instruction
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stringlengths 56
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|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void expunge_all(struct msg_queue *msq, int res)
{
struct msg_receiver *msr, *t;
list_for_each_entry_safe(msr, t, &msq->q_receivers, r_list) {
msr->r_msg = NULL; /* initialize expunge ordering */
wake_up_process(msr->r_tsk);
/*
* Ensure that the wakeup is visible before setting r_msg as
* the receiving end depends on it: either spinning on a nil,
* or dealing with -EAGAIN cases. See lockless receive part 1
* and 2 in do_msgrcv().
*/
smp_wmb(); /* barrier (B) */
msr->r_msg = ERR_PTR(res);
}
}
Commit Message: Initialize msg/shm IPC objects before doing ipc_addid()
As reported by Dmitry Vyukov, we really shouldn't do ipc_addid() before
having initialized the IPC object state. Yes, we initialize the IPC
object in a locked state, but with all the lockless RCU lookup work,
that IPC object lock no longer means that the state cannot be seen.
We already did this for the IPC semaphore code (see commit e8577d1f0329:
"ipc/sem.c: fully initialize sem_array before making it visible") but we
clearly forgot about msg and shm.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 41,997
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebPage::selectAtDocumentPoint(const Platform::IntPoint& documentPoint)
{
if (d->m_page->defersLoading())
return;
d->m_selectionHandler->selectAtPoint(documentPoint);
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 104,376
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool SyncBackendHost::IsCryptographerReady(
const sync_api::BaseTransaction* trans) const {
return syncapi_initialized_ && trans->GetCryptographer()->is_ready();
}
Commit Message: Enable HistoryModelWorker by default, now that bug 69561 is fixed.
BUG=69561
TEST=Run sync manually and run integration tests, sync should not crash.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7016007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@85211 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 101,457
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ft_glyphslot_free_bitmap( FT_GlyphSlot slot )
{
if ( slot->internal && ( slot->internal->flags & FT_GLYPH_OWN_BITMAP ) )
{
FT_Memory memory = FT_FACE_MEMORY( slot->face );
FT_FREE( slot->bitmap.buffer );
slot->internal->flags &= ~FT_GLYPH_OWN_BITMAP;
}
else
{
/* assume that the bitmap buffer was stolen or not */
/* allocated from the heap */
slot->bitmap.buffer = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 9,688
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool X86_insn_reg_att2(unsigned int id, x86_reg *reg1, enum cs_ac_type *access1, x86_reg *reg2, enum cs_ac_type *access2)
{
unsigned int i;
for (i = 0; i < ARR_SIZE(insn_regs_intel2); i++) {
if (insn_regs_intel2[i].insn == id) {
*reg1 = insn_regs_intel2[i].reg2;
*reg2 = insn_regs_intel2[i].reg1;
if (access1)
*access1 = insn_regs_intel2[i].access2;
if (access2)
*access2 = insn_regs_intel2[i].access1;
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: x86: fast path checking for X86_insn_reg_intel()
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 94,023
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct hlist_head *nl_portid_hash_zalloc(size_t size)
{
if (size <= PAGE_SIZE)
return kzalloc(size, GFP_ATOMIC);
else
return (struct hlist_head *)
__get_free_pages(GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_ZERO,
get_order(size));
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 40,574
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t proc_coredump_filter_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(file->f_dentry->d_inode);
struct mm_struct *mm;
char buffer[PROC_NUMBUF];
size_t len;
int ret;
if (!task)
return -ESRCH;
ret = 0;
mm = get_task_mm(task);
if (mm) {
len = snprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer), "%08lx\n",
((mm->flags & MMF_DUMP_FILTER_MASK) >>
MMF_DUMP_FILTER_SHIFT));
mmput(mm);
ret = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, buffer, len);
}
put_task_struct(task);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: proc: restrict access to /proc/PID/io
/proc/PID/io may be used for gathering private information. E.g. for
openssh and vsftpd daemons wchars/rchars may be used to learn the
precise password length. Restrict it to processes being able to ptrace
the target process.
ptrace_may_access() is needed to prevent keeping open file descriptor of
"io" file, executing setuid binary and gathering io information of the
setuid'ed process.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 26,841
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static long tun_set_vnet_be(struct tun_struct *tun, int __user *argp)
{
return -EINVAL;
}
Commit Message: tun: call dev_get_valid_name() before register_netdevice()
register_netdevice() could fail early when we have an invalid
dev name, in which case ->ndo_uninit() is not called. For tun
device, this is a problem because a timer etc. are already
initialized and it expects ->ndo_uninit() to clean them up.
We could move these initializations into a ->ndo_init() so
that register_netdevice() knows better, however this is still
complicated due to the logic in tun_detach().
Therefore, I choose to just call dev_get_valid_name() before
register_netdevice(), which is quicker and much easier to audit.
And for this specific case, it is already enough.
Fixes: 96442e42429e ("tuntap: choose the txq based on rxq")
Reported-by: Dmitry Alexeev <avekceeb@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 93,330
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ftrace_ops_test(struct ftrace_ops *ops, unsigned long ip)
{
return 1;
}
Commit Message: tracing: Fix possible NULL pointer dereferences
Currently set_ftrace_pid and set_graph_function files use seq_lseek
for their fops. However seq_open() is called only for FMODE_READ in
the fops->open() so that if an user tries to seek one of those file
when she open it for writing, it sees NULL seq_file and then panic.
It can be easily reproduced with following command:
$ cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
$ echo 1234 | sudo tee -a set_ftrace_pid
In this example, GNU coreutils' tee opens the file with fopen(, "a")
and then the fopen() internally calls lseek().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365663302-2170-1-git-send-email-namhyung@kernel.org
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung.kim@lge.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 30,192
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: quic::QuicTagVector GetQuicConnectionOptions(
const VariationParameters& quic_trial_params) {
auto it = quic_trial_params.find("connection_options");
if (it == quic_trial_params.end()) {
return quic::QuicTagVector();
}
return net::ParseQuicConnectionOptions(it->second);
}
Commit Message: Fix a bug in network_session_configurator.cc in which support for HTTPS URLS in QUIC proxies was always set to false.
BUG=914497
Change-Id: I56ad16088168302598bb448553ba32795eee3756
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1417356
Auto-Submit: Ryan Hamilton <rch@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhongyi Shi <zhongyi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Zhongyi Shi <zhongyi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#623763}
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 152,700
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static zend_object_value spl_object_storage_clone(zval *zobject TSRMLS_DC)
{
zend_object_value new_obj_val;
zend_object *old_object;
zend_object *new_object;
zend_object_handle handle = Z_OBJ_HANDLE_P(zobject);
spl_SplObjectStorage *intern;
old_object = zend_objects_get_address(zobject TSRMLS_CC);
new_obj_val = spl_object_storage_new_ex(old_object->ce, &intern, zobject TSRMLS_CC);
new_object = &intern->std;
zend_objects_clone_members(new_object, new_obj_val, old_object, handle TSRMLS_CC);
return new_obj_val;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 12,428
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Log(const std::string& value) { logs_ += value + "\n"; }
Commit Message: [Extensions] Don't allow built-in extensions code to be overridden
BUG=546677
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417513003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356654}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 133,035
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct futex_pi_state * alloc_pi_state(void)
{
struct futex_pi_state *pi_state = current->pi_state_cache;
WARN_ON(!pi_state);
current->pi_state_cache = NULL;
return pi_state;
}
Commit Message: futex-prevent-requeue-pi-on-same-futex.patch futex: Forbid uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_requeue(..., requeue_pi=1)
If uaddr == uaddr2, then we have broken the rule of only requeueing from
a non-pi futex to a pi futex with this call. If we attempt this, then
dangling pointers may be left for rt_waiter resulting in an exploitable
condition.
This change brings futex_requeue() in line with futex_wait_requeue_pi()
which performs the same check as per commit 6f7b0a2a5c0f ("futex: Forbid
uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_wait_requeue_pi()")
[ tglx: Compare the resulting keys as well, as uaddrs might be
different depending on the mapping ]
Fixes CVE-2014-3153.
Reported-by: Pinkie Pie
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 38,188
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderBlockFlow::determineLogicalLeftPositionForChild(RenderBox* child, ApplyLayoutDeltaMode applyDelta)
{
LayoutUnit startPosition = borderStart() + paddingStart();
if (style()->shouldPlaceBlockDirectionScrollbarOnLogicalLeft())
startPosition -= verticalScrollbarWidth();
LayoutUnit totalAvailableLogicalWidth = borderAndPaddingLogicalWidth() + availableLogicalWidth();
LayoutUnit childMarginStart = marginStartForChild(child);
LayoutUnit newPosition = startPosition + childMarginStart;
if (child->avoidsFloats() && containsFloats() && !flowThreadContainingBlock())
newPosition += computeStartPositionDeltaForChildAvoidingFloats(child, marginStartForChild(child));
setLogicalLeftForChild(child, style()->isLeftToRightDirection() ? newPosition : totalAvailableLogicalWidth - newPosition - logicalWidthForChild(child), applyDelta);
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 116,362
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void sas_chain_work(struct sas_ha_struct *ha, struct sas_work *sw)
{
/* chained work is not subject to SA_HA_DRAINING or
* SAS_HA_REGISTERED, because it is either submitted in the
* workqueue, or known to be submitted from a context that is
* not racing against draining
*/
queue_work(ha->disco_q, &sw->work);
}
Commit Message: scsi: libsas: direct call probe and destruct
In commit 87c8331fcf72 ("[SCSI] libsas: prevent domain rediscovery
competing with ata error handling") introduced disco mutex to prevent
rediscovery competing with ata error handling and put the whole
revalidation in the mutex. But the rphy add/remove needs to wait for the
error handling which also grabs the disco mutex. This may leads to dead
lock.So the probe and destruct event were introduce to do the rphy
add/remove asynchronously and out of the lock.
The asynchronously processed workers makes the whole discovery process
not atomic, the other events may interrupt the process. For example,
if a loss of signal event inserted before the probe event, the
sas_deform_port() is called and the port will be deleted.
And sas_port_delete() may run before the destruct event, but the
port-x:x is the top parent of end device or expander. This leads to
a kernel WARNING such as:
[ 82.042979] sysfs group 'power' not found for kobject 'phy-1:0:22'
[ 82.042983] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 82.042986] WARNING: CPU: 54 PID: 1714 at fs/sysfs/group.c:237
sysfs_remove_group+0x94/0xa0
[ 82.043059] Call trace:
[ 82.043082] [<ffff0000082e7624>] sysfs_remove_group+0x94/0xa0
[ 82.043085] [<ffff00000864e320>] dpm_sysfs_remove+0x60/0x70
[ 82.043086] [<ffff00000863ee10>] device_del+0x138/0x308
[ 82.043089] [<ffff00000869a2d0>] sas_phy_delete+0x38/0x60
[ 82.043091] [<ffff00000869a86c>] do_sas_phy_delete+0x6c/0x80
[ 82.043093] [<ffff00000863dc20>] device_for_each_child+0x58/0xa0
[ 82.043095] [<ffff000008696f80>] sas_remove_children+0x40/0x50
[ 82.043100] [<ffff00000869d1bc>] sas_destruct_devices+0x64/0xa0
[ 82.043102] [<ffff0000080e93bc>] process_one_work+0x1fc/0x4b0
[ 82.043104] [<ffff0000080e96c0>] worker_thread+0x50/0x490
[ 82.043105] [<ffff0000080f0364>] kthread+0xfc/0x128
[ 82.043107] [<ffff0000080836c0>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x50
Make probe and destruct a direct call in the disco and revalidate function,
but put them outside the lock. The whole discovery or revalidate won't
be interrupted by other events. And the DISCE_PROBE and DISCE_DESTRUCT
event are deleted as a result of the direct call.
Introduce a new list to destruct the sas_port and put the port delete after
the destruct. This makes sure the right order of destroying the sysfs
kobject and fix the warning above.
In sas_ex_revalidate_domain() have a loop to find all broadcasted
device, and sometimes we have a chance to find the same expander twice.
Because the sas_port will be deleted at the end of the whole revalidate
process, sas_port with the same name cannot be added before this.
Otherwise the sysfs will complain of creating duplicate filename. Since
the LLDD will send broadcast for every device change, we can only
process one expander's revalidation.
[mkp: kbuild test robot warning]
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
CC: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
CC: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
CC: Ewan Milne <emilne@redhat.com>
CC: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
CC: Tomas Henzl <thenzl@redhat.com>
CC: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 85,466
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void release_pte_pages(pte_t *pte, pte_t *_pte)
{
while (--_pte >= pte) {
pte_t pteval = *_pte;
if (!pte_none(pteval))
release_pte_page(pte_page(pteval));
}
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix /dev/zero MAP_PRIVATE and vm_flags cleanups
The huge_memory.c THP page fault was allowed to run if vm_ops was null
(which would succeed for /dev/zero MAP_PRIVATE, as the f_op->mmap wouldn't
setup a special vma->vm_ops and it would fallback to regular anonymous
memory) but other THP logics weren't fully activated for vmas with vm_file
not NULL (/dev/zero has a not NULL vma->vm_file).
So this removes the vm_file checks so that /dev/zero also can safely use
THP (the other albeit safer approach to fix this bug would have been to
prevent the THP initial page fault to run if vm_file was set).
After removing the vm_file checks, this also makes huge_memory.c stricter
in khugepaged for the DEBUG_VM=y case. It doesn't replace the vm_file
check with a is_pfn_mapping check (but it keeps checking for VM_PFNMAP
under VM_BUG_ON) because for a is_cow_mapping() mapping VM_PFNMAP should
only be allowed to exist before the first page fault, and in turn when
vma->anon_vma is null (so preventing khugepaged registration). So I tend
to think the previous comment saying if vm_file was set, VM_PFNMAP might
have been set and we could still be registered in khugepaged (despite
anon_vma was not NULL to be registered in khugepaged) was too paranoid.
The is_linear_pfn_mapping check is also I think superfluous (as described
by comment) but under DEBUG_VM it is safe to stay.
Addresses https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=33682
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Caspar Zhang <bugs@casparzhang.com>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> [2.6.38.x]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 35,129
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebPagePrivate::exitFullScreenForElement(Element* element)
{
#if ENABLE(VIDEO)
if (!element || (!element->hasTagName(HTMLNames::videoTag) && !containsVideoTags(element)))
return;
if (m_webSettings->fullScreenVideoCapable()) {
exitFullscreenForNode(element);
} else {
client()->fullscreenStop();
m_fullscreenVideoNode = 0;
}
#endif
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 104,202
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::MarkLayerComposited() {
if (!isContextLost())
GetDrawingBuffer()->ResetBuffersToAutoClear();
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 142,274
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void nicklist_update_flags(SERVER_REC *server, const char *nick,
int gone, int serverop)
{
nicklist_update_flags_list(server, gone, serverop,
nicklist_get_same(server, nick));
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'security' into 'master'
Security
Closes #10
See merge request !17
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 63,700
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static zend_always_inline int zend_hash_compare_impl(HashTable *ht1, HashTable *ht2, compare_func_t compar, zend_bool ordered) {
uint32_t idx1, idx2;
if (ht1->nNumOfElements != ht2->nNumOfElements) {
return ht1->nNumOfElements > ht2->nNumOfElements ? 1 : -1;
}
for (idx1 = 0, idx2 = 0; idx1 < ht1->nNumUsed; idx1++) {
Bucket *p1 = ht1->arData + idx1, *p2;
zval *pData1, *pData2;
int result;
if (Z_TYPE(p1->val) == IS_UNDEF) continue;
if (ordered) {
while (1) {
ZEND_ASSERT(idx2 != ht2->nNumUsed);
p2 = ht2->arData + idx2;
if (Z_TYPE(p2->val) != IS_UNDEF) break;
idx2++;
}
if (p1->key == NULL && p2->key == NULL) { /* numeric indices */
if (p1->h != p2->h) {
return p1->h > p2->h ? 1 : -1;
}
} else if (p1->key != NULL && p2->key != NULL) { /* string indices */
if (ZSTR_LEN(p1->key) != ZSTR_LEN(p2->key)) {
return ZSTR_LEN(p1->key) > ZSTR_LEN(p2->key) ? 1 : -1;
}
result = memcmp(ZSTR_VAL(p1->key), ZSTR_VAL(p2->key), ZSTR_LEN(p1->key));
if (result != 0) {
return result;
}
} else {
/* Mixed key types: A string key is considered as larger */
return p1->key != NULL ? 1 : -1;
}
pData2 = &p2->val;
idx2++;
} else {
if (p1->key == NULL) { /* numeric index */
pData2 = zend_hash_index_find(ht2, p1->h);
if (pData2 == NULL) {
return 1;
}
} else { /* string index */
pData2 = zend_hash_find(ht2, p1->key);
if (pData2 == NULL) {
return 1;
}
}
}
pData1 = &p1->val;
if (Z_TYPE_P(pData1) == IS_INDIRECT) {
pData1 = Z_INDIRECT_P(pData1);
}
if (Z_TYPE_P(pData2) == IS_INDIRECT) {
pData2 = Z_INDIRECT_P(pData2);
}
if (Z_TYPE_P(pData1) == IS_UNDEF) {
if (Z_TYPE_P(pData2) != IS_UNDEF) {
return -1;
}
} else if (Z_TYPE_P(pData2) == IS_UNDEF) {
return 1;
} else {
result = compar(pData1, pData2);
if (result != 0) {
return result;
}
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix #73832 - leave the table in a safe state if the size is too big.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 69,172
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ui::ModalType AutofillDialogViews::GetModalType() const {
return ui::MODAL_TYPE_CHILD;
}
Commit Message: Clear out some minor TODOs.
BUG=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1047063002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#322959}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 109,979
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PageSnapshotTaker::Start() {
AutomationTabHelper* automation_tab_helper =
AutomationTabHelper::FromWebContents(tab_contents_->web_contents());
StartObserving(automation_tab_helper);
automation_tab_helper->SnapshotEntirePage();
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 117,637
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ion_client_destroy(struct ion_client *client)
{
struct ion_device *dev = client->dev;
struct rb_node *n;
pr_debug("%s: %d\n", __func__, __LINE__);
mutex_lock(&debugfs_mutex);
while ((n = rb_first(&client->handles))) {
struct ion_handle *handle = rb_entry(n, struct ion_handle,
node);
ion_handle_destroy(&handle->ref);
}
idr_destroy(&client->idr);
down_write(&dev->lock);
if (client->task)
put_task_struct(client->task);
rb_erase(&client->node, &dev->clients);
debugfs_remove_recursive(client->debug_root);
up_write(&dev->lock);
kfree(client->display_name);
kfree(client->name);
kfree(client);
mutex_unlock(&debugfs_mutex);
}
Commit Message: staging/android/ion : fix a race condition in the ion driver
There is a use-after-free problem in the ion driver.
This is caused by a race condition in the ion_ioctl()
function.
A handle has ref count of 1 and two tasks on different
cpus calls ION_IOC_FREE simultaneously.
cpu 0 cpu 1
-------------------------------------------------------
ion_handle_get_by_id()
(ref == 2)
ion_handle_get_by_id()
(ref == 3)
ion_free()
(ref == 2)
ion_handle_put()
(ref == 1)
ion_free()
(ref == 0 so ion_handle_destroy() is
called
and the handle is freed.)
ion_handle_put() is called and it
decreases the slub's next free pointer
The problem is detected as an unaligned access in the
spin lock functions since it uses load exclusive
instruction. In some cases it corrupts the slub's
free pointer which causes a mis-aligned access to the
next free pointer.(kmalloc returns a pointer like
ffffc0745b4580aa). And it causes lots of other
hard-to-debug problems.
This symptom is caused since the first member in the
ion_handle structure is the reference count and the
ion driver decrements the reference after it has been
freed.
To fix this problem client->lock mutex is extended
to protect all the codes that uses the handle.
Signed-off-by: Eun Taik Lee <eun.taik.lee@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 48,533
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Ins_AA( void )
{
/* intentionally no longer supported */
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 10,575
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FindChildForEvent(SpritePtr pSprite, WindowPtr event)
{
WindowPtr w = DeepestSpriteWin(pSprite);
Window child = None;
/* If the search ends up past the root should the child field be
set to none or should the value in the argument be passed
through. It probably doesn't matter since everyone calls
this function with child == None anyway. */
while (w) {
/* If the source window is same as event window, child should be
none. Don't bother going all all the way back to the root. */
if (w == event) {
child = None;
break;
}
if (w->parent == event) {
child = w->drawable.id;
break;
}
w = w->parent;
}
return child;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 4,831
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int mov_read_free(MOVContext *c, AVIOContext *pb, MOVAtom atom)
{
int ret;
uint8_t content[16];
if (atom.size < 8)
return 0;
ret = avio_read(pb, content, FFMIN(sizeof(content), atom.size));
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if ( !c->found_moov
&& !c->found_mdat
&& !memcmp(content, "Anevia\x1A\x1A", 8)
&& c->use_mfra_for == FF_MOV_FLAG_MFRA_AUTO) {
c->use_mfra_for = FF_MOV_FLAG_MFRA_PTS;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/mov: Fix DoS in read_tfra()
Fixes: Missing EOF check in loop
No testcase
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-834
| 0
| 61,437
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t MediaPlayerService::Client::setMetadataFilter(const Parcel& filter)
{
status_t status;
media::Metadata::Filter allow, drop;
if (unmarshallFilter(filter, &allow, &status) &&
unmarshallFilter(filter, &drop, &status)) {
Mutex::Autolock lock(mLock);
mMetadataAllow = allow;
mMetadataDrop = drop;
}
return status;
}
Commit Message: MediaPlayerService: avoid invalid static cast
Bug: 30204103
Change-Id: Ie0dd3568a375f1e9fed8615ad3d85184bcc99028
(cherry picked from commit ee0a0e39acdcf8f97e0d6945c31ff36a06a36e9d)
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 158,034
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SkCanvas* ImageDataPlatformBackend::GetCanvas() {
return mapped_canvas_.get();
}
Commit Message: Security fix: integer overflow on checking image size
Test is left in another CL (codereview.chromiu,.org/11274036) to avoid conflict there. Hope it's fine.
BUG=160926
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11410081
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167882 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 102,370
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: size_t rpc_peeraddr(struct rpc_clnt *clnt, struct sockaddr *buf, size_t bufsize)
{
size_t bytes;
struct rpc_xprt *xprt = clnt->cl_xprt;
bytes = sizeof(xprt->addr);
if (bytes > bufsize)
bytes = bufsize;
memcpy(buf, &clnt->cl_xprt->addr, bytes);
return xprt->addrlen;
}
Commit Message: NLM: Don't hang forever on NLM unlock requests
If the NLM daemon is killed on the NFS server, we can currently end up
hanging forever on an 'unlock' request, instead of aborting. Basically,
if the rpcbind request fails, or the server keeps returning garbage, we
really want to quit instead of retrying.
Tested-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@sw.ru>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 34,908
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int fchmod_umask(int fd, mode_t m) {
mode_t u;
int r;
u = umask(0777);
r = fchmod(fd, m & (~u)) < 0 ? -errno : 0;
umask(u);
return r;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 11,520
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline IntSize adjustedScrollDelta(const IntSize& delta)
{
return IntSize(adjustedScrollDelta(delta.width()), adjustedScrollDelta(delta.height()));
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 116,453
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cf2_builder_lineTo( CF2_OutlineCallbacks callbacks,
const CF2_CallbackParams params )
{
/* downcast the object pointer */
CF2_Outline outline = (CF2_Outline)callbacks;
CFF_Builder* builder;
FT_ASSERT( outline && outline->decoder );
FT_ASSERT( params->op == CF2_PathOpLineTo );
builder = &outline->decoder->builder;
if ( !builder->path_begun )
{
/* record the move before the line; also check points and set */
/* `path_begun' */
cff_builder_start_point( builder,
params->pt0.x,
params->pt0.y );
}
/* `cff_builder_add_point1' includes a check_points call for one point */
cff_builder_add_point1( builder,
params->pt1.x,
params->pt1.y );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 13,075
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: LockServer(void)
{
char tmp[PATH_MAX], pid_str[12];
int lfd, i, haslock, l_pid, t;
char *tmppath = NULL;
int len;
char port[20];
if (nolock) return;
/*
* Path names
*/
tmppath = LOCK_DIR;
sprintf(port, "%d", atoi(display));
len = strlen(LOCK_PREFIX) > strlen(LOCK_TMP_PREFIX) ? strlen(LOCK_PREFIX) :
strlen(LOCK_TMP_PREFIX);
len += strlen(tmppath) + strlen(port) + strlen(LOCK_SUFFIX) + 1;
if (len > sizeof(LockFile))
FatalError("Display name `%s' is too long\n", port);
(void)sprintf(tmp, "%s" LOCK_TMP_PREFIX "%s" LOCK_SUFFIX, tmppath, port);
(void)sprintf(LockFile, "%s" LOCK_PREFIX "%s" LOCK_SUFFIX, tmppath, port);
/*
* Create a temporary file containing our PID. Attempt three times
* to create the file.
*/
StillLocking = TRUE;
i = 0;
do {
i++;
lfd = open(tmp, O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_WRONLY, 0644);
if (lfd < 0)
sleep(2);
else
break;
} while (i < 3);
if (lfd < 0) {
unlink(tmp);
i = 0;
do {
i++;
lfd = open(tmp, O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_WRONLY, 0644);
if (lfd < 0)
sleep(2);
else
break;
} while (i < 3);
}
if (lfd < 0)
FatalError("Could not create lock file in %s\n", tmp);
(void) sprintf(pid_str, "%10ld\n", (long)getpid());
(void) write(lfd, pid_str, 11);
(void) chmod(tmp, 0444);
(void) close(lfd);
/*
* OK. Now the tmp file exists. Try three times to move it in place
* for the lock.
*/
i = 0;
haslock = 0;
while ((!haslock) && (i++ < 3)) {
haslock = (link(tmp,LockFile) == 0);
if (haslock) {
/*
* We're done.
*/
break;
}
else {
/*
* Read the pid from the existing file
*/
lfd = open(LockFile, O_RDONLY|O_NOFOLLOW);
if (lfd < 0) {
unlink(tmp);
FatalError("Can't read lock file %s\n", LockFile);
}
pid_str[0] = '\0';
if (read(lfd, pid_str, 11) != 11) {
/*
* Bogus lock file.
*/
unlink(LockFile);
close(lfd);
continue;
}
pid_str[11] = '\0';
sscanf(pid_str, "%d", &l_pid);
close(lfd);
/*
* Now try to kill the PID to see if it exists.
*/
errno = 0;
t = kill(l_pid, 0);
if ((t< 0) && (errno == ESRCH)) {
/*
* Stale lock file.
*/
unlink(LockFile);
continue;
}
else if (((t < 0) && (errno == EPERM)) || (t == 0)) {
/*
* Process is still active.
*/
unlink(tmp);
FatalError("Server is already active for display %s\n%s %s\n%s\n",
port, "\tIf this server is no longer running, remove",
LockFile, "\tand start again.");
}
}
}
unlink(tmp);
if (!haslock)
FatalError("Could not create server lock file: %s\n", LockFile);
StillLocking = FALSE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 1
| 165,236
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool rmode_segment_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int seg)
{
struct kvm_segment var;
u32 ar;
vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &var, seg);
var.dpl = 0x3;
if (seg == VCPU_SREG_CS)
var.type = 0x3;
ar = vmx_segment_access_rights(&var);
if (var.base != (var.selector << 4))
return false;
if (var.limit != 0xffff)
return false;
if (ar != 0xf3)
return false;
return true;
}
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 37,171
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: garp_group_handler(vector_t *strvec)
{
if (!strvec)
return;
alloc_garp_delay();
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 75,975
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AppShortcutManager::Observe(int type,
const content::NotificationSource& source,
const content::NotificationDetails& details) {
switch (type) {
case chrome::NOTIFICATION_EXTENSIONS_READY: {
OnceOffCreateShortcuts();
break;
}
case chrome::NOTIFICATION_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_DEPRECATED: {
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
if (!apps::IsAppShimsEnabled())
break;
#endif // defined(OS_MACOSX)
const extensions::InstalledExtensionInfo* installed_info =
content::Details<const extensions::InstalledExtensionInfo>(details)
.ptr();
const Extension* extension = installed_info->extension;
if (installed_info->is_update) {
web_app::UpdateAllShortcuts(
base::UTF8ToUTF16(installed_info->old_name), profile_, extension);
} else if (ShouldCreateShortcutFor(profile_, extension)) {
CreateShortcutsInApplicationsMenu(profile_, extension);
}
break;
}
case chrome::NOTIFICATION_EXTENSION_UNINSTALLED: {
const Extension* extension = content::Details<const Extension>(
details).ptr();
web_app::DeleteAllShortcuts(profile_, extension);
break;
}
default:
NOTREACHED();
}
}
Commit Message: Remove --disable-app-shims.
App shims have been enabled by default for 3 milestones
(since r242711).
BUG=350161
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/298953002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@272786 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 1
| 171,145
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: printable(char *buf, size_t bufsiz, const char *str)
{
char *ptr, *eptr;
const unsigned char *s = (const unsigned char *)str;
for (ptr = buf, eptr = ptr + bufsiz - 1; ptr < eptr && *s; s++) {
if (isprint(*s)) {
*ptr++ = *s;
continue;
}
if (ptr >= eptr + 4)
break;
*ptr++ = '\\';
*ptr++ = ((*s >> 6) & 7) + '0';
*ptr++ = ((*s >> 3) & 7) + '0';
*ptr++ = ((*s >> 0) & 7) + '0';
}
*ptr = '\0';
return buf;
}
Commit Message: - reduce recursion level from 20 to 10 and make a symbolic constant for it.
- pull out the guts of saving and restoring the output buffer into functions
and take care not to overwrite the error message if an error happened.
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 35,663
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int no_givcrypt(struct aead_givcrypt_request *req)
{
return -ENOSYS;
}
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 31,228
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: LayoutUnit RenderBlock::textIndentOffset() const
{
LayoutUnit cw = 0;
if (style()->textIndent().isPercent())
cw = containingBlock()->availableLogicalWidth();
return minimumValueForLength(style()->textIndent(), cw);
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 116,303
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct fpm_child_s *fpm_child_find(pid_t pid) /* {{{ */
{
struct fpm_worker_pool_s *wp;
struct fpm_child_s *child = 0;
for (wp = fpm_worker_all_pools; wp; wp = wp->next) {
for (child = wp->children; child; child = child->next) {
if (child->pid == pid) {
break;
}
}
if (child) break;
}
if (!child) {
return 0;
}
return child;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Fixed bug #73342
Directly listen on socket, instead of duping it to STDIN and
listening on that.
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 86,605
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: char *drm_get_encoder_name(struct drm_encoder *encoder)
{
static char buf[32];
snprintf(buf, 32, "%s-%d",
drm_encoder_enum_list[encoder->encoder_type].name,
encoder->base.id);
return buf;
}
Commit Message: drm: integer overflow in drm_mode_dirtyfb_ioctl()
There is a potential integer overflow in drm_mode_dirtyfb_ioctl()
if userspace passes in a large num_clips. The call to kmalloc would
allocate a small buffer, and the call to fb->funcs->dirty may result
in a memory corruption.
Reported-by: Haogang Chen <haogangchen@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 21,875
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned long weighted_cpuload(const int cpu)
{
return cpu_rq(cpu)->load.weight;
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 22,670
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void pdftex_fail(const char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list args;
va_start(args, fmt);
fputs("\nError: module writet1", stderr);
if (cur_file_name)
fprintf(stderr, " (file %s)", cur_file_name);
fputs(": ", stderr);
vsprintf(print_buf, fmt, args);
fputs(print_buf, stderr);
fputs("\n ==> Fatal error occurred, the output PS file is not finished!\n", stderr);
va_end(args);
exit(-1);
}
Commit Message: writet1 protection against buffer overflow
git-svn-id: svn://tug.org/texlive/trunk/Build/source@48697 c570f23f-e606-0410-a88d-b1316a301751
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 76,644
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: INST_HANDLER (eor) { // EOR Rd, Rr
int d = ((buf[0] >> 4) & 0xf) | ((buf[1] & 1) << 4);
int r = (buf[0] & 0xf) | ((buf[1] & 2) << 3);
ESIL_A ("r%d,r%d,^,", r, d); // 0: Rd ^ Rr
__generic_bitop_flags (op); // up flags
ESIL_A ("r%d,=,", d); // Rd = Result
}
Commit Message: Fix #9943 - Invalid free on RAnal.avr
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 82,718
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const AtomicString& HTMLKeygenElement::formControlType() const
{
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(const AtomicString, keygen, ("keygen", AtomicString::ConstructFromLiteral));
return keygen;
}
Commit Message: Add HTMLFormControlElement::supportsAutofocus to fix a FIXME comment.
This virtual function should return true if the form control can hanlde
'autofocucs' attribute if it is specified.
Note: HTMLInputElement::supportsAutofocus reuses InputType::isInteractiveContent
because interactiveness is required for autofocus capability.
BUG=none
TEST=none; no behavior changes.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/143343003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165432 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 114,035
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void MediaStreamManager::OnMediaStreamUIWindowId(
MediaStreamType video_type,
const MediaStreamDevices& devices,
gfx::NativeViewId window_id) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
if (!window_id)
return;
if (video_type != MEDIA_DESKTOP_VIDEO_CAPTURE)
return;
for (const MediaStreamDevice& device : devices) {
if (device.type != MEDIA_DESKTOP_VIDEO_CAPTURE)
continue;
DesktopMediaID media_id = DesktopMediaID::Parse(device.id);
if (media_id.type == DesktopMediaID::TYPE_WEB_CONTENTS)
continue;
#if defined(USE_AURA)
if (media_id.aura_id > DesktopMediaID::kNullId)
continue;
#endif
video_capture_manager_->SetDesktopCaptureWindowId(device.session_id,
window_id);
break;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix MediaObserver notifications in MediaStreamManager.
This CL fixes the stream type used to notify MediaObserver about
cancelled MediaStream requests.
Before this CL, NUM_MEDIA_TYPES was used as stream type to indicate
that all stream types should be cancelled.
However, the MediaObserver end does not interpret NUM_MEDIA_TYPES this
way and the request to update the UI is ignored.
This CL sends a separate notification for each stream type so that the
UI actually gets updated for all stream types in use.
Bug: 816033
Change-Id: Ib7d3b3046d1dd0976627f8ab38abf086eacc9405
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/939630
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540122}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 148,330
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int mov_write_subtitle_tag(AVIOContext *pb, MOVTrack *track)
{
int64_t pos = avio_tell(pb);
avio_wb32(pb, 0); /* size */
avio_wl32(pb, track->tag); // store it byteswapped
avio_wb32(pb, 0); /* Reserved */
avio_wb16(pb, 0); /* Reserved */
avio_wb16(pb, 1); /* Data-reference index */
if (track->par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_DVD_SUBTITLE)
mov_write_esds_tag(pb, track);
else if (track->par->extradata_size)
avio_write(pb, track->par->extradata, track->par->extradata_size);
return update_size(pb, pos);
}
Commit Message: avformat/movenc: Write version 2 of audio atom if channels is not known
The version 1 needs the channel count and would divide by 0
Fixes: division by 0
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_1.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_2.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_3.wav
Found-by: #CHEN HONGXU# <HCHEN017@e.ntu.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 79,408
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: fetch_pixel_no_alpha (bits_image_t *image,
int x, int y, pixman_bool_t check_bounds)
{
if (check_bounds &&
(x < 0 || x >= image->width || y < 0 || y >= image->height))
{
return 0;
}
return image->fetch_pixel_32 (image, x, y);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 15,444
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void cma_work_handler(struct work_struct *_work)
{
struct cma_work *work = container_of(_work, struct cma_work, work);
struct rdma_id_private *id_priv = work->id;
int destroy = 0;
mutex_lock(&id_priv->handler_mutex);
if (!cma_comp_exch(id_priv, work->old_state, work->new_state))
goto out;
if (id_priv->id.event_handler(&id_priv->id, &work->event)) {
cma_exch(id_priv, RDMA_CM_DESTROYING);
destroy = 1;
}
out:
mutex_unlock(&id_priv->handler_mutex);
cma_deref_id(id_priv);
if (destroy)
rdma_destroy_id(&id_priv->id);
kfree(work);
}
Commit Message: IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <monis@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 38,537
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void wake_up_klogd(void)
{
if (waitqueue_active(&log_wait))
this_cpu_or(printk_pending, PRINTK_PENDING_WAKEUP);
}
Commit Message: printk: fix buffer overflow when calling log_prefix function from call_console_drivers
This patch corrects a buffer overflow in kernels from 3.0 to 3.4 when calling
log_prefix() function from call_console_drivers().
This bug existed in previous releases but has been revealed with commit
162a7e7500f9664636e649ba59defe541b7c2c60 (2.6.39 => 3.0) that made changes
about how to allocate memory for early printk buffer (use of memblock_alloc).
It disappears with commit 7ff9554bb578ba02166071d2d487b7fc7d860d62 (3.4 => 3.5)
that does a refactoring of printk buffer management.
In log_prefix(), the access to "p[0]", "p[1]", "p[2]" or
"simple_strtoul(&p[1], &endp, 10)" may cause a buffer overflow as this
function is called from call_console_drivers by passing "&LOG_BUF(cur_index)"
where the index must be masked to do not exceed the buffer's boundary.
The trick is to prepare in call_console_drivers() a buffer with the necessary
data (PRI field of syslog message) to be safely evaluated in log_prefix().
This patch can be applied to stable kernel branches 3.0.y, 3.2.y and 3.4.y.
Without this patch, one can freeze a server running this loop from shell :
$ export DUMMY=`cat /dev/urandom | tr -dc '12345AZERTYUIOPQSDFGHJKLMWXCVBNazertyuiopqsdfghjklmwxcvbn' | head -c255`
$ while true do ; echo $DUMMY > /dev/kmsg ; done
The "server freeze" depends on where memblock_alloc does allocate printk buffer :
if the buffer overflow is inside another kernel allocation the problem may not
be revealed, else the server may hangs up.
Signed-off-by: Alexandre SIMON <Alexandre.Simon@univ-lorraine.fr>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 33,474
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SWFShape_addLineStyle2(SWFShape shape, unsigned short width,
byte r, byte g, byte b, byte a,
int flags, float miterLimit)
{
growLineArray(shape);
SWFShape_useVersion(shape, SWF_SHAPE4);
shape->lines[shape->nLines] = newSWFLineStyle2(width, r, g, b, a, flags, miterLimit);
return ++shape->nLines;
}
Commit Message: SWFShape_setLeftFillStyle: prevent fill overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 89,499
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool HTMLMediaElement::IsMediaDataCORSSameOrigin(
const SecurityOrigin* origin) const {
if (GetWebMediaPlayer() &&
GetWebMediaPlayer()->DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker()) {
return false;
}
if (!HasSingleSecurityOrigin())
return false;
return (GetWebMediaPlayer() &&
GetWebMediaPlayer()->DidPassCORSAccessCheck()) ||
origin->CanReadContent(currentSrc());
}
Commit Message: defeat cors attacks on audio/video tags
Neutralize error messages and fire no progress events
until media metadata has been loaded for media loaded
from cross-origin locations.
Bug: 828265, 826187
Change-Id: Iaf15ef38676403687d6a913cbdc84f2d70a6f5c6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1015794
Reviewed-by: Mounir Lamouri <mlamouri@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dale Curtis <dalecurtis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#557312}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 154,129
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void vhost_zerocopy_callback(struct ubuf_info *ubuf, bool success)
{
struct vhost_net_ubuf_ref *ubufs = ubuf->ctx;
struct vhost_virtqueue *vq = ubufs->vq;
int cnt = atomic_read(&ubufs->kref.refcount);
/*
* Trigger polling thread if guest stopped submitting new buffers:
* in this case, the refcount after decrement will eventually reach 1
* so here it is 2.
* We also trigger polling periodically after each 16 packets
* (the value 16 here is more or less arbitrary, it's tuned to trigger
* less than 10% of times).
*/
if (cnt <= 2 || !(cnt % 16))
vhost_poll_queue(&vq->poll);
/* set len to mark this desc buffers done DMA */
vq->heads[ubuf->desc].len = success ?
VHOST_DMA_DONE_LEN : VHOST_DMA_FAILED_LEN;
vhost_net_ubuf_put(ubufs);
}
Commit Message: vhost-net: fix use-after-free in vhost_net_flush
vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait has a confusing name:
it will actually also free it's argument.
Thus since commit 1280c27f8e29acf4af2da914e80ec27c3dbd5c01
"vhost-net: flush outstanding DMAs on memory change"
vhost_net_flush tries to use the argument after passing it
to vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait, this results
in use after free.
To fix, don't free the argument in vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait,
add an new API for callers that want to free ubufs.
Acked-by: Asias He <asias@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 30,063
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int serdes_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
{
struct phy_provider *provider;
struct serdes_ctrl *ctrl;
unsigned int i;
int ret;
ctrl = devm_kzalloc(&pdev->dev, sizeof(*ctrl), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ctrl)
return -ENOMEM;
ctrl->dev = &pdev->dev;
ctrl->regs = syscon_node_to_regmap(pdev->dev.parent->of_node);
if (IS_ERR(ctrl->regs))
return PTR_ERR(ctrl->regs);
for (i = 0; i <= SERDES_MAX; i++) {
ret = serdes_phy_create(ctrl, i, &ctrl->phys[i]);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
dev_set_drvdata(&pdev->dev, ctrl);
provider = devm_of_phy_provider_register(ctrl->dev,
serdes_simple_xlate);
return PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(provider);
}
Commit Message: phy: ocelot-serdes: fix out-of-bounds read
Currently, there is an out-of-bounds read on array ctrl->phys,
once variable i reaches the maximum array size of SERDES_MAX
in the for loop.
Fix this by changing the condition in the for loop from
i <= SERDES_MAX to i < SERDES_MAX.
Addresses-Coverity-ID: 1473966 ("Out-of-bounds read")
Addresses-Coverity-ID: 1473959 ("Out-of-bounds read")
Fixes: 51f6b410fc22 ("phy: add driver for Microsemi Ocelot SerDes muxing")
Reviewed-by: Quentin Schulz <quentin.schulz@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 1
| 169,764
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned long alpha_perf_event_update(struct perf_event *event,
struct hw_perf_event *hwc, int idx, long ovf)
{
long prev_raw_count, new_raw_count;
long delta;
again:
prev_raw_count = local64_read(&hwc->prev_count);
new_raw_count = alpha_read_pmc(idx);
if (local64_cmpxchg(&hwc->prev_count, prev_raw_count,
new_raw_count) != prev_raw_count)
goto again;
delta = (new_raw_count - (prev_raw_count & alpha_pmu->pmc_count_mask[idx])) + ovf;
/* It is possible on very rare occasions that the PMC has overflowed
* but the interrupt is yet to come. Detect and fix this situation.
*/
if (unlikely(delta < 0)) {
delta += alpha_pmu->pmc_max_period[idx] + 1;
}
local64_add(delta, &event->count);
local64_sub(delta, &hwc->period_left);
return new_raw_count;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 25,222
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DeviceTokenFetcher::DeviceTokenFetcher(
DeviceManagementService* service,
CloudPolicyCacheBase* cache,
CloudPolicyDataStore* data_store,
PolicyNotifier* notifier,
DelayedWorkScheduler* scheduler) {
Initialize(service, cache, data_store, notifier, scheduler);
}
Commit Message: Reset the device policy machinery upon retrying enrollment.
BUG=chromium-os:18208
TEST=See bug description
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7676005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97615 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 97,785
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameHostManager::SendPageMessage(IPC::Message* msg,
SiteInstance* instance_to_skip) {
DCHECK(IPC_MESSAGE_CLASS(*msg) == PageMsgStart);
DCHECK(!frame_tree_node_->parent());
if ((IPC_MESSAGE_CLASS(*msg) != PageMsgStart) || frame_tree_node_->parent()) {
delete msg;
return;
}
auto send_msg = [instance_to_skip](IPC::Sender* sender,
int routing_id,
IPC::Message* msg,
SiteInstance* sender_instance) {
if (sender_instance == instance_to_skip)
return;
IPC::Message* copy = new IPC::Message(*msg);
copy->set_routing_id(routing_id);
sender->Send(copy);
};
RenderFrameProxyHost* outer_delegate_proxy =
ForInnerDelegate() ? GetProxyToOuterDelegate() : nullptr;
for (const auto& pair : proxy_hosts_) {
if (outer_delegate_proxy != pair.second.get()) {
send_msg(pair.second.get(), pair.second->GetRoutingID(), msg,
pair.second->GetSiteInstance());
}
}
if (speculative_render_frame_host_) {
send_msg(speculative_render_frame_host_.get(),
speculative_render_frame_host_->GetRoutingID(), msg,
speculative_render_frame_host_->GetSiteInstance());
} else if (pending_render_frame_host_) {
send_msg(pending_render_frame_host_.get(),
pending_render_frame_host_->GetRoutingID(), msg,
pending_render_frame_host_->GetSiteInstance());
}
if (render_frame_host_->GetSiteInstance() != instance_to_skip) {
msg->set_routing_id(render_frame_host_->GetRoutingID());
render_frame_host_->Send(msg);
} else {
delete msg;
}
}
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 136,232
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
{
const unsigned char *curves;
size_t num_curves, i;
unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
return 0;
/* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
if (suiteb_flags) {
unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
if (p[1])
return 0;
if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
return 0;
} else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
return 0;
} else /* Should never happen */
return 0;
}
if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
return 0;
for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 6,161
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ImageLoader::updatedHasPendingEvent()
{
bool wasProtected = m_elementIsProtected;
m_elementIsProtected = m_hasPendingLoadEvent || m_hasPendingErrorEvent;
if (wasProtected == m_elementIsProtected)
return;
if (m_elementIsProtected) {
if (m_derefElementTimer.isActive())
m_derefElementTimer.stop();
else
m_element->ref();
} else {
ASSERT(!m_derefElementTimer.isActive());
m_derefElementTimer.startOneShot(0);
}
}
Commit Message: Error event was fired synchronously blowing away the input element from underneath. Remove the FIXME and fire it asynchronously using errorEventSender().
BUG=240124
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14741011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@150232 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 113,495
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DrawingBufferClientRestorePixelUnpackBufferBinding() {}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 142,246
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GranularityStrategyTest::SetInnerHTML(const char* html_content) {
GetDocument().documentElement()->setInnerHTML(String::FromUTF8(html_content));
GetDocument().View()->UpdateAllLifecyclePhases();
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 124,841
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MagickExport void *FileToBlob(const char *filename,const size_t extent,
size_t *length,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
int
file;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
offset;
register size_t
i;
ssize_t
count;
struct stat
attributes;
unsigned char
*blob;
void
*map;
assert(filename != (const char *) NULL);
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
*length=0;
status=IsRightsAuthorized(PathPolicyDomain,ReadPolicyRights,filename);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
errno=EPERM;
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),PolicyError,
"NotAuthorized","`%s'",filename);
return(NULL);
}
file=fileno(stdin);
if (LocaleCompare(filename,"-") != 0)
{
status=GetPathAttributes(filename,&attributes);
if ((status == MagickFalse) || (S_ISDIR(attributes.st_mode) != 0))
{
ThrowFileException(exception,BlobError,"UnableToReadBlob",filename);
return(NULL);
}
file=open_utf8(filename,O_RDONLY | O_BINARY,0);
}
if (file == -1)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,BlobError,"UnableToOpenFile",filename);
return(NULL);
}
offset=(MagickOffsetType) lseek(file,0,SEEK_END);
count=0;
if ((file == fileno(stdin)) || (offset < 0) ||
(offset != (MagickOffsetType) ((ssize_t) offset)))
{
size_t
quantum;
struct stat
file_stats;
/*
Stream is not seekable.
*/
offset=(MagickOffsetType) lseek(file,0,SEEK_SET);
quantum=(size_t) MagickMaxBufferExtent;
if ((fstat(file,&file_stats) == 0) && (file_stats.st_size > 0))
quantum=(size_t) MagickMin(file_stats.st_size,MagickMaxBufferExtent);
blob=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(quantum,sizeof(*blob));
for (i=0; blob != (unsigned char *) NULL; i+=count)
{
count=read(file,blob+i,quantum);
if (count <= 0)
{
count=0;
if (errno != EINTR)
break;
}
if (~((size_t) i) < (quantum+1))
{
blob=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(blob);
break;
}
blob=(unsigned char *) ResizeQuantumMemory(blob,i+quantum+1,
sizeof(*blob));
if ((size_t) (i+count) >= extent)
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(filename,"-") != 0)
file=close(file);
if (blob == (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed","`%s'",filename);
return(NULL);
}
if (file == -1)
{
blob=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(blob);
ThrowFileException(exception,BlobError,"UnableToReadBlob",filename);
return(NULL);
}
*length=(size_t) MagickMin(i+count,extent);
blob[*length]='\0';
return(blob);
}
*length=(size_t) MagickMin(offset,(MagickOffsetType)
MagickMin(extent,(size_t) SSIZE_MAX));
blob=(unsigned char *) NULL;
if (~(*length) >= (MagickPathExtent-1))
blob=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(*length+MagickPathExtent,
sizeof(*blob));
if (blob == (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
file=close(file);
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed","`%s'",filename);
return(NULL);
}
map=MapBlob(file,ReadMode,0,*length);
if (map != (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
(void) memcpy(blob,map,*length);
(void) UnmapBlob(map,*length);
}
else
{
(void) lseek(file,0,SEEK_SET);
for (i=0; i < *length; i+=count)
{
count=read(file,blob+i,(size_t) MagickMin(*length-i,(size_t)
SSIZE_MAX));
if (count <= 0)
{
count=0;
if (errno != EINTR)
break;
}
}
if (i < *length)
{
file=close(file)-1;
blob=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(blob);
ThrowFileException(exception,BlobError,"UnableToReadBlob",filename);
return(NULL);
}
}
blob[*length]='\0';
if (LocaleCompare(filename,"-") != 0)
file=close(file);
if (file == -1)
{
blob=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(blob);
ThrowFileException(exception,BlobError,"UnableToReadBlob",filename);
}
return(blob);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick6/issues/43
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 96,636
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool HTMLLinkElement::IsURLAttribute(const Attribute& attribute) const {
return attribute.GetName().LocalName() == hrefAttr ||
HTMLElement::IsURLAttribute(attribute);
}
Commit Message: Avoid crash when setting rel=stylesheet on <link> in shadow root.
Link elements in shadow roots without rel=stylesheet are currently not
added as stylesheet candidates upon insertion. This causes a crash if
rel=stylesheet is set (and then loaded) later.
R=futhark@chromium.org
Bug: 886753
Change-Id: Ia0de2c1edf43407950f973982ee1c262a909d220
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1242463
Commit-Queue: Anders Ruud <andruud@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Rune Lillesveen <futhark@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#593907}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 143,326
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CLASS nokia_load_raw()
{
uchar *data, *dp;
ushort *pixel, *pix;
int rev, dwide, row, c;
rev = 3 * (order == 0x4949);
dwide = raw_width * 5 / 4;
data = (uchar *) malloc (dwide + raw_width*2);
merror (data, "nokia_load_raw()");
pixel = (ushort *) (data + dwide);
for (row=0; row < raw_height; row++) {
if ((int) fread (data+dwide, 1, dwide, ifp) < dwide) derror();
FORC(dwide) data[c] = data[dwide+(c ^ rev)];
for (dp=data, pix=pixel; pix < pixel+raw_width; dp+=5, pix+=4)
FORC4 pix[c] = (dp[c] << 2) | (dp[4] >> (c << 1) & 3);
if (row < top_margin)
FORC(width) black += pixel[c];
else
FORC(width) BAYER(row-top_margin,c) = pixel[c];
}
free (data);
if (top_margin) black /= top_margin * width;
maximum = 0x3ff;
}
Commit Message: Avoid overflow in ljpeg_start().
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 43,329
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SkiaOutputSurfaceImpl::CreateSkSurfaceCharacterization(
const gfx::Size& surface_size,
ResourceFormat format,
bool mipmap,
sk_sp<SkColorSpace> color_space) {
auto gr_context_thread_safe = impl_on_gpu_->GetGrContextThreadSafeProxy();
auto cache_max_resource_bytes = impl_on_gpu_->max_resource_cache_bytes();
SkSurfaceProps surface_props(0 /*flags */,
SkSurfaceProps::kLegacyFontHost_InitType);
auto color_type =
ResourceFormatToClosestSkColorType(true /* gpu_compositing */, format);
auto image_info =
SkImageInfo::Make(surface_size.width(), surface_size.height(), color_type,
kPremul_SkAlphaType, std::move(color_space));
auto backend_format = gr_context_thread_safe->defaultBackendFormat(
color_type, GrRenderable::kYes);
DCHECK(backend_format.isValid());
auto characterization = gr_context_thread_safe->createCharacterization(
cache_max_resource_bytes, image_info, backend_format, 0 /* sampleCount */,
kTopLeft_GrSurfaceOrigin, surface_props, mipmap);
DCHECK(characterization.isValid());
return characterization;
}
Commit Message: SkiaRenderer: Support changing color space
SkiaOutputSurfaceImpl did not handle the color space changing after it
was created previously. The SkSurfaceCharacterization color space was
only set during the first time Reshape() ran when the charactization is
returned from the GPU thread. If the color space was changed later the
SkSurface and SkDDL color spaces no longer matched and draw failed.
Bug: 1009452
Change-Id: Ib6d2083efc7e7eb6f94782342e92a809b69d6fdc
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1841811
Reviewed-by: Peng Huang <penghuang@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: kylechar <kylechar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#702946}
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 135,956
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TestBlinkPlatformSupport::cryptographicallyRandomValues(
unsigned char* buffer,
size_t length) {
}
Commit Message: Add assertions that the empty Platform::cryptographicallyRandomValues() overrides are not being used.
These implementations are not safe and look scary if not accompanied by an assertion. Also one of the comments was incorrect.
BUG=552749
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1419293005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#359229}
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 1
| 172,238
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PassRefPtrWillBeRawPtr<Attr> Document::createAttributeNS(const AtomicString& namespaceURI, const AtomicString& qualifiedName, ExceptionState& exceptionState, bool shouldIgnoreNamespaceChecks)
{
AtomicString prefix, localName;
if (!parseQualifiedName(qualifiedName, prefix, localName, exceptionState))
return nullptr;
QualifiedName qName(prefix, localName, namespaceURI);
if (!shouldIgnoreNamespaceChecks && !hasValidNamespaceForAttributes(qName)) {
exceptionState.throwDOMException(NamespaceError, "The namespace URI provided ('" + namespaceURI + "') is not valid for the qualified name provided ('" + qualifiedName + "').");
return nullptr;
}
return Attr::create(*this, qName, emptyAtom);
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 124,310
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct sk_buff *__pfkey_xfrm_state2msg(const struct xfrm_state *x,
int add_keys, int hsc)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct sadb_msg *hdr;
struct sadb_sa *sa;
struct sadb_lifetime *lifetime;
struct sadb_address *addr;
struct sadb_key *key;
struct sadb_x_sa2 *sa2;
struct sadb_x_sec_ctx *sec_ctx;
struct xfrm_sec_ctx *xfrm_ctx;
int ctx_size = 0;
int size;
int auth_key_size = 0;
int encrypt_key_size = 0;
int sockaddr_size;
struct xfrm_encap_tmpl *natt = NULL;
int mode;
/* address family check */
sockaddr_size = pfkey_sockaddr_size(x->props.family);
if (!sockaddr_size)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
/* base, SA, (lifetime (HSC),) address(SD), (address(P),)
key(AE), (identity(SD),) (sensitivity)> */
size = sizeof(struct sadb_msg) +sizeof(struct sadb_sa) +
sizeof(struct sadb_lifetime) +
((hsc & 1) ? sizeof(struct sadb_lifetime) : 0) +
((hsc & 2) ? sizeof(struct sadb_lifetime) : 0) +
sizeof(struct sadb_address)*2 +
sockaddr_size*2 +
sizeof(struct sadb_x_sa2);
if ((xfrm_ctx = x->security)) {
ctx_size = PFKEY_ALIGN8(xfrm_ctx->ctx_len);
size += sizeof(struct sadb_x_sec_ctx) + ctx_size;
}
/* identity & sensitivity */
if (!xfrm_addr_equal(&x->sel.saddr, &x->props.saddr, x->props.family))
size += sizeof(struct sadb_address) + sockaddr_size;
if (add_keys) {
if (x->aalg && x->aalg->alg_key_len) {
auth_key_size =
PFKEY_ALIGN8((x->aalg->alg_key_len + 7) / 8);
size += sizeof(struct sadb_key) + auth_key_size;
}
if (x->ealg && x->ealg->alg_key_len) {
encrypt_key_size =
PFKEY_ALIGN8((x->ealg->alg_key_len+7) / 8);
size += sizeof(struct sadb_key) + encrypt_key_size;
}
}
if (x->encap)
natt = x->encap;
if (natt && natt->encap_type) {
size += sizeof(struct sadb_x_nat_t_type);
size += sizeof(struct sadb_x_nat_t_port);
size += sizeof(struct sadb_x_nat_t_port);
}
skb = alloc_skb(size + 16, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (skb == NULL)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOBUFS);
/* call should fill header later */
hdr = (struct sadb_msg *) skb_put(skb, sizeof(struct sadb_msg));
memset(hdr, 0, size); /* XXX do we need this ? */
hdr->sadb_msg_len = size / sizeof(uint64_t);
/* sa */
sa = (struct sadb_sa *) skb_put(skb, sizeof(struct sadb_sa));
sa->sadb_sa_len = sizeof(struct sadb_sa)/sizeof(uint64_t);
sa->sadb_sa_exttype = SADB_EXT_SA;
sa->sadb_sa_spi = x->id.spi;
sa->sadb_sa_replay = x->props.replay_window;
switch (x->km.state) {
case XFRM_STATE_VALID:
sa->sadb_sa_state = x->km.dying ?
SADB_SASTATE_DYING : SADB_SASTATE_MATURE;
break;
case XFRM_STATE_ACQ:
sa->sadb_sa_state = SADB_SASTATE_LARVAL;
break;
default:
sa->sadb_sa_state = SADB_SASTATE_DEAD;
break;
}
sa->sadb_sa_auth = 0;
if (x->aalg) {
struct xfrm_algo_desc *a = xfrm_aalg_get_byname(x->aalg->alg_name, 0);
sa->sadb_sa_auth = (a && a->pfkey_supported) ?
a->desc.sadb_alg_id : 0;
}
sa->sadb_sa_encrypt = 0;
BUG_ON(x->ealg && x->calg);
if (x->ealg) {
struct xfrm_algo_desc *a = xfrm_ealg_get_byname(x->ealg->alg_name, 0);
sa->sadb_sa_encrypt = (a && a->pfkey_supported) ?
a->desc.sadb_alg_id : 0;
}
/* KAME compatible: sadb_sa_encrypt is overloaded with calg id */
if (x->calg) {
struct xfrm_algo_desc *a = xfrm_calg_get_byname(x->calg->alg_name, 0);
sa->sadb_sa_encrypt = (a && a->pfkey_supported) ?
a->desc.sadb_alg_id : 0;
}
sa->sadb_sa_flags = 0;
if (x->props.flags & XFRM_STATE_NOECN)
sa->sadb_sa_flags |= SADB_SAFLAGS_NOECN;
if (x->props.flags & XFRM_STATE_DECAP_DSCP)
sa->sadb_sa_flags |= SADB_SAFLAGS_DECAP_DSCP;
if (x->props.flags & XFRM_STATE_NOPMTUDISC)
sa->sadb_sa_flags |= SADB_SAFLAGS_NOPMTUDISC;
/* hard time */
if (hsc & 2) {
lifetime = (struct sadb_lifetime *) skb_put(skb,
sizeof(struct sadb_lifetime));
lifetime->sadb_lifetime_len =
sizeof(struct sadb_lifetime)/sizeof(uint64_t);
lifetime->sadb_lifetime_exttype = SADB_EXT_LIFETIME_HARD;
lifetime->sadb_lifetime_allocations = _X2KEY(x->lft.hard_packet_limit);
lifetime->sadb_lifetime_bytes = _X2KEY(x->lft.hard_byte_limit);
lifetime->sadb_lifetime_addtime = x->lft.hard_add_expires_seconds;
lifetime->sadb_lifetime_usetime = x->lft.hard_use_expires_seconds;
}
/* soft time */
if (hsc & 1) {
lifetime = (struct sadb_lifetime *) skb_put(skb,
sizeof(struct sadb_lifetime));
lifetime->sadb_lifetime_len =
sizeof(struct sadb_lifetime)/sizeof(uint64_t);
lifetime->sadb_lifetime_exttype = SADB_EXT_LIFETIME_SOFT;
lifetime->sadb_lifetime_allocations = _X2KEY(x->lft.soft_packet_limit);
lifetime->sadb_lifetime_bytes = _X2KEY(x->lft.soft_byte_limit);
lifetime->sadb_lifetime_addtime = x->lft.soft_add_expires_seconds;
lifetime->sadb_lifetime_usetime = x->lft.soft_use_expires_seconds;
}
/* current time */
lifetime = (struct sadb_lifetime *) skb_put(skb,
sizeof(struct sadb_lifetime));
lifetime->sadb_lifetime_len =
sizeof(struct sadb_lifetime)/sizeof(uint64_t);
lifetime->sadb_lifetime_exttype = SADB_EXT_LIFETIME_CURRENT;
lifetime->sadb_lifetime_allocations = x->curlft.packets;
lifetime->sadb_lifetime_bytes = x->curlft.bytes;
lifetime->sadb_lifetime_addtime = x->curlft.add_time;
lifetime->sadb_lifetime_usetime = x->curlft.use_time;
/* src address */
addr = (struct sadb_address*) skb_put(skb,
sizeof(struct sadb_address)+sockaddr_size);
addr->sadb_address_len =
(sizeof(struct sadb_address)+sockaddr_size)/
sizeof(uint64_t);
addr->sadb_address_exttype = SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC;
/* "if the ports are non-zero, then the sadb_address_proto field,
normally zero, MUST be filled in with the transport
protocol's number." - RFC2367 */
addr->sadb_address_proto = 0;
addr->sadb_address_reserved = 0;
addr->sadb_address_prefixlen =
pfkey_sockaddr_fill(&x->props.saddr, 0,
(struct sockaddr *) (addr + 1),
x->props.family);
if (!addr->sadb_address_prefixlen)
BUG();
/* dst address */
addr = (struct sadb_address*) skb_put(skb,
sizeof(struct sadb_address)+sockaddr_size);
addr->sadb_address_len =
(sizeof(struct sadb_address)+sockaddr_size)/
sizeof(uint64_t);
addr->sadb_address_exttype = SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST;
addr->sadb_address_proto = 0;
addr->sadb_address_reserved = 0;
addr->sadb_address_prefixlen =
pfkey_sockaddr_fill(&x->id.daddr, 0,
(struct sockaddr *) (addr + 1),
x->props.family);
if (!addr->sadb_address_prefixlen)
BUG();
if (!xfrm_addr_equal(&x->sel.saddr, &x->props.saddr,
x->props.family)) {
addr = (struct sadb_address*) skb_put(skb,
sizeof(struct sadb_address)+sockaddr_size);
addr->sadb_address_len =
(sizeof(struct sadb_address)+sockaddr_size)/
sizeof(uint64_t);
addr->sadb_address_exttype = SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_PROXY;
addr->sadb_address_proto =
pfkey_proto_from_xfrm(x->sel.proto);
addr->sadb_address_prefixlen = x->sel.prefixlen_s;
addr->sadb_address_reserved = 0;
pfkey_sockaddr_fill(&x->sel.saddr, x->sel.sport,
(struct sockaddr *) (addr + 1),
x->props.family);
}
/* auth key */
if (add_keys && auth_key_size) {
key = (struct sadb_key *) skb_put(skb,
sizeof(struct sadb_key)+auth_key_size);
key->sadb_key_len = (sizeof(struct sadb_key) + auth_key_size) /
sizeof(uint64_t);
key->sadb_key_exttype = SADB_EXT_KEY_AUTH;
key->sadb_key_bits = x->aalg->alg_key_len;
key->sadb_key_reserved = 0;
memcpy(key + 1, x->aalg->alg_key, (x->aalg->alg_key_len+7)/8);
}
/* encrypt key */
if (add_keys && encrypt_key_size) {
key = (struct sadb_key *) skb_put(skb,
sizeof(struct sadb_key)+encrypt_key_size);
key->sadb_key_len = (sizeof(struct sadb_key) +
encrypt_key_size) / sizeof(uint64_t);
key->sadb_key_exttype = SADB_EXT_KEY_ENCRYPT;
key->sadb_key_bits = x->ealg->alg_key_len;
key->sadb_key_reserved = 0;
memcpy(key + 1, x->ealg->alg_key,
(x->ealg->alg_key_len+7)/8);
}
/* sa */
sa2 = (struct sadb_x_sa2 *) skb_put(skb, sizeof(struct sadb_x_sa2));
sa2->sadb_x_sa2_len = sizeof(struct sadb_x_sa2)/sizeof(uint64_t);
sa2->sadb_x_sa2_exttype = SADB_X_EXT_SA2;
if ((mode = pfkey_mode_from_xfrm(x->props.mode)) < 0) {
kfree_skb(skb);
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
sa2->sadb_x_sa2_mode = mode;
sa2->sadb_x_sa2_reserved1 = 0;
sa2->sadb_x_sa2_reserved2 = 0;
sa2->sadb_x_sa2_sequence = 0;
sa2->sadb_x_sa2_reqid = x->props.reqid;
if (natt && natt->encap_type) {
struct sadb_x_nat_t_type *n_type;
struct sadb_x_nat_t_port *n_port;
/* type */
n_type = (struct sadb_x_nat_t_type*) skb_put(skb, sizeof(*n_type));
n_type->sadb_x_nat_t_type_len = sizeof(*n_type)/sizeof(uint64_t);
n_type->sadb_x_nat_t_type_exttype = SADB_X_EXT_NAT_T_TYPE;
n_type->sadb_x_nat_t_type_type = natt->encap_type;
n_type->sadb_x_nat_t_type_reserved[0] = 0;
n_type->sadb_x_nat_t_type_reserved[1] = 0;
n_type->sadb_x_nat_t_type_reserved[2] = 0;
/* source port */
n_port = (struct sadb_x_nat_t_port*) skb_put(skb, sizeof (*n_port));
n_port->sadb_x_nat_t_port_len = sizeof(*n_port)/sizeof(uint64_t);
n_port->sadb_x_nat_t_port_exttype = SADB_X_EXT_NAT_T_SPORT;
n_port->sadb_x_nat_t_port_port = natt->encap_sport;
n_port->sadb_x_nat_t_port_reserved = 0;
/* dest port */
n_port = (struct sadb_x_nat_t_port*) skb_put(skb, sizeof (*n_port));
n_port->sadb_x_nat_t_port_len = sizeof(*n_port)/sizeof(uint64_t);
n_port->sadb_x_nat_t_port_exttype = SADB_X_EXT_NAT_T_DPORT;
n_port->sadb_x_nat_t_port_port = natt->encap_dport;
n_port->sadb_x_nat_t_port_reserved = 0;
}
/* security context */
if (xfrm_ctx) {
sec_ctx = (struct sadb_x_sec_ctx *) skb_put(skb,
sizeof(struct sadb_x_sec_ctx) + ctx_size);
sec_ctx->sadb_x_sec_len =
(sizeof(struct sadb_x_sec_ctx) + ctx_size) / sizeof(uint64_t);
sec_ctx->sadb_x_sec_exttype = SADB_X_EXT_SEC_CTX;
sec_ctx->sadb_x_ctx_doi = xfrm_ctx->ctx_doi;
sec_ctx->sadb_x_ctx_alg = xfrm_ctx->ctx_alg;
sec_ctx->sadb_x_ctx_len = xfrm_ctx->ctx_len;
memcpy(sec_ctx + 1, xfrm_ctx->ctx_str,
xfrm_ctx->ctx_len);
}
return skb;
}
Commit Message: af_key: initialize satype in key_notify_policy_flush()
This field was left uninitialized. Some user daemons perform check against this
field.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 31,377
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void byteAttributeAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
ExceptionState exceptionState(ExceptionState::SetterContext, "byteAttribute", "TestObjectPython", info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate());
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_EXCEPTION_VOID(int, cppValue, toInt8(jsValue, exceptionState), exceptionState);
imp->setByteAttribute(cppValue);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 122,162
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int hidg_setup(struct usb_function *f,
const struct usb_ctrlrequest *ctrl)
{
struct f_hidg *hidg = func_to_hidg(f);
struct usb_composite_dev *cdev = f->config->cdev;
struct usb_request *req = cdev->req;
int status = 0;
__u16 value, length;
value = __le16_to_cpu(ctrl->wValue);
length = __le16_to_cpu(ctrl->wLength);
VDBG(cdev,
"%s crtl_request : bRequestType:0x%x bRequest:0x%x Value:0x%x\n",
__func__, ctrl->bRequestType, ctrl->bRequest, value);
switch ((ctrl->bRequestType << 8) | ctrl->bRequest) {
case ((USB_DIR_IN | USB_TYPE_CLASS | USB_RECIP_INTERFACE) << 8
| HID_REQ_GET_REPORT):
VDBG(cdev, "get_report\n");
/* send an empty report */
length = min_t(unsigned, length, hidg->report_length);
memset(req->buf, 0x0, length);
goto respond;
break;
case ((USB_DIR_IN | USB_TYPE_CLASS | USB_RECIP_INTERFACE) << 8
| HID_REQ_GET_PROTOCOL):
VDBG(cdev, "get_protocol\n");
length = min_t(unsigned int, length, 1);
((u8 *) req->buf)[0] = hidg->protocol;
goto respond;
break;
case ((USB_DIR_OUT | USB_TYPE_CLASS | USB_RECIP_INTERFACE) << 8
| HID_REQ_SET_REPORT):
VDBG(cdev, "set_report | wLength=%d\n", ctrl->wLength);
goto stall;
break;
case ((USB_DIR_OUT | USB_TYPE_CLASS | USB_RECIP_INTERFACE) << 8
| HID_REQ_SET_PROTOCOL):
VDBG(cdev, "set_protocol\n");
if (value > HID_REPORT_PROTOCOL)
goto stall;
length = 0;
/*
* We assume that programs implementing the Boot protocol
* are also compatible with the Report Protocol
*/
if (hidg->bInterfaceSubClass == USB_INTERFACE_SUBCLASS_BOOT) {
hidg->protocol = value;
goto respond;
}
goto stall;
break;
case ((USB_DIR_IN | USB_TYPE_STANDARD | USB_RECIP_INTERFACE) << 8
| USB_REQ_GET_DESCRIPTOR):
switch (value >> 8) {
case HID_DT_HID:
{
struct hid_descriptor hidg_desc_copy = hidg_desc;
VDBG(cdev, "USB_REQ_GET_DESCRIPTOR: HID\n");
hidg_desc_copy.desc[0].bDescriptorType = HID_DT_REPORT;
hidg_desc_copy.desc[0].wDescriptorLength =
cpu_to_le16(hidg->report_desc_length);
length = min_t(unsigned short, length,
hidg_desc_copy.bLength);
memcpy(req->buf, &hidg_desc_copy, length);
goto respond;
break;
}
case HID_DT_REPORT:
VDBG(cdev, "USB_REQ_GET_DESCRIPTOR: REPORT\n");
length = min_t(unsigned short, length,
hidg->report_desc_length);
memcpy(req->buf, hidg->report_desc, length);
goto respond;
break;
default:
VDBG(cdev, "Unknown descriptor request 0x%x\n",
value >> 8);
goto stall;
break;
}
break;
default:
VDBG(cdev, "Unknown request 0x%x\n",
ctrl->bRequest);
goto stall;
break;
}
stall:
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
respond:
req->zero = 0;
req->length = length;
status = usb_ep_queue(cdev->gadget->ep0, req, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (status < 0)
ERROR(cdev, "usb_ep_queue error on ep0 %d\n", value);
return status;
}
Commit Message: USB: gadget: f_hid: fix deadlock in f_hidg_write()
In f_hidg_write() the write_spinlock is acquired before calling
usb_ep_queue() which causes a deadlock when dummy_hcd is being used.
This is because dummy_queue() callbacks into f_hidg_req_complete() which
tries to acquire the same spinlock. This is (part of) the backtrace when
the deadlock occurs:
0xffffffffc06b1410 in f_hidg_req_complete
0xffffffffc06a590a in usb_gadget_giveback_request
0xffffffffc06cfff2 in dummy_queue
0xffffffffc06a4b96 in usb_ep_queue
0xffffffffc06b1eb6 in f_hidg_write
0xffffffff8127730b in __vfs_write
0xffffffff812774d1 in vfs_write
0xffffffff81277725 in SYSC_write
Fix this by releasing the write_spinlock before calling usb_ep_queue()
Reviewed-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Tested-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.11+
Fixes: 749494b6bdbb ("usb: gadget: f_hid: fix: Move IN request allocation to set_alt()")
Signed-off-by: Radoslav Gerganov <rgerganov@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 96,690
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ScriptController::clearScriptObjects()
{
PluginObjectMap::iterator it = m_pluginObjects.begin();
for (; it != m_pluginObjects.end(); ++it) {
_NPN_UnregisterObject(it->second);
_NPN_ReleaseObject(it->second);
}
m_pluginObjects.clear();
#if ENABLE(NETSCAPE_PLUGIN_API)
if (m_wrappedWindowScriptNPObject) {
NPObjectWrapper* windowScriptObjectWrapper = NPObjectWrapper::getWrapper(m_wrappedWindowScriptNPObject);
ASSERT(windowScriptObjectWrapper);
NPObject* windowScriptNPObject = NPObjectWrapper::getUnderlyingNPObject(m_wrappedWindowScriptNPObject);
ASSERT(windowScriptNPObject);
_NPN_DeallocateObject(windowScriptNPObject);
windowScriptObjectWrapper->clear();
_NPN_ReleaseObject(m_wrappedWindowScriptNPObject);
m_wrappedWindowScriptNPObject = 0;
}
#endif
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 109,684
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int udf_CS0toNLS(struct nls_table *nls, struct ustr *utf_o,
const struct ustr *ocu_i)
{
const uint8_t *ocu;
uint8_t cmp_id, ocu_len;
int i, len;
ocu_len = ocu_i->u_len;
if (ocu_len == 0) {
memset(utf_o, 0, sizeof(struct ustr));
return 0;
}
cmp_id = ocu_i->u_cmpID;
if (cmp_id != 8 && cmp_id != 16) {
memset(utf_o, 0, sizeof(struct ustr));
pr_err("unknown compression code (%d) stri=%s\n",
cmp_id, ocu_i->u_name);
return 0;
}
ocu = ocu_i->u_name;
utf_o->u_len = 0;
for (i = 0; (i < ocu_len) && (utf_o->u_len <= (UDF_NAME_LEN - 3));) {
/* Expand OSTA compressed Unicode to Unicode */
uint32_t c = ocu[i++];
if (cmp_id == 16)
c = (c << 8) | ocu[i++];
len = nls->uni2char(c, &utf_o->u_name[utf_o->u_len],
UDF_NAME_LEN - utf_o->u_len);
/* Valid character? */
if (len >= 0)
utf_o->u_len += len;
else
utf_o->u_name[utf_o->u_len++] = '?';
}
utf_o->u_cmpID = 8;
return utf_o->u_len;
}
Commit Message: udf: Check path length when reading symlink
Symlink reading code does not check whether the resulting path fits into
the page provided by the generic code. This isn't as easy as just
checking the symlink size because of various encoding conversions we
perform on path. So we have to check whether there is still enough space
in the buffer on the fly.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Carl Henrik Lunde <chlunde@ping.uio.no>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-17
| 0
| 45,267
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void av_log_missing_feature(void *avc, const char *feature, int want_sample)
{
av_log(avc, AV_LOG_WARNING, "%s is not implemented. Update your FFmpeg "
"version to the newest one from Git. If the problem still "
"occurs, it means that your file has a feature which has not "
"been implemented.\n", feature);
if(want_sample)
av_log_ask_for_sample(avc, NULL);
}
Commit Message: avcodec/utils: correct align value for interplay
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: 452/fuzz-1-ffmpeg_VIDEO_AV_CODEC_ID_INTERPLAY_VIDEO_fuzzer
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 66,962
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AwContents::OnComputeScroll(JNIEnv* env,
jobject obj,
jlong animation_time_millis) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
browser_view_renderer_.OnComputeScroll(
base::TimeTicks() +
base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(animation_time_millis));
}
Commit Message: sync compositor: pass simple gfx types by const ref
See bug for reasoning
BUG=159273
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417893006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356653}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 119,603
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE3(unlinkat, int, dfd, const char __user *, pathname, int, flag)
{
if ((flag & ~AT_REMOVEDIR) != 0)
return -EINVAL;
if (flag & AT_REMOVEDIR)
return do_rmdir(dfd, pathname);
return do_unlinkat(dfd, pathname);
}
Commit Message: fs: umount on symlink leaks mnt count
Currently umount on symlink blocks following umount:
/vz is separate mount
# ls /vz/ -al | grep test
drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root 4096 Jul 19 01:14 testdir
lrwxrwxrwx. 1 root root 11 Jul 19 01:16 testlink -> /vz/testdir
# umount -l /vz/testlink
umount: /vz/testlink: not mounted (expected)
# lsof /vz
# umount /vz
umount: /vz: device is busy. (unexpected)
In this case mountpoint_last() gets an extra refcount on path->mnt
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 36,283
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline struct net_device** get_dev_p(pvc_device *pvc, int type)
{
if (type == ARPHRD_ETHER)
return &pvc->ether;
else
return &pvc->main;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 23,920
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void tipc_sk_rcv(struct net *net, struct sk_buff_head *inputq)
{
u32 dnode, dport = 0;
int err;
struct tipc_sock *tsk;
struct sock *sk;
struct sk_buff *skb;
while (skb_queue_len(inputq)) {
dport = tipc_skb_peek_port(inputq, dport);
tsk = tipc_sk_lookup(net, dport);
if (likely(tsk)) {
sk = &tsk->sk;
if (likely(spin_trylock_bh(&sk->sk_lock.slock))) {
tipc_sk_enqueue(inputq, sk, dport);
spin_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_lock.slock);
}
sock_put(sk);
continue;
}
/* No destination socket => dequeue skb if still there */
skb = tipc_skb_dequeue(inputq, dport);
if (!skb)
return;
/* Try secondary lookup if unresolved named message */
err = TIPC_ERR_NO_PORT;
if (tipc_msg_lookup_dest(net, skb, &err))
goto xmit;
/* Prepare for message rejection */
if (!tipc_msg_reverse(tipc_own_addr(net), &skb, err))
continue;
xmit:
dnode = msg_destnode(buf_msg(skb));
tipc_node_xmit_skb(net, skb, dnode, dport);
}
}
Commit Message: tipc: check nl sock before parsing nested attributes
Make sure the socket for which the user is listing publication exists
before parsing the socket netlink attributes.
Prior to this patch a call without any socket caused a NULL pointer
dereference in tipc_nl_publ_dump().
Tested-and-reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Alpe <richard.alpe@ericsson.com>
Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.cm>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 52,504
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct page *read_cache_page(struct address_space *mapping,
pgoff_t index,
int (*filler)(void *,struct page*),
void *data)
{
struct page *page;
page = read_cache_page_async(mapping, index, filler, data);
if (IS_ERR(page))
goto out;
wait_on_page_locked(page);
if (!PageUptodate(page)) {
page_cache_release(page);
page = ERR_PTR(-EIO);
}
out:
return page;
}
Commit Message: fix writev regression: pan hanging unkillable and un-straceable
Frederik Himpe reported an unkillable and un-straceable pan process.
Zero length iovecs can go into an infinite loop in writev, because the
iovec iterator does not always advance over them.
The sequence required to trigger this is not trivial. I think it
requires that a zero-length iovec be followed by a non-zero-length iovec
which causes a pagefault in the atomic usercopy. This causes the writev
code to drop back into single-segment copy mode, which then tries to
copy the 0 bytes of the zero-length iovec; a zero length copy looks like
a failure though, so it loops.
Put a test into iov_iter_advance to catch zero-length iovecs. We could
just put the test in the fallback path, but I feel it is more robust to
skip over zero-length iovecs throughout the code (iovec iterator may be
used in filesystems too, so it should be robust).
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 58,831
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Browser::CanCloseWithInProgressDownloads() {
if (cancel_download_confirmation_state_ != NOT_PROMPTED) {
if (cancel_download_confirmation_state_ == WAITING_FOR_RESPONSE) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
bool normal_downloads_are_present = false;
bool incognito_downloads_are_present = false;
CheckDownloadsInProgress(&normal_downloads_are_present,
&incognito_downloads_are_present);
if (!normal_downloads_are_present && !incognito_downloads_are_present)
return true;
if (is_attempting_to_close_browser_)
return true;
if ((!normal_downloads_are_present && !profile()->IsOffTheRecord()) ||
(!incognito_downloads_are_present && profile()->IsOffTheRecord()))
return true;
int count = 0;
for (BrowserList::const_iterator iter = BrowserList::begin();
iter != BrowserList::end(); ++iter) {
Browser* const browser = *iter;
if (browser == this
|| browser->is_attempting_to_close_browser_
|| browser->type() != Browser::TYPE_NORMAL)
continue;
if (normal_downloads_are_present && !profile()->IsOffTheRecord() &&
browser->profile()->IsOffTheRecord())
continue;
if (incognito_downloads_are_present && profile()->IsOffTheRecord() &&
!browser->profile()->IsOffTheRecord())
continue;
if ((*iter)->profile() == profile() ||
(*iter)->profile()->GetOriginalProfile() == profile())
count++;
}
if (count > 0)
return true;
cancel_download_confirmation_state_ = WAITING_FOR_RESPONSE;
window_->ConfirmBrowserCloseWithPendingDownloads();
return false;
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 98,200
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int nfs4_xdr_enc_close(struct rpc_rqst *req, __be32 *p, struct nfs_closeargs *args)
{
struct xdr_stream xdr;
struct compound_hdr hdr = {
.nops = 3,
};
int status;
xdr_init_encode(&xdr, &req->rq_snd_buf, p);
encode_compound_hdr(&xdr, &hdr);
status = encode_putfh(&xdr, args->fh);
if(status)
goto out;
status = encode_close(&xdr, args);
if (status != 0)
goto out;
status = encode_getfattr(&xdr, args->bitmask);
out:
return status;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 23,131
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void JunkChunk::write( RIFF_MetaHandler* handler, XMP_IO* file, bool isMainChunk )
{
XIO::WriteUns32_LE( file, kChunk_JUNK ); // write JUNK, never JUNQ
XMP_Enforce( this->newSize < 0xFFFFFFFF );
XMP_Enforce( this->newSize >= 8 ); // minimum size of any chunk
XMP_Uns32 innerSize = (XMP_Uns32)this->newSize - 8;
XIO::WriteUns32_LE( file, innerSize );
while ( innerSize > kZeroBufferSize64K )
{
file->Write ( kZeroes64K , kZeroBufferSize64K );
innerSize -= kZeroBufferSize64K;
}
file->Write ( kZeroes64K , innerSize );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 16,086
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void MockRenderThread::SetIdleNotificationDelayInMs(
int64 idle_notification_delay_in_ms) {
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 108,493
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: msg_fifo_head (struct msg_fifo *fifo)
{
return fifo->head;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 3,567
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int get_audio_frame_duration(enum AVCodecID id, int sr, int ch, int ba,
uint32_t tag, int bits_per_coded_sample, int64_t bitrate,
uint8_t * extradata, int frame_size, int frame_bytes)
{
int bps = av_get_exact_bits_per_sample(id);
int framecount = (ba > 0 && frame_bytes / ba > 0) ? frame_bytes / ba : 1;
/* codecs with an exact constant bits per sample */
if (bps > 0 && ch > 0 && frame_bytes > 0 && ch < 32768 && bps < 32768)
return (frame_bytes * 8LL) / (bps * ch);
bps = bits_per_coded_sample;
/* codecs with a fixed packet duration */
switch (id) {
case AV_CODEC_ID_ADPCM_ADX: return 32;
case AV_CODEC_ID_ADPCM_IMA_QT: return 64;
case AV_CODEC_ID_ADPCM_EA_XAS: return 128;
case AV_CODEC_ID_AMR_NB:
case AV_CODEC_ID_EVRC:
case AV_CODEC_ID_GSM:
case AV_CODEC_ID_QCELP:
case AV_CODEC_ID_RA_288: return 160;
case AV_CODEC_ID_AMR_WB:
case AV_CODEC_ID_GSM_MS: return 320;
case AV_CODEC_ID_MP1: return 384;
case AV_CODEC_ID_ATRAC1: return 512;
case AV_CODEC_ID_ATRAC3: return 1024 * framecount;
case AV_CODEC_ID_ATRAC3P: return 2048;
case AV_CODEC_ID_MP2:
case AV_CODEC_ID_MUSEPACK7: return 1152;
case AV_CODEC_ID_AC3: return 1536;
}
if (sr > 0) {
/* calc from sample rate */
if (id == AV_CODEC_ID_TTA)
return 256 * sr / 245;
else if (id == AV_CODEC_ID_DST)
return 588 * sr / 44100;
if (ch > 0) {
/* calc from sample rate and channels */
if (id == AV_CODEC_ID_BINKAUDIO_DCT)
return (480 << (sr / 22050)) / ch;
}
}
if (ba > 0) {
/* calc from block_align */
if (id == AV_CODEC_ID_SIPR) {
switch (ba) {
case 20: return 160;
case 19: return 144;
case 29: return 288;
case 37: return 480;
}
} else if (id == AV_CODEC_ID_ILBC) {
switch (ba) {
case 38: return 160;
case 50: return 240;
}
}
}
if (frame_bytes > 0) {
/* calc from frame_bytes only */
if (id == AV_CODEC_ID_TRUESPEECH)
return 240 * (frame_bytes / 32);
if (id == AV_CODEC_ID_NELLYMOSER)
return 256 * (frame_bytes / 64);
if (id == AV_CODEC_ID_RA_144)
return 160 * (frame_bytes / 20);
if (id == AV_CODEC_ID_G723_1)
return 240 * (frame_bytes / 24);
if (bps > 0) {
/* calc from frame_bytes and bits_per_coded_sample */
if (id == AV_CODEC_ID_ADPCM_G726)
return frame_bytes * 8 / bps;
}
if (ch > 0 && ch < INT_MAX/16) {
/* calc from frame_bytes and channels */
switch (id) {
case AV_CODEC_ID_ADPCM_AFC:
return frame_bytes / (9 * ch) * 16;
case AV_CODEC_ID_ADPCM_PSX:
case AV_CODEC_ID_ADPCM_DTK:
return frame_bytes / (16 * ch) * 28;
case AV_CODEC_ID_ADPCM_4XM:
case AV_CODEC_ID_ADPCM_IMA_DAT4:
case AV_CODEC_ID_ADPCM_IMA_ISS:
return (frame_bytes - 4 * ch) * 2 / ch;
case AV_CODEC_ID_ADPCM_IMA_SMJPEG:
return (frame_bytes - 4) * 2 / ch;
case AV_CODEC_ID_ADPCM_IMA_AMV:
return (frame_bytes - 8) * 2 / ch;
case AV_CODEC_ID_ADPCM_THP:
case AV_CODEC_ID_ADPCM_THP_LE:
if (extradata)
return frame_bytes * 14 / (8 * ch);
break;
case AV_CODEC_ID_ADPCM_XA:
return (frame_bytes / 128) * 224 / ch;
case AV_CODEC_ID_INTERPLAY_DPCM:
return (frame_bytes - 6 - ch) / ch;
case AV_CODEC_ID_ROQ_DPCM:
return (frame_bytes - 8) / ch;
case AV_CODEC_ID_XAN_DPCM:
return (frame_bytes - 2 * ch) / ch;
case AV_CODEC_ID_MACE3:
return 3 * frame_bytes / ch;
case AV_CODEC_ID_MACE6:
return 6 * frame_bytes / ch;
case AV_CODEC_ID_PCM_LXF:
return 2 * (frame_bytes / (5 * ch));
case AV_CODEC_ID_IAC:
case AV_CODEC_ID_IMC:
return 4 * frame_bytes / ch;
}
if (tag) {
/* calc from frame_bytes, channels, and codec_tag */
if (id == AV_CODEC_ID_SOL_DPCM) {
if (tag == 3)
return frame_bytes / ch;
else
return frame_bytes * 2 / ch;
}
}
if (ba > 0) {
/* calc from frame_bytes, channels, and block_align */
int blocks = frame_bytes / ba;
switch (id) {
case AV_CODEC_ID_ADPCM_IMA_WAV:
if (bps < 2 || bps > 5)
return 0;
return blocks * (1 + (ba - 4 * ch) / (bps * ch) * 8);
case AV_CODEC_ID_ADPCM_IMA_DK3:
return blocks * (((ba - 16) * 2 / 3 * 4) / ch);
case AV_CODEC_ID_ADPCM_IMA_DK4:
return blocks * (1 + (ba - 4 * ch) * 2 / ch);
case AV_CODEC_ID_ADPCM_IMA_RAD:
return blocks * ((ba - 4 * ch) * 2 / ch);
case AV_CODEC_ID_ADPCM_MS:
return blocks * (2 + (ba - 7 * ch) * 2 / ch);
case AV_CODEC_ID_ADPCM_MTAF:
return blocks * (ba - 16) * 2 / ch;
}
}
if (bps > 0) {
/* calc from frame_bytes, channels, and bits_per_coded_sample */
switch (id) {
case AV_CODEC_ID_PCM_DVD:
if(bps<4)
return 0;
return 2 * (frame_bytes / ((bps * 2 / 8) * ch));
case AV_CODEC_ID_PCM_BLURAY:
if(bps<4)
return 0;
return frame_bytes / ((FFALIGN(ch, 2) * bps) / 8);
case AV_CODEC_ID_S302M:
return 2 * (frame_bytes / ((bps + 4) / 4)) / ch;
}
}
}
}
/* Fall back on using frame_size */
if (frame_size > 1 && frame_bytes)
return frame_size;
if (bitrate > 0 && frame_bytes > 0 && sr > 0 && ba > 1) {
if (id == AV_CODEC_ID_WMAV1 || id == AV_CODEC_ID_WMAV2)
return (frame_bytes * 8LL * sr) / bitrate;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/utils: correct align value for interplay
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: 452/fuzz-1-ffmpeg_VIDEO_AV_CODEC_ID_INTERPLAY_VIDEO_fuzzer
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 67,047
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct pending_req *alloc_req(struct xen_blkif *blkif)
{
struct pending_req *req = NULL;
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&blkif->pending_free_lock, flags);
if (!list_empty(&blkif->pending_free)) {
req = list_entry(blkif->pending_free.next, struct pending_req,
free_list);
list_del(&req->free_list);
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&blkif->pending_free_lock, flags);
return req;
}
Commit Message: xen/blkback: Check device permissions before allowing OP_DISCARD
We need to make sure that the device is not RO or that
the request is not past the number of sectors we want to
issue the DISCARD operation for.
This fixes CVE-2013-2140.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com>
[v1: Made it pr_warn instead of pr_debug]
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 31,823
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int BackendImpl::OpenEntry(const std::string& key, Entry** entry,
const CompletionCallback& callback) {
DCHECK(!callback.is_null());
background_queue_.OpenEntry(key, entry, callback);
return net::ERR_IO_PENDING;
}
Commit Message: Blockfile cache: fix long-standing sparse + evict reentrancy problem
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for an alternative perspective
plus a reduction to make fixing this much easier.
Bug: 826626, 518908, 537063, 802886
Change-Id: Ibfa01416f9a8e7f7b361e4f93b4b6b134728b85f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/985052
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547103}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 147,262
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ResetPaddingKeyForTesting() {
*GetPaddingKey() = SymmetricKey::GenerateRandomKey(kPaddingKeyAlgorithm, 128);
}
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 1
| 173,001
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int airo_get_mode(struct net_device *dev,
struct iw_request_info *info,
__u32 *uwrq,
char *extra)
{
struct airo_info *local = dev->ml_priv;
readConfigRid(local, 1);
/* If not managed, assume it's ad-hoc */
switch (local->config.opmode & MODE_CFG_MASK) {
case MODE_STA_ESS:
*uwrq = IW_MODE_INFRA;
break;
case MODE_AP:
*uwrq = IW_MODE_MASTER;
break;
case MODE_AP_RPTR:
*uwrq = IW_MODE_REPEAT;
break;
default:
*uwrq = IW_MODE_ADHOC;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 23,954
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int sc_concatenate_path(sc_path_t *d, const sc_path_t *p1, const sc_path_t *p2)
{
sc_path_t tpath;
if (d == NULL || p1 == NULL || p2 == NULL)
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS;
if (p1->type == SC_PATH_TYPE_DF_NAME || p2->type == SC_PATH_TYPE_DF_NAME)
/* we do not support concatenation of AIDs at the moment */
return SC_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
if (p1->len + p2->len > SC_MAX_PATH_SIZE)
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS;
memset(&tpath, 0, sizeof(sc_path_t));
memcpy(tpath.value, p1->value, p1->len);
memcpy(tpath.value + p1->len, p2->value, p2->len);
tpath.len = p1->len + p2->len;
tpath.type = SC_PATH_TYPE_PATH;
/* use 'index' and 'count' entry of the second path object */
tpath.index = p2->index;
tpath.count = p2->count;
/* the result is currently always as path */
tpath.type = SC_PATH_TYPE_PATH;
*d = tpath;
return SC_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds writes
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problems.
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 78,829
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: IHEVCD_ERROR_T ihevcd_operation_point_set(vps_t *ps_vps, bitstrm_t *ps_bitstrm, WORD32 ops_idx)
{
WORD32 i;
WORD32 value;
IHEVCD_ERROR_T ret = (IHEVCD_ERROR_T)IHEVCD_SUCCESS;
UNUSED(ops_idx);
for(i = 0; i <= ps_vps->i1_vps_max_nuh_reserved_zero_layer_id; i++)
{
BITS_PARSE("list_entry_l0[ i ]", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
}
UNUSED(value);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Check only allocated mv bufs for releasing from reference
When checking mv bufs for releasing from reference, unallocated
mv bufs were also checked. This issue was fixed by restricting
the loop count to allocated number of mv bufs.
Bug: 34896906
Bug: 34819017
Change-Id: If832f590b301f414d4cd5206414efc61a70c17cb
(cherry picked from commit 23bfe3e06d53ea749073a5d7ceda84239742b2c2)
CWE ID:
| 0
| 162,366
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::AddConsoleMessage(ConsoleMessage* console_message) {
if (!IsContextThread()) {
TaskRunnerHelper::Get(TaskType::kUnthrottled, this)
->PostTask(BLINK_FROM_HERE,
CrossThreadBind(
&RunAddConsoleMessageTask, console_message->Source(),
console_message->Level(), console_message->Message(),
WrapCrossThreadPersistent(this)));
return;
}
if (!frame_)
return;
if (console_message->Location()->IsUnknown()) {
unsigned line_number = 0;
if (!IsInDocumentWrite() && GetScriptableDocumentParser()) {
ScriptableDocumentParser* parser = GetScriptableDocumentParser();
if (parser->IsParsingAtLineNumber())
line_number = parser->LineNumber().OneBasedInt();
}
console_message = ConsoleMessage::Create(
console_message->Source(), console_message->Level(),
console_message->Message(),
SourceLocation::Create(Url().GetString(), line_number, 0, nullptr));
}
frame_->Console().AddMessage(console_message);
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 134,022
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static gboolean channel_init(GAState *s, const gchar *method, const gchar *path)
{
GAChannelMethod channel_method;
if (method == NULL) {
method = "virtio-serial";
}
if (path == NULL) {
if (strcmp(method, "virtio-serial") != 0) {
g_critical("must specify a path for this channel");
return false;
}
/* try the default path for the virtio-serial port */
path = QGA_VIRTIO_PATH_DEFAULT;
}
if (strcmp(method, "virtio-serial") == 0) {
s->virtio = true; /* virtio requires special handling in some cases */
channel_method = GA_CHANNEL_VIRTIO_SERIAL;
} else if (strcmp(method, "isa-serial") == 0) {
channel_method = GA_CHANNEL_ISA_SERIAL;
} else if (strcmp(method, "unix-listen") == 0) {
channel_method = GA_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTEN;
} else {
g_critical("unsupported channel method/type: %s", method);
return false;
}
s->channel = ga_channel_new(channel_method, path, channel_event_cb, s);
if (!s->channel) {
g_critical("failed to create guest agent channel");
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 3,840
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: lha_crc16_init(void)
{
unsigned int i;
static int crc16init = 0;
if (crc16init)
return;
crc16init = 1;
for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
unsigned int j;
uint16_t crc = (uint16_t)i;
for (j = 8; j; j--)
crc = (crc >> 1) ^ ((crc & 1) * 0xA001);
crc16tbl[0][i] = crc;
}
for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
crc16tbl[1][i] = (crc16tbl[0][i] >> 8)
^ crc16tbl[0][crc16tbl[0][i] & 0xff];
}
}
Commit Message: Fail with negative lha->compsize in lha_read_file_header_1()
Fixes a heap buffer overflow reported in Secunia SA74169
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 68,627
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: clear_password(struct rad_handle *h)
{
if (h->pass_len != 0) {
memset(h->pass, 0, h->pass_len);
h->pass_len = 0;
}
h->pass_pos = 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix a security issue in radius_get_vendor_attr().
The underlying rad_get_vendor_attr() function assumed that it would always be
given valid VSA data. Indeed, the buffer length wasn't even passed in; the
assumption was that the length field within the VSA structure would be valid.
This could result in denial of service by providing a length that would be
beyond the memory limit, or potential arbitrary memory access by providing a
length greater than the actual data given.
rad_get_vendor_attr() has been changed to require the raw data length be
provided, and this is then used to check that the VSA is valid.
Conflicts:
radlib_vs.h
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 31,520
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int em_bsr_c(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
/* If src is zero, do not writeback, but update flags */
if (ctxt->src.val == 0)
ctxt->dst.type = OP_NONE;
return fastop(ctxt, em_bsr);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: drop error recovery in em_jmp_far and em_ret_far
em_jmp_far and em_ret_far assumed that setting IP can only fail in 64
bit mode, but syzkaller proved otherwise (and SDM agrees).
Code segment was restored upon failure, but it was left uninitialized
outside of long mode, which could lead to a leak of host kernel stack.
We could have fixed that by always saving and restoring the CS, but we
take a simpler approach and just break any guest that manages to fail
as the error recovery is error-prone and modern CPUs don't need emulator
for this.
Found by syzkaller:
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 3668 at arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2217 em_ret_far+0x428/0x480
Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...
CPU: 2 PID: 3668 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 4.9.0-rc4+ #49
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
[...]
Call Trace:
[...] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15
[...] dump_stack+0xb3/0x118 lib/dump_stack.c:51
[...] panic+0x1b7/0x3a3 kernel/panic.c:179
[...] __warn+0x1c4/0x1e0 kernel/panic.c:542
[...] warn_slowpath_null+0x2c/0x40 kernel/panic.c:585
[...] em_ret_far+0x428/0x480 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2217
[...] em_ret_far_imm+0x17/0x70 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2227
[...] x86_emulate_insn+0x87a/0x3730 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:5294
[...] x86_emulate_instruction+0x520/0x1ba0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:5545
[...] emulate_instruction arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h:1116
[...] complete_emulated_io arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6870
[...] complete_emulated_mmio+0x4e9/0x710 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6934
[...] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x3b7a/0x5a90 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6978
[...] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x61e/0xdd0 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:2557
[...] vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:43
[...] do_vfs_ioctl+0x18c/0x1040 fs/ioctl.c:679
[...] SYSC_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:694
[...] SyS_ioctl+0x8f/0xc0 fs/ioctl.c:685
[...] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d1442d85cc30 ("KVM: x86: Handle errors when RIP is set during far jumps")
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 47,942
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: size_t OpenMP4SourceUDTA(char *filename)
{
mp4object *mp4 = (mp4object *)malloc(sizeof(mp4object));
if (mp4 == NULL) return 0;
memset(mp4, 0, sizeof(mp4object));
#ifdef _WINDOWS
fopen_s(&mp4->mediafp, filename, "rb");
#else
mp4->mediafp = fopen(filename, "rb");
#endif
if (mp4->mediafp)
{
uint32_t qttag, qtsize32, len;
int32_t nest = 0;
uint64_t nestsize[MAX_NEST_LEVEL] = { 0 };
uint64_t lastsize = 0, qtsize;
do
{
len = fread(&qtsize32, 1, 4, mp4->mediafp);
len += fread(&qttag, 1, 4, mp4->mediafp);
if (len == 8)
{
if (!GPMF_VALID_FOURCC(qttag))
{
LONGSEEK(mp4->mediafp, lastsize - 8 - 8, SEEK_CUR);
NESTSIZE(lastsize - 8);
continue;
}
qtsize32 = BYTESWAP32(qtsize32);
if (qtsize32 == 1) // 64-bit Atom
{
fread(&qtsize, 1, 8, mp4->mediafp);
qtsize = BYTESWAP64(qtsize) - 8;
}
else
qtsize = qtsize32;
nest++;
if (qtsize < 8) break;
if (nest >= MAX_NEST_LEVEL) break;
nestsize[nest] = qtsize;
lastsize = qtsize;
if (qttag == MAKEID('m', 'd', 'a', 't') ||
qttag == MAKEID('f', 't', 'y', 'p'))
{
LONGSEEK(mp4->mediafp, qtsize - 8, SEEK_CUR);
NESTSIZE(qtsize);
continue;
}
if (qttag == MAKEID('G', 'P', 'M', 'F'))
{
mp4->videolength += 1.0;
mp4->metadatalength += 1.0;
mp4->indexcount = (int)mp4->metadatalength;
mp4->metasizes = (uint32_t *)malloc(mp4->indexcount * 4 + 4); memset(mp4->metasizes, 0, mp4->indexcount * 4 + 4);
mp4->metaoffsets = (uint64_t *)malloc(mp4->indexcount * 8 + 8); memset(mp4->metaoffsets, 0, mp4->indexcount * 8 + 8);
mp4->metasizes[0] = (int)qtsize - 8;
mp4->metaoffsets[0] = ftell(mp4->mediafp);
mp4->metasize_count = 1;
return (size_t)mp4; // not an MP4, RAW GPMF which has not inherent timing, assigning a during of 1second.
}
if (qttag != MAKEID('m', 'o', 'o', 'v') && //skip over all but these atoms
qttag != MAKEID('u', 'd', 't', 'a'))
{
LONGSEEK(mp4->mediafp, qtsize - 8, SEEK_CUR);
NESTSIZE(qtsize);
continue;
}
else
{
NESTSIZE(8);
}
}
} while (len > 0);
}
return (size_t)mp4;
}
Commit Message: fixed many security issues with the too crude mp4 reader
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 1
| 169,551
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableWebGLImageChromium(bool enable) {
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SetWebGLImageChromiumEnabled(enable);
}
Commit Message: Remove RequireCSSExtensionForFile runtime enabled flag.
The feature has long since been stable (since M64) and doesn't seem
to be a need for this flag.
BUG=788936
Change-Id: I666390b869289c328acb4a2daa5bf4154e1702c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1324143
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dave Tapuska <dtapuska@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#607329}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 154,699
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WorkerProcessLauncherTest::QuitMainMessageLoop() {
message_loop_.PostTask(FROM_HERE, MessageLoop::QuitClosure());
}
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 118,825
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int in_standby(struct audio_stream *stream)
{
struct stream_in *in = (struct stream_in *)stream;
struct audio_device *adev = in->dev;
int status;
ALOGV("%s: enter", __func__);
pthread_mutex_lock(&adev->lock_inputs);
status = in_standby_l(in);
pthread_mutex_unlock(&adev->lock_inputs);
ALOGV("%s: exit: status(%d)", __func__, status);
return status;
}
Commit Message: Fix audio record pre-processing
proc_buf_out consistently initialized.
intermediate scratch buffers consistently initialized.
prevent read failure from overwriting memory.
Test: POC, CTS, camera record
Bug: 62873231
Change-Id: Ie26e12a419a5819c1c5c3a0bcf1876d6d7aca686
(cherry picked from commit 6d7b330c27efba944817e647955da48e54fd74eb)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 162,298
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void flush_inline_data(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, nid_t ino)
{
struct inode *inode;
struct page *page;
int ret;
/* should flush inline_data before evict_inode */
inode = ilookup(sbi->sb, ino);
if (!inode)
return;
page = pagecache_get_page(inode->i_mapping, 0, FGP_LOCK|FGP_NOWAIT, 0);
if (!page)
goto iput_out;
if (!PageUptodate(page))
goto page_out;
if (!PageDirty(page))
goto page_out;
if (!clear_page_dirty_for_io(page))
goto page_out;
ret = f2fs_write_inline_data(inode, page);
inode_dec_dirty_pages(inode);
remove_dirty_inode(inode);
if (ret)
set_page_dirty(page);
page_out:
f2fs_put_page(page, 1);
iput_out:
iput(inode);
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix race condition in between free nid allocator/initializer
In below concurrent case, allocated nid can be loaded into free nid cache
and be allocated again.
Thread A Thread B
- f2fs_create
- f2fs_new_inode
- alloc_nid
- __insert_nid_to_list(ALLOC_NID_LIST)
- f2fs_balance_fs_bg
- build_free_nids
- __build_free_nids
- scan_nat_page
- add_free_nid
- __lookup_nat_cache
- f2fs_add_link
- init_inode_metadata
- new_inode_page
- new_node_page
- set_node_addr
- alloc_nid_done
- __remove_nid_from_list(ALLOC_NID_LIST)
- __insert_nid_to_list(FREE_NID_LIST)
This patch makes nat cache lookup and free nid list operation being atomical
to avoid this race condition.
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 85,263
|
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