instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cifs_del_lock_waiters(struct cifsLockInfo *lock)
{
struct cifsLockInfo *li, *tmp;
list_for_each_entry_safe(li, tmp, &lock->blist, blist) {
list_del_init(&li->blist);
wake_up(&li->block_q);
}
}
Commit Message: cifs: ensure that uncached writes handle unmapped areas correctly
It's possible for userland to pass down an iovec via writev() that has a
bogus user pointer in it. If that happens and we're doing an uncached
write, then we can end up getting less bytes than we expect from the
call to iov_iter_copy_from_user. This is CVE-2014-0069
cifs_iovec_write isn't set up to handle that situation however. It'll
blindly keep chugging through the page array and not filling those pages
with anything useful. Worse yet, we'll later end up with a negative
number in wdata->tailsz, which will confuse the sending routines and
cause an oops at the very least.
Fix this by having the copy phase of cifs_iovec_write stop copying data
in this situation and send the last write as a short one. At the same
time, we want to avoid sending a zero-length write to the server, so
break out of the loop and set rc to -EFAULT if that happens. This also
allows us to handle the case where no address in the iovec is valid.
[Note: Marking this for stable on v3.4+ kernels, but kernels as old as
v2.6.38 may have a similar problem and may need similar fix]
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.4+
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 39,965
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool HTMLFormControlElement::isAutofocusable() const {
return fastHasAttribute(autofocusAttr) && supportsAutofocus();
}
Commit Message: Form validation: Do not show validation bubble if the page is invisible.
BUG=673163
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2572813003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#438476}
CWE ID: CWE-1021
| 0
| 139,970
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int LongpressX() { return longpress_x_; }
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 148,062
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static double filter_cubic_spline(const double x1)
{
const double x = x1 < 0.0 ? -x1 : x1;
if (x < 1.0 ) {
const double x2 = x*x;
return (0.5 * x2 * x - x2 + 2.0 / 3.0);
}
if (x < 2.0) {
return (pow(2.0 - x, 3.0)/6.0);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: gdImageScaleTwoPass memory leak fix
Fixing memory leak in gdImageScaleTwoPass, as reported by @cmb69 and
confirmed by @vapier. This bug actually bit me in production and I'm
very thankful that it was reported with an easy fix.
Fixes #173.
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 56,323
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void NotifyProcessLaunchedAndConnected(const ChildProcessData& data) {
for (auto& observer : g_browser_child_process_observers.Get())
observer.BrowserChildProcessLaunchedAndConnected(data);
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 149,214
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebSocketJob::CompleteIO(int result) {
if (callback_) {
net::CompletionCallback* callback = callback_;
callback_ = NULL;
callback->Run(result);
Release(); // Balanced with OnStartOpenConnection().
}
}
Commit Message: Use ScopedRunnableMethodFactory in WebSocketJob
Don't post SendPending if it is already posted.
BUG=89795
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7488007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93599 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 98,368
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: VideoTrackRecorder::CodecId VideoStringToCodecId(
const blink::WebString& codecs) {
const std::string& codecs_str = ToLowerASCII(codecs.Utf8());
if (codecs_str.find("vp8") != std::string::npos)
return VideoTrackRecorder::CodecId::VP8;
if (codecs_str.find("vp9") != std::string::npos)
return VideoTrackRecorder::CodecId::VP9;
#if BUILDFLAG(RTC_USE_H264)
if (codecs_str.find("h264") != std::string::npos ||
codecs_str.find("avc1") != std::string::npos)
return VideoTrackRecorder::CodecId::H264;
#endif
return VideoTrackRecorder::CodecId::LAST;
}
Commit Message: Check context is attached before creating MediaRecorder
Bug: 896736
Change-Id: I3ccfd2188fb15704af14c8af050e0a5667855d34
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1324231
Commit-Queue: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Miguel Casas <mcasas@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606242}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 143,521
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int check_matrix_bitmap(unsigned char *bmap,
int ich, int och, int num_outs)
{
int idx = ich * num_outs + och;
return bmap[idx >> 3] & (0x80 >> (idx & 7));
}
Commit Message: ALSA: usb-audio: Kill stray URB at exiting
USB-audio driver may leave a stray URB for the mixer interrupt when it
exits by some error during probe. This leads to a use-after-free
error as spotted by syzkaller like:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in snd_usb_mixer_interrupt+0x604/0x6f0
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16
dump_stack+0x292/0x395 lib/dump_stack.c:52
print_address_description+0x78/0x280 mm/kasan/report.c:252
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351
kasan_report+0x23d/0x350 mm/kasan/report.c:409
__asan_report_load8_noabort+0x19/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:430
snd_usb_mixer_interrupt+0x604/0x6f0 sound/usb/mixer.c:2490
__usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x2e0/0x650 drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1779
....
Allocated by task 1484:
save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:59
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:447
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:459
kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:551
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x11e/0x2d0 mm/slub.c:2772
kmalloc ./include/linux/slab.h:493
kzalloc ./include/linux/slab.h:666
snd_usb_create_mixer+0x145/0x1010 sound/usb/mixer.c:2540
create_standard_mixer_quirk+0x58/0x80 sound/usb/quirks.c:516
snd_usb_create_quirk+0x92/0x100 sound/usb/quirks.c:560
create_composite_quirk+0x1c4/0x3e0 sound/usb/quirks.c:59
snd_usb_create_quirk+0x92/0x100 sound/usb/quirks.c:560
usb_audio_probe+0x1040/0x2c10 sound/usb/card.c:618
....
Freed by task 1484:
save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:59
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:447
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:459
kasan_slab_free+0x72/0xc0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:524
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1390
slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1412
slab_free mm/slub.c:2988
kfree+0xf6/0x2f0 mm/slub.c:3919
snd_usb_mixer_free+0x11a/0x160 sound/usb/mixer.c:2244
snd_usb_mixer_dev_free+0x36/0x50 sound/usb/mixer.c:2250
__snd_device_free+0x1ff/0x380 sound/core/device.c:91
snd_device_free_all+0x8f/0xe0 sound/core/device.c:244
snd_card_do_free sound/core/init.c:461
release_card_device+0x47/0x170 sound/core/init.c:181
device_release+0x13f/0x210 drivers/base/core.c:814
....
Actually such a URB is killed properly at disconnection when the
device gets probed successfully, and what we need is to apply it for
the error-path, too.
In this patch, we apply snd_usb_mixer_disconnect() at releasing.
Also introduce a new flag, disconnected, to struct usb_mixer_interface
for not performing the disconnection procedure twice.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 59,965
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: blink::WebString RenderViewImpl::AcceptLanguages() {
return WebString::FromUTF8(renderer_preferences_.accept_languages);
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 145,079
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ManifestManager* RenderFrameImpl::manifest_manager() {
return manifest_manager_;
}
Commit Message: Connect WebUSB client interface to the devices app
This provides a basic WebUSB client interface in
content/renderer. Most of the interface is unimplemented,
but this CL hooks up navigator.usb.getDevices() to the
browser's Mojo devices app to enumerate available USB
devices.
BUG=492204
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1293253002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344881}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 123,253
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void nfs_commit_free(struct nfs_commit_data *p)
{
mempool_free(p, nfs_commit_mempool);
}
Commit Message: nfs: always make sure page is up-to-date before extending a write to cover the entire page
We should always make sure the cached page is up-to-date when we're
determining whether we can extend a write to cover the full page -- even
if we've received a write delegation from the server.
Commit c7559663 added logic to skip this check if we have a write
delegation, which can lead to data corruption such as the following
scenario if client B receives a write delegation from the NFS server:
Client A:
# echo 123456789 > /mnt/file
Client B:
# echo abcdefghi >> /mnt/file
# cat /mnt/file
0�D0�abcdefghi
Just because we hold a write delegation doesn't mean that we've read in
the entire page contents.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.11+
Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 39,138
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ThreadHeap::ReportMemoryUsageForTracing() {
bool gc_tracing_enabled;
TRACE_EVENT_CATEGORY_GROUP_ENABLED(TRACE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT("blink_gc"),
&gc_tracing_enabled);
if (!gc_tracing_enabled)
return;
ThreadHeap& heap = ThreadState::Current()->Heap();
TRACE_COUNTER1(TRACE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT("blink_gc"),
"ThreadHeap::allocatedObjectSizeKB",
std::min(heap.HeapStats().AllocatedObjectSize() / 1024,
static_cast<size_t>(INT_MAX)));
TRACE_COUNTER1(TRACE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT("blink_gc"),
"ThreadHeap::markedObjectSizeKB",
std::min(heap.HeapStats().MarkedObjectSize() / 1024,
static_cast<size_t>(INT_MAX)));
TRACE_COUNTER1(
TRACE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT("blink_gc"),
"ThreadHeap::markedObjectSizeAtLastCompleteSweepKB",
std::min(heap.HeapStats().MarkedObjectSizeAtLastCompleteSweep() / 1024,
static_cast<size_t>(INT_MAX)));
TRACE_COUNTER1(TRACE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT("blink_gc"),
"ThreadHeap::allocatedSpaceKB",
std::min(heap.HeapStats().AllocatedSpace() / 1024,
static_cast<size_t>(INT_MAX)));
TRACE_COUNTER1(TRACE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT("blink_gc"),
"ThreadHeap::objectSizeAtLastGCKB",
std::min(heap.HeapStats().ObjectSizeAtLastGC() / 1024,
static_cast<size_t>(INT_MAX)));
TRACE_COUNTER1(
TRACE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT("blink_gc"), "ThreadHeap::wrapperCount",
std::min(heap.HeapStats().WrapperCount(), static_cast<size_t>(INT_MAX)));
TRACE_COUNTER1(TRACE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT("blink_gc"),
"ThreadHeap::wrapperCountAtLastGC",
std::min(heap.HeapStats().WrapperCountAtLastGC(),
static_cast<size_t>(INT_MAX)));
TRACE_COUNTER1(TRACE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT("blink_gc"),
"ThreadHeap::collectedWrapperCount",
std::min(heap.HeapStats().CollectedWrapperCount(),
static_cast<size_t>(INT_MAX)));
TRACE_COUNTER1(TRACE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT("blink_gc"),
"ThreadHeap::partitionAllocSizeAtLastGCKB",
std::min(heap.HeapStats().PartitionAllocSizeAtLastGC() / 1024,
static_cast<size_t>(INT_MAX)));
TRACE_COUNTER1(TRACE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT("blink_gc"),
"Partitions::totalSizeOfCommittedPagesKB",
std::min(WTF::Partitions::TotalSizeOfCommittedPages() / 1024,
static_cast<size_t>(INT_MAX)));
}
Commit Message: [oilpan] Fix GCInfoTable for multiple threads
Previously, grow and access from different threads could lead to a race
on the table backing; see bug.
- Rework the table to work on an existing reservation.
- Commit upon growing, avoiding any copies.
Drive-by: Fix over-allocation of table.
Bug: chromium:841280
Change-Id: I329cb6f40091e14e8c05334ba1104a9440c31d43
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1061525
Commit-Queue: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560434}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 153,676
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void InstallablePaymentAppCrawler::OnPaymentWebAppIconDownloadAndDecoded(
const GURL& method_manifest_url,
const GURL& web_app_manifest_url,
const SkBitmap& icon) {
number_of_web_app_icons_to_download_and_decode_--;
if (icon.drawsNothing()) {
WarnIfPossible(
"Failed to download or decode installable payment app's icon for web "
"app manifest " +
web_app_manifest_url.spec() + ".");
} else {
std::map<GURL, std::unique_ptr<WebAppInstallationInfo>>::iterator it =
installable_apps_.find(method_manifest_url);
DCHECK(it != installable_apps_.end());
DCHECK(url::IsSameOriginWith(GURL(it->second->sw_scope),
web_app_manifest_url));
it->second->icon = std::make_unique<SkBitmap>(icon);
}
FinishCrawlingPaymentAppsIfReady();
}
Commit Message: [Payments] Restrict just-in-time payment handler to payment method domain and its subdomains
Bug: 853937
Change-Id: I148b3d96950a9d90fa362e580e9593caa6b92a36
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1132116
Reviewed-by: Mathieu Perreault <mathp@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ganggui Tang <gogerald@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#573911}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 145,398
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HTMLInputElement::defaultBlur()
{
HTMLTextFormControlElement::blur();
}
Commit Message: Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 112,883
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int readContigStripsIntoBuffer (TIFF* in, uint8* buf)
{
uint8* bufp = buf;
int32 bytes_read = 0;
uint32 strip, nstrips = TIFFNumberOfStrips(in);
uint32 stripsize = TIFFStripSize(in);
uint32 rows = 0;
uint32 rps = TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(in, TIFFTAG_ROWSPERSTRIP, &rps);
tsize_t scanline_size = TIFFScanlineSize(in);
if (scanline_size == 0) {
TIFFError("", "TIFF scanline size is zero!");
return 0;
}
for (strip = 0; strip < nstrips; strip++) {
bytes_read = TIFFReadEncodedStrip (in, strip, bufp, -1);
rows = bytes_read / scanline_size;
if ((strip < (nstrips - 1)) && (bytes_read != (int32)stripsize))
TIFFError("", "Strip %d: read %lu bytes, strip size %lu",
(int)strip + 1, (unsigned long) bytes_read,
(unsigned long)stripsize);
if (bytes_read < 0 && !ignore) {
TIFFError("", "Error reading strip %lu after %lu rows",
(unsigned long) strip, (unsigned long)rows);
return 0;
}
bufp += bytes_read;
}
return 1;
} /* end readContigStripsIntoBuffer */
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcrop.c: fix out-of-bound read of up to 3 bytes in
readContigTilesIntoBuffer(). Reported as MSVR 35092 by Axel Souchet
& Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 48,271
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: standard_row(png_const_structp pp, png_byte std[STANDARD_ROWMAX],
png_uint_32 id, png_uint_32 y)
{
if (WIDTH_FROM_ID(id) == 0)
transform_row(pp, std, COL_FROM_ID(id), DEPTH_FROM_ID(id), y);
else
size_row(std, WIDTH_FROM_ID(id) * bit_size(pp, COL_FROM_ID(id),
DEPTH_FROM_ID(id)), y);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
| 0
| 160,047
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int mov_read_stsc(MOVContext *c, AVIOContext *pb, MOVAtom atom)
{
AVStream *st;
MOVStreamContext *sc;
unsigned int i, entries;
if (c->fc->nb_streams < 1)
return 0;
st = c->fc->streams[c->fc->nb_streams-1];
sc = st->priv_data;
avio_r8(pb); /* version */
avio_rb24(pb); /* flags */
entries = avio_rb32(pb);
av_dlog(c->fc, "track[%i].stsc.entries = %i\n", c->fc->nb_streams-1, entries);
if (!entries)
return 0;
if (entries >= UINT_MAX / sizeof(*sc->stsc_data))
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
sc->stsc_data = av_malloc(entries * sizeof(*sc->stsc_data));
if (!sc->stsc_data)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
sc->stsc_count = entries;
for (i=0; i<entries; i++) {
sc->stsc_data[i].first = avio_rb32(pb);
sc->stsc_data[i].count = avio_rb32(pb);
sc->stsc_data[i].id = avio_rb32(pb);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mov: reset dref_count on realloc to keep values consistent.
This fixes a potential crash.
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 54,541
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void poison_obj(struct kmem_cache *cachep, void *addr, unsigned char val)
{
int size = cachep->object_size;
addr = &((char *)addr)[obj_offset(cachep)];
memset(addr, val, size);
*(unsigned char *)(addr + size - 1) = POISON_END;
}
Commit Message: mm/slab.c: fix SLAB freelist randomization duplicate entries
This patch fixes a bug in the freelist randomization code. When a high
random number is used, the freelist will contain duplicate entries. It
will result in different allocations sharing the same chunk.
It will result in odd behaviours and crashes. It should be uncommon but
it depends on the machines. We saw it happening more often on some
machines (every few hours of running tests).
Fixes: c7ce4f60ac19 ("mm: SLAB freelist randomization")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170103181908.143178-1-thgarnie@google.com
Signed-off-by: John Sperbeck <jsperbeck@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 68,915
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderViewHostImpl::DragTargetDragOver(
const gfx::Point& client_pt,
const gfx::Point& screen_pt,
WebDragOperationsMask operations_allowed,
int key_modifiers) {
Send(new DragMsg_TargetDragOver(GetRoutingID(), client_pt, screen_pt,
operations_allowed, key_modifiers));
}
Commit Message: Filter more incoming URLs in the CreateWindow path.
BUG=170532
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12036002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@178728 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 117,182
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void perf_event_switch(struct task_struct *task,
struct task_struct *next_prev, bool sched_in)
{
struct perf_switch_event switch_event;
/* N.B. caller checks nr_switch_events != 0 */
switch_event = (struct perf_switch_event){
.task = task,
.next_prev = next_prev,
.event_id = {
.header = {
/* .type */
.misc = sched_in ? 0 : PERF_RECORD_MISC_SWITCH_OUT,
/* .size */
},
/* .next_prev_pid */
/* .next_prev_tid */
},
};
perf_event_aux(perf_event_switch_output,
&switch_event,
NULL);
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix race in swevent hash
There's a race on CPU unplug where we free the swevent hash array
while it can still have events on. This will result in a
use-after-free which is BAD.
Simply do not free the hash array on unplug. This leaves the thing
around and no use-after-free takes place.
When the last swevent dies, we do a for_each_possible_cpu() iteration
anyway to clean these up, at which time we'll free it, so no leakage
will occur.
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 56,100
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ModuleExport MagickBooleanType ReadPSDLayers(Image *image,
const ImageInfo *image_info,const PSDInfo *psd_info,
const MagickBooleanType skip_layers,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
type[4];
LayerInfo
*layer_info;
MagickSizeType
size;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register ssize_t
i;
ssize_t
count,
j,
number_layers;
size=GetPSDSize(psd_info,image);
if (size == 0)
{
/*
Skip layers & masks.
*/
(void) ReadBlobLong(image);
count=ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) type);
ReversePSDString(image,type,4);
status=MagickFalse;
if ((count == 0) || (LocaleNCompare(type,"8BIM",4) != 0))
return(MagickTrue);
else
{
count=ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) type);
ReversePSDString(image,type,4);
if ((count != 0) && (LocaleNCompare(type,"Lr16",4) == 0))
size=GetPSDSize(psd_info,image);
else
return(MagickTrue);
}
}
status=MagickTrue;
if (size != 0)
{
layer_info=(LayerInfo *) NULL;
number_layers=(short) ReadBlobShort(image);
if (number_layers < 0)
{
/*
The first alpha channel in the merged result contains the
transparency data for the merged result.
*/
number_layers=MagickAbsoluteValue(number_layers);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" negative layer count corrected for");
image->alpha_trait=BlendPixelTrait;
}
/*
We only need to know if the image has an alpha channel
*/
if (skip_layers != MagickFalse)
return(MagickTrue);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" image contains %.20g layers",(double) number_layers);
if (number_layers == 0)
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"InvalidNumberOfLayers",
image->filename);
layer_info=(LayerInfo *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) number_layers,
sizeof(*layer_info));
if (layer_info == (LayerInfo *) NULL)
{
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" allocation of LayerInfo failed");
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
}
(void) ResetMagickMemory(layer_info,0,(size_t) number_layers*
sizeof(*layer_info));
for (i=0; i < number_layers; i++)
{
ssize_t
x,
y;
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" reading layer #%.20g",(double) i+1);
layer_info[i].page.y=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
layer_info[i].page.x=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
y=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
x=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
layer_info[i].page.width=(size_t) (x-layer_info[i].page.x);
layer_info[i].page.height=(size_t) (y-layer_info[i].page.y);
layer_info[i].channels=ReadBlobShort(image);
if (layer_info[i].channels > MaxPSDChannels)
{
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"MaximumChannelsExceeded",
image->filename);
}
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" offset(%.20g,%.20g), size(%.20g,%.20g), channels=%.20g",
(double) layer_info[i].page.x,(double) layer_info[i].page.y,
(double) layer_info[i].page.height,(double)
layer_info[i].page.width,(double) layer_info[i].channels);
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) layer_info[i].channels; j++)
{
layer_info[i].channel_info[j].type=(short) ReadBlobShort(image);
layer_info[i].channel_info[j].size=(size_t) GetPSDSize(psd_info,
image);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" channel[%.20g]: type=%.20g, size=%.20g",(double) j,
(double) layer_info[i].channel_info[j].type,
(double) layer_info[i].channel_info[j].size);
}
count=ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) type);
ReversePSDString(image,type,4);
if ((count == 0) || (LocaleNCompare(type,"8BIM",4) != 0))
{
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" layer type was %.4s instead of 8BIM", type);
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader",
image->filename);
}
count=ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) layer_info[i].blendkey);
ReversePSDString(image,layer_info[i].blendkey,4);
layer_info[i].opacity=(Quantum) ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
layer_info[i].clipping=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
layer_info[i].flags=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
layer_info[i].visible=!(layer_info[i].flags & 0x02);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" blend=%.4s, opacity=%.20g, clipping=%s, flags=%d, visible=%s",
layer_info[i].blendkey,(double) layer_info[i].opacity,
layer_info[i].clipping ? "true" : "false",layer_info[i].flags,
layer_info[i].visible ? "true" : "false");
(void) ReadBlobByte(image); /* filler */
size=ReadBlobLong(image);
if (size != 0)
{
MagickSizeType
combined_length,
length;
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" layer contains additional info");
length=ReadBlobLong(image);
combined_length=length+4;
if (length != 0)
{
/*
Layer mask info.
*/
layer_info[i].mask.page.y=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
layer_info[i].mask.page.x=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
layer_info[i].mask.page.height=(size_t) (ReadBlobLong(image)-
layer_info[i].mask.page.y);
layer_info[i].mask.page.width=(size_t) (ReadBlobLong(image)-
layer_info[i].mask.page.x);
layer_info[i].mask.background=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(
image);
layer_info[i].mask.flags=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (!(layer_info[i].mask.flags & 0x01))
{
layer_info[i].mask.page.y=layer_info[i].mask.page.y-
layer_info[i].page.y;
layer_info[i].mask.page.x=layer_info[i].mask.page.x-
layer_info[i].page.x;
}
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" layer mask: offset(%.20g,%.20g), size(%.20g,%.20g), length=%.20g",
(double) layer_info[i].mask.page.x,(double)
layer_info[i].mask.page.y,(double) layer_info[i].mask.page.width,
(double) layer_info[i].mask.page.height,(double)
((MagickOffsetType) length)-18);
/*
Skip over the rest of the layer mask information.
*/
if (DiscardBlobBytes(image,(MagickSizeType) (length-18)) == MagickFalse)
{
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
}
}
length=ReadBlobLong(image);
combined_length+=length+4;
if (length != 0)
{
/*
Layer blending ranges info.
*/
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" layer blending ranges: length=%.20g",(double)
((MagickOffsetType) length));
/*
We read it, but don't use it...
*/
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) length; j+=8)
{
size_t blend_source=ReadBlobLong(image);
size_t blend_dest=ReadBlobLong(image);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" source(%x), dest(%x)",(unsigned int)
blend_source,(unsigned int) blend_dest);
}
}
/*
Layer name.
*/
length=(MagickSizeType) (unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
combined_length+=length+1;
if (length > 0)
(void) ReadBlob(image,(size_t) length++,layer_info[i].name);
layer_info[i].name[length]='\0';
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" layer name: %s",layer_info[i].name);
if ((length % 4) != 0)
{
length=4-(length % 4);
combined_length+=length;
/* Skip over the padding of the layer name */
if (DiscardBlobBytes(image,length) == MagickFalse)
{
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
}
}
length=(MagickSizeType) size-combined_length;
if (length > 0)
{
unsigned char
*info;
layer_info[i].info=AcquireStringInfo((const size_t) length);
info=GetStringInfoDatum(layer_info[i].info);
(void) ReadBlob(image,(const size_t) length,info);
}
}
}
for (i=0; i < number_layers; i++)
{
if ((layer_info[i].page.width == 0) ||
(layer_info[i].page.height == 0))
{
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" layer data is empty");
if (layer_info[i].info != (StringInfo *) NULL)
layer_info[i].info=DestroyStringInfo(layer_info[i].info);
continue;
}
/*
Allocate layered image.
*/
layer_info[i].image=CloneImage(image,layer_info[i].page.width,
layer_info[i].page.height,MagickFalse,exception);
if (layer_info[i].image == (Image *) NULL)
{
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" allocation of image for layer %.20g failed",(double) i);
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
}
if (layer_info[i].info != (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
(void) SetImageProfile(layer_info[i].image,"psd:additional-info",
layer_info[i].info,exception);
layer_info[i].info=DestroyStringInfo(layer_info[i].info);
}
}
if (image_info->ping == MagickFalse)
{
for (i=0; i < number_layers; i++)
{
if (layer_info[i].image == (Image *) NULL)
{
for (j=0; j < layer_info[i].channels; j++)
{
if (DiscardBlobBytes(image,(MagickSizeType)
layer_info[i].channel_info[j].size) == MagickFalse)
{
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
}
}
continue;
}
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" reading data for layer %.20g",(double) i);
status=ReadPSDLayer(image,image_info,psd_info,&layer_info[i],
exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,i,(MagickSizeType)
number_layers);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (status != MagickFalse)
{
for (i=0; i < number_layers; i++)
{
if (layer_info[i].image == (Image *) NULL)
{
for (j=i; j < number_layers - 1; j++)
layer_info[j] = layer_info[j+1];
number_layers--;
i--;
}
}
if (number_layers > 0)
{
for (i=0; i < number_layers; i++)
{
if (i > 0)
layer_info[i].image->previous=layer_info[i-1].image;
if (i < (number_layers-1))
layer_info[i].image->next=layer_info[i+1].image;
layer_info[i].image->page=layer_info[i].page;
}
image->next=layer_info[0].image;
layer_info[0].image->previous=image;
}
layer_info=(LayerInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(layer_info);
}
else
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
}
return(status);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/350
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 1
| 168,405
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int buffer_needs_copy(PadContext *s, AVFrame *frame, AVBufferRef *buf)
{
int planes[4] = { -1, -1, -1, -1}, *p = planes;
int i, j;
/* get all planes in this buffer */
for (i = 0; i < FF_ARRAY_ELEMS(planes) && frame->data[i]; i++) {
if (av_frame_get_plane_buffer(frame, i) == buf)
*p++ = i;
}
/* for each plane in this buffer, check that it can be padded without
* going over buffer bounds or other planes */
for (i = 0; i < FF_ARRAY_ELEMS(planes) && planes[i] >= 0; i++) {
int hsub = s->draw.hsub[planes[i]];
int vsub = s->draw.vsub[planes[i]];
uint8_t *start = frame->data[planes[i]];
uint8_t *end = start + (frame->height >> vsub) *
frame->linesize[planes[i]];
/* amount of free space needed before the start and after the end
* of the plane */
ptrdiff_t req_start = (s->x >> hsub) * s->draw.pixelstep[planes[i]] +
(s->y >> vsub) * frame->linesize[planes[i]];
ptrdiff_t req_end = ((s->w - s->x - frame->width) >> hsub) *
s->draw.pixelstep[planes[i]] +
(s->y >> vsub) * frame->linesize[planes[i]];
if (frame->linesize[planes[i]] < (s->w >> hsub) * s->draw.pixelstep[planes[i]])
return 1;
if (start - buf->data < req_start ||
(buf->data + buf->size) - end < req_end)
return 1;
for (j = 0; j < FF_ARRAY_ELEMS(planes) && planes[j] >= 0; j++) {
int vsub1 = s->draw.vsub[planes[j]];
uint8_t *start1 = frame->data[planes[j]];
uint8_t *end1 = start1 + (frame->height >> vsub1) *
frame->linesize[planes[j]];
if (i == j)
continue;
if (FFSIGN(start - end1) != FFSIGN(start - end1 - req_start) ||
FFSIGN(end - start1) != FFSIGN(end - start1 + req_end))
return 1;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avfilter: fix plane validity checks
Fixes out of array accesses
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 29,770
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int sc_file_valid(const sc_file_t *file) {
if (file == NULL)
return 0;
return file->magic == SC_FILE_MAGIC;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds writes
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problems.
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 78,841
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OnProceed() {
if (state_)
*state_ = OKED;
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 108,301
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: hook_command_build_completion (struct t_hook_command *hook_command)
{
int i, j, k, length, num_items;
struct t_weelist *list;
char *pos_completion, *pos_double_pipe, *pos_start, *pos_end;
char **items, *last_space, *ptr_template;
/* split templates using "||" as separator */
hook_command->cplt_num_templates = 1;
pos_completion = hook_command->completion;
while ((pos_double_pipe = strstr (pos_completion, "||")) != NULL)
{
hook_command->cplt_num_templates++;
pos_completion = pos_double_pipe + 2;
}
hook_command->cplt_templates = malloc (hook_command->cplt_num_templates *
sizeof (*hook_command->cplt_templates));
for (i = 0; i < hook_command->cplt_num_templates; i++)
{
hook_command->cplt_templates[i] = NULL;
}
pos_completion = hook_command->completion;
i = 0;
while (pos_completion)
{
pos_double_pipe = strstr (pos_completion, "||");
if (!pos_double_pipe)
pos_double_pipe = pos_completion + strlen (pos_completion);
pos_start = pos_completion;
pos_end = pos_double_pipe - 1;
if (pos_end < pos_start)
{
hook_command->cplt_templates[i] = strdup ("");
}
else
{
while (pos_start[0] == ' ')
{
pos_start++;
}
pos_end = pos_double_pipe - 1;
while ((pos_end > pos_start) && (pos_end[0] == ' '))
{
pos_end--;
}
hook_command->cplt_templates[i] = string_strndup (pos_start,
pos_end - pos_start + 1);
}
i++;
if (!pos_double_pipe[0])
pos_completion = NULL;
else
pos_completion = pos_double_pipe + 2;
}
/* for each template, split/count args */
hook_command->cplt_templates_static = malloc (hook_command->cplt_num_templates *
sizeof (*hook_command->cplt_templates_static));
hook_command->cplt_template_num_args = malloc (hook_command->cplt_num_templates *
sizeof (*hook_command->cplt_template_num_args));
hook_command->cplt_template_args = malloc (hook_command->cplt_num_templates *
sizeof (*hook_command->cplt_template_args));
hook_command->cplt_template_num_args_concat = 0;
for (i = 0; i < hook_command->cplt_num_templates; i++)
{
/*
* build static part of template: it's first argument(s) which does not
* contain "%" or "|"
*/
last_space = NULL;
ptr_template = hook_command->cplt_templates[i];
while (ptr_template && ptr_template[0])
{
if (ptr_template[0] == ' ')
{
last_space = ptr_template;
break;
}
else if ((ptr_template[0] == '%') || (ptr_template[0] == '|'))
break;
ptr_template = utf8_next_char (ptr_template);
}
if (last_space)
{
last_space--;
while (last_space > hook_command->cplt_templates[i])
{
if (last_space[0] != ' ')
break;
}
if (last_space < hook_command->cplt_templates[i])
last_space = NULL;
else
last_space++;
}
if (last_space)
hook_command->cplt_templates_static[i] = string_strndup (hook_command->cplt_templates[i],
last_space - hook_command->cplt_templates[i]);
else
hook_command->cplt_templates_static[i] = strdup (hook_command->cplt_templates[i]);
/* build arguments for each template */
hook_command->cplt_template_args[i] = string_split (hook_command->cplt_templates[i],
" ", 0, 0,
&(hook_command->cplt_template_num_args[i]));
if (hook_command->cplt_template_num_args[i] > hook_command->cplt_template_num_args_concat)
hook_command->cplt_template_num_args_concat = hook_command->cplt_template_num_args[i];
}
/*
* build strings with concatentaion of items from different templates
* for each argument: these strings will be used when completing argument
* if we can't find which template to use (for example for first argument)
*/
if (hook_command->cplt_template_num_args_concat == 0)
hook_command->cplt_template_args_concat = NULL;
else
{
hook_command->cplt_template_args_concat = malloc (hook_command->cplt_template_num_args_concat *
sizeof (*hook_command->cplt_template_args_concat));
list = weelist_new ();
for (i = 0; i < hook_command->cplt_template_num_args_concat; i++)
{
/* first compute length */
length = 1;
for (j = 0; j < hook_command->cplt_num_templates; j++)
{
if (i < hook_command->cplt_template_num_args[j])
length += strlen (hook_command->cplt_template_args[j][i]) + 1;
}
/* alloc memory */
hook_command->cplt_template_args_concat[i] = malloc (length);
if (hook_command->cplt_template_args_concat[i])
{
/* concatene items with "|" as separator */
weelist_remove_all (list);
hook_command->cplt_template_args_concat[i][0] = '\0';
for (j = 0; j < hook_command->cplt_num_templates; j++)
{
if (i < hook_command->cplt_template_num_args[j])
{
items = string_split (hook_command->cplt_template_args[j][i],
"|", 0, 0, &num_items);
for (k = 0; k < num_items; k++)
{
if (!weelist_search (list, items[k]))
{
if (hook_command->cplt_template_args_concat[i][0])
strcat (hook_command->cplt_template_args_concat[i], "|");
strcat (hook_command->cplt_template_args_concat[i],
items[k]);
weelist_add (list, items[k], WEECHAT_LIST_POS_END,
NULL);
}
}
string_free_split (items);
}
}
}
}
weelist_free (list);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 7,280
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DataReductionProxyConfig::FindConfiguredDataReductionProxy(
const net::ProxyServer& proxy_server) const {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
return config_values_->FindConfiguredDataReductionProxy(proxy_server);
}
Commit Message: Disable all DRP URL fetches when holdback is enabled
Disable secure proxy checker, warmup url fetcher
and client config fetch when the client is in DRP
(Data Reduction Proxy) holdback.
This CL does not disable pingbacks when client is in the
holdback, but the pingback code is going away soon.
Change-Id: Icbb59d814d1452123869c609e0770d1439c1db51
Bug: 984964
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1709965
Commit-Queue: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#679649}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 137,869
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameImpl::didChangeSelection(bool is_empty_selection) {
if (!GetRenderWidget()->handling_input_event() && !handling_select_range_)
return;
if (is_empty_selection)
selection_text_.clear();
GetRenderWidget()->UpdateTextInputState(
RenderWidget::NO_SHOW_IME, RenderWidget::FROM_NON_IME);
SyncSelectionIfRequired();
}
Commit Message: Connect WebUSB client interface to the devices app
This provides a basic WebUSB client interface in
content/renderer. Most of the interface is unimplemented,
but this CL hooks up navigator.usb.getDevices() to the
browser's Mojo devices app to enumerate available USB
devices.
BUG=492204
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1293253002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344881}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 123,221
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SupervisedUserWhitelistService* SupervisedUserService::GetWhitelistService() {
return whitelist_service_.get();
}
Commit Message: [signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <droger@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <isherman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <msarda@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 143,099
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameImpl::DidChangeIcon(blink::WebIconURL::Type icon_type) {
SendUpdateFaviconURL();
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 139,574
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int v9fs_acl_chmod(struct inode *inode, struct p9_fid *fid)
{
int retval = 0;
struct posix_acl *acl;
if (S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
acl = v9fs_get_cached_acl(inode, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS);
if (acl) {
retval = __posix_acl_chmod(&acl, GFP_KERNEL, inode->i_mode);
if (retval)
return retval;
set_cached_acl(inode, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS, acl);
retval = v9fs_set_acl(fid, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS, acl);
posix_acl_release(acl);
}
return retval;
}
Commit Message: posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting file permissions
When file permissions are modified via chmod(2) and the user is not in
the owning group or capable of CAP_FSETID, the setgid bit is cleared in
inode_change_ok(). Setting a POSIX ACL via setxattr(2) sets the file
permissions as well as the new ACL, but doesn't clear the setgid bit in
a similar way; this allows to bypass the check in chmod(2). Fix that.
References: CVE-2016-7097
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-285
| 0
| 50,305
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: map_activate(map_op_t op, bool use_default)
{
if (use_default)
script_run(s_def_map_scripts[op], false);
script_run(s_map->scripts[op], false);
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c (#268)
* Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c
There's a buffer overflow bug in the function layer_resize. It allocates
a buffer `tilemap` with size `x_size * y_size * sizeof(struct map_tile)`.
But it didn't check for integer overflow, so if x_size and y_size are
very large, it's possible that the buffer size is smaller than needed,
causing a buffer overflow later.
PoC: `SetLayerSize(0, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF);`
* move malloc to a separate line
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 75,013
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: read_header(struct archive_read *a, struct archive_entry *entry,
char head_type)
{
const void *h;
const char *p, *endp;
struct rar *rar;
struct rar_header rar_header;
struct rar_file_header file_header;
int64_t header_size;
unsigned filename_size, end;
char *filename;
char *strp;
char packed_size[8];
char unp_size[8];
int ttime;
struct archive_string_conv *sconv, *fn_sconv;
unsigned long crc32_val;
int ret = (ARCHIVE_OK), ret2;
rar = (struct rar *)(a->format->data);
/* Setup a string conversion object for non-rar-unicode filenames. */
sconv = rar->opt_sconv;
if (sconv == NULL) {
if (!rar->init_default_conversion) {
rar->sconv_default =
archive_string_default_conversion_for_read(
&(a->archive));
rar->init_default_conversion = 1;
}
sconv = rar->sconv_default;
}
if ((h = __archive_read_ahead(a, 7, NULL)) == NULL)
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
p = h;
memcpy(&rar_header, p, sizeof(rar_header));
rar->file_flags = archive_le16dec(rar_header.flags);
header_size = archive_le16dec(rar_header.size);
if (header_size < (int64_t)sizeof(file_header) + 7) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Invalid header size");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
crc32_val = crc32(0, (const unsigned char *)p + 2, 7 - 2);
__archive_read_consume(a, 7);
if (!(rar->file_flags & FHD_SOLID))
{
rar->compression_method = 0;
rar->packed_size = 0;
rar->unp_size = 0;
rar->mtime = 0;
rar->ctime = 0;
rar->atime = 0;
rar->arctime = 0;
rar->mode = 0;
memset(&rar->salt, 0, sizeof(rar->salt));
rar->atime = 0;
rar->ansec = 0;
rar->ctime = 0;
rar->cnsec = 0;
rar->mtime = 0;
rar->mnsec = 0;
rar->arctime = 0;
rar->arcnsec = 0;
}
else
{
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"RAR solid archive support unavailable.");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
if ((h = __archive_read_ahead(a, (size_t)header_size - 7, NULL)) == NULL)
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
/* File Header CRC check. */
crc32_val = crc32(crc32_val, h, (unsigned)(header_size - 7));
if ((crc32_val & 0xffff) != archive_le16dec(rar_header.crc)) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Header CRC error");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
/* If no CRC error, Go on parsing File Header. */
p = h;
endp = p + header_size - 7;
memcpy(&file_header, p, sizeof(file_header));
p += sizeof(file_header);
rar->compression_method = file_header.method;
ttime = archive_le32dec(file_header.file_time);
rar->mtime = get_time(ttime);
rar->file_crc = archive_le32dec(file_header.file_crc);
if (rar->file_flags & FHD_PASSWORD)
{
archive_entry_set_is_data_encrypted(entry, 1);
rar->has_encrypted_entries = 1;
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"RAR encryption support unavailable.");
/* Since it is only the data part itself that is encrypted we can at least
extract information about the currently processed entry and don't need
to return ARCHIVE_FATAL here. */
/*return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);*/
}
if (rar->file_flags & FHD_LARGE)
{
memcpy(packed_size, file_header.pack_size, 4);
memcpy(packed_size + 4, p, 4); /* High pack size */
p += 4;
memcpy(unp_size, file_header.unp_size, 4);
memcpy(unp_size + 4, p, 4); /* High unpack size */
p += 4;
rar->packed_size = archive_le64dec(&packed_size);
rar->unp_size = archive_le64dec(&unp_size);
}
else
{
rar->packed_size = archive_le32dec(file_header.pack_size);
rar->unp_size = archive_le32dec(file_header.unp_size);
}
if (rar->packed_size < 0 || rar->unp_size < 0)
{
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Invalid sizes specified.");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
rar->bytes_remaining = rar->packed_size;
/* TODO: RARv3 subblocks contain comments. For now the complete block is
* consumed at the end.
*/
if (head_type == NEWSUB_HEAD) {
size_t distance = p - (const char *)h;
header_size += rar->packed_size;
/* Make sure we have the extended data. */
if ((h = __archive_read_ahead(a, (size_t)header_size - 7, NULL)) == NULL)
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
p = h;
endp = p + header_size - 7;
p += distance;
}
filename_size = archive_le16dec(file_header.name_size);
if (p + filename_size > endp) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Invalid filename size");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
if (rar->filename_allocated < filename_size * 2 + 2) {
char *newptr;
size_t newsize = filename_size * 2 + 2;
newptr = realloc(rar->filename, newsize);
if (newptr == NULL) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM,
"Couldn't allocate memory.");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
rar->filename = newptr;
rar->filename_allocated = newsize;
}
filename = rar->filename;
memcpy(filename, p, filename_size);
filename[filename_size] = '\0';
if (rar->file_flags & FHD_UNICODE)
{
if (filename_size != strlen(filename))
{
unsigned char highbyte, flagbits, flagbyte;
unsigned fn_end, offset;
end = filename_size;
fn_end = filename_size * 2;
filename_size = 0;
offset = (unsigned)strlen(filename) + 1;
highbyte = *(p + offset++);
flagbits = 0;
flagbyte = 0;
while (offset < end && filename_size < fn_end)
{
if (!flagbits)
{
flagbyte = *(p + offset++);
flagbits = 8;
}
flagbits -= 2;
switch((flagbyte >> flagbits) & 3)
{
case 0:
filename[filename_size++] = '\0';
filename[filename_size++] = *(p + offset++);
break;
case 1:
filename[filename_size++] = highbyte;
filename[filename_size++] = *(p + offset++);
break;
case 2:
filename[filename_size++] = *(p + offset + 1);
filename[filename_size++] = *(p + offset);
offset += 2;
break;
case 3:
{
char extra, high;
uint8_t length = *(p + offset++);
if (length & 0x80) {
extra = *(p + offset++);
high = (char)highbyte;
} else
extra = high = 0;
length = (length & 0x7f) + 2;
while (length && filename_size < fn_end) {
unsigned cp = filename_size >> 1;
filename[filename_size++] = high;
filename[filename_size++] = p[cp] + extra;
length--;
}
}
break;
}
}
if (filename_size > fn_end) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Invalid filename");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
filename[filename_size++] = '\0';
/*
* Do not increment filename_size here as the computations below
* add the space for the terminating NUL explicitly.
*/
filename[filename_size] = '\0';
/* Decoded unicode form is UTF-16BE, so we have to update a string
* conversion object for it. */
if (rar->sconv_utf16be == NULL) {
rar->sconv_utf16be = archive_string_conversion_from_charset(
&a->archive, "UTF-16BE", 1);
if (rar->sconv_utf16be == NULL)
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
fn_sconv = rar->sconv_utf16be;
strp = filename;
while (memcmp(strp, "\x00\x00", 2))
{
if (!memcmp(strp, "\x00\\", 2))
*(strp + 1) = '/';
strp += 2;
}
p += offset;
} else {
/*
* If FHD_UNICODE is set but no unicode data, this file name form
* is UTF-8, so we have to update a string conversion object for
* it accordingly.
*/
if (rar->sconv_utf8 == NULL) {
rar->sconv_utf8 = archive_string_conversion_from_charset(
&a->archive, "UTF-8", 1);
if (rar->sconv_utf8 == NULL)
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
fn_sconv = rar->sconv_utf8;
while ((strp = strchr(filename, '\\')) != NULL)
*strp = '/';
p += filename_size;
}
}
else
{
fn_sconv = sconv;
while ((strp = strchr(filename, '\\')) != NULL)
*strp = '/';
p += filename_size;
}
/* Split file in multivolume RAR. No more need to process header. */
if (rar->filename_save &&
filename_size == rar->filename_save_size &&
!memcmp(rar->filename, rar->filename_save, filename_size + 1))
{
__archive_read_consume(a, header_size - 7);
rar->cursor++;
if (rar->cursor >= rar->nodes)
{
rar->nodes++;
if ((rar->dbo =
realloc(rar->dbo, sizeof(*rar->dbo) * rar->nodes)) == NULL)
{
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM, "Couldn't allocate memory.");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
rar->dbo[rar->cursor].header_size = header_size;
rar->dbo[rar->cursor].start_offset = -1;
rar->dbo[rar->cursor].end_offset = -1;
}
if (rar->dbo[rar->cursor].start_offset < 0)
{
rar->dbo[rar->cursor].start_offset = a->filter->position;
rar->dbo[rar->cursor].end_offset = rar->dbo[rar->cursor].start_offset +
rar->packed_size;
}
return ret;
}
rar->filename_save = (char*)realloc(rar->filename_save,
filename_size + 1);
memcpy(rar->filename_save, rar->filename, filename_size + 1);
rar->filename_save_size = filename_size;
/* Set info for seeking */
free(rar->dbo);
if ((rar->dbo = calloc(1, sizeof(*rar->dbo))) == NULL)
{
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM, "Couldn't allocate memory.");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
rar->dbo[0].header_size = header_size;
rar->dbo[0].start_offset = -1;
rar->dbo[0].end_offset = -1;
rar->cursor = 0;
rar->nodes = 1;
if (rar->file_flags & FHD_SALT)
{
if (p + 8 > endp) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Invalid header size");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
memcpy(rar->salt, p, 8);
p += 8;
}
if (rar->file_flags & FHD_EXTTIME) {
if (read_exttime(p, rar, endp) < 0) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Invalid header size");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
}
__archive_read_consume(a, header_size - 7);
rar->dbo[0].start_offset = a->filter->position;
rar->dbo[0].end_offset = rar->dbo[0].start_offset + rar->packed_size;
switch(file_header.host_os)
{
case OS_MSDOS:
case OS_OS2:
case OS_WIN32:
rar->mode = archive_le32dec(file_header.file_attr);
if (rar->mode & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY)
rar->mode = AE_IFDIR | S_IXUSR | S_IXGRP | S_IXOTH;
else
rar->mode = AE_IFREG;
rar->mode |= S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IROTH;
break;
case OS_UNIX:
case OS_MAC_OS:
case OS_BEOS:
rar->mode = archive_le32dec(file_header.file_attr);
break;
default:
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Unknown file attributes from RAR file's host OS");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
rar->bytes_uncopied = rar->bytes_unconsumed = 0;
rar->lzss.position = rar->offset = 0;
rar->offset_seek = 0;
rar->dictionary_size = 0;
rar->offset_outgoing = 0;
rar->br.cache_avail = 0;
rar->br.avail_in = 0;
rar->crc_calculated = 0;
rar->entry_eof = 0;
rar->valid = 1;
rar->is_ppmd_block = 0;
rar->start_new_table = 1;
free(rar->unp_buffer);
rar->unp_buffer = NULL;
rar->unp_offset = 0;
rar->unp_buffer_size = UNP_BUFFER_SIZE;
memset(rar->lengthtable, 0, sizeof(rar->lengthtable));
__archive_ppmd7_functions.Ppmd7_Free(&rar->ppmd7_context);
rar->ppmd_valid = rar->ppmd_eod = 0;
/* Don't set any archive entries for non-file header types */
if (head_type == NEWSUB_HEAD)
return ret;
archive_entry_set_mtime(entry, rar->mtime, rar->mnsec);
archive_entry_set_ctime(entry, rar->ctime, rar->cnsec);
archive_entry_set_atime(entry, rar->atime, rar->ansec);
archive_entry_set_size(entry, rar->unp_size);
archive_entry_set_mode(entry, rar->mode);
if (archive_entry_copy_pathname_l(entry, filename, filename_size, fn_sconv))
{
if (errno == ENOMEM)
{
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM,
"Can't allocate memory for Pathname");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Pathname cannot be converted from %s to current locale.",
archive_string_conversion_charset_name(fn_sconv));
ret = (ARCHIVE_WARN);
}
if (((rar->mode) & AE_IFMT) == AE_IFLNK)
{
/* Make sure a symbolic-link file does not have its body. */
rar->bytes_remaining = 0;
archive_entry_set_size(entry, 0);
/* Read a symbolic-link name. */
if ((ret2 = read_symlink_stored(a, entry, sconv)) < (ARCHIVE_WARN))
return ret2;
if (ret > ret2)
ret = ret2;
}
if (rar->bytes_remaining == 0)
rar->entry_eof = 1;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: rar: file split across multi-part archives must match
Fuzzing uncovered some UAF and memory overrun bugs where a file in a
single file archive reported that it was split across multiple
volumes. This was caused by ppmd7 operations calling
rar_br_fillup. This would invoke rar_read_ahead, which would in some
situations invoke archive_read_format_rar_read_header. That would
check the new file name against the old file name, and if they didn't
match up it would free the ppmd7 buffer and allocate a new
one. However, because the ppmd7 decoder wasn't actually done with the
buffer, it would continue to used the freed buffer. Both reads and
writes to the freed region can be observed.
This is quite tricky to solve: once the buffer has been freed it is
too late, as the ppmd7 decoder functions almost universally assume
success - there's no way for ppmd_read to signal error, nor are there
good ways for functions like Range_Normalise to propagate them. So we
can't detect after the fact that we're in an invalid state - e.g. by
checking rar->cursor, we have to prevent ourselves from ever ending up
there. So, when we are in the dangerous part or rar_read_ahead that
assumes a valid split, we set a flag force read_header to either go
down the path for split files or bail. This means that the ppmd7
decoder keeps a valid buffer and just runs out of data.
Found with a combination of AFL, afl-rb and qsym.
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 1
| 168,931
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool DevToolsWindow::InterceptPageBeforeUnload(WebContents* contents) {
DevToolsWindow* window =
DevToolsWindow::GetInstanceForInspectedWebContents(contents);
if (!window || window->intercepted_page_beforeunload_)
return false;
if (window->life_stage_ != kLoadCompleted)
return false;
window->intercepted_page_beforeunload_ = true;
if (!DevToolsWindow::InterceptPageBeforeUnload(window->main_web_contents_)) {
window->main_web_contents_->DispatchBeforeUnload();
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move front-end URL handling to DevToolsUIBindingds
BUG=662859
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2607833002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#440926}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 138,403
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void set_run_unload_listener(bool value) { run_unload_ = value; }
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 98,190
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SPL_METHOD(SplObjectStorage, rewind)
{
spl_SplObjectStorage *intern = (spl_SplObjectStorage*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
zend_hash_internal_pointer_reset_ex(&intern->storage, &intern->pos);
intern->index = 0;
} /* }}} */
/* {{{ proto bool SplObjectStorage::valid()
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 12,407
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GDataRootDirectory::FromProto(const GDataRootDirectoryProto& proto) {
root_ = this;
GDataDirectory::FromProto(proto.gdata_directory());
largest_changestamp_ = proto.largest_changestamp();
}
Commit Message: gdata: Define the resource ID for the root directory
Per the spec, the resource ID for the root directory is defined
as "folder:root". Add the resource ID to the root directory in our
file system representation so we can look up the root directory by
the resource ID.
BUG=127697
TEST=add unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332253
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137928 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 104,694
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void php_wddx_serialize_var(wddx_packet *packet, zval *var, char *name, int name_len TSRMLS_DC)
{
HashTable *ht;
if (name) {
size_t name_esc_len;
char *tmp_buf, *name_esc;
name_esc = php_escape_html_entities(name, name_len, &name_esc_len, 0, ENT_QUOTES, NULL TSRMLS_CC);
tmp_buf = emalloc(name_esc_len + sizeof(WDDX_VAR_S));
snprintf(tmp_buf, name_esc_len + sizeof(WDDX_VAR_S), WDDX_VAR_S, name_esc);
php_wddx_add_chunk(packet, tmp_buf);
efree(tmp_buf);
str_efree(name_esc);
}
switch(Z_TYPE_P(var)) {
case IS_STRING:
php_wddx_serialize_string(packet, var TSRMLS_CC);
break;
case IS_LONG:
case IS_DOUBLE:
php_wddx_serialize_number(packet, var);
break;
case IS_BOOL:
php_wddx_serialize_boolean(packet, var);
break;
case IS_NULL:
php_wddx_serialize_unset(packet);
break;
case IS_ARRAY:
ht = Z_ARRVAL_P(var);
if (ht->nApplyCount > 1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_RECOVERABLE_ERROR, "WDDX doesn't support circular references");
return;
}
ht->nApplyCount++;
php_wddx_serialize_array(packet, var);
ht->nApplyCount--;
break;
case IS_OBJECT:
ht = Z_OBJPROP_P(var);
if (ht->nApplyCount > 1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_RECOVERABLE_ERROR, "WDDX doesn't support circular references");
return;
}
ht->nApplyCount++;
php_wddx_serialize_object(packet, var);
ht->nApplyCount--;
break;
}
if (name) {
php_wddx_add_chunk_static(packet, WDDX_VAR_E);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-502
| 0
| 4,704
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: unsigned int lcdGetPixel_ArrayBuffer(JsGraphics *gfx, short x, short y) {
unsigned int col = 0;
JsVar *buf = (JsVar*)gfx->backendData;
unsigned int idx = lcdGetPixelIndex_ArrayBuffer(gfx,x,y,1);
JsvArrayBufferIterator it;
jsvArrayBufferIteratorNew(&it, buf, idx>>3 );
if (gfx->data.bpp&7/*not a multiple of one byte*/) {
idx = idx & 7;
unsigned int mask = (unsigned int)(1<<gfx->data.bpp)-1;
unsigned int existing = (unsigned int)jsvArrayBufferIteratorGetIntegerValue(&it);
unsigned int bitIdx = (gfx->data.flags & JSGRAPHICSFLAGS_ARRAYBUFFER_MSB) ? 8-(idx+gfx->data.bpp) : idx;
col = ((existing>>bitIdx)&mask);
} else {
int i;
for (i=0;i<gfx->data.bpp;i+=8) {
col |= ((unsigned int)jsvArrayBufferIteratorGetIntegerValue(&it)) << i;
jsvArrayBufferIteratorNext(&it);
}
}
jsvArrayBufferIteratorFree(&it);
return col;
}
Commit Message: Add height check for Graphics.createArrayBuffer(...vertical_byte:true) (fix #1421)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 82,590
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xmlXPtrNewLocationSetNodes(xmlNodePtr start, xmlNodePtr end) {
xmlXPathObjectPtr ret;
ret = (xmlXPathObjectPtr) xmlMalloc(sizeof(xmlXPathObject));
if (ret == NULL) {
xmlXPtrErrMemory("allocating locationset");
return(NULL);
}
memset(ret, 0 , (size_t) sizeof(xmlXPathObject));
ret->type = XPATH_LOCATIONSET;
if (end == NULL)
ret->user = xmlXPtrLocationSetCreate(xmlXPtrNewCollapsedRange(start));
else
ret->user = xmlXPtrLocationSetCreate(xmlXPtrNewRangeNodes(start,end));
return(ret);
}
Commit Message: Fix XPointer bug.
BUG=125462
AUTHOR=asd@ut.ee
R=cevans@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10344022
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@135174 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 109,071
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameImpl::didFirstVisuallyNonEmptyLayout(
blink::WebLocalFrame* frame) {
DCHECK(!frame_ || frame_ == frame);
if (frame->parent())
return;
InternalDocumentStateData* data =
InternalDocumentStateData::FromDataSource(frame->dataSource());
data->set_did_first_visually_non_empty_layout(true);
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
GetRenderWidget()->DidChangeBodyBackgroundColor(
render_view_->webwidget_->backgroundColor());
#endif
GetRenderWidget()->QueueMessage(
new FrameHostMsg_DidFirstVisuallyNonEmptyPaint(routing_id_),
MESSAGE_DELIVERY_POLICY_WITH_VISUAL_STATE);
}
Commit Message: Connect WebUSB client interface to the devices app
This provides a basic WebUSB client interface in
content/renderer. Most of the interface is unimplemented,
but this CL hooks up navigator.usb.getDevices() to the
browser's Mojo devices app to enumerate available USB
devices.
BUG=492204
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1293253002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344881}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 123,234
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebBluetoothServiceImpl::RemoteCharacteristicGetDescriptors(
const std::string& characteristic_instance_id,
blink::mojom::WebBluetoothGATTQueryQuantity quantity,
const base::Optional<BluetoothUUID>& descriptors_uuid,
RemoteCharacteristicGetDescriptorsCallback callback) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
RecordGetDescriptorsDescriptor(quantity, descriptors_uuid);
if (descriptors_uuid &&
BluetoothBlocklist::Get().IsExcluded(descriptors_uuid.value())) {
RecordGetDescriptorsOutcome(quantity, UMAGetDescriptorOutcome::BLOCKLISTED);
std::move(callback).Run(
blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult::BLOCKLISTED_DESCRIPTOR_UUID,
base::nullopt /* descriptor */);
return;
}
const CacheQueryResult query_result =
QueryCacheForCharacteristic(characteristic_instance_id);
if (query_result.outcome == CacheQueryOutcome::BAD_RENDERER) {
return;
}
if (query_result.outcome != CacheQueryOutcome::SUCCESS) {
RecordGetDescriptorsOutcome(quantity, query_result.outcome);
std::move(callback).Run(query_result.GetWebResult(),
base::nullopt /* descriptor */);
return;
}
auto descriptors = descriptors_uuid
? query_result.characteristic->GetDescriptorsByUUID(
descriptors_uuid.value())
: query_result.characteristic->GetDescriptors();
std::vector<blink::mojom::WebBluetoothRemoteGATTDescriptorPtr>
response_descriptors;
for (device::BluetoothRemoteGattDescriptor* descriptor : descriptors) {
if (BluetoothBlocklist::Get().IsExcluded(descriptor->GetUUID())) {
continue;
}
std::string descriptor_instance_id = descriptor->GetIdentifier();
auto insert_result = descriptor_id_to_characteristic_id_.insert(
{descriptor_instance_id, characteristic_instance_id});
if (!insert_result.second)
DCHECK(insert_result.first->second == characteristic_instance_id);
auto descriptor_ptr(blink::mojom::WebBluetoothRemoteGATTDescriptor::New());
descriptor_ptr->instance_id = descriptor_instance_id;
descriptor_ptr->uuid = descriptor->GetUUID();
response_descriptors.push_back(std::move(descriptor_ptr));
if (quantity == blink::mojom::WebBluetoothGATTQueryQuantity::SINGLE) {
break;
}
}
if (!response_descriptors.empty()) {
RecordGetDescriptorsOutcome(quantity, UMAGetDescriptorOutcome::SUCCESS);
std::move(callback).Run(blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult::SUCCESS,
std::move(response_descriptors));
return;
}
RecordGetDescriptorsOutcome(
quantity, descriptors_uuid ? UMAGetDescriptorOutcome::NOT_FOUND
: UMAGetDescriptorOutcome::NO_DESCRIPTORS);
std::move(callback).Run(
descriptors_uuid ? blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult::DESCRIPTOR_NOT_FOUND
: blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult::NO_DESCRIPTORS_FOUND,
base::nullopt /* descriptors */);
}
Commit Message: bluetooth: Implement getAvailability()
This change implements the getAvailability() method for
navigator.bluetooth as defined in the specification.
Bug: 707640
Change-Id: I9e9b3e7f8ea7f259e975f71cb6d9570e5f04b479
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1651516
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Giovanni Ortuño Urquidi <ortuno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#688987}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 138,136
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int hfs_file_read_lzvn_attr(TSK_FS_FILE* fs_file,
char* buffer,
uint32_t attributeLength,
uint64_t uncSize)
{
return hfs_file_read_compressed_attr(
fs_file, DECMPFS_TYPE_LZVN_ATTR,
buffer, attributeLength, uncSize,
hfs_decompress_lzvn_attr
);
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #1374 from JordyZomer/develop
Fix CVE-2018-19497.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 75,696
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::statePopped(PassRefPtr<SerializedScriptValue> stateObject)
{
if (!frame())
return;
if (m_readyState == Complete)
enqueuePopstateEvent(stateObject);
else
m_pendingStateObject = stateObject;
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 105,632
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int do_chown_cgroup(const char *controller, const char *cgroup_path,
uid_t newuid)
{
int sv[2] = {-1, -1}, optval = 1, ret = -1;
char buf[1];
struct pollfd fds;
if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_DGRAM, 0, sv) < 0) {
SYSERROR("Error creating socketpair");
goto out;
}
if (setsockopt(sv[1], SOL_SOCKET, SO_PASSCRED, &optval, sizeof(optval)) == -1) {
SYSERROR("setsockopt failed");
goto out;
}
if (setsockopt(sv[0], SOL_SOCKET, SO_PASSCRED, &optval, sizeof(optval)) == -1) {
SYSERROR("setsockopt failed");
goto out;
}
if ( cgmanager_chown_scm_sync(NULL, cgroup_manager, controller,
cgroup_path, sv[1]) != 0) {
NihError *nerr;
nerr = nih_error_get();
ERROR("call to cgmanager_chown_scm_sync failed: %s", nerr->message);
nih_free(nerr);
goto out;
}
/* now send credentials */
fds.fd = sv[0];
fds.events = POLLIN;
fds.revents = 0;
if (poll(&fds, 1, -1) <= 0) {
ERROR("Error getting go-ahead from server: %s", strerror(errno));
goto out;
}
if (read(sv[0], &buf, 1) != 1) {
ERROR("Error getting reply from server over socketpair");
goto out;
}
if (send_creds(sv[0], getpid(), getuid(), getgid())) {
SYSERROR("%s: Error sending pid over SCM_CREDENTIAL", __func__);
goto out;
}
fds.fd = sv[0];
fds.events = POLLIN;
fds.revents = 0;
if (poll(&fds, 1, -1) <= 0) {
ERROR("Error getting go-ahead from server: %s", strerror(errno));
goto out;
}
if (read(sv[0], &buf, 1) != 1) {
ERROR("Error getting reply from server over socketpair");
goto out;
}
if (send_creds(sv[0], getpid(), newuid, 0)) {
SYSERROR("%s: Error sending pid over SCM_CREDENTIAL", __func__);
goto out;
}
fds.fd = sv[0];
fds.events = POLLIN;
fds.revents = 0;
if (poll(&fds, 1, -1) <= 0) {
ERROR("Error getting go-ahead from server: %s", strerror(errno));
goto out;
}
ret = read(sv[0], buf, 1);
out:
close(sv[0]);
close(sv[1]);
if (ret == 1 && *buf == '1')
return 0;
return -1;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 44,542
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static size_t GetCPUCoreCount() {
long cpuCoreCount = 1;
#if defined(_SC_NPROCESSORS_ONLN)
cpuCoreCount = sysconf(_SC_NPROCESSORS_ONLN);
#else
cpuCoreCount = sysconf(_SC_NPROC_ONLN);
#endif
CHECK(cpuCoreCount >= 1);
ALOGV("Number of CPU cores: %ld", cpuCoreCount);
return (size_t)cpuCoreCount;
}
Commit Message: SoftHEVC: Exit gracefully in case of decoder errors
Exit for error in allocation and unsupported resolutions
Bug: 28816956
Change-Id: Ieb830bedeb3a7431d1d21a024927df630f7eda1e
CWE ID: CWE-172
| 0
| 159,406
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: AutofillField* AutofillManager::GetAutofillField(const FormData& form,
const FormFieldData& field) {
if (!personal_data_)
return nullptr;
FormStructure* form_structure = nullptr;
AutofillField* autofill_field = nullptr;
if (!GetCachedFormAndField(form, field, &form_structure, &autofill_field))
return nullptr;
if (!form_structure->IsAutofillable())
return nullptr;
return autofill_field;
}
Commit Message: [AF] Don't simplify/dedupe suggestions for (partially) filled sections.
Since Autofill does not fill field by field anymore, this simplifying
and deduping of suggestions is not useful anymore.
Bug: 858820
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:ios-simulator-full-configs;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
Change-Id: I36f7cfe425a0bdbf5ba7503a3d96773b405cc19b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1128255
Reviewed-by: Roger McFarlane <rogerm@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sebastien Seguin-Gagnon <sebsg@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#573315}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 154,951
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::vector<std::string> ChromeContentBrowserClient::GetStartupServices() {
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
return {"download_manager"};
#else
return {};
#endif
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 142,677
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Extension::InitExtensionID(extensions::Manifest* manifest,
const FilePath& path,
const std::string& explicit_id,
int creation_flags,
string16* error) {
if (!explicit_id.empty()) {
manifest->set_extension_id(explicit_id);
return true;
}
if (manifest->HasKey(keys::kPublicKey)) {
std::string public_key;
std::string public_key_bytes;
std::string extension_id;
if (!manifest->GetString(keys::kPublicKey, &public_key) ||
!ParsePEMKeyBytes(public_key, &public_key_bytes) ||
!GenerateId(public_key_bytes, &extension_id)) {
*error = ASCIIToUTF16(errors::kInvalidKey);
return false;
}
manifest->set_extension_id(extension_id);
return true;
}
if (creation_flags & REQUIRE_KEY) {
*error = ASCIIToUTF16(errors::kInvalidKey);
return false;
} else {
std::string extension_id = GenerateIdForPath(path);
if (extension_id.empty()) {
NOTREACHED() << "Could not create ID from path.";
return false;
}
manifest->set_extension_id(extension_id);
return true;
}
}
Commit Message: Tighten restrictions on hosted apps calling extension APIs
Only allow component apps to make any API calls, and for them only allow the namespaces they explicitly have permission for (plus chrome.test - I need to see if I can rework some WebStore tests to remove even this).
BUG=172369
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12095095
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180426 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 114,316
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Browser::ConfirmSetDefaultSearchProvider(
TabContents* tab_contents,
TemplateURL* template_url,
TemplateURLModel* template_url_model) {
window()->ConfirmSetDefaultSearchProvider(tab_contents, template_url,
template_url_model);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 98,206
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: INT AirPDcapDestroyContext(
PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx)
{
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_START("AirPDcapDestroyContext");
if (ctx==NULL) {
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapDestroyContext", "NULL context", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapDestroyContext");
return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;
}
AirPDcapCleanKeys(ctx);
AirPDcapCleanSecAssoc(ctx);
ctx->first_free_index=0;
ctx->index=-1;
ctx->sa_index=-1;
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapDestroyContext", "Context destroyed!", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapDestroyContext");
return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Sanity check eapol_len in AirPDcapDecryptWPABroadcastKey
Bug: 12175
Change-Id: Iaf977ba48f8668bf8095800a115ff9a3472dd893
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15326
Petri-Dish: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <buildbot-no-reply@wireshark.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexis La Goutte <alexis.lagoutte@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Wu <peter@lekensteyn.nl>
Tested-by: Peter Wu <peter@lekensteyn.nl>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 51,897
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned int hc_str(const char *s, size_t len)
{
unsigned int r = 0;
while (len-- > 0)
r = r * 31 + *s++;
return r;
}
Commit Message: prefer memcpy to strcpy
When we already know the length of a string (e.g., because
we just malloc'd to fit it), it's nicer to use memcpy than
strcpy, as it makes it more obvious that we are not going to
overflow the buffer (because the size we pass matches the
size in the allocation).
This also eliminates calls to strcpy, which make auditing
the code base harder.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 55,078
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int do_recv_XButtonEvent(rpc_message_t *message, XEvent *xevent)
{
int32_t x, y, x_root, y_root, same_screen;
uint32_t root, subwindow, time, state, button;
int error;
if ((error = do_recv_XAnyEvent(message, xevent)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_recv_uint32(message, &root)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_recv_uint32(message, &subwindow)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_recv_uint32(message, &time)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_recv_int32(message, &x)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_recv_int32(message, &y)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_recv_int32(message, &x_root)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_recv_int32(message, &y_root)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_recv_uint32(message, &state)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_recv_uint32(message, &button)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_recv_int32(message, &same_screen)) < 0)
return error;
xevent->xbutton.root = root;
xevent->xbutton.subwindow = subwindow;
xevent->xbutton.time = time;
xevent->xbutton.x = x;
xevent->xbutton.y = y;
xevent->xbutton.x_root = x_root;
xevent->xbutton.y_root = y_root;
xevent->xbutton.state = state;
xevent->xbutton.button = button;
xevent->xbutton.same_screen = same_screen;
return RPC_ERROR_NO_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 26,980
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int fuse_dev_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
/*
* The fuse device's file's private_data is used to hold
* the fuse_conn(ection) when it is mounted, and is used to
* keep track of whether the file has been mounted already.
*/
file->private_data = NULL;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 96,800
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gpgsm_set_fd (engine_gpgsm_t gpgsm, fd_type_t fd_type, const char *opt)
{
gpg_error_t err = 0;
char line[COMMANDLINELEN];
char *which;
iocb_data_t *iocb_data;
#if USE_DESCRIPTOR_PASSING
int dir;
#endif
switch (fd_type)
{
case INPUT_FD:
which = "INPUT";
iocb_data = &gpgsm->input_cb;
break;
case OUTPUT_FD:
which = "OUTPUT";
iocb_data = &gpgsm->output_cb;
break;
case MESSAGE_FD:
which = "MESSAGE";
iocb_data = &gpgsm->message_cb;
break;
default:
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE);
}
#if USE_DESCRIPTOR_PASSING
dir = iocb_data->dir;
/* We try to short-cut the communication by giving GPGSM direct
access to the file descriptor, rather than using a pipe. */
iocb_data->server_fd = _gpgme_data_get_fd (iocb_data->data);
if (iocb_data->server_fd < 0)
{
int fds[2];
if (_gpgme_io_pipe (fds, dir) < 0)
return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
iocb_data->fd = dir ? fds[0] : fds[1];
iocb_data->server_fd = dir ? fds[1] : fds[0];
if (_gpgme_io_set_close_notify (iocb_data->fd,
close_notify_handler, gpgsm))
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
goto leave_set_fd;
}
}
err = assuan_sendfd (gpgsm->assuan_ctx, iocb_data->server_fd);
if (err)
goto leave_set_fd;
_gpgme_io_close (iocb_data->server_fd);
iocb_data->server_fd = -1;
if (opt)
snprintf (line, COMMANDLINELEN, "%s FD %s", which, opt);
else
snprintf (line, COMMANDLINELEN, "%s FD", which);
#else
if (opt)
snprintf (line, COMMANDLINELEN, "%s FD=%s %s",
which, iocb_data->server_fd_str, opt);
else
snprintf (line, COMMANDLINELEN, "%s FD=%s",
which, iocb_data->server_fd_str);
#endif
err = gpgsm_assuan_simple_command (gpgsm->assuan_ctx, line, NULL, NULL);
#if USE_DESCRIPTOR_PASSING
leave_set_fd:
if (err)
{
_gpgme_io_close (iocb_data->fd);
iocb_data->fd = -1;
if (iocb_data->server_fd != -1)
{
_gpgme_io_close (iocb_data->server_fd);
iocb_data->server_fd = -1;
}
}
#endif
return err;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 12,282
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool TypedUrlModelAssociator::WriteToHistoryBackend(
const TypedUrlTitleVector* titles,
const TypedUrlVector* new_urls,
const TypedUrlUpdateVector* updated_urls,
const TypedUrlVisitVector* new_visits,
const history::VisitVector* deleted_visits) {
if (titles) {
for (TypedUrlTitleVector::const_iterator title = titles->begin();
title != titles->end(); ++title) {
history_backend_->SetPageTitle(title->first, title->second);
}
}
if (new_urls) {
#ifndef NDEBUG
for (TypedUrlVector::const_iterator url = new_urls->begin();
url != new_urls->end(); ++url) {
DCHECK(IsAssociated(url->url().spec()));
}
#endif
history_backend_->AddPagesWithDetails(*new_urls, history::SOURCE_SYNCED);
}
if (updated_urls) {
for (TypedUrlUpdateVector::const_iterator url = updated_urls->begin();
url != updated_urls->end(); ++url) {
DCHECK(url->second.visit_count());
DCHECK(url->second.typed_count());
DCHECK(IsAssociated(url->second.url().spec()));
if (!history_backend_->UpdateURL(url->first, url->second)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Could not update page: " << url->second.url().spec();
return false;
}
}
}
if (new_visits) {
for (TypedUrlVisitVector::const_iterator visits = new_visits->begin();
visits != new_visits->end(); ++visits) {
DCHECK(IsAssociated(visits->first.spec()));
if (!history_backend_->AddVisits(visits->first, visits->second,
history::SOURCE_SYNCED)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Could not add visits.";
return false;
}
}
}
if (deleted_visits) {
if (!history_backend_->RemoveVisits(*deleted_visits)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Could not remove visits.";
return false;
}
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Now ignores obsolete sync nodes without visit transitions.
Also removed assertion that was erroneously triggered by obsolete sync nodes.
BUG=none
TEST=run chrome against a database that contains obsolete typed url sync nodes.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7129069
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88846 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 100,817
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: posix_acl_xattr_get(const struct xattr_handler *handler,
struct dentry *unused, struct inode *inode,
const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
{
struct posix_acl *acl;
int error;
if (!IS_POSIXACL(inode))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
acl = get_acl(inode, handler->flags);
if (IS_ERR(acl))
return PTR_ERR(acl);
if (acl == NULL)
return -ENODATA;
error = posix_acl_to_xattr(&init_user_ns, acl, value, size);
posix_acl_release(acl);
return error;
}
Commit Message: posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting file permissions
When file permissions are modified via chmod(2) and the user is not in
the owning group or capable of CAP_FSETID, the setgid bit is cleared in
inode_change_ok(). Setting a POSIX ACL via setxattr(2) sets the file
permissions as well as the new ACL, but doesn't clear the setgid bit in
a similar way; this allows to bypass the check in chmod(2). Fix that.
References: CVE-2016-7097
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-285
| 0
| 50,390
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ext4_run_li_request(struct ext4_li_request *elr)
{
struct ext4_group_desc *gdp = NULL;
ext4_group_t group, ngroups;
struct super_block *sb;
unsigned long timeout = 0;
int ret = 0;
sb = elr->lr_super;
ngroups = EXT4_SB(sb)->s_groups_count;
for (group = elr->lr_next_group; group < ngroups; group++) {
gdp = ext4_get_group_desc(sb, group, NULL);
if (!gdp) {
ret = 1;
break;
}
if (!(gdp->bg_flags & cpu_to_le16(EXT4_BG_INODE_ZEROED)))
break;
}
if (group >= ngroups)
ret = 1;
if (!ret) {
timeout = jiffies;
ret = ext4_init_inode_table(sb, group,
elr->lr_timeout ? 0 : 1);
if (elr->lr_timeout == 0) {
timeout = (jiffies - timeout) *
elr->lr_sbi->s_li_wait_mult;
elr->lr_timeout = timeout;
}
elr->lr_next_sched = jiffies + elr->lr_timeout;
elr->lr_next_group = group + 1;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ext4: validate s_first_meta_bg at mount time
Ralf Spenneberg reported that he hit a kernel crash when mounting a
modified ext4 image. And it turns out that kernel crashed when
calculating fs overhead (ext4_calculate_overhead()), this is because
the image has very large s_first_meta_bg (debug code shows it's
842150400), and ext4 overruns the memory in count_overhead() when
setting bitmap buffer, which is PAGE_SIZE.
ext4_calculate_overhead():
buf = get_zeroed_page(GFP_NOFS); <=== PAGE_SIZE buffer
blks = count_overhead(sb, i, buf);
count_overhead():
for (j = ext4_bg_num_gdb(sb, grp); j > 0; j--) { <=== j = 842150400
ext4_set_bit(EXT4_B2C(sbi, s++), buf); <=== buffer overrun
count++;
}
This can be reproduced easily for me by this script:
#!/bin/bash
rm -f fs.img
mkdir -p /mnt/ext4
fallocate -l 16M fs.img
mke2fs -t ext4 -O bigalloc,meta_bg,^resize_inode -F fs.img
debugfs -w -R "ssv first_meta_bg 842150400" fs.img
mount -o loop fs.img /mnt/ext4
Fix it by validating s_first_meta_bg first at mount time, and
refusing to mount if its value exceeds the largest possible meta_bg
number.
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <ralf@os-t.de>
Signed-off-by: Eryu Guan <guaneryu@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 70,546
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::uniform3i(const WebGLUniformLocation* location,
GLint x,
GLint y,
GLint z) {
if (isContextLost() || !location)
return;
if (location->Program() != current_program_) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "uniform3i",
"location not for current program");
return;
}
ContextGL()->Uniform3i(location->Location(), x, y, z);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 133,893
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int l2cap_sock_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname, char __user *optval, unsigned int optlen)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct l2cap_chan *chan = l2cap_pi(sk)->chan;
struct bt_security sec;
struct bt_power pwr;
struct l2cap_conn *conn;
int len, err = 0;
u32 opt;
BT_DBG("sk %p", sk);
if (level == SOL_L2CAP)
return l2cap_sock_setsockopt_old(sock, optname, optval, optlen);
if (level != SOL_BLUETOOTH)
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
lock_sock(sk);
switch (optname) {
case BT_SECURITY:
if (chan->chan_type != L2CAP_CHAN_CONN_ORIENTED &&
chan->chan_type != L2CAP_CHAN_RAW) {
err = -EINVAL;
break;
}
sec.level = BT_SECURITY_LOW;
len = min_t(unsigned int, sizeof(sec), optlen);
if (copy_from_user((char *) &sec, optval, len)) {
err = -EFAULT;
break;
}
if (sec.level < BT_SECURITY_LOW ||
sec.level > BT_SECURITY_HIGH) {
err = -EINVAL;
break;
}
chan->sec_level = sec.level;
if (!chan->conn)
break;
conn = chan->conn;
/*change security for LE channels */
if (chan->scid == L2CAP_CID_LE_DATA) {
if (!conn->hcon->out) {
err = -EINVAL;
break;
}
if (smp_conn_security(conn, sec.level))
break;
sk->sk_state = BT_CONFIG;
chan->state = BT_CONFIG;
/* or for ACL link */
} else if ((sk->sk_state == BT_CONNECT2 &&
test_bit(BT_SK_DEFER_SETUP, &bt_sk(sk)->flags)) ||
sk->sk_state == BT_CONNECTED) {
if (!l2cap_chan_check_security(chan))
set_bit(BT_SK_SUSPEND, &bt_sk(sk)->flags);
else
sk->sk_state_change(sk);
} else {
err = -EINVAL;
}
break;
case BT_DEFER_SETUP:
if (sk->sk_state != BT_BOUND && sk->sk_state != BT_LISTEN) {
err = -EINVAL;
break;
}
if (get_user(opt, (u32 __user *) optval)) {
err = -EFAULT;
break;
}
if (opt)
set_bit(BT_SK_DEFER_SETUP, &bt_sk(sk)->flags);
else
clear_bit(BT_SK_DEFER_SETUP, &bt_sk(sk)->flags);
break;
case BT_FLUSHABLE:
if (get_user(opt, (u32 __user *) optval)) {
err = -EFAULT;
break;
}
if (opt > BT_FLUSHABLE_ON) {
err = -EINVAL;
break;
}
if (opt == BT_FLUSHABLE_OFF) {
struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
/* proceed further only when we have l2cap_conn and
No Flush support in the LM */
if (!conn || !lmp_no_flush_capable(conn->hcon->hdev)) {
err = -EINVAL;
break;
}
}
if (opt)
set_bit(FLAG_FLUSHABLE, &chan->flags);
else
clear_bit(FLAG_FLUSHABLE, &chan->flags);
break;
case BT_POWER:
if (chan->chan_type != L2CAP_CHAN_CONN_ORIENTED &&
chan->chan_type != L2CAP_CHAN_RAW) {
err = -EINVAL;
break;
}
pwr.force_active = BT_POWER_FORCE_ACTIVE_ON;
len = min_t(unsigned int, sizeof(pwr), optlen);
if (copy_from_user((char *) &pwr, optval, len)) {
err = -EFAULT;
break;
}
if (pwr.force_active)
set_bit(FLAG_FORCE_ACTIVE, &chan->flags);
else
clear_bit(FLAG_FORCE_ACTIVE, &chan->flags);
break;
case BT_CHANNEL_POLICY:
if (!enable_hs) {
err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
break;
}
if (get_user(opt, (u32 __user *) optval)) {
err = -EFAULT;
break;
}
if (opt > BT_CHANNEL_POLICY_AMP_PREFERRED) {
err = -EINVAL;
break;
}
if (chan->mode != L2CAP_MODE_ERTM &&
chan->mode != L2CAP_MODE_STREAMING) {
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
break;
}
chan->chan_policy = (u8) opt;
break;
default:
err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
break;
}
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: L2CAP - Fix info leak via getsockname()
The L2CAP code fails to initialize the l2_bdaddr_type member of struct
sockaddr_l2 and the padding byte added for alignment. It that for leaks
two bytes kernel stack via the getsockname() syscall. Add an explicit
memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 94,533
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int swapin_walk_pmd_entry(pmd_t *pmd, unsigned long start,
unsigned long end, struct mm_walk *walk)
{
pte_t *orig_pte;
struct vm_area_struct *vma = walk->private;
unsigned long index;
if (pmd_none_or_trans_huge_or_clear_bad(pmd))
return 0;
for (index = start; index != end; index += PAGE_SIZE) {
pte_t pte;
swp_entry_t entry;
struct page *page;
spinlock_t *ptl;
orig_pte = pte_offset_map_lock(vma->vm_mm, pmd, start, &ptl);
pte = *(orig_pte + ((index - start) / PAGE_SIZE));
pte_unmap_unlock(orig_pte, ptl);
if (pte_present(pte) || pte_none(pte))
continue;
entry = pte_to_swp_entry(pte);
if (unlikely(non_swap_entry(entry)))
continue;
page = read_swap_cache_async(entry, GFP_HIGHUSER_MOVABLE,
vma, index, false);
if (page)
put_page(page);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mm/madvise.c: fix madvise() infinite loop under special circumstances
MADVISE_WILLNEED has always been a noop for DAX (formerly XIP) mappings.
Unfortunately madvise_willneed() doesn't communicate this information
properly to the generic madvise syscall implementation. The calling
convention is quite subtle there. madvise_vma() is supposed to either
return an error or update &prev otherwise the main loop will never
advance to the next vma and it will keep looping for ever without a way
to get out of the kernel.
It seems this has been broken since introduction. Nobody has noticed
because nobody seems to be using MADVISE_WILLNEED on these DAX mappings.
[mhocko@suse.com: rewrite changelog]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171127115318.911-1-guoxuenan@huawei.com
Fixes: fe77ba6f4f97 ("[PATCH] xip: madvice/fadvice: execute in place")
Signed-off-by: chenjie <chenjie6@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: guoxuenan <guoxuenan@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: zhangyi (F) <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Cc: Miao Xie <miaoxie@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Shaohua Li <shli@fb.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Anshuman Khandual <khandual@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Carsten Otte <cotte@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 85,785
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2(ExecState* exec)
{
JSValue thisValue = exec->hostThisValue();
if (!thisValue.inherits(&JSTestInterface::s_info))
return throwVMTypeError(exec);
JSTestInterface* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestInterface*>(asObject(thisValue));
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(castedThis, &JSTestInterface::s_info);
TestInterface* impl = static_cast<TestInterface*>(castedThis->impl());
if (exec->argumentCount() < 2)
return throwVMError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments"));
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
ScriptExecutionContext* scriptContext = jsCast<JSDOMGlobalObject*>(exec->lexicalGlobalObject())->scriptExecutionContext();
if (!scriptContext)
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
const String& strArg(ustringToString(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 0, DefaultIsUndefined).isEmpty() ? UString() : MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 0, DefaultIsUndefined).toString(exec)->value(exec)));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
TestObj* objArg(toTestObj(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 1, DefaultIsUndefined)));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
JSC::JSValue result = toJS(exec, castedThis->globalObject(), WTF::getPtr(TestSupplemental::supplementalMethod2(impl, scriptContext, strArg, objArg, ec)));
setDOMException(exec, ec);
return JSValue::encode(result);
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 170,575
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool check_mmio_spte(struct kvm *kvm, u64 spte)
{
unsigned int kvm_gen, spte_gen;
kvm_gen = kvm_current_mmio_generation(kvm);
spte_gen = get_mmio_spte_generation(spte);
trace_check_mmio_spte(spte, kvm_gen, spte_gen);
return likely(kvm_gen == spte_gen);
}
Commit Message: nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <nyh@il.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <xinhao.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 37,403
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int hid_add_usage(struct hid_parser *parser, unsigned usage)
{
if (parser->local.usage_index >= HID_MAX_USAGES) {
hid_err(parser->device, "usage index exceeded\n");
return -1;
}
parser->local.usage[parser->local.usage_index] = usage;
parser->local.collection_index[parser->local.usage_index] =
parser->collection_stack_ptr ?
parser->collection_stack[parser->collection_stack_ptr - 1] : 0;
parser->local.usage_index++;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: HID: core: prevent out-of-bound readings
Plugging a Logitech DJ receiver with KASAN activated raises a bunch of
out-of-bound readings.
The fields are allocated up to MAX_USAGE, meaning that potentially, we do
not have enough fields to fit the incoming values.
Add checks and silence KASAN.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 49,478
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int count_overhead(struct super_block *sb, ext4_group_t grp,
char *buf)
{
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb);
struct ext4_group_desc *gdp;
ext4_fsblk_t first_block, last_block, b;
ext4_group_t i, ngroups = ext4_get_groups_count(sb);
int s, j, count = 0;
if (!ext4_has_feature_bigalloc(sb))
return (ext4_bg_has_super(sb, grp) + ext4_bg_num_gdb(sb, grp) +
sbi->s_itb_per_group + 2);
first_block = le32_to_cpu(sbi->s_es->s_first_data_block) +
(grp * EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(sb));
last_block = first_block + EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(sb) - 1;
for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) {
gdp = ext4_get_group_desc(sb, i, NULL);
b = ext4_block_bitmap(sb, gdp);
if (b >= first_block && b <= last_block) {
ext4_set_bit(EXT4_B2C(sbi, b - first_block), buf);
count++;
}
b = ext4_inode_bitmap(sb, gdp);
if (b >= first_block && b <= last_block) {
ext4_set_bit(EXT4_B2C(sbi, b - first_block), buf);
count++;
}
b = ext4_inode_table(sb, gdp);
if (b >= first_block && b + sbi->s_itb_per_group <= last_block)
for (j = 0; j < sbi->s_itb_per_group; j++, b++) {
int c = EXT4_B2C(sbi, b - first_block);
ext4_set_bit(c, buf);
count++;
}
if (i != grp)
continue;
s = 0;
if (ext4_bg_has_super(sb, grp)) {
ext4_set_bit(s++, buf);
count++;
}
j = ext4_bg_num_gdb(sb, grp);
if (s + j > EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(sb)) {
ext4_error(sb, "Invalid number of block group "
"descriptor blocks: %d", j);
j = EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(sb) - s;
}
count += j;
for (; j > 0; j--)
ext4_set_bit(EXT4_B2C(sbi, s++), buf);
}
if (!count)
return 0;
return EXT4_CLUSTERS_PER_GROUP(sb) -
ext4_count_free(buf, EXT4_CLUSTERS_PER_GROUP(sb) / 8);
}
Commit Message: ext4: validate s_first_meta_bg at mount time
Ralf Spenneberg reported that he hit a kernel crash when mounting a
modified ext4 image. And it turns out that kernel crashed when
calculating fs overhead (ext4_calculate_overhead()), this is because
the image has very large s_first_meta_bg (debug code shows it's
842150400), and ext4 overruns the memory in count_overhead() when
setting bitmap buffer, which is PAGE_SIZE.
ext4_calculate_overhead():
buf = get_zeroed_page(GFP_NOFS); <=== PAGE_SIZE buffer
blks = count_overhead(sb, i, buf);
count_overhead():
for (j = ext4_bg_num_gdb(sb, grp); j > 0; j--) { <=== j = 842150400
ext4_set_bit(EXT4_B2C(sbi, s++), buf); <=== buffer overrun
count++;
}
This can be reproduced easily for me by this script:
#!/bin/bash
rm -f fs.img
mkdir -p /mnt/ext4
fallocate -l 16M fs.img
mke2fs -t ext4 -O bigalloc,meta_bg,^resize_inode -F fs.img
debugfs -w -R "ssv first_meta_bg 842150400" fs.img
mount -o loop fs.img /mnt/ext4
Fix it by validating s_first_meta_bg first at mount time, and
refusing to mount if its value exceeds the largest possible meta_bg
number.
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <ralf@os-t.de>
Signed-off-by: Eryu Guan <guaneryu@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 70,520
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ImageLoader::GetImageAnimationPolicy(ImageAnimationPolicy& policy) {
if (!GetElement()->GetDocument().GetSettings())
return false;
policy = GetElement()->GetDocument().GetSettings()->GetImageAnimationPolicy();
return true;
}
Commit Message: service worker: Disable interception when OBJECT/EMBED uses ImageLoader.
Per the specification, service worker should not intercept requests for
OBJECT/EMBED elements.
R=kinuko
Bug: 771933
Change-Id: Ia6da6107dc5c68aa2c2efffde14bd2c51251fbd4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/927303
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Matt Falkenhagen <falken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#538027}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 147,491
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void acl_state_changed_callback(bt_status_t status, bt_bdaddr_t *bd_addr,
bt_acl_state_t state)
{
jbyteArray addr;
int i;
if (!checkCallbackThread()) {
ALOGE("Callback: '%s' is not called on the correct thread", __FUNCTION__);
return;
}
if (!bd_addr) {
ALOGE("Address is null in %s", __FUNCTION__);
return;
}
addr = callbackEnv->NewByteArray(sizeof(bt_bdaddr_t));
if (addr == NULL) {
ALOGE("Address allocation failed in %s", __FUNCTION__);
return;
}
callbackEnv->SetByteArrayRegion(addr, 0, sizeof(bt_bdaddr_t), (jbyte *)bd_addr);
callbackEnv->CallVoidMethod(sJniCallbacksObj, method_aclStateChangeCallback, (jint) status,
addr, (jint)state);
checkAndClearExceptionFromCallback(callbackEnv, __FUNCTION__);
callbackEnv->DeleteLocalRef(addr);
}
Commit Message: Add guest mode functionality (3/3)
Add a flag to enable() to start Bluetooth in restricted
mode. In restricted mode, all devices that are paired during
restricted mode are deleted upon leaving restricted mode.
Right now restricted mode is only entered while a guest
user is active.
Bug: 27410683
Change-Id: If4a8855faf362d7f6de509d7ddc7197d1ac75cee
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 163,659
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: parse_register_dcl_bracket(
struct translate_ctx *ctx,
struct parsed_dcl_bracket *bracket)
{
uint uindex;
memset(bracket, 0, sizeof(struct parsed_dcl_bracket));
eat_opt_white( &ctx->cur );
if (!parse_uint( &ctx->cur, &uindex )) {
/* it can be an empty bracket [] which means its range
* is from 0 to some implied size */
if (ctx->cur[0] == ']' && ctx->implied_array_size != 0) {
bracket->first = 0;
bracket->last = ctx->implied_array_size - 1;
goto cleanup;
}
report_error( ctx, "Expected literal unsigned integer" );
return FALSE;
}
bracket->first = uindex;
eat_opt_white( &ctx->cur );
if (ctx->cur[0] == '.' && ctx->cur[1] == '.') {
uint uindex;
ctx->cur += 2;
eat_opt_white( &ctx->cur );
if (!parse_uint( &ctx->cur, &uindex )) {
report_error( ctx, "Expected literal integer" );
return FALSE;
}
bracket->last = (int) uindex;
eat_opt_white( &ctx->cur );
}
else {
bracket->last = bracket->first;
}
cleanup:
if (*ctx->cur != ']') {
report_error( ctx, "Expected `]' or `..'" );
return FALSE;
}
ctx->cur++;
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 9,739
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int invoke_tx_handlers(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
{
struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(tx->skb);
ieee80211_tx_result res = TX_DROP;
#define CALL_TXH(txh) \
do { \
res = txh(tx); \
if (res != TX_CONTINUE) \
goto txh_done; \
} while (0)
CALL_TXH(ieee80211_tx_h_dynamic_ps);
CALL_TXH(ieee80211_tx_h_check_assoc);
CALL_TXH(ieee80211_tx_h_ps_buf);
CALL_TXH(ieee80211_tx_h_check_control_port_protocol);
CALL_TXH(ieee80211_tx_h_select_key);
if (!(tx->local->hw.flags & IEEE80211_HW_HAS_RATE_CONTROL))
CALL_TXH(ieee80211_tx_h_rate_ctrl);
if (unlikely(info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_INTFL_RETRANSMISSION)) {
__skb_queue_tail(&tx->skbs, tx->skb);
tx->skb = NULL;
goto txh_done;
}
CALL_TXH(ieee80211_tx_h_michael_mic_add);
CALL_TXH(ieee80211_tx_h_sequence);
CALL_TXH(ieee80211_tx_h_fragment);
/* handlers after fragment must be aware of tx info fragmentation! */
CALL_TXH(ieee80211_tx_h_stats);
CALL_TXH(ieee80211_tx_h_encrypt);
if (!(tx->local->hw.flags & IEEE80211_HW_HAS_RATE_CONTROL))
CALL_TXH(ieee80211_tx_h_calculate_duration);
#undef CALL_TXH
txh_done:
if (unlikely(res == TX_DROP)) {
I802_DEBUG_INC(tx->local->tx_handlers_drop);
if (tx->skb)
ieee80211_free_txskb(&tx->local->hw, tx->skb);
else
ieee80211_purge_tx_queue(&tx->local->hw, &tx->skbs);
return -1;
} else if (unlikely(res == TX_QUEUED)) {
I802_DEBUG_INC(tx->local->tx_handlers_queued);
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mac80211: fix fragmentation code, particularly for encryption
The "new" fragmentation code (since my rewrite almost 5 years ago)
erroneously sets skb->len rather than using skb_trim() to adjust
the length of the first fragment after copying out all the others.
This leaves the skb tail pointer pointing to after where the data
originally ended, and thus causes the encryption MIC to be written
at that point, rather than where it belongs: immediately after the
data.
The impact of this is that if software encryption is done, then
a) encryption doesn't work for the first fragment, the connection
becomes unusable as the first fragment will never be properly
verified at the receiver, the MIC is practically guaranteed to
be wrong
b) we leak up to 8 bytes of plaintext (!) of the packet out into
the air
This is only mitigated by the fact that many devices are capable
of doing encryption in hardware, in which case this can't happen
as the tail pointer is irrelevant in that case. Additionally,
fragmentation is not used very frequently and would normally have
to be configured manually.
Fix this by using skb_trim() properly.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 2de8e0d999b8 ("mac80211: rewrite fragmentation")
Reported-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 35,497
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void MockRenderThread::AddObserver(content::RenderProcessObserver* observer) {
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 108,471
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void limitedWithEmptyMissingInvalidAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
TestObjectV8Internal::limitedWithEmptyMissingInvalidAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 121,730
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct sk_buff *skb_segment(struct sk_buff *head_skb,
netdev_features_t features)
{
struct sk_buff *segs = NULL;
struct sk_buff *tail = NULL;
struct sk_buff *list_skb = skb_shinfo(head_skb)->frag_list;
skb_frag_t *frag = skb_shinfo(head_skb)->frags;
unsigned int mss = skb_shinfo(head_skb)->gso_size;
unsigned int doffset = head_skb->data - skb_mac_header(head_skb);
unsigned int offset = doffset;
unsigned int tnl_hlen = skb_tnl_header_len(head_skb);
unsigned int headroom;
unsigned int len;
__be16 proto;
bool csum;
int sg = !!(features & NETIF_F_SG);
int nfrags = skb_shinfo(head_skb)->nr_frags;
int err = -ENOMEM;
int i = 0;
int pos;
proto = skb_network_protocol(head_skb);
if (unlikely(!proto))
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
csum = !!can_checksum_protocol(features, proto);
__skb_push(head_skb, doffset);
headroom = skb_headroom(head_skb);
pos = skb_headlen(head_skb);
do {
struct sk_buff *nskb;
skb_frag_t *nskb_frag;
int hsize;
int size;
len = head_skb->len - offset;
if (len > mss)
len = mss;
hsize = skb_headlen(head_skb) - offset;
if (hsize < 0)
hsize = 0;
if (hsize > len || !sg)
hsize = len;
if (!hsize && i >= nfrags && skb_headlen(list_skb) &&
(skb_headlen(list_skb) == len || sg)) {
BUG_ON(skb_headlen(list_skb) > len);
i = 0;
nfrags = skb_shinfo(list_skb)->nr_frags;
frag = skb_shinfo(list_skb)->frags;
pos += skb_headlen(list_skb);
while (pos < offset + len) {
BUG_ON(i >= nfrags);
size = skb_frag_size(frag);
if (pos + size > offset + len)
break;
i++;
pos += size;
frag++;
}
nskb = skb_clone(list_skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
list_skb = list_skb->next;
if (unlikely(!nskb))
goto err;
if (unlikely(pskb_trim(nskb, len))) {
kfree_skb(nskb);
goto err;
}
hsize = skb_end_offset(nskb);
if (skb_cow_head(nskb, doffset + headroom)) {
kfree_skb(nskb);
goto err;
}
nskb->truesize += skb_end_offset(nskb) - hsize;
skb_release_head_state(nskb);
__skb_push(nskb, doffset);
} else {
nskb = __alloc_skb(hsize + doffset + headroom,
GFP_ATOMIC, skb_alloc_rx_flag(head_skb),
NUMA_NO_NODE);
if (unlikely(!nskb))
goto err;
skb_reserve(nskb, headroom);
__skb_put(nskb, doffset);
}
if (segs)
tail->next = nskb;
else
segs = nskb;
tail = nskb;
__copy_skb_header(nskb, head_skb);
nskb->mac_len = head_skb->mac_len;
skb_headers_offset_update(nskb, skb_headroom(nskb) - headroom);
skb_copy_from_linear_data_offset(head_skb, -tnl_hlen,
nskb->data - tnl_hlen,
doffset + tnl_hlen);
if (nskb->len == len + doffset)
goto perform_csum_check;
if (!sg) {
nskb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
nskb->csum = skb_copy_and_csum_bits(head_skb, offset,
skb_put(nskb, len),
len, 0);
continue;
}
nskb_frag = skb_shinfo(nskb)->frags;
skb_copy_from_linear_data_offset(head_skb, offset,
skb_put(nskb, hsize), hsize);
skb_shinfo(nskb)->tx_flags = skb_shinfo(head_skb)->tx_flags &
SKBTX_SHARED_FRAG;
while (pos < offset + len) {
if (i >= nfrags) {
BUG_ON(skb_headlen(list_skb));
i = 0;
nfrags = skb_shinfo(list_skb)->nr_frags;
frag = skb_shinfo(list_skb)->frags;
BUG_ON(!nfrags);
list_skb = list_skb->next;
}
if (unlikely(skb_shinfo(nskb)->nr_frags >=
MAX_SKB_FRAGS)) {
net_warn_ratelimited(
"skb_segment: too many frags: %u %u\n",
pos, mss);
goto err;
}
*nskb_frag = *frag;
__skb_frag_ref(nskb_frag);
size = skb_frag_size(nskb_frag);
if (pos < offset) {
nskb_frag->page_offset += offset - pos;
skb_frag_size_sub(nskb_frag, offset - pos);
}
skb_shinfo(nskb)->nr_frags++;
if (pos + size <= offset + len) {
i++;
frag++;
pos += size;
} else {
skb_frag_size_sub(nskb_frag, pos + size - (offset + len));
goto skip_fraglist;
}
nskb_frag++;
}
skip_fraglist:
nskb->data_len = len - hsize;
nskb->len += nskb->data_len;
nskb->truesize += nskb->data_len;
perform_csum_check:
if (!csum) {
nskb->csum = skb_checksum(nskb, doffset,
nskb->len - doffset, 0);
nskb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
}
} while ((offset += len) < head_skb->len);
return segs;
err:
kfree_skb_list(segs);
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
Commit Message: skbuff: skb_segment: orphan frags before copying
skb_segment copies frags around, so we need
to copy them carefully to avoid accessing
user memory after reporting completion to userspace
through a callback.
skb_segment doesn't normally happen on datapath:
TSO needs to be disabled - so disabling zero copy
in this case does not look like a big deal.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 1
| 166,458
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Element* Document::CreateElement(const QualifiedName& q_name,
const CreateElementFlags flags,
const AtomicString& is) {
CustomElementDefinition* definition = nullptr;
if (flags.IsCustomElementsV1() &&
q_name.NamespaceURI() == html_names::xhtmlNamespaceURI) {
const CustomElementDescriptor desc(is.IsNull() ? q_name.LocalName() : is,
q_name.LocalName());
if (CustomElementRegistry* registry = CustomElement::Registry(*this))
definition = registry->DefinitionFor(desc);
}
if (definition)
return definition->CreateElement(*this, q_name, flags);
return CustomElement::CreateUncustomizedOrUndefinedElement(*this, q_name,
flags, is);
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 129,631
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: scoped_ptr<cc::CompositorFrame> SynchronousCompositorImpl::DemandDrawHw(
gfx::Size surface_size,
const gfx::Transform& transform,
gfx::Rect viewport,
gfx::Rect clip,
gfx::Rect viewport_rect_for_tile_priority,
const gfx::Transform& transform_for_tile_priority) {
DCHECK(CalledOnValidThread());
DCHECK(output_surface_);
DCHECK(begin_frame_source_);
scoped_ptr<cc::CompositorFrame> frame =
output_surface_->DemandDrawHw(surface_size,
transform,
viewport,
clip,
viewport_rect_for_tile_priority,
transform_for_tile_priority);
if (frame.get())
UpdateFrameMetaData(frame->metadata);
return frame.Pass();
}
Commit Message: sync compositor: pass simple gfx types by const ref
See bug for reasoning
BUG=159273
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417893006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356653}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 1
| 171,619
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void vmx_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
u64 phys_addr = __pa(per_cpu(vmxarea, cpu));
if (!vmm_exclusive)
kvm_cpu_vmxon(phys_addr);
else if (vmx->loaded_vmcs->cpu != cpu)
loaded_vmcs_clear(vmx->loaded_vmcs);
if (per_cpu(current_vmcs, cpu) != vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs) {
per_cpu(current_vmcs, cpu) = vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs;
vmcs_load(vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs);
}
if (vmx->loaded_vmcs->cpu != cpu) {
struct desc_ptr *gdt = this_cpu_ptr(&host_gdt);
unsigned long sysenter_esp;
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH, vcpu);
local_irq_disable();
crash_disable_local_vmclear(cpu);
/*
* Read loaded_vmcs->cpu should be before fetching
* loaded_vmcs->loaded_vmcss_on_cpu_link.
* See the comments in __loaded_vmcs_clear().
*/
smp_rmb();
list_add(&vmx->loaded_vmcs->loaded_vmcss_on_cpu_link,
&per_cpu(loaded_vmcss_on_cpu, cpu));
crash_enable_local_vmclear(cpu);
local_irq_enable();
/*
* Linux uses per-cpu TSS and GDT, so set these when switching
* processors.
*/
vmcs_writel(HOST_TR_BASE, kvm_read_tr_base()); /* 22.2.4 */
vmcs_writel(HOST_GDTR_BASE, gdt->address); /* 22.2.4 */
rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, sysenter_esp);
vmcs_writel(HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, sysenter_esp); /* 22.2.3 */
/* Setup TSC multiplier */
if (cpu_has_vmx_tsc_scaling())
vmcs_write64(TSC_MULTIPLIER,
vcpu->arch.tsc_scaling_ratio);
vmx->loaded_vmcs->cpu = cpu;
}
vmx_vcpu_pi_load(vcpu, cpu);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: work around infinite loop in microcode when #AC is delivered
It was found that a guest can DoS a host by triggering an infinite
stream of "alignment check" (#AC) exceptions. This causes the
microcode to enter an infinite loop where the core never receives
another interrupt. The host kernel panics pretty quickly due to the
effects (CVE-2015-5307).
Signed-off-by: Eric Northup <digitaleric@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 42,773
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual int DoSwitchToSpdyTest(SocketStreamEvent* event) {
return ERR_PROTOCOL_SWITCHED;
}
Commit Message: Revert a workaround commit for a Use-After-Free crash.
Revert a workaround commit r20158 for a Use-After-Free issue (http://crbug.com/244746) because a cleaner CL r207218 is landed.
URLRequestContext does not inherit SupportsWeakPtr now.
R=mmenke
BUG=244746
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16870008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@207811 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 112,729
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SessionCommand* SessionService::CreateWindowClosedCommand(
const SessionID::id_type window_id) {
ClosedPayload payload;
memset(&payload, 0, sizeof(payload));
payload.id = window_id;
payload.close_time = Time::Now().ToInternalValue();
SessionCommand* command =
new SessionCommand(kCommandWindowClosed, sizeof(payload));
memcpy(command->contents(), &payload, sizeof(payload));
return command;
}
Commit Message: Metrics for measuring how much overhead reading compressed content states adds.
BUG=104293
TEST=NONE
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9426039
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@123733 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 108,810
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Document::hasFocus() const
{
return page() && page()->focusController().isDocumentFocused(*this);
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 124,391
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool RenderFrameImpl::UpdateNavigationHistory(
const blink::WebHistoryItem& item,
blink::WebHistoryCommitType commit_type) {
NavigationState* navigation_state =
NavigationState::FromDocumentLoader(frame_->GetDocumentLoader());
const RequestNavigationParams& request_params =
navigation_state->request_params();
current_history_item_ = item;
current_history_item_.SetTarget(
blink::WebString::FromUTF8(unique_name_helper_.value()));
bool is_new_navigation = commit_type == blink::kWebStandardCommit;
if (request_params.should_clear_history_list) {
render_view_->history_list_offset_ = 0;
render_view_->history_list_length_ = 1;
} else if (is_new_navigation) {
DCHECK(!navigation_state->common_params().should_replace_current_entry ||
render_view_->history_list_length_ > 0);
if (!navigation_state->common_params().should_replace_current_entry) {
render_view_->history_list_offset_++;
if (render_view_->history_list_offset_ >= kMaxSessionHistoryEntries)
render_view_->history_list_offset_ = kMaxSessionHistoryEntries - 1;
render_view_->history_list_length_ =
render_view_->history_list_offset_ + 1;
}
} else if (request_params.nav_entry_id != 0 &&
!request_params.intended_as_new_entry) {
render_view_->history_list_offset_ =
navigation_state->request_params().pending_history_list_offset;
}
if (commit_type == blink::WebHistoryCommitType::kWebBackForwardCommit)
render_view_->DidCommitProvisionalHistoryLoad();
return is_new_navigation;
}
Commit Message: Fix crashes in RenderFrameImpl::OnSelectPopupMenuItem(s)
ExternalPopupMenu::DidSelectItem(s) can delete the RenderFrameImpl.
We need to reset external_popup_menu_ before calling it.
Bug: 912211
Change-Id: Ia9a628e144464a2ebb14ab77d3a693fd5cead6fc
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1381325
Commit-Queue: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#618026}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 152,909
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void VRDisplay::OnSubmitFrameTransferred() {
pending_submit_frame_ = false;
}
Commit Message: WebVR: fix initial vsync
Applications sometimes use window.rAF while not presenting, then switch to
vrDisplay.rAF after presentation starts. Depending on the animation loop's
timing, this can cause a race condition where presentation has been started
but there's no vrDisplay.rAF pending yet. Ensure there's at least vsync
being processed after presentation starts so that a queued window.rAF
can run and schedule a vrDisplay.rAF.
BUG=711789
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2848483003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468167}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 128,365
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebTransformOperations::appendRotate(double x, double y, double z, double degrees)
{
WebTransformOperation toAdd;
toAdd.matrix.rotate3d(x, y, z, degrees);
toAdd.type = WebTransformOperation::WebTransformOperationRotate;
toAdd.rotate.axis.x = x;
toAdd.rotate.axis.y = y;
toAdd.rotate.axis.z = z;
toAdd.rotate.angle = degrees;
m_private->operations.append(toAdd);
}
Commit Message: [chromium] We should accelerate all transformations, except when we must blend matrices that cannot be decomposed.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95855
Reviewed by James Robinson.
Source/Platform:
WebTransformOperations are now able to report if they can successfully blend.
WebTransformationMatrix::blend now returns a bool if blending would fail.
* chromium/public/WebTransformOperations.h:
(WebTransformOperations):
* chromium/public/WebTransformationMatrix.h:
(WebTransformationMatrix):
Source/WebCore:
WebTransformOperations are now able to report if they can successfully blend.
WebTransformationMatrix::blend now returns a bool if blending would fail.
Unit tests:
AnimationTranslationUtilTest.createTransformAnimationWithNonDecomposableMatrix
AnimationTranslationUtilTest.createTransformAnimationWithNonInvertibleTransform
* platform/chromium/support/WebTransformOperations.cpp:
(WebKit::blendTransformOperations):
(WebKit::WebTransformOperations::blend):
(WebKit::WebTransformOperations::canBlendWith):
(WebKit):
(WebKit::WebTransformOperations::blendInternal):
* platform/chromium/support/WebTransformationMatrix.cpp:
(WebKit::WebTransformationMatrix::blend):
* platform/graphics/chromium/AnimationTranslationUtil.cpp:
(WebCore::WebTransformAnimationCurve):
Source/WebKit/chromium:
Added the following unit tests:
AnimationTranslationUtilTest.createTransformAnimationWithNonDecomposableMatrix
AnimationTranslationUtilTest.createTransformAnimationWithNonInvertibleTransform
* tests/AnimationTranslationUtilTest.cpp:
(WebKit::TEST):
(WebKit):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@127868 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 108,163
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: __be32 __skb_flow_get_ports(const struct sk_buff *skb, int thoff, u8 ip_proto,
void *data, int hlen)
{
int poff = proto_ports_offset(ip_proto);
if (!data) {
data = skb->data;
hlen = skb_headlen(skb);
}
if (poff >= 0) {
__be32 *ports, _ports;
ports = __skb_header_pointer(skb, thoff + poff,
sizeof(_ports), data, hlen, &_ports);
if (ports)
return *ports;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: flow_dissector: Jump to exit code in __skb_flow_dissect
Instead of returning immediately (on a parsing failure for instance) we
jump to cleanup code. This always sets protocol values in key_control
(even on a failure there is still valid information in the key_tags that
was set before the problem was hit).
Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 61,953
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void V8TestObject::RuntimeEnabledVoidMethodMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_runtimeEnabledVoidMethod");
test_object_v8_internal::RuntimeEnabledVoidMethodMethod(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 135,134
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool canAccessAncestor(const SecurityOrigin* activeSecurityOrigin, Frame* targetFrame)
{
if (!targetFrame)
return false;
const bool isLocalActiveOrigin = activeSecurityOrigin->isLocal();
for (Frame* ancestorFrame = targetFrame; ancestorFrame; ancestorFrame = ancestorFrame->tree()->parent()) {
Document* ancestorDocument = ancestorFrame->document();
if (!ancestorDocument)
return true;
const SecurityOrigin* ancestorSecurityOrigin = ancestorDocument->securityOrigin();
if (activeSecurityOrigin->canAccess(ancestorSecurityOrigin))
return true;
if (isLocalActiveOrigin && ancestorSecurityOrigin->isLocal())
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 102,631
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GpuFeatureFlags GpuDataManager::GetGpuFeatureFlags() {
return gpu_feature_flags_;
}
Commit Message: Fixing Coverity bugs (DEAD_CODE and PASS_BY_VALUE)
CIDs 16230, 16439, 16610, 16635
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7215029
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@90134 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 98,432
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BrowserContextIODataImpl(const BrowserContext::Params& params)
: data_(this, params) {}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,196
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int php_curl_option_str(php_curl *ch, zend_long option, const char *str, const int len, zend_bool make_copy)
{
CURLcode error = CURLE_OK;
if (strlen(str) != len) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Curl option contains invalid characters (\\0)");
return FAILURE;
}
#if LIBCURL_VERSION_NUM >= 0x071100
if (make_copy) {
#endif
char *copystr;
/* Strings passed to libcurl as 'char *' arguments, are copied by the library since 7.17.0 */
copystr = estrndup(str, len);
error = curl_easy_setopt(ch->cp, option, copystr);
zend_llist_add_element(&ch->to_free->str, ©str);
#if LIBCURL_VERSION_NUM >= 0x071100
} else {
error = curl_easy_setopt(ch->cp, option, str);
}
#endif
SAVE_CURL_ERROR(ch, error)
return error == CURLE_OK ? SUCCESS : FAILURE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 5,107
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DOMWindow::focus(LocalDOMWindow* incumbent_window) {
if (!GetFrame())
return;
Page* page = GetFrame()->GetPage();
if (!page)
return;
DCHECK(incumbent_window);
ExecutionContext* incumbent_execution_context =
incumbent_window->GetExecutionContext();
bool allow_focus = incumbent_execution_context->IsWindowInteractionAllowed();
if (allow_focus) {
incumbent_execution_context->ConsumeWindowInteraction();
} else {
DCHECK(IsMainThread());
allow_focus =
opener() && (opener() != this) &&
(ToDocument(incumbent_execution_context)->domWindow() == opener());
}
if (GetFrame()->IsMainFrame() && allow_focus)
page->GetChromeClient().Focus();
page->GetFocusController().FocusDocumentView(GetFrame(),
true /* notifyEmbedder */);
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID:
| 1
| 172,722
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: CommandBufferId GLManager::GetCommandBufferID() const {
return command_buffer_->GetCommandBufferID();
}
Commit Message: Fix tabs sharing TEXTURE_2D_ARRAY/TEXTURE_3D data.
In linux and android, we are seeing an issue where texture data from one
tab overwrites the texture data of another tab. This is happening for apps
which are using webgl2 texture of type TEXTURE_2D_ARRAY/TEXTURE_3D.
Due to a bug in virtual context save/restore code for above texture formats,
the texture data is not properly restored while switching tabs. Hence
texture data from one tab overwrites other.
This CL has fix for that issue, an update for existing test expectations
and a new unit test for this bug.
Bug: 788448
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ie933984cdd2d1381f42eb4638f730c8245207a28
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/930327
Reviewed-by: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: vikas soni <vikassoni@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#539111}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 150,045
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ec_device_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
{
int retval = -ENOMEM;
struct device *dev = &pdev->dev;
struct cros_ec_platform *ec_platform = dev_get_platdata(dev);
dev_t devno = MKDEV(ec_major, pdev->id);
struct cros_ec_dev *ec = kzalloc(sizeof(*ec), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ec)
return retval;
dev_set_drvdata(dev, ec);
ec->ec_dev = dev_get_drvdata(dev->parent);
ec->dev = dev;
ec->cmd_offset = ec_platform->cmd_offset;
device_initialize(&ec->class_dev);
cdev_init(&ec->cdev, &fops);
/*
* Add the character device
* Link cdev to the class device to be sure device is not used
* before unbinding it.
*/
ec->cdev.kobj.parent = &ec->class_dev.kobj;
retval = cdev_add(&ec->cdev, devno, 1);
if (retval) {
dev_err(dev, ": failed to add character device\n");
goto cdev_add_failed;
}
/*
* Add the class device
* Link to the character device for creating the /dev entry
* in devtmpfs.
*/
ec->class_dev.devt = ec->cdev.dev;
ec->class_dev.class = &cros_class;
ec->class_dev.parent = dev;
ec->class_dev.release = __remove;
retval = dev_set_name(&ec->class_dev, "%s", ec_platform->ec_name);
if (retval) {
dev_err(dev, "dev_set_name failed => %d\n", retval);
goto set_named_failed;
}
retval = device_add(&ec->class_dev);
if (retval) {
dev_err(dev, "device_register failed => %d\n", retval);
goto dev_reg_failed;
}
return 0;
dev_reg_failed:
set_named_failed:
dev_set_drvdata(dev, NULL);
cdev_del(&ec->cdev);
cdev_add_failed:
kfree(ec);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: platform/chrome: cros_ec_dev - double fetch bug in ioctl
We verify "u_cmd.outsize" and "u_cmd.insize" but we need to make sure
that those values have not changed between the two copy_from_user()
calls. Otherwise it could lead to a buffer overflow.
Additionally, cros_ec_cmd_xfer() can set s_cmd->insize to a lower value.
We should use the new smaller value so we don't copy too much data to
the user.
Reported-by: Pengfei Wang <wpengfeinudt@gmail.com>
Fixes: a841178445bb ('mfd: cros_ec: Use a zero-length array for command data')
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Gwendal Grignou <gwendal@chromium.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.2+
Signed-off-by: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 51,114
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GfxPatternColorSpace::GfxPatternColorSpace(GfxColorSpace *underA) {
under = underA;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 966
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void stringAttributeAttributeSetterCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8Value = info[0];
TestInterfaceNodeV8Internal::stringAttributeAttributeSetter(v8Value, info);
}
Commit Message: binding: Removes unused code in templates/attributes.cpp.
Faking {{cpp_class}} and {{c8_class}} doesn't make sense.
Probably it made sense before the introduction of virtual
ScriptWrappable::wrap().
Checking the existence of window->document() doesn't seem
making sense to me, and CQ tests seem passing without the
check.
BUG=
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2268433002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#413375}
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 119,289
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ReverbSetDecayTime(ReverbContext *pContext, uint32_t time){
LVREV_ControlParams_st ActiveParams; /* Current control Parameters */
LVREV_ReturnStatus_en LvmStatus=LVREV_SUCCESS; /* Function call status */
/* Get the current settings */
LvmStatus = LVREV_GetControlParameters(pContext->hInstance, &ActiveParams);
LVM_ERROR_CHECK(LvmStatus, "LVREV_GetControlParameters", "ReverbSetDecayTime")
if (time <= LVREV_MAX_T60) {
ActiveParams.T60 = (LVM_UINT16)time;
}
else {
ActiveParams.T60 = LVREV_MAX_T60;
}
/* Activate the initial settings */
LvmStatus = LVREV_SetControlParameters(pContext->hInstance, &ActiveParams);
LVM_ERROR_CHECK(LvmStatus, "LVREV_SetControlParameters", "ReverbSetDecayTime")
pContext->SamplesToExitCount = (ActiveParams.T60 * pContext->config.inputCfg.samplingRate)/1000;
pContext->SavedDecayTime = (int16_t)time;
return;
}
Commit Message: audio effects: fix heap overflow
Check consistency of effect command reply sizes before
copying to reply address.
Also add null pointer check on reply size.
Also remove unused parameter warning.
Bug: 21953516.
Change-Id: I4cf00c12eaed696af28f3b7613f7e36f47a160c4
(cherry picked from commit 0f714a464d2425afe00d6450535e763131b40844)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 157,440
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void __perf_event_task_sched_out(struct task_struct *task,
struct task_struct *next)
{
int ctxn;
for_each_task_context_nr(ctxn)
perf_event_context_sched_out(task, ctxn, next);
/*
* if cgroup events exist on this CPU, then we need
* to check if we have to switch out PMU state.
* cgroup event are system-wide mode only
*/
if (atomic_read(this_cpu_ptr(&perf_cgroup_events)))
perf_cgroup_sched_out(task, next);
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix event->ctx locking
There have been a few reported issues wrt. the lack of locking around
changing event->ctx. This patch tries to address those.
It avoids the whole rwsem thing; and while it appears to work, please
give it some thought in review.
What I did fail at is sensible runtime checks on the use of
event->ctx, the RCU use makes it very hard.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150123125834.209535886@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 50,424
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int get_float64(QEMUFile *f, void *pv, size_t size)
{
float64 *v = pv;
*v = make_float64(qemu_get_be64(f));
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 15,703
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ReadableStream::setReader(ReadableStreamReader* reader)
{
ASSERT((reader && !m_reader) || (!reader && m_reader));
m_reader = reader;
}
Commit Message: Remove blink::ReadableStream
This CL removes two stable runtime enabled flags
- ResponseConstructedWithReadableStream
- ResponseBodyWithV8ExtraStream
and related code including blink::ReadableStream.
BUG=613435
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2227403002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#411014}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 120,344
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static long media_device_enum_links(struct media_device *mdev,
struct media_links_enum __user *ulinks)
{
struct media_links_enum links;
int rval;
if (copy_from_user(&links, ulinks, sizeof(links)))
return -EFAULT;
rval = __media_device_enum_links(mdev, &links);
if (rval < 0)
return rval;
if (copy_to_user(ulinks, &links, sizeof(*ulinks)))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: [media] media-device: fix infoleak in ioctl media_enum_entities()
This fixes CVE-2014-1739.
Signed-off-by: Salva Peiró <speiro@ai2.upv.es>
Acked-by: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart@ideasonboard.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <m.chehab@samsung.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 39,314
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int bad_cluster(DOS_FS * fs, uint32_t cluster)
{
FAT_ENTRY curEntry;
get_fat(&curEntry, fs->fat, cluster, fs);
return FAT_IS_BAD(fs, curEntry.value);
}
Commit Message: set_fat(): Fix off-by-2 error leading to corruption in FAT12
In FAT12 two 12 bit entries are combined to a 24 bit value (three
bytes). Therefore, when an even numbered FAT entry is set in FAT12, it
must be be combined with the following entry. To prevent accessing
beyond the end of the FAT array, it must be checked that the cluster is
not the last one.
Previously, the check tested that the requested cluster was equal to
fs->clusters - 1. However, fs->clusters is the number of data clusters
not including the two reserved FAT entries at the start so the test
triggered two clusters early.
If the third to last entry was written on a FAT12 filesystem with an
odd number of clusters, the second to last entry would be corrupted.
This corruption may also lead to invalid memory accesses when the
corrupted entry becomes out of bounds and is used later.
Change the test to fs->clusters + 1 to fix.
Reported-by: Hanno Böck
Signed-off-by: Andreas Bombe <aeb@debian.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 56,359
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void qcow2_process_discards(BlockDriverState *bs, int ret)
{
BDRVQcowState *s = bs->opaque;
Qcow2DiscardRegion *d, *next;
QTAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(d, &s->discards, next, next) {
QTAILQ_REMOVE(&s->discards, d, next);
/* Discard is optional, ignore the return value */
if (ret >= 0) {
bdrv_discard(bs->file,
d->offset >> BDRV_SECTOR_BITS,
d->bytes >> BDRV_SECTOR_BITS);
}
g_free(d);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 16,814
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xsltCheckInstructionElement(xsltStylesheetPtr style, xmlNodePtr inst) {
xmlNodePtr parent;
int has_ext;
if ((style == NULL) || (inst == NULL) || (inst->ns == NULL) ||
(style->literal_result))
return;
has_ext = (style->extInfos != NULL);
parent = inst->parent;
if (parent == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(NULL, style, inst,
"internal problem: element has no parent\n");
style->errors++;
return;
}
while ((parent != NULL) && (parent->type != XML_DOCUMENT_NODE)) {
if (((parent->ns == inst->ns) ||
((parent->ns != NULL) &&
(xmlStrEqual(parent->ns->href, inst->ns->href)))) &&
((xmlStrEqual(parent->name, BAD_CAST "template")) ||
(xmlStrEqual(parent->name, BAD_CAST "param")) ||
(xmlStrEqual(parent->name, BAD_CAST "attribute")) ||
(xmlStrEqual(parent->name, BAD_CAST "variable")))) {
return;
}
/*
* if we are within an extension element all bets are off
* about the semantic there e.g. xsl:param within func:function
*/
if ((has_ext) && (parent->ns != NULL) &&
(xmlHashLookup(style->extInfos, parent->ns->href) != NULL))
return;
parent = parent->parent;
}
xsltTransformError(NULL, style, inst,
"element %s only allowed within a template, variable or param\n",
inst->name);
style->errors++;
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 156,776
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: array_size_show(struct mddev *mddev, char *page)
{
if (mddev->external_size)
return sprintf(page, "%llu\n",
(unsigned long long)mddev->array_sectors/2);
else
return sprintf(page, "default\n");
}
Commit Message: md: use kzalloc() when bitmap is disabled
In drivers/md/md.c get_bitmap_file() uses kmalloc() for creating a
mdu_bitmap_file_t called "file".
5769 file = kmalloc(sizeof(*file), GFP_NOIO);
5770 if (!file)
5771 return -ENOMEM;
This structure is copied to user space at the end of the function.
5786 if (err == 0 &&
5787 copy_to_user(arg, file, sizeof(*file)))
5788 err = -EFAULT
But if bitmap is disabled only the first byte of "file" is initialized
with zero, so it's possible to read some bytes (up to 4095) of kernel
space memory from user space. This is an information leak.
5775 /* bitmap disabled, zero the first byte and copy out */
5776 if (!mddev->bitmap_info.file)
5777 file->pathname[0] = '\0';
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Randazzo <benjamin@randazzo.fr>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 42,362
|
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