instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct inode *alloc_inode(struct super_block *sb)
{
struct inode *inode;
if (sb->s_op->alloc_inode)
inode = sb->s_op->alloc_inode(sb);
else
inode = kmem_cache_alloc(inode_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!inode)
return NULL;
if (unlikely(inode_init_always(sb, inode))) {
if (inode->i_sb->s_op->destroy_inode)
inode->i_sb->s_op->destroy_inode(inode);
else
kmem_cache_free(inode_cachep, inode);
return NULL;
}
return inode;
}
Commit Message: fs,userns: Change inode_capable to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid
The kernel has no concept of capabilities with respect to inodes; inodes
exist independently of namespaces. For example, inode_capable(inode,
CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) would be nonsense.
This patch changes inode_capable to check for uid and gid mappings and
renames it to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid, which should make it more
obvious what it does.
Fixes CVE-2014-4014.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 36,832
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: TestPaintArtifact& TestPaintArtifact::Chunk(DisplayItemClient& client,
const PropertyTreeState& state) {
auto& chunks = paint_chunks_data_.chunks;
if (!chunks.IsEmpty())
chunks.back().end_index = display_item_list_.size();
chunks.push_back(
PaintChunk(display_item_list_.size(), 0,
PaintChunk::Id(client, DisplayItem::kDrawingFirst), state));
chunks.back().client_is_just_created = false;
return *this;
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 125,713
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static EditorClient& emptyEditorClient() {
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(EmptyEditorClient, client, ());
return client;
}
Commit Message: Make TypingCommand::insertText() to take SelectionInDOMTree instead of VisibleSelection
This patch makes |TypingCommand::insertText()| to take |SelectionInDOMTree|
instead of |VisibleSelection| to reduce usage of |VisibleSelection| for
improving code health.
BUG=657237
TEST=n/a
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2733183002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#455368}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 129,138
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DevToolsWindow::ShowCertificateViewer(const std::string& cert_chain) {
std::unique_ptr<base::Value> value = base::JSONReader::Read(cert_chain);
if (!value || value->GetType() != base::Value::Type::LIST) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
std::unique_ptr<base::ListValue> list =
base::ListValue::From(std::move(value));
std::vector<std::string> decoded;
for (size_t i = 0; i < list->GetSize(); ++i) {
base::Value* item;
if (!list->Get(i, &item) || item->GetType() != base::Value::Type::STRING) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
std::string temp;
if (!item->GetAsString(&temp)) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
if (!base::Base64Decode(temp, &temp)) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
decoded.push_back(temp);
}
std::vector<base::StringPiece> cert_string_piece;
for (const auto& str : decoded)
cert_string_piece.push_back(str);
scoped_refptr<net::X509Certificate> cert =
net::X509Certificate::CreateFromDERCertChain(cert_string_piece);
if (!cert) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
WebContents* inspected_contents =
is_docked_ ? GetInspectedWebContents() : main_web_contents_;
Browser* browser = NULL;
int tab = 0;
if (!FindInspectedBrowserAndTabIndex(inspected_contents, &browser, &tab))
return;
gfx::NativeWindow parent = browser->window()->GetNativeWindow();
::ShowCertificateViewer(inspected_contents, parent, cert.get());
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Use no-referrer for DevTools links
Bug: 732751
Change-Id: I77753120e2424203dedcc7bc0847fb67f87fe2b2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/615021
Reviewed-by: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#494413}
CWE ID: CWE-668
| 0
| 151,076
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void t1_start_eexec(void)
{
int i;
if (is_included(fm_cur)) {
get_length1();
save_offset();
}
if (!t1_pfa)
t1_check_block_len(false);
for (t1_line_ptr = t1_line_array, i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
edecrypt((byte)t1_getbyte());
*t1_line_ptr++ = 0;
}
t1_eexec_encrypt = true;
if (is_included(fm_cur))
t1_putline(); /* to put the first four bytes */
}
Commit Message: writet1 protection against buffer overflow
git-svn-id: svn://tug.org/texlive/trunk/Build/source@48697 c570f23f-e606-0410-a88d-b1316a301751
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 76,664
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int snd_seq_kernel_client_enqueue(int client, struct snd_seq_event * ev,
int atomic, int hop)
{
return kernel_client_enqueue(client, ev, NULL, 0, atomic, hop);
}
Commit Message: ALSA: seq: Fix missing NULL check at remove_events ioctl
snd_seq_ioctl_remove_events() calls snd_seq_fifo_clear()
unconditionally even if there is no FIFO assigned, and this leads to
an Oops due to NULL dereference. The fix is just to add a proper NULL
check.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 54,726
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Layer::SetIsDrawable(bool is_drawable) {
DCHECK(IsPropertyChangeAllowed());
if (is_drawable_ == is_drawable)
return;
is_drawable_ = is_drawable;
SetNeedsCommit();
}
Commit Message: Removed pinch viewport scroll offset distribution
The associated change in Blink makes the pinch viewport a proper
ScrollableArea meaning the normal path for synchronizing layer scroll
offsets is used.
This is a 2 sided patch, the other CL:
https://codereview.chromium.org/199253002/
BUG=349941
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/210543002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@260105 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 111,910
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DisplaySourceCustomBindings::DisplaySourceCustomBindings(ScriptContext* context)
: ObjectBackedNativeHandler(context),
weak_factory_(this) {
RouteFunction("StartSession",
base::Bind(&DisplaySourceCustomBindings::StartSession,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
RouteFunction("TerminateSession",
base::Bind(&DisplaySourceCustomBindings::TerminateSession,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Expand bindings access checks
BUG=601149
BUG=601073
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1866103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#387710}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 1
| 172,248
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int nfs4_xdr_dec_pathconf(struct rpc_rqst *req, __be32 *p, struct nfs_pathconf *pathconf)
{
struct xdr_stream xdr;
struct compound_hdr hdr;
int status;
xdr_init_decode(&xdr, &req->rq_rcv_buf, p);
status = decode_compound_hdr(&xdr, &hdr);
if (!status)
status = decode_putfh(&xdr);
if (!status)
status = decode_pathconf(&xdr, pathconf);
return status;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 23,115
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Polkit1Backend::isCallerAuthorized(const QString &action, QByteArray callerID)
{
PolkitQt1::SystemBusNameSubject subject(QString::fromUtf8(callerID));
authority->checkAuthorization(action, subject, PolkitQt1::Authority::AllowUserInteraction);
e.exec();
switch (e.result()) {
case PolkitQt1::Authority::Yes:
return true;
default:
return false;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-290
| 0
| 7,207
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int cm_migrate(struct ib_cm_id *cm_id)
{
struct cm_id_private *cm_id_priv;
unsigned long flags;
int ret = 0;
cm_id_priv = container_of(cm_id, struct cm_id_private, id);
spin_lock_irqsave(&cm_id_priv->lock, flags);
if (cm_id->state == IB_CM_ESTABLISHED &&
(cm_id->lap_state == IB_CM_LAP_UNINIT ||
cm_id->lap_state == IB_CM_LAP_IDLE)) {
cm_id->lap_state = IB_CM_LAP_IDLE;
cm_id_priv->av = cm_id_priv->alt_av;
} else
ret = -EINVAL;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&cm_id_priv->lock, flags);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <monis@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 38,406
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: EXPORTED char *mbentry_datapath(const struct mboxlist_entry *mbentry, uint32_t uid)
{
return mboxname_datapath(mbentry->partition,
mbentry->name,
mbentry->uniqueid,
uid);
}
Commit Message: mboxlist: fix uninitialised memory use where pattern is "Other Users"
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 61,243
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SerializedScriptValue::SerializedScriptValue(const String& wireData)
: m_externallyAllocatedMemory(0)
{
m_data = wireData.isolatedCopy();
}
Commit Message: Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings
BUG=390928
R=dcarney@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 120,423
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DevToolsWindow::ActivateContents(content::WebContents* contents) {
if (IsDocked()) {
content::WebContents* inspected_tab = this->GetInspectedWebContents();
inspected_tab->GetDelegate()->ActivateContents(inspected_tab);
} else {
browser_->window()->Activate();
}
}
Commit Message: DevTools: handle devtools renderer unresponsiveness during beforeunload event interception
This patch fixes the crash which happenes under the following conditions:
1. DevTools window is in undocked state
2. DevTools renderer is unresponsive
3. User attempts to close inspected page
BUG=322380
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/84883002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@237611 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 113,123
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AddAllUsers() {
for (size_t i = 0; i < base::size(kTestAccounts); ++i) {
if (i == PRIMARY_ACCOUNT_INDEX)
continue;
AddUser(kTestAccounts[i], i >= SECONDARY_ACCOUNT_INDEX_START);
}
}
Commit Message: [Files app] Fix open new window command
Change background page |launcher| namesspace to use var instead of const
to be accessible in the foreground page.
Test: --gtest_filter="KeyboardOperations/FilesAppBrowserTest.Test/keyboardOpenNewWindow*"
Bug: 933302
Change-Id: I6e8cec2fd96034d8376fb247743adf1818c00adf
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1477469
Commit-Queue: Luciano Pacheco <lucmult@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Noel Gordon <noel@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Luciano Pacheco <lucmult@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Noel Gordon <noel@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#633486}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 130,773
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: psf_asciiheader_printf (SF_PRIVATE *psf, const char *format, ...)
{ va_list argptr ;
int maxlen ;
char *start ;
maxlen = strlen ((char*) psf->header) ;
start = ((char*) psf->header) + maxlen ;
maxlen = sizeof (psf->header) - maxlen ;
va_start (argptr, format) ;
vsnprintf (start, maxlen, format, argptr) ;
va_end (argptr) ;
/* Make sure the string is properly terminated. */
start [maxlen - 1] = 0 ;
psf->headindex = strlen ((char*) psf->header) ;
return ;
} /* psf_asciiheader_printf */
Commit Message: src/ : Move to a variable length header buffer
Previously, the `psf->header` buffer was a fixed length specified by
`SF_HEADER_LEN` which was set to `12292`. This was problematic for
two reasons; this value was un-necessarily large for the majority
of files and too small for some others.
Now the size of the header buffer starts at 256 bytes and grows as
necessary up to a maximum of 100k.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 170,063
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleShaderSourceBucket(
uint32 immediate_data_size, const cmds::ShaderSourceBucket& c) {
Bucket* bucket = GetBucket(c.data_bucket_id);
if (!bucket || bucket->size() == 0) {
return error::kInvalidArguments;
}
return ShaderSourceHelper(
c.shader, bucket->GetDataAs<const char*>(0, bucket->size() - 1),
bucket->size() - 1);
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 120,972
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct sk_buff *__skb_recv_datagram(struct sock *sk, unsigned int flags,
int *peeked, int *off, int *err)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
long timeo;
/*
* Caller is allowed not to check sk->sk_err before skb_recv_datagram()
*/
int error = sock_error(sk);
if (error)
goto no_packet;
timeo = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
do {
/* Again only user level code calls this function, so nothing
* interrupt level will suddenly eat the receive_queue.
*
* Look at current nfs client by the way...
* However, this function was correct in any case. 8)
*/
unsigned long cpu_flags;
struct sk_buff_head *queue = &sk->sk_receive_queue;
spin_lock_irqsave(&queue->lock, cpu_flags);
skb_queue_walk(queue, skb) {
*peeked = skb->peeked;
if (flags & MSG_PEEK) {
if (*off >= skb->len) {
*off -= skb->len;
continue;
}
skb->peeked = 1;
atomic_inc(&skb->users);
} else
__skb_unlink(skb, queue);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&queue->lock, cpu_flags);
return skb;
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&queue->lock, cpu_flags);
/* User doesn't want to wait */
error = -EAGAIN;
if (!timeo)
goto no_packet;
} while (!wait_for_packet(sk, err, &timeo));
return NULL;
no_packet:
*err = error;
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: net: fix infinite loop in __skb_recv_datagram()
Tommi was fuzzing with trinity and reported the following problem :
commit 3f518bf745 (datagram: Add offset argument to __skb_recv_datagram)
missed that a raw socket receive queue can contain skbs with no payload.
We can loop in __skb_recv_datagram() with MSG_PEEK mode, because
wait_for_packet() is not prepared to skip these skbs.
[ 83.541011] INFO: rcu_sched detected stalls on CPUs/tasks: {}
(detected by 0, t=26002 jiffies, g=27673, c=27672, q=75)
[ 83.541011] INFO: Stall ended before state dump start
[ 108.067010] BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 22s! [trinity-child31:2847]
...
[ 108.067010] Call Trace:
[ 108.067010] [<ffffffff818cc103>] __skb_recv_datagram+0x1a3/0x3b0
[ 108.067010] [<ffffffff818cc33d>] skb_recv_datagram+0x2d/0x30
[ 108.067010] [<ffffffff819ed43d>] rawv6_recvmsg+0xad/0x240
[ 108.067010] [<ffffffff818c4b04>] sock_common_recvmsg+0x34/0x50
[ 108.067010] [<ffffffff818bc8ec>] sock_recvmsg+0xbc/0xf0
[ 108.067010] [<ffffffff818bf31e>] sys_recvfrom+0xde/0x150
[ 108.067010] [<ffffffff81ca4329>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Reported-by: Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 166,144
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FrameFetchContext::PopulateResourceRequest(
Resource::Type type,
const ClientHintsPreferences& hints_preferences,
const FetchParameters::ResourceWidth& resource_width,
ResourceRequest& request) {
ModifyRequestForCSP(request);
AddClientHintsIfNecessary(hints_preferences, resource_width, request);
AddCSPHeaderIfNecessary(type, request);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 138,766
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: _asn1_cpy_name (asn1_node dst, asn1_node src)
{
if (dst == NULL)
return dst;
if (src == NULL)
{
dst->name[0] = 0;
dst->name_hash = hash_pjw_bare (dst->name, 0);
return dst;
}
_asn1_str_cpy (dst->name, sizeof (dst->name), src->name);
dst->name_hash = src->name_hash;
return dst;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 3,876
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::CheckResetStatus() {
DCHECK(!WasContextLost());
DCHECK(context_->IsCurrent(nullptr));
if (IsRobustnessSupported()) {
GLenum driver_status = api()->glGetGraphicsResetStatusARBFn();
if (driver_status == GL_NO_ERROR) {
return false;
}
switch (driver_status) {
case GL_GUILTY_CONTEXT_RESET_ARB:
MarkContextLost(error::kGuilty);
break;
case GL_INNOCENT_CONTEXT_RESET_ARB:
MarkContextLost(error::kInnocent);
break;
case GL_UNKNOWN_CONTEXT_RESET_ARB:
MarkContextLost(error::kUnknown);
break;
default:
NOTREACHED();
return false;
}
reset_by_robustness_extension_ = true;
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,733
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void sc_format_path(const char *str, sc_path_t *path)
{
int type = SC_PATH_TYPE_PATH;
if (path) {
memset(path, 0, sizeof(*path));
if (*str == 'i' || *str == 'I') {
type = SC_PATH_TYPE_FILE_ID;
str++;
}
path->len = sizeof(path->value);
if (sc_hex_to_bin(str, path->value, &path->len) >= 0) {
path->type = type;
}
path->count = -1;
}
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds writes
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problems.
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 78,843
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HTMLMediaElement::SetMediaStreamRegistry(URLRegistry* registry) {
DCHECK(!media_stream_registry_);
media_stream_registry_ = registry;
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 144,584
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void XSSAuditor::SetEncoding(const WTF::TextEncoding& encoding) {
const size_t kMiniumLengthForSuffixTree = 512; // FIXME: Tune this parameter.
const int kSuffixTreeDepth = 5;
if (!encoding.IsValid())
return;
encoding_ = encoding;
decoded_url_ = Canonicalize(document_url_.GetString(), kNoTruncation);
if (decoded_url_.Find(IsRequiredForInjection) == kNotFound)
decoded_url_ = String();
if (!http_body_as_string_.IsEmpty()) {
decoded_http_body_ = Canonicalize(http_body_as_string_, kNoTruncation);
http_body_as_string_ = String();
if (decoded_http_body_.Find(IsRequiredForInjection) == kNotFound)
decoded_http_body_ = String();
if (decoded_http_body_.length() >= kMiniumLengthForSuffixTree)
decoded_http_body_suffix_tree_ = WTF::WrapUnique(
new SuffixTree<ASCIICodebook>(decoded_http_body_, kSuffixTreeDepth));
}
if (decoded_url_.IsEmpty() && decoded_http_body_.IsEmpty())
is_enabled_ = false;
}
Commit Message: Restrict the xss audit report URL to same origin
BUG=441275
R=tsepez@chromium.org,mkwst@chromium.org
Change-Id: I27bc8e251b9ad962c3b4fdebf084a2b9152f915d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/768367
Reviewed-by: Tom Sepez <tsepez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#516666}
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 147,016
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: tree_mod_log_set_root_pointer(struct btrfs_root *root,
struct extent_buffer *new_root_node,
int log_removal)
{
int ret;
ret = tree_mod_log_insert_root(root->fs_info, root->node,
new_root_node, GFP_NOFS, log_removal);
BUG_ON(ret < 0);
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: make xattr replace operations atomic
Replacing a xattr consists of doing a lookup for its existing value, delete
the current value from the respective leaf, release the search path and then
finally insert the new value. This leaves a time window where readers (getxattr,
listxattrs) won't see any value for the xattr. Xattrs are used to store ACLs,
so this has security implications.
This change also fixes 2 other existing issues which were:
*) Deleting the old xattr value without verifying first if the new xattr will
fit in the existing leaf item (in case multiple xattrs are packed in the
same item due to name hash collision);
*) Returning -EEXIST when the flag XATTR_CREATE is given and the xattr doesn't
exist but we have have an existing item that packs muliple xattrs with
the same name hash as the input xattr. In this case we should return ENOSPC.
A test case for xfstests follows soon.
Thanks to Alexandre Oliva for reporting the non-atomicity of the xattr replace
implementation.
Reported-by: Alexandre Oliva <oliva@gnu.org>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 45,373
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int sctp_register_pf(struct sctp_pf *pf, sa_family_t family)
{
switch (family) {
case PF_INET:
if (sctp_pf_inet_specific)
return 0;
sctp_pf_inet_specific = pf;
break;
case PF_INET6:
if (sctp_pf_inet6_specific)
return 0;
sctp_pf_inet6_specific = pf;
break;
default:
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: sctp: fix race on protocol/netns initialization
Consider sctp module is unloaded and is being requested because an user
is creating a sctp socket.
During initialization, sctp will add the new protocol type and then
initialize pernet subsys:
status = sctp_v4_protosw_init();
if (status)
goto err_protosw_init;
status = sctp_v6_protosw_init();
if (status)
goto err_v6_protosw_init;
status = register_pernet_subsys(&sctp_net_ops);
The problem is that after those calls to sctp_v{4,6}_protosw_init(), it
is possible for userspace to create SCTP sockets like if the module is
already fully loaded. If that happens, one of the possible effects is
that we will have readers for net->sctp.local_addr_list list earlier
than expected and sctp_net_init() does not take precautions while
dealing with that list, leading to a potential panic but not limited to
that, as sctp_sock_init() will copy a bunch of blank/partially
initialized values from net->sctp.
The race happens like this:
CPU 0 | CPU 1
socket() |
__sock_create | socket()
inet_create | __sock_create
list_for_each_entry_rcu( |
answer, &inetsw[sock->type], |
list) { | inet_create
/* no hits */ |
if (unlikely(err)) { |
... |
request_module() |
/* socket creation is blocked |
* the module is fully loaded |
*/ |
sctp_init |
sctp_v4_protosw_init |
inet_register_protosw |
list_add_rcu(&p->list, |
last_perm); |
| list_for_each_entry_rcu(
| answer, &inetsw[sock->type],
sctp_v6_protosw_init | list) {
| /* hit, so assumes protocol
| * is already loaded
| */
| /* socket creation continues
| * before netns is initialized
| */
register_pernet_subsys |
Simply inverting the initialization order between
register_pernet_subsys() and sctp_v4_protosw_init() is not possible
because register_pernet_subsys() will create a control sctp socket, so
the protocol must be already visible by then. Deferring the socket
creation to a work-queue is not good specially because we loose the
ability to handle its errors.
So, as suggested by Vlad, the fix is to split netns initialization in
two moments: defaults and control socket, so that the defaults are
already loaded by when we register the protocol, while control socket
initialization is kept at the same moment it is today.
Fixes: 4db67e808640 ("sctp: Make the address lists per network namespace")
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 42,925
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Extension::RuntimeData::UpdateTabSpecificPermissions(
int tab_id,
scoped_refptr<const PermissionSet> permissions) {
CHECK_GE(tab_id, 0);
if (tab_specific_permissions_.count(tab_id)) {
tab_specific_permissions_[tab_id] = PermissionSet::CreateUnion(
tab_specific_permissions_[tab_id],
permissions.get());
} else {
tab_specific_permissions_[tab_id] = permissions;
}
}
Commit Message: Tighten restrictions on hosted apps calling extension APIs
Only allow component apps to make any API calls, and for them only allow the namespaces they explicitly have permission for (plus chrome.test - I need to see if I can rework some WebStore tests to remove even this).
BUG=172369
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12095095
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180426 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 114,380
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::unique_ptr<service_manager::Service> CreateTestService() {
return std::unique_ptr<service_manager::Service>(new TestService);
}
Commit Message: Fix content_shell with network service enabled not loading pages.
This regressed in my earlier cl r528763.
This is a reland of r547221.
Bug: 833612
Change-Id: I4c2649414d42773f2530e1abe5912a04fcd0ed9b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1064702
Reviewed-by: Jay Civelli <jcivelli@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560011}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 131,061
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OneClickSigninSyncStarter::CompleteInitForNewProfile(
chrome::HostDesktopType desktop_type,
Profile* new_profile,
Profile::CreateStatus status) {
DCHECK_NE(profile_, new_profile);
switch (status) {
case Profile::CREATE_STATUS_LOCAL_FAIL: {
NOTREACHED() << "Error creating new profile";
CancelSigninAndDelete();
return;
}
case Profile::CREATE_STATUS_CREATED: {
break;
}
case Profile::CREATE_STATUS_INITIALIZED: {
SigninManager* old_signin_manager =
SigninManagerFactory::GetForProfile(profile_);
SigninManager* new_signin_manager =
SigninManagerFactory::GetForProfile(new_profile);
DCHECK(!old_signin_manager->GetUsernameForAuthInProgress().empty());
DCHECK(old_signin_manager->GetAuthenticatedUsername().empty());
DCHECK(new_signin_manager->GetAuthenticatedUsername().empty());
DCHECK(policy_client_);
new_signin_manager->CopyCredentialsFrom(*old_signin_manager);
FinishProfileSyncServiceSetup();
Initialize(new_profile, NULL);
DCHECK_EQ(profile_, new_profile);
old_signin_manager->SignOut();
LoadPolicyWithCachedClient();
ProfileManager::FindOrCreateNewWindowForProfile(
new_profile,
chrome::startup::IS_PROCESS_STARTUP,
chrome::startup::IS_FIRST_RUN,
desktop_type,
false);
break;
}
case Profile::CREATE_STATUS_REMOTE_FAIL:
case Profile::CREATE_STATUS_CANCELED:
case Profile::MAX_CREATE_STATUS: {
NOTREACHED() << "Invalid profile creation status";
CancelSigninAndDelete();
return;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Display confirmation dialog for untrusted signins
BUG=252062
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17482002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@208520 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 112,605
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool GraphicsContext3DPrivate::makeCurrentIfNeeded() const
{
const QOpenGLContext* currentContext = QOpenGLContext::currentContext();
if (currentContext == m_platformContext)
return true;
return m_platformContext->makeCurrent(m_surface);
}
Commit Message: [Qt] Remove an unnecessary masking from swapBgrToRgb()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=103630
Reviewed by Zoltan Herczeg.
Get rid of a masking command in swapBgrToRgb() to speed up a little bit.
* platform/graphics/qt/GraphicsContext3DQt.cpp:
(WebCore::swapBgrToRgb):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@136375 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 107,389
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: image_transform_png_set_tRNS_to_alpha_add(image_transform *this,
PNG_CONST image_transform **that, png_byte colour_type, png_byte bit_depth)
{
UNUSED(bit_depth)
this->next = *that;
*that = this;
/* We don't know yet whether there will be a tRNS chunk, but we know that
* this transformation should do nothing if there already is an alpha
* channel.
*/
return (colour_type & PNG_COLOR_MASK_ALPHA) == 0;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
| 1
| 173,654
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ftp_site(ftpbuf_t *ftp, const char *cmd)
{
if (ftp == NULL) {
return 0;
}
if (!ftp_putcmd(ftp, "SITE", cmd)) {
return 0;
}
if (!ftp_getresp(ftp) || ftp->resp < 200 || ftp->resp >= 300) {
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 14,810
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int nl80211_tx_mgmt_cancel_wait(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
{
struct cfg80211_registered_device *rdev = info->user_ptr[0];
struct net_device *dev = info->user_ptr[1];
u64 cookie;
if (!info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_COOKIE])
return -EINVAL;
if (!rdev->ops->mgmt_tx_cancel_wait)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (dev->ieee80211_ptr->iftype != NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION &&
dev->ieee80211_ptr->iftype != NL80211_IFTYPE_ADHOC &&
dev->ieee80211_ptr->iftype != NL80211_IFTYPE_P2P_CLIENT &&
dev->ieee80211_ptr->iftype != NL80211_IFTYPE_AP &&
dev->ieee80211_ptr->iftype != NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN &&
dev->ieee80211_ptr->iftype != NL80211_IFTYPE_P2P_GO)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
cookie = nla_get_u64(info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_COOKIE]);
return rdev->ops->mgmt_tx_cancel_wait(&rdev->wiphy, dev, cookie);
}
Commit Message: nl80211: fix check for valid SSID size in scan operations
In both trigger_scan and sched_scan operations, we were checking for
the SSID length before assigning the value correctly. Since the
memory was just kzalloc'ed, the check was always failing and SSID with
over 32 characters were allowed to go through.
This was causing a buffer overflow when copying the actual SSID to the
proper place.
This bug has been there since 2.6.29-rc4.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Luciano Coelho <coelho@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 26,779
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: generic_file_splice_write(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, struct file *out,
loff_t *ppos, size_t len, unsigned int flags)
{
struct address_space *mapping = out->f_mapping;
struct inode *inode = mapping->host;
struct splice_desc sd = {
.total_len = len,
.flags = flags,
.pos = *ppos,
.u.file = out,
};
ssize_t ret;
pipe_lock(pipe);
splice_from_pipe_begin(&sd);
do {
ret = splice_from_pipe_next(pipe, &sd);
if (ret <= 0)
break;
mutex_lock_nested(&inode->i_mutex, I_MUTEX_CHILD);
ret = file_remove_suid(out);
if (!ret) {
ret = file_update_time(out);
if (!ret)
ret = splice_from_pipe_feed(pipe, &sd,
pipe_to_file);
}
mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
} while (ret > 0);
splice_from_pipe_end(pipe, &sd);
pipe_unlock(pipe);
if (sd.num_spliced)
ret = sd.num_spliced;
if (ret > 0) {
int err;
err = generic_write_sync(out, *ppos, ret);
if (err)
ret = err;
else
*ppos += ret;
balance_dirty_pages_ratelimited(mapping);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ->splice_write() via ->write_iter()
iter_file_splice_write() - a ->splice_write() instance that gathers the
pipe buffers, builds a bio_vec-based iov_iter covering those and feeds
it to ->write_iter(). A bunch of simple cases coverted to that...
[AV: fixed the braino spotted by Cyrill]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 46,372
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: client_connected_to_dbus (GObject *source_object,
GAsyncResult *res,
gpointer user_data)
{
FlatpakProxyClient *client = user_data;
GSocketConnection *connection;
GError *error = NULL;
GIOStream *stream;
stream = g_dbus_address_get_stream_finish (res, NULL, &error);
if (stream == NULL)
{
g_warning ("Failed to connect to bus: %s", error->message);
g_object_unref (client);
return;
}
connection = G_SOCKET_CONNECTION (stream);
g_socket_set_blocking (g_socket_connection_get_socket (connection), FALSE);
client->bus_side.connection = connection;
start_reading (&client->client_side);
start_reading (&client->bus_side);
}
Commit Message: Fix vulnerability in dbus proxy
During the authentication all client data is directly forwarded
to the dbus daemon as is, until we detect the BEGIN command after
which we start filtering the binary dbus protocol.
Unfortunately the detection of the BEGIN command in the proxy
did not exactly match the detection in the dbus daemon. A BEGIN
followed by a space or tab was considered ok in the daemon but
not by the proxy. This could be exploited to send arbitrary
dbus messages to the host, which can be used to break out of
the sandbox.
This was noticed by Gabriel Campana of The Google Security Team.
This fix makes the detection of the authentication phase end
match the dbus code. In addition we duplicate the authentication
line validation from dbus, which includes ensuring all data is
ASCII, and limiting the size of a line to 16k. In fact, we add
some extra stringent checks, disallowing ASCII control chars and
requiring that auth lines start with a capital letter.
CWE ID: CWE-436
| 0
| 84,365
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: mrb_instance_alloc(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_value cv)
{
struct RClass *c = mrb_class_ptr(cv);
struct RObject *o;
enum mrb_vtype ttype = MRB_INSTANCE_TT(c);
if (c->tt == MRB_TT_SCLASS)
mrb_raise(mrb, E_TYPE_ERROR, "can't create instance of singleton class");
if (ttype == 0) ttype = MRB_TT_OBJECT;
if (ttype <= MRB_TT_CPTR) {
mrb_raisef(mrb, E_TYPE_ERROR, "can't create instance of %S", cv);
}
o = (struct RObject*)mrb_obj_alloc(mrb, ttype, c);
return mrb_obj_value(o);
}
Commit Message: `mrb_class_real()` did not work for `BasicObject`; fix #4037
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 82,097
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int kern_path(const char *name, unsigned int flags, struct path *path)
{
struct nameidata nd;
struct filename *filename = getname_kernel(name);
int res = PTR_ERR(filename);
if (!IS_ERR(filename)) {
res = filename_lookup(AT_FDCWD, filename, flags, &nd);
putname(filename);
if (!res)
*path = nd.path;
}
return res;
}
Commit Message: path_openat(): fix double fput()
path_openat() jumps to the wrong place after do_tmpfile() - it has
already done path_cleanup() (as part of path_lookupat() called by
do_tmpfile()), so doing that again can lead to double fput().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.11+
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 42,328
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int hostap_set_antsel(local_info_t *local)
{
u16 val;
int ret = 0;
if (local->antsel_tx != HOSTAP_ANTSEL_DO_NOT_TOUCH &&
local->func->cmd(local->dev, HFA384X_CMDCODE_READMIF,
HFA386X_CR_TX_CONFIGURE,
NULL, &val) == 0) {
val &= ~(BIT(2) | BIT(1));
switch (local->antsel_tx) {
case HOSTAP_ANTSEL_DIVERSITY:
val |= BIT(1);
break;
case HOSTAP_ANTSEL_LOW:
break;
case HOSTAP_ANTSEL_HIGH:
val |= BIT(2);
break;
}
if (local->func->cmd(local->dev, HFA384X_CMDCODE_WRITEMIF,
HFA386X_CR_TX_CONFIGURE, &val, NULL)) {
printk(KERN_INFO "%s: setting TX AntSel failed\n",
local->dev->name);
ret = -1;
}
}
if (local->antsel_rx != HOSTAP_ANTSEL_DO_NOT_TOUCH &&
local->func->cmd(local->dev, HFA384X_CMDCODE_READMIF,
HFA386X_CR_RX_CONFIGURE,
NULL, &val) == 0) {
val &= ~(BIT(1) | BIT(0));
switch (local->antsel_rx) {
case HOSTAP_ANTSEL_DIVERSITY:
break;
case HOSTAP_ANTSEL_LOW:
val |= BIT(0);
break;
case HOSTAP_ANTSEL_HIGH:
val |= BIT(0) | BIT(1);
break;
}
if (local->func->cmd(local->dev, HFA384X_CMDCODE_WRITEMIF,
HFA386X_CR_RX_CONFIGURE, &val, NULL)) {
printk(KERN_INFO "%s: setting RX AntSel failed\n",
local->dev->name);
ret = -1;
}
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 24,108
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: stringprep_apply_table_to_string (uint32_t * ucs4,
size_t * ucs4len,
size_t maxucs4len,
const Stringprep_table_element * table)
{
ssize_t pos;
size_t i, maplen;
while ((pos = stringprep_find_string_in_table (ucs4, *ucs4len,
&i, table)) != -1)
{
for (maplen = STRINGPREP_MAX_MAP_CHARS;
maplen > 0 && table[i].map[maplen - 1] == 0; maplen--)
;
if (*ucs4len - 1 + maplen >= maxucs4len)
return STRINGPREP_TOO_SMALL_BUFFER;
memmove (&ucs4[pos + maplen], &ucs4[pos + 1],
sizeof (uint32_t) * (*ucs4len - pos - 1));
memcpy (&ucs4[pos], table[i].map, sizeof (uint32_t) * maplen);
*ucs4len = *ucs4len - 1 + maplen;
}
return STRINGPREP_OK;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 4,781
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: incremental_gc_step(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_gc *gc)
{
size_t limit = 0, result = 0;
limit = (GC_STEP_SIZE/100) * gc->step_ratio;
while (result < limit) {
result += incremental_gc(mrb, gc, limit);
if (gc->state == MRB_GC_STATE_ROOT)
break;
}
gc->threshold = gc->live + GC_STEP_SIZE;
}
Commit Message: Clear unused stack region that may refer freed objects; fix #3596
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 64,424
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void update_metadata(HTTPContext *s, char *data)
{
char *key;
char *val;
char *end;
char *next = data;
while (*next) {
key = next;
val = strstr(key, "='");
if (!val)
break;
end = strstr(val, "';");
if (!end)
break;
*val = '\0';
*end = '\0';
val += 2;
av_dict_set(&s->metadata, key, val, 0);
next = end + 2;
}
}
Commit Message: http: make length/offset-related variables unsigned.
Fixes #5992, reported and found by Paul Cher <paulcher@icloud.com>.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 70,874
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int decode_attr_layout_blksize(struct xdr_stream *xdr, uint32_t *bitmap,
uint32_t *res)
{
__be32 *p;
dprintk("%s: bitmap is %x\n", __func__, bitmap[2]);
*res = 0;
if (bitmap[2] & FATTR4_WORD2_LAYOUT_BLKSIZE) {
p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, 4);
if (unlikely(!p)) {
print_overflow_msg(__func__, xdr);
return -EIO;
}
*res = be32_to_cpup(p);
bitmap[2] &= ~FATTR4_WORD2_LAYOUT_BLKSIZE;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 23,266
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void JBIG2Stream::readPageInfoSeg(Guint length) {
Guint xRes, yRes, flags, striping;
if (!readULong(&pageW) || !readULong(&pageH) ||
!readULong(&xRes) || !readULong(&yRes) ||
!readUByte(&flags) || !readUWord(&striping)) {
goto eofError;
}
pageDefPixel = (flags >> 2) & 1;
defCombOp = (flags >> 3) & 3;
if (pageH == 0xffffffff) {
curPageH = striping & 0x7fff;
} else {
curPageH = pageH;
}
pageBitmap = new JBIG2Bitmap(0, pageW, curPageH);
if (!pageBitmap->isOk()) {
delete pageBitmap;
pageBitmap = NULL;
return;
}
if (pageDefPixel) {
pageBitmap->clearToOne();
} else {
pageBitmap->clearToZero();
}
return;
eofError:
error(errSyntaxError, curStr->getPos(), "Unexpected EOF in JBIG2 stream");
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 14,711
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PageHandler::NotifyScreencastVisibility(bool visible) {
if (visible)
capture_retry_count_ = kCaptureRetryLimit;
frontend_->ScreencastVisibilityChanged(visible);
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow Page.setDownloadBehavior for extensions
Bug: 866426
Change-Id: I71b672978e1a8ec779ede49da16b21198567d3a4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1270007
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598004}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 143,617
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Document::HasValidNamespaceForElements(const QualifiedName& q_name) {
if (!q_name.Prefix().IsEmpty() && q_name.NamespaceURI().IsNull())
return false;
if (q_name.Prefix() == g_xml_atom &&
q_name.NamespaceURI() != xml_names::kNamespaceURI)
return false;
if (q_name.Prefix() == g_xmlns_atom ||
(q_name.Prefix().IsEmpty() && q_name.LocalName() == g_xmlns_atom))
return q_name.NamespaceURI() == xmlns_names::kNamespaceURI;
return q_name.NamespaceURI() != xmlns_names::kNamespaceURI;
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 129,743
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void free_pipe_info(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < pipe->buffers; i++) {
struct pipe_buffer *buf = pipe->bufs + i;
if (buf->ops)
buf->ops->release(pipe, buf);
}
if (pipe->tmp_page)
__free_page(pipe->tmp_page);
kfree(pipe->bufs);
kfree(pipe);
}
Commit Message: new helper: copy_page_from_iter()
parallel to copy_page_to_iter(). pipe_write() switched to it (and became
->write_iter()).
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-17
| 0
| 44,134
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned char* ensure(printbuffer * const p, size_t needed)
{
unsigned char *newbuffer = NULL;
size_t newsize = 0;
if ((p == NULL) || (p->buffer == NULL))
{
return NULL;
}
if ((p->length > 0) && (p->offset >= p->length))
{
/* make sure that offset is valid */
return NULL;
}
if (needed > INT_MAX)
{
/* sizes bigger than INT_MAX are currently not supported */
return NULL;
}
needed += p->offset + 1;
if (needed <= p->length)
{
return p->buffer + p->offset;
}
if (p->noalloc) {
return NULL;
}
/* calculate new buffer size */
if (needed > (INT_MAX / 2))
{
/* overflow of int, use INT_MAX if possible */
if (needed <= INT_MAX)
{
newsize = INT_MAX;
}
else
{
return NULL;
}
}
else
{
newsize = needed * 2;
}
if (p->hooks.reallocate != NULL)
{
/* reallocate with realloc if available */
newbuffer = (unsigned char*)p->hooks.reallocate(p->buffer, newsize);
if (newbuffer == NULL)
{
p->hooks.deallocate(p->buffer);
p->length = 0;
p->buffer = NULL;
return NULL;
}
}
else
{
/* otherwise reallocate manually */
newbuffer = (unsigned char*)p->hooks.allocate(newsize);
if (!newbuffer)
{
p->hooks.deallocate(p->buffer);
p->length = 0;
p->buffer = NULL;
return NULL;
}
if (newbuffer)
{
memcpy(newbuffer, p->buffer, p->offset + 1);
}
p->hooks.deallocate(p->buffer);
}
p->length = newsize;
p->buffer = newbuffer;
return newbuffer + p->offset;
}
Commit Message: Fix crash of cJSON_GetObjectItemCaseSensitive when calling it on arrays
CWE ID: CWE-754
| 0
| 87,151
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SigPipe(SIGNAL_ARG)
{
#ifdef USE_MIGEMO
init_migemo();
#endif
mySignal(SIGPIPE, SigPipe);
SIGNAL_RETURN;
}
Commit Message: Make temporary directory safely when ~/.w3m is unwritable
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 84,451
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RequestConnection(struct upnphttp * h, const char * action, const char * ns)
{
UNUSED(action);
UNUSED(ns);
SoapError(h, 606, "Action not authorized");
}
Commit Message: GetOutboundPinholeTimeout: check args
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 89,874
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Err drep_Size(GF_Box *s)
{
s->size += 8;
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,073
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gfx::Rect BrowserNonClientFrameViewAura::GetWindowBoundsForClientBounds(
const gfx::Rect& client_bounds) const {
int top_height = NonClientTopBorderHeight(false);
return frame_painter_->GetWindowBoundsForClientBounds(top_height,
client_bounds);
}
Commit Message: Ash: Fix fullscreen window bounds
I was computing the non-client frame top border height incorrectly for fullscreen windows, so it was trying to draw a few pixels of transparent non-client border.
BUG=118774
TEST=visual
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9810014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@128014 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 108,188
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GLenum Framebuffer::GetStatus(
TextureManager* texture_manager, GLenum target) const {
std::string signature;
if (allow_framebuffer_combo_complete_map_) {
signature = base::StringPrintf("|FBO|target=%04x", target);
for (AttachmentMap::const_iterator it = attachments_.begin();
it != attachments_.end(); ++it) {
Attachment* attachment = it->second.get();
signature +=
base::StringPrintf("|Attachment|attachmentpoint=%04x", it->first);
attachment->AddToSignature(texture_manager, &signature);
}
if (!framebuffer_combo_complete_map_) {
framebuffer_combo_complete_map_ = new FramebufferComboCompleteMap();
}
FramebufferComboCompleteMap::const_iterator it =
framebuffer_combo_complete_map_->find(signature);
if (it != framebuffer_combo_complete_map_->end()) {
return GL_FRAMEBUFFER_COMPLETE;
}
}
GLenum result = glCheckFramebufferStatusEXT(target);
if (allow_framebuffer_combo_complete_map_ &&
result == GL_FRAMEBUFFER_COMPLETE) {
framebuffer_combo_complete_map_->insert(std::make_pair(signature, true));
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 120,694
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BrowserCommandController::UpdateReloadStopState(bool is_loading,
bool force) {
window()->UpdateReloadStopState(is_loading, force);
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_STOP, is_loading);
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 117,886
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoCopyTexImage(Texture* texture,
GLenum textarget,
gl::GLImage* image) {
texture->SetLevelImageState(textarget, 0, Texture::COPIED);
bool rv = image->CopyTexImage(textarget);
DCHECK(rv) << "CopyTexImage() failed";
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,287
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool HTMLFormElement::layoutObjectIsNeeded(const ComputedStyle& style) {
if (!m_wasDemoted)
return HTMLElement::layoutObjectIsNeeded(style);
ContainerNode* node = parentNode();
if (!node || !node->layoutObject())
return HTMLElement::layoutObjectIsNeeded(style);
LayoutObject* parentLayoutObject = node->layoutObject();
bool parentIsTableElementPart =
(parentLayoutObject->isTable() && isHTMLTableElement(*node)) ||
(parentLayoutObject->isTableRow() && isHTMLTableRowElement(*node)) ||
(parentLayoutObject->isTableSection() && node->hasTagName(tbodyTag)) ||
(parentLayoutObject->isLayoutTableCol() && node->hasTagName(colTag)) ||
(parentLayoutObject->isTableCell() && isHTMLTableRowElement(*node));
if (!parentIsTableElementPart)
return true;
EDisplay display = style.display();
bool formIsTablePart =
display == EDisplay::Table || display == EDisplay::InlineTable ||
display == EDisplay::TableRowGroup ||
display == EDisplay::TableHeaderGroup ||
display == EDisplay::TableFooterGroup || display == EDisplay::TableRow ||
display == EDisplay::TableColumnGroup ||
display == EDisplay::TableColumn || display == EDisplay::TableCell ||
display == EDisplay::TableCaption;
return formIsTablePart;
}
Commit Message: Enforce form-action CSP even when form.target is present.
BUG=630332
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2464123004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#429922}
CWE ID: CWE-19
| 0
| 142,538
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: is_ubik(uint32_t opcode)
{
if ((opcode >= VOTE_LOW && opcode <= VOTE_HIGH) ||
(opcode >= DISK_LOW && opcode <= DISK_HIGH))
return(1);
else
return(0);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13049/Rx: add a missing bounds check for Ubik
One of the case blocks in ubik_print() didn't check bounds before
fetching 32 bits of packet data and could overread past the captured
packet data by that amount.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Henri Salo from Nixu
Corporation.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 62,274
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int snd_timer_stop1(struct snd_timer_instance *timeri, bool stop)
{
struct snd_timer *timer;
int result = 0;
unsigned long flags;
timer = timeri->timer;
if (!timer)
return -EINVAL;
spin_lock_irqsave(&timer->lock, flags);
if (!(timeri->flags & (SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_RUNNING |
SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_START))) {
result = -EBUSY;
goto unlock;
}
list_del_init(&timeri->ack_list);
list_del_init(&timeri->active_list);
if (timer->card && timer->card->shutdown)
goto unlock;
if (stop) {
timeri->cticks = timeri->ticks;
timeri->pticks = 0;
}
if ((timeri->flags & SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_RUNNING) &&
!(--timer->running)) {
timer->hw.stop(timer);
if (timer->flags & SNDRV_TIMER_FLG_RESCHED) {
timer->flags &= ~SNDRV_TIMER_FLG_RESCHED;
snd_timer_reschedule(timer, 0);
if (timer->flags & SNDRV_TIMER_FLG_CHANGE) {
timer->flags &= ~SNDRV_TIMER_FLG_CHANGE;
timer->hw.start(timer);
}
}
}
timeri->flags &= ~(SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_RUNNING | SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_START);
snd_timer_notify1(timeri, stop ? SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_STOP :
SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_CONTINUE);
unlock:
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&timer->lock, flags);
return result;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: timer: Fix leak in events via snd_timer_user_tinterrupt
The stack object “r1” has a total size of 32 bytes. Its field
“event” and “val” both contain 4 bytes padding. These 8 bytes
padding bytes are sent to user without being initialized.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 52,718
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void add_session_id(struct cryp_ctx *ctx)
{
/*
* We never want 0 to be a valid value, since this is the default value
* for the software context.
*/
if (unlikely(atomic_inc_and_test(&session_id)))
atomic_inc(&session_id);
ctx->session_id = atomic_read(&session_id);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 47,481
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RendererURLRequestContextSelector(BrowserContext* browser_context,
int render_child_id)
: request_context_(browser_context->GetRequestContextForRenderProcess(
render_child_id)),
media_request_context_(
browser_context->GetMediaRequestContextForRenderProcess(
render_child_id)) {
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 114,559
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void gnutls_lxc_init(void)
{
gnutls_global_init();
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 44,677
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BluetoothDeviceChooserController::SetTestScanDurationForTesting(
TestScanDurationSetting setting) {
switch (setting) {
case TestScanDurationSetting::IMMEDIATE_TIMEOUT:
scan_duration_ = 0;
break;
case TestScanDurationSetting::NEVER_TIMEOUT:
scan_duration_ = base::TimeDelta::Max().InSeconds();
break;
}
}
Commit Message: bluetooth: Implement getAvailability()
This change implements the getAvailability() method for
navigator.bluetooth as defined in the specification.
Bug: 707640
Change-Id: I9e9b3e7f8ea7f259e975f71cb6d9570e5f04b479
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1651516
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Giovanni Ortuño Urquidi <ortuno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#688987}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 138,084
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Err stsh_Write(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_Err e;
u32 i;
GF_StshEntry *ent;
GF_ShadowSyncBox *ptr = (GF_ShadowSyncBox *)s;
e = gf_isom_full_box_write(s, bs);
if (e) return e;
gf_bs_write_u32(bs, gf_list_count(ptr->entries));
i=0;
while ((ent = (GF_StshEntry *)gf_list_enum(ptr->entries, &i))) {
gf_bs_write_u32(bs, ent->shadowedSampleNumber);
gf_bs_write_u32(bs, ent->syncSampleNumber);
}
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,485
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: AppModalDialog::~AppModalDialog() {
}
Commit Message: Fix a Windows crash bug with javascript alerts from extension popups.
BUG=137707
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10828423
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@152716 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 170,755
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void String8::clear() {
SharedBuffer::bufferFromData(mString)->release();
mString = getEmptyString();
}
Commit Message: libutils/Unicode.cpp: Correct length computation and add checks for utf16->utf8
Inconsistent behaviour between utf16_to_utf8 and utf16_to_utf8_length
is causing a heap overflow.
Correcting the length computation and adding bound checks to the
conversion functions.
Test: ran libutils_tests
Bug: 29250543
Change-Id: I6115e3357141ed245c63c6eb25fc0fd0a9a7a2bb
(cherry picked from commit c4966a363e46d2e1074d1a365e232af0dcedd6a1)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 158,389
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: sshkey_load_cert(const char *filename, struct sshkey **keyp)
{
struct sshkey *pub = NULL;
char *file = NULL;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if (keyp != NULL)
*keyp = NULL;
if (asprintf(&file, "%s-cert.pub", filename) == -1)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((pub = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) {
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshkey_try_load_public(pub, file, NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
/* success */
if (keyp != NULL) {
*keyp = pub;
pub = NULL;
}
r = 0;
out:
free(file);
sshkey_free(pub);
return r;
}
Commit Message: use sshbuf_allocate() to pre-allocate the buffer used for loading
keys. This avoids implicit realloc inside the buffer code, which
might theoretically leave fragments of the key on the heap. This
doesn't appear to happen in practice for normal sized keys, but
was observed for novelty oversize ones.
Pointed out by Jann Horn of Project Zero; ok markus@
CWE ID: CWE-320
| 0
| 72,305
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Err gf_isom_box_dump(void *ptr, FILE * trace)
{
return gf_isom_box_dump_ex(ptr, trace, 0);
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,738
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void reflectedCustomBooleanAttrAttributeGetter(const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
v8SetReturnValueBool(info, imp->fastHasAttribute(HTMLNames::customContentBooleanAttrAttr));
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 121,906
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CommandBufferProxyImpl::TryUpdateState() {
if (last_state_.error == gpu::error::kNoError)
shared_state_->Read(&last_state_);
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 106,747
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int shared_policy_replace(struct shared_policy *sp, unsigned long start,
unsigned long end, struct sp_node *new)
{
struct sp_node *n, *new2 = NULL;
restart:
spin_lock(&sp->lock);
n = sp_lookup(sp, start, end);
/* Take care of old policies in the same range. */
while (n && n->start < end) {
struct rb_node *next = rb_next(&n->nd);
if (n->start >= start) {
if (n->end <= end)
sp_delete(sp, n);
else
n->start = end;
} else {
/* Old policy spanning whole new range. */
if (n->end > end) {
if (!new2) {
spin_unlock(&sp->lock);
new2 = sp_alloc(end, n->end, n->policy);
if (!new2)
return -ENOMEM;
goto restart;
}
n->end = start;
sp_insert(sp, new2);
new2 = NULL;
break;
} else
n->end = start;
}
if (!next)
break;
n = rb_entry(next, struct sp_node, nd);
}
if (new)
sp_insert(sp, new);
spin_unlock(&sp->lock);
if (new2) {
mpol_put(new2->policy);
kmem_cache_free(sn_cache, new2);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 21,351
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void __kfree_skb_defer(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
_kfree_skb_defer(skb);
}
Commit Message: tcp: fix SCM_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS for normal skbs
__sock_recv_timestamp can be called for both normal skbs (for
receive timestamps) and for skbs on the error queue (for transmit
timestamps).
Commit 1c885808e456
(tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING)
assumes any skb passed to __sock_recv_timestamp are from
the error queue, containing OPT_STATS in the content of the skb.
This results in accessing invalid memory or generating junk
data.
To fix this, set skb->pkt_type to PACKET_OUTGOING for packets
on the error queue. This is safe because on the receive path
on local sockets skb->pkt_type is never set to PACKET_OUTGOING.
With that, copy OPT_STATS from a packet, only if its pkt_type
is PACKET_OUTGOING.
Fixes: 1c885808e456 ("tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING")
Reported-by: JongHwan Kim <zzoru007@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 67,663
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HTMLMediaElement::loadInternal() {
m_textTracksWhenResourceSelectionBegan.clear();
if (m_textTracks) {
for (unsigned i = 0; i < m_textTracks->length(); ++i) {
TextTrack* track = m_textTracks->anonymousIndexedGetter(i);
if (track->mode() != TextTrack::disabledKeyword())
m_textTracksWhenResourceSelectionBegan.push_back(track);
}
}
selectMediaResource();
}
Commit Message: [Blink>Media] Allow autoplay muted on Android by default
There was a mistake causing autoplay muted is shipped on Android
but it will be disabled if the chromium embedder doesn't specify
content setting for "AllowAutoplay" preference. This CL makes the
AllowAutoplay preference true by default so that it is allowed by
embedders (including AndroidWebView) unless they explicitly
disable it.
Intent to ship:
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/Q1cnzNI2GpI/AL_eyUNABgAJ
BUG=689018
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2677173002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#448423}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 128,834
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void reflectUrlStringAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestInterfaceNodeV8Internal::reflectUrlStringAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
}
Commit Message: binding: Removes unused code in templates/attributes.cpp.
Faking {{cpp_class}} and {{c8_class}} doesn't make sense.
Probably it made sense before the introduction of virtual
ScriptWrappable::wrap().
Checking the existence of window->document() doesn't seem
making sense to me, and CQ tests seem passing without the
check.
BUG=
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2268433002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#413375}
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 119,284
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WallpaperManagerBase::SetCommandLineForTesting(
base::CommandLine* command_line) {
command_line_for_testing_ = command_line;
SetDefaultWallpaperPathsFromCommandLine(command_line);
}
Commit Message: [reland] Do not set default wallpaper unless it should do so.
TBR=bshe@chromium.org, alemate@chromium.org
Bug: 751382
Change-Id: Id0793dfe467f737526a95b1e66ed01fbb8860bda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/619754
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <xdai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Alekseev <alemate@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Biao She <bshe@chromium.org>
Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498325}
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/646430
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498982}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 128,086
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Ins_SSWCI( TT_ExecContext exc,
FT_Long* args )
{
exc->GS.single_width_cutin = (FT_F26Dot6)args[0];
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 10,681
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool HTMLFormElement::validateInteractively() {
UseCounter::count(document(), UseCounter::FormValidationStarted);
const FormAssociatedElement::List& elements = associatedElements();
for (unsigned i = 0; i < elements.size(); ++i) {
if (elements[i]->isFormControlElement())
toHTMLFormControlElement(elements[i])->hideVisibleValidationMessage();
}
HeapVector<Member<HTMLFormControlElement>> unhandledInvalidControls;
if (!checkInvalidControlsAndCollectUnhandled(
&unhandledInvalidControls, CheckValidityDispatchInvalidEvent))
return true;
UseCounter::count(document(), UseCounter::FormValidationAbortedSubmission);
document().updateStyleAndLayoutIgnorePendingStylesheets();
for (unsigned i = 0; i < unhandledInvalidControls.size(); ++i) {
HTMLFormControlElement* unhandled = unhandledInvalidControls[i].get();
if (unhandled->isFocusable()) {
unhandled->showValidationMessage();
UseCounter::count(document(), UseCounter::FormValidationShowedMessage);
break;
}
}
if (document().frame()) {
for (unsigned i = 0; i < unhandledInvalidControls.size(); ++i) {
HTMLFormControlElement* unhandled = unhandledInvalidControls[i].get();
if (unhandled->isFocusable())
continue;
String message(
"An invalid form control with name='%name' is not focusable.");
message.replace("%name", unhandled->name());
document().addConsoleMessage(ConsoleMessage::create(
RenderingMessageSource, ErrorMessageLevel, message));
}
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Enforce form-action CSP even when form.target is present.
BUG=630332
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2464123004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#429922}
CWE ID: CWE-19
| 0
| 142,558
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned long count_partial(struct kmem_cache_node *n,
int (*get_count)(struct page *))
{
unsigned long flags;
unsigned long x = 0;
struct page *page;
spin_lock_irqsave(&n->list_lock, flags);
list_for_each_entry(page, &n->partial, lru)
x += get_count(page);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&n->list_lock, flags);
return x;
}
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 24,777
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void check_stack_usage(void)
{
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(low_water_lock);
static int lowest_to_date = THREAD_SIZE;
unsigned long *n = end_of_stack(current);
unsigned long free;
while (*n == 0)
n++;
free = (unsigned long)n - (unsigned long)end_of_stack(current);
if (free >= lowest_to_date)
return;
spin_lock(&low_water_lock);
if (free < lowest_to_date) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "%s used greatest stack depth: %lu bytes "
"left\n",
current->comm, free);
lowest_to_date = free;
}
spin_unlock(&low_water_lock);
}
Commit Message: Move "exit_robust_list" into mm_release()
We don't want to get rid of the futexes just at exit() time, we want to
drop them when doing an execve() too, since that gets rid of the
previous VM image too.
Doing it at mm_release() time means that we automatically always do it
when we disassociate a VM map from the task.
Reported-by: pageexec@freemail.hu
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: Alex Efros <powerman@powerman.name>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 22,098
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool mock_saving() const { return mock_saving_; }
Commit Message: Remove unused histograms from the background loader offliner.
Bug: 975512
Change-Id: I87b0a91bed60e3a9e8a1fd9ae9b18cac27a0859f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1683361
Reviewed-by: Cathy Li <chili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Steven Holte <holte@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Peter Williamson <petewil@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#675332}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 139,162
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WebKitWebView* kit(WebCore::Page* corePage)
{
if (!corePage)
return 0;
ASSERT(corePage->chrome());
WebKit::ChromeClient* client = static_cast<WebKit::ChromeClient*>(corePage->chrome()->client());
return client ? static_cast<WebKitWebView*>(client->webView()) : 0;
}
Commit Message: 2011-06-02 Joone Hur <joone.hur@collabora.co.uk>
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
[GTK] Only load dictionaries if spell check is enabled
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32879
We don't need to call enchant if enable-spell-checking is false.
* webkit/webkitwebview.cpp:
(webkit_web_view_update_settings): Skip loading dictionaries when enable-spell-checking is false.
(webkit_web_view_settings_notify): Ditto.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@87925 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 100,503
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MODRET set_maxhostclients(cmd_rec *cmd) {
int max;
config_rec *c = NULL;
if (cmd->argc < 2 || cmd->argc > 3)
CONF_ERROR(cmd, "wrong number of parameters");
CHECK_CONF(cmd, CONF_ROOT|CONF_VIRTUAL|CONF_GLOBAL|CONF_ANON);
if (!strcasecmp(cmd->argv[1], "none"))
max = 0;
else {
char *endp = NULL;
max = (int) strtol(cmd->argv[1], &endp, 10);
if ((endp && *endp) || max < 1)
CONF_ERROR(cmd, "parameter must be 'none' or a number greater than 0");
}
if (cmd->argc == 3) {
c = add_config_param(cmd->argv[0], 2, NULL, NULL);
c->argv[0] = pcalloc(c->pool, sizeof(unsigned int));
*((unsigned int *) c->argv[0]) = max;
c->argv[1] = pstrdup(c->pool, cmd->argv[2]);
} else {
c = add_config_param(cmd->argv[0], 1, NULL);
c->argv[0] = pcalloc(c->pool, sizeof(unsigned int));
*((unsigned int *) c->argv[0]) = max;
}
c->flags |= CF_MERGEDOWN;
return PR_HANDLED(cmd);
}
Commit Message: Walk the entire DefaultRoot path, checking for symlinks of any component,
when AllowChrootSymlinks is disabled.
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 67,617
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ext4_split_extent_at(handle_t *handle,
struct inode *inode,
struct ext4_ext_path *path,
ext4_lblk_t split,
int split_flag,
int flags)
{
ext4_fsblk_t newblock;
ext4_lblk_t ee_block;
struct ext4_extent *ex, newex, orig_ex;
struct ext4_extent *ex2 = NULL;
unsigned int ee_len, depth;
int err = 0;
ext_debug("ext4_split_extents_at: inode %lu, logical"
"block %llu\n", inode->i_ino, (unsigned long long)split);
ext4_ext_show_leaf(inode, path);
depth = ext_depth(inode);
ex = path[depth].p_ext;
ee_block = le32_to_cpu(ex->ee_block);
ee_len = ext4_ext_get_actual_len(ex);
newblock = split - ee_block + ext4_ext_pblock(ex);
BUG_ON(split < ee_block || split >= (ee_block + ee_len));
err = ext4_ext_get_access(handle, inode, path + depth);
if (err)
goto out;
if (split == ee_block) {
/*
* case b: block @split is the block that the extent begins with
* then we just change the state of the extent, and splitting
* is not needed.
*/
if (split_flag & EXT4_EXT_MARK_UNINIT2)
ext4_ext_mark_uninitialized(ex);
else
ext4_ext_mark_initialized(ex);
if (!(flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_PRE_IO))
ext4_ext_try_to_merge(inode, path, ex);
err = ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + depth);
goto out;
}
/* case a */
memcpy(&orig_ex, ex, sizeof(orig_ex));
ex->ee_len = cpu_to_le16(split - ee_block);
if (split_flag & EXT4_EXT_MARK_UNINIT1)
ext4_ext_mark_uninitialized(ex);
/*
* path may lead to new leaf, not to original leaf any more
* after ext4_ext_insert_extent() returns,
*/
err = ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + depth);
if (err)
goto fix_extent_len;
ex2 = &newex;
ex2->ee_block = cpu_to_le32(split);
ex2->ee_len = cpu_to_le16(ee_len - (split - ee_block));
ext4_ext_store_pblock(ex2, newblock);
if (split_flag & EXT4_EXT_MARK_UNINIT2)
ext4_ext_mark_uninitialized(ex2);
err = ext4_ext_insert_extent(handle, inode, path, &newex, flags);
if (err == -ENOSPC && (EXT4_EXT_MAY_ZEROOUT & split_flag)) {
err = ext4_ext_zeroout(inode, &orig_ex);
if (err)
goto fix_extent_len;
/* update the extent length and mark as initialized */
ex->ee_len = cpu_to_le32(ee_len);
ext4_ext_try_to_merge(inode, path, ex);
err = ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + depth);
goto out;
} else if (err)
goto fix_extent_len;
out:
ext4_ext_show_leaf(inode, path);
return err;
fix_extent_len:
ex->ee_len = orig_ex.ee_len;
ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + depth);
return err;
}
Commit Message: ext4: reimplement convert and split_unwritten
Reimplement ext4_ext_convert_to_initialized() and
ext4_split_unwritten_extents() using ext4_split_extent()
Signed-off-by: Yongqiang Yang <xiaoqiangnk@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Tested-by: Allison Henderson <achender@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 34,777
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType WritePixelCacheIndexes(CacheInfo *cache_info,
NexusInfo *restrict nexus_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
MagickOffsetType
count,
offset;
MagickSizeType
extent,
length;
register const IndexPacket
*restrict p;
register ssize_t
y;
size_t
rows;
if (cache_info->active_index_channel == MagickFalse)
return(MagickFalse);
if (nexus_info->authentic_pixel_cache != MagickFalse)
return(MagickTrue);
offset=(MagickOffsetType) nexus_info->region.y*cache_info->columns+
nexus_info->region.x;
length=(MagickSizeType) nexus_info->region.width*sizeof(IndexPacket);
rows=nexus_info->region.height;
extent=(MagickSizeType) length*rows;
p=nexus_info->indexes;
y=0;
switch (cache_info->type)
{
case MemoryCache:
case MapCache:
{
register IndexPacket
*restrict q;
/*
Write indexes to memory.
*/
if ((cache_info->columns == nexus_info->region.width) &&
(extent == (MagickSizeType) ((size_t) extent)))
{
length=extent;
rows=1UL;
}
q=cache_info->indexes+offset;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) rows; y++)
{
(void) memcpy(q,p,(size_t) length);
p+=nexus_info->region.width;
q+=cache_info->columns;
}
break;
}
case DiskCache:
{
/*
Write indexes to disk.
*/
LockSemaphoreInfo(cache_info->file_semaphore);
if (OpenPixelCacheOnDisk(cache_info,IOMode) == MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,FileOpenError,"UnableToOpenFile",
cache_info->cache_filename);
UnlockSemaphoreInfo(cache_info->file_semaphore);
return(MagickFalse);
}
if ((cache_info->columns == nexus_info->region.width) &&
(extent <= MagickMaxBufferExtent))
{
length=extent;
rows=1UL;
}
extent=(MagickSizeType) cache_info->columns*cache_info->rows;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) rows; y++)
{
count=WritePixelCacheRegion(cache_info,cache_info->offset+extent*
sizeof(PixelPacket)+offset*sizeof(*p),length,(const unsigned char *)
p);
if ((MagickSizeType) count < length)
break;
p+=nexus_info->region.width;
offset+=cache_info->columns;
}
if (IsFileDescriptorLimitExceeded() != MagickFalse)
(void) ClosePixelCacheOnDisk(cache_info);
UnlockSemaphoreInfo(cache_info->file_semaphore);
break;
}
case DistributedCache:
{
RectangleInfo
region;
/*
Write indexes to distributed cache.
*/
LockSemaphoreInfo(cache_info->file_semaphore);
region=nexus_info->region;
if ((cache_info->columns != nexus_info->region.width) ||
(extent > MagickMaxBufferExtent))
region.height=1UL;
else
{
length=extent;
rows=1UL;
}
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) rows; y++)
{
count=WriteDistributePixelCacheIndexes((DistributeCacheInfo *)
cache_info->server_info,®ion,length,(const unsigned char *) p);
if (count != (MagickOffsetType) length)
break;
p+=nexus_info->region.width;
region.y++;
}
UnlockSemaphoreInfo(cache_info->file_semaphore);
break;
}
default:
break;
}
if (y < (ssize_t) rows)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CacheError,"UnableToWritePixelCache",
cache_info->cache_filename);
return(MagickFalse);
}
if ((cache_info->debug != MagickFalse) &&
(CacheTick(nexus_info->region.y,cache_info->rows) != MagickFalse))
(void) LogMagickEvent(CacheEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"%s[%.20gx%.20g%+.20g%+.20g]",cache_info->filename,(double)
nexus_info->region.width,(double) nexus_info->region.height,(double)
nexus_info->region.x,(double) nexus_info->region.y);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 73,664
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BluetoothSocketAsyncApiFunction::~BluetoothSocketAsyncApiFunction() {}
Commit Message: chrome.bluetoothSocket: Fix regression in send()
In https://crrev.com/c/997098, params_ was changed to a local variable,
but it needs to last longer than that since net::WrappedIOBuffer may use
the data after the local variable goes out of scope.
This CL changed it back to be an instance variable.
Bug: 851799
Change-Id: I392f8acaef4c6473d6ea4fbee7209445aa09112e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1103676
Reviewed-by: Toni Barzic <tbarzic@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sonny Sasaka <sonnysasaka@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#568137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 154,097
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int em_call(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
long rel = ctxt->src.val;
ctxt->src.val = (unsigned long)ctxt->_eip;
jmp_rel(ctxt, rel);
return em_push(ctxt);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Emulator fixes for eip canonical checks on near branches
Before changing rip (during jmp, call, ret, etc.) the target should be asserted
to be canonical one, as real CPUs do. During sysret, both target rsp and rip
should be canonical. If any of these values is noncanonical, a #GP exception
should occur. The exception to this rule are syscall and sysenter instructions
in which the assigned rip is checked during the assignment to the relevant
MSRs.
This patch fixes the emulator to behave as real CPUs do for near branches.
Far branches are handled by the next patch.
This fixes CVE-2014-3647.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 1
| 169,909
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static long aio_read_events_ring(struct kioctx *ctx,
struct io_event __user *event, long nr)
{
struct aio_ring *ring;
unsigned head, tail, pos;
long ret = 0;
int copy_ret;
mutex_lock(&ctx->ring_lock);
ring = kmap_atomic(ctx->ring_pages[0]);
head = ring->head;
tail = ring->tail;
kunmap_atomic(ring);
pr_debug("h%u t%u m%u\n", head, tail, ctx->nr_events);
if (head == tail)
goto out;
while (ret < nr) {
long avail;
struct io_event *ev;
struct page *page;
avail = (head <= tail ? tail : ctx->nr_events) - head;
if (head == tail)
break;
avail = min(avail, nr - ret);
avail = min_t(long, avail, AIO_EVENTS_PER_PAGE -
((head + AIO_EVENTS_OFFSET) % AIO_EVENTS_PER_PAGE));
pos = head + AIO_EVENTS_OFFSET;
page = ctx->ring_pages[pos / AIO_EVENTS_PER_PAGE];
pos %= AIO_EVENTS_PER_PAGE;
ev = kmap(page);
copy_ret = copy_to_user(event + ret, ev + pos,
sizeof(*ev) * avail);
kunmap(page);
if (unlikely(copy_ret)) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
ret += avail;
head += avail;
head %= ctx->nr_events;
}
ring = kmap_atomic(ctx->ring_pages[0]);
ring->head = head;
kunmap_atomic(ring);
flush_dcache_page(ctx->ring_pages[0]);
pr_debug("%li h%u t%u\n", ret, head, tail);
put_reqs_available(ctx, ret);
out:
mutex_unlock(&ctx->ring_lock);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: aio: prevent double free in ioctx_alloc
ioctx_alloc() calls aio_setup_ring() to allocate a ring. If aio_setup_ring()
fails to do so it would call aio_free_ring() before returning, but
ioctx_alloc() would call aio_free_ring() again causing a double free of
the ring.
This is easily reproducible from userspace.
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Benjamin LaHaise <bcrl@kvack.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 40,092
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void netdev_lower_state_changed(struct net_device *lower_dev,
void *lower_state_info)
{
struct netdev_notifier_changelowerstate_info changelowerstate_info;
ASSERT_RTNL();
changelowerstate_info.lower_state_info = lower_state_info;
call_netdevice_notifiers_info(NETDEV_CHANGELOWERSTATE, lower_dev,
&changelowerstate_info.info);
}
Commit Message: tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 48,883
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline bool rb_reader_lock(struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer)
{
if (likely(!in_nmi())) {
raw_spin_lock(&cpu_buffer->reader_lock);
return true;
}
/*
* If an NMI die dumps out the content of the ring buffer
* trylock must be used to prevent a deadlock if the NMI
* preempted a task that holds the ring buffer locks. If
* we get the lock then all is fine, if not, then continue
* to do the read, but this can corrupt the ring buffer,
* so it must be permanently disabled from future writes.
* Reading from NMI is a oneshot deal.
*/
if (raw_spin_trylock(&cpu_buffer->reader_lock))
return true;
/* Continue without locking, but disable the ring buffer */
atomic_inc(&cpu_buffer->record_disabled);
return false;
}
Commit Message: ring-buffer: Prevent overflow of size in ring_buffer_resize()
If the size passed to ring_buffer_resize() is greater than MAX_LONG - BUF_PAGE_SIZE
then the DIV_ROUND_UP() will return zero.
Here's the details:
# echo 18014398509481980 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_size_kb
tracing_entries_write() processes this and converts kb to bytes.
18014398509481980 << 10 = 18446744073709547520
and this is passed to ring_buffer_resize() as unsigned long size.
size = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE);
Where DIV_ROUND_UP(a, b) is (a + b - 1)/b
BUF_PAGE_SIZE is 4080 and here
18446744073709547520 + 4080 - 1 = 18446744073709551599
where 18446744073709551599 is still smaller than 2^64
2^64 - 18446744073709551599 = 17
But now 18446744073709551599 / 4080 = 4521260802379792
and size = size * 4080 = 18446744073709551360
This is checked to make sure its still greater than 2 * 4080,
which it is.
Then we convert to the number of buffer pages needed.
nr_page = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE)
but this time size is 18446744073709551360 and
2^64 - (18446744073709551360 + 4080 - 1) = -3823
Thus it overflows and the resulting number is less than 4080, which makes
3823 / 4080 = 0
an nr_pages is set to this. As we already checked against the minimum that
nr_pages may be, this causes the logic to fail as well, and we crash the
kernel.
There's no reason to have the two DIV_ROUND_UP() (that's just result of
historical code changes), clean up the code and fix this bug.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.5+
Fixes: 83f40318dab00 ("ring-buffer: Make removal of ring buffer pages atomic")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 72,570
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleTexSubImage3D(
uint32_t immediate_data_size,
const volatile void* cmd_data) {
if (!feature_info_->IsWebGL2OrES3Context())
return error::kUnknownCommand;
const char* func_name = "glTexSubImage3D";
const volatile gles2::cmds::TexSubImage3D& c =
*static_cast<const volatile gles2::cmds::TexSubImage3D*>(cmd_data);
TRACE_EVENT2("gpu", "GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleTexSubImage3D",
"widthXheight", c.width * c.height, "depth", c.depth);
GLboolean internal = static_cast<GLboolean>(c.internal);
if (internal == GL_TRUE && texture_state_.tex_image_failed)
return error::kNoError;
GLenum target = static_cast<GLenum>(c.target);
GLint level = static_cast<GLint>(c.level);
GLint xoffset = static_cast<GLint>(c.xoffset);
GLint yoffset = static_cast<GLint>(c.yoffset);
GLint zoffset = static_cast<GLint>(c.zoffset);
GLsizei width = static_cast<GLsizei>(c.width);
GLsizei height = static_cast<GLsizei>(c.height);
GLsizei depth = static_cast<GLsizei>(c.depth);
GLenum format = static_cast<GLenum>(c.format);
GLenum type = static_cast<GLenum>(c.type);
uint32_t pixels_shm_id = static_cast<uint32_t>(c.pixels_shm_id);
uint32_t pixels_shm_offset = static_cast<uint32_t>(c.pixels_shm_offset);
if (width < 0 || height < 0 || depth < 0) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, func_name, "dimensions < 0");
return error::kNoError;
}
PixelStoreParams params;
Buffer* buffer = state_.bound_pixel_unpack_buffer.get();
if (buffer) {
if (pixels_shm_id)
return error::kInvalidArguments;
if (buffer->GetMappedRange()) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, func_name,
"pixel unpack buffer should not be mapped to client memory");
return error::kNoError;
}
params = state_.GetUnpackParams(ContextState::k3D);
} else {
if (!pixels_shm_id && pixels_shm_offset)
return error::kInvalidArguments;
params.alignment = state_.unpack_alignment;
}
uint32_t pixels_size;
uint32_t skip_size;
uint32_t padding;
if (!GLES2Util::ComputeImageDataSizesES3(width, height, depth,
format, type,
params,
&pixels_size,
nullptr,
nullptr,
&skip_size,
&padding)) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
DCHECK_EQ(0u, skip_size);
const void* pixels;
if (pixels_shm_id) {
pixels = GetSharedMemoryAs<const void*>(
pixels_shm_id, pixels_shm_offset, pixels_size);
if (!pixels)
return error::kOutOfBounds;
} else {
DCHECK(buffer || !pixels_shm_offset);
pixels = reinterpret_cast<const void*>(pixels_shm_offset);
}
TextureManager::DoTexSubImageArguments args = {
target, level, xoffset, yoffset, zoffset, width, height, depth,
format, type, pixels, pixels_size, padding,
TextureManager::DoTexSubImageArguments::kTexSubImage3D};
texture_manager()->ValidateAndDoTexSubImage(
this, &texture_state_, &state_, error_state_.get(), &framebuffer_state_,
func_name, args);
ExitCommandProcessingEarly();
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,597
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: tracing_free_buffer_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *ubuf,
size_t cnt, loff_t *ppos)
{
/*
* There is no need to read what the user has written, this function
* is just to make sure that there is no error when "echo" is used
*/
*ppos += cnt;
return cnt;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 81,470
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Ins_JROF( TT_ExecContext exc,
FT_Long* args )
{
if ( args[1] == 0 )
Ins_JMPR( exc, args );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 10,618
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: __wsum __skb_checksum(const struct sk_buff *skb, int offset, int len,
__wsum csum, const struct skb_checksum_ops *ops)
{
int start = skb_headlen(skb);
int i, copy = start - offset;
struct sk_buff *frag_iter;
int pos = 0;
/* Checksum header. */
if (copy > 0) {
if (copy > len)
copy = len;
csum = ops->update(skb->data + offset, copy, csum);
if ((len -= copy) == 0)
return csum;
offset += copy;
pos = copy;
}
for (i = 0; i < skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags; i++) {
int end;
skb_frag_t *frag = &skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[i];
WARN_ON(start > offset + len);
end = start + skb_frag_size(frag);
if ((copy = end - offset) > 0) {
__wsum csum2;
u8 *vaddr;
if (copy > len)
copy = len;
vaddr = kmap_atomic(skb_frag_page(frag));
csum2 = ops->update(vaddr + frag->page_offset +
offset - start, copy, 0);
kunmap_atomic(vaddr);
csum = ops->combine(csum, csum2, pos, copy);
if (!(len -= copy))
return csum;
offset += copy;
pos += copy;
}
start = end;
}
skb_walk_frags(skb, frag_iter) {
int end;
WARN_ON(start > offset + len);
end = start + frag_iter->len;
if ((copy = end - offset) > 0) {
__wsum csum2;
if (copy > len)
copy = len;
csum2 = __skb_checksum(frag_iter, offset - start,
copy, 0, ops);
csum = ops->combine(csum, csum2, pos, copy);
if ((len -= copy) == 0)
return csum;
offset += copy;
pos += copy;
}
start = end;
}
BUG_ON(len);
return csum;
}
Commit Message: skbuff: skb_segment: orphan frags before copying
skb_segment copies frags around, so we need
to copy them carefully to avoid accessing
user memory after reporting completion to userspace
through a callback.
skb_segment doesn't normally happen on datapath:
TSO needs to be disabled - so disabling zero copy
in this case does not look like a big deal.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 39,854
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int mov_auto_flush_fragment(AVFormatContext *s, int force)
{
MOVMuxContext *mov = s->priv_data;
int had_moov = mov->moov_written;
int ret = mov_flush_fragment(s, force);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (!had_moov && mov->flags & FF_MOV_FLAG_DELAY_MOOV)
ret = mov_flush_fragment(s, force);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: avformat/movenc: Write version 2 of audio atom if channels is not known
The version 1 needs the channel count and would divide by 0
Fixes: division by 0
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_1.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_2.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_3.wav
Found-by: #CHEN HONGXU# <HCHEN017@e.ntu.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 79,301
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HTMLElement::applyAlignmentAttributeToStyle(const Attribute& attribute, StylePropertySet* style)
{
int floatValue = CSSValueInvalid;
int verticalAlignValue = CSSValueInvalid;
const AtomicString& alignment = attribute.value();
if (equalIgnoringCase(alignment, "absmiddle"))
verticalAlignValue = CSSValueMiddle;
else if (equalIgnoringCase(alignment, "absbottom"))
verticalAlignValue = CSSValueBottom;
else if (equalIgnoringCase(alignment, "left")) {
floatValue = CSSValueLeft;
verticalAlignValue = CSSValueTop;
} else if (equalIgnoringCase(alignment, "right")) {
floatValue = CSSValueRight;
verticalAlignValue = CSSValueTop;
} else if (equalIgnoringCase(alignment, "top"))
verticalAlignValue = CSSValueTop;
else if (equalIgnoringCase(alignment, "middle"))
verticalAlignValue = CSSValueWebkitBaselineMiddle;
else if (equalIgnoringCase(alignment, "center"))
verticalAlignValue = CSSValueMiddle;
else if (equalIgnoringCase(alignment, "bottom"))
verticalAlignValue = CSSValueBaseline;
else if (equalIgnoringCase(alignment, "texttop"))
verticalAlignValue = CSSValueTextTop;
if (floatValue != CSSValueInvalid)
addPropertyToAttributeStyle(style, CSSPropertyFloat, floatValue);
if (verticalAlignValue != CSSValueInvalid)
addPropertyToAttributeStyle(style, CSSPropertyVerticalAlign, verticalAlignValue);
}
Commit Message: There are too many poorly named functions to create a fragment from markup
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87339
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Source/WebCore:
Moved all functions that create a fragment from markup to markup.h/cpp.
There should be no behavioral change.
* dom/Range.cpp:
(WebCore::Range::createContextualFragment):
* dom/Range.h: Removed createDocumentFragmentForElement.
* dom/ShadowRoot.cpp:
(WebCore::ShadowRoot::setInnerHTML):
* editing/markup.cpp:
(WebCore::createFragmentFromMarkup):
(WebCore::createFragmentForInnerOuterHTML): Renamed from createFragmentFromSource.
(WebCore::createFragmentForTransformToFragment): Moved from XSLTProcessor.
(WebCore::removeElementPreservingChildren): Moved from Range.
(WebCore::createContextualFragment): Ditto.
* editing/markup.h:
* html/HTMLElement.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setInnerHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setOuterHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML):
* inspector/DOMPatchSupport.cpp:
(WebCore::DOMPatchSupport::patchNode): Added a FIXME since this code should be using
one of the functions listed in markup.h
* xml/XSLTProcessor.cpp:
(WebCore::XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment):
Source/WebKit/qt:
Replace calls to Range::createDocumentFragmentForElement by calls to
createContextualDocumentFragment.
* Api/qwebelement.cpp:
(QWebElement::appendInside):
(QWebElement::prependInside):
(QWebElement::prependOutside):
(QWebElement::appendOutside):
(QWebElement::encloseContentsWith):
(QWebElement::encloseWith):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118414 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 100,354
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CardUnmaskPromptViews::FadeOutView::OnPaint(gfx::Canvas* canvas) {
if (!fade_everything_ || opacity_ > 0.99)
return views::View::OnPaint(canvas);
canvas->SaveLayerAlpha(0xff * opacity_);
views::View::OnPaint(canvas);
canvas->Restore();
}
Commit Message: Clear out some minor TODOs.
BUG=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1047063002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#322959}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 110,113
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: String LocalFrameClientImpl::UserAgent() {
WebString override =
web_frame_->Client() ? web_frame_->Client()->UserAgentOverride() : "";
if (!override.IsEmpty())
return override;
if (user_agent_.IsEmpty())
user_agent_ = Platform::Current()->UserAgent();
return user_agent_;
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 145,322
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void DeprecateAsOverloadedMethod2Method(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
ExceptionState exception_state(info.GetIsolate(), ExceptionState::kExecutionContext, "TestObject", "DeprecateAsOverloadedMethod");
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
int32_t arg;
arg = NativeValueTraits<IDLLong>::NativeValue(info.GetIsolate(), info[0], exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return;
impl->DeprecateAsOverloadedMethod(arg);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 134,647
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Ins_NROUND( INS_ARG )
{
DO_NROUND
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 10,143
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sysvipc_proc_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
int ret;
struct seq_file *seq;
struct ipc_proc_iter *iter;
ret = -ENOMEM;
iter = kmalloc(sizeof(*iter), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!iter)
goto out;
ret = seq_open(file, &sysvipc_proc_seqops);
if (ret)
goto out_kfree;
seq = file->private_data;
seq->private = iter;
iter->iface = PDE(inode)->data;
iter->ns = get_ipc_ns(current->nsproxy->ipc_ns);
out:
return ret;
out_kfree:
kfree(iter);
goto out;
}
Commit Message: ipc,sem: fine grained locking for semtimedop
Introduce finer grained locking for semtimedop, to handle the common case
of a program wanting to manipulate one semaphore from an array with
multiple semaphores.
If the call is a semop manipulating just one semaphore in an array with
multiple semaphores, only take the lock for that semaphore itself.
If the call needs to manipulate multiple semaphores, or another caller is
in a transaction that manipulates multiple semaphores, the sem_array lock
is taken, as well as all the locks for the individual semaphores.
On a 24 CPU system, performance numbers with the semop-multi
test with N threads and N semaphores, look like this:
vanilla Davidlohr's Davidlohr's + Davidlohr's +
threads patches rwlock patches v3 patches
10 610652 726325 1783589 2142206
20 341570 365699 1520453 1977878
30 288102 307037 1498167 2037995
40 290714 305955 1612665 2256484
50 288620 312890 1733453 2650292
60 289987 306043 1649360 2388008
70 291298 306347 1723167 2717486
80 290948 305662 1729545 2763582
90 290996 306680 1736021 2757524
100 292243 306700 1773700 3059159
[davidlohr.bueso@hp.com: do not call sem_lock when bogus sma]
[davidlohr.bueso@hp.com: make refcounter atomic]
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr.bueso@hp.com>
Cc: Chegu Vinod <chegu_vinod@hp.com>
Cc: Jason Low <jason.low2@hp.com>
Reviewed-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Cc: Stanislav Kinsbursky <skinsbursky@parallels.com>
Tested-by: Emmanuel Benisty <benisty.e@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 29,585
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xsltInitCtxtKeys(xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt, xsltDocumentPtr idoc) {
xsltStylesheetPtr style;
xsltKeyDefPtr keyDef;
if ((ctxt == NULL) || (idoc == NULL))
return;
#ifdef KEY_INIT_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "xsltInitCtxtKeys on document\n");
#endif
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_KEYS
if ((idoc->doc != NULL) && (idoc->doc->URL != NULL))
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_KEYS,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext, "Initializing keys on %s\n",
idoc->doc->URL));
#endif
style = ctxt->style;
while (style != NULL) {
keyDef = (xsltKeyDefPtr) style->keys;
while (keyDef != NULL) {
xsltInitCtxtKey(ctxt, idoc, keyDef);
keyDef = keyDef->next;
}
style = xsltNextImport(style);
}
#ifdef KEY_INIT_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "xsltInitCtxtKeys on document: done\n");
#endif
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 156,745
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int async_chainiv_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
{
struct async_chainiv_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
spin_lock_init(&ctx->lock);
crypto_init_queue(&ctx->queue, 100);
INIT_WORK(&ctx->postponed, async_chainiv_do_postponed);
return chainiv_init_common(tfm);
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 45,605
|
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