e>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x71
The bug can be easily triggered, if an extra delay (e.g. 10ms) is added
between the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and dm_get() in
dm_get_from_kobject().
To fix it, we need to ensure the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and
dm_get() are done in an atomic way, so _minor_lock is used.
The other callers of dm_get() have also been checked to be OK: some
callers invoke dm_get() under _minor_lock, some callers invoke it under
_hash_lock, and dm_start_request() invoke it after increasing
md->open_count.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 85,914
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int md_setup_cluster(struct mddev *mddev, int nodes)
{
int err;
err = request_module("md-cluster");
if (err) {
pr_err("md-cluster module not found.\n");
return -ENOENT;
}
spin_lock(&pers_lock);
if (!md_cluster_ops || !try_module_get(md_cluster_mod)) {
spin_unlock(&pers_lock);
return -ENOENT;
}
spin_unlock(&pers_lock);
return md_cluster_ops->join(mddev, nodes);
}
Commit Message: md: use kzalloc() when bitmap is disabled
In drivers/md/md.c get_bitmap_file() uses kmalloc() for creating a
mdu_bitmap_file_t called "file".
5769 file = kmalloc(sizeof(*file), GFP_NOIO);
5770 if (!file)
5771 return -ENOMEM;
This structure is copied to user space at the end of the function.
5786 if (err == 0 &&
5787 copy_to_user(arg, file, sizeof(*file)))
5788 err = -EFAULT
But if bitmap is disabled only the first byte of "file" is initialized
with zero, so it's possible to read some bytes (up to 4095) of kernel
space memory from user space. This is an information leak.
5775 /* bitmap disabled, zero the first byte and copy out */
5776 if (!mddev->bitmap_info.file)
5777 file->pathname[0] = '\0';
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Randazzo <benjamin@randazzo.fr>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 42,470
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ChromeContentBrowserClient::ShouldAllowOpenURL(
content::SiteInstance* site_instance, const GURL& url) {
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_EXTENSIONS)
bool result;
if (ChromeContentBrowserClientExtensionsPart::ShouldAllowOpenURL(
site_instance, url, &result))
return result;
#endif
GURL from_url = site_instance->GetSiteURL();
if (from_url.GetOrigin().spec() == chrome::kChromeUIChromeSigninURL &&
url.SchemeIs(content::kChromeUIScheme) &&
url.host_piece() != chrome::kChromeUIChromeSigninHost) {
VLOG(1) << "Blocked navigation to " << url.spec() << " from "
<< chrome::kChromeUIChromeSigninURL;
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 142,752
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int AccessibilityUIElement::rowCount()
{
if (!m_element || !ATK_IS_TABLE(m_element))
return 0;
return atk_table_get_n_rows(ATK_TABLE(m_element));
}
Commit Message: [GTK][WTR] Implement AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=102951
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
Implement AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue in the ATK backend
in the same manner it is implemented in DumpRenderTree.
* WebKitTestRunner/InjectedBundle/atk/AccessibilityUIElementAtk.cpp:
(WTR::replaceCharactersForResults):
(WTR):
(WTR::AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@135485 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 106,400
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int lua_apr_rmdir(lua_State *L)
{
request_rec *r;
const char *path;
apr_status_t status;
r = ap_lua_check_request_rec(L, 1);
luaL_checktype(L, 2, LUA_TSTRING);
path = lua_tostring(L, 2);
status = apr_dir_remove(path, r->pool);
lua_pushboolean(L, (status == 0));
return 1;
}
Commit Message: *) SECURITY: CVE-2015-0228 (cve.mitre.org)
mod_lua: A maliciously crafted websockets PING after a script
calls r:wsupgrade() can cause a child process crash.
[Edward Lu <Chaosed0 gmail.com>]
Discovered by Guido Vranken <guidovranken gmail.com>
Submitted by: Edward Lu
Committed by: covener
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1657261 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 45,097
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void vhost_dev_free_iovecs(struct vhost_dev *dev)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < dev->nvqs; ++i)
vhost_vq_free_iovecs(dev->vqs[i]);
}
Commit Message: vhost: actually track log eventfd file
While reviewing vhost log code, I found out that log_file is never
set. Note: I haven't tested the change (QEMU doesn't use LOG_FD yet).
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 42,210
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int tcp_splice_data_recv(read_descriptor_t *rd_desc, struct sk_buff *skb,
unsigned int offset, size_t len)
{
struct tcp_splice_state *tss = rd_desc->arg.data;
int ret;
ret = skb_splice_bits(skb, skb->sk, offset, tss->pipe,
min(rd_desc->count, len), tss->flags);
if (ret > 0)
rd_desc->count -= ret;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: tcp: initialize rcv_mss to TCP_MIN_MSS instead of 0
When tcp_disconnect() is called, inet_csk_delack_init() sets
icsk->icsk_ack.rcv_mss to 0.
This could potentially cause tcp_recvmsg() => tcp_cleanup_rbuf() =>
__tcp_select_window() call path to have division by 0 issue.
So this patch initializes rcv_mss to TCP_MIN_MSS instead of 0.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 61,769
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AppCacheHost::ObserveGroupBeingUpdated(AppCacheGroup* group) {
DCHECK(!group_being_updated_.get());
group_being_updated_ = group;
newest_cache_of_group_being_updated_ = group->newest_complete_cache();
group->AddUpdateObserver(this);
}
Commit Message: Fix possible map::end() dereference in AppCacheUpdateJob triggered by a compromised renderer.
BUG=551044
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1418783005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#358815}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 124,210
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int assign_eip_far(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, ulong dst,
int cs_l)
{
switch (ctxt->op_bytes) {
case 2:
ctxt->_eip = (u16)dst;
break;
case 4:
ctxt->_eip = (u32)dst;
break;
case 8:
if ((cs_l && is_noncanonical_address(dst)) ||
(!cs_l && (dst & ~(u32)-1)))
return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
ctxt->_eip = dst;
break;
default:
WARN(1, "unsupported eip assignment size\n");
}
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
Commit Message: KVM: emulate: avoid accessing NULL ctxt->memopp
A failure to decode the instruction can cause a NULL pointer access.
This is fixed simply by moving the "done" label as close as possible
to the return.
This fixes CVE-2014-8481.
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 41061cdb98a0bec464278b4db8e894a3121671f5
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 35,504
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Err pcrb_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
u32 i;
GF_PcrInfoBox *p = (GF_PcrInfoBox *)a;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "MPEG2TSPCRInfoBox", trace);
fprintf(trace, "subsegment_count=\"%d\">\n", p->subsegment_count);
for (i=0; i<p->subsegment_count; i++) {
fprintf(trace, "<PCRInfo PCR=\""LLU"\" />\n", p->pcr_values[i]);
}
if (!p->size) {
fprintf(trace, "<PCRInfo PCR=\"\" />\n");
}
gf_isom_box_dump_done("MPEG2TSPCRInfoBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,816
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline bool kvm_vcpu_trigger_posted_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
bool nested)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
int pi_vec = nested ? POSTED_INTR_NESTED_VECTOR : POSTED_INTR_VECTOR;
if (vcpu->mode == IN_GUEST_MODE) {
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
/*
* Currently, we don't support urgent interrupt,
* all interrupts are recognized as non-urgent
* interrupt, so we cannot post interrupts when
* 'SN' is set.
*
* If the vcpu is in guest mode, it means it is
* running instead of being scheduled out and
* waiting in the run queue, and that's the only
* case when 'SN' is set currently, warning if
* 'SN' is set.
*/
WARN_ON_ONCE(pi_test_sn(&vmx->pi_desc));
apic->send_IPI_mask(get_cpu_mask(vcpu->cpu), pi_vec);
return true;
}
#endif
return false;
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Don't allow L2 to access the hardware CR8
If L1 does not specify the "use TPR shadow" VM-execution control in
vmcs12, then L0 must specify the "CR8-load exiting" and "CR8-store
exiting" VM-execution controls in vmcs02. Failure to do so will give
the L2 VM unrestricted read/write access to the hardware CR8.
This fixes CVE-2017-12154.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 62,984
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int inet6_getname(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
int *uaddr_len, int peer)
{
struct sockaddr_in6 *sin = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)uaddr;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
sin->sin6_family = AF_INET6;
sin->sin6_flowinfo = 0;
sin->sin6_scope_id = 0;
if (peer) {
if (!inet->inet_dport)
return -ENOTCONN;
if (((1 << sk->sk_state) & (TCPF_CLOSE | TCPF_SYN_SENT)) &&
peer == 1)
return -ENOTCONN;
sin->sin6_port = inet->inet_dport;
sin->sin6_addr = sk->sk_v6_daddr;
if (np->sndflow)
sin->sin6_flowinfo = np->flow_label;
} else {
if (ipv6_addr_any(&sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr))
sin->sin6_addr = np->saddr;
else
sin->sin6_addr = sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr;
sin->sin6_port = inet->inet_sport;
}
sin->sin6_scope_id = ipv6_iface_scope_id(&sin->sin6_addr,
sk->sk_bound_dev_if);
*uaddr_len = sizeof(*sin);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument
郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:
int socket_fd;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
addr.sin_port = 0;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
addr.sin_family = 10;
socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
connect(socket_fd , &addr,16);
AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
store a zero in the protocol fields.
This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
is NULL for raw sockets.
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: [<ffffffff816db90e>] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
kernel: [<ffffffff816db9a4>] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff81645069>] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
kernel: [<ffffffff810ac51b>] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff810236d8>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
kernel: [<ffffffff81645e0e>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
kernel: [<ffffffff81779515>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89
I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.
CVE: CVE-2015-8543
Cc: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
Reported-by: 郭永刚 <guoyonggang@360.cn>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 41,557
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: access_flags_to_smbopen_mode(const int access_flags)
{
int masked_flags = access_flags & (GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_WRITE);
if (masked_flags == GENERIC_READ)
return SMBOPEN_READ;
else if (masked_flags == GENERIC_WRITE)
return SMBOPEN_WRITE;
/* just go for read/write */
return SMBOPEN_READWRITE;
}
Commit Message: cifs: fix possible memory corruption in CIFSFindNext
The name_len variable in CIFSFindNext is a signed int that gets set to
the resume_name_len in the cifs_search_info. The resume_name_len however
is unsigned and for some infolevels is populated directly from a 32 bit
value sent by the server.
If the server sends a very large value for this, then that value could
look negative when converted to a signed int. That would make that
value pass the PATH_MAX check later in CIFSFindNext. The name_len would
then be used as a length value for a memcpy. It would then be treated
as unsigned again, and the memcpy scribbles over a ton of memory.
Fix this by making the name_len an unsigned value in CIFSFindNext.
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Darren Lavender <dcl@hppine99.gbr.hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 25,005
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RemoteFrame::Navigate(Document& origin_document,
const KURL& url,
bool replace_current_item,
UserGestureStatus user_gesture_status) {
FrameLoadRequest frame_request(&origin_document, ResourceRequest(url));
frame_request.SetReplacesCurrentItem(replace_current_item);
frame_request.GetResourceRequest().SetHasUserGesture(
user_gesture_status == UserGestureStatus::kActive);
frame_request.GetResourceRequest().SetFrameType(
IsMainFrame() ? network::mojom::RequestContextFrameType::kTopLevel
: network::mojom::RequestContextFrameType::kNested);
Navigate(frame_request);
}
Commit Message: Move user activation check to RemoteFrame::Navigate's callers.
Currently RemoteFrame::Navigate is the user of
Frame::HasTransientUserActivation that passes a RemoteFrame*, and
it seems wrong because the user activation (user gesture) needed by
the navigation should belong to the LocalFrame that initiated the
navigation.
Follow-up CLs after this one will update UserActivation code in
Frame to take a LocalFrame* instead of a Frame*, and get rid of
redundant IPCs.
Bug: 811414
Change-Id: I771c1694043edb54374a44213d16715d9c7da704
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/914736
Commit-Queue: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#536728}
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 152,200
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SupervisedUserService::AddExtensionUpdateRequest(
const std::string& extension_id,
const base::Version& version,
SuccessCallback callback) {
std::string id = GetExtensionRequestId(extension_id, version);
AddPermissionRequestInternal(
base::BindRepeating(CreateExtensionUpdateRequest, id),
std::move(callback), 0);
}
Commit Message: [signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <droger@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <isherman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <msarda@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 143,075
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool HTMLMediaElement::endedPlayback(LoopCondition loopCondition) const {
double dur = duration();
if (std::isnan(dur))
return false;
if (m_readyState < kHaveMetadata)
return false;
double now = currentPlaybackPosition();
if (getDirectionOfPlayback() == Forward)
return dur > 0 && now >= dur &&
(loopCondition == LoopCondition::Ignored || !loop());
DCHECK_EQ(getDirectionOfPlayback(), Backward);
return now <= earliestPossiblePosition();
}
Commit Message: [Blink>Media] Allow autoplay muted on Android by default
There was a mistake causing autoplay muted is shipped on Android
but it will be disabled if the chromium embedder doesn't specify
content setting for "AllowAutoplay" preference. This CL makes the
AllowAutoplay preference true by default so that it is allowed by
embedders (including AndroidWebView) unless they explicitly
disable it.
Intent to ship:
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/Q1cnzNI2GpI/AL_eyUNABgAJ
BUG=689018
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2677173002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#448423}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 128,796
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct request_queue *blk_alloc_queue(gfp_t gfp_mask)
{
return blk_alloc_queue_node(gfp_mask, NUMA_NO_NODE, NULL);
}
Commit Message: block: blk_init_allocated_queue() set q->fq as NULL in the fail case
We find the memory use-after-free issue in __blk_drain_queue()
on the kernel 4.14. After read the latest kernel 4.18-rc6 we
think it has the same problem.
Memory is allocated for q->fq in the blk_init_allocated_queue().
If the elevator init function called with error return, it will
run into the fail case to free the q->fq.
Then the __blk_drain_queue() uses the same memory after the free
of the q->fq, it will lead to the unpredictable event.
The patch is to set q->fq as NULL in the fail case of
blk_init_allocated_queue().
Fixes: commit 7c94e1c157a2 ("block: introduce blk_flush_queue to drive flush machinery")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: xiao jin <jin.xiao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 91,962
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: inline unsigned long copy_transact_fpr_to_user(void __user *to,
struct task_struct *task)
{
return __copy_to_user(to, task->thread.transact_fp.fpr,
ELF_NFPREG * sizeof(double));
}
Commit Message: powerpc/tm: Block signal return setting invalid MSR state
Currently we allow both the MSR T and S bits to be set by userspace on
a signal return. Unfortunately this is a reserved configuration and
will cause a TM Bad Thing exception if attempted (via rfid).
This patch checks for this case in both the 32 and 64 bit signals
code. If both T and S are set, we mark the context as invalid.
Found using a syscall fuzzer.
Fixes: 2b0a576d15e0 ("powerpc: Add new transactional memory state to the signal context")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.9+
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 56,466
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: remove_unused_rules(struct rule_state * list)
{
char ifname[IFNAMSIZ];
unsigned short iport;
struct rule_state * tmp;
u_int64_t packets;
u_int64_t bytes;
unsigned int timestamp;
int n = 0;
while(list)
{
/* remove the rule if no traffic has used it */
if(get_redirect_rule(ifname, list->eport, list->proto,
0, 0, &iport, 0, 0, 0, 0, ×tamp,
&packets, &bytes) >= 0)
{
if(packets == list->packets && bytes == list->bytes)
{
syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "removing unused mapping %hu %s : still "
"%" PRIu64 "packets %" PRIu64 "bytes",
list->eport, proto_itoa(list->proto),
packets, bytes);
_upnp_delete_redir(list->eport, list->proto);
n++;
}
}
tmp = list;
list = tmp->next;
free(tmp);
}
if(n>0)
syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "removed %d unused rules", n);
}
Commit Message: upnp_redirect(): accept NULL desc argument
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 89,837
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned char *AcquireCompactPixels(const Image *image,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
size_t
packet_size;
unsigned char
*compact_pixels;
packet_size=image->depth > 8UL ? 2UL : 1UL;
compact_pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((9*
image->columns)+1,packet_size*sizeof(*compact_pixels));
if (compact_pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed","`%s'",image->filename);
}
return(compact_pixels);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1451
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 91,355
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int nfs4_decode_dirent(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct nfs_entry *entry,
int plus)
{
uint32_t bitmap[3] = {0};
uint32_t len;
__be32 *p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, 4);
if (unlikely(!p))
goto out_overflow;
if (*p == xdr_zero) {
p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, 4);
if (unlikely(!p))
goto out_overflow;
if (*p == xdr_zero)
return -EAGAIN;
entry->eof = 1;
return -EBADCOOKIE;
}
p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, 12);
if (unlikely(!p))
goto out_overflow;
entry->prev_cookie = entry->cookie;
p = xdr_decode_hyper(p, &entry->cookie);
entry->len = be32_to_cpup(p);
p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, entry->len);
if (unlikely(!p))
goto out_overflow;
entry->name = (const char *) p;
/*
* In case the server doesn't return an inode number,
* we fake one here. (We don't use inode number 0,
* since glibc seems to choke on it...)
*/
entry->ino = 1;
entry->fattr->valid = 0;
if (decode_attr_bitmap(xdr, bitmap) < 0)
goto out_overflow;
if (decode_attr_length(xdr, &len, &p) < 0)
goto out_overflow;
if (decode_getfattr_attrs(xdr, bitmap, entry->fattr, entry->fh,
entry->server, 1) < 0)
goto out_overflow;
if (entry->fattr->valid & NFS_ATTR_FATTR_MOUNTED_ON_FILEID)
entry->ino = entry->fattr->mounted_on_fileid;
else if (entry->fattr->valid & NFS_ATTR_FATTR_FILEID)
entry->ino = entry->fattr->fileid;
entry->d_type = DT_UNKNOWN;
if (entry->fattr->valid & NFS_ATTR_FATTR_TYPE)
entry->d_type = nfs_umode_to_dtype(entry->fattr->mode);
return 0;
out_overflow:
print_overflow_msg(__func__, xdr);
return -EAGAIN;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 23,402
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int set_brk(unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
{
start = ELF_PAGEALIGN(start);
end = ELF_PAGEALIGN(end);
if (end > start) {
unsigned long addr;
down_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
addr = do_brk(start, end - start);
up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
if (BAD_ADDR(addr))
return addr;
}
current->mm->start_brk = current->mm->brk = end;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: regset: Prevent null pointer reference on readonly regsets
The regset common infrastructure assumed that regsets would always
have .get and .set methods, but not necessarily .active methods.
Unfortunately people have since written regsets without .set methods.
Rather than putting in stub functions everywhere, handle regsets with
null .get or .set methods explicitly.
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 21,469
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __netlink_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock,
struct mutex *cb_mutex, int protocol)
{
struct sock *sk;
struct netlink_sock *nlk;
sock->ops = &netlink_ops;
sk = sk_alloc(net, PF_NETLINK, GFP_KERNEL, &netlink_proto);
if (!sk)
return -ENOMEM;
sock_init_data(sock, sk);
nlk = nlk_sk(sk);
if (cb_mutex) {
nlk->cb_mutex = cb_mutex;
} else {
nlk->cb_mutex = &nlk->cb_def_mutex;
mutex_init(nlk->cb_mutex);
}
init_waitqueue_head(&nlk->wait);
sk->sk_destruct = netlink_sock_destruct;
sk->sk_protocol = protocol;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: af_netlink: force credentials passing [CVE-2012-3520]
Pablo Neira Ayuso discovered that avahi and
potentially NetworkManager accept spoofed Netlink messages because of a
kernel bug. The kernel passes all-zero SCM_CREDENTIALS ancillary data
to the receiver if the sender did not provide such data, instead of not
including any such data at all or including the correct data from the
peer (as it is the case with AF_UNIX).
This bug was introduced in commit 16e572626961
(af_unix: dont send SCM_CREDENTIALS by default)
This patch forces passing credentials for netlink, as
before the regression.
Another fix would be to not add SCM_CREDENTIALS in
netlink messages if not provided by the sender, but it
might break some programs.
With help from Florian Weimer & Petr Matousek
This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3520
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-287
| 0
| 19,205
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void JSFloat64Array::getOwnPropertyNames(JSObject* object, ExecState* exec, PropertyNameArray& propertyNames, EnumerationMode mode)
{
JSFloat64Array* thisObject = jsCast<JSFloat64Array*>(object);
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(thisObject, &s_info);
for (unsigned i = 0; i < static_cast<Float64Array*>(thisObject->impl())->length(); ++i)
propertyNames.add(Identifier::from(exec, i));
Base::getOwnPropertyNames(thisObject, exec, propertyNames, mode);
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 101,044
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool nested_vmx_exit_handled(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
u32 intr_info = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO);
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
u32 exit_reason = vmx->exit_reason;
trace_kvm_nested_vmexit(kvm_rip_read(vcpu), exit_reason,
vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION),
vmx->idt_vectoring_info,
intr_info,
vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_ERROR_CODE),
KVM_ISA_VMX);
if (vmx->nested.nested_run_pending)
return false;
if (unlikely(vmx->fail)) {
pr_info_ratelimited("%s failed vm entry %x\n", __func__,
vmcs_read32(VM_INSTRUCTION_ERROR));
return true;
}
switch (exit_reason) {
case EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI:
if (!is_exception(intr_info))
return false;
else if (is_page_fault(intr_info))
return enable_ept;
else if (is_no_device(intr_info) &&
!(vmcs12->guest_cr0 & X86_CR0_TS))
return false;
return vmcs12->exception_bitmap &
(1u << (intr_info & INTR_INFO_VECTOR_MASK));
case EXIT_REASON_EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT:
return false;
case EXIT_REASON_TRIPLE_FAULT:
return true;
case EXIT_REASON_PENDING_INTERRUPT:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_VIRTUAL_INTR_PENDING);
case EXIT_REASON_NMI_WINDOW:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_VIRTUAL_NMI_PENDING);
case EXIT_REASON_TASK_SWITCH:
return true;
case EXIT_REASON_CPUID:
if (kvm_register_read(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RAX) == 0xa)
return false;
return true;
case EXIT_REASON_HLT:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_HLT_EXITING);
case EXIT_REASON_INVD:
return true;
case EXIT_REASON_INVLPG:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_INVLPG_EXITING);
case EXIT_REASON_RDPMC:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_RDPMC_EXITING);
case EXIT_REASON_RDTSC: case EXIT_REASON_RDTSCP:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_RDTSC_EXITING);
case EXIT_REASON_VMCALL: case EXIT_REASON_VMCLEAR:
case EXIT_REASON_VMLAUNCH: case EXIT_REASON_VMPTRLD:
case EXIT_REASON_VMPTRST: case EXIT_REASON_VMREAD:
case EXIT_REASON_VMRESUME: case EXIT_REASON_VMWRITE:
case EXIT_REASON_VMOFF: case EXIT_REASON_VMON:
case EXIT_REASON_INVEPT: case EXIT_REASON_INVVPID:
/*
* VMX instructions trap unconditionally. This allows L1 to
* emulate them for its L2 guest, i.e., allows 3-level nesting!
*/
return true;
case EXIT_REASON_CR_ACCESS:
return nested_vmx_exit_handled_cr(vcpu, vmcs12);
case EXIT_REASON_DR_ACCESS:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_MOV_DR_EXITING);
case EXIT_REASON_IO_INSTRUCTION:
return nested_vmx_exit_handled_io(vcpu, vmcs12);
case EXIT_REASON_MSR_READ:
case EXIT_REASON_MSR_WRITE:
return nested_vmx_exit_handled_msr(vcpu, vmcs12, exit_reason);
case EXIT_REASON_INVALID_STATE:
return true;
case EXIT_REASON_MWAIT_INSTRUCTION:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_MWAIT_EXITING);
case EXIT_REASON_MONITOR_TRAP_FLAG:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_MONITOR_TRAP_FLAG);
case EXIT_REASON_MONITOR_INSTRUCTION:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_MONITOR_EXITING);
case EXIT_REASON_PAUSE_INSTRUCTION:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_PAUSE_EXITING) ||
nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12,
SECONDARY_EXEC_PAUSE_LOOP_EXITING);
case EXIT_REASON_MCE_DURING_VMENTRY:
return false;
case EXIT_REASON_TPR_BELOW_THRESHOLD:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW);
case EXIT_REASON_APIC_ACCESS:
return nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12,
SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES);
case EXIT_REASON_APIC_WRITE:
case EXIT_REASON_EOI_INDUCED:
/* apic_write and eoi_induced should exit unconditionally. */
return true;
case EXIT_REASON_EPT_VIOLATION:
/*
* L0 always deals with the EPT violation. If nested EPT is
* used, and the nested mmu code discovers that the address is
* missing in the guest EPT table (EPT12), the EPT violation
* will be injected with nested_ept_inject_page_fault()
*/
return false;
case EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG:
/*
* L2 never uses directly L1's EPT, but rather L0's own EPT
* table (shadow on EPT) or a merged EPT table that L0 built
* (EPT on EPT). So any problems with the structure of the
* table is L0's fault.
*/
return false;
case EXIT_REASON_WBINVD:
return nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_WBINVD_EXITING);
case EXIT_REASON_XSETBV:
return true;
case EXIT_REASON_XSAVES: case EXIT_REASON_XRSTORS:
/*
* This should never happen, since it is not possible to
* set XSS to a non-zero value---neither in L1 nor in L2.
* If if it were, XSS would have to be checked against
* the XSS exit bitmap in vmcs12.
*/
return nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_XSAVES);
case EXIT_REASON_PCOMMIT:
return nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_PCOMMIT);
default:
return true;
}
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: work around infinite loop in microcode when #AC is delivered
It was found that a guest can DoS a host by triggering an infinite
stream of "alignment check" (#AC) exceptions. This causes the
microcode to enter an infinite loop where the core never receives
another interrupt. The host kernel panics pretty quickly due to the
effects (CVE-2015-5307).
Signed-off-by: Eric Northup <digitaleric@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 42,703
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SynthesizedClip() : layer_(cc::PictureLayer::Create(this)) {
mask_isolation_id_ =
CompositorElementIdFromUniqueObjectId(NewUniqueObjectId());
mask_effect_id_ =
CompositorElementIdFromUniqueObjectId(NewUniqueObjectId());
layer_->SetIsDrawable(true);
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 125,539
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: rtadv_recv_packet (int sock, u_char *buf, int buflen,
struct sockaddr_in6 *from, ifindex_t *ifindex,
int *hoplimit)
{
int ret;
struct msghdr msg;
struct iovec iov;
struct cmsghdr *cmsgptr;
struct in6_addr dst;
char adata[1024];
/* Fill in message and iovec. */
msg.msg_name = (void *) from;
msg.msg_namelen = sizeof (struct sockaddr_in6);
msg.msg_iov = &iov;
msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
msg.msg_control = (void *) adata;
msg.msg_controllen = sizeof adata;
iov.iov_base = buf;
iov.iov_len = buflen;
/* If recvmsg fail return minus value. */
ret = recvmsg (sock, &msg, 0);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
for (cmsgptr = ZCMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg); cmsgptr != NULL;
cmsgptr = CMSG_NXTHDR(&msg, cmsgptr))
{
/* I want interface index which this packet comes from. */
if (cmsgptr->cmsg_level == IPPROTO_IPV6 &&
cmsgptr->cmsg_type == IPV6_PKTINFO)
{
struct in6_pktinfo *ptr;
ptr = (struct in6_pktinfo *) CMSG_DATA (cmsgptr);
*ifindex = ptr->ipi6_ifindex;
memcpy(&dst, &ptr->ipi6_addr, sizeof(ptr->ipi6_addr));
}
/* Incoming packet's hop limit. */
if (cmsgptr->cmsg_level == IPPROTO_IPV6 &&
cmsgptr->cmsg_type == IPV6_HOPLIMIT)
{
int *hoptr = (int *) CMSG_DATA (cmsgptr);
*hoplimit = *hoptr;
}
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: zebra: stack overrun in IPv6 RA receive code (CVE-2016-1245)
The IPv6 RA code also receives ICMPv6 RS and RA messages.
Unfortunately, by bad coding practice, the buffer size specified on
receiving such messages mixed up 2 constants that in fact have
different values.
The code itself has:
#define RTADV_MSG_SIZE 4096
While BUFSIZ is system-dependent, in my case (x86_64 glibc):
/usr/include/_G_config.h:#define _G_BUFSIZ 8192
/usr/include/libio.h:#define _IO_BUFSIZ _G_BUFSIZ
/usr/include/stdio.h:# define BUFSIZ _IO_BUFSIZ
FreeBSD, OpenBSD, NetBSD and Illumos are not affected, since all of them
have BUFSIZ == 1024.
As the latter is passed to the kernel on recvmsg(), it's possible to
overwrite 4kB of stack -- with ICMPv6 packets that can be globally sent
to any of the system's addresses (using fragmentation to get to 8k).
(The socket has filters installed limiting this to RS and RA packets,
but does not have a filter for source address or TTL.)
Issue discovered by trying to test other stuff, which randomly caused
the stack to be smaller than 8kB in that code location, which then
causes the kernel to report EFAULT (Bad address).
Signed-off-by: David Lamparter <equinox@opensourcerouting.org>
Reviewed-by: Donald Sharp <sharpd@cumulusnetworks.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 73,959
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void StyleResolver::pushParentShadowRoot(const ShadowRoot& shadowRoot)
{
ASSERT(shadowRoot.host());
m_styleTree.pushStyleCache(shadowRoot, shadowRoot.host());
}
Commit Message: Remove the Simple Default Stylesheet, it's just a foot-gun.
We've been bitten by the Simple Default Stylesheet being out
of sync with the real html.css twice this week.
The Simple Default Stylesheet was invented years ago for Mac:
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/36135
It nicely handles the case where you just want to create
a single WebView and parse some simple HTML either without
styling said HTML, or only to display a small string, etc.
Note that this optimization/complexity *only* helps for the
very first document, since the default stylesheets are
all static (process-global) variables. Since any real page
on the internet uses a tag not covered by the simple default
stylesheet, not real load benefits from this optimization.
Only uses of WebView which were just rendering small bits
of text might have benefited from this. about:blank would
also have used this sheet.
This was a common application for some uses of WebView back
in those days. These days, even with WebView on Android,
there are likely much larger overheads than parsing the
html.css stylesheet, so making it required seems like the
right tradeoff of code-simplicity for this case.
BUG=319556
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73723005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162153 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 118,988
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: uint32_t smb1cli_conn_max_xmit(struct smbXcli_conn *conn)
{
return conn->smb1.max_xmit;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 2,395
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void rds_tcp_set_callbacks(struct socket *sock, struct rds_conn_path *cp)
{
struct rds_tcp_connection *tc = cp->cp_transport_data;
rdsdebug("setting sock %p callbacks to tc %p\n", sock, tc);
write_lock_bh(&sock->sk->sk_callback_lock);
/* done under the callback_lock to serialize with write_space */
spin_lock(&rds_tcp_tc_list_lock);
list_add_tail(&tc->t_list_item, &rds_tcp_tc_list);
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
rds6_tcp_tc_count++;
#endif
if (!tc->t_cpath->cp_conn->c_isv6)
rds_tcp_tc_count++;
spin_unlock(&rds_tcp_tc_list_lock);
/* accepted sockets need our listen data ready undone */
if (sock->sk->sk_data_ready == rds_tcp_listen_data_ready)
sock->sk->sk_data_ready = sock->sk->sk_user_data;
tc->t_sock = sock;
tc->t_cpath = cp;
tc->t_orig_data_ready = sock->sk->sk_data_ready;
tc->t_orig_write_space = sock->sk->sk_write_space;
tc->t_orig_state_change = sock->sk->sk_state_change;
sock->sk->sk_user_data = cp;
sock->sk->sk_data_ready = rds_tcp_data_ready;
sock->sk->sk_write_space = rds_tcp_write_space;
sock->sk->sk_state_change = rds_tcp_state_change;
write_unlock_bh(&sock->sk->sk_callback_lock);
}
Commit Message: net: rds: force to destroy connection if t_sock is NULL in rds_tcp_kill_sock().
When it is to cleanup net namespace, rds_tcp_exit_net() will call
rds_tcp_kill_sock(), if t_sock is NULL, it will not call
rds_conn_destroy(), rds_conn_path_destroy() and rds_tcp_conn_free() to free
connection, and the worker cp_conn_w is not stopped, afterwards the net is freed in
net_drop_ns(); While cp_conn_w rds_connect_worker() will call rds_tcp_conn_path_connect()
and reference 'net' which has already been freed.
In rds_tcp_conn_path_connect(), rds_tcp_set_callbacks() will set t_sock = sock before
sock->ops->connect, but if connect() is failed, it will call
rds_tcp_restore_callbacks() and set t_sock = NULL, if connect is always
failed, rds_connect_worker() will try to reconnect all the time, so
rds_tcp_kill_sock() will never to cancel worker cp_conn_w and free the
connections.
Therefore, the condition !tc->t_sock is not needed if it is going to do
cleanup_net->rds_tcp_exit_net->rds_tcp_kill_sock, because tc->t_sock is always
NULL, and there is on other path to cancel cp_conn_w and free
connection. So this patch is to fix this.
rds_tcp_kill_sock():
...
if (net != c_net || !tc->t_sock)
...
Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com>
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in inet_create+0xbcc/0xd28
net/ipv4/af_inet.c:340
Read of size 4 at addr ffff8003496a4684 by task kworker/u8:4/3721
CPU: 3 PID: 3721 Comm: kworker/u8:4 Not tainted 5.1.0 #11
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
Workqueue: krdsd rds_connect_worker
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0x0/0x3c0 arch/arm64/kernel/time.c:53
show_stack+0x28/0x38 arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:152
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x120/0x188 lib/dump_stack.c:113
print_address_description+0x68/0x278 mm/kasan/report.c:253
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351 [inline]
kasan_report+0x21c/0x348 mm/kasan/report.c:409
__asan_report_load4_noabort+0x30/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:429
inet_create+0xbcc/0xd28 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:340
__sock_create+0x4f8/0x770 net/socket.c:1276
sock_create_kern+0x50/0x68 net/socket.c:1322
rds_tcp_conn_path_connect+0x2b4/0x690 net/rds/tcp_connect.c:114
rds_connect_worker+0x108/0x1d0 net/rds/threads.c:175
process_one_work+0x6e8/0x1700 kernel/workqueue.c:2153
worker_thread+0x3b0/0xdd0 kernel/workqueue.c:2296
kthread+0x2f0/0x378 kernel/kthread.c:255
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:1117
Allocated by task 687:
save_stack mm/kasan/kasan.c:448 [inline]
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline]
kasan_kmalloc+0xd4/0x180 mm/kasan/kasan.c:553
kasan_slab_alloc+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/kasan.c:490
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:444 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2705 [inline]
slab_alloc mm/slub.c:2713 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc+0x14c/0x388 mm/slub.c:2718
kmem_cache_zalloc include/linux/slab.h:697 [inline]
net_alloc net/core/net_namespace.c:384 [inline]
copy_net_ns+0xc4/0x2d0 net/core/net_namespace.c:424
create_new_namespaces+0x300/0x658 kernel/nsproxy.c:107
unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0xa0/0x198 kernel/nsproxy.c:206
ksys_unshare+0x340/0x628 kernel/fork.c:2577
__do_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:2645 [inline]
__se_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:2643 [inline]
__arm64_sys_unshare+0x38/0x58 kernel/fork.c:2643
__invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:35 [inline]
invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:47 [inline]
el0_svc_common+0x168/0x390 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:83
el0_svc_handler+0x60/0xd0 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:129
el0_svc+0x8/0xc arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:960
Freed by task 264:
save_stack mm/kasan/kasan.c:448 [inline]
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0x114/0x220 mm/kasan/kasan.c:521
kasan_slab_free+0x10/0x18 mm/kasan/kasan.c:528
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1370 [inline]
slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1397 [inline]
slab_free mm/slub.c:2952 [inline]
kmem_cache_free+0xb8/0x3a8 mm/slub.c:2968
net_free net/core/net_namespace.c:400 [inline]
net_drop_ns.part.6+0x78/0x90 net/core/net_namespace.c:407
net_drop_ns net/core/net_namespace.c:406 [inline]
cleanup_net+0x53c/0x6d8 net/core/net_namespace.c:569
process_one_work+0x6e8/0x1700 kernel/workqueue.c:2153
worker_thread+0x3b0/0xdd0 kernel/workqueue.c:2296
kthread+0x2f0/0x378 kernel/kthread.c:255
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:1117
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8003496a3f80
which belongs to the cache net_namespace of size 7872
The buggy address is located 1796 bytes inside of
7872-byte region [ffff8003496a3f80, ffff8003496a5e40)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffff7e000d25a800 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff80036ce4b000
index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
flags: 0xffffe0000008100(slab|head)
raw: 0ffffe0000008100 dead000000000100 dead000000000200 ffff80036ce4b000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080040004 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff8003496a4580: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8003496a4600: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff8003496a4680: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff8003496a4700: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8003496a4780: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
==================================================================
Fixes: 467fa15356ac("RDS-TCP: Support multiple RDS-TCP listen endpoints, one per netns.")
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mao Wenan <maowenan@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 90,197
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void skb_entail(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
struct tcp_skb_cb *tcb = TCP_SKB_CB(skb);
skb->csum = 0;
tcb->seq = tcb->end_seq = tp->write_seq;
tcb->tcp_flags = TCPHDR_ACK;
tcb->sacked = 0;
__skb_header_release(skb);
tcp_add_write_queue_tail(sk, skb);
sk->sk_wmem_queued += skb->truesize;
sk_mem_charge(sk, skb->truesize);
if (tp->nonagle & TCP_NAGLE_PUSH)
tp->nonagle &= ~TCP_NAGLE_PUSH;
tcp_slow_start_after_idle_check(sk);
}
Commit Message: tcp: initialize rcv_mss to TCP_MIN_MSS instead of 0
When tcp_disconnect() is called, inet_csk_delack_init() sets
icsk->icsk_ack.rcv_mss to 0.
This could potentially cause tcp_recvmsg() => tcp_cleanup_rbuf() =>
__tcp_select_window() call path to have division by 0 issue.
So this patch initializes rcv_mss to TCP_MIN_MSS instead of 0.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 61,732
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void vrend_renderer_get_rect(int res_handle, struct iovec *iov, unsigned int num_iovs,
uint32_t offset, int x, int y, int width, int height)
{
struct vrend_resource *res = vrend_resource_lookup(res_handle, 0);
struct vrend_transfer_info transfer_info;
struct pipe_box box;
int elsize;
memset(&transfer_info, 0, sizeof(transfer_info));
elsize = util_format_get_blocksize(res->base.format);
box.x = x;
box.y = y;
box.z = 0;
box.width = width;
box.height = height;
box.depth = 1;
transfer_info.box = &box;
transfer_info.stride = util_format_get_nblocksx(res->base.format, res->base.width0) * elsize;
transfer_info.offset = offset;
transfer_info.handle = res->handle;
transfer_info.iovec = iov;
transfer_info.iovec_cnt = num_iovs;
vrend_renderer_transfer_iov(&transfer_info, VREND_TRANSFER_READ);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 8,906
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int nfs_close(struct device_d *dev, FILE *file)
{
struct file_priv *priv = file->priv;
nfs_do_close(priv);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 1,335
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void giveup_altivec_maybe_transactional(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
/*
* If we are saving the current thread's registers, and the
* thread is in a transactional state, set the TIF_RESTORE_TM
* bit so that we know to restore the registers before
* returning to userspace.
*/
if (tsk == current && tsk->thread.regs &&
MSR_TM_ACTIVE(tsk->thread.regs->msr) &&
!test_thread_flag(TIF_RESTORE_TM)) {
tsk->thread.ckpt_regs.msr = tsk->thread.regs->msr;
set_thread_flag(TIF_RESTORE_TM);
}
giveup_altivec(tsk);
}
Commit Message: powerpc/tm: Check for already reclaimed tasks
Currently we can hit a scenario where we'll tm_reclaim() twice. This
results in a TM bad thing exception because the second reclaim occurs
when not in suspend mode.
The scenario in which this can happen is the following. We attempt to
deliver a signal to userspace. To do this we need obtain the stack
pointer to write the signal context. To get this stack pointer we
must tm_reclaim() in case we need to use the checkpointed stack
pointer (see get_tm_stackpointer()). Normally we'd then return
directly to userspace to deliver the signal without going through
__switch_to().
Unfortunatley, if at this point we get an error (such as a bad
userspace stack pointer), we need to exit the process. The exit will
result in a __switch_to(). __switch_to() will attempt to save the
process state which results in another tm_reclaim(). This
tm_reclaim() now causes a TM Bad Thing exception as this state has
already been saved and the processor is no longer in TM suspend mode.
Whee!
This patch checks the state of the MSR to ensure we are TM suspended
before we attempt the tm_reclaim(). If we've already saved the state
away, we should no longer be in TM suspend mode. This has the
additional advantage of checking for a potential TM Bad Thing
exception.
Found using syscall fuzzer.
Fixes: fb09692e71f1 ("powerpc: Add reclaim and recheckpoint functions for context switching transactional memory processes")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.9+
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 56,447
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool xmp_set_property_int32(XmpPtr xmp, const char *schema, const char *name,
int32_t value, uint32_t optionBits)
{
CHECK_PTR(xmp, false);
RESET_ERROR;
bool ret = false;
auto txmp = reinterpret_cast<SXMPMeta *>(xmp);
try {
txmp->SetProperty_Int(schema, name, value, optionBits);
ret = true;
}
catch (const XMP_Error &e) {
set_error(e);
}
catch (...) {
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 16,054
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void do_pf_write(void)
{
ps_set_intr(do_pf_write_start, NULL, 0, nice);
}
Commit Message: paride/pf: Fix potential NULL pointer dereference
Syzkaller report this:
pf: pf version 1.04, major 47, cluster 64, nice 0
pf: No ATAPI disk detected
kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 0 PID: 9887 Comm: syz-executor.0 Tainted: G C 5.1.0-rc3+ #8
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:pf_init+0x7af/0x1000 [pf]
Code: 46 77 d2 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 80 3c 28 00 74 08 48 89 df e8 03 25 a6 d2 4c 8b 23 49 8d bc 24 80 05 00 00 48 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <80> 3c 28 00 74 05 e8 e6 24 a6 d2 49 8b bc 24 80 05 00 00 e8 79 34
RSP: 0018:ffff8881abcbf998 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 00000000000000b0 RBX: ffffffffc1e4a8a8 RCX: ffffffffaec50788
RDX: 0000000000039b10 RSI: ffffc9000153c000 RDI: 0000000000000580
RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: ffffed103ee44e59 R09: ffffed103ee44e59
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed103ee44e58 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffffffffc1e4b028 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000020
FS: 00007f1b78a91700(0000) GS:ffff8881f7200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f6d72b207f8 CR3: 00000001d5790004 CR4: 00000000007606f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
? 0xffffffffc1e50000
do_one_initcall+0xbc/0x47d init/main.c:901
do_init_module+0x1b5/0x547 kernel/module.c:3456
load_module+0x6405/0x8c10 kernel/module.c:3804
__do_sys_finit_module+0x162/0x190 kernel/module.c:3898
do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x450 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f1b78a90c58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000180 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f1b78a90c70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f1b78a916bc
R13: 00000000004bcefa R14: 00000000006f6fb0 R15: 0000000000000004
Modules linked in: pf(+) paride gpio_tps65218 tps65218 i2c_cht_wc ati_remote dc395x act_meta_skbtcindex act_ife ife ecdh_generic rc_xbox_dvd sky81452_regulator v4l2_fwnode leds_blinkm snd_usb_hiface comedi(C) aes_ti slhc cfi_cmdset_0020 mtd cfi_util sx8654 mdio_gpio of_mdio fixed_phy mdio_bitbang libphy alcor_pci matrix_keymap hid_uclogic usbhid scsi_transport_fc videobuf2_v4l2 videobuf2_dma_sg snd_soc_pcm179x_spi snd_soc_pcm179x_codec i2c_demux_pinctrl mdev snd_indigodj isl6405 mii enc28j60 cmac adt7316_i2c(C) adt7316(C) fmc_trivial fmc nf_reject_ipv4 authenc rc_dtt200u rtc_ds1672 dvb_usb_dibusb_mc dvb_usb_dibusb_mc_common dib3000mc dibx000_common dvb_usb_dibusb_common dvb_usb dvb_core videobuf2_common videobuf2_vmalloc videobuf2_memops regulator_haptic adf7242 mac802154 ieee802154 s5h1409 da9034_ts snd_intel8x0m wmi cx24120 usbcore sdhci_cadence sdhci_pltfm sdhci mmc_core joydev i2c_algo_bit scsi_transport_iscsi iscsi_boot_sysfs ves1820 lockd grace nfs_acl auth_rpcgss sunrp
c
ip_vs snd_soc_adau7002 snd_cs4281 snd_rawmidi gameport snd_opl3_lib snd_seq_device snd_hwdep snd_ac97_codec ad7418 hid_primax hid snd_soc_cs4265 snd_soc_core snd_pcm_dmaengine snd_pcm snd_timer ac97_bus snd_compress snd soundcore ti_adc108s102 eeprom_93cx6 i2c_algo_pca mlxreg_hotplug st_pressure st_sensors industrialio_triggered_buffer kfifo_buf industrialio v4l2_common videodev media snd_soc_adau_utils rc_pinnacle_grey rc_core pps_gpio leds_lm3692x nandcore ledtrig_pattern iptable_security iptable_raw iptable_mangle iptable_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 iptable_filter bpfilter ip6_vti ip_vti ip_gre ipip sit tunnel4 ip_tunnel hsr veth netdevsim vxcan batman_adv cfg80211 rfkill chnl_net caif nlmon dummy team bonding vcan bridge stp llc ip6_gre gre ip6_tunnel tunnel6 tun mousedev ppdev tpm kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel ide_pci_generic aes_x86_64 piix crypto_simd input_leds psmouse cryp
td
glue_helper ide_core intel_agp serio_raw intel_gtt agpgart ata_generic i2c_piix4 pata_acpi parport_pc parport rtc_cmos floppy sch_fq_codel ip_tables x_tables sha1_ssse3 sha1_generic ipv6 [last unloaded: paride]
Dumping ftrace buffer:
(ftrace buffer empty)
---[ end trace 7a818cf5f210d79e ]---
If alloc_disk fails in pf_init_units, pf->disk will be
NULL, however in pf_detect and pf_exit, it's not check
this before free.It may result a NULL pointer dereference.
Also when register_blkdev failed, blk_cleanup_queue() and
blk_mq_free_tag_set() should be called to free resources.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: 6ce59025f118 ("paride/pf: cleanup queues when detection fails")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 87,996
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct page *no_page_table(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned int flags)
{
/*
* When core dumping an enormous anonymous area that nobody
* has touched so far, we don't want to allocate unnecessary pages or
* page tables. Return error instead of NULL to skip handle_mm_fault,
* then get_dump_page() will return NULL to leave a hole in the dump.
* But we can only make this optimization where a hole would surely
* be zero-filled if handle_mm_fault() actually did handle it.
*/
if ((flags & FOLL_DUMP) && (!vma->vm_ops || !vma->vm_ops->fault))
return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: mm: remove gup_flags FOLL_WRITE games from __get_user_pages()
This is an ancient bug that was actually attempted to be fixed once
(badly) by me eleven years ago in commit 4ceb5db9757a ("Fix
get_user_pages() race for write access") but that was then undone due to
problems on s390 by commit f33ea7f404e5 ("fix get_user_pages bug").
In the meantime, the s390 situation has long been fixed, and we can now
fix it by checking the pte_dirty() bit properly (and do it better). The
s390 dirty bit was implemented in abf09bed3cce ("s390/mm: implement
software dirty bits") which made it into v3.9. Earlier kernels will
have to look at the page state itself.
Also, the VM has become more scalable, and what used a purely
theoretical race back then has become easier to trigger.
To fix it, we introduce a new internal FOLL_COW flag to mark the "yes,
we already did a COW" rather than play racy games with FOLL_WRITE that
is very fundamental, and then use the pte dirty flag to validate that
the FOLL_COW flag is still valid.
Reported-and-tested-by: Phil "not Paul" Oester <kernel@linuxace.com>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 52,118
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void net_tx_action(struct softirq_action *h)
{
struct softnet_data *sd = &__get_cpu_var(softnet_data);
if (sd->completion_queue) {
struct sk_buff *clist;
local_irq_disable();
clist = sd->completion_queue;
sd->completion_queue = NULL;
local_irq_enable();
while (clist) {
struct sk_buff *skb = clist;
clist = clist->next;
WARN_ON(atomic_read(&skb->users));
__kfree_skb(skb);
}
}
if (sd->output_queue) {
struct Qdisc *head;
local_irq_disable();
head = sd->output_queue;
sd->output_queue = NULL;
sd->output_queue_tailp = &sd->output_queue;
local_irq_enable();
while (head) {
struct Qdisc *q = head;
spinlock_t *root_lock;
head = head->next_sched;
root_lock = qdisc_lock(q);
if (spin_trylock(root_lock)) {
smp_mb__before_clear_bit();
clear_bit(__QDISC_STATE_SCHED,
&q->state);
qdisc_run(q);
spin_unlock(root_lock);
} else {
if (!test_bit(__QDISC_STATE_DEACTIVATED,
&q->state)) {
__netif_reschedule(q);
} else {
smp_mb__before_clear_bit();
clear_bit(__QDISC_STATE_SCHED,
&q->state);
}
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: netdevice.h net/core/dev.c: Convert netdev_<level> logging macros to functions
Reduces an x86 defconfig text and data ~2k.
text is smaller, data is larger.
$ size vmlinux*
text data bss dec hex filename
7198862 720112 1366288 9285262 8dae8e vmlinux
7205273 716016 1366288 9287577 8db799 vmlinux.device_h
Uses %pV and struct va_format
Format arguments are verified before printk
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 38,003
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TestRenderWidgetHostView::SubmitCompositorFrame(
const cc::LocalSurfaceId& local_surface_id,
cc::CompositorFrame frame) {
did_swap_compositor_frame_ = true;
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 127,950
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int valid_phys_addr_range(phys_addr_t addr, size_t count)
{
return addr + count <= __pa(high_memory);
}
Commit Message: mm: Tighten x86 /dev/mem with zeroing reads
Under CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM, reading System RAM through /dev/mem is
disallowed. However, on x86, the first 1MB was always allowed for BIOS
and similar things, regardless of it actually being System RAM. It was
possible for heap to end up getting allocated in low 1MB RAM, and then
read by things like x86info or dd, which would trip hardened usercopy:
usercopy: kernel memory exposure attempt detected from ffff880000090000 (dma-kmalloc-256) (4096 bytes)
This changes the x86 exception for the low 1MB by reading back zeros for
System RAM areas instead of blindly allowing them. More work is needed to
extend this to mmap, but currently mmap doesn't go through usercopy, so
hardened usercopy won't Oops the kernel.
Reported-by: Tommi Rantala <tommi.t.rantala@nokia.com>
Tested-by: Tommi Rantala <tommi.t.rantala@nokia.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 66,901
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ipv6_local_rxpmtu(struct sock *sk, struct flowi6 *fl6, u32 mtu)
{
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct ipv6hdr *iph;
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct ip6_mtuinfo *mtu_info;
if (!np->rxopt.bits.rxpmtu)
return;
skb = alloc_skb(sizeof(struct ipv6hdr), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!skb)
return;
skb_put(skb, sizeof(struct ipv6hdr));
skb_reset_network_header(skb);
iph = ipv6_hdr(skb);
iph->daddr = fl6->daddr;
mtu_info = IP6CBMTU(skb);
mtu_info->ip6m_mtu = mtu;
mtu_info->ip6m_addr.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
mtu_info->ip6m_addr.sin6_port = 0;
mtu_info->ip6m_addr.sin6_flowinfo = 0;
mtu_info->ip6m_addr.sin6_scope_id = fl6->flowi6_oif;
mtu_info->ip6m_addr.sin6_addr = ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr;
__skb_pull(skb, skb_tail_pointer(skb) - skb->data);
skb_reset_transport_header(skb);
skb = xchg(&np->rxpmtu, skb);
kfree_skb(skb);
}
Commit Message: ipv6: add complete rcu protection around np->opt
This patch addresses multiple problems :
UDP/RAW sendmsg() need to get a stable struct ipv6_txoptions
while socket is not locked : Other threads can change np->opt
concurrently. Dmitry posted a syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller) program desmonstrating
use-after-free.
Starting with TCP/DCCP lockless listeners, tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock()
and dccp_v6_request_recv_sock() also need to use RCU protection
to dereference np->opt once (before calling ipv6_dup_options())
This patch adds full RCU protection to np->opt
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 53,669
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: coolkey_v0_get_attribute_len(const u8 *attr, size_t buf_len, size_t *len)
{
coolkey_v0_attribute_header_t *attribute_head = (coolkey_v0_attribute_header_t *)attr;
/* don't reference beyond our buffer */
if (buf_len < sizeof(coolkey_v0_attribute_header_t)) {
return SC_ERROR_CORRUPTED_DATA;
}
*len = bebytes2ushort(attribute_head->attribute_data_len);
return SC_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 78,320
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void MeasuredLongAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
V8SetReturnValueInt(info, impl->measuredLongAttribute());
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 134,875
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int SocketStream::DoReadTunnelHeadersComplete(int result) {
DCHECK_EQ(kTunnelProxy, proxy_mode_);
if (result < 0) {
next_state_ = STATE_CLOSE;
return result;
}
if (result == 0) {
next_state_ = STATE_CLOSE;
return ERR_CONNECTION_CLOSED;
}
tunnel_response_headers_len_ += result;
DCHECK(tunnel_response_headers_len_ <= tunnel_response_headers_capacity_);
int eoh = HttpUtil::LocateEndOfHeaders(
tunnel_response_headers_->headers(), tunnel_response_headers_len_, 0);
if (eoh == -1) {
if (tunnel_response_headers_len_ >= kMaxTunnelResponseHeadersSize) {
next_state_ = STATE_CLOSE;
return ERR_RESPONSE_HEADERS_TOO_BIG;
}
next_state_ = STATE_READ_TUNNEL_HEADERS;
return OK;
}
scoped_refptr<HttpResponseHeaders> headers;
headers = new HttpResponseHeaders(
HttpUtil::AssembleRawHeaders(tunnel_response_headers_->headers(), eoh));
if (headers->GetParsedHttpVersion() < HttpVersion(1, 0)) {
next_state_ = STATE_CLOSE;
return ERR_TUNNEL_CONNECTION_FAILED;
}
switch (headers->response_code()) {
case 200: // OK
if (is_secure()) {
DCHECK_EQ(eoh, tunnel_response_headers_len_);
next_state_ = STATE_SSL_CONNECT;
} else {
result = DidEstablishConnection();
if (result < 0) {
next_state_ = STATE_CLOSE;
return result;
}
if ((eoh < tunnel_response_headers_len_) && delegate_)
delegate_->OnReceivedData(
this, tunnel_response_headers_->headers() + eoh,
tunnel_response_headers_len_ - eoh);
}
return OK;
case 407: // Proxy Authentication Required.
if (proxy_mode_ != kTunnelProxy)
return ERR_UNEXPECTED_PROXY_AUTH;
result = proxy_auth_controller_->HandleAuthChallenge(
headers, false, true, net_log_);
if (result != OK)
return result;
DCHECK(!proxy_info_.is_empty());
next_state_ = STATE_AUTH_REQUIRED;
if (proxy_auth_controller_->HaveAuth()) {
base::MessageLoop::current()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::Bind(&SocketStream::DoRestartWithAuth, this));
return ERR_IO_PENDING;
}
if (delegate_) {
base::MessageLoop::current()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::Bind(&SocketStream::DoAuthRequired, this));
return ERR_IO_PENDING;
}
break;
default:
break;
}
next_state_ = STATE_CLOSE;
return ERR_TUNNEL_CONNECTION_FAILED;
}
Commit Message: Revert a workaround commit for a Use-After-Free crash.
Revert a workaround commit r20158 for a Use-After-Free issue (http://crbug.com/244746) because a cleaner CL r207218 is landed.
URLRequestContext does not inherit SupportsWeakPtr now.
R=mmenke
BUG=244746
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16870008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@207811 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 112,678
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __init balloon_init(void)
{
if (!xen_domain())
return -ENODEV;
pr_info("Initialising balloon driver\n");
#ifdef CONFIG_XEN_PV
balloon_stats.current_pages = xen_pv_domain()
? min(xen_start_info->nr_pages - xen_released_pages, max_pfn)
: get_num_physpages();
#else
balloon_stats.current_pages = get_num_physpages();
#endif
balloon_stats.target_pages = balloon_stats.current_pages;
balloon_stats.balloon_low = 0;
balloon_stats.balloon_high = 0;
balloon_stats.total_pages = balloon_stats.current_pages;
balloon_stats.schedule_delay = 1;
balloon_stats.max_schedule_delay = 32;
balloon_stats.retry_count = 1;
balloon_stats.max_retry_count = RETRY_UNLIMITED;
#ifdef CONFIG_XEN_BALLOON_MEMORY_HOTPLUG
set_online_page_callback(&xen_online_page);
register_memory_notifier(&xen_memory_nb);
register_sysctl_table(xen_root);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_XEN_PV
{
int i;
/*
* Initialize the balloon with pages from the extra memory
* regions (see arch/x86/xen/setup.c).
*/
for (i = 0; i < XEN_EXTRA_MEM_MAX_REGIONS; i++)
if (xen_extra_mem[i].n_pfns)
balloon_add_region(xen_extra_mem[i].start_pfn,
xen_extra_mem[i].n_pfns);
}
#endif
/* Init the xen-balloon driver. */
xen_balloon_init();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: xen: let alloc_xenballooned_pages() fail if not enough memory free
commit a1078e821b605813b63bf6bca414a85f804d5c66 upstream.
Instead of trying to allocate pages with GFP_USER in
add_ballooned_pages() check the available free memory via
si_mem_available(). GFP_USER is far less limiting memory exhaustion
than the test via si_mem_available().
This will avoid dom0 running out of memory due to excessive foreign
page mappings especially on ARM and on x86 in PVH mode, as those don't
have a pre-ballooned area which can be used for foreign mappings.
As the normal ballooning suffers from the same problem don't balloon
down more than si_mem_available() pages in one iteration. At the same
time limit the default maximum number of retries.
This is part of XSA-300.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 1
| 169,493
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void voidMethodTestInterfaceEmptyArgVariadicTestInterfaceEmptyArgMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::voidMethodTestInterfaceEmptyArgVariadicTestInterfaceEmptyArgMethod(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 122,901
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate::CheckClientDownloadDone(
int32 download_id,
DownloadProtectionService::DownloadCheckResult result) {
DownloadItem* item = download_manager_->GetDownload(download_id);
if (!item || (item->GetState() != DownloadItem::IN_PROGRESS))
return;
VLOG(2) << __FUNCTION__ << "() download = " << item->DebugString(false)
<< " verdict = " << result;
if (item->GetDangerType() == content::DOWNLOAD_DANGER_TYPE_NOT_DANGEROUS ||
item->GetDangerType() ==
content::DOWNLOAD_DANGER_TYPE_MAYBE_DANGEROUS_CONTENT) {
switch (result) {
case DownloadProtectionService::SAFE:
break;
case DownloadProtectionService::DANGEROUS:
item->OnContentCheckCompleted(
content::DOWNLOAD_DANGER_TYPE_DANGEROUS_CONTENT);
break;
case DownloadProtectionService::UNCOMMON:
item->OnContentCheckCompleted(
content::DOWNLOAD_DANGER_TYPE_UNCOMMON_CONTENT);
break;
}
}
SafeBrowsingState* state = static_cast<SafeBrowsingState*>(
item->GetUserData(&safe_browsing_id));
state->SetVerdict(result);
}
Commit Message: For "Dangerous" file type, no user gesture will bypass the download warning.
BUG=170569
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12039015
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@178072 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 115,072
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void drain_local_stock(struct work_struct *dummy)
{
struct memcg_stock_pcp *stock = &__get_cpu_var(memcg_stock);
drain_stock(stock);
clear_bit(FLUSHING_CACHED_CHARGE, &stock->flags);
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 21,022
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::ApplyDirtyState() {
if (framebuffer_state_.clear_state_dirty) {
bool have_alpha = BoundFramebufferHasColorAttachmentWithAlpha(true);
state_.SetDeviceColorMask(state_.color_mask_red,
state_.color_mask_green,
state_.color_mask_blue,
state_.color_mask_alpha && have_alpha);
bool have_depth = BoundFramebufferHasDepthAttachment();
state_.SetDeviceDepthMask(state_.depth_mask && have_depth);
bool have_stencil = BoundFramebufferHasStencilAttachment();
state_.SetDeviceStencilMaskSeparate(
GL_FRONT, have_stencil ? state_.stencil_front_writemask : 0);
state_.SetDeviceStencilMaskSeparate(
GL_BACK, have_stencil ? state_.stencil_back_writemask : 0);
state_.SetDeviceCapabilityState(
GL_DEPTH_TEST, state_.enable_flags.depth_test && have_depth);
state_.SetDeviceCapabilityState(
GL_STENCIL_TEST, state_.enable_flags.stencil_test && have_stencil);
framebuffer_state_.clear_state_dirty = false;
}
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 120,741
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> toV8Object(const WebGLGetInfo& info, v8::Isolate* isolate)
{
switch (info.getType()) {
case WebGLGetInfo::kTypeBool:
return v8::Boolean::New(info.getBool());
case WebGLGetInfo::kTypeBoolArray: {
const Vector<bool>& value = info.getBoolArray();
v8::Local<v8::Array> array = v8::Array::New(value.size());
for (size_t ii = 0; ii < value.size(); ++ii)
array->Set(v8::Integer::New(ii), v8::Boolean::New(value[ii]));
return array;
}
case WebGLGetInfo::kTypeFloat:
return v8::Number::New(info.getFloat());
case WebGLGetInfo::kTypeInt:
return v8::Integer::New(info.getInt());
case WebGLGetInfo::kTypeNull:
return v8::Null();
case WebGLGetInfo::kTypeString:
return v8::String::New(fromWebCoreString(info.getString()), info.getString().length());
case WebGLGetInfo::kTypeUnsignedInt:
return v8::Integer::NewFromUnsigned(info.getUnsignedInt());
case WebGLGetInfo::kTypeWebGLBuffer:
return toV8(info.getWebGLBuffer(), isolate);
case WebGLGetInfo::kTypeWebGLFloatArray:
return toV8(info.getWebGLFloatArray(), isolate);
case WebGLGetInfo::kTypeWebGLFramebuffer:
return toV8(info.getWebGLFramebuffer(), isolate);
case WebGLGetInfo::kTypeWebGLIntArray:
return toV8(info.getWebGLIntArray(), isolate);
case WebGLGetInfo::kTypeWebGLProgram:
return toV8(info.getWebGLProgram(), isolate);
case WebGLGetInfo::kTypeWebGLRenderbuffer:
return toV8(info.getWebGLRenderbuffer(), isolate);
case WebGLGetInfo::kTypeWebGLTexture:
return toV8(info.getWebGLTexture(), isolate);
case WebGLGetInfo::kTypeWebGLUnsignedByteArray:
return toV8(info.getWebGLUnsignedByteArray(), isolate);
case WebGLGetInfo::kTypeWebGLUnsignedIntArray:
return toV8(info.getWebGLUnsignedIntArray(), isolate);
case WebGLGetInfo::kTypeWebGLVertexArrayObjectOES:
return toV8(info.getWebGLVertexArrayObjectOES(), isolate);
default:
notImplemented();
return v8::Undefined();
}
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 109,781
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::ActiveChainNodeDetached(Element& element) {
if (element == active_element_)
active_element_ = SkipDisplayNoneAncestors(&element);
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 134,020
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int tipc_nl_compat_handle(struct tipc_nl_compat_msg *msg)
{
struct tipc_nl_compat_cmd_dump dump;
struct tipc_nl_compat_cmd_doit doit;
memset(&dump, 0, sizeof(dump));
memset(&doit, 0, sizeof(doit));
switch (msg->cmd) {
case TIPC_CMD_NOOP:
msg->rep = tipc_tlv_alloc(0);
if (!msg->rep)
return -ENOMEM;
return 0;
case TIPC_CMD_GET_BEARER_NAMES:
msg->rep_size = MAX_BEARERS * TLV_SPACE(TIPC_MAX_BEARER_NAME);
dump.dumpit = tipc_nl_bearer_dump;
dump.format = tipc_nl_compat_bearer_dump;
return tipc_nl_compat_dumpit(&dump, msg);
case TIPC_CMD_ENABLE_BEARER:
msg->req_type = TIPC_TLV_BEARER_CONFIG;
doit.doit = tipc_nl_bearer_enable;
doit.transcode = tipc_nl_compat_bearer_enable;
return tipc_nl_compat_doit(&doit, msg);
case TIPC_CMD_DISABLE_BEARER:
msg->req_type = TIPC_TLV_BEARER_NAME;
doit.doit = tipc_nl_bearer_disable;
doit.transcode = tipc_nl_compat_bearer_disable;
return tipc_nl_compat_doit(&doit, msg);
case TIPC_CMD_SHOW_LINK_STATS:
msg->req_type = TIPC_TLV_LINK_NAME;
msg->rep_size = ULTRA_STRING_MAX_LEN;
msg->rep_type = TIPC_TLV_ULTRA_STRING;
dump.dumpit = tipc_nl_node_dump_link;
dump.format = tipc_nl_compat_link_stat_dump;
return tipc_nl_compat_dumpit(&dump, msg);
case TIPC_CMD_GET_LINKS:
msg->req_type = TIPC_TLV_NET_ADDR;
msg->rep_size = ULTRA_STRING_MAX_LEN;
dump.dumpit = tipc_nl_node_dump_link;
dump.format = tipc_nl_compat_link_dump;
return tipc_nl_compat_dumpit(&dump, msg);
case TIPC_CMD_SET_LINK_TOL:
case TIPC_CMD_SET_LINK_PRI:
case TIPC_CMD_SET_LINK_WINDOW:
msg->req_type = TIPC_TLV_LINK_CONFIG;
doit.doit = tipc_nl_node_set_link;
doit.transcode = tipc_nl_compat_link_set;
return tipc_nl_compat_doit(&doit, msg);
case TIPC_CMD_RESET_LINK_STATS:
msg->req_type = TIPC_TLV_LINK_NAME;
doit.doit = tipc_nl_node_reset_link_stats;
doit.transcode = tipc_nl_compat_link_reset_stats;
return tipc_nl_compat_doit(&doit, msg);
case TIPC_CMD_SHOW_NAME_TABLE:
msg->req_type = TIPC_TLV_NAME_TBL_QUERY;
msg->rep_size = ULTRA_STRING_MAX_LEN;
msg->rep_type = TIPC_TLV_ULTRA_STRING;
dump.header = tipc_nl_compat_name_table_dump_header;
dump.dumpit = tipc_nl_name_table_dump;
dump.format = tipc_nl_compat_name_table_dump;
return tipc_nl_compat_dumpit(&dump, msg);
case TIPC_CMD_SHOW_PORTS:
msg->rep_size = ULTRA_STRING_MAX_LEN;
msg->rep_type = TIPC_TLV_ULTRA_STRING;
dump.dumpit = tipc_nl_sk_dump;
dump.format = tipc_nl_compat_sk_dump;
return tipc_nl_compat_dumpit(&dump, msg);
case TIPC_CMD_GET_MEDIA_NAMES:
msg->rep_size = MAX_MEDIA * TLV_SPACE(TIPC_MAX_MEDIA_NAME);
dump.dumpit = tipc_nl_media_dump;
dump.format = tipc_nl_compat_media_dump;
return tipc_nl_compat_dumpit(&dump, msg);
case TIPC_CMD_GET_NODES:
msg->rep_size = ULTRA_STRING_MAX_LEN;
dump.dumpit = tipc_nl_node_dump;
dump.format = tipc_nl_compat_node_dump;
return tipc_nl_compat_dumpit(&dump, msg);
case TIPC_CMD_SET_NODE_ADDR:
msg->req_type = TIPC_TLV_NET_ADDR;
doit.doit = tipc_nl_net_set;
doit.transcode = tipc_nl_compat_net_set;
return tipc_nl_compat_doit(&doit, msg);
case TIPC_CMD_SET_NETID:
msg->req_type = TIPC_TLV_UNSIGNED;
doit.doit = tipc_nl_net_set;
doit.transcode = tipc_nl_compat_net_set;
return tipc_nl_compat_doit(&doit, msg);
case TIPC_CMD_GET_NETID:
msg->rep_size = sizeof(u32);
dump.dumpit = tipc_nl_net_dump;
dump.format = tipc_nl_compat_net_dump;
return tipc_nl_compat_dumpit(&dump, msg);
case TIPC_CMD_SHOW_STATS:
return tipc_cmd_show_stats_compat(msg);
}
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
Commit Message: tipc: fix an infoleak in tipc_nl_compat_link_dump
link_info.str is a char array of size 60. Memory after the NULL
byte is not initialized. Sending the whole object out can cause
a leak.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 52,078
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int imap_sync_message_for_copy(struct ImapData *idata, struct Header *hdr,
struct Buffer *cmd, int *err_continue)
{
char flags[LONG_STRING];
char *tags;
char uid[11];
if (!compare_flags_for_copy(hdr))
{
if (hdr->deleted == HEADER_DATA(hdr)->deleted)
hdr->changed = false;
return 0;
}
snprintf(uid, sizeof(uid), "%u", HEADER_DATA(hdr)->uid);
cmd->dptr = cmd->data;
mutt_buffer_addstr(cmd, "UID STORE ");
mutt_buffer_addstr(cmd, uid);
flags[0] = '\0';
set_flag(idata, MUTT_ACL_SEEN, hdr->read, "\\Seen ", flags, sizeof(flags));
set_flag(idata, MUTT_ACL_WRITE, hdr->old, "Old ", flags, sizeof(flags));
set_flag(idata, MUTT_ACL_WRITE, hdr->flagged, "\\Flagged ", flags, sizeof(flags));
set_flag(idata, MUTT_ACL_WRITE, hdr->replied, "\\Answered ", flags, sizeof(flags));
set_flag(idata, MUTT_ACL_DELETE, HEADER_DATA(hdr)->deleted, "\\Deleted ",
flags, sizeof(flags));
if (mutt_bit_isset(idata->ctx->rights, MUTT_ACL_WRITE))
{
/* restore system flags */
if (HEADER_DATA(hdr)->flags_system)
mutt_str_strcat(flags, sizeof(flags), HEADER_DATA(hdr)->flags_system);
/* set custom flags */
tags = driver_tags_get_with_hidden(&hdr->tags);
if (tags)
{
mutt_str_strcat(flags, sizeof(flags), tags);
FREE(&tags);
}
}
mutt_str_remove_trailing_ws(flags);
/* UW-IMAP is OK with null flags, Cyrus isn't. The only solution is to
* explicitly revoke all system flags (if we have permission) */
if (!*flags)
{
set_flag(idata, MUTT_ACL_SEEN, 1, "\\Seen ", flags, sizeof(flags));
set_flag(idata, MUTT_ACL_WRITE, 1, "Old ", flags, sizeof(flags));
set_flag(idata, MUTT_ACL_WRITE, 1, "\\Flagged ", flags, sizeof(flags));
set_flag(idata, MUTT_ACL_WRITE, 1, "\\Answered ", flags, sizeof(flags));
set_flag(idata, MUTT_ACL_DELETE, !HEADER_DATA(hdr)->deleted, "\\Deleted ",
flags, sizeof(flags));
/* erase custom flags */
if (mutt_bit_isset(idata->ctx->rights, MUTT_ACL_WRITE) && HEADER_DATA(hdr)->flags_remote)
mutt_str_strcat(flags, sizeof(flags), HEADER_DATA(hdr)->flags_remote);
mutt_str_remove_trailing_ws(flags);
mutt_buffer_addstr(cmd, " -FLAGS.SILENT (");
}
else
mutt_buffer_addstr(cmd, " FLAGS.SILENT (");
mutt_buffer_addstr(cmd, flags);
mutt_buffer_addstr(cmd, ")");
/* dumb hack for bad UW-IMAP 4.7 servers spurious FLAGS updates */
hdr->active = false;
/* after all this it's still possible to have no flags, if you
* have no ACL rights */
if (*flags && (imap_exec(idata, cmd->data, 0) != 0) && err_continue &&
(*err_continue != MUTT_YES))
{
*err_continue = imap_continue("imap_sync_message: STORE failed", idata->buf);
if (*err_continue != MUTT_YES)
{
hdr->active = true;
return -1;
}
}
/* server have now the updated flags */
FREE(&HEADER_DATA(hdr)->flags_remote);
HEADER_DATA(hdr)->flags_remote = driver_tags_get_with_hidden(&hdr->tags);
hdr->active = true;
if (hdr->deleted == HEADER_DATA(hdr)->deleted)
hdr->changed = false;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: quote imap strings more carefully
Co-authored-by: JerikoOne <jeriko.one@gmx.us>
CWE ID: CWE-77
| 0
| 79,608
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void adts_variable_header(adts_header *adts, bitfile *ld)
{
adts->copyright_identification_bit = faad_get1bit(ld
DEBUGVAR(1,129,"adts_variable_header(): copyright_identification_bit"));
adts->copyright_identification_start = faad_get1bit(ld
DEBUGVAR(1,130,"adts_variable_header(): copyright_identification_start"));
adts->aac_frame_length = (uint16_t)faad_getbits(ld, 13
DEBUGVAR(1,131,"adts_variable_header(): aac_frame_length"));
adts->adts_buffer_fullness = (uint16_t)faad_getbits(ld, 11
DEBUGVAR(1,132,"adts_variable_header(): adts_buffer_fullness"));
adts->no_raw_data_blocks_in_frame = (uint8_t)faad_getbits(ld, 2
DEBUGVAR(1,133,"adts_variable_header(): no_raw_data_blocks_in_frame"));
}
Commit Message: Fix a couple buffer overflows
https://hackerone.com/reports/502816
https://hackerone.com/reports/507858
https://github.com/videolan/vlc/blob/master/contrib/src/faad2/faad2-fix-overflows.patch
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 88,370
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void free_user_ns(struct user_namespace *ns)
{
struct user_namespace *parent;
do {
parent = ns->parent;
proc_free_inum(ns->proc_inum);
kmem_cache_free(user_ns_cachep, ns);
ns = parent;
} while (atomic_dec_and_test(&parent->count));
}
Commit Message: userns: unshare_userns(&cred) should not populate cred on failure
unshare_userns(new_cred) does *new_cred = prepare_creds() before
create_user_ns() which can fail. However, the caller expects that
it doesn't need to take care of new_cred if unshare_userns() fails.
We could change the single caller, sys_unshare(), but I think it
would be more clean to avoid the side effects on failure, so with
this patch unshare_userns() does put_cred() itself and initializes
*new_cred only if create_user_ns() succeeeds.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 29,893
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RunTest(const FilePath& url,
const char* expected_reply,
bool new_tab) {
FilePath test_path;
test_path = gpu_test_dir_.Append(url);
ASSERT_TRUE(file_util::PathExists(test_path))
<< "Missing test file: " << test_path.value();
ui_test_utils::DOMMessageQueue message_queue;
if (new_tab) {
ui_test_utils::NavigateToURLWithDisposition(
browser(), net::FilePathToFileURL(test_path),
NEW_FOREGROUND_TAB, ui_test_utils::BROWSER_TEST_NONE);
} else {
ui_test_utils::NavigateToURL(
browser(), net::FilePathToFileURL(test_path));
}
std::string result;
ASSERT_TRUE(message_queue.WaitForMessage(&result));
if (expected_reply)
EXPECT_STREQ(expected_reply, result.c_str());
}
Commit Message: Revert 124346 - Add basic threaded compositor test to gpu_feature_browsertest.cc
BUG=113159
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9509001
TBR=jbates@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9561011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@124356 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 107,223
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct ip_sf_list *igmp_mcf_get_idx(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t pos)
{
struct ip_sf_list *psf = igmp_mcf_get_first(seq);
if (psf)
while (pos && (psf = igmp_mcf_get_next(seq, psf)) != NULL)
--pos;
return pos ? NULL : psf;
}
Commit Message: igmp: Avoid zero delay when receiving odd mixture of IGMP queries
Commit 5b7c84066733c5dfb0e4016d939757b38de189e4 ('ipv4: correct IGMP
behavior on v3 query during v2-compatibility mode') added yet another
case for query parsing, which can result in max_delay = 0. Substitute
a value of 1, as in the usual v3 case.
Reported-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@debian.org>
References: http://bugs.debian.org/654876
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 21,603
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: qedi_dbg_warn(struct qedi_dbg_ctx *qedi, const char *func, u32 line,
const char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list va;
struct va_format vaf;
char nfunc[32];
memset(nfunc, 0, sizeof(nfunc));
memcpy(nfunc, func, sizeof(nfunc) - 1);
va_start(va, fmt);
vaf.fmt = fmt;
vaf.va = &va;
if (!(qedi_dbg_log & QEDI_LOG_WARN))
goto ret;
if (likely(qedi) && likely(qedi->pdev))
pr_warn("[%s]:[%s:%d]:%d: %pV", dev_name(&qedi->pdev->dev),
nfunc, line, qedi->host_no, &vaf);
else
pr_warn("[0000:00:00.0]:[%s:%d]: %pV", nfunc, line, &vaf);
ret:
va_end(va);
}
Commit Message: scsi: qedi: remove memset/memcpy to nfunc and use func instead
KASAN reports this:
BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in qedi_dbg_err+0xda/0x330 [qedi]
Read of size 31 at addr ffffffffc12b0ae0 by task syz-executor.0/2429
CPU: 0 PID: 2429 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc7+ #45
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0xfa/0x1ce lib/dump_stack.c:113
print_address_description+0x1c4/0x270 mm/kasan/report.c:187
kasan_report+0x149/0x18d mm/kasan/report.c:317
memcpy+0x1f/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:130
qedi_dbg_err+0xda/0x330 [qedi]
? 0xffffffffc12d0000
qedi_init+0x118/0x1000 [qedi]
? 0xffffffffc12d0000
? 0xffffffffc12d0000
? 0xffffffffc12d0000
do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887
do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460
load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808
__do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902
do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f2d57e55c58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bfa0 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000200003c0 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f2d57e55c70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f2d57e566bc
R13: 00000000004bcefb R14: 00000000006f7030 R15: 0000000000000004
The buggy address belongs to the variable:
__func__.67584+0x0/0xffffffffffffd520 [qedi]
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffffffffc12b0980: fa fa fa fa 00 04 fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 05 fa
ffffffffc12b0a00: fa fa fa fa 00 00 04 fa fa fa fa fa 00 05 fa fa
> ffffffffc12b0a80: fa fa fa fa 00 06 fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 02 fa fa
^
ffffffffc12b0b00: fa fa fa fa 00 00 04 fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 03 fa
ffffffffc12b0b80: fa fa fa fa 00 00 02 fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 04 fa
Currently the qedi_dbg_* family of functions can overrun the end of the
source string if it is less than the destination buffer length because of
the use of a fixed sized memcpy. Remove the memset/memcpy calls to nfunc
and just use func instead as it is always a null terminated string.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: ace7f46ba5fd ("scsi: qedi: Add QLogic FastLinQ offload iSCSI driver framework.")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 1
| 169,561
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool CSPSourceList::parsePath(const UChar* begin, const UChar* end, String& path)
{
ASSERT(begin <= end);
ASSERT(path.isEmpty());
const UChar* position = begin;
skipWhile<UChar, isPathComponentCharacter>(position, end);
if (position < end)
m_policy->reportInvalidPathCharacter(m_directiveName, String(begin, end - begin), *position);
path = decodeURLEscapeSequences(String(begin, position - begin));
ASSERT(position <= end);
ASSERT(position == end || (*position == '#' || *position == '?'));
return true;
}
Commit Message: Disallow CSP source * matching of data:, blob:, and filesystem: URLs
The CSP spec specifically excludes matching of data:, blob:, and
filesystem: URLs with the source '*' wildcard. This adds checks to make
sure that doesn't happen, along with tests.
BUG=534570
R=mkwst@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1361763005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#350950}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 125,396
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void NavigationControllerImpl::SetPendingEntry(NavigationEntryImpl* entry) {
DiscardNonCommittedEntriesInternal();
pending_entry_ = entry;
NotificationService::current()->Notify(
NOTIFICATION_NAV_ENTRY_PENDING,
Source<NavigationController>(this),
Details<NavigationEntry>(entry));
}
Commit Message: Delete unneeded pending entries in DidFailProvisionalLoad to prevent a spoof.
BUG=280512
BUG=278899
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23978003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@222146 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 111,568
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
{
const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
int k;
/* Can't do anything on client side */
if (s->server == 0)
return -1;
if (nmatch == -2) {
if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
/*
* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
* these are acceptable due to previous checks.
*/
unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
/* Should never happen */
return NID_undef;
}
/* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
nmatch = 0;
}
/*
* Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
* but s->options is a long...
*/
if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s,
(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0,
&supp, &num_supp))
/* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s,
(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0,
&pref, &num_pref))
return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
for (k = 0, i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
continue;
if (nmatch == k) {
int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id, NULL);
}
k++;
}
}
}
if (nmatch == -1)
return k;
/* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
return NID_undef;
}
Commit Message: Don't change the state of the ETM flags until CCS processing
Changing the ciphersuite during a renegotiation can result in a crash
leading to a DoS attack. ETM has not been implemented in 1.1.0 for DTLS
so this is TLS only.
The problem is caused by changing the flag indicating whether to use ETM
or not immediately on negotiation of ETM, rather than at CCS. Therefore,
during a renegotiation, if the ETM state is changing (usually due to a
change of ciphersuite), then an error/crash will occur.
Due to the fact that there are separate CCS messages for read and write
we actually now need two flags to determine whether to use ETM or not.
CVE-2017-3733
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 69,307
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: skb_zerocopy(struct sk_buff *to, struct sk_buff *from, int len, int hlen)
{
int i, j = 0;
int plen = 0; /* length of skb->head fragment */
int ret;
struct page *page;
unsigned int offset;
BUG_ON(!from->head_frag && !hlen);
/* dont bother with small payloads */
if (len <= skb_tailroom(to))
return skb_copy_bits(from, 0, skb_put(to, len), len);
if (hlen) {
ret = skb_copy_bits(from, 0, skb_put(to, hlen), hlen);
if (unlikely(ret))
return ret;
len -= hlen;
} else {
plen = min_t(int, skb_headlen(from), len);
if (plen) {
page = virt_to_head_page(from->head);
offset = from->data - (unsigned char *)page_address(page);
__skb_fill_page_desc(to, 0, page, offset, plen);
get_page(page);
j = 1;
len -= plen;
}
}
to->truesize += len + plen;
to->len += len + plen;
to->data_len += len + plen;
if (unlikely(skb_orphan_frags(from, GFP_ATOMIC))) {
skb_tx_error(from);
return -ENOMEM;
}
for (i = 0; i < skb_shinfo(from)->nr_frags; i++) {
if (!len)
break;
skb_shinfo(to)->frags[j] = skb_shinfo(from)->frags[i];
skb_shinfo(to)->frags[j].size = min_t(int, skb_shinfo(to)->frags[j].size, len);
len -= skb_shinfo(to)->frags[j].size;
skb_frag_ref(to, j);
j++;
}
skb_shinfo(to)->nr_frags = j;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: tcp: fix SCM_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS for normal skbs
__sock_recv_timestamp can be called for both normal skbs (for
receive timestamps) and for skbs on the error queue (for transmit
timestamps).
Commit 1c885808e456
(tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING)
assumes any skb passed to __sock_recv_timestamp are from
the error queue, containing OPT_STATS in the content of the skb.
This results in accessing invalid memory or generating junk
data.
To fix this, set skb->pkt_type to PACKET_OUTGOING for packets
on the error queue. This is safe because on the receive path
on local sockets skb->pkt_type is never set to PACKET_OUTGOING.
With that, copy OPT_STATS from a packet, only if its pkt_type
is PACKET_OUTGOING.
Fixes: 1c885808e456 ("tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING")
Reported-by: JongHwan Kim <zzoru007@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 67,718
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(stripos)
{
char *found = NULL;
zend_string *haystack;
zend_long offset = 0;
char needle_char[2];
zval *needle;
zend_string *needle_dup = NULL, *haystack_dup;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "Sz|l", &haystack, &needle, &offset) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (offset < 0 || (size_t)offset > ZSTR_LEN(haystack)) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Offset not contained in string");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (ZSTR_LEN(haystack) == 0) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (Z_TYPE_P(needle) == IS_STRING) {
if (Z_STRLEN_P(needle) == 0 || Z_STRLEN_P(needle) > ZSTR_LEN(haystack)) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
haystack_dup = php_string_tolower(haystack);
needle_dup = php_string_tolower(Z_STR_P(needle));
found = (char*)php_memnstr(ZSTR_VAL(haystack_dup) + offset,
ZSTR_VAL(needle_dup), ZSTR_LEN(needle_dup), ZSTR_VAL(haystack_dup) + ZSTR_LEN(haystack));
} else {
if (php_needle_char(needle, needle_char) != SUCCESS) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
haystack_dup = php_string_tolower(haystack);
needle_char[0] = tolower(needle_char[0]);
needle_char[1] = '\0';
found = (char*)php_memnstr(ZSTR_VAL(haystack_dup) + offset,
needle_char,
sizeof(needle_char) - 1,
ZSTR_VAL(haystack_dup) + ZSTR_LEN(haystack));
}
if (found) {
RETVAL_LONG(found - ZSTR_VAL(haystack_dup));
} else {
RETVAL_FALSE;
}
zend_string_release(haystack_dup);
if (needle_dup) {
zend_string_release(needle_dup);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-17
| 0
| 14,622
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AXNodeObject::insertChild(AXObject* child, unsigned index) {
if (!child)
return;
child->clearChildren();
if (child->accessibilityIsIgnored()) {
const auto& children = child->children();
size_t length = children.size();
for (size_t i = 0; i < length; ++i)
m_children.insert(index + i, children[i]);
} else {
ASSERT(child->parentObject() == this);
m_children.insert(index, child);
}
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 127,155
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int ohci_put_ed(OHCIState *ohci,
dma_addr_t addr, struct ohci_ed *ed)
{
/* ed->tail is under control of the HCD.
* Since just ed->head is changed by HC, just write back this
*/
return put_dwords(ohci, addr + ED_WBACK_OFFSET,
(uint32_t *)((char *)ed + ED_WBACK_OFFSET),
ED_WBACK_SIZE >> 2);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 5,925
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void igmp_ifc_timer_expire(unsigned long data)
{
struct in_device *in_dev = (struct in_device *)data;
igmpv3_send_cr(in_dev);
if (in_dev->mr_ifc_count) {
in_dev->mr_ifc_count--;
igmp_ifc_start_timer(in_dev, IGMP_Unsolicited_Report_Interval);
}
__in_dev_put(in_dev);
}
Commit Message: igmp: Avoid zero delay when receiving odd mixture of IGMP queries
Commit 5b7c84066733c5dfb0e4016d939757b38de189e4 ('ipv4: correct IGMP
behavior on v3 query during v2-compatibility mode') added yet another
case for query parsing, which can result in max_delay = 0. Substitute
a value of 1, as in the usual v3 case.
Reported-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@debian.org>
References: http://bugs.debian.org/654876
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 21,593
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleDrawArrays(
uint32 immediate_data_size, const cmds::DrawArrays& c) {
return DoDrawArrays("glDrawArrays",
false,
static_cast<GLenum>(c.mode),
static_cast<GLint>(c.first),
static_cast<GLsizei>(c.count),
0);
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 120,937
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftMPEG4Encoder::internalGetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamVideoBitrate:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_BITRATETYPE *bitRate =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_BITRATETYPE *) params;
if (bitRate->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
bitRate->eControlRate = OMX_Video_ControlRateVariable;
bitRate->nTargetBitrate = mBitrate;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoH263:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_H263TYPE *h263type =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_H263TYPE *)params;
if (h263type->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
h263type->nAllowedPictureTypes =
(OMX_VIDEO_PictureTypeI | OMX_VIDEO_PictureTypeP);
h263type->eProfile = OMX_VIDEO_H263ProfileBaseline;
h263type->eLevel = OMX_VIDEO_H263Level45;
h263type->bPLUSPTYPEAllowed = OMX_FALSE;
h263type->bForceRoundingTypeToZero = OMX_FALSE;
h263type->nPictureHeaderRepetition = 0;
h263type->nGOBHeaderInterval = 0;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoMpeg4:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_MPEG4TYPE *mpeg4type =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_MPEG4TYPE *)params;
if (mpeg4type->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
mpeg4type->eProfile = OMX_VIDEO_MPEG4ProfileCore;
mpeg4type->eLevel = OMX_VIDEO_MPEG4Level2;
mpeg4type->nAllowedPictureTypes =
(OMX_VIDEO_PictureTypeI | OMX_VIDEO_PictureTypeP);
mpeg4type->nBFrames = 0;
mpeg4type->nIDCVLCThreshold = 0;
mpeg4type->bACPred = OMX_TRUE;
mpeg4type->nMaxPacketSize = 256;
mpeg4type->nTimeIncRes = 1000;
mpeg4type->nHeaderExtension = 0;
mpeg4type->bReversibleVLC = OMX_FALSE;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SoftVideoEncoderOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(index, params);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE - libstagefright: check requested memory size before allocation for SoftMPEG4Encoder and SoftVPXEncoder.
Bug: 25812794
Change-Id: I96dc74734380d462583f6efa33d09946f9532809
(cherry picked from commit 87f8cbb223ee516803dbb99699320c2484cbf3ba)
(cherry picked from commit 0462975291796e414891e04bcec9da993914e458)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 162,010
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int skcipher_decrypt_ablkcipher(struct skcipher_request *req)
{
struct crypto_skcipher *skcipher = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
struct crypto_tfm *tfm = crypto_skcipher_tfm(skcipher);
struct ablkcipher_alg *alg = &tfm->__crt_alg->cra_ablkcipher;
return skcipher_crypt_ablkcipher(req, alg->decrypt);
}
Commit Message: crypto: skcipher - Add missing API setkey checks
The API setkey checks for key sizes and alignment went AWOL during the
skcipher conversion. This patch restores them.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: 4e6c3df4d729 ("crypto: skcipher - Add low-level skcipher...")
Reported-by: Baozeng <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 64,787
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DevToolsUIBindings::AppendedTo(const std::string& url) {
base::StringValue url_value(url);
CallClientFunction("DevToolsAPI.appendedToURL", &url_value, NULL,
NULL);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move front-end URL handling to DevToolsUIBindingds
BUG=662859
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2607833002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#440926}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 138,288
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ProfileDependencyManager* ProfileDependencyManager::GetInstance() {
return Singleton<ProfileDependencyManager>::get();
}
Commit Message: DIAL (Discovery and Launch protocol) extension API skeleton.
This implements the skeleton for a new Chrome extension API for local device discovery. The API will first be restricted to whitelisted extensions only. The API will allow extensions to receive events from a DIAL service running within Chrome which notifies of devices being discovered on the local network.
Spec available here:
https://docs.google.com/a/google.com/document/d/14FI-VKWrsMG7pIy3trgM3ybnKS-o5TULkt8itiBNXlQ/edit
BUG=163288
TBR=ben@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11444020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@172243 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 113,723
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MakeBitmapsFromFont(FontPtr pFont, int first, int count, int list_base)
{
unsigned long i, nglyphs;
CARD8 chs[2]; /* the font index we are going after */
CharInfoPtr pci;
int rv; /* return value */
int encoding = (FONTLASTROW(pFont) == 0) ? Linear16Bit : TwoD16Bit;
CALL_PixelStorei( GET_DISPATCH(), (GL_UNPACK_SWAP_BYTES, FALSE) );
CALL_PixelStorei( GET_DISPATCH(), (GL_UNPACK_LSB_FIRST, BITMAP_BIT_ORDER == LSBFirst) );
CALL_PixelStorei( GET_DISPATCH(), (GL_UNPACK_ROW_LENGTH, 0) );
CALL_PixelStorei( GET_DISPATCH(), (GL_UNPACK_SKIP_ROWS, 0) );
CALL_PixelStorei( GET_DISPATCH(), (GL_UNPACK_SKIP_PIXELS, 0) );
CALL_PixelStorei( GET_DISPATCH(), (GL_UNPACK_ALIGNMENT, GLYPHPADBYTES) );
for (i=0; i < count; i++) {
chs[0] = (first + i) >> 8; /* high byte is first byte */
chs[1] = first + i;
(*pFont->get_glyphs)(pFont, 1, chs, (FontEncoding)encoding,
&nglyphs, &pci);
/*
** Define a display list containing just a glBitmap() call.
*/
CALL_NewList( GET_DISPATCH(), (list_base + i, GL_COMPILE) );
if (nglyphs ) {
rv = __glXMakeBitmapFromGlyph(pFont, pci);
if (rv) {
return rv;
}
}
CALL_EndList( GET_DISPATCH(), () );
}
return Success;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 14,193
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(openssl_pkcs12_export_to_file)
{
X509 * cert = NULL;
BIO * bio_out = NULL;
PKCS12 * p12 = NULL;
char * filename;
char * friendly_name = NULL;
int filename_len;
char * pass;
int pass_len;
zval **zcert = NULL, *zpkey = NULL, *args = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *priv_key = NULL;
long certresource, keyresource;
zval ** item;
STACK_OF(X509) *ca = NULL;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "Zpzs|a", &zcert, &filename, &filename_len, &zpkey, &pass, &pass_len, &args) == FAILURE)
return;
RETVAL_FALSE;
cert = php_openssl_x509_from_zval(zcert, 0, &certresource TSRMLS_CC);
if (cert == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "cannot get cert from parameter 1");
return;
}
priv_key = php_openssl_evp_from_zval(&zpkey, 0, "", 1, &keyresource TSRMLS_CC);
if (priv_key == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "cannot get private key from parameter 3");
goto cleanup;
}
if (cert && !X509_check_private_key(cert, priv_key)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "private key does not correspond to cert");
goto cleanup;
}
if (php_openssl_open_base_dir_chk(filename TSRMLS_CC)) {
goto cleanup;
}
/* parse extra config from args array, promote this to an extra function */
if (args && zend_hash_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(args), "friendly_name", sizeof("friendly_name"), (void**)&item) == SUCCESS && Z_TYPE_PP(item) == IS_STRING)
friendly_name = Z_STRVAL_PP(item);
/* certpbe (default RC2-40)
keypbe (default 3DES)
friendly_caname
*/
if (args && zend_hash_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(args), "extracerts", sizeof("extracerts"), (void**)&item) == SUCCESS)
ca = php_array_to_X509_sk(item TSRMLS_CC);
/* end parse extra config */
/*PKCS12 *PKCS12_create(char *pass, char *name, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *cert, STACK_OF(X509) *ca,
int nid_key, int nid_cert, int iter, int mac_iter, int keytype);*/
p12 = PKCS12_create(pass, friendly_name, priv_key, cert, ca, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
bio_out = BIO_new_file(filename, "w");
if (bio_out) {
i2d_PKCS12_bio(bio_out, p12);
RETVAL_TRUE;
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "error opening file %s", filename);
}
BIO_free(bio_out);
PKCS12_free(p12);
php_sk_X509_free(ca);
cleanup:
if (keyresource == -1 && priv_key) {
EVP_PKEY_free(priv_key);
}
if (certresource == -1 && cert) {
X509_free(cert);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 14,206
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct page *hugetlbfs_pagecache_page(struct hstate *h,
struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address)
{
struct address_space *mapping;
pgoff_t idx;
mapping = vma->vm_file->f_mapping;
idx = vma_hugecache_offset(h, vma, address);
return find_lock_page(mapping, idx);
}
Commit Message: hugetlb: fix resv_map leak in error path
When called for anonymous (non-shared) mappings, hugetlb_reserve_pages()
does a resv_map_alloc(). It depends on code in hugetlbfs's
vm_ops->close() to release that allocation.
However, in the mmap() failure path, we do a plain unmap_region() without
the remove_vma() which actually calls vm_ops->close().
This is a decent fix. This leak could get reintroduced if new code (say,
after hugetlb_reserve_pages() in hugetlbfs_file_mmap()) decides to return
an error. But, I think it would have to unroll the reservation anyway.
Christoph's test case:
http://marc.info/?l=linux-mm&m=133728900729735
This patch applies to 3.4 and later. A version for earlier kernels is at
https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/5/22/418.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie>
Acked-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Reported-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Tested-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [2.6.32+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 19,723
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int tun_net_open(struct net_device *dev)
{
netif_start_queue(dev);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 23,867
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct b43_dmadesc_generic *op32_idx2desc(struct b43_dmaring *ring,
int slot,
struct b43_dmadesc_meta **meta)
{
struct b43_dmadesc32 *desc;
*meta = &(ring->meta[slot]);
desc = ring->descbase;
desc = &(desc[slot]);
return (struct b43_dmadesc_generic *)desc;
}
Commit Message: b43: allocate receive buffers big enough for max frame len + offset
Otherwise, skb_put inside of dma_rx can fail...
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32042
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Larry Finger <Larry.Finger@lwfinger.net>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 24,558
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void setbit128_bbe(void *b, int bit)
{
__set_bit(bit ^ (0x80 -
#ifdef __BIG_ENDIAN
BITS_PER_LONG
#else
BITS_PER_BYTE
#endif
), b);
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 45,814
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AwContents::OnSizeChanged(JNIEnv* env, jobject obj,
int w, int h, int ow, int oh) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
browser_view_renderer_.OnSizeChanged(w, h);
}
Commit Message: sync compositor: pass simple gfx types by const ref
See bug for reasoning
BUG=159273
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417893006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356653}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 119,614
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ext2_xattr_handler(int name_index)
{
const struct xattr_handler *handler = NULL;
if (name_index > 0 && name_index < ARRAY_SIZE(ext2_xattr_handler_map))
handler = ext2_xattr_handler_map[name_index];
return handler;
}
Commit Message: ext2: convert to mbcache2
The conversion is generally straightforward. We convert filesystem from
a global cache to per-fs one. Similarly to ext4 the tricky part is that
xattr block corresponding to found mbcache entry can get freed before we
get buffer lock for that block. So we have to check whether the entry is
still valid after getting the buffer lock.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-19
| 0
| 94,980
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void customVoidMethodMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
V8TestObjectPython::customVoidMethodMethodCustom(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 122,255
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void drop_inmem_pages(struct inode *inode)
{
struct f2fs_inode_info *fi = F2FS_I(inode);
mutex_lock(&fi->inmem_lock);
__revoke_inmem_pages(inode, &fi->inmem_pages, true, false);
mutex_unlock(&fi->inmem_lock);
clear_inode_flag(inode, FI_ATOMIC_FILE);
clear_inode_flag(inode, FI_HOT_DATA);
stat_dec_atomic_write(inode);
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix potential panic during fstrim
As Ju Hyung Park reported:
"When 'fstrim' is called for manual trim, a BUG() can be triggered
randomly with this patch.
I'm seeing this issue on both x86 Desktop and arm64 Android phone.
On x86 Desktop, this was caused during Ubuntu boot-up. I have a
cronjob installed which calls 'fstrim -v /' during boot. On arm64
Android, this was caused during GC looping with 1ms gc_min_sleep_time
& gc_max_sleep_time."
Root cause of this issue is that f2fs_wait_discard_bios can only be
used by f2fs_put_super, because during put_super there must be no
other referrers, so it can ignore discard entry's reference count
when removing the entry, otherwise in other caller we will hit bug_on
in __remove_discard_cmd as there may be other issuer added reference
count in discard entry.
Thread A Thread B
- issue_discard_thread
- f2fs_ioc_fitrim
- f2fs_trim_fs
- f2fs_wait_discard_bios
- __issue_discard_cmd
- __submit_discard_cmd
- __wait_discard_cmd
- dc->ref++
- __wait_one_discard_bio
- __wait_discard_cmd
- __remove_discard_cmd
- f2fs_bug_on(sbi, dc->ref)
Fixes: 969d1b180d987c2be02de890d0fff0f66a0e80de
Reported-by: Ju Hyung Park <qkrwngud825@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 86,020
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool LayoutBlockFlow::mustSeparateMarginBeforeForChild(const LayoutBox& child) const
{
ASSERT(!child.selfNeedsLayout());
const ComputedStyle& childStyle = child.styleRef();
if (!child.isWritingModeRoot())
return childStyle.marginBeforeCollapse() == MSEPARATE;
if (child.isHorizontalWritingMode() == isHorizontalWritingMode())
return childStyle.marginAfterCollapse() == MSEPARATE;
return false;
}
Commit Message: Consistently check if a block can handle pagination strut propagation.
https://codereview.chromium.org/1360753002 got it right for inline child
layout, but did nothing for block child layout.
BUG=329421
R=jchaffraix@chromium.org,leviw@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1387553002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#352429}
CWE ID: CWE-22
| 0
| 123,029
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virDomainGetMemoryParameters(virDomainPtr domain,
virTypedParameterPtr params,
int *nparams, unsigned int flags)
{
virConnectPtr conn;
VIR_DOMAIN_DEBUG(domain, "params=%p, nparams=%d, flags=%x",
params, (nparams) ? *nparams : -1, flags);
virResetLastError();
virCheckDomainReturn(domain, -1);
virCheckNonNullArgGoto(nparams, error);
virCheckNonNegativeArgGoto(*nparams, error);
if (*nparams != 0)
virCheckNonNullArgGoto(params, error);
if (VIR_DRV_SUPPORTS_FEATURE(domain->conn->driver, domain->conn,
VIR_DRV_FEATURE_TYPED_PARAM_STRING))
flags |= VIR_TYPED_PARAM_STRING_OKAY;
VIR_EXCLUSIVE_FLAGS_GOTO(VIR_DOMAIN_AFFECT_LIVE,
VIR_DOMAIN_AFFECT_CONFIG,
error);
conn = domain->conn;
if (conn->driver->domainGetMemoryParameters) {
int ret;
ret = conn->driver->domainGetMemoryParameters(domain, params, nparams, flags);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
return ret;
}
virReportUnsupportedError();
error:
virDispatchError(domain->conn);
return -1;
}
Commit Message: virDomainGetTime: Deny on RO connections
We have a policy that if API may end up talking to a guest agent
it should require RW connection. We don't obey the rule in
virDomainGetTime().
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 93,813
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: AXObject* AXObjectCacheImpl::createFromNode(Node* node) {
if (isMenuListOption(node))
return AXMenuListOption::create(toHTMLOptionElement(node), *this);
if (isHTMLAreaElement(node))
return AXImageMapLink::create(toHTMLAreaElement(node), *this);
return AXNodeObject::create(node, *this);
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 127,325
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: HistogramBase* Histogram::FactoryGet(const char* name,
Sample minimum,
Sample maximum,
uint32_t bucket_count,
int32_t flags) {
return FactoryGet(std::string(name), minimum, maximum, bucket_count, flags);
}
Commit Message: Convert DCHECKs to CHECKs for histogram types
When a histogram is looked up by name, there is currently a DCHECK that
verifies the type of the stored histogram matches the expected type.
A mismatch represents a significant problem because the returned
HistogramBase is cast to a Histogram in ValidateRangeChecksum,
potentially causing a crash.
This CL converts the DCHECK to a CHECK to prevent the possibility of
type confusion in release builds.
BUG=651443
R=isherman@chromium.org
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2381893003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#421929}
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 140,027
|
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