instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void tcp_get_info(struct sock *sk, struct tcp_info *info)
{
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
const struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
u32 now = tcp_time_stamp;
memset(info, 0, sizeof(*info));
info->tcpi_state = sk->sk_state;
info->tcpi_ca_state = icsk->icsk_ca_state;
info->tcpi_retransmits = icsk->icsk_retransmits;
info->tcpi_probes = icsk->icsk_probes_out;
info->tcpi_backoff = icsk->icsk_backoff;
if (tp->rx_opt.tstamp_ok)
info->tcpi_options |= TCPI_OPT_TIMESTAMPS;
if (tcp_is_sack(tp))
info->tcpi_options |= TCPI_OPT_SACK;
if (tp->rx_opt.wscale_ok) {
info->tcpi_options |= TCPI_OPT_WSCALE;
info->tcpi_snd_wscale = tp->rx_opt.snd_wscale;
info->tcpi_rcv_wscale = tp->rx_opt.rcv_wscale;
}
if (tp->ecn_flags&TCP_ECN_OK)
info->tcpi_options |= TCPI_OPT_ECN;
info->tcpi_rto = jiffies_to_usecs(icsk->icsk_rto);
info->tcpi_ato = jiffies_to_usecs(icsk->icsk_ack.ato);
info->tcpi_snd_mss = tp->mss_cache;
info->tcpi_rcv_mss = icsk->icsk_ack.rcv_mss;
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN) {
info->tcpi_unacked = sk->sk_ack_backlog;
info->tcpi_sacked = sk->sk_max_ack_backlog;
} else {
info->tcpi_unacked = tp->packets_out;
info->tcpi_sacked = tp->sacked_out;
}
info->tcpi_lost = tp->lost_out;
info->tcpi_retrans = tp->retrans_out;
info->tcpi_fackets = tp->fackets_out;
info->tcpi_last_data_sent = jiffies_to_msecs(now - tp->lsndtime);
info->tcpi_last_data_recv = jiffies_to_msecs(now - icsk->icsk_ack.lrcvtime);
info->tcpi_last_ack_recv = jiffies_to_msecs(now - tp->rcv_tstamp);
info->tcpi_pmtu = icsk->icsk_pmtu_cookie;
info->tcpi_rcv_ssthresh = tp->rcv_ssthresh;
info->tcpi_rtt = jiffies_to_usecs(tp->srtt)>>3;
info->tcpi_rttvar = jiffies_to_usecs(tp->mdev)>>2;
info->tcpi_snd_ssthresh = tp->snd_ssthresh;
info->tcpi_snd_cwnd = tp->snd_cwnd;
info->tcpi_advmss = tp->advmss;
info->tcpi_reordering = tp->reordering;
info->tcpi_rcv_rtt = jiffies_to_usecs(tp->rcv_rtt_est.rtt)>>3;
info->tcpi_rcv_space = tp->rcvq_space.space;
info->tcpi_total_retrans = tp->total_retrans;
}
Commit Message: net: Fix oops from tcp_collapse() when using splice()
tcp_read_sock() can have a eat skbs without immediately advancing copied_seq.
This can cause a panic in tcp_collapse() if it is called as a result
of the recv_actor dropping the socket lock.
A userspace program that splices data from a socket to either another
socket or to a file can trigger this bug.
Signed-off-by: Steven J. Magnani <steve@digidescorp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 31,873
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: char* Elf_(r_bin_elf_get_arch)(ELFOBJ *bin) {
switch (bin->ehdr.e_machine) {
case EM_ARC:
case EM_ARC_A5:
return strdup ("arc");
case EM_AVR: return strdup ("avr");
case EM_CRIS: return strdup ("cris");
case EM_68K: return strdup ("m68k");
case EM_MIPS:
case EM_MIPS_RS3_LE:
case EM_MIPS_X:
return strdup ("mips");
case EM_MCST_ELBRUS:
return strdup ("elbrus");
case EM_TRICORE:
return strdup ("tricore");
case EM_ARM:
case EM_AARCH64:
return strdup ("arm");
case EM_HEXAGON:
return strdup ("hexagon");
case EM_BLACKFIN:
return strdup ("blackfin");
case EM_SPARC:
case EM_SPARC32PLUS:
case EM_SPARCV9:
return strdup ("sparc");
case EM_PPC:
case EM_PPC64:
return strdup ("ppc");
case EM_PARISC:
return strdup ("hppa");
case EM_PROPELLER:
return strdup ("propeller");
case EM_MICROBLAZE:
return strdup ("microblaze.gnu");
case EM_RISCV:
return strdup ("riscv");
case EM_VAX:
return strdup ("vax");
case EM_XTENSA:
return strdup ("xtensa");
case EM_LANAI:
return strdup ("lanai");
case EM_VIDEOCORE3:
case EM_VIDEOCORE4:
return strdup ("vc4");
case EM_SH:
return strdup ("sh");
case EM_V850:
return strdup ("v850");
case EM_IA_64:
return strdup("ia64");
default: return strdup ("x86");
}
}
Commit Message: Fix #8764 - huge vd_aux caused pointer wraparound
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 60,050
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool vmx_get_nmi_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
bool masked;
if (vmx->loaded_vmcs->nmi_known_unmasked)
return false;
masked = vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO) & GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI;
vmx->loaded_vmcs->nmi_known_unmasked = !masked;
return masked;
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Don't allow L2 to access the hardware CR8
If L1 does not specify the "use TPR shadow" VM-execution control in
vmcs12, then L0 must specify the "CR8-load exiting" and "CR8-store
exiting" VM-execution controls in vmcs02. Failure to do so will give
the L2 VM unrestricted read/write access to the hardware CR8.
This fixes CVE-2017-12154.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 63,041
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::OnSuddenTerminationDisablerChanged(
bool present,
blink::WebSuddenTerminationDisablerType disabler_type) {
DCHECK_NE(GetSuddenTerminationDisablerState(disabler_type), present);
if (present) {
sudden_termination_disabler_types_enabled_ |= disabler_type;
} else {
sudden_termination_disabler_types_enabled_ &= ~disabler_type;
}
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 139,371
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int addr_validate_path_internal(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
IPAddrBlocks *ext)
{
IPAddrBlocks *child = NULL;
int i, j, ret = 1;
X509 *x;
OPENSSL_assert(chain != NULL && sk_X509_num(chain) > 0);
OPENSSL_assert(ctx != NULL || ext != NULL);
OPENSSL_assert(ctx == NULL || ctx->verify_cb != NULL);
/*
* Figure out where to start. If we don't have an extension to
* check, we're done. Otherwise, check canonical form and
* set up for walking up the chain.
*/
if (ext != NULL) {
i = -1;
x = NULL;
} else {
i = 0;
x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
OPENSSL_assert(x != NULL);
if ((ext = x->rfc3779_addr) == NULL)
goto done;
}
if (!X509v3_addr_is_canonical(ext))
validation_err(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION);
(void)sk_IPAddressFamily_set_cmp_func(ext, IPAddressFamily_cmp);
if ((child = sk_IPAddressFamily_dup(ext)) == NULL) {
X509V3err(X509V3_F_ADDR_VALIDATE_PATH_INTERNAL,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
ret = 0;
goto done;
}
/*
* Now walk up the chain. No cert may list resources that its
* parent doesn't list.
*/
for (i++; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
OPENSSL_assert(x != NULL);
if (!X509v3_addr_is_canonical(x->rfc3779_addr))
validation_err(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION);
if (x->rfc3779_addr == NULL) {
for (j = 0; j < sk_IPAddressFamily_num(child); j++) {
IPAddressFamily *fc = sk_IPAddressFamily_value(child, j);
if (fc->ipAddressChoice->type != IPAddressChoice_inherit) {
validation_err(X509_V_ERR_UNNESTED_RESOURCE);
break;
}
}
continue;
}
(void)sk_IPAddressFamily_set_cmp_func(x->rfc3779_addr,
IPAddressFamily_cmp);
for (j = 0; j < sk_IPAddressFamily_num(child); j++) {
IPAddressFamily *fc = sk_IPAddressFamily_value(child, j);
int k = sk_IPAddressFamily_find(x->rfc3779_addr, fc);
IPAddressFamily *fp =
sk_IPAddressFamily_value(x->rfc3779_addr, k);
if (fp == NULL) {
if (fc->ipAddressChoice->type ==
IPAddressChoice_addressesOrRanges) {
validation_err(X509_V_ERR_UNNESTED_RESOURCE);
break;
}
continue;
}
if (fp->ipAddressChoice->type ==
IPAddressChoice_addressesOrRanges) {
if (fc->ipAddressChoice->type == IPAddressChoice_inherit
|| addr_contains(fp->ipAddressChoice->u.addressesOrRanges,
fc->ipAddressChoice->u.addressesOrRanges,
length_from_afi(X509v3_addr_get_afi(fc))))
sk_IPAddressFamily_set(child, j, fp);
else
validation_err(X509_V_ERR_UNNESTED_RESOURCE);
}
}
}
/*
* Trust anchor can't inherit.
*/
OPENSSL_assert(x != NULL);
if (x->rfc3779_addr != NULL) {
for (j = 0; j < sk_IPAddressFamily_num(x->rfc3779_addr); j++) {
IPAddressFamily *fp =
sk_IPAddressFamily_value(x->rfc3779_addr, j);
if (fp->ipAddressChoice->type == IPAddressChoice_inherit
&& sk_IPAddressFamily_find(child, fp) >= 0)
validation_err(X509_V_ERR_UNNESTED_RESOURCE);
}
}
done:
sk_IPAddressFamily_free(child);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Avoid out-of-bounds read
Fixes CVE 2017-3735
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4276)
(cherry picked from commit b23171744b01e473ebbfd6edad70c1c3825ffbcd)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 69,281
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void touch_softlockup_watchdog_sync(void)
{
__raw_get_cpu_var(softlockup_touch_sync) = true;
__raw_get_cpu_var(watchdog_touch_ts) = 0;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 26,391
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static PHP_MINIT_FUNCTION(zip)
{
zend_class_entry ce;
memcpy(&zip_object_handlers, zend_get_std_object_handlers(), sizeof(zend_object_handlers));
zip_object_handlers.offset = XtOffsetOf(ze_zip_object, zo);
zip_object_handlers.free_obj = php_zip_object_free_storage;
zip_object_handlers.clone_obj = NULL;
zip_object_handlers.get_property_ptr_ptr = php_zip_get_property_ptr_ptr;
zip_object_handlers.get_properties = php_zip_get_properties;
zip_object_handlers.read_property = php_zip_read_property;
zip_object_handlers.has_property = php_zip_has_property;
INIT_CLASS_ENTRY(ce, "ZipArchive", zip_class_functions);
ce.create_object = php_zip_object_new;
zip_class_entry = zend_register_internal_class(&ce);
zend_hash_init(&zip_prop_handlers, 0, NULL, php_zip_free_prop_handler, 1);
php_zip_register_prop_handler(&zip_prop_handlers, "status", php_zip_status, NULL, NULL, IS_LONG);
php_zip_register_prop_handler(&zip_prop_handlers, "statusSys", php_zip_status_sys, NULL, NULL, IS_LONG);
php_zip_register_prop_handler(&zip_prop_handlers, "numFiles", php_zip_get_num_files, NULL, NULL, IS_LONG);
php_zip_register_prop_handler(&zip_prop_handlers, "filename", NULL, NULL, php_zipobj_get_filename, IS_STRING);
php_zip_register_prop_handler(&zip_prop_handlers, "comment", NULL, php_zipobj_get_zip_comment, NULL, IS_STRING);
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("CREATE", ZIP_CREATE);
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("EXCL", ZIP_EXCL);
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("CHECKCONS", ZIP_CHECKCONS);
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("OVERWRITE", ZIP_OVERWRITE);
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("FL_NOCASE", ZIP_FL_NOCASE);
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("FL_NODIR", ZIP_FL_NODIR);
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("FL_COMPRESSED", ZIP_FL_COMPRESSED);
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("FL_UNCHANGED", ZIP_FL_UNCHANGED);
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("CM_DEFAULT", ZIP_CM_DEFAULT);
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("CM_STORE", ZIP_CM_STORE);
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("CM_SHRINK", ZIP_CM_SHRINK);
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("CM_REDUCE_1", ZIP_CM_REDUCE_1);
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("CM_REDUCE_2", ZIP_CM_REDUCE_2);
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("CM_REDUCE_3", ZIP_CM_REDUCE_3);
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("CM_REDUCE_4", ZIP_CM_REDUCE_4);
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("CM_IMPLODE", ZIP_CM_IMPLODE);
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("CM_DEFLATE", ZIP_CM_DEFLATE);
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("CM_DEFLATE64", ZIP_CM_DEFLATE64);
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("CM_PKWARE_IMPLODE", ZIP_CM_PKWARE_IMPLODE);
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("CM_BZIP2", ZIP_CM_BZIP2);
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("CM_LZMA", ZIP_CM_LZMA);
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("CM_TERSE", ZIP_CM_TERSE);
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("CM_LZ77", ZIP_CM_LZ77);
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("CM_WAVPACK", ZIP_CM_WAVPACK);
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("CM_PPMD", ZIP_CM_PPMD);
/* Error code */
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("ER_OK", ZIP_ER_OK); /* N No error */
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("ER_MULTIDISK", ZIP_ER_MULTIDISK); /* N Multi-disk zip archives not supported */
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("ER_RENAME", ZIP_ER_RENAME); /* S Renaming temporary file failed */
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("ER_CLOSE", ZIP_ER_CLOSE); /* S Closing zip archive failed */
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("ER_SEEK", ZIP_ER_SEEK); /* S Seek error */
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("ER_READ", ZIP_ER_READ); /* S Read error */
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("ER_WRITE", ZIP_ER_WRITE); /* S Write error */
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("ER_CRC", ZIP_ER_CRC); /* N CRC error */
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("ER_ZIPCLOSED", ZIP_ER_ZIPCLOSED); /* N Containing zip archive was closed */
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("ER_NOENT", ZIP_ER_NOENT); /* N No such file */
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("ER_EXISTS", ZIP_ER_EXISTS); /* N File already exists */
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("ER_OPEN", ZIP_ER_OPEN); /* S Can't open file */
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("ER_TMPOPEN", ZIP_ER_TMPOPEN); /* S Failure to create temporary file */
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("ER_ZLIB", ZIP_ER_ZLIB); /* Z Zlib error */
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("ER_MEMORY", ZIP_ER_MEMORY); /* N Malloc failure */
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("ER_CHANGED", ZIP_ER_CHANGED); /* N Entry has been changed */
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("ER_COMPNOTSUPP", ZIP_ER_COMPNOTSUPP);/* N Compression method not supported */
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("ER_EOF", ZIP_ER_EOF); /* N Premature EOF */
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("ER_INVAL", ZIP_ER_INVAL); /* N Invalid argument */
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("ER_NOZIP", ZIP_ER_NOZIP); /* N Not a zip archive */
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("ER_INTERNAL", ZIP_ER_INTERNAL); /* N Internal error */
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("ER_INCONS", ZIP_ER_INCONS); /* N Zip archive inconsistent */
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("ER_REMOVE", ZIP_ER_REMOVE); /* S Can't remove file */
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("ER_DELETED", ZIP_ER_DELETED); /* N Entry has been deleted */
#ifdef ZIP_OPSYS_DEFAULT
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("OPSYS_DOS", ZIP_OPSYS_DOS);
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("OPSYS_AMIGA", ZIP_OPSYS_AMIGA);
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("OPSYS_OPENVMS", ZIP_OPSYS_OPENVMS);
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("OPSYS_UNIX", ZIP_OPSYS_UNIX);
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("OPSYS_VM_CMS", ZIP_OPSYS_VM_CMS);
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("OPSYS_ATARI_ST", ZIP_OPSYS_ATARI_ST);
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("OPSYS_OS_2", ZIP_OPSYS_OS_2);
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("OPSYS_MACINTOSH", ZIP_OPSYS_MACINTOSH);
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("OPSYS_Z_SYSTEM", ZIP_OPSYS_Z_SYSTEM);
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("OPSYS_Z_CPM", ZIP_OPSYS_CPM);
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("OPSYS_WINDOWS_NTFS", ZIP_OPSYS_WINDOWS_NTFS);
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("OPSYS_MVS", ZIP_OPSYS_MVS);
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("OPSYS_VSE", ZIP_OPSYS_VSE);
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("OPSYS_ACORN_RISC", ZIP_OPSYS_ACORN_RISC);
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("OPSYS_VFAT", ZIP_OPSYS_VFAT);
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("OPSYS_ALTERNATE_MVS", ZIP_OPSYS_ALTERNATE_MVS);
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("OPSYS_BEOS", ZIP_OPSYS_BEOS);
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("OPSYS_TANDEM", ZIP_OPSYS_TANDEM);
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("OPSYS_OS_400", ZIP_OPSYS_OS_400);
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("OPSYS_OS_X", ZIP_OPSYS_OS_X);
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("OPSYS_DEFAULT", ZIP_OPSYS_DEFAULT);
#endif /* ifdef ZIP_OPSYS_DEFAULT */
php_register_url_stream_wrapper("zip", &php_stream_zip_wrapper);
le_zip_dir = zend_register_list_destructors_ex(php_zip_free_dir, NULL, le_zip_dir_name, module_number);
le_zip_entry = zend_register_list_destructors_ex(php_zip_free_entry, NULL, le_zip_entry_name, module_number);
return SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #71923 - integer overflow in ZipArchive::getFrom*
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 54,379
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: archive_read_format_cpio_options(struct archive_read *a,
const char *key, const char *val)
{
struct cpio *cpio;
int ret = ARCHIVE_FAILED;
cpio = (struct cpio *)(a->format->data);
if (strcmp(key, "compat-2x") == 0) {
/* Handle filnames as libarchive 2.x */
cpio->init_default_conversion = (val != NULL)?1:0;
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
} else if (strcmp(key, "hdrcharset") == 0) {
if (val == NULL || val[0] == 0)
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"cpio: hdrcharset option needs a character-set name");
else {
cpio->opt_sconv =
archive_string_conversion_from_charset(
&a->archive, val, 0);
if (cpio->opt_sconv != NULL)
ret = ARCHIVE_OK;
else
ret = ARCHIVE_FATAL;
}
return (ret);
}
/* Note: The "warn" return is just to inform the options
* supervisor that we didn't handle it. It will generate
* a suitable error if no one used this option. */
return (ARCHIVE_WARN);
}
Commit Message: Reject cpio symlinks that exceed 1MB
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 52,587
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void tty_update_time(struct timespec *time)
{
unsigned long sec = get_seconds();
/*
* We only care if the two values differ in anything other than the
* lower three bits (i.e every 8 seconds). If so, then we can update
* the time of the tty device, otherwise it could be construded as a
* security leak to let userspace know the exact timing of the tty.
*/
if ((sec ^ time->tv_sec) & ~7)
time->tv_sec = sec;
}
Commit Message: tty: Fix unsafe ldisc reference via ioctl(TIOCGETD)
ioctl(TIOCGETD) retrieves the line discipline id directly from the
ldisc because the line discipline id (c_line) in termios is untrustworthy;
userspace may have set termios via ioctl(TCSETS*) without actually
changing the line discipline via ioctl(TIOCSETD).
However, directly accessing the current ldisc via tty->ldisc is
unsafe; the ldisc ptr dereferenced may be stale if the line discipline
is changing via ioctl(TIOCSETD) or hangup.
Wait for the line discipline reference (just like read() or write())
to retrieve the "current" line discipline id.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 55,952
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: STDMETHODIMP UrlmonUrlRequest::OnSecurityProblem(DWORD problem) {
DVLOG(1) << __FUNCTION__ << me() << "Security problem : " << problem;
if (GetIEVersion() == IE_6)
return S_FALSE;
HRESULT hr = E_ABORT;
switch (problem) {
case ERROR_INTERNET_SEC_CERT_REV_FAILED: {
hr = RPC_E_RETRY;
break;
}
case ERROR_INTERNET_SEC_CERT_DATE_INVALID:
case ERROR_INTERNET_SEC_CERT_CN_INVALID:
case ERROR_INTERNET_INVALID_CA: {
hr = S_FALSE;
break;
}
default: {
NOTREACHED() << "Unhandled security problem : " << problem;
break;
}
}
return hr;
}
Commit Message: iwyu: Include callback_old.h where appropriate, final.
BUG=82098
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@85003 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 100,962
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FetchManager::Loader::~Loader() {
DCHECK(!threadable_loader_);
}
Commit Message: [Fetch API] Fix redirect leak on "no-cors" requests
The spec issue is now fixed, and this CL follows the spec change[1].
1: https://github.com/whatwg/fetch/commit/14858d3e9402285a7ff3b5e47a22896ff3adc95d
Bug: 791324
Change-Id: Ic3e3955f43578b38fc44a5a6b2a1b43d56a2becb
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1023613
Reviewed-by: Tsuyoshi Horo <horo@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#552964}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 154,248
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline struct sem_array *sem_obtain_object_check(struct ipc_namespace *ns,
int id)
{
struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp = ipc_obtain_object_check(&sem_ids(ns), id);
if (IS_ERR(ipcp))
return ERR_CAST(ipcp);
return container_of(ipcp, struct sem_array, sem_perm);
}
Commit Message: ipc,sem: fine grained locking for semtimedop
Introduce finer grained locking for semtimedop, to handle the common case
of a program wanting to manipulate one semaphore from an array with
multiple semaphores.
If the call is a semop manipulating just one semaphore in an array with
multiple semaphores, only take the lock for that semaphore itself.
If the call needs to manipulate multiple semaphores, or another caller is
in a transaction that manipulates multiple semaphores, the sem_array lock
is taken, as well as all the locks for the individual semaphores.
On a 24 CPU system, performance numbers with the semop-multi
test with N threads and N semaphores, look like this:
vanilla Davidlohr's Davidlohr's + Davidlohr's +
threads patches rwlock patches v3 patches
10 610652 726325 1783589 2142206
20 341570 365699 1520453 1977878
30 288102 307037 1498167 2037995
40 290714 305955 1612665 2256484
50 288620 312890 1733453 2650292
60 289987 306043 1649360 2388008
70 291298 306347 1723167 2717486
80 290948 305662 1729545 2763582
90 290996 306680 1736021 2757524
100 292243 306700 1773700 3059159
[davidlohr.bueso@hp.com: do not call sem_lock when bogus sma]
[davidlohr.bueso@hp.com: make refcounter atomic]
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr.bueso@hp.com>
Cc: Chegu Vinod <chegu_vinod@hp.com>
Cc: Jason Low <jason.low2@hp.com>
Reviewed-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Cc: Stanislav Kinsbursky <skinsbursky@parallels.com>
Tested-by: Emmanuel Benisty <benisty.e@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 29,547
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderBlock::clearTruncation()
{
if (style()->visibility() == VISIBLE) {
if (childrenInline() && hasMarkupTruncation()) {
setHasMarkupTruncation(false);
for (RootInlineBox* box = firstRootBox(); box; box = box->nextRootBox())
box->clearTruncation();
} else {
for (RenderObject* obj = firstChild(); obj; obj = obj->nextSibling()) {
if (shouldCheckLines(obj))
toRenderBlock(obj)->clearTruncation();
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 116,165
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int ReadProfileByte(unsigned char **p,size_t *length)
{
int
c;
if (*length < 1)
return(EOF);
c=(int) (*(*p)++);
(*length)--;
return(c);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/354
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 69,109
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void scheduler_ipi(void)
{
sched_ttwu_pending();
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 26,343
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline u32 evmcs_read32(unsigned long field) { return 0; }
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Enforce cpl=0 for VMX instructions
VMX instructions executed inside a L1 VM will always trigger a VM exit
even when executed with cpl 3. This means we must perform the
privilege check in software.
Fixes: 70f3aac964ae("kvm: nVMX: Remove superfluous VMX instruction fault checks")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Felix Wilhelm <fwilhelm@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 80,931
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: NavigationControllerImpl::GetSessionStorageNamespaceMap() const {
return session_storage_namespace_map_;
}
Commit Message: Delete unneeded pending entries in DidFailProvisionalLoad to prevent a spoof.
BUG=280512
BUG=278899
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23978003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@222146 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 111,523
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct fuse_dev *fuse_get_dev(struct file *file)
{
/*
* Lockless access is OK, because file->private data is set
* once during mount and is valid until the file is released.
*/
return READ_ONCE(file->private_data);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 96,809
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int mov_write_tfxd_tag(AVIOContext *pb, MOVTrack *track)
{
int64_t pos = avio_tell(pb);
static const uint8_t uuid[] = {
0x6d, 0x1d, 0x9b, 0x05, 0x42, 0xd5, 0x44, 0xe6,
0x80, 0xe2, 0x14, 0x1d, 0xaf, 0xf7, 0x57, 0xb2
};
avio_wb32(pb, 0); /* size placeholder */
ffio_wfourcc(pb, "uuid");
avio_write(pb, uuid, sizeof(uuid));
avio_w8(pb, 1);
avio_wb24(pb, 0);
avio_wb64(pb, track->start_dts + track->frag_start +
track->cluster[0].cts);
avio_wb64(pb, track->end_pts -
(track->cluster[0].dts + track->cluster[0].cts));
return update_size(pb, pos);
}
Commit Message: avformat/movenc: Write version 2 of audio atom if channels is not known
The version 1 needs the channel count and would divide by 0
Fixes: division by 0
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_1.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_2.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_3.wav
Found-by: #CHEN HONGXU# <HCHEN017@e.ntu.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 79,417
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PageHandler::SetRenderer(RenderProcessHost* process_host,
RenderFrameHostImpl* frame_host) {
if (host_ == frame_host)
return;
RenderWidgetHostImpl* widget_host =
host_ ? host_->GetRenderWidgetHost() : nullptr;
if (widget_host) {
registrar_.Remove(
this,
content::NOTIFICATION_RENDER_WIDGET_VISIBILITY_CHANGED,
content::Source<RenderWidgetHost>(widget_host));
}
host_ = frame_host;
widget_host = host_ ? host_->GetRenderWidgetHost() : nullptr;
if (widget_host) {
registrar_.Add(
this,
content::NOTIFICATION_RENDER_WIDGET_VISIBILITY_CHANGED,
content::Source<RenderWidgetHost>(widget_host));
}
}
Commit Message: DevTools: allow styling the page number element when printing over the protocol.
Bug: none
Change-Id: I13e6afbd86a7c6bcdedbf0645183194b9de7cfb4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/809759
Commit-Queue: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Sepez <tsepez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jianzhou Feng <jzfeng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#523966}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 149,807
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: count_loading_descriptors_progress(void)
{
int num_present = 0, num_usable=0;
time_t now = time(NULL);
const or_options_t *options = get_options();
const networkstatus_t *consensus =
networkstatus_get_reasonably_live_consensus(now,usable_consensus_flavor());
double paths, fraction;
if (!consensus)
return 0; /* can't count descriptors if we have no list of them */
paths = compute_frac_paths_available(consensus, options, now,
&num_present, &num_usable,
NULL);
fraction = paths / get_frac_paths_needed_for_circs(options,consensus);
if (fraction > 1.0)
return 0; /* it's not the number of descriptors holding us back */
return BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_LOADING_DESCRIPTORS + (int)
(fraction*(BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_CONN_OR-1 -
BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_LOADING_DESCRIPTORS));
}
Commit Message: Consider the exit family when applying guard restrictions.
When the new path selection logic went into place, I accidentally
dropped the code that considered the _family_ of the exit node when
deciding if the guard was usable, and we didn't catch that during
code review.
This patch makes the guard_restriction_t code consider the exit
family as well, and adds some (hopefully redundant) checks for the
case where we lack a node_t for a guard but we have a bridge_info_t
for it.
Fixes bug 22753; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha. Tracked as TROVE-2016-006
and CVE-2017-0377.
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 69,764
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void fuse_page_descs_length_init(struct fuse_req *req,
unsigned index, unsigned nr_pages)
{
int i;
for (i = index; i < index + nr_pages; i++)
req->page_descs[i].length = PAGE_SIZE -
req->page_descs[i].offset;
}
Commit Message: fuse: break infinite loop in fuse_fill_write_pages()
I got a report about unkillable task eating CPU. Further
investigation shows, that the problem is in the fuse_fill_write_pages()
function. If iov's first segment has zero length, we get an infinite
loop, because we never reach iov_iter_advance() call.
Fix this by calling iov_iter_advance() before repeating an attempt to
copy data from userspace.
A similar problem is described in 124d3b7041f ("fix writev regression:
pan hanging unkillable and un-straceable"). If zero-length segmend
is followed by segment with invalid address,
iov_iter_fault_in_readable() checks only first segment (zero-length),
iov_iter_copy_from_user_atomic() skips it, fails at second and
returns zero -> goto again without skipping zero-length segment.
Patch calls iov_iter_advance() before goto again: we'll skip zero-length
segment at second iteraction and iov_iter_fault_in_readable() will detect
invalid address.
Special thanks to Konstantin Khlebnikov, who helped a lot with the commit
description.
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Maxim Patlasov <mpatlasov@parallels.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <klamm@yandex-team.ru>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Fixes: ea9b9907b82a ("fuse: implement perform_write")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 56,950
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int hub_handle_remote_wakeup(struct usb_hub *hub, unsigned int port,
u16 portstatus, u16 portchange)
{
return 0;
}
Commit Message: USB: fix invalid memory access in hub_activate()
Commit 8520f38099cc ("USB: change hub initialization sleeps to
delayed_work") changed the hub_activate() routine to make part of it
run in a workqueue. However, the commit failed to take a reference to
the usb_hub structure or to lock the hub interface while doing so. As
a result, if a hub is plugged in and quickly unplugged before the work
routine can run, the routine will try to access memory that has been
deallocated. Or, if the hub is unplugged while the routine is
running, the memory may be deallocated while it is in active use.
This patch fixes the problem by taking a reference to the usb_hub at
the start of hub_activate() and releasing it at the end (when the work
is finished), and by locking the hub interface while the work routine
is running. It also adds a check at the start of the routine to see
if the hub has already been disconnected, in which nothing should be
done.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Reported-by: Alexandru Cornea <alexandru.cornea@intel.com>
Tested-by: Alexandru Cornea <alexandru.cornea@intel.com>
Fixes: 8520f38099cc ("USB: change hub initialization sleeps to delayed_work")
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 56,747
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int avpriv_unlock_avformat(void)
{
if (lockmgr_cb) {
if ((*lockmgr_cb)(&avformat_mutex, AV_LOCK_RELEASE))
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/utils: correct align value for interplay
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: 452/fuzz-1-ffmpeg_VIDEO_AV_CODEC_ID_INTERPLAY_VIDEO_fuzzer
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 67,008
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void process_bin_delete(conn *c) {
item *it;
protocol_binary_request_delete* req = binary_get_request(c);
char* key = binary_get_key(c);
size_t nkey = c->binary_header.request.keylen;
assert(c != NULL);
if (settings.verbose > 1) {
fprintf(stderr, "Deleting %s\n", key);
}
if (settings.detail_enabled) {
stats_prefix_record_delete(key, nkey);
}
it = item_get(key, nkey);
if (it) {
uint64_t cas = ntohll(req->message.header.request.cas);
if (cas == 0 || cas == ITEM_get_cas(it)) {
MEMCACHED_COMMAND_DELETE(c->sfd, ITEM_key(it), it->nkey);
item_unlink(it);
write_bin_response(c, NULL, 0, 0, 0);
} else {
write_bin_error(c, PROTOCOL_BINARY_RESPONSE_KEY_EEXISTS, 0);
}
item_remove(it); /* release our reference */
} else {
write_bin_error(c, PROTOCOL_BINARY_RESPONSE_KEY_ENOENT, 0);
}
}
Commit Message: Use strncmp when checking for large ascii multigets.
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 18,265
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ion_dma_buf_end_cpu_access(struct dma_buf *dmabuf, size_t start,
size_t len,
enum dma_data_direction direction)
{
struct ion_buffer *buffer = dmabuf->priv;
mutex_lock(&buffer->lock);
ion_buffer_kmap_put(buffer);
mutex_unlock(&buffer->lock);
}
Commit Message: staging/android/ion : fix a race condition in the ion driver
There is a use-after-free problem in the ion driver.
This is caused by a race condition in the ion_ioctl()
function.
A handle has ref count of 1 and two tasks on different
cpus calls ION_IOC_FREE simultaneously.
cpu 0 cpu 1
-------------------------------------------------------
ion_handle_get_by_id()
(ref == 2)
ion_handle_get_by_id()
(ref == 3)
ion_free()
(ref == 2)
ion_handle_put()
(ref == 1)
ion_free()
(ref == 0 so ion_handle_destroy() is
called
and the handle is freed.)
ion_handle_put() is called and it
decreases the slub's next free pointer
The problem is detected as an unaligned access in the
spin lock functions since it uses load exclusive
instruction. In some cases it corrupts the slub's
free pointer which causes a mis-aligned access to the
next free pointer.(kmalloc returns a pointer like
ffffc0745b4580aa). And it causes lots of other
hard-to-debug problems.
This symptom is caused since the first member in the
ion_handle structure is the reference count and the
ion driver decrements the reference after it has been
freed.
To fix this problem client->lock mutex is extended
to protect all the codes that uses the handle.
Signed-off-by: Eun Taik Lee <eun.taik.lee@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 48,543
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Err edts_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
GF_EditBox *p;
p = (GF_EditBox *)a;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "EditBox", trace);
fprintf(trace, ">\n");
if (p->size)
gf_isom_box_dump_ex(p->editList, trace, GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_ELST);
gf_isom_box_dump_done("EditBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,721
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct mnt_namespace *create_mnt_ns(struct vfsmount *m)
{
struct mnt_namespace *new_ns = alloc_mnt_ns(&init_user_ns);
if (!IS_ERR(new_ns)) {
struct mount *mnt = real_mount(m);
mnt->mnt_ns = new_ns;
new_ns->root = mnt;
list_add(&mnt->mnt_list, &new_ns->list);
} else {
mntput(m);
}
return new_ns;
}
Commit Message: mnt: Add a per mount namespace limit on the number of mounts
CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com> pointed out that the semantics
of shared subtrees make it possible to create an exponentially
increasing number of mounts in a mount namespace.
mkdir /tmp/1 /tmp/2
mount --make-rshared /
for i in $(seq 1 20) ; do mount --bind /tmp/1 /tmp/2 ; done
Will create create 2^20 or 1048576 mounts, which is a practical problem
as some people have managed to hit this by accident.
As such CVE-2016-6213 was assigned.
Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net> described the situation for autofs users
as follows:
> The number of mounts for direct mount maps is usually not very large because of
> the way they are implemented, large direct mount maps can have performance
> problems. There can be anywhere from a few (likely case a few hundred) to less
> than 10000, plus mounts that have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> Indirect mounts have one autofs mount at the root plus the number of mounts that
> have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> The number of autofs indirect map entries can range from a few to the common
> case of several thousand and in rare cases up to between 30000 and 50000. I've
> not heard of people with maps larger than 50000 entries.
>
> The larger the number of map entries the greater the possibility for a large
> number of active mounts so it's not hard to expect cases of a 1000 or somewhat
> more active mounts.
So I am setting the default number of mounts allowed per mount
namespace at 100,000. This is more than enough for any use case I
know of, but small enough to quickly stop an exponential increase
in mounts. Which should be perfect to catch misconfigurations and
malfunctioning programs.
For anyone who needs a higher limit this can be changed by writing
to the new /proc/sys/fs/mount-max sysctl.
Tested-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 1
| 167,010
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: snd_pcm_sframes_t snd_pcm_lib_write(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream, const void __user *buf, snd_pcm_uframes_t size)
{
struct snd_pcm_runtime *runtime;
int nonblock;
int err;
err = pcm_sanity_check(substream);
if (err < 0)
return err;
runtime = substream->runtime;
nonblock = !!(substream->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK);
if (runtime->access != SNDRV_PCM_ACCESS_RW_INTERLEAVED &&
runtime->channels > 1)
return -EINVAL;
return snd_pcm_lib_write1(substream, (unsigned long)buf, size, nonblock,
snd_pcm_lib_write_transfer);
}
Commit Message: ALSA: pcm : Call kill_fasync() in stream lock
Currently kill_fasync() is called outside the stream lock in
snd_pcm_period_elapsed(). This is potentially racy, since the stream
may get released even during the irq handler is running. Although
snd_pcm_release_substream() calls snd_pcm_drop(), this doesn't
guarantee that the irq handler finishes, thus the kill_fasync() call
outside the stream spin lock may be invoked after the substream is
detached, as recently reported by KASAN.
As a quick workaround, move kill_fasync() call inside the stream
lock. The fasync is rarely used interface, so this shouldn't have a
big impact from the performance POV.
Ideally, we should implement some sync mechanism for the proper finish
of stream and irq handler. But this oneliner should suffice for most
cases, so far.
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 47,838
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void row_dim_write(zval *object, zval *member, zval *value TSRMLS_DC)
{
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "This PDORow is not from a writable result set");
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #73331 - do not try to serialize/unserialize objects wddx can not handle
Proper soltion would be to call serialize/unserialize and deal with the result,
but this requires more work that should be done by wddx maintainer (not me).
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 72,448
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool retry_instruction(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
unsigned long cr2, int emulation_type)
{
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = emul_to_vcpu(ctxt);
unsigned long last_retry_eip, last_retry_addr, gpa = cr2;
last_retry_eip = vcpu->arch.last_retry_eip;
last_retry_addr = vcpu->arch.last_retry_addr;
/*
* If the emulation is caused by #PF and it is non-page_table
* writing instruction, it means the VM-EXIT is caused by shadow
* page protected, we can zap the shadow page and retry this
* instruction directly.
*
* Note: if the guest uses a non-page-table modifying instruction
* on the PDE that points to the instruction, then we will unmap
* the instruction and go to an infinite loop. So, we cache the
* last retried eip and the last fault address, if we meet the eip
* and the address again, we can break out of the potential infinite
* loop.
*/
vcpu->arch.last_retry_eip = vcpu->arch.last_retry_addr = 0;
if (!(emulation_type & EMULTYPE_RETRY))
return false;
if (x86_page_table_writing_insn(ctxt))
return false;
if (ctxt->eip == last_retry_eip && last_retry_addr == cr2)
return false;
vcpu->arch.last_retry_eip = ctxt->eip;
vcpu->arch.last_retry_addr = cr2;
if (!vcpu->arch.mmu.direct_map)
gpa = kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_write(vcpu, cr2, NULL);
kvm_mmu_unprotect_page(vcpu->kvm, gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT);
return true;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 20,876
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: putCompChar(widechar character, const TranslationTableHeader *table, int pos,
const InString *input, OutString *output, int *posMapping, int *cursorPosition,
int *cursorStatus) {
/* Insert the dots equivalent of a character into the output buffer */
widechar d;
TranslationTableOffset offset = (findCharOrDots(character, 0, table))->definitionRule;
if (offset) {
const TranslationTableRule *rule =
(TranslationTableRule *)&table->ruleArea[offset];
if (rule->dotslen)
return for_updatePositions(&rule->charsdots[1], 1, rule->dotslen, 0, pos,
input, output, posMapping, cursorPosition, cursorStatus);
d = _lou_getDotsForChar(character);
return for_updatePositions(&d, 1, 1, 0, pos, input, output, posMapping,
cursorPosition, cursorStatus);
}
return undefinedCharacter(character, table, pos, input, output, posMapping,
cursorPosition, cursorStatus);
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow
Fixes #635
Thanks to HongxuChen for reporting it
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 76,768
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::string TestURLLoader::TestBasicFileRangePOST() {
std::string message;
pp::FileSystem file_system(instance_, PP_FILESYSTEMTYPE_LOCALTEMPORARY);
int32_t rv = OpenFileSystem(&file_system, &message);
if (rv != PP_OK)
return ReportError(message.c_str(), rv);
pp::FileRef file_ref(file_system, "/file_range_post_test");
std::string postdata("postdatapostdata");
rv = PrepareFileForPost(file_ref, postdata, &message);
if (rv != PP_OK)
return ReportError(message.c_str(), rv);
pp::URLRequestInfo request(instance_);
request.SetURL("/echo");
request.SetMethod("POST");
request.AppendFileRangeToBody(file_ref, 4, 12, 0);
return LoadAndCompareBody(request, postdata.substr(4, 12));
}
Commit Message: Fix one implicit 64-bit -> 32-bit implicit conversion in a PPAPI test.
../../ppapi/tests/test_url_loader.cc:877:11: warning: implicit conversion loses integer precision: 'int64_t' (aka 'long long') to 'int32_t' (aka 'int') [-Wshorten-64-to-32]
total_bytes_to_be_received);
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
BUG=879657
Change-Id: I152f456368131fe7a2891ff0c97bf83f26ef0906
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1220173
Commit-Queue: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#600182}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 156,449
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void *nlmsg_reserve(struct nl_msg *n, size_t len, int pad)
{
void *buf = n->nm_nlh;
size_t nlmsg_len = n->nm_nlh->nlmsg_len;
size_t tlen;
tlen = pad ? ((len + (pad - 1)) & ~(pad - 1)) : len;
if ((tlen + nlmsg_len) > n->nm_size)
n->nm_nlh->nlmsg_len += tlen;
if (tlen > len)
memset(buf + len, 0, tlen - len);
NL_DBG(2, "msg %p: Reserved %zu (%zu) bytes, pad=%d, nlmsg_len=%d\n",
n, tlen, len, pad, n->nm_nlh->nlmsg_len);
return buf;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 1
| 165,218
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: zlib_run(struct zlib *zlib)
/* Like zlib_advance but also handles a stream of IDAT chunks. */
{
/* The 'extra_bytes' field is set by zlib_advance if there is extra
* compressed data in the chunk it handles (if it sees Z_STREAM_END before
* all the input data has been used.) This function uses the value to update
* the correct chunk length, so the problem should only ever be detected once
* for each chunk. zlib_advance outputs the error message, though see the
* IDAT specific check below.
*/
zlib->extra_bytes = 0;
if (zlib->idat != NULL)
{
struct IDAT_list *list = zlib->idat->idat_list_head;
struct IDAT_list *last = zlib->idat->idat_list_tail;
int skip = 0;
/* 'rewrite_offset' is the offset of the LZ data within the chunk, for
* IDAT it should be 0:
*/
assert(zlib->rewrite_offset == 0);
/* Process each IDAT_list in turn; the caller has left the stream
* positioned at the start of the first IDAT chunk data.
*/
for (;;)
{
const unsigned int count = list->count;
unsigned int i;
for (i = 0; i<count; ++i)
{
int rc;
if (skip > 0) /* Skip CRC and next IDAT header */
skip_12(zlib->file);
skip = 12; /* for the next time */
rc = zlib_advance(zlib, list->lengths[i]);
switch (rc)
{
case ZLIB_OK: /* keep going */
break;
case ZLIB_STREAM_END: /* stop */
/* There may be extra chunks; if there are and one of them is
* not zero length output the 'extra data' message. Only do
* this check if errors are being output.
*/
if (zlib->global->errors && zlib->extra_bytes == 0)
{
struct IDAT_list *check = list;
int j = i+1, jcount = count;
for (;;)
{
for (; j<jcount; ++j)
if (check->lengths[j] > 0)
{
chunk_message(zlib->chunk,
"extra compressed data");
goto end_check;
}
if (check == last)
break;
check = check->next;
jcount = check->count;
j = 0;
}
}
end_check:
/* Terminate the list at the current position, reducing the
* length of the last IDAT too if required.
*/
list->lengths[i] -= zlib->extra_bytes;
list->count = i+1;
zlib->idat->idat_list_tail = list;
/* FALL THROUGH */
default:
return rc;
}
}
/* At the end of the compressed data and Z_STREAM_END was not seen. */
if (list == last)
return ZLIB_OK;
list = list->next;
}
}
else
{
struct chunk *chunk = zlib->chunk;
int rc;
assert(zlib->rewrite_offset < chunk->chunk_length);
rc = zlib_advance(zlib, chunk->chunk_length - zlib->rewrite_offset);
/* The extra bytes in the chunk are handled now by adjusting the chunk
* length to exclude them; the zlib data is always stored at the end of
* the PNG chunk (although clearly this is not necessary.) zlib_advance
* has already output a warning message.
*/
chunk->chunk_length -= zlib->extra_bytes;
return rc;
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
| 1
| 173,743
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: evdns_close_server_port(struct evdns_server_port *port)
{
EVDNS_LOCK(port);
if (--port->refcnt == 0) {
EVDNS_UNLOCK(port);
server_port_free(port);
} else {
port->closing = 1;
}
}
Commit Message: evdns: fix searching empty hostnames
From #332:
Here follows a bug report by **Guido Vranken** via the _Tor bug bounty program_. Please credit Guido accordingly.
## Bug report
The DNS code of Libevent contains this rather obvious OOB read:
```c
static char *
search_make_new(const struct search_state *const state, int n, const char *const base_name) {
const size_t base_len = strlen(base_name);
const char need_to_append_dot = base_name[base_len - 1] == '.' ? 0 : 1;
```
If the length of ```base_name``` is 0, then line 3125 reads 1 byte before the buffer. This will trigger a crash on ASAN-protected builds.
To reproduce:
Build libevent with ASAN:
```
$ CFLAGS='-fomit-frame-pointer -fsanitize=address' ./configure && make -j4
```
Put the attached ```resolv.conf``` and ```poc.c``` in the source directory and then do:
```
$ gcc -fsanitize=address -fomit-frame-pointer poc.c .libs/libevent.a
$ ./a.out
=================================================================
==22201== ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60060000efdf at pc 0x4429da bp 0x7ffe1ed47300 sp 0x7ffe1ed472f8
READ of size 1 at 0x60060000efdf thread T0
```
P.S. we can add a check earlier, but since this is very uncommon, I didn't add it.
Fixes: #332
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 70,602
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BlobRegistryProxy::addDataToStream(const KURL& url, PassRefPtr<RawData> streamData)
{
if (m_webBlobRegistry) {
WebKit::WebThreadSafeData webThreadSafeData(streamData);
m_webBlobRegistry->addDataToStream(url, webThreadSafeData);
}
}
Commit Message: Remove BlobRegistry indirection since there is only one implementation.
BUG=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15851008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152746 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 102,516
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __exit vfio_pci_cleanup(void)
{
pci_unregister_driver(&vfio_pci_driver);
vfio_pci_uninit_perm_bits();
}
Commit Message: vfio/pci: Fix integer overflows, bitmask check
The VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS ioctl did not sufficiently sanitize
user-supplied integers, potentially allowing memory corruption. This
patch adds appropriate integer overflow checks, checks the range bounds
for VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_NONE, and also verifies that only single element
in the VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_TYPE_MASK bitmask is set.
VFIO_IRQ_SET_ACTION_TYPE_MASK is already correctly checked later in
vfio_pci_set_irqs_ioctl().
Furthermore, a kzalloc is changed to a kcalloc because the use of a
kzalloc with an integer multiplication allowed an integer overflow
condition to be reached without this patch. kcalloc checks for overflow
and should prevent a similar occurrence.
Signed-off-by: Vlad Tsyrklevich <vlad@tsyrklevich.net>
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 48,580
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int vmx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
{
struct shared_msr_entry *msr;
switch (msr_info->index) {
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
case MSR_FS_BASE:
msr_info->data = vmcs_readl(GUEST_FS_BASE);
break;
case MSR_GS_BASE:
msr_info->data = vmcs_readl(GUEST_GS_BASE);
break;
case MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE:
vmx_load_host_state(to_vmx(vcpu));
msr_info->data = to_vmx(vcpu)->msr_guest_kernel_gs_base;
break;
#endif
case MSR_EFER:
return kvm_get_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info);
case MSR_IA32_TSC:
msr_info->data = guest_read_tsc(vcpu);
break;
case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS:
msr_info->data = vmcs_read32(GUEST_SYSENTER_CS);
break;
case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP:
msr_info->data = vmcs_readl(GUEST_SYSENTER_EIP);
break;
case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP:
msr_info->data = vmcs_readl(GUEST_SYSENTER_ESP);
break;
case MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS:
if (!vmx_mpx_supported())
return 1;
msr_info->data = vmcs_read64(GUEST_BNDCFGS);
break;
case MSR_IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL:
if (!nested_vmx_allowed(vcpu))
return 1;
msr_info->data = to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.msr_ia32_feature_control;
break;
case MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC ... MSR_IA32_VMX_VMFUNC:
if (!nested_vmx_allowed(vcpu))
return 1;
return vmx_get_vmx_msr(vcpu, msr_info->index, &msr_info->data);
case MSR_IA32_XSS:
if (!vmx_xsaves_supported())
return 1;
msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.ia32_xss;
break;
case MSR_TSC_AUX:
if (!guest_cpuid_has_rdtscp(vcpu))
return 1;
/* Otherwise falls through */
default:
msr = find_msr_entry(to_vmx(vcpu), msr_info->index);
if (msr) {
msr_info->data = msr->data;
break;
}
return kvm_get_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: work around infinite loop in microcode when #AC is delivered
It was found that a guest can DoS a host by triggering an infinite
stream of "alignment check" (#AC) exceptions. This causes the
microcode to enter an infinite loop where the core never receives
another interrupt. The host kernel panics pretty quickly due to the
effects (CVE-2015-5307).
Signed-off-by: Eric Northup <digitaleric@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 42,751
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ext4_ext_binsearch(struct inode *inode,
struct ext4_ext_path *path, ext4_lblk_t block)
{
struct ext4_extent_header *eh = path->p_hdr;
struct ext4_extent *r, *l, *m;
if (eh->eh_entries == 0) {
/*
* this leaf is empty:
* we get such a leaf in split/add case
*/
return;
}
ext_debug("binsearch for %u: ", block);
l = EXT_FIRST_EXTENT(eh) + 1;
r = EXT_LAST_EXTENT(eh);
while (l <= r) {
m = l + (r - l) / 2;
if (block < le32_to_cpu(m->ee_block))
r = m - 1;
else
l = m + 1;
ext_debug("%p(%u):%p(%u):%p(%u) ", l, le32_to_cpu(l->ee_block),
m, le32_to_cpu(m->ee_block),
r, le32_to_cpu(r->ee_block));
}
path->p_ext = l - 1;
ext_debug(" -> %d:%llu:[%d]%d ",
le32_to_cpu(path->p_ext->ee_block),
ext4_ext_pblock(path->p_ext),
ext4_ext_is_uninitialized(path->p_ext),
ext4_ext_get_actual_len(path->p_ext));
#ifdef CHECK_BINSEARCH
{
struct ext4_extent *chex, *ex;
int k;
chex = ex = EXT_FIRST_EXTENT(eh);
for (k = 0; k < le16_to_cpu(eh->eh_entries); k++, ex++) {
BUG_ON(k && le32_to_cpu(ex->ee_block)
<= le32_to_cpu(ex[-1].ee_block));
if (block < le32_to_cpu(ex->ee_block))
break;
chex = ex;
}
BUG_ON(chex != path->p_ext);
}
#endif
}
Commit Message: ext4: race-condition protection for ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio
We assumed that at the time we call ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio()
extent in question is fully inside [map.m_lblk, map->m_len] because
it was already split during submission. But this may not be true due to
a race between writeback vs fallocate.
If extent in question is larger than requested we will split it again.
Special precautions should being done if zeroout required because
[map.m_lblk, map->m_len] already contains valid data.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Monakhov <dmonakhov@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 18,543
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: M_fs_error_t M_fs_path_readlink_int(char **out, const char *path, M_bool last, M_fs_path_norm_t flags, M_fs_system_t sys_type)
{
(void)path;
(void)last;
(void)flags;
(void)sys_type;
*out = NULL;
return M_FS_ERROR_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: fs: Don't try to delete the file when copying. It could cause a security issue if the file exists and doesn't allow other's to read/write. delete could allow someone to create the file and have access to the data.
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 79,650
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int jpc_ppm_putparms(jpc_ms_t *ms, jpc_cstate_t *cstate, jas_stream_t *out)
{
jpc_ppm_t *ppm = &ms->parms.ppm;
/* Eliminate compiler warning about unused variables. */
cstate = 0;
if (JAS_CAST(uint, jas_stream_write(out, (char *) ppm->data, ppm->len)) != ppm->len) {
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Added some missing sanity checks on the data in a SIZ marker segment.
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 72,985
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: u8d(double d)
{
d = closestinteger(d);
return (png_byte)d;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
| 0
| 159,949
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void jas_matrix_asl(jas_matrix_t *matrix, int n)
{
int i;
int j;
jas_seqent_t *rowstart;
int rowstep;
jas_seqent_t *data;
if (jas_matrix_numrows(matrix) > 0 && jas_matrix_numcols(matrix) > 0) {
assert(matrix->rows_);
rowstep = jas_matrix_rowstep(matrix);
for (i = matrix->numrows_, rowstart = matrix->rows_[0]; i > 0; --i,
rowstart += rowstep) {
for (j = matrix->numcols_, data = rowstart; j > 0; --j,
++data) {
*data = jas_seqent_asl(*data, n);
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 1
| 168,697
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebSocketJob::Close() {
if (state_ == CLOSED)
return;
state_ = CLOSING;
if (current_buffer_) {
return;
}
state_ = CLOSED;
CloseInternal();
}
Commit Message: Use ScopedRunnableMethodFactory in WebSocketJob
Don't post SendPending if it is already posted.
BUG=89795
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7488007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93599 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 98,366
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual void SetUp() {
gl_.reset(new ::testing::StrictMock< ::gfx::MockGLInterface>());
::gfx::MockGLInterface::SetGLInterface(gl_.get());
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 120,730
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void account_event(struct perf_event *event)
{
if (event->parent)
return;
if (event->attach_state & PERF_ATTACH_TASK)
static_key_slow_inc(&perf_sched_events.key);
if (event->attr.mmap || event->attr.mmap_data)
atomic_inc(&nr_mmap_events);
if (event->attr.comm)
atomic_inc(&nr_comm_events);
if (event->attr.task)
atomic_inc(&nr_task_events);
if (event->attr.freq) {
if (atomic_inc_return(&nr_freq_events) == 1)
tick_nohz_full_kick_all();
}
if (has_branch_stack(event))
static_key_slow_inc(&perf_sched_events.key);
if (is_cgroup_event(event))
static_key_slow_inc(&perf_sched_events.key);
account_event_cpu(event, event->cpu);
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix event->ctx locking
There have been a few reported issues wrt. the lack of locking around
changing event->ctx. This patch tries to address those.
It avoids the whole rwsem thing; and while it appears to work, please
give it some thought in review.
What I did fail at is sensible runtime checks on the use of
event->ctx, the RCU use makes it very hard.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150123125834.209535886@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 50,428
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const SerializedResource* getResource(const char* url, const char* mimeType)
{
KURL kURL = KURL(m_baseUrl, url);
String mime(mimeType);
for (size_t i = 0; i < m_resources.size(); ++i) {
const SerializedResource& resource = m_resources[i];
if (resource.url == kURL && !resource.data->isEmpty()
&& (mime.isNull() || equalIgnoringCase(resource.mimeType, mime)))
return &resource;
}
return nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Escape "--" in the page URL at page serialization
This patch makes page serializer to escape the page URL embed into a HTML
comment of result HTML[1] to avoid inserting text as HTML from URL by
introducing a static member function |PageSerialzier::markOfTheWebDeclaration()|
for sharing it between |PageSerialzier| and |WebPageSerialzier| classes.
[1] We use following format for serialized HTML:
saved from url=(${lengthOfURL})${URL}
BUG=503217
TEST=webkit_unit_tests --gtest_filter=PageSerializerTest.markOfTheWebDeclaration
TEST=webkit_unit_tests --gtest_filter=WebPageSerializerTest.fromUrlWithMinusMinu
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1371323003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351736}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 125,363
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ~OptimizationHintsComponentInstallerPolicy() {}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 142,791
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FilePath SavePackage::GetSuggestedNameForSaveAs(
bool can_save_as_complete,
const std::string& contents_mime_type,
const std::string& accept_langs) {
FilePath name_with_proper_ext =
FilePath::FromWStringHack(UTF16ToWideHack(title_));
if (title_ == net::FormatUrl(page_url_, accept_langs)) {
std::string url_path;
if (!page_url_.SchemeIs(chrome::kDataScheme)) {
std::vector<std::string> url_parts;
base::SplitString(page_url_.path(), '/', &url_parts);
if (!url_parts.empty()) {
for (int i = static_cast<int>(url_parts.size()) - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
url_path = url_parts[i];
if (!url_path.empty())
break;
}
}
if (url_path.empty())
url_path = page_url_.host();
} else {
url_path = "dataurl";
}
name_with_proper_ext = FilePath::FromWStringHack(UTF8ToWide(url_path));
}
name_with_proper_ext = EnsureMimeExtension(name_with_proper_ext,
contents_mime_type);
if (can_save_as_complete)
name_with_proper_ext = EnsureHtmlExtension(name_with_proper_ext);
FilePath::StringType file_name = name_with_proper_ext.value();
file_util::ReplaceIllegalCharactersInPath(&file_name, ' ');
return FilePath(file_name);
}
Commit Message: Fix crash with mismatched vector sizes.
BUG=169295
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11817050
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176252 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 115,195
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int truncate_racily_clean(git_index *index)
{
size_t i;
int error;
git_index_entry *entry;
git_diff_options diff_opts = GIT_DIFF_OPTIONS_INIT;
git_diff *diff = NULL;
git_vector paths = GIT_VECTOR_INIT;
git_diff_delta *delta;
/* Nothing to do if there's no repo to talk about */
if (!INDEX_OWNER(index))
return 0;
/* If there's no workdir, we can't know where to even check */
if (!git_repository_workdir(INDEX_OWNER(index)))
return 0;
diff_opts.flags |= GIT_DIFF_INCLUDE_TYPECHANGE | GIT_DIFF_IGNORE_SUBMODULES | GIT_DIFF_DISABLE_PATHSPEC_MATCH;
git_vector_foreach(&index->entries, i, entry) {
if ((entry->flags_extended & GIT_IDXENTRY_UPTODATE) == 0 &&
is_racy_entry(index, entry))
git_vector_insert(&paths, (char *)entry->path);
}
if (paths.length == 0)
goto done;
diff_opts.pathspec.count = paths.length;
diff_opts.pathspec.strings = (char **)paths.contents;
if ((error = git_diff_index_to_workdir(&diff, INDEX_OWNER(index), index, &diff_opts)) < 0)
return error;
git_vector_foreach(&diff->deltas, i, delta) {
entry = (git_index_entry *)git_index_get_bypath(index, delta->old_file.path, 0);
/* Ensure that we have a stage 0 for this file (ie, it's not a
* conflict), otherwise smudging it is quite pointless.
*/
if (entry)
entry->file_size = 0;
}
done:
git_diff_free(diff);
git_vector_free(&paths);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: index: convert `read_entry` to return entry size via an out-param
The function `read_entry` does not conform to our usual coding style of
returning stuff via the out parameter and to use the return value for
reporting errors. Due to most of our code conforming to that pattern, it
has become quite natural for us to actually return `-1` in case there is
any error, which has also slipped in with commit 5625d86b9 (index:
support index v4, 2016-05-17). As the function returns an `size_t` only,
though, the return value is wrapped around, causing the caller of
`read_tree` to continue with an invalid index entry. Ultimately, this
can lead to a double-free.
Improve code and fix the bug by converting the function to return the
index entry size via an out parameter and only using the return value to
indicate errors.
Reported-by: Krishna Ram Prakash R <krp@gtux.in>
Reported-by: Vivek Parikh <viv0411.parikh@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 83,762
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE2(mlock, unsigned long, start, size_t, len)
{
return do_mlock(start, len, VM_LOCKED);
}
Commit Message: mlock: fix mlock count can not decrease in race condition
Kefeng reported that when running the follow test, the mlock count in
meminfo will increase permanently:
[1] testcase
linux:~ # cat test_mlockal
grep Mlocked /proc/meminfo
for j in `seq 0 10`
do
for i in `seq 4 15`
do
./p_mlockall >> log &
done
sleep 0.2
done
# wait some time to let mlock counter decrease and 5s may not enough
sleep 5
grep Mlocked /proc/meminfo
linux:~ # cat p_mlockall.c
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#define SPACE_LEN 4096
int main(int argc, char ** argv)
{
int ret;
void *adr = malloc(SPACE_LEN);
if (!adr)
return -1;
ret = mlockall(MCL_CURRENT | MCL_FUTURE);
printf("mlcokall ret = %d\n", ret);
ret = munlockall();
printf("munlcokall ret = %d\n", ret);
free(adr);
return 0;
}
In __munlock_pagevec() we should decrement NR_MLOCK for each page where
we clear the PageMlocked flag. Commit 1ebb7cc6a583 ("mm: munlock: batch
NR_MLOCK zone state updates") has introduced a bug where we don't
decrement NR_MLOCK for pages where we clear the flag, but fail to
isolate them from the lru list (e.g. when the pages are on some other
cpu's percpu pagevec). Since PageMlocked stays cleared, the NR_MLOCK
accounting gets permanently disrupted by this.
Fix it by counting the number of page whose PageMlock flag is cleared.
Fixes: 1ebb7cc6a583 (" mm: munlock: batch NR_MLOCK zone state updates")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1495678405-54569-1-git-send-email-xieyisheng1@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Yisheng Xie <xieyisheng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Joern Engel <joern@logfs.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: Xishi Qiu <qiuxishi@huawei.com>
Cc: zhongjiang <zhongjiang@huawei.com>
Cc: Hanjun Guo <guohanjun@huawei.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 85,653
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int match_tcon(struct cifs_tcon *tcon, const char *unc)
{
if (tcon->tidStatus == CifsExiting)
return 0;
if (strncmp(tcon->treeName, unc, MAX_TREE_SIZE))
return 0;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: cifs: fix off-by-one bug in build_unc_path_to_root
commit 839db3d10a (cifs: fix up handling of prefixpath= option) changed
the code such that the vol->prepath no longer contained a leading
delimiter and then fixed up the places that accessed that field to
account for that change.
One spot in build_unc_path_to_root was missed however. When doing the
pointer addition on pos, that patch failed to account for the fact that
we had already incremented "pos" by one when adding the length of the
prepath. This caused a buffer overrun by one byte.
This patch fixes the problem by correcting the handling of "pos".
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.8+
Reported-by: Marcus Moeller <marcus.moeller@gmx.ch>
Reported-by: Ken Fallon <ken.fallon@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 29,860
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool HTMLInputElement::ShouldAppearChecked() const {
return checked() && input_type_->IsCheckable();
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 126,107
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GetEstimatedMemoryFreedOnDiscardKB() const {
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
std::unique_ptr<base::ProcessMetrics> process_metrics(
base::ProcessMetrics::CreateProcessMetrics(GetProcessHandle()));
base::ProcessMetrics::TotalsSummary summary =
process_metrics->GetTotalsSummary();
return summary.private_clean_kb + summary.private_dirty_kb + summary.swap_kb;
#else
return 0;
#endif
}
Commit Message: Connect the LocalDB to TabManager.
Bug: 773382
Change-Id: Iec8fe5226ee175105d51f300f30b4865478ac099
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1118611
Commit-Queue: Sébastien Marchand <sebmarchand@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <fdoray@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572871}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 132,104
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleCompressedTexSubImage3DBucket(
uint32_t immediate_data_size, const volatile void* cmd_data) {
if (!feature_info_->IsWebGL2OrES3Context())
return error::kUnknownCommand;
const volatile gles2::cmds::CompressedTexSubImage3DBucket& c =
*static_cast<const volatile gles2::cmds::CompressedTexSubImage3DBucket*>(
cmd_data);
GLenum target = static_cast<GLenum>(c.target);
GLint level = static_cast<GLint>(c.level);
GLint xoffset = static_cast<GLint>(c.xoffset);
GLint yoffset = static_cast<GLint>(c.yoffset);
GLint zoffset = static_cast<GLint>(c.zoffset);
GLsizei width = static_cast<GLsizei>(c.width);
GLsizei height = static_cast<GLsizei>(c.height);
GLsizei depth = static_cast<GLsizei>(c.depth);
GLenum format = static_cast<GLenum>(c.format);
GLuint bucket_id = static_cast<GLuint>(c.bucket_id);
if (state_.bound_pixel_unpack_buffer.get()) {
return error::kInvalidArguments;
}
Bucket* bucket = GetBucket(bucket_id);
if (!bucket)
return error::kInvalidArguments;
uint32_t image_size = bucket->size();
const void* data = bucket->GetData(0, image_size);
DCHECK(data || !image_size);
return DoCompressedTexSubImage(target, level, xoffset, yoffset, zoffset,
width, height, depth, format, image_size,
data, ContextState::k3D);
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,514
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void string_cleanup(char** out)
{
free(*out);
*out = NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fixed #5645: realloc return handling
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 87,597
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MojoResult Core::CancelWatch(MojoHandle watcher_handle, uintptr_t context) {
RequestContext request_context;
scoped_refptr<Dispatcher> watcher = GetDispatcher(watcher_handle);
if (!watcher || watcher->GetType() != Dispatcher::Type::WATCHER)
return MOJO_RESULT_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
return watcher->CancelWatch(context);
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 149,573
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool AwContents::RequestDrawGL(bool wait_for_completion) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
JNIEnv* env = AttachCurrentThread();
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jobject> obj = java_ref_.get(env);
if (obj.is_null())
return false;
return Java_AwContents_requestDrawGL(env, obj.obj(), wait_for_completion);
}
Commit Message: sync compositor: pass simple gfx types by const ref
See bug for reasoning
BUG=159273
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417893006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356653}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 119,622
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AppLayerProtoDetectUnittestsRegister(void)
{
SCEnter();
UtRegisterTest("AppLayerProtoDetectTest01", AppLayerProtoDetectTest01);
UtRegisterTest("AppLayerProtoDetectTest02", AppLayerProtoDetectTest02);
UtRegisterTest("AppLayerProtoDetectTest03", AppLayerProtoDetectTest03);
UtRegisterTest("AppLayerProtoDetectTest04", AppLayerProtoDetectTest04);
UtRegisterTest("AppLayerProtoDetectTest05", AppLayerProtoDetectTest05);
UtRegisterTest("AppLayerProtoDetectTest06", AppLayerProtoDetectTest06);
UtRegisterTest("AppLayerProtoDetectTest07", AppLayerProtoDetectTest07);
UtRegisterTest("AppLayerProtoDetectTest08", AppLayerProtoDetectTest08);
UtRegisterTest("AppLayerProtoDetectTest09", AppLayerProtoDetectTest09);
UtRegisterTest("AppLayerProtoDetectTest10", AppLayerProtoDetectTest10);
UtRegisterTest("AppLayerProtoDetectTest11", AppLayerProtoDetectTest11);
UtRegisterTest("AppLayerProtoDetectTest12", AppLayerProtoDetectTest12);
UtRegisterTest("AppLayerProtoDetectTest13", AppLayerProtoDetectTest13);
UtRegisterTest("AppLayerProtoDetectTest14", AppLayerProtoDetectTest14);
UtRegisterTest("AppLayerProtoDetectTest15", AppLayerProtoDetectTest15);
UtRegisterTest("AppLayerProtoDetectTest16", AppLayerProtoDetectTest16);
UtRegisterTest("AppLayerProtoDetectTest17", AppLayerProtoDetectTest17);
UtRegisterTest("AppLayerProtoDetectTest18", AppLayerProtoDetectTest18);
UtRegisterTest("AppLayerProtoDetectTest19", AppLayerProtoDetectTest19);
SCReturn;
}
Commit Message: proto/detect: workaround dns misdetected as dcerpc
The DCERPC UDP detection would misfire on DNS with transaction
ID 0x0400. This would happen as the protocol detection engine
gives preference to pattern based detection over probing parsers for
performance reasons.
This hack/workaround fixes this specific case by still running the
probing parser if DCERPC has been detected on UDP. The probing
parser result will take precedence.
Bug #2736.
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 96,532
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int nft_ctx_init_from_elemattr(struct nft_ctx *ctx,
const struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
const struct nlattr * const nla[],
bool trans)
{
const struct nfgenmsg *nfmsg = nlmsg_data(nlh);
struct nft_af_info *afi;
struct nft_table *table;
struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
afi = nf_tables_afinfo_lookup(net, nfmsg->nfgen_family, false);
if (IS_ERR(afi))
return PTR_ERR(afi);
table = nf_tables_table_lookup(afi, nla[NFTA_SET_ELEM_LIST_TABLE]);
if (IS_ERR(table))
return PTR_ERR(table);
if (!trans && (table->flags & NFT_TABLE_INACTIVE))
return -ENOENT;
nft_ctx_init(ctx, skb, nlh, afi, table, NULL, nla);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: nf_tables: fix flush ruleset chain dependencies
Jumping between chains doesn't mix well with flush ruleset. Rules
from a different chain and set elements may still refer to us.
[ 353.373791] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 353.373845] kernel BUG at net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:1159!
[ 353.373896] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 353.373942] Modules linked in: intel_powerclamp uas iwldvm iwlwifi
[ 353.374017] CPU: 0 PID: 6445 Comm: 31c3.nft Not tainted 3.18.0 #98
[ 353.374069] Hardware name: LENOVO 5129CTO/5129CTO, BIOS 6QET47WW (1.17 ) 07/14/2010
[...]
[ 353.375018] Call Trace:
[ 353.375046] [<ffffffff81964c31>] ? nf_tables_commit+0x381/0x540
[ 353.375101] [<ffffffff81949118>] nfnetlink_rcv+0x3d8/0x4b0
[ 353.375150] [<ffffffff81943fc5>] netlink_unicast+0x105/0x1a0
[ 353.375200] [<ffffffff8194438e>] netlink_sendmsg+0x32e/0x790
[ 353.375253] [<ffffffff818f398e>] sock_sendmsg+0x8e/0xc0
[ 353.375300] [<ffffffff818f36b9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel.part.20+0x19/0x70
[ 353.375357] [<ffffffff818f44f9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel+0x19/0x30
[ 353.375410] [<ffffffff819016d2>] ? verify_iovec+0x42/0xd0
[ 353.375459] [<ffffffff818f3e10>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x3f0/0x400
[ 353.375510] [<ffffffff810615fa>] ? native_sched_clock+0x2a/0x90
[ 353.375563] [<ffffffff81176697>] ? acct_account_cputime+0x17/0x20
[ 353.375616] [<ffffffff8110dc78>] ? account_user_time+0x88/0xa0
[ 353.375667] [<ffffffff818f4bbd>] __sys_sendmsg+0x3d/0x80
[ 353.375719] [<ffffffff81b184f4>] ? int_check_syscall_exit_work+0x34/0x3d
[ 353.375776] [<ffffffff818f4c0d>] SyS_sendmsg+0xd/0x20
[ 353.375823] [<ffffffff81b1826d>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Release objects in this order: rules -> sets -> chains -> tables, to
make sure no references to chains are held anymore.
Reported-by: Asbjoern Sloth Toennesen <asbjorn@asbjorn.biz>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-19
| 0
| 58,009
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static V9fsFidState *coroutine_fn get_fid(V9fsPDU *pdu, int32_t fid)
{
int err;
V9fsFidState *f;
V9fsState *s = pdu->s;
for (f = s->fid_list; f; f = f->next) {
BUG_ON(f->clunked);
if (f->fid == fid) {
/*
* Update the fid ref upfront so that
* we don't get reclaimed when we yield
* in open later.
*/
f->ref++;
/*
* check whether we need to reopen the
* file. We might have closed the fd
* while trying to free up some file
* descriptors.
*/
err = v9fs_reopen_fid(pdu, f);
if (err < 0) {
f->ref--;
return NULL;
}
/*
* Mark the fid as referenced so that the LRU
* reclaim won't close the file descriptor
*/
f->flags |= FID_REFERENCED;
return f;
}
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 1,461
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool DateTimeFieldElement::isDateTimeFieldElement() const
{
return true;
}
Commit Message: INPUT_MULTIPLE_FIELDS_UI: Inconsistent value of aria-valuetext attribute
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=107897
Reviewed by Kentaro Hara.
Source/WebCore:
aria-valuetext and aria-valuenow attributes had inconsistent values in
a case of initial empty state and a case that a user clears a field.
- aria-valuetext attribute should have "blank" message in the initial
empty state.
- aria-valuenow attribute should be removed in the cleared empty state.
Also, we have a bug that aira-valuenow had a symbolic value such as "AM"
"January". It should always have a numeric value according to the
specification.
http://www.w3.org/TR/wai-aria/states_and_properties#aria-valuenow
No new tests. Updates fast/forms/*-multiple-fields/*-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.html.
* html/shadow/DateTimeFieldElement.cpp:
(WebCore::DateTimeFieldElement::DateTimeFieldElement):
Set "blank" message to aria-valuetext attribute.
(WebCore::DateTimeFieldElement::updateVisibleValue):
aria-valuenow attribute should be a numeric value. Apply String::number
to the return value of valueForARIAValueNow.
Remove aria-valuenow attribute if nothing is selected.
(WebCore::DateTimeFieldElement::valueForARIAValueNow):
Added.
* html/shadow/DateTimeFieldElement.h:
(DateTimeFieldElement): Declare valueForARIAValueNow.
* html/shadow/DateTimeSymbolicFieldElement.cpp:
(WebCore::DateTimeSymbolicFieldElement::valueForARIAValueNow):
Added. Returns 1 + internal selection index.
For example, the function returns 1 for January.
* html/shadow/DateTimeSymbolicFieldElement.h:
(DateTimeSymbolicFieldElement): Declare valueForARIAValueNow.
LayoutTests:
Fix existing tests to show aria-valuenow attribute values.
* fast/forms/resources/multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.js: Added.
* fast/forms/date-multiple-fields/date-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes-expected.txt:
* fast/forms/date-multiple-fields/date-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.html:
Use multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.js.
Add tests for initial empty-value state.
* fast/forms/month-multiple-fields/month-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes-expected.txt:
* fast/forms/month-multiple-fields/month-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.html:
Use multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.js.
* fast/forms/time-multiple-fields/time-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes-expected.txt:
* fast/forms/time-multiple-fields/time-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.html:
Use multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.js.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@140803 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 103,234
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: _PUBLIC_ codepoint_t toupper_m(codepoint_t val)
{
if (val < 128) {
return toupper(val);
}
if (val >= ARRAY_SIZE(upcase_table)) {
return val;
}
return upcase_table[val];
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 2,287
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void red_channel_add_client(RedChannel *channel, RedChannelClient *rcc)
{
spice_assert(rcc);
ring_add(&channel->clients, &rcc->channel_link);
channel->clients_num++;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 2,073
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: UNCURL_EXPORT int32_t uncurl_new_tls_ctx(struct uncurl_tls_ctx **uc_tls_in)
{
int32_t e;
struct uncurl_tls_ctx *uc_tls = *uc_tls_in = calloc(1, sizeof(struct uncurl_tls_ctx));
e = tlss_alloc(&uc_tls->tlss);
if (e == UNCURL_OK) return e;
uncurl_free_tls_ctx(uc_tls);
*uc_tls_in = NULL;
return e;
}
Commit Message: origin matching must come at str end
CWE ID: CWE-352
| 0
| 84,334
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: CSoundFile::ProbeResult CSoundFile::ProbeFileHeaderSTP(MemoryFileReader file, const uint64 *pfilesize)
{
STPFileHeader fileHeader;
if(!file.ReadStruct(fileHeader))
{
return ProbeWantMoreData;
}
if(!ValidateHeader(fileHeader))
{
return ProbeFailure;
}
MPT_UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(pfilesize);
return ProbeSuccess;
}
Commit Message: [Fix] STP: Possible out-of-bounds memory read with malformed STP files (caught with afl-fuzz).
git-svn-id: https://source.openmpt.org/svn/openmpt/trunk/OpenMPT@9567 56274372-70c3-4bfc-bfc3-4c3a0b034d27
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 84,356
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void __init fork_init(void)
{
int i;
#ifndef CONFIG_ARCH_TASK_STRUCT_ALLOCATOR
#ifndef ARCH_MIN_TASKALIGN
#define ARCH_MIN_TASKALIGN 0
#endif
int align = max_t(int, L1_CACHE_BYTES, ARCH_MIN_TASKALIGN);
/* create a slab on which task_structs can be allocated */
task_struct_cachep = kmem_cache_create("task_struct",
arch_task_struct_size, align,
SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_NOTRACK|SLAB_ACCOUNT, NULL);
#endif
/* do the arch specific task caches init */
arch_task_cache_init();
set_max_threads(MAX_THREADS);
init_task.signal->rlim[RLIMIT_NPROC].rlim_cur = max_threads/2;
init_task.signal->rlim[RLIMIT_NPROC].rlim_max = max_threads/2;
init_task.signal->rlim[RLIMIT_SIGPENDING] =
init_task.signal->rlim[RLIMIT_NPROC];
for (i = 0; i < UCOUNT_COUNTS; i++) {
init_user_ns.ucount_max[i] = max_threads/2;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_VMAP_STACK
cpuhp_setup_state(CPUHP_BP_PREPARE_DYN, "fork:vm_stack_cache",
NULL, free_vm_stack_cache);
#endif
}
Commit Message: fork: fix incorrect fput of ->exe_file causing use-after-free
Commit 7c051267931a ("mm, fork: make dup_mmap wait for mmap_sem for
write killable") made it possible to kill a forking task while it is
waiting to acquire its ->mmap_sem for write, in dup_mmap().
However, it was overlooked that this introduced an new error path before
a reference is taken on the mm_struct's ->exe_file. Since the
->exe_file of the new mm_struct was already set to the old ->exe_file by
the memcpy() in dup_mm(), it was possible for the mmput() in the error
path of dup_mm() to drop a reference to ->exe_file which was never
taken.
This caused the struct file to later be freed prematurely.
Fix it by updating mm_init() to NULL out the ->exe_file, in the same
place it clears other things like the list of mmaps.
This bug was found by syzkaller. It can be reproduced using the
following C program:
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <pthread.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <unistd.h>
static void *mmap_thread(void *_arg)
{
for (;;) {
mmap(NULL, 0x1000000, PROT_READ,
MAP_POPULATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0);
}
}
static void *fork_thread(void *_arg)
{
usleep(rand() % 10000);
fork();
}
int main(void)
{
fork();
fork();
fork();
for (;;) {
if (fork() == 0) {
pthread_t t;
pthread_create(&t, NULL, mmap_thread, NULL);
pthread_create(&t, NULL, fork_thread, NULL);
usleep(rand() % 10000);
syscall(__NR_exit_group, 0);
}
wait(NULL);
}
}
No special kernel config options are needed. It usually causes a NULL
pointer dereference in __remove_shared_vm_struct() during exit, or in
dup_mmap() (which is usually inlined into copy_process()) during fork.
Both are due to a vm_area_struct's ->vm_file being used after it's
already been freed.
Google Bug Id: 64772007
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170823211408.31198-1-ebiggers3@gmail.com
Fixes: 7c051267931a ("mm, fork: make dup_mmap wait for mmap_sem for write killable")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Tested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [v4.7+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 59,278
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: stack_max_size_read(struct file *filp, char __user *ubuf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
unsigned long *ptr = filp->private_data;
char buf[64];
int r;
r = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%ld\n", *ptr);
if (r > sizeof(buf))
r = sizeof(buf);
return simple_read_from_buffer(ubuf, count, ppos, buf, r);
}
Commit Message: tracing: Fix possible NULL pointer dereferences
Currently set_ftrace_pid and set_graph_function files use seq_lseek
for their fops. However seq_open() is called only for FMODE_READ in
the fops->open() so that if an user tries to seek one of those file
when she open it for writing, it sees NULL seq_file and then panic.
It can be easily reproduced with following command:
$ cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
$ echo 1234 | sudo tee -a set_ftrace_pid
In this example, GNU coreutils' tee opens the file with fopen(, "a")
and then the fopen() internally calls lseek().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365663302-2170-1-git-send-email-namhyung@kernel.org
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung.kim@lge.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 30,298
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool RenderWidgetHostViewAura::NeedsMouseCapture() {
#if defined(OS_LINUX) && !defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
return NeedsInputGrab();
#endif
return false;
}
Commit Message: Allocate a FrameSinkId for RenderWidgetHostViewAura in mus+ash
RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame expects its parent to have a valid
FrameSinkId. Make sure RenderWidgetHostViewAura has a FrameSinkId even
if DelegatedFrameHost is not used (in mus+ash).
BUG=706553
TBR=jam@chromium.org
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2847253003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468179}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 132,260
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_vcpu_events(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_vcpu_events *events)
{
if (events->flags & ~(KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_NMI_PENDING
| KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_SIPI_VECTOR
| KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_SHADOW
| KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_SMM))
return -EINVAL;
process_nmi(vcpu);
vcpu->arch.exception.pending = events->exception.injected;
vcpu->arch.exception.nr = events->exception.nr;
vcpu->arch.exception.has_error_code = events->exception.has_error_code;
vcpu->arch.exception.error_code = events->exception.error_code;
vcpu->arch.interrupt.pending = events->interrupt.injected;
vcpu->arch.interrupt.nr = events->interrupt.nr;
vcpu->arch.interrupt.soft = events->interrupt.soft;
if (events->flags & KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_SHADOW)
kvm_x86_ops->set_interrupt_shadow(vcpu,
events->interrupt.shadow);
vcpu->arch.nmi_injected = events->nmi.injected;
if (events->flags & KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_NMI_PENDING)
vcpu->arch.nmi_pending = events->nmi.pending;
kvm_x86_ops->set_nmi_mask(vcpu, events->nmi.masked);
if (events->flags & KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_SIPI_VECTOR &&
kvm_vcpu_has_lapic(vcpu))
vcpu->arch.apic->sipi_vector = events->sipi_vector;
if (events->flags & KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_SMM) {
if (events->smi.smm)
vcpu->arch.hflags |= HF_SMM_MASK;
else
vcpu->arch.hflags &= ~HF_SMM_MASK;
vcpu->arch.smi_pending = events->smi.pending;
if (events->smi.smm_inside_nmi)
vcpu->arch.hflags |= HF_SMM_INSIDE_NMI_MASK;
else
vcpu->arch.hflags &= ~HF_SMM_INSIDE_NMI_MASK;
if (kvm_vcpu_has_lapic(vcpu)) {
if (events->smi.latched_init)
set_bit(KVM_APIC_INIT, &vcpu->arch.apic->pending_events);
else
clear_bit(KVM_APIC_INIT, &vcpu->arch.apic->pending_events);
}
}
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Reload pit counters for all channels when restoring state
Currently if userspace restores the pit counters with a count of 0
on channels 1 or 2 and the guest attempts to read the count on those
channels, then KVM will perform a mod of 0 and crash. This will ensure
that 0 values are converted to 65536 as per the spec.
This is CVE-2015-7513.
Signed-off-by: Andy Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 57,772
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: LONG GetEntryWidth(HWND hDropDown, const char *entry)
{
HDC hDC;
HFONT hFont, hDefFont = NULL;
SIZE size;
hDC = GetDC(hDropDown);
hFont = (HFONT)SendMessage(hDropDown, WM_GETFONT, 0, 0);
if (hFont != NULL)
hDefFont = (HFONT)SelectObject(hDC, hFont);
if (!GetTextExtentPointU(hDC, entry, &size))
size.cx = 0;
if (hFont != NULL)
SelectObject(hDC, hDefFont);
if (hDC != NULL)
ReleaseDC(hDropDown, hDC);
return size.cx;
}
Commit Message: [pki] fix https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/403768
* This commit effectively fixes https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/403768 (CVE-2017-13083) as
it is described per its revision 11, which is the latest revision at the time of this commit,
by disabling Windows prompts, enacted during signature validation, that allow the user to
bypass the intended signature verification checks.
* It needs to be pointed out that the vulnerability ("allow(ing) the use of a self-signed
certificate"), which relies on the end-user actively ignoring a Windows prompt that tells
them that the update failed the signature validation whilst also advising against running it,
is being fully addressed, even as the update protocol remains HTTP.
* It also need to be pointed out that the extended delay (48 hours) between the time the
vulnerability was reported and the moment it is fixed in our codebase has to do with
the fact that the reporter chose to deviate from standard security practices by not
disclosing the details of the vulnerability with us, be it publicly or privately,
before creating the cert.org report. The only advance notification we received was a
generic note about the use of HTTP vs HTTPS, which, as have established, is not
immediately relevant to addressing the reported vulnerability.
* Closes #1009
* Note: The other vulnerability scenario described towards the end of #1009, which
doesn't have to do with the "lack of CA checking", will be addressed separately.
CWE ID: CWE-494
| 0
| 62,191
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ZEND_API int add_property_zval_ex(zval *arg, const char *key, uint key_len, zval *value TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
zval *z_key;
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(z_key);
ZVAL_STRINGL(z_key, key, key_len-1, 1);
Z_OBJ_HANDLER_P(arg, write_property)(arg, z_key, value, 0 TSRMLS_CC);
zval_ptr_dtor(&z_key);
return SUCCESS;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 13,755
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LayerTreeCoordinator::scheduleAnimation()
{
scheduleLayerFlush();
}
Commit Message: [WK2] LayerTreeCoordinator should release unused UpdatedAtlases
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95072
Reviewed by Jocelyn Turcotte.
Release graphic buffers that haven't been used for a while in order to save memory.
This way we can give back memory to the system when no user interaction happens
after a period of time, for example when we are in the background.
* Shared/ShareableBitmap.h:
* WebProcess/WebPage/CoordinatedGraphics/LayerTreeCoordinator.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::LayerTreeCoordinator):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::beginContentUpdate):
(WebKit):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::scheduleReleaseInactiveAtlases):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::releaseInactiveAtlasesTimerFired):
* WebProcess/WebPage/CoordinatedGraphics/LayerTreeCoordinator.h:
(LayerTreeCoordinator):
* WebProcess/WebPage/UpdateAtlas.cpp:
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::UpdateAtlas):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::didSwapBuffers):
Don't call buildLayoutIfNeeded here. It's enought to call it in beginPaintingOnAvailableBuffer
and this way we can track whether this atlas is used with m_areaAllocator.
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::beginPaintingOnAvailableBuffer):
* WebProcess/WebPage/UpdateAtlas.h:
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::addTimeInactive):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::isInactive):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::isInUse):
(UpdateAtlas):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@128473 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 97,600
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static CURLcode imap_setup_connection(struct connectdata * conn)
{
struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
if(conn->bits.httpproxy && !data->set.tunnel_thru_httpproxy) {
/* Unless we have asked to tunnel imap operations through the proxy, we
switch and use HTTP operations only */
#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_HTTP
if(conn->handler == &Curl_handler_imap)
conn->handler = &Curl_handler_imap_proxy;
else {
#ifdef USE_SSL
conn->handler = &Curl_handler_imaps_proxy;
#else
failf(data, "IMAPS not supported!");
return CURLE_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
#endif
}
/*
* We explicitly mark this connection as persistent here as we're doing
* IMAP over HTTP and thus we accidentally avoid setting this value
* otherwise.
*/
conn->bits.close = FALSE;
#else
failf(data, "IMAP over http proxy requires HTTP support built-in!");
return CURLE_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
#endif
}
data->state.path++; /* don't include the initial slash */
return CURLE_OK;
}
Commit Message: URL sanitize: reject URLs containing bad data
Protocols (IMAP, POP3 and SMTP) that use the path part of a URL in a
decoded manner now use the new Curl_urldecode() function to reject URLs
with embedded control codes (anything that is or decodes to a byte value
less than 32).
URLs containing such codes could easily otherwise be used to do harm and
allow users to do unintended actions with otherwise innocent tools and
applications. Like for example using a URL like
pop3://pop3.example.com/1%0d%0aDELE%201 when the app wants a URL to get
a mail and instead this would delete one.
This flaw is considered a security vulnerability: CVE-2012-0036
Security advisory at: http://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20120124.html
Reported by: Dan Fandrich
CWE ID: CWE-89
| 0
| 22,093
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: toi(const void *p, int n)
{
const unsigned char *v = (const unsigned char *)p;
if (n > 1)
return v[0] + 256 * toi(v + 1, n - 1);
if (n == 1)
return v[0];
return (0);
}
Commit Message: Issue 717: Fix integer overflow when computing location of volume descriptor
The multiplication here defaulted to 'int' but calculations
of file positions should always use int64_t. A simple cast
suffices to fix this since the base location is always 32 bits
for ISO, so multiplying by the sector size will never overflow
a 64-bit integer.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 51,225
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: reset_order_state(void)
{
memset(&g_order_state, 0, sizeof(g_order_state));
g_order_state.order_type = RDP_ORDER_PATBLT;
}
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 92,985
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void setup_ksp_vsid(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long sp)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_STD_MMU_64
unsigned long sp_vsid;
unsigned long llp = mmu_psize_defs[mmu_linear_psize].sllp;
if (mmu_has_feature(MMU_FTR_1T_SEGMENT))
sp_vsid = get_kernel_vsid(sp, MMU_SEGSIZE_1T)
<< SLB_VSID_SHIFT_1T;
else
sp_vsid = get_kernel_vsid(sp, MMU_SEGSIZE_256M)
<< SLB_VSID_SHIFT;
sp_vsid |= SLB_VSID_KERNEL | llp;
p->thread.ksp_vsid = sp_vsid;
#endif
}
Commit Message: powerpc/tm: Check for already reclaimed tasks
Currently we can hit a scenario where we'll tm_reclaim() twice. This
results in a TM bad thing exception because the second reclaim occurs
when not in suspend mode.
The scenario in which this can happen is the following. We attempt to
deliver a signal to userspace. To do this we need obtain the stack
pointer to write the signal context. To get this stack pointer we
must tm_reclaim() in case we need to use the checkpointed stack
pointer (see get_tm_stackpointer()). Normally we'd then return
directly to userspace to deliver the signal without going through
__switch_to().
Unfortunatley, if at this point we get an error (such as a bad
userspace stack pointer), we need to exit the process. The exit will
result in a __switch_to(). __switch_to() will attempt to save the
process state which results in another tm_reclaim(). This
tm_reclaim() now causes a TM Bad Thing exception as this state has
already been saved and the processor is no longer in TM suspend mode.
Whee!
This patch checks the state of the MSR to ensure we are TM suspended
before we attempt the tm_reclaim(). If we've already saved the state
away, we should no longer be in TM suspend mode. This has the
additional advantage of checking for a potential TM Bad Thing
exception.
Found using syscall fuzzer.
Fixes: fb09692e71f1 ("powerpc: Add reclaim and recheckpoint functions for context switching transactional memory processes")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.9+
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 56,451
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: explicit FadeInAnimationDelegate(views::View* view) : view_(view) {}
Commit Message: ash: Add launcher overflow bubble.
- Host a LauncherView in bubble to display overflown items;
- Mouse wheel and two-finger scroll to scroll the LauncherView in bubble in case overflow bubble is overflown;
- Fit bubble when items are added/removed;
- Keep launcher bar on screen when the bubble is shown;
BUG=128054
TEST=Verify launcher overflown items are in a bubble instead of menu.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10659003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@146460 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 106,228
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: _krb5_pk_cert_free(struct krb5_pk_cert *cert)
{
if (cert->cert) {
hx509_cert_free(cert->cert);
}
free(cert);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2019-12098: krb5: always confirm PA-PKINIT-KX for anon PKINIT
RFC8062 Section 7 requires verification of the PA-PKINIT-KX key excahnge
when anonymous PKINIT is used. Failure to do so can permit an active
attacker to become a man-in-the-middle.
Introduced by a1ef548600c5bb51cf52a9a9ea12676506ede19f. First tagged
release Heimdal 1.4.0.
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N (4.8)
Change-Id: I6cc1c0c24985936468af08693839ac6c3edda133
Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
Approved-by: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auritor.com>
(cherry picked from commit 38c797e1ae9b9c8f99ae4aa2e73957679031fd2b)
CWE ID: CWE-320
| 0
| 89,952
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ScrollAnchor::ClearSelf() {
LayoutObject* anchor_object = anchor_object_;
anchor_object_ = nullptr;
saved_selector_ = String();
if (anchor_object)
anchor_object->MaybeClearIsScrollAnchorObject();
}
Commit Message: Consider scroll-padding when determining scroll anchor node
Scroll anchoring should not anchor to a node that is behind scroll
padding.
Bug: 1010002
Change-Id: Icbd89fb85ea2c97a6de635930a9896f6a87b8f07
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1887745
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nick Burris <nburris@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#711020}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 136,973
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TestFillFormEmptyFormNames(const char* html, bool unowned) {
LoadHTML(html);
WebLocalFrame* web_frame = GetMainFrame();
ASSERT_NE(nullptr, web_frame);
FormCache form_cache(web_frame);
std::vector<FormData> forms = form_cache.ExtractNewForms();
const size_t expected_size = unowned ? 1 : 2;
ASSERT_EQ(expected_size, forms.size());
WebInputElement input_element = GetInputElementById("apple");
FormData form;
FormFieldData field;
EXPECT_TRUE(
FindFormAndFieldForFormControlElement(input_element, &form, &field));
EXPECT_EQ(GetCanonicalOriginForDocument(web_frame->GetDocument()),
form.origin);
if (!unowned) {
EXPECT_TRUE(form.name.empty());
EXPECT_EQ(GURL("http://abc.com"), form.action);
}
const std::vector<FormFieldData>& fields = form.fields;
const size_t unowned_offset = unowned ? 3 : 0;
ASSERT_EQ(unowned_offset + 3, fields.size());
FormFieldData expected;
expected.form_control_type = "text";
expected.max_length = WebInputElement::DefaultMaxLength();
expected.id_attribute = ASCIIToUTF16("apple");
expected.name = expected.id_attribute;
expected.is_autofilled = false;
EXPECT_FORM_FIELD_DATA_EQUALS(expected, fields[unowned_offset]);
expected.id_attribute = ASCIIToUTF16("banana");
expected.name = expected.id_attribute;
expected.is_autofilled = false;
EXPECT_FORM_FIELD_DATA_EQUALS(expected, fields[unowned_offset + 1]);
expected.id_attribute = ASCIIToUTF16("cantelope");
expected.name = expected.id_attribute;
expected.is_autofilled = false;
EXPECT_FORM_FIELD_DATA_EQUALS(expected, fields[unowned_offset + 2]);
form.fields[unowned_offset + 0].value = ASCIIToUTF16("Red");
form.fields[unowned_offset + 1].value = ASCIIToUTF16("Yellow");
form.fields[unowned_offset + 2].value = ASCIIToUTF16("Also Yellow");
form.fields[unowned_offset + 0].is_autofilled = true;
form.fields[unowned_offset + 1].is_autofilled = true;
form.fields[unowned_offset + 2].is_autofilled = true;
FillForm(form, input_element);
FormData form2;
FormFieldData field2;
EXPECT_TRUE(
FindFormAndFieldForFormControlElement(input_element, &form2, &field2));
EXPECT_EQ(GetCanonicalOriginForDocument(web_frame->GetDocument()),
form2.origin);
if (!unowned) {
EXPECT_TRUE(form2.name.empty());
EXPECT_EQ(GURL("http://abc.com"), form2.action);
}
const std::vector<FormFieldData>& fields2 = form2.fields;
ASSERT_EQ(unowned_offset + 3, fields2.size());
expected.id_attribute = ASCIIToUTF16("apple");
expected.name = expected.id_attribute;
expected.value = ASCIIToUTF16("Red");
expected.is_autofilled = true;
EXPECT_FORM_FIELD_DATA_EQUALS(expected, fields2[unowned_offset + 0]);
expected.id_attribute = ASCIIToUTF16("banana");
expected.name = expected.id_attribute;
expected.value = ASCIIToUTF16("Yellow");
expected.is_autofilled = true;
EXPECT_FORM_FIELD_DATA_EQUALS(expected, fields2[unowned_offset + 1]);
expected.id_attribute = ASCIIToUTF16("cantelope");
expected.name = expected.id_attribute;
expected.value = ASCIIToUTF16("Also Yellow");
expected.is_autofilled = true;
EXPECT_FORM_FIELD_DATA_EQUALS(expected, fields2[unowned_offset + 2]);
}
Commit Message: [autofill] Pin preview font-family to a system font
Bug: 916838
Change-Id: I4e874105262f2e15a11a7a18a7afd204e5827400
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1423109
Reviewed-by: Fabio Tirelo <ftirelo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Koji Ishii <kojii@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Roger McFarlane <rogerm@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#640884}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 151,822
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int StreamTcpHandleFin(ThreadVars *tv, StreamTcpThread *stt,
TcpSession *ssn, Packet *p, PacketQueue *pq)
{
if (PKT_IS_TOSERVER(p)) {
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: pkt (%" PRIu32 ") is to server: SEQ %" PRIu32 ","
" ACK %" PRIu32 "", ssn, p->payload_len, TCP_GET_SEQ(p),
TCP_GET_ACK(p));
if (StreamTcpValidateAck(ssn, &ssn->server, p) == -1) {
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: rejecting because of invalid ack value", ssn);
StreamTcpSetEvent(p, STREAM_FIN_INVALID_ACK);
return -1;
}
if (SEQ_LT(TCP_GET_SEQ(p), ssn->client.next_seq) ||
SEQ_GT(TCP_GET_SEQ(p), (ssn->client.last_ack + ssn->client.window)))
{
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: -> SEQ mismatch, packet SEQ %" PRIu32 " != "
"%" PRIu32 " from stream", ssn, TCP_GET_SEQ(p),
ssn->client.next_seq);
StreamTcpSetEvent(p, STREAM_FIN_OUT_OF_WINDOW);
return -1;
}
StreamTcpPacketSetState(p, ssn, TCP_CLOSE_WAIT);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: state changed to TCP_CLOSE_WAIT", ssn);
if (SEQ_EQ(TCP_GET_SEQ(p), ssn->client.next_seq))
ssn->client.next_seq = TCP_GET_SEQ(p) + p->payload_len;
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: ssn->client.next_seq %" PRIu32 "", ssn,
ssn->client.next_seq);
ssn->server.window = TCP_GET_WINDOW(p) << ssn->server.wscale;
StreamTcpUpdateLastAck(ssn, &ssn->server, TCP_GET_ACK(p));
if (ssn->flags & STREAMTCP_FLAG_TIMESTAMP) {
StreamTcpHandleTimestamp(ssn, p);
}
/* Update the next_seq, in case if we have missed the client packet
and server has already received and acked it */
if (SEQ_LT(ssn->server.next_seq, TCP_GET_ACK(p)))
ssn->server.next_seq = TCP_GET_ACK(p);
StreamTcpReassembleHandleSegment(tv, stt->ra_ctx, ssn, &ssn->client, p, pq);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: =+ next SEQ %" PRIu32 ", last ACK %" PRIu32 "",
ssn, ssn->client.next_seq, ssn->server.last_ack);
} else { /* implied to client */
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: pkt (%" PRIu32 ") is to client: SEQ %" PRIu32 ", "
"ACK %" PRIu32 "", ssn, p->payload_len, TCP_GET_SEQ(p),
TCP_GET_ACK(p));
if (StreamTcpValidateAck(ssn, &ssn->client, p) == -1) {
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: rejecting because of invalid ack value", ssn);
StreamTcpSetEvent(p, STREAM_FIN_INVALID_ACK);
return -1;
}
if (SEQ_LT(TCP_GET_SEQ(p), ssn->server.next_seq) ||
SEQ_GT(TCP_GET_SEQ(p), (ssn->server.last_ack + ssn->server.window)))
{
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: -> SEQ mismatch, packet SEQ %" PRIu32 " != "
"%" PRIu32 " from stream (last_ack %u win %u = %u)", ssn, TCP_GET_SEQ(p),
ssn->server.next_seq, ssn->server.last_ack, ssn->server.window, (ssn->server.last_ack + ssn->server.window));
StreamTcpSetEvent(p, STREAM_FIN_OUT_OF_WINDOW);
return -1;
}
StreamTcpPacketSetState(p, ssn, TCP_FIN_WAIT1);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: state changed to TCP_FIN_WAIT1", ssn);
if (SEQ_EQ(TCP_GET_SEQ(p), ssn->server.next_seq))
ssn->server.next_seq = TCP_GET_SEQ(p) + p->payload_len;
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: ssn->server.next_seq %" PRIu32 "", ssn,
ssn->server.next_seq);
ssn->client.window = TCP_GET_WINDOW(p) << ssn->client.wscale;
StreamTcpUpdateLastAck(ssn, &ssn->client, TCP_GET_ACK(p));
if (ssn->flags & STREAMTCP_FLAG_TIMESTAMP) {
StreamTcpHandleTimestamp(ssn, p);
}
/* Update the next_seq, in case if we have missed the client packet
and server has already received and acked it */
if (SEQ_LT(ssn->client.next_seq, TCP_GET_ACK(p)))
ssn->client.next_seq = TCP_GET_ACK(p);
StreamTcpReassembleHandleSegment(tv, stt->ra_ctx, ssn, &ssn->server, p, pq);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: =+ next SEQ %" PRIu32 ", last ACK %" PRIu32 "",
ssn, ssn->server.next_seq, ssn->client.last_ack);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: stream: support RST getting lost/ignored
In case of a valid RST on a SYN, the state is switched to 'TCP_CLOSED'.
However, the target of the RST may not have received it, or may not
have accepted it. Also, the RST may have been injected, so the supposed
sender may not actually be aware of the RST that was sent in it's name.
In this case the previous behavior was to switch the state to CLOSED and
accept no further TCP updates or stream reassembly.
This patch changes this. It still switches the state to CLOSED, as this
is by far the most likely to be correct. However, it will reconsider
the state if the receiver continues to talk.
To do this on each state change the previous state will be recorded in
TcpSession::pstate. If a non-RST packet is received after a RST, this
TcpSession::pstate is used to try to continue the conversation.
If the (supposed) sender of the RST is also continueing the conversation
as normal, it's highly likely it didn't send the RST. In this case
a stream event is generated.
Ticket: #2501
Reported-By: Kirill Shipulin
CWE ID:
| 0
| 79,188
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pcmap(void)
{
}
Commit Message: Make temporary directory safely when ~/.w3m is unwritable
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 84,525
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: free_key_ctx_bi (struct key_ctx_bi *ctx)
{
free_key_ctx(&ctx->encrypt);
free_key_ctx(&ctx->decrypt);
}
Commit Message: Use constant time memcmp when comparing HMACs in openvpn_decrypt.
Signed-off-by: Steffan Karger <steffan.karger@fox-it.com>
Acked-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 32,007
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int l2tp_ip6_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
int addr_len)
{
struct sockaddr_l2tpip6 *lsa = (struct sockaddr_l2tpip6 *) uaddr;
struct sockaddr_in6 *usin = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) uaddr;
struct in6_addr *daddr;
int addr_type;
int rc;
if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED)) /* Must bind first - autobinding does not work */
return -EINVAL;
if (addr_len < sizeof(*lsa))
return -EINVAL;
if (usin->sin6_family != AF_INET6)
return -EINVAL;
addr_type = ipv6_addr_type(&usin->sin6_addr);
if (addr_type & IPV6_ADDR_MULTICAST)
return -EINVAL;
if (addr_type & IPV6_ADDR_MAPPED) {
daddr = &usin->sin6_addr;
if (ipv4_is_multicast(daddr->s6_addr32[3]))
return -EINVAL;
}
rc = ip6_datagram_connect(sk, uaddr, addr_len);
lock_sock(sk);
l2tp_ip6_sk(sk)->peer_conn_id = lsa->l2tp_conn_id;
write_lock_bh(&l2tp_ip6_lock);
hlist_del_init(&sk->sk_bind_node);
sk_add_bind_node(sk, &l2tp_ip6_bind_table);
write_unlock_bh(&l2tp_ip6_lock);
release_sock(sk);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: add complete rcu protection around np->opt
This patch addresses multiple problems :
UDP/RAW sendmsg() need to get a stable struct ipv6_txoptions
while socket is not locked : Other threads can change np->opt
concurrently. Dmitry posted a syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller) program desmonstrating
use-after-free.
Starting with TCP/DCCP lockless listeners, tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock()
and dccp_v6_request_recv_sock() also need to use RCU protection
to dereference np->opt once (before calling ipv6_dup_options())
This patch adds full RCU protection to np->opt
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 53,743
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FakePacketTransport(quic::QuicAlarmFactory* alarm_factory,
quic::MockClock* clock)
: alarm_(alarm_factory->CreateAlarm(new AlarmDelegate(this))),
clock_(clock) {}
Commit Message: P2PQuicStream write functionality.
This adds the P2PQuicStream::WriteData function and adds tests. It also
adds the concept of a write buffered amount, enforcing this at the
P2PQuicStreamImpl.
Bug: 874296
Change-Id: Id02c8aa8d5368a87bb24a2e50dab5ef94bcae131
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1315534
Commit-Queue: Seth Hampson <shampson@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <hbos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#605766}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 132,744
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: mojom::CommitResult FrameLoader::CommitSameDocumentNavigation(
const KURL& url,
WebFrameLoadType frame_load_type,
HistoryItem* history_item,
ClientRedirectPolicy client_redirect_policy,
Document* origin_document,
bool has_event,
std::unique_ptr<WebDocumentLoader::ExtraData> extra_data) {
DCHECK(!IsReloadLoadType(frame_load_type));
DCHECK(frame_->GetDocument());
if (in_stop_all_loaders_)
return mojom::CommitResult::Aborted;
bool history_navigation = IsBackForwardLoadType(frame_load_type);
if (!frame_->IsNavigationAllowed() && history_navigation)
return mojom::CommitResult::Aborted;
if (!history_navigation) {
if (!url.HasFragmentIdentifier() ||
!EqualIgnoringFragmentIdentifier(frame_->GetDocument()->Url(), url) ||
frame_->GetDocument()->IsFrameSet()) {
return mojom::CommitResult::RestartCrossDocument;
}
}
DCHECK(history_item || !history_navigation);
scoped_refptr<SerializedScriptValue> state_object =
history_navigation ? history_item->StateObject() : nullptr;
if (!history_navigation) {
document_loader_->SetNavigationType(
DetermineNavigationType(frame_load_type, false, has_event));
if (ShouldTreatURLAsSameAsCurrent(url))
frame_load_type = WebFrameLoadType::kReplaceCurrentItem;
}
LoadInSameDocument(url, state_object, frame_load_type, history_item,
client_redirect_policy, origin_document,
std::move(extra_data));
return mojom::CommitResult::Ok;
}
Commit Message: Inherit the navigation initiator when navigating instead of the parent/opener
Spec PR: https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-csp/pull/358
Bug: 905301, 894228, 836148
Change-Id: I43ada2266d42d1cd56dbe3c6dd89d115e878a83a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1314633
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#610850}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 152,556
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void activityLoggedInIsolatedWorldsAttrSetterAttributeSetterForMainWorld(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
ExceptionState exceptionState(ExceptionState::SetterContext, "activityLoggedInIsolatedWorldsAttrSetter", "TestObject", info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate());
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_EXCEPTION_VOID(int, cppValue, toInt32(jsValue, exceptionState), exceptionState);
imp->setActivityLoggedInIsolatedWorldsAttrSetter(cppValue);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 121,550
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void sanitize_key(unsigned flags, char *str, size_t len, zval *zv, zend_bool *rfc5987 TSRMLS_DC)
{
char *eos;
zval_dtor(zv);
php_trim(str, len, NULL, 0, zv, 3 TSRMLS_CC);
if (flags & PHP_HTTP_PARAMS_ESCAPED) {
sanitize_escaped(zv TSRMLS_CC);
}
if (!Z_STRLEN_P(zv)) {
return;
}
if (flags & PHP_HTTP_PARAMS_RFC5987) {
eos = &Z_STRVAL_P(zv)[Z_STRLEN_P(zv)-1];
if (*eos == '*') {
*eos = '\0';
*rfc5987 = 1;
Z_STRLEN_P(zv) -= 1;
}
}
if (flags & PHP_HTTP_PARAMS_URLENCODED) {
sanitize_urlencoded(zv TSRMLS_CC);
}
if (flags & PHP_HTTP_PARAMS_DIMENSION) {
sanitize_dimension(zv TSRMLS_CC);
}
}
Commit Message: fix bug #73055
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 94,003
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cifs_find_lock_conflict(struct cifsFileInfo *cfile, __u64 offset, __u64 length,
__u8 type, struct cifsLockInfo **conf_lock,
int rw_check)
{
bool rc = false;
struct cifs_fid_locks *cur;
struct cifsInodeInfo *cinode = CIFS_I(cfile->dentry->d_inode);
list_for_each_entry(cur, &cinode->llist, llist) {
rc = cifs_find_fid_lock_conflict(cur, offset, length, type,
cfile, conf_lock, rw_check);
if (rc)
break;
}
return rc;
}
Commit Message: cifs: ensure that uncached writes handle unmapped areas correctly
It's possible for userland to pass down an iovec via writev() that has a
bogus user pointer in it. If that happens and we're doing an uncached
write, then we can end up getting less bytes than we expect from the
call to iov_iter_copy_from_user. This is CVE-2014-0069
cifs_iovec_write isn't set up to handle that situation however. It'll
blindly keep chugging through the page array and not filling those pages
with anything useful. Worse yet, we'll later end up with a negative
number in wdata->tailsz, which will confuse the sending routines and
cause an oops at the very least.
Fix this by having the copy phase of cifs_iovec_write stop copying data
in this situation and send the last write as a short one. At the same
time, we want to avoid sending a zero-length write to the server, so
break out of the loop and set rc to -EFAULT if that happens. This also
allows us to handle the case where no address in the iovec is valid.
[Note: Marking this for stable on v3.4+ kernels, but kernels as old as
v2.6.38 may have a similar problem and may need similar fix]
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.4+
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 39,970
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static CURLcode cmp_peer_pubkey(struct ssl_connect_data *connssl,
const char *pinnedpubkey)
{
CURLcode result = CURLE_SSL_PINNEDPUBKEYNOTMATCH;
struct Curl_easy *data = connssl->data;
CERTCertificate *cert;
if(!pinnedpubkey)
/* no pinned public key specified */
return CURLE_OK;
/* get peer certificate */
cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(connssl->handle);
if(cert) {
/* extract public key from peer certificate */
SECKEYPublicKey *pubkey = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(cert);
if(pubkey) {
/* encode the public key as DER */
SECItem *cert_der = PK11_DEREncodePublicKey(pubkey);
if(cert_der) {
/* compare the public key with the pinned public key */
result = Curl_pin_peer_pubkey(data, pinnedpubkey, cert_der->data,
cert_der->len);
SECITEM_FreeItem(cert_der, PR_TRUE);
}
SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubkey);
}
CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
}
/* report the resulting status */
switch(result) {
case CURLE_OK:
infof(data, "pinned public key verified successfully!\n");
break;
case CURLE_SSL_PINNEDPUBKEYNOTMATCH:
failf(data, "failed to verify pinned public key");
break;
default:
/* OOM, etc. */
break;
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: nss: refuse previously loaded certificate from file
... when we are not asked to use a certificate from file
CWE ID: CWE-287
| 0
| 50,085
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BlockEntry::Kind Track::EOSBlock::GetKind() const
{
return kBlockEOS;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 174,331
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int vcpu_enter_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
int r;
bool req_int_win = !irqchip_in_kernel(vcpu->kvm) &&
vcpu->run->request_interrupt_window;
bool req_immediate_exit = 0;
if (vcpu->requests) {
if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_MMU_RELOAD, vcpu))
kvm_mmu_unload(vcpu);
if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_MIGRATE_TIMER, vcpu))
__kvm_migrate_timers(vcpu);
if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_CLOCK_UPDATE, vcpu)) {
r = kvm_guest_time_update(vcpu);
if (unlikely(r))
goto out;
}
if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_MMU_SYNC, vcpu))
kvm_mmu_sync_roots(vcpu);
if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH, vcpu))
kvm_x86_ops->tlb_flush(vcpu);
if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_REPORT_TPR_ACCESS, vcpu)) {
vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_TPR_ACCESS;
r = 0;
goto out;
}
if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_TRIPLE_FAULT, vcpu)) {
vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_SHUTDOWN;
r = 0;
goto out;
}
if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_DEACTIVATE_FPU, vcpu)) {
vcpu->fpu_active = 0;
kvm_x86_ops->fpu_deactivate(vcpu);
}
if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_APF_HALT, vcpu)) {
/* Page is swapped out. Do synthetic halt */
vcpu->arch.apf.halted = true;
r = 1;
goto out;
}
if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_STEAL_UPDATE, vcpu))
record_steal_time(vcpu);
if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_NMI, vcpu))
process_nmi(vcpu);
req_immediate_exit =
kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_IMMEDIATE_EXIT, vcpu);
if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_PMU, vcpu))
kvm_handle_pmu_event(vcpu);
if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_PMI, vcpu))
kvm_deliver_pmi(vcpu);
}
r = kvm_mmu_reload(vcpu);
if (unlikely(r))
goto out;
if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu) || req_int_win) {
inject_pending_event(vcpu);
/* enable NMI/IRQ window open exits if needed */
if (vcpu->arch.nmi_pending)
kvm_x86_ops->enable_nmi_window(vcpu);
else if (kvm_cpu_has_interrupt(vcpu) || req_int_win)
kvm_x86_ops->enable_irq_window(vcpu);
if (kvm_lapic_enabled(vcpu)) {
update_cr8_intercept(vcpu);
kvm_lapic_sync_to_vapic(vcpu);
}
}
preempt_disable();
kvm_x86_ops->prepare_guest_switch(vcpu);
if (vcpu->fpu_active)
kvm_load_guest_fpu(vcpu);
kvm_load_guest_xcr0(vcpu);
vcpu->mode = IN_GUEST_MODE;
/* We should set ->mode before check ->requests,
* see the comment in make_all_cpus_request.
*/
smp_mb();
local_irq_disable();
if (vcpu->mode == EXITING_GUEST_MODE || vcpu->requests
|| need_resched() || signal_pending(current)) {
vcpu->mode = OUTSIDE_GUEST_MODE;
smp_wmb();
local_irq_enable();
preempt_enable();
kvm_x86_ops->cancel_injection(vcpu);
r = 1;
goto out;
}
srcu_read_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu, vcpu->srcu_idx);
if (req_immediate_exit)
smp_send_reschedule(vcpu->cpu);
kvm_guest_enter();
if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs)) {
set_debugreg(0, 7);
set_debugreg(vcpu->arch.eff_db[0], 0);
set_debugreg(vcpu->arch.eff_db[1], 1);
set_debugreg(vcpu->arch.eff_db[2], 2);
set_debugreg(vcpu->arch.eff_db[3], 3);
}
trace_kvm_entry(vcpu->vcpu_id);
kvm_x86_ops->run(vcpu);
/*
* If the guest has used debug registers, at least dr7
* will be disabled while returning to the host.
* If we don't have active breakpoints in the host, we don't
* care about the messed up debug address registers. But if
* we have some of them active, restore the old state.
*/
if (hw_breakpoint_active())
hw_breakpoint_restore();
vcpu->arch.last_guest_tsc = kvm_x86_ops->read_l1_tsc(vcpu);
vcpu->mode = OUTSIDE_GUEST_MODE;
smp_wmb();
local_irq_enable();
++vcpu->stat.exits;
/*
* We must have an instruction between local_irq_enable() and
* kvm_guest_exit(), so the timer interrupt isn't delayed by
* the interrupt shadow. The stat.exits increment will do nicely.
* But we need to prevent reordering, hence this barrier():
*/
barrier();
kvm_guest_exit();
preempt_enable();
vcpu->srcu_idx = srcu_read_lock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu);
/*
* Profile KVM exit RIPs:
*/
if (unlikely(prof_on == KVM_PROFILING)) {
unsigned long rip = kvm_rip_read(vcpu);
profile_hit(KVM_PROFILING, (void *)rip);
}
kvm_lapic_sync_from_vapic(vcpu);
r = kvm_x86_ops->handle_exit(vcpu);
out:
return r;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 20,891
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ColorChooserDialog::~ColorChooserDialog() {
}
Commit Message: ColorChooserWin::End should act like the dialog has closed
This is only a problem on Windows.
When the page closes itself while the color chooser dialog is open,
ColorChooserDialog::DidCloseDialog was called after the listener has been destroyed.
ColorChooserWin::End() will not actually close the color chooser dialog (because we can't) but act like it did so we can do the necessary cleanup.
BUG=279263
R=jschuh@chromium.org, pkasting@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/23785003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@220639 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 111,481
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void perf_sysenter_disable(struct ftrace_event_call *call)
{
int num;
num = ((struct syscall_metadata *)call->data)->syscall_nr;
mutex_lock(&syscall_trace_lock);
sys_perf_refcount_enter--;
clear_bit(num, enabled_perf_enter_syscalls);
if (!sys_perf_refcount_enter)
unregister_trace_sys_enter(perf_syscall_enter, NULL);
mutex_unlock(&syscall_trace_lock);
}
Commit Message: tracing/syscalls: Ignore numbers outside NR_syscalls' range
ARM has some private syscalls (for example, set_tls(2)) which lie
outside the range of NR_syscalls. If any of these are called while
syscall tracing is being performed, out-of-bounds array access will
occur in the ftrace and perf sys_{enter,exit} handlers.
# trace-cmd record -e raw_syscalls:* true && trace-cmd report
...
true-653 [000] 384.675777: sys_enter: NR 192 (0, 1000, 3, 4000022, ffffffff, 0)
true-653 [000] 384.675812: sys_exit: NR 192 = 1995915264
true-653 [000] 384.675971: sys_enter: NR 983045 (76f74480, 76f74000, 76f74b28, 76f74480, 76f76f74, 1)
true-653 [000] 384.675988: sys_exit: NR 983045 = 0
...
# trace-cmd record -e syscalls:* true
[ 17.289329] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address aaaaaace
[ 17.289590] pgd = 9e71c000
[ 17.289696] [aaaaaace] *pgd=00000000
[ 17.289985] Internal error: Oops: 5 [#1] PREEMPT SMP ARM
[ 17.290169] Modules linked in:
[ 17.290391] CPU: 0 PID: 704 Comm: true Not tainted 3.18.0-rc2+ #21
[ 17.290585] task: 9f4dab00 ti: 9e710000 task.ti: 9e710000
[ 17.290747] PC is at ftrace_syscall_enter+0x48/0x1f8
[ 17.290866] LR is at syscall_trace_enter+0x124/0x184
Fix this by ignoring out-of-NR_syscalls-bounds syscall numbers.
Commit cd0980fc8add "tracing: Check invalid syscall nr while tracing syscalls"
added the check for less than zero, but it should have also checked
for greater than NR_syscalls.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/p/1414620418-29472-1-git-send-email-rabin@rab.in
Fixes: cd0980fc8add "tracing: Check invalid syscall nr while tracing syscalls"
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 2.6.33+
Signed-off-by: Rabin Vincent <rabin@rab.in>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 35,905
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: TIFFStartTile(TIFF* tif, uint32 tile)
{
static const char module[] = "TIFFStartTile";
TIFFDirectory *td = &tif->tif_dir;
uint32 howmany32;
if (!_TIFFFillStriles( tif ) || !tif->tif_dir.td_stripbytecount)
return 0;
if ((tif->tif_flags & TIFF_CODERSETUP) == 0) {
if (!(*tif->tif_setupdecode)(tif))
return (0);
tif->tif_flags |= TIFF_CODERSETUP;
}
tif->tif_curtile = tile;
howmany32=TIFFhowmany_32(td->td_imagewidth, td->td_tilewidth);
if (howmany32 == 0) {
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata,module,"Zero tiles");
return 0;
}
tif->tif_row = (tile % howmany32) * td->td_tilelength;
howmany32=TIFFhowmany_32(td->td_imagelength, td->td_tilelength);
if (howmany32 == 0) {
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata,module,"Zero tiles");
return 0;
}
tif->tif_col = (tile % howmany32) * td->td_tilewidth;
tif->tif_flags &= ~TIFF_BUF4WRITE;
if (tif->tif_flags&TIFF_NOREADRAW)
{
tif->tif_rawcp = NULL;
tif->tif_rawcc = 0;
}
else
{
tif->tif_rawcp = tif->tif_rawdata;
tif->tif_rawcc = (tmsize_t)td->td_stripbytecount[tile];
}
return ((*tif->tif_predecode)(tif,
(uint16)(tile/td->td_stripsperimage)));
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_read.c, libtiff/tiffiop.h: fix uint32 overflow in
TIFFReadEncodedStrip() that caused an integer division by zero.
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2596
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 70,344
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: make_size_images(png_store *ps)
{
/* This is in case of errors. */
safecat(ps->test, sizeof ps->test, 0, "make size images");
/* Arguments are colour_type, low bit depth, high bit depth
*/
make_size(ps, 0, 0, WRITE_BDHI);
make_size(ps, 2, 3, WRITE_BDHI);
make_size(ps, 3, 0, 3 /*palette: max 8 bits*/);
make_size(ps, 4, 3, WRITE_BDHI);
make_size(ps, 6, 3, WRITE_BDHI);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
| 0
| 159,993
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void MediaStreamManager::GenerateStream(
int render_process_id,
int render_frame_id,
const std::string& salt,
int page_request_id,
const StreamControls& controls,
const url::Origin& security_origin,
bool user_gesture,
GenerateStreamCallback generate_stream_cb,
DeviceStoppedCallback device_stopped_cb) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
DVLOG(1) << "GenerateStream()";
DeviceRequest* request =
new DeviceRequest(render_process_id, render_frame_id, page_request_id,
security_origin, user_gesture, MEDIA_GENERATE_STREAM,
controls, salt, std::move(device_stopped_cb));
const std::string& label = AddRequest(request);
request->generate_stream_cb = std::move(generate_stream_cb);
if (generate_stream_test_callback_) {
if (generate_stream_test_callback_.Run(controls)) {
FinalizeGenerateStream(label, request);
} else {
FinalizeRequestFailed(label, request, MEDIA_DEVICE_INVALID_STATE);
}
return;
}
BrowserThread::PostTask(BrowserThread::IO, FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&MediaStreamManager::SetupRequest,
base::Unretained(this), label));
}
Commit Message: Fix MediaObserver notifications in MediaStreamManager.
This CL fixes the stream type used to notify MediaObserver about
cancelled MediaStream requests.
Before this CL, NUM_MEDIA_TYPES was used as stream type to indicate
that all stream types should be cancelled.
However, the MediaObserver end does not interpret NUM_MEDIA_TYPES this
way and the request to update the UI is ignored.
This CL sends a separate notification for each stream type so that the
UI actually gets updated for all stream types in use.
Bug: 816033
Change-Id: Ib7d3b3046d1dd0976627f8ab38abf086eacc9405
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/939630
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540122}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 148,315
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ssize_t utf16_to_utf8_length(const char16_t *src, size_t src_len)
{
if (src == NULL || src_len == 0) {
return -1;
}
size_t ret = 0;
const char16_t* const end = src + src_len;
while (src < end) {
if ((*src & 0xFC00) == 0xD800 && (src + 1) < end
&& (*++src & 0xFC00) == 0xDC00) {
ret += 4;
src++;
} else {
ret += utf32_codepoint_utf8_length((char32_t) *src++);
}
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: libutils/Unicode.cpp: Correct length computation and add checks for utf16->utf8
Inconsistent behaviour between utf16_to_utf8 and utf16_to_utf8_length
is causing a heap overflow.
Correcting the length computation and adding bound checks to the
conversion functions.
Test: ran libutils_tests
Bug: 29250543
Change-Id: I6115e3357141ed245c63c6eb25fc0fd0a9a7a2bb
(cherry picked from commit c4966a363e46d2e1074d1a365e232af0dcedd6a1)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 173,420
|
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