instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AppCacheHost::CompleteTransfer(int host_id, AppCacheFrontend* frontend) {
host_id_ = host_id;
frontend_ = frontend;
}
Commit Message: Fix possible map::end() dereference in AppCacheUpdateJob triggered by a compromised renderer.
BUG=551044
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1418783005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#358815}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 124,194
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BrowserView::OnExclusiveAccessUserInput() {
if (exclusive_access_bubble_.get())
exclusive_access_bubble_->OnUserInput();
}
Commit Message: Mac: turn popups into new tabs while in fullscreen.
It's platform convention to show popups as new tabs while in
non-HTML5 fullscreen. (Popups cause tabs to lose HTML5 fullscreen.)
This was implemented for Cocoa in a BrowserWindow override, but
it makes sense to just stick it into Browser and remove a ton
of override code put in just to support this.
BUG=858929, 868416
TEST=as in bugs
Change-Id: I43471f242813ec1159d9c690bab73dab3e610b7d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1153455
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <sdy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#578755}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 155,234
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HistogramEnumerateOsArch(const std::string& sandbox_isa) {
enum NaClOSArch {
kNaClLinux32 = 0,
kNaClLinux64,
kNaClLinuxArm,
kNaClMac32,
kNaClMac64,
kNaClMacArm,
kNaClWin32,
kNaClWin64,
kNaClWinArm,
kNaClOSArchMax
};
NaClOSArch os_arch = kNaClOSArchMax;
#if NACL_LINUX
os_arch = kNaClLinux32;
#elif NACL_OSX
os_arch = kNaClMac32;
#elif NACL_WINDOWS
os_arch = kNaClWin32;
#endif
if (sandbox_isa == "x86-64")
os_arch = static_cast<NaClOSArch>(os_arch + 1);
if (sandbox_isa == "arm")
os_arch = static_cast<NaClOSArch>(os_arch + 2);
HistogramEnumerate("NaCl.Client.OSArch", os_arch, kNaClOSArchMax, -1);
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 103,357
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int usbnet_get_endpoints(struct usbnet *dev, struct usb_interface *intf)
{
int tmp;
struct usb_host_interface *alt = NULL;
struct usb_host_endpoint *in = NULL, *out = NULL;
struct usb_host_endpoint *status = NULL;
for (tmp = 0; tmp < intf->num_altsetting; tmp++) {
unsigned ep;
in = out = status = NULL;
alt = intf->altsetting + tmp;
/* take the first altsetting with in-bulk + out-bulk;
* remember any status endpoint, just in case;
* ignore other endpoints and altsettings.
*/
for (ep = 0; ep < alt->desc.bNumEndpoints; ep++) {
struct usb_host_endpoint *e;
int intr = 0;
e = alt->endpoint + ep;
switch (e->desc.bmAttributes) {
case USB_ENDPOINT_XFER_INT:
if (!usb_endpoint_dir_in(&e->desc))
continue;
intr = 1;
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case USB_ENDPOINT_XFER_BULK:
break;
default:
continue;
}
if (usb_endpoint_dir_in(&e->desc)) {
if (!intr && !in)
in = e;
else if (intr && !status)
status = e;
} else {
if (!out)
out = e;
}
}
if (in && out)
break;
}
if (!alt || !in || !out)
return -EINVAL;
if (alt->desc.bAlternateSetting != 0 ||
!(dev->driver_info->flags & FLAG_NO_SETINT)) {
tmp = usb_set_interface (dev->udev, alt->desc.bInterfaceNumber,
alt->desc.bAlternateSetting);
if (tmp < 0)
return tmp;
}
dev->in = usb_rcvbulkpipe (dev->udev,
in->desc.bEndpointAddress & USB_ENDPOINT_NUMBER_MASK);
dev->out = usb_sndbulkpipe (dev->udev,
out->desc.bEndpointAddress & USB_ENDPOINT_NUMBER_MASK);
dev->status = status;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: usbnet: cleanup after bind() in probe()
In case bind() works, but a later error forces bailing
in probe() in error cases work and a timer may be scheduled.
They must be killed. This fixes an error case related to
the double free reported in
http://www.spinics.net/lists/netdev/msg367669.html
and needs to go on top of Linus' fix to cdc-ncm.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 94,897
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: add_compile_string(UChar* s, int mb_len, int str_len,
regex_t* reg, int ignore_case)
{
int op;
int r;
int byte_len;
UChar* p;
UChar* end;
op = select_str_opcode(mb_len, str_len, ignore_case);
r = add_op(reg, op);
if (r != 0) return r;
byte_len = mb_len * str_len;
end = s + byte_len;
if (op == OP_EXACTMBN) {
p = onigenc_strdup(reg->enc, s, end);
CHECK_NULL_RETURN_MEMERR(p);
COP(reg)->exact_len_n.len = mb_len;
COP(reg)->exact_len_n.n = str_len;
COP(reg)->exact_len_n.s = p;
}
else if (IS_NEED_STR_LEN_OP_EXACT(op)) {
p = onigenc_strdup(reg->enc, s, end);
CHECK_NULL_RETURN_MEMERR(p);
if (op == OP_EXACTN_IC)
COP(reg)->exact_n.n = byte_len;
else
COP(reg)->exact_n.n = str_len;
COP(reg)->exact_n.s = p;
}
else {
xmemcpy(COP(reg)->exact.s, s, (size_t )byte_len);
COP(reg)->exact.s[byte_len] = '\0';
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix CVE-2019-13225: problem in converting if-then-else pattern to bytecode.
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 89,100
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: archive_acl_add_entry(struct archive_acl *acl,
int type, int permset, int tag, int id, const char *name)
{
struct archive_acl_entry *ap;
if (acl_special(acl, type, permset, tag) == 0)
return ARCHIVE_OK;
ap = acl_new_entry(acl, type, permset, tag, id);
if (ap == NULL) {
/* XXX Error XXX */
return ARCHIVE_FAILED;
}
if (name != NULL && *name != '\0')
archive_mstring_copy_mbs(&ap->name, name);
else
archive_mstring_clean(&ap->name);
return ARCHIVE_OK;
}
Commit Message: Skip 0-length ACL fields
Currently, it is possible to create an archive that crashes bsdtar
with a malformed ACL:
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
archive_acl_from_text_l (acl=<optimised out>, text=0x7e2e92 "", want_type=<optimised out>, sc=<optimised out>) at libarchive/archive_acl.c:1726
1726 switch (*s) {
(gdb) p n
$1 = 1
(gdb) p field[n]
$2 = {start = 0x0, end = 0x0}
Stop this by checking that the length is not zero before beginning
the switch statement.
I am pretty sure this is the bug mentioned in the qsym paper [1],
and I was able to replicate it with a qsym + AFL + afl-rb setup.
[1] https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity18/presentation/yun
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 74,927
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ZEND_API int clean_non_persistent_function_full(zval *zv) /* {{{ */
{
zend_function *function = Z_PTR_P(zv);
return (function->type == ZEND_INTERNAL_FUNCTION) ? ZEND_HASH_APPLY_KEEP : ZEND_HASH_APPLY_REMOVE;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Use format string
CWE ID: CWE-134
| 0
| 57,308
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline bool cgfs_enter(void *hdata, pid_t pid)
{
struct cgfs_data *d = hdata;
struct cgroup_process_info *i;
int ret;
if (!d)
return false;
i = d->info;
ret = lxc_cgroupfs_enter(i, pid, false);
return ret == 0;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 44,459
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderBox::setOverrideContainingBlockContentLogicalWidth(LayoutUnit logicalWidth)
{
if (!gOverrideContainingBlockLogicalWidthMap)
gOverrideContainingBlockLogicalWidthMap = new OverrideSizeMap;
gOverrideContainingBlockLogicalWidthMap->set(this, logicalWidth);
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 116,602
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Err void_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "VoidBox", trace);
fprintf(trace, ">\n");
gf_isom_box_dump_done("VoidBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,909
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::activeChainNodeDetached(Node* node)
{
if (!m_activeHoverElement)
return;
if (node != m_activeHoverElement)
return;
Node* activeNode = ComposedTreeTraversal::parent(*node);
while (activeNode && activeNode->isElementNode() && !activeNode->layoutObject())
activeNode = ComposedTreeTraversal::parent(*activeNode);
m_activeHoverElement = activeNode && activeNode->isElementNode() ? toElement(activeNode) : 0;
}
Commit Message: Correctly keep track of isolates for microtask execution
BUG=487155
R=haraken@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1161823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@195985 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 127,500
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestNamedConstructor.Constructor");
if (!args.IsConstructCall())
return V8Proxy::throwTypeError("DOM object constructor cannot be called as a function.");
if (ConstructorMode::current() == ConstructorMode::WrapExistingObject)
return args.Holder();
Frame* frame = V8Proxy::retrieveFrameForCurrentContext();
if (!frame)
return V8Proxy::throwError(V8Proxy::ReferenceError, "TestNamedConstructor constructor associated frame is unavailable", args.GetIsolate());
Document* document = frame->document();
toV8(document, args.GetIsolate());
if (args.Length() < 1)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
STRING_TO_V8PARAMETER_EXCEPTION_BLOCK(V8Parameter<>, str1, MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined));
STRING_TO_V8PARAMETER_EXCEPTION_BLOCK(V8Parameter<>, str2, MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 1, DefaultIsUndefined));
STRING_TO_V8PARAMETER_EXCEPTION_BLOCK(V8Parameter<>, str3, MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 2, DefaultIsNullString));
RefPtr<TestNamedConstructor> impl = TestNamedConstructor::createForJSConstructor(document, str1, str2, str3, ec);
v8::Handle<v8::Object> wrapper = args.Holder();
if (ec)
goto fail;
V8DOMWrapper::setDOMWrapper(wrapper, &V8TestNamedConstructorConstructor::info, impl.get());
V8DOMWrapper::setJSWrapperForActiveDOMObject(impl.release(), v8::Persistent<v8::Object>::New(wrapper), args.GetIsolate());
return args.Holder();
fail:
return throwError(ec, args.GetIsolate());
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 1
| 171,075
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleDeleteProgram(
uint32 immediate_data_size, const cmds::DeleteProgram& c) {
GLuint client_id = c.program;
if (client_id) {
Program* program = GetProgram(client_id);
if (program) {
if (!program->IsDeleted()) {
program_manager()->MarkAsDeleted(shader_manager(), program);
}
} else {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glDeleteProgram", "unknown program");
}
}
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 120,933
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void init_once(void *foo)
{
struct udf_inode_info *ei = (struct udf_inode_info *)foo;
ei->i_ext.i_data = NULL;
inode_init_once(&ei->vfs_inode);
}
Commit Message: udf: Avoid run away loop when partition table length is corrupted
Check provided length of partition table so that (possibly maliciously)
corrupted partition table cannot cause accessing data beyond current buffer.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 19,510
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: tar_sparse_init (struct tar_sparse_file *file)
{
memset (file, 0, sizeof *file);
if (!sparse_select_optab (file))
return false;
if (file->optab->init)
return file->optab->init (file);
return true;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 677
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
u32 tsid,
u16 orig_tclass,
u32 specified,
const char *objname,
u32 *out_sid,
bool kern)
{
struct class_datum *cladatum = NULL;
struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL, newcontext;
struct role_trans *roletr = NULL;
struct avtab_key avkey;
struct avtab_datum *avdatum;
struct avtab_node *node;
u16 tclass;
int rc = 0;
bool sock;
if (!ss_initialized) {
switch (orig_tclass) {
case SECCLASS_PROCESS: /* kernel value */
*out_sid = ssid;
break;
default:
*out_sid = tsid;
break;
}
goto out;
}
context_init(&newcontext);
read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
if (kern) {
tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass);
sock = security_is_socket_class(orig_tclass);
} else {
tclass = orig_tclass;
sock = security_is_socket_class(map_class(tclass));
}
scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
if (!scontext) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
__func__, ssid);
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out_unlock;
}
tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid);
if (!tcontext) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
__func__, tsid);
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out_unlock;
}
if (tclass && tclass <= policydb.p_classes.nprim)
cladatum = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
/* Set the user identity. */
switch (specified) {
case AVTAB_TRANSITION:
case AVTAB_CHANGE:
if (cladatum && cladatum->default_user == DEFAULT_TARGET) {
newcontext.user = tcontext->user;
} else {
/* notice this gets both DEFAULT_SOURCE and unset */
/* Use the process user identity. */
newcontext.user = scontext->user;
}
break;
case AVTAB_MEMBER:
/* Use the related object owner. */
newcontext.user = tcontext->user;
break;
}
/* Set the role to default values. */
if (cladatum && cladatum->default_role == DEFAULT_SOURCE) {
newcontext.role = scontext->role;
} else if (cladatum && cladatum->default_role == DEFAULT_TARGET) {
newcontext.role = tcontext->role;
} else {
if ((tclass == policydb.process_class) || (sock == true))
newcontext.role = scontext->role;
else
newcontext.role = OBJECT_R_VAL;
}
/* Set the type to default values. */
if (cladatum && cladatum->default_type == DEFAULT_SOURCE) {
newcontext.type = scontext->type;
} else if (cladatum && cladatum->default_type == DEFAULT_TARGET) {
newcontext.type = tcontext->type;
} else {
if ((tclass == policydb.process_class) || (sock == true)) {
/* Use the type of process. */
newcontext.type = scontext->type;
} else {
/* Use the type of the related object. */
newcontext.type = tcontext->type;
}
}
/* Look for a type transition/member/change rule. */
avkey.source_type = scontext->type;
avkey.target_type = tcontext->type;
avkey.target_class = tclass;
avkey.specified = specified;
avdatum = avtab_search(&policydb.te_avtab, &avkey);
/* If no permanent rule, also check for enabled conditional rules */
if (!avdatum) {
node = avtab_search_node(&policydb.te_cond_avtab, &avkey);
for (; node; node = avtab_search_node_next(node, specified)) {
if (node->key.specified & AVTAB_ENABLED) {
avdatum = &node->datum;
break;
}
}
}
if (avdatum) {
/* Use the type from the type transition/member/change rule. */
newcontext.type = avdatum->data;
}
/* if we have a objname this is a file trans check so check those rules */
if (objname)
filename_compute_type(&policydb, &newcontext, scontext->type,
tcontext->type, tclass, objname);
/* Check for class-specific changes. */
if (specified & AVTAB_TRANSITION) {
/* Look for a role transition rule. */
for (roletr = policydb.role_tr; roletr; roletr = roletr->next) {
if ((roletr->role == scontext->role) &&
(roletr->type == tcontext->type) &&
(roletr->tclass == tclass)) {
/* Use the role transition rule. */
newcontext.role = roletr->new_role;
break;
}
}
}
/* Set the MLS attributes.
This is done last because it may allocate memory. */
rc = mls_compute_sid(scontext, tcontext, tclass, specified,
&newcontext, sock);
if (rc)
goto out_unlock;
/* Check the validity of the context. */
if (!policydb_context_isvalid(&policydb, &newcontext)) {
rc = compute_sid_handle_invalid_context(scontext,
tcontext,
tclass,
&newcontext);
if (rc)
goto out_unlock;
}
/* Obtain the sid for the context. */
rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &newcontext, out_sid);
out_unlock:
read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
context_destroy(&newcontext);
out:
return rc;
}
Commit Message: SELinux: Fix kernel BUG on empty security contexts.
Setting an empty security context (length=0) on a file will
lead to incorrectly dereferencing the type and other fields
of the security context structure, yielding a kernel BUG.
As a zero-length security context is never valid, just reject
all such security contexts whether coming from userspace
via setxattr or coming from the filesystem upon a getxattr
request by SELinux.
Setting a security context value (empty or otherwise) unknown to
SELinux in the first place is only possible for a root process
(CAP_MAC_ADMIN), and, if running SELinux in enforcing mode, only
if the corresponding SELinux mac_admin permission is also granted
to the domain by policy. In Fedora policies, this is only allowed for
specific domains such as livecd for setting down security contexts
that are not defined in the build host policy.
Reproducer:
su
setenforce 0
touch foo
setfattr -n security.selinux foo
Caveat:
Relabeling or removing foo after doing the above may not be possible
without booting with SELinux disabled. Any subsequent access to foo
after doing the above will also trigger the BUG.
BUG output from Matthew Thode:
[ 473.893141] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 473.962110] kernel BUG at security/selinux/ss/services.c:654!
[ 473.995314] invalid opcode: 0000 [#6] SMP
[ 474.027196] Modules linked in:
[ 474.058118] CPU: 0 PID: 8138 Comm: ls Tainted: G D I
3.13.0-grsec #1
[ 474.116637] Hardware name: Supermicro X8ST3/X8ST3, BIOS 2.0
07/29/10
[ 474.149768] task: ffff8805f50cd010 ti: ffff8805f50cd488 task.ti:
ffff8805f50cd488
[ 474.183707] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff814681c7>] [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 474.219954] RSP: 0018:ffff8805c0ac3c38 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 474.252253] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8805c0ac3d94 RCX:
0000000000000100
[ 474.287018] RDX: ffff8805e8aac000 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI:
ffff8805e8aaa000
[ 474.321199] RBP: ffff8805c0ac3cb8 R08: 0000000000000010 R09:
0000000000000006
[ 474.357446] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8805c567a000 R12:
0000000000000006
[ 474.419191] R13: ffff8805c2b74e88 R14: 00000000000001da R15:
0000000000000000
[ 474.453816] FS: 00007f2e75220800(0000) GS:ffff88061fc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 474.489254] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 474.522215] CR2: 00007f2e74716090 CR3: 00000005c085e000 CR4:
00000000000207f0
[ 474.556058] Stack:
[ 474.584325] ffff8805c0ac3c98 ffffffff811b549b ffff8805c0ac3c98
ffff8805f1190a40
[ 474.618913] ffff8805a6202f08 ffff8805c2b74e88 00068800d0464990
ffff8805e8aac860
[ 474.653955] ffff8805c0ac3cb8 000700068113833a ffff880606c75060
ffff8805c0ac3d94
[ 474.690461] Call Trace:
[ 474.723779] [<ffffffff811b549b>] ? lookup_fast+0x1cd/0x22a
[ 474.778049] [<ffffffff81468824>] security_compute_av+0xf4/0x20b
[ 474.811398] [<ffffffff8196f419>] avc_compute_av+0x2a/0x179
[ 474.843813] [<ffffffff8145727b>] avc_has_perm+0x45/0xf4
[ 474.875694] [<ffffffff81457d0e>] inode_has_perm+0x2a/0x31
[ 474.907370] [<ffffffff81457e76>] selinux_inode_getattr+0x3c/0x3e
[ 474.938726] [<ffffffff81455cf6>] security_inode_getattr+0x1b/0x22
[ 474.970036] [<ffffffff811b057d>] vfs_getattr+0x19/0x2d
[ 475.000618] [<ffffffff811b05e5>] vfs_fstatat+0x54/0x91
[ 475.030402] [<ffffffff811b063b>] vfs_lstat+0x19/0x1b
[ 475.061097] [<ffffffff811b077e>] SyS_newlstat+0x15/0x30
[ 475.094595] [<ffffffff8113c5c1>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xa1/0xc3
[ 475.148405] [<ffffffff8197791e>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[ 475.179201] Code: 00 48 85 c0 48 89 45 b8 75 02 0f 0b 48 8b 45 a0 48
8b 3d 45 d0 b6 00 8b 40 08 89 c6 ff ce e8 d1 b0 06 00 48 85 c0 49 89 c7
75 02 <0f> 0b 48 8b 45 b8 4c 8b 28 eb 1e 49 8d 7d 08 be 80 01 00 00 e8
[ 475.255884] RIP [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 475.296120] RSP <ffff8805c0ac3c38>
[ 475.328734] ---[ end trace f076482e9d754adc ]---
Reported-by: Matthew Thode <mthode@mthode.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 39,265
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int proc_dointvec_minmax(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
{
return -ENOSYS;
}
Commit Message: sysctl: restrict write access to dmesg_restrict
When dmesg_restrict is set to 1 CAP_SYS_ADMIN is needed to read the kernel
ring buffer. But a root user without CAP_SYS_ADMIN is able to reset
dmesg_restrict to 0.
This is an issue when e.g. LXC (Linux Containers) are used and complete
user space is running without CAP_SYS_ADMIN. A unprivileged and jailed
root user can bypass the dmesg_restrict protection.
With this patch writing to dmesg_restrict is only allowed when root has
CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Acked-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Eugene Teo <eugeneteo@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 24,426
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static char *alloc_one_pg_vec_page(unsigned long order)
{
char *buffer;
gfp_t gfp_flags = GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_COMP |
__GFP_ZERO | __GFP_NOWARN | __GFP_NORETRY;
buffer = (char *) __get_free_pages(gfp_flags, order);
if (buffer)
return buffer;
/* __get_free_pages failed, fall back to vmalloc */
buffer = vzalloc((1 << order) * PAGE_SIZE);
if (buffer)
return buffer;
/* vmalloc failed, lets dig into swap here */
gfp_flags &= ~__GFP_NORETRY;
buffer = (char *) __get_free_pages(gfp_flags, order);
if (buffer)
return buffer;
/* complete and utter failure */
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: packet: fix race condition in packet_set_ring
When packet_set_ring creates a ring buffer it will initialize a
struct timer_list if the packet version is TPACKET_V3. This value
can then be raced by a different thread calling setsockopt to
set the version to TPACKET_V1 before packet_set_ring has finished.
This leads to a use-after-free on a function pointer in the
struct timer_list when the socket is closed as the previously
initialized timer will not be deleted.
The bug is fixed by taking lock_sock(sk) in packet_setsockopt when
changing the packet version while also taking the lock at the start
of packet_set_ring.
Fixes: f6fb8f100b80 ("af-packet: TPACKET_V3 flexible buffer implementation.")
Signed-off-by: Philip Pettersson <philip.pettersson@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 49,157
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(flock)
{
zval *arg1, *arg3 = NULL;
int act;
php_stream *stream;
long operation = 0;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rl|z", &arg1, &operation, &arg3) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
PHP_STREAM_TO_ZVAL(stream, &arg1);
act = operation & 3;
if (act < 1 || act > 3) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Illegal operation argument");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (arg3 && PZVAL_IS_REF(arg3)) {
convert_to_long_ex(&arg3);
Z_LVAL_P(arg3) = 0;
}
/* flock_values contains all possible actions if (operation & 4) we won't block on the lock */
act = flock_values[act - 1] | (operation & PHP_LOCK_NB ? LOCK_NB : 0);
if (php_stream_lock(stream, act)) {
if (operation && errno == EWOULDBLOCK && arg3 && PZVAL_IS_REF(arg3)) {
Z_LVAL_P(arg3) = 1;
}
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETURN_TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72114 - int/size_t confusion in fread
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 52,145
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void inet_put_port(struct sock *sk)
{
local_bh_disable();
__inet_put_port(sk);
local_bh_enable();
}
Commit Message: net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5.
Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.
MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)
Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic
regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and
use a full 32-bit sequence number.
For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.
Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 25,078
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SimulateMouseEvent(WebInputEvent::Type type,
int x,
int y,
int modifiers,
bool pressed) {
WebMouseEvent event =
SyntheticWebMouseEventBuilder::Build(type, x, y, modifiers);
if (pressed)
event.button = WebMouseEvent::Button::kLeft;
widget_host_->ForwardMouseEvent(event);
base::RunLoop().RunUntilIdle();
}
Commit Message: Start rendering timer after first navigation
Currently the new content rendering timer in the browser process,
which clears an old page's contents 4 seconds after a navigation if the
new page doesn't draw in that time, is not set on the first navigation
for a top-level frame.
This is problematic because content can exist before the first
navigation, for instance if it was created by a javascript: URL.
This CL removes the code that skips the timer activation on the first
navigation.
Bug: 844881
Change-Id: I19b3ad1ff62c69ded3a5f7b1c0afde191aaf4584
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1188589
Reviewed-by: Fady Samuel <fsamuel@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: ccameron <ccameron@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586913}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 145,652
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int yr_object_from_external_variable(
YR_EXTERNAL_VARIABLE* external,
YR_OBJECT** object)
{
YR_OBJECT* obj;
int result;
uint8_t obj_type = 0;
switch(external->type)
{
case EXTERNAL_VARIABLE_TYPE_INTEGER:
case EXTERNAL_VARIABLE_TYPE_BOOLEAN:
obj_type = OBJECT_TYPE_INTEGER;
break;
case EXTERNAL_VARIABLE_TYPE_FLOAT:
obj_type = OBJECT_TYPE_FLOAT;
break;
case EXTERNAL_VARIABLE_TYPE_STRING:
case EXTERNAL_VARIABLE_TYPE_MALLOC_STRING:
obj_type = OBJECT_TYPE_STRING;
break;
default:
assert(FALSE);
}
result = yr_object_create(
obj_type,
external->identifier,
NULL,
&obj);
if (result == ERROR_SUCCESS)
{
switch(external->type)
{
case EXTERNAL_VARIABLE_TYPE_INTEGER:
case EXTERNAL_VARIABLE_TYPE_BOOLEAN:
yr_object_set_integer(external->value.i, obj, NULL);
break;
case EXTERNAL_VARIABLE_TYPE_FLOAT:
yr_object_set_float(external->value.f, obj, NULL);
break;
case EXTERNAL_VARIABLE_TYPE_STRING:
case EXTERNAL_VARIABLE_TYPE_MALLOC_STRING:
yr_object_set_string(
external->value.s, strlen(external->value.s), obj, NULL);
break;
}
*object = obj;
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: Fix heap overflow (reported by Jurriaan Bremer)
When setting a new array item with yr_object_array_set_item() the array size is doubled if the index for the new item is larger than the already allocated ones. No further checks were made to ensure that the index fits into the array after doubling its capacity. If the array capacity was for example 64, and a new object is assigned to an index larger than 128 the overflow occurs. As yr_object_array_set_item() is usually invoked with indexes that increase monotonically by one, this bug never triggered before. But the new "dotnet" module has the potential to allow the exploitation of this bug by scanning a specially crafted .NET binary.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 63,469
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: grub_fshelp_log2blksize (unsigned int blksize, unsigned int *pow)
{
int mod;
*pow = 0;
while (blksize > 1)
{
mod = blksize - ((blksize >> 1) << 1);
blksize >>= 1;
/* Check if it really is a power of two. */
if (mod)
return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_NUMBER,
"the blocksize is not a power of two");
(*pow)++;
}
return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
}
Commit Message: Fix ext2 buffer overflow in r2_sbu_grub_memmove
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 64,169
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static PHP_FUNCTION(xmlwriter_start_element_ns)
{
zval *pind;
xmlwriter_object *intern;
xmlTextWriterPtr ptr;
char *name, *prefix, *uri;
int name_len, prefix_len, uri_len, retval;
#ifdef ZEND_ENGINE_2
zval *this = getThis();
if (this) {
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s!ss!",
&prefix, &prefix_len, &name, &name_len, &uri, &uri_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
XMLWRITER_FROM_OBJECT(intern, this);
} else
#endif
{
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rs!ss!", &pind,
&prefix, &prefix_len, &name, &name_len, &uri, &uri_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(intern,xmlwriter_object *, &pind, -1, "XMLWriter", le_xmlwriter);
}
XMLW_NAME_CHK("Invalid Element Name");
ptr = intern->ptr;
if (ptr) {
retval = xmlTextWriterStartElementNS(ptr, (xmlChar *)prefix, (xmlChar *)name, (xmlChar *)uri);
if (retval != -1) {
RETURN_TRUE;
}
}
RETURN_FALSE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 15,300
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void dispatchSetNeedsRedraw(void* self)
{
ASSERT(isMainThread());
CCLayerTreeHostTest* test = static_cast<CCLayerTreeHostTest*>(self);
ASSERT(test);
if (test->m_layerTreeHost)
test->m_layerTreeHost->setNeedsRedraw();
}
Commit Message: [chromium] Fix shutdown race when posting main thread task to CCThreadProxy and enable tests
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=70161
Reviewed by David Levin.
Source/WebCore:
Adds a weak pointer mechanism to cancel main thread tasks posted to CCThreadProxy instances from the compositor
thread. Previously there was a race condition where main thread tasks could run even after the CCThreadProxy was
destroyed.
This race does not exist in the other direction because when tearing down a CCThreadProxy we first post a quit
task to the compositor thread and then suspend execution of the main thread until all compositor tasks for the
CCThreadProxy have been drained.
Covered by the now-enabled CCLayerTreeHostTest* unit tests.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCScopedMainThreadProxy.h: Added.
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::create):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::postTask):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::shutdown):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::CCScopedMainThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::runTaskIfNotShutdown):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.cpp:
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::~CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::createBeginFrameAndCommitTaskOnCCThread):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.h:
Source/WebKit/chromium:
Enables the CCLayerTreeHostTest* tests by default. Most tests are run twice in a single thread and multiple
thread configuration. Some tests run only in the multiple thread configuration if they depend on the compositor
thread scheduling draws by itself.
* tests/CCLayerTreeHostTest.cpp:
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::timeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::clearTimeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::CCLayerTreeHostTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::onEndTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::clearTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::~TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::Run):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::doBeginTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestThreadOnly::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestSetNeedsRedraw::commitCompleteOnCCThread):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@97784 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 97,905
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int input_closed(h2_stream *stream)
{
switch (stream->state) {
case H2_STREAM_ST_OPEN:
case H2_STREAM_ST_CLOSED_OUTPUT:
return 0;
default:
return 1;
}
}
Commit Message: SECURITY: CVE-2016-8740
mod_http2: properly crafted, endless HTTP/2 CONTINUATION frames could be used to exhaust all server's memory.
Reported by: Naveen Tiwari <naveen.tiwari@asu.edu> and CDF/SEFCOM at Arizona State University
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1772576 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 48,719
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SyntheticMotion(DeviceIntPtr dev, int x, int y)
{
int screenno = 0;
#ifdef PANORAMIX
if (!noPanoramiXExtension)
screenno = dev->spriteInfo->sprite->screen->myNum;
#endif
PostSyntheticMotion(dev, x, y, screenno,
(syncEvents.playingEvents) ? syncEvents.time.
milliseconds : currentTime.milliseconds);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 4,896
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ps_table_done( PS_Table table )
{
FT_Memory memory = table->memory;
FT_Error error;
FT_Byte* old_base = table->block;
/* should never fail, because rec.cursor <= rec.size */
if ( !old_base )
return;
if ( FT_ALLOC( table->block, table->cursor ) )
return;
FT_MEM_COPY( table->block, old_base, table->cursor );
shift_elements( table, old_base );
table->capacity = table->cursor;
FT_FREE( old_base );
FT_UNUSED( error );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 7,354
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: jbig2_page_info(Jbig2Ctx *ctx, Jbig2Segment *segment, const uint8_t *segment_data)
{
Jbig2Page *page;
/* a new page info segment implies the previous page is finished */
page = &(ctx->pages[ctx->current_page]);
if ((page->number != 0) && ((page->state == JBIG2_PAGE_NEW) || (page->state == JBIG2_PAGE_FREE))) {
page->state = JBIG2_PAGE_COMPLETE;
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_WARNING, segment->number, "unexpected page info segment, marking previous page finished");
}
/* find a free page */
{
int index, j;
index = ctx->current_page;
while (ctx->pages[index].state != JBIG2_PAGE_FREE) {
index++;
if (index >= ctx->max_page_index) {
/* grow the list */
ctx->pages = jbig2_renew(ctx, ctx->pages, Jbig2Page, (ctx->max_page_index <<= 2));
for (j = index; j < ctx->max_page_index; j++) {
ctx->pages[j].state = JBIG2_PAGE_FREE;
ctx->pages[j].number = 0;
ctx->pages[j].image = NULL;
}
}
}
page = &(ctx->pages[index]);
ctx->current_page = index;
page->state = JBIG2_PAGE_NEW;
page->number = segment->page_association;
}
/* FIXME: would be nice if we tried to work around this */
if (segment->data_length < 19) {
return jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "segment too short");
}
/* 7.4.8.x */
page->width = jbig2_get_uint32(segment_data);
page->height = jbig2_get_uint32(segment_data + 4);
page->x_resolution = jbig2_get_uint32(segment_data + 8);
page->y_resolution = jbig2_get_uint32(segment_data + 12);
page->flags = segment_data[16];
/* 7.4.8.6 */
{
int16_t striping = jbig2_get_int16(segment_data + 17);
if (striping & 0x8000) {
page->striped = TRUE;
page->stripe_size = striping & 0x7FFF;
} else {
page->striped = FALSE;
page->stripe_size = 0; /* would page->height be better? */
}
}
if (page->height == 0xFFFFFFFF && page->striped == FALSE) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_WARNING, segment->number, "height is unspecified but page is not markes as striped");
page->striped = TRUE;
}
page->end_row = 0;
if (segment->data_length > 19) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_WARNING, segment->number, "extra data in segment");
}
dump_page_info(ctx, segment, page);
/* allocate an approprate page image buffer */
/* 7.4.8.2 */
if (page->height == 0xFFFFFFFF) {
page->image = jbig2_image_new(ctx, page->width, page->stripe_size);
} else {
page->image = jbig2_image_new(ctx, page->width, page->height);
}
if (page->image == NULL) {
return jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "failed to allocate buffer for page image");
} else {
/* 8.2 (3) fill the page with the default pixel value */
jbig2_image_clear(ctx, page->image, (page->flags & 4));
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_DEBUG, segment->number,
"allocated %dx%d page image (%d bytes)", page->image->width, page->image->height, page->image->stride * page->image->height);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 18,066
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const Block* Track::EOSBlock::GetBlock() const
{
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 174,284
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void NullableLongSequenceMethodMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
base::Optional<Vector<int32_t>> result = impl->nullableLongSequenceMethod();
if (!result)
V8SetReturnValueNull(info);
else
V8SetReturnValue(info, ToV8(result.value(), info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate()));
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 134,917
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DocumentLoader::DataReceived(Resource* resource,
const char* data,
size_t length) {
DCHECK(data);
DCHECK(length);
DCHECK_EQ(resource, GetResource());
DCHECK(!response_.IsNull());
DCHECK(!frame_->GetPage()->Paused());
if (in_data_received_) {
data_buffer_->Append(data, length);
return;
}
base::AutoReset<bool> reentrancy_protector(&in_data_received_, true);
ProcessData(data, length);
ProcessDataBuffer();
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when self-navigating to local-scheme URL
As the linked bug example shows, we should inherit CSP when we navigate
to a local-scheme URL (even if we are in a main browsing context).
Bug: 799747
Change-Id: I8413aa8e8049461ebcf0ffbf7b04c41d1340af02
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1234337
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597889}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 144,086
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Part::slotSaveAs()
{
QUrl saveUrl = QFileDialog::getSaveFileUrl(widget(), i18nc("@title:window", "Save Archive As"), url());
if ((saveUrl.isValid()) && (!saveUrl.isEmpty())) {
auto statJob = KIO::stat(saveUrl, KIO::StatJob::DestinationSide, 0);
KJobWidgets::setWindow(statJob, widget());
if (statJob->exec()) {
int overwrite = KMessageBox::warningContinueCancel(widget(),
xi18nc("@info", "An archive named <filename>%1</filename> already exists. Are you sure you want to overwrite it?", saveUrl.fileName()),
QString(),
KStandardGuiItem::overwrite());
if (overwrite != KMessageBox::Continue) {
return;
}
}
QUrl srcUrl = QUrl::fromLocalFile(localFilePath());
if (!QFile::exists(localFilePath())) {
if (url().isLocalFile()) {
KMessageBox::error(widget(),
xi18nc("@info", "The archive <filename>%1</filename> cannot be copied to the specified location. The archive does not exist anymore.", localFilePath()));
return;
} else {
srcUrl = url();
}
}
KIO::Job *copyJob = KIO::file_copy(srcUrl, saveUrl, -1, KIO::Overwrite);
KJobWidgets::setWindow(copyJob, widget());
copyJob->exec();
if (copyJob->error()) {
KMessageBox::error(widget(),
xi18nc("@info", "The archive could not be saved as <filename>%1</filename>. Try saving it to another location.", saveUrl.path()));
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-78
| 0
| 9,940
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SMB2_set_compression(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon,
u64 persistent_fid, u64 volatile_fid)
{
int rc;
struct compress_ioctl fsctl_input;
char *ret_data = NULL;
fsctl_input.CompressionState =
__constant_cpu_to_le16(COMPRESSION_FORMAT_DEFAULT);
rc = SMB2_ioctl(xid, tcon, persistent_fid, volatile_fid,
FSCTL_SET_COMPRESSION, true /* is_fsctl */,
(char *)&fsctl_input /* data input */,
2 /* in data len */, &ret_data /* out data */, NULL);
cifs_dbg(FYI, "set compression rc %d\n", rc);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: [CIFS] Possible null ptr deref in SMB2_tcon
As Raphael Geissert pointed out, tcon_error_exit can dereference tcon
and there is one path in which tcon can be null.
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.7+
Reported-by: Raphael Geissert <geissert@debian.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 35,986
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RenderWidgetHostImpl* RenderFrameHostImpl::GetRenderWidgetHost() {
RenderFrameHostImpl* frame = this;
while (frame) {
if (frame->render_widget_host_)
return frame->render_widget_host_;
frame = frame->GetParent();
}
NOTREACHED();
return nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 127,800
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int nfs_post_op_update_inode(struct inode *inode, struct nfs_fattr *fattr)
{
int status;
spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
status = nfs_post_op_update_inode_locked(inode, fattr);
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
return status;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 22,805
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ssl_password_cb(char *buf, int size, int flags, void *userdata)
{
char *pass = ssl_parameters.keyfile_password;
if (size < strlen(pass) + 1) {
return (0);
}
strcpy(buf, pass);
return (strlen(pass));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 1,996
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int snd_seq_ioctl_remove_events(struct snd_seq_client *client,
void *arg)
{
struct snd_seq_remove_events *info = arg;
/*
* Input mostly not implemented XXX.
*/
if (info->remove_mode & SNDRV_SEQ_REMOVE_INPUT) {
/*
* No restrictions so for a user client we can clear
* the whole fifo
*/
if (client->type == USER_CLIENT && client->data.user.fifo)
snd_seq_fifo_clear(client->data.user.fifo);
}
if (info->remove_mode & SNDRV_SEQ_REMOVE_OUTPUT)
snd_seq_queue_remove_cells(client->number, info);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: seq: Fix use-after-free at creating a port
There is a potential race window opened at creating and deleting a
port via ioctl, as spotted by fuzzing. snd_seq_create_port() creates
a port object and returns its pointer, but it doesn't take the
refcount, thus it can be deleted immediately by another thread.
Meanwhile, snd_seq_ioctl_create_port() still calls the function
snd_seq_system_client_ev_port_start() with the created port object
that is being deleted, and this triggers use-after-free like:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0x504/0x630 [snd_seq] at addr ffff8801f2241cb1
=============================================================================
BUG kmalloc-512 (Tainted: G B ): kasan: bad access detected
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
INFO: Allocated in snd_seq_create_port+0x94/0x9b0 [snd_seq] age=1 cpu=3 pid=4511
___slab_alloc+0x425/0x460
__slab_alloc+0x20/0x40
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x150/0x190
snd_seq_create_port+0x94/0x9b0 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0xd1/0x630 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x11c/0x190 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl+0x40/0x80 [snd_seq]
do_vfs_ioctl+0x54b/0xda0
SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x75
INFO: Freed in port_delete+0x136/0x1a0 [snd_seq] age=1 cpu=2 pid=4717
__slab_free+0x204/0x310
kfree+0x15f/0x180
port_delete+0x136/0x1a0 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_delete_port+0x235/0x350 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl_delete_port+0xc8/0x180 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x11c/0x190 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl+0x40/0x80 [snd_seq]
do_vfs_ioctl+0x54b/0xda0
SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x75
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81b03781>] dump_stack+0x63/0x82
[<ffffffff81531b3b>] print_trailer+0xfb/0x160
[<ffffffff81536db4>] object_err+0x34/0x40
[<ffffffff815392d3>] kasan_report.part.2+0x223/0x520
[<ffffffffa07aadf4>] ? snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0x504/0x630 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffff815395fe>] __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x2e/0x30
[<ffffffffa07aadf4>] snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0x504/0x630 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffffa07aa8f0>] ? snd_seq_ioctl_delete_port+0x180/0x180 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffff8136be50>] ? taskstats_exit+0xbc0/0xbc0
[<ffffffffa07abc5c>] snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x11c/0x190 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffffa07abd10>] snd_seq_ioctl+0x40/0x80 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffff8136d433>] ? acct_account_cputime+0x63/0x80
[<ffffffff815b515b>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x54b/0xda0
.....
We may fix this in a few different ways, and in this patch, it's fixed
simply by taking the refcount properly at snd_seq_create_port() and
letting the caller unref the object after use. Also, there is another
potential use-after-free by sprintf() call in snd_seq_create_port(),
and this is moved inside the lock.
This fix covers CVE-2017-15265.
Reported-and-tested-by: Michael23 Yu <ycqzsy@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 60,600
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int php_libxml_streams_IO_read(void *context, char *buffer, int len)
{
TSRMLS_FETCH();
return php_stream_read((php_stream*)context, buffer, len);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 14,262
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void hid_attr_release(struct config_item *item)
{
struct f_hid_opts *opts = to_f_hid_opts(item);
usb_put_function_instance(&opts->func_inst);
}
Commit Message: USB: gadget: f_hid: fix deadlock in f_hidg_write()
In f_hidg_write() the write_spinlock is acquired before calling
usb_ep_queue() which causes a deadlock when dummy_hcd is being used.
This is because dummy_queue() callbacks into f_hidg_req_complete() which
tries to acquire the same spinlock. This is (part of) the backtrace when
the deadlock occurs:
0xffffffffc06b1410 in f_hidg_req_complete
0xffffffffc06a590a in usb_gadget_giveback_request
0xffffffffc06cfff2 in dummy_queue
0xffffffffc06a4b96 in usb_ep_queue
0xffffffffc06b1eb6 in f_hidg_write
0xffffffff8127730b in __vfs_write
0xffffffff812774d1 in vfs_write
0xffffffff81277725 in SYSC_write
Fix this by releasing the write_spinlock before calling usb_ep_queue()
Reviewed-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Tested-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.11+
Fixes: 749494b6bdbb ("usb: gadget: f_hid: fix: Move IN request allocation to set_alt()")
Signed-off-by: Radoslav Gerganov <rgerganov@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 96,678
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleBindAttribLocationBucket(
uint32 immediate_data_size, const cmds::BindAttribLocationBucket& c) {
GLuint program = static_cast<GLuint>(c.program);
GLuint index = static_cast<GLuint>(c.index);
Bucket* bucket = GetBucket(c.name_bucket_id);
if (!bucket || bucket->size() == 0) {
return error::kInvalidArguments;
}
std::string name_str;
if (!bucket->GetAsString(&name_str)) {
return error::kInvalidArguments;
}
DoBindAttribLocation(program, index, name_str.c_str());
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 120,928
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: AP_DECLARE(int) ap_get_basic_auth_pw(request_rec *r, const char **pw)
{
const char *auth_line = apr_table_get(r->headers_in,
(PROXYREQ_PROXY == r->proxyreq)
? "Proxy-Authorization"
: "Authorization");
const char *t;
if (!(t = ap_auth_type(r)) || strcasecmp(t, "Basic"))
return DECLINED;
if (!ap_auth_name(r)) {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(00572)
"need AuthName: %s", r->uri);
return HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR;
}
if (!auth_line) {
ap_note_auth_failure(r);
return HTTP_UNAUTHORIZED;
}
if (strcasecmp(ap_getword(r->pool, &auth_line, ' '), "Basic")) {
/* Client tried to authenticate using wrong auth scheme */
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r, APLOGNO(00573)
"client used wrong authentication scheme: %s", r->uri);
ap_note_auth_failure(r);
return HTTP_UNAUTHORIZED;
}
while (*auth_line == ' ' || *auth_line == '\t') {
auth_line++;
}
t = ap_pbase64decode(r->pool, auth_line);
r->user = ap_getword_nulls (r->pool, &t, ':');
r->ap_auth_type = "Basic";
*pw = t;
return OK;
}
Commit Message: *) SECURITY: CVE-2015-0253 (cve.mitre.org)
core: Fix a crash introduced in with ErrorDocument 400 pointing
to a local URL-path with the INCLUDES filter active, introduced
in 2.4.11. PR 57531. [Yann Ylavic]
Submitted By: ylavic
Committed By: covener
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1664205 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID:
| 0
| 44,985
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: rad_get_vendor_attr(u_int32_t *vendor, const void **data, size_t *len)
{
struct vendor_attribute *attr;
attr = (struct vendor_attribute *)*data;
*vendor = ntohl(attr->vendor_value);
*data = attr->attrib_data;
*len = attr->attrib_len - 2;
return (attr->attrib_type);
}
Commit Message: Fix a security issue in radius_get_vendor_attr().
The underlying rad_get_vendor_attr() function assumed that it would always be
given valid VSA data. Indeed, the buffer length wasn't even passed in; the
assumption was that the length field within the VSA structure would be valid.
This could result in denial of service by providing a length that would be
beyond the memory limit, or potential arbitrary memory access by providing a
length greater than the actual data given.
rad_get_vendor_attr() has been changed to require the raw data length be
provided, and this is then used to check that the VSA is valid.
Conflicts:
radlib_vs.h
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 166,078
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool init_features(ASS_Shaper *shaper)
{
shaper->features = calloc(sizeof(hb_feature_t), NUM_FEATURES);
if (!shaper->features)
return false;
shaper->n_features = NUM_FEATURES;
shaper->features[VERT].tag = HB_TAG('v', 'e', 'r', 't');
shaper->features[VERT].end = UINT_MAX;
shaper->features[VKNA].tag = HB_TAG('v', 'k', 'n', 'a');
shaper->features[VKNA].end = UINT_MAX;
shaper->features[KERN].tag = HB_TAG('k', 'e', 'r', 'n');
shaper->features[KERN].end = UINT_MAX;
shaper->features[LIGA].tag = HB_TAG('l', 'i', 'g', 'a');
shaper->features[LIGA].end = UINT_MAX;
shaper->features[CLIG].tag = HB_TAG('c', 'l', 'i', 'g');
shaper->features[CLIG].end = UINT_MAX;
return true;
}
Commit Message: shaper: fix reallocation
Update the variable that tracks the allocated size. This potentially
improves performance and avoid some side effects, which lead to
undefined behavior in some cases.
Fixes fuzzer test case id:000051,sig:11,sync:fuzzer3,src:004221.
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 73,299
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::SynthesizeGLError(
GLenum error,
const char* function_name,
const char* description,
ConsoleDisplayPreference display) {
String error_type = GetErrorString(error);
if (synthesized_errors_to_console_ && display == kDisplayInConsole) {
String message = String("WebGL: ") + error_type + ": " +
String(function_name) + ": " + String(description);
PrintGLErrorToConsole(message);
}
if (!isContextLost()) {
if (!synthetic_errors_.Contains(error))
synthetic_errors_.push_back(error);
} else {
if (!lost_context_errors_.Contains(error))
lost_context_errors_.push_back(error);
}
probe::DidFireWebGLError(canvas(), error_type);
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 142,288
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual void quitNow() {
message_loop_->QuitNow();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 98,831
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PassRefPtr<CSSRuleList> StyleResolver::pseudoCSSRulesForElement(Element* element, PseudoId pseudoId, unsigned rulesToInclude, ShouldIncludeStyleSheetInCSSOMWrapper includeDocument)
{
ASSERT(element);
StyleResolverState state(document(), element);
ElementRuleCollector collector(state.elementContext(), m_selectorFilter, state.style(), includeDocument);
collector.setMode(SelectorChecker::CollectingCSSRules);
collectPseudoRulesForElement(element, collector, pseudoId, rulesToInclude);
return collector.matchedCSSRuleList();
}
Commit Message: Remove the Simple Default Stylesheet, it's just a foot-gun.
We've been bitten by the Simple Default Stylesheet being out
of sync with the real html.css twice this week.
The Simple Default Stylesheet was invented years ago for Mac:
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/36135
It nicely handles the case where you just want to create
a single WebView and parse some simple HTML either without
styling said HTML, or only to display a small string, etc.
Note that this optimization/complexity *only* helps for the
very first document, since the default stylesheets are
all static (process-global) variables. Since any real page
on the internet uses a tag not covered by the simple default
stylesheet, not real load benefits from this optimization.
Only uses of WebView which were just rendering small bits
of text might have benefited from this. about:blank would
also have used this sheet.
This was a common application for some uses of WebView back
in those days. These days, even with WebView on Android,
there are likely much larger overheads than parsing the
html.css stylesheet, so making it required seems like the
right tradeoff of code-simplicity for this case.
BUG=319556
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73723005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162153 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 118,986
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: EXPORTED void mboxlist_done(void)
{
/* DB->done() handled by cyrus_done() */
}
Commit Message: mboxlist: fix uninitialised memory use where pattern is "Other Users"
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 61,263
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int FAST_FUNC read_str(const char *line, void *arg)
{
char **dest = arg;
free(*dest);
*dest = xstrdup(line);
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 13,137
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLES2Implementation::RemoveMappedBufferRangeById(GLuint buffer) {
if (buffer > 0) {
auto iter = mapped_buffer_range_map_.find(buffer);
if (iter != mapped_buffer_range_map_.end() && iter->second.shm_memory) {
mapped_memory_->FreePendingToken(iter->second.shm_memory,
helper_->InsertToken());
mapped_buffer_range_map_.erase(iter);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,105
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t ACodec::setupAC3Codec(
bool encoder, int32_t numChannels, int32_t sampleRate) {
status_t err = setupRawAudioFormat(
encoder ? kPortIndexInput : kPortIndexOutput, sampleRate, numChannels);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
if (encoder) {
ALOGW("AC3 encoding is not supported.");
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_ANDROID_AC3TYPE def;
InitOMXParams(&def);
def.nPortIndex = kPortIndexInput;
err = mOMX->getParameter(
mNode,
(OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_IndexParamAudioAndroidAc3,
&def,
sizeof(def));
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
def.nChannels = numChannels;
def.nSampleRate = sampleRate;
return mOMX->setParameter(
mNode,
(OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_IndexParamAudioAndroidAc3,
&def,
sizeof(def));
}
Commit Message: Fix initialization of AAC presentation struct
Otherwise the new size checks trip on this.
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I1f8f01097e3a88ff041b69279a6121be842f1766
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 164,139
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int callchain_trace(struct stackframe *frame, void *data)
{
struct perf_callchain_entry *entry = data;
perf_callchain_store(entry, frame->pc);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: arm64: perf: reject groups spanning multiple HW PMUs
The perf core implicitly rejects events spanning multiple HW PMUs, as in
these cases the event->ctx will differ. However this validation is
performed after pmu::event_init() is called in perf_init_event(), and
thus pmu::event_init() may be called with a group leader from a
different HW PMU.
The ARM64 PMU driver does not take this fact into account, and when
validating groups assumes that it can call to_arm_pmu(event->pmu) for
any HW event. When the event in question is from another HW PMU this is
wrong, and results in dereferencing garbage.
This patch updates the ARM64 PMU driver to first test for and reject
events from other PMUs, moving the to_arm_pmu and related logic after
this test. Fixes a crash triggered by perf_fuzzer on Linux-4.0-rc2, with
a CCI PMU present:
Bad mode in Synchronous Abort handler detected, code 0x86000006 -- IABT (current EL)
CPU: 0 PID: 1371 Comm: perf_fuzzer Not tainted 3.19.0+ #249
Hardware name: V2F-1XV7 Cortex-A53x2 SMM (DT)
task: ffffffc07c73a280 ti: ffffffc07b0a0000 task.ti: ffffffc07b0a0000
PC is at 0x0
LR is at validate_event+0x90/0xa8
pc : [<0000000000000000>] lr : [<ffffffc000090228>] pstate: 00000145
sp : ffffffc07b0a3ba0
[< (null)>] (null)
[<ffffffc0000907d8>] armpmu_event_init+0x174/0x3cc
[<ffffffc00015d870>] perf_try_init_event+0x34/0x70
[<ffffffc000164094>] perf_init_event+0xe0/0x10c
[<ffffffc000164348>] perf_event_alloc+0x288/0x358
[<ffffffc000164c5c>] SyS_perf_event_open+0x464/0x98c
Code: bad PC value
Also cleans up the code to use the arm_pmu only when we know
that we are dealing with an arm pmu event.
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Peter Ziljstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K. Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 56,224
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: file_oomem(struct magic_set *ms, size_t len)
{
file_error(ms, errno, "cannot allocate %" SIZE_T_FORMAT "u bytes",
len);
}
Commit Message: - reduce recursion level from 20 to 10 and make a symbolic constant for it.
- pull out the guts of saving and restoring the output buffer into functions
and take care not to overwrite the error message if an error happened.
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 35,639
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ssl_get_verify_result( const ssl_context *ssl )
{
return( ssl->verify_result );
}
Commit Message: ssl_parse_certificate() now calls x509parse_crt_der() directly
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 29,000
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int do_setxattr(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
struct inode *inode, const char *name,
const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
{
struct btrfs_dir_item *di;
struct btrfs_root *root = BTRFS_I(inode)->root;
struct btrfs_path *path;
size_t name_len = strlen(name);
int ret = 0;
if (name_len + size > BTRFS_MAX_XATTR_SIZE(root))
return -ENOSPC;
path = btrfs_alloc_path();
if (!path)
return -ENOMEM;
if (flags & XATTR_REPLACE) {
di = btrfs_lookup_xattr(trans, root, path, btrfs_ino(inode), name,
name_len, -1);
if (IS_ERR(di)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(di);
goto out;
} else if (!di) {
ret = -ENODATA;
goto out;
}
ret = btrfs_delete_one_dir_name(trans, root, path, di);
if (ret)
goto out;
btrfs_release_path(path);
/*
* remove the attribute
*/
if (!value)
goto out;
} else {
di = btrfs_lookup_xattr(NULL, root, path, btrfs_ino(inode),
name, name_len, 0);
if (IS_ERR(di)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(di);
goto out;
}
if (!di && !value)
goto out;
btrfs_release_path(path);
}
again:
ret = btrfs_insert_xattr_item(trans, root, path, btrfs_ino(inode),
name, name_len, value, size);
/*
* If we're setting an xattr to a new value but the new value is say
* exactly BTRFS_MAX_XATTR_SIZE, we could end up with EOVERFLOW getting
* back from split_leaf. This is because it thinks we'll be extending
* the existing item size, but we're asking for enough space to add the
* item itself. So if we get EOVERFLOW just set ret to EEXIST and let
* the rest of the function figure it out.
*/
if (ret == -EOVERFLOW)
ret = -EEXIST;
if (ret == -EEXIST) {
if (flags & XATTR_CREATE)
goto out;
/*
* We can't use the path we already have since we won't have the
* proper locking for a delete, so release the path and
* re-lookup to delete the thing.
*/
btrfs_release_path(path);
di = btrfs_lookup_xattr(trans, root, path, btrfs_ino(inode),
name, name_len, -1);
if (IS_ERR(di)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(di);
goto out;
} else if (!di) {
/* Shouldn't happen but just in case... */
btrfs_release_path(path);
goto again;
}
ret = btrfs_delete_one_dir_name(trans, root, path, di);
if (ret)
goto out;
/*
* We have a value to set, so go back and try to insert it now.
*/
if (value) {
btrfs_release_path(path);
goto again;
}
}
out:
btrfs_free_path(path);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: make xattr replace operations atomic
Replacing a xattr consists of doing a lookup for its existing value, delete
the current value from the respective leaf, release the search path and then
finally insert the new value. This leaves a time window where readers (getxattr,
listxattrs) won't see any value for the xattr. Xattrs are used to store ACLs,
so this has security implications.
This change also fixes 2 other existing issues which were:
*) Deleting the old xattr value without verifying first if the new xattr will
fit in the existing leaf item (in case multiple xattrs are packed in the
same item due to name hash collision);
*) Returning -EEXIST when the flag XATTR_CREATE is given and the xattr doesn't
exist but we have have an existing item that packs muliple xattrs with
the same name hash as the input xattr. In this case we should return ENOSPC.
A test case for xfstests follows soon.
Thanks to Alexandre Oliva for reporting the non-atomicity of the xattr replace
implementation.
Reported-by: Alexandre Oliva <oliva@gnu.org>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 1
| 166,765
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void nfs_file_set_open_context(struct file *filp, struct nfs_open_context *ctx)
{
struct inode *inode = filp->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
struct nfs_inode *nfsi = NFS_I(inode);
filp->private_data = get_nfs_open_context(ctx);
spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
list_add(&ctx->list, &nfsi->open_files);
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 22,793
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void binaryToUnaryIfNull(Parse *pParse, Expr *pY, Expr *pA, int op){
sqlite3 *db = pParse->db;
if( pA && pY && pY->op==TK_NULL && !IN_RENAME_OBJECT ){
pA->op = (u8)op;
sqlite3ExprDelete(db, pA->pRight);
pA->pRight = 0;
}
}
Commit Message: sqlite: backport bugfixes for dbfuzz2
Bug: 952406
Change-Id: Icbec429742048d6674828726c96d8e265c41b595
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1568152
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Darwin Huang <huangdarwin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#651030}
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 151,661
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: jbig2_table(Jbig2Ctx *ctx, Jbig2Segment *segment, const byte *segment_data)
{
Jbig2HuffmanParams *params = NULL;
Jbig2HuffmanLine *line = NULL;
segment->result = NULL;
if (segment->data_length < 10)
goto too_short;
{
/* B.2 1) (B.2.1) Code table flags */
const int code_table_flags = segment_data[0];
const int HTOOB = code_table_flags & 0x01; /* Bit 0: HTOOB */
/* Bits 1-3: Number of bits used in code table line prefix size fields */
const int HTPS = (code_table_flags >> 1 & 0x07) + 1;
/* Bits 4-6: Number of bits used in code table line range size fields */
const int HTRS = (code_table_flags >> 4 & 0x07) + 1;
/* B.2 2) (B.2.2) The lower bound of the first table line in the encoded table */
const int32_t HTLOW = jbig2_get_int32(segment_data + 1);
/* B.2 3) (B.2.3) One larger than the upeer bound of
the last normal table line in the encoded table */
const int32_t HTHIGH = jbig2_get_int32(segment_data + 5);
/* estimated number of lines int this table, used for alloacting memory for lines */
const size_t lines_max = (segment->data_length * 8 - HTPS * (HTOOB ? 3 : 2)) / (HTPS + HTRS) + (HTOOB ? 3 : 2);
/* points to a first table line data */
const byte *lines_data = segment_data + 9;
const size_t lines_data_bitlen = (segment->data_length - 9) * 8; /* length in bit */
/* bit offset: controls bit reading */
size_t boffset = 0;
/* B.2 4) */
int32_t CURRANGELOW = HTLOW;
size_t NTEMP = 0;
#ifdef JBIG2_DEBUG
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_DEBUG, segment->number,
"DECODING USER TABLE... Flags: %d, HTOOB: %d, HTPS: %d, HTRS: %d, HTLOW: %d, HTHIGH: %d",
code_table_flags, HTOOB, HTPS, HTRS, HTLOW, HTHIGH);
#endif
/* allocate HuffmanParams & HuffmanLine */
params = jbig2_new(ctx, Jbig2HuffmanParams, 1);
if (params == NULL) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "Could not allocate Huffman Table Parameter");
goto error_exit;
}
line = jbig2_new(ctx, Jbig2HuffmanLine, lines_max);
if (line == NULL) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "Could not allocate Huffman Table Lines");
goto error_exit;
}
/* B.2 5) */
while (CURRANGELOW < HTHIGH) {
/* B.2 5) a) */
if (boffset + HTPS >= lines_data_bitlen)
goto too_short;
line[NTEMP].PREFLEN = jbig2_table_read_bits(lines_data, &boffset, HTPS);
/* B.2 5) b) */
if (boffset + HTRS >= lines_data_bitlen)
goto too_short;
line[NTEMP].RANGELEN = jbig2_table_read_bits(lines_data, &boffset, HTRS);
/* B.2 5) c) */
line[NTEMP].RANGELOW = CURRANGELOW;
CURRANGELOW += (1 << line[NTEMP].RANGELEN);
NTEMP++;
}
/* B.2 6), B.2 7) lower range table line */
if (boffset + HTPS >= lines_data_bitlen)
goto too_short;
line[NTEMP].PREFLEN = jbig2_table_read_bits(lines_data, &boffset, HTPS);
line[NTEMP].RANGELEN = 32;
line[NTEMP].RANGELOW = HTLOW - 1;
NTEMP++;
/* B.2 8), B.2 9) upper range table line */
if (boffset + HTPS >= lines_data_bitlen)
goto too_short;
line[NTEMP].PREFLEN = jbig2_table_read_bits(lines_data, &boffset, HTPS);
line[NTEMP].RANGELEN = 32;
line[NTEMP].RANGELOW = HTHIGH;
NTEMP++;
/* B.2 10) */
if (HTOOB) {
/* B.2 10) a), B.2 10) b) out-of-bound table line */
if (boffset + HTPS >= lines_data_bitlen)
goto too_short;
line[NTEMP].PREFLEN = jbig2_table_read_bits(lines_data, &boffset, HTPS);
line[NTEMP].RANGELEN = 0;
line[NTEMP].RANGELOW = 0;
NTEMP++;
}
if (NTEMP != lines_max) {
Jbig2HuffmanLine *new_line = jbig2_renew(ctx, line,
Jbig2HuffmanLine, NTEMP);
if (new_line == NULL) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "Could not reallocate Huffman Table Lines");
goto error_exit;
}
line = new_line;
}
params->HTOOB = HTOOB;
params->n_lines = NTEMP;
params->lines = line;
segment->result = params;
#ifdef JBIG2_DEBUG
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < NTEMP; i++) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_DEBUG, segment->number,
"Line: %d, PREFLEN: %d, RANGELEN: %d, RANGELOW: %d",
i, params->lines[i].PREFLEN, params->lines[i].RANGELEN, params->lines[i].RANGELOW);
}
}
#endif
}
return 0;
too_short:
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "Segment too short");
error_exit:
if (line != NULL) {
jbig2_free(ctx->allocator, line);
}
if (params != NULL) {
jbig2_free(ctx->allocator, params);
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 18,049
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void qcow2_encrypt_sectors(BDRVQcowState *s, int64_t sector_num,
uint8_t *out_buf, const uint8_t *in_buf,
int nb_sectors, int enc,
const AES_KEY *key)
{
union {
uint64_t ll[2];
uint8_t b[16];
} ivec;
int i;
for(i = 0; i < nb_sectors; i++) {
ivec.ll[0] = cpu_to_le64(sector_num);
ivec.ll[1] = 0;
AES_cbc_encrypt(in_buf, out_buf, 512, key,
ivec.b, enc);
sector_num++;
in_buf += 512;
out_buf += 512;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 16,938
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int imap_complete(char *buf, size_t buflen, char *path)
{
struct ImapData *idata = NULL;
char list[LONG_STRING];
char tmp[LONG_STRING];
struct ImapList listresp;
char completion[LONG_STRING];
int clen;
size_t matchlen = 0;
int completions = 0;
struct ImapMbox mx;
int rc;
if (imap_parse_path(path, &mx))
{
mutt_str_strfcpy(buf, path, buflen);
return complete_hosts(buf, buflen);
}
/* don't open a new socket just for completion. Instead complete over
* known mailboxes/hooks/etc */
idata = imap_conn_find(&(mx.account), MUTT_IMAP_CONN_NONEW);
if (!idata)
{
FREE(&mx.mbox);
mutt_str_strfcpy(buf, path, buflen);
return complete_hosts(buf, buflen);
}
/* reformat path for IMAP list, and append wildcard */
/* don't use INBOX in place of "" */
if (mx.mbox && mx.mbox[0])
imap_fix_path(idata, mx.mbox, list, sizeof(list));
else
list[0] = '\0';
/* fire off command */
snprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), "%s \"\" \"%s%%\"", ImapListSubscribed ? "LSUB" : "LIST", list);
imap_cmd_start(idata, tmp);
/* and see what the results are */
mutt_str_strfcpy(completion, NONULL(mx.mbox), sizeof(completion));
idata->cmdtype = IMAP_CT_LIST;
idata->cmddata = &listresp;
do
{
listresp.name = NULL;
rc = imap_cmd_step(idata);
if (rc == IMAP_CMD_CONTINUE && listresp.name)
{
/* if the folder isn't selectable, append delimiter to force browse
* to enter it on second tab. */
if (listresp.noselect)
{
clen = strlen(listresp.name);
listresp.name[clen++] = listresp.delim;
listresp.name[clen] = '\0';
}
/* copy in first word */
if (!completions)
{
mutt_str_strfcpy(completion, listresp.name, sizeof(completion));
matchlen = strlen(completion);
completions++;
continue;
}
matchlen = longest_common_prefix(completion, listresp.name, 0, matchlen);
completions++;
}
} while (rc == IMAP_CMD_CONTINUE);
idata->cmddata = NULL;
if (completions)
{
/* reformat output */
imap_qualify_path(buf, buflen, &mx, completion);
mutt_pretty_mailbox(buf, buflen);
FREE(&mx.mbox);
return 0;
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message: quote imap strings more carefully
Co-authored-by: JerikoOne <jeriko.one@gmx.us>
CWE ID: CWE-77
| 0
| 79,584
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual bool Visit(RenderView* render_view) {
WebView* webview = render_view->webview();
WebDocument document = webview->mainFrame()->document();
if (document.isPluginDocument())
return true;
if (net::GetHostOrSpecFromURL(GURL(document.url())) == host_)
webview->setZoomLevel(false, zoom_level_);
return true;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 98,891
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct sctp_chunk *sctp_process_asconf(struct sctp_association *asoc,
struct sctp_chunk *asconf)
{
sctp_addiphdr_t *hdr;
union sctp_addr_param *addr_param;
sctp_addip_param_t *asconf_param;
struct sctp_chunk *asconf_ack;
__be16 err_code;
int length = 0;
int chunk_len;
__u32 serial;
int all_param_pass = 1;
chunk_len = ntohs(asconf->chunk_hdr->length) - sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t);
hdr = (sctp_addiphdr_t *)asconf->skb->data;
serial = ntohl(hdr->serial);
/* Skip the addiphdr and store a pointer to address parameter. */
length = sizeof(sctp_addiphdr_t);
addr_param = (union sctp_addr_param *)(asconf->skb->data + length);
chunk_len -= length;
/* Skip the address parameter and store a pointer to the first
* asconf parameter.
*/
length = ntohs(addr_param->p.length);
asconf_param = (void *)addr_param + length;
chunk_len -= length;
/* create an ASCONF_ACK chunk.
* Based on the definitions of parameters, we know that the size of
* ASCONF_ACK parameters are less than or equal to the fourfold of ASCONF
* parameters.
*/
asconf_ack = sctp_make_asconf_ack(asoc, serial, chunk_len * 4);
if (!asconf_ack)
goto done;
/* Process the TLVs contained within the ASCONF chunk. */
while (chunk_len > 0) {
err_code = sctp_process_asconf_param(asoc, asconf,
asconf_param);
/* ADDIP 4.1 A7)
* If an error response is received for a TLV parameter,
* all TLVs with no response before the failed TLV are
* considered successful if not reported. All TLVs after
* the failed response are considered unsuccessful unless
* a specific success indication is present for the parameter.
*/
if (SCTP_ERROR_NO_ERROR != err_code)
all_param_pass = 0;
if (!all_param_pass)
sctp_add_asconf_response(asconf_ack,
asconf_param->crr_id, err_code,
asconf_param);
/* ADDIP 4.3 D11) When an endpoint receiving an ASCONF to add
* an IP address sends an 'Out of Resource' in its response, it
* MUST also fail any subsequent add or delete requests bundled
* in the ASCONF.
*/
if (SCTP_ERROR_RSRC_LOW == err_code)
goto done;
/* Move to the next ASCONF param. */
length = ntohs(asconf_param->param_hdr.length);
asconf_param = (void *)asconf_param + length;
chunk_len -= length;
}
done:
asoc->peer.addip_serial++;
/* If we are sending a new ASCONF_ACK hold a reference to it in assoc
* after freeing the reference to old asconf ack if any.
*/
if (asconf_ack) {
sctp_chunk_hold(asconf_ack);
list_add_tail(&asconf_ack->transmitted_list,
&asoc->asconf_ack_list);
}
return asconf_ack;
}
Commit Message: net: sctp: fix skb_over_panic when receiving malformed ASCONF chunks
Commit 6f4c618ddb0 ("SCTP : Add paramters validity check for
ASCONF chunk") added basic verification of ASCONF chunks, however,
it is still possible to remotely crash a server by sending a
special crafted ASCONF chunk, even up to pre 2.6.12 kernels:
skb_over_panic: text:ffffffffa01ea1c3 len:31056 put:30768
head:ffff88011bd81800 data:ffff88011bd81800 tail:0x7950
end:0x440 dev:<NULL>
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:129!
[...]
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffff8144fb1c>] skb_put+0x5c/0x70
[<ffffffffa01ea1c3>] sctp_addto_chunk+0x63/0xd0 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01eadaf>] sctp_process_asconf+0x1af/0x540 [sctp]
[<ffffffff8152d025>] ? _read_unlock_bh+0x15/0x20
[<ffffffffa01e0038>] sctp_sf_do_asconf+0x168/0x240 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e3751>] sctp_do_sm+0x71/0x1210 [sctp]
[<ffffffff8147645d>] ? fib_rules_lookup+0xad/0xf0
[<ffffffffa01e6b22>] ? sctp_cmp_addr_exact+0x32/0x40 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e8393>] sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0xd3/0x180 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01ee986>] sctp_inq_push+0x56/0x80 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01fcc42>] sctp_rcv+0x982/0xa10 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01d5123>] ? ipt_local_in_hook+0x23/0x28 [iptable_filter]
[<ffffffff8148bdc9>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0
[<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff8148bf86>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120
[<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff81496ded>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xdd/0x2d0
[<ffffffff81497078>] ip_local_deliver+0x98/0xa0
[<ffffffff8149653d>] ip_rcv_finish+0x12d/0x440
[<ffffffff81496ac5>] ip_rcv+0x275/0x350
[<ffffffff8145c88b>] __netif_receive_skb+0x4ab/0x750
[<ffffffff81460588>] netif_receive_skb+0x58/0x60
This can be triggered e.g., through a simple scripted nmap
connection scan injecting the chunk after the handshake, for
example, ...
-------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------->
<----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------
-------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
<-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
------------------ ASCONF; UNKNOWN ------------------>
... where ASCONF chunk of length 280 contains 2 parameters ...
1) Add IP address parameter (param length: 16)
2) Add/del IP address parameter (param length: 255)
... followed by an UNKNOWN chunk of e.g. 4 bytes. Here, the
Address Parameter in the ASCONF chunk is even missing, too.
This is just an example and similarly-crafted ASCONF chunks
could be used just as well.
The ASCONF chunk passes through sctp_verify_asconf() as all
parameters passed sanity checks, and after walking, we ended
up successfully at the chunk end boundary, and thus may invoke
sctp_process_asconf(). Parameter walking is done with
WORD_ROUND() to take padding into account.
In sctp_process_asconf()'s TLV processing, we may fail in
sctp_process_asconf_param() e.g., due to removal of the IP
address that is also the source address of the packet containing
the ASCONF chunk, and thus we need to add all TLVs after the
failure to our ASCONF response to remote via helper function
sctp_add_asconf_response(), which basically invokes a
sctp_addto_chunk() adding the error parameters to the given
skb.
When walking to the next parameter this time, we proceed
with ...
length = ntohs(asconf_param->param_hdr.length);
asconf_param = (void *)asconf_param + length;
... instead of the WORD_ROUND()'ed length, thus resulting here
in an off-by-one that leads to reading the follow-up garbage
parameter length of 12336, and thus throwing an skb_over_panic
for the reply when trying to sctp_addto_chunk() next time,
which implicitly calls the skb_put() with that length.
Fix it by using sctp_walk_params() [ which is also used in
INIT parameter processing ] macro in the verification *and*
in ASCONF processing: it will make sure we don't spill over,
that we walk parameters WORD_ROUND()'ed. Moreover, we're being
more defensive and guard against unknown parameter types and
missized addresses.
Joint work with Vlad Yasevich.
Fixes: b896b82be4ae ("[SCTP] ADDIP: Support for processing incoming ASCONF_ACK chunks.")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 1
| 166,333
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int cirrus_bitblt_videotovideo_copy(CirrusVGAState * s)
{
if (blit_is_unsafe(s, false))
return 0;
return cirrus_do_copy(s, s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr - s->vga.start_addr,
s->cirrus_blt_srcaddr - s->vga.start_addr,
s->cirrus_blt_width, s->cirrus_blt_height);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 16,679
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: unsigned InputType::Height() const {
return 0;
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 126,202
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DrawingBufferClientRestorePixelPackParameters() {
if (destruction_in_progress_)
return;
if (!ContextGL())
return;
ContextGL()->PixelStorei(GL_PACK_ALIGNMENT, pack_alignment_);
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 142,245
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: server_file_method(struct client *clt)
{
struct http_descriptor *desc = clt->clt_descreq;
switch (desc->http_method) {
case HTTP_METHOD_GET:
case HTTP_METHOD_HEAD:
return (0);
default:
/* Other methods are not allowed */
errno = EACCES;
return (405);
}
/* NOTREACHED */
}
Commit Message: Reimplement httpd's support for byte ranges.
The previous implementation loaded all the output into a single output
buffer and used its size to determine the Content-Length of the body.
The new implementation calculates the body length first and writes the
individual ranges in an async way using the bufferevent mechanism.
This prevents httpd from using too much memory and applies the
watermark and throttling mechanisms to range requests.
Problem reported by Pierre Kim (pierre.kim.sec at gmail.com)
OK benno@ sunil@
CWE ID: CWE-770
| 0
| 68,488
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderViewHostImpl::DisownOpener() {
DCHECK(is_swapped_out_);
Send(new ViewMsg_DisownOpener(GetRoutingID()));
}
Commit Message: Filter more incoming URLs in the CreateWindow path.
BUG=170532
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12036002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@178728 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 117,176
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void pcnet_poll(PCNetState *s)
{
if (CSR_RXON(s)) {
pcnet_rdte_poll(s);
}
if (CSR_TDMD(s) ||
(CSR_TXON(s) && !CSR_DPOLL(s) && pcnet_tdte_poll(s)))
{
/* prevent recursion */
if (s->tx_busy)
return;
pcnet_transmit(s);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 14,523
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(openssl_pkcs12_export_to_file)
{
X509 * cert = NULL;
BIO * bio_out = NULL;
PKCS12 * p12 = NULL;
char * filename;
char * friendly_name = NULL;
size_t filename_len;
char * pass;
size_t pass_len;
zval *zcert = NULL, *zpkey = NULL, *args = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *priv_key = NULL;
zend_resource *certresource, *keyresource;
zval * item;
STACK_OF(X509) *ca = NULL;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "zpzs|a", &zcert, &filename, &filename_len, &zpkey, &pass, &pass_len, &args) == FAILURE)
return;
RETVAL_FALSE;
cert = php_openssl_x509_from_zval(zcert, 0, &certresource);
if (cert == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "cannot get cert from parameter 1");
return;
}
priv_key = php_openssl_evp_from_zval(zpkey, 0, "", 0, 1, &keyresource);
if (priv_key == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "cannot get private key from parameter 3");
goto cleanup;
}
if (cert && !X509_check_private_key(cert, priv_key)) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "private key does not correspond to cert");
goto cleanup;
}
if (php_openssl_open_base_dir_chk(filename)) {
goto cleanup;
}
/* parse extra config from args array, promote this to an extra function */
if (args && (item = zend_hash_str_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(args), "friendly_name", sizeof("friendly_name")-1)) != NULL && Z_TYPE_P(item) == IS_STRING)
friendly_name = Z_STRVAL_P(item);
/* certpbe (default RC2-40)
keypbe (default 3DES)
friendly_caname
*/
if (args && (item = zend_hash_str_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(args), "extracerts", sizeof("extracerts")-1)) != NULL)
ca = php_array_to_X509_sk(item);
/* end parse extra config */
/*PKCS12 *PKCS12_create(char *pass, char *name, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *cert, STACK_OF(X509) *ca,
int nid_key, int nid_cert, int iter, int mac_iter, int keytype);*/
p12 = PKCS12_create(pass, friendly_name, priv_key, cert, ca, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
bio_out = BIO_new_file(filename, "w");
if (bio_out) {
i2d_PKCS12_bio(bio_out, p12);
RETVAL_TRUE;
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "error opening file %s", filename);
}
BIO_free(bio_out);
PKCS12_free(p12);
php_sk_X509_free(ca);
cleanup:
if (keyresource == NULL && priv_key) {
EVP_PKEY_free(priv_key);
}
if (certresource == NULL && cert) {
X509_free(cert);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-754
| 0
| 4,496
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const gfx::Size& CapturerMac::size_most_recent() const {
return helper_.size_most_recent();
}
Commit Message: Workaround for bad driver issue with NVIDIA GeForce 7300 GT on Mac 10.5.
BUG=87283
TEST=Run on a machine with NVIDIA GeForce 7300 GT on Mac 10.5 immediately after booting.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7373018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@92651 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 98,524
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ping_err(struct sk_buff *skb, int offset, u32 info)
{
int family;
struct icmphdr *icmph;
struct inet_sock *inet_sock;
int type;
int code;
struct net *net = dev_net(skb->dev);
struct sock *sk;
int harderr;
int err;
if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) {
family = AF_INET;
type = icmp_hdr(skb)->type;
code = icmp_hdr(skb)->code;
icmph = (struct icmphdr *)(skb->data + offset);
} else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) {
family = AF_INET6;
type = icmp6_hdr(skb)->icmp6_type;
code = icmp6_hdr(skb)->icmp6_code;
icmph = (struct icmphdr *) (skb->data + offset);
} else {
BUG();
}
/* We assume the packet has already been checked by icmp_unreach */
if (!ping_supported(family, icmph->type, icmph->code))
return;
pr_debug("ping_err(proto=0x%x,type=%d,code=%d,id=%04x,seq=%04x)\n",
skb->protocol, type, code, ntohs(icmph->un.echo.id),
ntohs(icmph->un.echo.sequence));
sk = ping_lookup(net, skb, ntohs(icmph->un.echo.id));
if (!sk) {
pr_debug("no socket, dropping\n");
return; /* No socket for error */
}
pr_debug("err on socket %p\n", sk);
err = 0;
harderr = 0;
inet_sock = inet_sk(sk);
if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) {
switch (type) {
default:
case ICMP_TIME_EXCEEDED:
err = EHOSTUNREACH;
break;
case ICMP_SOURCE_QUENCH:
/* This is not a real error but ping wants to see it.
* Report it with some fake errno.
*/
err = EREMOTEIO;
break;
case ICMP_PARAMETERPROB:
err = EPROTO;
harderr = 1;
break;
case ICMP_DEST_UNREACH:
if (code == ICMP_FRAG_NEEDED) { /* Path MTU discovery */
ipv4_sk_update_pmtu(skb, sk, info);
if (inet_sock->pmtudisc != IP_PMTUDISC_DONT) {
err = EMSGSIZE;
harderr = 1;
break;
}
goto out;
}
err = EHOSTUNREACH;
if (code <= NR_ICMP_UNREACH) {
harderr = icmp_err_convert[code].fatal;
err = icmp_err_convert[code].errno;
}
break;
case ICMP_REDIRECT:
/* See ICMP_SOURCE_QUENCH */
ipv4_sk_redirect(skb, sk);
err = EREMOTEIO;
break;
}
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
} else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) {
harderr = pingv6_ops.icmpv6_err_convert(type, code, &err);
#endif
}
/*
* RFC1122: OK. Passes ICMP errors back to application, as per
* 4.1.3.3.
*/
if ((family == AF_INET && !inet_sock->recverr) ||
(family == AF_INET6 && !inet6_sk(sk)->recverr)) {
if (!harderr || sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
goto out;
} else {
if (family == AF_INET) {
ip_icmp_error(sk, skb, err, 0 /* no remote port */,
info, (u8 *)icmph);
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
} else if (family == AF_INET6) {
pingv6_ops.ipv6_icmp_error(sk, skb, err, 0,
info, (u8 *)icmph);
#endif
}
}
sk->sk_err = err;
sk->sk_error_report(sk);
out:
sock_put(sk);
}
Commit Message: ipv4: Missing sk_nulls_node_init() in ping_unhash().
If we don't do that, then the poison value is left in the ->pprev
backlink.
This can cause crashes if we do a disconnect, followed by a connect().
Tested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Reported-by: Wen Xu <hotdog3645@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 43,395
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BrowserNonClientFrameViewAura::GetAccessibleState(
ui::AccessibleViewState* state) {
state->role = ui::AccessibilityTypes::ROLE_TITLEBAR;
}
Commit Message: Ash: Fix fullscreen window bounds
I was computing the non-client frame top border height incorrectly for fullscreen windows, so it was trying to draw a few pixels of transparent non-client border.
BUG=118774
TEST=visual
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9810014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@128014 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 108,179
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct snd_timer *snd_timer_find(struct snd_timer_id *tid)
{
struct snd_timer *timer = NULL;
list_for_each_entry(timer, &snd_timer_list, device_list) {
if (timer->tmr_class != tid->dev_class)
continue;
if ((timer->tmr_class == SNDRV_TIMER_CLASS_CARD ||
timer->tmr_class == SNDRV_TIMER_CLASS_PCM) &&
(timer->card == NULL ||
timer->card->number != tid->card))
continue;
if (timer->tmr_device != tid->device)
continue;
if (timer->tmr_subdevice != tid->subdevice)
continue;
return timer;
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: timer: Fix leak in events via snd_timer_user_tinterrupt
The stack object “r1” has a total size of 32 bytes. Its field
“event” and “val” both contain 4 bytes padding. These 8 bytes
padding bytes are sent to user without being initialized.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 52,690
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static uint32_t scsi_init_iovec(SCSIDiskReq *r)
{
r->iov.iov_len = MIN(r->sector_count * 512, SCSI_DMA_BUF_SIZE);
qemu_iovec_init_external(&r->qiov, &r->iov, 1);
return r->qiov.size / 512;
}
Commit Message: scsi-disk: lazily allocate bounce buffer
It will not be needed for reads and writes if the HBA provides a sglist.
In addition, this lets scsi-disk refuse commands with an excessive
allocation length, as well as limit memory on usual well-behaved guests.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 166,554
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void setBaseFolder(const char* folder)
{
m_folder = WebString::fromUTF8(folder);
}
Commit Message: Escape "--" in the page URL at page serialization
This patch makes page serializer to escape the page URL embed into a HTML
comment of result HTML[1] to avoid inserting text as HTML from URL by
introducing a static member function |PageSerialzier::markOfTheWebDeclaration()|
for sharing it between |PageSerialzier| and |WebPageSerialzier| classes.
[1] We use following format for serialized HTML:
saved from url=(${lengthOfURL})${URL}
BUG=503217
TEST=webkit_unit_tests --gtest_filter=PageSerializerTest.markOfTheWebDeclaration
TEST=webkit_unit_tests --gtest_filter=WebPageSerializerTest.fromUrlWithMinusMinu
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1371323003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351736}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 125,368
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: OVS_EXCLUDED(ofproto_mutex)
{
enum ofperr error = ofproto_flow_mod_learn_refresh(ofm);
struct rule *rule = ofm->temp_rule;
/* Do we need to insert the rule? */
if (!error && rule->state == RULE_INITIALIZED) {
ovs_mutex_lock(&ofproto_mutex);
ofm->version = rule->ofproto->tables_version + 1;
error = ofproto_flow_mod_learn_start(ofm);
if (!error) {
ofproto_flow_mod_learn_finish(ofm, NULL);
}
ovs_mutex_unlock(&ofproto_mutex);
}
if (!keep_ref) {
ofproto_rule_unref(rule);
ofm->temp_rule = NULL;
}
return error;
}
Commit Message: ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <vishal.deep.ajmera@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 77,126
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: rule_actions_create(const struct ofpact *ofpacts, size_t ofpacts_len)
{
struct rule_actions *actions;
actions = xmalloc(sizeof *actions + ofpacts_len);
actions->ofpacts_len = ofpacts_len;
memcpy(actions->ofpacts, ofpacts, ofpacts_len);
actions->has_meter = ofpacts_get_meter(ofpacts, ofpacts_len) != 0;
actions->has_groups =
(ofpact_find_type_flattened(ofpacts, OFPACT_GROUP,
ofpact_end(ofpacts, ofpacts_len))
!= NULL);
actions->has_learn_with_delete = (next_learn_with_delete(actions, NULL)
!= NULL);
return actions;
}
Commit Message: ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <vishal.deep.ajmera@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 77,424
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FS_TouchFile_f( void ) {
fileHandle_t f;
if ( Cmd_Argc() != 2 ) {
Com_Printf( "Usage: touchFile <file>\n" );
return;
}
FS_FOpenFileRead( Cmd_Argv( 1 ), &f, qfalse );
if ( f ) {
FS_FCloseFile( f );
}
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 95,836
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ModuleExport size_t RegisterTIFFImage(void)
{
#define TIFFDescription "Tagged Image File Format"
char
version[MaxTextExtent];
MagickInfo
*entry;
if (tiff_semaphore == (SemaphoreInfo *) NULL)
ActivateSemaphoreInfo(&tiff_semaphore);
LockSemaphoreInfo(tiff_semaphore);
if (instantiate_key == MagickFalse)
{
if (MagickCreateThreadKey(&tiff_exception) == MagickFalse)
ThrowFatalException(ResourceLimitFatalError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_HAVE_TIFFMERGEFIELDINFO) && defined(MAGICKCORE_HAVE_TIFFSETTAGEXTENDER)
if (tag_extender == (TIFFExtendProc) NULL)
tag_extender=TIFFSetTagExtender(TIFFTagExtender);
#endif
instantiate_key=MagickTrue;
}
UnlockSemaphoreInfo(tiff_semaphore);
*version='\0';
#if defined(TIFF_VERSION)
(void) FormatLocaleString(version,MaxTextExtent,"%d",TIFF_VERSION);
#endif
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_TIFF_DELEGATE)
{
const char
*p;
register ssize_t
i;
p=TIFFGetVersion();
for (i=0; (i < (MaxTextExtent-1)) && (*p != 0) && (*p != '\n'); i++)
version[i]=(*p++);
version[i]='\0';
}
#endif
entry=SetMagickInfo("GROUP4");
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_TIFF_DELEGATE)
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadGROUP4Image;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WriteGROUP4Image;
#endif
entry->raw=MagickTrue;
entry->endian_support=MagickTrue;
entry->adjoin=MagickFalse;
entry->format_type=ImplicitFormatType;
entry->seekable_stream=MagickTrue;
entry->description=ConstantString("Raw CCITT Group4");
entry->mime_type=ConstantString("image/tiff");
entry->module=ConstantString("TIFF");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
entry=SetMagickInfo("PTIF");
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_TIFF_DELEGATE)
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadTIFFImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WritePTIFImage;
#endif
entry->endian_support=MagickTrue;
entry->seekable_stream=MagickTrue;
entry->description=ConstantString("Pyramid encoded TIFF");
entry->mime_type=ConstantString("image/tiff");
entry->module=ConstantString("TIFF");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
entry=SetMagickInfo("TIF");
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_TIFF_DELEGATE)
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadTIFFImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WriteTIFFImage;
#endif
entry->endian_support=MagickTrue;
entry->seekable_stream=MagickTrue;
entry->stealth=MagickTrue;
entry->description=ConstantString(TIFFDescription);
if (*version != '\0')
entry->version=ConstantString(version);
entry->mime_type=ConstantString("image/tiff");
entry->module=ConstantString("TIFF");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
entry=SetMagickInfo("TIFF");
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_TIFF_DELEGATE)
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadTIFFImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WriteTIFFImage;
#endif
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsTIFF;
entry->endian_support=MagickTrue;
entry->seekable_stream=MagickTrue;
entry->description=ConstantString(TIFFDescription);
if (*version != '\0')
entry->version=ConstantString(version);
entry->mime_type=ConstantString("image/tiff");
entry->module=ConstantString("TIFF");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
entry=SetMagickInfo("TIFF64");
#if defined(TIFF_VERSION_BIG)
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadTIFFImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WriteTIFFImage;
#endif
entry->adjoin=MagickFalse;
entry->endian_support=MagickTrue;
entry->seekable_stream=MagickTrue;
entry->description=ConstantString("Tagged Image File Format (64-bit)");
if (*version != '\0')
entry->version=ConstantString(version);
entry->mime_type=ConstantString("image/tiff");
entry->module=ConstantString("TIFF");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
return(MagickImageCoderSignature);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 71,754
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FloatRect Range::boundingRect() const
{
if (!m_start.container())
return FloatRect();
m_ownerDocument->updateLayoutIgnorePendingStylesheets();
Vector<FloatQuad> quads;
getBorderAndTextQuads(quads);
if (quads.isEmpty())
return FloatRect();
FloatRect result;
for (size_t i = 0; i < quads.size(); ++i)
result.unite(quads[i].boundingBox());
return result;
}
Commit Message: There are too many poorly named functions to create a fragment from markup
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87339
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Source/WebCore:
Moved all functions that create a fragment from markup to markup.h/cpp.
There should be no behavioral change.
* dom/Range.cpp:
(WebCore::Range::createContextualFragment):
* dom/Range.h: Removed createDocumentFragmentForElement.
* dom/ShadowRoot.cpp:
(WebCore::ShadowRoot::setInnerHTML):
* editing/markup.cpp:
(WebCore::createFragmentFromMarkup):
(WebCore::createFragmentForInnerOuterHTML): Renamed from createFragmentFromSource.
(WebCore::createFragmentForTransformToFragment): Moved from XSLTProcessor.
(WebCore::removeElementPreservingChildren): Moved from Range.
(WebCore::createContextualFragment): Ditto.
* editing/markup.h:
* html/HTMLElement.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setInnerHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setOuterHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML):
* inspector/DOMPatchSupport.cpp:
(WebCore::DOMPatchSupport::patchNode): Added a FIXME since this code should be using
one of the functions listed in markup.h
* xml/XSLTProcessor.cpp:
(WebCore::XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment):
Source/WebKit/qt:
Replace calls to Range::createDocumentFragmentForElement by calls to
createContextualDocumentFragment.
* Api/qwebelement.cpp:
(QWebElement::appendInside):
(QWebElement::prependInside):
(QWebElement::prependOutside):
(QWebElement::appendOutside):
(QWebElement::encloseContentsWith):
(QWebElement::encloseWith):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118414 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 100,220
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: buf_allocation(const buf_t *buf)
{
size_t total = 0;
const chunk_t *chunk;
for (chunk = buf->head; chunk; chunk = chunk->next) {
total += CHUNK_ALLOC_SIZE(chunk->memlen);
}
return total;
}
Commit Message: Add a one-word sentinel value of 0x0 at the end of each buf_t chunk
This helps protect against bugs where any part of a buf_t's memory
is passed to a function that expects a NUL-terminated input.
It also closes TROVE-2016-10-001 (aka bug 20384).
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 73,141
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SVGElement::Trace(blink::Visitor* visitor) {
visitor->Trace(elements_with_relative_lengths_);
visitor->Trace(attribute_to_property_map_);
visitor->Trace(svg_rare_data_);
visitor->Trace(class_name_);
Element::Trace(visitor);
}
Commit Message: Fix SVG crash for v0 distribution into foreignObject.
We require a parent element to be an SVG element for non-svg-root
elements in order to create a LayoutObject for them. However, we checked
the light tree parent element, not the flat tree one which is the parent
for the layout tree construction. Note that this is just an issue in
Shadow DOM v0 since v1 does not allow shadow roots on SVG elements.
Bug: 915469
Change-Id: Id81843abad08814fae747b5bc81c09666583f130
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1382494
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <fs@opera.com>
Commit-Queue: Rune Lillesveen <futhark@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#617487}
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 152,805
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ipgre_ecn_encapsulate(u8 tos, struct iphdr *old_iph, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
u8 inner = 0;
if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
inner = old_iph->tos;
else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
inner = ipv6_get_dsfield((struct ipv6hdr *)old_iph);
return INET_ECN_encapsulate(tos, inner);
}
Commit Message: gre: fix netns vs proto registration ordering
GRE protocol receive hook can be called right after protocol addition is done.
If netns stuff is not yet initialized, we're going to oops in
net_generic().
This is remotely oopsable if ip_gre is compiled as module and packet
comes at unfortunate moment of module loading.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 27,482
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void reflectedCustomStringAttrAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_FOR_V8STRINGRESOURCE_VOID(V8StringResource<>, cppValue, jsValue);
CustomElementCallbackDispatcher::CallbackDeliveryScope deliveryScope;
imp->setAttribute(HTMLNames::customContentStringAttrAttr, cppValue);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 121,916
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int js_pconstruct(js_State *J, int n)
{
int savetop = TOP - n - 2;
if (js_try(J)) {
/* clean up the stack to only hold the error object */
STACK[savetop] = STACK[TOP-1];
TOP = savetop + 1;
return 1;
}
js_construct(J, n);
js_endtry(J);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 13,456
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void register_prot_hook(struct sock *sk)
{
struct packet_sock *po = pkt_sk(sk);
if (!po->running) {
if (po->fanout)
__fanout_link(sk, po);
else
dev_add_pack(&po->prot_hook);
sock_hold(sk);
po->running = 1;
}
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 40,662
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct file *aio_private_file(struct kioctx *ctx, loff_t nr_pages)
{
struct qstr this = QSTR_INIT("[aio]", 5);
struct file *file;
struct path path;
struct inode *inode = alloc_anon_inode(aio_mnt->mnt_sb);
if (IS_ERR(inode))
return ERR_CAST(inode);
inode->i_mapping->a_ops = &aio_ctx_aops;
inode->i_mapping->private_data = ctx;
inode->i_size = PAGE_SIZE * nr_pages;
path.dentry = d_alloc_pseudo(aio_mnt->mnt_sb, &this);
if (!path.dentry) {
iput(inode);
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
}
path.mnt = mntget(aio_mnt);
d_instantiate(path.dentry, inode);
file = alloc_file(&path, FMODE_READ | FMODE_WRITE, &aio_ring_fops);
if (IS_ERR(file)) {
path_put(&path);
return file;
}
file->f_flags = O_RDWR;
return file;
}
Commit Message: aio: mark AIO pseudo-fs noexec
This ensures that do_mmap() won't implicitly make AIO memory mappings
executable if the READ_IMPLIES_EXEC personality flag is set. Such
behavior is problematic because the security_mmap_file LSM hook doesn't
catch this case, potentially permitting an attacker to bypass a W^X
policy enforced by SELinux.
I have tested the patch on my machine.
To test the behavior, compile and run this:
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/personality.h>
#include <linux/aio_abi.h>
#include <err.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
int main(void) {
personality(READ_IMPLIES_EXEC);
aio_context_t ctx = 0;
if (syscall(__NR_io_setup, 1, &ctx))
err(1, "io_setup");
char cmd[1000];
sprintf(cmd, "cat /proc/%d/maps | grep -F '/[aio]'",
(int)getpid());
system(cmd);
return 0;
}
In the output, "rw-s" is good, "rwxs" is bad.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 72,022
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WebPluginAcceleratedSurfaceProxy::WebPluginAcceleratedSurfaceProxy(
WebPluginProxy* plugin_proxy)
: plugin_proxy_(plugin_proxy),
window_handle_(NULL) {
surface_ = new AcceleratedSurface;
if (!surface_->Initialize(NULL, true)) {
delete surface_;
surface_ = NULL;
return;
}
surface_->SetTransportDIBAllocAndFree(
NewCallback(plugin_proxy_, &WebPluginProxy::AllocSurfaceDIB),
NewCallback(plugin_proxy_, &WebPluginProxy::FreeSurfaceDIB));
}
Commit Message: iwyu: Include callback_old.h where appropriate, final.
BUG=82098
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@85003 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 100,986
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
{
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(ctx);
OPENSSL_free(ctx);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 12,864
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RenderViewZoomer(const std::string& host, double zoom_level)
: host_(host), zoom_level_(zoom_level) {
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 107,113
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: terminate_workers(pid_t *pids, int bound)
{
int i, status, num_active = 0;
pid_t pid;
/* Kill the active worker pids. */
for (i = 0; i < bound; i++) {
if (pids[i] == -1)
continue;
kill(pids[i], SIGTERM);
num_active++;
}
/* Wait for them to exit. */
while (num_active > 0) {
pid = wait(&status);
if (pid >= 0)
num_active--;
}
}
Commit Message: Multi-realm KDC null deref [CVE-2013-1418]
If a KDC serves multiple realms, certain requests can cause
setup_server_realm() to dereference a null pointer, crashing the KDC.
CVSSv2: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
A related but more minor vulnerability requires authentication to
exploit, and is only present if a third-party KDC database module can
dereference a null pointer under certain conditions.
(back ported from commit 5d2d9a1abe46a2c1a8614d4672d08d9d30a5f8bf)
ticket: 7757 (new)
version_fixed: 1.10.7
status: resolved
CWE ID:
| 0
| 28,284
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ProfileImplIOData::Handle::Init(
const FilePath& cookie_path,
const FilePath& origin_bound_cert_path,
const FilePath& cache_path,
int cache_max_size,
const FilePath& media_cache_path,
int media_cache_max_size,
const FilePath& extensions_cookie_path,
const FilePath& app_path,
chrome_browser_net::Predictor* predictor,
PrefService* local_state,
IOThread* io_thread,
bool restore_old_session_cookies) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
DCHECK(!io_data_->lazy_params_.get());
DCHECK(predictor);
LazyParams* lazy_params = new LazyParams;
lazy_params->cookie_path = cookie_path;
lazy_params->origin_bound_cert_path = origin_bound_cert_path;
lazy_params->cache_path = cache_path;
lazy_params->cache_max_size = cache_max_size;
lazy_params->media_cache_path = media_cache_path;
lazy_params->media_cache_max_size = media_cache_max_size;
lazy_params->extensions_cookie_path = extensions_cookie_path;
lazy_params->restore_old_session_cookies = restore_old_session_cookies;
io_data_->lazy_params_.reset(lazy_params);
io_data_->app_path_ = app_path;
io_data_->predictor_.reset(predictor);
if (!main_request_context_getter_) {
main_request_context_getter_ =
ChromeURLRequestContextGetter::CreateOriginal(
profile_, io_data_);
}
io_data_->predictor_->InitNetworkPredictor(profile_->GetPrefs(),
local_state,
io_thread,
main_request_context_getter_);
}
Commit Message: Give the media context an ftp job factory; prevent a browser crash.
BUG=112983
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9372002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@121378 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 108,213
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Performance::clearResourceTimings() {
resource_timing_buffer_.clear();
}
Commit Message: Fix timing allow check algorithm for service workers
This CL uses the OriginalURLViaServiceWorker() in the timing allow check
algorithm if the response WasFetchedViaServiceWorker(). This way, if a
service worker changes a same origin request to become cross origin,
then the timing allow check algorithm will still fail.
resource-timing-worker.js is changed so it avoids an empty Response,
which is an odd case in terms of same origin checks.
Bug: 837275
Change-Id: I7e497a6fcc2ee14244121b915ca5f5cceded417a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1038229
Commit-Queue: Nicolás Peña Moreno <npm@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yoav Weiss <yoav@yoav.ws>
Reviewed-by: Timothy Dresser <tdresser@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#555476}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 153,877
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::NavigationRequestCancelled(
NavigationRequest* navigation_request) {
OnCrossDocumentCommitProcessed(navigation_request,
blink::mojom::CommitResult::Aborted);
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 139,328
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::DidUpdateBackingStore(
const gfx::Rect& scroll_rect,
const gfx::Vector2d& scroll_delta,
const std::vector<gfx::Rect>& copy_rects) {
if (accelerated_compositing_state_changed_)
UpdateExternalTexture();
if (host_->is_hidden())
return;
gfx::Rect clip_rect;
if (paint_canvas_) {
SkRect sk_clip_rect;
if (paint_canvas_->sk_canvas()->getClipBounds(&sk_clip_rect))
clip_rect = gfx::ToEnclosingRect(gfx::SkRectToRectF(sk_clip_rect));
}
if (!scroll_rect.IsEmpty())
SchedulePaintIfNotInClip(scroll_rect, clip_rect);
for (size_t i = 0; i < copy_rects.size(); ++i) {
gfx::Rect rect = gfx::SubtractRects(copy_rects[i], scroll_rect);
if (rect.IsEmpty())
continue;
SchedulePaintIfNotInClip(rect, clip_rect);
#if defined(OS_WIN)
gfx::Rect screen_rect = GetViewBounds();
gfx::Rect invalid_screen_rect(rect);
invalid_screen_rect.Offset(screen_rect.x(), screen_rect.y());
HWND hwnd = window_->GetRootWindow()->GetAcceleratedWidget();
PaintPluginWindowsHelper(hwnd, invalid_screen_rect);
#endif // defined(OS_WIN)
}
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 114,813
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void reflectedTreatNullAsNullStringTreatUndefinedAsNullStringCustomURLAttrAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_FOR_V8STRINGRESOURCE_VOID(V8StringResource<WithUndefinedOrNullCheck>, cppValue, jsValue);
CustomElementCallbackDispatcher::CallbackDeliveryScope deliveryScope;
imp->setAttribute(HTMLNames::customContentURLAttrAttr, cppValue);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 121,948
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int nfs4_sequence_done(struct rpc_task *task,
struct nfs4_sequence_res *res)
{
return nfs40_sequence_done(task, res);
}
Commit Message: NFS: Fix a NULL pointer dereference of migration recovery ops for v4.2 client
---Steps to Reproduce--
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
<nfs-client>
# mount -t nfs nfs-server:/nfs/ /mnt/
# ll /mnt/*/
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt,refer=/nfs/old/@nfs-server)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
# service nfs restart
<nfs-client>
# ll /mnt/*/ --->>>>> oops here
[ 5123.102925] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 5123.103363] IP: [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.103752] PGD 587b9067 PUD 3cbf5067 PMD 0
[ 5123.104131] Oops: 0000 [#1]
[ 5123.104529] Modules linked in: nfsv4(OE) nfs(OE) fscache(E) nfsd(OE) xfs libcrc32c iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ppdev vmw_balloon parport_pc parport i2c_piix4 shpchp auth_rpcgss nfs_acl vmw_vmci lockd grace sunrpc vmwgfx drm_kms_helper ttm drm mptspi serio_raw scsi_transport_spi e1000 mptscsih mptbase ata_generic pata_acpi [last unloaded: nfsd]
[ 5123.105887] CPU: 0 PID: 15853 Comm: ::1-manager Tainted: G OE 4.2.0-rc6+ #214
[ 5123.106358] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/20/2014
[ 5123.106860] task: ffff88007620f300 ti: ffff88005877c000 task.ti: ffff88005877c000
[ 5123.107363] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa03ed38b>] [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.107909] RSP: 0018:ffff88005877fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 5123.108435] RAX: ffff880053f3bc00 RBX: ffff88006ce6c908 RCX: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.108968] RDX: ffffea0000e6d940 RSI: ffff8800399a0000 RDI: ffff88006ce6c908
[ 5123.109503] RBP: ffff88005877fe28 R08: ffffffff81c708a0 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 5123.110045] R10: 00000000000001a2 R11: ffff88003ba7f5c8 R12: ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.110618] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880053a0d240 R15: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.111169] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffffff81c27000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5123.111726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5123.112286] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000054cac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
[ 5123.112888] Stack:
[ 5123.113458] ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 00000000000167d0 0000000000000000
[ 5123.114049] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000a7ec82c6
[ 5123.114662] ffff88005877fe18 ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.115264] Call Trace:
[ 5123.115868] [<ffffffffa03fb44b>] nfs4_try_migration+0xbb/0x220 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.116487] [<ffffffffa03fcb3b>] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x4ab/0x7b0 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117104] [<ffffffffa03fc690>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x510/0x510 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117813] [<ffffffff810a4527>] kthread+0xd7/0xf0
[ 5123.118456] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.119108] [<ffffffff816d9cdf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 5123.119723] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.120329] Code: 4c 8b 6a 58 74 17 eb 52 48 8d 55 a8 89 c6 4c 89 e7 e8 4a b5 ff ff 8b 45 b0 85 c0 74 1c 4c 89 f9 48 8b 55 90 48 8b 75 98 48 89 df <41> ff 55 00 3d e8 d8 ff ff 41 89 c6 74 cf 48 8b 4d c8 65 48 33
[ 5123.121643] RIP [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.122308] RSP <ffff88005877fdb8>
[ 5123.122942] CR2: 0000000000000000
Fixes: ec011fe847 ("NFS: Introduce a vector of migration recovery ops")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 57,238
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: selaGetSelnames(SELA *sela)
{
char *selname;
l_int32 i, n;
SEL *sel;
SARRAY *sa;
PROCNAME("selaGetSelnames");
if (!sela)
return (SARRAY *)ERROR_PTR("sela not defined", procName, NULL);
if ((n = selaGetCount(sela)) == 0)
return (SARRAY *)ERROR_PTR("no sels in sela", procName, NULL);
if ((sa = sarrayCreate(n)) == NULL)
return (SARRAY *)ERROR_PTR("sa not made", procName, NULL);
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
sel = selaGetSel(sela, i);
selname = selGetName(sel);
sarrayAddString(sa, selname, L_COPY);
}
return sa;
}
Commit Message: Security fixes: expect final changes for release 1.75.3.
* Fixed a debian security issue with fscanf() reading a string with
possible buffer overflow.
* There were also a few similar situations with sscanf().
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 84,236
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int LvmBundle_process(LVM_INT16 *pIn,
LVM_INT16 *pOut,
int frameCount,
EffectContext *pContext){
LVM_ControlParams_t ActiveParams; /* Current control Parameters */
LVM_ReturnStatus_en LvmStatus = LVM_SUCCESS; /* Function call status */
LVM_INT16 *pOutTmp;
if (pContext->config.outputCfg.accessMode == EFFECT_BUFFER_ACCESS_WRITE){
pOutTmp = pOut;
}else if (pContext->config.outputCfg.accessMode == EFFECT_BUFFER_ACCESS_ACCUMULATE){
if (pContext->pBundledContext->frameCount != frameCount) {
if (pContext->pBundledContext->workBuffer != NULL) {
free(pContext->pBundledContext->workBuffer);
}
pContext->pBundledContext->workBuffer =
(LVM_INT16 *)malloc(frameCount * sizeof(LVM_INT16) * 2);
pContext->pBundledContext->frameCount = frameCount;
}
pOutTmp = pContext->pBundledContext->workBuffer;
}else{
ALOGV("LVM_ERROR : LvmBundle_process invalid access mode");
return -EINVAL;
}
#ifdef LVM_PCM
fwrite(pIn, frameCount*sizeof(LVM_INT16)*2, 1, pContext->pBundledContext->PcmInPtr);
fflush(pContext->pBundledContext->PcmInPtr);
#endif
/* Process the samples */
LvmStatus = LVM_Process(pContext->pBundledContext->hInstance, /* Instance handle */
pIn, /* Input buffer */
pOutTmp, /* Output buffer */
(LVM_UINT16)frameCount, /* Number of samples to read */
0); /* Audo Time */
LVM_ERROR_CHECK(LvmStatus, "LVM_Process", "LvmBundle_process")
if(LvmStatus != LVM_SUCCESS) return -EINVAL;
#ifdef LVM_PCM
fwrite(pOutTmp, frameCount*sizeof(LVM_INT16)*2, 1, pContext->pBundledContext->PcmOutPtr);
fflush(pContext->pBundledContext->PcmOutPtr);
#endif
if (pContext->config.outputCfg.accessMode == EFFECT_BUFFER_ACCESS_ACCUMULATE){
for (int i=0; i<frameCount*2; i++){
pOut[i] = clamp16((LVM_INT32)pOut[i] + (LVM_INT32)pOutTmp[i]);
}
}
return 0;
} /* end LvmBundle_process */
Commit Message: audio effects: fix heap overflow
Check consistency of effect command reply sizes before
copying to reply address.
Also add null pointer check on reply size.
Also remove unused parameter warning.
Bug: 21953516.
Change-Id: I4cf00c12eaed696af28f3b7613f7e36f47a160c4
(cherry picked from commit 0f714a464d2425afe00d6450535e763131b40844)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 157,404
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool PaintLayerScrollableArea::UserInputScrollable(
ScrollbarOrientation orientation) const {
if (orientation == kVerticalScrollbar &&
GetLayoutBox()->GetDocument().IsVerticalScrollEnforced()) {
return false;
}
if (GetLayoutBox()->IsIntrinsicallyScrollable(orientation))
return true;
if (GetLayoutBox()->IsLayoutView()) {
Document& document = GetLayoutBox()->GetDocument();
Element* fullscreen_element = Fullscreen::FullscreenElementFrom(document);
if (fullscreen_element && fullscreen_element != document.documentElement())
return false;
ScrollbarMode h_mode;
ScrollbarMode v_mode;
ToLayoutView(GetLayoutBox())->CalculateScrollbarModes(h_mode, v_mode);
ScrollbarMode mode =
(orientation == kHorizontalScrollbar) ? h_mode : v_mode;
return mode == kScrollbarAuto || mode == kScrollbarAlwaysOn;
}
EOverflow overflow_style = (orientation == kHorizontalScrollbar)
? GetLayoutBox()->StyleRef().OverflowX()
: GetLayoutBox()->StyleRef().OverflowY();
return (overflow_style == EOverflow::kScroll ||
overflow_style == EOverflow::kAuto ||
overflow_style == EOverflow::kOverlay);
}
Commit Message: Always call UpdateCompositedScrollOffset, not just for the root layer
Bug: 927560
Change-Id: I1d5522aae4f11dd3f5b8947bb089bac1bf19bdb4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1452701
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mason Freed <masonfreed@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#628942}
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 130,153
|
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