instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
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| output
int64 0
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int64 0
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|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int32_t PepperFlashRendererHost::OnDrawGlyphs(
ppapi::host::HostMessageContext* host_context,
ppapi::proxy::PPBFlash_DrawGlyphs_Params params) {
if (params.glyph_indices.size() != params.glyph_advances.size() ||
params.glyph_indices.empty())
return PP_ERROR_FAILED;
int style = SkTypeface::kNormal;
if (static_cast<PP_BrowserFont_Trusted_Weight>(params.font_desc.weight) >=
PP_BROWSERFONT_TRUSTED_WEIGHT_BOLD)
style |= SkTypeface::kBold;
if (params.font_desc.italic)
style |= SkTypeface::kItalic;
skia::RefPtr<SkTypeface> typeface = skia::AdoptRef(
SkTypeface::CreateFromName(params.font_desc.face.c_str(),
static_cast<SkTypeface::Style>(style)));
if (!typeface)
return PP_ERROR_FAILED;
EnterResourceNoLock<PPB_ImageData_API> enter(
params.image_data.host_resource(), true);
if (enter.failed())
return PP_ERROR_FAILED;
PPB_ImageData_API* image = static_cast<PPB_ImageData_API*>(
enter.object());
SkCanvas* canvas = image->GetPlatformCanvas();
bool needs_unmapping = false;
if (!canvas) {
needs_unmapping = true;
image->Map();
canvas = image->GetPlatformCanvas();
if (!canvas)
return PP_ERROR_FAILED; // Failure mapping.
}
SkAutoCanvasRestore acr(canvas, true);
SkRect clip_rect = {
SkIntToScalar(params.clip.point.x),
SkIntToScalar(params.clip.point.y),
SkIntToScalar(params.clip.point.x + params.clip.size.width),
SkIntToScalar(params.clip.point.y + params.clip.size.height)
};
canvas->clipRect(clip_rect);
SkMatrix matrix;
matrix.set(SkMatrix::kMScaleX, SkFloatToScalar(params.transformation[0][0]));
matrix.set(SkMatrix::kMSkewX, SkFloatToScalar(params.transformation[0][1]));
matrix.set(SkMatrix::kMTransX, SkFloatToScalar(params.transformation[0][2]));
matrix.set(SkMatrix::kMSkewY, SkFloatToScalar(params.transformation[1][0]));
matrix.set(SkMatrix::kMScaleY, SkFloatToScalar(params.transformation[1][1]));
matrix.set(SkMatrix::kMTransY, SkFloatToScalar(params.transformation[1][2]));
matrix.set(SkMatrix::kMPersp0, SkFloatToScalar(params.transformation[2][0]));
matrix.set(SkMatrix::kMPersp1, SkFloatToScalar(params.transformation[2][1]));
matrix.set(SkMatrix::kMPersp2, SkFloatToScalar(params.transformation[2][2]));
canvas->concat(matrix);
SkPaint paint;
paint.setColor(params.color);
paint.setTextEncoding(SkPaint::kGlyphID_TextEncoding);
paint.setAntiAlias(true);
paint.setHinting(SkPaint::kFull_Hinting);
paint.setTextSize(SkIntToScalar(params.font_desc.size));
paint.setTypeface(typeface.get()); // Takes a ref and manages lifetime.
if (params.allow_subpixel_aa) {
paint.setSubpixelText(true);
paint.setLCDRenderText(true);
}
SkScalar x = SkIntToScalar(params.position.x);
SkScalar y = SkIntToScalar(params.position.y);
size_t glyph_count = params.glyph_indices.size();
if (glyph_count) {
std::vector<SkPoint> storage;
storage.resize(glyph_count);
SkPoint* sk_positions = &storage[0];
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < glyph_count; i++) {
sk_positions[i].set(x, y);
x += SkFloatToScalar(params.glyph_advances[i].x);
y += SkFloatToScalar(params.glyph_advances[i].y);
}
canvas->drawPosText(¶ms.glyph_indices[0], glyph_count * 2, sk_positions,
paint);
}
if (needs_unmapping)
image->Unmap();
return PP_OK;
}
Commit Message: PPB_Flash.Navigate(): Disallow certain HTTP request headers.
With this CL, PPB_Flash.Navigate() fails the operation with
PP_ERROR_NOACCESS if the request headers contain non-simple headers.
BUG=332023
TEST=None
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/136393004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@249114 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 123,699
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool userfaultfd_remove(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
struct userfaultfd_ctx *ctx;
struct userfaultfd_wait_queue ewq;
ctx = vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx.ctx;
if (!ctx || !(ctx->features & UFFD_FEATURE_EVENT_REMOVE))
return true;
userfaultfd_ctx_get(ctx);
WRITE_ONCE(ctx->mmap_changing, true);
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
msg_init(&ewq.msg);
ewq.msg.event = UFFD_EVENT_REMOVE;
ewq.msg.arg.remove.start = start;
ewq.msg.arg.remove.end = end;
userfaultfd_event_wait_completion(ctx, &ewq);
return false;
}
Commit Message: userfaultfd: shmem/hugetlbfs: only allow to register VM_MAYWRITE vmas
After the VMA to register the uffd onto is found, check that it has
VM_MAYWRITE set before allowing registration. This way we inherit all
common code checks before allowing to fill file holes in shmem and
hugetlbfs with UFFDIO_COPY.
The userfaultfd memory model is not applicable for readonly files unless
it's a MAP_PRIVATE.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181126173452.26955-4-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: ff62a3421044 ("hugetlb: implement memfd sealing")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Fixes: 4c27fe4c4c84 ("userfaultfd: shmem: add shmem_mcopy_atomic_pte for userfaultfd support")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 76,463
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderProcessHostImpl::SetWebRtcLogMessageCallback(
base::Callback<void(const std::string&)> callback) {
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_WEBRTC)
BrowserMainLoop::GetInstance()->media_stream_manager()->
RegisterNativeLogCallback(GetID(), callback);
#endif
}
Commit Message: Switching AudioOutputAuthorizationHandler from using AudioManager interface to AudioSystem one.
BUG=672468
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2692203003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450939}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 128,320
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int set_fpexc_mode(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned int val)
{
struct pt_regs *regs = tsk->thread.regs;
/* This is a bit hairy. If we are an SPE enabled processor
* (have embedded fp) we store the IEEE exception enable flags in
* fpexc_mode. fpexc_mode is also used for setting FP exception
* mode (asyn, precise, disabled) for 'Classic' FP. */
if (val & PR_FP_EXC_SW_ENABLE) {
#ifdef CONFIG_SPE
if (cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_SPE)) {
/*
* When the sticky exception bits are set
* directly by userspace, it must call prctl
* with PR_GET_FPEXC (with PR_FP_EXC_SW_ENABLE
* in the existing prctl settings) or
* PR_SET_FPEXC (with PR_FP_EXC_SW_ENABLE in
* the bits being set). <fenv.h> functions
* saving and restoring the whole
* floating-point environment need to do so
* anyway to restore the prctl settings from
* the saved environment.
*/
tsk->thread.spefscr_last = mfspr(SPRN_SPEFSCR);
tsk->thread.fpexc_mode = val &
(PR_FP_EXC_SW_ENABLE | PR_FP_ALL_EXCEPT);
return 0;
} else {
return -EINVAL;
}
#else
return -EINVAL;
#endif
}
/* on a CONFIG_SPE this does not hurt us. The bits that
* __pack_fe01 use do not overlap with bits used for
* PR_FP_EXC_SW_ENABLE. Additionally, the MSR[FE0,FE1] bits
* on CONFIG_SPE implementations are reserved so writing to
* them does not change anything */
if (val > PR_FP_EXC_PRECISE)
return -EINVAL;
tsk->thread.fpexc_mode = __pack_fe01(val);
if (regs != NULL && (regs->msr & MSR_FP) != 0)
regs->msr = (regs->msr & ~(MSR_FE0|MSR_FE1))
| tsk->thread.fpexc_mode;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: powerpc/tm: Fix crash when forking inside a transaction
When we fork/clone we currently don't copy any of the TM state to the new
thread. This results in a TM bad thing (program check) when the new process is
switched in as the kernel does a tmrechkpt with TEXASR FS not set. Also, since
R1 is from userspace, we trigger the bad kernel stack pointer detection. So we
end up with something like this:
Bad kernel stack pointer 0 at c0000000000404fc
cpu 0x2: Vector: 700 (Program Check) at [c00000003ffefd40]
pc: c0000000000404fc: restore_gprs+0xc0/0x148
lr: 0000000000000000
sp: 0
msr: 9000000100201030
current = 0xc000001dd1417c30
paca = 0xc00000000fe00800 softe: 0 irq_happened: 0x01
pid = 0, comm = swapper/2
WARNING: exception is not recoverable, can't continue
The below fixes this by flushing the TM state before we copy the task_struct to
the clone. To do this we go through the tmreclaim patch, which removes the
checkpointed registers from the CPU and transitions the CPU out of TM suspend
mode. Hence we need to call tmrechkpt after to restore the checkpointed state
and the TM mode for the current task.
To make this fail from userspace is simply:
tbegin
li r0, 2
sc
<boom>
Kudos to Adhemerval Zanella Neto for finding this.
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
cc: Adhemerval Zanella Neto <azanella@br.ibm.com>
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 38,647
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static pfunc stream_token(struct jv_parser* p, char ch) {
jv_kind k;
jv last;
switch (ch) {
case '[':
if (jv_is_valid(p->next))
return "Expected a separator between values";
p->path = jv_array_append(p->path, jv_number(0)); // push
p->last_seen = JV_LAST_OPEN_ARRAY;
p->stacklen++;
break;
case '{':
if (p->last_seen == JV_LAST_VALUE)
return "Expected a separator between values";
p->path = jv_array_append(p->path, jv_null()); // push
p->last_seen = JV_LAST_OPEN_OBJECT;
p->stacklen++;
break;
case ':':
if (p->stacklen == 0 || jv_get_kind(jv_array_get(jv_copy(p->path), p->stacklen - 1)) == JV_KIND_NUMBER)
return "':' not as part of an object";
if (!jv_is_valid(p->next) || p->last_seen == JV_LAST_NONE)
return "Expected string key before ':'";
if (jv_get_kind(p->next) != JV_KIND_STRING)
return "Object keys must be strings";
if (p->last_seen != JV_LAST_VALUE)
return "':' should follow a key";
p->last_seen = JV_LAST_COLON;
p->path = jv_array_set(p->path, p->stacklen - 1, p->next);
p->next = jv_invalid();
break;
case ',':
if (p->last_seen != JV_LAST_VALUE)
return "Expected value before ','";
if (p->stacklen == 0)
return "',' not as part of an object or array";
last = jv_array_get(jv_copy(p->path), p->stacklen - 1);
k = jv_get_kind(last);
if (k == JV_KIND_NUMBER) {
int idx = jv_number_value(last);
if (jv_is_valid(p->next)) {
p->output = JV_ARRAY(jv_copy(p->path), p->next);
p->next = jv_invalid();
}
p->path = jv_array_set(p->path, p->stacklen - 1, jv_number(idx + 1));
p->last_seen = JV_LAST_COMMA;
} else if (k == JV_KIND_STRING) {
if (jv_is_valid(p->next)) {
p->output = JV_ARRAY(jv_copy(p->path), p->next);
p->next = jv_invalid();
}
p->path = jv_array_set(p->path, p->stacklen - 1, jv_true()); // ready for another name:value pair
p->last_seen = JV_LAST_COMMA;
} else {
assert(k == JV_KIND_NULL);
jv_free(last);
return "Objects must consist of key:value pairs";
}
jv_free(last);
break;
case ']':
if (p->stacklen == 0)
return "Unmatched ']' at the top-level";
if (p->last_seen == JV_LAST_COMMA)
return "Expected another array element";
if (p->last_seen == JV_LAST_OPEN_ARRAY)
assert(!jv_is_valid(p->next));
last = jv_array_get(jv_copy(p->path), p->stacklen - 1);
k = jv_get_kind(last);
jv_free(last);
if (k != JV_KIND_NUMBER)
return "Unmatched ']' in the middle of an object";
if (jv_is_valid(p->next)) {
p->output = JV_ARRAY(jv_copy(p->path), p->next, jv_true());
p->next = jv_invalid();
} else if (p->last_seen != JV_LAST_OPEN_ARRAY) {
p->output = JV_ARRAY(jv_copy(p->path));
}
p->path = jv_array_slice(p->path, 0, --(p->stacklen)); // pop
jv_free(p->next);
p->next = jv_invalid();
if (p->last_seen == JV_LAST_OPEN_ARRAY)
p->output = JV_ARRAY(jv_copy(p->path), jv_array()); // Empty arrays are leaves
if (p->stacklen == 0)
p->last_seen = JV_LAST_NONE;
else
p->last_seen = JV_LAST_VALUE;
break;
case '}':
if (p->stacklen == 0)
return "Unmatched '}' at the top-level";
if (p->last_seen == JV_LAST_COMMA)
return "Expected another key:value pair";
if (p->last_seen == JV_LAST_OPEN_OBJECT)
assert(!jv_is_valid(p->next));
last = jv_array_get(jv_copy(p->path), p->stacklen - 1);
k = jv_get_kind(last);
jv_free(last);
if (k == JV_KIND_NUMBER)
return "Unmatched '}' in the middle of an array";
Commit Message: Heap buffer overflow in tokenadd() (fix #105)
This was an off-by one: the NUL terminator byte was not allocated on
resize. This was triggered by JSON-encoded numbers longer than 256
bytes.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 56,402
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WORD32 ih264d_mark_err_slice_skip(dec_struct_t * ps_dec,
WORD32 num_mb_skip,
UWORD8 u1_is_idr_slice,
UWORD16 u2_frame_num,
pocstruct_t *ps_cur_poc,
WORD32 prev_slice_err)
{
WORD32 i2_cur_mb_addr;
UWORD32 u1_num_mbs, u1_num_mbsNby2;
UWORD32 u1_mb_idx = ps_dec->u1_mb_idx;
UWORD32 i2_mb_skip_run;
UWORD32 u1_num_mbs_next, u1_end_of_row;
const UWORD32 i2_pic_wdin_mbs = ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs;
UWORD32 u1_slice_end;
UWORD32 u1_tfr_n_mb;
UWORD32 u1_decode_nmb;
dec_bit_stream_t * const ps_bitstrm = ps_dec->ps_bitstrm;
dec_slice_params_t * ps_slice = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice;
UWORD32 *pu4_bitstrm_buf = ps_bitstrm->pu4_buffer;
UWORD32 *pu4_bitstrm_ofst = &ps_bitstrm->u4_ofst;
deblk_mb_t *ps_cur_deblk_mb;
dec_mb_info_t *ps_cur_mb_info;
parse_pmbarams_t *ps_parse_mb_data;
UWORD32 u1_inter_mb_type;
UWORD32 u1_deblk_mb_type;
UWORD16 u2_total_mbs_coded;
UWORD32 u1_mbaff = ps_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag;
parse_part_params_t *ps_part_info;
WORD32 ret;
UNUSED(u1_is_idr_slice);
if(ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status->u1_err_flag & REJECT_CUR_PIC)
{
ih264d_err_pic_dispbuf_mgr(ps_dec);
return 0;
}
if(ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag && (num_mb_skip & 1))
{
num_mb_skip++;
}
ps_dec->ps_dpb_cmds->u1_long_term_reference_flag = 0;
if(prev_slice_err == 1)
{
/* first slice - missing/header corruption */
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num = u2_frame_num;
{
WORD32 i, j, poc = 0;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_first_mb_in_slice = 0;
ps_dec->pf_mvpred = ih264d_mvpred_nonmbaff;
ps_dec->p_form_mb_part_info = ih264d_form_mb_part_info_bp;
ps_dec->p_motion_compensate = ih264d_motion_compensate_bp;
if(ps_dec->ps_cur_pic != NULL)
poc = ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_poc + 2;
j = -1;
for(i = 0; i < MAX_NUM_PIC_PARAMS; i++)
{
if(ps_dec->ps_pps[i].u1_is_valid == TRUE)
{
if(ps_dec->ps_pps[i].ps_sps->u1_is_valid == TRUE)
{
j = i;
break;
}
}
}
if(j == -1)
{
return ERROR_INV_SLICE_HDR_T;
}
/* call ih264d_start_of_pic only if it was not called earlier*/
if(ps_dec->u4_pic_buf_got == 0)
{
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_slice_type = P_SLICE;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_ref_idc = 1;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_unit_type = 1;
ret = ih264d_start_of_pic(ps_dec, poc, ps_cur_poc,
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num,
&ps_dec->ps_pps[j]);
if(ret != OK)
{
return ret;
}
}
ps_dec->ps_ref_pic_buf_lx[0][0]->u1_pic_buf_id = 0;
ps_dec->u4_output_present = 0;
{
ih264d_get_next_display_field(ps_dec,
ps_dec->ps_out_buffer,
&(ps_dec->s_disp_op));
/* If error code is non-zero then there is no buffer available for display,
hence avoid format conversion */
if(0 != ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_error_code)
{
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row = ps_dec->s_disp_frame_info.u4_y_ht;
}
else
ps_dec->u4_output_present = 1;
}
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse == 1)
{
if(ps_dec->u4_dec_thread_created == 0)
{
ithread_create(ps_dec->pv_dec_thread_handle, NULL,
(void *)ih264d_decode_picture_thread,
(void *)ps_dec);
ps_dec->u4_dec_thread_created = 1;
}
if((ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3) &&
((ps_dec->u4_app_disable_deblk_frm == 0) || ps_dec->i1_recon_in_thread3_flag)
&& (ps_dec->u4_bs_deblk_thread_created == 0))
{
ps_dec->u4_start_recon_deblk = 0;
ithread_create(ps_dec->pv_bs_deblk_thread_handle, NULL,
(void *)ih264d_recon_deblk_thread,
(void *)ps_dec);
ps_dec->u4_bs_deblk_thread_created = 1;
}
}
}
ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic = 0;
}
else
{
dec_slice_struct_t *ps_parse_cur_slice;
ps_parse_cur_slice = ps_dec->ps_dec_slice_buf + ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num;
if(ps_dec->u1_slice_header_done
&& ps_parse_cur_slice == ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice)
{
if((u1_mbaff) && (ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb & 1))
{
ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb = ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb - 1;
ps_dec->u2_cur_mb_addr--;
}
u1_num_mbs = ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb;
if(u1_num_mbs)
{
ps_cur_mb_info = ps_dec->ps_nmb_info + u1_num_mbs - 1;
}
else
{
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ps_cur_mb_info = ps_dec->ps_nmb_info;
}
else
{
ps_cur_mb_info = ps_dec->ps_nmb_info
+ ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_prev_nmb - 1;
}
}
ps_dec->u2_mby = ps_cur_mb_info->u2_mby;
ps_dec->u2_mbx = ps_cur_mb_info->u2_mbx;
ps_dec->u1_mb_ngbr_availablity =
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_mb_ngbr_availablity;
if(u1_num_mbs)
{
ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data = ps_dec->pv_prev_mb_parse_tu_coeff_data;
ps_dec->u2_cur_mb_addr--;
ps_dec->i4_submb_ofst -= SUB_BLK_SIZE;
if (ps_dec->u1_pr_sl_type == P_SLICE
|| ps_dec->u1_pr_sl_type == B_SLICE)
{
ps_dec->pf_mvpred_ref_tfr_nby2mb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs);
ps_dec->ps_part = ps_dec->ps_parse_part_params;
}
u1_num_mbs_next = i2_pic_wdin_mbs - ps_dec->u2_mbx - 1;
u1_end_of_row = (!u1_num_mbs_next)
&& (!(u1_mbaff && (u1_num_mbs & 0x01)));
u1_slice_end = 1;
u1_tfr_n_mb = 1;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_end_of_slice = u1_slice_end;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ih264d_parse_tfr_nmb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs,
u1_num_mbs_next, u1_tfr_n_mb, u1_end_of_row);
ps_dec->ps_nmb_info += u1_num_mbs;
}
else
{
ih264d_decode_recon_tfr_nmb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs,
u1_num_mbs_next, u1_tfr_n_mb, u1_end_of_row);
}
ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded += u1_num_mbs;
ps_dec->u1_mb_idx = 0;
ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb = 0;
}
if(ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded
>= ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs)
{
ps_dec->u1_pic_decode_done = 1;
return 0;
}
/* Inserting new slice only if the current slice has atleast 1 MB*/
if(ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->u4_first_mb_in_slice <
(UWORD32)(ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded >> ps_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag))
{
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mbx = ps_dec->u2_mbx;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mby = ps_dec->u2_mby;
ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num++;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice++;
}
}
else
{
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice = ps_dec->ps_dec_slice_buf
+ ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num;
}
}
/******************************************************/
/* Initializations to new slice */
/******************************************************/
{
WORD32 num_entries;
WORD32 size;
UWORD8 *pu1_buf;
num_entries = MIN(MAX_FRAMES, ps_dec->u4_num_ref_frames_at_init);
num_entries = 2 * ((2 * num_entries) + 1);
size = num_entries * sizeof(void *);
size += PAD_MAP_IDX_POC * sizeof(void *);
pu1_buf = (UWORD8 *)ps_dec->pv_map_ref_idx_to_poc_buf;
pu1_buf += size * ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->ppv_map_ref_idx_to_poc = (volatile void **)pu1_buf;
}
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_first_mb_in_slice = ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded >> u1_mbaff;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->i1_slice_alpha_c0_offset = 0;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->i1_slice_beta_offset = 0;
if(ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag)
ps_dec->u2_prv_frame_num = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->u4_first_mb_in_slice = ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded >> u1_mbaff;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->u2_log2Y_crwd = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_log2Y_crwd;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->pv_tu_coeff_data_start = ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data;
}
else
{
ps_dec->pv_proc_tu_coeff_data = ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data;
}
/******************************************************/
/* Initializations specific to P slice */
/******************************************************/
u1_inter_mb_type = P_MB;
u1_deblk_mb_type = D_INTER_MB;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_slice_type = P_SLICE;
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->slice_type = P_SLICE;
ps_dec->pf_mvpred_ref_tfr_nby2mb = ih264d_mv_pred_ref_tfr_nby2_pmb;
ps_dec->ps_part = ps_dec->ps_parse_part_params;
ps_dec->u2_mbx =
(MOD(ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_first_mb_in_slice - 1, ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs));
ps_dec->u2_mby =
(DIV(ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_first_mb_in_slice - 1, ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs));
ps_dec->u2_mby <<= u1_mbaff;
/******************************************************/
/* Parsing / decoding the slice */
/******************************************************/
ps_dec->u1_slice_header_done = 2;
ps_dec->u1_qp = ps_slice->u1_slice_qp;
ih264d_update_qp(ps_dec, 0);
u1_mb_idx = ps_dec->u1_mb_idx;
ps_parse_mb_data = ps_dec->ps_parse_mb_data;
u1_num_mbs = u1_mb_idx;
u1_slice_end = 0;
u1_tfr_n_mb = 0;
u1_decode_nmb = 0;
u1_num_mbsNby2 = 0;
i2_cur_mb_addr = ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded;
i2_mb_skip_run = num_mb_skip;
while(!u1_slice_end)
{
UWORD8 u1_mb_type;
if(i2_cur_mb_addr > ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u2_max_mb_addr)
break;
ps_cur_mb_info = ps_dec->ps_nmb_info + u1_num_mbs;
ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb = u1_num_mbs;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_Mux = 0;
ps_dec->u4_num_pmbair = (u1_num_mbs >> u1_mbaff);
ps_cur_deblk_mb = ps_dec->ps_deblk_mbn + u1_num_mbs;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_end_of_slice = 0;
/* Storing Default partition info */
ps_parse_mb_data->u1_num_part = 1;
ps_parse_mb_data->u1_isI_mb = 0;
/**************************************************************/
/* Get the required information for decoding of MB */
/**************************************************************/
/* mb_x, mb_y, neighbor availablity, */
if (u1_mbaff)
ih264d_get_mb_info_cavlc_mbaff(ps_dec, i2_cur_mb_addr, ps_cur_mb_info, i2_mb_skip_run);
else
ih264d_get_mb_info_cavlc_nonmbaff(ps_dec, i2_cur_mb_addr, ps_cur_mb_info, i2_mb_skip_run);
/* Set the deblocking parameters for this MB */
if(ps_dec->u4_app_disable_deblk_frm == 0)
{
ih264d_set_deblocking_parameters(ps_cur_deblk_mb, ps_slice,
ps_dec->u1_mb_ngbr_availablity,
ps_dec->u1_cur_mb_fld_dec_flag);
}
/* Set appropriate flags in ps_cur_mb_info and ps_dec */
ps_dec->i1_prev_mb_qp_delta = 0;
ps_dec->u1_sub_mb_num = 0;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_mb_type = MB_SKIP;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_mb_mc_mode = PRED_16x16;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_cbp = 0;
/* Storing Skip partition info */
ps_part_info = ps_dec->ps_part;
ps_part_info->u1_is_direct = PART_DIRECT_16x16;
ps_part_info->u1_sub_mb_num = 0;
ps_dec->ps_part++;
/* Update Nnzs */
ih264d_update_nnz_for_skipmb(ps_dec, ps_cur_mb_info, CAVLC);
ps_cur_mb_info->ps_curmb->u1_mb_type = u1_inter_mb_type;
ps_cur_deblk_mb->u1_mb_type |= u1_deblk_mb_type;
i2_mb_skip_run--;
ps_cur_deblk_mb->u1_mb_qp = ps_dec->u1_qp;
if (u1_mbaff)
{
ih264d_update_mbaff_left_nnz(ps_dec, ps_cur_mb_info);
}
/**************************************************************/
/* Get next Macroblock address */
/**************************************************************/
i2_cur_mb_addr++;
u1_num_mbs++;
u1_num_mbsNby2++;
ps_parse_mb_data++;
/****************************************************************/
/* Check for End Of Row and other flags that determine when to */
/* do DMA setup for N/2-Mb, Decode for N-Mb, and Transfer for */
/* N-Mb */
/****************************************************************/
u1_num_mbs_next = i2_pic_wdin_mbs - ps_dec->u2_mbx - 1;
u1_end_of_row = (!u1_num_mbs_next) && (!(u1_mbaff && (u1_num_mbs & 0x01)));
u1_slice_end = !i2_mb_skip_run;
u1_tfr_n_mb = (u1_num_mbs == ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp) || u1_end_of_row
|| u1_slice_end;
u1_decode_nmb = u1_tfr_n_mb || u1_slice_end;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_end_of_slice = u1_slice_end;
if(u1_decode_nmb)
{
ps_dec->pf_mvpred_ref_tfr_nby2mb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs);
u1_num_mbsNby2 = 0;
ps_parse_mb_data = ps_dec->ps_parse_mb_data;
ps_dec->ps_part = ps_dec->ps_parse_part_params;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ih264d_parse_tfr_nmb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs,
u1_num_mbs_next, u1_tfr_n_mb, u1_end_of_row);
ps_dec->ps_nmb_info += u1_num_mbs;
}
else
{
ih264d_decode_recon_tfr_nmb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs, u1_num_mbs_next,
u1_tfr_n_mb, u1_end_of_row);
}
ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded += u1_num_mbs;
if(u1_tfr_n_mb)
u1_num_mbs = 0;
u1_mb_idx = u1_num_mbs;
ps_dec->u1_mb_idx = u1_num_mbs;
}
}
ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb = 0;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u4_mbs_in_slice = i2_cur_mb_addr
- ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice->u4_first_mb_in_slice;
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT("Mbs in slice: %d\n", ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u4_mbs_in_slice);
/* incremented here only if first slice is inserted */
if(ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic != 0)
{
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice++;
ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num++;
}
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mbx = ps_dec->u2_mbx;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mby = ps_dec->u2_mby;
if(ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded
>= ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs)
{
ps_dec->u1_pic_decode_done = 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Decoder: Fixed initialization of first_slice_in_pic
To handle some errors, first_slice_in_pic was being set to 2.
This is now cleaned up and first_slice_in_pic is set to 1 only once per pic.
This will ensure picture level initializations are done only once even in case
of error clips
Bug: 33717589
Bug: 33551775
Bug: 33716442
Bug: 33677995
Change-Id: If341436b3cbaa724017eedddd88c2e6fac36d8ba
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 1
| 174,039
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: CStarter::createJobOwnerSecSession( int /*cmd*/, Stream* s )
{
MyString fqu;
getJobOwnerFQUOrDummy(fqu);
ASSERT( !fqu.IsEmpty() );
MyString error_msg;
ClassAd input;
s->decode();
if( !input.initFromStream(*s) || !s->end_of_message() ) {
dprintf(D_ALWAYS,"Failed to read request in createJobOwnerSecSession()\n");
return FALSE;
}
MyString job_claim_id;
MyString input_claim_id;
getJobClaimId(job_claim_id);
input.LookupString(ATTR_CLAIM_ID,input_claim_id);
if( job_claim_id != input_claim_id || job_claim_id.IsEmpty() ) {
dprintf(D_ALWAYS,
"Claim ID provided to createJobOwnerSecSession does not match "
"expected value! Rejecting connection from %s\n",
s->peer_description());
return FALSE;
}
char *session_id = Condor_Crypt_Base::randomHexKey();
char *session_key = Condor_Crypt_Base::randomHexKey();
MyString session_info;
input.LookupString(ATTR_SESSION_INFO,session_info);
IpVerify* ipv = daemonCore->getSecMan()->getIpVerify();
bool rc = ipv->PunchHole(READ, fqu);
if( !rc ) {
error_msg = "Starter failed to create authorization entry for job owner.";
}
if( rc ) {
rc = daemonCore->getSecMan()->CreateNonNegotiatedSecuritySession(
READ,
session_id,
session_key,
session_info.Value(),
fqu.Value(),
NULL,
0 );
}
if( rc ) {
session_info = "";
rc = daemonCore->getSecMan()->ExportSecSessionInfo(
session_id,
session_info );
}
ClassAd response;
response.Assign(ATTR_VERSION,CondorVersion());
if( !rc ) {
if( error_msg.IsEmpty() ) {
error_msg = "Failed to create security session.";
}
response.Assign(ATTR_RESULT,false);
response.Assign(ATTR_ERROR_STRING,error_msg);
dprintf(D_ALWAYS,
"createJobOwnerSecSession failed: %s\n", error_msg.Value());
}
else {
ClaimIdParser claimid(session_id,session_info.Value(),session_key);
response.Assign(ATTR_RESULT,true);
response.Assign(ATTR_CLAIM_ID,claimid.claimId());
response.Assign(ATTR_STARTER_IP_ADDR,daemonCore->publicNetworkIpAddr());
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG,"Created security session for job owner (%s).\n",
fqu.Value());
}
if( !response.put(*s) || !s->end_of_message() ) {
dprintf(D_ALWAYS,
"createJobOwnerSecSession failed to send response\n");
}
free( session_id );
free( session_key );
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134
| 0
| 16,418
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FakeDownloadItem* DownloadPathReservationTrackerTest::CreateDownloadItem(
int32 id) {
FakeDownloadItem* item = new ::testing::StrictMock<FakeDownloadItem>;
DownloadId download_id(reinterpret_cast<void*>(this), id);
EXPECT_CALL(*item, GetGlobalId())
.WillRepeatedly(Return(download_id));
EXPECT_CALL(*item, GetTargetFilePath())
.WillRepeatedly(ReturnRefOfCopy(base::FilePath()));
return item;
}
Commit Message: Fix OS_MACOS typos. Should be OS_MACOSX.
BUG=163208
TEST=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12829005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@189130 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 118,743
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int writeBufferToContigStrips(TIFF* out, uint8* buf, uint32 imagelength)
{
uint32 row, nrows, rowsperstrip;
tstrip_t strip = 0;
tsize_t stripsize;
TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(out, TIFFTAG_ROWSPERSTRIP, &rowsperstrip);
for (row = 0; row < imagelength; row += rowsperstrip)
{
nrows = (row + rowsperstrip > imagelength) ?
imagelength - row : rowsperstrip;
stripsize = TIFFVStripSize(out, nrows);
if (TIFFWriteEncodedStrip(out, strip++, buf, stripsize) < 0)
{
TIFFError(TIFFFileName(out), "Error, can't write strip %u", strip - 1);
return 1;
}
buf += stripsize;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcrop.c: fix out-of-bound read of up to 3 bytes in
readContigTilesIntoBuffer(). Reported as MSVR 35092 by Axel Souchet
& Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 48,286
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int num_buffers() const { return num_buffers_; }
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 164,447
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __skb_complete_tx_timestamp(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct sock *sk,
int tstype)
{
struct sock_exterr_skb *serr;
int err;
serr = SKB_EXT_ERR(skb);
memset(serr, 0, sizeof(*serr));
serr->ee.ee_errno = ENOMSG;
serr->ee.ee_origin = SO_EE_ORIGIN_TIMESTAMPING;
serr->ee.ee_info = tstype;
if (sk->sk_tsflags & SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_ID) {
serr->ee.ee_data = skb_shinfo(skb)->tskey;
if (sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_TCP &&
sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM)
serr->ee.ee_data -= sk->sk_tskey;
}
err = sock_queue_err_skb(sk, skb);
if (err)
kfree_skb(skb);
}
Commit Message: tcp: mark skbs with SCM_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS
SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS can be enabled and disabled
while packets are collected on the error queue.
So, checking SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS in sk->sk_tsflags
is not enough to safely assume that the skb contains
OPT_STATS data.
Add a bit in sock_exterr_skb to indicate whether the
skb contains opt_stats data.
Fixes: 1c885808e456 ("tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING")
Reported-by: JongHwan Kim <zzoru007@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 1
| 170,071
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int parse_annotate_store_data(const char *tag,
int permessage_flag,
struct entryattlist **entryatts)
{
int c, islist = 0;
static struct buf entry, attrib, value;
struct attvaluelist *attvalues = NULL;
*entryatts = NULL;
c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
if (c == EOF) {
prot_printf(imapd_out,
"%s BAD Missing annotation entry\r\n", tag);
goto baddata;
}
else if (c == '(') {
/* entry list */
islist = 1;
}
else if (permessage_flag) {
prot_printf(imapd_out,
"%s BAD Missing paren for annotation entry\r\n", tag);
goto baddata;
}
else {
/* single entry -- put the char back */
prot_ungetc(c, imapd_in);
}
do {
/* get entry */
if (permessage_flag)
c = getastring(imapd_in, imapd_out, &entry);
else
c = getqstring(imapd_in, imapd_out, &entry);
if (c == EOF) {
prot_printf(imapd_out,
"%s BAD Missing annotation entry\r\n", tag);
goto baddata;
}
/* parse att-value list */
if (c != ' ' || (c = prot_getc(imapd_in)) != '(') {
prot_printf(imapd_out,
"%s BAD Missing annotation attribute-values list\r\n",
tag);
goto baddata;
}
do {
/* get attrib */
if (permessage_flag)
c = getastring(imapd_in, imapd_out, &attrib);
else
c = getqstring(imapd_in, imapd_out, &attrib);
if (c == EOF) {
prot_printf(imapd_out,
"%s BAD Missing annotation attribute\r\n", tag);
goto baddata;
}
/* get value */
if (c != ' ') {
prot_printf(imapd_out,
"%s BAD Missing annotation value\r\n", tag);
goto baddata;
}
c = getbnstring(imapd_in, imapd_out, &value);
if (c == EOF) {
prot_printf(imapd_out,
"%s BAD Missing annotation value\r\n", tag);
goto baddata;
}
/* add the attrib-value pair to the list */
appendattvalue(&attvalues, attrib.s, &value);
} while (c == ' ');
if (c != ')') {
prot_printf(imapd_out,
"%s BAD Missing close paren in annotation "
"attribute-values list\r\n", tag);
goto baddata;
}
/* add the entry to the list */
appendentryatt(entryatts, entry.s, attvalues);
attvalues = NULL;
c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
} while (c == ' ');
if (islist) {
if (c != ')') {
prot_printf(imapd_out,
"%s BAD Missing close paren in annotation entry list \r\n",
tag);
goto baddata;
}
c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
}
return c;
baddata:
if (attvalues) freeattvalues(attvalues);
if (c != EOF) prot_ungetc(c, imapd_in);
return EOF;
}
Commit Message: imapd: check for isadmin BEFORE parsing sync lines
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 95,236
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AudioRendererAlgorithm::CopyWithoutAdvance(uint8* dest) {
CopyWithoutAdvance(dest, 0);
}
Commit Message: Protect AudioRendererAlgorithm from invalid step sizes.
BUG=165430
TEST=unittests and asan pass.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11573023
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@173249 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 118,685
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t vfio_pci_read(void *device_data, char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
if (!count)
return 0;
return vfio_pci_rw(device_data, buf, count, ppos, false);
}
Commit Message: vfio/pci: Fix integer overflows, bitmask check
The VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS ioctl did not sufficiently sanitize
user-supplied integers, potentially allowing memory corruption. This
patch adds appropriate integer overflow checks, checks the range bounds
for VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_NONE, and also verifies that only single element
in the VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_TYPE_MASK bitmask is set.
VFIO_IRQ_SET_ACTION_TYPE_MASK is already correctly checked later in
vfio_pci_set_irqs_ioctl().
Furthermore, a kzalloc is changed to a kcalloc because the use of a
kzalloc with an integer multiplication allowed an integer overflow
condition to be reached without this patch. kcalloc checks for overflow
and should prevent a similar occurrence.
Signed-off-by: Vlad Tsyrklevich <vlad@tsyrklevich.net>
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 48,597
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int nl_str2nlmsgtype(const char *name)
{
return __str2type(name, nl_msgtypes, ARRAY_SIZE(nl_msgtypes));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 12,902
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: String HTMLAnchorElement::input() const
{
return getAttribute(hrefAttr);
}
Commit Message: Disable frame navigations during DocumentLoader detach in FrameLoader::startLoad
BUG=613266
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2006033002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#396241}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 132,653
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool cmd_r2cmd(RCore *core, const char *_input) {
char *input = r_str_newf ("r%s", _input);
int rc = 0;
if (r_str_startswith (input, "rax2")) {
rc = __runMain (core->r_main_rax2, input);
} else if (r_str_startswith (input, "radare2")) {
r_sys_cmdf ("%s", input);
} else if (r_str_startswith (input, "rasm2")) {
r_sys_cmdf ("%s", input);
} else if (r_str_startswith (input, "rabin2")) {
r_sys_cmdf ("%s", input);
} else if (r_str_startswith (input, "ragg2")) {
r_sys_cmdf ("%s", input);
} else if (r_str_startswith (input, "r2pm")) {
r_sys_cmdf ("%s", input);
} else if (r_str_startswith (input, "radiff2")) {
rc = __runMain (core->r_main_radiff2, input);
} else {
const char *r2cmds[] = {
"rax2", "r2pm", "rasm2", "rabin2", "rahash2", "rafind2", "rarun2", "ragg2", "radare2", "r2", NULL
};
int i;
for (i = 0; r2cmds[i]; i++) {
if (r_str_startswith (input, r2cmds[i])) {
free (input);
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
free (input);
core->num->value = rc;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix #14990 - multiple quoted command parsing issue ##core
> "?e hello""?e world"
hello
world"
> "?e hello";"?e world"
hello
world
CWE ID: CWE-78
| 0
| 87,788
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChromeContentBrowserClient::GetAdditionalViewSourceSchemes(
std::vector<std::string>* additional_schemes) {
GetAdditionalWebUISchemes(additional_schemes);
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_EXTENSIONS)
additional_schemes->push_back(extensions::kExtensionScheme);
#endif
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 142,636
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void uipc_wakeup_locked(void)
{
char sig_on = 1;
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("UIPC SEND WAKE UP");
send(uipc_main.signal_fds[1], &sig_on, sizeof(sig_on), 0);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 1
| 173,499
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: filesystem_set_label_completed_cb (DBusGMethodInvocation *context,
Device *device,
gboolean job_was_cancelled,
int status,
const char *stderr,
const char *stdout,
gpointer user_data)
{
char *new_label = user_data;
/* poke the kernel so we can reread the data */
device_generate_kernel_change_event (device);
if (WEXITSTATUS (status) == 0 && !job_was_cancelled)
{
/* update local copy, don't wait for the kernel */
device_set_id_label (device, new_label);
drain_pending_changes (device, FALSE);
dbus_g_method_return (context);
}
else
{
if (job_was_cancelled)
{
throw_error (context, ERROR_CANCELLED, "Job was cancelled");
}
else
{
throw_error (context,
ERROR_FAILED,
"Error changing fslabel: helper exited with exit code %d: %s",
WEXITSTATUS (status),
stderr);
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 11,702
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void __audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SECCOMP);
if (unlikely(!ab))
return;
audit_log_task(ab);
audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld arch=%x syscall=%ld compat=%d ip=0x%lx code=0x%x",
signr, syscall_get_arch(), syscall,
in_compat_syscall(), KSTK_EIP(current), code);
audit_log_end(ab);
}
Commit Message: audit: fix a double fetch in audit_log_single_execve_arg()
There is a double fetch problem in audit_log_single_execve_arg()
where we first check the execve(2) argumnets for any "bad" characters
which would require hex encoding and then re-fetch the arguments for
logging in the audit record[1]. Of course this leaves a window of
opportunity for an unsavory application to munge with the data.
This patch reworks things by only fetching the argument data once[2]
into a buffer where it is scanned and logged into the audit
records(s). In addition to fixing the double fetch, this patch
improves on the original code in a few other ways: better handling
of large arguments which require encoding, stricter record length
checking, and some performance improvements (completely unverified,
but we got rid of some strlen() calls, that's got to be a good
thing).
As part of the development of this patch, I've also created a basic
regression test for the audit-testsuite, the test can be tracked on
GitHub at the following link:
* https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/issues/25
[1] If you pay careful attention, there is actually a triple fetch
problem due to a strnlen_user() call at the top of the function.
[2] This is a tiny white lie, we do make a call to strnlen_user()
prior to fetching the argument data. I don't like it, but due to the
way the audit record is structured we really have no choice unless we
copy the entire argument at once (which would require a rather
wasteful allocation). The good news is that with this patch the
kernel no longer relies on this strnlen_user() value for anything
beyond recording it in the log, we also update it with a trustworthy
value whenever possible.
Reported-by: Pengfei Wang <wpengfeinudt@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 51,136
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int fuse_wait_on_page_writeback(struct inode *inode, pgoff_t index)
{
struct fuse_inode *fi = get_fuse_inode(inode);
wait_event(fi->page_waitq, !fuse_page_is_writeback(inode, index));
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fuse: verify ioctl retries
Verify that the total length of the iovec returned in FUSE_IOCTL_RETRY
doesn't overflow iov_length().
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
CC: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
CC: <stable@kernel.org> [2.6.31+]
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 27,906
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: evutil_ascii_strcasecmp(const char *s1, const char *s2)
{
char c1, c2;
while (1) {
c1 = EVUTIL_TOLOWER_(*s1++);
c2 = EVUTIL_TOLOWER_(*s2++);
if (c1 < c2)
return -1;
else if (c1 > c2)
return 1;
else if (c1 == 0)
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message: evutil_parse_sockaddr_port(): fix buffer overflow
@asn-the-goblin-slayer:
"Length between '[' and ']' is cast to signed 32 bit integer on line 1815. Is
the length is more than 2<<31 (INT_MAX), len will hold a negative value.
Consequently, it will pass the check at line 1816. Segfault happens at line
1819.
Generate a resolv.conf with generate-resolv.conf, then compile and run
poc.c. See entry-functions.txt for functions in tor that might be
vulnerable.
Please credit 'Guido Vranken' for this discovery through the Tor bug bounty
program."
Reproducer for gdb (https://gist.github.com/azat/be2b0d5e9417ba0dfe2c):
start
p (1ULL<<31)+1ULL
# $1 = 2147483649
p malloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr))
# $2 = (void *) 0x646010
p malloc(sizeof(int))
# $3 = (void *) 0x646030
p malloc($1)
# $4 = (void *) 0x7fff76a2a010
p memset($4, 1, $1)
# $5 = 1990369296
p (char *)$4
# $6 = 0x7fff76a2a010 '\001' <repeats 200 times>...
set $6[0]='['
set $6[$1]=']'
p evutil_parse_sockaddr_port($4, $2, $3)
# $7 = -1
Before:
$ gdb bin/http-connect < gdb
(gdb) $1 = 2147483649
(gdb) (gdb) $2 = (void *) 0x646010
(gdb) (gdb) $3 = (void *) 0x646030
(gdb) (gdb) $4 = (void *) 0x7fff76a2a010
(gdb) (gdb) $5 = 1990369296
(gdb) (gdb) $6 = 0x7fff76a2a010 '\001' <repeats 200 times>...
(gdb) (gdb) (gdb) (gdb)
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
__memcpy_sse2_unaligned () at memcpy-sse2-unaligned.S:36
After:
$ gdb bin/http-connect < gdb
(gdb) $1 = 2147483649
(gdb) (gdb) $2 = (void *) 0x646010
(gdb) (gdb) $3 = (void *) 0x646030
(gdb) (gdb) $4 = (void *) 0x7fff76a2a010
(gdb) (gdb) $5 = 1990369296
(gdb) (gdb) $6 = 0x7fff76a2a010 '\001' <repeats 200 times>...
(gdb) (gdb) (gdb) (gdb) $7 = -1
(gdb) (gdb) quit
Fixes: #318
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 70,717
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void setJSTestObjUnsignedIntSequenceAttr(ExecState* exec, JSObject* thisObject, JSValue value)
{
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(thisObject);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
impl->setUnsignedIntSequenceAttr(toNativeArray<unsigned int>(exec, value));
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 101,359
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(rmdir)
{
char *dir;
int dir_len;
zval *zcontext = NULL;
php_stream_context *context;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "p|r", &dir, &dir_len, &zcontext) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
context = php_stream_context_from_zval(zcontext, 0);
RETURN_BOOL(php_stream_rmdir(dir, REPORT_ERRORS, context));
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72114 - int/size_t confusion in fread
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 52,165
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bgp_attr_aggregate_intern (struct bgp *bgp, u_char origin,
struct aspath *aspath,
struct community *community, int as_set)
{
struct attr attr;
struct attr *new;
struct attr_extra *attre;
memset (&attr, 0, sizeof (struct attr));
attre = bgp_attr_extra_get (&attr);
/* Origin attribute. */
attr.origin = origin;
attr.flag |= ATTR_FLAG_BIT (BGP_ATTR_ORIGIN);
/* AS path attribute. */
if (aspath)
attr.aspath = aspath_intern (aspath);
else
attr.aspath = aspath_empty ();
attr.flag |= ATTR_FLAG_BIT (BGP_ATTR_AS_PATH);
/* Next hop attribute. */
attr.flag |= ATTR_FLAG_BIT (BGP_ATTR_NEXT_HOP);
if (community)
{
attr.community = community;
attr.flag |= ATTR_FLAG_BIT (BGP_ATTR_COMMUNITIES);
}
attre->weight = BGP_ATTR_DEFAULT_WEIGHT;
#ifdef HAVE_IPV6
attre->mp_nexthop_len = IPV6_MAX_BYTELEN;
#endif
if (! as_set)
attr.flag |= ATTR_FLAG_BIT (BGP_ATTR_ATOMIC_AGGREGATE);
attr.flag |= ATTR_FLAG_BIT (BGP_ATTR_AGGREGATOR);
if (CHECK_FLAG (bgp->config, BGP_CONFIG_CONFEDERATION))
attre->aggregator_as = bgp->confed_id;
else
attre->aggregator_as = bgp->as;
attre->aggregator_addr = bgp->router_id;
new = bgp_attr_intern (&attr);
bgp_attr_extra_free (&attr);
aspath_unintern (&new->aspath);
return new;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 235
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PS_SERIALIZER_DECODE_FUNC(php) /* {{{ */
{
const char *p, *q;
char *name;
const char *endptr = val + vallen;
zval *current;
int namelen;
int has_value;
php_unserialize_data_t var_hash;
PHP_VAR_UNSERIALIZE_INIT(var_hash);
p = val;
while (p < endptr) {
zval **tmp;
q = p;
while (*q != PS_DELIMITER) {
if (++q >= endptr) goto break_outer_loop;
}
if (p[0] == PS_UNDEF_MARKER) {
p++;
has_value = 0;
} else {
has_value = 1;
}
namelen = q - p;
name = estrndup(p, namelen);
q++;
if (zend_hash_find(&EG(symbol_table), name, namelen + 1, (void **) &tmp) == SUCCESS) {
if ((Z_TYPE_PP(tmp) == IS_ARRAY && Z_ARRVAL_PP(tmp) == &EG(symbol_table)) || *tmp == PS(http_session_vars)) {
goto skip;
}
}
if (has_value) {
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(current);
if (php_var_unserialize(¤t, (const unsigned char **) &q, (const unsigned char *) endptr, &var_hash TSRMLS_CC)) {
php_set_session_var(name, namelen, current, &var_hash TSRMLS_CC);
} else {
var_push_dtor_no_addref(&var_hash, ¤t);
efree(name);
PHP_VAR_UNSERIALIZE_DESTROY(var_hash);
return FAILURE;
}
var_push_dtor_no_addref(&var_hash, ¤t);
}
PS_ADD_VARL(name, namelen);
skip:
efree(name);
p = q;
}
break_outer_loop:
PHP_VAR_UNSERIALIZE_DESTROY(var_hash);
return SUCCESS;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Fix bug #72681 - consume data even if we're not storing them
CWE ID: CWE-74
| 1
| 166,959
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void Ins_EVEN( INS_ARG )
{
if ( (CUR_Func_round( args[0], 0L ) & 127) == 0 )
args[0] = 1;
else
args[0] = 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 5,380
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: lquery_in(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
char *buf = (char *) PG_GETARG_POINTER(0);
char *ptr;
int num = 0,
totallen = 0,
numOR = 0;
int state = LQPRS_WAITLEVEL;
lquery *result;
nodeitem *lptr = NULL;
lquery_level *cur,
*curqlevel,
*tmpql;
lquery_variant *lrptr = NULL;
bool hasnot = false;
bool wasbad = false;
int charlen;
int pos = 0;
ptr = buf;
while (*ptr)
{
charlen = pg_mblen(ptr);
if (charlen == 1)
{
if (t_iseq(ptr, '.'))
num++;
else if (t_iseq(ptr, '|'))
numOR++;
}
ptr += charlen;
}
num++;
curqlevel = tmpql = (lquery_level *) palloc0(ITEMSIZE * num);
ptr = buf;
while (*ptr)
{
charlen = pg_mblen(ptr);
if (state == LQPRS_WAITLEVEL)
{
if (ISALNUM(ptr))
{
GETVAR(curqlevel) = lptr = (nodeitem *) palloc0(sizeof(nodeitem) * (numOR + 1));
lptr->start = ptr;
state = LQPRS_WAITDELIM;
curqlevel->numvar = 1;
}
else if (charlen == 1 && t_iseq(ptr, '!'))
{
GETVAR(curqlevel) = lptr = (nodeitem *) palloc0(sizeof(nodeitem) * (numOR + 1));
lptr->start = ptr + 1;
state = LQPRS_WAITDELIM;
curqlevel->numvar = 1;
curqlevel->flag |= LQL_NOT;
hasnot = true;
}
else if (charlen == 1 && t_iseq(ptr, '*'))
state = LQPRS_WAITOPEN;
else
UNCHAR;
}
else if (state == LQPRS_WAITVAR)
{
if (ISALNUM(ptr))
{
lptr++;
lptr->start = ptr;
state = LQPRS_WAITDELIM;
curqlevel->numvar++;
}
else
UNCHAR;
}
else if (state == LQPRS_WAITDELIM)
{
if (charlen == 1 && t_iseq(ptr, '@'))
{
if (lptr->start == ptr)
UNCHAR;
lptr->flag |= LVAR_INCASE;
curqlevel->flag |= LVAR_INCASE;
}
else if (charlen == 1 && t_iseq(ptr, '*'))
{
if (lptr->start == ptr)
UNCHAR;
lptr->flag |= LVAR_ANYEND;
curqlevel->flag |= LVAR_ANYEND;
}
else if (charlen == 1 && t_iseq(ptr, '%'))
{
if (lptr->start == ptr)
UNCHAR;
lptr->flag |= LVAR_SUBLEXEME;
curqlevel->flag |= LVAR_SUBLEXEME;
}
else if (charlen == 1 && t_iseq(ptr, '|'))
{
lptr->len = ptr - lptr->start -
((lptr->flag & LVAR_SUBLEXEME) ? 1 : 0) -
((lptr->flag & LVAR_INCASE) ? 1 : 0) -
((lptr->flag & LVAR_ANYEND) ? 1 : 0);
if (lptr->wlen > 255)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_NAME_TOO_LONG),
errmsg("name of level is too long"),
errdetail("Name length is %d, must "
"be < 256, in position %d.",
lptr->wlen, pos)));
state = LQPRS_WAITVAR;
}
else if (charlen == 1 && t_iseq(ptr, '.'))
{
lptr->len = ptr - lptr->start -
((lptr->flag & LVAR_SUBLEXEME) ? 1 : 0) -
((lptr->flag & LVAR_INCASE) ? 1 : 0) -
((lptr->flag & LVAR_ANYEND) ? 1 : 0);
if (lptr->wlen > 255)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_NAME_TOO_LONG),
errmsg("name of level is too long"),
errdetail("Name length is %d, must "
"be < 256, in position %d.",
lptr->wlen, pos)));
state = LQPRS_WAITLEVEL;
curqlevel = NEXTLEV(curqlevel);
}
else if (ISALNUM(ptr))
{
if (lptr->flag)
UNCHAR;
}
else
UNCHAR;
}
else if (state == LQPRS_WAITOPEN)
{
if (charlen == 1 && t_iseq(ptr, '{'))
state = LQPRS_WAITFNUM;
else if (charlen == 1 && t_iseq(ptr, '.'))
{
curqlevel->low = 0;
curqlevel->high = 0xffff;
curqlevel = NEXTLEV(curqlevel);
state = LQPRS_WAITLEVEL;
}
else
UNCHAR;
}
else if (state == LQPRS_WAITFNUM)
{
if (charlen == 1 && t_iseq(ptr, ','))
state = LQPRS_WAITSNUM;
else if (t_isdigit(ptr))
{
curqlevel->low = atoi(ptr);
state = LQPRS_WAITND;
}
else
UNCHAR;
}
else if (state == LQPRS_WAITSNUM)
{
if (t_isdigit(ptr))
{
curqlevel->high = atoi(ptr);
state = LQPRS_WAITCLOSE;
}
else if (charlen == 1 && t_iseq(ptr, '}'))
{
curqlevel->high = 0xffff;
state = LQPRS_WAITEND;
}
else
UNCHAR;
}
else if (state == LQPRS_WAITCLOSE)
{
if (charlen == 1 && t_iseq(ptr, '}'))
state = LQPRS_WAITEND;
else if (!t_isdigit(ptr))
UNCHAR;
}
else if (state == LQPRS_WAITND)
{
if (charlen == 1 && t_iseq(ptr, '}'))
{
curqlevel->high = curqlevel->low;
state = LQPRS_WAITEND;
}
else if (charlen == 1 && t_iseq(ptr, ','))
state = LQPRS_WAITSNUM;
else if (!t_isdigit(ptr))
UNCHAR;
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 1
| 166,404
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void set_redirect_url(const GURL& url) { redirect_url_ = url; }
Commit Message: Tests were marked as Flaky.
BUG=151811,151810
TBR=droger@chromium.org,shalev@chromium.org
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10968052
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@158204 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 102,296
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void __online_page_free(struct page *page)
{
ClearPageReserved(page);
init_page_count(page);
__free_page(page);
}
Commit Message: mm/hotplug: correctly add new zone to all other nodes' zone lists
When online_pages() is called to add new memory to an empty zone, it
rebuilds all zone lists by calling build_all_zonelists(). But there's a
bug which prevents the new zone to be added to other nodes' zone lists.
online_pages() {
build_all_zonelists()
.....
node_set_state(zone_to_nid(zone), N_HIGH_MEMORY)
}
Here the node of the zone is put into N_HIGH_MEMORY state after calling
build_all_zonelists(), but build_all_zonelists() only adds zones from
nodes in N_HIGH_MEMORY state to the fallback zone lists.
build_all_zonelists()
->__build_all_zonelists()
->build_zonelists()
->find_next_best_node()
->for_each_node_state(n, N_HIGH_MEMORY)
So memory in the new zone will never be used by other nodes, and it may
cause strange behavor when system is under memory pressure. So put node
into N_HIGH_MEMORY state before calling build_all_zonelists().
Signed-off-by: Jianguo Wu <wujianguo@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiang Liu <liuj97@gmail.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Keping Chen <chenkeping@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 18,487
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(link)
{
char *topath, *frompath;
int topath_len, frompath_len;
int ret;
char source_p[MAXPATHLEN];
char dest_p[MAXPATHLEN];
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "pp", &topath, &topath_len, &frompath, &frompath_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (!expand_filepath(frompath, source_p TSRMLS_CC) || !expand_filepath(topath, dest_p TSRMLS_CC)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "No such file or directory");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (php_stream_locate_url_wrapper(source_p, NULL, STREAM_LOCATE_WRAPPERS_ONLY TSRMLS_CC) ||
php_stream_locate_url_wrapper(dest_p, NULL, STREAM_LOCATE_WRAPPERS_ONLY TSRMLS_CC) )
{
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to link to a URL");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (php_check_open_basedir(dest_p TSRMLS_CC)) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (php_check_open_basedir(source_p TSRMLS_CC)) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
#ifndef ZTS
ret = link(topath, frompath);
#else
ret = link(dest_p, source_p);
#endif
if (ret == -1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "%s", strerror(errno));
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETURN_TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 15,249
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: get_futex_key(u32 __user *uaddr, int fshared, union futex_key *key, int rw)
{
unsigned long address = (unsigned long)uaddr;
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
struct page *page, *tail;
struct address_space *mapping;
int err, ro = 0;
/*
* The futex address must be "naturally" aligned.
*/
key->both.offset = address % PAGE_SIZE;
if (unlikely((address % sizeof(u32)) != 0))
return -EINVAL;
address -= key->both.offset;
if (unlikely(!access_ok(rw, uaddr, sizeof(u32))))
return -EFAULT;
if (unlikely(should_fail_futex(fshared)))
return -EFAULT;
/*
* PROCESS_PRIVATE futexes are fast.
* As the mm cannot disappear under us and the 'key' only needs
* virtual address, we dont even have to find the underlying vma.
* Note : We do have to check 'uaddr' is a valid user address,
* but access_ok() should be faster than find_vma()
*/
if (!fshared) {
key->private.mm = mm;
key->private.address = address;
get_futex_key_refs(key); /* implies smp_mb(); (B) */
return 0;
}
again:
/* Ignore any VERIFY_READ mapping (futex common case) */
if (unlikely(should_fail_futex(fshared)))
return -EFAULT;
err = get_user_pages_fast(address, 1, 1, &page);
/*
* If write access is not required (eg. FUTEX_WAIT), try
* and get read-only access.
*/
if (err == -EFAULT && rw == VERIFY_READ) {
err = get_user_pages_fast(address, 1, 0, &page);
ro = 1;
}
if (err < 0)
return err;
else
err = 0;
/*
* The treatment of mapping from this point on is critical. The page
* lock protects many things but in this context the page lock
* stabilizes mapping, prevents inode freeing in the shared
* file-backed region case and guards against movement to swap cache.
*
* Strictly speaking the page lock is not needed in all cases being
* considered here and page lock forces unnecessarily serialization
* From this point on, mapping will be re-verified if necessary and
* page lock will be acquired only if it is unavoidable
*
* Mapping checks require the head page for any compound page so the
* head page and mapping is looked up now. For anonymous pages, it
* does not matter if the page splits in the future as the key is
* based on the address. For filesystem-backed pages, the tail is
* required as the index of the page determines the key. For
* base pages, there is no tail page and tail == page.
*/
tail = page;
page = compound_head(page);
mapping = READ_ONCE(page->mapping);
/*
* If page->mapping is NULL, then it cannot be a PageAnon
* page; but it might be the ZERO_PAGE or in the gate area or
* in a special mapping (all cases which we are happy to fail);
* or it may have been a good file page when get_user_pages_fast
* found it, but truncated or holepunched or subjected to
* invalidate_complete_page2 before we got the page lock (also
* cases which we are happy to fail). And we hold a reference,
* so refcount care in invalidate_complete_page's remove_mapping
* prevents drop_caches from setting mapping to NULL beneath us.
*
* The case we do have to guard against is when memory pressure made
* shmem_writepage move it from filecache to swapcache beneath us:
* an unlikely race, but we do need to retry for page->mapping.
*/
if (unlikely(!mapping)) {
int shmem_swizzled;
/*
* Page lock is required to identify which special case above
* applies. If this is really a shmem page then the page lock
* will prevent unexpected transitions.
*/
lock_page(page);
shmem_swizzled = PageSwapCache(page) || page->mapping;
unlock_page(page);
put_page(page);
if (shmem_swizzled)
goto again;
return -EFAULT;
}
/*
* Private mappings are handled in a simple way.
*
* If the futex key is stored on an anonymous page, then the associated
* object is the mm which is implicitly pinned by the calling process.
*
* NOTE: When userspace waits on a MAP_SHARED mapping, even if
* it's a read-only handle, it's expected that futexes attach to
* the object not the particular process.
*/
if (PageAnon(page)) {
/*
* A RO anonymous page will never change and thus doesn't make
* sense for futex operations.
*/
if (unlikely(should_fail_futex(fshared)) || ro) {
err = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
key->both.offset |= FUT_OFF_MMSHARED; /* ref taken on mm */
key->private.mm = mm;
key->private.address = address;
get_futex_key_refs(key); /* implies smp_mb(); (B) */
} else {
struct inode *inode;
/*
* The associated futex object in this case is the inode and
* the page->mapping must be traversed. Ordinarily this should
* be stabilised under page lock but it's not strictly
* necessary in this case as we just want to pin the inode, not
* update the radix tree or anything like that.
*
* The RCU read lock is taken as the inode is finally freed
* under RCU. If the mapping still matches expectations then the
* mapping->host can be safely accessed as being a valid inode.
*/
rcu_read_lock();
if (READ_ONCE(page->mapping) != mapping) {
rcu_read_unlock();
put_page(page);
goto again;
}
inode = READ_ONCE(mapping->host);
if (!inode) {
rcu_read_unlock();
put_page(page);
goto again;
}
/*
* Take a reference unless it is about to be freed. Previously
* this reference was taken by ihold under the page lock
* pinning the inode in place so i_lock was unnecessary. The
* only way for this check to fail is if the inode was
* truncated in parallel which is almost certainly an
* application bug. In such a case, just retry.
*
* We are not calling into get_futex_key_refs() in file-backed
* cases, therefore a successful atomic_inc return below will
* guarantee that get_futex_key() will still imply smp_mb(); (B).
*/
if (!atomic_inc_not_zero(&inode->i_count)) {
rcu_read_unlock();
put_page(page);
goto again;
}
/* Should be impossible but lets be paranoid for now */
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(inode->i_mapping != mapping)) {
err = -EFAULT;
rcu_read_unlock();
iput(inode);
goto out;
}
key->both.offset |= FUT_OFF_INODE; /* inode-based key */
key->shared.inode = inode;
key->shared.pgoff = basepage_index(tail);
rcu_read_unlock();
}
out:
put_page(page);
return err;
}
Commit Message: futex: Prevent overflow by strengthen input validation
UBSAN reports signed integer overflow in kernel/futex.c:
UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in kernel/futex.c:2041:18
signed integer overflow:
0 - -2147483648 cannot be represented in type 'int'
Add a sanity check to catch negative values of nr_wake and nr_requeue.
Signed-off-by: Li Jinyue <lijinyue@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: dvhart@infradead.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1513242294-31786-1-git-send-email-lijinyue@huawei.com
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 84,266
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DownloadManagerDelegate::ApplicationClientIdForFileScanning() const {
return std::string();
}
Commit Message: Downloads : Fixed an issue of opening incorrect download file
When one download overwrites another completed download, calling download.open in the old download causes the new download to open, which could be dangerous and undesirable. In this CL, we are trying to avoid this by blocking the opening of the old download.
Bug: 793620
Change-Id: Ic948175756700ad7c08489c3cc347330daedb6f8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/826477
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <dtrainor@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Shakti Sahu <shaktisahu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525810}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 146,468
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: fst_intr(int dummy, void *dev_id)
{
struct fst_card_info *card = dev_id;
struct fst_port_info *port;
int rdidx; /* Event buffer indices */
int wridx;
int event; /* Actual event for processing */
unsigned int dma_intcsr = 0;
unsigned int do_card_interrupt;
unsigned int int_retry_count;
/*
* Check to see if the interrupt was for this card
* return if not
* Note that the call to clear the interrupt is important
*/
dbg(DBG_INTR, "intr: %d %p\n", card->irq, card);
if (card->state != FST_RUNNING) {
pr_err("Interrupt received for card %d in a non running state (%d)\n",
card->card_no, card->state);
/*
* It is possible to really be running, i.e. we have re-loaded
* a running card
* Clear and reprime the interrupt source
*/
fst_clear_intr(card);
return IRQ_HANDLED;
}
/* Clear and reprime the interrupt source */
fst_clear_intr(card);
/*
* Is the interrupt for this card (handshake == 1)
*/
do_card_interrupt = 0;
if (FST_RDB(card, interruptHandshake) == 1) {
do_card_interrupt += FST_CARD_INT;
/* Set the software acknowledge */
FST_WRB(card, interruptHandshake, 0xEE);
}
if (card->family == FST_FAMILY_TXU) {
/*
* Is it a DMA Interrupt
*/
dma_intcsr = inl(card->pci_conf + INTCSR_9054);
if (dma_intcsr & 0x00200000) {
/*
* DMA Channel 0 (Rx transfer complete)
*/
dbg(DBG_RX, "DMA Rx xfer complete\n");
outb(0x8, card->pci_conf + DMACSR0);
fst_rx_dma_complete(card, card->dma_port_rx,
card->dma_len_rx, card->dma_skb_rx,
card->dma_rxpos);
card->dmarx_in_progress = 0;
do_card_interrupt += FST_RX_DMA_INT;
}
if (dma_intcsr & 0x00400000) {
/*
* DMA Channel 1 (Tx transfer complete)
*/
dbg(DBG_TX, "DMA Tx xfer complete\n");
outb(0x8, card->pci_conf + DMACSR1);
fst_tx_dma_complete(card, card->dma_port_tx,
card->dma_len_tx, card->dma_txpos);
card->dmatx_in_progress = 0;
do_card_interrupt += FST_TX_DMA_INT;
}
}
/*
* Have we been missing Interrupts
*/
int_retry_count = FST_RDL(card, interruptRetryCount);
if (int_retry_count) {
dbg(DBG_ASS, "Card %d int_retry_count is %d\n",
card->card_no, int_retry_count);
FST_WRL(card, interruptRetryCount, 0);
}
if (!do_card_interrupt) {
return IRQ_HANDLED;
}
/* Scehdule the bottom half of the ISR */
fst_q_work_item(&fst_work_intq, card->card_no);
tasklet_schedule(&fst_int_task);
/* Drain the event queue */
rdidx = FST_RDB(card, interruptEvent.rdindex) & 0x1f;
wridx = FST_RDB(card, interruptEvent.wrindex) & 0x1f;
while (rdidx != wridx) {
event = FST_RDB(card, interruptEvent.evntbuff[rdidx]);
port = &card->ports[event & 0x03];
dbg(DBG_INTR, "Processing Interrupt event: %x\n", event);
switch (event) {
case TE1_ALMA:
dbg(DBG_INTR, "TE1 Alarm intr\n");
if (port->run)
fst_intr_te1_alarm(card, port);
break;
case CTLA_CHG:
case CTLB_CHG:
case CTLC_CHG:
case CTLD_CHG:
if (port->run)
fst_intr_ctlchg(card, port);
break;
case ABTA_SENT:
case ABTB_SENT:
case ABTC_SENT:
case ABTD_SENT:
dbg(DBG_TX, "Abort complete port %d\n", port->index);
break;
case TXA_UNDF:
case TXB_UNDF:
case TXC_UNDF:
case TXD_UNDF:
/* Difficult to see how we'd get this given that we
* always load up the entire packet for DMA.
*/
dbg(DBG_TX, "Tx underflow port %d\n", port->index);
port_to_dev(port)->stats.tx_errors++;
port_to_dev(port)->stats.tx_fifo_errors++;
dbg(DBG_ASS, "Tx underflow on card %d port %d\n",
card->card_no, port->index);
break;
case INIT_CPLT:
dbg(DBG_INIT, "Card init OK intr\n");
break;
case INIT_FAIL:
dbg(DBG_INIT, "Card init FAILED intr\n");
card->state = FST_IFAILED;
break;
default:
pr_err("intr: unknown card event %d. ignored\n", event);
break;
}
/* Bump and wrap the index */
if (++rdidx >= MAX_CIRBUFF)
rdidx = 0;
}
FST_WRB(card, interruptEvent.rdindex, rdidx);
return IRQ_HANDLED;
}
Commit Message: farsync: fix info leak in ioctl
The fst_get_iface() code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of
struct sync_serial_settings after the ->loopback member. Add an explicit
memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 39,518
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: channel_open_message(void)
{
Buffer buffer;
Channel *c;
char buf[1024], *cp;
u_int i;
buffer_init(&buffer);
snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "The following connections are open:\r\n");
buffer_append(&buffer, buf, strlen(buf));
for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) {
c = channels[i];
if (c == NULL)
continue;
switch (c->type) {
case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER:
case SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER:
case SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER:
case SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED:
case SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET:
case SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE:
case SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED:
case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT:
case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER:
case SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER:
case SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER:
continue;
case SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL:
case SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING:
case SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING:
case SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC:
case SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN:
case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN:
case SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING:
case SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING:
snprintf(buf, sizeof buf,
" #%d %.300s (t%d r%d i%d/%d o%d/%d fd %d/%d cc %d)\r\n",
c->self, c->remote_name,
c->type, c->remote_id,
c->istate, buffer_len(&c->input),
c->ostate, buffer_len(&c->output),
c->rfd, c->wfd, c->ctl_chan);
buffer_append(&buffer, buf, strlen(buf));
continue;
default:
fatal("channel_open_message: bad channel type %d", c->type);
/* NOTREACHED */
}
}
buffer_append(&buffer, "\0", 1);
cp = xstrdup((char *)buffer_ptr(&buffer));
buffer_free(&buffer);
return cp;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 2,247
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ext4_dx_add_entry(handle_t *handle, struct dentry *dentry,
struct inode *inode)
{
struct dx_frame frames[2], *frame;
struct dx_entry *entries, *at;
struct dx_hash_info hinfo;
struct buffer_head *bh;
struct inode *dir = dentry->d_parent->d_inode;
struct super_block *sb = dir->i_sb;
struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de;
int err;
frame = dx_probe(&dentry->d_name, dir, &hinfo, frames, &err);
if (!frame)
return err;
entries = frame->entries;
at = frame->at;
if (!(bh = ext4_bread(handle,dir, dx_get_block(frame->at), 0, &err)))
goto cleanup;
if (!buffer_verified(bh) &&
!ext4_dirent_csum_verify(dir, (struct ext4_dir_entry *)bh->b_data))
goto journal_error;
set_buffer_verified(bh);
BUFFER_TRACE(bh, "get_write_access");
err = ext4_journal_get_write_access(handle, bh);
if (err)
goto journal_error;
err = add_dirent_to_buf(handle, dentry, inode, NULL, bh);
if (err != -ENOSPC)
goto cleanup;
/* Block full, should compress but for now just split */
dxtrace(printk(KERN_DEBUG "using %u of %u node entries\n",
dx_get_count(entries), dx_get_limit(entries)));
/* Need to split index? */
if (dx_get_count(entries) == dx_get_limit(entries)) {
ext4_lblk_t newblock;
unsigned icount = dx_get_count(entries);
int levels = frame - frames;
struct dx_entry *entries2;
struct dx_node *node2;
struct buffer_head *bh2;
if (levels && (dx_get_count(frames->entries) ==
dx_get_limit(frames->entries))) {
ext4_warning(sb, "Directory index full!");
err = -ENOSPC;
goto cleanup;
}
bh2 = ext4_append (handle, dir, &newblock, &err);
if (!(bh2))
goto cleanup;
node2 = (struct dx_node *)(bh2->b_data);
entries2 = node2->entries;
memset(&node2->fake, 0, sizeof(struct fake_dirent));
node2->fake.rec_len = ext4_rec_len_to_disk(sb->s_blocksize,
sb->s_blocksize);
BUFFER_TRACE(frame->bh, "get_write_access");
err = ext4_journal_get_write_access(handle, frame->bh);
if (err)
goto journal_error;
if (levels) {
unsigned icount1 = icount/2, icount2 = icount - icount1;
unsigned hash2 = dx_get_hash(entries + icount1);
dxtrace(printk(KERN_DEBUG "Split index %i/%i\n",
icount1, icount2));
BUFFER_TRACE(frame->bh, "get_write_access"); /* index root */
err = ext4_journal_get_write_access(handle,
frames[0].bh);
if (err)
goto journal_error;
memcpy((char *) entries2, (char *) (entries + icount1),
icount2 * sizeof(struct dx_entry));
dx_set_count(entries, icount1);
dx_set_count(entries2, icount2);
dx_set_limit(entries2, dx_node_limit(dir));
/* Which index block gets the new entry? */
if (at - entries >= icount1) {
frame->at = at = at - entries - icount1 + entries2;
frame->entries = entries = entries2;
swap(frame->bh, bh2);
}
dx_insert_block(frames + 0, hash2, newblock);
dxtrace(dx_show_index("node", frames[1].entries));
dxtrace(dx_show_index("node",
((struct dx_node *) bh2->b_data)->entries));
err = ext4_handle_dirty_dx_node(handle, dir, bh2);
if (err)
goto journal_error;
brelse (bh2);
} else {
dxtrace(printk(KERN_DEBUG
"Creating second level index...\n"));
memcpy((char *) entries2, (char *) entries,
icount * sizeof(struct dx_entry));
dx_set_limit(entries2, dx_node_limit(dir));
/* Set up root */
dx_set_count(entries, 1);
dx_set_block(entries + 0, newblock);
((struct dx_root *) frames[0].bh->b_data)->info.indirect_levels = 1;
/* Add new access path frame */
frame = frames + 1;
frame->at = at = at - entries + entries2;
frame->entries = entries = entries2;
frame->bh = bh2;
err = ext4_journal_get_write_access(handle,
frame->bh);
if (err)
goto journal_error;
}
err = ext4_handle_dirty_dx_node(handle, dir, frames[0].bh);
if (err) {
ext4_std_error(inode->i_sb, err);
goto cleanup;
}
}
de = do_split(handle, dir, &bh, frame, &hinfo, &err);
if (!de)
goto cleanup;
err = add_dirent_to_buf(handle, dentry, inode, de, bh);
goto cleanup;
journal_error:
ext4_std_error(dir->i_sb, err);
cleanup:
if (bh)
brelse(bh);
dx_release(frames);
return err;
}
Commit Message: ext4: make orphan functions be no-op in no-journal mode
Instead of checking whether the handle is valid, we check if journal
is enabled. This avoids taking the s_orphan_lock mutex in all cases
when there is no journal in use, including the error paths where
ext4_orphan_del() is called with a handle set to NULL.
Signed-off-by: Anatol Pomozov <anatol.pomozov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 42,065
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static wchar_t vfat_skip_char(wchar_t w)
{
return (w == '.') || (w == ' ');
}
Commit Message: NLS: improve UTF8 -> UTF16 string conversion routine
The utf8s_to_utf16s conversion routine needs to be improved. Unlike
its utf16s_to_utf8s sibling, it doesn't accept arguments specifying
the maximum length of the output buffer or the endianness of its
16-bit output.
This patch (as1501) adds the two missing arguments, and adjusts the
only two places in the kernel where the function is called. A
follow-on patch will add a third caller that does utilize the new
capabilities.
The two conversion routines are still annoyingly inconsistent in the
way they handle invalid byte combinations. But that's a subject for a
different patch.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
CC: Clemens Ladisch <clemens@ladisch.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 33,409
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void dccp_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *bp, const u_char *data2,
u_int len)
{
const struct dccp_hdr *dh;
const struct ip *ip;
const struct ip6_hdr *ip6;
const u_char *cp;
u_short sport, dport;
u_int hlen;
u_int fixed_hdrlen;
uint8_t dccph_type;
dh = (const struct dccp_hdr *)bp;
ip = (const struct ip *)data2;
if (IP_V(ip) == 6)
ip6 = (const struct ip6_hdr *)data2;
else
ip6 = NULL;
/* make sure we have enough data to look at the X bit */
cp = (const u_char *)(dh + 1);
if (cp > ndo->ndo_snapend) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Invalid packet|dccp]"));
return;
}
if (len < sizeof(struct dccp_hdr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "truncated-dccp - %u bytes missing!",
len - (u_int)sizeof(struct dccp_hdr)));
return;
}
/* get the length of the generic header */
fixed_hdrlen = dccp_basic_hdr_len(dh);
if (len < fixed_hdrlen) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "truncated-dccp - %u bytes missing!",
len - fixed_hdrlen));
return;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*dh, fixed_hdrlen);
sport = EXTRACT_16BITS(&dh->dccph_sport);
dport = EXTRACT_16BITS(&dh->dccph_dport);
hlen = dh->dccph_doff * 4;
if (ip6) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s.%d > %s.%d: ",
ip6addr_string(ndo, &ip6->ip6_src), sport,
ip6addr_string(ndo, &ip6->ip6_dst), dport));
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s.%d > %s.%d: ",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &ip->ip_src), sport,
ipaddr_string(ndo, &ip->ip_dst), dport));
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "DCCP"));
if (ndo->ndo_qflag) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %d", len - hlen));
if (hlen > len) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [bad hdr length %u - too long, > %u]",
hlen, len));
}
return;
}
/* other variables in generic header */
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (CCVal %d, CsCov %d, ", DCCPH_CCVAL(dh), DCCPH_CSCOV(dh)));
}
/* checksum calculation */
if (ndo->ndo_vflag && ND_TTEST2(bp[0], len)) {
uint16_t sum = 0, dccp_sum;
dccp_sum = EXTRACT_16BITS(&dh->dccph_checksum);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "cksum 0x%04x ", dccp_sum));
if (IP_V(ip) == 4)
sum = dccp_cksum(ndo, ip, dh, len);
else if (IP_V(ip) == 6)
sum = dccp6_cksum(ndo, ip6, dh, len);
if (sum != 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(incorrect -> 0x%04x)",in_cksum_shouldbe(dccp_sum, sum)));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(correct)"));
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ")"));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " "));
dccph_type = DCCPH_TYPE(dh);
switch (dccph_type) {
case DCCP_PKT_REQUEST: {
const struct dccp_hdr_request *dhr =
(const struct dccp_hdr_request *)(bp + fixed_hdrlen);
fixed_hdrlen += 4;
if (len < fixed_hdrlen) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "truncated-%s - %u bytes missing!",
tok2str(dccp_pkt_type_str, "", dccph_type),
len - fixed_hdrlen));
return;
}
ND_TCHECK(*dhr);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s (service=%d) ",
tok2str(dccp_pkt_type_str, "", dccph_type),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dhr->dccph_req_service)));
break;
}
case DCCP_PKT_RESPONSE: {
const struct dccp_hdr_response *dhr =
(const struct dccp_hdr_response *)(bp + fixed_hdrlen);
fixed_hdrlen += 12;
if (len < fixed_hdrlen) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "truncated-%s - %u bytes missing!",
tok2str(dccp_pkt_type_str, "", dccph_type),
len - fixed_hdrlen));
return;
}
ND_TCHECK(*dhr);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s (service=%d) ",
tok2str(dccp_pkt_type_str, "", dccph_type),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dhr->dccph_resp_service)));
break;
}
case DCCP_PKT_DATA:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s ", tok2str(dccp_pkt_type_str, "", dccph_type)));
break;
case DCCP_PKT_ACK: {
fixed_hdrlen += 8;
if (len < fixed_hdrlen) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "truncated-%s - %u bytes missing!",
tok2str(dccp_pkt_type_str, "", dccph_type),
len - fixed_hdrlen));
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s ", tok2str(dccp_pkt_type_str, "", dccph_type)));
break;
}
case DCCP_PKT_DATAACK: {
fixed_hdrlen += 8;
if (len < fixed_hdrlen) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "truncated-%s - %u bytes missing!",
tok2str(dccp_pkt_type_str, "", dccph_type),
len - fixed_hdrlen));
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s ", tok2str(dccp_pkt_type_str, "", dccph_type)));
break;
}
case DCCP_PKT_CLOSEREQ:
fixed_hdrlen += 8;
if (len < fixed_hdrlen) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "truncated-%s - %u bytes missing!",
tok2str(dccp_pkt_type_str, "", dccph_type),
len - fixed_hdrlen));
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s ", tok2str(dccp_pkt_type_str, "", dccph_type)));
break;
case DCCP_PKT_CLOSE:
fixed_hdrlen += 8;
if (len < fixed_hdrlen) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "truncated-%s - %u bytes missing!",
tok2str(dccp_pkt_type_str, "", dccph_type),
len - fixed_hdrlen));
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s ", tok2str(dccp_pkt_type_str, "", dccph_type)));
break;
case DCCP_PKT_RESET: {
const struct dccp_hdr_reset *dhr =
(const struct dccp_hdr_reset *)(bp + fixed_hdrlen);
fixed_hdrlen += 12;
if (len < fixed_hdrlen) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "truncated-%s - %u bytes missing!",
tok2str(dccp_pkt_type_str, "", dccph_type),
len - fixed_hdrlen));
return;
}
ND_TCHECK(*dhr);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s (code=%s) ",
tok2str(dccp_pkt_type_str, "", dccph_type),
dccp_reset_code(dhr->dccph_reset_code)));
break;
}
case DCCP_PKT_SYNC:
fixed_hdrlen += 8;
if (len < fixed_hdrlen) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "truncated-%s - %u bytes missing!",
tok2str(dccp_pkt_type_str, "", dccph_type),
len - fixed_hdrlen));
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s ", tok2str(dccp_pkt_type_str, "", dccph_type)));
break;
case DCCP_PKT_SYNCACK:
fixed_hdrlen += 8;
if (len < fixed_hdrlen) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "truncated-%s - %u bytes missing!",
tok2str(dccp_pkt_type_str, "", dccph_type),
len - fixed_hdrlen));
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s ", tok2str(dccp_pkt_type_str, "", dccph_type)));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s ", tok2str(dccp_pkt_type_str, "unknown-type-%u", dccph_type)));
break;
}
if ((DCCPH_TYPE(dh) != DCCP_PKT_DATA) &&
(DCCPH_TYPE(dh) != DCCP_PKT_REQUEST))
dccp_print_ack_no(ndo, bp);
if (ndo->ndo_vflag < 2)
return;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "seq %" PRIu64, dccp_seqno(bp)));
/* process options */
if (hlen > fixed_hdrlen){
u_int optlen;
cp = bp + fixed_hdrlen;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " <"));
hlen -= fixed_hdrlen;
while(1){
optlen = dccp_print_option(ndo, cp, hlen);
if (!optlen)
break;
if (hlen <= optlen)
break;
hlen -= optlen;
cp += optlen;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", "));
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ">"));
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return;
}
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-16229/DCCP: Fix printing "Timestamp" and "Timestamp Echo" options
Add some comments.
Moreover:
Put a function definition name at the beginning of the line.
(This change was ported from commit 6df4852 in the master branch.)
Ryan Ackroyd had independently identified this buffer over-read later by
means of fuzzing and provided the packet capture file for the test.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 93,165
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int apply_event_filter(struct trace_event_file *file, char *filter_string)
{
struct trace_event_call *call = file->event_call;
struct event_filter *filter = NULL;
int err;
if (!strcmp(strstrip(filter_string), "0")) {
filter_disable(file);
filter = event_filter(file);
if (!filter)
return 0;
event_clear_filter(file);
/* Make sure the filter is not being used */
synchronize_sched();
__free_filter(filter);
return 0;
}
err = create_filter(call, filter_string, true, &filter);
/*
* Always swap the call filter with the new filter
* even if there was an error. If there was an error
* in the filter, we disable the filter and show the error
* string
*/
if (filter) {
struct event_filter *tmp;
tmp = event_filter(file);
if (!err)
event_set_filtered_flag(file);
else
filter_disable(file);
event_set_filter(file, filter);
if (tmp) {
/* Make sure the call is done with the filter */
synchronize_sched();
__free_filter(tmp);
}
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 81,554
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: fz_set_default_gray(fz_context *ctx, fz_default_colorspaces *default_cs, fz_colorspace *cs)
{
if (cs->n == 1)
{
fz_drop_colorspace(ctx, default_cs->gray);
default_cs->gray = fz_keep_colorspace(ctx, cs);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 405
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void fr_destroy(struct net_device *frad)
{
hdlc_device *hdlc = dev_to_hdlc(frad);
pvc_device *pvc = state(hdlc)->first_pvc;
state(hdlc)->first_pvc = NULL; /* All PVCs destroyed */
state(hdlc)->dce_pvc_count = 0;
state(hdlc)->dce_changed = 1;
while (pvc) {
pvc_device *next = pvc->next;
/* destructors will free_netdev() main and ether */
if (pvc->main)
unregister_netdevice(pvc->main);
if (pvc->ether)
unregister_netdevice(pvc->ether);
kfree(pvc);
pvc = next;
}
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 23,909
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebPagePrivate::syncDestroyCompositorOnCompositingThread()
{
if (!m_compositor)
return;
Platform::userInterfaceThreadMessageClient()->dispatchSyncMessage(
Platform::createMethodCallMessage(
&WebPagePrivate::destroyCompositor, this));
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 104,444
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool omx_video::release_done(void)
{
bool bRet = false;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Inside release_done()");
if (release_input_done()) {
if (release_output_done()) {
bRet = true;
}
}
return bRet;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: add checks before accessing heap pointers
Heap pointers do not point to user virtual addresses in case
of secure session.
Set them to NULL and add checks to avoid accesing them
Bug: 28815329
Bug: 28920116
Change-Id: I94fd5808e753b58654d65e175d3857ef46ffba26
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 159,200
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::LoadStateChanged(
const GURL& url,
const net::LoadStateWithParam& load_state,
uint64_t upload_position,
uint64_t upload_size) {
tracked_objects::ScopedTracker tracking_profile1(
FROM_HERE_WITH_EXPLICIT_FUNCTION(
"466285 WebContentsImpl::LoadStateChanged::Start"));
load_state_ = load_state;
upload_position_ = upload_position;
upload_size_ = upload_size;
load_state_host_ = url_formatter::IDNToUnicode(url.host());
if (load_state_.state == net::LOAD_STATE_READING_RESPONSE)
SetNotWaitingForResponse();
if (IsLoading()) {
NotifyNavigationStateChanged(static_cast<InvalidateTypes>(
INVALIDATE_TYPE_LOAD | INVALIDATE_TYPE_TAB));
}
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 135,763
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int register_netdev(struct net_device *dev)
{
int err;
rtnl_lock();
err = register_netdevice(dev);
rtnl_unlock();
return err;
}
Commit Message: tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 48,929
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int parse_hw_handler(struct dm_arg_set *as, struct multipath *m)
{
unsigned hw_argc;
int ret;
struct dm_target *ti = m->ti;
static struct dm_arg _args[] = {
{0, 1024, "invalid number of hardware handler args"},
};
if (dm_read_arg_group(_args, as, &hw_argc, &ti->error))
return -EINVAL;
if (!hw_argc)
return 0;
m->hw_handler_name = kstrdup(dm_shift_arg(as), GFP_KERNEL);
request_module("scsi_dh_%s", m->hw_handler_name);
if (scsi_dh_handler_exist(m->hw_handler_name) == 0) {
ti->error = "unknown hardware handler type";
ret = -EINVAL;
goto fail;
}
if (hw_argc > 1) {
char *p;
int i, j, len = 4;
for (i = 0; i <= hw_argc - 2; i++)
len += strlen(as->argv[i]) + 1;
p = m->hw_handler_params = kzalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!p) {
ti->error = "memory allocation failed";
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto fail;
}
j = sprintf(p, "%d", hw_argc - 1);
for (i = 0, p+=j+1; i <= hw_argc - 2; i++, p+=j+1)
j = sprintf(p, "%s", as->argv[i]);
}
dm_consume_args(as, hw_argc - 1);
return 0;
fail:
kfree(m->hw_handler_name);
m->hw_handler_name = NULL;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: dm: do not forward ioctls from logical volumes to the underlying device
A logical volume can map to just part of underlying physical volume.
In this case, it must be treated like a partition.
Based on a patch from Alasdair G Kergon.
Cc: Alasdair G Kergon <agk@redhat.com>
Cc: dm-devel@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 23,604
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static __net_exit void dccp_net_exit(struct net *net)
{
nf_ct_l4proto_pernet_unregister(net, &dccp_proto6);
nf_ct_l4proto_pernet_unregister(net, &dccp_proto4);
}
Commit Message: netfilter: nf_conntrack_dccp: fix skb_header_pointer API usages
Some occurences in the netfilter tree use skb_header_pointer() in
the following way ...
struct dccp_hdr _dh, *dh;
...
skb_header_pointer(skb, dataoff, sizeof(_dh), &dh);
... where dh itself is a pointer that is being passed as the copy
buffer. Instead, we need to use &_dh as the forth argument so that
we're copying the data into an actual buffer that sits on the stack.
Currently, we probably could overwrite memory on the stack (e.g.
with a possibly mal-formed DCCP packet), but unintentionally, as
we only want the buffer to be placed into _dh variable.
Fixes: 2bc780499aa3 ("[NETFILTER]: nf_conntrack: add DCCP protocol support")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 39,113
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool DesktopWindowTreeHostX11::IsAnimatingClosed() const {
return false;
}
Commit Message: Fix PIP window being blank after minimize/show
DesktopWindowTreeHostX11::SetVisible only made the call into
OnNativeWidgetVisibilityChanged when transitioning from shown
to minimized and not vice versa. This is because this change
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1437263
considered IsVisible to be true when minimized, which made
IsVisible always true in this case. This caused layers to be hidden
but never shown again.
This is a reland of:
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1580103
Bug: 949199
Change-Id: I2151cd09e537d8ce8781897f43a3b8e9cec75996
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1584617
Reviewed-by: Scott Violet <sky@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: enne <enne@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654280}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 140,556
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int kvm_read_guest_cached(struct kvm *kvm, struct gfn_to_hva_cache *ghc,
void *data, unsigned long len)
{
struct kvm_memslots *slots = kvm_memslots(kvm);
int r;
BUG_ON(len > ghc->len);
if (slots->generation != ghc->generation)
kvm_gfn_to_hva_cache_init(kvm, ghc, ghc->gpa, ghc->len);
if (unlikely(!ghc->memslot))
return kvm_read_guest(kvm, ghc->gpa, data, len);
if (kvm_is_error_hva(ghc->hva))
return -EFAULT;
r = __copy_from_user(data, (void __user *)ghc->hva, len);
if (r)
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Improve create VCPU parameter (CVE-2013-4587)
In multiple functions the vcpu_id is used as an offset into a bitfield. Ag
malicious user could specify a vcpu_id greater than 255 in order to set or
clear bits in kernel memory. This could be used to elevate priveges in the
kernel. This patch verifies that the vcpu_id provided is less than 255.
The api documentation already specifies that the vcpu_id must be less than
max_vcpus, but this is currently not checked.
Reported-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 29,345
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool __init sparc64_has_md5_opcode(void)
{
unsigned long cfr;
if (!(sparc64_elf_hwcap & HWCAP_SPARC_CRYPTO))
return false;
__asm__ __volatile__("rd %%asr26, %0" : "=r" (cfr));
if (!(cfr & CFR_MD5))
return false;
return true;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 46,785
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int rds_notify_cong(struct rds_sock *rs, struct msghdr *msghdr)
{
uint64_t notify = rs->rs_cong_notify;
unsigned long flags;
int err;
err = put_cmsg(msghdr, SOL_RDS, RDS_CMSG_CONG_UPDATE,
sizeof(notify), ¬ify);
if (err)
return err;
spin_lock_irqsave(&rs->rs_lock, flags);
rs->rs_cong_notify &= ~notify;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&rs->rs_lock, flags);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: rds: set correct msg_namelen
Jay Fenlason (fenlason@redhat.com) found a bug,
that recvfrom() on an RDS socket can return the contents of random kernel
memory to userspace if it was called with a address length larger than
sizeof(struct sockaddr_in).
rds_recvmsg() also fails to set the addr_len paramater properly before
returning, but that's just a bug.
There are also a number of cases wher recvfrom() can return an entirely bogus
address. Anything in rds_recvmsg() that returns a non-negative value but does
not go through the "sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)msg->msg_name;" code path
at the end of the while(1) loop will return up to 128 bytes of kernel memory
to userspace.
And I write two test programs to reproduce this bug, you will see that in
rds_server, fromAddr will be overwritten and the following sock_fd will be
destroyed.
Yes, it is the programmer's fault to set msg_namelen incorrectly, but it is
better to make the kernel copy the real length of address to user space in
such case.
How to run the test programs ?
I test them on 32bit x86 system, 3.5.0-rc7.
1 compile
gcc -o rds_client rds_client.c
gcc -o rds_server rds_server.c
2 run ./rds_server on one console
3 run ./rds_client on another console
4 you will see something like:
server is waiting to receive data...
old socket fd=3
server received data from client:data from client
msg.msg_namelen=32
new socket fd=-1067277685
sendmsg()
: Bad file descriptor
/***************** rds_client.c ********************/
int main(void)
{
int sock_fd;
struct sockaddr_in serverAddr;
struct sockaddr_in toAddr;
char recvBuffer[128] = "data from client";
struct msghdr msg;
struct iovec iov;
sock_fd = socket(AF_RDS, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
if (sock_fd < 0) {
perror("create socket error\n");
exit(1);
}
memset(&serverAddr, 0, sizeof(serverAddr));
serverAddr.sin_family = AF_INET;
serverAddr.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("127.0.0.1");
serverAddr.sin_port = htons(4001);
if (bind(sock_fd, (struct sockaddr*)&serverAddr, sizeof(serverAddr)) < 0) {
perror("bind() error\n");
close(sock_fd);
exit(1);
}
memset(&toAddr, 0, sizeof(toAddr));
toAddr.sin_family = AF_INET;
toAddr.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("127.0.0.1");
toAddr.sin_port = htons(4000);
msg.msg_name = &toAddr;
msg.msg_namelen = sizeof(toAddr);
msg.msg_iov = &iov;
msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
msg.msg_iov->iov_base = recvBuffer;
msg.msg_iov->iov_len = strlen(recvBuffer) + 1;
msg.msg_control = 0;
msg.msg_controllen = 0;
msg.msg_flags = 0;
if (sendmsg(sock_fd, &msg, 0) == -1) {
perror("sendto() error\n");
close(sock_fd);
exit(1);
}
printf("client send data:%s\n", recvBuffer);
memset(recvBuffer, '\0', 128);
msg.msg_name = &toAddr;
msg.msg_namelen = sizeof(toAddr);
msg.msg_iov = &iov;
msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
msg.msg_iov->iov_base = recvBuffer;
msg.msg_iov->iov_len = 128;
msg.msg_control = 0;
msg.msg_controllen = 0;
msg.msg_flags = 0;
if (recvmsg(sock_fd, &msg, 0) == -1) {
perror("recvmsg() error\n");
close(sock_fd);
exit(1);
}
printf("receive data from server:%s\n", recvBuffer);
close(sock_fd);
return 0;
}
/***************** rds_server.c ********************/
int main(void)
{
struct sockaddr_in fromAddr;
int sock_fd;
struct sockaddr_in serverAddr;
unsigned int addrLen;
char recvBuffer[128];
struct msghdr msg;
struct iovec iov;
sock_fd = socket(AF_RDS, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
if(sock_fd < 0) {
perror("create socket error\n");
exit(0);
}
memset(&serverAddr, 0, sizeof(serverAddr));
serverAddr.sin_family = AF_INET;
serverAddr.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("127.0.0.1");
serverAddr.sin_port = htons(4000);
if (bind(sock_fd, (struct sockaddr*)&serverAddr, sizeof(serverAddr)) < 0) {
perror("bind error\n");
close(sock_fd);
exit(1);
}
printf("server is waiting to receive data...\n");
msg.msg_name = &fromAddr;
/*
* I add 16 to sizeof(fromAddr), ie 32,
* and pay attention to the definition of fromAddr,
* recvmsg() will overwrite sock_fd,
* since kernel will copy 32 bytes to userspace.
*
* If you just use sizeof(fromAddr), it works fine.
* */
msg.msg_namelen = sizeof(fromAddr) + 16;
/* msg.msg_namelen = sizeof(fromAddr); */
msg.msg_iov = &iov;
msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
msg.msg_iov->iov_base = recvBuffer;
msg.msg_iov->iov_len = 128;
msg.msg_control = 0;
msg.msg_controllen = 0;
msg.msg_flags = 0;
while (1) {
printf("old socket fd=%d\n", sock_fd);
if (recvmsg(sock_fd, &msg, 0) == -1) {
perror("recvmsg() error\n");
close(sock_fd);
exit(1);
}
printf("server received data from client:%s\n", recvBuffer);
printf("msg.msg_namelen=%d\n", msg.msg_namelen);
printf("new socket fd=%d\n", sock_fd);
strcat(recvBuffer, "--data from server");
if (sendmsg(sock_fd, &msg, 0) == -1) {
perror("sendmsg()\n");
close(sock_fd);
exit(1);
}
}
close(sock_fd);
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Weiping Pan <wpan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 19,358
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: raptor_rdfxml_parse_recognise_syntax(raptor_parser_factory* factory,
const unsigned char *buffer, size_t len,
const unsigned char *identifier,
const unsigned char *suffix,
const char *mime_type)
{
int score = 0;
if(suffix) {
if(!strcmp((const char*)suffix, "rdf") ||
!strcmp((const char*)suffix, "rdfs") ||
!strcmp((const char*)suffix, "foaf") ||
!strcmp((const char*)suffix, "doap") ||
!strcmp((const char*)suffix, "owl") ||
!strcmp((const char*)suffix, "daml"))
score = 9;
if(!strcmp((const char*)suffix, "rss"))
score = 3;
}
if(identifier) {
if(strstr((const char*)identifier, "rss1"))
score += 5;
else if(!suffix && strstr((const char*)identifier, "rss"))
score += 3;
else if(!suffix && strstr((const char*)identifier, "rdf"))
score += 2;
else if(!suffix && strstr((const char*)identifier, "RDF"))
score += 2;
}
if(mime_type) {
if(strstr((const char*)mime_type, "html"))
score -= 4;
else if(!strcmp((const char*)mime_type, "text/rdf"))
score += 7;
else if(!strcmp((const char*)mime_type, "application/xml"))
score += 5;
}
if(buffer && len) {
/* Check it's an XML namespace declared and not N3 or Turtle which
* mention the namespace URI but not in this form.
*/
#define HAS_RDF_XMLNS1 (raptor_memstr((const char*)buffer, len, "xmlns:rdf=\"http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#") != NULL)
#define HAS_RDF_XMLNS2 (raptor_memstr((const char*)buffer, len, "xmlns:rdf='http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#") != NULL)
#define HAS_RDF_XMLNS3 (raptor_memstr((const char*)buffer, len, "xmlns=\"http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#") != NULL)
#define HAS_RDF_XMLNS4 (raptor_memstr((const char*)buffer, len, "xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#") != NULL)
#define HAS_RDF_ENTITY1 (raptor_memstr((const char*)buffer, len, "<!ENTITY rdf 'http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#'>") != NULL)
#define HAS_RDF_ENTITY2 (raptor_memstr((const char*)buffer, len, "<!ENTITY rdf \"http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#\">") != NULL)
#define HAS_RDF_ENTITY3 (raptor_memstr((const char*)buffer, len, "xmlns:rdf=\"&rdf;\"") != NULL)
#define HAS_RDF_ENTITY4 (raptor_memstr((const char*)buffer, len, "xmlns:rdf='&rdf;'") != NULL)
#define HAS_HTML_NS (raptor_memstr((const char*)buffer, len, "http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml") != NULL)
#define HAS_HTML_ROOT (raptor_memstr((const char*)buffer, len, "<html") != NULL)
if(!HAS_HTML_NS && !HAS_HTML_ROOT &&
(HAS_RDF_XMLNS1 || HAS_RDF_XMLNS2 || HAS_RDF_XMLNS3 || HAS_RDF_XMLNS4 ||
HAS_RDF_ENTITY1 || HAS_RDF_ENTITY2 || HAS_RDF_ENTITY3 || HAS_RDF_ENTITY4)
) {
int has_rdf_RDF = (raptor_memstr((const char*)buffer, len, "<rdf:RDF") != NULL);
int has_rdf_Description = (raptor_memstr((const char*)buffer, len, "rdf:Description") != NULL);
int has_rdf_about = (raptor_memstr((const char*)buffer, len, "rdf:about") != NULL);
score += 7;
if(has_rdf_RDF)
score++;
if(has_rdf_Description)
score++;
if(has_rdf_about)
score++;
}
}
return score;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2012-0037
Enforce entity loading policy in raptor_libxml_resolveEntity
and raptor_libxml_getEntity by checking for file URIs and network URIs.
Add RAPTOR_OPTION_LOAD_EXTERNAL_ENTITIES / loadExternalEntities for
turning on loading of XML external entity loading, disabled by default.
This affects all the parsers that use SAX2: rdfxml, rss-tag-soup (and
aliases) and rdfa.
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 22,016
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::DisableBeforeUnloadHangMonitorForTesting() {
beforeunload_timeout_.reset();
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 127,765
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void NestedUnionAtributeAttributeGetter(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
DoubleOrStringOrDoubleOrStringSequence result;
impl->nestedUnionAtribute(result);
V8SetReturnValue(info, result);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 134,893
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ImageInputType::isFormDataAppendable() const
{
return true;
}
Commit Message: ImageInputType::ensurePrimaryContent should recreate UA shadow tree.
Once the fallback shadow tree was created, it was never recreated even if
ensurePrimaryContent was called. Such situation happens by updating |src|
attribute.
BUG=589838
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1732753004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#377804}
CWE ID: CWE-361
| 0
| 133,013
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int cac_read_binary(sc_card_t *card, unsigned int idx,
unsigned char *buf, size_t count, unsigned long flags)
{
cac_private_data_t * priv = CAC_DATA(card);
int r = 0;
u8 *tl = NULL, *val = NULL;
u8 *tl_ptr, *val_ptr, *tlv_ptr, *tl_start;
u8 *cert_ptr;
size_t tl_len, val_len, tlv_len;
size_t len, tl_head_len, cert_len;
u8 cert_type, tag;
SC_FUNC_CALLED(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE);
/* if we didn't return it all last time, return the remainder */
if (priv->cached) {
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,
"returning cached value idx=%d count=%"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u",
idx, count);
if (idx > priv->cache_buf_len) {
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, SC_ERROR_FILE_END_REACHED);
}
len = MIN(count, priv->cache_buf_len-idx);
memcpy(buf, &priv->cache_buf[idx], len);
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, len);
}
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,
"clearing cache idx=%d count=%"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u",
idx, count);
if (priv->cache_buf) {
free(priv->cache_buf);
priv->cache_buf = NULL;
priv->cache_buf_len = 0;
}
if (priv->object_type <= 0)
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, SC_ERROR_INTERNAL);
r = cac_read_file(card, CAC_FILE_TAG, &tl, &tl_len);
if (r < 0) {
goto done;
}
r = cac_read_file(card, CAC_FILE_VALUE, &val, &val_len);
if (r < 0)
goto done;
switch (priv->object_type) {
case CAC_OBJECT_TYPE_TLV_FILE:
tlv_len = tl_len + val_len;
priv->cache_buf = malloc(tlv_len);
if (priv->cache_buf == NULL) {
r = SC_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
goto done;
}
priv->cache_buf_len = tlv_len;
for (tl_ptr = tl, val_ptr=val, tlv_ptr = priv->cache_buf;
tl_len >= 2 && tlv_len > 0;
val_len -= len, tlv_len -= len, val_ptr += len, tlv_ptr += len) {
/* get the tag and the length */
tl_start = tl_ptr;
if (sc_simpletlv_read_tag(&tl_ptr, tl_len, &tag, &len) != SC_SUCCESS)
break;
tl_head_len = (tl_ptr - tl_start);
sc_simpletlv_put_tag(tag, len, tlv_ptr, tlv_len, &tlv_ptr);
tlv_len -= tl_head_len;
tl_len -= tl_head_len;
/* don't crash on bad data */
if (val_len < len) {
len = val_len;
}
/* if we run out of return space, truncate */
if (tlv_len < len) {
len = tlv_len;
}
memcpy(tlv_ptr, val_ptr, len);
}
break;
case CAC_OBJECT_TYPE_CERT:
/* read file */
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,
" obj= cert_file, val_len=%"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u (0x%04"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"x)",
val_len, val_len);
cert_len = 0;
cert_ptr = NULL;
cert_type = 0;
for (tl_ptr = tl, val_ptr = val; tl_len >= 2;
val_len -= len, val_ptr += len, tl_len -= tl_head_len) {
tl_start = tl_ptr;
if (sc_simpletlv_read_tag(&tl_ptr, tl_len, &tag, &len) != SC_SUCCESS)
break;
tl_head_len = tl_ptr - tl_start;
/* incomplete value */
if (val_len < len)
break;
if (tag == CAC_TAG_CERTIFICATE) {
cert_len = len;
cert_ptr = val_ptr;
}
if (tag == CAC_TAG_CERTINFO) {
if ((len >= 1) && (val_len >=1)) {
cert_type = *val_ptr;
}
}
if (tag == CAC_TAG_MSCUID) {
sc_log_hex(card->ctx, "MSCUID", val_ptr, len);
}
if ((val_len < len) || (tl_len < tl_head_len)) {
break;
}
}
/* if the info byte is 1, then the cert is compressed, decompress it */
if ((cert_type & 0x3) == 1) {
#ifdef ENABLE_ZLIB
r = sc_decompress_alloc(&priv->cache_buf, &priv->cache_buf_len,
cert_ptr, cert_len, COMPRESSION_AUTO);
#else
sc_log(card->ctx, "CAC compression not supported, no zlib");
r = SC_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
#endif
if (r)
goto done;
} else if (cert_len > 0) {
priv->cache_buf = malloc(cert_len);
if (priv->cache_buf == NULL) {
r = SC_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
goto done;
}
priv->cache_buf_len = cert_len;
memcpy(priv->cache_buf, cert_ptr, cert_len);
} else {
sc_log(card->ctx, "Can't read zero-length certificate");
goto done;
}
break;
case CAC_OBJECT_TYPE_GENERIC:
/* TODO
* We have some two buffers in unknown encoding that we
* need to present in PKCS#15 layer.
*/
default:
/* Unknown object type */
sc_log(card->ctx, "Unknown object type: %x", priv->object_type);
r = SC_ERROR_INTERNAL;
goto done;
}
/* OK we've read the data, now copy the required portion out to the callers buffer */
priv->cached = 1;
len = MIN(count, priv->cache_buf_len-idx);
memcpy(buf, &priv->cache_buf[idx], len);
r = len;
done:
if (tl)
free(tl);
if (val)
free(val);
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, r);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds writes
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problems.
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 78,742
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int is_dsp_inst(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
unsigned short inst = 0;
/*
* Safe guard if DSP mode is already enabled or we're lacking
* the DSP altogether.
*/
if (!(current_cpu_data.flags & CPU_HAS_DSP) || (regs->sr & SR_DSP))
return 0;
get_user(inst, ((unsigned short *) regs->pc));
inst &= 0xf000;
/* Check for any type of DSP or support instruction */
if ((inst == 0xf000) || (inst == 0x4000))
return 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 25,558
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void complete_and_exit(struct completion *comp, long code)
{
if (comp)
complete(comp);
do_exit(code);
}
Commit Message: fix infoleak in waitid(2)
kernel_waitid() can return a PID, an error or 0. rusage is filled in the first
case and waitid(2) rusage should've been copied out exactly in that case, *not*
whenever kernel_waitid() has not returned an error. Compat variant shares that
braino; none of kernel_wait4() callers do, so the below ought to fix it.
Reported-and-tested-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Fixes: ce72a16fa705 ("wait4(2)/waitid(2): separate copying rusage to userland")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.13
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 60,785
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned int xen_blkbk_unmap_prepare(
struct xen_blkif_ring *ring,
struct grant_page **pages,
unsigned int num,
struct gnttab_unmap_grant_ref *unmap_ops,
struct page **unmap_pages)
{
unsigned int i, invcount = 0;
for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
if (pages[i]->persistent_gnt != NULL) {
put_persistent_gnt(ring, pages[i]->persistent_gnt);
continue;
}
if (pages[i]->handle == BLKBACK_INVALID_HANDLE)
continue;
unmap_pages[invcount] = pages[i]->page;
gnttab_set_unmap_op(&unmap_ops[invcount], vaddr(pages[i]->page),
GNTMAP_host_map, pages[i]->handle);
pages[i]->handle = BLKBACK_INVALID_HANDLE;
invcount++;
}
return invcount;
}
Commit Message: xen-blkback: don't leak stack data via response ring
Rather than constructing a local structure instance on the stack, fill
the fields directly on the shared ring, just like other backends do.
Build on the fact that all response structure flavors are actually
identical (the old code did make this assumption too).
This is XSA-216.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 63,746
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void bdrv_attach_dev_nofail(BlockDriverState *bs, void *dev)
{
if (bdrv_attach_dev(bs, dev) < 0) {
abort();
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 16,839
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: TransportDIB* TransportDIB::Create(size_t size, uint32 sequence_num) {
const int shmkey = shmget(IPC_PRIVATE, size, 0666);
if (shmkey == -1) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to create SysV shared memory region"
<< " errno:" << errno;
return NULL;
}
void* address = shmat(shmkey, NULL /* desired address */, 0 /* flags */);
shmctl(shmkey, IPC_RMID, 0);
if (address == kInvalidAddress)
return NULL;
TransportDIB* dib = new TransportDIB;
dib->key_.shmkey = shmkey;
dib->address_ = address;
dib->size_ = size;
return dib;
}
Commit Message: Make shared memory segments writable only by their rightful owners.
BUG=143859
TEST=Chrome's UI still works on Linux and Chrome OS
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854242
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@158289 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 1
| 171,596
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void tcp_tx_timestamp(struct sock *sk, u16 tsflags, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
if (tsflags) {
struct skb_shared_info *shinfo = skb_shinfo(skb);
struct tcp_skb_cb *tcb = TCP_SKB_CB(skb);
sock_tx_timestamp(sk, tsflags, &shinfo->tx_flags);
if (tsflags & SOF_TIMESTAMPING_TX_ACK)
tcb->txstamp_ack = 1;
if (tsflags & SOF_TIMESTAMPING_TX_RECORD_MASK)
shinfo->tskey = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq + skb->len - 1;
}
}
Commit Message: tcp: avoid infinite loop in tcp_splice_read()
Splicing from TCP socket is vulnerable when a packet with URG flag is
received and stored into receive queue.
__tcp_splice_read() returns 0, and sk_wait_data() immediately
returns since there is the problematic skb in queue.
This is a nice way to burn cpu (aka infinite loop) and trigger
soft lockups.
Again, this gem was found by syzkaller tool.
Fixes: 9c55e01c0cc8 ("[TCP]: Splice receive support.")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 68,261
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DocumentLoader::DidInstallNewDocument(Document* document) {
document->SetReadyState(Document::kLoading);
if (content_security_policy_) {
document->InitContentSecurityPolicy(content_security_policy_.Release());
}
if (history_item_ && IsBackForwardLoadType(load_type_))
document->SetStateForNewFormElements(history_item_->GetDocumentState());
DCHECK(document->GetFrame());
document->GetFrame()->GetClientHintsPreferences().UpdateFrom(
client_hints_preferences_);
Settings* settings = document->GetSettings();
fetcher_->SetImagesEnabled(settings->GetImagesEnabled());
fetcher_->SetAutoLoadImages(settings->GetLoadsImagesAutomatically());
const AtomicString& dns_prefetch_control =
response_.HttpHeaderField(HTTPNames::X_DNS_Prefetch_Control);
if (!dns_prefetch_control.IsEmpty())
document->ParseDNSPrefetchControlHeader(dns_prefetch_control);
String header_content_language =
response_.HttpHeaderField(HTTPNames::Content_Language);
if (!header_content_language.IsEmpty()) {
size_t comma_index = header_content_language.find(',');
header_content_language.Truncate(comma_index);
header_content_language =
header_content_language.StripWhiteSpace(IsHTMLSpace<UChar>);
if (!header_content_language.IsEmpty())
document->SetContentLanguage(AtomicString(header_content_language));
}
String referrer_policy_header =
response_.HttpHeaderField(HTTPNames::Referrer_Policy);
if (!referrer_policy_header.IsNull()) {
UseCounter::Count(*document, WebFeature::kReferrerPolicyHeader);
document->ParseAndSetReferrerPolicy(referrer_policy_header);
}
if (response_.IsSignedExchangeInnerResponse())
UseCounter::Count(*document, WebFeature::kSignedExchangeInnerResponse);
GetLocalFrameClient().DidCreateNewDocument();
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when self-navigating to local-scheme URL
As the linked bug example shows, we should inherit CSP when we navigate
to a local-scheme URL (even if we are in a main browsing context).
Bug: 799747
Change-Id: I8413aa8e8049461ebcf0ffbf7b04c41d1340af02
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1234337
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597889}
CWE ID:
| 1
| 172,617
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::OnAccessibilitySnapshotResponse(
int callback_id,
const AXContentTreeUpdate& snapshot) {
const auto& it = ax_tree_snapshot_callbacks_.find(callback_id);
if (it != ax_tree_snapshot_callbacks_.end()) {
ui::AXTreeUpdate dst_snapshot;
dst_snapshot.root_id = snapshot.root_id;
dst_snapshot.nodes.resize(snapshot.nodes.size());
for (size_t i = 0; i < snapshot.nodes.size(); ++i) {
AXContentNodeDataToAXNodeData(snapshot.nodes[i],
&dst_snapshot.nodes[i]);
}
if (snapshot.has_tree_data) {
ax_content_tree_data_ = snapshot.tree_data;
AXContentTreeDataToAXTreeData(&dst_snapshot.tree_data);
dst_snapshot.has_tree_data = true;
}
std::move(it->second).Run(dst_snapshot);
ax_tree_snapshot_callbacks_.erase(it);
} else {
NOTREACHED() << "Received AX tree snapshot response for unknown id";
}
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 139,337
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void bt_free(struct blk_mq_bitmap_tags *bt)
{
kfree(bt->map);
kfree(bt->bs);
}
Commit Message: blk-mq: fix race between timeout and freeing request
Inside timeout handler, blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is called
to retrieve the request from one tag. This way is obviously
wrong because the request can be freed any time and some
fiedds of the request can't be trusted, then kernel oops
might be triggered[1].
Currently wrt. blk_mq_tag_to_rq(), the only special case is
that the flush request can share same tag with the request
cloned from, and the two requests can't be active at the same
time, so this patch fixes the above issue by updating tags->rqs[tag]
with the active request(either flush rq or the request cloned
from) of the tag.
Also blk_mq_tag_to_rq() gets much simplified with this patch.
Given blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is mainly for drivers and the caller must
make sure the request can't be freed, so in bt_for_each() this
helper is replaced with tags->rqs[tag].
[1] kernel oops log
[ 439.696220] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.697162] IP: [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.700653] PGD 7ef765067 PUD 7ef764067 PMD 0 ^M
[ 439.700653] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC ^M
[ 439.700653] Dumping ftrace buffer:^M
[ 439.700653] (ftrace buffer empty)^M
[ 439.700653] Modules linked in: nbd ipv6 kvm_intel kvm serio_raw^M
[ 439.700653] CPU: 6 PID: 2779 Comm: stress-ng-sigfd Not tainted 4.2.0-rc5-next-20150805+ #265^M
[ 439.730500] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011^M
[ 439.730500] task: ffff880605308000 ti: ffff88060530c000 task.ti: ffff88060530c000^M
[ 439.730500] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812d89ba>] [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.730500] RSP: 0018:ffff880819203da0 EFLAGS: 00010283^M
[ 439.730500] RAX: ffff880811b0e000 RBX: ffff8800bb465f00 RCX: 0000000000000002^M
[ 439.730500] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000202 RDI: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] RBP: ffff880819203db0 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000202^M
[ 439.730500] R13: ffff880814104800 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: ffff880811a2ea00^M
[ 439.730500] FS: 00007f165b3f5740(0000) GS:ffff880819200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b^M
[ 439.730500] CR2: 0000000000000158 CR3: 00000007ef766000 CR4: 00000000000006e0^M
[ 439.730500] Stack:^M
[ 439.730500] 0000000000000008 ffff8808114eed90 ffff880819203e00 ffffffff812dc104^M
[ 439.755663] ffff880819203e40 ffffffff812d9f5e 0000020000000000 ffff8808114eed80^M
[ 439.755663] Call Trace:^M
[ 439.755663] <IRQ> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc104>] bt_for_each+0x6e/0xc8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc1b3>] blk_mq_tag_busy_iter+0x55/0x5e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d8911>] blk_mq_rq_timer+0x5d/0xd4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3e10>] call_timer_fn+0xf7/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3d1e>] ? call_timer_fn+0x5/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a46d6>] run_timer_softirq+0x1ce/0x1f8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c367>] __do_softirq+0x181/0x3a4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c76e>] irq_exit+0x40/0x94^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81031482>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x33/0x3e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff815559a4>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x84/0x90^M
[ 439.755663] <EOI> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81554350>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x32/0x4a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a98b>] finish_task_switch+0xe0/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a94d>] ? finish_task_switch+0xa2/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81550066>] __schedule+0x469/0x6cd^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8155039b>] schedule+0x82/0x9a^M
[ 439.789267] [<ffffffff8119b28b>] signalfd_read+0x186/0x49a^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8106d86a>] ? wake_up_q+0x47/0x47^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811618c2>] __vfs_read+0x28/0x9f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8117a289>] ? __fget_light+0x4d/0x74^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811620a7>] vfs_read+0x7a/0xc6^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8116292b>] SyS_read+0x49/0x7f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff81554c17>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f^M
[ 439.790911] Code: 48 89 e5 e8 a9 b8 e7 ff 5d c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 89
f2 48 89 e5 41 54 41 89 f4 53 48 8b 47 60 48 8b 1c d0 48 8b 7b 30 48 8b
53 38 <48> 8b 87 58 01 00 00 48 85 c0 75 09 48 8b 97 88 0c 00 00 eb 10
^M
[ 439.790911] RIP [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.790911] RSP <ffff880819203da0>^M
[ 439.790911] CR2: 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.790911] ---[ end trace d40af58949325661 ]---^M
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 86,656
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void MojoVideoEncodeAcceleratorService::RequestEncodingParametersChange(
uint32_t bitrate,
uint32_t framerate) {
DVLOG(2) << __func__ << " bitrate=" << bitrate << " framerate=" << framerate;
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_SEQUENCE(sequence_checker_);
if (!encoder_)
return;
encoder_->RequestEncodingParametersChange(bitrate, framerate);
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 149,561
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void blk_mq_enable_hotplug(void)
{
mutex_unlock(&all_q_mutex);
}
Commit Message: blk-mq: fix race between timeout and freeing request
Inside timeout handler, blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is called
to retrieve the request from one tag. This way is obviously
wrong because the request can be freed any time and some
fiedds of the request can't be trusted, then kernel oops
might be triggered[1].
Currently wrt. blk_mq_tag_to_rq(), the only special case is
that the flush request can share same tag with the request
cloned from, and the two requests can't be active at the same
time, so this patch fixes the above issue by updating tags->rqs[tag]
with the active request(either flush rq or the request cloned
from) of the tag.
Also blk_mq_tag_to_rq() gets much simplified with this patch.
Given blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is mainly for drivers and the caller must
make sure the request can't be freed, so in bt_for_each() this
helper is replaced with tags->rqs[tag].
[1] kernel oops log
[ 439.696220] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.697162] IP: [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.700653] PGD 7ef765067 PUD 7ef764067 PMD 0 ^M
[ 439.700653] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC ^M
[ 439.700653] Dumping ftrace buffer:^M
[ 439.700653] (ftrace buffer empty)^M
[ 439.700653] Modules linked in: nbd ipv6 kvm_intel kvm serio_raw^M
[ 439.700653] CPU: 6 PID: 2779 Comm: stress-ng-sigfd Not tainted 4.2.0-rc5-next-20150805+ #265^M
[ 439.730500] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011^M
[ 439.730500] task: ffff880605308000 ti: ffff88060530c000 task.ti: ffff88060530c000^M
[ 439.730500] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812d89ba>] [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.730500] RSP: 0018:ffff880819203da0 EFLAGS: 00010283^M
[ 439.730500] RAX: ffff880811b0e000 RBX: ffff8800bb465f00 RCX: 0000000000000002^M
[ 439.730500] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000202 RDI: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] RBP: ffff880819203db0 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000202^M
[ 439.730500] R13: ffff880814104800 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: ffff880811a2ea00^M
[ 439.730500] FS: 00007f165b3f5740(0000) GS:ffff880819200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b^M
[ 439.730500] CR2: 0000000000000158 CR3: 00000007ef766000 CR4: 00000000000006e0^M
[ 439.730500] Stack:^M
[ 439.730500] 0000000000000008 ffff8808114eed90 ffff880819203e00 ffffffff812dc104^M
[ 439.755663] ffff880819203e40 ffffffff812d9f5e 0000020000000000 ffff8808114eed80^M
[ 439.755663] Call Trace:^M
[ 439.755663] <IRQ> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc104>] bt_for_each+0x6e/0xc8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc1b3>] blk_mq_tag_busy_iter+0x55/0x5e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d8911>] blk_mq_rq_timer+0x5d/0xd4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3e10>] call_timer_fn+0xf7/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3d1e>] ? call_timer_fn+0x5/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a46d6>] run_timer_softirq+0x1ce/0x1f8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c367>] __do_softirq+0x181/0x3a4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c76e>] irq_exit+0x40/0x94^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81031482>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x33/0x3e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff815559a4>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x84/0x90^M
[ 439.755663] <EOI> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81554350>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x32/0x4a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a98b>] finish_task_switch+0xe0/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a94d>] ? finish_task_switch+0xa2/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81550066>] __schedule+0x469/0x6cd^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8155039b>] schedule+0x82/0x9a^M
[ 439.789267] [<ffffffff8119b28b>] signalfd_read+0x186/0x49a^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8106d86a>] ? wake_up_q+0x47/0x47^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811618c2>] __vfs_read+0x28/0x9f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8117a289>] ? __fget_light+0x4d/0x74^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811620a7>] vfs_read+0x7a/0xc6^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8116292b>] SyS_read+0x49/0x7f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff81554c17>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f^M
[ 439.790911] Code: 48 89 e5 e8 a9 b8 e7 ff 5d c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 89
f2 48 89 e5 41 54 41 89 f4 53 48 8b 47 60 48 8b 1c d0 48 8b 7b 30 48 8b
53 38 <48> 8b 87 58 01 00 00 48 85 c0 75 09 48 8b 97 88 0c 00 00 eb 10
^M
[ 439.790911] RIP [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.790911] RSP <ffff880819203da0>^M
[ 439.790911] CR2: 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.790911] ---[ end trace d40af58949325661 ]---^M
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 86,691
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int do_path_lookup(int dfd, const char *name,
unsigned int flags, struct nameidata *nd)
{
int retval = path_init(dfd, name, flags, nd);
if (!retval)
retval = path_walk(name, nd);
if (unlikely(!retval && !audit_dummy_context() && nd->path.dentry &&
nd->path.dentry->d_inode))
audit_inode(name, nd->path.dentry);
if (nd->root.mnt) {
path_put(&nd->root);
nd->root.mnt = NULL;
}
return retval;
}
Commit Message: fix autofs/afs/etc. magic mountpoint breakage
We end up trying to kfree() nd.last.name on open("/mnt/tmp", O_CREAT)
if /mnt/tmp is an autofs direct mount. The reason is that nd.last_type
is bogus here; we want LAST_BIND for everything of that kind and we
get LAST_NORM left over from finding parent directory.
So make sure that it *is* set properly; set to LAST_BIND before
doing ->follow_link() - for normal symlinks it will be changed
by __vfs_follow_link() and everything else needs it set that way.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 39,676
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: TEE_Result syscall_authenc_init(unsigned long state, const void *nonce,
size_t nonce_len, size_t tag_len,
size_t aad_len, size_t payload_len)
{
TEE_Result res;
struct tee_cryp_state *cs;
struct tee_ta_session *sess;
struct tee_obj *o;
struct tee_cryp_obj_secret *key;
res = tee_ta_get_current_session(&sess);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
res = tee_svc_cryp_get_state(sess, tee_svc_uref_to_vaddr(state), &cs);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
res = tee_obj_get(to_user_ta_ctx(sess->ctx), cs->key1, &o);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
if ((o->info.handleFlags & TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_INITIALIZED) == 0)
return TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
key = o->attr;
res = crypto_authenc_init(cs->ctx, cs->algo, cs->mode,
(uint8_t *)(key + 1), key->key_size,
nonce, nonce_len, tag_len, aad_len,
payload_len);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
cs->ctx_finalize = (tee_cryp_ctx_finalize_func_t)crypto_authenc_final;
return TEE_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: svc: check for allocation overflow in crypto calls part 2
Without checking for overflow there is a risk of allocating a buffer
with size smaller than anticipated and as a consequence of that it might
lead to a heap based overflow with attacker controlled data written
outside the boundaries of the buffer.
Fixes: OP-TEE-2018-0011: "Integer overflow in crypto system calls (x2)"
Signed-off-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org> (QEMU v7, v8)
Reviewed-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Riscure <inforequest@riscure.com>
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <a.a.milburn@vu.nl>
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@linaro.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 86,861
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: map_engine_get_talk_distance(void)
{
return s_talk_distance;
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c (#268)
* Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c
There's a buffer overflow bug in the function layer_resize. It allocates
a buffer `tilemap` with size `x_size * y_size * sizeof(struct map_tile)`.
But it didn't check for integer overflow, so if x_size and y_size are
very large, it's possible that the buffer size is smaller than needed,
causing a buffer overflow later.
PoC: `SetLayerSize(0, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF);`
* move malloc to a separate line
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 75,031
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct crypto_tfm *__crypto_alloc_tfm(struct crypto_alg *alg, u32 type,
u32 mask)
{
struct crypto_tfm *tfm = NULL;
unsigned int tfm_size;
int err = -ENOMEM;
tfm_size = sizeof(*tfm) + crypto_ctxsize(alg, type, mask);
tfm = kzalloc(tfm_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (tfm == NULL)
goto out_err;
tfm->__crt_alg = alg;
err = crypto_init_ops(tfm, type, mask);
if (err)
goto out_free_tfm;
if (!tfm->exit && alg->cra_init && (err = alg->cra_init(tfm)))
goto cra_init_failed;
goto out;
cra_init_failed:
crypto_exit_ops(tfm);
out_free_tfm:
if (err == -EAGAIN)
crypto_shoot_alg(alg);
kfree(tfm);
out_err:
tfm = ERR_PTR(err);
out:
return tfm;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 47,126
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int midi_setup_control(struct _mdi *mdi, uint8_t channel,
uint8_t controller, uint8_t setting) {
void (*tmp_event)(struct _mdi *mdi, struct _event_data *data) = NULL;
MIDI_EVENT_DEBUG(__FUNCTION__,channel, controller);
switch (controller) {
/*
**********************************************************************
FIXME: Need to add dummy events for MIDI events we don't support.
There is no reason not to store unsupported events in light of our
out to midi option.
**********************************************************************
*/
case 0:
tmp_event = *_WM_do_control_bank_select;
mdi->channel[channel].bank = setting;
break;
case 6:
tmp_event = *_WM_do_control_data_entry_course;
break;
case 7:
tmp_event = *_WM_do_control_channel_volume;
mdi->channel[channel].volume = setting;
break;
case 8:
tmp_event = *_WM_do_control_channel_balance;
break;
case 10:
tmp_event = *_WM_do_control_channel_pan;
break;
case 11:
tmp_event = *_WM_do_control_channel_expression;
break;
case 38:
tmp_event = *_WM_do_control_data_entry_fine;
break;
case 64:
tmp_event = *_WM_do_control_channel_hold;
break;
case 96:
tmp_event = *_WM_do_control_data_increment;
break;
case 97:
tmp_event = *_WM_do_control_data_decrement;
break;
case 98:
tmp_event = *_WM_do_control_non_registered_param_fine;
break;
case 99:
tmp_event = *_WM_do_control_non_registered_param_course;
break;
case 100:
tmp_event = *_WM_do_control_registered_param_fine;
break;
case 101:
tmp_event = *_WM_do_control_registered_param_course;
break;
case 120:
tmp_event = *_WM_do_control_channel_sound_off;
break;
case 121:
tmp_event = *_WM_do_control_channel_controllers_off;
break;
case 123:
tmp_event = *_WM_do_control_channel_notes_off;
break;
default:
tmp_event = *_WM_do_control_dummy;
break;
}
_WM_CheckEventMemoryPool(mdi);
mdi->events[mdi->event_count].do_event = tmp_event;
mdi->events[mdi->event_count].event_data.channel = channel;
if (tmp_event != *_WM_do_control_dummy) {
mdi->events[mdi->event_count].event_data.data.value = setting;
} else {
mdi->events[mdi->event_count].event_data.data.value = (controller << 8) | setting;
}
mdi->events[mdi->event_count].samples_to_next = 0;
mdi->event_count++;
return (0);
}
Commit Message: Add a new size parameter to _WM_SetupMidiEvent() so that it knows
where to stop reading, and adjust its users properly. Fixes bug #175
(CVE-2017-11661, CVE-2017-11662, CVE-2017-11663, CVE-2017-11664.)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 63,275
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct sock *ipxitf_find_internal_socket(struct ipx_interface *intrfc,
unsigned char *ipx_node,
__be16 port)
{
struct sock *s;
ipxitf_hold(intrfc);
spin_lock_bh(&intrfc->if_sklist_lock);
sk_for_each(s, &intrfc->if_sklist) {
struct ipx_sock *ipxs = ipx_sk(s);
if (ipxs->port == port &&
!memcmp(ipx_node, ipxs->node, IPX_NODE_LEN))
goto found;
}
s = NULL;
found:
spin_unlock_bh(&intrfc->if_sklist_lock);
ipxitf_put(intrfc);
return s;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 40,455
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ofputil_queue_stats_to_ofp10(const struct ofputil_queue_stats *oqs,
struct ofp10_queue_stats *qs10)
{
qs10->port_no = htons(ofp_to_u16(oqs->port_no));
memset(qs10->pad, 0, sizeof qs10->pad);
qs10->queue_id = htonl(oqs->queue_id);
put_32aligned_be64(&qs10->tx_bytes, htonll(oqs->tx_bytes));
put_32aligned_be64(&qs10->tx_packets, htonll(oqs->tx_packets));
put_32aligned_be64(&qs10->tx_errors, htonll(oqs->tx_errors));
}
Commit Message: ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <pkusunyifeng@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 77,704
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int build_spdinfo(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net *net,
u32 pid, u32 seq, u32 flags)
{
struct xfrmk_spdinfo si;
struct xfrmu_spdinfo spc;
struct xfrmu_spdhinfo sph;
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
int err;
u32 *f;
nlh = nlmsg_put(skb, pid, seq, XFRM_MSG_NEWSPDINFO, sizeof(u32), 0);
if (nlh == NULL) /* shouldn't really happen ... */
return -EMSGSIZE;
f = nlmsg_data(nlh);
*f = flags;
xfrm_spd_getinfo(net, &si);
spc.incnt = si.incnt;
spc.outcnt = si.outcnt;
spc.fwdcnt = si.fwdcnt;
spc.inscnt = si.inscnt;
spc.outscnt = si.outscnt;
spc.fwdscnt = si.fwdscnt;
sph.spdhcnt = si.spdhcnt;
sph.spdhmcnt = si.spdhmcnt;
err = nla_put(skb, XFRMA_SPD_INFO, sizeof(spc), &spc);
if (!err)
err = nla_put(skb, XFRMA_SPD_HINFO, sizeof(sph), &sph);
if (err) {
nlmsg_cancel(skb, nlh);
return err;
}
return nlmsg_end(skb, nlh);
}
Commit Message: xfrm_user: return error pointer instead of NULL
When dump_one_state() returns an error, e.g. because of a too small
buffer to dump the whole xfrm state, xfrm_state_netlink() returns NULL
instead of an error pointer. But its callers expect an error pointer
and therefore continue to operate on a NULL skbuff.
This could lead to a privilege escalation (execution of user code in
kernel context) if the attacker has CAP_NET_ADMIN and is able to map
address 0.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 33,095
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: TemplateURLRef::TemplateURLRef(const TemplateURL* owner, Type type)
: owner_(owner),
type_(type),
index_in_owner_(0),
parsed_(false),
valid_(false),
supports_replacements_(false),
search_term_position_in_path_(std::string::npos),
search_term_key_location_(url::Parsed::QUERY),
prepopulated_(false) {
DCHECK(owner_);
DCHECK_NE(INDEXED, type_);
}
Commit Message: [Contextual Search] Change "Now on Tap" to "Contextual Cards"
BUG=644934
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2361163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#420899}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 120,317
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SPL_METHOD(FilesystemIterator, rewind)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
int skip_dots = SPL_HAS_FLAG(intern->flags, SPL_FILE_DIR_SKIPDOTS);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
intern->u.dir.index = 0;
if (intern->u.dir.dirp) {
php_stream_rewinddir(intern->u.dir.dirp);
}
do {
spl_filesystem_dir_read(intern TSRMLS_CC);
} while (skip_dots && spl_filesystem_is_dot(intern->u.dir.entry.d_name));
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 51,329
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ip6t_error(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_action_param *par)
{
net_info_ratelimited("error: `%s'\n", (const char *)par->targinfo);
return NF_DROP;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: make sure e->next_offset covers remaining blob size
Otherwise this function may read data beyond the ruleset blob.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 52,366
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GURL CreateRedirectURL(const std::string& scheme,
const std::string& host,
std::uint16_t port) {
return GURL(scheme + "://" + host + ":" + base::NumberToString(port));
}
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311}
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 136,943
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: float Parcel::readFloat() const
{
return readAligned<float>();
}
Commit Message: Disregard alleged binder entities beyond parcel bounds
When appending one parcel's contents to another, ignore binder
objects within the source Parcel that appear to lie beyond the
formal bounds of that Parcel's data buffer.
Bug 17312693
Change-Id: If592a260f3fcd9a56fc160e7feb2c8b44c73f514
(cherry picked from commit 27182be9f20f4f5b48316666429f09b9ecc1f22e)
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 157,298
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void tg3_set_multi(struct tg3 *tp, unsigned int accept_all)
{
/* accept or reject all multicast frames */
tw32(MAC_HASH_REG_0, accept_all ? 0xffffffff : 0);
tw32(MAC_HASH_REG_1, accept_all ? 0xffffffff : 0);
tw32(MAC_HASH_REG_2, accept_all ? 0xffffffff : 0);
tw32(MAC_HASH_REG_3, accept_all ? 0xffffffff : 0);
}
Commit Message: tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <oded@privatecore.com>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matt Carlson <mcarlson@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 32,751
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ModuleExport size_t RegisterEMFImage(void)
{
MagickInfo
*entry;
entry=SetMagickInfo("EMF");
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_WINGDI32_DELEGATE)
entry->decoder=ReadEMFImage;
#endif
entry->description=ConstantString(
"Windows Enhanced Meta File");
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsEMF;
entry->blob_support=MagickFalse;
entry->module=ConstantString("WMF");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
entry=SetMagickInfo("WMF");
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_WINGDI32_DELEGATE)
entry->decoder=ReadEMFImage;
#endif
entry->description=ConstantString("Windows Meta File");
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsWMF;
entry->blob_support=MagickFalse;
entry->module=ConstantString("WMF");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
return(MagickImageCoderSignature);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 71,529
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int apparmor_capable(struct task_struct *task, const struct cred *cred,
struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, int audit)
{
struct aa_profile *profile;
/* cap_capable returns 0 on success, else -EPERM */
int error = cap_capable(task, cred, ns, cap, audit);
if (!error) {
profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
if (!unconfined(profile))
error = aa_capable(task, profile, cap, audit);
}
return error;
}
Commit Message: AppArmor: fix oops in apparmor_setprocattr
When invalid parameters are passed to apparmor_setprocattr a NULL deref
oops occurs when it tries to record an audit message. This is because
it is passing NULL for the profile parameter for aa_audit. But aa_audit
now requires that the profile passed is not NULL.
Fix this by passing the current profile on the task that is trying to
setprocattr.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 34,780
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void MojoJpegDecodeAccelerator::InitializeAsync(Client* client,
InitCB init_cb) {
DCHECK(io_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
jpeg_decoder_.Bind(std::move(jpeg_decoder_info_));
jpeg_decoder_.set_connection_error_handler(
base::Bind(&MojoJpegDecodeAccelerator::OnLostConnectionToJpegDecoder,
base::Unretained(this)));
jpeg_decoder_->Initialize(
base::Bind(&MojoJpegDecodeAccelerator::OnInitializeDone,
base::Unretained(this), std::move(init_cb), client));
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 149,506
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static long dprintf_DollarString(char *input, char **end)
{
int number=0;
while(ISDIGIT(*input)) {
number *= 10;
number += *input-'0';
input++;
}
if(number && ('$'==*input++)) {
*end = input;
return number;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: printf: fix floating point buffer overflow issues
... and add a bunch of floating point printf tests
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 86,519
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PDFiumEngine::PostPaint() {
for (size_t i = 0; i < progressive_paints_.size(); ++i) {
if (progressive_paints_[i].painted_)
continue;
FPDF_RenderPage_Close(
pages_[progressive_paints_[i].page_index]->GetPage());
FPDFBitmap_Destroy(progressive_paints_[i].bitmap);
progressive_paints_.erase(progressive_paints_.begin() + i);
--i;
}
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Defer page unloading in JS callback.
One of the callbacks from PDFium JavaScript into the embedder is to get the
current page number. In Chromium, this will trigger a call to
CalculateMostVisiblePage that method will determine the visible pages and unload
any non-visible pages. But, if the originating JS is on a non-visible page
we'll delete the page and annotations associated with that page. This will
cause issues as we are currently working with those objects when the JavaScript
returns.
This Cl defers the page unloading triggered by getting the most visible page
until the next event is handled by the Chromium embedder.
BUG=chromium:653090
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2418533002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#424781}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 140,398
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChromeNetworkDelegate::OnBeforeRedirect(net::URLRequest* request,
const GURL& new_location) {
ExtensionWebRequestEventRouter::GetInstance()->OnBeforeRedirect(
profile_, extension_info_map_.get(), request, new_location);
}
Commit Message: Added daily UMA for non-data-reduction-proxy data usage when the proxy is enabled.
BUG=325325
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/106113002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@239897 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 113,562
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void netlink_detachskb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
kfree_skb(skb);
sock_put(sk);
}
Commit Message: af_netlink: force credentials passing [CVE-2012-3520]
Pablo Neira Ayuso discovered that avahi and
potentially NetworkManager accept spoofed Netlink messages because of a
kernel bug. The kernel passes all-zero SCM_CREDENTIALS ancillary data
to the receiver if the sender did not provide such data, instead of not
including any such data at all or including the correct data from the
peer (as it is the case with AF_UNIX).
This bug was introduced in commit 16e572626961
(af_unix: dont send SCM_CREDENTIALS by default)
This patch forces passing credentials for netlink, as
before the regression.
Another fix would be to not add SCM_CREDENTIALS in
netlink messages if not provided by the sender, but it
might break some programs.
With help from Florian Weimer & Petr Matousek
This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3520
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-287
| 0
| 19,228
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gdImagePtr gdImageCreateFromGd2Part (FILE * inFile, int srcx, int srcy, int w, int h)
{
gdImagePtr im;
gdIOCtx *in = gdNewFileCtx(inFile);
im = gdImageCreateFromGd2PartCtx(in, srcx, srcy, w, h);
in->gd_free(in);
return im;
}
Commit Message: Fixed #72339 Integer Overflow in _gd2GetHeader() resulting in heap overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 51,473
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int WebGLRenderingContextBase::ExternallyAllocatedBufferCountPerPixel() {
if (isContextLost())
return 0;
int buffer_count = 1;
buffer_count *= 2; // WebGL's front and back color buffers.
int samples = GetDrawingBuffer() ? GetDrawingBuffer()->SampleCount() : 0;
base::Optional<WebGLContextAttributes> attribs;
getContextAttributes(attribs);
if (attribs) {
if (attribs->antialias() && samples > 0 &&
GetDrawingBuffer()->ExplicitResolveOfMultisampleData()) {
if (attribs->depth() || attribs->stencil())
buffer_count += samples; // depth/stencil multisample buffer
buffer_count += samples; // color multisample buffer
} else if (attribs->depth() || attribs->stencil()) {
buffer_count += 1; // regular depth/stencil buffer
}
}
return buffer_count;
}
Commit Message: Validate all incoming WebGLObjects.
A few entry points were missing the correct validation.
Tested with improved conformance tests in
https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2654 .
Bug: 848914
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ib98a61cc5bf378d1b3338b04acd7e1bc4c2fe008
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1086718
Reviewed-by: Kai Ninomiya <kainino@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#565016}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 153,606
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t expect_preface(h2o_http2_conn_t *conn, const uint8_t *src, size_t len, const char **err_desc)
{
if (len < CONNECTION_PREFACE.len) {
return H2O_HTTP2_ERROR_INCOMPLETE;
}
if (memcmp(src, CONNECTION_PREFACE.base, CONNECTION_PREFACE.len) != 0) {
return H2O_HTTP2_ERROR_PROTOCOL_CLOSE_IMMEDIATELY;
}
{ /* send SETTINGS */
h2o_iovec_t vec = h2o_buffer_reserve(&conn->_write.buf, SETTINGS_HOST_BIN.len);
memcpy(vec.base, SETTINGS_HOST_BIN.base, SETTINGS_HOST_BIN.len);
conn->_write.buf->size += SETTINGS_HOST_BIN.len;
h2o_http2_conn_request_write(conn);
}
conn->_read_expect = expect_default;
return CONNECTION_PREFACE.len;
}
Commit Message: h2: use after free on premature connection close #920
lib/http2/connection.c:on_read() calls parse_input(), which might free
`conn`. It does so in particular if the connection preface isn't
the expected one in expect_preface(). `conn` is then used after the free
in `if (h2o_timeout_is_linked(&conn->_write.timeout_entry)`.
We fix this by adding a return value to close_connection that returns a
negative value if `conn` has been free'd and can't be used anymore.
Credits for finding the bug to Tim Newsham.
CWE ID:
| 0
| 52,549
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static IntPoint extractClickLocation(Event* event)
{
if (!event->underlyingEvent() || !event->underlyingEvent()->isMouseEvent())
return IntPoint();
MouseEvent* mouseEvent = toMouseEvent(event->underlyingEvent());
if (!mouseEvent->hasPosition())
return IntPoint();
return IntPoint(mouseEvent->offsetX(), mouseEvent->offsetY());
}
Commit Message: ImageInputType::ensurePrimaryContent should recreate UA shadow tree.
Once the fallback shadow tree was created, it was never recreated even if
ensurePrimaryContent was called. Such situation happens by updating |src|
attribute.
BUG=589838
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1732753004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#377804}
CWE ID: CWE-361
| 0
| 133,008
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len,
const ASN1_ITEM *it,
int tag, int aclass, char opt, ASN1_TLC *ctx)
{
const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, *errtt = NULL;
const ASN1_COMPAT_FUNCS *cf;
const ASN1_EXTERN_FUNCS *ef;
const ASN1_AUX *aux = it->funcs;
ASN1_aux_cb *asn1_cb;
const unsigned char *p = NULL, *q;
unsigned char *wp = NULL; /* BIG FAT WARNING! BREAKS CONST WHERE USED */
unsigned char imphack = 0, oclass;
char seq_eoc, seq_nolen, cst, isopt;
long tmplen;
int i;
int otag;
int ret = 0;
ASN1_VALUE **pchptr, *ptmpval;
if (!pval)
return 0;
if (aux && aux->asn1_cb)
asn1_cb = 0;
switch (it->itype) {
case ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE:
if (it->templates) {
/*
* tagging or OPTIONAL is currently illegal on an item template
* because the flags can't get passed down. In practice this
* isn't a problem: we include the relevant flags from the item
* template in the template itself.
*/
if ((tag != -1) || opt) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I,
ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_OPTIONS_ON_ITEM_TEMPLATE);
goto err;
}
return asn1_template_ex_d2i(pval, in, len,
it->templates, opt, ctx);
}
return asn1_d2i_ex_primitive(pval, in, len, it,
tag, aclass, opt, ctx);
break;
case ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING:
p = *in;
/* Just read in tag and class */
ret = asn1_check_tlen(NULL, &otag, &oclass, NULL, NULL,
&p, len, -1, 0, 1, ctx);
if (!ret) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/* Must be UNIVERSAL class */
if (oclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
/* If OPTIONAL, assume this is OK */
if (opt)
return -1;
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_MSTRING_NOT_UNIVERSAL);
goto err;
}
/* Check tag matches bit map */
if (!(ASN1_tag2bit(otag) & it->utype)) {
/* If OPTIONAL, assume this is OK */
if (opt)
return -1;
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_MSTRING_WRONG_TAG);
goto err;
}
return asn1_d2i_ex_primitive(pval, in, len, it, otag, 0, 0, ctx);
case ASN1_ITYPE_EXTERN:
/* Use new style d2i */
ef = it->funcs;
return ef->asn1_ex_d2i(pval, in, len, it, tag, aclass, opt, ctx);
case ASN1_ITYPE_COMPAT:
/* we must resort to old style evil hackery */
cf = it->funcs;
/* If OPTIONAL see if it is there */
if (opt) {
int exptag;
p = *in;
if (tag == -1)
exptag = it->utype;
else
exptag = tag;
/*
* Don't care about anything other than presence of expected tag
*/
ret = asn1_check_tlen(NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
&p, len, exptag, aclass, 1, ctx);
if (!ret) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (ret == -1)
return -1;
}
/*
* This is the old style evil hack IMPLICIT handling: since the
* underlying code is expecting a tag and class other than the one
* present we change the buffer temporarily then change it back
* afterwards. This doesn't and never did work for tags > 30. Yes
* this is *horrible* but it is only needed for old style d2i which
* will hopefully not be around for much longer. FIXME: should copy
* the buffer then modify it so the input buffer can be const: we
* should *always* copy because the old style d2i might modify the
* buffer.
*/
if (tag != -1) {
wp = *(unsigned char **)in;
imphack = *wp;
if (p == NULL) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
goto err;
}
*wp = (unsigned char)((*p & V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
| it->utype);
}
ptmpval = cf->asn1_d2i(pval, in, len);
if (tag != -1)
*wp = imphack;
if (ptmpval)
return 1;
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
goto err;
case ASN1_ITYPE_CHOICE:
if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_PRE, pval, it, NULL))
goto auxerr;
if (*pval) {
/* Free up and zero CHOICE value if initialised */
i = asn1_get_choice_selector(pval, it);
if ((i >= 0) && (i < it->tcount)) {
tt = it->templates + i;
pchptr = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, tt);
ASN1_template_free(pchptr, tt);
asn1_set_choice_selector(pval, -1, it);
}
} else if (!ASN1_item_ex_new(pval, it)) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/* CHOICE type, try each possibility in turn */
p = *in;
for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; i++, tt++) {
pchptr = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, tt);
/*
* We mark field as OPTIONAL so its absence can be recognised.
*/
ret = asn1_template_ex_d2i(pchptr, &p, len, tt, 1, ctx);
/* If field not present, try the next one */
if (ret == -1)
continue;
/* If positive return, read OK, break loop */
if (ret > 0)
break;
/* Otherwise must be an ASN1 parsing error */
errtt = tt;
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/* Did we fall off the end without reading anything? */
if (i == it->tcount) {
/* If OPTIONAL, this is OK */
if (opt) {
/* Free and zero it */
ASN1_item_ex_free(pval, it);
return -1;
}
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_NO_MATCHING_CHOICE_TYPE);
goto err;
}
asn1_set_choice_selector(pval, i, it);
if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_POST, pval, it, NULL))
goto auxerr;
*in = p;
return 1;
case ASN1_ITYPE_NDEF_SEQUENCE:
case ASN1_ITYPE_SEQUENCE:
p = *in;
tmplen = len;
/* If no IMPLICIT tagging set to SEQUENCE, UNIVERSAL */
if (tag == -1) {
tag = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE;
aclass = V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL;
}
/* Get SEQUENCE length and update len, p */
ret = asn1_check_tlen(&len, NULL, NULL, &seq_eoc, &cst,
&p, len, tag, aclass, opt, ctx);
if (!ret) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
goto err;
} else if (ret == -1)
return -1;
if (aux && (aux->flags & ASN1_AFLG_BROKEN)) {
len = tmplen - (p - *in);
seq_nolen = 1;
}
/* If indefinite we don't do a length check */
else
seq_nolen = seq_eoc;
if (!cst) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_SEQUENCE_NOT_CONSTRUCTED);
goto err;
}
if (!*pval && !ASN1_item_ex_new(pval, it)) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_PRE, pval, it, NULL))
goto auxerr;
/* Free up and zero any ADB found */
for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; i++, tt++) {
if (tt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_ADB_MASK) {
const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt;
ASN1_VALUE **pseqval;
seqtt = asn1_do_adb(pval, tt, 1);
pseqval = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, seqtt);
ASN1_template_free(pseqval, seqtt);
}
}
/* Get each field entry */
for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; i++, tt++) {
const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt;
ASN1_VALUE **pseqval;
seqtt = asn1_do_adb(pval, tt, 1);
if (!seqtt)
goto err;
pseqval = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, seqtt);
/* Have we ran out of data? */
if (!len)
break;
q = p;
if (asn1_check_eoc(&p, len)) {
if (!seq_eoc) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_UNEXPECTED_EOC);
goto err;
}
len -= p - q;
seq_eoc = 0;
q = p;
break;
}
/*
* This determines the OPTIONAL flag value. The field cannot be
* omitted if it is the last of a SEQUENCE and there is still
* data to be read. This isn't strictly necessary but it
* increases efficiency in some cases.
*/
if (i == (it->tcount - 1))
isopt = 0;
else
isopt = (char)(seqtt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_OPTIONAL);
/*
* attempt to read in field, allowing each to be OPTIONAL
*/
ret = asn1_template_ex_d2i(pseqval, &p, len, seqtt, isopt, ctx);
if (!ret) {
errtt = seqtt;
goto err;
} else if (ret == -1) {
/*
* OPTIONAL component absent. Free and zero the field.
*/
ASN1_template_free(pseqval, seqtt);
continue;
}
/* Update length */
len -= p - q;
}
/* Check for EOC if expecting one */
if (seq_eoc && !asn1_check_eoc(&p, len)) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_MISSING_EOC);
goto err;
}
/* Check all data read */
if (!seq_nolen && len) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_SEQUENCE_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
/*
* If we get here we've got no more data in the SEQUENCE, however we
* may not have read all fields so check all remaining are OPTIONAL
* and clear any that are.
*/
for (; i < it->tcount; tt++, i++) {
const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt;
seqtt = asn1_do_adb(pval, tt, 1);
if (!seqtt)
goto err;
if (seqtt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_OPTIONAL) {
ASN1_VALUE **pseqval;
pseqval = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, seqtt);
ASN1_template_free(pseqval, seqtt);
} else {
errtt = seqtt;
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_FIELD_MISSING);
goto err;
}
}
/* Save encoding */
if (!asn1_enc_save(pval, *in, p - *in, it))
goto auxerr;
if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_POST, pval, it, NULL))
goto auxerr;
*in = p;
return 1;
default:
return 0;
}
auxerr:
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_AUX_ERROR);
auxerr:
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_AUX_ERROR);
err:
ASN1_item_ex_free(pval, it);
if (errtt)
ERR_add_error_data(4, "Field=", errtt->field_name,
", Type=", it->sname);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 1
| 164,718
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int kvm_arch_vcpu_init(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct page *page;
struct kvm *kvm;
int r;
BUG_ON(vcpu->kvm == NULL);
kvm = vcpu->kvm;
vcpu->arch.pv.pv_unhalted = false;
vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt.ops = &emulate_ops;
if (!irqchip_in_kernel(kvm) || kvm_vcpu_is_reset_bsp(vcpu))
vcpu->arch.mp_state = KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE;
else
vcpu->arch.mp_state = KVM_MP_STATE_UNINITIALIZED;
page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
if (!page) {
r = -ENOMEM;
goto fail;
}
vcpu->arch.pio_data = page_address(page);
kvm_set_tsc_khz(vcpu, max_tsc_khz);
r = kvm_mmu_create(vcpu);
if (r < 0)
goto fail_free_pio_data;
if (irqchip_in_kernel(kvm)) {
r = kvm_create_lapic(vcpu);
if (r < 0)
goto fail_mmu_destroy;
} else
static_key_slow_inc(&kvm_no_apic_vcpu);
vcpu->arch.mce_banks = kzalloc(KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS * sizeof(u64) * 4,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!vcpu->arch.mce_banks) {
r = -ENOMEM;
goto fail_free_lapic;
}
vcpu->arch.mcg_cap = KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS;
if (!zalloc_cpumask_var(&vcpu->arch.wbinvd_dirty_mask, GFP_KERNEL)) {
r = -ENOMEM;
goto fail_free_mce_banks;
}
fx_init(vcpu);
vcpu->arch.ia32_tsc_adjust_msr = 0x0;
vcpu->arch.pv_time_enabled = false;
vcpu->arch.guest_supported_xcr0 = 0;
vcpu->arch.guest_xstate_size = XSAVE_HDR_SIZE + XSAVE_HDR_OFFSET;
vcpu->arch.maxphyaddr = cpuid_query_maxphyaddr(vcpu);
vcpu->arch.pat = MSR_IA32_CR_PAT_DEFAULT;
kvm_async_pf_hash_reset(vcpu);
kvm_pmu_init(vcpu);
vcpu->arch.pending_external_vector = -1;
return 0;
fail_free_mce_banks:
kfree(vcpu->arch.mce_banks);
fail_free_lapic:
kvm_free_lapic(vcpu);
fail_mmu_destroy:
kvm_mmu_destroy(vcpu);
fail_free_pio_data:
free_page((unsigned long)vcpu->arch.pio_data);
fail:
return r;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Reload pit counters for all channels when restoring state
Currently if userspace restores the pit counters with a count of 0
on channels 1 or 2 and the guest attempts to read the count on those
channels, then KVM will perform a mod of 0 and crash. This will ensure
that 0 values are converted to 65536 as per the spec.
This is CVE-2015-7513.
Signed-off-by: Andy Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 57,706
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool HTMLMediaElement::seeking() const {
return m_seeking;
}
Commit Message: [Blink>Media] Allow autoplay muted on Android by default
There was a mistake causing autoplay muted is shipped on Android
but it will be disabled if the chromium embedder doesn't specify
content setting for "AllowAutoplay" preference. This CL makes the
AllowAutoplay preference true by default so that it is allowed by
embedders (including AndroidWebView) unless they explicitly
disable it.
Intent to ship:
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/Q1cnzNI2GpI/AL_eyUNABgAJ
BUG=689018
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2677173002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#448423}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 128,900
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SAPI_API int sapi_flush(TSRMLS_D)
{
if (sapi_module.flush) {
sapi_module.flush(SG(server_context));
return SUCCESS;
} else {
return FAILURE;
}
}
Commit Message: Update header handling to RFC 7230
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 56,269
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void activityLoggedAttrGetter2AttributeGetter(const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
v8SetReturnValueInt(info, imp->activityLoggedAttrGetter2());
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 121,503
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ofputil_make_set_packet_in_format(enum ofp_version ofp_version,
enum nx_packet_in_format packet_in_format)
{
struct nx_set_packet_in_format *spif;
struct ofpbuf *msg;
msg = ofpraw_alloc(OFPRAW_NXT_SET_PACKET_IN_FORMAT, ofp_version, 0);
spif = ofpbuf_put_zeros(msg, sizeof *spif);
spif->format = htonl(packet_in_format);
return msg;
}
Commit Message: ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <pkusunyifeng@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 77,629
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::updateGraphicBufferInMeta(
OMX_U32 portIndex, const sp<GraphicBuffer>& graphicBuffer,
OMX::buffer_id buffer) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header = findBufferHeader(buffer, portIndex);
return updateGraphicBufferInMeta_l(
portIndex, graphicBuffer, buffer, header,
portIndex == kPortIndexOutput /* updateCodecBuffer */);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: IOMX: work against metadata buffer spoofing
- Prohibit direct set/getParam/Settings for extensions meant for
OMXNodeInstance alone. This disallows enabling metadata mode
without the knowledge of OMXNodeInstance.
- Use a backup buffer for metadata mode buffers and do not directly
share with clients.
- Disallow setting up metadata mode/tunneling/input surface
after first sendCommand.
- Disallow store-meta for input cross process.
- Disallow emptyBuffer for surface input (via IOMX).
- Fix checking for input surface.
Bug: 29422020
Change-Id: I801c77b80e703903f62e42d76fd2e76a34e4bc8e
(cherry picked from commit 7c3c2fa3e233c656fc8c2fc2a6634b3ecf8a23e8)
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 1
| 174,141
|
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