instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void NetworkChangeNotifierMac::OnNetworkConfigChange(CFArrayRef changed_keys) {
#if defined(OS_IOS)
NOTREACHED();
#else
DCHECK_EQ(run_loop_.get(), CFRunLoopGetCurrent());
for (CFIndex i = 0; i < CFArrayGetCount(changed_keys); ++i) {
CFStringRef key = static_cast<CFStringRef>(
CFArrayGetValueAtIndex(changed_keys, i));
if (CFStringHasSuffix(key, kSCEntNetIPv4) ||
CFStringHasSuffix(key, kSCEntNetIPv6)) {
NotifyObserversOfIPAddressChange();
return;
}
if (CFStringHasSuffix(key, kSCEntNetInterface)) {
} else {
NOTREACHED();
}
}
#endif // defined(OS_IOS)
}
Commit Message: Replace base::MakeUnique with std::make_unique in net/.
base/memory/ptr_util.h includes will be cleaned up later.
Bug: 755727
Change-Id: Ibaf46f05c9b02b76f9a91e819984b087a8c0d434
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/627300
Commit-Queue: Jeremy Roman <jbroman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Bence Béky <bnc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498123}
CWE ID: CWE-311
| 0
| 156,290
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void SetPSDPixel(Image *image,const size_t channels,
const ssize_t type,const size_t packet_size,const Quantum pixel,Quantum *q,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
PixelInfo
*color;
if (type == 0)
{
if (packet_size == 1)
SetPixelIndex(image,ScaleQuantumToChar(pixel),q);
else
SetPixelIndex(image,ScaleQuantumToShort(pixel),q);
}
color=image->colormap+(ssize_t) ConstrainColormapIndex(image,
(ssize_t) GetPixelIndex(image,q),exception);
if ((type == 0) && (channels > 1))
return;
else
color->alpha=(MagickRealType) pixel;
SetPixelViaPixelInfo(image,color,q);
return;
}
switch (type)
{
case -1:
{
SetPixelAlpha(image,pixel,q);
break;
}
case -2:
case 0:
{
SetPixelRed(image,pixel,q);
break;
}
case -3:
case 1:
{
SetPixelGreen(image,pixel,q);
break;
}
case -4:
case 2:
{
SetPixelBlue(image,pixel,q);
break;
}
case 3:
{
if (image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
SetPixelBlack(image,pixel,q);
else
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
SetPixelAlpha(image,pixel,q);
break;
}
case 4:
{
if ((IssRGBCompatibleColorspace(image->colorspace) != MagickFalse) &&
(channels > 3))
break;
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
SetPixelAlpha(image,pixel,q);
break;
}
}
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1451
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 91,378
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void dump_attr(FILE *ofd, struct nlattr *attr, int prefix)
{
int len = nla_len(attr);
dump_hex(ofd, nla_data(attr), len, prefix);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 12,894
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void av_register_codec_parser(AVCodecParser *parser)
{
do {
parser->next = av_first_parser;
} while (parser->next != avpriv_atomic_ptr_cas((void * volatile *)&av_first_parser, parser->next, parser));
}
Commit Message: avcodec/parser: reset indexes on realloc failure
Fixes Ticket2982
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 28,024
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void pdf_populate_next_xref_level(fz_context *ctx, pdf_document *doc)
{
pdf_xref *xref;
doc->xref_sections = fz_resize_array(ctx, doc->xref_sections, doc->num_xref_sections + 1, sizeof(pdf_xref));
doc->num_xref_sections++;
xref = &doc->xref_sections[doc->num_xref_sections - 1];
xref->subsec = NULL;
xref->num_objects = 0;
xref->trailer = NULL;
xref->pre_repair_trailer = NULL;
xref->unsaved_sigs = NULL;
xref->unsaved_sigs_end = NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 16,714
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static PHP_GINIT_FUNCTION(libxml)
{
libxml_globals->stream_context = NULL;
libxml_globals->error_buffer.c = NULL;
libxml_globals->error_list = NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 1
| 164,744
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void console_start(struct console *console)
{
console_lock();
console->flags |= CON_ENABLED;
console_unlock();
}
Commit Message: printk: fix buffer overflow when calling log_prefix function from call_console_drivers
This patch corrects a buffer overflow in kernels from 3.0 to 3.4 when calling
log_prefix() function from call_console_drivers().
This bug existed in previous releases but has been revealed with commit
162a7e7500f9664636e649ba59defe541b7c2c60 (2.6.39 => 3.0) that made changes
about how to allocate memory for early printk buffer (use of memblock_alloc).
It disappears with commit 7ff9554bb578ba02166071d2d487b7fc7d860d62 (3.4 => 3.5)
that does a refactoring of printk buffer management.
In log_prefix(), the access to "p[0]", "p[1]", "p[2]" or
"simple_strtoul(&p[1], &endp, 10)" may cause a buffer overflow as this
function is called from call_console_drivers by passing "&LOG_BUF(cur_index)"
where the index must be masked to do not exceed the buffer's boundary.
The trick is to prepare in call_console_drivers() a buffer with the necessary
data (PRI field of syslog message) to be safely evaluated in log_prefix().
This patch can be applied to stable kernel branches 3.0.y, 3.2.y and 3.4.y.
Without this patch, one can freeze a server running this loop from shell :
$ export DUMMY=`cat /dev/urandom | tr -dc '12345AZERTYUIOPQSDFGHJKLMWXCVBNazertyuiopqsdfghjklmwxcvbn' | head -c255`
$ while true do ; echo $DUMMY > /dev/kmsg ; done
The "server freeze" depends on where memblock_alloc does allocate printk buffer :
if the buffer overflow is inside another kernel allocation the problem may not
be revealed, else the server may hangs up.
Signed-off-by: Alexandre SIMON <Alexandre.Simon@univ-lorraine.fr>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 33,440
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int mmu_memory_cache_free_objects(struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache *cache)
{
return cache->nobjs;
}
Commit Message: nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <nyh@il.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <xinhao.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 37,526
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void kvm_arch_commit_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm,
struct kvm_userspace_memory_region *mem,
struct kvm_memory_slot old,
int user_alloc)
{
int nr_mmu_pages = 0, npages = mem->memory_size >> PAGE_SHIFT;
if (!user_alloc && !old.user_alloc && old.rmap && !npages) {
int ret;
down_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
ret = do_munmap(current->mm, old.userspace_addr,
old.npages * PAGE_SIZE);
up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
if (ret < 0)
printk(KERN_WARNING
"kvm_vm_ioctl_set_memory_region: "
"failed to munmap memory\n");
}
if (!kvm->arch.n_requested_mmu_pages)
nr_mmu_pages = kvm_mmu_calculate_mmu_pages(kvm);
spin_lock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
if (nr_mmu_pages)
kvm_mmu_change_mmu_pages(kvm, nr_mmu_pages);
kvm_mmu_slot_remove_write_access(kvm, mem->slot);
spin_unlock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 20,715
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int date_period_it_has_more(zend_object_iterator *iter TSRMLS_DC)
{
date_period_it *iterator = (date_period_it *)iter;
php_period_obj *object = iterator->object;
timelib_time *it_time = object->current;
/* apply modification if it's not the first iteration */
if (!object->include_start_date || iterator->current_index > 0) {
it_time->have_relative = 1;
it_time->relative = *object->interval;
it_time->sse_uptodate = 0;
timelib_update_ts(it_time, NULL);
timelib_update_from_sse(it_time);
}
if (object->end) {
return object->current->sse < object->end->sse ? SUCCESS : FAILURE;
} else {
return (iterator->current_index < object->recurrences) ? SUCCESS : FAILURE;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 6,328
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderBox::setOverrideContainingBlockContentLogicalHeight(LayoutUnit logicalHeight)
{
if (!gOverrideContainingBlockLogicalHeightMap)
gOverrideContainingBlockLogicalHeightMap = new OverrideSizeMap;
gOverrideContainingBlockLogicalHeightMap->set(this, logicalHeight);
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 116,601
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gx_dc_pattern2_get_color_space(const gx_device_color * pdevc)
{
gs_pattern2_instance_t *pinst =
(gs_pattern2_instance_t *)pdevc->ccolor.pattern;
const gs_shading_t *psh = pinst->templat.Shading;
return psh->params.ColorSpace;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 1,716
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: long long mkvparser::GetUIntLength(IMkvReader* pReader, long long pos,
long& len) {
assert(pReader);
assert(pos >= 0);
long long total, available;
int status = pReader->Length(&total, &available);
assert(status >= 0);
assert((total < 0) || (available <= total));
len = 1;
if (pos >= available)
return pos; // too few bytes available
unsigned char b;
status = pReader->Read(pos, 1, &b);
if (status < 0)
return status;
assert(status == 0);
if (b == 0) // we can't handle u-int values larger than 8 bytes
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
unsigned char m = 0x80;
while (!(b & m)) {
m >>= 1;
++len;
}
return 0; // success
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 173,824
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int do_ssh_connection_init(Ssh ssh, unsigned char c)
{
/*
* Ordinary SSH begins with the banner "SSH-x.y-...". This is just
* the ssh-connection part, extracted and given a trivial binary
* packet protocol, so we replace 'SSH-' at the start with a new
* name. In proper SSH style (though of course this part of the
* proper SSH protocol _isn't_ subject to this kind of
* DNS-domain-based extension), we define the new name in our
* extension space.
*/
static const char protoname[] =
"SSHCONNECTION@putty.projects.tartarus.org-";
struct do_ssh_connection_init_state {
int crLine;
int vslen;
char version[10];
char *vstring;
int vstrsize;
int i;
};
crState(do_ssh_connection_init_state);
crBeginState;
/* Search for a line beginning with the protocol name prefix in
* the input. */
for (;;) {
for (s->i = 0; protoname[s->i]; s->i++) {
if ((char)c != protoname[s->i]) goto no;
crReturn(1);
}
break;
no:
while (c != '\012')
crReturn(1);
crReturn(1);
}
s->vstrsize = sizeof(protoname) + 16;
s->vstring = snewn(s->vstrsize, char);
strcpy(s->vstring, protoname);
s->vslen = strlen(protoname);
s->i = 0;
while (1) {
if (s->vslen >= s->vstrsize - 1) {
s->vstrsize += 16;
s->vstring = sresize(s->vstring, s->vstrsize, char);
}
s->vstring[s->vslen++] = c;
if (s->i >= 0) {
if (c == '-') {
s->version[s->i] = '\0';
s->i = -1;
} else if (s->i < sizeof(s->version) - 1)
s->version[s->i++] = c;
} else if (c == '\012')
break;
crReturn(1); /* get another char */
}
ssh->agentfwd_enabled = FALSE;
ssh->rdpkt2_bare_state.incoming_sequence = 0;
s->vstring[s->vslen] = 0;
s->vstring[strcspn(s->vstring, "\015\012")] = '\0';/* remove EOL chars */
logeventf(ssh, "Server version: %s", s->vstring);
ssh_detect_bugs(ssh, s->vstring);
/*
* Decide which SSH protocol version to support. This is easy in
* bare ssh-connection mode: only 2.0 is legal.
*/
if (ssh_versioncmp(s->version, "2.0") < 0) {
bombout(("Server announces compatibility with SSH-1 in bare ssh-connection protocol"));
crStop(0);
}
if (conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshprot) == 0) {
bombout(("Bare ssh-connection protocol cannot be run in SSH-1-only mode"));
crStop(0);
}
ssh->version = 2;
logeventf(ssh, "Using bare ssh-connection protocol");
/* Send the version string, if we haven't already */
ssh_send_verstring(ssh, protoname, s->version);
/*
* Initialise bare connection protocol.
*/
ssh->protocol = ssh2_bare_connection_protocol;
ssh2_bare_connection_protocol_setup(ssh);
ssh->s_rdpkt = ssh2_bare_connection_rdpkt;
update_specials_menu(ssh->frontend);
ssh->state = SSH_STATE_BEFORE_SIZE;
ssh->pinger = pinger_new(ssh->conf, &ssh_backend, ssh);
/*
* Get authconn (really just conn) under way.
*/
do_ssh2_authconn(ssh, NULL, 0, NULL);
sfree(s->vstring);
crFinish(0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 8,513
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LayerTreeHostImpl::RegisterScrollbarAnimationController(
int scroll_layer_id) {
if (settings().scrollbar_animator == LayerTreeSettings::NO_ANIMATOR)
return;
if (ScrollbarAnimationControllerForId(scroll_layer_id))
return;
scrollbar_animation_controllers_[scroll_layer_id] =
active_tree_->CreateScrollbarAnimationController(scroll_layer_id);
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 137,322
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PPB_URLLoader_Impl::UpdateStatus() {
if (status_callback_ &&
(RecordDownloadProgress() || RecordUploadProgress())) {
status_callback_(
pp_instance(), pp_resource(),
RecordUploadProgress() ? bytes_sent_ : -1,
RecordUploadProgress() ? total_bytes_to_be_sent_ : -1,
RecordDownloadProgress() ? bytes_received_ : -1,
RecordDownloadProgress() ? total_bytes_to_be_received_ : -1);
}
}
Commit Message: Break path whereby AssociatedURLLoader::~AssociatedURLLoader() is re-entered on top of itself.
BUG=159429
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11359222
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@168150 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 102,324
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: svcxdr_tmpalloc(struct nfsd4_compoundargs *argp, u32 len)
{
struct svcxdr_tmpbuf *tb;
tb = kmalloc(sizeof(*tb) + len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tb)
return NULL;
tb->next = argp->to_free;
argp->to_free = tb;
return tb->buf;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 65,846
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PopupHeaderView::~PopupHeaderView() {
}
Commit Message: Fix UAF in Origin Info Bubble and permission settings UI.
In addition to fixing the UAF, will this also fix the problem of the bubble
showing over the previous tab (if the bubble is open when the tab it was opened
for closes).
BUG=490492
TBR=tedchoc
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1317443002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#346023}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 125,240
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool tap() const { return tap_; }
Commit Message: Pass ui::LatencyInfo correct with unified gesture detector on Aura.
BUG=379812
TEST=GestureRecognizerTest.LatencyPassedFromTouchEvent
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/309823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@274602 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 112,132
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: _archive_write_disk_header(struct archive *_a, struct archive_entry *entry)
{
struct archive_write_disk *a = (struct archive_write_disk *)_a;
struct fixup_entry *fe;
int ret, r;
archive_check_magic(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_WRITE_DISK_MAGIC,
ARCHIVE_STATE_HEADER | ARCHIVE_STATE_DATA,
"archive_write_disk_header");
archive_clear_error(&a->archive);
if (a->archive.state & ARCHIVE_STATE_DATA) {
r = _archive_write_disk_finish_entry(&a->archive);
if (r == ARCHIVE_FATAL)
return (r);
}
/* Set up for this particular entry. */
a->pst = NULL;
a->current_fixup = NULL;
a->deferred = 0;
if (a->entry) {
archive_entry_free(a->entry);
a->entry = NULL;
}
a->entry = archive_entry_clone(entry);
a->fd = -1;
a->fd_offset = 0;
a->offset = 0;
a->restore_pwd = -1;
a->uid = a->user_uid;
a->mode = archive_entry_mode(a->entry);
if (archive_entry_size_is_set(a->entry))
a->filesize = archive_entry_size(a->entry);
else
a->filesize = -1;
archive_strcpy(&(a->_name_data), archive_entry_pathname(a->entry));
a->name = a->_name_data.s;
archive_clear_error(&a->archive);
/*
* Clean up the requested path. This is necessary for correct
* dir restores; the dir restore logic otherwise gets messed
* up by nonsense like "dir/.".
*/
ret = cleanup_pathname(a);
if (ret != ARCHIVE_OK)
return (ret);
/*
* Query the umask so we get predictable mode settings.
* This gets done on every call to _write_header in case the
* user edits their umask during the extraction for some
* reason.
*/
umask(a->user_umask = umask(0));
/* Figure out what we need to do for this entry. */
a->todo = TODO_MODE_BASE;
if (a->flags & ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_PERM) {
a->todo |= TODO_MODE_FORCE; /* Be pushy about permissions. */
/*
* SGID requires an extra "check" step because we
* cannot easily predict the GID that the system will
* assign. (Different systems assign GIDs to files
* based on a variety of criteria, including process
* credentials and the gid of the enclosing
* directory.) We can only restore the SGID bit if
* the file has the right GID, and we only know the
* GID if we either set it (see set_ownership) or if
* we've actually called stat() on the file after it
* was restored. Since there are several places at
* which we might verify the GID, we need a TODO bit
* to keep track.
*/
if (a->mode & S_ISGID)
a->todo |= TODO_SGID | TODO_SGID_CHECK;
/*
* Verifying the SUID is simpler, but can still be
* done in multiple ways, hence the separate "check" bit.
*/
if (a->mode & S_ISUID)
a->todo |= TODO_SUID | TODO_SUID_CHECK;
} else {
/*
* User didn't request full permissions, so don't
* restore SUID, SGID bits and obey umask.
*/
a->mode &= ~S_ISUID;
a->mode &= ~S_ISGID;
a->mode &= ~S_ISVTX;
a->mode &= ~a->user_umask;
}
if (a->flags & ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_OWNER)
a->todo |= TODO_OWNER;
if (a->flags & ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_TIME)
a->todo |= TODO_TIMES;
if (a->flags & ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_ACL) {
if (archive_entry_filetype(a->entry) == AE_IFDIR)
a->deferred |= TODO_ACLS;
else
a->todo |= TODO_ACLS;
}
if (a->flags & ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_MAC_METADATA) {
if (archive_entry_filetype(a->entry) == AE_IFDIR)
a->deferred |= TODO_MAC_METADATA;
else
a->todo |= TODO_MAC_METADATA;
}
#if defined(__APPLE__) && defined(UF_COMPRESSED) && defined(HAVE_ZLIB_H)
if ((a->flags & ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_NO_HFS_COMPRESSION) == 0) {
unsigned long set, clear;
archive_entry_fflags(a->entry, &set, &clear);
if ((set & ~clear) & UF_COMPRESSED) {
a->todo |= TODO_HFS_COMPRESSION;
a->decmpfs_block_count = (unsigned)-1;
}
}
if ((a->flags & ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_HFS_COMPRESSION_FORCED) != 0 &&
(a->mode & AE_IFMT) == AE_IFREG && a->filesize > 0) {
a->todo |= TODO_HFS_COMPRESSION;
a->decmpfs_block_count = (unsigned)-1;
}
{
const char *p;
/* Check if the current file name is a type of the
* resource fork file. */
p = strrchr(a->name, '/');
if (p == NULL)
p = a->name;
else
p++;
if (p[0] == '.' && p[1] == '_') {
/* Do not compress "._XXX" files. */
a->todo &= ~TODO_HFS_COMPRESSION;
if (a->filesize > 0)
a->todo |= TODO_APPLEDOUBLE;
}
}
#endif
if (a->flags & ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_XATTR)
a->todo |= TODO_XATTR;
if (a->flags & ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_FFLAGS)
a->todo |= TODO_FFLAGS;
if (a->flags & ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_SYMLINKS) {
ret = check_symlinks(a);
if (ret != ARCHIVE_OK)
return (ret);
}
#if defined(HAVE_FCHDIR) && defined(PATH_MAX)
/* If path exceeds PATH_MAX, shorten the path. */
edit_deep_directories(a);
#endif
ret = restore_entry(a);
#if defined(__APPLE__) && defined(UF_COMPRESSED) && defined(HAVE_ZLIB_H)
/*
* Check if the filesystem the file is restoring on supports
* HFS+ Compression. If not, cancel HFS+ Compression.
*/
if (a->todo | TODO_HFS_COMPRESSION) {
/*
* NOTE: UF_COMPRESSED is ignored even if the filesystem
* supports HFS+ Compression because the file should
* have at least an extended attriute "com.apple.decmpfs"
* before the flag is set to indicate that the file have
* been compressed. If hte filesystem does not support
* HFS+ Compression the system call will fail.
*/
if (a->fd < 0 || fchflags(a->fd, UF_COMPRESSED) != 0)
a->todo &= ~TODO_HFS_COMPRESSION;
}
#endif
/*
* TODO: There are rumours that some extended attributes must
* be restored before file data is written. If this is true,
* then we either need to write all extended attributes both
* before and after restoring the data, or find some rule for
* determining which must go first and which last. Due to the
* many ways people are using xattrs, this may prove to be an
* intractable problem.
*/
#ifdef HAVE_FCHDIR
/* If we changed directory above, restore it here. */
if (a->restore_pwd >= 0) {
r = fchdir(a->restore_pwd);
if (r != 0) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, errno, "chdir() failure");
ret = ARCHIVE_FATAL;
}
close(a->restore_pwd);
a->restore_pwd = -1;
}
#endif
/*
* Fixup uses the unedited pathname from archive_entry_pathname(),
* because it is relative to the base dir and the edited path
* might be relative to some intermediate dir as a result of the
* deep restore logic.
*/
if (a->deferred & TODO_MODE) {
fe = current_fixup(a, archive_entry_pathname(entry));
if (fe == NULL)
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
fe->fixup |= TODO_MODE_BASE;
fe->mode = a->mode;
}
if ((a->deferred & TODO_TIMES)
&& (archive_entry_mtime_is_set(entry)
|| archive_entry_atime_is_set(entry))) {
fe = current_fixup(a, archive_entry_pathname(entry));
if (fe == NULL)
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
fe->mode = a->mode;
fe->fixup |= TODO_TIMES;
if (archive_entry_atime_is_set(entry)) {
fe->atime = archive_entry_atime(entry);
fe->atime_nanos = archive_entry_atime_nsec(entry);
} else {
/* If atime is unset, use start time. */
fe->atime = a->start_time;
fe->atime_nanos = 0;
}
if (archive_entry_mtime_is_set(entry)) {
fe->mtime = archive_entry_mtime(entry);
fe->mtime_nanos = archive_entry_mtime_nsec(entry);
} else {
/* If mtime is unset, use start time. */
fe->mtime = a->start_time;
fe->mtime_nanos = 0;
}
if (archive_entry_birthtime_is_set(entry)) {
fe->birthtime = archive_entry_birthtime(entry);
fe->birthtime_nanos = archive_entry_birthtime_nsec(entry);
} else {
/* If birthtime is unset, use mtime. */
fe->birthtime = fe->mtime;
fe->birthtime_nanos = fe->mtime_nanos;
}
}
if (a->deferred & TODO_ACLS) {
fe = current_fixup(a, archive_entry_pathname(entry));
if (fe == NULL)
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
fe->fixup |= TODO_ACLS;
archive_acl_copy(&fe->acl, archive_entry_acl(entry));
}
if (a->deferred & TODO_MAC_METADATA) {
const void *metadata;
size_t metadata_size;
metadata = archive_entry_mac_metadata(a->entry, &metadata_size);
if (metadata != NULL && metadata_size > 0) {
fe = current_fixup(a, archive_entry_pathname(entry));
if (fe == NULL)
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
fe->mac_metadata = malloc(metadata_size);
if (fe->mac_metadata != NULL) {
memcpy(fe->mac_metadata, metadata, metadata_size);
fe->mac_metadata_size = metadata_size;
fe->fixup |= TODO_MAC_METADATA;
}
}
}
if (a->deferred & TODO_FFLAGS) {
fe = current_fixup(a, archive_entry_pathname(entry));
if (fe == NULL)
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
fe->fixup |= TODO_FFLAGS;
/* TODO: Complete this.. defer fflags from below. */
}
/* We've created the object and are ready to pour data into it. */
if (ret >= ARCHIVE_WARN)
a->archive.state = ARCHIVE_STATE_DATA;
/*
* If it's not open, tell our client not to try writing.
* In particular, dirs, links, etc, don't get written to.
*/
if (a->fd < 0) {
archive_entry_set_size(entry, 0);
a->filesize = 0;
}
return (ret);
}
Commit Message: Add ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS option
This fixes a directory traversal in the cpio tool.
CWE ID: CWE-22
| 0
| 43,892
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct net_device *netdev_upper_get_next_dev_rcu(struct net_device *dev,
struct list_head **iter)
{
struct netdev_adjacent *upper;
WARN_ON_ONCE(!rcu_read_lock_held() && !lockdep_rtnl_is_held());
upper = list_entry_rcu((*iter)->next, struct netdev_adjacent, list);
if (&upper->list == &dev->adj_list.upper)
return NULL;
*iter = &upper->list;
return upper->dev;
}
Commit Message: tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 48,902
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ProcQueryFont(ClientPtr client)
{
xQueryFontReply *reply;
FontPtr pFont;
int rc;
REQUEST(xResourceReq);
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xResourceReq);
rc = dixLookupFontable(&pFont, stuff->id, client, DixGetAttrAccess);
if (rc != Success)
return rc;
{
xCharInfo *pmax = FONTINKMAX(pFont);
xCharInfo *pmin = FONTINKMIN(pFont);
int nprotoxcistructs;
int rlength;
nprotoxcistructs = (pmax->rightSideBearing == pmin->rightSideBearing &&
pmax->leftSideBearing == pmin->leftSideBearing &&
pmax->descent == pmin->descent &&
pmax->ascent == pmin->ascent &&
pmax->characterWidth == pmin->characterWidth) ?
0 : N2dChars(pFont);
rlength = sizeof(xQueryFontReply) +
FONTINFONPROPS(FONTCHARSET(pFont)) * sizeof(xFontProp) +
nprotoxcistructs * sizeof(xCharInfo);
reply = calloc(1, rlength);
if (!reply) {
return BadAlloc;
}
reply->type = X_Reply;
reply->length = bytes_to_int32(rlength - sizeof(xGenericReply));
reply->sequenceNumber = client->sequence;
QueryFont(pFont, reply, nprotoxcistructs);
WriteReplyToClient(client, rlength, reply);
free(reply);
return Success;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 15,009
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BaseMultipleFieldsDateAndTimeInputType::clearValue()
{
RefPtr<HTMLInputElement> input(element());
input->setValue("", DispatchInputAndChangeEvent);
input->updateClearButtonVisibility();
}
Commit Message: Fix reentrance of BaseMultipleFieldsDateAndTimeInputType::destroyShadowSubtree.
destroyShadowSubtree could dispatch 'blur' event unexpectedly because
element()->focused() had incorrect information. We make sure it has
correct information by checking if the UA shadow root contains the
focused element.
BUG=257353
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/19067004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@154086 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 112,452
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void xen_netbk_queue_tx_skb(struct xenvif *vif, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct xen_netbk *netbk = vif->netbk;
skb_queue_tail(&netbk->rx_queue, skb);
xen_netbk_kick_thread(netbk);
}
Commit Message: xen/netback: don't leak pages on failure in xen_netbk_tx_check_gop.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattjd@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 34,013
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BrowserEventRouter::DispatchSimpleBrowserEvent(
Profile* profile, const int window_id, const char* event_name) {
if (!profile_->IsSameProfile(profile))
return;
scoped_ptr<ListValue> args(new ListValue());
args->Append(Value::CreateIntegerValue(window_id));
DispatchEvent(profile, event_name, args.Pass(),
EventRouter::USER_GESTURE_UNKNOWN);
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 117,705
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int64_t asf_read_pts(AVFormatContext *s, int stream_index,
int64_t *ppos, int64_t pos_limit)
{
ASFContext *asf = s->priv_data;
AVPacket pkt1, *pkt = &pkt1;
ASFStream *asf_st;
int64_t pts;
int64_t pos = *ppos;
int i;
int64_t start_pos[ASF_MAX_STREAMS];
for (i = 0; i < s->nb_streams; i++)
start_pos[i] = pos;
if (s->packet_size > 0)
pos = (pos + s->packet_size - 1 - s->internal->data_offset) /
s->packet_size * s->packet_size +
s->internal->data_offset;
*ppos = pos;
if (avio_seek(s->pb, pos, SEEK_SET) < 0)
return AV_NOPTS_VALUE;
ff_read_frame_flush(s);
asf_reset_header(s);
for (;;) {
if (av_read_frame(s, pkt) < 0) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_INFO, "asf_read_pts failed\n");
return AV_NOPTS_VALUE;
}
pts = pkt->dts;
if (pkt->flags & AV_PKT_FLAG_KEY) {
i = pkt->stream_index;
asf_st = &asf->streams[s->streams[i]->id];
pos = asf_st->packet_pos;
av_assert1(pkt->pos == asf_st->packet_pos);
av_add_index_entry(s->streams[i], pos, pts, pkt->size,
pos - start_pos[i] + 1, AVINDEX_KEYFRAME);
start_pos[i] = asf_st->packet_pos + 1;
if (pkt->stream_index == stream_index) {
av_packet_unref(pkt);
break;
}
}
av_packet_unref(pkt);
}
*ppos = pos;
return pts;
}
Commit Message: avformat/asfdec: Fix DoS in asf_build_simple_index()
Fixes: Missing EOF check in loop
No testcase
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 61,361
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: smp_fetch_url_ip(struct proxy *px, struct session *l4, void *l7, unsigned int opt,
const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw)
{
struct http_txn *txn = l7;
struct sockaddr_storage addr;
CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST();
url2sa(txn->req.chn->buf->p + txn->req.sl.rq.u, txn->req.sl.rq.u_l, &addr, NULL);
if (((struct sockaddr_in *)&addr)->sin_family != AF_INET)
return 0;
smp->type = SMP_T_IPV4;
smp->data.ipv4 = ((struct sockaddr_in *)&addr)->sin_addr;
smp->flags = 0;
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 9,865
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: qboolean CL_GetLimboString( int index, char *buf ) {
if ( index >= LIMBOCHAT_HEIGHT ) {
return qfalse;
}
strncpy( buf, cl.limboChatMsgs[index], 140 );
return qtrue;
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 95,676
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WebWidget* RenderViewImpl::CreatePopup(blink::WebLocalFrame* creator,
blink::WebPopupType popup_type) {
RenderWidget* widget = RenderWidget::CreateForPopup(
this, compositor_deps_, popup_type, screen_info_,
creator->GetTaskRunner(blink::TaskType::kUnthrottled));
if (!widget)
return nullptr;
if (screen_metrics_emulator_) {
widget->SetPopupOriginAdjustmentsForEmulation(
screen_metrics_emulator_.get());
}
return widget->GetWebWidget();
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 147,957
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void V8TestObject::CustomGetterImplementedAsLongAttributeAttributeSetterCallback(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_customGetterImplementedAsLongAttribute_Setter");
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value = info[0];
test_object_v8_internal::CustomGetterImplementedAsLongAttributeAttributeSetter(v8_value, info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 134,621
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool fwnet_pd_update(struct fwnet_peer *peer,
struct fwnet_partial_datagram *pd, void *frag_buf,
unsigned frag_off, unsigned frag_len)
{
if (fwnet_frag_new(pd, frag_off, frag_len) == NULL)
return false;
memcpy(pd->pbuf + frag_off, frag_buf, frag_len);
/*
* Move list entry to beginning of list so that oldest partial
* datagrams percolate to the end of the list
*/
list_move_tail(&pd->pd_link, &peer->pd_list);
return true;
}
Commit Message: firewire: net: guard against rx buffer overflows
The IP-over-1394 driver firewire-net lacked input validation when
handling incoming fragmented datagrams. A maliciously formed fragment
with a respectively large datagram_offset would cause a memcpy past the
datagram buffer.
So, drop any packets carrying a fragment with offset + length larger
than datagram_size.
In addition, ensure that
- GASP header, unfragmented encapsulation header, or fragment
encapsulation header actually exists before we access it,
- the encapsulated datagram or fragment is of nonzero size.
Reported-by: Eyal Itkin <eyal.itkin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Eyal Itkin <eyal.itkin@gmail.com>
Fixes: CVE 2016-8633
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stefan Richter <stefanr@s5r6.in-berlin.de>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 49,343
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static Image *ReadSGIImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickSizeType
number_pixels;
MemoryInfo
*pixel_info;
register Quantum
*q;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register unsigned char
*p;
SGIInfo
iris_info;
size_t
bytes_per_pixel,
quantum;
ssize_t
count,
y,
z;
unsigned char
*pixels;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read SGI raster header.
*/
iris_info.magic=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
do
{
/*
Verify SGI identifier.
*/
if (iris_info.magic != 0x01DA)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
iris_info.storage=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
switch (iris_info.storage)
{
case 0x00: image->compression=NoCompression; break;
case 0x01: image->compression=RLECompression; break;
default:
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
iris_info.bytes_per_pixel=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
if ((iris_info.bytes_per_pixel == 0) || (iris_info.bytes_per_pixel > 2))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
iris_info.dimension=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
iris_info.columns=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
iris_info.rows=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
iris_info.depth=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
if ((iris_info.depth == 0) || (iris_info.depth > 4))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
iris_info.minimum_value=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
iris_info.maximum_value=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
iris_info.sans=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
(void) ReadBlob(image,sizeof(iris_info.name),(unsigned char *)
iris_info.name);
iris_info.name[sizeof(iris_info.name)-1]='\0';
if (*iris_info.name != '\0')
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"label",iris_info.name,exception);
iris_info.pixel_format=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
if (iris_info.pixel_format != 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
count=ReadBlob(image,sizeof(iris_info.filler),iris_info.filler);
(void) count;
image->columns=iris_info.columns;
image->rows=iris_info.rows;
image->depth=(size_t) MagickMin(iris_info.depth,MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH);
if (iris_info.pixel_format == 0)
image->depth=(size_t) MagickMin((size_t) 8*
iris_info.bytes_per_pixel,MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH);
if (iris_info.depth < 3)
{
image->storage_class=PseudoClass;
image->colors=iris_info.bytes_per_pixel > 1 ? 65535 : 256;
}
if ((image_info->ping != MagickFalse) && (image_info->number_scenes != 0))
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
/*
Allocate SGI pixels.
*/
bytes_per_pixel=(size_t) iris_info.bytes_per_pixel;
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) iris_info.columns*iris_info.rows;
if ((4*bytes_per_pixel*number_pixels) != ((MagickSizeType) (size_t)
(4*bytes_per_pixel*number_pixels)))
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory(iris_info.columns,iris_info.rows*4*
bytes_per_pixel*sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
if ((int) iris_info.storage != 0x01)
{
unsigned char
*scanline;
/*
Read standard image format.
*/
scanline=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(iris_info.columns,
bytes_per_pixel*sizeof(*scanline));
if (scanline == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (z=0; z < (ssize_t) iris_info.depth; z++)
{
p=pixels+bytes_per_pixel*z;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) iris_info.rows; y++)
{
count=ReadBlob(image,bytes_per_pixel*iris_info.columns,scanline);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
break;
if (bytes_per_pixel == 2)
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) iris_info.columns; x++)
{
*p=scanline[2*x];
*(p+1)=scanline[2*x+1];
p+=8;
}
else
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) iris_info.columns; x++)
{
*p=scanline[x];
p+=4;
}
}
}
scanline=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(scanline);
}
else
{
MemoryInfo
*packet_info;
size_t
*runlength;
ssize_t
offset,
*offsets;
unsigned char
*packets;
unsigned int
data_order;
/*
Read runlength-encoded image format.
*/
offsets=(ssize_t *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) iris_info.rows,
iris_info.depth*sizeof(*offsets));
runlength=(size_t *) AcquireQuantumMemory(iris_info.rows,
iris_info.depth*sizeof(*runlength));
packet_info=AcquireVirtualMemory((size_t) iris_info.columns+10UL,4UL*
sizeof(*packets));
if ((offsets == (ssize_t *) NULL) ||
(runlength == (size_t *) NULL) ||
(packet_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL))
{
if (offsets == (ssize_t *) NULL)
offsets=(ssize_t *) RelinquishMagickMemory(offsets);
if (runlength == (size_t *) NULL)
runlength=(size_t *) RelinquishMagickMemory(runlength);
if (packet_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
packet_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(packet_info);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
packets=(unsigned char *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(packet_info);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) (iris_info.rows*iris_info.depth); i++)
offsets[i]=ReadBlobMSBSignedLong(image);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) (iris_info.rows*iris_info.depth); i++)
{
runlength[i]=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
if (runlength[i] > (4*(size_t) iris_info.columns+10))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
/*
Check data order.
*/
offset=0;
data_order=0;
for (y=0; ((y < (ssize_t) iris_info.rows) && (data_order == 0)); y++)
for (z=0; ((z < (ssize_t) iris_info.depth) && (data_order == 0)); z++)
{
if (offsets[y+z*iris_info.rows] < offset)
data_order=1;
offset=offsets[y+z*iris_info.rows];
}
offset=(ssize_t) TellBlob(image);
if (data_order == 1)
{
for (z=0; z < (ssize_t) iris_info.depth; z++)
{
p=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) iris_info.rows; y++)
{
if (offset != offsets[y+z*iris_info.rows])
{
offset=offsets[y+z*iris_info.rows];
offset=(ssize_t) SeekBlob(image,(ssize_t) offset,SEEK_SET);
}
count=ReadBlob(image,(size_t) runlength[y+z*iris_info.rows],
packets);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
break;
offset+=(ssize_t) runlength[y+z*iris_info.rows];
status=SGIDecode(bytes_per_pixel,(ssize_t)
(runlength[y+z*iris_info.rows]/bytes_per_pixel),packets,
1L*iris_info.columns,p+bytes_per_pixel*z);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
p+=(iris_info.columns*4*bytes_per_pixel);
}
}
}
else
{
MagickOffsetType
position;
position=TellBlob(image);
p=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) iris_info.rows; y++)
{
for (z=0; z < (ssize_t) iris_info.depth; z++)
{
if (offset != offsets[y+z*iris_info.rows])
{
offset=offsets[y+z*iris_info.rows];
offset=(ssize_t) SeekBlob(image,(ssize_t) offset,SEEK_SET);
}
count=ReadBlob(image,(size_t) runlength[y+z*iris_info.rows],
packets);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
break;
offset+=(ssize_t) runlength[y+z*iris_info.rows];
status=SGIDecode(bytes_per_pixel,(ssize_t)
(runlength[y+z*iris_info.rows]/bytes_per_pixel),packets,
1L*iris_info.columns,p+bytes_per_pixel*z);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
p+=(iris_info.columns*4*bytes_per_pixel);
}
offset=(ssize_t) SeekBlob(image,position,SEEK_SET);
}
packet_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(packet_info);
runlength=(size_t *) RelinquishMagickMemory(runlength);
offsets=(ssize_t *) RelinquishMagickMemory(offsets);
}
/*
Initialize image structure.
*/
image->alpha_trait=iris_info.depth == 4 ? BlendPixelTrait :
UndefinedPixelTrait;
image->columns=iris_info.columns;
image->rows=iris_info.rows;
/*
Convert SGI raster image to pixel packets.
*/
if (image->storage_class == DirectClass)
{
/*
Convert SGI image to DirectClass pixel packets.
*/
if (bytes_per_pixel == 2)
{
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*8*image->columns;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short)
((*(p+0) << 8) | (*(p+1)))),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short)
((*(p+2) << 8) | (*(p+3)))),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short)
((*(p+4) << 8) | (*(p+5)))),q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,OpaqueAlpha,q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short)
((*(p+6) << 8) | (*(p+7)))),q);
p+=8;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
y,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
else
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*4*image->columns;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*(p+1)),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*(p+2)),q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,OpaqueAlpha,q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*(p+3)),q);
p+=4;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
else
{
/*
Create grayscale map.
*/
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
/*
Convert SGI image to PseudoClass pixel packets.
*/
if (bytes_per_pixel == 2)
{
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*8*image->columns;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
quantum=(*p << 8);
quantum|=(*(p+1));
SetPixelIndex(image,(Quantum) quantum,q);
p+=8;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
y,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
else
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*4*image->columns;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelIndex(image,*p,q);
p+=4;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
(void) SyncImage(image,exception);
}
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
iris_info.magic=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
if (iris_info.magic == 0x01DA)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
} while (iris_info.magic == 0x01DA);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Commit Message: Prevent buffer overflow in BMP & SGI coders (bug report from pwchen&rayzhong of tencent)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 1
| 168,815
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AudioFlinger::EffectChain::setAudioSource_l(audio_source_t source)
{
size_t size = mEffects.size();
for (size_t i = 0; i < size; i++) {
mEffects[i]->setAudioSource(source);
}
}
Commit Message: Add EFFECT_CMD_SET_PARAM parameter checking
Bug: 30204301
Change-Id: Ib9c3ee1c2f23c96f8f7092dd9e146bc453d7a290
(cherry picked from commit e4a1d91501d47931dbae19c47815952378787ab6)
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 157,847
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MagickExport DrawInfo *DestroyDrawInfo(DrawInfo *draw_info)
{
if (draw_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"...");
assert(draw_info != (DrawInfo *) NULL);
assert(draw_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (draw_info->primitive != (char *) NULL)
draw_info->primitive=DestroyString(draw_info->primitive);
if (draw_info->text != (char *) NULL)
draw_info->text=DestroyString(draw_info->text);
if (draw_info->geometry != (char *) NULL)
draw_info->geometry=DestroyString(draw_info->geometry);
if (draw_info->tile != (Image *) NULL)
draw_info->tile=DestroyImage(draw_info->tile);
if (draw_info->fill_pattern != (Image *) NULL)
draw_info->fill_pattern=DestroyImage(draw_info->fill_pattern);
if (draw_info->stroke_pattern != (Image *) NULL)
draw_info->stroke_pattern=DestroyImage(draw_info->stroke_pattern);
if (draw_info->font != (char *) NULL)
draw_info->font=DestroyString(draw_info->font);
if (draw_info->metrics != (char *) NULL)
draw_info->metrics=DestroyString(draw_info->metrics);
if (draw_info->family != (char *) NULL)
draw_info->family=DestroyString(draw_info->family);
if (draw_info->encoding != (char *) NULL)
draw_info->encoding=DestroyString(draw_info->encoding);
if (draw_info->density != (char *) NULL)
draw_info->density=DestroyString(draw_info->density);
if (draw_info->server_name != (char *) NULL)
draw_info->server_name=(char *)
RelinquishMagickMemory(draw_info->server_name);
if (draw_info->dash_pattern != (double *) NULL)
draw_info->dash_pattern=(double *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
draw_info->dash_pattern);
if (draw_info->gradient.stops != (StopInfo *) NULL)
draw_info->gradient.stops=(StopInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
draw_info->gradient.stops);
if (draw_info->clip_mask != (char *) NULL)
draw_info->clip_mask=DestroyString(draw_info->clip_mask);
draw_info->signature=(~MagickSignature);
draw_info=(DrawInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(draw_info);
return(draw_info);
}
Commit Message: Prevent buffer overflow (bug report from Max Thrane)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 71,992
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int vrend_decode_create_surface(struct vrend_decode_ctx *ctx, uint32_t handle, uint16_t length)
{
uint32_t res_handle, format, val0, val1;
int ret;
if (length != VIRGL_OBJ_SURFACE_SIZE)
return EINVAL;
res_handle = get_buf_entry(ctx, VIRGL_OBJ_SURFACE_RES_HANDLE);
format = get_buf_entry(ctx, VIRGL_OBJ_SURFACE_FORMAT);
/* decide later if these are texture or buffer */
val0 = get_buf_entry(ctx, VIRGL_OBJ_SURFACE_BUFFER_FIRST_ELEMENT);
val1 = get_buf_entry(ctx, VIRGL_OBJ_SURFACE_BUFFER_LAST_ELEMENT);
ret = vrend_create_surface(ctx->grctx, handle, res_handle, format, val0, val1);
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 9,103
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int mov_read_stco(MOVContext *c, AVIOContext *pb, MOVAtom atom)
{
AVStream *st;
MOVStreamContext *sc;
unsigned int i, entries;
if (c->fc->nb_streams < 1)
return 0;
st = c->fc->streams[c->fc->nb_streams-1];
sc = st->priv_data;
avio_r8(pb); /* version */
avio_rb24(pb); /* flags */
entries = avio_rb32(pb);
if (!entries)
return 0;
if (entries >= UINT_MAX/sizeof(int64_t))
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
sc->chunk_offsets = av_malloc(entries * sizeof(int64_t));
if (!sc->chunk_offsets)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
sc->chunk_count = entries;
if (atom.type == MKTAG('s','t','c','o'))
for (i=0; i<entries; i++)
sc->chunk_offsets[i] = avio_rb32(pb);
else if (atom.type == MKTAG('c','o','6','4'))
for (i=0; i<entries; i++)
sc->chunk_offsets[i] = avio_rb64(pb);
else
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mov: reset dref_count on realloc to keep values consistent.
This fixes a potential crash.
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 54,539
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int vfio_msi_set_vector_signal(struct vfio_pci_device *vdev,
int vector, int fd, bool msix)
{
struct pci_dev *pdev = vdev->pdev;
struct eventfd_ctx *trigger;
int irq, ret;
if (vector < 0 || vector >= vdev->num_ctx)
return -EINVAL;
irq = pci_irq_vector(pdev, vector);
if (vdev->ctx[vector].trigger) {
free_irq(irq, vdev->ctx[vector].trigger);
irq_bypass_unregister_producer(&vdev->ctx[vector].producer);
kfree(vdev->ctx[vector].name);
eventfd_ctx_put(vdev->ctx[vector].trigger);
vdev->ctx[vector].trigger = NULL;
}
if (fd < 0)
return 0;
vdev->ctx[vector].name = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "vfio-msi%s[%d](%s)",
msix ? "x" : "", vector,
pci_name(pdev));
if (!vdev->ctx[vector].name)
return -ENOMEM;
trigger = eventfd_ctx_fdget(fd);
if (IS_ERR(trigger)) {
kfree(vdev->ctx[vector].name);
return PTR_ERR(trigger);
}
/*
* The MSIx vector table resides in device memory which may be cleared
* via backdoor resets. We don't allow direct access to the vector
* table so even if a userspace driver attempts to save/restore around
* such a reset it would be unsuccessful. To avoid this, restore the
* cached value of the message prior to enabling.
*/
if (msix) {
struct msi_msg msg;
get_cached_msi_msg(irq, &msg);
pci_write_msi_msg(irq, &msg);
}
ret = request_irq(irq, vfio_msihandler, 0,
vdev->ctx[vector].name, trigger);
if (ret) {
kfree(vdev->ctx[vector].name);
eventfd_ctx_put(trigger);
return ret;
}
vdev->ctx[vector].producer.token = trigger;
vdev->ctx[vector].producer.irq = irq;
ret = irq_bypass_register_producer(&vdev->ctx[vector].producer);
if (unlikely(ret))
dev_info(&pdev->dev,
"irq bypass producer (token %p) registration fails: %d\n",
vdev->ctx[vector].producer.token, ret);
vdev->ctx[vector].trigger = trigger;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: vfio/pci: Fix integer overflows, bitmask check
The VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS ioctl did not sufficiently sanitize
user-supplied integers, potentially allowing memory corruption. This
patch adds appropriate integer overflow checks, checks the range bounds
for VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_NONE, and also verifies that only single element
in the VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_TYPE_MASK bitmask is set.
VFIO_IRQ_SET_ACTION_TYPE_MASK is already correctly checked later in
vfio_pci_set_irqs_ioctl().
Furthermore, a kzalloc is changed to a kcalloc because the use of a
kzalloc with an integer multiplication allowed an integer overflow
condition to be reached without this patch. kcalloc checks for overflow
and should prevent a similar occurrence.
Signed-off-by: Vlad Tsyrklevich <vlad@tsyrklevich.net>
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 48,615
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: long follow_hugetlb_page(struct mm_struct *mm, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
struct page **pages, struct vm_area_struct **vmas,
unsigned long *position, unsigned long *nr_pages,
long i, unsigned int flags, int *nonblocking)
{
unsigned long pfn_offset;
unsigned long vaddr = *position;
unsigned long remainder = *nr_pages;
struct hstate *h = hstate_vma(vma);
int err = -EFAULT;
while (vaddr < vma->vm_end && remainder) {
pte_t *pte;
spinlock_t *ptl = NULL;
int absent;
struct page *page;
/*
* If we have a pending SIGKILL, don't keep faulting pages and
* potentially allocating memory.
*/
if (unlikely(fatal_signal_pending(current))) {
remainder = 0;
break;
}
/*
* Some archs (sparc64, sh*) have multiple pte_ts to
* each hugepage. We have to make sure we get the
* first, for the page indexing below to work.
*
* Note that page table lock is not held when pte is null.
*/
pte = huge_pte_offset(mm, vaddr & huge_page_mask(h),
huge_page_size(h));
if (pte)
ptl = huge_pte_lock(h, mm, pte);
absent = !pte || huge_pte_none(huge_ptep_get(pte));
/*
* When coredumping, it suits get_dump_page if we just return
* an error where there's an empty slot with no huge pagecache
* to back it. This way, we avoid allocating a hugepage, and
* the sparse dumpfile avoids allocating disk blocks, but its
* huge holes still show up with zeroes where they need to be.
*/
if (absent && (flags & FOLL_DUMP) &&
!hugetlbfs_pagecache_present(h, vma, vaddr)) {
if (pte)
spin_unlock(ptl);
remainder = 0;
break;
}
/*
* We need call hugetlb_fault for both hugepages under migration
* (in which case hugetlb_fault waits for the migration,) and
* hwpoisoned hugepages (in which case we need to prevent the
* caller from accessing to them.) In order to do this, we use
* here is_swap_pte instead of is_hugetlb_entry_migration and
* is_hugetlb_entry_hwpoisoned. This is because it simply covers
* both cases, and because we can't follow correct pages
* directly from any kind of swap entries.
*/
if (absent || is_swap_pte(huge_ptep_get(pte)) ||
((flags & FOLL_WRITE) &&
!huge_pte_write(huge_ptep_get(pte)))) {
int ret;
unsigned int fault_flags = 0;
if (pte)
spin_unlock(ptl);
if (flags & FOLL_WRITE)
fault_flags |= FAULT_FLAG_WRITE;
if (nonblocking)
fault_flags |= FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY;
if (flags & FOLL_NOWAIT)
fault_flags |= FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY |
FAULT_FLAG_RETRY_NOWAIT;
if (flags & FOLL_TRIED) {
VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(fault_flags &
FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY);
fault_flags |= FAULT_FLAG_TRIED;
}
ret = hugetlb_fault(mm, vma, vaddr, fault_flags);
if (ret & VM_FAULT_ERROR) {
err = vm_fault_to_errno(ret, flags);
remainder = 0;
break;
}
if (ret & VM_FAULT_RETRY) {
if (nonblocking)
*nonblocking = 0;
*nr_pages = 0;
/*
* VM_FAULT_RETRY must not return an
* error, it will return zero
* instead.
*
* No need to update "position" as the
* caller will not check it after
* *nr_pages is set to 0.
*/
return i;
}
continue;
}
pfn_offset = (vaddr & ~huge_page_mask(h)) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
page = pte_page(huge_ptep_get(pte));
same_page:
if (pages) {
pages[i] = mem_map_offset(page, pfn_offset);
get_page(pages[i]);
}
if (vmas)
vmas[i] = vma;
vaddr += PAGE_SIZE;
++pfn_offset;
--remainder;
++i;
if (vaddr < vma->vm_end && remainder &&
pfn_offset < pages_per_huge_page(h)) {
/*
* We use pfn_offset to avoid touching the pageframes
* of this compound page.
*/
goto same_page;
}
spin_unlock(ptl);
}
*nr_pages = remainder;
/*
* setting position is actually required only if remainder is
* not zero but it's faster not to add a "if (remainder)"
* branch.
*/
*position = vaddr;
return i ? i : err;
}
Commit Message: userfaultfd: hugetlbfs: prevent UFFDIO_COPY to fill beyond the end of i_size
This oops:
kernel BUG at fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c:484!
RIP: remove_inode_hugepages+0x3d0/0x410
Call Trace:
hugetlbfs_setattr+0xd9/0x130
notify_change+0x292/0x410
do_truncate+0x65/0xa0
do_sys_ftruncate.constprop.3+0x11a/0x180
SyS_ftruncate+0xe/0x10
tracesys+0xd9/0xde
was caused by the lack of i_size check in hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte.
mmap() can still succeed beyond the end of the i_size after vmtruncate
zapped vmas in those ranges, but the faults must not succeed, and that
includes UFFDIO_COPY.
We could differentiate the retval to userland to represent a SIGBUS like
a page fault would do (vs SIGSEGV), but it doesn't seem very useful and
we'd need to pick a random retval as there's no meaningful syscall
retval that would differentiate from SIGSEGV and SIGBUS, there's just
-EFAULT.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171016223914.2421-2-aarcange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 86,350
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static u64 sched_slice(struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq, struct sched_entity *se)
{
u64 slice = __sched_period(cfs_rq->nr_running + !se->on_rq);
for_each_sched_entity(se) {
struct load_weight *load;
struct load_weight lw;
cfs_rq = cfs_rq_of(se);
load = &cfs_rq->load;
if (unlikely(!se->on_rq)) {
lw = cfs_rq->load;
update_load_add(&lw, se->load.weight);
load = &lw;
}
slice = __calc_delta(slice, se->load.weight, load);
}
return slice;
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 92,664
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void get_xref_linear_skipped(FILE *fp, xref_t *xref)
{
int err;
char ch, buf[256];
if (xref->start != 0)
return;
/* Special case (Linearized PDF with initial startxref at 0) */
xref->is_linear = 1;
/* Seek to %%EOF */
if ((xref->end = get_next_eof(fp)) < 0)
return;
/* Locate the trailer */
err = 0;
while (!(err = ferror(fp)) && fread(buf, 1, 8, fp))
{
if (strncmp(buf, "trailer", strlen("trailer")) == 0)
break;
else if ((ftell(fp) - 9) < 0)
return;
fseek(fp, -9, SEEK_CUR);
}
if (err)
return;
/* If we found 'trailer' look backwards for 'xref' */
ch = 0;
while (SAFE_F(fp, ((ch = fgetc(fp)) != 'x')))
fseek(fp, -2, SEEK_CUR);
if (ch == 'x')
{
xref->start = ftell(fp) - 1;
fseek(fp, -1, SEEK_CUR);
}
/* Now continue to next eof ... */
fseek(fp, xref->start, SEEK_SET);
}
Commit Message: Zero and sanity check all dynamic allocs.
This addresses the memory issues in Issue #6 expressed in
calloc_some.pdf and malloc_some.pdf
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 88,588
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: __GLXcontext *__glXLookupContextByTag(__GLXclientState *cl, GLXContextTag tag)
{
int num = cl->numCurrentContexts;
if (tag < 1 || tag > num) {
return 0;
} else {
return cl->currentContexts[tag-1];
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 14,184
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void pdf_run_CS(fz_context *ctx, pdf_processor *proc, const char *name, fz_colorspace *colorspace)
{
pdf_run_processor *pr = (pdf_run_processor *)proc;
pr->dev->flags &= ~FZ_DEVFLAG_STROKECOLOR_UNDEFINED;
if (!strcmp(name, "Pattern"))
pdf_set_pattern(ctx, pr, PDF_STROKE, NULL, NULL);
else
pdf_set_colorspace(ctx, pr, PDF_STROKE, colorspace);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 475
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ModuleSystem::NativesEnabledScope::~NativesEnabledScope() {
module_system_->natives_enabled_--;
CHECK_GE(module_system_->natives_enabled_, 0);
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Don't allow built-in extensions code to be overridden
BUG=546677
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417513003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356654}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 133,081
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ParamTraits<double>::Write(Message* m, const param_type& p) {
m->WriteData(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(&p), sizeof(param_type));
}
Commit Message: Validate that paths don't contain embedded NULLs at deserialization.
BUG=166867
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11743009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@174935 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 117,409
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int flush_completed_IO(struct inode *inode)
{
ext4_io_end_t *io;
int ret = 0;
int ret2 = 0;
if (list_empty(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_completed_io_list))
return ret;
dump_completed_IO(inode);
while (!list_empty(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_completed_io_list)){
io = list_entry(EXT4_I(inode)->i_completed_io_list.next,
ext4_io_end_t, list);
/*
* Calling ext4_end_io_nolock() to convert completed
* IO to written.
*
* When ext4_sync_file() is called, run_queue() may already
* about to flush the work corresponding to this io structure.
* It will be upset if it founds the io structure related
* to the work-to-be schedule is freed.
*
* Thus we need to keep the io structure still valid here after
* convertion finished. The io structure has a flag to
* avoid double converting from both fsync and background work
* queue work.
*/
ret = ext4_end_io_nolock(io);
if (ret < 0)
ret2 = ret;
else
list_del_init(&io->list);
}
return (ret2 < 0) ? ret2 : 0;
}
Commit Message: ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <jiayingz@google.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID:
| 1
| 167,550
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void jpc_ft_fwdlift_colres(jpc_fix_t *a, int numrows, int numcols, int stride,
int parity)
{
jpc_fix_t *lptr;
jpc_fix_t *hptr;
register jpc_fix_t *lptr2;
register jpc_fix_t *hptr2;
register int n;
register int i;
int llen;
llen = (numrows + 1 - parity) >> 1;
if (numrows > 1) {
/* Apply the first lifting step. */
lptr = &a[0];
hptr = &a[llen * stride];
if (parity) {
lptr2 = lptr;
hptr2 = hptr;
for (i = 0; i < numcols; ++i) {
hptr2[0] -= lptr2[0];
++hptr2;
++lptr2;
}
hptr += stride;
}
n = numrows - llen - parity - (parity == (numrows & 1));
while (n-- > 0) {
lptr2 = lptr;
hptr2 = hptr;
for (i = 0; i < numcols; ++i) {
hptr2[0] -= jpc_fix_asr(lptr2[0] + lptr2[stride], 1);
++lptr2;
++hptr2;
}
hptr += stride;
lptr += stride;
}
if (parity == (numrows & 1)) {
lptr2 = lptr;
hptr2 = hptr;
for (i = 0; i < numcols; ++i) {
hptr2[0] -= lptr2[0];
++lptr2;
++hptr2;
}
}
/* Apply the second lifting step. */
lptr = &a[0];
hptr = &a[llen * stride];
if (!parity) {
lptr2 = lptr;
hptr2 = hptr;
for (i = 0; i < numcols; ++i) {
lptr2[0] += jpc_fix_asr(hptr2[0] + 1, 1);
++lptr2;
++hptr2;
}
lptr += stride;
}
n = llen - (!parity) - (parity != (numrows & 1));
while (n-- > 0) {
lptr2 = lptr;
hptr2 = hptr;
for (i = 0; i < numcols; ++i) {
lptr2[0] += jpc_fix_asr(hptr2[0] + hptr2[stride] + 2, 2);
++lptr2;
++hptr2;
}
lptr += stride;
hptr += stride;
}
if (parity != (numrows & 1)) {
lptr2 = lptr;
hptr2 = hptr;
for (i = 0; i < numcols; ++i) {
lptr2[0] += jpc_fix_asr(hptr2[0] + 1, 1);
++lptr2;
++hptr2;
}
}
} else {
if (parity) {
lptr2 = &a[0];
for (i = 0; i < numcols; ++i) {
lptr2[0] = jpc_fix_asl(lptr2[0], 1);
++lptr2;
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed a buffer overrun problem in the QMFB code in the JPC codec
that was caused by a buffer being allocated with a size that was too small
in some cases.
Added a new regression test case.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 86,541
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: JSRetainPtr<JSStringRef> AccessibilityUIElement::selectedTextRange()
{
return JSStringCreateWithCharacters(0, 0);
}
Commit Message: [GTK][WTR] Implement AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=102951
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
Implement AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue in the ATK backend
in the same manner it is implemented in DumpRenderTree.
* WebKitTestRunner/InjectedBundle/atk/AccessibilityUIElementAtk.cpp:
(WTR::replaceCharactersForResults):
(WTR):
(WTR::AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@135485 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 106,405
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void udp_destroy_sock(struct sock *sk)
{
bool slow = lock_sock_fast(sk);
udp_flush_pending_frames(sk);
unlock_sock_fast(sk, slow);
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 19,078
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderViewImpl::OnSetRendererPrefs(
const RendererPreferences& renderer_prefs) {
double old_zoom_level = renderer_preferences_.default_zoom_level;
renderer_preferences_ = renderer_prefs;
UpdateFontRenderingFromRendererPrefs();
#if defined(USE_DEFAULT_RENDER_THEME) || defined(TOOLKIT_GTK)
if (renderer_prefs.use_custom_colors) {
WebColorName name = WebKit::WebColorWebkitFocusRingColor;
WebKit::setNamedColors(&name, &renderer_prefs.focus_ring_color, 1);
WebKit::setCaretBlinkInterval(renderer_prefs.caret_blink_interval);
#if defined(TOOLKIT_GTK)
ui::NativeTheme::instance()->SetScrollbarColors(
renderer_prefs.thumb_inactive_color,
renderer_prefs.thumb_active_color,
renderer_prefs.track_color);
#endif // defined(TOOLKIT_GTK)
if (webview()) {
#if defined(TOOLKIT_GTK)
webview()->setScrollbarColors(
renderer_prefs.thumb_inactive_color,
renderer_prefs.thumb_active_color,
renderer_prefs.track_color);
#endif // defined(TOOLKIT_GTK)
webview()->setSelectionColors(
renderer_prefs.active_selection_bg_color,
renderer_prefs.active_selection_fg_color,
renderer_prefs.inactive_selection_bg_color,
renderer_prefs.inactive_selection_fg_color);
webview()->themeChanged();
}
}
#endif // defined(USE_DEFAULT_RENDER_THEME) || defined(TOOLKIT_GTK)
if (RenderThreadImpl::current()) // Will be NULL during unit tests.
RenderThreadImpl::current()->SetFlingCurveParameters(
renderer_prefs.touchpad_fling_profile,
renderer_prefs.touchscreen_fling_profile);
if (webview() && !webview()->mainFrame()->document().isPluginDocument() &&
!ZoomValuesEqual(old_zoom_level,
renderer_preferences_.default_zoom_level) &&
ZoomValuesEqual(webview()->zoomLevel(), old_zoom_level)) {
webview()->setZoomLevel(false, renderer_preferences_.default_zoom_level);
zoomLevelChanged();
}
}
Commit Message: Let the browser handle external navigations from DevTools.
BUG=180555
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12531004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@186793 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 115,565
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: string16 OmniboxViewWin::GetSelectedText() const {
CHARRANGE sel;
GetSel(sel);
string16 str;
if (sel.cpMin != sel.cpMax)
GetSelText(WriteInto(&str, sel.cpMax - sel.cpMin + 1));
return str;
}
Commit Message: Change omnibox behavior when stripping javascript schema to navigate after stripping the schema on drag drop.
BUG=109245
TEST=N/A
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9116016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116692 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 107,450
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: net::URLRequestContext* GetRequestContext(
scoped_refptr<net::URLRequestContextGetter> request_context,
scoped_refptr<net::URLRequestContextGetter> media_request_context,
ResourceType resource_type) {
if (resource_type == RESOURCE_TYPE_MEDIA)
return media_request_context->GetURLRequestContext();
return request_context->GetURLRequestContext();
}
Commit Message: Switching AudioOutputAuthorizationHandler from using AudioManager interface to AudioSystem one.
BUG=672468
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2692203003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450939}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 128,266
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void UpdatePolicyForEvent(const WebInputEvent* input_event,
NavigationPolicy* policy) {
if (!input_event)
return;
unsigned short button_number = 0;
if (input_event->GetType() == WebInputEvent::kMouseUp) {
const WebMouseEvent* mouse_event =
static_cast<const WebMouseEvent*>(input_event);
switch (mouse_event->button) {
case WebMouseEvent::Button::kLeft:
button_number = 0;
break;
case WebMouseEvent::Button::kMiddle:
button_number = 1;
break;
case WebMouseEvent::Button::kRight:
button_number = 2;
break;
default:
return;
}
} else if ((WebInputEvent::IsKeyboardEventType(input_event->GetType()) &&
static_cast<const WebKeyboardEvent*>(input_event)
->windows_key_code == VKEY_RETURN) ||
WebInputEvent::IsGestureEventType(input_event->GetType())) {
button_number = 0;
} else {
return;
}
bool ctrl = input_event->GetModifiers() & WebInputEvent::kControlKey;
bool shift = input_event->GetModifiers() & WebInputEvent::kShiftKey;
bool alt = input_event->GetModifiers() & WebInputEvent::kAltKey;
bool meta = input_event->GetModifiers() & WebInputEvent::kMetaKey;
NavigationPolicy user_policy = *policy;
NavigationPolicyFromMouseEvent(button_number, ctrl, shift, alt, meta,
&user_policy);
if (user_policy == kNavigationPolicyDownload &&
*policy != kNavigationPolicyIgnore)
return;
if (user_policy == kNavigationPolicyNewWindow &&
*policy == kNavigationPolicyNewPopup)
return;
*policy = user_policy;
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 148,220
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static const struct k_clock *clockid_to_kclock(const clockid_t id)
{
if (id < 0)
return (id & CLOCKFD_MASK) == CLOCKFD ?
&clock_posix_dynamic : &clock_posix_cpu;
if (id >= ARRAY_SIZE(posix_clocks) || !posix_clocks[id])
return NULL;
return posix_clocks[id];
}
Commit Message: posix-timer: Properly check sigevent->sigev_notify
timer_create() specifies via sigevent->sigev_notify the signal delivery for
the new timer. The valid modes are SIGEV_NONE, SIGEV_SIGNAL, SIGEV_THREAD
and (SIGEV_SIGNAL | SIGEV_THREAD_ID).
The sanity check in good_sigevent() is only checking the valid combination
for the SIGEV_THREAD_ID bit, i.e. SIGEV_SIGNAL, but if SIGEV_THREAD_ID is
not set it accepts any random value.
This has no real effects on the posix timer and signal delivery code, but
it affects show_timer() which handles the output of /proc/$PID/timers. That
function uses a string array to pretty print sigev_notify. The access to
that array has no bound checks, so random sigev_notify cause access beyond
the array bounds.
Add proper checks for the valid notify modes and remove the SIGEV_THREAD_ID
masking from various code pathes as SIGEV_NONE can never be set in
combination with SIGEV_THREAD_ID.
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reported-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 85,134
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChromeRenderMessageFilter::OnExtensionCloseChannel(int port_id,
bool connection_error) {
if (!content::RenderProcessHost::FromID(render_process_id_))
return; // To guard against crash in browser_tests shutdown.
extensions::MessageService* message_service =
extensions::ExtensionSystem::Get(profile_)->message_service();
if (message_service)
message_service->CloseChannel(port_id, connection_error);
}
Commit Message: Disable tcmalloc profile files.
BUG=154983
TBR=darin@chromium.org
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11087041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@161048 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 102,104
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline bool IsValidNamePart(UChar32 c) {
if (IsValidNameStart(c))
return true;
if (c == 0x00B7 || c == 0x0387)
return true;
if (c == '-' || c == '.')
return true;
const uint32_t kOtherNamePartMask =
WTF::Unicode::kMark_NonSpacing | WTF::Unicode::kMark_Enclosing |
WTF::Unicode::kMark_SpacingCombining | WTF::Unicode::kLetter_Modifier |
WTF::Unicode::kNumber_DecimalDigit;
if (!(WTF::Unicode::Category(c) & kOtherNamePartMask))
return false;
if (c >= 0xF900 && c < 0xFFFE)
return false;
WTF::Unicode::CharDecompositionType decomp_type =
WTF::Unicode::DecompositionType(c);
if (decomp_type == WTF::Unicode::kDecompositionFont ||
decomp_type == WTF::Unicode::kDecompositionCompat)
return false;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 134,105
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FactoryRegistry::ResetFunctions() {
RegisterFunction<GetWindowFunction>();
RegisterFunction<GetCurrentWindowFunction>();
RegisterFunction<GetLastFocusedWindowFunction>();
RegisterFunction<GetAllWindowsFunction>();
RegisterFunction<CreateWindowFunction>();
RegisterFunction<UpdateWindowFunction>();
RegisterFunction<RemoveWindowFunction>();
RegisterFunction<GetTabFunction>();
RegisterFunction<GetCurrentTabFunction>();
RegisterFunction<GetSelectedTabFunction>();
RegisterFunction<GetAllTabsInWindowFunction>();
RegisterFunction<CreateTabFunction>();
RegisterFunction<UpdateTabFunction>();
RegisterFunction<MoveTabFunction>();
RegisterFunction<RemoveTabFunction>();
RegisterFunction<DetectTabLanguageFunction>();
RegisterFunction<CaptureVisibleTabFunction>();
RegisterFunction<TabsExecuteScriptFunction>();
RegisterFunction<TabsInsertCSSFunction>();
RegisterFunction<EnablePageActionFunction>();
RegisterFunction<DisablePageActionFunction>();
RegisterFunction<PageActionShowFunction>();
RegisterFunction<PageActionHideFunction>();
RegisterFunction<PageActionSetIconFunction>();
RegisterFunction<PageActionSetTitleFunction>();
RegisterFunction<PageActionSetPopupFunction>();
RegisterFunction<BrowserActionSetIconFunction>();
RegisterFunction<BrowserActionSetTitleFunction>();
RegisterFunction<BrowserActionSetBadgeTextFunction>();
RegisterFunction<BrowserActionSetBadgeBackgroundColorFunction>();
RegisterFunction<BrowserActionSetPopupFunction>();
RegisterFunction<GetBookmarksFunction>();
RegisterFunction<GetBookmarkChildrenFunction>();
RegisterFunction<GetBookmarkRecentFunction>();
RegisterFunction<GetBookmarkTreeFunction>();
RegisterFunction<GetBookmarkSubTreeFunction>();
RegisterFunction<SearchBookmarksFunction>();
RegisterFunction<RemoveBookmarkFunction>();
RegisterFunction<RemoveTreeBookmarkFunction>();
RegisterFunction<CreateBookmarkFunction>();
RegisterFunction<MoveBookmarkFunction>();
RegisterFunction<UpdateBookmarkFunction>();
RegisterFunction<ShowInfoBarFunction>();
RegisterFunction<CopyBookmarkManagerFunction>();
RegisterFunction<CutBookmarkManagerFunction>();
RegisterFunction<PasteBookmarkManagerFunction>();
RegisterFunction<CanPasteBookmarkManagerFunction>();
RegisterFunction<ImportBookmarksFunction>();
RegisterFunction<ExportBookmarksFunction>();
RegisterFunction<SortChildrenBookmarkManagerFunction>();
RegisterFunction<BookmarkManagerGetStringsFunction>();
RegisterFunction<StartDragBookmarkManagerFunction>();
RegisterFunction<DropBookmarkManagerFunction>();
RegisterFunction<GetSubtreeBookmarkManagerFunction>();
RegisterFunction<CanEditBookmarkManagerFunction>();
RegisterFunction<AddUrlHistoryFunction>();
RegisterFunction<DeleteAllHistoryFunction>();
RegisterFunction<DeleteRangeHistoryFunction>();
RegisterFunction<DeleteUrlHistoryFunction>();
RegisterFunction<GetVisitsHistoryFunction>();
RegisterFunction<SearchHistoryFunction>();
RegisterFunction<ExtensionIdleQueryStateFunction>();
RegisterFunction<GetAcceptLanguagesFunction>();
RegisterFunction<GetProcessIdForTabFunction>();
RegisterFunction<MetricsGetEnabledFunction>();
RegisterFunction<MetricsSetEnabledFunction>();
RegisterFunction<MetricsRecordUserActionFunction>();
RegisterFunction<MetricsRecordValueFunction>();
RegisterFunction<MetricsRecordPercentageFunction>();
RegisterFunction<MetricsRecordCountFunction>();
RegisterFunction<MetricsRecordSmallCountFunction>();
RegisterFunction<MetricsRecordMediumCountFunction>();
RegisterFunction<MetricsRecordTimeFunction>();
RegisterFunction<MetricsRecordMediumTimeFunction>();
RegisterFunction<MetricsRecordLongTimeFunction>();
#if defined(OS_WIN)
RegisterFunction<RlzRecordProductEventFunction>();
RegisterFunction<RlzGetAccessPointRlzFunction>();
RegisterFunction<RlzSendFinancialPingFunction>();
RegisterFunction<RlzClearProductStateFunction>();
#endif
RegisterFunction<GetCookieFunction>();
RegisterFunction<GetAllCookiesFunction>();
RegisterFunction<SetCookieFunction>();
RegisterFunction<RemoveCookieFunction>();
RegisterFunction<GetAllCookieStoresFunction>();
RegisterFunction<ExtensionTestPassFunction>();
RegisterFunction<ExtensionTestFailFunction>();
RegisterFunction<ExtensionTestLogFunction>();
RegisterFunction<ExtensionTestQuotaResetFunction>();
RegisterFunction<ExtensionTestCreateIncognitoTabFunction>();
RegisterFunction<ExtensionTestSendMessageFunction>();
RegisterFunction<ExtensionTestGetConfigFunction>();
RegisterFunction<GetFocusedControlFunction>();
RegisterFunction<SetAccessibilityEnabledFunction>();
RegisterFunction<ExtensionTtsSpeakFunction>();
RegisterFunction<ExtensionTtsStopSpeakingFunction>();
RegisterFunction<ExtensionTtsIsSpeakingFunction>();
RegisterFunction<ExtensionTtsSpeakCompletedFunction>();
RegisterFunction<CreateContextMenuFunction>();
RegisterFunction<UpdateContextMenuFunction>();
RegisterFunction<RemoveContextMenuFunction>();
RegisterFunction<RemoveAllContextMenusFunction>();
RegisterFunction<OmniboxSendSuggestionsFunction>();
RegisterFunction<OmniboxSetDefaultSuggestionFunction>();
RegisterFunction<CollapseSidebarFunction>();
RegisterFunction<ExpandSidebarFunction>();
RegisterFunction<GetStateSidebarFunction>();
RegisterFunction<HideSidebarFunction>();
RegisterFunction<NavigateSidebarFunction>();
RegisterFunction<SetBadgeTextSidebarFunction>();
RegisterFunction<SetIconSidebarFunction>();
RegisterFunction<SetTitleSidebarFunction>();
RegisterFunction<ShowSidebarFunction>();
#if defined(TOOLKIT_VIEWS)
RegisterFunction<SendKeyboardEventInputFunction>();
#endif
#if defined(TOUCH_UI)
RegisterFunction<HideKeyboardFunction>();
RegisterFunction<SetKeyboardHeightFunction>();
#endif
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS) && defined(TOUCH_UI)
RegisterFunction<CandidateClickedInputUiFunction>();
RegisterFunction<CursorUpInputUiFunction>();
RegisterFunction<CursorDownInputUiFunction>();
RegisterFunction<PageUpInputUiFunction>();
RegisterFunction<PageDownInputUiFunction>();
RegisterFunction<RegisterInputUiFunction>();
RegisterFunction<PageUpInputUiFunction>();
RegisterFunction<PageDownInputUiFunction>();
#endif
RegisterFunction<GetAllExtensionsFunction>();
RegisterFunction<GetExtensionByIdFunction>();
RegisterFunction<LaunchAppFunction>();
RegisterFunction<SetEnabledFunction>();
RegisterFunction<UninstallFunction>();
RegisterFunction<SetUpdateUrlDataFunction>();
RegisterFunction<IsAllowedIncognitoAccessFunction>();
RegisterFunction<IsAllowedFileSchemeAccessFunction>();
RegisterFunction<GetBrowserLoginFunction>();
RegisterFunction<GetStoreLoginFunction>();
RegisterFunction<SetStoreLoginFunction>();
RegisterFunction<PromptBrowserLoginFunction>();
RegisterFunction<BeginInstallFunction>();
RegisterFunction<BeginInstallWithManifestFunction>();
RegisterFunction<CompleteInstallFunction>();
RegisterFunction<WebRequestAddEventListener>();
RegisterFunction<WebRequestEventHandled>();
RegisterFunction<GetPreferenceFunction>();
RegisterFunction<SetPreferenceFunction>();
RegisterFunction<ClearPreferenceFunction>();
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
RegisterFunction<GetChromeosInfoFunction>();
RegisterFunction<CancelFileDialogFunction>();
RegisterFunction<ExecuteTasksFileBrowserFunction>();
RegisterFunction<FileDialogStringsFunction>();
RegisterFunction<GetFileTasksFileBrowserFunction>();
RegisterFunction<GetVolumeMetadataFunction>();
RegisterFunction<RequestLocalFileSystemFunction>();
RegisterFunction<AddFileWatchBrowserFunction>();
RegisterFunction<RemoveFileWatchBrowserFunction>();
RegisterFunction<SelectFileFunction>();
RegisterFunction<SelectFilesFunction>();
RegisterFunction<UnmountVolumeFunction>();
RegisterFunction<ViewFilesFunction>();
RegisterFunction<PlayAtMediaplayerFunction>();
RegisterFunction<SetPlaybackErrorMediaplayerFunction>();
RegisterFunction<GetPlaylistMediaplayerFunction>();
RegisterFunction<TogglePlaylistPanelMediaplayerFunction>();
RegisterFunction<ToggleFullscreenMediaplayerFunction>();
#if defined(TOUCH_UI)
RegisterFunction<SendHandwritingStrokeFunction>();
RegisterFunction<CancelHandwritingStrokesFunction>();
#endif
#endif
RegisterFunction<WebSocketProxyPrivateGetPassportForTCPFunction>();
RegisterFunction<AttachDebuggerFunction>();
RegisterFunction<DetachDebuggerFunction>();
RegisterFunction<SendRequestDebuggerFunction>();
RegisterFunction<GetResourceIdentifiersFunction>();
RegisterFunction<ClearContentSettingsFunction>();
RegisterFunction<GetContentSettingFunction>();
RegisterFunction<SetContentSettingFunction>();
RegisterFunction<AppNotifyFunction>();
RegisterFunction<AppClearAllNotificationsFunction>();
}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 170,373
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool HTMLCanvasElement::IsAccelerated() const {
return context_ && context_->IsAccelerated();
}
Commit Message: Clean up CanvasResourceDispatcher on finalizer
We may have pending mojo messages after GC, so we want to drop the
dispatcher as soon as possible.
Bug: 929757,913964
Change-Id: I5789bcbb55aada4a74c67a28758f07686f8911c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489175
Reviewed-by: Ken Rockot <rockot@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#635833}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 152,092
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool PageCaptureSaveAsMHTMLFunction::RunAsync() {
params_ = SaveAsMHTML::Params::Create(*args_);
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(params_.get());
AddRef(); // Balanced in ReturnFailure/ReturnSuccess()
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
if (profiles::ArePublicSessionRestrictionsEnabled()) {
WebContents* web_contents = GetWebContents();
if (!web_contents) {
ReturnFailure(kTabClosedError);
return true;
}
auto callback =
base::Bind(&PageCaptureSaveAsMHTMLFunction::ResolvePermissionRequest,
base::Unretained(this));
permission_helper::HandlePermissionRequest(
*extension(), {APIPermission::kPageCapture}, web_contents, callback,
permission_helper::PromptFactory());
return true;
}
#endif
base::PostTaskWithTraits(
FROM_HERE, kCreateTemporaryFileTaskTraits,
base::BindOnce(&PageCaptureSaveAsMHTMLFunction::CreateTemporaryFile,
this));
return true;
}
Commit Message: Call CanCaptureVisiblePage in page capture API.
Currently the pageCapture permission allows access
to arbitrary local files and chrome:// pages which
can be a security concern. In order to address this,
the page capture API needs to be changed similar to
the captureVisibleTab API. The API will now only allow
extensions to capture otherwise-restricted URLs if the
user has granted activeTab. In addition, file:// URLs are
only capturable with the "Allow on file URLs" option enabled.
Bug: 893087
Change-Id: I6d6225a3efb70fc033e2e1c031c633869afac624
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1330689
Commit-Queue: Bettina Dea <bdea@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Varun Khaneja <vakh@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#615248}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 173,004
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebKitTestController::PluginCrashed(const base::FilePath& plugin_path,
base::ProcessId plugin_pid) {
DCHECK(CalledOnValidThread());
printer_->AddErrorMessage(
base::StringPrintf("#CRASHED - plugin (pid %d)", plugin_pid));
base::MessageLoop::current()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(base::IgnoreResult(&WebKitTestController::DiscardMainWindow),
base::Unretained(this)));
}
Commit Message: content: Rename webkit_test_helpers.{cc,h} to blink_test_helpers.{cc,h}
Now that webkit/ is gone, we are preparing ourselves for the merge of
third_party/WebKit into //blink.
BUG=None
BUG=content_shell && content_unittests
R=avi@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1118183003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#328202}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 123,514
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const gfx::Point& gesture_end_location() const {
return gesture_end_location_;
}
Commit Message: Pass ui::LatencyInfo correct with unified gesture detector on Aura.
BUG=379812
TEST=GestureRecognizerTest.LatencyPassedFromTouchEvent
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/309823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@274602 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 112,102
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ext4_xattr_block_csum_set(struct inode *inode,
sector_t block_nr,
struct ext4_xattr_header *hdr)
{
if (!ext4_has_metadata_csum(inode->i_sb))
return;
hdr->h_checksum = ext4_xattr_block_csum(inode, block_nr, hdr);
}
Commit Message: ext4: convert to mbcache2
The conversion is generally straightforward. The only tricky part is
that xattr block corresponding to found mbcache entry can get freed
before we get buffer lock for that block. So we have to check whether
the entry is still valid after getting buffer lock.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-19
| 0
| 94,991
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BackFramebuffer::AttachRenderBuffer(GLenum target,
BackRenderbuffer* render_buffer) {
DCHECK_NE(id_, 0u);
ScopedGLErrorSuppressor suppressor(
"BackFramebuffer::AttachRenderBuffer", decoder_->GetErrorState());
ScopedFramebufferBinder binder(decoder_, id_);
GLuint attach_id = render_buffer ? render_buffer->id() : 0;
api()->glFramebufferRenderbufferEXTFn(GL_FRAMEBUFFER, target, GL_RENDERBUFFER,
attach_id);
}
Commit Message: Implement immutable texture base/max level clamping
It seems some drivers fail to handle that gracefully, so let's always clamp
to be on the safe side.
BUG=877874
TEST=test case in the bug, gpu_unittests
R=kbr@chromium.org
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I6d93cb9389ea70525df4604112223604577582a2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1194994
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#587264}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 145,835
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Err fiin_Read(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
FDItemInformationBox *ptr = (FDItemInformationBox *)s;
ISOM_DECREASE_SIZE(ptr, 2);
gf_bs_read_u16(bs);
return gf_isom_box_array_read(s, bs, fiin_AddBox);
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,121
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned short get_tga_ushort(const unsigned char *data)
{
return (unsigned short)(data[0] | (data[1] << 8));
}
Commit Message: pgxtoimage(): fix write stack buffer overflow (#997)
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 61,886
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool RenderBox::canBeScrolledAndHasScrollableArea() const
{
return canBeProgramaticallyScrolled() && (scrollHeight() != clientHeight() || scrollWidth() != clientWidth());
}
Commit Message: Source/WebCore: Fix for bug 64046 - Wrong image height in absolutely positioned div in
relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
Test: fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html
* rendering/RenderBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBox::availableLogicalHeightUsing):
LayoutTests: Test to cover absolutely positioned child with percentage height
in relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent-expected.txt: Added.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html: Added.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@91533 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 101,537
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: LocalFrame* WebLocalFrameImpl::CreateChildFrame(
const AtomicString& name,
HTMLFrameOwnerElement* owner_element) {
DCHECK(client_);
TRACE_EVENT0("blink", "WebLocalFrameImpl::createChildframe");
WebTreeScopeType scope =
GetFrame()->GetDocument() == owner_element->GetTreeScope()
? WebTreeScopeType::kDocument
: WebTreeScopeType::kShadow;
WebFrameOwnerProperties owner_properties(
owner_element->BrowsingContextContainerName(),
owner_element->ScrollingMode(), owner_element->MarginWidth(),
owner_element->MarginHeight(), owner_element->AllowFullscreen(),
owner_element->AllowPaymentRequest(), owner_element->IsDisplayNone(),
owner_element->Csp(), owner_element->AllowedFeatures());
WebLocalFrameImpl* webframe_child =
ToWebLocalFrameImpl(client_->CreateChildFrame(
this, scope, name,
owner_element->getAttribute(
owner_element->SubResourceAttributeName()),
static_cast<WebSandboxFlags>(owner_element->GetSandboxFlags()),
owner_element->ContainerPolicy(), owner_properties));
if (!webframe_child)
return nullptr;
webframe_child->InitializeCoreFrame(*GetFrame()->GetPage(), owner_element,
name);
DCHECK(webframe_child->Parent());
return webframe_child->GetFrame();
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 134,262
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int PartiallyRuntimeEnabledOverloadedVoidMethodMethodMaxArg() {
if (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::RuntimeFeature3Enabled()) {
return 3;
}
return 2;
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 135,002
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xfs_attr_calc_size(
struct xfs_inode *ip,
int namelen,
int valuelen,
int *local)
{
struct xfs_mount *mp = ip->i_mount;
int size;
int nblks;
/*
* Determine space new attribute will use, and if it would be
* "local" or "remote" (note: local != inline).
*/
size = xfs_attr_leaf_newentsize(namelen, valuelen,
mp->m_sb.sb_blocksize, local);
nblks = XFS_DAENTER_SPACE_RES(mp, XFS_ATTR_FORK);
if (*local) {
if (size > (mp->m_sb.sb_blocksize >> 1)) {
/* Double split possible */
nblks *= 2;
}
} else {
/*
* Out of line attribute, cannot double split, but
* make room for the attribute value itself.
*/
uint dblocks = XFS_B_TO_FSB(mp, valuelen);
nblks += dblocks;
nblks += XFS_NEXTENTADD_SPACE_RES(mp, dblocks, XFS_ATTR_FORK);
}
return nblks;
}
Commit Message: xfs: remote attribute overwrite causes transaction overrun
Commit e461fcb ("xfs: remote attribute lookups require the value
length") passes the remote attribute length in the xfs_da_args
structure on lookup so that CRC calculations and validity checking
can be performed correctly by related code. This, unfortunately has
the side effect of changing the args->valuelen parameter in cases
where it shouldn't.
That is, when we replace a remote attribute, the incoming
replacement stores the value and length in args->value and
args->valuelen, but then the lookup which finds the existing remote
attribute overwrites args->valuelen with the length of the remote
attribute being replaced. Hence when we go to create the new
attribute, we create it of the size of the existing remote
attribute, not the size it is supposed to be. When the new attribute
is much smaller than the old attribute, this results in a
transaction overrun and an ASSERT() failure on a debug kernel:
XFS: Assertion failed: tp->t_blk_res_used <= tp->t_blk_res, file: fs/xfs/xfs_trans.c, line: 331
Fix this by keeping the remote attribute value length separate to
the attribute value length in the xfs_da_args structure. The enables
us to pass the length of the remote attribute to be removed without
overwriting the new attribute's length.
Also, ensure that when we save remote block contexts for a later
rename we zero the original state variables so that we don't confuse
the state of the attribute to be removes with the state of the new
attribute that we just added. [Spotted by Brain Foster.]
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
CWE ID: CWE-19
| 1
| 166,730
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int drm_mode_rmfb(struct drm_device *dev,
void *data, struct drm_file *file_priv)
{
struct drm_mode_object *obj;
struct drm_framebuffer *fb = NULL;
struct drm_framebuffer *fbl = NULL;
uint32_t *id = data;
int ret = 0;
int found = 0;
if (!drm_core_check_feature(dev, DRIVER_MODESET))
return -EINVAL;
mutex_lock(&dev->mode_config.mutex);
obj = drm_mode_object_find(dev, *id, DRM_MODE_OBJECT_FB);
/* TODO check that we really get a framebuffer back. */
if (!obj) {
DRM_ERROR("mode invalid framebuffer id\n");
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
fb = obj_to_fb(obj);
list_for_each_entry(fbl, &file_priv->fbs, filp_head)
if (fb == fbl)
found = 1;
if (!found) {
DRM_ERROR("tried to remove a fb that we didn't own\n");
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
/* TODO release all crtc connected to the framebuffer */
/* TODO unhock the destructor from the buffer object */
list_del(&fb->filp_head);
fb->funcs->destroy(fb);
out:
mutex_unlock(&dev->mode_config.mutex);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: drm: integer overflow in drm_mode_dirtyfb_ioctl()
There is a potential integer overflow in drm_mode_dirtyfb_ioctl()
if userspace passes in a large num_clips. The call to kmalloc would
allocate a small buffer, and the call to fb->funcs->dirty may result
in a memory corruption.
Reported-by: Haogang Chen <haogangchen@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 21,918
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int check_path_shared(struct btrfs_root *root,
struct btrfs_path *path)
{
struct extent_buffer *eb;
int level;
u64 refs = 1;
for (level = 0; level < BTRFS_MAX_LEVEL; level++) {
int ret;
if (!path->nodes[level])
break;
eb = path->nodes[level];
if (!btrfs_block_can_be_shared(root, eb))
continue;
ret = btrfs_lookup_extent_info(NULL, root, eb->start, eb->len,
&refs, NULL);
if (refs > 1)
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <chris.mason@fusionio.com>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <pascal@junod.info>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 34,371
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t Parcel::writeFloatVector(const std::vector<float>& val)
{
return writeTypedVector(val, &Parcel::writeFloat);
}
Commit Message: Add bound checks to utf16_to_utf8
Bug: 29250543
Change-Id: I518e7b2fe10aaa3f1c1987586a09b1110aff7e1a
(cherry picked from commit 7e93b2ddcb49b5365fbe1dab134ffb38e6f1c719)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 163,617
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t Camera2Client::setPreviewTarget(
const sp<IGraphicBufferProducer>& bufferProducer) {
ATRACE_CALL();
ALOGV("%s: E", __FUNCTION__);
Mutex::Autolock icl(mBinderSerializationLock);
status_t res;
if ( (res = checkPid(__FUNCTION__) ) != OK) return res;
sp<IBinder> binder;
sp<ANativeWindow> window;
if (bufferProducer != 0) {
binder = bufferProducer->asBinder();
window = new Surface(bufferProducer, /*controlledByApp*/ true);
}
return setPreviewWindowL(binder, window);
}
Commit Message: Camera: Disallow dumping clients directly
Camera service dumps should only be initiated through
ICameraService::dump.
Bug: 26265403
Change-Id: If3ca4718ed74bf33ad8a416192689203029e2803
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 161,745
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: parse_keyword(struct archive_read *a, struct mtree *mtree,
struct archive_entry *entry, struct mtree_option *opt, int *parsed_kws)
{
char *val, *key;
key = opt->value;
if (*key == '\0')
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
if (strcmp(key, "nochange") == 0) {
*parsed_kws |= MTREE_HAS_NOCHANGE;
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
if (strcmp(key, "optional") == 0) {
*parsed_kws |= MTREE_HAS_OPTIONAL;
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
if (strcmp(key, "ignore") == 0) {
/*
* The mtree processing is not recursive, so
* recursion will only happen for explicitly listed
* entries.
*/
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
val = strchr(key, '=');
if (val == NULL) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Malformed attribute \"%s\" (%d)", key, key[0]);
return (ARCHIVE_WARN);
}
*val = '\0';
++val;
switch (key[0]) {
case 'c':
if (strcmp(key, "content") == 0
|| strcmp(key, "contents") == 0) {
parse_escapes(val, NULL);
archive_strcpy(&mtree->contents_name, val);
break;
}
if (strcmp(key, "cksum") == 0)
break;
case 'd':
if (strcmp(key, "device") == 0) {
/* stat(2) st_rdev field, e.g. the major/minor IDs
* of a char/block special file */
int r;
dev_t dev;
*parsed_kws |= MTREE_HAS_DEVICE;
r = parse_device(&dev, &a->archive, val);
if (r == ARCHIVE_OK)
archive_entry_set_rdev(entry, dev);
return r;
}
case 'f':
if (strcmp(key, "flags") == 0) {
*parsed_kws |= MTREE_HAS_FFLAGS;
archive_entry_copy_fflags_text(entry, val);
break;
}
case 'g':
if (strcmp(key, "gid") == 0) {
*parsed_kws |= MTREE_HAS_GID;
archive_entry_set_gid(entry, mtree_atol10(&val));
break;
}
if (strcmp(key, "gname") == 0) {
*parsed_kws |= MTREE_HAS_GNAME;
archive_entry_copy_gname(entry, val);
break;
}
case 'i':
if (strcmp(key, "inode") == 0) {
archive_entry_set_ino(entry, mtree_atol10(&val));
break;
}
case 'l':
if (strcmp(key, "link") == 0) {
archive_entry_copy_symlink(entry, val);
break;
}
case 'm':
if (strcmp(key, "md5") == 0 || strcmp(key, "md5digest") == 0)
break;
if (strcmp(key, "mode") == 0) {
if (val[0] >= '0' && val[0] <= '9') {
*parsed_kws |= MTREE_HAS_PERM;
archive_entry_set_perm(entry,
(mode_t)mtree_atol8(&val));
} else {
archive_set_error(&a->archive,
ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Symbolic mode \"%s\" unsupported", val);
return ARCHIVE_WARN;
}
break;
}
case 'n':
if (strcmp(key, "nlink") == 0) {
*parsed_kws |= MTREE_HAS_NLINK;
archive_entry_set_nlink(entry,
(unsigned int)mtree_atol10(&val));
break;
}
case 'r':
if (strcmp(key, "resdevice") == 0) {
/* stat(2) st_dev field, e.g. the device ID where the
* inode resides */
int r;
dev_t dev;
r = parse_device(&dev, &a->archive, val);
if (r == ARCHIVE_OK)
archive_entry_set_dev(entry, dev);
return r;
}
if (strcmp(key, "rmd160") == 0 ||
strcmp(key, "rmd160digest") == 0)
break;
case 's':
if (strcmp(key, "sha1") == 0 || strcmp(key, "sha1digest") == 0)
break;
if (strcmp(key, "sha256") == 0 ||
strcmp(key, "sha256digest") == 0)
break;
if (strcmp(key, "sha384") == 0 ||
strcmp(key, "sha384digest") == 0)
break;
if (strcmp(key, "sha512") == 0 ||
strcmp(key, "sha512digest") == 0)
break;
if (strcmp(key, "size") == 0) {
archive_entry_set_size(entry, mtree_atol10(&val));
break;
}
case 't':
if (strcmp(key, "tags") == 0) {
/*
* Comma delimited list of tags.
* Ignore the tags for now, but the interface
* should be extended to allow inclusion/exclusion.
*/
break;
}
if (strcmp(key, "time") == 0) {
int64_t m;
int64_t my_time_t_max = get_time_t_max();
int64_t my_time_t_min = get_time_t_min();
long ns = 0;
*parsed_kws |= MTREE_HAS_MTIME;
m = mtree_atol10(&val);
/* Replicate an old mtree bug:
* 123456789.1 represents 123456789
* seconds and 1 nanosecond. */
if (*val == '.') {
++val;
ns = (long)mtree_atol10(&val);
} else
ns = 0;
if (m > my_time_t_max)
m = my_time_t_max;
else if (m < my_time_t_min)
m = my_time_t_min;
archive_entry_set_mtime(entry, (time_t)m, ns);
break;
}
if (strcmp(key, "type") == 0) {
switch (val[0]) {
case 'b':
if (strcmp(val, "block") == 0) {
archive_entry_set_filetype(entry, AE_IFBLK);
break;
}
case 'c':
if (strcmp(val, "char") == 0) {
archive_entry_set_filetype(entry,
AE_IFCHR);
break;
}
case 'd':
if (strcmp(val, "dir") == 0) {
archive_entry_set_filetype(entry,
AE_IFDIR);
break;
}
case 'f':
if (strcmp(val, "fifo") == 0) {
archive_entry_set_filetype(entry,
AE_IFIFO);
break;
}
if (strcmp(val, "file") == 0) {
archive_entry_set_filetype(entry,
AE_IFREG);
break;
}
case 'l':
if (strcmp(val, "link") == 0) {
archive_entry_set_filetype(entry,
AE_IFLNK);
break;
}
default:
archive_set_error(&a->archive,
ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Unrecognized file type \"%s\"; "
"assuming \"file\"", val);
archive_entry_set_filetype(entry, AE_IFREG);
return (ARCHIVE_WARN);
}
*parsed_kws |= MTREE_HAS_TYPE;
break;
}
case 'u':
if (strcmp(key, "uid") == 0) {
*parsed_kws |= MTREE_HAS_UID;
archive_entry_set_uid(entry, mtree_atol10(&val));
break;
}
if (strcmp(key, "uname") == 0) {
*parsed_kws |= MTREE_HAS_UNAME;
archive_entry_copy_uname(entry, val);
break;
}
default:
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Unrecognized key %s=%s", key, val);
return (ARCHIVE_WARN);
}
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
Commit Message: Fix libarchive/archive_read_support_format_mtree.c:1388:11: error: array subscript is above array bounds
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 53,520
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ALWAYS_INLINE bool GLES2DecoderImpl::CheckTransformFeedback(
const char* function_name,
bool instanced,
GLenum mode,
const GLsizei* counts,
const GLsizei* primcounts,
GLsizei drawcount,
GLsizei* vertices_drawn) {
DCHECK(state_.bound_transform_feedback.get());
if (state_.bound_transform_feedback->active() &&
!state_.bound_transform_feedback->paused()) {
if (mode != state_.bound_transform_feedback->primitive_mode()) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION, function_name,
"mode differs from active transformfeedback's primitiveMode");
return false;
}
for (GLsizei draw_id = 0; draw_id < drawcount; ++draw_id) {
GLsizei count = counts[draw_id];
GLsizei primcount = instanced ? primcounts[draw_id] : 1;
bool valid = state_.bound_transform_feedback->GetVerticesNeededForDraw(
mode, count, primcount, *vertices_drawn, vertices_drawn);
if (!valid) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, function_name,
"integer overflow calculating number of vertices "
"for transform feedback");
return false;
}
}
if (!buffer_manager()->RequestBuffersAccess(
error_state_.get(), state_.bound_transform_feedback.get(),
state_.current_program->GetTransformFeedbackVaryingSizes(),
*vertices_drawn, function_name, "transformfeedback buffers")) {
return false;
}
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,207
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SProcPseudoramiXDispatch(ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xReq);
TRACE;
switch (stuff->data) {
case X_PanoramiXQueryVersion:
return SProcPseudoramiXQueryVersion(client);
case X_PanoramiXGetState:
return SProcPseudoramiXGetState(client);
case X_PanoramiXGetScreenCount:
return SProcPseudoramiXGetScreenCount(client);
case X_PanoramiXGetScreenSize:
return SProcPseudoramiXGetScreenSize(client);
case X_XineramaIsActive:
return SProcPseudoramiXIsActive(client);
case X_XineramaQueryScreens:
return SProcPseudoramiXQueryScreens(client);
}
return BadRequest;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,544
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int usb_clear_port_feature(struct usb_device *hdev, int port1, int feature)
{
return usb_control_msg(hdev, usb_sndctrlpipe(hdev, 0),
USB_REQ_CLEAR_FEATURE, USB_RT_PORT, feature, port1,
NULL, 0, 1000);
}
Commit Message: USB: fix invalid memory access in hub_activate()
Commit 8520f38099cc ("USB: change hub initialization sleeps to
delayed_work") changed the hub_activate() routine to make part of it
run in a workqueue. However, the commit failed to take a reference to
the usb_hub structure or to lock the hub interface while doing so. As
a result, if a hub is plugged in and quickly unplugged before the work
routine can run, the routine will try to access memory that has been
deallocated. Or, if the hub is unplugged while the routine is
running, the memory may be deallocated while it is in active use.
This patch fixes the problem by taking a reference to the usb_hub at
the start of hub_activate() and releasing it at the end (when the work
is finished), and by locking the hub interface while the work routine
is running. It also adds a check at the start of the routine to see
if the hub has already been disconnected, in which nothing should be
done.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Reported-by: Alexandru Cornea <alexandru.cornea@intel.com>
Tested-by: Alexandru Cornea <alexandru.cornea@intel.com>
Fixes: 8520f38099cc ("USB: change hub initialization sleeps to delayed_work")
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 56,790
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CommandBufferProxyImpl::OnSwapBuffersCompleted(
const SwapBuffersCompleteParams& params) {
if (!swap_buffers_completion_callback_.is_null())
swap_buffers_completion_callback_.Run(params);
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 149,467
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int crypto_skcipher_report(struct sk_buff *skb, struct crypto_alg *alg)
{
struct crypto_report_blkcipher rblkcipher;
struct skcipher_alg *skcipher = container_of(alg, struct skcipher_alg,
base);
strncpy(rblkcipher.type, "skcipher", sizeof(rblkcipher.type));
strncpy(rblkcipher.geniv, "<none>", sizeof(rblkcipher.geniv));
rblkcipher.blocksize = alg->cra_blocksize;
rblkcipher.min_keysize = skcipher->min_keysize;
rblkcipher.max_keysize = skcipher->max_keysize;
rblkcipher.ivsize = skcipher->ivsize;
if (nla_put(skb, CRYPTOCFGA_REPORT_BLKCIPHER,
sizeof(struct crypto_report_blkcipher), &rblkcipher))
goto nla_put_failure;
return 0;
nla_put_failure:
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
Commit Message: crypto: skcipher - Add missing API setkey checks
The API setkey checks for key sizes and alignment went AWOL during the
skcipher conversion. This patch restores them.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: 4e6c3df4d729 ("crypto: skcipher - Add low-level skcipher...")
Reported-by: Baozeng <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 64,779
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BGD_DECLARE(gdImagePtr) gdImageCreateFromTgaPtr(int size, void *data)
{
gdImagePtr im;
gdIOCtx *in = gdNewDynamicCtxEx (size, data, 0);
if (in == NULL) return NULL;
im = gdImageCreateFromTgaCtx(in);
in->gd_free(in);
return im;
}
Commit Message: Proper fix for #248
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 50,409
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LayerTreeHost::DidInitializeCompositorFrameSink() {
DCHECK(new_compositor_frame_sink_);
current_compositor_frame_sink_ = std::move(new_compositor_frame_sink_);
client_->DidInitializeCompositorFrameSink();
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 137,108
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ZEND_API zend_object_handlers *zend_get_std_object_handlers(void)
{
return &std_object_handlers;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #73052 - Memory Corruption in During Deserialized-object Destruction
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 49,965
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::ShowCreatedWidget(int process_id,
int route_id,
bool is_fullscreen,
const gfx::Rect& initial_rect) {
RenderWidgetHostViewBase* widget_host_view =
static_cast<RenderWidgetHostViewBase*>(
GetCreatedWidget(process_id, route_id));
if (!widget_host_view)
return;
RenderWidgetHostView* view = NULL;
if (GetOuterWebContents()) {
view = GetOuterWebContents()->GetRenderWidgetHostView();
} else {
view = GetRenderWidgetHostView();
}
if (is_fullscreen) {
DCHECK_EQ(MSG_ROUTING_NONE, fullscreen_widget_routing_id_);
view_->StoreFocus();
fullscreen_widget_process_id_ =
widget_host_view->GetRenderWidgetHost()->GetProcess()->GetID();
fullscreen_widget_routing_id_ = route_id;
if (delegate_ && delegate_->EmbedsFullscreenWidget()) {
widget_host_view->InitAsChild(GetRenderWidgetHostView()->GetNativeView());
delegate_->EnterFullscreenModeForTab(this, GURL());
} else {
widget_host_view->InitAsFullscreen(view);
}
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.DidShowFullscreenWidget();
if (!widget_host_view->HasFocus())
widget_host_view->Focus();
} else {
widget_host_view->InitAsPopup(view, initial_rect);
}
RenderWidgetHostImpl* render_widget_host_impl =
RenderWidgetHostImpl::From(widget_host_view->GetRenderWidgetHost());
render_widget_host_impl->Init();
render_widget_host_impl->set_allow_privileged_mouse_lock(is_fullscreen);
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
base::mac::NSObjectRelease(widget_host_view->GetNativeView());
#endif
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 135,896
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HTMLInputElement::selectColorInColorChooser(const Color& color)
{
if (!m_inputType->isColorControl())
return;
static_cast<ColorInputType*>(m_inputType.get())->didChooseColor(color);
}
Commit Message: Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 112,981
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void prepare_vmcs02_full(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
vmcs_write16(GUEST_ES_SELECTOR, vmcs12->guest_es_selector);
vmcs_write16(GUEST_SS_SELECTOR, vmcs12->guest_ss_selector);
vmcs_write16(GUEST_DS_SELECTOR, vmcs12->guest_ds_selector);
vmcs_write16(GUEST_FS_SELECTOR, vmcs12->guest_fs_selector);
vmcs_write16(GUEST_GS_SELECTOR, vmcs12->guest_gs_selector);
vmcs_write16(GUEST_LDTR_SELECTOR, vmcs12->guest_ldtr_selector);
vmcs_write16(GUEST_TR_SELECTOR, vmcs12->guest_tr_selector);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_ES_LIMIT, vmcs12->guest_es_limit);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_SS_LIMIT, vmcs12->guest_ss_limit);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_DS_LIMIT, vmcs12->guest_ds_limit);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_FS_LIMIT, vmcs12->guest_fs_limit);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_GS_LIMIT, vmcs12->guest_gs_limit);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_LDTR_LIMIT, vmcs12->guest_ldtr_limit);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_TR_LIMIT, vmcs12->guest_tr_limit);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_GDTR_LIMIT, vmcs12->guest_gdtr_limit);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_IDTR_LIMIT, vmcs12->guest_idtr_limit);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_ES_AR_BYTES, vmcs12->guest_es_ar_bytes);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_SS_AR_BYTES, vmcs12->guest_ss_ar_bytes);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_DS_AR_BYTES, vmcs12->guest_ds_ar_bytes);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_FS_AR_BYTES, vmcs12->guest_fs_ar_bytes);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_GS_AR_BYTES, vmcs12->guest_gs_ar_bytes);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_LDTR_AR_BYTES, vmcs12->guest_ldtr_ar_bytes);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_TR_AR_BYTES, vmcs12->guest_tr_ar_bytes);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_SS_BASE, vmcs12->guest_ss_base);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_DS_BASE, vmcs12->guest_ds_base);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_FS_BASE, vmcs12->guest_fs_base);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_GS_BASE, vmcs12->guest_gs_base);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_LDTR_BASE, vmcs12->guest_ldtr_base);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_TR_BASE, vmcs12->guest_tr_base);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_GDTR_BASE, vmcs12->guest_gdtr_base);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_IDTR_BASE, vmcs12->guest_idtr_base);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_SYSENTER_CS, vmcs12->guest_sysenter_cs);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS,
vmcs12->guest_pending_dbg_exceptions);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_SYSENTER_ESP, vmcs12->guest_sysenter_esp);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_SYSENTER_EIP, vmcs12->guest_sysenter_eip);
if (nested_cpu_has_xsaves(vmcs12))
vmcs_write64(XSS_EXIT_BITMAP, vmcs12->xss_exit_bitmap);
vmcs_write64(VMCS_LINK_POINTER, -1ull);
if (cpu_has_vmx_posted_intr())
vmcs_write16(POSTED_INTR_NV, POSTED_INTR_NESTED_VECTOR);
/*
* Whether page-faults are trapped is determined by a combination of
* 3 settings: PFEC_MASK, PFEC_MATCH and EXCEPTION_BITMAP.PF.
* If enable_ept, L0 doesn't care about page faults and we should
* set all of these to L1's desires. However, if !enable_ept, L0 does
* care about (at least some) page faults, and because it is not easy
* (if at all possible?) to merge L0 and L1's desires, we simply ask
* to exit on each and every L2 page fault. This is done by setting
* MASK=MATCH=0 and (see below) EB.PF=1.
* Note that below we don't need special code to set EB.PF beyond the
* "or"ing of the EB of vmcs01 and vmcs12, because when enable_ept,
* vmcs01's EB.PF is 0 so the "or" will take vmcs12's value, and when
* !enable_ept, EB.PF is 1, so the "or" will always be 1.
*/
vmcs_write32(PAGE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MASK,
enable_ept ? vmcs12->page_fault_error_code_mask : 0);
vmcs_write32(PAGE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MATCH,
enable_ept ? vmcs12->page_fault_error_code_match : 0);
/* All VMFUNCs are currently emulated through L0 vmexits. */
if (cpu_has_vmx_vmfunc())
vmcs_write64(VM_FUNCTION_CONTROL, 0);
if (cpu_has_vmx_apicv()) {
vmcs_write64(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP0, vmcs12->eoi_exit_bitmap0);
vmcs_write64(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP1, vmcs12->eoi_exit_bitmap1);
vmcs_write64(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP2, vmcs12->eoi_exit_bitmap2);
vmcs_write64(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP3, vmcs12->eoi_exit_bitmap3);
}
/*
* Set host-state according to L0's settings (vmcs12 is irrelevant here)
* Some constant fields are set here by vmx_set_constant_host_state().
* Other fields are different per CPU, and will be set later when
* vmx_vcpu_load() is called, and when vmx_save_host_state() is called.
*/
vmx_set_constant_host_state(vmx);
/*
* Set the MSR load/store lists to match L0's settings.
*/
vmcs_write32(VM_EXIT_MSR_STORE_COUNT, 0);
vmcs_write32(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, vmx->msr_autoload.nr);
vmcs_write64(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_ADDR, __pa(vmx->msr_autoload.host));
vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, vmx->msr_autoload.nr);
vmcs_write64(VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_ADDR, __pa(vmx->msr_autoload.guest));
set_cr4_guest_host_mask(vmx);
if (vmx_mpx_supported())
vmcs_write64(GUEST_BNDCFGS, vmcs12->guest_bndcfgs);
if (enable_vpid) {
if (nested_cpu_has_vpid(vmcs12) && vmx->nested.vpid02)
vmcs_write16(VIRTUAL_PROCESSOR_ID, vmx->nested.vpid02);
else
vmcs_write16(VIRTUAL_PROCESSOR_ID, vmx->vpid);
}
/*
* L1 may access the L2's PDPTR, so save them to construct vmcs12
*/
if (enable_ept) {
vmcs_write64(GUEST_PDPTR0, vmcs12->guest_pdptr0);
vmcs_write64(GUEST_PDPTR1, vmcs12->guest_pdptr1);
vmcs_write64(GUEST_PDPTR2, vmcs12->guest_pdptr2);
vmcs_write64(GUEST_PDPTR3, vmcs12->guest_pdptr3);
}
if (cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap())
vmcs_write64(MSR_BITMAP, __pa(vmx->nested.vmcs02.msr_bitmap));
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Enforce cpl=0 for VMX instructions
VMX instructions executed inside a L1 VM will always trigger a VM exit
even when executed with cpl 3. This means we must perform the
privilege check in software.
Fixes: 70f3aac964ae("kvm: nVMX: Remove superfluous VMX instruction fault checks")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Felix Wilhelm <fwilhelm@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 80,994
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static long futex_wait_restart(struct restart_block *restart)
{
u32 __user *uaddr = restart->futex.uaddr;
ktime_t t, *tp = NULL;
if (restart->futex.flags & FLAGS_HAS_TIMEOUT) {
t.tv64 = restart->futex.time;
tp = &t;
}
restart->fn = do_no_restart_syscall;
return (long)futex_wait(uaddr, restart->futex.flags,
restart->futex.val, tp, restart->futex.bitset);
}
Commit Message: futex-prevent-requeue-pi-on-same-futex.patch futex: Forbid uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_requeue(..., requeue_pi=1)
If uaddr == uaddr2, then we have broken the rule of only requeueing from
a non-pi futex to a pi futex with this call. If we attempt this, then
dangling pointers may be left for rt_waiter resulting in an exploitable
condition.
This change brings futex_requeue() in line with futex_wait_requeue_pi()
which performs the same check as per commit 6f7b0a2a5c0f ("futex: Forbid
uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_wait_requeue_pi()")
[ tglx: Compare the resulting keys as well, as uaddrs might be
different depending on the mapping ]
Fixes CVE-2014-3153.
Reported-by: Pinkie Pie
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 38,210
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GLint GLES2Implementation::GetProgramResourceLocationHelper(
GLuint program,
GLenum program_interface,
const char* name) {
typedef cmds::GetProgramResourceLocation::Result Result;
SetBucketAsCString(kResultBucketId, name);
auto result = GetResultAs<Result>();
if (!result) {
return -1;
}
*result = -1;
helper_->GetProgramResourceLocation(program, program_interface,
kResultBucketId, GetResultShmId(),
result.offset());
WaitForCmd();
helper_->SetBucketSize(kResultBucketId, 0);
return *result;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,013
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: fbStore_r8g8b8 (FbBits *bits, const CARD32 *values, int x, int width, miIndexedPtr indexed)
{
int i;
CARD8 *pixel = ((CARD8 *) bits) + 3*x;
for (i = 0; i < width; ++i) {
Store24(pixel, READ(values + i));
pixel += 3;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 11,488
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool cgm_bind_dir(const char *root, const char *dirname)
{
nih_local char *cgpath = NULL;
/* /sys should have been mounted by now */
cgpath = NIH_MUST( nih_strdup(NULL, root) );
NIH_MUST( nih_strcat(&cgpath, NULL, "/sys/fs/cgroup") );
if (!dir_exists(cgpath)) {
ERROR("%s does not exist", cgpath);
return false;
}
/* mount a tmpfs there so we can create subdirs */
if (mount("cgroup", cgpath, "tmpfs", 0, "size=10000,mode=755")) {
SYSERROR("Failed to mount tmpfs at %s", cgpath);
return false;
}
NIH_MUST( nih_strcat(&cgpath, NULL, "/cgmanager") );
if (mkdir(cgpath, 0755) < 0) {
SYSERROR("Failed to create %s", cgpath);
return false;
}
if (mount(dirname, cgpath, "none", MS_BIND, 0)) {
SYSERROR("Failed to bind mount %s to %s", dirname, cgpath);
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 1
| 166,710
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RequestSender::SendInternalComplete(int error,
const std::string& response_body,
const std::string& response_etag,
int retry_after_sec) {
if (!error) {
if (!use_signing_) {
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::BindOnce(std::move(request_sender_callback_), 0,
response_body, retry_after_sec));
return;
}
DCHECK(use_signing_);
DCHECK(signer_);
if (signer_->ValidateResponse(response_body, response_etag)) {
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::BindOnce(std::move(request_sender_callback_), 0,
response_body, retry_after_sec));
return;
}
error = static_cast<int>(ProtocolError::RESPONSE_NOT_TRUSTED);
}
DCHECK(error);
if (retry_after_sec <= 0 && ++cur_url_ != urls_.end() &&
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::BindOnce(&RequestSender::SendInternal,
base::Unretained(this)))) {
return;
}
HandleSendError(error, retry_after_sec);
}
Commit Message: Fix error handling in the request sender and url fetcher downloader.
That means handling the network errors by primarily looking at net_error.
Bug: 1028369
Change-Id: I8181bced25f8b56144ea336a03883d0dceea5108
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1935428
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sorin Jianu <sorin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#719199}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 136,825
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WebContentsView* WebContentsImpl::GetView() const {
return view_.get();
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 110,673
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void sig_connected(IRC_SERVER_REC *server)
{
if (!IS_IRC_SERVER(server) || !server->connrec->reconnection)
return;
if (server->connrec->away_reason != NULL)
irc_server_send_away(server, server->connrec->away_reason);
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #1058 from ailin-nemui/sasl-reconnect
copy sasl username and password values
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 89,416
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool AllSamplesPassedQuery::End(base::subtle::Atomic32 submit_count) {
EndQueryHelper(target());
return AddToPendingQueue(submit_count);
}
Commit Message: Add bounds validation to AsyncPixelTransfersCompletedQuery::End
BUG=351852
R=jbauman@chromium.org, jorgelo@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/198253002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@256723 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 121,445
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: selaDestroy(SELA **psela)
{
SELA *sela;
l_int32 i;
if (!psela) return;
if ((sela = *psela) == NULL)
return;
for (i = 0; i < sela->n; i++)
selDestroy(&sela->sel[i]);
LEPT_FREE(sela->sel);
LEPT_FREE(sela);
*psela = NULL;
return;
}
Commit Message: Security fixes: expect final changes for release 1.75.3.
* Fixed a debian security issue with fscanf() reading a string with
possible buffer overflow.
* There were also a few similar situations with sscanf().
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 84,229
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int tpacket_parse_header(struct packet_sock *po, void *frame,
int size_max, void **data)
{
union tpacket_uhdr ph;
int tp_len, off;
ph.raw = frame;
switch (po->tp_version) {
case TPACKET_V2:
tp_len = ph.h2->tp_len;
break;
default:
tp_len = ph.h1->tp_len;
break;
}
if (unlikely(tp_len > size_max)) {
pr_err("packet size is too long (%d > %d)\n", tp_len, size_max);
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
if (unlikely(po->tp_tx_has_off)) {
int off_min, off_max;
off_min = po->tp_hdrlen - sizeof(struct sockaddr_ll);
off_max = po->tx_ring.frame_size - tp_len;
if (po->sk.sk_type == SOCK_DGRAM) {
switch (po->tp_version) {
case TPACKET_V2:
off = ph.h2->tp_net;
break;
default:
off = ph.h1->tp_net;
break;
}
} else {
switch (po->tp_version) {
case TPACKET_V2:
off = ph.h2->tp_mac;
break;
default:
off = ph.h1->tp_mac;
break;
}
}
if (unlikely((off < off_min) || (off_max < off)))
return -EINVAL;
} else {
off = po->tp_hdrlen - sizeof(struct sockaddr_ll);
}
*data = frame + off;
return tp_len;
}
Commit Message: packet: fix race condition in packet_set_ring
When packet_set_ring creates a ring buffer it will initialize a
struct timer_list if the packet version is TPACKET_V3. This value
can then be raced by a different thread calling setsockopt to
set the version to TPACKET_V1 before packet_set_ring has finished.
This leads to a use-after-free on a function pointer in the
struct timer_list when the socket is closed as the previously
initialized timer will not be deleted.
The bug is fixed by taking lock_sock(sk) in packet_setsockopt when
changing the packet version while also taking the lock at the start
of packet_set_ring.
Fixes: f6fb8f100b80 ("af-packet: TPACKET_V3 flexible buffer implementation.")
Signed-off-by: Philip Pettersson <philip.pettersson@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 49,222
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void willRemoveChild(Node* child)
{
ASSERT(child->parentNode());
ChildListMutationScope(child->parentNode()).willRemoveChild(child);
child->notifyMutationObserversNodeWillDetach();
dispatchChildRemovalEvents(child);
child->document().nodeWillBeRemoved(child); // e.g. mutation event listener can create a new range.
ChildFrameDisconnector(child).disconnect();
}
Commit Message: Notify nodes removal to Range/Selection after dispatching blur and mutation event
This patch changes notifying nodes removal to Range/Selection after dispatching blur and mutation event. In willRemoveChildren(), like willRemoveChild(); r115686 did same change, although it didn't change willRemoveChildren().
The issue 295010, use-after-free, is caused by setting removed node to Selection in mutation event handler.
BUG=295010
TEST=LayoutTests/fast/dom/Range/range-created-during-remove-children.html, LayoutTests/editing/selection/selection-change-in-mutation-event-by-remove-children.html, LayoutTests/editing/selection/selection-change-in-blur-event-by-remove-children.html
R=tkent@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/25389004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159007 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 110,525
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int decode_opaque_fixed(struct xdr_stream *xdr, void *buf, size_t len)
{
__be32 *p;
p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, len);
if (likely(p)) {
memcpy(buf, p, len);
return 0;
}
print_overflow_msg(__func__, xdr);
return -EIO;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 23,317
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BrowserView::ShowInactive() {
if (frame_->IsVisible())
return;
CreateLauncherIcon();
frame_->ShowInactive();
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 118,451
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Sys_In_Restart_f( void )
{
IN_Restart( );
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 95,857
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: LayerTreeHostTestHasImplThreadTest() : single_threaded_(false) {}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 137,438
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameImpl::MarkWebAXObjectDirty(const blink::WebAXObject& obj,
bool subtree) {
if (render_accessibility_)
render_accessibility_->MarkWebAXObjectDirty(obj, subtree);
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 139,728
|
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