instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderFrameHostManager::CanSubframeSwapProcess(
const GURL& dest_url,
SiteInstance* source_instance,
SiteInstance* dest_instance,
bool was_server_redirect) {
DCHECK(!source_instance || !dest_instance);
GURL resolved_url = dest_url;
if (url::Origin::Create(resolved_url).unique()) {
if (source_instance) {
resolved_url = source_instance->GetSiteURL();
} else if (dest_instance) {
resolved_url = dest_instance->GetSiteURL();
} else {
if (!was_server_redirect)
return false;
}
}
if (!IsRendererTransferNeededForNavigation(render_frame_host_.get(),
resolved_url)) {
DCHECK(!dest_instance ||
dest_instance == render_frame_host_->GetSiteInstance());
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Use unique processes for data URLs on restore.
Data URLs are usually put into the process that created them, but this
info is not tracked after a tab restore. Ensure that they do not end up
in the parent frame's process (or each other's process), in case they
are malicious.
BUG=863069
Change-Id: Ib391f90c7bdf28a0a9c057c5cc7918c10aed968b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1150767
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#581023}
CWE ID: CWE-285 | 1 | 173,181 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MultibufferDataSource::MultibufferDataSource(
const scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner>& task_runner,
scoped_refptr<UrlData> url_data_arg,
MediaLog* media_log,
BufferedDataSourceHost* host,
const DownloadingCB& downloading_cb)
: total_bytes_(kPositionNotSpecified),
streaming_(false),
loading_(false),
failed_(false),
render_task_runner_(task_runner),
stop_signal_received_(false),
media_has_played_(false),
single_origin_(true),
cancel_on_defer_(false),
preload_(AUTO),
bitrate_(0),
playback_rate_(0.0),
media_log_(media_log),
host_(host),
downloading_cb_(downloading_cb),
weak_factory_(this) {
url_data_and_loading_state_.SetUrlData(std::move(url_data_arg));
weak_ptr_ = weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr();
DCHECK(host_);
DCHECK(downloading_cb_);
DCHECK(render_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
DCHECK(url_data());
url_data()->Use();
url_data()->OnRedirect(
base::Bind(&MultibufferDataSource::OnRedirect, weak_ptr_));
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 144,223 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool GlobalHistogramAllocator::ParseFilePath(const FilePath& path,
std::string* out_name,
Time* out_stamp,
ProcessId* out_pid) {
std::string filename = path.BaseName().AsUTF8Unsafe();
std::vector<base::StringPiece> parts = base::SplitStringPiece(
filename, "-.", base::KEEP_WHITESPACE, base::SPLIT_WANT_ALL);
if (parts.size() != 4)
return false;
if (out_name)
*out_name = parts[0].as_string();
if (out_stamp) {
int64_t stamp;
if (!HexStringToInt64(parts[1], &stamp))
return false;
*out_stamp = Time::FromTimeT(static_cast<time_t>(stamp));
}
if (out_pid) {
int64_t pid;
if (!HexStringToInt64(parts[2], &pid))
return false;
*out_pid = static_cast<ProcessId>(pid);
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Remove UMA.CreatePersistentHistogram.Result
This histogram isn't showing anything meaningful and the problems it
could show are better observed by looking at the allocators directly.
Bug: 831013
Change-Id: Ibe968597758230192e53a7675e7390e968c9e5b9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1008047
Commit-Queue: Brian White <bcwhite@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexei Svitkine <asvitkine@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#549986}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 131,129 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WallpaperManager::OnWallpaperDecoded(
const AccountId& account_id,
const wallpaper::WallpaperInfo& info,
bool update_wallpaper,
MovableOnDestroyCallbackHolder on_finish,
std::unique_ptr<user_manager::UserImage> user_image) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
TRACE_EVENT_ASYNC_END0("ui", "LoadAndDecodeWallpaper", this);
if (user_image->image().isNull()) {
wallpaper::WallpaperInfo default_info(
"", wallpaper::WALLPAPER_LAYOUT_CENTER_CROPPED, wallpaper::DEFAULT,
base::Time::Now().LocalMidnight());
SetUserWallpaperInfo(account_id, default_info, true);
if (update_wallpaper)
DoSetDefaultWallpaper(account_id, std::move(on_finish));
return;
}
wallpaper_cache_[account_id].second = user_image->image();
if (update_wallpaper)
SetWallpaper(user_image->image(), info);
}
Commit Message: [reland] Do not set default wallpaper unless it should do so.
TBR=bshe@chromium.org, alemate@chromium.org
Bug: 751382
Change-Id: Id0793dfe467f737526a95b1e66ed01fbb8860bda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/619754
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <xdai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Alekseev <alemate@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Biao She <bshe@chromium.org>
Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498325}
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/646430
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498982}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 1 | 171,968 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned char port_inl(const struct si_sm_io *io, unsigned int offset)
{
unsigned int addr = io->addr_data;
return (inl(addr + (offset * io->regspacing)) >> io->regshift) & 0xff;
}
Commit Message: ipmi_si: fix use-after-free of resource->name
When we excute the following commands, we got oops
rmmod ipmi_si
cat /proc/ioports
[ 1623.482380] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff00000901d478
[ 1623.482382] Mem abort info:
[ 1623.482383] ESR = 0x96000007
[ 1623.482385] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 1623.482386] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 1623.482387] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 1623.482388] Data abort info:
[ 1623.482389] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000007
[ 1623.482390] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 1623.482393] swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000d7d94a66
[ 1623.482395] [ffff00000901d478] pgd=000000dffbfff003, pud=000000dffbffe003, pmd=0000003f5d06e003, pte=0000000000000000
[ 1623.482399] Internal error: Oops: 96000007 [#1] SMP
[ 1623.487407] Modules linked in: ipmi_si(E) nls_utf8 isofs rpcrdma ib_iser ib_srpt target_core_mod ib_srp scsi_transport_srp ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log iw_cm dm_mod aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ses ghash_ce sha2_ce enclosure sha256_arm64 sg sha1_ce hisi_sas_v2_hw hibmc_drm sbsa_gwdt hisi_sas_main ip_tables mlx5_ib ib_uverbs marvell ib_core mlx5_core ixgbe mdio hns_dsaf ipmi_devintf hns_enet_drv ipmi_msghandler hns_mdio [last unloaded: ipmi_si]
[ 1623.532410] CPU: 30 PID: 11438 Comm: cat Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E 5.0.0-rc3+ #168
[ 1623.541498] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.37 11/21/2017
[ 1623.548822] pstate: a0000005 (NzCv daif -PAN -UAO)
[ 1623.553684] pc : string+0x28/0x98
[ 1623.557040] lr : vsnprintf+0x368/0x5e8
[ 1623.560837] sp : ffff000013213a80
[ 1623.564191] x29: ffff000013213a80 x28: ffff00001138abb5
[ 1623.569577] x27: ffff000013213c18 x26: ffff805f67d06049
[ 1623.574963] x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffff00001138abb5
[ 1623.580349] x23: 0000000000000fb7 x22: ffff0000117ed000
[ 1623.585734] x21: ffff000011188fd8 x20: ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.591119] x19: ffff805f67d06061 x18: ffffffffffffffff
[ 1623.596505] x17: 0000000000000200 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.601890] x15: ffff0000117ed748 x14: ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.607276] x13: ffff805f67d0605e x12: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.612661] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.618046] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 000000000000000f
[ 1623.623432] x7 : ffff805f67d06061 x6 : fffffffffffffffe
[ 1623.628817] x5 : 0000000000000012 x4 : ffff00000901d478
[ 1623.634203] x3 : ffff0a00ffffff04 x2 : ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.639588] x1 : ffff805f67d07000 x0 : ffffffffffffffff
[ 1623.644974] Process cat (pid: 11438, stack limit = 0x000000008d4cbc10)
[ 1623.651592] Call trace:
[ 1623.654068] string+0x28/0x98
[ 1623.657071] vsnprintf+0x368/0x5e8
[ 1623.660517] seq_vprintf+0x70/0x98
[ 1623.668009] seq_printf+0x7c/0xa0
[ 1623.675530] r_show+0xc8/0xf8
[ 1623.682558] seq_read+0x330/0x440
[ 1623.689877] proc_reg_read+0x78/0xd0
[ 1623.697346] __vfs_read+0x60/0x1a0
[ 1623.704564] vfs_read+0x94/0x150
[ 1623.711339] ksys_read+0x6c/0xd8
[ 1623.717939] __arm64_sys_read+0x24/0x30
[ 1623.725077] el0_svc_common+0x120/0x148
[ 1623.732035] el0_svc_handler+0x30/0x40
[ 1623.738757] el0_svc+0x8/0xc
[ 1623.744520] Code: d1000406 aa0103e2 54000149 b4000080 (39400085)
[ 1623.753441] ---[ end trace f91b6a4937de9835 ]---
[ 1623.760871] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
[ 1623.768935] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 1623.775718] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 1623.781998] CPU features: 0x002,21006008
[ 1623.788777] Memory Limit: none
[ 1623.798329] Starting crashdump kernel...
[ 1623.805202] Bye!
If io_setup is called successful in try_smi_init() but try_smi_init()
goes out_err before calling ipmi_register_smi(), so ipmi_unregister_smi()
will not be called while removing module. It leads to the resource that
allocated in io_setup() can not be freed, but the name(DEVICE_NAME) of
resource is freed while removing the module. It causes use-after-free
when cat /proc/ioports.
Fix this by calling io_cleanup() while try_smi_init() goes to out_err.
and don't call io_cleanup() until io_setup() returns successful to avoid
warning prints.
Fixes: 93c303d2045b ("ipmi_si: Clean up shutdown a bit")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: NuoHan Qiao <qiaonuohan@huawei.com>
Suggested-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 90,280 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TextureManager::TextureInfo* GetTextureInfo(GLuint client_id) {
TextureManager::TextureInfo* info =
texture_manager()->GetTextureInfo(client_id);
return info;
}
Commit Message: Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 103,611 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _archive_write_free(struct archive *_a)
{
struct archive_write *a = (struct archive_write *)_a;
int r = ARCHIVE_OK, r1;
if (_a == NULL)
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
/* It is okay to call free() in state FATAL. */
archive_check_magic(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_WRITE_MAGIC,
ARCHIVE_STATE_ANY | ARCHIVE_STATE_FATAL, "archive_write_free");
if (a->archive.state != ARCHIVE_STATE_FATAL)
r = archive_write_close(&a->archive);
/* Release format resources. */
if (a->format_free != NULL) {
r1 = (a->format_free)(a);
if (r1 < r)
r = r1;
}
__archive_write_filters_free(_a);
/* Release various dynamic buffers. */
free((void *)(uintptr_t)(const void *)a->nulls);
archive_string_free(&a->archive.error_string);
a->archive.magic = 0;
__archive_clean(&a->archive);
free(a);
return (r);
}
Commit Message: Limit write requests to at most INT_MAX.
This prevents a certain common programming error (passing -1 to write)
from leading to other problems deeper in the library.
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 34,057 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GfxSubpath::GfxSubpath(GfxSubpath *subpath) {
size = subpath->size;
n = subpath->n;
x = (double *)gmallocn(size, sizeof(double));
y = (double *)gmallocn(size, sizeof(double));
curve = (GBool *)gmallocn(size, sizeof(GBool));
memcpy(x, subpath->x, n * sizeof(double));
memcpy(y, subpath->y, n * sizeof(double));
memcpy(curve, subpath->curve, n * sizeof(GBool));
closed = subpath->closed;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 977 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool BrowserView::ExecuteWindowsCommand(int command_id) {
#if defined(OS_WIN) && !defined(USE_AURA)
if (command_id == IDC_DEBUG_FRAME_TOGGLE)
GetWidget()->DebugToggleFrameType();
if (base::win::IsMetroProcess()) {
static const int sc_mask = 0xFFF0;
if (((command_id & sc_mask) == SC_MOVE) ||
((command_id & sc_mask) == SC_SIZE) ||
((command_id & sc_mask) == SC_MAXIMIZE))
return true;
}
#endif
int command_id_from_app_command = GetCommandIDForAppCommandID(command_id);
if (command_id_from_app_command != -1)
command_id = command_id_from_app_command;
return chrome::ExecuteCommand(browser_.get(), command_id);
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 118,325 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: KeyboardOverlayUIHTMLSource::KeyboardOverlayUIHTMLSource()
: DataSource(chrome::kChromeUIKeyboardOverlayHost,
MessageLoop::current()) {
}
Commit Message: Add missing shortcut keys to the keyboard overlay.
This CL adds the following shortcuts to the keyboard overlay.
* Alt - 1, Alt - 2, .., Alt - 8: go to the window at the specified position
* Alt - 9: go to the last window open
* Ctrl - Forward: switches focus to the next keyboard-accessible pane
* Ctrl - Back: switches focus to the previous keyboard-accessible pane
* Ctrl - Right: move the text cursor to the end of the next word
* Ctrl - Left: move the text cursor to the start of the previous word
* Ctrl - Alt - Z: enable or disable accessibility features
* Ctrl - Shift - Maximize: take a screenshot of the selected region
* Ctrl - Shift - O: open the Bookmark Manager
I also deleted a duplicated entry of "Close window".
BUG=chromium-os:17152
TEST=Manually checked on chromebook
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7489040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93906 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 99,061 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void pr_drop_req(struct request_sock *req, __u16 port, int family)
{
struct inet_request_sock *ireq = inet_rsk(req);
if (family == AF_INET)
net_dbg_ratelimited("drop open request from %pI4/%u\n",
&ireq->ir_rmt_addr, port);
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
else if (family == AF_INET6)
net_dbg_ratelimited("drop open request from %pI6/%u\n",
&ireq->ir_v6_rmt_addr, port);
#endif
}
Commit Message: tcp: make challenge acks less predictable
Yue Cao claims that current host rate limiting of challenge ACKS
(RFC 5961) could leak enough information to allow a patient attacker
to hijack TCP sessions. He will soon provide details in an academic
paper.
This patch increases the default limit from 100 to 1000, and adds
some randomization so that the attacker can no longer hijack
sessions without spending a considerable amount of probes.
Based on initial analysis and patch from Linus.
Note that we also have per socket rate limiting, so it is tempting
to remove the host limit in the future.
v2: randomize the count of challenge acks per second, not the period.
Fixes: 282f23c6ee34 ("tcp: implement RFC 5961 3.2")
Reported-by: Yue Cao <ycao009@ucr.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 51,509 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: asmlinkage void do_tr(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
unsigned int opcode, tcode = 0;
if (__get_user(opcode, (unsigned int __user *) exception_epc(regs)))
goto out_sigsegv;
/* Immediate versions don't provide a code. */
if (!(opcode & OPCODE))
tcode = ((opcode >> 6) & ((1 << 10) - 1));
do_trap_or_bp(regs, tcode, "Trap");
return;
out_sigsegv:
force_sig(SIGSEGV, current);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,402 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PrintWebViewHelper::PrintPreviewContext::PrintPreviewContext()
: total_page_count_(0),
current_page_index_(0),
generate_draft_pages_(true),
print_ready_metafile_page_count_(0),
error_(PREVIEW_ERROR_NONE),
state_(UNINITIALIZED) {
}
Commit Message: Crash on nested IPC handlers in PrintWebViewHelper
Class is not designed to handle nested IPC. Regular flows also does not
expect them. Still during printing of plugging them may show message
boxes and start nested message loops.
For now we are going just crash. If stats show us that this case is
frequent we will have to do something more complicated.
BUG=502562
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1228693002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338100}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,663 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::open(Document* ownerDocument)
{
if (ownerDocument) {
setURL(ownerDocument->url());
m_cookieURL = ownerDocument->cookieURL();
setSecurityOrigin(ownerDocument->securityOrigin());
}
if (m_frame) {
if (ScriptableDocumentParser* parser = scriptableDocumentParser()) {
if (parser->isParsing()) {
if (parser->isExecutingScript())
return;
if (!parser->wasCreatedByScript() && parser->hasInsertionPoint())
return;
}
}
if (m_frame->loader()->state() == FrameStateProvisional)
m_frame->loader()->stopAllLoaders();
}
removeAllEventListeners();
implicitOpen();
if (ScriptableDocumentParser* parser = scriptableDocumentParser())
parser->setWasCreatedByScript(true);
if (DOMWindow* domWindow = this->domWindow())
domWindow->removeAllEventListeners();
if (m_frame)
m_frame->loader()->didExplicitOpen();
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 105,557 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool LayoutBlockFlow::updateLogicalWidthAndColumnWidth()
{
bool relayoutChildren = LayoutBlock::updateLogicalWidthAndColumnWidth();
if (LayoutMultiColumnFlowThread* flowThread = multiColumnFlowThread()) {
if (flowThread->needsNewWidth())
return true;
}
return relayoutChildren;
}
Commit Message: Consistently check if a block can handle pagination strut propagation.
https://codereview.chromium.org/1360753002 got it right for inline child
layout, but did nothing for block child layout.
BUG=329421
R=jchaffraix@chromium.org,leviw@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1387553002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#352429}
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 123,059 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ath_cabq_update(struct ath_softc *sc)
{
struct ath9k_tx_queue_info qi;
struct ath_beacon_config *cur_conf = &sc->cur_beacon_conf;
int qnum = sc->beacon.cabq->axq_qnum;
ath9k_hw_get_txq_props(sc->sc_ah, qnum, &qi);
qi.tqi_readyTime = (cur_conf->beacon_interval *
ATH_CABQ_READY_TIME) / 100;
ath_txq_update(sc, qnum, &qi);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ath9k: protect tid->sched check
We check tid->sched without a lock taken on ath_tx_aggr_sleep(). That
is race condition which can result of doing list_del(&tid->list) twice
(second time with poisoned list node) and cause crash like shown below:
[424271.637220] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00100104
[424271.637328] IP: [<f90fc072>] ath_tx_aggr_sleep+0x62/0xe0 [ath9k]
...
[424271.639953] Call Trace:
[424271.639998] [<f90f6900>] ? ath9k_get_survey+0x110/0x110 [ath9k]
[424271.640083] [<f90f6942>] ath9k_sta_notify+0x42/0x50 [ath9k]
[424271.640177] [<f809cfef>] sta_ps_start+0x8f/0x1c0 [mac80211]
[424271.640258] [<c10f730e>] ? free_compound_page+0x2e/0x40
[424271.640346] [<f809e915>] ieee80211_rx_handlers+0x9d5/0x2340 [mac80211]
[424271.640437] [<c112f048>] ? kmem_cache_free+0x1d8/0x1f0
[424271.640510] [<c1345a84>] ? kfree_skbmem+0x34/0x90
[424271.640578] [<c10fc23c>] ? put_page+0x2c/0x40
[424271.640640] [<c1345a84>] ? kfree_skbmem+0x34/0x90
[424271.640706] [<c1345a84>] ? kfree_skbmem+0x34/0x90
[424271.640787] [<f809dde3>] ? ieee80211_rx_handlers_result+0x73/0x1d0 [mac80211]
[424271.640897] [<f80a07a0>] ieee80211_prepare_and_rx_handle+0x520/0xad0 [mac80211]
[424271.641009] [<f809e22d>] ? ieee80211_rx_handlers+0x2ed/0x2340 [mac80211]
[424271.641104] [<c13846ce>] ? ip_output+0x7e/0xd0
[424271.641182] [<f80a1057>] ieee80211_rx+0x307/0x7c0 [mac80211]
[424271.641266] [<f90fa6ee>] ath_rx_tasklet+0x88e/0xf70 [ath9k]
[424271.641358] [<f80a0f2c>] ? ieee80211_rx+0x1dc/0x7c0 [mac80211]
[424271.641445] [<f90f82db>] ath9k_tasklet+0xcb/0x130 [ath9k]
Bug report:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=70551
Reported-and-tested-by: Max Sydorenko <maxim.stargazer@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 38,661 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int khugepaged_scan_pmd(struct mm_struct *mm,
struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long address,
struct page **hpage)
{
pgd_t *pgd;
pud_t *pud;
pmd_t *pmd;
pte_t *pte, *_pte;
int ret = 0, referenced = 0, none = 0;
struct page *page;
unsigned long _address;
spinlock_t *ptl;
int node = -1;
VM_BUG_ON(address & ~HPAGE_PMD_MASK);
pgd = pgd_offset(mm, address);
if (!pgd_present(*pgd))
goto out;
pud = pud_offset(pgd, address);
if (!pud_present(*pud))
goto out;
pmd = pmd_offset(pud, address);
if (!pmd_present(*pmd) || pmd_trans_huge(*pmd))
goto out;
pte = pte_offset_map_lock(mm, pmd, address, &ptl);
for (_address = address, _pte = pte; _pte < pte+HPAGE_PMD_NR;
_pte++, _address += PAGE_SIZE) {
pte_t pteval = *_pte;
if (pte_none(pteval)) {
if (++none <= khugepaged_max_ptes_none)
continue;
else
goto out_unmap;
}
if (!pte_present(pteval) || !pte_write(pteval))
goto out_unmap;
page = vm_normal_page(vma, _address, pteval);
if (unlikely(!page))
goto out_unmap;
/*
* Chose the node of the first page. This could
* be more sophisticated and look at more pages,
* but isn't for now.
*/
if (node == -1)
node = page_to_nid(page);
VM_BUG_ON(PageCompound(page));
if (!PageLRU(page) || PageLocked(page) || !PageAnon(page))
goto out_unmap;
/* cannot use mapcount: can't collapse if there's a gup pin */
if (page_count(page) != 1)
goto out_unmap;
if (pte_young(pteval) || PageReferenced(page) ||
mmu_notifier_test_young(vma->vm_mm, address))
referenced = 1;
}
if (referenced)
ret = 1;
out_unmap:
pte_unmap_unlock(pte, ptl);
if (ret)
/* collapse_huge_page will return with the mmap_sem released */
collapse_huge_page(mm, address, hpage, vma, node);
out:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix /dev/zero MAP_PRIVATE and vm_flags cleanups
The huge_memory.c THP page fault was allowed to run if vm_ops was null
(which would succeed for /dev/zero MAP_PRIVATE, as the f_op->mmap wouldn't
setup a special vma->vm_ops and it would fallback to regular anonymous
memory) but other THP logics weren't fully activated for vmas with vm_file
not NULL (/dev/zero has a not NULL vma->vm_file).
So this removes the vm_file checks so that /dev/zero also can safely use
THP (the other albeit safer approach to fix this bug would have been to
prevent the THP initial page fault to run if vm_file was set).
After removing the vm_file checks, this also makes huge_memory.c stricter
in khugepaged for the DEBUG_VM=y case. It doesn't replace the vm_file
check with a is_pfn_mapping check (but it keeps checking for VM_PFNMAP
under VM_BUG_ON) because for a is_cow_mapping() mapping VM_PFNMAP should
only be allowed to exist before the first page fault, and in turn when
vma->anon_vma is null (so preventing khugepaged registration). So I tend
to think the previous comment saying if vm_file was set, VM_PFNMAP might
have been set and we could still be registered in khugepaged (despite
anon_vma was not NULL to be registered in khugepaged) was too paranoid.
The is_linear_pfn_mapping check is also I think superfluous (as described
by comment) but under DEBUG_VM it is safe to stay.
Addresses https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=33682
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Caspar Zhang <bugs@casparzhang.com>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> [2.6.38.x]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 35,114 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void enqueue_huge_page(struct hstate *h, struct page *page)
{
int nid = page_to_nid(page);
list_move(&page->lru, &h->hugepage_freelists[nid]);
h->free_huge_pages++;
h->free_huge_pages_node[nid]++;
}
Commit Message: userfaultfd: hugetlbfs: prevent UFFDIO_COPY to fill beyond the end of i_size
This oops:
kernel BUG at fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c:484!
RIP: remove_inode_hugepages+0x3d0/0x410
Call Trace:
hugetlbfs_setattr+0xd9/0x130
notify_change+0x292/0x410
do_truncate+0x65/0xa0
do_sys_ftruncate.constprop.3+0x11a/0x180
SyS_ftruncate+0xe/0x10
tracesys+0xd9/0xde
was caused by the lack of i_size check in hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte.
mmap() can still succeed beyond the end of the i_size after vmtruncate
zapped vmas in those ranges, but the faults must not succeed, and that
includes UFFDIO_COPY.
We could differentiate the retval to userland to represent a SIGBUS like
a page fault would do (vs SIGSEGV), but it doesn't seem very useful and
we'd need to pick a random retval as there's no meaningful syscall
retval that would differentiate from SIGSEGV and SIGBUS, there's just
-EFAULT.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171016223914.2421-2-aarcange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 86,344 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameHostManager::CleanUpNavigation() {
if (speculative_render_frame_host_) {
if (speculative_render_frame_host_->navigation_handle()) {
frame_tree_node_->navigator()->DiscardPendingEntryIfNeeded(
speculative_render_frame_host_->navigation_handle()
->pending_nav_entry_id());
}
bool was_loading = speculative_render_frame_host_->is_loading();
DiscardUnusedFrame(UnsetSpeculativeRenderFrameHost());
if (was_loading)
frame_tree_node_->DidStopLoading();
}
}
Commit Message: Fix issue with pending NavigationEntry being discarded incorrectly
This CL fixes an issue where we would attempt to discard a pending
NavigationEntry when a cross-process navigation to this NavigationEntry
is interrupted by another navigation to the same NavigationEntry.
BUG=760342,797656,796135
Change-Id: I204deff1efd4d572dd2e0b20e492592d48d787d9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/850877
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528611}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 146,811 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderWidgetHostImpl::GetScreenColorProfile(
std::vector<char>* color_profile) {
DCHECK(color_profile->empty());
if (view_)
return view_->GetScreenColorProfile(color_profile);
return false;
}
Commit Message: Check that RWHI isn't deleted manually while owned by a scoped_ptr in RVHI
BUG=590284
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1747183002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#378844}
CWE ID: | 0 | 130,962 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void sco_disconn_cfm(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 reason)
{
BT_DBG("hcon %p reason %d", hcon, reason);
sco_conn_del(hcon, bt_to_errno(reason));
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: SCO - Fix missing msg_namelen update in sco_sock_recvmsg()
If the socket is in state BT_CONNECT2 and BT_SK_DEFER_SETUP is set in
the flags, sco_sock_recvmsg() returns early with 0 without updating the
possibly set msg_namelen member. This, in turn, leads to a 128 byte
kernel stack leak in net/socket.c.
Fix this by updating msg_namelen in this case. For all other cases it
will be handled in bt_sock_recvmsg().
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 30,705 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void reds_handle_auth_mechanism(void *opaque)
{
RedLinkInfo *link = (RedLinkInfo *)opaque;
spice_info("Auth method: %d", link->auth_mechanism.auth_mechanism);
if (link->auth_mechanism.auth_mechanism == SPICE_COMMON_CAP_AUTH_SPICE
&& !sasl_enabled
) {
reds_get_spice_ticket(link);
#if HAVE_SASL
} else if (link->auth_mechanism.auth_mechanism == SPICE_COMMON_CAP_AUTH_SASL) {
spice_info("Starting SASL");
reds_start_auth_sasl(link);
#endif
} else {
spice_warning("Unknown auth method, disconnecting");
if (sasl_enabled) {
spice_warning("Your client doesn't handle SASL?");
}
reds_send_link_error(link, SPICE_LINK_ERR_INVALID_DATA);
reds_link_free(link);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 1,869 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static float uif(unsigned int ui)
{
union { float f; unsigned int ui; } myuif;
myuif.ui = ui;
return myuif.f;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 9,085 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ScriptedIdleTaskController& Document::ensureScriptedIdleTaskController()
{
if (!m_scriptedIdleTaskController)
m_scriptedIdleTaskController = ScriptedIdleTaskController::create(this);
return *m_scriptedIdleTaskController;
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 124,368 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BrowserNonClientFrameViewAura::~BrowserNonClientFrameViewAura() {
}
Commit Message: Ash: Fix fullscreen window bounds
I was computing the non-client frame top border height incorrectly for fullscreen windows, so it was trying to draw a few pixels of transparent non-client border.
BUG=118774
TEST=visual
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9810014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@128014 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 108,200 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const std::string& GLES2Implementation::GetLogPrefix() const {
const std::string& prefix(debug_marker_manager_.GetMarker());
return prefix.empty() ? this_in_hex_ : prefix;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,004 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void mptsas_process_ioc_init(MPTSASState *s, MPIMsgIOCInit *req)
{
MPIMsgIOCInitReply reply;
mptsas_fix_ioc_init_endianness(req);
QEMU_BUILD_BUG_ON(MPTSAS_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE < sizeof(*req));
QEMU_BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(s->doorbell_msg) < sizeof(*req));
QEMU_BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(s->doorbell_reply) < sizeof(reply));
s->who_init = req->WhoInit;
s->reply_frame_size = req->ReplyFrameSize;
s->max_buses = req->MaxBuses;
s->max_devices = req->MaxDevices ? req->MaxDevices : 256;
s->host_mfa_high_addr = (hwaddr)req->HostMfaHighAddr << 32;
s->sense_buffer_high_addr = (hwaddr)req->SenseBufferHighAddr << 32;
if (s->state == MPI_IOC_STATE_READY) {
s->state = MPI_IOC_STATE_OPERATIONAL;
}
memset(&reply, 0, sizeof(reply));
reply.WhoInit = s->who_init;
reply.MsgLength = sizeof(reply) / 4;
reply.Function = req->Function;
reply.MaxDevices = s->max_devices;
reply.MaxBuses = s->max_buses;
reply.MsgContext = req->MsgContext;
mptsas_fix_ioc_init_reply_endianness(&reply);
mptsas_reply(s, (MPIDefaultReply *)&reply);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 8,373 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int read_one_line_file(const char *fn, char **line) {
FILE *f;
int r;
char t[LINE_MAX], *c;
assert(fn);
assert(line);
f = fopen(fn, "re");
if (!f)
return -errno;
if (!fgets(t, sizeof(t), f)) {
if (ferror(f)) {
r = -errno;
goto finish;
}
t[0] = 0;
}
c = strdup(t);
if (!c) {
r = -ENOMEM;
goto finish;
}
truncate_nl(c);
*line = c;
r = 0;
finish:
fclose(f);
return r;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 11,575 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int copy_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *dst_state,
const struct bpf_verifier_state *src)
{
struct bpf_func_state *dst;
int i, err;
/* if dst has more stack frames then src frame, free them */
for (i = src->curframe + 1; i <= dst_state->curframe; i++) {
free_func_state(dst_state->frame[i]);
dst_state->frame[i] = NULL;
}
dst_state->curframe = src->curframe;
for (i = 0; i <= src->curframe; i++) {
dst = dst_state->frame[i];
if (!dst) {
dst = kzalloc(sizeof(*dst), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dst)
return -ENOMEM;
dst_state->frame[i] = dst;
}
err = copy_func_state(dst, src->frame[i]);
if (err)
return err;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic
Jann reported that the original commit back in b2157399cc98
("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation") was not sufficient
to stop CPU from speculating out of bounds memory access:
While b2157399cc98 only focussed on masking array map access
for unprivileged users for tail calls and data access such
that the user provided index gets sanitized from BPF program
and syscall side, there is still a more generic form affected
from BPF programs that applies to most maps that hold user
data in relation to dynamic map access when dealing with
unknown scalars or "slow" known scalars as access offset, for
example:
- Load a map value pointer into R6
- Load an index into R7
- Do a slow computation (e.g. with a memory dependency) that
loads a limit into R8 (e.g. load the limit from a map for
high latency, then mask it to make the verifier happy)
- Exit if R7 >= R8 (mispredicted branch)
- Load R0 = R6[R7]
- Load R0 = R6[R0]
For unknown scalars there are two options in the BPF verifier
where we could derive knowledge from in order to guarantee
safe access to the memory: i) While </>/<=/>= variants won't
allow to derive any lower or upper bounds from the unknown
scalar where it would be safe to add it to the map value
pointer, it is possible through ==/!= test however. ii) another
option is to transform the unknown scalar into a known scalar,
for example, through ALU ops combination such as R &= <imm>
followed by R |= <imm> or any similar combination where the
original information from the unknown scalar would be destroyed
entirely leaving R with a constant. The initial slow load still
precedes the latter ALU ops on that register, so the CPU
executes speculatively from that point. Once we have the known
scalar, any compare operation would work then. A third option
only involving registers with known scalars could be crafted
as described in [0] where a CPU port (e.g. Slow Int unit)
would be filled with many dependent computations such that
the subsequent condition depending on its outcome has to wait
for evaluation on its execution port and thereby executing
speculatively if the speculated code can be scheduled on a
different execution port, or any other form of mistraining
as described in [1], for example. Given this is not limited
to only unknown scalars, not only map but also stack access
is affected since both is accessible for unprivileged users
and could potentially be used for out of bounds access under
speculation.
In order to prevent any of these cases, the verifier is now
sanitizing pointer arithmetic on the offset such that any
out of bounds speculation would be masked in a way where the
pointer arithmetic result in the destination register will
stay unchanged, meaning offset masked into zero similar as
in array_index_nospec() case. With regards to implementation,
there are three options that were considered: i) new insn
for sanitation, ii) push/pop insn and sanitation as inlined
BPF, iii) reuse of ax register and sanitation as inlined BPF.
Option i) has the downside that we end up using from reserved
bits in the opcode space, but also that we would require
each JIT to emit masking as native arch opcodes meaning
mitigation would have slow adoption till everyone implements
it eventually which is counter-productive. Option ii) and iii)
have both in common that a temporary register is needed in
order to implement the sanitation as inlined BPF since we
are not allowed to modify the source register. While a push /
pop insn in ii) would be useful to have in any case, it
requires once again that every JIT needs to implement it
first. While possible, amount of changes needed would also
be unsuitable for a -stable patch. Therefore, the path which
has fewer changes, less BPF instructions for the mitigation
and does not require anything to be changed in the JITs is
option iii) which this work is pursuing. The ax register is
already mapped to a register in all JITs (modulo arm32 where
it's mapped to stack as various other BPF registers there)
and used in constant blinding for JITs-only so far. It can
be reused for verifier rewrites under certain constraints.
The interpreter's tmp "register" has therefore been remapped
into extending the register set with hidden ax register and
reusing that for a number of instructions that needed the
prior temporary variable internally (e.g. div, mod). This
allows for zero increase in stack space usage in the interpreter,
and enables (restricted) generic use in rewrites otherwise as
long as such a patchlet does not make use of these instructions.
The sanitation mask is dynamic and relative to the offset the
map value or stack pointer currently holds.
There are various cases that need to be taken under consideration
for the masking, e.g. such operation could look as follows:
ptr += val or val += ptr or ptr -= val. Thus, the value to be
sanitized could reside either in source or in destination
register, and the limit is different depending on whether
the ALU op is addition or subtraction and depending on the
current known and bounded offset. The limit is derived as
follows: limit := max_value_size - (smin_value + off). For
subtraction: limit := umax_value + off. This holds because
we do not allow any pointer arithmetic that would
temporarily go out of bounds or would have an unknown
value with mixed signed bounds where it is unclear at
verification time whether the actual runtime value would
be either negative or positive. For example, we have a
derived map pointer value with constant offset and bounded
one, so limit based on smin_value works because the verifier
requires that statically analyzed arithmetic on the pointer
must be in bounds, and thus it checks if resulting
smin_value + off and umax_value + off is still within map
value bounds at time of arithmetic in addition to time of
access. Similarly, for the case of stack access we derive
the limit as follows: MAX_BPF_STACK + off for subtraction
and -off for the case of addition where off := ptr_reg->off +
ptr_reg->var_off.value. Subtraction is a special case for
the masking which can be in form of ptr += -val, ptr -= -val,
or ptr -= val. In the first two cases where we know that
the value is negative, we need to temporarily negate the
value in order to do the sanitation on a positive value
where we later swap the ALU op, and restore original source
register if the value was in source.
The sanitation of pointer arithmetic alone is still not fully
sufficient as is, since a scenario like the following could
happen ...
PTR += 0x1000 (e.g. K-based imm)
PTR -= BIG_NUMBER_WITH_SLOW_COMPARISON
PTR += 0x1000
PTR -= BIG_NUMBER_WITH_SLOW_COMPARISON
[...]
... which under speculation could end up as ...
PTR += 0x1000
PTR -= 0 [ truncated by mitigation ]
PTR += 0x1000
PTR -= 0 [ truncated by mitigation ]
[...]
... and therefore still access out of bounds. To prevent such
case, the verifier is also analyzing safety for potential out
of bounds access under speculative execution. Meaning, it is
also simulating pointer access under truncation. We therefore
"branch off" and push the current verification state after the
ALU operation with known 0 to the verification stack for later
analysis. Given the current path analysis succeeded it is
likely that the one under speculation can be pruned. In any
case, it is also subject to existing complexity limits and
therefore anything beyond this point will be rejected. In
terms of pruning, it needs to be ensured that the verification
state from speculative execution simulation must never prune
a non-speculative execution path, therefore, we mark verifier
state accordingly at the time of push_stack(). If verifier
detects out of bounds access under speculative execution from
one of the possible paths that includes a truncation, it will
reject such program.
Given we mask every reg-based pointer arithmetic for
unprivileged programs, we've been looking into how it could
affect real-world programs in terms of size increase. As the
majority of programs are targeted for privileged-only use
case, we've unconditionally enabled masking (with its alu
restrictions on top of it) for privileged programs for the
sake of testing in order to check i) whether they get rejected
in its current form, and ii) by how much the number of
instructions and size will increase. We've tested this by
using Katran, Cilium and test_l4lb from the kernel selftests.
For Katran we've evaluated balancer_kern.o, Cilium bpf_lxc.o
and an older test object bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o and l4lb
we've used test_l4lb.o as well as test_l4lb_noinline.o. We
found that none of the programs got rejected by the verifier
with this change, and that impact is rather minimal to none.
balancer_kern.o had 13,904 bytes (1,738 insns) xlated and
7,797 bytes JITed before and after the change. Most complex
program in bpf_lxc.o had 30,544 bytes (3,817 insns) xlated
and 18,538 bytes JITed before and after and none of the other
tail call programs in bpf_lxc.o had any changes either. For
the older bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o object we found a small
increase from 20,616 bytes (2,576 insns) and 12,536 bytes JITed
before to 20,664 bytes (2,582 insns) and 12,558 bytes JITed
after the change. Other programs from that object file had
similar small increase. Both test_l4lb.o had no change and
remained at 6,544 bytes (817 insns) xlated and 3,401 bytes
JITed and for test_l4lb_noinline.o constant at 5,080 bytes
(634 insns) xlated and 3,313 bytes JITed. This can be explained
in that LLVM typically optimizes stack based pointer arithmetic
by using K-based operations and that use of dynamic map access
is not overly frequent. However, in future we may decide to
optimize the algorithm further under known guarantees from
branch and value speculation. Latter seems also unclear in
terms of prediction heuristics that today's CPUs apply as well
as whether there could be collisions in e.g. the predictor's
Value History/Pattern Table for triggering out of bounds access,
thus masking is performed unconditionally at this point but could
be subject to relaxation later on. We were generally also
brainstorming various other approaches for mitigation, but the
blocker was always lack of available registers at runtime and/or
overhead for runtime tracking of limits belonging to a specific
pointer. Thus, we found this to be minimally intrusive under
given constraints.
With that in place, a simple example with sanitized access on
unprivileged load at post-verification time looks as follows:
# bpftool prog dump xlated id 282
[...]
28: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r7 +0)
29: (79) r2 = *(u64 *)(r7 +8)
30: (57) r1 &= 15
31: (79) r3 = *(u64 *)(r0 +4608)
32: (57) r3 &= 1
33: (47) r3 |= 1
34: (2d) if r2 > r3 goto pc+19
35: (b4) (u32) r11 = (u32) 20479 |
36: (1f) r11 -= r2 | Dynamic sanitation for pointer
37: (4f) r11 |= r2 | arithmetic with registers
38: (87) r11 = -r11 | containing bounded or known
39: (c7) r11 s>>= 63 | scalars in order to prevent
40: (5f) r11 &= r2 | out of bounds speculation.
41: (0f) r4 += r11 |
42: (71) r4 = *(u8 *)(r4 +0)
43: (6f) r4 <<= r1
[...]
For the case where the scalar sits in the destination register
as opposed to the source register, the following code is emitted
for the above example:
[...]
16: (b4) (u32) r11 = (u32) 20479
17: (1f) r11 -= r2
18: (4f) r11 |= r2
19: (87) r11 = -r11
20: (c7) r11 s>>= 63
21: (5f) r2 &= r11
22: (0f) r2 += r0
23: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r2 +0)
[...]
JIT blinding example with non-conflicting use of r10:
[...]
d5: je 0x0000000000000106 _
d7: mov 0x0(%rax),%edi |
da: mov $0xf153246,%r10d | Index load from map value and
e0: xor $0xf153259,%r10 | (const blinded) mask with 0x1f.
e7: and %r10,%rdi |_
ea: mov $0x2f,%r10d |
f0: sub %rdi,%r10 | Sanitized addition. Both use r10
f3: or %rdi,%r10 | but do not interfere with each
f6: neg %r10 | other. (Neither do these instructions
f9: sar $0x3f,%r10 | interfere with the use of ax as temp
fd: and %r10,%rdi | in interpreter.)
100: add %rax,%rdi |_
103: mov 0x0(%rdi),%eax
[...]
Tested that it fixes Jann's reproducer, and also checked that test_verifier
and test_progs suite with interpreter, JIT and JIT with hardening enabled
on x86-64 and arm64 runs successfully.
[0] Speculose: Analyzing the Security Implications of Speculative
Execution in CPUs, Giorgi Maisuradze and Christian Rossow,
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1801.04084.pdf
[1] A Systematic Evaluation of Transient Execution Attacks and
Defenses, Claudio Canella, Jo Van Bulck, Michael Schwarz,
Moritz Lipp, Benjamin von Berg, Philipp Ortner, Frank Piessens,
Dmitry Evtyushkin, Daniel Gruss,
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1811.05441.pdf
Fixes: b2157399cc98 ("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 1 | 170,241 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BGD_DECLARE(gdImagePtr) gdImageCreateFromGd2Part (FILE * inFile, int srcx, int srcy, int w, int h)
{
gdImagePtr im;
gdIOCtx *in = gdNewFileCtx (inFile);
if (in == NULL) return NULL;
im = gdImageCreateFromGd2PartCtx (in, srcx, srcy, w, h);
in->gd_free (in);
return im;
}
Commit Message: gd2: handle corrupt images better (CVE-2016-3074)
Make sure we do some range checking on corrupted chunks.
Thanks to Hans Jerry Illikainen <hji@dyntopia.com> for indepth report
and reproducer information. Made for easy test case writing :).
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 54,443 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void *ffs_acquire_dev(const char *dev_name)
{
struct ffs_dev *ffs_dev;
ENTER();
ffs_dev_lock();
ffs_dev = _ffs_find_dev(dev_name);
if (!ffs_dev)
ffs_dev = ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
else if (ffs_dev->mounted)
ffs_dev = ERR_PTR(-EBUSY);
else if (ffs_dev->ffs_acquire_dev_callback &&
ffs_dev->ffs_acquire_dev_callback(ffs_dev))
ffs_dev = ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
else
ffs_dev->mounted = true;
ffs_dev_unlock();
return ffs_dev;
}
Commit Message: usb: gadget: f_fs: Fix use-after-free
When using asynchronous read or write operations on the USB endpoints the
issuer of the IO request is notified by calling the ki_complete() callback
of the submitted kiocb when the URB has been completed.
Calling this ki_complete() callback will free kiocb. Make sure that the
structure is no longer accessed beyond that point, otherwise undefined
behaviour might occur.
Fixes: 2e4c7553cd6f ("usb: gadget: f_fs: add aio support")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.15+
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 49,575 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int rdma_read_chunk_lcl(struct svcxprt_rdma *xprt,
struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt *head,
int *page_no,
u32 *page_offset,
u32 rs_handle,
u32 rs_length,
u64 rs_offset,
bool last)
{
struct ib_rdma_wr read_wr;
int pages_needed = PAGE_ALIGN(*page_offset + rs_length) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt *ctxt = svc_rdma_get_context(xprt);
int ret, read, pno;
u32 pg_off = *page_offset;
u32 pg_no = *page_no;
ctxt->direction = DMA_FROM_DEVICE;
ctxt->read_hdr = head;
pages_needed = min_t(int, pages_needed, xprt->sc_max_sge_rd);
read = min_t(int, (pages_needed << PAGE_SHIFT) - *page_offset,
rs_length);
for (pno = 0; pno < pages_needed; pno++) {
int len = min_t(int, rs_length, PAGE_SIZE - pg_off);
head->arg.pages[pg_no] = rqstp->rq_arg.pages[pg_no];
head->arg.page_len += len;
head->arg.len += len;
if (!pg_off)
head->count++;
rqstp->rq_respages = &rqstp->rq_arg.pages[pg_no+1];
rqstp->rq_next_page = rqstp->rq_respages + 1;
ctxt->sge[pno].addr =
ib_dma_map_page(xprt->sc_cm_id->device,
head->arg.pages[pg_no], pg_off,
PAGE_SIZE - pg_off,
DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
ret = ib_dma_mapping_error(xprt->sc_cm_id->device,
ctxt->sge[pno].addr);
if (ret)
goto err;
svc_rdma_count_mappings(xprt, ctxt);
ctxt->sge[pno].lkey = xprt->sc_pd->local_dma_lkey;
ctxt->sge[pno].length = len;
ctxt->count++;
/* adjust offset and wrap to next page if needed */
pg_off += len;
if (pg_off == PAGE_SIZE) {
pg_off = 0;
pg_no++;
}
rs_length -= len;
}
if (last && rs_length == 0)
set_bit(RDMACTXT_F_LAST_CTXT, &ctxt->flags);
else
clear_bit(RDMACTXT_F_LAST_CTXT, &ctxt->flags);
memset(&read_wr, 0, sizeof(read_wr));
ctxt->cqe.done = svc_rdma_wc_read;
read_wr.wr.wr_cqe = &ctxt->cqe;
read_wr.wr.opcode = IB_WR_RDMA_READ;
read_wr.wr.send_flags = IB_SEND_SIGNALED;
read_wr.rkey = rs_handle;
read_wr.remote_addr = rs_offset;
read_wr.wr.sg_list = ctxt->sge;
read_wr.wr.num_sge = pages_needed;
ret = svc_rdma_send(xprt, &read_wr.wr);
if (ret) {
pr_err("svcrdma: Error %d posting RDMA_READ\n", ret);
set_bit(XPT_CLOSE, &xprt->sc_xprt.xpt_flags);
goto err;
}
/* return current location in page array */
*page_no = pg_no;
*page_offset = pg_off;
ret = read;
atomic_inc(&rdma_stat_read);
return ret;
err:
svc_rdma_unmap_dma(ctxt);
svc_rdma_put_context(ctxt, 0);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,975 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sctp_ctl_sock_init(struct net *net)
{
int err;
sa_family_t family = PF_INET;
if (sctp_get_pf_specific(PF_INET6))
family = PF_INET6;
err = inet_ctl_sock_create(&net->sctp.ctl_sock, family,
SOCK_SEQPACKET, IPPROTO_SCTP, net);
/* If IPv6 socket could not be created, try the IPv4 socket */
if (err < 0 && family == PF_INET6)
err = inet_ctl_sock_create(&net->sctp.ctl_sock, AF_INET,
SOCK_SEQPACKET, IPPROTO_SCTP,
net);
if (err < 0) {
pr_err("Failed to create the SCTP control socket\n");
return err;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: sctp: fix race on protocol/netns initialization
Consider sctp module is unloaded and is being requested because an user
is creating a sctp socket.
During initialization, sctp will add the new protocol type and then
initialize pernet subsys:
status = sctp_v4_protosw_init();
if (status)
goto err_protosw_init;
status = sctp_v6_protosw_init();
if (status)
goto err_v6_protosw_init;
status = register_pernet_subsys(&sctp_net_ops);
The problem is that after those calls to sctp_v{4,6}_protosw_init(), it
is possible for userspace to create SCTP sockets like if the module is
already fully loaded. If that happens, one of the possible effects is
that we will have readers for net->sctp.local_addr_list list earlier
than expected and sctp_net_init() does not take precautions while
dealing with that list, leading to a potential panic but not limited to
that, as sctp_sock_init() will copy a bunch of blank/partially
initialized values from net->sctp.
The race happens like this:
CPU 0 | CPU 1
socket() |
__sock_create | socket()
inet_create | __sock_create
list_for_each_entry_rcu( |
answer, &inetsw[sock->type], |
list) { | inet_create
/* no hits */ |
if (unlikely(err)) { |
... |
request_module() |
/* socket creation is blocked |
* the module is fully loaded |
*/ |
sctp_init |
sctp_v4_protosw_init |
inet_register_protosw |
list_add_rcu(&p->list, |
last_perm); |
| list_for_each_entry_rcu(
| answer, &inetsw[sock->type],
sctp_v6_protosw_init | list) {
| /* hit, so assumes protocol
| * is already loaded
| */
| /* socket creation continues
| * before netns is initialized
| */
register_pernet_subsys |
Simply inverting the initialization order between
register_pernet_subsys() and sctp_v4_protosw_init() is not possible
because register_pernet_subsys() will create a control sctp socket, so
the protocol must be already visible by then. Deferring the socket
creation to a work-queue is not good specially because we loose the
ability to handle its errors.
So, as suggested by Vlad, the fix is to split netns initialization in
two moments: defaults and control socket, so that the defaults are
already loaded by when we register the protocol, while control socket
initialization is kept at the same moment it is today.
Fixes: 4db67e808640 ("sctp: Make the address lists per network namespace")
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 42,907 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int qeth_peer_func_level(int level)
{
if ((level & 0xff) == 8)
return (level & 0xff) + 0x400;
if (((level >> 8) & 3) == 1)
return (level & 0xff) + 0x200;
return level;
}
Commit Message: qeth: avoid buffer overflow in snmp ioctl
Check user-defined length in snmp ioctl request and allow request
only if it fits into a qeth command buffer.
Signed-off-by: Ursula Braun <ursula.braun@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Frank Blaschka <frank.blaschka@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heicars2@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 28,597 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int udpv6_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct sock *sk,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
{
struct ipv6_txoptions opt_space;
struct udp_sock *up = udp_sk(sk);
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) msg->msg_name;
struct in6_addr *daddr, *final_p, final;
struct ipv6_txoptions *opt = NULL;
struct ip6_flowlabel *flowlabel = NULL;
struct flowi6 fl6;
struct dst_entry *dst;
int addr_len = msg->msg_namelen;
int ulen = len;
int hlimit = -1;
int tclass = -1;
int dontfrag = -1;
int corkreq = up->corkflag || msg->msg_flags&MSG_MORE;
int err;
int connected = 0;
int is_udplite = IS_UDPLITE(sk);
int (*getfrag)(void *, char *, int, int, int, struct sk_buff *);
/* destination address check */
if (sin6) {
if (addr_len < offsetof(struct sockaddr, sa_data))
return -EINVAL;
switch (sin6->sin6_family) {
case AF_INET6:
if (addr_len < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
return -EINVAL;
daddr = &sin6->sin6_addr;
break;
case AF_INET:
goto do_udp_sendmsg;
case AF_UNSPEC:
msg->msg_name = sin6 = NULL;
msg->msg_namelen = addr_len = 0;
daddr = NULL;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
} else if (!up->pending) {
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
return -EDESTADDRREQ;
daddr = &sk->sk_v6_daddr;
} else
daddr = NULL;
if (daddr) {
if (ipv6_addr_v4mapped(daddr)) {
struct sockaddr_in sin;
sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
sin.sin_port = sin6 ? sin6->sin6_port : inet->inet_dport;
sin.sin_addr.s_addr = daddr->s6_addr32[3];
msg->msg_name = &sin;
msg->msg_namelen = sizeof(sin);
do_udp_sendmsg:
if (__ipv6_only_sock(sk))
return -ENETUNREACH;
return udp_sendmsg(iocb, sk, msg, len);
}
}
if (up->pending == AF_INET)
return udp_sendmsg(iocb, sk, msg, len);
/* Rough check on arithmetic overflow,
better check is made in ip6_append_data().
*/
if (len > INT_MAX - sizeof(struct udphdr))
return -EMSGSIZE;
if (up->pending) {
/*
* There are pending frames.
* The socket lock must be held while it's corked.
*/
lock_sock(sk);
if (likely(up->pending)) {
if (unlikely(up->pending != AF_INET6)) {
release_sock(sk);
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
}
dst = NULL;
goto do_append_data;
}
release_sock(sk);
}
ulen += sizeof(struct udphdr);
memset(&fl6, 0, sizeof(fl6));
if (sin6) {
if (sin6->sin6_port == 0)
return -EINVAL;
fl6.fl6_dport = sin6->sin6_port;
daddr = &sin6->sin6_addr;
if (np->sndflow) {
fl6.flowlabel = sin6->sin6_flowinfo&IPV6_FLOWINFO_MASK;
if (fl6.flowlabel&IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MASK) {
flowlabel = fl6_sock_lookup(sk, fl6.flowlabel);
if (flowlabel == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
daddr = &flowlabel->dst;
}
}
/*
* Otherwise it will be difficult to maintain
* sk->sk_dst_cache.
*/
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_ESTABLISHED &&
ipv6_addr_equal(daddr, &sk->sk_v6_daddr))
daddr = &sk->sk_v6_daddr;
if (addr_len >= sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6) &&
sin6->sin6_scope_id &&
__ipv6_addr_needs_scope_id(__ipv6_addr_type(daddr)))
fl6.flowi6_oif = sin6->sin6_scope_id;
} else {
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
return -EDESTADDRREQ;
fl6.fl6_dport = inet->inet_dport;
daddr = &sk->sk_v6_daddr;
fl6.flowlabel = np->flow_label;
connected = 1;
}
if (!fl6.flowi6_oif)
fl6.flowi6_oif = sk->sk_bound_dev_if;
if (!fl6.flowi6_oif)
fl6.flowi6_oif = np->sticky_pktinfo.ipi6_ifindex;
fl6.flowi6_mark = sk->sk_mark;
if (msg->msg_controllen) {
opt = &opt_space;
memset(opt, 0, sizeof(struct ipv6_txoptions));
opt->tot_len = sizeof(*opt);
err = ip6_datagram_send_ctl(sock_net(sk), sk, msg, &fl6, opt,
&hlimit, &tclass, &dontfrag);
if (err < 0) {
fl6_sock_release(flowlabel);
return err;
}
if ((fl6.flowlabel&IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MASK) && !flowlabel) {
flowlabel = fl6_sock_lookup(sk, fl6.flowlabel);
if (flowlabel == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
}
if (!(opt->opt_nflen|opt->opt_flen))
opt = NULL;
connected = 0;
}
if (opt == NULL)
opt = np->opt;
if (flowlabel)
opt = fl6_merge_options(&opt_space, flowlabel, opt);
opt = ipv6_fixup_options(&opt_space, opt);
fl6.flowi6_proto = sk->sk_protocol;
if (!ipv6_addr_any(daddr))
fl6.daddr = *daddr;
else
fl6.daddr.s6_addr[15] = 0x1; /* :: means loopback (BSD'ism) */
if (ipv6_addr_any(&fl6.saddr) && !ipv6_addr_any(&np->saddr))
fl6.saddr = np->saddr;
fl6.fl6_sport = inet->inet_sport;
final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, opt, &final);
if (final_p)
connected = 0;
if (!fl6.flowi6_oif && ipv6_addr_is_multicast(&fl6.daddr)) {
fl6.flowi6_oif = np->mcast_oif;
connected = 0;
} else if (!fl6.flowi6_oif)
fl6.flowi6_oif = np->ucast_oif;
security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl6));
dst = ip6_sk_dst_lookup_flow(sk, &fl6, final_p, true);
if (IS_ERR(dst)) {
err = PTR_ERR(dst);
dst = NULL;
goto out;
}
if (hlimit < 0) {
if (ipv6_addr_is_multicast(&fl6.daddr))
hlimit = np->mcast_hops;
else
hlimit = np->hop_limit;
if (hlimit < 0)
hlimit = ip6_dst_hoplimit(dst);
}
if (tclass < 0)
tclass = np->tclass;
if (msg->msg_flags&MSG_CONFIRM)
goto do_confirm;
back_from_confirm:
lock_sock(sk);
if (unlikely(up->pending)) {
/* The socket is already corked while preparing it. */
/* ... which is an evident application bug. --ANK */
release_sock(sk);
LIMIT_NETDEBUG(KERN_DEBUG "udp cork app bug 2\n");
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
up->pending = AF_INET6;
do_append_data:
if (dontfrag < 0)
dontfrag = np->dontfrag;
up->len += ulen;
getfrag = is_udplite ? udplite_getfrag : ip_generic_getfrag;
err = ip6_append_data(sk, getfrag, msg->msg_iov, ulen,
sizeof(struct udphdr), hlimit, tclass, opt, &fl6,
(struct rt6_info*)dst,
corkreq ? msg->msg_flags|MSG_MORE : msg->msg_flags, dontfrag);
if (err)
udp_v6_flush_pending_frames(sk);
else if (!corkreq)
err = udp_v6_push_pending_frames(sk);
else if (unlikely(skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_write_queue)))
up->pending = 0;
if (dst) {
if (connected) {
ip6_dst_store(sk, dst,
ipv6_addr_equal(&fl6.daddr, &sk->sk_v6_daddr) ?
&sk->sk_v6_daddr : NULL,
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_SUBTREES
ipv6_addr_equal(&fl6.saddr, &np->saddr) ?
&np->saddr :
#endif
NULL);
} else {
dst_release(dst);
}
dst = NULL;
}
if (err > 0)
err = np->recverr ? net_xmit_errno(err) : 0;
release_sock(sk);
out:
dst_release(dst);
fl6_sock_release(flowlabel);
if (!err)
return len;
/*
* ENOBUFS = no kernel mem, SOCK_NOSPACE = no sndbuf space. Reporting
* ENOBUFS might not be good (it's not tunable per se), but otherwise
* we don't have a good statistic (IpOutDiscards but it can be too many
* things). We could add another new stat but at least for now that
* seems like overkill.
*/
if (err == -ENOBUFS || test_bit(SOCK_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags)) {
UDP6_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk),
UDP_MIB_SNDBUFERRORS, is_udplite);
}
return err;
do_confirm:
dst_confirm(dst);
if (!(msg->msg_flags&MSG_PROBE) || len)
goto back_from_confirm;
err = 0;
goto out;
}
Commit Message: inet: prevent leakage of uninitialized memory to user in recv syscalls
Only update *addr_len when we actually fill in sockaddr, otherwise we
can return uninitialized memory from the stack to the caller in the
recvfrom, recvmmsg and recvmsg syscalls. Drop the the (addr_len == NULL)
checks because we only get called with a valid addr_len pointer either
from sock_common_recvmsg or inet_recvmsg.
If a blocking read waits on a socket which is concurrently shut down we
now return zero and set msg_msgnamelen to 0.
Reported-by: mpb <mpb.mail@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 40,225 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void sk_set_memalloc(struct sock *sk)
{
sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_MEMALLOC);
sk->sk_allocation |= __GFP_MEMALLOC;
static_key_slow_inc(&memalloc_socks);
}
Commit Message: net: guard tcp_set_keepalive() to tcp sockets
Its possible to use RAW sockets to get a crash in
tcp_set_keepalive() / sk_reset_timer()
Fix is to make sure socket is a SOCK_STREAM one.
Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 41,073 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SetSecondaryDisplayLayout(DisplayLayout::Position position) {
DisplayLayout layout =
Shell::GetInstance()->display_manager()->GetCurrentDisplayLayout();
layout.position = position;
Shell::GetInstance()->display_manager()->
SetLayoutForCurrentDisplays(layout);
}
Commit Message: Use the host coordinate when comparing to host window bounds.
I somehow overlooked this and the test was not strict enough to catch this.
BUG=521919
TEST=Updated ScreenPositionControllerTest.ConvertHostPointToScreenHiDPI so that it fails without the patch.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1293373002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344186}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 123,730 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool TestRenderWidgetHostView::HasAcceleratedSurface(
const gfx::Size& desired_size) {
return false;
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,934 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ZSTD_CStream* ZSTD_createCStream(void)
{
DEBUGLOG(3, "ZSTD_createCStream");
return ZSTD_createCStream_advanced(ZSTD_defaultCMem);
}
Commit Message: fixed T36302429
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 90,046 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gsicc_initialize_default_profile(cmm_profile_t *icc_profile)
{
gsicc_profile_t defaulttype = icc_profile->default_match;
gsicc_colorbuffer_t default_space = gsUNDEFINED;
int num_comps, num_comps_out;
gs_memory_t *mem = icc_profile->memory;
/* Get the profile handle if it is not already set */
if (icc_profile->profile_handle == NULL) {
icc_profile->profile_handle =
gsicc_get_profile_handle_buffer(icc_profile->buffer,
icc_profile->buffer_size,
mem);
if (icc_profile->profile_handle == NULL) {
return gs_rethrow1(gs_error_VMerror, "allocation of profile %s handle failed",
icc_profile->name);
}
}
if (icc_profile->buffer != NULL && icc_profile->hash_is_valid == false) {
/* Compute the hash code of the profile. */
gsicc_get_icc_buff_hash(icc_profile->buffer, &(icc_profile->hashcode),
icc_profile->buffer_size);
icc_profile->hash_is_valid = true;
}
num_comps = icc_profile->num_comps;
icc_profile->num_comps =
gscms_get_input_channel_count(icc_profile->profile_handle);
num_comps_out = icc_profile->num_comps_out;
icc_profile->num_comps_out =
gscms_get_output_channel_count(icc_profile->profile_handle);
icc_profile->data_cs =
gscms_get_profile_data_space(icc_profile->profile_handle);
if_debug0m(gs_debug_flag_icc,mem,"[icc] Setting ICC profile in Manager\n");
switch(defaulttype) {
case DEFAULT_GRAY:
if_debug0m(gs_debug_flag_icc,mem,"[icc] Default Gray\n");
default_space = gsGRAY;
break;
case DEFAULT_RGB:
if_debug0m(gs_debug_flag_icc,mem,"[icc] Default RGB\n");
default_space = gsRGB;
break;
case DEFAULT_CMYK:
if_debug0m(gs_debug_flag_icc,mem,"[icc] Default CMYK\n");
default_space = gsCMYK;
break;
case NAMED_TYPE:
if_debug0m(gs_debug_flag_icc,mem,"[icc] Named Color\n");
break;
case LAB_TYPE:
if_debug0m(gs_debug_flag_icc,mem,"[icc] CIELAB Profile\n");
break;
case DEVICEN_TYPE:
if_debug0m(gs_debug_flag_icc,mem,"[icc] DeviceN Profile\n");
break;
case DEFAULT_NONE:
default:
return 0;
break;
}
if_debug1m(gs_debug_flag_icc,mem,"[icc] name = %s\n", icc_profile->name);
if_debug1m(gs_debug_flag_icc,mem,"[icc] num_comps = %d\n", icc_profile->num_comps);
/* Check that we have the proper color space for the ICC
profiles that can be externally set */
if (default_space != gsUNDEFINED ||
num_comps != icc_profile->num_comps ||
num_comps_out != icc_profile->num_comps_out) {
if (icc_profile->data_cs != default_space) {
return gs_rethrow(-1, "A default profile has an incorrect color space");
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 13,974 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NavigatorImpl::DidStartMainFrameNavigation(
const GURL& url,
SiteInstanceImpl* site_instance,
NavigationHandleImpl* navigation_handle) {
NavigationEntryImpl* pending_entry = controller_->GetPendingEntry();
bool has_browser_initiated_pending_entry =
pending_entry && !pending_entry->is_renderer_initiated();
bool renderer_provisional_load_to_pending_url =
pending_entry && pending_entry->is_renderer_initiated() &&
(pending_entry->GetURL() == url);
bool has_transient_entry = !!controller_->GetTransientEntry();
if (!has_browser_initiated_pending_entry && !has_transient_entry &&
!renderer_provisional_load_to_pending_url) {
std::unique_ptr<NavigationEntryImpl> entry =
NavigationEntryImpl::FromNavigationEntry(
NavigationController::CreateNavigationEntry(
url, content::Referrer(), ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_LINK,
true /* is_renderer_initiated */, std::string(),
controller_->GetBrowserContext(),
nullptr /* blob_url_loader_factory */));
if (pending_entry) {
entry->set_should_replace_entry(pending_entry->should_replace_entry());
entry->SetRedirectChain(pending_entry->GetRedirectChain());
}
controller_->SetPendingEntry(std::move(entry));
if (delegate_)
delegate_->NotifyChangedNavigationState(content::INVALIDATE_TYPE_URL);
}
}
Commit Message: Don't preserve NavigationEntry for failed navigations with invalid URLs.
The formatting logic may rewrite such URLs into an unsafe state. This
is a first step before preventing navigations to invalid URLs entirely.
Bug: 850824
Change-Id: I71743bfb4b610d55ce901ee8902125f934a2bb23
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1252942
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597304}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 143,808 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int __ext4_journal_stop(const char *where, unsigned int line, handle_t *handle)
{
struct super_block *sb;
int err;
int rc;
if (!ext4_handle_valid(handle)) {
ext4_put_nojournal(handle);
return 0;
}
if (!handle->h_transaction) {
err = jbd2_journal_stop(handle);
return handle->h_err ? handle->h_err : err;
}
sb = handle->h_transaction->t_journal->j_private;
err = handle->h_err;
rc = jbd2_journal_stop(handle);
if (!err)
err = rc;
if (err)
__ext4_std_error(sb, where, line, err);
return err;
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix potential use after free in __ext4_journal_stop
There is a use-after-free possibility in __ext4_journal_stop() in the
case that we free the handle in the first jbd2_journal_stop() because
we're referencing handle->h_err afterwards. This was introduced in
9705acd63b125dee8b15c705216d7186daea4625 and it is wrong. Fix it by
storing the handle->h_err value beforehand and avoid referencing
potentially freed handle.
Fixes: 9705acd63b125dee8b15c705216d7186daea4625
Signed-off-by: Lukas Czerner <lczerner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 1 | 167,465 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2Implementation::StencilThenCoverStrokePathInstancedCHROMIUM(
GLsizei num_paths,
GLenum path_name_type,
const GLvoid* paths,
GLuint path_base,
GLint ref,
GLuint mask,
GLenum cover_mode,
GLenum transform_type,
const GLfloat* transform_values) {
GPU_CLIENT_SINGLE_THREAD_CHECK();
GPU_CLIENT_LOG("[" << GetLogPrefix()
<< "] glStencilThenCoverStrokePathInstancedCHROMIUM("
<< num_paths << ", " << path_name_type << ", " << paths
<< ", " << path_base << ", " << cover_mode << ", " << ref
<< ", " << mask << ", " << transform_type << ", "
<< transform_values << ")");
ScopedTransferBufferPtr buffer(helper_, transfer_buffer_);
uint32_t paths_shm_id = 0;
uint32_t paths_offset = 0;
uint32_t transforms_shm_id = 0;
uint32_t transforms_offset = 0;
if (!PrepareInstancedPathCommand(
"glStencilThenCoverStrokePathInstancedCHROMIUM", num_paths,
path_name_type, paths, transform_type, transform_values, &buffer,
&paths_shm_id, &paths_offset, &transforms_shm_id,
&transforms_offset)) {
return;
}
helper_->StencilThenCoverStrokePathInstancedCHROMIUM(
num_paths, path_name_type, paths_shm_id, paths_offset, path_base, ref,
mask, cover_mode, transform_type, transforms_shm_id, transforms_offset);
CheckGLError();
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,128 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderView* render_view() const { return render_view_; }
Commit Message: content: Rename webkit_test_helpers.{cc,h} to blink_test_helpers.{cc,h}
Now that webkit/ is gone, we are preparing ourselves for the merge of
third_party/WebKit into //blink.
BUG=None
BUG=content_shell && content_unittests
R=avi@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1118183003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#328202}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 123,614 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: XML_ErrorString(enum XML_Error code)
{
switch (code) {
case XML_ERROR_NONE:
return NULL;
case XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY:
return XML_L("out of memory");
case XML_ERROR_SYNTAX:
return XML_L("syntax error");
case XML_ERROR_NO_ELEMENTS:
return XML_L("no element found");
case XML_ERROR_INVALID_TOKEN:
return XML_L("not well-formed (invalid token)");
case XML_ERROR_UNCLOSED_TOKEN:
return XML_L("unclosed token");
case XML_ERROR_PARTIAL_CHAR:
return XML_L("partial character");
case XML_ERROR_TAG_MISMATCH:
return XML_L("mismatched tag");
case XML_ERROR_DUPLICATE_ATTRIBUTE:
return XML_L("duplicate attribute");
case XML_ERROR_JUNK_AFTER_DOC_ELEMENT:
return XML_L("junk after document element");
case XML_ERROR_PARAM_ENTITY_REF:
return XML_L("illegal parameter entity reference");
case XML_ERROR_UNDEFINED_ENTITY:
return XML_L("undefined entity");
case XML_ERROR_RECURSIVE_ENTITY_REF:
return XML_L("recursive entity reference");
case XML_ERROR_ASYNC_ENTITY:
return XML_L("asynchronous entity");
case XML_ERROR_BAD_CHAR_REF:
return XML_L("reference to invalid character number");
case XML_ERROR_BINARY_ENTITY_REF:
return XML_L("reference to binary entity");
case XML_ERROR_ATTRIBUTE_EXTERNAL_ENTITY_REF:
return XML_L("reference to external entity in attribute");
case XML_ERROR_MISPLACED_XML_PI:
return XML_L("XML or text declaration not at start of entity");
case XML_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ENCODING:
return XML_L("unknown encoding");
case XML_ERROR_INCORRECT_ENCODING:
return XML_L("encoding specified in XML declaration is incorrect");
case XML_ERROR_UNCLOSED_CDATA_SECTION:
return XML_L("unclosed CDATA section");
case XML_ERROR_EXTERNAL_ENTITY_HANDLING:
return XML_L("error in processing external entity reference");
case XML_ERROR_NOT_STANDALONE:
return XML_L("document is not standalone");
case XML_ERROR_UNEXPECTED_STATE:
return XML_L("unexpected parser state - please send a bug report");
case XML_ERROR_ENTITY_DECLARED_IN_PE:
return XML_L("entity declared in parameter entity");
case XML_ERROR_FEATURE_REQUIRES_XML_DTD:
return XML_L("requested feature requires XML_DTD support in Expat");
case XML_ERROR_CANT_CHANGE_FEATURE_ONCE_PARSING:
return XML_L("cannot change setting once parsing has begun");
/* Added in 1.95.7. */
case XML_ERROR_UNBOUND_PREFIX:
return XML_L("unbound prefix");
/* Added in 1.95.8. */
case XML_ERROR_UNDECLARING_PREFIX:
return XML_L("must not undeclare prefix");
case XML_ERROR_INCOMPLETE_PE:
return XML_L("incomplete markup in parameter entity");
case XML_ERROR_XML_DECL:
return XML_L("XML declaration not well-formed");
case XML_ERROR_TEXT_DECL:
return XML_L("text declaration not well-formed");
case XML_ERROR_PUBLICID:
return XML_L("illegal character(s) in public id");
case XML_ERROR_SUSPENDED:
return XML_L("parser suspended");
case XML_ERROR_NOT_SUSPENDED:
return XML_L("parser not suspended");
case XML_ERROR_ABORTED:
return XML_L("parsing aborted");
case XML_ERROR_FINISHED:
return XML_L("parsing finished");
case XML_ERROR_SUSPEND_PE:
return XML_L("cannot suspend in external parameter entity");
/* Added in 2.0.0. */
case XML_ERROR_RESERVED_PREFIX_XML:
return XML_L("reserved prefix (xml) must not be undeclared or bound to another namespace name");
case XML_ERROR_RESERVED_PREFIX_XMLNS:
return XML_L("reserved prefix (xmlns) must not be declared or undeclared");
case XML_ERROR_RESERVED_NAMESPACE_URI:
return XML_L("prefix must not be bound to one of the reserved namespace names");
/* Added in 2.2.5. */
case XML_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT: /* Constant added in 2.2.1, already */
return XML_L("invalid argument");
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Fix extraction of namespace prefix from XML name (#186)
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 0 | 92,238 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WORD32 ih264d_set_num_cores(iv_obj_t *dec_hdl, void *pv_api_ip, void *pv_api_op)
{
ih264d_ctl_set_num_cores_ip_t *ps_ip;
ih264d_ctl_set_num_cores_op_t *ps_op;
dec_struct_t *ps_dec = dec_hdl->pv_codec_handle;
ps_ip = (ih264d_ctl_set_num_cores_ip_t *)pv_api_ip;
ps_op = (ih264d_ctl_set_num_cores_op_t *)pv_api_op;
ps_op->u4_error_code = 0;
ps_dec->u4_num_cores = ps_ip->u4_num_cores;
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 1)
{
ps_dec->u1_separate_parse = 0;
ps_dec->pi4_ctxt_save_register_dec = ps_dec->pi4_ctxt_save_register;
}
else
{
ps_dec->u1_separate_parse = 1;
}
/*using only upto three threads currently*/
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores > 3)
ps_dec->u4_num_cores = 3;
return IV_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Decoder: Fixed initialization of first_slice_in_pic
To handle some errors, first_slice_in_pic was being set to 2.
This is now cleaned up and first_slice_in_pic is set to 1 only once per pic.
This will ensure picture level initializations are done only once even in case
of error clips
Bug: 33717589
Bug: 33551775
Bug: 33716442
Bug: 33677995
Change-Id: If341436b3cbaa724017eedddd88c2e6fac36d8ba
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 162,622 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TestURLFetcher::SetResponseFilePath(const FilePath& path) {
SetResponseDestinationForTesting(TEMP_FILE);
fake_response_file_path_ = path;
}
Commit Message: Use URLFetcher::Create instead of new in http_bridge.cc.
This change modified http_bridge so that it uses a factory to construct
the URLFetcher. Moreover, it modified sync_backend_host_unittest.cc to
use an URLFetcher factory which will prevent access to www.example.com during
the test.
BUG=none
TEST=sync_backend_host_unittest.cc
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7053011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87227 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,160 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: EVP_PKEY_CTX *CMS_RecipientInfo_get0_pkey_ctx(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
{
if (ri->type == CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS)
return ri->d.ktri->pctx;
else if (ri->type == CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE)
return ri->d.kari->pctx;
return NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-311 | 0 | 11,906 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::OnUpdateUserActivationState(
blink::UserActivationUpdateType update_type) {
if (!is_active())
return;
frame_tree_node_->UpdateUserActivationState(update_type);
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,374 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int64_t GenerateOfflineId() {
return base::RandGenerator(std::numeric_limits<int64_t>::max()) + 1;
}
Commit Message: Add the method to check if offline archive is in internal dir
Bug: 758690
Change-Id: I8bb4283fc40a87fa7a87df2c7e513e2e16903290
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/828049
Reviewed-by: Filip Gorski <fgorski@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jian Li <jianli@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#524232}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 155,877 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ValidatePageElement(TabContents* tab,
const std::wstring& frame,
const std::wstring& javascript,
const std::string& expected_value) {
std::string returned_value;
std::string error;
if (!ui_test_utils::ExecuteJavaScriptAndExtractString(
tab->render_view_host(),
frame,
javascript, &returned_value))
return false;
EXPECT_STREQ(expected_value.c_str(), returned_value.c_str());
return expected_value == returned_value;
}
Commit Message: Unrevert: Show the install dialog for the initial load of an unpacked extension
with plugins.
First landing broke some browser tests.
BUG=83273
TEST=in the extensions managmenet page, with developer mode enabled, Load an unpacked extension on an extension with NPAPI plugins. You should get an install dialog.
TBR=mihaip
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87738 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 99,910 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool IsValidUTF16(const base::string16& str16) {
std::string unused_str8;
return base::UTF16ToUTF8(str16.c_str(), str16.size(), &unused_str8);
}
Commit Message: chrome/browser/ui/webauthn: long domains may cause a line break.
As requested by UX in [1], allow long host names to split a title into
two lines. This allows us to show more of the name before eliding,
although sufficiently long names will still trigger elision.
Screenshot at
https://drive.google.com/open?id=1_V6t2CeZDAVazy3Px-OET2LnB__aEW1r.
[1] https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1TtxkPUchyVZulqgdMcfui-68B0W-DWaFFVJEffGIbLA/edit#slide=id.g5913c4105f_1_12
Change-Id: I70f6541e0db3e9942239304de43b487a7561ca34
Bug: 870892
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1601812
Auto-Submit: Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nina Satragno <nsatragno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nina Satragno <nsatragno@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#658114}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 142,975 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool FileUtilProxy::Move(scoped_refptr<MessageLoopProxy> message_loop_proxy,
const FilePath& src_file_path,
const FilePath& dest_file_path,
StatusCallback* callback) {
return Start(FROM_HERE, message_loop_proxy,
new RelayMove(src_file_path, dest_file_path, callback));
}
Commit Message: Fix a small leak in FileUtilProxy
BUG=none
TEST=green mem bots
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7669046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97451 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 97,639 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WorkerProcessLauncherTest::KillProcess(DWORD exit_code) {
exit_code_ = exit_code;
BOOL result = SetEvent(process_exit_event_);
EXPECT_TRUE(result);
}
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 171,550 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int i2d_RSAPublicKey_fp(FILE *fp, RSA *rsa)
{
return ASN1_item_i2d_fp(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSAPublicKey), fp, rsa);
}
Commit Message: Fix various certificate fingerprint issues.
By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a
certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature.
Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed
this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the
certificate fingerprint for blacklists.
1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits.
If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject
the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits.
2. Check certificate algorithm consistency.
Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the
certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure
errors for some broken certificates.
3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER.
Reencode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received
signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch.
This will reject various cases including garbage after signature
(thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS
program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs
(negative or with leading zeroes).
CVE-2014-8275
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 94,687 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: uint32_t virtio_config_readw(VirtIODevice *vdev, uint32_t addr)
{
VirtioDeviceClass *k = VIRTIO_DEVICE_GET_CLASS(vdev);
uint16_t val;
if (addr + sizeof(val) > vdev->config_len) {
return (uint32_t)-1;
}
k->get_config(vdev, vdev->config);
val = lduw_p(vdev->config + addr);
return val;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 9,189 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AudioOutputAuthorizationHandler::~AudioOutputAuthorizationHandler() {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
}
Commit Message: Switching AudioOutputAuthorizationHandler from using AudioManager interface to AudioSystem one.
BUG=672468
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2692203003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450939}
CWE ID: | 0 | 128,163 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ExtensionFunction* FactoryRegistry::NewFunction(const std::string& name) {
FactoryMap::iterator iter = factories_.find(name);
DCHECK(iter != factories_.end());
ExtensionFunction* function = iter->second();
function->set_name(name);
return function;
}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 99,654 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: long Tracks::Parse() {
assert(m_trackEntries == NULL);
assert(m_trackEntriesEnd == NULL);
const long long stop = m_start + m_size;
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
int count = 0;
long long pos = m_start;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
const long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (size == 0) // weird
continue;
if (id == 0x2E) // TrackEntry ID
++count;
pos += size; // consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(pos == stop);
if (count <= 0)
return 0; // success
m_trackEntries = new (std::nothrow) Track* [count];
if (m_trackEntries == NULL)
return -1;
m_trackEntriesEnd = m_trackEntries;
pos = m_start;
while (pos < stop) {
const long long element_start = pos;
long long id, payload_size;
const long status =
ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, payload_size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (payload_size == 0) // weird
continue;
const long long payload_stop = pos + payload_size;
assert(payload_stop <= stop); // checked in ParseElement
const long long element_size = payload_stop - element_start;
if (id == 0x2E) { // TrackEntry ID
Track*& pTrack = *m_trackEntriesEnd;
pTrack = NULL;
const long status = ParseTrackEntry(pos, payload_size, element_start,
element_size, pTrack);
if (status)
return status;
if (pTrack)
++m_trackEntriesEnd;
}
pos = payload_stop;
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(pos == stop);
return 0; // success
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 173,845 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeContentBrowserClient::UpdateRendererPreferencesForWorker(
content::BrowserContext* browser_context,
content::RendererPreferences* out_prefs) {
DCHECK(browser_context);
DCHECK(out_prefs);
renderer_preferences_util::UpdateFromSystemSettings(
out_prefs, Profile::FromBrowserContext(browser_context));
}
Commit Message: [GuestView] - Introduce MimeHandlerViewAttachHelper
This CL is for the most part a mechanical change which extracts almost
all the frame-based MimeHandlerView code out of
ExtensionsGuestViewMessageFilter. This change both removes the current
clutter form EGVMF as well as fixesa race introduced when the
frame-based logic was added to EGVMF. The reason for the race was that
EGVMF is destroyed on IO thread but all the access to it (for
frame-based MHV) are from UI.
TBR=avi@chromium.org,lazyboy@chromium.org
Bug: 659750, 896679, 911161, 918861
Change-Id: I6474b870e4d56daa68be03637bb633665d9f9dda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1401451
Commit-Queue: Ehsan Karamad <ekaramad@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: James MacLean <wjmaclean@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ehsan Karamad <ekaramad@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621155}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 152,396 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: kmem_cache_alloc_trace(struct kmem_cache *cachep, gfp_t flags, size_t size)
{
void *ret;
ret = slab_alloc(cachep, flags, _RET_IP_);
kasan_kmalloc(cachep, ret, size, flags);
trace_kmalloc(_RET_IP_, ret,
size, cachep->size, flags);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: mm/slab.c: fix SLAB freelist randomization duplicate entries
This patch fixes a bug in the freelist randomization code. When a high
random number is used, the freelist will contain duplicate entries. It
will result in different allocations sharing the same chunk.
It will result in odd behaviours and crashes. It should be uncommon but
it depends on the machines. We saw it happening more often on some
machines (every few hours of running tests).
Fixes: c7ce4f60ac19 ("mm: SLAB freelist randomization")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170103181908.143178-1-thgarnie@google.com
Signed-off-by: John Sperbeck <jsperbeck@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 68,902 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GDataRootDirectory::UpdateCacheMap(const std::string& resource_id,
const std::string& md5,
CacheSubDirectoryType subdir,
int cache_state) {
CacheMap::iterator iter = cache_map_.find(resource_id);
if (iter == cache_map_.end()) { // New resource, create new entry.
DCHECK(cache_state != GDataFile::CACHE_STATE_NONE);
if (cache_state != GDataFile::CACHE_STATE_NONE) {
CacheEntry* entry = new CacheEntry(md5, subdir, cache_state);
cache_map_.insert(std::make_pair(resource_id, entry));
DVLOG(1) << "Added res_id=" << resource_id
<< ", " << entry->ToString();
}
} else { // Resource exists.
CacheEntry* entry = iter->second;
if (cache_state == GDataFile::CACHE_STATE_NONE) {
DVLOG(1) << "Deleting res_id=" << resource_id
<< ", " << entry->ToString();
delete entry;
cache_map_.erase(iter);
} else { // Otherwise, update entry in cache map.
entry->md5 = md5;
entry->sub_dir_type = subdir;
entry->cache_state = cache_state;
DVLOG(1) << "Updated res_id=" << resource_id
<< ", " << entry->ToString();
}
}
}
Commit Message: gdata: Define the resource ID for the root directory
Per the spec, the resource ID for the root directory is defined
as "folder:root". Add the resource ID to the root directory in our
file system representation so we can look up the root directory by
the resource ID.
BUG=127697
TEST=add unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332253
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137928 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,720 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ACodec::initiateStart() {
(new AMessage(kWhatStart, this))->post();
}
Commit Message: Fix initialization of AAC presentation struct
Otherwise the new size checks trip on this.
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I1f8f01097e3a88ff041b69279a6121be842f1766
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 164,072 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bdf_get_property( char* name,
bdf_font_t* font )
{
hashnode hn;
size_t propid;
if ( name == 0 || *name == 0 )
return 0;
if ( ( hn = hash_lookup( name, &(font->proptbl) ) ) == 0 )
return 0;
propid = hn->data;
if ( propid >= _num_bdf_properties )
return font->user_props + ( propid - _num_bdf_properties );
return (bdf_property_t*)_bdf_properties + propid;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 6,521 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NormalPageArena::setAllocationPoint(Address point, size_t size) {
#if DCHECK_IS_ON()
if (point) {
ASSERT(size);
BasePage* page = pageFromObject(point);
ASSERT(!page->isLargeObjectPage());
ASSERT(size <= static_cast<NormalPage*>(page)->payloadSize());
}
#endif
if (hasCurrentAllocationArea()) {
addToFreeList(currentAllocationPoint(), remainingAllocationSize());
}
updateRemainingAllocationSize();
m_currentAllocationPoint = point;
m_lastRemainingAllocationSize = m_remainingAllocationSize = size;
}
Commit Message: Call HeapObjectHeader::checkHeader solely for its side-effect.
This requires changing its signature. This is a preliminary stage to making it
private.
BUG=633030
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2698673003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#460489}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 147,586 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int calculate_sizes(struct kmem_cache *s, int forced_order)
{
unsigned long flags = s->flags;
unsigned long size = s->objsize;
unsigned long align = s->align;
int order;
/*
* Round up object size to the next word boundary. We can only
* place the free pointer at word boundaries and this determines
* the possible location of the free pointer.
*/
size = ALIGN(size, sizeof(void *));
#ifdef CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG
/*
* Determine if we can poison the object itself. If the user of
* the slab may touch the object after free or before allocation
* then we should never poison the object itself.
*/
if ((flags & SLAB_POISON) && !(flags & SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU) &&
!s->ctor)
s->flags |= __OBJECT_POISON;
else
s->flags &= ~__OBJECT_POISON;
/*
* If we are Redzoning then check if there is some space between the
* end of the object and the free pointer. If not then add an
* additional word to have some bytes to store Redzone information.
*/
if ((flags & SLAB_RED_ZONE) && size == s->objsize)
size += sizeof(void *);
#endif
/*
* With that we have determined the number of bytes in actual use
* by the object. This is the potential offset to the free pointer.
*/
s->inuse = size;
if (((flags & (SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU | SLAB_POISON)) ||
s->ctor)) {
/*
* Relocate free pointer after the object if it is not
* permitted to overwrite the first word of the object on
* kmem_cache_free.
*
* This is the case if we do RCU, have a constructor or
* destructor or are poisoning the objects.
*/
s->offset = size;
size += sizeof(void *);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG
if (flags & SLAB_STORE_USER)
/*
* Need to store information about allocs and frees after
* the object.
*/
size += 2 * sizeof(struct track);
if (flags & SLAB_RED_ZONE)
/*
* Add some empty padding so that we can catch
* overwrites from earlier objects rather than let
* tracking information or the free pointer be
* corrupted if an user writes before the start
* of the object.
*/
size += sizeof(void *);
#endif
/*
* Determine the alignment based on various parameters that the
* user specified and the dynamic determination of cache line size
* on bootup.
*/
align = calculate_alignment(flags, align, s->objsize);
/*
* SLUB stores one object immediately after another beginning from
* offset 0. In order to align the objects we have to simply size
* each object to conform to the alignment.
*/
size = ALIGN(size, align);
s->size = size;
if (forced_order >= 0)
order = forced_order;
else
order = calculate_order(size);
if (order < 0)
return 0;
s->allocflags = 0;
if (order)
s->allocflags |= __GFP_COMP;
if (s->flags & SLAB_CACHE_DMA)
s->allocflags |= SLUB_DMA;
if (s->flags & SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT)
s->allocflags |= __GFP_RECLAIMABLE;
/*
* Determine the number of objects per slab
*/
s->oo = oo_make(order, size);
s->min = oo_make(get_order(size), size);
if (oo_objects(s->oo) > oo_objects(s->max))
s->max = s->oo;
return !!oo_objects(s->oo);
}
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 24,767 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void webkit_web_view_size_request(GtkWidget* widget, GtkRequisition* requisition)
{
WebKitWebView* web_view = WEBKIT_WEB_VIEW(widget);
Frame* coreFrame = core(webkit_web_view_get_main_frame(web_view));
if (!coreFrame)
return;
FrameView* view = coreFrame->view();
if (!view)
return;
requisition->width = view->contentsWidth();
requisition->height = view->contentsHeight();
}
Commit Message: 2011-06-02 Joone Hur <joone.hur@collabora.co.uk>
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
[GTK] Only load dictionaries if spell check is enabled
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32879
We don't need to call enchant if enable-spell-checking is false.
* webkit/webkitwebview.cpp:
(webkit_web_view_update_settings): Skip loading dictionaries when enable-spell-checking is false.
(webkit_web_view_settings_notify): Ditto.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@87925 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,649 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int sched_rt_can_attach(struct task_group *tg, struct task_struct *tsk)
{
/* Don't accept realtime tasks when there is no way for them to run */
if (rt_task(tsk) && tg->rt_bandwidth.rt_runtime == 0)
return 0;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,565 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ocfs2_unwritten_check(struct inode *inode,
struct ocfs2_write_ctxt *wc,
struct ocfs2_write_cluster_desc *desc)
{
struct ocfs2_inode_info *oi = OCFS2_I(inode);
struct ocfs2_unwritten_extent *ue = NULL, *new = NULL;
int ret = 0;
if (!desc->c_needs_zero)
return 0;
retry:
spin_lock(&oi->ip_lock);
/* Needs not to zero no metter buffer or direct. The one who is zero
* the cluster is doing zero. And he will clear unwritten after all
* cluster io finished. */
list_for_each_entry(ue, &oi->ip_unwritten_list, ue_ip_node) {
if (desc->c_cpos == ue->ue_cpos) {
BUG_ON(desc->c_new);
desc->c_needs_zero = 0;
desc->c_clear_unwritten = 0;
goto unlock;
}
}
if (wc->w_type != OCFS2_WRITE_DIRECT)
goto unlock;
if (new == NULL) {
spin_unlock(&oi->ip_lock);
new = kmalloc(sizeof(struct ocfs2_unwritten_extent),
GFP_NOFS);
if (new == NULL) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
goto retry;
}
/* This direct write will doing zero. */
new->ue_cpos = desc->c_cpos;
new->ue_phys = desc->c_phys;
desc->c_clear_unwritten = 0;
list_add_tail(&new->ue_ip_node, &oi->ip_unwritten_list);
list_add_tail(&new->ue_node, &wc->w_unwritten_list);
new = NULL;
unlock:
spin_unlock(&oi->ip_lock);
out:
if (new)
kfree(new);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ocfs2: ip_alloc_sem should be taken in ocfs2_get_block()
ip_alloc_sem should be taken in ocfs2_get_block() when reading file in
DIRECT mode to prevent concurrent access to extent tree with
ocfs2_dio_end_io_write(), which may cause BUGON in the following
situation:
read file 'A' end_io of writing file 'A'
vfs_read
__vfs_read
ocfs2_file_read_iter
generic_file_read_iter
ocfs2_direct_IO
__blockdev_direct_IO
do_blockdev_direct_IO
do_direct_IO
get_more_blocks
ocfs2_get_block
ocfs2_extent_map_get_blocks
ocfs2_get_clusters
ocfs2_get_clusters_nocache()
ocfs2_search_extent_list
return the index of record which
contains the v_cluster, that is
v_cluster > rec[i]->e_cpos.
ocfs2_dio_end_io
ocfs2_dio_end_io_write
down_write(&oi->ip_alloc_sem);
ocfs2_mark_extent_written
ocfs2_change_extent_flag
ocfs2_split_extent
...
--> modify the rec[i]->e_cpos, resulting
in v_cluster < rec[i]->e_cpos.
BUG_ON(v_cluster < le32_to_cpu(rec->e_cpos))
[alex.chen@huawei.com: v3]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59EF3614.6050008@huawei.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59EF3614.6050008@huawei.com
Fixes: c15471f79506 ("ocfs2: fix sparse file & data ordering issue in direct io")
Signed-off-by: Alex Chen <alex.chen@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Gang He <ghe@suse.com>
Acked-by: Changwei Ge <ge.changwei@h3c.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@versity.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 85,513 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Ins_RTG( TT_ExecContext exc )
{
exc->GS.round_state = TT_Round_To_Grid;
exc->func_round = (TT_Round_Func)Round_To_Grid;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 10,653 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::GotFocus() {
Focus();
if (owner_delegate_)
owner_delegate_->RenderWidgetGotFocus();
if (delegate_)
delegate_->RenderWidgetGotFocus(this);
}
Commit Message: Check that RWHI isn't deleted manually while owned by a scoped_ptr in RVHI
BUG=590284
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1747183002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#378844}
CWE ID: | 0 | 130,965 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int get_properties(int num_properties, bt_property_t *properties, jintArray *types,
jobjectArray *props) {
jbyteArray propVal;
for (int i = 0; i < num_properties; i++) {
propVal = callbackEnv->NewByteArray(properties[i].len);
if (propVal == NULL) goto Fail;
callbackEnv->SetByteArrayRegion(propVal, 0, properties[i].len,
(jbyte*)properties[i].val);
callbackEnv->SetObjectArrayElement(*props, i, propVal);
callbackEnv->DeleteLocalRef(propVal);
callbackEnv->SetIntArrayRegion(*types, i, 1, (jint *)&properties[i].type);
}
return 0;
Fail:
if (propVal) callbackEnv->DeleteLocalRef(propVal);
ALOGE("Error while allocation of array in %s", __FUNCTION__);
return -1;
}
Commit Message: Add guest mode functionality (3/3)
Add a flag to enable() to start Bluetooth in restricted
mode. In restricted mode, all devices that are paired during
restricted mode are deleted upon leaving restricted mode.
Right now restricted mode is only entered while a guest
user is active.
Bug: 27410683
Change-Id: If4a8855faf362d7f6de509d7ddc7197d1ac75cee
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 163,688 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Element::scrollByLines(int lines)
{
scrollByUnits(lines, ScrollByLine);
}
Commit Message: Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 112,361 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void comps_rtree_print(COMPS_HSList * hl, unsigned deep) {
COMPS_HSListItem * it;
for (it = hl->first; it != NULL; it=it->next) {
printf("%d %s\n",deep, (((COMPS_RTreeData*)it->data)->key));
comps_rtree_print(((COMPS_RTreeData*)it->data)->subnodes, deep+1);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix UAF in comps_objmrtree_unite function
The added field is not used at all in many places and it is probably the
left-over of some copy-paste.
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 91,828 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: XMLRPC_VALUE XMLRPC_VectorRewind(XMLRPC_VALUE value) {
XMLRPC_VALUE xReturn = NULL;
if(value && value->type == xmlrpc_vector && value->v) {
xReturn = (XMLRPC_VALUE)Q_Head(value->v->q);
}
return xReturn;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 12,176 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ext4_setup_super(struct super_block *sb, struct ext4_super_block *es,
int read_only)
{
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb);
int res = 0;
if (le32_to_cpu(es->s_rev_level) > EXT4_MAX_SUPP_REV) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "revision level too high, "
"forcing read-only mode");
res = MS_RDONLY;
}
if (read_only)
return res;
if (!(sbi->s_mount_state & EXT4_VALID_FS))
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, "warning: mounting unchecked fs, "
"running e2fsck is recommended");
else if ((sbi->s_mount_state & EXT4_ERROR_FS))
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING,
"warning: mounting fs with errors, "
"running e2fsck is recommended");
else if ((__s16) le16_to_cpu(es->s_max_mnt_count) >= 0 &&
le16_to_cpu(es->s_mnt_count) >=
(unsigned short) (__s16) le16_to_cpu(es->s_max_mnt_count))
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING,
"warning: maximal mount count reached, "
"running e2fsck is recommended");
else if (le32_to_cpu(es->s_checkinterval) &&
(le32_to_cpu(es->s_lastcheck) +
le32_to_cpu(es->s_checkinterval) <= get_seconds()))
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING,
"warning: checktime reached, "
"running e2fsck is recommended");
if (!sbi->s_journal)
es->s_state &= cpu_to_le16(~EXT4_VALID_FS);
if (!(__s16) le16_to_cpu(es->s_max_mnt_count))
es->s_max_mnt_count = cpu_to_le16(EXT4_DFL_MAX_MNT_COUNT);
le16_add_cpu(&es->s_mnt_count, 1);
es->s_mtime = cpu_to_le32(get_seconds());
ext4_update_dynamic_rev(sb);
if (sbi->s_journal)
EXT4_SET_INCOMPAT_FEATURE(sb, EXT4_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_RECOVER);
ext4_commit_super(sb, 1);
if (test_opt(sb, DEBUG))
printk(KERN_INFO "[EXT4 FS bs=%lu, gc=%u, "
"bpg=%lu, ipg=%lu, mo=%04x, mo2=%04x]\n",
sb->s_blocksize,
sbi->s_groups_count,
EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(sb),
EXT4_INODES_PER_GROUP(sb),
sbi->s_mount_opt, sbi->s_mount_opt2);
return res;
}
Commit Message: ext4: init timer earlier to avoid a kernel panic in __save_error_info
During mount, when we fail to open journal inode or root inode, the
__save_error_info will mod_timer. But actually s_err_report isn't
initialized yet and the kernel oops. The detailed information can
be found https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32082.
The best way is to check whether the timer s_err_report is initialized
or not. But it seems that in include/linux/timer.h, we can't find a
good function to check the status of this timer, so this patch just
move the initializtion of s_err_report earlier so that we can avoid
the kernel panic. The corresponding del_timer is also added in the
error path.
Reported-by: Sami Liedes <sliedes@cc.hut.fi>
Signed-off-by: Tao Ma <boyu.mt@taobao.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 26,954 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: tt_cmap4_validate( FT_Byte* table,
FT_Validator valid )
{
FT_Byte* p;
FT_UInt length;
FT_Byte *ends, *starts, *offsets, *deltas, *glyph_ids;
FT_UInt num_segs;
FT_Error error = FT_Err_Ok;
if ( table + 2 + 2 > valid->limit )
FT_INVALID_TOO_SHORT;
p = table + 2; /* skip format */
length = TT_NEXT_USHORT( p );
if ( length < 16 )
FT_INVALID_TOO_SHORT;
/* in certain fonts, the `length' field is invalid and goes */
/* out of bound. We try to correct this here... */
if ( table + length > valid->limit )
{
if ( valid->level >= FT_VALIDATE_TIGHT )
FT_INVALID_TOO_SHORT;
length = (FT_UInt)( valid->limit - table );
}
p = table + 6;
num_segs = TT_NEXT_USHORT( p ); /* read segCountX2 */
if ( valid->level >= FT_VALIDATE_PARANOID )
{
/* check that we have an even value here */
if ( num_segs & 1 )
FT_INVALID_DATA;
}
num_segs /= 2;
if ( length < 16 + num_segs * 2 * 4 )
FT_INVALID_TOO_SHORT;
/* check the search parameters - even though we never use them */
/* */
if ( valid->level >= FT_VALIDATE_PARANOID )
{
/* check the values of `searchRange', `entrySelector', `rangeShift' */
FT_UInt search_range = TT_NEXT_USHORT( p );
FT_UInt entry_selector = TT_NEXT_USHORT( p );
FT_UInt range_shift = TT_NEXT_USHORT( p );
if ( ( search_range | range_shift ) & 1 ) /* must be even values */
FT_INVALID_DATA;
search_range /= 2;
range_shift /= 2;
/* `search range' is the greatest power of 2 that is <= num_segs */
if ( search_range > num_segs ||
search_range * 2 < num_segs ||
search_range + range_shift != num_segs ||
search_range != ( 1U << entry_selector ) )
FT_INVALID_DATA;
}
ends = table + 14;
starts = table + 16 + num_segs * 2;
deltas = starts + num_segs * 2;
offsets = deltas + num_segs * 2;
glyph_ids = offsets + num_segs * 2;
/* check last segment; its end count value must be 0xFFFF */
if ( valid->level >= FT_VALIDATE_PARANOID )
{
p = ends + ( num_segs - 1 ) * 2;
if ( TT_PEEK_USHORT( p ) != 0xFFFFU )
FT_INVALID_DATA;
}
{
FT_UInt start, end, offset, n;
FT_UInt last_start = 0, last_end = 0;
FT_Int delta;
FT_Byte* p_start = starts;
FT_Byte* p_end = ends;
FT_Byte* p_delta = deltas;
FT_Byte* p_offset = offsets;
for ( n = 0; n < num_segs; n++ )
{
p = p_offset;
start = TT_NEXT_USHORT( p_start );
end = TT_NEXT_USHORT( p_end );
delta = TT_NEXT_SHORT( p_delta );
offset = TT_NEXT_USHORT( p_offset );
if ( start > end )
FT_INVALID_DATA;
/* this test should be performed at default validation level; */
/* unfortunately, some popular Asian fonts have overlapping */
/* ranges in their charmaps */
/* */
if ( start <= last_end && n > 0 )
{
if ( valid->level >= FT_VALIDATE_TIGHT )
FT_INVALID_DATA;
else
{
/* allow overlapping segments, provided their start points */
/* and end points, respectively, are in ascending order */
/* */
if ( last_start > start || last_end > end )
error |= TT_CMAP_FLAG_UNSORTED;
else
error |= TT_CMAP_FLAG_OVERLAPPING;
}
}
if ( offset && offset != 0xFFFFU )
{
p += offset; /* start of glyph ID array */
/* check that we point within the glyph IDs table only */
if ( valid->level >= FT_VALIDATE_TIGHT )
{
if ( p < glyph_ids ||
p + ( end - start + 1 ) * 2 > table + length )
FT_INVALID_DATA;
}
/* Some fonts handle the last segment incorrectly. In */
/* theory, 0xFFFF might point to an ordinary glyph -- */
/* a cmap 4 is versatile and could be used for any */
/* encoding, not only Unicode. However, reality shows */
/* that far too many fonts are sloppy and incorrectly */
/* set all fields but `start' and `end' for the last */
/* segment if it contains only a single character. */
/* */
/* We thus omit the test here, delaying it to the */
/* routines which actually access the cmap. */
else if ( n != num_segs - 1 ||
!( start == 0xFFFFU && end == 0xFFFFU ) )
{
if ( p < glyph_ids ||
p + ( end - start + 1 ) * 2 > valid->limit )
FT_INVALID_DATA;
}
/* check glyph indices within the segment range */
if ( valid->level >= FT_VALIDATE_TIGHT )
{
FT_UInt i, idx;
for ( i = start; i < end; i++ )
{
idx = FT_NEXT_USHORT( p );
if ( idx != 0 )
{
idx = (FT_UInt)( idx + delta ) & 0xFFFFU;
if ( idx >= TT_VALID_GLYPH_COUNT( valid ) )
FT_INVALID_GLYPH_ID;
}
}
}
}
else if ( offset == 0xFFFFU )
{
/* some fonts (erroneously?) use a range offset of 0xFFFF */
/* to mean missing glyph in cmap table */
/* */
if ( valid->level >= FT_VALIDATE_PARANOID ||
n != num_segs - 1 ||
!( start == 0xFFFFU && end == 0xFFFFU ) )
FT_INVALID_DATA;
}
last_start = start;
last_end = end;
}
}
return error;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 6,978 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool WebMediaPlayerMS::IsInPictureInPicture() const {
DCHECK(client_);
return (!client_->IsInAutoPIP() &&
client_->DisplayType() ==
WebMediaPlayer::DisplayType::kPictureInPicture);
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 144,153 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int range_is_allowed(unsigned long pfn, unsigned long size)
{
u64 from = ((u64)pfn) << PAGE_SHIFT;
u64 to = from + size;
u64 cursor = from;
while (cursor < to) {
if (!devmem_is_allowed(pfn))
return 0;
cursor += PAGE_SIZE;
pfn++;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: mm: Tighten x86 /dev/mem with zeroing reads
Under CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM, reading System RAM through /dev/mem is
disallowed. However, on x86, the first 1MB was always allowed for BIOS
and similar things, regardless of it actually being System RAM. It was
possible for heap to end up getting allocated in low 1MB RAM, and then
read by things like x86info or dd, which would trip hardened usercopy:
usercopy: kernel memory exposure attempt detected from ffff880000090000 (dma-kmalloc-256) (4096 bytes)
This changes the x86 exception for the low 1MB by reading back zeros for
System RAM areas instead of blindly allowing them. More work is needed to
extend this to mmap, but currently mmap doesn't go through usercopy, so
hardened usercopy won't Oops the kernel.
Reported-by: Tommi Rantala <tommi.t.rantala@nokia.com>
Tested-by: Tommi Rantala <tommi.t.rantala@nokia.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 66,889 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int snd_ctl_elem_write_user(struct snd_ctl_file *file,
struct snd_ctl_elem_value __user *_control)
{
struct snd_ctl_elem_value *control;
struct snd_card *card;
int result;
control = memdup_user(_control, sizeof(*control));
if (IS_ERR(control))
return PTR_ERR(control);
card = file->card;
snd_power_lock(card);
result = snd_power_wait(card, SNDRV_CTL_POWER_D0);
if (result >= 0)
result = snd_ctl_elem_write(card, file, control);
snd_power_unlock(card);
if (result >= 0)
if (copy_to_user(_control, control, sizeof(*control)))
result = -EFAULT;
kfree(control);
return result;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: control: Handle numid overflow
Each control gets automatically assigned its numids when the control is created.
The allocation is done by incrementing the numid by the amount of allocated
numids per allocation. This means that excessive creation and destruction of
controls (e.g. via SNDRV_CTL_IOCTL_ELEM_ADD/REMOVE) can cause the id to
eventually overflow. Currently when this happens for the control that caused the
overflow kctl->id.numid + kctl->count will also over flow causing it to be
smaller than kctl->id.numid. Most of the code assumes that this is something
that can not happen, so we need to make sure that it won't happen
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 36,471 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static gboolean OnButtonPressReleaseEvent(
GtkWidget* widget,
GdkEventButton* event,
RenderWidgetHostViewGtk* host_view) {
TRACE_EVENT0("browser",
"RenderWidgetHostViewGtkWidget::OnButtonPressReleaseEvent");
if (event->type != GDK_BUTTON_RELEASE)
host_view->set_last_mouse_down(event);
if (!(event->button == 1 || event->button == 2 || event->button == 3))
return FALSE; // We do not forward any other buttons to the renderer.
if (event->type == GDK_2BUTTON_PRESS || event->type == GDK_3BUTTON_PRESS)
return FALSE;
if (!gtk_widget_is_focus(widget))
host_view->host_->OnPointerEventActivate();
if (event->type != GDK_BUTTON_RELEASE)
host_view->im_context_->ConfirmComposition();
GtkWidget* event_widget = gtk_get_event_widget(
reinterpret_cast<GdkEvent*>(event));
if (event_widget != widget) {
int x = 0;
int y = 0;
gtk_widget_get_pointer(widget, &x, &y);
GtkAllocation allocation;
gtk_widget_get_allocation(widget, &allocation);
bool click_in_popup = x >= 0 && y >= 0 && x < allocation.width &&
y < allocation.height;
if (event->type != GDK_BUTTON_RELEASE && host_view->IsPopup() &&
!host_view->is_popup_first_mouse_release_ && !click_in_popup) {
host_view->host_->Shutdown();
return FALSE;
}
event->x = x;
event->y = y;
}
if (event->type == GDK_BUTTON_PRESS && !gtk_widget_has_focus(widget))
gtk_widget_grab_focus(widget);
host_view->is_popup_first_mouse_release_ = false;
RenderWidgetHostImpl* widget_host =
RenderWidgetHostImpl::From(host_view->GetRenderWidgetHost());
if (widget_host)
widget_host->ForwardMouseEvent(WebInputEventFactory::mouseEvent(event));
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,971 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sg_poll(struct file *filp, poll_table * wait)
{
unsigned int res = 0;
Sg_device *sdp;
Sg_fd *sfp;
Sg_request *srp;
int count = 0;
unsigned long iflags;
sfp = filp->private_data;
if (!sfp)
return POLLERR;
sdp = sfp->parentdp;
if (!sdp)
return POLLERR;
poll_wait(filp, &sfp->read_wait, wait);
read_lock_irqsave(&sfp->rq_list_lock, iflags);
list_for_each_entry(srp, &sfp->rq_list, entry) {
/* if any read waiting, flag it */
if ((0 == res) && (1 == srp->done) && (!srp->sg_io_owned))
res = POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;
++count;
}
read_unlock_irqrestore(&sfp->rq_list_lock, iflags);
if (atomic_read(&sdp->detaching))
res |= POLLHUP;
else if (!sfp->cmd_q) {
if (0 == count)
res |= POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM;
} else if (count < SG_MAX_QUEUE)
res |= POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM;
SCSI_LOG_TIMEOUT(3, sg_printk(KERN_INFO, sdp,
"sg_poll: res=0x%x\n", (int) res));
return res;
}
Commit Message: scsi: sg: fixup infoleak when using SG_GET_REQUEST_TABLE
When calling SG_GET_REQUEST_TABLE ioctl only a half-filled table is
returned; the remaining part will then contain stale kernel memory
information. This patch zeroes out the entire table to avoid this
issue.
Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 60,766 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs_fh *fhandle,
struct nfs_fsinfo *info, struct nfs4_secinfo_flavors *flavors)
{
struct nfs4_exception exception = { };
int err;
do {
err = _nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(server, fhandle, info, flavors);
switch (err) {
case 0:
case -NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC:
case -NFS4ERR_NOTSUPP:
break;
default:
err = nfs4_handle_exception(server, err, &exception);
}
} while (exception.retry);
return err;
}
Commit Message: Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 19,859 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int blk_rq_map_user(struct request_queue *q, struct request *rq,
struct rq_map_data *map_data, void __user *ubuf,
unsigned long len, gfp_t gfp_mask)
{
struct iovec iov;
struct iov_iter i;
int ret = import_single_range(rq_data_dir(rq), ubuf, len, &iov, &i);
if (unlikely(ret < 0))
return ret;
return blk_rq_map_user_iov(q, rq, map_data, &i, gfp_mask);
}
Commit Message: Don't feed anything but regular iovec's to blk_rq_map_user_iov
In theory we could map other things, but there's a reason that function
is called "user_iov". Using anything else (like splice can do) just
confuses it.
Reported-and-tested-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 48,157 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderWidgetHostImpl::ScheduleComposite() {
if (is_hidden_ || current_size_.IsEmpty() || repaint_ack_pending_ ||
resize_ack_pending_) {
return false;
}
repaint_start_time_ = TimeTicks::Now();
repaint_ack_pending_ = true;
TRACE_EVENT_ASYNC_BEGIN0(
"renderer_host", "RenderWidgetHostImpl::repaint_ack_pending_", this);
Send(new ViewMsg_Repaint(routing_id_, current_size_));
return true;
}
Commit Message: Check that RWHI isn't deleted manually while owned by a scoped_ptr in RVHI
BUG=590284
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1747183002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#378844}
CWE ID: | 0 | 131,022 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ext4_mark_recovery_complete(struct super_block *sb,
struct ext4_super_block *es)
{
journal_t *journal = EXT4_SB(sb)->s_journal;
if (!EXT4_HAS_COMPAT_FEATURE(sb, EXT4_FEATURE_COMPAT_HAS_JOURNAL)) {
BUG_ON(journal != NULL);
return;
}
jbd2_journal_lock_updates(journal);
if (jbd2_journal_flush(journal) < 0)
goto out;
if (EXT4_HAS_INCOMPAT_FEATURE(sb, EXT4_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_RECOVER) &&
sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY) {
EXT4_CLEAR_INCOMPAT_FEATURE(sb, EXT4_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_RECOVER);
ext4_commit_super(sb, 1);
}
out:
jbd2_journal_unlock_updates(journal);
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix undefined behavior in ext4_fill_flex_info()
Commit 503358ae01b70ce6909d19dd01287093f6b6271c ("ext4: avoid divide by
zero when trying to mount a corrupted file system") fixes CVE-2009-4307
by performing a sanity check on s_log_groups_per_flex, since it can be
set to a bogus value by an attacker.
sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex = sbi->s_es->s_log_groups_per_flex;
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex < 2) { ... }
This patch fixes two potential issues in the previous commit.
1) The sanity check might only work on architectures like PowerPC.
On x86, 5 bits are used for the shifting amount. That means, given a
large s_log_groups_per_flex value like 36, groups_per_flex = 1 << 36
is essentially 1 << 4 = 16, rather than 0. This will bypass the check,
leaving s_log_groups_per_flex and groups_per_flex inconsistent.
2) The sanity check relies on undefined behavior, i.e., oversized shift.
A standard-confirming C compiler could rewrite the check in unexpected
ways. Consider the following equivalent form, assuming groups_per_flex
is unsigned for simplicity.
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex == 0 || groups_per_flex == 1) {
We compile the code snippet using Clang 3.0 and GCC 4.6. Clang will
completely optimize away the check groups_per_flex == 0, leaving the
patched code as vulnerable as the original. GCC keeps the check, but
there is no guarantee that future versions will do the same.
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 20,504 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: EventTargetData* RTCPeerConnection::ensureEventTargetData()
{
return &m_eventTargetData;
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r127612, r127660, and r127664.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127612
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127660
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127664
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95920
Source/Platform:
* Platform.gypi:
* chromium/public/WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebKit):
(WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* chromium/public/WebRTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
Source/WebCore:
* CMakeLists.txt:
* GNUmakefile.list.am:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCErrorCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnection::createOffer):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCPeerConnection):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCSessionDescriptionCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::create):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestSucceeded):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestFailed):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::clear):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.h:
(RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.cpp: Removed.
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.h: Removed.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/chromium/support/WebRTCVoidRequest.cpp: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebCore):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::~RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* platform/mediastream/RTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.cpp:
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.h:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium):
Tools:
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::SuccessCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::FailureCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::createOffer):
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(SuccessCallbackTask):
(FailureCallbackTask):
LayoutTests:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-createOffer.html:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription.html: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription.html: Removed.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@127679 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 99,369 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int _nfs4_proc_open(struct nfs4_opendata *data)
{
struct inode *dir = data->dir->d_inode;
struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(dir);
struct nfs_openargs *o_arg = &data->o_arg;
struct nfs_openres *o_res = &data->o_res;
struct rpc_task *task;
struct rpc_message msg = {
.rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_OPEN],
.rpc_argp = o_arg,
.rpc_resp = o_res,
.rpc_cred = data->owner->so_cred,
};
struct rpc_task_setup task_setup_data = {
.rpc_client = server->client,
.rpc_message = &msg,
.callback_ops = &nfs4_open_ops,
.callback_data = data,
.workqueue = nfsiod_workqueue,
.flags = RPC_TASK_ASYNC,
};
int status;
kref_get(&data->kref);
data->rpc_done = 0;
data->rpc_status = 0;
data->cancelled = 0;
task = rpc_run_task(&task_setup_data);
if (IS_ERR(task))
return PTR_ERR(task);
status = nfs4_wait_for_completion_rpc_task(task);
if (status != 0) {
data->cancelled = 1;
smp_wmb();
} else
status = data->rpc_status;
rpc_put_task(task);
if (status != 0 || !data->rpc_done)
return status;
if (o_res->fh.size == 0)
_nfs4_proc_lookup(dir, o_arg->name, &o_res->fh, o_res->f_attr);
if (o_arg->open_flags & O_CREAT) {
update_changeattr(dir, &o_res->cinfo);
nfs_post_op_update_inode(dir, o_res->dir_attr);
} else
nfs_refresh_inode(dir, o_res->dir_attr);
if(o_res->rflags & NFS4_OPEN_RESULT_CONFIRM) {
status = _nfs4_proc_open_confirm(data);
if (status != 0)
return status;
}
if (!(o_res->f_attr->valid & NFS_ATTR_FATTR))
_nfs4_proc_getattr(server, &o_res->fh, o_res->f_attr);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,846 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: radius_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *dat, u_int length)
{
register const struct radius_hdr *rad;
u_int len, auth_idx;
ND_TCHECK2(*dat, MIN_RADIUS_LEN);
rad = (const struct radius_hdr *)dat;
len = EXTRACT_16BITS(&rad->len);
if (len < MIN_RADIUS_LEN)
{
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return;
}
if (len > length)
len = length;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag < 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "RADIUS, %s (%u), id: 0x%02x length: %u",
tok2str(radius_command_values,"Unknown Command",rad->code),
rad->code,
rad->id,
len));
return;
}
else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "RADIUS, length: %u\n\t%s (%u), id: 0x%02x, Authenticator: ",
len,
tok2str(radius_command_values,"Unknown Command",rad->code),
rad->code,
rad->id));
for(auth_idx=0; auth_idx < 16; auth_idx++)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%02x", rad->auth[auth_idx]));
}
if (len > MIN_RADIUS_LEN)
radius_attrs_print(ndo, dat + MIN_RADIUS_LEN, len - MIN_RADIUS_LEN);
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13032/RADIUS: Check whether a byte exists before testing its value.
Reverse the test in a for loop to test the length before testing whether
we have a null byte.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
Clean up other length tests while we're at it.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 62,355 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AppCacheGroup::RemoveCache(AppCache* cache) {
DCHECK(cache->associated_hosts().empty());
if (cache == newest_complete_cache_) {
CancelUpdate();
AppCache* tmp_cache = newest_complete_cache_;
newest_complete_cache_ = nullptr;
tmp_cache->set_owning_group(nullptr); // may cause this group to be deleted
} else {
scoped_refptr<AppCacheGroup> protect(this);
Caches::iterator it =
std::find(old_caches_.begin(), old_caches_.end(), cache);
if (it != old_caches_.end()) {
AppCache* tmp_cache = *it;
old_caches_.erase(it);
tmp_cache->set_owning_group(nullptr); // may cause group to be released
}
if (!is_obsolete() && old_caches_.empty() &&
!newly_deletable_response_ids_.empty()) {
storage_->DeleteResponses(manifest_url_, newly_deletable_response_ids_);
newly_deletable_response_ids_.clear();
}
}
}
Commit Message: Refcount AppCacheGroup correctly.
Bug: 888926
Change-Id: Iab0d82d272e2f24a5e91180d64bc8e2aa8a8238d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1246827
Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Joshua Bell <jsbell@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Chris Palmer <palmer@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#594475}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 172,653 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void vlan_dev_set_ingress_priority(const struct net_device *dev,
u32 skb_prio, u16 vlan_prio)
{
struct vlan_dev_info *vlan = vlan_dev_info(dev);
if (vlan->ingress_priority_map[vlan_prio & 0x7] && !skb_prio)
vlan->nr_ingress_mappings--;
else if (!vlan->ingress_priority_map[vlan_prio & 0x7] && skb_prio)
vlan->nr_ingress_mappings++;
vlan->ingress_priority_map[vlan_prio & 0x7] = skb_prio;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 24,284 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CheckUserParameters(int argc, char **argv, char **envp)
{
enum BadCode bad = NotBad;
int i = 0, j;
char *a, *e = NULL;
#if CHECK_EUID
if (geteuid() == 0 && getuid() != geteuid())
#endif
{
/* Check each argv[] */
for (i = 1; i < argc; i++) {
if (strcmp(argv[i], "-fp") == 0)
{
i++; /* continue with next argument. skip the length check */
if (i >= argc)
break;
} else
{
if (strlen(argv[i]) > MAX_ARG_LENGTH) {
bad = ArgTooLong;
break;
}
}
a = argv[i];
while (*a) {
if (checkPrintable(*a) == 0) {
bad = UnprintableArg;
break;
}
a++;
}
if (bad)
break;
}
if (!bad) {
/* Check each envp[] */
for (i = 0; envp[i]; i++) {
/* Check for bad environment variables and values */
#if REMOVE_ENV_LD
while (envp[i] && (strncmp(envp[i], "LD", 2) == 0)) {
for (j = i; envp[j]; j++) {
envp[j] = envp[j+1];
}
}
#endif
if (envp[i] && (strlen(envp[i]) > MAX_ENV_LENGTH)) {
#if REMOVE_LONG_ENV
for (j = i; envp[j]; j++) {
envp[j] = envp[j+1];
}
i--;
#else
char *eq;
int len;
eq = strchr(envp[i], '=');
if (!eq)
continue;
len = eq - envp[i];
e = malloc(len + 1);
if (!e) {
bad = InternalError;
break;
}
strncpy(e, envp[i], len);
e[len] = 0;
if (len >= 4 &&
(strcmp(e + len - 4, "PATH") == 0 ||
strcmp(e, "TERMCAP") == 0)) {
if (strlen(envp[i]) > MAX_ENV_PATH_LENGTH) {
bad = EnvTooLong;
break;
} else {
free(e);
}
} else {
bad = EnvTooLong;
break;
}
#endif
}
}
}
#if NO_OUTPUT_PIPES
if (!bad) {
struct stat buf;
if (fstat(fileno(stdout), &buf) == 0 && S_ISFIFO(buf.st_mode))
bad = OutputIsPipe;
if (fstat(fileno(stderr), &buf) == 0 && S_ISFIFO(buf.st_mode))
bad = OutputIsPipe;
}
#endif
}
switch (bad) {
case NotBad:
return;
case UnsafeArg:
ErrorF("Command line argument number %d is unsafe\n", i);
break;
case ArgTooLong:
ErrorF("Command line argument number %d is too long\n", i);
break;
case UnprintableArg:
ErrorF("Command line argument number %d contains unprintable"
" characters\n", i);
break;
case EnvTooLong:
ErrorF("Environment variable `%s' is too long\n", e);
break;
case OutputIsPipe:
ErrorF("Stdout and/or stderr is a pipe\n");
break;
case InternalError:
ErrorF("Internal Error\n");
break;
default:
ErrorF("Unknown error\n");
break;
}
FatalError("X server aborted because of unsafe environment\n");
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 13,348 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool kvm_ioapic_handles_vector(struct kvm *kvm, int vector)
{
struct kvm_ioapic *ioapic = kvm->arch.vioapic;
smp_rmb();
return test_bit(vector, ioapic->handled_vectors);
}
Commit Message: KVM: Fix bounds checking in ioapic indirect register reads (CVE-2013-1798)
If the guest specifies a IOAPIC_REG_SELECT with an invalid value and follows
that with a read of the IOAPIC_REG_WINDOW KVM does not properly validate
that request. ioapic_read_indirect contains an
ASSERT(redir_index < IOAPIC_NUM_PINS), but the ASSERT has no effect in
non-debug builds. In recent kernels this allows a guest to cause a kernel
oops by reading invalid memory. In older kernels (pre-3.3) this allows a
guest to read from large ranges of host memory.
Tested: tested against apic unit tests.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 33,255 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TEE_Result syscall_cryp_state_free(unsigned long state)
{
TEE_Result res;
struct tee_cryp_state *cs;
struct tee_ta_session *sess;
res = tee_ta_get_current_session(&sess);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
res = tee_svc_cryp_get_state(sess, tee_svc_uref_to_vaddr(state), &cs);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
cryp_state_free(to_user_ta_ctx(sess->ctx), cs);
return TEE_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: svc: check for allocation overflow in crypto calls part 2
Without checking for overflow there is a risk of allocating a buffer
with size smaller than anticipated and as a consequence of that it might
lead to a heap based overflow with attacker controlled data written
outside the boundaries of the buffer.
Fixes: OP-TEE-2018-0011: "Integer overflow in crypto system calls (x2)"
Signed-off-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org> (QEMU v7, v8)
Reviewed-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Riscure <inforequest@riscure.com>
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <a.a.milburn@vu.nl>
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@linaro.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 86,879 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AXObjectCache* Document::GetOrCreateAXObjectCache() const {
Settings* settings = GetSettings();
if (!settings || !settings->GetAccessibilityEnabled())
return nullptr;
Document& cache_owner = AXObjectCacheOwner();
if (!cache_owner.GetLayoutView())
return nullptr;
DCHECK(&cache_owner == this || !ax_object_cache_);
if (!cache_owner.ax_object_cache_)
cache_owner.ax_object_cache_ = AXObjectCache::Create(cache_owner);
return cache_owner.ax_object_cache_.Get();
}
Commit Message: Fixed bug where PlzNavigate CSP in a iframe did not get the inherited CSP
When inheriting the CSP from a parent document to a local-scheme CSP,
it does not always get propagated to the PlzNavigate CSP. This means
that PlzNavigate CSP checks (like `frame-src`) would be ran against
a blank policy instead of the proper inherited policy.
Bug: 778658
Change-Id: I61bb0d432e1cea52f199e855624cb7b3078f56a9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/765969
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#518245}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 146,755 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: vsock_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr, int addr_len)
{
int err;
struct sock *sk;
struct sockaddr_vm *vm_addr;
sk = sock->sk;
if (vsock_addr_cast(addr, addr_len, &vm_addr) != 0)
return -EINVAL;
lock_sock(sk);
err = __vsock_bind(sk, vm_addr);
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
Commit Message: VSOCK: Fix missing msg_namelen update in vsock_stream_recvmsg()
The code misses to update the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore
makes net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage
variable to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory.
Cc: Andy King <acking@vmware.com>
Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <dtor@vmware.com>
Cc: George Zhang <georgezhang@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 30,326 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AudioHandler::SetMuted(bool mute) {
mixer_->SetMuted(mute);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Move audio, power, and UI files into subdirs.
This moves more files from chrome/browser/chromeos/ into
subdirectories.
BUG=chromium-os:22896
TEST=did chrome os builds both with and without aura
TBR=sky
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9125006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 109,251 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::WriteCurrentURLToClipboard() {
TabContents* contents = GetSelectedTabContents();
if (!contents->ShouldDisplayURL())
return;
chrome_browser_net::WriteURLToClipboard(
contents->GetURL(),
profile_->GetPrefs()->GetString(prefs::kAcceptLanguages),
g_browser_process->clipboard());
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 97,446 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void qeth_clear_recovery_task(struct qeth_card *card)
{
card->recovery_task = NULL;
}
Commit Message: qeth: avoid buffer overflow in snmp ioctl
Check user-defined length in snmp ioctl request and allow request
only if it fits into a qeth command buffer.
Signed-off-by: Ursula Braun <ursula.braun@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Frank Blaschka <frank.blaschka@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heicars2@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 28,497 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: strlen16 (unsigned short *s)
{
int len = 0;
while (*s) {
s++;
len++;
}
return len;
}
Commit Message: Fix #340: System frozen
gdImageCreate() doesn't check for oversized images and as such is prone
to DoS vulnerabilities. We fix that by applying the same overflow check
that is already in place for gdImageCreateTrueColor().
CVE-2016-9317
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 73,104 |
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