instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool NaClListener::Send(IPC::Message* msg) {
DCHECK(main_loop_ != NULL);
if (MessageLoop::current() == main_loop_) {
return channel_->Send(msg);
} else {
return filter_->Send(msg);
}
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 103,320 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cmp_gss_names(gss_name_t n1, gss_name_t n2)
{
OM_uint32 emin;
int equal;
if (GSS_ERROR(gss_compare_name(&emin, n1, n2, &equal)))
return(0);
return(equal);
}
Commit Message: Fix leaks in kadmin server stubs [CVE-2015-8631]
In each kadmind server stub, initialize the client_name and
server_name variables, and release them in the cleanup handler. Many
of the stubs will otherwise leak the client and server name if
krb5_unparse_name() fails. Also make sure to free the prime_arg
variables in rename_principal_2_svc(), or we can leak the first one if
unparsing the second one fails. Discovered by Simo Sorce.
CVE-2015-8631:
In all versions of MIT krb5, an authenticated attacker can cause
kadmind to leak memory by supplying a null principal name in a request
which uses one. Repeating these requests will eventually cause
kadmind to exhaust all available memory.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8343 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 57,283 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SpoolssFCPN_r(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree, dcerpc_info *di, guint8 *drep)
{
/* Parse packet */
offset = dissect_doserror(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep, hf_rc, NULL);
return offset;
}
Commit Message: SPOOLSS: Try to avoid an infinite loop.
Use tvb_reported_length_remaining in dissect_spoolss_uint16uni. Make
sure our offset always increments in dissect_spoolss_keybuffer.
Change-Id: I7017c9685bb2fa27161d80a03b8fca4ef630e793
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/14687
Reviewed-by: Gerald Combs <gerald@wireshark.org>
Petri-Dish: Gerald Combs <gerald@wireshark.org>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <buildbot-no-reply@wireshark.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 51,955 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bson_iter_overwrite_timestamp (bson_iter_t *iter,
uint32_t timestamp,
uint32_t increment)
{
uint64_t value;
BSON_ASSERT (iter);
if (ITER_TYPE (iter) == BSON_TYPE_TIMESTAMP) {
value = ((((uint64_t) timestamp) << 32U) | ((uint64_t) increment));
value = BSON_UINT64_TO_LE (value);
memcpy ((void *) (iter->raw + iter->d1), &value, sizeof (value));
}
}
Commit Message: Fix for CVE-2018-16790 -- Verify bounds before binary length read.
As reported here: https://jira.mongodb.org/browse/CDRIVER-2819,
a heap overread occurs due a failure to correctly verify data
bounds.
In the original check, len - o returns the data left including the
sizeof(l) we just read. Instead, the comparison should check
against the data left NOT including the binary int32, i.e. just
subtype (byte*) instead of int32 subtype (byte*).
Added in test for corrupted BSON example.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 77,855 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ResourceMetadataDB::Clear() {
level_db_.reset();
leveldb::DestroyDB(db_path_.value(), leveldb::Options());
Init();
}
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 117,076 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: process_polygon2(STREAM s, POLYGON2_ORDER * os, uint32 present, RD_BOOL delta)
{
int index, data, next;
uint8 flags = 0;
RD_POINT *points;
BRUSH brush;
if (present & 0x0001)
rdp_in_coord(s, &os->x, delta);
if (present & 0x0002)
rdp_in_coord(s, &os->y, delta);
if (present & 0x0004)
in_uint8(s, os->opcode);
if (present & 0x0008)
in_uint8(s, os->fillmode);
if (present & 0x0010)
rdp_in_colour(s, &os->bgcolour);
if (present & 0x0020)
rdp_in_colour(s, &os->fgcolour);
rdp_parse_brush(s, &os->brush, present >> 6);
if (present & 0x0800)
in_uint8(s, os->npoints);
if (present & 0x1000)
{
in_uint8(s, os->datasize);
in_uint8a(s, os->data, os->datasize);
}
logger(Graphics, Debug,
"process_polygon2(), x=%d, y=%d, op=0x%x, fm=%d, bs=%d, bg=0x%x, fg=0x%x, n=%d, sz=%d)",
os->x, os->y, os->opcode, os->fillmode, os->brush.style, os->bgcolour, os->fgcolour,
os->npoints, os->datasize);
if (os->opcode < 0x01 || os->opcode > 0x10)
{
logger(Graphics, Error, "process_polygon2(), bad ROP2 0x%x", os->opcode);
return;
}
setup_brush(&brush, &os->brush);
points = (RD_POINT *) xmalloc((os->npoints + 1) * sizeof(RD_POINT));
memset(points, 0, (os->npoints + 1) * sizeof(RD_POINT));
points[0].x = os->x;
points[0].y = os->y;
index = 0;
data = ((os->npoints - 1) / 4) + 1;
for (next = 1; (next <= os->npoints) && (next < 256) && (data < os->datasize); next++)
{
if ((next - 1) % 4 == 0)
flags = os->data[index++];
if (~flags & 0x80)
points[next].x = parse_delta(os->data, &data);
if (~flags & 0x40)
points[next].y = parse_delta(os->data, &data);
flags <<= 2;
}
if (next - 1 == os->npoints)
ui_polygon(os->opcode - 1, os->fillmode, points, os->npoints + 1,
&brush, os->bgcolour, os->fgcolour);
else
logger(Graphics, Error, "process_polygon2(), polygon parse error");
xfree(points);
}
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 92,974 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned int tower_poll (struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
{
struct lego_usb_tower *dev;
unsigned int mask = 0;
dev = file->private_data;
if (!dev->udev)
return POLLERR | POLLHUP;
poll_wait(file, &dev->read_wait, wait);
poll_wait(file, &dev->write_wait, wait);
tower_check_for_read_packet(dev);
if (dev->read_packet_length > 0) {
mask |= POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;
}
if (!dev->interrupt_out_busy) {
mask |= POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM;
}
return mask;
}
Commit Message: usb: misc: legousbtower: Fix NULL pointer deference
This patch fixes a NULL pointer dereference caused by a race codition in
the probe function of the legousbtower driver. It re-structures the
probe function to only register the interface after successfully reading
the board's firmware ID.
The probe function does not deregister the usb interface after an error
receiving the devices firmware ID. The device file registered
(/dev/usb/legousbtower%d) may be read/written globally before the probe
function returns. When tower_delete is called in the probe function
(after an r/w has been initiated), core dev structures are deleted while
the file operation functions are still running. If the 0 address is
mappable on the machine, this vulnerability can be used to create a
Local Priviege Escalation exploit via a write-what-where condition by
remapping dev->interrupt_out_buffer in tower_write. A forged USB device
and local program execution would be required for LPE. The USB device
would have to delay the control message in tower_probe and accept
the control urb in tower_open whilst guest code initiated a write to the
device file as tower_delete is called from the error in tower_probe.
This bug has existed since 2003. Patch tested by emulated device.
Reported-by: James Patrick-Evans <james@jmp-e.com>
Tested-by: James Patrick-Evans <james@jmp-e.com>
Signed-off-by: James Patrick-Evans <james@jmp-e.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 60,720 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int f2fs_mpage_readpages(struct address_space *mapping,
struct list_head *pages, struct page *page,
unsigned nr_pages)
{
struct bio *bio = NULL;
unsigned page_idx;
sector_t last_block_in_bio = 0;
struct inode *inode = mapping->host;
const unsigned blkbits = inode->i_blkbits;
const unsigned blocksize = 1 << blkbits;
sector_t block_in_file;
sector_t last_block;
sector_t last_block_in_file;
sector_t block_nr;
struct f2fs_map_blocks map;
map.m_pblk = 0;
map.m_lblk = 0;
map.m_len = 0;
map.m_flags = 0;
map.m_next_pgofs = NULL;
for (page_idx = 0; nr_pages; page_idx++, nr_pages--) {
prefetchw(&page->flags);
if (pages) {
page = list_last_entry(pages, struct page, lru);
list_del(&page->lru);
if (add_to_page_cache_lru(page, mapping,
page->index,
readahead_gfp_mask(mapping)))
goto next_page;
}
block_in_file = (sector_t)page->index;
last_block = block_in_file + nr_pages;
last_block_in_file = (i_size_read(inode) + blocksize - 1) >>
blkbits;
if (last_block > last_block_in_file)
last_block = last_block_in_file;
/*
* Map blocks using the previous result first.
*/
if ((map.m_flags & F2FS_MAP_MAPPED) &&
block_in_file > map.m_lblk &&
block_in_file < (map.m_lblk + map.m_len))
goto got_it;
/*
* Then do more f2fs_map_blocks() calls until we are
* done with this page.
*/
map.m_flags = 0;
if (block_in_file < last_block) {
map.m_lblk = block_in_file;
map.m_len = last_block - block_in_file;
if (f2fs_map_blocks(inode, &map, 0,
F2FS_GET_BLOCK_READ))
goto set_error_page;
}
got_it:
if ((map.m_flags & F2FS_MAP_MAPPED)) {
block_nr = map.m_pblk + block_in_file - map.m_lblk;
SetPageMappedToDisk(page);
if (!PageUptodate(page) && !cleancache_get_page(page)) {
SetPageUptodate(page);
goto confused;
}
} else {
zero_user_segment(page, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
if (!PageUptodate(page))
SetPageUptodate(page);
unlock_page(page);
goto next_page;
}
/*
* This page will go to BIO. Do we need to send this
* BIO off first?
*/
if (bio && (last_block_in_bio != block_nr - 1 ||
!__same_bdev(F2FS_I_SB(inode), block_nr, bio))) {
submit_and_realloc:
__submit_bio(F2FS_I_SB(inode), bio, DATA);
bio = NULL;
}
if (bio == NULL) {
bio = f2fs_grab_bio(inode, block_nr, nr_pages);
if (IS_ERR(bio)) {
bio = NULL;
goto set_error_page;
}
bio_set_op_attrs(bio, REQ_OP_READ, 0);
}
if (bio_add_page(bio, page, blocksize, 0) < blocksize)
goto submit_and_realloc;
last_block_in_bio = block_nr;
goto next_page;
set_error_page:
SetPageError(page);
zero_user_segment(page, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
unlock_page(page);
goto next_page;
confused:
if (bio) {
__submit_bio(F2FS_I_SB(inode), bio, DATA);
bio = NULL;
}
unlock_page(page);
next_page:
if (pages)
put_page(page);
}
BUG_ON(pages && !list_empty(pages));
if (bio)
__submit_bio(F2FS_I_SB(inode), bio, DATA);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix a dead loop in f2fs_fiemap()
A dead loop can be triggered in f2fs_fiemap() using the test case
as below:
...
fd = open();
fallocate(fd, 0, 0, 4294967296);
ioctl(fd, FS_IOC_FIEMAP, fiemap_buf);
...
It's caused by an overflow in __get_data_block():
...
bh->b_size = map.m_len << inode->i_blkbits;
...
map.m_len is an unsigned int, and bh->b_size is a size_t which is 64 bits
on 64 bits archtecture, type conversion from an unsigned int to a size_t
will result in an overflow.
In the above-mentioned case, bh->b_size will be zero, and f2fs_fiemap()
will call get_data_block() at block 0 again an again.
Fix this by adding a force conversion before left shift.
Signed-off-by: Wei Fang <fangwei1@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 85,169 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: u32 h264bsdActivateParamSets(storage_t *pStorage, u32 ppsId, u32 isIdr)
{
/* Variables */
u32 tmp;
u32 flag;
/* Code */
ASSERT(pStorage);
ASSERT(ppsId < MAX_NUM_PIC_PARAM_SETS);
/* check that pps and corresponding sps exist */
if ( (pStorage->pps[ppsId] == NULL) ||
(pStorage->sps[pStorage->pps[ppsId]->seqParameterSetId] == NULL) )
{
return(HANTRO_NOK);
}
/* check that pps parameters do not violate picture size constraints */
tmp = CheckPps(pStorage->pps[ppsId],
pStorage->sps[pStorage->pps[ppsId]->seqParameterSetId]);
if (tmp != HANTRO_OK)
return(tmp);
/* first activation part1 */
if (pStorage->activePpsId == MAX_NUM_PIC_PARAM_SETS)
{
pStorage->activePpsId = ppsId;
pStorage->activePps = pStorage->pps[ppsId];
pStorage->activeSpsId = pStorage->activePps->seqParameterSetId;
pStorage->activeSps = pStorage->sps[pStorage->activeSpsId];
pStorage->picSizeInMbs =
pStorage->activeSps->picWidthInMbs *
pStorage->activeSps->picHeightInMbs;
pStorage->currImage->width = pStorage->activeSps->picWidthInMbs;
pStorage->currImage->height = pStorage->activeSps->picHeightInMbs;
pStorage->pendingActivation = HANTRO_TRUE;
}
/* first activation part2 */
else if (pStorage->pendingActivation)
{
pStorage->pendingActivation = HANTRO_FALSE;
FREE(pStorage->mb);
FREE(pStorage->sliceGroupMap);
ALLOCATE(pStorage->mb, pStorage->picSizeInMbs, mbStorage_t);
ALLOCATE(pStorage->sliceGroupMap, pStorage->picSizeInMbs, u32);
if (pStorage->mb == NULL || pStorage->sliceGroupMap == NULL)
return(MEMORY_ALLOCATION_ERROR);
H264SwDecMemset(pStorage->mb, 0,
pStorage->picSizeInMbs * sizeof(mbStorage_t));
h264bsdInitMbNeighbours(pStorage->mb,
pStorage->activeSps->picWidthInMbs,
pStorage->picSizeInMbs);
/* dpb output reordering disabled if
* 1) application set noReordering flag
* 2) POC type equal to 2
* 3) num_reorder_frames in vui equal to 0 */
if ( pStorage->noReordering ||
pStorage->activeSps->picOrderCntType == 2 ||
(pStorage->activeSps->vuiParametersPresentFlag &&
pStorage->activeSps->vuiParameters->bitstreamRestrictionFlag &&
!pStorage->activeSps->vuiParameters->numReorderFrames) )
flag = HANTRO_TRUE;
else
flag = HANTRO_FALSE;
tmp = h264bsdResetDpb(pStorage->dpb,
pStorage->activeSps->picWidthInMbs *
pStorage->activeSps->picHeightInMbs,
pStorage->activeSps->maxDpbSize,
pStorage->activeSps->numRefFrames,
pStorage->activeSps->maxFrameNum,
flag);
if (tmp != HANTRO_OK)
return(tmp);
}
else if (ppsId != pStorage->activePpsId)
{
/* sequence parameter set shall not change but before an IDR picture */
if (pStorage->pps[ppsId]->seqParameterSetId != pStorage->activeSpsId)
{
DEBUG(("SEQ PARAM SET CHANGING...\n"));
if (isIdr)
{
pStorage->activePpsId = ppsId;
pStorage->activePps = pStorage->pps[ppsId];
pStorage->activeSpsId = pStorage->activePps->seqParameterSetId;
pStorage->activeSps = pStorage->sps[pStorage->activeSpsId];
pStorage->picSizeInMbs =
pStorage->activeSps->picWidthInMbs *
pStorage->activeSps->picHeightInMbs;
pStorage->currImage->width = pStorage->activeSps->picWidthInMbs;
pStorage->currImage->height =
pStorage->activeSps->picHeightInMbs;
pStorage->pendingActivation = HANTRO_TRUE;
}
else
{
DEBUG(("TRYING TO CHANGE SPS IN NON-IDR SLICE\n"));
return(HANTRO_NOK);
}
}
else
{
pStorage->activePpsId = ppsId;
pStorage->activePps = pStorage->pps[ppsId];
}
}
return(HANTRO_OK);
}
Commit Message: h264bsdActivateParamSets: Prevent multiplication overflow.
Report MEMORY_ALLOCATION_ERROR if pStorage->picSizeInMbs would
exceed UINT32_MAX bytes.
Bug: 28532266
Change-Id: Ia6f11efb18818afcdb5fa2a38a14f2a2d8c8447a
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 173,767 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TestRenderViewHost::SimulateWasHidden() {
GetWidget()->WasHidden();
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,946 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void notEnumerableReadOnlyVoidMethodMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::notEnumerableReadOnlyVoidMethodMethod(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,425 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void write_guest_rom_state(VAPICROMState *s)
{
cpu_physical_memory_write(s->rom_state_paddr, &s->rom_state,
sizeof(GuestROMState));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 11,273 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MojoResult ScopedPlatformHandleToMojoPlatformHandle(
ScopedPlatformHandle handle,
MojoPlatformHandle* platform_handle) {
if (platform_handle->struct_size != sizeof(MojoPlatformHandle))
return MOJO_RESULT_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (!handle.is_valid()) {
platform_handle->type = MOJO_PLATFORM_HANDLE_TYPE_INVALID;
return MOJO_RESULT_OK;
}
#if defined(OS_FUCHSIA)
if (handle.get().is_valid_fd()) {
platform_handle->type = MOJO_PLATFORM_HANDLE_TYPE_FILE_DESCRIPTOR;
platform_handle->value = handle.release().as_fd();
} else {
platform_handle->type = MOJO_PLATFORM_HANDLE_TYPE_FUCHSIA_HANDLE;
platform_handle->value = handle.release().as_handle();
}
#elif defined(OS_POSIX)
switch (handle.get().type) {
case PlatformHandle::Type::POSIX:
platform_handle->type = MOJO_PLATFORM_HANDLE_TYPE_FILE_DESCRIPTOR;
platform_handle->value = static_cast<uint64_t>(handle.release().handle);
break;
#if defined(OS_MACOSX) && !defined(OS_IOS)
case PlatformHandle::Type::MACH:
platform_handle->type = MOJO_PLATFORM_HANDLE_TYPE_MACH_PORT;
platform_handle->value = static_cast<uint64_t>(handle.release().port);
break;
#endif // defined(OS_MACOSX) && !defined(OS_IOS)
default:
return MOJO_RESULT_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
#elif defined(OS_WIN)
platform_handle->type = MOJO_PLATFORM_HANDLE_TYPE_WINDOWS_HANDLE;
platform_handle->value = reinterpret_cast<uint64_t>(handle.release().handle);
#endif // defined(OS_WIN)
return MOJO_RESULT_OK;
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 149,610 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AppWindowCustomBindings::AppWindowCustomBindings(
ExtensionDispatcher* extension_dispatcher)
: ChromeV8Extension(extension_dispatcher) {
RouteStaticFunction("GetView", &GetView);
}
Commit Message: Make chrome.appWindow.create() provide access to the child window at a predictable time.
When you first create a window with chrome.appWindow.create(), it won't have
loaded any resources. So, at create time, you are guaranteed that:
child_window.location.href == 'about:blank'
child_window.document.documentElement.outerHTML ==
'<html><head></head><body></body></html>'
This is in line with the behaviour of window.open().
BUG=131735
TEST=browser_tests:PlatformAppBrowserTest.WindowsApi
Committed: http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome?view=rev&revision=144072
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10644006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@144356 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 105,354 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LayoutUnit RenderBox::minPreferredLogicalWidth() const
{
if (preferredLogicalWidthsDirty())
const_cast<RenderBox*>(this)->computePreferredLogicalWidths();
return m_minPreferredLogicalWidth;
}
Commit Message: Source/WebCore: Fix for bug 64046 - Wrong image height in absolutely positioned div in
relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
Test: fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html
* rendering/RenderBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBox::availableLogicalHeightUsing):
LayoutTests: Test to cover absolutely positioned child with percentage height
in relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent-expected.txt: Added.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html: Added.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@91533 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 101,606 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void emulator_set_nmi_mask(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, bool masked)
{
kvm_x86_ops->set_nmi_mask(emul_to_vcpu(ctxt), masked);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Reload pit counters for all channels when restoring state
Currently if userspace restores the pit counters with a count of 0
on channels 1 or 2 and the guest attempts to read the count on those
channels, then KVM will perform a mod of 0 and crash. This will ensure
that 0 values are converted to 65536 as per the spec.
This is CVE-2015-7513.
Signed-off-by: Andy Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 57,677 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sig_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *p)
{
uint32_t call_ref;
ND_TCHECK(p[PROTO_POS]);
if (p[PROTO_POS] == Q2931) {
/*
* protocol:Q.2931 for User to Network Interface
* (UNI 3.1) signalling
*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Q.2931"));
ND_TCHECK(p[MSG_TYPE_POS]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ":%s ",
tok2str(msgtype2str, "msgtype#%d", p[MSG_TYPE_POS])));
/*
* The call reference comes before the message type,
* so if we know we have the message type, which we
* do from the caplen test above, we also know we have
* the call reference.
*/
call_ref = EXTRACT_24BITS(&p[CALL_REF_POS]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "CALL_REF:0x%06x", call_ref));
} else {
/* SSCOP with some unknown protocol atop it */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "SSCOP, proto %d ", p[PROTO_POS]));
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", tstr));
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12897/ISO CLNS: Use ND_TTEST() for the bounds checks in isoclns_print().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Don't pass the remaining caplen - that's too hard to get right, and we
were getting it wrong in at least one case; just use ND_TTEST().
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 62,555 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static uint32_t latm_get_value(bitfile *ld)
{
uint32_t l, value;
uint8_t bytesForValue;
bytesForValue = (uint8_t)faad_getbits(ld, 2);
value = 0;
for(l=0; l<bytesForValue; l++)
value = (value << 8) | (uint8_t)faad_getbits(ld, 8);
return value;
}
Commit Message: Fix a couple buffer overflows
https://hackerone.com/reports/502816
https://hackerone.com/reports/507858
https://github.com/videolan/vlc/blob/master/contrib/src/faad2/faad2-fix-overflows.patch
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 88,387 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlParseXMLDecl(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
xmlChar *version;
/*
* This value for standalone indicates that the document has an
* XML declaration but it does not have a standalone attribute.
* It will be overwritten later if a standalone attribute is found.
*/
ctxt->input->standalone = -2;
/*
* We know that '<?xml' is here.
*/
SKIP(5);
if (!IS_BLANK_CH(RAW)) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_SPACE_REQUIRED,
"Blank needed after '<?xml'\n");
}
SKIP_BLANKS;
/*
* We must have the VersionInfo here.
*/
version = xmlParseVersionInfo(ctxt);
if (version == NULL) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_VERSION_MISSING, NULL);
} else {
if (!xmlStrEqual(version, (const xmlChar *) XML_DEFAULT_VERSION)) {
/*
* Changed here for XML-1.0 5th edition
*/
if (ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_OLD10) {
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_UNKNOWN_VERSION,
"Unsupported version '%s'\n",
version);
} else {
if ((version[0] == '1') && ((version[1] == '.'))) {
xmlWarningMsg(ctxt, XML_WAR_UNKNOWN_VERSION,
"Unsupported version '%s'\n",
version, NULL);
} else {
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_UNKNOWN_VERSION,
"Unsupported version '%s'\n",
version);
}
}
}
if (ctxt->version != NULL)
xmlFree((void *) ctxt->version);
ctxt->version = version;
}
/*
* We may have the encoding declaration
*/
if (!IS_BLANK_CH(RAW)) {
if ((RAW == '?') && (NXT(1) == '>')) {
SKIP(2);
return;
}
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_SPACE_REQUIRED, "Blank needed here\n");
}
xmlParseEncodingDecl(ctxt);
if ((ctxt->errNo == XML_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ENCODING) ||
(ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)) {
/*
* The XML REC instructs us to stop parsing right here
*/
return;
}
/*
* We may have the standalone status.
*/
if ((ctxt->input->encoding != NULL) && (!IS_BLANK_CH(RAW))) {
if ((RAW == '?') && (NXT(1) == '>')) {
SKIP(2);
return;
}
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_SPACE_REQUIRED, "Blank needed here\n");
}
/*
* We can grow the input buffer freely at that point
*/
GROW;
SKIP_BLANKS;
ctxt->input->standalone = xmlParseSDDecl(ctxt);
SKIP_BLANKS;
if ((RAW == '?') && (NXT(1) == '>')) {
SKIP(2);
} else if (RAW == '>') {
/* Deprecated old WD ... */
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_XMLDECL_NOT_FINISHED, NULL);
NEXT;
} else {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_XMLDECL_NOT_FINISHED, NULL);
MOVETO_ENDTAG(CUR_PTR);
NEXT;
}
}
Commit Message: Detect infinite recursion in parameter entities
When expanding a parameter entity in a DTD, infinite recursion could
lead to an infinite loop or memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Wei Lei for the first of many reports.
Fixes bug 759579.
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 59,527 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ZIPARCHIVE_METHOD(unchangeArchive)
{
struct zip *intern;
zval *self = getThis();
if (!self) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZIP_FROM_OBJECT(intern, self);
if (zip_unchange_archive(intern) != 0) {
RETURN_FALSE;
} else {
RETURN_TRUE;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #71923 - integer overflow in ZipArchive::getFrom*
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 54,415 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cdrom_mmc3_profile(struct cdrom_device_info *cdi)
{
struct packet_command cgc;
char buffer[32];
int ret, mmc3_profile;
init_cdrom_command(&cgc, buffer, sizeof(buffer), CGC_DATA_READ);
cgc.cmd[0] = GPCMD_GET_CONFIGURATION;
cgc.cmd[1] = 0;
cgc.cmd[2] = cgc.cmd[3] = 0; /* Starting Feature Number */
cgc.cmd[8] = sizeof(buffer); /* Allocation Length */
cgc.quiet = 1;
if ((ret = cdi->ops->generic_packet(cdi, &cgc)))
mmc3_profile = 0xffff;
else
mmc3_profile = (buffer[6] << 8) | buffer[7];
cdi->mmc3_profile = mmc3_profile;
}
Commit Message: cdrom: fix improper type cast, which can leat to information leak.
There is another cast from unsigned long to int which causes
a bounds check to fail with specially crafted input. The value is
then used as an index in the slot array in cdrom_slot_status().
This issue is similar to CVE-2018-16658 and CVE-2018-10940.
Signed-off-by: Young_X <YangX92@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 76,252 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int incrementallyRehash(int dbid) {
/* Keys dictionary */
if (dictIsRehashing(server.db[dbid].dict)) {
dictRehashMilliseconds(server.db[dbid].dict,1);
return 1; /* already used our millisecond for this loop... */
}
/* Expires */
if (dictIsRehashing(server.db[dbid].expires)) {
dictRehashMilliseconds(server.db[dbid].expires,1);
return 1; /* already used our millisecond for this loop... */
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Security: Cross Protocol Scripting protection.
This is an attempt at mitigating problems due to cross protocol
scripting, an attack targeting services using line oriented protocols
like Redis that can accept HTTP requests as valid protocol, by
discarding the invalid parts and accepting the payloads sent, for
example, via a POST request.
For this to be effective, when we detect POST and Host: and terminate
the connection asynchronously, the networking code was modified in order
to never process further input. It was later verified that in a
pipelined request containing a POST command, the successive commands are
not executed.
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 70,033 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __bt_get(struct blk_mq_hw_ctx *hctx, struct blk_mq_bitmap_tags *bt,
unsigned int *tag_cache, struct blk_mq_tags *tags)
{
unsigned int last_tag, org_last_tag;
int index, i, tag;
if (!hctx_may_queue(hctx, bt))
return -1;
last_tag = org_last_tag = *tag_cache;
index = TAG_TO_INDEX(bt, last_tag);
for (i = 0; i < bt->map_nr; i++) {
tag = __bt_get_word(&bt->map[index], TAG_TO_BIT(bt, last_tag),
BT_ALLOC_RR(tags));
if (tag != -1) {
tag += (index << bt->bits_per_word);
goto done;
}
/*
* Jump to next index, and reset the last tag to be the
* first tag of that index
*/
index++;
last_tag = (index << bt->bits_per_word);
if (index >= bt->map_nr) {
index = 0;
last_tag = 0;
}
}
*tag_cache = 0;
return -1;
/*
* Only update the cache from the allocation path, if we ended
* up using the specific cached tag.
*/
done:
if (tag == org_last_tag || unlikely(BT_ALLOC_RR(tags))) {
last_tag = tag + 1;
if (last_tag >= bt->depth - 1)
last_tag = 0;
*tag_cache = last_tag;
}
return tag;
}
Commit Message: blk-mq: fix race between timeout and freeing request
Inside timeout handler, blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is called
to retrieve the request from one tag. This way is obviously
wrong because the request can be freed any time and some
fiedds of the request can't be trusted, then kernel oops
might be triggered[1].
Currently wrt. blk_mq_tag_to_rq(), the only special case is
that the flush request can share same tag with the request
cloned from, and the two requests can't be active at the same
time, so this patch fixes the above issue by updating tags->rqs[tag]
with the active request(either flush rq or the request cloned
from) of the tag.
Also blk_mq_tag_to_rq() gets much simplified with this patch.
Given blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is mainly for drivers and the caller must
make sure the request can't be freed, so in bt_for_each() this
helper is replaced with tags->rqs[tag].
[1] kernel oops log
[ 439.696220] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.697162] IP: [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.700653] PGD 7ef765067 PUD 7ef764067 PMD 0 ^M
[ 439.700653] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC ^M
[ 439.700653] Dumping ftrace buffer:^M
[ 439.700653] (ftrace buffer empty)^M
[ 439.700653] Modules linked in: nbd ipv6 kvm_intel kvm serio_raw^M
[ 439.700653] CPU: 6 PID: 2779 Comm: stress-ng-sigfd Not tainted 4.2.0-rc5-next-20150805+ #265^M
[ 439.730500] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011^M
[ 439.730500] task: ffff880605308000 ti: ffff88060530c000 task.ti: ffff88060530c000^M
[ 439.730500] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812d89ba>] [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.730500] RSP: 0018:ffff880819203da0 EFLAGS: 00010283^M
[ 439.730500] RAX: ffff880811b0e000 RBX: ffff8800bb465f00 RCX: 0000000000000002^M
[ 439.730500] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000202 RDI: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] RBP: ffff880819203db0 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000202^M
[ 439.730500] R13: ffff880814104800 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: ffff880811a2ea00^M
[ 439.730500] FS: 00007f165b3f5740(0000) GS:ffff880819200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b^M
[ 439.730500] CR2: 0000000000000158 CR3: 00000007ef766000 CR4: 00000000000006e0^M
[ 439.730500] Stack:^M
[ 439.730500] 0000000000000008 ffff8808114eed90 ffff880819203e00 ffffffff812dc104^M
[ 439.755663] ffff880819203e40 ffffffff812d9f5e 0000020000000000 ffff8808114eed80^M
[ 439.755663] Call Trace:^M
[ 439.755663] <IRQ> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc104>] bt_for_each+0x6e/0xc8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc1b3>] blk_mq_tag_busy_iter+0x55/0x5e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d8911>] blk_mq_rq_timer+0x5d/0xd4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3e10>] call_timer_fn+0xf7/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3d1e>] ? call_timer_fn+0x5/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a46d6>] run_timer_softirq+0x1ce/0x1f8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c367>] __do_softirq+0x181/0x3a4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c76e>] irq_exit+0x40/0x94^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81031482>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x33/0x3e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff815559a4>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x84/0x90^M
[ 439.755663] <EOI> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81554350>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x32/0x4a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a98b>] finish_task_switch+0xe0/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a94d>] ? finish_task_switch+0xa2/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81550066>] __schedule+0x469/0x6cd^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8155039b>] schedule+0x82/0x9a^M
[ 439.789267] [<ffffffff8119b28b>] signalfd_read+0x186/0x49a^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8106d86a>] ? wake_up_q+0x47/0x47^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811618c2>] __vfs_read+0x28/0x9f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8117a289>] ? __fget_light+0x4d/0x74^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811620a7>] vfs_read+0x7a/0xc6^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8116292b>] SyS_read+0x49/0x7f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff81554c17>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f^M
[ 439.790911] Code: 48 89 e5 e8 a9 b8 e7 ff 5d c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 89
f2 48 89 e5 41 54 41 89 f4 53 48 8b 47 60 48 8b 1c d0 48 8b 7b 30 48 8b
53 38 <48> 8b 87 58 01 00 00 48 85 c0 75 09 48 8b 97 88 0c 00 00 eb 10
^M
[ 439.790911] RIP [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.790911] RSP <ffff880819203da0>^M
[ 439.790911] CR2: 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.790911] ---[ end trace d40af58949325661 ]---^M
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 86,642 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: append_dir_structure (const struct url *u, struct growable *dest)
{
char *pathel, *next;
int cut = opt.cut_dirs;
/* Go through the path components, de-URL-quote them, and quote them
(if necessary) as file names. */
pathel = u->path;
for (; (next = strchr (pathel, '/')) != NULL; pathel = next + 1)
{
if (cut-- > 0)
continue;
if (pathel == next)
/* Ignore empty pathels. */
continue;
if (dest->tail)
append_char ('/', dest);
append_uri_pathel (pathel, next, true, dest);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-93 | 0 | 8,677 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoRenderbufferStorageMultisampleAdvancedAMD(
GLenum target,
GLsizei samples,
GLsizei storageSamples,
GLenum internalformat,
GLsizei width,
GLsizei height) {
Renderbuffer* renderbuffer = GetRenderbufferInfoForTarget(GL_RENDERBUFFER);
if (!renderbuffer) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
"glRenderbufferStorageMultisampleAdvancedAMD",
"no renderbuffer bound");
return;
}
if (!ValidateRenderbufferStorageMultisampleAMD(
samples, storageSamples, internalformat, width, height)) {
return;
}
GLenum impl_format =
renderbuffer_manager()->InternalRenderbufferFormatToImplFormat(
internalformat);
LOCAL_COPY_REAL_GL_ERRORS_TO_WRAPPER(
"glRenderbufferStorageMultisampleAdvancedAMD");
RenderbufferStorageMultisampleHelperAMD(
target, samples, storageSamples, impl_format, width, height, kDoNotForce);
GLenum error =
LOCAL_PEEK_GL_ERROR("glRenderbufferStorageMultisampleAdvancedAMD");
if (error == GL_NO_ERROR) {
if (workarounds().validate_multisample_buffer_allocation) {
if (!VerifyMultisampleRenderbufferIntegrity(renderbuffer->service_id(),
impl_format)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_OUT_OF_MEMORY,
"glRenderbufferStorageMultisampleAdvancedAMD",
"out of memory");
return;
}
}
renderbuffer_manager()->SetInfoAndInvalidate(renderbuffer, samples,
internalformat, width, height);
}
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,361 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlCheckLanguageID(const xmlChar * lang)
{
const xmlChar *cur = lang, *nxt;
if (cur == NULL)
return (0);
if (((cur[0] == 'i') && (cur[1] == '-')) ||
((cur[0] == 'I') && (cur[1] == '-')) ||
((cur[0] == 'x') && (cur[1] == '-')) ||
((cur[0] == 'X') && (cur[1] == '-'))) {
/*
* Still allow IANA code and user code which were coming
* from the previous version of the XML-1.0 specification
* it's deprecated but we should not fail
*/
cur += 2;
while (((cur[0] >= 'A') && (cur[0] <= 'Z')) ||
((cur[0] >= 'a') && (cur[0] <= 'z')))
cur++;
return(cur[0] == 0);
}
nxt = cur;
while (((nxt[0] >= 'A') && (nxt[0] <= 'Z')) ||
((nxt[0] >= 'a') && (nxt[0] <= 'z')))
nxt++;
if (nxt - cur >= 4) {
/*
* Reserved
*/
if ((nxt - cur > 8) || (nxt[0] != 0))
return(0);
return(1);
}
if (nxt - cur < 2)
return(0);
/* we got an ISO 639 code */
if (nxt[0] == 0)
return(1);
if (nxt[0] != '-')
return(0);
nxt++;
cur = nxt;
/* now we can have extlang or script or region or variant */
if ((nxt[0] >= '0') && (nxt[0] <= '9'))
goto region_m49;
while (((nxt[0] >= 'A') && (nxt[0] <= 'Z')) ||
((nxt[0] >= 'a') && (nxt[0] <= 'z')))
nxt++;
if (nxt - cur == 4)
goto script;
if (nxt - cur == 2)
goto region;
if ((nxt - cur >= 5) && (nxt - cur <= 8))
goto variant;
if (nxt - cur != 3)
return(0);
/* we parsed an extlang */
if (nxt[0] == 0)
return(1);
if (nxt[0] != '-')
return(0);
nxt++;
cur = nxt;
/* now we can have script or region or variant */
if ((nxt[0] >= '0') && (nxt[0] <= '9'))
goto region_m49;
while (((nxt[0] >= 'A') && (nxt[0] <= 'Z')) ||
((nxt[0] >= 'a') && (nxt[0] <= 'z')))
nxt++;
if (nxt - cur == 2)
goto region;
if ((nxt - cur >= 5) && (nxt - cur <= 8))
goto variant;
if (nxt - cur != 4)
return(0);
/* we parsed a script */
script:
if (nxt[0] == 0)
return(1);
if (nxt[0] != '-')
return(0);
nxt++;
cur = nxt;
/* now we can have region or variant */
if ((nxt[0] >= '0') && (nxt[0] <= '9'))
goto region_m49;
while (((nxt[0] >= 'A') && (nxt[0] <= 'Z')) ||
((nxt[0] >= 'a') && (nxt[0] <= 'z')))
nxt++;
if ((nxt - cur >= 5) && (nxt - cur <= 8))
goto variant;
if (nxt - cur != 2)
return(0);
/* we parsed a region */
region:
if (nxt[0] == 0)
return(1);
if (nxt[0] != '-')
return(0);
nxt++;
cur = nxt;
/* now we can just have a variant */
while (((nxt[0] >= 'A') && (nxt[0] <= 'Z')) ||
((nxt[0] >= 'a') && (nxt[0] <= 'z')))
nxt++;
if ((nxt - cur < 5) || (nxt - cur > 8))
return(0);
/* we parsed a variant */
variant:
if (nxt[0] == 0)
return(1);
if (nxt[0] != '-')
return(0);
/* extensions and private use subtags not checked */
return (1);
region_m49:
if (((nxt[1] >= '0') && (nxt[1] <= '9')) &&
((nxt[2] >= '0') && (nxt[2] <= '9'))) {
nxt += 3;
goto region;
}
return(0);
}
Commit Message: Detect infinite recursion in parameter entities
When expanding a parameter entity in a DTD, infinite recursion could
lead to an infinite loop or memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Wei Lei for the first of many reports.
Fixes bug 759579.
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 59,409 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void InitializeAura() {
view_->InitAsChild(nullptr);
view_->Show();
}
Commit Message: Start rendering timer after first navigation
Currently the new content rendering timer in the browser process,
which clears an old page's contents 4 seconds after a navigation if the
new page doesn't draw in that time, is not set on the first navigation
for a top-level frame.
This is problematic because content can exist before the first
navigation, for instance if it was created by a javascript: URL.
This CL removes the code that skips the timer activation on the first
navigation.
Bug: 844881
Change-Id: I19b3ad1ff62c69ded3a5f7b1c0afde191aaf4584
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1188589
Reviewed-by: Fady Samuel <fsamuel@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: ccameron <ccameron@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586913}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 145,604 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline u64 get_kernel_ns(void)
{
struct timespec ts;
WARN_ON(preemptible());
ktime_get_ts(&ts);
monotonic_to_bootbased(&ts);
return timespec_to_ns(&ts);
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 20,696 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FrameReference::~FrameReference() {
}
Commit Message: Crash on nested IPC handlers in PrintWebViewHelper
Class is not designed to handle nested IPC. Regular flows also does not
expect them. Still during printing of plugging them may show message
boxes and start nested message loops.
For now we are going just crash. If stats show us that this case is
frequent we will have to do something more complicated.
BUG=502562
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1228693002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338100}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,692 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ssl_set_session_cache( ssl_context *ssl,
int (*f_get_cache)(void *, ssl_session *), void *p_get_cache,
int (*f_set_cache)(void *, const ssl_session *), void *p_set_cache )
{
ssl->f_get_cache = f_get_cache;
ssl->p_get_cache = p_get_cache;
ssl->f_set_cache = f_set_cache;
ssl->p_set_cache = p_set_cache;
}
Commit Message: ssl_parse_certificate() now calls x509parse_crt_der() directly
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 29,042 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void VoidMethodOptionalStringArgMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
V8StringResource<> optional_string_arg;
int num_args_passed = info.Length();
while (num_args_passed > 0) {
if (!info[num_args_passed - 1]->IsUndefined())
break;
--num_args_passed;
}
if (UNLIKELY(num_args_passed <= 0)) {
impl->voidMethodOptionalStringArg();
return;
}
optional_string_arg = info[0];
if (!optional_string_arg.Prepare())
return;
impl->voidMethodOptionalStringArg(optional_string_arg);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 135,455 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct net_device *__dev_get_by_index(struct net *net, int ifindex)
{
struct net_device *dev;
struct hlist_head *head = dev_index_hash(net, ifindex);
hlist_for_each_entry(dev, head, index_hlist)
if (dev->ifindex == ifindex)
return dev;
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 48,731 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8TestObject::ItemMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_item");
test_object_v8_internal::ItemMethod(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 134,783 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: smp_fetch_param(char delim, const char *name, int name_len, const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private)
{
const char *vstart, *vend;
struct chunk *temp;
const char **chunks = (const char **)smp->ctx.a;
if (!find_next_url_param(chunks,
name, name_len,
&vstart, &vend,
delim))
return 0;
/* Create sample. If the value is contiguous, return the pointer as CONST,
* if the value is wrapped, copy-it in a buffer.
*/
smp->data.type = SMP_T_STR;
if (chunks[2] &&
vstart >= chunks[0] && vstart <= chunks[1] &&
vend >= chunks[2] && vend <= chunks[3]) {
/* Wrapped case. */
temp = get_trash_chunk();
memcpy(temp->str, vstart, chunks[1] - vstart);
memcpy(temp->str + ( chunks[1] - vstart ), chunks[2], vend - chunks[2]);
smp->data.u.str.str = temp->str;
smp->data.u.str.len = ( chunks[1] - vstart ) + ( vend - chunks[2] );
} else {
/* Contiguous case. */
smp->data.u.str.str = (char *)vstart;
smp->data.u.str.len = vend - vstart;
smp->flags = SMP_F_VOL_1ST | SMP_F_CONST;
}
/* Update context, check wrapping. */
chunks[0] = vend;
if (chunks[2] && vend >= chunks[2] && vend <= chunks[3]) {
chunks[1] = chunks[3];
chunks[2] = NULL;
}
if (chunks[0] < chunks[1])
smp->flags |= SMP_F_NOT_LAST;
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 6,917 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int raw_seq_open(struct inode *ino, struct file *file,
struct raw_hashinfo *h, const struct seq_operations *ops)
{
int err;
struct raw_iter_state *i;
err = seq_open_net(ino, file, ops, sizeof(struct raw_iter_state));
if (err < 0)
return err;
i = raw_seq_private((struct seq_file *)file->private_data);
i->h = h;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 18,970 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: set_system_pointer(uint32 ptr)
{
switch (ptr)
{
case SYSPTR_NULL:
ui_set_null_cursor();
break;
case SYSPTR_DEFAULT:
ui_set_standard_cursor();
break;
default:
logger(Protocol, Warning,
"set_system_pointer(), unhandled pointer type 0x%x", ptr);
}
}
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 93,041 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int caif_stream_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t size,
int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
int copied = 0;
int target;
int err = 0;
long timeo;
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (flags&MSG_OOB)
goto out;
msg->msg_namelen = 0;
/*
* Lock the socket to prevent queue disordering
* while sleeps in memcpy_tomsg
*/
err = -EAGAIN;
if (sk->sk_state == CAIF_CONNECTING)
goto out;
caif_read_lock(sk);
target = sock_rcvlowat(sk, flags&MSG_WAITALL, size);
timeo = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, flags&MSG_DONTWAIT);
do {
int chunk;
struct sk_buff *skb;
lock_sock(sk);
skb = skb_dequeue(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
caif_check_flow_release(sk);
if (skb == NULL) {
if (copied >= target)
goto unlock;
/*
* POSIX 1003.1g mandates this order.
*/
err = sock_error(sk);
if (err)
goto unlock;
err = -ECONNRESET;
if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN)
goto unlock;
err = -EPIPE;
if (sk->sk_state != CAIF_CONNECTED)
goto unlock;
if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD))
goto unlock;
release_sock(sk);
err = -EAGAIN;
if (!timeo)
break;
caif_read_unlock(sk);
timeo = caif_stream_data_wait(sk, timeo);
if (signal_pending(current)) {
err = sock_intr_errno(timeo);
goto out;
}
caif_read_lock(sk);
continue;
unlock:
release_sock(sk);
break;
}
release_sock(sk);
chunk = min_t(unsigned int, skb->len, size);
if (memcpy_toiovec(msg->msg_iov, skb->data, chunk)) {
skb_queue_head(&sk->sk_receive_queue, skb);
if (copied == 0)
copied = -EFAULT;
break;
}
copied += chunk;
size -= chunk;
/* Mark read part of skb as used */
if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK)) {
skb_pull(skb, chunk);
/* put the skb back if we didn't use it up. */
if (skb->len) {
skb_queue_head(&sk->sk_receive_queue, skb);
break;
}
kfree_skb(skb);
} else {
/*
* It is questionable, see note in unix_dgram_recvmsg.
*/
/* put message back and return */
skb_queue_head(&sk->sk_receive_queue, skb);
break;
}
} while (size);
caif_read_unlock(sk);
out:
return copied ? : err;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 166,497 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool DevToolsAgent::OnMessageReceived(const IPC::Message& message) {
bool handled = true;
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP(DevToolsAgent, message)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(DevToolsAgentMsg_Attach, OnAttach)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(DevToolsAgentMsg_Detach, OnDetach)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(DevToolsAgentMsg_FrontendLoaded, OnFrontendLoaded)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(DevToolsAgentMsg_DispatchOnInspectorBackend,
OnDispatchOnInspectorBackend)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(DevToolsAgentMsg_InspectElement, OnInspectElement)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(DevToolsMsg_SetupDevToolsClient, OnSetupDevToolsClient)
IPC_MESSAGE_UNHANDLED(handled = false)
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP()
if (message.type() == ViewMsg_Navigate::ID)
OnNavigate(); // Don't want to swallow the message.
return handled;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,823 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: u64 snmp_fold_field64(void __percpu *mib, int offt, size_t syncp_offset)
{
u64 res = 0;
int cpu;
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
res += snmp_get_cpu_field64(mib, cpu, offt, syncp_offset);
}
return res;
}
Commit Message: net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument
郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:
int socket_fd;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
addr.sin_port = 0;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
addr.sin_family = 10;
socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
connect(socket_fd , &addr,16);
AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
store a zero in the protocol fields.
This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
is NULL for raw sockets.
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: [<ffffffff816db90e>] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
kernel: [<ffffffff816db9a4>] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff81645069>] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
kernel: [<ffffffff810ac51b>] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff810236d8>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
kernel: [<ffffffff81645e0e>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
kernel: [<ffffffff81779515>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89
I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.
CVE: CVE-2015-8543
Cc: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
Reported-by: 郭永刚 <guoyonggang@360.cn>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 41,552 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: setlkflg (int type)
{
return (type == NFS4_READW_LT || type == NFS4_READ_LT) ?
RD_STATE : WR_STATE;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,703 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SPL_METHOD(SplHeap, recoverFromCorruption)
{
spl_heap_object *intern;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "") == FAILURE) {
return;
}
intern = (spl_heap_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
intern->heap->flags = intern->heap->flags & ~SPL_HEAP_CORRUPTED;
RETURN_TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 14,883 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: NuPlayer::GenericSource::GenericSource(
const sp<AMessage> ¬ify,
bool uidValid,
uid_t uid)
: Source(notify),
mAudioTimeUs(0),
mAudioLastDequeueTimeUs(0),
mVideoTimeUs(0),
mVideoLastDequeueTimeUs(0),
mFetchSubtitleDataGeneration(0),
mFetchTimedTextDataGeneration(0),
mDurationUs(-1ll),
mAudioIsVorbis(false),
mIsWidevine(false),
mIsSecure(false),
mIsStreaming(false),
mUIDValid(uidValid),
mUID(uid),
mFd(-1),
mDrmManagerClient(NULL),
mBitrate(-1ll),
mPollBufferingGeneration(0),
mPendingReadBufferTypes(0),
mBuffering(false),
mPrepareBuffering(false),
mPrevBufferPercentage(-1) {
resetDataSource();
DataSource::RegisterDefaultSniffers();
}
Commit Message: MPEG4Extractor: ensure kKeyTrackID exists before creating an MPEG4Source as track.
GenericSource: return error when no track exists.
SampleIterator: make sure mSamplesPerChunk is not zero before using it as divisor.
Bug: 21657957
Bug: 23705695
Bug: 22802344
Bug: 28799341
Change-Id: I7664992ade90b935d3f255dcd43ecc2898f30b04
(cherry picked from commit 0386c91b8a910a134e5898ffa924c1b6c7560b13)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 160,395 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void tipc_sk_proto_rcv(struct tipc_sock *tsk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct sock *sk = &tsk->sk;
struct tipc_msg *hdr = buf_msg(skb);
int mtyp = msg_type(hdr);
bool conn_cong;
/* Ignore if connection cannot be validated: */
if (!tsk_peer_msg(tsk, hdr))
goto exit;
tsk->probing_state = TIPC_CONN_OK;
if (mtyp == CONN_PROBE) {
msg_set_type(hdr, CONN_PROBE_REPLY);
tipc_sk_respond(sk, skb, TIPC_OK);
return;
} else if (mtyp == CONN_ACK) {
conn_cong = tsk_conn_cong(tsk);
tsk->snt_unacked -= msg_conn_ack(hdr);
if (tsk->peer_caps & TIPC_BLOCK_FLOWCTL)
tsk->snd_win = msg_adv_win(hdr);
if (conn_cong)
sk->sk_write_space(sk);
} else if (mtyp != CONN_PROBE_REPLY) {
pr_warn("Received unknown CONN_PROTO msg\n");
}
exit:
kfree_skb(skb);
}
Commit Message: tipc: check nl sock before parsing nested attributes
Make sure the socket for which the user is listing publication exists
before parsing the socket netlink attributes.
Prior to this patch a call without any socket caused a NULL pointer
dereference in tipc_nl_publ_dump().
Tested-and-reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Alpe <richard.alpe@ericsson.com>
Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.cm>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 52,502 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SyncBackendHost::GetModelSafeRoutingInfo(ModelSafeRoutingInfo* out) {
base::AutoLock lock(registrar_lock_);
ModelSafeRoutingInfo copy(registrar_.routing_info);
out->swap(copy);
}
Commit Message: Enable HistoryModelWorker by default, now that bug 69561 is fixed.
BUG=69561
TEST=Run sync manually and run integration tests, sync should not crash.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7016007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@85211 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 101,446 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool FrameFetchContext::ShouldBypassMainWorldCSP() const {
if (IsDetached())
return false;
return GetFrame()->GetScriptController().ShouldBypassMainWorldCSP();
}
Commit Message: Do not forward resource timing to parent frame after back-forward navigation
LocalFrame has |should_send_resource_timing_info_to_parent_| flag not to
send timing info to parent except for the first navigation. This flag is
cleared when the first timing is sent to parent, however this does not happen
if iframe's first navigation was by back-forward navigation. For such
iframes, we shouldn't send timings to parent at all.
Bug: 876822
Change-Id: I128b51a82ef278c439548afc8283ae63abdef5c5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1186215
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kunihiko Sakamoto <ksakamoto@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#585736}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 145,829 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xsltApplyStripSpaces(xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt, xmlNodePtr node) {
xmlNodePtr current;
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
int nb = 0;
#endif
current = node;
while (current != NULL) {
/*
* Cleanup children empty nodes if asked for
*/
if ((IS_XSLT_REAL_NODE(current)) &&
(current->children != NULL) &&
(xsltFindElemSpaceHandling(ctxt, current))) {
xmlNodePtr delete = NULL, cur = current->children;
while (cur != NULL) {
if (IS_BLANK_NODE(cur))
delete = cur;
cur = cur->next;
if (delete != NULL) {
xmlUnlinkNode(delete);
xmlFreeNode(delete);
delete = NULL;
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
nb++;
#endif
}
}
}
/*
* Skip to next node in document order.
*/
if (node->type == XML_ENTITY_REF_NODE) {
/* process deep in entities */
xsltApplyStripSpaces(ctxt, node->children);
}
if ((current->children != NULL) &&
(current->type != XML_ENTITY_REF_NODE)) {
current = current->children;
} else if (current->next != NULL) {
current = current->next;
} else {
do {
current = current->parent;
if (current == NULL)
break;
if (current == node)
goto done;
if (current->next != NULL) {
current = current->next;
break;
}
} while (current != NULL);
}
}
done:
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_STRIP_SPACES,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltApplyStripSpaces: removed %d ignorable blank node\n", nb));
#endif
return;
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 156,809 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SyncBackendHost::Core::DeleteSyncDataFolder() {
if (file_util::DirectoryExists(host_->sync_data_folder_path())) {
if (!file_util::Delete(host_->sync_data_folder_path(), true))
LOG(DFATAL) << "Could not delete the Sync Data folder.";
}
}
Commit Message: Enable HistoryModelWorker by default, now that bug 69561 is fixed.
BUG=69561
TEST=Run sync manually and run integration tests, sync should not crash.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7016007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@85211 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 101,424 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void vcpu_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
preempt_disable();
kvm_arch_vcpu_put(vcpu);
preempt_notifier_unregister(&vcpu->preempt_notifier);
preempt_enable();
}
Commit Message: kvm: fix kvm_ioctl_create_device() reference counting (CVE-2019-6974)
kvm_ioctl_create_device() does the following:
1. creates a device that holds a reference to the VM object (with a borrowed
reference, the VM's refcount has not been bumped yet)
2. initializes the device
3. transfers the reference to the device to the caller's file descriptor table
4. calls kvm_get_kvm() to turn the borrowed reference to the VM into a real
reference
The ownership transfer in step 3 must not happen before the reference to the VM
becomes a proper, non-borrowed reference, which only happens in step 4.
After step 3, an attacker can close the file descriptor and drop the borrowed
reference, which can cause the refcount of the kvm object to drop to zero.
This means that we need to grab a reference for the device before
anon_inode_getfd(), otherwise the VM can disappear from under us.
Fixes: 852b6d57dc7f ("kvm: add device control API")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 91,603 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: XMPChunk::XMPChunk( ContainerChunk* parent, RIFF_MetaHandler* handler ) : Chunk( parent, handler, false, chunk_XMP )
{
chunkType = chunk_XMP;
XMP_IO* file = handler->parent->ioRef;
XMP_Uns8 level = handler->level;
handler->packetInfo.offset = this->oldPos + 8;
handler->packetInfo.length = (XMP_Int32) this->oldSize - 8;
handler->xmpPacket.reserve ( handler->packetInfo.length );
handler->xmpPacket.assign ( handler->packetInfo.length, ' ' );
file->ReadAll ( (void*)handler->xmpPacket.data(), handler->packetInfo.length );
handler->containsXMP = true; // last, after all possible failure
handler->xmpChunk = this;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 16,070 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CanonicalizeRef(const char* spec,
const Component& ref,
CanonOutput* output,
Component* out_ref) {
DoCanonicalizeRef<char, unsigned char>(spec, ref, output, out_ref);
}
Commit Message: Percent-encode UTF8 characters in URL fragment identifiers.
This brings us into line with Firefox, Safari, and the spec.
Bug: 758523
Change-Id: I7e354ab441222d9fd08e45f0e70f91ad4e35fafe
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/668363
Commit-Queue: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507481}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 149,851 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: child_cleanup(int signo _U_)
{
wait(NULL);
}
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14879/fix -V to fail invalid input safely
get_next_file() did not check the return value of strlen() and
underflowed an array index if the line read by fgets() from the file
started with \0. This caused an out-of-bounds read and could cause a
write. Add the missing check.
This vulnerability was discovered by Brian Carpenter & Geeknik Labs.
CWE ID: CWE-120 | 0 | 93,177 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void VoidMethodDefaultNullableByteStringArgMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
ExceptionState exception_state(info.GetIsolate(), ExceptionState::kExecutionContext, "TestObject", "voidMethodDefaultNullableByteStringArg");
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
V8StringResource<kTreatNullAndUndefinedAsNullString> default_string_arg;
if (!info[0]->IsUndefined()) {
default_string_arg = NativeValueTraits<IDLByteStringOrNull>::NativeValue(info.GetIsolate(), info[0], exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return;
} else {
default_string_arg = nullptr;
}
impl->voidMethodDefaultNullableByteStringArg(default_string_arg);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 135,379 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: unsigned AXTableCell::ariaColumnIndex() const {
const AtomicString& colIndex = getAttribute(aria_colindexAttr);
if (colIndex.toInt() >= 1)
return colIndex.toInt();
AXObject* parent = parentObjectUnignored();
if (!parent || !parent->isTableRow())
return 0;
return m_ariaColIndexFromRow;
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,395 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool tcp_prune_ofo_queue(struct sock *sk)
{
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
bool res = false;
if (!skb_queue_empty(&tp->out_of_order_queue)) {
NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_OFOPRUNED);
__skb_queue_purge(&tp->out_of_order_queue);
/* Reset SACK state. A conforming SACK implementation will
* do the same at a timeout based retransmit. When a connection
* is in a sad state like this, we care only about integrity
* of the connection not performance.
*/
if (tp->rx_opt.sack_ok)
tcp_sack_reset(&tp->rx_opt);
sk_mem_reclaim(sk);
res = true;
}
return res;
}
Commit Message: tcp: fix zero cwnd in tcp_cwnd_reduction
Patch 3759824da87b ("tcp: PRR uses CRB mode by default and SS mode
conditionally") introduced a bug that cwnd may become 0 when both
inflight and sndcnt are 0 (cwnd = inflight + sndcnt). This may lead
to a div-by-zero if the connection starts another cwnd reduction
phase by setting tp->prior_cwnd to the current cwnd (0) in
tcp_init_cwnd_reduction().
To prevent this we skip PRR operation when nothing is acked or
sacked. Then cwnd must be positive in all cases as long as ssthresh
is positive:
1) The proportional reduction mode
inflight > ssthresh > 0
2) The reduction bound mode
a) inflight == ssthresh > 0
b) inflight < ssthresh
sndcnt > 0 since newly_acked_sacked > 0 and inflight < ssthresh
Therefore in all cases inflight and sndcnt can not both be 0.
We check invalid tp->prior_cwnd to avoid potential div0 bugs.
In reality this bug is triggered only with a sequence of less common
events. For example, the connection is terminating an ECN-triggered
cwnd reduction with an inflight 0, then it receives reordered/old
ACKs or DSACKs from prior transmission (which acks nothing). Or the
connection is in fast recovery stage that marks everything lost,
but fails to retransmit due to local issues, then receives data
packets from other end which acks nothing.
Fixes: 3759824da87b ("tcp: PRR uses CRB mode by default and SS mode conditionally")
Reported-by: Oleksandr Natalenko <oleksandr@natalenko.name>
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 55,398 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void handle_tx_net(struct vhost_work *work)
{
struct vhost_net *net = container_of(work, struct vhost_net,
poll[VHOST_NET_VQ_TX].work);
handle_tx(net);
}
Commit Message: vhost-net: fix use-after-free in vhost_net_flush
vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait has a confusing name:
it will actually also free it's argument.
Thus since commit 1280c27f8e29acf4af2da914e80ec27c3dbd5c01
"vhost-net: flush outstanding DMAs on memory change"
vhost_net_flush tries to use the argument after passing it
to vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait, this results
in use after free.
To fix, don't free the argument in vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait,
add an new API for callers that want to free ubufs.
Acked-by: Asias He <asias@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 30,037 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int kvm_arch_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
atomic_set(&vcpu->arch.nmi_queued, 0);
vcpu->arch.nmi_pending = 0;
vcpu->arch.nmi_injected = false;
vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs = 0;
memset(vcpu->arch.db, 0, sizeof(vcpu->arch.db));
vcpu->arch.dr6 = DR6_FIXED_1;
vcpu->arch.dr7 = DR7_FIXED_1;
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
vcpu->arch.apf.msr_val = 0;
vcpu->arch.st.msr_val = 0;
kvmclock_reset(vcpu);
kvm_clear_async_pf_completion_queue(vcpu);
kvm_async_pf_hash_reset(vcpu);
vcpu->arch.apf.halted = false;
kvm_pmu_reset(vcpu);
return kvm_x86_ops->vcpu_reset(vcpu);
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 20,746 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Node::InsertionNotificationRequest HTMLInputElement::insertedInto(ContainerNode* insertionPoint)
{
HTMLTextFormControlElement::insertedInto(insertionPoint);
if (insertionPoint->inDocument() && !form())
addToRadioButtonGroup();
resetListAttributeTargetObserver();
return InsertionDone;
}
Commit Message: Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 112,909 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int RenderViewImpl::GetPageId() {
return page_id_;
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 108,364 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: char *bin2hex(const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
{
ssize_t slen;
char *s;
slen = len * 2 + 1;
if (slen % 4)
slen += 4 - (slen % 4);
s = (char *)calloc(slen, 1);
if (unlikely(!s))
quithere(1, "Failed to calloc");
__bin2hex(s, p, len);
return s;
}
Commit Message: stratum: parse_notify(): Don't die on malformed bbversion/prev_hash/nbit/ntime.
Might have introduced a memory leak, don't have time to check. :(
Should the other hex2bin()'s be checked?
Thanks to Mick Ayzenberg <mick.dejavusecurity.com> for finding this.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 36,558 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: extension_info_start (NautilusDirectory *directory,
NautilusFile *file,
gboolean *doing_io)
{
NautilusInfoProvider *provider;
NautilusOperationResult result;
NautilusOperationHandle *handle;
GClosure *update_complete;
if (directory->details->extension_info_in_progress != NULL)
{
*doing_io = TRUE;
return;
}
if (!is_needy (file, lacks_extension_info, REQUEST_EXTENSION_INFO))
{
return;
}
*doing_io = TRUE;
if (!async_job_start (directory, "extension info"))
{
return;
}
provider = file->details->pending_info_providers->data;
update_complete = g_cclosure_new (G_CALLBACK (info_provider_callback),
directory,
NULL);
g_closure_set_marshal (update_complete,
g_cclosure_marshal_generic);
result = nautilus_info_provider_update_file_info
(provider,
NAUTILUS_FILE_INFO (file),
update_complete,
&handle);
g_closure_unref (update_complete);
if (result == NAUTILUS_OPERATION_COMPLETE ||
result == NAUTILUS_OPERATION_FAILED)
{
finish_info_provider (directory, file, provider);
async_job_end (directory, "extension info");
}
else
{
directory->details->extension_info_in_progress = handle;
directory->details->extension_info_provider = provider;
directory->details->extension_info_file = file;
}
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 60,891 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int read_user_chunk_callback(png_struct *ping, png_unknown_chunkp chunk)
{
Image
*image;
/* The unknown chunk structure contains the chunk data:
png_byte name[5];
png_byte *data;
png_size_t size;
Note that libpng has already taken care of the CRC handling.
*/
LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" read_user_chunk: found %c%c%c%c chunk",
chunk->name[0],chunk->name[1],chunk->name[2],chunk->name[3]);
if (chunk->name[0] == 101 &&
(chunk->name[1] == 88 || chunk->name[1] == 120 ) &&
chunk->name[2] == 73 &&
chunk-> name[3] == 102)
{
/* process eXIf or exIf chunk */
PNGErrorInfo
*error_info;
StringInfo
*profile;
unsigned char
*p;
png_byte
*s;
int
i;
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" recognized eXIf|exIf chunk");
image=(Image *) png_get_user_chunk_ptr(ping);
error_info=(PNGErrorInfo *) png_get_error_ptr(ping);
profile=BlobToStringInfo((const void *) NULL,chunk->size+6);
if (profile == (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(error_info->exception,GetMagickModule(),
ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed","`%s'",image->filename);
return(-1);
}
p=GetStringInfoDatum(profile);
/* Initialize profile with "Exif\0\0" */
*p++ ='E';
*p++ ='x';
*p++ ='i';
*p++ ='f';
*p++ ='\0';
*p++ ='\0';
/* copy chunk->data to profile */
s=chunk->data;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) chunk->size; i++)
*p++ = *s++;
(void) SetImageProfile(image,"exif",profile);
return(1);
}
/* vpAg (deprecated, replaced by caNv) */
if (chunk->name[0] == 118 &&
chunk->name[1] == 112 &&
chunk->name[2] == 65 &&
chunk->name[3] == 103)
{
/* recognized vpAg */
if (chunk->size != 9)
return(-1); /* Error return */
if (chunk->data[8] != 0)
return(0); /* ImageMagick requires pixel units */
image=(Image *) png_get_user_chunk_ptr(ping);
image->page.width=(size_t) ((chunk->data[0] << 24) |
(chunk->data[1] << 16) | (chunk->data[2] << 8) | chunk->data[3]);
image->page.height=(size_t) ((chunk->data[4] << 24) |
(chunk->data[5] << 16) | (chunk->data[6] << 8) | chunk->data[7]);
return(1);
}
/* caNv */
if (chunk->name[0] == 99 &&
chunk->name[1] == 97 &&
chunk->name[2] == 78 &&
chunk->name[3] == 118)
{
/* recognized caNv */
if (chunk->size != 16)
return(-1); /* Error return */
image=(Image *) png_get_user_chunk_ptr(ping);
image->page.width=(size_t) ((chunk->data[0] << 24) |
(chunk->data[1] << 16) | (chunk->data[2] << 8) | chunk->data[3]);
image->page.height=(size_t) ((chunk->data[4] << 24) |
(chunk->data[5] << 16) | (chunk->data[6] << 8) | chunk->data[7]);
image->page.x=(size_t) ((chunk->data[8] << 24) |
(chunk->data[9] << 16) | (chunk->data[10] << 8) | chunk->data[11]);
image->page.y=(size_t) ((chunk->data[12] << 24) |
(chunk->data[13] << 16) | (chunk->data[14] << 8) | chunk->data[15]);
/* Return one of the following: */
/* return(-n); chunk had an error */
/* return(0); did not recognize */
/* return(n); success */
return(1);
}
return(0); /* Did not recognize */
}
Commit Message: ...
CWE ID: CWE-754 | 0 | 62,163 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CGaiaCredentialBase::CGaiaCredentialBase() {}
Commit Message: [GCPW] Disallow sign in of consumer accounts when mdm is enabled.
Unless the registry key "mdm_aca" is explicitly set to 1, always
fail sign in of consumer accounts when mdm enrollment is enabled.
Consumer accounts are defined as accounts with gmail.com or
googlemail.com domain.
Bug: 944049
Change-Id: Icb822f3737d90931de16a8d3317616dd2b159edd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1532903
Commit-Queue: Tien Mai <tienmai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Roger Tawa <rogerta@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#646278}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 130,677 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void VoidMethodUnsignedLongLongArgMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
ExceptionState exception_state(info.GetIsolate(), ExceptionState::kExecutionContext, "TestObject", "voidMethodUnsignedLongLongArg");
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() < 1)) {
exception_state.ThrowTypeError(ExceptionMessages::NotEnoughArguments(1, info.Length()));
return;
}
uint64_t unsigned_long_long_arg;
unsigned_long_long_arg = NativeValueTraits<IDLUnsignedLongLong>::NativeValue(info.GetIsolate(), info[0], exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return;
impl->voidMethodUnsignedLongLongArg(unsigned_long_long_arg);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 135,509 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int sock_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size,
int flags)
{
int err = security_socket_recvmsg(sock, msg, size, flags);
return err ?: sock_recvmsg_nosec(sock, msg, size, flags);
}
Commit Message: net: Fix use after free in the recvmmsg exit path
The syzkaller fuzzer hit the following use-after-free:
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff8175ea0e>] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x3e/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:295
[<ffffffff851cc31a>] __sys_recvmmsg+0x6fa/0x7f0 net/socket.c:2261
[< inline >] SYSC_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2281
[<ffffffff851cc57f>] SyS_recvmmsg+0x16f/0x180 net/socket.c:2270
[<ffffffff86332bb6>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185
And, as Dmitry rightly assessed, that is because we can drop the
reference and then touch it when the underlying recvmsg calls return
some packets and then hit an error, which will make recvmmsg to set
sock->sk->sk_err, oops, fix it.
Reported-and-Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Fixes: a2e2725541fa ("net: Introduce recvmmsg socket syscall")
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160122211644.GC2470@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 50,272 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static boolean EmptyOutputBuffer(j_compress_ptr cinfo)
{
DestinationManager
*destination;
destination=(DestinationManager *) cinfo->dest;
destination->manager.free_in_buffer=(size_t) WriteBlob(destination->image,
MaxBufferExtent,destination->buffer);
if (destination->manager.free_in_buffer != MaxBufferExtent)
ERREXIT(cinfo,JERR_FILE_WRITE);
destination->manager.next_output_byte=destination->buffer;
return(TRUE);
}
Commit Message: ...
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 63,358 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int modbus_reply_exception(modbus_t *ctx, const uint8_t *req,
unsigned int exception_code)
{
int offset;
int slave;
int function;
uint8_t rsp[MAX_MESSAGE_LENGTH];
int rsp_length;
int dummy_length = 99;
sft_t sft;
if (ctx == NULL) {
errno = EINVAL;
return -1;
}
offset = ctx->backend->header_length;
slave = req[offset - 1];
function = req[offset];
sft.slave = slave;
sft.function = function + 0x80;
sft.t_id = ctx->backend->prepare_response_tid(req, &dummy_length);
rsp_length = ctx->backend->build_response_basis(&sft, rsp);
/* Positive exception code */
if (exception_code < MODBUS_EXCEPTION_MAX) {
rsp[rsp_length++] = exception_code;
return send_msg(ctx, rsp, rsp_length);
} else {
errno = EINVAL;
return -1;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix VD-1301 and VD-1302 vulnerabilities
This patch was contributed by Maor Vermucht and Or Peles from
VDOO Connected Trust.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 88,744 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GLvoid StubGLDeleteRenderbuffers(GLsizei n, const GLuint* renderbuffers) {
glDeleteRenderbuffersEXT(n, renderbuffers);
}
Commit Message: Add chromium_code: 1 to surface.gyp and gl.gyp to pick up -Werror.
It looks like this was dropped accidentally in http://codereview.chromium.org/6718027 (surface.gyp) and http://codereview.chromium.org/6722026 (gl.gyp)
Remove now-redudant code that's implied by chromium_code: 1.
Fix the warnings that have crept in since chromium_code: 1 was removed.
BUG=none
TEST=none
Committed: http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome?view=rev&revision=91598
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7227009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91813 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 99,556 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sctp_getsockopt_hmac_ident(struct sock *sk, int len,
char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
{
struct sctp_endpoint *ep = sctp_sk(sk)->ep;
struct sctp_hmacalgo __user *p = (void __user *)optval;
struct sctp_hmac_algo_param *hmacs;
__u16 data_len = 0;
u32 num_idents;
int i;
if (!ep->auth_enable)
return -EACCES;
hmacs = ep->auth_hmacs_list;
data_len = ntohs(hmacs->param_hdr.length) - sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t);
if (len < sizeof(struct sctp_hmacalgo) + data_len)
return -EINVAL;
len = sizeof(struct sctp_hmacalgo) + data_len;
num_idents = data_len / sizeof(u16);
if (put_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
if (put_user(num_idents, &p->shmac_num_idents))
return -EFAULT;
for (i = 0; i < num_idents; i++) {
__u16 hmacid = ntohs(hmacs->hmac_ids[i]);
if (copy_to_user(&p->shmac_idents[i], &hmacid, sizeof(__u16)))
return -EFAULT;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: sctp: deny peeloff operation on asocs with threads sleeping on it
commit 2dcab5984841 ("sctp: avoid BUG_ON on sctp_wait_for_sndbuf")
attempted to avoid a BUG_ON call when the association being used for a
sendmsg() is blocked waiting for more sndbuf and another thread did a
peeloff operation on such asoc, moving it to another socket.
As Ben Hutchings noticed, then in such case it would return without
locking back the socket and would cause two unlocks in a row.
Further analysis also revealed that it could allow a double free if the
application managed to peeloff the asoc that is created during the
sendmsg call, because then sctp_sendmsg() would try to free the asoc
that was created only for that call.
This patch takes another approach. It will deny the peeloff operation
if there is a thread sleeping on the asoc, so this situation doesn't
exist anymore. This avoids the issues described above and also honors
the syscalls that are already being handled (it can be multiple sendmsg
calls).
Joint work with Xin Long.
Fixes: 2dcab5984841 ("sctp: avoid BUG_ON on sctp_wait_for_sndbuf")
Cc: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 68,143 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool AddPolicyForGPU(CommandLine* cmd_line, sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
#if !defined(NACL_WIN64) // We don't need this code on win nacl64.
if (base::win::GetVersion() > base::win::VERSION_SERVER_2003) {
if (cmd_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kUseGL) ==
gfx::kGLImplementationDesktopName) {
policy->SetTokenLevel(sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS,
sandbox::USER_LIMITED);
policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_UNPROTECTED, 0);
policy->SetDelayedIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW);
} else {
if (cmd_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kUseGL) ==
gfx::kGLImplementationSwiftShaderName ||
cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kReduceGpuSandbox)) {
policy->SetTokenLevel(sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS,
sandbox::USER_LIMITED);
policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_LIMITED_USER,
JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_SYSTEMPARAMETERS |
JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_DESKTOP |
JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_EXITWINDOWS |
JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_DISPLAYSETTINGS);
} else {
policy->SetTokenLevel(sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS,
sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED);
policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_LOCKDOWN,
JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_HANDLES);
}
policy->SetIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW);
}
} else {
policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_UNPROTECTED, 0);
policy->SetTokenLevel(sandbox::USER_UNPROTECTED,
sandbox::USER_LIMITED);
}
sandbox::ResultCode result = policy->AddRule(
sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES,
sandbox::TargetPolicy::NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY,
L"\\\\.\\pipe\\chrome.gpu.*");
if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
return false;
result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_HANDLES,
sandbox::TargetPolicy::HANDLES_DUP_ANY,
L"Section");
if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
return false;
AddGenericDllEvictionPolicy(policy);
#endif
return true;
}
Commit Message: Prevent sandboxed processes from opening each other
TBR=brettw
BUG=117627
BUG=119150
TEST=sbox_validation_tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9716027
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132477 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 1 | 170,911 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int btrfs_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
{
struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans;
struct btrfs_root *root = BTRFS_I(old_dir)->root;
struct btrfs_root *dest = BTRFS_I(new_dir)->root;
struct inode *new_inode = new_dentry->d_inode;
struct inode *old_inode = old_dentry->d_inode;
struct timespec ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
u64 index = 0;
u64 root_objectid;
int ret;
u64 old_ino = btrfs_ino(old_inode);
if (btrfs_ino(new_dir) == BTRFS_EMPTY_SUBVOL_DIR_OBJECTID)
return -EPERM;
/* we only allow rename subvolume link between subvolumes */
if (old_ino != BTRFS_FIRST_FREE_OBJECTID && root != dest)
return -EXDEV;
if (old_ino == BTRFS_EMPTY_SUBVOL_DIR_OBJECTID ||
(new_inode && btrfs_ino(new_inode) == BTRFS_FIRST_FREE_OBJECTID))
return -ENOTEMPTY;
if (S_ISDIR(old_inode->i_mode) && new_inode &&
new_inode->i_size > BTRFS_EMPTY_DIR_SIZE)
return -ENOTEMPTY;
/*
* we're using rename to replace one file with another.
* and the replacement file is large. Start IO on it now so
* we don't add too much work to the end of the transaction
*/
if (new_inode && S_ISREG(old_inode->i_mode) && new_inode->i_size &&
old_inode->i_size > BTRFS_ORDERED_OPERATIONS_FLUSH_LIMIT)
filemap_flush(old_inode->i_mapping);
/* close the racy window with snapshot create/destroy ioctl */
if (old_ino == BTRFS_FIRST_FREE_OBJECTID)
down_read(&root->fs_info->subvol_sem);
/*
* We want to reserve the absolute worst case amount of items. So if
* both inodes are subvols and we need to unlink them then that would
* require 4 item modifications, but if they are both normal inodes it
* would require 5 item modifications, so we'll assume their normal
* inodes. So 5 * 2 is 10, plus 1 for the new link, so 11 total items
* should cover the worst case number of items we'll modify.
*/
trans = btrfs_start_transaction(root, 20);
if (IS_ERR(trans)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(trans);
goto out_notrans;
}
if (dest != root)
btrfs_record_root_in_trans(trans, dest);
ret = btrfs_set_inode_index(new_dir, &index);
if (ret)
goto out_fail;
if (unlikely(old_ino == BTRFS_FIRST_FREE_OBJECTID)) {
/* force full log commit if subvolume involved. */
root->fs_info->last_trans_log_full_commit = trans->transid;
} else {
ret = btrfs_insert_inode_ref(trans, dest,
new_dentry->d_name.name,
new_dentry->d_name.len,
old_ino,
btrfs_ino(new_dir), index);
if (ret)
goto out_fail;
/*
* this is an ugly little race, but the rename is required
* to make sure that if we crash, the inode is either at the
* old name or the new one. pinning the log transaction lets
* us make sure we don't allow a log commit to come in after
* we unlink the name but before we add the new name back in.
*/
btrfs_pin_log_trans(root);
}
/*
* make sure the inode gets flushed if it is replacing
* something.
*/
if (new_inode && new_inode->i_size && S_ISREG(old_inode->i_mode))
btrfs_add_ordered_operation(trans, root, old_inode);
inode_inc_iversion(old_dir);
inode_inc_iversion(new_dir);
inode_inc_iversion(old_inode);
old_dir->i_ctime = old_dir->i_mtime = ctime;
new_dir->i_ctime = new_dir->i_mtime = ctime;
old_inode->i_ctime = ctime;
if (old_dentry->d_parent != new_dentry->d_parent)
btrfs_record_unlink_dir(trans, old_dir, old_inode, 1);
if (unlikely(old_ino == BTRFS_FIRST_FREE_OBJECTID)) {
root_objectid = BTRFS_I(old_inode)->root->root_key.objectid;
ret = btrfs_unlink_subvol(trans, root, old_dir, root_objectid,
old_dentry->d_name.name,
old_dentry->d_name.len);
} else {
ret = __btrfs_unlink_inode(trans, root, old_dir,
old_dentry->d_inode,
old_dentry->d_name.name,
old_dentry->d_name.len);
if (!ret)
ret = btrfs_update_inode(trans, root, old_inode);
}
if (ret) {
btrfs_abort_transaction(trans, root, ret);
goto out_fail;
}
if (new_inode) {
inode_inc_iversion(new_inode);
new_inode->i_ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
if (unlikely(btrfs_ino(new_inode) ==
BTRFS_EMPTY_SUBVOL_DIR_OBJECTID)) {
root_objectid = BTRFS_I(new_inode)->location.objectid;
ret = btrfs_unlink_subvol(trans, dest, new_dir,
root_objectid,
new_dentry->d_name.name,
new_dentry->d_name.len);
BUG_ON(new_inode->i_nlink == 0);
} else {
ret = btrfs_unlink_inode(trans, dest, new_dir,
new_dentry->d_inode,
new_dentry->d_name.name,
new_dentry->d_name.len);
}
if (!ret && new_inode->i_nlink == 0) {
ret = btrfs_orphan_add(trans, new_dentry->d_inode);
BUG_ON(ret);
}
if (ret) {
btrfs_abort_transaction(trans, root, ret);
goto out_fail;
}
}
fixup_inode_flags(new_dir, old_inode);
ret = btrfs_add_link(trans, new_dir, old_inode,
new_dentry->d_name.name,
new_dentry->d_name.len, 0, index);
if (ret) {
btrfs_abort_transaction(trans, root, ret);
goto out_fail;
}
if (old_ino != BTRFS_FIRST_FREE_OBJECTID) {
struct dentry *parent = new_dentry->d_parent;
btrfs_log_new_name(trans, old_inode, old_dir, parent);
btrfs_end_log_trans(root);
}
out_fail:
btrfs_end_transaction(trans, root);
out_notrans:
if (old_ino == BTRFS_FIRST_FREE_OBJECTID)
up_read(&root->fs_info->subvol_sem);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <chris.mason@fusionio.com>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <pascal@junod.info>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 1 | 166,194 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: IsParent(WindowPtr a, WindowPtr b)
{
for (b = b->parent; b; b = b->parent)
if (b == a)
return TRUE;
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 4,851 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static pid_t pid_of_stack(struct proc_maps_private *priv,
struct vm_area_struct *vma, bool is_pid)
{
struct inode *inode = priv->inode;
struct task_struct *task;
pid_t ret = 0;
rcu_read_lock();
task = pid_task(proc_pid(inode), PIDTYPE_PID);
if (task) {
task = task_of_stack(task, vma, is_pid);
if (task)
ret = task_pid_nr_ns(task, inode->i_sb->s_fs_info);
}
rcu_read_unlock();
return ret;
}
Commit Message: pagemap: do not leak physical addresses to non-privileged userspace
As pointed by recent post[1] on exploiting DRAM physical imperfection,
/proc/PID/pagemap exposes sensitive information which can be used to do
attacks.
This disallows anybody without CAP_SYS_ADMIN to read the pagemap.
[1] http://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2015/03/exploiting-dram-rowhammer-bug-to-gain.html
[ Eventually we might want to do anything more finegrained, but for now
this is the simple model. - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mark Seaborn <mseaborn@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 55,810 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FLAC_API FLAC__bool FLAC__stream_decoder_set_md5_checking(FLAC__StreamDecoder *decoder, FLAC__bool value)
{
FLAC__ASSERT(0 != decoder);
FLAC__ASSERT(0 != decoder->protected_);
if(decoder->protected_->state != FLAC__STREAM_DECODER_UNINITIALIZED)
return false;
decoder->protected_->md5_checking = value;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Avoid free-before-initialize vulnerability in heap
Bug: 27211885
Change-Id: Ib9c93bd9ffdde2a5f8d31a86f06e267dc9c152db
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 161,206 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int asf_read_data(AVFormatContext *s, const GUIDParseTable *g)
{
ASFContext *asf = s->priv_data;
AVIOContext *pb = s->pb;
uint64_t size = asf->data_size = avio_rl64(pb);
int i;
if (!asf->data_reached) {
asf->data_reached = 1;
asf->data_offset = asf->offset;
}
for (i = 0; i < asf->nb_streams; i++) {
if (!(asf->b_flags & ASF_FLAG_BROADCAST))
s->streams[i]->duration = asf->duration;
}
asf->nb_mult_left = 0;
asf->sub_left = 0;
asf->state = PARSE_PACKET_HEADER;
asf->return_subpayload = 0;
asf->packet_size_internal = 0;
avio_skip(pb, 16); // skip File ID
size = avio_rl64(pb); // Total Data Packets
if (size != asf->nb_packets)
av_log(s, AV_LOG_WARNING,
"Number of Packets from File Properties Object is not equal to Total"
"Datapackets value! num of packets %"PRIu64" total num %"PRIu64".\n",
size, asf->nb_packets);
avio_skip(pb, 2); // skip reserved field
asf->first_packet_offset = avio_tell(pb);
if ((pb->seekable & AVIO_SEEKABLE_NORMAL) && !(asf->b_flags & ASF_FLAG_BROADCAST))
align_position(pb, asf->offset, asf->data_size);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/asfdec_o: Check size_bmp more fully
Fixes: integer overflow and out of array access
Fixes: asfo-crash-46080c4341572a7137a162331af77f6ded45cbd7
Found-by: Paul Ch <paulcher@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 74,866 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ospf6_decode_v3(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const struct ospf6hdr *op,
register const u_char *dataend)
{
register const rtrid_t *ap;
register const struct lsr6 *lsrp;
register const struct lsa6_hdr *lshp;
register const struct lsa6 *lsap;
register int i;
switch (op->ospf6_type) {
case OSPF_TYPE_HELLO: {
register const struct hello6 *hellop = (const struct hello6 *)((const uint8_t *)op + OSPF6HDR_LEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tOptions [%s]",
bittok2str(ospf6_option_values, "none",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&hellop->hello_options))));
ND_TCHECK(hellop->hello_deadint);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Hello Timer %us, Dead Timer %us, Interface-ID %s, Priority %u",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&hellop->hello_helloint),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&hellop->hello_deadint),
ipaddr_string(ndo, &hellop->hello_ifid),
hellop->hello_priority));
ND_TCHECK(hellop->hello_dr);
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(&hellop->hello_dr) != 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Designated Router %s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &hellop->hello_dr)));
ND_TCHECK(hellop->hello_bdr);
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(&hellop->hello_bdr) != 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Backup Designated Router %s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &hellop->hello_bdr)));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Neighbor List:"));
ap = hellop->hello_neighbor;
while ((const u_char *)ap < dataend) {
ND_TCHECK(*ap);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, ap)));
++ap;
}
}
break; /* HELLO */
}
case OSPF_TYPE_DD: {
register const struct dd6 *ddp = (const struct dd6 *)((const uint8_t *)op + OSPF6HDR_LEN);
ND_TCHECK(ddp->db_options);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tOptions [%s]",
bittok2str(ospf6_option_values, "none",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&ddp->db_options))));
ND_TCHECK(ddp->db_flags);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", DD Flags [%s]",
bittok2str(ospf6_dd_flag_values,"none",ddp->db_flags)));
ND_TCHECK(ddp->db_seq);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", MTU %u, DD-Sequence 0x%08x",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&ddp->db_mtu),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&ddp->db_seq)));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
/* Print all the LS adv's */
lshp = ddp->db_lshdr;
while ((const u_char *)lshp < dataend) {
if (ospf6_print_lshdr(ndo, lshp++, dataend))
goto trunc;
}
}
break;
}
case OSPF_TYPE_LS_REQ:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
lsrp = (const struct lsr6 *)((const uint8_t *)op + OSPF6HDR_LEN);
while ((const u_char *)lsrp < dataend) {
ND_TCHECK(*lsrp);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Advertising Router %s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &lsrp->ls_router)));
ospf6_print_ls_type(ndo, EXTRACT_16BITS(&lsrp->ls_type),
&lsrp->ls_stateid);
++lsrp;
}
}
break;
case OSPF_TYPE_LS_UPDATE:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
register const struct lsu6 *lsup = (const struct lsu6 *)((const uint8_t *)op + OSPF6HDR_LEN);
ND_TCHECK(lsup->lsu_count);
i = EXTRACT_32BITS(&lsup->lsu_count);
lsap = lsup->lsu_lsa;
while ((const u_char *)lsap < dataend && i--) {
if (ospf6_print_lsa(ndo, lsap, dataend))
goto trunc;
lsap = (const struct lsa6 *)((const u_char *)lsap +
EXTRACT_16BITS(&lsap->ls_hdr.ls_length));
}
}
break;
case OSPF_TYPE_LS_ACK:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
lshp = (const struct lsa6_hdr *)((const uint8_t *)op + OSPF6HDR_LEN);
while ((const u_char *)lshp < dataend) {
if (ospf6_print_lshdr(ndo, lshp++, dataend))
goto trunc;
}
}
break;
default:
break;
}
return (0);
trunc:
return (1);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13036/OSPFv3: Add a bounds check before fetching data
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 167,847 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: iperf_on_test_start(struct iperf_test *test)
{
if (test->json_output) {
cJSON_AddItemToObject(test->json_start, "test_start", iperf_json_printf("protocol: %s num_streams: %d blksize: %d omit: %d duration: %d bytes: %d blocks: %d reverse: %d", test->protocol->name, (int64_t) test->num_streams, (int64_t) test->settings->blksize, (int64_t) test->omit, (int64_t) test->duration, (int64_t) test->settings->bytes, (int64_t) test->settings->blocks, test->reverse?(int64_t)1:(int64_t)0));
} else {
if (test->verbose) {
if (test->settings->bytes)
iprintf(test, test_start_bytes, test->protocol->name, test->num_streams, test->settings->blksize, test->omit, test->settings->bytes);
else if (test->settings->blocks)
iprintf(test, test_start_blocks, test->protocol->name, test->num_streams, test->settings->blksize, test->omit, test->settings->blocks);
else
iprintf(test, test_start_time, test->protocol->name, test->num_streams, test->settings->blksize, test->omit, test->duration);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 53,408 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ModuleExport size_t RegisterINLINEImage(void)
{
MagickInfo
*entry;
entry=SetMagickInfo("DATA");
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadINLINEImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WriteINLINEImage;
entry->format_type=ImplicitFormatType;
entry->description=ConstantString("Base64-encoded inline images");
entry->module=ConstantString("INLINE");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
entry=SetMagickInfo("INLINE");
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadINLINEImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WriteINLINEImage;
entry->format_type=ImplicitFormatType;
entry->description=ConstantString("Base64-encoded inline images");
entry->module=ConstantString("INLINE");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
return(MagickImageCoderSignature);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/572
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 62,680 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: KURL Document::ValidBaseElementURL() const {
if (base_element_url_.IsValid())
return base_element_url_;
return KURL();
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 129,926 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(dom_document_create_text_node)
{
zval *id;
xmlNode *node;
xmlDocPtr docp;
int ret, value_len;
dom_object *intern;
char *value;
if (zend_parse_method_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, getThis(), "Os", &id, dom_document_class_entry, &value, &value_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
DOM_GET_OBJ(docp, id, xmlDocPtr, intern);
node = xmlNewDocText(docp, (xmlChar *) value);
if (!node) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
DOM_RET_OBJ(node, &ret, intern);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 15,039 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void EnterpriseEnrollmentScreen::OnIssueAuthTokenSuccess(
const std::string& service,
const std::string& auth_token) {
if (service != GaiaConstants::kDeviceManagementService) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION(policy::kMetricEnrollment,
policy::kMetricEnrollmentOtherFailed,
policy::kMetricEnrollmentSize);
NOTREACHED() << service;
return;
}
scoped_ptr<GaiaAuthFetcher> auth_fetcher(auth_fetcher_.release());
RegisterForDevicePolicy(auth_token,
policy::BrowserPolicyConnector::TOKEN_TYPE_GAIA);
}
Commit Message: Reset the device policy machinery upon retrying enrollment.
BUG=chromium-os:18208
TEST=See bug description
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7676005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97615 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 97,717 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void srpt_cm_drep_recv(struct ib_cm_id *cm_id)
{
pr_info("Received InfiniBand DREP message for cm_id %p.\n", cm_id);
srpt_drain_channel(cm_id);
}
Commit Message: IB/srpt: Simplify srpt_handle_tsk_mgmt()
Let the target core check task existence instead of the SRP target
driver. Additionally, let the target core check the validity of the
task management request instead of the ib_srpt driver.
This patch fixes the following kernel crash:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000001
IP: [<ffffffffa0565f37>] srpt_handle_new_iu+0x6d7/0x790 [ib_srpt]
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
Call Trace:
[<ffffffffa05660ce>] srpt_process_completion+0xde/0x570 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffffa056669f>] srpt_compl_thread+0x13f/0x160 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffff8109726f>] kthread+0xcf/0xe0
[<ffffffff81613cfc>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@sandisk.com>
Fixes: 3e4f574857ee ("ib_srpt: Convert TMR path to target_submit_tmr")
Tested-by: Alex Estrin <alex.estrin@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
Cc: Sagi Grimberg <sagig@mellanox.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 50,637 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: iasecc_keyset_change(struct sc_card *card, struct sc_pin_cmd_data *data, int *tries_left)
{
struct sc_context *ctx = card->ctx;
struct iasecc_sdo_update update;
struct iasecc_sdo sdo;
unsigned scb;
int rv;
LOG_FUNC_CALLED(ctx);
sc_log(ctx, "Change keyset(ref:%i,lengths:%i)", data->pin_reference, data->pin2.len);
if (!data->pin2.data || data->pin2.len < 32)
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, SC_ERROR_INVALID_DATA, "Needs at least 32 bytes for a new keyset value");
memset(&sdo, 0, sizeof(sdo));
sdo.sdo_class = IASECC_SDO_CLASS_KEYSET;
sdo.sdo_ref = data->pin_reference;
rv = iasecc_sdo_get_data(card, &sdo);
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, rv, "Cannot get keyset data");
if (sdo.docp.acls_contact.size == 0)
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, SC_ERROR_INVALID_DATA, "Bewildered ... there are no ACLs");
scb = sdo.docp.scbs[IASECC_ACLS_KEYSET_PUT_DATA];
iasecc_sdo_free_fields(card, &sdo);
sc_log(ctx, "SCB:0x%X", scb);
if (!(scb & IASECC_SCB_METHOD_SM))
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, SC_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED, "Other then protected by SM, the keyset change is not supported");
memset(&update, 0, sizeof(update));
update.magic = SC_CARDCTL_IASECC_SDO_MAGIC_PUT_DATA;
update.sdo_class = sdo.sdo_class;
update.sdo_ref = sdo.sdo_ref;
update.fields[0].parent_tag = IASECC_SDO_KEYSET_TAG;
update.fields[0].tag = IASECC_SDO_KEYSET_TAG_MAC;
/* FIXME is it safe to modify the const value here? */
update.fields[0].value = (unsigned char *) data->pin2.data;
update.fields[0].size = 16;
update.fields[1].parent_tag = IASECC_SDO_KEYSET_TAG;
update.fields[1].tag = IASECC_SDO_KEYSET_TAG_ENC;
/* FIXME is it safe to modify the const value here? */
update.fields[1].value = (unsigned char *) data->pin2.data + 16;
update.fields[1].size = 16;
rv = iasecc_sm_sdo_update(card, (scb & IASECC_SCB_METHOD_MASK_REF), &update);
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, rv);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 78,494 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void AppLayerProtoDetectProbingParserFree(AppLayerProtoDetectProbingParser *p)
{
SCEnter();
AppLayerProtoDetectProbingParserPort *pt = p->port;
while (pt != NULL) {
AppLayerProtoDetectProbingParserPort *pt_next = pt->next;
AppLayerProtoDetectProbingParserPortFree(pt);
pt = pt_next;
}
SCFree(p);
SCReturn;
}
Commit Message: proto/detect: workaround dns misdetected as dcerpc
The DCERPC UDP detection would misfire on DNS with transaction
ID 0x0400. This would happen as the protocol detection engine
gives preference to pattern based detection over probing parsers for
performance reasons.
This hack/workaround fixes this specific case by still running the
probing parser if DCERPC has been detected on UDP. The probing
parser result will take precedence.
Bug #2736.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 96,502 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void conditionalRuntimeEnabledLongAttributeAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
ExceptionState exceptionState(ExceptionState::SetterContext, "conditionalRuntimeEnabledLongAttribute", "TestObjectPython", info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate());
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_EXCEPTION_VOID(int, cppValue, toInt32(jsValue, exceptionState), exceptionState);
imp->setConditionalRuntimeEnabledLongAttribute(cppValue);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,222 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __hw_perf_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
{
struct perf_event_attr *attr = &event->attr;
struct hw_perf_event *hwc = &event->hw;
struct perf_event *evts[MAX_HWEVENTS];
unsigned long evtypes[MAX_HWEVENTS];
int idx_rubbish_bin[MAX_HWEVENTS];
int ev;
int n;
/* We only support a limited range of HARDWARE event types with one
* only programmable via a RAW event type.
*/
if (attr->type == PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE) {
if (attr->config >= alpha_pmu->max_events)
return -EINVAL;
ev = alpha_pmu->event_map[attr->config];
} else if (attr->type == PERF_TYPE_HW_CACHE) {
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
} else if (attr->type == PERF_TYPE_RAW) {
ev = attr->config & 0xff;
} else {
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
if (ev < 0) {
return ev;
}
/* The EV67 does not support mode exclusion */
if (attr->exclude_kernel || attr->exclude_user
|| attr->exclude_hv || attr->exclude_idle) {
return -EPERM;
}
/*
* We place the event type in event_base here and leave calculation
* of the codes to programme the PMU for alpha_pmu_enable() because
* it is only then we will know what HW events are actually
* scheduled on to the PMU. At that point the code to programme the
* PMU is put into config_base and the PMC to use is placed into
* idx. We initialise idx (below) to PMC_NO_INDEX to indicate that
* it is yet to be determined.
*/
hwc->event_base = ev;
/* Collect events in a group together suitable for calling
* alpha_check_constraints() to verify that the group as a whole can
* be scheduled on to the PMU.
*/
n = 0;
if (event->group_leader != event) {
n = collect_events(event->group_leader,
alpha_pmu->num_pmcs - 1,
evts, evtypes, idx_rubbish_bin);
if (n < 0)
return -EINVAL;
}
evtypes[n] = hwc->event_base;
evts[n] = event;
if (alpha_check_constraints(evts, evtypes, n + 1))
return -EINVAL;
/* Indicate that PMU config and idx are yet to be determined. */
hwc->config_base = 0;
hwc->idx = PMC_NO_INDEX;
event->destroy = hw_perf_event_destroy;
/*
* Most architectures reserve the PMU for their use at this point.
* As there is no existing mechanism to arbitrate usage and there
* appears to be no other user of the Alpha PMU we just assume
* that we can just use it, hence a NO-OP here.
*
* Maybe an alpha_reserve_pmu() routine should be implemented but is
* anything else ever going to use it?
*/
if (!hwc->sample_period) {
hwc->sample_period = alpha_pmu->pmc_max_period[0];
hwc->last_period = hwc->sample_period;
local64_set(&hwc->period_left, hwc->sample_period);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,220 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OxideQQuickWebViewPrivate::CreateJavaScriptDialog(
oxide::qt::JavaScriptDialogProxyClient::Type type,
oxide::qt::JavaScriptDialogProxyClient* client) {
Q_Q(OxideQQuickWebView);
switch (type) {
case oxide::qt::JavaScriptDialogProxyClient::TypeAlert:
return new oxide::qquick::AlertDialog(q, client);
case oxide::qt::JavaScriptDialogProxyClient::TypeConfirm:
return new oxide::qquick::ConfirmDialog(q, client);
case oxide::qt::JavaScriptDialogProxyClient::TypePrompt:
return new oxide::qquick::PromptDialog(q, client);
default:
Q_UNREACHABLE();
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,032 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int check_sp(struct rock_ridge *rr, struct inode *inode)
{
if (rr->u.SP.magic[0] != 0xbe)
return -1;
if (rr->u.SP.magic[1] != 0xef)
return -1;
ISOFS_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_rock_offset = rr->u.SP.skip;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: isofs: Fix infinite looping over CE entries
Rock Ridge extensions define so called Continuation Entries (CE) which
define where is further space with Rock Ridge data. Corrupted isofs
image can contain arbitrarily long chain of these, including a one
containing loop and thus causing kernel to end in an infinite loop when
traversing these entries.
Limit the traversal to 32 entries which should be more than enough space
to store all the Rock Ridge data.
Reported-by: P J P <ppandit@redhat.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 35,377 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int enable_snd_device(struct audio_device *adev,
struct audio_usecase *uc_info,
snd_device_t snd_device,
bool update_mixer)
{
struct mixer_card *mixer_card;
struct listnode *node;
const char *snd_device_name = get_snd_device_name(snd_device);
if (snd_device_name == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
adev->snd_dev_ref_cnt[snd_device]++;
if (adev->snd_dev_ref_cnt[snd_device] > 1) {
ALOGV("%s: snd_device(%d: %s) is already active",
__func__, snd_device, snd_device_name);
return 0;
}
ALOGV("%s: snd_device(%d: %s)", __func__,
snd_device, snd_device_name);
list_for_each(node, &uc_info->mixer_list) {
mixer_card = node_to_item(node, struct mixer_card, uc_list_node[uc_info->id]);
audio_route_apply_path(mixer_card->audio_route, snd_device_name);
if (update_mixer)
audio_route_update_mixer(mixer_card->audio_route);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix audio record pre-processing
proc_buf_out consistently initialized.
intermediate scratch buffers consistently initialized.
prevent read failure from overwriting memory.
Test: POC, CTS, camera record
Bug: 62873231
Change-Id: Ie26e12a419a5819c1c5c3a0bcf1876d6d7aca686
(cherry picked from commit 6d7b330c27efba944817e647955da48e54fd74eb)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 162,266 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void adjustOpenFilesLimit(void) {
rlim_t maxfiles = server.maxclients+CONFIG_MIN_RESERVED_FDS;
struct rlimit limit;
if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE,&limit) == -1) {
serverLog(LL_WARNING,"Unable to obtain the current NOFILE limit (%s), assuming 1024 and setting the max clients configuration accordingly.",
strerror(errno));
server.maxclients = 1024-CONFIG_MIN_RESERVED_FDS;
} else {
rlim_t oldlimit = limit.rlim_cur;
/* Set the max number of files if the current limit is not enough
* for our needs. */
if (oldlimit < maxfiles) {
rlim_t bestlimit;
int setrlimit_error = 0;
/* Try to set the file limit to match 'maxfiles' or at least
* to the higher value supported less than maxfiles. */
bestlimit = maxfiles;
while(bestlimit > oldlimit) {
rlim_t decr_step = 16;
limit.rlim_cur = bestlimit;
limit.rlim_max = bestlimit;
if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE,&limit) != -1) break;
setrlimit_error = errno;
/* We failed to set file limit to 'bestlimit'. Try with a
* smaller limit decrementing by a few FDs per iteration. */
if (bestlimit < decr_step) break;
bestlimit -= decr_step;
}
/* Assume that the limit we get initially is still valid if
* our last try was even lower. */
if (bestlimit < oldlimit) bestlimit = oldlimit;
if (bestlimit < maxfiles) {
int old_maxclients = server.maxclients;
server.maxclients = bestlimit-CONFIG_MIN_RESERVED_FDS;
if (server.maxclients < 1) {
serverLog(LL_WARNING,"Your current 'ulimit -n' "
"of %llu is not enough for the server to start. "
"Please increase your open file limit to at least "
"%llu. Exiting.",
(unsigned long long) oldlimit,
(unsigned long long) maxfiles);
exit(1);
}
serverLog(LL_WARNING,"You requested maxclients of %d "
"requiring at least %llu max file descriptors.",
old_maxclients,
(unsigned long long) maxfiles);
serverLog(LL_WARNING,"Server can't set maximum open files "
"to %llu because of OS error: %s.",
(unsigned long long) maxfiles, strerror(setrlimit_error));
serverLog(LL_WARNING,"Current maximum open files is %llu. "
"maxclients has been reduced to %d to compensate for "
"low ulimit. "
"If you need higher maxclients increase 'ulimit -n'.",
(unsigned long long) bestlimit, server.maxclients);
} else {
serverLog(LL_NOTICE,"Increased maximum number of open files "
"to %llu (it was originally set to %llu).",
(unsigned long long) maxfiles,
(unsigned long long) oldlimit);
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: Security: Cross Protocol Scripting protection.
This is an attempt at mitigating problems due to cross protocol
scripting, an attack targeting services using line oriented protocols
like Redis that can accept HTTP requests as valid protocol, by
discarding the invalid parts and accepting the payloads sent, for
example, via a POST request.
For this to be effective, when we detect POST and Host: and terminate
the connection asynchronously, the networking code was modified in order
to never process further input. It was later verified that in a
pipelined request containing a POST command, the successive commands are
not executed.
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 69,995 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int gather_surplus_pages(struct hstate *h, int delta)
{
struct list_head surplus_list;
struct page *page, *tmp;
int ret, i;
int needed, allocated;
bool alloc_ok = true;
needed = (h->resv_huge_pages + delta) - h->free_huge_pages;
if (needed <= 0) {
h->resv_huge_pages += delta;
return 0;
}
allocated = 0;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&surplus_list);
ret = -ENOMEM;
retry:
spin_unlock(&hugetlb_lock);
for (i = 0; i < needed; i++) {
page = __alloc_buddy_huge_page(h, htlb_alloc_mask(h),
NUMA_NO_NODE, NULL);
if (!page) {
alloc_ok = false;
break;
}
list_add(&page->lru, &surplus_list);
cond_resched();
}
allocated += i;
/*
* After retaking hugetlb_lock, we need to recalculate 'needed'
* because either resv_huge_pages or free_huge_pages may have changed.
*/
spin_lock(&hugetlb_lock);
needed = (h->resv_huge_pages + delta) -
(h->free_huge_pages + allocated);
if (needed > 0) {
if (alloc_ok)
goto retry;
/*
* We were not able to allocate enough pages to
* satisfy the entire reservation so we free what
* we've allocated so far.
*/
goto free;
}
/*
* The surplus_list now contains _at_least_ the number of extra pages
* needed to accommodate the reservation. Add the appropriate number
* of pages to the hugetlb pool and free the extras back to the buddy
* allocator. Commit the entire reservation here to prevent another
* process from stealing the pages as they are added to the pool but
* before they are reserved.
*/
needed += allocated;
h->resv_huge_pages += delta;
ret = 0;
/* Free the needed pages to the hugetlb pool */
list_for_each_entry_safe(page, tmp, &surplus_list, lru) {
if ((--needed) < 0)
break;
/*
* This page is now managed by the hugetlb allocator and has
* no users -- drop the buddy allocator's reference.
*/
put_page_testzero(page);
VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(page_count(page), page);
enqueue_huge_page(h, page);
}
free:
spin_unlock(&hugetlb_lock);
/* Free unnecessary surplus pages to the buddy allocator */
list_for_each_entry_safe(page, tmp, &surplus_list, lru)
put_page(page);
spin_lock(&hugetlb_lock);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: userfaultfd: hugetlbfs: prevent UFFDIO_COPY to fill beyond the end of i_size
This oops:
kernel BUG at fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c:484!
RIP: remove_inode_hugepages+0x3d0/0x410
Call Trace:
hugetlbfs_setattr+0xd9/0x130
notify_change+0x292/0x410
do_truncate+0x65/0xa0
do_sys_ftruncate.constprop.3+0x11a/0x180
SyS_ftruncate+0xe/0x10
tracesys+0xd9/0xde
was caused by the lack of i_size check in hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte.
mmap() can still succeed beyond the end of the i_size after vmtruncate
zapped vmas in those ranges, but the faults must not succeed, and that
includes UFFDIO_COPY.
We could differentiate the retval to userland to represent a SIGBUS like
a page fault would do (vs SIGSEGV), but it doesn't seem very useful and
we'd need to pick a random retval as there's no meaningful syscall
retval that would differentiate from SIGSEGV and SIGBUS, there's just
-EFAULT.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171016223914.2421-2-aarcange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 86,356 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WORD32 ihevcd_rel_display_frame(iv_obj_t *ps_codec_obj,
void *pv_api_ip,
void *pv_api_op)
{
ivd_rel_display_frame_ip_t *ps_dec_rel_disp_ip;
ivd_rel_display_frame_op_t *ps_dec_rel_disp_op;
codec_t *ps_codec = (codec_t *)ps_codec_obj->pv_codec_handle;
ps_dec_rel_disp_ip = (ivd_rel_display_frame_ip_t *)pv_api_ip;
ps_dec_rel_disp_op = (ivd_rel_display_frame_op_t *)pv_api_op;
UNUSED(ps_dec_rel_disp_op);
if(0 == ps_codec->i4_share_disp_buf)
{
return IV_SUCCESS;
}
ihevc_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_codec->pv_pic_buf_mgr, ps_dec_rel_disp_ip->u4_disp_buf_id, BUF_MGR_DISP);
return IV_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Decoder: Handle ps_codec_obj memory allocation failure gracefully
If memory allocation for ps_codec_obj fails, return gracefully
with an error code. All other allocation failures are
handled correctly.
Bug: 68299873
Test: before/after with always-failing malloc
Change-Id: I5e6c07b147b13df81e65476851662d4b55d33b83
(cherry picked from commit a966e2a65dd901151ce7f4481d0084840c9a0f7e)
CWE ID: CWE-770 | 0 | 163,313 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void php_array_element_dump(zval *zv, zend_ulong index, zend_string *key, int level) /* {{{ */
{
if (key == NULL) { /* numeric key */
php_printf("%*c[" ZEND_LONG_FMT "]=>\n", level + 1, ' ', index);
} else { /* string key */
php_printf("%*c[\"", level + 1, ' ');
PHPWRITE(ZSTR_VAL(key), ZSTR_LEN(key));
php_printf("\"]=>\n");
}
php_var_dump(zv, level + 2);
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Complete the fix of bug #70172 for PHP 7
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 72,367 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ofputil_decode_ofp11_table_stats(struct ofpbuf *msg,
struct ofputil_table_stats *stats,
struct ofputil_table_features *features)
{
struct ofp11_table_stats *ots;
ots = ofpbuf_try_pull(msg, sizeof *ots);
if (!ots) {
return OFPERR_OFPBRC_BAD_LEN;
}
features->table_id = ots->table_id;
ovs_strlcpy(features->name, ots->name, sizeof features->name);
features->max_entries = ntohl(ots->max_entries);
features->nonmiss.instructions = ovsinst_bitmap_from_openflow(
ots->instructions, OFP11_VERSION);
features->nonmiss.write.ofpacts = ofpact_bitmap_from_openflow(
ots->write_actions, OFP11_VERSION);
features->nonmiss.apply.ofpacts = ofpact_bitmap_from_openflow(
ots->write_actions, OFP11_VERSION);
features->miss = features->nonmiss;
features->miss_config = ofputil_decode_table_miss(ots->config,
OFP11_VERSION);
features->match = mf_bitmap_from_of11(ots->match);
features->wildcard = mf_bitmap_from_of11(ots->wildcards);
bitmap_or(features->match.bm, features->wildcard.bm, MFF_N_IDS);
stats->table_id = ots->table_id;
stats->active_count = ntohl(ots->active_count);
stats->lookup_count = ntohll(ots->lookup_count);
stats->matched_count = ntohll(ots->matched_count);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <pkusunyifeng@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 77,520 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gpgsm_encrypt (void *engine, gpgme_key_t recp[], gpgme_encrypt_flags_t flags,
gpgme_data_t plain, gpgme_data_t ciph, int use_armor)
{
engine_gpgsm_t gpgsm = engine;
gpgme_error_t err;
if (!gpgsm)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE);
if (!recp)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
if (flags & GPGME_ENCRYPT_NO_ENCRYPT_TO)
{
err = gpgsm_assuan_simple_command (gpgsm->assuan_ctx,
"OPTION no-encrypt-to", NULL, NULL);
if (err)
return err;
}
gpgsm->input_cb.data = plain;
err = gpgsm_set_fd (gpgsm, INPUT_FD, map_data_enc (gpgsm->input_cb.data));
if (err)
return err;
gpgsm->output_cb.data = ciph;
err = gpgsm_set_fd (gpgsm, OUTPUT_FD, use_armor ? "--armor"
: map_data_enc (gpgsm->output_cb.data));
if (err)
return err;
gpgsm_clear_fd (gpgsm, MESSAGE_FD);
gpgsm->inline_data = NULL;
err = set_recipients (gpgsm, recp);
if (!err)
err = start (gpgsm, "ENCRYPT");
return err;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 12,266 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool GetPostLayerVisibilityAndReset() {
bool r = post_layer_visibility_;
post_layer_visibility_ = false;
return r;
}
Commit Message: Fix the crash after clamshell -> tablet transition in overview mode.
This CL just reverted some changes that were made in
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1658955. In
that CL, we changed the clamshell <-> tablet transition when clamshell
split view mode is enabled, however, we should keep the old behavior
unchanged if the feature is not enabled, i.e., overview should be ended
if it's active before the transition. Otherwise, it will cause a nullptr
dereference crash since |split_view_drag_indicators_| is not created in
clamshell overview and will be used in tablet overview.
Bug: 982507
Change-Id: I238fe9472648a446cff4ab992150658c228714dd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1705474
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <xdai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mitsuru Oshima (Slow - on/off site) <oshima@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#679306}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 137,555 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: http_SetH(const struct http *to, unsigned n, const char *fm)
{
assert(n < to->shd);
AN(fm);
to->hd[n].b = TRUST_ME(fm);
to->hd[n].e = strchr(to->hd[n].b, '\0');
to->hdf[n] = 0;
}
Commit Message: Check for duplicate Content-Length headers in requests
If a duplicate CL header is in the request, we fail the request with a
400 (Bad Request)
Fix a test case that was sending duplicate CL by misstake and would
not fail because of that.
CWE ID: | 0 | 56,432 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int get_freq0(RangeCoder *rc, unsigned total_freq, unsigned *freq)
{
if (rc->range == 0)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
*freq = total_freq * (uint64_t)(rc->code - rc->code1) / rc->range;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/scpr: Check y in first line loop in decompress_i()
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: 1478/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-5285486908145664
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 63,941 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderFrameHostImpl::RenderFrameHostImpl(SiteInstance* site_instance,
RenderViewHostImpl* render_view_host,
RenderFrameHostDelegate* delegate,
RenderWidgetHostDelegate* rwh_delegate,
FrameTree* frame_tree,
FrameTreeNode* frame_tree_node,
int32_t routing_id,
int32_t widget_routing_id,
bool hidden,
bool renderer_initiated_creation)
: render_view_host_(render_view_host),
delegate_(delegate),
site_instance_(static_cast<SiteInstanceImpl*>(site_instance)),
process_(site_instance->GetProcess()),
frame_tree_(frame_tree),
frame_tree_node_(frame_tree_node),
parent_(nullptr),
render_widget_host_(nullptr),
routing_id_(routing_id),
is_waiting_for_swapout_ack_(false),
render_frame_created_(false),
navigations_suspended_(false),
is_waiting_for_beforeunload_ack_(false),
unload_ack_is_for_navigation_(false),
is_loading_(false),
pending_commit_(false),
nav_entry_id_(0),
accessibility_reset_token_(0),
accessibility_reset_count_(0),
browser_plugin_embedder_ax_tree_id_(ui::AXTreeIDRegistry::kNoAXTreeID),
no_create_browser_accessibility_manager_for_testing_(false),
web_ui_type_(WebUI::kNoWebUI),
pending_web_ui_type_(WebUI::kNoWebUI),
should_reuse_web_ui_(false),
has_selection_(false),
last_navigation_previews_state_(PREVIEWS_UNSPECIFIED),
frame_host_interface_broker_binding_(this),
frame_host_associated_binding_(this),
waiting_for_init_(renderer_initiated_creation),
has_focused_editable_element_(false),
weak_ptr_factory_(this) {
frame_tree_->AddRenderViewHostRef(render_view_host_);
GetProcess()->AddRoute(routing_id_, this);
g_routing_id_frame_map.Get().insert(std::make_pair(
RenderFrameHostID(GetProcess()->GetID(), routing_id_),
this));
site_instance_->AddObserver(this);
GetSiteInstance()->IncrementActiveFrameCount();
if (frame_tree_node_->parent()) {
parent_ = frame_tree_node_->parent()->current_frame_host();
if (parent_->GetEnabledBindings())
enabled_bindings_ = parent_->GetEnabledBindings();
set_nav_entry_id(
frame_tree_node_->parent()->current_frame_host()->nav_entry_id());
}
SetUpMojoIfNeeded();
swapout_event_monitor_timeout_.reset(new TimeoutMonitor(base::Bind(
&RenderFrameHostImpl::OnSwappedOut, weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr())));
beforeunload_timeout_.reset(
new TimeoutMonitor(base::Bind(&RenderFrameHostImpl::BeforeUnloadTimeout,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr())));
if (widget_routing_id != MSG_ROUTING_NONE) {
render_widget_host_ =
RenderWidgetHostImpl::FromID(GetProcess()->GetID(), widget_routing_id);
if (!render_widget_host_) {
DCHECK(frame_tree_node->parent());
render_widget_host_ = new RenderWidgetHostImpl(rwh_delegate, GetProcess(),
widget_routing_id, hidden);
render_widget_host_->set_owned_by_render_frame_host(true);
} else {
DCHECK(!render_widget_host_->owned_by_render_frame_host());
}
InputRouterImpl* ir =
static_cast<InputRouterImpl*>(render_widget_host_->input_router());
ir->SetFrameTreeNodeId(frame_tree_node_->frame_tree_node_id());
}
ResetFeaturePolicy();
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,882 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int is_dir(const char *fname) {
assert(fname);
if (*fname == '\0')
return 0;
int rv;
struct stat s;
if (fname[strlen(fname) - 1] == '/')
rv = stat(fname, &s);
else {
char *tmp;
if (asprintf(&tmp, "%s/", fname) == -1) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: cannot allocate memory, %s:%d\n", __FILE__, __LINE__);
errExit("asprintf");
}
rv = stat(tmp, &s);
free(tmp);
}
if (rv == -1)
return 0;
if (S_ISDIR(s.st_mode))
return 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: security fix
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 96,106 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static boolean ReadComment(j_decompress_ptr jpeg_info)
{
ErrorManager
*error_manager;
Image
*image;
register unsigned char
*p;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
length;
StringInfo
*comment;
/*
Determine length of comment.
*/
error_manager=(ErrorManager *) jpeg_info->client_data;
image=error_manager->image;
length=(size_t) ((size_t) GetCharacter(jpeg_info) << 8);
length+=GetCharacter(jpeg_info);
if (length <= 2)
return(TRUE);
length-=2;
comment=BlobToStringInfo((const void *) NULL,length);
if (comment == (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed","`%s'",image->filename);
return(FALSE);
}
/*
Read comment.
*/
error_manager->profile=comment;
p=GetStringInfoDatum(comment);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) GetStringInfoLength(comment); i++)
*p++=(unsigned char) GetCharacter(jpeg_info);
*p='\0';
error_manager->profile=NULL;
p=GetStringInfoDatum(comment);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"comment",(const char *) p);
comment=DestroyStringInfo(comment);
return(TRUE);
}
Commit Message: ...
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 63,371 |
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