instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SpdyWriteQueue::Enqueue(RequestPriority priority,
SpdyFrameType frame_type,
scoped_ptr<SpdyBufferProducer> frame_producer,
const base::WeakPtr<SpdyStream>& stream) {
CHECK_GE(priority, MINIMUM_PRIORITY);
CHECK_LE(priority, MAXIMUM_PRIORITY);
if (stream.get())
DCHECK_EQ(stream->priority(), priority);
queue_[priority].push_back(
PendingWrite(frame_type, frame_producer.release(), stream));
}
Commit Message: These can post callbacks which re-enter into SpdyWriteQueue.
BUG=369539
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/265933007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@268730 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 121,323
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OutOfProcessInstance::UpdateCursor(PP_CursorType_Dev cursor) {
if (cursor == cursor_)
return;
cursor_ = cursor;
const PPB_CursorControl_Dev* cursor_interface =
reinterpret_cast<const PPB_CursorControl_Dev*>(
pp::Module::Get()->GetBrowserInterface(PPB_CURSOR_CONTROL_DEV_INTERFACE));
if (!cursor_interface) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
cursor_interface->SetCursor(
pp_instance(), cursor_, pp::ImageData().pp_resource(), nullptr);
}
Commit Message: Prevent leaking PDF data cross-origin
BUG=520422
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1311973002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#345267}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 129,481
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::UpdateStyleAndLayoutTreeIgnorePendingStylesheets() {
CHECK(Lifecycle().StateAllowsTreeMutations());
StyleEngine::IgnoringPendingStylesheet ignoring(GetStyleEngine());
if (GetStyleEngine().HasPendingScriptBlockingSheets()) {
HTMLElement* body_element = body();
if (body_element && !body_element->GetLayoutObject() &&
pending_sheet_layout_ == kNoLayoutWithPendingSheets) {
pending_sheet_layout_ = kDidLayoutWithPendingSheets;
GetStyleEngine().MarkAllTreeScopesDirty();
}
if (has_nodes_with_placeholder_style_) {
SetNeedsStyleRecalc(kSubtreeStyleChange,
StyleChangeReasonForTracing::Create(
StyleChangeReason::kCleanupPlaceholderStyles));
}
}
UpdateStyleAndLayoutTree();
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 134,189
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderThread::CloseCurrentConnections() {
Send(new ViewHostMsg_CloseCurrentConnections());
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 98,869
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int create_yamaha_midi_quirk(struct snd_usb_audio *chip,
struct usb_interface *iface,
struct usb_driver *driver,
struct usb_host_interface *alts)
{
static const struct snd_usb_audio_quirk yamaha_midi_quirk = {
.type = QUIRK_MIDI_YAMAHA
};
struct usb_midi_in_jack_descriptor *injd;
struct usb_midi_out_jack_descriptor *outjd;
/* must have some valid jack descriptors */
injd = snd_usb_find_csint_desc(alts->extra, alts->extralen,
NULL, USB_MS_MIDI_IN_JACK);
outjd = snd_usb_find_csint_desc(alts->extra, alts->extralen,
NULL, USB_MS_MIDI_OUT_JACK);
if (!injd && !outjd)
return -ENODEV;
if (injd && (injd->bLength < 5 ||
(injd->bJackType != USB_MS_EMBEDDED &&
injd->bJackType != USB_MS_EXTERNAL)))
return -ENODEV;
if (outjd && (outjd->bLength < 6 ||
(outjd->bJackType != USB_MS_EMBEDDED &&
outjd->bJackType != USB_MS_EXTERNAL)))
return -ENODEV;
return create_any_midi_quirk(chip, iface, driver, &yamaha_midi_quirk);
}
Commit Message: ALSA: usb-audio: Fix NULL dereference in create_fixed_stream_quirk()
create_fixed_stream_quirk() may cause a NULL-pointer dereference by
accessing the non-existing endpoint when a USB device with a malformed
USB descriptor is used.
This patch avoids it simply by adding a sanity check of bNumEndpoints
before the accesses.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=971125
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 55,248
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: set_date_time(unsigned char *p, time_t t)
{
struct tm tm;
get_tmfromtime(&tm, &t);
set_digit(p, 4, tm.tm_year + 1900);
set_digit(p+4, 2, tm.tm_mon + 1);
set_digit(p+6, 2, tm.tm_mday);
set_digit(p+8, 2, tm.tm_hour);
set_digit(p+10, 2, tm.tm_min);
set_digit(p+12, 2, tm.tm_sec);
set_digit(p+14, 2, 0);
set_num_712(p+16, (char)(get_gmoffset(&tm)/(60*15)));
}
Commit Message: Issue 711: Be more careful about verifying filename lengths when writing ISO9660 archives
* Don't cast size_t to int, since this can lead to overflow
on machines where sizeof(int) < sizeof(size_t)
* Check a + b > limit by writing it as
a > limit || b > limit || a + b > limit
to avoid problems when a + b wraps around.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 50,865
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BrowserView::~BrowserView() {
#if defined(USE_ASH)
launcher_item_controller_.reset();
#endif
preview_controller_.reset(NULL);
browser_->tab_strip_model()->RemoveObserver(this);
#if defined(OS_WIN) && !defined(USE_AURA)
ticker_.Stop();
ticker_.UnregisterTickHandler(&hung_window_detector_);
if (jumplist_) {
jumplist_->Terminate();
}
#endif
download_shelf_.reset();
if (tabstrip_) {
tabstrip_->parent()->RemoveChildView(tabstrip_);
delete tabstrip_;
tabstrip_ = NULL;
}
RemoveAllChildViews(true);
browser_.reset();
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 118,478
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void JSTestObjConstructor::finishCreation(ExecState* exec, JSDOMGlobalObject* globalObject)
{
Base::finishCreation(exec->globalData());
ASSERT(inherits(&s_info));
putDirect(exec->globalData(), exec->propertyNames().prototype, JSTestObjPrototype::self(exec, globalObject), DontDelete | ReadOnly);
putDirect(exec->globalData(), exec->propertyNames().length, jsNumber(1), ReadOnly | DontDelete | DontEnum);
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 101,200
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FrameLoader::checkTimerFired(Timer<FrameLoader>*)
{
RefPtr<Frame> protect(m_frame);
if (Page* page = m_frame->page()) {
if (page->defersLoading())
return;
}
if (m_shouldCallCheckCompleted)
checkCompleted();
}
Commit Message: Don't wait to notify client of spoof attempt if a modal dialog is created.
BUG=281256
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23620020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@157196 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 111,624
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LocalSiteCharacteristicsDataImpl::NotifyUsesNotificationsInBackground() {
NotifyFeatureUsage(
site_characteristics_.mutable_uses_notifications_in_background());
}
Commit Message: Connect the LocalDB to TabManager.
Bug: 773382
Change-Id: Iec8fe5226ee175105d51f300f30b4865478ac099
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1118611
Commit-Queue: Sébastien Marchand <sebmarchand@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <fdoray@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572871}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 132,062
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int get_implied_cluster_alloc(struct super_block *sb,
struct ext4_map_blocks *map,
struct ext4_extent *ex,
struct ext4_ext_path *path)
{
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb);
ext4_lblk_t c_offset = EXT4_LBLK_COFF(sbi, map->m_lblk);
ext4_lblk_t ex_cluster_start, ex_cluster_end;
ext4_lblk_t rr_cluster_start;
ext4_lblk_t ee_block = le32_to_cpu(ex->ee_block);
ext4_fsblk_t ee_start = ext4_ext_pblock(ex);
unsigned short ee_len = ext4_ext_get_actual_len(ex);
/* The extent passed in that we are trying to match */
ex_cluster_start = EXT4_B2C(sbi, ee_block);
ex_cluster_end = EXT4_B2C(sbi, ee_block + ee_len - 1);
/* The requested region passed into ext4_map_blocks() */
rr_cluster_start = EXT4_B2C(sbi, map->m_lblk);
if ((rr_cluster_start == ex_cluster_end) ||
(rr_cluster_start == ex_cluster_start)) {
if (rr_cluster_start == ex_cluster_end)
ee_start += ee_len - 1;
map->m_pblk = EXT4_PBLK_CMASK(sbi, ee_start) + c_offset;
map->m_len = min(map->m_len,
(unsigned) sbi->s_cluster_ratio - c_offset);
/*
* Check for and handle this case:
*
* |--------- cluster # N-------------|
* |------- extent ----|
* |--- requested region ---|
* |===========|
*/
if (map->m_lblk < ee_block)
map->m_len = min(map->m_len, ee_block - map->m_lblk);
/*
* Check for the case where there is already another allocated
* block to the right of 'ex' but before the end of the cluster.
*
* |------------- cluster # N-------------|
* |----- ex -----| |---- ex_right ----|
* |------ requested region ------|
* |================|
*/
if (map->m_lblk > ee_block) {
ext4_lblk_t next = ext4_ext_next_allocated_block(path);
map->m_len = min(map->m_len, next - map->m_lblk);
}
trace_ext4_get_implied_cluster_alloc_exit(sb, map, 1);
return 1;
}
trace_ext4_get_implied_cluster_alloc_exit(sb, map, 0);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ext4: allocate entire range in zero range
Currently there is a bug in zero range code which causes zero range
calls to only allocate block aligned portion of the range, while
ignoring the rest in some cases.
In some cases, namely if the end of the range is past i_size, we do
attempt to preallocate the last nonaligned block. However this might
cause kernel to BUG() in some carefully designed zero range requests
on setups where page size > block size.
Fix this problem by first preallocating the entire range, including
the nonaligned edges and converting the written extents to unwritten
in the next step. This approach will also give us the advantage of
having the range to be as linearly contiguous as possible.
Signed-off-by: Lukas Czerner <lczerner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-17
| 0
| 44,909
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cluster_free (struct cluster_list *cluster)
{
if (cluster->list)
XFREE (MTYPE_CLUSTER_VAL, cluster->list);
XFREE (MTYPE_CLUSTER, cluster);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 274
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int cdrom_slot_status(struct cdrom_device_info *cdi, int slot)
{
struct cdrom_changer_info *info;
int ret;
cd_dbg(CD_CHANGER, "entering cdrom_slot_status()\n");
if (cdi->sanyo_slot)
return CDS_NO_INFO;
info = kmalloc(sizeof(*info), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!info)
return -ENOMEM;
if ((ret = cdrom_read_mech_status(cdi, info)))
goto out_free;
if (info->slots[slot].disc_present)
ret = CDS_DISC_OK;
else
ret = CDS_NO_DISC;
out_free:
kfree(info);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: cdrom: fix improper type cast, which can leat to information leak.
There is another cast from unsigned long to int which causes
a bounds check to fail with specially crafted input. The value is
then used as an index in the slot array in cdrom_slot_status().
This issue is similar to CVE-2018-16658 and CVE-2018-10940.
Signed-off-by: Young_X <YangX92@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 76,275
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual gfx::GLSurface* GetGLSurface() { return surface_.get(); }
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 99,221
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void cmd_dump(char *tag, char *name, int uid_start)
{
int r = 0;
struct mailbox *mailbox = NULL;
/* administrators only please */
if (!imapd_userisadmin)
r = IMAP_PERMISSION_DENIED;
char *intname = mboxname_from_external(name, &imapd_namespace, imapd_userid);
if (!r) r = mailbox_open_irl(intname, &mailbox);
if (!r) r = dump_mailbox(tag, mailbox, uid_start, MAILBOX_MINOR_VERSION,
imapd_in, imapd_out, imapd_authstate);
if (r) {
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s NO %s\r\n", tag, error_message(r));
} else {
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s OK %s\r\n", tag,
error_message(IMAP_OK_COMPLETED));
}
if (mailbox) mailbox_close(&mailbox);
free(intname);
}
Commit Message: imapd: check for isadmin BEFORE parsing sync lines
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 95,140
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int mpeg4_decode_gop_header(MpegEncContext *s, GetBitContext *gb)
{
int hours, minutes, seconds;
if (!show_bits(gb, 23)) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING, "GOP header invalid\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
hours = get_bits(gb, 5);
minutes = get_bits(gb, 6);
check_marker(s->avctx, gb, "in gop_header");
seconds = get_bits(gb, 6);
s->time_base = seconds + 60*(minutes + 60*hours);
skip_bits1(gb);
skip_bits1(gb);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/mpeg4videodec: Check read profile before setting it
Fixes: null pointer dereference
Fixes: ffmpeg_crash_7.avi
Found-by: Thuan Pham, Marcel Böhme, Andrew Santosa and Alexandru Razvan Caciulescu with AFLSmart
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 79,892
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: inline void load_free_nid_bitmap(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi)
{
struct f2fs_nm_info *nm_i = NM_I(sbi);
unsigned int i = 0;
nid_t nid, last_nid;
if (!enabled_nat_bits(sbi, NULL))
return;
for (i = 0; i < nm_i->nat_blocks; i++) {
i = find_next_bit_le(nm_i->empty_nat_bits, nm_i->nat_blocks, i);
if (i >= nm_i->nat_blocks)
break;
__set_bit_le(i, nm_i->nat_block_bitmap);
nid = i * NAT_ENTRY_PER_BLOCK;
last_nid = (i + 1) * NAT_ENTRY_PER_BLOCK;
spin_lock(&NM_I(sbi)->nid_list_lock);
for (; nid < last_nid; nid++)
update_free_nid_bitmap(sbi, nid, true, true);
spin_unlock(&NM_I(sbi)->nid_list_lock);
}
for (i = 0; i < nm_i->nat_blocks; i++) {
i = find_next_bit_le(nm_i->full_nat_bits, nm_i->nat_blocks, i);
if (i >= nm_i->nat_blocks)
break;
__set_bit_le(i, nm_i->nat_block_bitmap);
}
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix race condition in between free nid allocator/initializer
In below concurrent case, allocated nid can be loaded into free nid cache
and be allocated again.
Thread A Thread B
- f2fs_create
- f2fs_new_inode
- alloc_nid
- __insert_nid_to_list(ALLOC_NID_LIST)
- f2fs_balance_fs_bg
- build_free_nids
- __build_free_nids
- scan_nat_page
- add_free_nid
- __lookup_nat_cache
- f2fs_add_link
- init_inode_metadata
- new_inode_page
- new_node_page
- set_node_addr
- alloc_nid_done
- __remove_nid_from_list(ALLOC_NID_LIST)
- __insert_nid_to_list(FREE_NID_LIST)
This patch makes nat cache lookup and free nid list operation being atomical
to avoid this race condition.
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 85,279
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DevToolsWindow::SearchCompleted(
int request_id,
const std::string& file_system_path,
const std::vector<std::string>& file_paths) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
ListValue file_paths_value;
for (std::vector<std::string>::const_iterator it(file_paths.begin());
it != file_paths.end(); ++it) {
file_paths_value.AppendString(*it);
}
base::FundamentalValue request_id_value(request_id);
StringValue file_system_path_value(file_system_path);
CallClientFunction("InspectorFrontendAPI.searchCompleted", &request_id_value,
&file_system_path_value, &file_paths_value);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: handle devtools renderer unresponsiveness during beforeunload event interception
This patch fixes the crash which happenes under the following conditions:
1. DevTools window is in undocked state
2. DevTools renderer is unresponsive
3. User attempts to close inspected page
BUG=322380
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/84883002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@237611 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 113,200
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CommandBufferProxyImpl::DestroyImage(int32_t id) {
CheckLock();
base::AutoLock lock(last_state_lock_);
if (last_state_.error != gpu::error::kNoError)
return;
Send(new GpuCommandBufferMsg_DestroyImage(route_id_, id));
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 149,440
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::RequestToLockMouse(
RenderWidgetHostImpl* render_widget_host,
bool user_gesture,
bool last_unlocked_by_target,
bool privileged) {
for (WebContentsImpl* current = this; current;
current = current->GetOuterWebContents()) {
if (current->mouse_lock_widget_) {
render_widget_host->GotResponseToLockMouseRequest(false);
return;
}
}
if (privileged) {
DCHECK(!GetOuterWebContents());
mouse_lock_widget_ = render_widget_host;
render_widget_host->GotResponseToLockMouseRequest(true);
return;
}
bool widget_in_frame_tree = false;
for (FrameTreeNode* node : frame_tree_.Nodes()) {
if (node->current_frame_host()->GetRenderWidgetHost() ==
render_widget_host) {
widget_in_frame_tree = true;
break;
}
}
if (widget_in_frame_tree && delegate_) {
for (WebContentsImpl* current = this; current;
current = current->GetOuterWebContents()) {
current->mouse_lock_widget_ = render_widget_host;
}
delegate_->RequestToLockMouse(this, user_gesture, last_unlocked_by_target);
} else {
render_widget_host->GotResponseToLockMouseRequest(false);
}
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 135,865
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RunExternalProtocolDialogWithDelegate(
const GURL& url,
int render_process_host_id,
int routing_id,
ui::PageTransition page_transition,
bool has_user_gesture,
ExternalProtocolHandler::Delegate* delegate) {
if (delegate) {
delegate->RunExternalProtocolDialog(url, render_process_host_id, routing_id,
page_transition, has_user_gesture);
return;
}
ExternalProtocolHandler::RunExternalProtocolDialog(
url, render_process_host_id, routing_id, page_transition,
has_user_gesture);
}
Commit Message: Reland "Launching an external protocol handler now escapes the URL."
This is a reland of 2401e58572884b3561e4348d64f11ac74667ef02
Original change's description:
> Launching an external protocol handler now escapes the URL.
>
> Fixes bug introduced in r102449.
>
> Bug: 785809
> Change-Id: I9e6dd1031dd7e7b8d378b138ab151daefdc0c6dc
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/778747
> Commit-Queue: Matt Giuca <mgiuca@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Eric Lawrence <elawrence@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Ben Wells <benwells@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#518848}
Bug: 785809
Change-Id: Ib8954584004ff5681654398db76d48cdf4437df7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/788551
Reviewed-by: Ben Wells <benwells@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Matt Giuca <mgiuca@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#519203}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 146,880
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cib_client_status_callback(const char *node, const char *client, const char *status, void *private)
{
crm_node_t *peer = NULL;
if (safe_str_eq(client, CRM_SYSTEM_CIB)) {
crm_info("Status update: Client %s/%s now has status [%s]", node, client, status);
if (safe_str_eq(status, JOINSTATUS)) {
status = ONLINESTATUS;
} else if (safe_str_eq(status, LEAVESTATUS)) {
status = OFFLINESTATUS;
}
peer = crm_get_peer(0, node);
crm_update_peer_proc(__FUNCTION__, peer, crm_proc_cib, status);
}
return;
}
Commit Message: High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 33,851
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RenderViewTest::RenderViewTest()
: view_(NULL) {
RenderFrameImpl::InstallCreateHook(&TestRenderFrame::CreateTestRenderFrame);
}
Commit Message: Connect WebUSB client interface to the devices app
This provides a basic WebUSB client interface in
content/renderer. Most of the interface is unimplemented,
but this CL hooks up navigator.usb.getDevices() to the
browser's Mojo devices app to enumerate available USB
devices.
BUG=492204
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1293253002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344881}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 123,082
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static __net_init int sysctl_route_net_init(struct net *net)
{
struct ctl_table *tbl;
tbl = ipv4_route_flush_table;
if (!net_eq(net, &init_net)) {
tbl = kmemdup(tbl, sizeof(ipv4_route_flush_table), GFP_KERNEL);
if (tbl == NULL)
goto err_dup;
}
tbl[0].extra1 = net;
net->ipv4.route_hdr =
register_net_sysctl_table(net, ipv4_route_path, tbl);
if (net->ipv4.route_hdr == NULL)
goto err_reg;
return 0;
err_reg:
if (tbl != ipv4_route_flush_table)
kfree(tbl);
err_dup:
return -ENOMEM;
}
Commit Message: net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5.
Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.
MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)
Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic
regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and
use a full 32-bit sequence number.
For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.
Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 25,191
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DocumentWriter::begin(const KURL& urlReference, bool dispatch, SecurityOrigin* origin)
{
RefPtr<SecurityOrigin> forcedSecurityOrigin = origin;
KURL url = urlReference;
RefPtr<Document> document = createDocument(url);
if (document->isPluginDocument() && m_frame->loader()->isSandboxed(SandboxPlugins))
document = SinkDocument::create(m_frame, url);
bool resetScripting = !(m_frame->loader()->stateMachine()->isDisplayingInitialEmptyDocument() && m_frame->document()->securityOrigin()->isSecureTransitionTo(url));
m_frame->loader()->clear(resetScripting, resetScripting);
clear();
if (resetScripting)
m_frame->script()->updatePlatformScriptObjects();
m_frame->loader()->setOutgoingReferrer(url);
m_frame->setDocument(document);
if (m_decoder)
document->setDecoder(m_decoder.get());
if (forcedSecurityOrigin)
document->setSecurityOrigin(forcedSecurityOrigin.get());
m_frame->domWindow()->setURL(document->url());
m_frame->domWindow()->setSecurityOrigin(document->securityOrigin());
m_frame->loader()->didBeginDocument(dispatch);
document->implicitOpen();
m_parser = document->parser();
if (m_frame->view() && m_frame->loader()->client()->hasHTMLView())
m_frame->view()->setContentsSize(IntSize());
}
Commit Message: Remove DocumentWriter::setDecoder as a grep of WebKit shows no callers
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=67803
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
Smells like dead code.
* loader/DocumentWriter.cpp:
* loader/DocumentWriter.h:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@94800 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 98,530
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: t42_is_space( FT_Byte c )
{
return ( c == ' ' || c == '\t' ||
c == '\r' || c == '\n' || c == '\f' ||
c == '\0' );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 7,070
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: t42_parse_sfnts( T42_Face face,
T42_Loader loader )
{
T42_Parser parser = &loader->parser;
FT_Memory memory = parser->root.memory;
FT_Byte* cur;
FT_Byte* limit = parser->root.limit;
FT_Error error;
FT_Int num_tables = 0;
FT_ULong count, ttf_size = 0;
FT_Long n, string_size, old_string_size, real_size;
FT_Byte* string_buf = NULL;
FT_Bool allocated = 0;
T42_Load_Status status;
/* The format is */
/* */
/* /sfnts [ <hexstring> <hexstring> ... ] def */
/* */
/* or */
/* */
/* /sfnts [ */
/* <num_bin_bytes> RD <binary data> */
/* <num_bin_bytes> RD <binary data> */
/* ... */
/* ] def */
/* */
/* with exactly one space after the `RD' token. */
T1_Skip_Spaces( parser );
if ( parser->root.cursor >= limit || *parser->root.cursor++ != '[' )
{
FT_ERROR(( "t42_parse_sfnts: can't find begin of sfnts vector\n" ));
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
goto Fail;
}
T1_Skip_Spaces( parser );
status = BEFORE_START;
string_size = 0;
old_string_size = 0;
count = 0;
while ( parser->root.cursor < limit )
{
cur = parser->root.cursor;
if ( *cur == ']' )
{
parser->root.cursor++;
goto Exit;
}
else if ( *cur == '<' )
{
T1_Skip_PS_Token( parser );
if ( parser->root.error )
goto Exit;
/* don't include delimiters */
string_size = (FT_Long)( ( parser->root.cursor - cur - 2 + 1 ) / 2 );
if ( FT_REALLOC( string_buf, old_string_size, string_size ) )
goto Fail;
allocated = 1;
parser->root.cursor = cur;
(void)T1_ToBytes( parser, string_buf, string_size, &real_size, 1 );
old_string_size = string_size;
string_size = real_size;
}
else if ( ft_isdigit( *cur ) )
{
if ( allocated )
{
FT_ERROR(( "t42_parse_sfnts: "
"can't handle mixed binary and hex strings\n" ));
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
goto Fail;
}
string_size = T1_ToInt( parser );
if ( string_size < 0 )
{
FT_ERROR(( "t42_parse_sfnts: invalid string size\n" ));
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
goto Fail;
}
T1_Skip_PS_Token( parser ); /* `RD' */
if ( parser->root.error )
return;
string_buf = parser->root.cursor + 1; /* one space after `RD' */
if ( limit - parser->root.cursor < string_size )
{
FT_ERROR(( "t42_parse_sfnts: too many binary data\n" ));
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
goto Fail;
}
else
parser->root.cursor += string_size + 1;
}
if ( !string_buf )
{
FT_ERROR(( "t42_parse_sfnts: invalid data in sfnts array\n" ));
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
goto Fail;
}
/* A string can have a trailing zero (odd) byte for padding. */
/* Ignore it. */
if ( ( string_size & 1 ) && string_buf[string_size - 1] == 0 )
string_size--;
if ( !string_size )
{
FT_ERROR(( "t42_parse_sfnts: invalid string\n" ));
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
goto Fail;
}
for ( n = 0; n < string_size; n++ )
{
switch ( status )
{
case BEFORE_START:
/* load offset table, 12 bytes */
if ( count < 12 )
{
face->ttf_data[count++] = string_buf[n];
continue;
}
else
{
num_tables = 16 * face->ttf_data[4] + face->ttf_data[5];
status = BEFORE_TABLE_DIR;
ttf_size = 12 + 16 * num_tables;
if ( FT_REALLOC( face->ttf_data, 12, ttf_size ) )
goto Fail;
}
/* fall through */
case BEFORE_TABLE_DIR:
/* the offset table is read; read the table directory */
if ( count < ttf_size )
{
face->ttf_data[count++] = string_buf[n];
continue;
}
else
{
int i;
FT_ULong len;
for ( i = 0; i < num_tables; i++ )
{
FT_Byte* p = face->ttf_data + 12 + 16 * i + 12;
len = FT_PEEK_ULONG( p );
/* Pad to a 4-byte boundary length */
ttf_size += ( len + 3 ) & ~3;
}
status = OTHER_TABLES;
face->ttf_size = ttf_size;
/* there are no more than 256 tables, so no size check here */
if ( FT_REALLOC( face->ttf_data, 12 + 16 * num_tables,
ttf_size + 1 ) )
goto Fail;
}
/* fall through */
case OTHER_TABLES:
/* all other tables are just copied */
if ( count >= ttf_size )
{
FT_ERROR(( "t42_parse_sfnts: too many binary data\n" ));
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
goto Fail;
}
face->ttf_data[count++] = string_buf[n];
}
}
T1_Skip_Spaces( parser );
}
/* if control reaches this point, the format was not valid */
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
Fail:
parser->root.error = error;
Exit:
if ( allocated )
FT_FREE( string_buf );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 7,077
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int cp2112_get_usb_config(struct hid_device *hdev,
struct cp2112_usb_config_report *cfg)
{
int ret;
ret = cp2112_hid_get(hdev, CP2112_USB_CONFIG, (u8 *)cfg, sizeof(*cfg),
HID_FEATURE_REPORT);
if (ret != sizeof(*cfg)) {
hid_err(hdev, "error reading usb config: %d\n", ret);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
return -EIO;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: HID: cp2112: fix gpio-callback error handling
In case of a zero-length report, the gpio direction_input callback would
currently return success instead of an errno.
Fixes: 1ffb3c40ffb5 ("HID: cp2112: make transfer buffers DMA capable")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.9
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-388
| 0
| 66,443
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int skb_checksum_setup(struct sk_buff *skb, bool recalculate)
{
int err;
switch (skb->protocol) {
case htons(ETH_P_IP):
err = skb_checksum_setup_ipv4(skb, recalculate);
break;
case htons(ETH_P_IPV6):
err = skb_checksum_setup_ipv6(skb, recalculate);
break;
default:
err = -EPROTO;
break;
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: tcp: fix SCM_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS for normal skbs
__sock_recv_timestamp can be called for both normal skbs (for
receive timestamps) and for skbs on the error queue (for transmit
timestamps).
Commit 1c885808e456
(tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING)
assumes any skb passed to __sock_recv_timestamp are from
the error queue, containing OPT_STATS in the content of the skb.
This results in accessing invalid memory or generating junk
data.
To fix this, set skb->pkt_type to PACKET_OUTGOING for packets
on the error queue. This is safe because on the receive path
on local sockets skb->pkt_type is never set to PACKET_OUTGOING.
With that, copy OPT_STATS from a packet, only if its pkt_type
is PACKET_OUTGOING.
Fixes: 1c885808e456 ("tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING")
Reported-by: JongHwan Kim <zzoru007@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 67,688
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ReceiveEnableDeviceEmulation(
RenderViewImpl* view,
const blink::WebDeviceEmulationParams& params) {
view->GetWidget()->OnEnableDeviceEmulation(params);
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 139,904
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void smbXcli_negprot_smb2_done(struct tevent_req *subreq)
{
struct tevent_req *req =
tevent_req_callback_data(subreq,
struct tevent_req);
struct smbXcli_negprot_state *state =
tevent_req_data(req,
struct smbXcli_negprot_state);
struct smbXcli_conn *conn = state->conn;
size_t security_offset, security_length;
DATA_BLOB blob;
NTSTATUS status;
struct iovec *iov;
uint8_t *body;
size_t i;
uint16_t dialect_revision;
struct smb2_negotiate_contexts c = { .num_contexts = 0, };
uint32_t negotiate_context_offset = 0;
uint16_t negotiate_context_count = 0;
DATA_BLOB negotiate_context_blob = data_blob_null;
size_t avail;
size_t ctx_ofs;
size_t needed;
struct smb2_negotiate_context *preauth = NULL;
uint16_t hash_count;
uint16_t salt_length;
uint16_t hash_selected;
struct hc_sha512state sctx;
struct smb2_negotiate_context *cipher = NULL;
struct iovec sent_iov[3];
static const struct smb2cli_req_expected_response expected[] = {
{
.status = NT_STATUS_OK,
.body_size = 0x41
}
};
status = smb2cli_req_recv(subreq, state, &iov,
expected, ARRAY_SIZE(expected));
if (tevent_req_nterror(req, status)) {
return;
}
body = (uint8_t *)iov[1].iov_base;
dialect_revision = SVAL(body, 4);
for (i=0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(smb2cli_prots); i++) {
if (smb2cli_prots[i].proto < state->conn->min_protocol) {
continue;
}
if (smb2cli_prots[i].proto > state->conn->max_protocol) {
continue;
}
if (smb2cli_prots[i].smb2_dialect != dialect_revision) {
continue;
}
conn->protocol = smb2cli_prots[i].proto;
break;
}
if (conn->protocol == PROTOCOL_NONE) {
TALLOC_FREE(subreq);
if (state->conn->min_protocol >= PROTOCOL_SMB2_02) {
tevent_req_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_NETWORK_RESPONSE);
return;
}
if (dialect_revision != SMB2_DIALECT_REVISION_2FF) {
tevent_req_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_NETWORK_RESPONSE);
return;
}
/* make sure we do not loop forever */
state->conn->min_protocol = PROTOCOL_SMB2_02;
/*
* send a SMB2 negprot, in order to negotiate
* the SMB2 dialect.
*/
subreq = smbXcli_negprot_smb2_subreq(state);
if (tevent_req_nomem(subreq, req)) {
return;
}
tevent_req_set_callback(subreq, smbXcli_negprot_smb2_done, req);
return;
}
conn->smb2.server.security_mode = SVAL(body, 2);
if (conn->protocol >= PROTOCOL_SMB3_10) {
negotiate_context_count = SVAL(body, 6);
}
blob = data_blob_const(body + 8, 16);
status = GUID_from_data_blob(&blob, &conn->smb2.server.guid);
if (tevent_req_nterror(req, status)) {
return;
}
conn->smb2.server.capabilities = IVAL(body, 24);
conn->smb2.server.max_trans_size= IVAL(body, 28);
conn->smb2.server.max_read_size = IVAL(body, 32);
conn->smb2.server.max_write_size= IVAL(body, 36);
conn->smb2.server.system_time = BVAL(body, 40);
conn->smb2.server.start_time = BVAL(body, 48);
security_offset = SVAL(body, 56);
security_length = SVAL(body, 58);
if (security_offset != SMB2_HDR_BODY + iov[1].iov_len) {
tevent_req_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_NETWORK_RESPONSE);
return;
}
if (security_length > iov[2].iov_len) {
tevent_req_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_NETWORK_RESPONSE);
return;
}
conn->smb2.server.gss_blob = data_blob_talloc(conn,
iov[2].iov_base,
security_length);
if (tevent_req_nomem(conn->smb2.server.gss_blob.data, req)) {
return;
}
if (conn->protocol < PROTOCOL_SMB3_10) {
TALLOC_FREE(subreq);
if (conn->smb2.server.capabilities & SMB2_CAP_ENCRYPTION) {
conn->smb2.server.cipher = SMB2_ENCRYPTION_AES128_CCM;
}
tevent_req_done(req);
return;
}
if (conn->smb2.server.capabilities & SMB2_CAP_ENCRYPTION) {
tevent_req_nterror(req,
NT_STATUS_INVALID_NETWORK_RESPONSE);
return;
}
negotiate_context_offset = IVAL(body, 60);
if (negotiate_context_offset < security_offset) {
tevent_req_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_NETWORK_RESPONSE);
return;
}
ctx_ofs = negotiate_context_offset - security_offset;
if (ctx_ofs > iov[2].iov_len) {
tevent_req_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_NETWORK_RESPONSE);
return;
}
avail = iov[2].iov_len - security_length;
needed = iov[2].iov_len - ctx_ofs;
if (needed > avail) {
tevent_req_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_NETWORK_RESPONSE);
return;
}
negotiate_context_blob.data = (uint8_t *)iov[2].iov_base;
negotiate_context_blob.length = iov[2].iov_len;
negotiate_context_blob.data += ctx_ofs;
negotiate_context_blob.length -= ctx_ofs;
status = smb2_negotiate_context_parse(state, negotiate_context_blob, &c);
if (tevent_req_nterror(req, status)) {
return;
}
if (negotiate_context_count != c.num_contexts) {
tevent_req_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_NETWORK_RESPONSE);
return;
}
preauth = smb2_negotiate_context_find(&c,
SMB2_PREAUTH_INTEGRITY_CAPABILITIES);
if (preauth == NULL) {
tevent_req_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_NETWORK_RESPONSE);
return;
}
if (preauth->data.length < 6) {
tevent_req_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_NETWORK_RESPONSE);
return;
}
hash_count = SVAL(preauth->data.data, 0);
salt_length = SVAL(preauth->data.data, 2);
hash_selected = SVAL(preauth->data.data, 4);
if (hash_count != 1) {
tevent_req_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_NETWORK_RESPONSE);
return;
}
if (preauth->data.length != (6 + salt_length)) {
tevent_req_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_NETWORK_RESPONSE);
return;
}
if (hash_selected != SMB2_PREAUTH_INTEGRITY_SHA512) {
tevent_req_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_NETWORK_RESPONSE);
return;
}
cipher = smb2_negotiate_context_find(&c, SMB2_ENCRYPTION_CAPABILITIES);
if (cipher != NULL) {
uint16_t cipher_count;
if (cipher->data.length < 2) {
tevent_req_nterror(req,
NT_STATUS_INVALID_NETWORK_RESPONSE);
return;
}
cipher_count = SVAL(cipher->data.data, 0);
if (cipher_count > 1) {
tevent_req_nterror(req,
NT_STATUS_INVALID_NETWORK_RESPONSE);
return;
}
if (cipher->data.length != (2 + 2 * cipher_count)) {
tevent_req_nterror(req,
NT_STATUS_INVALID_NETWORK_RESPONSE);
return;
}
if (cipher_count == 1) {
uint16_t cipher_selected;
cipher_selected = SVAL(cipher->data.data, 2);
switch (cipher_selected) {
case SMB2_ENCRYPTION_AES128_GCM:
case SMB2_ENCRYPTION_AES128_CCM:
conn->smb2.server.cipher = cipher_selected;
break;
}
}
}
/* First we hash the request */
smb2cli_req_get_sent_iov(subreq, sent_iov);
samba_SHA512_Init(&sctx);
samba_SHA512_Update(&sctx, conn->smb2.preauth_sha512,
sizeof(conn->smb2.preauth_sha512));
for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
samba_SHA512_Update(&sctx, sent_iov[i].iov_base, sent_iov[i].iov_len);
}
samba_SHA512_Final(conn->smb2.preauth_sha512, &sctx);
TALLOC_FREE(subreq);
/* And now we hash the response */
samba_SHA512_Init(&sctx);
samba_SHA512_Update(&sctx, conn->smb2.preauth_sha512,
sizeof(conn->smb2.preauth_sha512));
for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
samba_SHA512_Update(&sctx, iov[i].iov_base, iov[i].iov_len);
}
samba_SHA512_Final(conn->smb2.preauth_sha512, &sctx);
tevent_req_done(req);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 2,485
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PrintingMessageFilter::GetPrintSettingsForRenderView(
int render_view_id,
GetPrintSettingsForRenderViewParams params,
const base::Closure& callback,
scoped_refptr<printing::PrinterQuery> printer_query) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
content::WebContents* wc = GetWebContentsForRenderView(render_view_id);
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::IO, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&printing::PrinterQuery::GetSettings, printer_query,
params.ask_user_for_settings, wc->GetView()->GetNativeView(),
params.expected_page_count, params.has_selection,
params.margin_type, callback));
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 105,778
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ExtensionWebRequestTest::FireURLRequestWithData(
const std::string& method,
const char* content_type,
const std::vector<char>& bytes_1,
const std::vector<char>& bytes_2) {
GURL request_url("http://www.example.com");
std::unique_ptr<net::URLRequest> request(
context_->CreateRequest(request_url, net::DEFAULT_PRIORITY, &delegate_));
request->set_method(method);
if (content_type != NULL) {
request->SetExtraRequestHeaderByName(net::HttpRequestHeaders::kContentType,
content_type,
true /* overwrite */);
}
std::vector<std::unique_ptr<net::UploadElementReader>> element_readers;
element_readers.push_back(base::MakeUnique<net::UploadBytesElementReader>(
&(bytes_1[0]), bytes_1.size()));
element_readers.push_back(base::MakeUnique<net::UploadFileElementReader>(
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get().get(), base::FilePath(), 0, 0,
base::Time()));
element_readers.push_back(base::MakeUnique<net::UploadBytesElementReader>(
&(bytes_2[0]), bytes_2.size()));
request->set_upload(base::MakeUnique<net::ElementsUploadDataStream>(
std::move(element_readers), 0));
ipc_sender_.PushTask(base::Bind(&base::DoNothing));
request->Start();
}
Commit Message: Replace fixed string uses of AddHeaderFromString
Uses of AddHeaderFromString() with a static string may as well be
replaced with SetHeader(). Do so.
BUG=None
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2236933005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#418161}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 119,303
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void rds_ib_add_one(struct ib_device *device)
{
struct rds_ib_device *rds_ibdev;
struct ib_device_attr *dev_attr;
/* Only handle IB (no iWARP) devices */
if (device->node_type != RDMA_NODE_IB_CA)
return;
dev_attr = kmalloc(sizeof *dev_attr, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dev_attr)
return;
if (ib_query_device(device, dev_attr)) {
rdsdebug("Query device failed for %s\n", device->name);
goto free_attr;
}
rds_ibdev = kzalloc_node(sizeof(struct rds_ib_device), GFP_KERNEL,
ibdev_to_node(device));
if (!rds_ibdev)
goto free_attr;
spin_lock_init(&rds_ibdev->spinlock);
atomic_set(&rds_ibdev->refcount, 1);
INIT_WORK(&rds_ibdev->free_work, rds_ib_dev_free);
rds_ibdev->max_wrs = dev_attr->max_qp_wr;
rds_ibdev->max_sge = min(dev_attr->max_sge, RDS_IB_MAX_SGE);
rds_ibdev->fmr_max_remaps = dev_attr->max_map_per_fmr?: 32;
rds_ibdev->max_fmrs = dev_attr->max_fmr ?
min_t(unsigned int, dev_attr->max_fmr, fmr_pool_size) :
fmr_pool_size;
rds_ibdev->max_initiator_depth = dev_attr->max_qp_init_rd_atom;
rds_ibdev->max_responder_resources = dev_attr->max_qp_rd_atom;
rds_ibdev->dev = device;
rds_ibdev->pd = ib_alloc_pd(device);
if (IS_ERR(rds_ibdev->pd)) {
rds_ibdev->pd = NULL;
goto put_dev;
}
rds_ibdev->mr = ib_get_dma_mr(rds_ibdev->pd, IB_ACCESS_LOCAL_WRITE);
if (IS_ERR(rds_ibdev->mr)) {
rds_ibdev->mr = NULL;
goto put_dev;
}
rds_ibdev->mr_pool = rds_ib_create_mr_pool(rds_ibdev);
if (IS_ERR(rds_ibdev->mr_pool)) {
rds_ibdev->mr_pool = NULL;
goto put_dev;
}
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&rds_ibdev->ipaddr_list);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&rds_ibdev->conn_list);
down_write(&rds_ib_devices_lock);
list_add_tail_rcu(&rds_ibdev->list, &rds_ib_devices);
up_write(&rds_ib_devices_lock);
atomic_inc(&rds_ibdev->refcount);
ib_set_client_data(device, &rds_ib_client, rds_ibdev);
atomic_inc(&rds_ibdev->refcount);
rds_ib_nodev_connect();
put_dev:
rds_ib_dev_put(rds_ibdev);
free_attr:
kfree(dev_attr);
}
Commit Message: rds: prevent dereference of a NULL device
Binding might result in a NULL device, which is dereferenced
causing this BUG:
[ 1317.260548] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 000000000000097
4
[ 1317.261847] IP: [<ffffffff84225f52>] rds_ib_laddr_check+0x82/0x110
[ 1317.263315] PGD 418bcb067 PUD 3ceb21067 PMD 0
[ 1317.263502] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
[ 1317.264179] Dumping ftrace buffer:
[ 1317.264774] (ftrace buffer empty)
[ 1317.265220] Modules linked in:
[ 1317.265824] CPU: 4 PID: 836 Comm: trinity-child46 Tainted: G W 3.13.0-rc4-
next-20131218-sasha-00013-g2cebb9b-dirty #4159
[ 1317.267415] task: ffff8803ddf33000 ti: ffff8803cd31a000 task.ti: ffff8803cd31a000
[ 1317.268399] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff84225f52>] [<ffffffff84225f52>] rds_ib_laddr_check+
0x82/0x110
[ 1317.269670] RSP: 0000:ffff8803cd31bdf8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 1317.270230] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88020b0dd388 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 1317.270230] RDX: ffffffff8439822e RSI: 00000000000c000a RDI: 0000000000000286
[ 1317.270230] RBP: ffff8803cd31be38 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 1317.270230] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000
[ 1317.270230] R13: 0000000054086700 R14: 0000000000a25de0 R15: 0000000000000031
[ 1317.270230] FS: 00007ff40251d700(0000) GS:ffff88022e200000(0000) knlGS:000000000000
0000
[ 1317.270230] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
[ 1317.270230] CR2: 0000000000000974 CR3: 00000003cd478000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 1317.270230] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 1317.270230] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000090602
[ 1317.270230] Stack:
[ 1317.270230] 0000000054086700 5408670000a25de0 5408670000000002 0000000000000000
[ 1317.270230] ffffffff84223542 00000000ea54c767 0000000000000000 ffffffff86d26160
[ 1317.270230] ffff8803cd31be68 ffffffff84223556 ffff8803cd31beb8 ffff8800c6765280
[ 1317.270230] Call Trace:
[ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff84223542>] ? rds_trans_get_preferred+0x42/0xa0
[ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff84223556>] rds_trans_get_preferred+0x56/0xa0
[ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff8421c9c3>] rds_bind+0x73/0xf0
[ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff83e4ce62>] SYSC_bind+0x92/0xf0
[ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff812493f8>] ? context_tracking_user_exit+0xb8/0x1d0
[ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff8119313d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
[ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff8107a852>] ? syscall_trace_enter+0x32/0x290
[ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff83e4cece>] SyS_bind+0xe/0x10
[ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff843a6ad0>] tracesys+0xdd/0xe2
[ 1317.270230] Code: 00 8b 45 cc 48 8d 75 d0 48 c7 45 d8 00 00 00 00 66 c7 45 d0 02 00
89 45 d4 48 89 df e8 78 49 76 ff 41 89 c4 85 c0 75 0c 48 8b 03 <80> b8 74 09 00 00 01 7
4 06 41 bc 9d ff ff ff f6 05 2a b6 c2 02
[ 1317.270230] RIP [<ffffffff84225f52>] rds_ib_laddr_check+0x82/0x110
[ 1317.270230] RSP <ffff8803cd31bdf8>
[ 1317.270230] CR2: 0000000000000974
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 40,102
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool LauncherView::SameDragType(LauncherItemType typea,
LauncherItemType typeb) const {
switch (typea) {
case TYPE_TABBED:
case TYPE_APP_PANEL:
case TYPE_PLATFORM_APP:
return (typeb == TYPE_TABBED ||
typeb == TYPE_APP_PANEL ||
typeb == TYPE_PLATFORM_APP);
case TYPE_APP_SHORTCUT:
case TYPE_APP_LIST:
case TYPE_BROWSER_SHORTCUT:
return typeb == typea;
}
NOTREACHED();
return false;
}
Commit Message: ash: Add launcher overflow bubble.
- Host a LauncherView in bubble to display overflown items;
- Mouse wheel and two-finger scroll to scroll the LauncherView in bubble in case overflow bubble is overflown;
- Fit bubble when items are added/removed;
- Keep launcher bar on screen when the bubble is shown;
BUG=128054
TEST=Verify launcher overflown items are in a bubble instead of menu.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10659003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@146460 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 106,257
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int HTMLInputElement::maxLength() const
{
return m_maxLength;
}
Commit Message: Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 112,955
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static size_t index_entry_size(size_t path_len, size_t varint_len, uint32_t flags)
{
if (varint_len) {
if (flags & GIT_IDXENTRY_EXTENDED)
return offsetof(struct entry_long, path) + path_len + 1 + varint_len;
else
return offsetof(struct entry_short, path) + path_len + 1 + varint_len;
} else {
#define entry_size(type,len) ((offsetof(type, path) + (len) + 8) & ~7)
if (flags & GIT_IDXENTRY_EXTENDED)
return entry_size(struct entry_long, path_len);
else
return entry_size(struct entry_short, path_len);
#undef entry_size
}
}
Commit Message: index: convert `read_entry` to return entry size via an out-param
The function `read_entry` does not conform to our usual coding style of
returning stuff via the out parameter and to use the return value for
reporting errors. Due to most of our code conforming to that pattern, it
has become quite natural for us to actually return `-1` in case there is
any error, which has also slipped in with commit 5625d86b9 (index:
support index v4, 2016-05-17). As the function returns an `size_t` only,
though, the return value is wrapped around, causing the caller of
`read_tree` to continue with an invalid index entry. Ultimately, this
can lead to a double-free.
Improve code and fix the bug by converting the function to return the
index entry size via an out parameter and only using the return value to
indicate errors.
Reported-by: Krishna Ram Prakash R <krp@gtux.in>
Reported-by: Vivek Parikh <viv0411.parikh@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 83,735
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: png_get_sBIT(png_structp png_ptr, png_infop info_ptr, png_color_8p *sig_bit)
{
png_debug1(1, "in %s retrieval function", "sBIT");
if (png_ptr != NULL && info_ptr != NULL && (info_ptr->valid & PNG_INFO_sBIT)
&& sig_bit != NULL)
{
*sig_bit = &(info_ptr->sig_bit);
return (PNG_INFO_sBIT);
}
return (0);
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 131,298
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: KURL FrameFetchContext::GetSiteForCookies() const {
if (IsDetached())
return frozen_state_->site_for_cookies;
Document* document = document_ ? document_.Get() : GetFrame()->GetDocument();
return document->SiteForCookies();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 138,754
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t MPEG4Extractor::parseColorInfo(off64_t offset, size_t size) {
if (size < 4 || size == SIZE_MAX || mLastTrack == NULL) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t *buffer = new (std::nothrow) uint8_t[size + 1];
if (buffer == NULL) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(offset, buffer, size) != (ssize_t)size) {
delete[] buffer;
buffer = NULL;
return ERROR_IO;
}
int32_t type = U32_AT(&buffer[0]);
if ((type == FOURCC('n', 'c', 'l', 'x') && size >= 11)
|| (type == FOURCC('n', 'c', 'l', 'c') && size >= 10)) {
int32_t primaries = U16_AT(&buffer[4]);
int32_t transfer = U16_AT(&buffer[6]);
int32_t coeffs = U16_AT(&buffer[8]);
bool fullRange = (type == FOURCC('n', 'c', 'l', 'x')) && (buffer[10] & 128);
ColorAspects aspects;
ColorUtils::convertIsoColorAspectsToCodecAspects(
primaries, transfer, coeffs, fullRange, aspects);
if (!mLastTrack->meta->hasData(kKeyColorPrimaries)) {
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyColorPrimaries, aspects.mPrimaries);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyTransferFunction, aspects.mTransfer);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyColorMatrix, aspects.mMatrixCoeffs);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyColorRange, aspects.mRange);
}
}
delete[] buffer;
buffer = NULL;
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Skip track if verification fails
Bug: 62187433
Test: ran poc, CTS
Change-Id: Ib9b0b6de88d046d8149e9ea5073d6c40ffec7b0c
(cherry picked from commit ef8c7830d838d877e6b37b75b47294b064c79397)
CWE ID:
| 0
| 162,153
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SignInIsolationBrowserTest()
: https_server_(net::EmbeddedTestServer::TYPE_HTTPS) {}
Commit Message: Don't preserve NavigationEntry for failed navigations with invalid URLs.
The formatting logic may rewrite such URLs into an unsafe state. This
is a first step before preventing navigations to invalid URLs entirely.
Bug: 850824
Change-Id: I71743bfb4b610d55ce901ee8902125f934a2bb23
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1252942
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597304}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 143,795
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: nvme_fc_parse_traddr(struct nvmet_fc_traddr *traddr, char *buf, size_t blen)
{
char name[2 + NVME_FC_TRADDR_HEXNAMELEN + 1];
substring_t wwn = { name, &name[sizeof(name)-1] };
int nnoffset, pnoffset;
/* validate it string one of the 2 allowed formats */
if (strnlen(buf, blen) == NVME_FC_TRADDR_MAXLENGTH &&
!strncmp(buf, "nn-0x", NVME_FC_TRADDR_OXNNLEN) &&
!strncmp(&buf[NVME_FC_TRADDR_MAX_PN_OFFSET],
"pn-0x", NVME_FC_TRADDR_OXNNLEN)) {
nnoffset = NVME_FC_TRADDR_OXNNLEN;
pnoffset = NVME_FC_TRADDR_MAX_PN_OFFSET +
NVME_FC_TRADDR_OXNNLEN;
} else if ((strnlen(buf, blen) == NVME_FC_TRADDR_MINLENGTH &&
!strncmp(buf, "nn-", NVME_FC_TRADDR_NNLEN) &&
!strncmp(&buf[NVME_FC_TRADDR_MIN_PN_OFFSET],
"pn-", NVME_FC_TRADDR_NNLEN))) {
nnoffset = NVME_FC_TRADDR_NNLEN;
pnoffset = NVME_FC_TRADDR_MIN_PN_OFFSET + NVME_FC_TRADDR_NNLEN;
} else
goto out_einval;
name[0] = '0';
name[1] = 'x';
name[2 + NVME_FC_TRADDR_HEXNAMELEN] = 0;
memcpy(&name[2], &buf[nnoffset], NVME_FC_TRADDR_HEXNAMELEN);
if (__nvme_fc_parse_u64(&wwn, &traddr->nn))
goto out_einval;
memcpy(&name[2], &buf[pnoffset], NVME_FC_TRADDR_HEXNAMELEN);
if (__nvme_fc_parse_u64(&wwn, &traddr->pn))
goto out_einval;
return 0;
out_einval:
pr_warn("%s: bad traddr string\n", __func__);
return -EINVAL;
}
Commit Message: nvmet-fc: ensure target queue id within range.
When searching for queue id's ensure they are within the expected range.
Signed-off-by: James Smart <james.smart@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 93,588
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MediaRequestState state(MediaStreamType stream_type) const {
return state_[stream_type];
}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <olka@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 153,217
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void adjust(LayoutSize& offset) const
{
LayoutUnit currLogicalLeftOffset = (m_isHorizontal ? m_colRect.x() : m_colRect.y()) - m_logicalLeft;
offset += m_isHorizontal ? LayoutSize(currLogicalLeftOffset, m_currLogicalTopOffset) : LayoutSize(m_currLogicalTopOffset, currLogicalLeftOffset);
if (m_colInfo->progressionAxis() == ColumnInfo::BlockAxis) {
if (m_isHorizontal)
offset.expand(0, m_colRect.y() - m_block.borderTop() - m_block.paddingTop());
else
offset.expand(m_colRect.x() - m_block.borderLeft() - m_block.paddingLeft(), 0);
}
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 116,136
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool InterstitialPageImpl::OnMessageReceived(
RenderFrameHostImpl* render_frame_host,
const IPC::Message& message) {
if (render_frame_host->GetRenderViewHost() != render_view_host_) {
DCHECK(!render_view_host_)
<< "We expect an interstitial page to have only a single RVH";
return false;
}
bool handled = true;
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP_WITH_PARAM(InterstitialPageImpl, message,
render_frame_host)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DomOperationResponse,
OnDomOperationResponse)
IPC_MESSAGE_UNHANDLED(handled = false)
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP()
return handled;
}
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 136,119
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void activityLoggedAttr1AttributeGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
V8PerContextData* contextData = V8PerContextData::from(info.GetIsolate()->GetCurrentContext());
if (contextData && contextData->activityLogger())
contextData->activityLogger()->log("TestObject.activityLoggedAttr1", 0, 0, "Getter");
TestObjectV8Internal::activityLoggedAttr1AttributeGetter(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 121,488
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FreeArray( _cmsDICarray* a)
{
if (a ->Name.Offsets != NULL) FreeElem(&a->Name);
if (a ->Value.Offsets != NULL) FreeElem(&a ->Value);
if (a ->DisplayName.Offsets != NULL) FreeElem(&a->DisplayName);
if (a ->DisplayValue.Offsets != NULL) FreeElem(&a ->DisplayValue);
}
Commit Message: Added an extra check to MLU bounds
Thanks to Ibrahim el-sayed for spotting the bug
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 70,939
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(imagecreatefromgif)
{
_php_image_create_from(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, PHP_GDIMG_TYPE_GIF, "GIF", gdImageCreateFromGif, gdImageCreateFromGifCtx);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 15,112
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: InterpolationQuality GraphicsContext::imageInterpolationQuality() const
{
return InterpolationDefault;
}
Commit Message: Reviewed by Kevin Ollivier.
[wx] Fix strokeArc and fillRoundedRect drawing, and add clipPath support.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=60847
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@86502 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 100,094
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: unsigned long nr_uninterruptible(void)
{
unsigned long i, sum = 0;
for_each_possible_cpu(i)
sum += cpu_rq(i)->nr_uninterruptible;
/*
* Since we read the counters lockless, it might be slightly
* inaccurate. Do not allow it to go below zero though:
*/
if (unlikely((long)sum < 0))
sum = 0;
return sum;
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 22,497
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int handle_wrmsr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct msr_data msr;
u32 ecx = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RCX];
u64 data = (vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX] & -1u)
| ((u64)(vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDX] & -1u) << 32);
msr.data = data;
msr.index = ecx;
msr.host_initiated = false;
if (kvm_set_msr(vcpu, &msr) != 0) {
trace_kvm_msr_write_ex(ecx, data);
kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
return 1;
}
trace_kvm_msr_write(ecx, data);
skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: kvm: vmx: handle invvpid vm exit gracefully
On systems with invvpid instruction support (corresponding bit in
IA32_VMX_EPT_VPID_CAP MSR is set) guest invocation of invvpid
causes vm exit, which is currently not handled and results in
propagation of unknown exit to userspace.
Fix this by installing an invvpid vm exit handler.
This is CVE-2014-3646.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 37,376
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: apprentice_sort(const void *a, const void *b)
{
const struct magic_entry *ma = CAST(const struct magic_entry *, a);
const struct magic_entry *mb = CAST(const struct magic_entry *, b);
size_t sa = apprentice_magic_strength(ma->mp);
size_t sb = apprentice_magic_strength(mb->mp);
if (sa == sb)
return 0;
else if (sa > sb)
return -1;
else
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-17
| 0
| 7,375
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t Camera2Client::commandPlayRecordingSoundL() {
mCameraService->playSound(CameraService::SOUND_RECORDING);
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Camera: Disallow dumping clients directly
Camera service dumps should only be initiated through
ICameraService::dump.
Bug: 26265403
Change-Id: If3ca4718ed74bf33ad8a416192689203029e2803
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 161,717
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: AutocompleteEditModel::State::State(bool user_input_in_progress,
const string16& user_text,
const string16& keyword,
bool is_keyword_hint)
: user_input_in_progress(user_input_in_progress),
user_text(user_text),
keyword(keyword),
is_keyword_hint(is_keyword_hint) {
}
Commit Message: Adds per-provider information to omnibox UMA logs.
Adds a fairly general structure to omnibox logs that can be used to pass information (that's not per-result information) from providers to the UMA logs. Right now it's only used to pass whether the asynchronous pass of a provider has finished, but it will probably be used for other things in the future.
BUG=
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10380007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137288 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 103,868
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void sycc422_to_rgb(opj_image_t *img)
{
int *d0, *d1, *d2, *r, *g, *b;
const int *y, *cb, *cr;
size_t maxw, maxh, max, offx, loopmaxw;
int offset, upb;
size_t i;
upb = (int)img->comps[0].prec;
offset = 1<<(upb - 1); upb = (1<<upb)-1;
maxw = (size_t)img->comps[0].w; maxh = (size_t)img->comps[0].h;
max = maxw * maxh;
y = img->comps[0].data;
cb = img->comps[1].data;
cr = img->comps[2].data;
d0 = r = (int*)malloc(sizeof(int) * max);
d1 = g = (int*)malloc(sizeof(int) * max);
d2 = b = (int*)malloc(sizeof(int) * max);
if(r == NULL || g == NULL || b == NULL) goto fails;
/* if img->x0 is odd, then first column shall use Cb/Cr = 0 */
offx = img->x0 & 1U;
loopmaxw = maxw - offx;
for(i=0U; i < maxh; ++i)
{
size_t j;
if (offx > 0U) {
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *y, 0, 0, r, g, b);
++y; ++r; ++g; ++b;
}
for(j=0U; j < (loopmaxw & ~(size_t)1U); j += 2U)
{
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *y, *cb, *cr, r, g, b);
++y; ++r; ++g; ++b;
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *y, *cb, *cr, r, g, b);
++y; ++r; ++g; ++b; ++cb; ++cr;
}
if (j < loopmaxw) {
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *y, *cb, *cr, r, g, b);
++y; ++r; ++g; ++b; ++cb; ++cr;
}
}
free(img->comps[0].data); img->comps[0].data = d0;
free(img->comps[1].data); img->comps[1].data = d1;
free(img->comps[2].data); img->comps[2].data = d2;
img->comps[1].w = img->comps[2].w = img->comps[0].w;
img->comps[1].h = img->comps[2].h = img->comps[0].h;
img->comps[1].dx = img->comps[2].dx = img->comps[0].dx;
img->comps[1].dy = img->comps[2].dy = img->comps[0].dy;
img->color_space = OPJ_CLRSPC_SRGB;
return;
fails:
free(r);
free(g);
free(b);
}/* sycc422_to_rgb() */
Commit Message: Fix Heap Buffer Overflow in function color_cmyk_to_rgb
Fix uclouvain/openjpeg#774
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 73,871
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int vmx_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
u32 exit_reason = vmx->exit_reason;
u32 vectoring_info = vmx->idt_vectoring_info;
trace_kvm_exit(exit_reason, vcpu, KVM_ISA_VMX);
/*
* Flush logged GPAs PML buffer, this will make dirty_bitmap more
* updated. Another good is, in kvm_vm_ioctl_get_dirty_log, before
* querying dirty_bitmap, we only need to kick all vcpus out of guest
* mode as if vcpus is in root mode, the PML buffer must has been
* flushed already.
*/
if (enable_pml)
vmx_flush_pml_buffer(vcpu);
/* If guest state is invalid, start emulating */
if (vmx->emulation_required)
return handle_invalid_guest_state(vcpu);
if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) && nested_vmx_exit_handled(vcpu)) {
nested_vmx_vmexit(vcpu, exit_reason,
vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO),
vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION));
return 1;
}
if (exit_reason & VMX_EXIT_REASONS_FAILED_VMENTRY) {
dump_vmcs();
vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_FAIL_ENTRY;
vcpu->run->fail_entry.hardware_entry_failure_reason
= exit_reason;
return 0;
}
if (unlikely(vmx->fail)) {
vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_FAIL_ENTRY;
vcpu->run->fail_entry.hardware_entry_failure_reason
= vmcs_read32(VM_INSTRUCTION_ERROR);
return 0;
}
/*
* Note:
* Do not try to fix EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG if it caused by
* delivery event since it indicates guest is accessing MMIO.
* The vm-exit can be triggered again after return to guest that
* will cause infinite loop.
*/
if ((vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_VALID_MASK) &&
(exit_reason != EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI &&
exit_reason != EXIT_REASON_EPT_VIOLATION &&
exit_reason != EXIT_REASON_PML_FULL &&
exit_reason != EXIT_REASON_TASK_SWITCH)) {
vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR;
vcpu->run->internal.suberror = KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_DELIVERY_EV;
vcpu->run->internal.ndata = 2;
vcpu->run->internal.data[0] = vectoring_info;
vcpu->run->internal.data[1] = exit_reason;
return 0;
}
if (unlikely(!cpu_has_virtual_nmis() && vmx->soft_vnmi_blocked &&
!(is_guest_mode(vcpu) && nested_cpu_has_virtual_nmis(
get_vmcs12(vcpu))))) {
if (vmx_interrupt_allowed(vcpu)) {
vmx->soft_vnmi_blocked = 0;
} else if (vmx->vnmi_blocked_time > 1000000000LL &&
vcpu->arch.nmi_pending) {
/*
* This CPU don't support us in finding the end of an
* NMI-blocked window if the guest runs with IRQs
* disabled. So we pull the trigger after 1 s of
* futile waiting, but inform the user about this.
*/
printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: Breaking out of NMI-blocked "
"state on VCPU %d after 1 s timeout\n",
__func__, vcpu->vcpu_id);
vmx->soft_vnmi_blocked = 0;
}
}
if (exit_reason < kvm_vmx_max_exit_handlers
&& kvm_vmx_exit_handlers[exit_reason])
return kvm_vmx_exit_handlers[exit_reason](vcpu);
else {
WARN_ONCE(1, "vmx: unexpected exit reason 0x%x\n", exit_reason);
kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
return 1;
}
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Allow L1 to intercept software exceptions (#BP and #OF)
When L2 exits to L0 due to "exception or NMI", software exceptions
(#BP and #OF) for which L1 has requested an intercept should be
handled by L1 rather than L0. Previously, only hardware exceptions
were forwarded to L1.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-388
| 0
| 48,120
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: iter_recurse (DBusMessageDataIter *iter)
{
iter->depth += 1;
_dbus_assert (iter->depth < _DBUS_MESSAGE_DATA_MAX_NESTING);
_dbus_assert (iter->sequence_nos[iter->depth] >= 0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 7,499
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void inet_free_ifa(struct in_ifaddr *ifa)
{
call_rcu(&ifa->rcu_head, inet_rcu_free_ifa);
}
Commit Message: ipv4: Don't do expensive useless work during inetdev destroy.
When an inetdev is destroyed, every address assigned to the interface
is removed. And in this scenerio we do two pointless things which can
be very expensive if the number of assigned interfaces is large:
1) Address promotion. We are deleting all addresses, so there is no
point in doing this.
2) A full nf conntrack table purge for every address. We only need to
do this once, as is already caught by the existing
masq_dev_notifier so masq_inet_event() can skip this.
Reported-by: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Tested-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 54,079
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: jpeg_start_decompress_encap(OJPEGState* sp, jpeg_decompress_struct* cinfo)
{
if( SETJMP(sp->exit_jmpbuf) )
return 0;
else {
jpeg_start_decompress(cinfo);
return 1;
}
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_ojpeg.c: make OJPEGDecode() early exit in case of failure in
OJPEGPreDecode(). This will avoid a divide by zero, and potential other issues.
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2611
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 70,329
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: v8::Handle<v8::Object> V8TestNamedConstructor::wrapSlow(PassRefPtr<TestNamedConstructor> impl, v8::Isolate* isolate)
{
v8::Handle<v8::Object> wrapper;
V8Proxy* proxy = 0;
wrapper = V8DOMWrapper::instantiateV8Object(proxy, &info, impl.get());
if (UNLIKELY(wrapper.IsEmpty()))
return wrapper;
v8::Persistent<v8::Object> wrapperHandle = v8::Persistent<v8::Object>::New(wrapper);
if (!hasDependentLifetime)
wrapperHandle.MarkIndependent();
V8DOMWrapper::setJSWrapperForActiveDOMObject(impl, wrapperHandle, isolate);
return wrapper;
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 109,513
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: COMPS_HSList* comps_rtree_pairs(COMPS_RTree * rt) {
return __comps_rtree_all(rt, 2);
}
Commit Message: Fix UAF in comps_objmrtree_unite function
The added field is not used at all in many places and it is probably the
left-over of some copy-paste.
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 91,827
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Con_DrawNotify (void)
{
int x, v;
short *text;
int i;
int time;
int skip;
int currentColor;
currentColor = 7;
re.SetColor( g_color_table[currentColor] );
v = 0;
for (i= con.current-NUM_CON_TIMES+1 ; i<=con.current ; i++)
{
if (i < 0)
continue;
time = con.times[i % NUM_CON_TIMES];
if (time == 0)
continue;
time = cls.realtime - time;
if (time > con_notifytime->value*1000)
continue;
text = con.text + (i % con.totallines)*con.linewidth;
if (cl.snap.ps.pm_type != PM_INTERMISSION && Key_GetCatcher( ) & (KEYCATCH_UI | KEYCATCH_CGAME) ) {
continue;
}
for (x = 0 ; x < con.linewidth ; x++) {
if ( ( text[x] & 0xff ) == ' ' ) {
continue;
}
if ( ColorIndexForNumber( text[x]>>8 ) != currentColor ) {
currentColor = ColorIndexForNumber( text[x]>>8 );
re.SetColor( g_color_table[currentColor] );
}
SCR_DrawSmallChar( cl_conXOffset->integer + con.xadjust + (x+1)*SMALLCHAR_WIDTH, v, text[x] & 0xff );
}
v += SMALLCHAR_HEIGHT;
}
re.SetColor( NULL );
if (Key_GetCatcher( ) & (KEYCATCH_UI | KEYCATCH_CGAME) ) {
return;
}
if ( Key_GetCatcher( ) & KEYCATCH_MESSAGE )
{
if (chat_team)
{
SCR_DrawBigString (8, v, "say_team:", 1.0f, qfalse );
skip = 10;
}
else
{
SCR_DrawBigString (8, v, "say:", 1.0f, qfalse );
skip = 5;
}
Field_BigDraw( &chatField, skip * BIGCHAR_WIDTH, v,
SCREEN_WIDTH - ( skip + 1 ) * BIGCHAR_WIDTH, qtrue, qtrue );
}
}
Commit Message: Merge some file writing extension checks from OpenJK.
Thanks Ensiform.
https://github.com/JACoders/OpenJK/commit/05928a57f9e4aae15a3bd0
https://github.com/JACoders/OpenJK/commit/ef124fd0fc48af164581176
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 95,427
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LayoutSVGViewportContainer::paint(const PaintInfo& paintInfo, const LayoutPoint& paintOffset) const
{
SVGContainerPainter(*this).paint(paintInfo);
}
Commit Message: Avoid using forced layout to trigger paint invalidation for SVG containers
Currently, SVG containers in the LayoutObject hierarchy force layout of
their children if the transform changes. The main reason for this is to
trigger paint invalidation of the subtree. In some cases - changes to the
scale factor - there are other reasons to trigger layout, like computing
a new scale factor for <text> or re-layout nodes with non-scaling stroke.
Compute a "scale-factor change" in addition to the "transform change"
already computed, then use this new signal to determine if layout should
be forced for the subtree. Trigger paint invalidation using the
LayoutObject flags instead.
The downside to this is that paint invalidation will walk into "hidden"
containers which rarely require repaint (since they are not technically
visible). This will hopefully be rectified in a follow-up CL.
For the testcase from 603850, this essentially eliminates the cost of
layout (from ~350ms to ~0ms on authors machine; layout cost is related
to text metrics recalculation), bumping frame rate significantly.
BUG=603956,603850
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/1996543002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#400950}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 121,140
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void tcp_mark_push(struct tcp_sock *tp, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_flags |= TCPHDR_PSH;
tp->pushed_seq = tp->write_seq;
}
Commit Message: tcp: initialize rcv_mss to TCP_MIN_MSS instead of 0
When tcp_disconnect() is called, inet_csk_delack_init() sets
icsk->icsk_ack.rcv_mss to 0.
This could potentially cause tcp_recvmsg() => tcp_cleanup_rbuf() =>
__tcp_select_window() call path to have division by 0 issue.
So this patch initializes rcv_mss to TCP_MIN_MSS instead of 0.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 61,748
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static BOOL update_recv_orders(rdpUpdate* update, wStream* s)
{
UINT16 numberOrders;
if (Stream_GetRemainingLength(s) < 6)
{
WLog_ERR(TAG, "Stream_GetRemainingLength(s) < 6");
return FALSE;
}
Stream_Seek_UINT16(s); /* pad2OctetsA (2 bytes) */
Stream_Read_UINT16(s, numberOrders); /* numberOrders (2 bytes) */
Stream_Seek_UINT16(s); /* pad2OctetsB (2 bytes) */
while (numberOrders > 0)
{
if (!update_recv_order(update, s))
{
WLog_ERR(TAG, "update_recv_order() failed");
return FALSE;
}
numberOrders--;
}
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8786
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 83,576
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: nfsd_adjust_nfsd_versions4(void)
{
unsigned i;
for (i = 0; i <= NFSD_SUPPORTED_MINOR_VERSION; i++) {
if (nfsd_supported_minorversions[i])
return;
}
nfsd_vers(4, NFSD_CLEAR);
}
Commit Message: nfsd: check for oversized NFSv2/v3 arguments
A client can append random data to the end of an NFSv2 or NFSv3 RPC call
without our complaining; we'll just stop parsing at the end of the
expected data and ignore the rest.
Encoded arguments and replies are stored together in an array of pages,
and if a call is too large it could leave inadequate space for the
reply. This is normally OK because NFS RPC's typically have either
short arguments and long replies (like READ) or long arguments and short
replies (like WRITE). But a client that sends an incorrectly long reply
can violate those assumptions. This was observed to cause crashes.
Also, several operations increment rq_next_page in the decode routine
before checking the argument size, which can leave rq_next_page pointing
well past the end of the page array, causing trouble later in
svc_free_pages.
So, following a suggestion from Neil Brown, add a central check to
enforce our expectation that no NFSv2/v3 call has both a large call and
a large reply.
As followup we may also want to rewrite the encoding routines to check
more carefully that they aren't running off the end of the page array.
We may also consider rejecting calls that have any extra garbage
appended. That would be safer, and within our rights by spec, but given
the age of our server and the NFS protocol, and the fact that we've
never enforced this before, we may need to balance that against the
possibility of breaking some oddball client.
Reported-by: Tuomas Haanpää <thaan@synopsys.com>
Reported-by: Ari Kauppi <ari@synopsys.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 67,132
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct instruction * compiler_create_instruction(struct filter_op *fop)
{
struct instruction *ins;
SAFE_CALLOC(ins, 1, sizeof(struct instruction));
/* copy the instruction */
memcpy(&ins->fop, fop, sizeof(struct filter_op));
return ins;
}
Commit Message: Exit gracefully in case of corrupted filters (Closes issue #782)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 68,065
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DevToolsWindow::AddNewContents(WebContents* source,
WebContents* new_contents,
WindowOpenDisposition disposition,
const gfx::Rect& initial_rect,
bool user_gesture,
bool* was_blocked) {
if (new_contents == toolbox_web_contents_) {
toolbox_web_contents_->SetDelegate(
new DevToolsToolboxDelegate(toolbox_web_contents_,
inspected_contents_observer_.get()));
if (main_web_contents_->GetRenderWidgetHostView() &&
toolbox_web_contents_->GetRenderWidgetHostView()) {
gfx::Size size =
main_web_contents_->GetRenderWidgetHostView()->GetViewBounds().size();
toolbox_web_contents_->GetRenderWidgetHostView()->SetSize(size);
}
UpdateBrowserWindow();
return;
}
WebContents* inspected_web_contents = GetInspectedWebContents();
if (inspected_web_contents) {
inspected_web_contents->GetDelegate()->AddNewContents(
source, new_contents, disposition, initial_rect, user_gesture,
was_blocked);
}
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move front-end URL handling to DevToolsUIBindingds
BUG=662859
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2607833002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#440926}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 138,373
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ScreenOrientationDispatcherHost::OnOrientationChange() {
if (provider_)
provider_->OnOrientationChange();
}
Commit Message: Cleanups in ScreenOrientationDispatcherHost.
BUG=None
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/408213003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@284786 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 111,196
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void dbg_to_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct sys_reg_params *p,
u64 *dbg_reg)
{
p->regval = *dbg_reg;
if (p->is_32bit)
p->regval &= 0xffffffffUL;
}
Commit Message: arm64: KVM: pmu: Fix AArch32 cycle counter access
We're missing the handling code for the cycle counter accessed
from a 32bit guest, leading to unexpected results.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.6+
Signed-off-by: Wei Huang <wei@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 62,876
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int int_floorlog2(int a)
{
int l;
for (l = 0; a > 1; l++) {
a >>= 1;
}
return l;
}
Commit Message: pgxtoimage(): fix write stack buffer overflow (#997)
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 61,892
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void perf_pmu_rotate_start(struct pmu *pmu)
{
struct perf_cpu_context *cpuctx = this_cpu_ptr(pmu->pmu_cpu_context);
struct list_head *head = &__get_cpu_var(rotation_list);
WARN_ON(!irqs_disabled());
if (list_empty(&cpuctx->rotation_list))
list_add(&cpuctx->rotation_list, head);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 26,149
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int kvm_apic_match_logical_addr(struct kvm_lapic *apic, u8 mda)
{
int result = 0;
u32 logical_id;
if (apic_x2apic_mode(apic)) {
logical_id = kvm_apic_get_reg(apic, APIC_LDR);
return logical_id & mda;
}
logical_id = GET_APIC_LOGICAL_ID(kvm_apic_get_reg(apic, APIC_LDR));
switch (kvm_apic_get_reg(apic, APIC_DFR)) {
case APIC_DFR_FLAT:
if (logical_id & mda)
result = 1;
break;
case APIC_DFR_CLUSTER:
if (((logical_id >> 4) == (mda >> 0x4))
&& (logical_id & mda & 0xf))
result = 1;
break;
default:
apic_debug("Bad DFR vcpu %d: %08x\n",
apic->vcpu->vcpu_id, kvm_apic_get_reg(apic, APIC_DFR));
break;
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: fix guest-initiated crash with x2apic (CVE-2013-6376)
A guest can cause a BUG_ON() leading to a host kernel crash.
When the guest writes to the ICR to request an IPI, while in x2apic
mode the following things happen, the destination is read from
ICR2, which is a register that the guest can control.
kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic_fast uses the high 16 bits of ICR2 as the
cluster id. A BUG_ON is triggered, which is a protection against
accessing map->logical_map with an out-of-bounds access and manages
to avoid that anything really unsafe occurs.
The logic in the code is correct from real HW point of view. The problem
is that KVM supports only one cluster with ID 0 in clustered mode, but
the code that has the bug does not take this into account.
Reported-by: Lars Bull <larsbull@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 28,753
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool PDFiumEngineExports::GetPDFPageSizeByIndex(
const void* pdf_buffer,
int pdf_buffer_size,
int page_number,
double* width,
double* height) {
FPDF_DOCUMENT doc =
FPDF_LoadMemDocument(pdf_buffer, pdf_buffer_size, nullptr);
if (!doc)
return false;
bool success = FPDF_GetPageSizeByIndex(doc, page_number, width, height) != 0;
FPDF_CloseDocument(doc);
return success;
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Defer page unloading in JS callback.
One of the callbacks from PDFium JavaScript into the embedder is to get the
current page number. In Chromium, this will trigger a call to
CalculateMostVisiblePage that method will determine the visible pages and unload
any non-visible pages. But, if the originating JS is on a non-visible page
we'll delete the page and annotations associated with that page. This will
cause issues as we are currently working with those objects when the JavaScript
returns.
This Cl defers the page unloading triggered by getting the most visible page
until the next event is handled by the Chromium embedder.
BUG=chromium:653090
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2418533002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#424781}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 140,338
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct fsnotify_group *inotify_new_group(struct user_struct *user, unsigned int max_events)
{
struct fsnotify_group *group;
group = fsnotify_alloc_group(&inotify_fsnotify_ops);
if (IS_ERR(group))
return group;
group->max_events = max_events;
spin_lock_init(&group->inotify_data.idr_lock);
idr_init(&group->inotify_data.idr);
group->inotify_data.last_wd = 0;
group->inotify_data.user = user;
group->inotify_data.fa = NULL;
return group;
}
Commit Message: inotify: fix double free/corruption of stuct user
On an error path in inotify_init1 a normal user can trigger a double
free of struct user. This is a regression introduced by a2ae4cc9a16e
("inotify: stop kernel memory leak on file creation failure").
We fix this by making sure that if a group exists the user reference is
dropped when the group is cleaned up. We should not explictly drop the
reference on error and also drop the reference when the group is cleaned
up.
The new lifetime rules are that an inotify group lives from
inotify_new_group to the last fsnotify_put_group. Since the struct user
and inotify_devs are directly tied to this lifetime they are only
changed/updated in those two locations. We get rid of all special
casing of struct user or user->inotify_devs.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org (2.6.37 and up)
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 1
| 165,888
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RecordAction(const UserMetricsAction& action) {
RecordComputedAction(action.str_);
}
Commit Message: Convert Uses of base::RepeatingCallback<>::Equals to Use == or != in //base
Staging this change because some conversions will have semantic changes.
BUG=937566
Change-Id: I2d4950624c0fab00e107814421a161e43da965cc
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1507245
Reviewed-by: Gabriel Charette <gab@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Gabriel Charette <gab@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#639702}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 130,658
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChromeMockRenderThread::set_print_preview_cancel_page_number(int page) {
print_preview_cancel_page_number_ = page;
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 105,867
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void grow_pgdat_span(struct pglist_data *pgdat, unsigned long start_pfn,
unsigned long end_pfn)
{
unsigned long old_pgdat_end_pfn =
pgdat->node_start_pfn + pgdat->node_spanned_pages;
if (start_pfn < pgdat->node_start_pfn)
pgdat->node_start_pfn = start_pfn;
pgdat->node_spanned_pages = max(old_pgdat_end_pfn, end_pfn) -
pgdat->node_start_pfn;
}
Commit Message: mm/hotplug: correctly add new zone to all other nodes' zone lists
When online_pages() is called to add new memory to an empty zone, it
rebuilds all zone lists by calling build_all_zonelists(). But there's a
bug which prevents the new zone to be added to other nodes' zone lists.
online_pages() {
build_all_zonelists()
.....
node_set_state(zone_to_nid(zone), N_HIGH_MEMORY)
}
Here the node of the zone is put into N_HIGH_MEMORY state after calling
build_all_zonelists(), but build_all_zonelists() only adds zones from
nodes in N_HIGH_MEMORY state to the fallback zone lists.
build_all_zonelists()
->__build_all_zonelists()
->build_zonelists()
->find_next_best_node()
->for_each_node_state(n, N_HIGH_MEMORY)
So memory in the new zone will never be used by other nodes, and it may
cause strange behavor when system is under memory pressure. So put node
into N_HIGH_MEMORY state before calling build_all_zonelists().
Signed-off-by: Jianguo Wu <wujianguo@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiang Liu <liuj97@gmail.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Keping Chen <chenkeping@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 18,499
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewGtk::SetHasHorizontalScrollbar(
bool has_horizontal_scrollbar) {
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 114,992
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline struct pfkey_sock *pfkey_sk(struct sock *sk)
{
return (struct pfkey_sock *)sk;
}
Commit Message: af_key: initialize satype in key_notify_policy_flush()
This field was left uninitialized. Some user daemons perform check against this
field.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 31,460
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void encode_renew(struct xdr_stream *xdr, const struct nfs_client *client_stateid, struct compound_hdr *hdr)
{
__be32 *p;
p = reserve_space(xdr, 12);
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(OP_RENEW);
xdr_encode_hyper(p, client_stateid->cl_clientid);
hdr->nops++;
hdr->replen += decode_renew_maxsz;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 23,388
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ip6_dev_loopback_xmit(struct sk_buff *newskb)
{
skb_reset_mac_header(newskb);
__skb_pull(newskb, skb_network_offset(newskb));
newskb->pkt_type = PACKET_LOOPBACK;
newskb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY;
WARN_ON(!skb_dst(newskb));
netif_rx_ni(newskb);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: make fragment identifications less predictable
IPv6 fragment identification generation is way beyond what we use for
IPv4 : It uses a single generator. Its not scalable and allows DOS
attacks.
Now inetpeer is IPv6 aware, we can use it to provide a more secure and
scalable frag ident generator (per destination, instead of system wide)
This patch :
1) defines a new secure_ipv6_id() helper
2) extends inet_getid() to provide 32bit results
3) extends ipv6_select_ident() with a new dest parameter
Reported-by: Fernando Gont <fernando@gont.com.ar>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 26,611
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: TabCloseableStateWatcher::TabCloseableStateWatcher()
: can_close_tab_(true),
signing_off_(false),
guest_session_(
CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kGuestSession)),
waiting_for_browser_(false) {
BrowserList::AddObserver(this);
notification_registrar_.Add(this, NotificationType::APP_EXITING,
NotificationService::AllSources());
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 98,026
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool IsFileType(BlobData::Item::Type type) {
switch (type) {
case BlobData::Item::TYPE_FILE:
case BlobData::Item::TYPE_FILE_FILESYSTEM:
return true;
default:
return false;
}
}
Commit Message: Avoid integer overflows in BlobURLRequestJob.
BUG=169685
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12047012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@179154 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 115,166
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Err ssix_Size(GF_Box *s)
{
u32 i;
GF_SubsegmentIndexBox *ptr = (GF_SubsegmentIndexBox*)s;
ptr->size += 4;
for (i = 0; i < ptr->subsegment_count; i++) {
ptr->size += 4 + 4 * ptr->subsegments[i].range_count;
}
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,431
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SpoolssEnumPrinters_q(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree, dcerpc_info *di, guint8 *drep _U_)
{
guint32 level, flags;
dcerpc_call_value *dcv = (dcerpc_call_value *)di->call_data;
static const int * hf_flags[] = {
&hf_enumprinters_flags_network,
&hf_enumprinters_flags_shared,
&hf_enumprinters_flags_remote,
&hf_enumprinters_flags_name,
&hf_enumprinters_flags_connections,
&hf_enumprinters_flags_local,
&hf_enumprinters_flags_default,
NULL
};
/* Parse packet */
offset = dissect_ndr_uint32(tvb, offset, pinfo, NULL, di, drep, -1, &flags);
proto_tree_add_bitmask_value(tree, tvb, offset - 4, hf_enumprinters_flags,
ett_enumprinters_flags, hf_flags, flags);
offset = dissect_ndr_str_pointer_item(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep,
NDR_POINTER_UNIQUE, "Server name", hf_servername, 0);
offset = dissect_ndr_uint32(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep, hf_level, &level);
/* GetPrinter() stores the level in se_data */
if(!pinfo->fd->flags.visited){
dcv->se_data = GINT_TO_POINTER((int)level);
}
col_append_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, ", level %d", level);
offset = dissect_spoolss_buffer(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep, NULL);
offset = dissect_ndr_uint32(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep, hf_offered, NULL);
return offset;
}
Commit Message: SPOOLSS: Try to avoid an infinite loop.
Use tvb_reported_length_remaining in dissect_spoolss_uint16uni. Make
sure our offset always increments in dissect_spoolss_keybuffer.
Change-Id: I7017c9685bb2fa27161d80a03b8fca4ef630e793
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/14687
Reviewed-by: Gerald Combs <gerald@wireshark.org>
Petri-Dish: Gerald Combs <gerald@wireshark.org>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <buildbot-no-reply@wireshark.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 51,952
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PDFiumEngine::SelectionChangeInvalidator::~SelectionChangeInvalidator() {
pp::Point offset = previous_origin_ - engine_->GetVisibleRect().point();
for (auto& old_selection : old_selections_)
old_selection.Offset(offset);
std::vector<pp::Rect> new_selections = GetVisibleSelections();
for (auto& new_selection : new_selections) {
for (auto& old_selection : old_selections_) {
if (!old_selection.IsEmpty() && new_selection == old_selection) {
new_selection = old_selection = pp::Rect();
break;
}
}
}
bool selection_changed = false;
for (const auto& old_selection : old_selections_) {
if (!old_selection.IsEmpty()) {
Invalidate(old_selection);
selection_changed = true;
}
}
for (const auto& new_selection : new_selections) {
if (!new_selection.IsEmpty()) {
Invalidate(new_selection);
selection_changed = true;
}
}
if (selection_changed)
engine_->OnSelectionChanged();
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Use a temporary list when unloading pages
When traversing the |deferred_page_unloads_| list and handling the
unloads it's possible for new pages to get added to the list which will
invalidate the iterator.
This CL swaps the list with an empty list and does the iteration on the
list copy. New items that are unloaded while handling the defers will be
unloaded at a later point.
Bug: 780450
Change-Id: Ic7ced1c82227109784fb536ce19a4dd51b9119ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758916
Commit-Queue: dsinclair <dsinclair@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#515056}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 146,228
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void V8TestObject::ReflectTestInterfaceAttributeAttributeSetterCallback(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_reflectTestInterfaceAttribute_Setter");
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value = info[0];
test_object_v8_internal::ReflectTestInterfaceAttributeAttributeSetter(v8_value, info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 135,092
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int efx_pm_resume(struct device *dev)
{
struct pci_dev *pci_dev = to_pci_dev(dev);
struct efx_nic *efx = pci_get_drvdata(pci_dev);
int rc;
rc = pci_set_power_state(pci_dev, PCI_D0);
if (rc)
return rc;
pci_restore_state(pci_dev);
rc = pci_enable_device(pci_dev);
if (rc)
return rc;
pci_set_master(efx->pci_dev);
rc = efx->type->reset(efx, RESET_TYPE_ALL);
if (rc)
return rc;
rc = efx->type->init(efx);
if (rc)
return rc;
efx_pm_thaw(dev);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: sfc: Fix maximum number of TSO segments and minimum TX queue size
[ Upstream commit 7e6d06f0de3f74ca929441add094518ae332257c ]
Currently an skb requiring TSO may not fit within a minimum-size TX
queue. The TX queue selected for the skb may stall and trigger the TX
watchdog repeatedly (since the problem skb will be retried after the
TX reset). This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3412.
Set the maximum number of TSO segments for our devices to 100. This
should make no difference to behaviour unless the actual MSS is less
than about 700. Increase the minimum TX queue size accordingly to
allow for 2 worst-case skbs, so that there will definitely be space
to add an skb after we wake a queue.
To avoid invalidating existing configurations, change
efx_ethtool_set_ringparam() to fix up values that are too small rather
than returning -EINVAL.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 19,400
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: juniper_atm2_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, register const u_char *p)
{
int llc_hdrlen;
struct juniper_l2info_t l2info;
l2info.pictype = DLT_JUNIPER_ATM2;
if (juniper_parse_header(ndo, p, h, &l2info) == 0)
return l2info.header_len;
p+=l2info.header_len;
if (l2info.cookie[7] & ATM2_PKT_TYPE_MASK) { /* OAM cell ? */
oam_print(ndo, p, l2info.length, ATM_OAM_NOHEC);
return l2info.header_len;
}
ND_TCHECK2(p[0], 3);
if (EXTRACT_24BITS(p) == 0xfefe03 || /* NLPID encaps ? */
EXTRACT_24BITS(p) == 0xaaaa03) { /* SNAP encaps ? */
llc_hdrlen = llc_print(ndo, p, l2info.length, l2info.caplen, NULL, NULL);
if (llc_hdrlen > 0)
return l2info.header_len;
}
if (l2info.direction != JUNIPER_BPF_PKT_IN && /* ether-over-1483 encaps ? */
(EXTRACT_32BITS(l2info.cookie) & ATM2_GAP_COUNT_MASK)) {
ether_print(ndo, p, l2info.length, l2info.caplen, NULL, NULL);
return l2info.header_len;
}
if (p[0] == 0x03) { /* Cisco style NLPID encaps ? */
isoclns_print(ndo, p + 1, l2info.length - 1);
/* FIXME check if frame was recognized */
return l2info.header_len;
}
if(juniper_ppp_heuristic_guess(ndo, p, l2info.length) != 0) /* PPPoA vcmux encaps ? */
return l2info.header_len;
if (ip_heuristic_guess(ndo, p, l2info.length) != 0) /* last try - vcmux encaps ? */
return l2info.header_len;
return l2info.header_len;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|juniper_atm2]"));
return l2info.header_len;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13004/Juniper: Add a bounds check.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add tests using the capture files supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 95,094
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DXVAVideoDecodeAccelerator::DXVAPictureBuffer::~DXVAPictureBuffer() {
if (decoding_surface_) {
eglReleaseTexImage(
static_cast<EGLDisplay*>(eglGetDisplay(EGL_DEFAULT_DISPLAY)),
decoding_surface_,
EGL_BACK_BUFFER);
eglDestroySurface(
static_cast<EGLDisplay*>(eglGetDisplay(EGL_DEFAULT_DISPLAY)),
decoding_surface_);
decoding_surface_ = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 106,954
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: u64 snmp_fold_field64(void __percpu *mib[], int offt, size_t syncp_offset)
{
u64 res = 0;
int cpu;
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
void *bhptr, *userptr;
struct u64_stats_sync *syncp;
u64 v_bh, v_user;
unsigned int start;
/* first mib used by softirq context, we must use _bh() accessors */
bhptr = per_cpu_ptr(SNMP_STAT_BHPTR(mib), cpu);
syncp = (struct u64_stats_sync *)(bhptr + syncp_offset);
do {
start = u64_stats_fetch_begin_bh(syncp);
v_bh = *(((u64 *) bhptr) + offt);
} while (u64_stats_fetch_retry_bh(syncp, start));
/* second mib used in USER context */
userptr = per_cpu_ptr(SNMP_STAT_USRPTR(mib), cpu);
syncp = (struct u64_stats_sync *)(userptr + syncp_offset);
do {
start = u64_stats_fetch_begin(syncp);
v_user = *(((u64 *) userptr) + offt);
} while (u64_stats_fetch_retry(syncp, start));
res += v_bh + v_user;
}
return res;
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 18,806
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int rtnetlink_event(struct notifier_block *this, unsigned long event, void *ptr)
{
struct net_device *dev = netdev_notifier_info_to_dev(ptr);
switch (event) {
case NETDEV_UP:
case NETDEV_DOWN:
case NETDEV_PRE_UP:
case NETDEV_POST_INIT:
case NETDEV_REGISTER:
case NETDEV_CHANGE:
case NETDEV_PRE_TYPE_CHANGE:
case NETDEV_GOING_DOWN:
case NETDEV_UNREGISTER:
case NETDEV_UNREGISTER_FINAL:
case NETDEV_RELEASE:
case NETDEV_JOIN:
case NETDEV_BONDING_INFO:
break;
default:
rtmsg_ifinfo(RTM_NEWLINK, dev, 0, GFP_KERNEL);
break;
}
return NOTIFY_DONE;
}
Commit Message: net: fix infoleak in rtnetlink
The stack object “map” has a total size of 32 bytes. Its last 4
bytes are padding generated by compiler. These padding bytes are
not initialized and sent out via “nla_put”.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 53,136
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool RenderWidgetHostViewGtk::LockMouse() {
if (mouse_locked_)
return true;
mouse_locked_ = true;
GtkWidget* current_grab_window = gtk_grab_get_current();
if (current_grab_window) {
gtk_grab_remove(current_grab_window);
LOG(WARNING) << "Locking Mouse with gdk_pointer_grab, "
<< "but had to steal grab from another window";
}
GtkWidget* widget = view_.get();
GdkWindow* window = gtk_widget_get_window(widget);
GdkCursor* cursor = gdk_cursor_new(GDK_BLANK_CURSOR);
GdkGrabStatus grab_status =
gdk_pointer_grab(window,
FALSE, // owner_events
static_cast<GdkEventMask>(
GDK_POINTER_MOTION_MASK |
GDK_BUTTON_PRESS_MASK |
GDK_BUTTON_RELEASE_MASK),
window, // confine_to
cursor,
GDK_CURRENT_TIME);
if (grab_status != GDK_GRAB_SUCCESS) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Failed to grab pointer for LockMouse. "
<< "gdk_pointer_grab returned: " << grab_status;
mouse_locked_ = false;
return false;
}
SetTooltipText(string16());
MarkCachedWidgetCenterStale();
return true;
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 114,963
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_func_state *reg_state /* func where register points to */,
int off, int size, int value_regno)
{
struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe];
int i, slot = -off - 1, spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE;
u8 *stype;
if (reg_state->allocated_stack <= slot) {
verbose(env, "invalid read from stack off %d+0 size %d\n",
off, size);
return -EACCES;
}
stype = reg_state->stack[spi].slot_type;
if (stype[0] == STACK_SPILL) {
if (size != BPF_REG_SIZE) {
verbose(env, "invalid size of register spill\n");
return -EACCES;
}
for (i = 1; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) {
if (stype[(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE] != STACK_SPILL) {
verbose(env, "corrupted spill memory\n");
return -EACCES;
}
}
if (value_regno >= 0) {
/* restore register state from stack */
state->regs[value_regno] = reg_state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr;
/* mark reg as written since spilled pointer state likely
* has its liveness marks cleared by is_state_visited()
* which resets stack/reg liveness for state transitions
*/
state->regs[value_regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
}
mark_reg_read(env, ®_state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr,
reg_state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.parent);
return 0;
} else {
int zeros = 0;
for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
if (stype[(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_MISC)
continue;
if (stype[(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_ZERO) {
zeros++;
continue;
}
verbose(env, "invalid read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n",
off, i, size);
return -EACCES;
}
mark_reg_read(env, ®_state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr,
reg_state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.parent);
if (value_regno >= 0) {
if (zeros == size) {
/* any size read into register is zero extended,
* so the whole register == const_zero
*/
__mark_reg_const_zero(&state->regs[value_regno]);
} else {
/* have read misc data from the stack */
mark_reg_unknown(env, state->regs, value_regno);
}
state->regs[value_regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
}
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix sanitation of alu op with pointer / scalar type from different paths
While 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer
arithmetic") took care of rejecting alu op on pointer when e.g. pointer
came from two different map values with different map properties such as
value size, Jann reported that a case was not covered yet when a given
alu op is used in both "ptr_reg += reg" and "numeric_reg += reg" from
different branches where we would incorrectly try to sanitize based
on the pointer's limit. Catch this corner case and reject the program
instead.
Fixes: 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 91,422
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static irqreturn_t atl2_intr(int irq, void *data)
{
struct atl2_adapter *adapter = netdev_priv(data);
struct atl2_hw *hw = &adapter->hw;
u32 status;
status = ATL2_READ_REG(hw, REG_ISR);
if (0 == status)
return IRQ_NONE;
/* link event */
if (status & ISR_PHY)
atl2_clear_phy_int(adapter);
/* clear ISR status, and Enable CMB DMA/Disable Interrupt */
ATL2_WRITE_REG(hw, REG_ISR, status | ISR_DIS_INT);
/* check if PCIE PHY Link down */
if (status & ISR_PHY_LINKDOWN) {
if (netif_running(adapter->netdev)) { /* reset MAC */
ATL2_WRITE_REG(hw, REG_ISR, 0);
ATL2_WRITE_REG(hw, REG_IMR, 0);
ATL2_WRITE_FLUSH(hw);
schedule_work(&adapter->reset_task);
return IRQ_HANDLED;
}
}
/* check if DMA read/write error? */
if (status & (ISR_DMAR_TO_RST | ISR_DMAW_TO_RST)) {
ATL2_WRITE_REG(hw, REG_ISR, 0);
ATL2_WRITE_REG(hw, REG_IMR, 0);
ATL2_WRITE_FLUSH(hw);
schedule_work(&adapter->reset_task);
return IRQ_HANDLED;
}
/* link event */
if (status & (ISR_PHY | ISR_MANUAL)) {
adapter->netdev->stats.tx_carrier_errors++;
atl2_check_for_link(adapter);
}
/* transmit event */
if (status & ISR_TX_EVENT)
atl2_intr_tx(adapter);
/* rx exception */
if (status & ISR_RX_EVENT)
atl2_intr_rx(adapter);
/* re-enable Interrupt */
ATL2_WRITE_REG(&adapter->hw, REG_ISR, 0);
return IRQ_HANDLED;
}
Commit Message: atl2: Disable unimplemented scatter/gather feature
atl2 includes NETIF_F_SG in hw_features even though it has no support
for non-linear skbs. This bug was originally harmless since the
driver does not claim to implement checksum offload and that used to
be a requirement for SG.
Now that SG and checksum offload are independent features, if you
explicitly enable SG *and* use one of the rare protocols that can use
SG without checkusm offload, this potentially leaks sensitive
information (before you notice that it just isn't working). Therefore
this obscure bug has been designated CVE-2016-2117.
Reported-by: Justin Yackoski <jyackoski@crypto-nite.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Fixes: ec5f06156423 ("net: Kill link between CSUM and SG features.")
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 55,311
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MAX_ROOM_NEEDED (const arguments *ap, size_t arg_index, FCHAR_T conversion,
arg_type type, int flags, size_t width, int has_precision,
size_t precision, int pad_ourselves)
{
size_t tmp_length;
switch (conversion)
{
case 'd': case 'i': case 'u':
# if HAVE_LONG_LONG_INT
if (type == TYPE_LONGLONGINT || type == TYPE_ULONGLONGINT)
tmp_length =
(unsigned int) (sizeof (unsigned long long) * CHAR_BIT
* 0.30103 /* binary -> decimal */
)
+ 1; /* turn floor into ceil */
else
# endif
if (type == TYPE_LONGINT || type == TYPE_ULONGINT)
tmp_length =
(unsigned int) (sizeof (unsigned long) * CHAR_BIT
* 0.30103 /* binary -> decimal */
)
+ 1; /* turn floor into ceil */
else
tmp_length =
(unsigned int) (sizeof (unsigned int) * CHAR_BIT
* 0.30103 /* binary -> decimal */
)
+ 1; /* turn floor into ceil */
if (tmp_length < precision)
tmp_length = precision;
/* Multiply by 2, as an estimate for FLAG_GROUP. */
tmp_length = xsum (tmp_length, tmp_length);
/* Add 1, to account for a leading sign. */
tmp_length = xsum (tmp_length, 1);
break;
case 'o':
# if HAVE_LONG_LONG_INT
if (type == TYPE_LONGLONGINT || type == TYPE_ULONGLONGINT)
tmp_length =
(unsigned int) (sizeof (unsigned long long) * CHAR_BIT
* 0.333334 /* binary -> octal */
)
+ 1; /* turn floor into ceil */
else
# endif
if (type == TYPE_LONGINT || type == TYPE_ULONGINT)
tmp_length =
(unsigned int) (sizeof (unsigned long) * CHAR_BIT
* 0.333334 /* binary -> octal */
)
+ 1; /* turn floor into ceil */
else
tmp_length =
(unsigned int) (sizeof (unsigned int) * CHAR_BIT
* 0.333334 /* binary -> octal */
)
+ 1; /* turn floor into ceil */
if (tmp_length < precision)
tmp_length = precision;
/* Add 1, to account for a leading sign. */
tmp_length = xsum (tmp_length, 1);
break;
case 'x': case 'X':
# if HAVE_LONG_LONG_INT
if (type == TYPE_LONGLONGINT || type == TYPE_ULONGLONGINT)
tmp_length =
(unsigned int) (sizeof (unsigned long long) * CHAR_BIT
* 0.25 /* binary -> hexadecimal */
)
+ 1; /* turn floor into ceil */
else
# endif
if (type == TYPE_LONGINT || type == TYPE_ULONGINT)
tmp_length =
(unsigned int) (sizeof (unsigned long) * CHAR_BIT
* 0.25 /* binary -> hexadecimal */
)
+ 1; /* turn floor into ceil */
else
tmp_length =
(unsigned int) (sizeof (unsigned int) * CHAR_BIT
* 0.25 /* binary -> hexadecimal */
)
+ 1; /* turn floor into ceil */
if (tmp_length < precision)
tmp_length = precision;
/* Add 2, to account for a leading sign or alternate form. */
tmp_length = xsum (tmp_length, 2);
break;
case 'f': case 'F':
if (type == TYPE_LONGDOUBLE)
tmp_length =
(unsigned int) (LDBL_MAX_EXP
* 0.30103 /* binary -> decimal */
* 2 /* estimate for FLAG_GROUP */
)
+ 1 /* turn floor into ceil */
+ 10; /* sign, decimal point etc. */
else
tmp_length =
(unsigned int) (DBL_MAX_EXP
* 0.30103 /* binary -> decimal */
* 2 /* estimate for FLAG_GROUP */
)
+ 1 /* turn floor into ceil */
+ 10; /* sign, decimal point etc. */
tmp_length = xsum (tmp_length, precision);
break;
case 'e': case 'E': case 'g': case 'G':
tmp_length =
12; /* sign, decimal point, exponent etc. */
tmp_length = xsum (tmp_length, precision);
break;
case 'a': case 'A':
if (type == TYPE_LONGDOUBLE)
tmp_length =
(unsigned int) (LDBL_DIG
* 0.831 /* decimal -> hexadecimal */
)
+ 1; /* turn floor into ceil */
else
tmp_length =
(unsigned int) (DBL_DIG
* 0.831 /* decimal -> hexadecimal */
)
+ 1; /* turn floor into ceil */
if (tmp_length < precision)
tmp_length = precision;
/* Account for sign, decimal point etc. */
tmp_length = xsum (tmp_length, 12);
break;
case 'c':
# if HAVE_WINT_T && !WIDE_CHAR_VERSION
if (type == TYPE_WIDE_CHAR)
tmp_length = MB_CUR_MAX;
else
# endif
tmp_length = 1;
break;
case 's':
# if HAVE_WCHAR_T
if (type == TYPE_WIDE_STRING)
{
# if WIDE_CHAR_VERSION
/* ISO C says about %ls in fwprintf:
"If the precision is not specified or is greater than the size
of the array, the array shall contain a null wide character."
So if there is a precision, we must not use wcslen. */
const wchar_t *arg = ap->arg[arg_index].a.a_wide_string;
if (has_precision)
tmp_length = local_wcsnlen (arg, precision);
else
tmp_length = local_wcslen (arg);
# else
/* ISO C says about %ls in fprintf:
"If a precision is specified, no more than that many bytes are
written (including shift sequences, if any), and the array
shall contain a null wide character if, to equal the multibyte
character sequence length given by the precision, the function
would need to access a wide character one past the end of the
array."
So if there is a precision, we must not use wcslen. */
/* This case has already been handled separately in VASNPRINTF. */
abort ();
# endif
}
else
# endif
{
# if WIDE_CHAR_VERSION
/* ISO C says about %s in fwprintf:
"If the precision is not specified or is greater than the size
of the converted array, the converted array shall contain a
null wide character."
So if there is a precision, we must not use strlen. */
/* This case has already been handled separately in VASNPRINTF. */
abort ();
# else
/* ISO C says about %s in fprintf:
"If the precision is not specified or greater than the size of
the array, the array shall contain a null character."
So if there is a precision, we must not use strlen. */
const char *arg = ap->arg[arg_index].a.a_string;
if (has_precision)
tmp_length = local_strnlen (arg, precision);
else
tmp_length = strlen (arg);
# endif
}
break;
case 'p':
tmp_length =
(unsigned int) (sizeof (void *) * CHAR_BIT
* 0.25 /* binary -> hexadecimal */
)
+ 1 /* turn floor into ceil */
+ 2; /* account for leading 0x */
break;
default:
abort ();
}
if (!pad_ourselves)
{
# if ENABLE_UNISTDIO
/* Padding considers the number of characters, therefore the number of
elements after padding may be
> max (tmp_length, width)
but is certainly
<= tmp_length + width. */
tmp_length = xsum (tmp_length, width);
# else
/* Padding considers the number of elements, says POSIX. */
if (tmp_length < width)
tmp_length = width;
# endif
}
tmp_length = xsum (tmp_length, 1); /* account for trailing NUL */
return tmp_length;
}
Commit Message: vasnprintf: Fix heap memory overrun bug.
Reported by Ben Pfaff <blp@cs.stanford.edu> in
<https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/bug-gnulib/2018-09/msg00107.html>.
* lib/vasnprintf.c (convert_to_decimal): Allocate one more byte of
memory.
* tests/test-vasnprintf.c (test_function): Add another test.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 76,530
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(SSL *s,
const unsigned char *data,
const unsigned char *limit,
int *al)
{
unsigned short type, size, len;
/* If resumed session or no custom extensions nothing to do */
if (s->hit || s->cert->srv_ext.meths_count == 0)
return 1;
if (data >= limit - 2)
return 1;
n2s(data, len);
if (data > limit - len)
return 1;
while (data <= limit - 4) {
n2s(data, type);
n2s(data, size);
if (data + size > limit)
return 1;
if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1 /* server */ , type, data, size, al) <= 0)
return 0;
data += size;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 1
| 165,203
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: XRenderExtAddDisplay (XRenderExtInfo *extinfo,
Display *dpy,
char *ext_name)
{
XRenderExtDisplayInfo *dpyinfo;
dpyinfo = (XRenderExtDisplayInfo *) Xmalloc (sizeof (XRenderExtDisplayInfo));
if (!dpyinfo) return NULL;
dpyinfo->display = dpy;
dpyinfo->info = NULL;
if (XRenderHasDepths (dpy))
dpyinfo->codes = XInitExtension (dpy, ext_name);
else
dpyinfo->codes = NULL;
/*
* if the server has the extension, then we can initialize the
* appropriate function vectors
*/
if (dpyinfo->codes) {
XESetCloseDisplay (dpy, dpyinfo->codes->extension,
XRenderCloseDisplay);
} else {
/* The server doesn't have this extension.
* Use a private Xlib-internal extension to hang the close_display
* hook on so that the "cache" (extinfo->cur) is properly cleaned.
* (XBUG 7955)
*/
XExtCodes *codes = XAddExtension(dpy);
if (!codes) {
XFree(dpyinfo);
return NULL;
}
XESetCloseDisplay (dpy, codes->extension, XRenderCloseDisplay);
}
/*
* now, chain it onto the list
*/
_XLockMutex(_Xglobal_lock);
dpyinfo->next = extinfo->head;
extinfo->head = dpyinfo;
extinfo->cur = dpyinfo;
extinfo->ndisplays++;
_XUnlockMutex(_Xglobal_lock);
return dpyinfo;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 8,274
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void drm_connector_cleanup(struct drm_connector *connector)
{
struct drm_device *dev = connector->dev;
struct drm_display_mode *mode, *t;
list_for_each_entry_safe(mode, t, &connector->probed_modes, head)
drm_mode_remove(connector, mode);
list_for_each_entry_safe(mode, t, &connector->modes, head)
drm_mode_remove(connector, mode);
list_for_each_entry_safe(mode, t, &connector->user_modes, head)
drm_mode_remove(connector, mode);
mutex_lock(&dev->mode_config.mutex);
drm_mode_object_put(dev, &connector->base);
list_del(&connector->head);
dev->mode_config.num_connector--;
mutex_unlock(&dev->mode_config.mutex);
}
Commit Message: drm: integer overflow in drm_mode_dirtyfb_ioctl()
There is a potential integer overflow in drm_mode_dirtyfb_ioctl()
if userspace passes in a large num_clips. The call to kmalloc would
allocate a small buffer, and the call to fb->funcs->dirty may result
in a memory corruption.
Reported-by: Haogang Chen <haogangchen@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 21,860
|
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