instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebDevToolsAgentImpl::disableTracing()
{
m_client->disableTracing();
}
Commit Message: [4/4] Process clearBrowserCahce/cookies commands in browser.
BUG=366585
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/251183005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172984 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,204 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType IsPCX(const unsigned char *magick,const size_t length)
{
if (length < 2)
return(MagickFalse);
if (memcmp(magick,"\012\002",2) == 0)
return(MagickTrue);
if (memcmp(magick,"\012\005",2) == 0)
return(MagickTrue);
return(MagickFalse);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/575
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 62,674 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int handler_init(void)
{
return tcmur_register_handler(&glfs_handler);
}
Commit Message: glfs: discard glfs_check_config
Signed-off-by: Prasanna Kumar Kalever <prasanna.kalever@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 59,064 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: char *usb_cache_string(struct usb_device *udev, int index)
{
char *buf;
char *smallbuf = NULL;
int len;
if (index <= 0)
return NULL;
buf = kmalloc(MAX_USB_STRING_SIZE, GFP_NOIO);
if (buf) {
len = usb_string(udev, index, buf, MAX_USB_STRING_SIZE);
if (len > 0) {
smallbuf = kmalloc(++len, GFP_NOIO);
if (!smallbuf)
return buf;
memcpy(smallbuf, buf, len);
}
kfree(buf);
}
return smallbuf;
}
Commit Message: USB: core: harden cdc_parse_cdc_header
Andrey Konovalov reported a possible out-of-bounds problem for the
cdc_parse_cdc_header function. He writes:
It looks like cdc_parse_cdc_header() doesn't validate buflen
before accessing buffer[1], buffer[2] and so on. The only check
present is while (buflen > 0).
So fix this issue up by properly validating the buffer length matches
what the descriptor says it is.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 59,765 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RSA *d2i_RSA_PUBKEY_fp(FILE *fp, RSA **rsa)
{
return ASN1_d2i_fp((void *(*)(void))
RSA_new,(D2I_OF(void))d2i_RSA_PUBKEY, fp,
(void **)rsa);
}
Commit Message: Fix various certificate fingerprint issues.
By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a
certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature.
Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed
this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the
certificate fingerprint for blacklists.
1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits.
If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject
the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits.
2. Check certificate algorithm consistency.
Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the
certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure
errors for some broken certificates.
3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER.
Reencode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received
signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch.
This will reject various cases including garbage after signature
(thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS
program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs
(negative or with leading zeroes).
CVE-2014-8275
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 94,657 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void Ins_UNKNOWN( INS_ARG )
{ /* Rewritten by igorm. */
Byte i;
TDefRecord* def;
PCallRecord call;
# if 0 /* The condition below appears always false
due to limited range of data type
- skip it to quiet a compiler warning. */
if (CUR.opcode > sizeof(CUR.IDefPtr) / sizeof(CUR.IDefPtr[0])) {
CUR.error = TT_Err_Invalid_Opcode;
return;
}
# endif
i = CUR.IDefPtr[(Byte)CUR.opcode];
if (i >= CUR.numIDefs)
{
CUR.error = TT_Err_Invalid_Opcode;
return;
}
def = &CUR.IDefs[i];
if ( CUR.callTop >= CUR.callSize )
{
CUR.error = TT_Err_Stack_Overflow;
return;
}
call = CUR.callStack + CUR.callTop++;
call->Caller_Range = CUR.curRange;
call->Caller_IP = CUR.IP+1;
call->Cur_Count = 1;
call->Cur_Restart = def->Start;
INS_Goto_CodeRange( def->Range, def->Start );
CUR.step_ins = FALSE;
return;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 5,473 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ExtensionViewAccumulator(const std::string& extension_id,
int browser_window_id,
ViewType::Type view_type)
: extension_id_(extension_id),
browser_window_id_(browser_window_id),
view_type_(view_type),
views_(v8::Array::New()),
index_(0) {
}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 99,806 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void paravirt_flush_lazy_mmu(void)
{
preempt_disable();
if (paravirt_get_lazy_mode() == PARAVIRT_LAZY_MMU) {
arch_leave_lazy_mmu_mode();
arch_enter_lazy_mmu_mode();
}
preempt_enable();
}
Commit Message: x86/paravirt: Fix spectre-v2 mitigations for paravirt guests
Nadav reported that on guests we're failing to rewrite the indirect
calls to CALLEE_SAVE paravirt functions. In particular the
pv_queued_spin_unlock() call is left unpatched and that is all over the
place. This obviously wrecks Spectre-v2 mitigation (for paravirt
guests) which relies on not actually having indirect calls around.
The reason is an incorrect clobber test in paravirt_patch_call(); this
function rewrites an indirect call with a direct call to the _SAME_
function, there is no possible way the clobbers can be different
because of this.
Therefore remove this clobber check. Also put WARNs on the other patch
failure case (not enough room for the instruction) which I've not seen
trigger in my (limited) testing.
Three live kernel image disassemblies for lock_sock_nested (as a small
function that illustrates the problem nicely). PRE is the current
situation for guests, POST is with this patch applied and NATIVE is with
or without the patch for !guests.
PRE:
(gdb) disassemble lock_sock_nested
Dump of assembler code for function lock_sock_nested:
0xffffffff817be970 <+0>: push %rbp
0xffffffff817be971 <+1>: mov %rdi,%rbp
0xffffffff817be974 <+4>: push %rbx
0xffffffff817be975 <+5>: lea 0x88(%rbp),%rbx
0xffffffff817be97c <+12>: callq 0xffffffff819f7160 <_cond_resched>
0xffffffff817be981 <+17>: mov %rbx,%rdi
0xffffffff817be984 <+20>: callq 0xffffffff819fbb00 <_raw_spin_lock_bh>
0xffffffff817be989 <+25>: mov 0x8c(%rbp),%eax
0xffffffff817be98f <+31>: test %eax,%eax
0xffffffff817be991 <+33>: jne 0xffffffff817be9ba <lock_sock_nested+74>
0xffffffff817be993 <+35>: movl $0x1,0x8c(%rbp)
0xffffffff817be99d <+45>: mov %rbx,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9a0 <+48>: callq *0xffffffff822299e8
0xffffffff817be9a7 <+55>: pop %rbx
0xffffffff817be9a8 <+56>: pop %rbp
0xffffffff817be9a9 <+57>: mov $0x200,%esi
0xffffffff817be9ae <+62>: mov $0xffffffff817be993,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9b5 <+69>: jmpq 0xffffffff81063ae0 <__local_bh_enable_ip>
0xffffffff817be9ba <+74>: mov %rbp,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9bd <+77>: callq 0xffffffff817be8c0 <__lock_sock>
0xffffffff817be9c2 <+82>: jmp 0xffffffff817be993 <lock_sock_nested+35>
End of assembler dump.
POST:
(gdb) disassemble lock_sock_nested
Dump of assembler code for function lock_sock_nested:
0xffffffff817be970 <+0>: push %rbp
0xffffffff817be971 <+1>: mov %rdi,%rbp
0xffffffff817be974 <+4>: push %rbx
0xffffffff817be975 <+5>: lea 0x88(%rbp),%rbx
0xffffffff817be97c <+12>: callq 0xffffffff819f7160 <_cond_resched>
0xffffffff817be981 <+17>: mov %rbx,%rdi
0xffffffff817be984 <+20>: callq 0xffffffff819fbb00 <_raw_spin_lock_bh>
0xffffffff817be989 <+25>: mov 0x8c(%rbp),%eax
0xffffffff817be98f <+31>: test %eax,%eax
0xffffffff817be991 <+33>: jne 0xffffffff817be9ba <lock_sock_nested+74>
0xffffffff817be993 <+35>: movl $0x1,0x8c(%rbp)
0xffffffff817be99d <+45>: mov %rbx,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9a0 <+48>: callq 0xffffffff810a0c20 <__raw_callee_save___pv_queued_spin_unlock>
0xffffffff817be9a5 <+53>: xchg %ax,%ax
0xffffffff817be9a7 <+55>: pop %rbx
0xffffffff817be9a8 <+56>: pop %rbp
0xffffffff817be9a9 <+57>: mov $0x200,%esi
0xffffffff817be9ae <+62>: mov $0xffffffff817be993,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9b5 <+69>: jmpq 0xffffffff81063aa0 <__local_bh_enable_ip>
0xffffffff817be9ba <+74>: mov %rbp,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9bd <+77>: callq 0xffffffff817be8c0 <__lock_sock>
0xffffffff817be9c2 <+82>: jmp 0xffffffff817be993 <lock_sock_nested+35>
End of assembler dump.
NATIVE:
(gdb) disassemble lock_sock_nested
Dump of assembler code for function lock_sock_nested:
0xffffffff817be970 <+0>: push %rbp
0xffffffff817be971 <+1>: mov %rdi,%rbp
0xffffffff817be974 <+4>: push %rbx
0xffffffff817be975 <+5>: lea 0x88(%rbp),%rbx
0xffffffff817be97c <+12>: callq 0xffffffff819f7160 <_cond_resched>
0xffffffff817be981 <+17>: mov %rbx,%rdi
0xffffffff817be984 <+20>: callq 0xffffffff819fbb00 <_raw_spin_lock_bh>
0xffffffff817be989 <+25>: mov 0x8c(%rbp),%eax
0xffffffff817be98f <+31>: test %eax,%eax
0xffffffff817be991 <+33>: jne 0xffffffff817be9ba <lock_sock_nested+74>
0xffffffff817be993 <+35>: movl $0x1,0x8c(%rbp)
0xffffffff817be99d <+45>: mov %rbx,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9a0 <+48>: movb $0x0,(%rdi)
0xffffffff817be9a3 <+51>: nopl 0x0(%rax)
0xffffffff817be9a7 <+55>: pop %rbx
0xffffffff817be9a8 <+56>: pop %rbp
0xffffffff817be9a9 <+57>: mov $0x200,%esi
0xffffffff817be9ae <+62>: mov $0xffffffff817be993,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9b5 <+69>: jmpq 0xffffffff81063ae0 <__local_bh_enable_ip>
0xffffffff817be9ba <+74>: mov %rbp,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9bd <+77>: callq 0xffffffff817be8c0 <__lock_sock>
0xffffffff817be9c2 <+82>: jmp 0xffffffff817be993 <lock_sock_nested+35>
End of assembler dump.
Fixes: 63f70270ccd9 ("[PATCH] i386: PARAVIRT: add common patching machinery")
Fixes: 3010a0663fd9 ("x86/paravirt, objtool: Annotate indirect calls")
Reported-by: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 79,061 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: get_delayed_job_ct()
{
tube t;
size_t i;
unsigned int count = 0;
for (i = 0; i < tubes.used; i++) {
t = tubes.items[i];
count += t->delay.used;
}
return count;
}
Commit Message: Discard job body bytes if the job is too big.
Previously, a malicious user could craft a job payload and inject
beanstalk commands without the client application knowing. (An
extra-careful client library could check the size of the job body before
sending the put command, but most libraries do not do this, nor should
they have to.)
Reported by Graham Barr.
CWE ID: | 0 | 18,143 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err smhd_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "SoundMediaHeaderBox", trace);
fprintf(trace, ">\n");
gf_isom_box_dump_done("SoundMediaHeaderBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,844 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CL_CheckAutoUpdate( void ) {
int validServerNum = 0;
int i = 0, rnd = 0;
netadr_t temp;
char *servername;
if ( !cl_autoupdate->integer ) {
return;
}
if ( autoupdateChecked ) {
return;
}
srand( Com_Milliseconds() );
for ( i = 0; i < MAX_AUTOUPDATE_SERVERS; i++ ) {
if ( NET_StringToAdr( cls.autoupdateServerNames[i], &temp, NA_UNSPEC ) ) {
validServerNum++;
}
}
if ( validServerNum > 1 ) {
rnd = rand() % validServerNum;
} else {
rnd = 0;
}
servername = cls.autoupdateServerNames[rnd];
Com_DPrintf( "Resolving AutoUpdate Server... " );
if ( !NET_StringToAdr( servername, &cls.autoupdateServer, NA_UNSPEC ) ) {
Com_DPrintf( "Couldn't resolve first address, trying default..." );
if ( !NET_StringToAdr( cls.autoupdateServerNames[0], &cls.autoupdateServer, NA_UNSPEC ) ) {
Com_DPrintf( "Failed to resolve any Auto-update servers.\n" );
autoupdateChecked = qtrue;
return;
}
}
cls.autoupdateServer.port = BigShort( PORT_SERVER );
Com_DPrintf( "%i.%i.%i.%i:%i\n", cls.autoupdateServer.ip[0], cls.autoupdateServer.ip[1],
cls.autoupdateServer.ip[2], cls.autoupdateServer.ip[3],
BigShort( cls.autoupdateServer.port ) );
NET_OutOfBandPrint( NS_CLIENT, cls.autoupdateServer, "getUpdateInfo \"%s\" \"%s\"-\"%s\"\n", Q3_VERSION, OS_STRING, ARCH_STRING );
CL_RequestMotd();
autoupdateChecked = qtrue;
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 95,648 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void overloadedMethodG1Method(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
imp->overloadedMethodG();
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,470 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int newseg(struct ipc_namespace *ns, struct ipc_params *params)
{
key_t key = params->key;
int shmflg = params->flg;
size_t size = params->u.size;
int error;
struct shmid_kernel *shp;
size_t numpages = (size + PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
struct file *file;
char name[13];
int id;
vm_flags_t acctflag = 0;
if (size < SHMMIN || size > ns->shm_ctlmax)
return -EINVAL;
if (numpages << PAGE_SHIFT < size)
return -ENOSPC;
if (ns->shm_tot + numpages < ns->shm_tot ||
ns->shm_tot + numpages > ns->shm_ctlall)
return -ENOSPC;
shp = ipc_rcu_alloc(sizeof(*shp));
if (!shp)
return -ENOMEM;
shp->shm_perm.key = key;
shp->shm_perm.mode = (shmflg & S_IRWXUGO);
shp->mlock_user = NULL;
shp->shm_perm.security = NULL;
error = security_shm_alloc(shp);
if (error) {
ipc_rcu_putref(shp, ipc_rcu_free);
return error;
}
sprintf(name, "SYSV%08x", key);
if (shmflg & SHM_HUGETLB) {
struct hstate *hs;
size_t hugesize;
hs = hstate_sizelog((shmflg >> SHM_HUGE_SHIFT) & SHM_HUGE_MASK);
if (!hs) {
error = -EINVAL;
goto no_file;
}
hugesize = ALIGN(size, huge_page_size(hs));
/* hugetlb_file_setup applies strict accounting */
if (shmflg & SHM_NORESERVE)
acctflag = VM_NORESERVE;
file = hugetlb_file_setup(name, hugesize, acctflag,
&shp->mlock_user, HUGETLB_SHMFS_INODE,
(shmflg >> SHM_HUGE_SHIFT) & SHM_HUGE_MASK);
} else {
/*
* Do not allow no accounting for OVERCOMMIT_NEVER, even
* if it's asked for.
*/
if ((shmflg & SHM_NORESERVE) &&
sysctl_overcommit_memory != OVERCOMMIT_NEVER)
acctflag = VM_NORESERVE;
file = shmem_kernel_file_setup(name, size, acctflag);
}
error = PTR_ERR(file);
if (IS_ERR(file))
goto no_file;
id = ipc_addid(&shm_ids(ns), &shp->shm_perm, ns->shm_ctlmni);
if (id < 0) {
error = id;
goto no_id;
}
shp->shm_cprid = task_tgid_vnr(current);
shp->shm_lprid = 0;
shp->shm_atim = shp->shm_dtim = 0;
shp->shm_ctim = get_seconds();
shp->shm_segsz = size;
shp->shm_nattch = 0;
shp->shm_file = file;
shp->shm_creator = current;
list_add(&shp->shm_clist, ¤t->sysvshm.shm_clist);
/*
* shmid gets reported as "inode#" in /proc/pid/maps.
* proc-ps tools use this. Changing this will break them.
*/
file_inode(file)->i_ino = shp->shm_perm.id;
ns->shm_tot += numpages;
error = shp->shm_perm.id;
ipc_unlock_object(&shp->shm_perm);
rcu_read_unlock();
return error;
no_id:
if (is_file_hugepages(file) && shp->mlock_user)
user_shm_unlock(size, shp->mlock_user);
fput(file);
no_file:
ipc_rcu_putref(shp, shm_rcu_free);
return error;
}
Commit Message: Initialize msg/shm IPC objects before doing ipc_addid()
As reported by Dmitry Vyukov, we really shouldn't do ipc_addid() before
having initialized the IPC object state. Yes, we initialize the IPC
object in a locked state, but with all the lockless RCU lookup work,
that IPC object lock no longer means that the state cannot be seen.
We already did this for the IPC semaphore code (see commit e8577d1f0329:
"ipc/sem.c: fully initialize sem_array before making it visible") but we
clearly forgot about msg and shm.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 1 | 166,579 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: armpmu_map_cache_event(const unsigned (*cache_map)
[PERF_COUNT_HW_CACHE_MAX]
[PERF_COUNT_HW_CACHE_OP_MAX]
[PERF_COUNT_HW_CACHE_RESULT_MAX],
u64 config)
{
unsigned int cache_type, cache_op, cache_result, ret;
cache_type = (config >> 0) & 0xff;
if (cache_type >= PERF_COUNT_HW_CACHE_MAX)
return -EINVAL;
cache_op = (config >> 8) & 0xff;
if (cache_op >= PERF_COUNT_HW_CACHE_OP_MAX)
return -EINVAL;
cache_result = (config >> 16) & 0xff;
if (cache_result >= PERF_COUNT_HW_CACHE_RESULT_MAX)
return -EINVAL;
ret = (int)(*cache_map)[cache_type][cache_op][cache_result];
if (ret == CACHE_OP_UNSUPPORTED)
return -ENOENT;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ARM: 7809/1: perf: fix event validation for software group leaders
It is possible to construct an event group with a software event as a
group leader and then subsequently add a hardware event to the group.
This results in the event group being validated by adding all members
of the group to a fake PMU and attempting to allocate each event on
their respective PMU.
Unfortunately, for software events wthout a corresponding arm_pmu, this
results in a kernel crash attempting to dereference the ->get_event_idx
function pointer.
This patch fixes the problem by checking explicitly for software events
and ignoring those in event validation (since they can always be
scheduled). We will probably want to revisit this for 3.12, since the
validation checks don't appear to work correctly when dealing with
multiple hardware PMUs anyway.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Tested-by: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Tested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 29,788 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pmcraid_allocate_control_blocks(struct pmcraid_instance *pinstance)
{
int i;
sprintf(pinstance->ctl_pool_name, "pmcraid_control_pool_%d",
pinstance->host->unique_id);
pinstance->control_pool =
pci_pool_create(pinstance->ctl_pool_name,
pinstance->pdev,
sizeof(struct pmcraid_control_block),
PMCRAID_IOARCB_ALIGNMENT, 0);
if (!pinstance->control_pool)
return -ENOMEM;
for (i = 0; i < PMCRAID_MAX_CMD; i++) {
pinstance->cmd_list[i]->ioa_cb =
pci_pool_alloc(
pinstance->control_pool,
GFP_KERNEL,
&(pinstance->cmd_list[i]->ioa_cb_bus_addr));
if (!pinstance->cmd_list[i]->ioa_cb) {
pmcraid_release_control_blocks(pinstance, i);
return -ENOMEM;
}
memset(pinstance->cmd_list[i]->ioa_cb, 0,
sizeof(struct pmcraid_control_block));
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: [SCSI] pmcraid: reject negative request size
There's a code path in pmcraid that can be reached via device ioctl that
causes all sorts of ugliness, including heap corruption or triggering the
OOM killer due to consecutive allocation of large numbers of pages.
First, the user can call pmcraid_chr_ioctl(), with a type
PMCRAID_PASSTHROUGH_IOCTL. This calls through to
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough(). Next, a pmcraid_passthrough_ioctl_buffer
is copied in, and the request_size variable is set to
buffer->ioarcb.data_transfer_length, which is an arbitrary 32-bit
signed value provided by the user. If a negative value is provided
here, bad things can happen. For example,
pmcraid_build_passthrough_ioadls() is called with this request_size,
which immediately calls pmcraid_alloc_sglist() with a negative size.
The resulting math on allocating a scatter list can result in an
overflow in the kzalloc() call (if num_elem is 0, the sglist will be
smaller than expected), or if num_elem is unexpectedly large the
subsequent loop will call alloc_pages() repeatedly, a high number of
pages will be allocated and the OOM killer might be invoked.
It looks like preventing this value from being negative in
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough() would be sufficient.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <JBottomley@Parallels.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 26,412 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tipc_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int lvl, int opt,
char __user *ov, int __user *ol)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct tipc_sock *tsk = tipc_sk(sk);
int len;
u32 value;
int res;
if ((lvl == IPPROTO_TCP) && (sock->type == SOCK_STREAM))
return put_user(0, ol);
if (lvl != SOL_TIPC)
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
res = get_user(len, ol);
if (res)
return res;
lock_sock(sk);
switch (opt) {
case TIPC_IMPORTANCE:
value = tsk_importance(tsk);
break;
case TIPC_SRC_DROPPABLE:
value = tsk_unreliable(tsk);
break;
case TIPC_DEST_DROPPABLE:
value = tsk_unreturnable(tsk);
break;
case TIPC_CONN_TIMEOUT:
value = tsk->conn_timeout;
/* no need to set "res", since already 0 at this point */
break;
case TIPC_NODE_RECVQ_DEPTH:
value = 0; /* was tipc_queue_size, now obsolete */
break;
case TIPC_SOCK_RECVQ_DEPTH:
value = skb_queue_len(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
break;
default:
res = -EINVAL;
}
release_sock(sk);
if (res)
return res; /* "get" failed */
if (len < sizeof(value))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_to_user(ov, &value, sizeof(value)))
return -EFAULT;
return put_user(sizeof(value), ol);
}
Commit Message: tipc: check nl sock before parsing nested attributes
Make sure the socket for which the user is listing publication exists
before parsing the socket netlink attributes.
Prior to this patch a call without any socket caused a NULL pointer
dereference in tipc_nl_publ_dump().
Tested-and-reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Alpe <richard.alpe@ericsson.com>
Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.cm>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 52,481 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mp_break_ctl(struct tty_struct *tty, int break_state)
{
struct sb_uart_state *state = tty->driver_data;
struct sb_uart_port *port = state->port;
MP_STATE_LOCK(state);
if (port->type != PORT_UNKNOWN)
port->ops->break_ctl(port, break_state);
MP_STATE_UNLOCK(state);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Staging: sb105x: info leak in mp_get_count()
The icount.reserved[] array isn't initialized so it leaks stack
information to userspace.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 29,379 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AutomationProvider::~AutomationProvider() {
STLDeleteContainerPairSecondPointers(port_containers_.begin(),
port_containers_.end());
port_containers_.clear();
if (channel_.get())
channel_->Close();
g_browser_process->ReleaseModule();
}
Commit Message: Rename the TabContentWrapper pieces to be "TabHelper"s. (Except for the PasswordManager... for now.) Also, just pre-create them up-front. It saves us effort, as they're all going to be eventually created anyway, so being lazy saves us nothing and creates headaches since the rules about what can be lazy differ from feature to feature.
BUG=71097
TEST=zero visible change
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6480117
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@75170 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 101,988 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void LocationPutForwardsAttributeGetter(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
V8SetReturnValueFast(info, WTF::GetPtr(impl->locationPutForwards()), impl);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 134,816 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderProcessHostImpl::IsSuitableHost(
RenderProcessHost* host,
BrowserContext* browser_context,
const GURL& site_url) {
if (run_renderer_in_process())
return true;
if (host->GetBrowserContext() != browser_context)
return false;
StoragePartition* dest_partition =
BrowserContext::GetStoragePartitionForSite(browser_context, site_url);
if (!host->InSameStoragePartition(dest_partition))
return false;
if (host->IsGuest())
return true;
if (!host->IsGuest() && site_url.SchemeIs(chrome::kGuestScheme))
return false;
WebUIControllerFactory* factory =
GetContentClient()->browser()->GetWebUIControllerFactory();
if (factory &&
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance()->HasWebUIBindings(
host->GetID()) !=
factory->UseWebUIBindingsForURL(browser_context, site_url)) {
return false;
}
return GetContentClient()->browser()->IsSuitableHost(host, site_url);
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,540 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void net_tx_action(struct softirq_action *h)
{
struct softnet_data *sd = &__get_cpu_var(softnet_data);
if (sd->completion_queue) {
struct sk_buff *clist;
local_irq_disable();
clist = sd->completion_queue;
sd->completion_queue = NULL;
local_irq_enable();
while (clist) {
struct sk_buff *skb = clist;
clist = clist->next;
WARN_ON(atomic_read(&skb->users));
trace_kfree_skb(skb, net_tx_action);
__kfree_skb(skb);
}
}
if (sd->output_queue) {
struct Qdisc *head;
local_irq_disable();
head = sd->output_queue;
sd->output_queue = NULL;
sd->output_queue_tailp = &sd->output_queue;
local_irq_enable();
while (head) {
struct Qdisc *q = head;
spinlock_t *root_lock;
head = head->next_sched;
root_lock = qdisc_lock(q);
if (spin_trylock(root_lock)) {
smp_mb__before_clear_bit();
clear_bit(__QDISC_STATE_SCHED,
&q->state);
qdisc_run(q);
spin_unlock(root_lock);
} else {
if (!test_bit(__QDISC_STATE_DEACTIVATED,
&q->state)) {
__netif_reschedule(q);
} else {
smp_mb__before_clear_bit();
clear_bit(__QDISC_STATE_SCHED,
&q->state);
}
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: net: don't allow CAP_NET_ADMIN to load non-netdev kernel modules
Since a8f80e8ff94ecba629542d9b4b5f5a8ee3eb565c any process with
CAP_NET_ADMIN may load any module from /lib/modules/. This doesn't mean
that CAP_NET_ADMIN is a superset of CAP_SYS_MODULE as modules are
limited to /lib/modules/**. However, CAP_NET_ADMIN capability shouldn't
allow anybody load any module not related to networking.
This patch restricts an ability of autoloading modules to netdev modules
with explicit aliases. This fixes CVE-2011-1019.
Arnd Bergmann suggested to leave untouched the old pre-v2.6.32 behavior
of loading netdev modules by name (without any prefix) for processes
with CAP_SYS_MODULE to maintain the compatibility with network scripts
that use autoloading netdev modules by aliases like "eth0", "wlan0".
Currently there are only three users of the feature in the upstream
kernel: ipip, ip_gre and sit.
root@albatros:~# capsh --drop=$(seq -s, 0 11),$(seq -s, 13 34) --
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: fffffff800001000
CapEff: fffffff800001000
CapBnd: fffffff800001000
root@albatros:~# modprobe xfs
FATAL: Error inserting xfs
(/lib/modules/2.6.38-rc6-00001-g2bf4ca3/kernel/fs/xfs/xfs.ko): Operation not permitted
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit
sit: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit0
sit0 Link encap:IPv6-in-IPv4
NOARP MTU:1480 Metric:1
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
sit 10457 0
tunnel4 2957 1 sit
For CAP_SYS_MODULE module loading is still relaxed:
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: ffffffffffffffff
CapEff: ffffffffffffffff
CapBnd: ffffffffffffffff
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
xfs 745319 0
Reference: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/24/203
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 35,276 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ModuleExport size_t RegisterICONImage(void)
{
MagickInfo
*entry;
entry=AcquireMagickInfo("ICON","CUR","Microsoft icon");
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadICONImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WriteICONImage;
entry->flags^=CoderAdjoinFlag;
entry->flags|=CoderSeekableStreamFlag;
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
entry=AcquireMagickInfo("ICON","ICO","Microsoft icon");
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadICONImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WriteICONImage;
entry->flags|=CoderSeekableStreamFlag;
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
entry=AcquireMagickInfo("ICON","ICON","Microsoft icon");
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadICONImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WriteICONImage;
entry->flags^=CoderAdjoinFlag;
entry->flags|=CoderSeekableStreamFlag;
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
return(MagickImageCoderSignature);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 74,046 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int icmp6_checkentry(const struct xt_mtchk_param *par)
{
const struct ip6t_icmp *icmpinfo = par->matchinfo;
/* Must specify no unknown invflags */
return (icmpinfo->invflags & ~IP6T_ICMP_INV) ? -EINVAL : 0;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: make sure e->next_offset covers remaining blob size
Otherwise this function may read data beyond the ruleset blob.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 52,355 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool TabStripGtk::CanPaintOnlyFavicons(const GdkRectangle* rects,
int num_rects, std::vector<int>* tabs_to_paint) {
int t = 0;
for (int r = 0; r < num_rects; ++r) {
while (t < GetTabCount()) {
TabGtk* tab = GetTabAt(t);
if (GdkRectMatchesTabFaviconBounds(rects[r], tab) &&
tab->ShouldShowIcon()) {
tabs_to_paint->push_back(t);
++t;
break;
}
++t;
}
}
return static_cast<int>(tabs_to_paint->size()) == num_rects;
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 118,067 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: brcmf_cfg80211_set_power_mgmt(struct wiphy *wiphy, struct net_device *ndev,
bool enabled, s32 timeout)
{
s32 pm;
s32 err = 0;
struct brcmf_cfg80211_info *cfg = wiphy_to_cfg(wiphy);
struct brcmf_if *ifp = netdev_priv(ndev);
brcmf_dbg(TRACE, "Enter\n");
/*
* Powersave enable/disable request is coming from the
* cfg80211 even before the interface is up. In that
* scenario, driver will be storing the power save
* preference in cfg struct to apply this to
* FW later while initializing the dongle
*/
cfg->pwr_save = enabled;
if (!check_vif_up(ifp->vif)) {
brcmf_dbg(INFO, "Device is not ready, storing the value in cfg_info struct\n");
goto done;
}
pm = enabled ? PM_FAST : PM_OFF;
/* Do not enable the power save after assoc if it is a p2p interface */
if (ifp->vif->wdev.iftype == NL80211_IFTYPE_P2P_CLIENT) {
brcmf_dbg(INFO, "Do not enable power save for P2P clients\n");
pm = PM_OFF;
}
brcmf_dbg(INFO, "power save %s\n", (pm ? "enabled" : "disabled"));
err = brcmf_fil_cmd_int_set(ifp, BRCMF_C_SET_PM, pm);
if (err) {
if (err == -ENODEV)
brcmf_err("net_device is not ready yet\n");
else
brcmf_err("error (%d)\n", err);
}
done:
brcmf_dbg(TRACE, "Exit\n");
return err;
}
Commit Message: brcmfmac: avoid potential stack overflow in brcmf_cfg80211_start_ap()
User-space can choose to omit NL80211_ATTR_SSID and only provide raw
IE TLV data. When doing so it can provide SSID IE with length exceeding
the allowed size. The driver further processes this IE copying it
into a local variable without checking the length. Hence stack can be
corrupted and used as exploit.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.7
Reported-by: Daxing Guo <freener.gdx@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Hante Meuleman <hante.meuleman@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Pieter-Paul Giesberts <pieter-paul.giesberts@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Franky Lin <franky.lin@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Arend van Spriel <arend.vanspriel@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 49,037 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RunMultipleWheelScroll() {
DoSmoothWheelScroll(gfx::Vector2d(0, 100));
while (!VerifyRecordedSamplesForHistogram(
1, "Event.Latency.ScrollBegin.Wheel.TimeToScrollUpdateSwapBegin4")) {
GiveItSomeTime();
FetchHistogramsFromChildProcesses();
}
while (!VerifyRecordedSamplesForHistogram(
1, "Event.Latency.ScrollUpdate.Wheel.TimeToScrollUpdateSwapBegin4")) {
GiveItSomeTime();
FetchHistogramsFromChildProcesses();
}
}
Commit Message: Revert "Add explicit flag for compositor scrollbar injected gestures"
This reverts commit d9a56afcbdf9850bc39bb3edb56d07d11a1eb2b2.
Reason for revert:
Findit (https://goo.gl/kROfz5) identified CL at revision 669086 as the
culprit for flakes in the build cycles as shown on:
https://analysis.chromium.org/p/chromium/flake-portal/analysis/culprit?key=ag9zfmZpbmRpdC1mb3ItbWVyQwsSDEZsYWtlQ3VscHJpdCIxY2hyb21pdW0vZDlhNTZhZmNiZGY5ODUwYmMzOWJiM2VkYjU2ZDA3ZDExYTFlYjJiMgw
Sample Failed Build: https://ci.chromium.org/buildbot/chromium.chromiumos/linux-chromeos-rel/25818
Sample Failed Step: content_browsertests on Ubuntu-16.04
Sample Flaky Test: ScrollLatencyScrollbarBrowserTest.ScrollbarThumbDragLatency
Original change's description:
> Add explicit flag for compositor scrollbar injected gestures
>
> The original change to enable scrollbar latency for the composited
> scrollbars incorrectly used an existing member to try and determine
> whether a GestureScrollUpdate was the first one in an injected sequence
> or not. is_first_gesture_scroll_update_ was incorrect because it is only
> updated when input is actually dispatched to InputHandlerProxy, and the
> flag is cleared for all GSUs before the location where it was being
> read.
>
> This bug was missed because of incorrect tests. The
> VerifyRecordedSamplesForHistogram method doesn't actually assert or
> expect anything - the return value must be inspected.
>
> As part of fixing up the tests, I made a few other changes to get them
> passing consistently across all platforms:
> - turn on main thread scrollbar injection feature (in case it's ever
> turned off we don't want the tests to start failing)
> - enable mock scrollbars
> - disable smooth scrolling
> - don't run scrollbar tests on Android
>
> The composited scrollbar button test is disabled due to a bug in how
> the mock theme reports its button sizes, which throws off the region
> detection in ScrollbarLayerImplBase::IdentifyScrollbarPart (filed
> crbug.com/974063 for this issue).
>
> Change-Id: Ie1a762a5f6ecc264d22f0256db68f141fc76b950
>
> Bug: 954007
> Change-Id: Ib258e08e083e79da90ba2e4e4216e4879cf00cf7
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1652741
> Commit-Queue: Daniel Libby <dlibby@microsoft.com>
> Reviewed-by: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#669086}
Change-Id: Icc743e48fa740fe27f0cb0cfa21b209a696f518c
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
Bug: 954007
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1660114
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#669150}
CWE ID: CWE-281 | 0 | 137,954 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static RELOC_PTRS_WITH(device_forward_reloc_ptrs, gx_device_forward *fdev)
{
fdev->target = gx_device_reloc_ptr(fdev->target, gcst);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-78 | 0 | 2,776 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ExtensionResourceRequestPolicy::CanRequestResource(
const GURL& resource_url,
const GURL& frame_url,
const ExtensionSet* loaded_extensions) {
CHECK(resource_url.SchemeIs(chrome::kExtensionScheme));
const Extension* extension =
loaded_extensions->GetExtensionOrAppByURL(ExtensionURLInfo(resource_url));
if (!extension) {
return true;
}
std::string resource_root_relative_path =
resource_url.path().empty() ? "" : resource_url.path().substr(1);
if (extension->is_hosted_app() &&
!extension->icons().ContainsPath(resource_root_relative_path)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Denying load of " << resource_url.spec() << " from "
<< "hosted app.";
return false;
}
if (!CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kDisableExtensionsResourceWhitelist) &&
!frame_url.is_empty() &&
!frame_url.SchemeIs(chrome::kExtensionScheme) &&
!extension->IsResourceWebAccessible(resource_url.path())) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Denying load of " << resource_url.spec() << " which "
<< "is not a web accessible resource.";
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Do not require DevTools extension resources to be white-listed in manifest.
Currently, resources used by DevTools extensions need to be white-listed as web_accessible_resources in manifest. This is quite inconvenitent and appears to be an overkill, given the fact that DevTools front-end is
(a) trusted and
(b) picky on the frames it loads.
This change adds resources that belong to DevTools extensions and are being loaded into a DevTools front-end page to the list of exceptions from web_accessible_resources check.
BUG=none
TEST=DevToolsExtensionTest.*
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9663076
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126378 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 171,001 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CloudPolicyController::CloudPolicyController(
DeviceManagementService* service,
CloudPolicyCacheBase* cache,
DeviceTokenFetcher* token_fetcher,
CloudPolicyDataStore* data_store,
PolicyNotifier* notifier,
DelayedWorkScheduler* scheduler) {
Initialize(service,
cache,
token_fetcher,
data_store,
notifier,
scheduler);
}
Commit Message: Reset the device policy machinery upon retrying enrollment.
BUG=chromium-os:18208
TEST=See bug description
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7676005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97615 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 97,755 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int php_openssl_make_REQ(struct php_x509_request * req, X509_REQ * csr, zval * dn, zval * attribs TSRMLS_DC)
{
STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) * dn_sk, *attr_sk = NULL;
char * str, *dn_sect, *attr_sect;
dn_sect = CONF_get_string(req->req_config, req->section_name, "distinguished_name");
if (dn_sect == NULL) {
return FAILURE;
}
dn_sk = CONF_get_section(req->req_config, dn_sect);
if (dn_sk == NULL) {
return FAILURE;
}
attr_sect = CONF_get_string(req->req_config, req->section_name, "attributes");
if (attr_sect == NULL) {
attr_sk = NULL;
} else {
attr_sk = CONF_get_section(req->req_config, attr_sect);
if (attr_sk == NULL) {
return FAILURE;
}
}
/* setup the version number: version 1 */
if (X509_REQ_set_version(csr, 0L)) {
int i, nid;
char * type;
CONF_VALUE * v;
X509_NAME * subj;
HashPosition hpos;
zval ** item;
subj = X509_REQ_get_subject_name(csr);
/* apply values from the dn hash */
zend_hash_internal_pointer_reset_ex(HASH_OF(dn), &hpos);
while(zend_hash_get_current_data_ex(HASH_OF(dn), (void**)&item, &hpos) == SUCCESS) {
char * strindex = NULL;
uint strindexlen = 0;
ulong intindex;
zend_hash_get_current_key_ex(HASH_OF(dn), &strindex, &strindexlen, &intindex, 0, &hpos);
convert_to_string_ex(item);
if (strindex) {
int nid;
nid = OBJ_txt2nid(strindex);
if (nid != NID_undef) {
if (!X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID(subj, nid, MBSTRING_UTF8,
(unsigned char*)Z_STRVAL_PP(item), -1, -1, 0))
{
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING,
"dn: add_entry_by_NID %d -> %s (failed; check error"
" queue and value of string_mask OpenSSL option "
"if illegal characters are reported)",
nid, Z_STRVAL_PP(item));
return FAILURE;
}
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "dn: %s is not a recognized name", strindex);
}
}
zend_hash_move_forward_ex(HASH_OF(dn), &hpos);
}
/* Finally apply defaults from config file */
for(i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(dn_sk); i++) {
int len;
char buffer[200 + 1]; /*200 + \0 !*/
v = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(dn_sk, i);
type = v->name;
len = strlen(type);
if (len < sizeof("_default")) {
continue;
}
len -= sizeof("_default") - 1;
if (strcmp("_default", type + len) != 0) {
continue;
}
if (len > 200) {
len = 200;
}
memcpy(buffer, type, len);
buffer[len] = '\0';
type = buffer;
/* Skip past any leading X. X: X, etc to allow for multiple
* instances */
for (str = type; *str; str++) {
if (*str == ':' || *str == ',' || *str == '.') {
str++;
if (*str) {
type = str;
}
break;
}
}
/* if it is already set, skip this */
nid = OBJ_txt2nid(type);
if (X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(subj, nid, -1) >= 0) {
continue;
}
if (!X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(subj, type, MBSTRING_UTF8, (unsigned char*)v->value, -1, -1, 0)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "add_entry_by_txt %s -> %s (failed)", type, v->value);
return FAILURE;
}
if (!X509_NAME_entry_count(subj)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "no objects specified in config file");
return FAILURE;
}
}
if (attribs) {
zend_hash_internal_pointer_reset_ex(HASH_OF(attribs), &hpos);
while(zend_hash_get_current_data_ex(HASH_OF(attribs), (void**)&item, &hpos) == SUCCESS) {
char *strindex = NULL;
uint strindexlen;
ulong intindex;
zend_hash_get_current_key_ex(HASH_OF(attribs), &strindex, &strindexlen, &intindex, 0, &hpos);
convert_to_string_ex(item);
if (strindex) {
int nid;
nid = OBJ_txt2nid(strindex);
if (nid != NID_undef) {
if (!X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID(subj, nid, MBSTRING_UTF8, (unsigned char*)Z_STRVAL_PP(item), -1, -1, 0)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "attribs: add_entry_by_NID %d -> %s (failed)", nid, Z_STRVAL_PP(item));
return FAILURE;
}
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "dn: %s is not a recognized name", strindex);
}
}
zend_hash_move_forward_ex(HASH_OF(attribs), &hpos);
}
for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(attr_sk); i++) {
v = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(attr_sk, i);
/* if it is already set, skip this */
nid = OBJ_txt2nid(v->name);
if (X509_REQ_get_attr_by_NID(csr, nid, -1) >= 0) {
continue;
}
if (!X509_REQ_add1_attr_by_txt(csr, v->name, MBSTRING_UTF8, (unsigned char*)v->value, -1)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING,
"add1_attr_by_txt %s -> %s (failed; check error queue "
"and value of string_mask OpenSSL option if illegal "
"characters are reported)",
v->name, v->value);
return FAILURE;
}
}
}
}
X509_REQ_set_pubkey(csr, req->priv_key);
return SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-754 | 0 | 4,685 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct buffer_head * ext4_find_entry (struct inode *dir,
const struct qstr *d_name,
struct ext4_dir_entry_2 ** res_dir)
{
struct super_block *sb;
struct buffer_head *bh_use[NAMEI_RA_SIZE];
struct buffer_head *bh, *ret = NULL;
ext4_lblk_t start, block, b;
const u8 *name = d_name->name;
int ra_max = 0; /* Number of bh's in the readahead
buffer, bh_use[] */
int ra_ptr = 0; /* Current index into readahead
buffer */
int num = 0;
ext4_lblk_t nblocks;
int i, err;
int namelen;
*res_dir = NULL;
sb = dir->i_sb;
namelen = d_name->len;
if (namelen > EXT4_NAME_LEN)
return NULL;
if ((namelen <= 2) && (name[0] == '.') &&
(name[1] == '.' || name[1] == '\0')) {
/*
* "." or ".." will only be in the first block
* NFS may look up ".."; "." should be handled by the VFS
*/
block = start = 0;
nblocks = 1;
goto restart;
}
if (is_dx(dir)) {
bh = ext4_dx_find_entry(dir, d_name, res_dir, &err);
/*
* On success, or if the error was file not found,
* return. Otherwise, fall back to doing a search the
* old fashioned way.
*/
if (bh || (err != ERR_BAD_DX_DIR))
return bh;
dxtrace(printk(KERN_DEBUG "ext4_find_entry: dx failed, "
"falling back\n"));
}
nblocks = dir->i_size >> EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE_BITS(sb);
start = EXT4_I(dir)->i_dir_start_lookup;
if (start >= nblocks)
start = 0;
block = start;
restart:
do {
/*
* We deal with the read-ahead logic here.
*/
if (ra_ptr >= ra_max) {
/* Refill the readahead buffer */
ra_ptr = 0;
b = block;
for (ra_max = 0; ra_max < NAMEI_RA_SIZE; ra_max++) {
/*
* Terminate if we reach the end of the
* directory and must wrap, or if our
* search has finished at this block.
*/
if (b >= nblocks || (num && block == start)) {
bh_use[ra_max] = NULL;
break;
}
num++;
bh = ext4_getblk(NULL, dir, b++, 0, &err);
bh_use[ra_max] = bh;
if (bh)
ll_rw_block(READ | REQ_META | REQ_PRIO,
1, &bh);
}
}
if ((bh = bh_use[ra_ptr++]) == NULL)
goto next;
wait_on_buffer(bh);
if (!buffer_uptodate(bh)) {
/* read error, skip block & hope for the best */
EXT4_ERROR_INODE(dir, "reading directory lblock %lu",
(unsigned long) block);
brelse(bh);
goto next;
}
if (!buffer_verified(bh) &&
!ext4_dirent_csum_verify(dir,
(struct ext4_dir_entry *)bh->b_data)) {
EXT4_ERROR_INODE(dir, "checksumming directory "
"block %lu", (unsigned long)block);
brelse(bh);
goto next;
}
set_buffer_verified(bh);
i = search_dirblock(bh, dir, d_name,
block << EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE_BITS(sb), res_dir);
if (i == 1) {
EXT4_I(dir)->i_dir_start_lookup = block;
ret = bh;
goto cleanup_and_exit;
} else {
brelse(bh);
if (i < 0)
goto cleanup_and_exit;
}
next:
if (++block >= nblocks)
block = 0;
} while (block != start);
/*
* If the directory has grown while we were searching, then
* search the last part of the directory before giving up.
*/
block = nblocks;
nblocks = dir->i_size >> EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE_BITS(sb);
if (block < nblocks) {
start = 0;
goto restart;
}
cleanup_and_exit:
/* Clean up the read-ahead blocks */
for (; ra_ptr < ra_max; ra_ptr++)
brelse(bh_use[ra_ptr]);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ext4: make orphan functions be no-op in no-journal mode
Instead of checking whether the handle is valid, we check if journal
is enabled. This avoids taking the s_orphan_lock mutex in all cases
when there is no journal in use, including the error paths where
ext4_orphan_del() is called with a handle set to NULL.
Signed-off-by: Anatol Pomozov <anatol.pomozov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 42,069 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BlinkTestRunner::TestFinished() {
if (!is_main_window_) {
Send(new ShellViewHostMsg_TestFinishedInSecondaryWindow(routing_id()));
return;
}
WebTestInterfaces* interfaces =
LayoutTestRenderProcessObserver::GetInstance()->test_interfaces();
interfaces->SetTestIsRunning(false);
if (interfaces->TestRunner()->ShouldDumpBackForwardList()) {
SyncNavigationStateVisitor visitor;
RenderView::ForEach(&visitor);
Send(new ShellViewHostMsg_CaptureSessionHistory(routing_id()));
} else {
CaptureDump();
}
}
Commit Message: content: Rename webkit_test_helpers.{cc,h} to blink_test_helpers.{cc,h}
Now that webkit/ is gone, we are preparing ourselves for the merge of
third_party/WebKit into //blink.
BUG=None
BUG=content_shell && content_unittests
R=avi@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1118183003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#328202}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 123,610 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void _php_image_convert(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS, int image_type )
{
char *f_org, *f_dest;
int f_org_len, f_dest_len;
long height, width, threshold;
gdImagePtr im_org, im_dest, im_tmp;
char *fn_org = NULL;
char *fn_dest = NULL;
FILE *org, *dest;
int dest_height = -1;
int dest_width = -1;
int org_height, org_width;
int white, black;
int color, color_org, median;
int int_threshold;
int x, y;
float x_ratio, y_ratio;
long ignore_warning;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "pplll", &f_org, &f_org_len, &f_dest, &f_dest_len, &height, &width, &threshold) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
fn_org = f_org;
fn_dest = f_dest;
dest_height = height;
dest_width = width;
int_threshold = threshold;
/* Check threshold value */
if (int_threshold < 0 || int_threshold > 8) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Invalid threshold value '%d'", int_threshold);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
/* Check origin file */
PHP_GD_CHECK_OPEN_BASEDIR(fn_org, "Invalid origin filename");
/* Check destination file */
PHP_GD_CHECK_OPEN_BASEDIR(fn_dest, "Invalid destination filename");
/* Open origin file */
org = VCWD_FOPEN(fn_org, "rb");
if (!org) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to open '%s' for reading", fn_org);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
/* Open destination file */
dest = VCWD_FOPEN(fn_dest, "wb");
if (!dest) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to open '%s' for writing", fn_dest);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
switch (image_type) {
case PHP_GDIMG_TYPE_GIF:
im_org = gdImageCreateFromGif(org);
if (im_org == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to open '%s' Not a valid GIF file", fn_dest);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
break;
#ifdef HAVE_GD_JPG
case PHP_GDIMG_TYPE_JPG:
ignore_warning = INI_INT("gd.jpeg_ignore_warning");
im_org = gdImageCreateFromJpegEx(org, ignore_warning);
if (im_org == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to open '%s' Not a valid JPEG file", fn_dest);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
break;
#endif /* HAVE_GD_JPG */
#ifdef HAVE_GD_PNG
case PHP_GDIMG_TYPE_PNG:
im_org = gdImageCreateFromPng(org);
if (im_org == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to open '%s' Not a valid PNG file", fn_dest);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
break;
#endif /* HAVE_GD_PNG */
default:
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Format not supported");
RETURN_FALSE;
break;
}
org_width = gdImageSX (im_org);
org_height = gdImageSY (im_org);
x_ratio = (float) org_width / (float) dest_width;
y_ratio = (float) org_height / (float) dest_height;
if (x_ratio > 1 && y_ratio > 1) {
if (y_ratio > x_ratio) {
x_ratio = y_ratio;
} else {
y_ratio = x_ratio;
}
dest_width = (int) (org_width / x_ratio);
dest_height = (int) (org_height / y_ratio);
} else {
x_ratio = (float) dest_width / (float) org_width;
y_ratio = (float) dest_height / (float) org_height;
if (y_ratio < x_ratio) {
x_ratio = y_ratio;
} else {
y_ratio = x_ratio;
}
dest_width = (int) (org_width * x_ratio);
dest_height = (int) (org_height * y_ratio);
}
im_tmp = gdImageCreate (dest_width, dest_height);
if (im_tmp == NULL ) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to allocate temporary buffer");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
gdImageCopyResized (im_tmp, im_org, 0, 0, 0, 0, dest_width, dest_height, org_width, org_height);
gdImageDestroy(im_org);
fclose(org);
im_dest = gdImageCreate(dest_width, dest_height);
if (im_dest == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to allocate destination buffer");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
white = gdImageColorAllocate(im_dest, 255, 255, 255);
if (white == -1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to allocate the colors for the destination buffer");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
black = gdImageColorAllocate(im_dest, 0, 0, 0);
if (black == -1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to allocate the colors for the destination buffer");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
int_threshold = int_threshold * 32;
for (y = 0; y < dest_height; y++) {
for (x = 0; x < dest_width; x++) {
color_org = gdImageGetPixel (im_tmp, x, y);
median = (im_tmp->red[color_org] + im_tmp->green[color_org] + im_tmp->blue[color_org]) / 3;
if (median < int_threshold) {
color = black;
} else {
color = white;
}
gdImageSetPixel (im_dest, x, y, color);
}
}
gdImageDestroy (im_tmp );
gdImageWBMP(im_dest, black , dest);
fflush(dest);
fclose(dest);
gdImageDestroy(im_dest);
RETURN_TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fixed bug #66356 (Heap Overflow Vulnerability in imagecrop())
And also fixed the bug: arguments are altered after some calls
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 39,238 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::open(Document* entered_document,
ExceptionState& exception_state) {
if (ImportLoader()) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
kInvalidStateError, "Imported document doesn't support open().");
return;
}
if (!IsHTMLDocument()) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(kInvalidStateError,
"Only HTML documents support open().");
return;
}
if (throw_on_dynamic_markup_insertion_count_) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
kInvalidStateError,
"Custom Element constructor should not use open().");
return;
}
if (entered_document) {
if (!GetSecurityOrigin()->IsSameSchemeHostPortAndSuborigin(
entered_document->GetSecurityOrigin())) {
exception_state.ThrowSecurityError(
"Can only call open() on same-origin documents.");
return;
}
SetSecurityOrigin(entered_document->GetSecurityOrigin());
if (this != entered_document) {
KURL new_url = entered_document->Url();
new_url.SetFragmentIdentifier(String());
SetURL(new_url);
SetReferrerPolicy(entered_document->GetReferrerPolicy());
}
cookie_url_ = entered_document->CookieURL();
}
open();
}
Commit Message: Fixed bug where PlzNavigate CSP in a iframe did not get the inherited CSP
When inheriting the CSP from a parent document to a local-scheme CSP,
it does not always get propagated to the PlzNavigate CSP. This means
that PlzNavigate CSP checks (like `frame-src`) would be ran against
a blank policy instead of the proper inherited policy.
Bug: 778658
Change-Id: I61bb0d432e1cea52f199e855624cb7b3078f56a9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/765969
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#518245}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 146,797 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: HB_Error HB_GPOS_Query_Features( HB_GPOSHeader* gpos,
HB_UShort script_index,
HB_UShort language_index,
HB_UInt** feature_tag_list )
{
HB_UShort n;
HB_Error error;
HB_UInt* ftl;
HB_ScriptList* sl;
HB_ScriptRecord* sr;
HB_ScriptTable* s;
HB_LangSysRecord* lsr;
HB_LangSys* ls;
HB_UShort* fi;
HB_FeatureList* fl;
HB_FeatureRecord* fr;
if ( !gpos || !feature_tag_list )
return ERR(HB_Err_Invalid_Argument);
sl = &gpos->ScriptList;
sr = sl->ScriptRecord;
fl = &gpos->FeatureList;
fr = fl->FeatureRecord;
if ( script_index >= sl->ScriptCount )
return ERR(HB_Err_Invalid_Argument);
s = &sr[script_index].Script;
lsr = s->LangSysRecord;
if ( language_index == 0xFFFF )
ls = &s->DefaultLangSys;
else
{
if ( language_index >= s->LangSysCount )
return ERR(HB_Err_Invalid_Argument);
ls = &lsr[language_index].LangSys;
}
fi = ls->FeatureIndex;
if ( ALLOC_ARRAY( ftl, ls->FeatureCount + 1, HB_UInt ) )
return error;
for ( n = 0; n < ls->FeatureCount; n++ )
{
if ( fi[n] >= fl->FeatureCount )
{
FREE( ftl );
return ERR(HB_Err_Invalid_SubTable_Format);
}
ftl[n] = fr[fi[n]].FeatureTag;
}
ftl[n] = 0;
*feature_tag_list = ftl;
return HB_Err_Ok;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,559 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: hash_init( hashtable* ht,
FT_Memory memory )
{
int sz = INITIAL_HT_SIZE;
FT_Error error = BDF_Err_Ok;
ht->size = sz;
ht->limit = sz / 3;
ht->used = 0;
if ( FT_NEW_ARRAY( ht->table, sz ) )
goto Exit;
Exit:
return error;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 6,526 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void stream_int_shutr(struct stream_interface *si)
{
si->ib->flags &= ~CF_SHUTR_NOW;
if (si->ib->flags & CF_SHUTR)
return;
si->ib->flags |= CF_SHUTR;
si->ib->rex = TICK_ETERNITY;
si->flags &= ~SI_FL_WAIT_ROOM;
if (si->state != SI_ST_EST && si->state != SI_ST_CON)
return;
if (si->ob->flags & CF_SHUTW) {
si->state = SI_ST_DIS;
si->exp = TICK_ETERNITY;
si_applet_release(si);
}
else if (si->flags & SI_FL_NOHALF) {
/* we want to immediately forward this close to the write side */
return stream_int_shutw(si);
}
/* note that if the task exists, it must unregister itself once it runs */
if (!(si->flags & SI_FL_DONT_WAKE) && si->owner)
task_wakeup(si->owner, TASK_WOKEN_IO);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 9,885 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xfs_reclaim_inodes_count(
struct xfs_mount *mp)
{
struct xfs_perag *pag;
xfs_agnumber_t ag = 0;
int reclaimable = 0;
while ((pag = xfs_perag_get_tag(mp, ag, XFS_ICI_RECLAIM_TAG))) {
ag = pag->pag_agno + 1;
reclaimable += pag->pag_ici_reclaimable;
xfs_perag_put(pag);
}
return reclaimable;
}
Commit Message: xfs: validate cached inodes are free when allocated
A recent fuzzed filesystem image cached random dcache corruption
when the reproducer was run. This often showed up as panics in
lookup_slow() on a null inode->i_ops pointer when doing pathwalks.
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000000
....
Call Trace:
lookup_slow+0x44/0x60
walk_component+0x3dd/0x9f0
link_path_walk+0x4a7/0x830
path_lookupat+0xc1/0x470
filename_lookup+0x129/0x270
user_path_at_empty+0x36/0x40
path_listxattr+0x98/0x110
SyS_listxattr+0x13/0x20
do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x280
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7
but had many different failure modes including deadlocks trying to
lock the inode that was just allocated or KASAN reports of
use-after-free violations.
The cause of the problem was a corrupt INOBT on a v4 fs where the
root inode was marked as free in the inobt record. Hence when we
allocated an inode, it chose the root inode to allocate, found it in
the cache and re-initialised it.
We recently fixed a similar inode allocation issue caused by inobt
record corruption problem in xfs_iget_cache_miss() in commit
ee457001ed6c ("xfs: catch inode allocation state mismatch
corruption"). This change adds similar checks to the cache-hit path
to catch it, and turns the reproducer into a corruption shutdown
situation.
Reported-by: Wen Xu <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Signed-Off-By: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
[darrick: fix typos in comment]
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 79,982 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: InputDispatcher::splitMotionEvent(const MotionEntry* originalMotionEntry, BitSet32 pointerIds) {
ALOG_ASSERT(pointerIds.value != 0);
uint32_t splitPointerIndexMap[MAX_POINTERS];
PointerProperties splitPointerProperties[MAX_POINTERS];
PointerCoords splitPointerCoords[MAX_POINTERS];
uint32_t originalPointerCount = originalMotionEntry->pointerCount;
uint32_t splitPointerCount = 0;
for (uint32_t originalPointerIndex = 0; originalPointerIndex < originalPointerCount;
originalPointerIndex++) {
const PointerProperties& pointerProperties =
originalMotionEntry->pointerProperties[originalPointerIndex];
uint32_t pointerId = uint32_t(pointerProperties.id);
if (pointerIds.hasBit(pointerId)) {
splitPointerIndexMap[splitPointerCount] = originalPointerIndex;
splitPointerProperties[splitPointerCount].copyFrom(pointerProperties);
splitPointerCoords[splitPointerCount].copyFrom(
originalMotionEntry->pointerCoords[originalPointerIndex]);
splitPointerCount += 1;
}
}
if (splitPointerCount != pointerIds.count()) {
ALOGW("Dropping split motion event because the pointer count is %d but "
"we expected there to be %d pointers. This probably means we received "
"a broken sequence of pointer ids from the input device.",
splitPointerCount, pointerIds.count());
return NULL;
}
int32_t action = originalMotionEntry->action;
int32_t maskedAction = action & AMOTION_EVENT_ACTION_MASK;
if (maskedAction == AMOTION_EVENT_ACTION_POINTER_DOWN
|| maskedAction == AMOTION_EVENT_ACTION_POINTER_UP) {
int32_t originalPointerIndex = getMotionEventActionPointerIndex(action);
const PointerProperties& pointerProperties =
originalMotionEntry->pointerProperties[originalPointerIndex];
uint32_t pointerId = uint32_t(pointerProperties.id);
if (pointerIds.hasBit(pointerId)) {
if (pointerIds.count() == 1) {
action = maskedAction == AMOTION_EVENT_ACTION_POINTER_DOWN
? AMOTION_EVENT_ACTION_DOWN : AMOTION_EVENT_ACTION_UP;
} else {
uint32_t splitPointerIndex = 0;
while (pointerId != uint32_t(splitPointerProperties[splitPointerIndex].id)) {
splitPointerIndex += 1;
}
action = maskedAction | (splitPointerIndex
<< AMOTION_EVENT_ACTION_POINTER_INDEX_SHIFT);
}
} else {
action = AMOTION_EVENT_ACTION_MOVE;
}
}
MotionEntry* splitMotionEntry = new MotionEntry(
originalMotionEntry->eventTime,
originalMotionEntry->deviceId,
originalMotionEntry->source,
originalMotionEntry->policyFlags,
action,
originalMotionEntry->actionButton,
originalMotionEntry->flags,
originalMotionEntry->metaState,
originalMotionEntry->buttonState,
originalMotionEntry->edgeFlags,
originalMotionEntry->xPrecision,
originalMotionEntry->yPrecision,
originalMotionEntry->downTime,
originalMotionEntry->displayId,
splitPointerCount, splitPointerProperties, splitPointerCoords, 0, 0);
if (originalMotionEntry->injectionState) {
splitMotionEntry->injectionState = originalMotionEntry->injectionState;
splitMotionEntry->injectionState->refCount += 1;
}
return splitMotionEntry;
}
Commit Message: Add new MotionEvent flag for partially obscured windows.
Due to more complex window layouts resulting in lots of overlapping
windows, the policy around FLAG_WINDOW_IS_OBSCURED has changed to
only be set when the point at which the window was touched is
obscured. Unfortunately, this doesn't prevent tapjacking attacks that
overlay the dialog's text, making a potentially dangerous operation
seem innocuous. To avoid this on particularly sensitive dialogs,
introduce a new flag that really does tell you when your window is
being even partially overlapped.
We aren't exposing this as API since we plan on making the original
flag more robust. This is really a workaround for system dialogs
since we generally know their layout and screen position, and that
they're unlikely to be overlapped by other applications.
Bug: 26677796
Change-Id: I9e336afe90f262ba22015876769a9c510048fd47
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 163,837 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ChromeClientImpl::OpenJavaScriptAlertDelegate(LocalFrame* frame,
const String& message) {
NotifyPopupOpeningObservers();
WebLocalFrameImpl* webframe = WebLocalFrameImpl::FromFrame(frame);
if (webframe->Client()) {
if (WebUserGestureIndicator::IsProcessingUserGesture(webframe))
WebUserGestureIndicator::DisableTimeout();
webframe->Client()->RunModalAlertDialog(message);
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID: | 0 | 148,165 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned zlib_compress(unsigned char** out, size_t* outsize, const unsigned char* in,
size_t insize, const LodePNGCompressSettings* settings)
{
if (!settings->custom_zlib) return 87; /*no custom zlib function provided */
return settings->custom_zlib(out, outsize, in, insize, settings);
}
Commit Message: Fixed #5645: realloc return handling
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 87,620 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static uint8_t avrc_proc_far_msg(uint8_t handle, uint8_t label, uint8_t cr,
BT_HDR** pp_pkt, tAVRC_MSG_VENDOR* p_msg) {
BT_HDR* p_pkt = *pp_pkt;
uint8_t* p_data;
uint8_t drop_code = 0;
bool buf_overflow = false;
BT_HDR* p_rsp = NULL;
BT_HDR* p_cmd = NULL;
bool req_continue = false;
BT_HDR* p_pkt_new = NULL;
uint8_t pkt_type;
tAVRC_RASM_CB* p_rcb;
tAVRC_NEXT_CMD avrc_cmd;
tAVRC_STS status;
p_data = (uint8_t*)(p_pkt + 1) + p_pkt->offset;
/* Skip over vendor header (ctype, subunit*, opcode, CO_ID) */
p_data += AVRC_VENDOR_HDR_SIZE;
pkt_type = *(p_data + 1) & AVRC_PKT_TYPE_MASK;
AVRC_TRACE_DEBUG("pkt_type %d", pkt_type);
p_rcb = &avrc_cb.rcb[handle];
/* check if the message needs to be re-assembled */
if (pkt_type == AVRC_PKT_SINGLE || pkt_type == AVRC_PKT_START) {
/* previous fragments need to be dropped, when received another new message
*/
p_rcb->rasm_offset = 0;
osi_free_and_reset((void**)&p_rcb->p_rmsg);
}
if (pkt_type != AVRC_PKT_SINGLE && cr == AVCT_RSP) {
/* not a single response packet - need to re-assemble metadata messages */
if (pkt_type == AVRC_PKT_START) {
/* Allocate buffer for re-assembly */
p_rcb->rasm_pdu = *p_data;
p_rcb->p_rmsg = (BT_HDR*)osi_malloc(BT_DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE);
/* Copy START packet to buffer for re-assembling fragments */
memcpy(p_rcb->p_rmsg, p_pkt, sizeof(BT_HDR)); /* Copy bt hdr */
/* Copy metadata message */
memcpy((uint8_t*)(p_rcb->p_rmsg + 1),
(uint8_t*)(p_pkt + 1) + p_pkt->offset, p_pkt->len);
/* offset of start of metadata response in reassembly buffer */
p_rcb->p_rmsg->offset = p_rcb->rasm_offset = 0;
/*
* Free original START packet, replace with pointer to
* reassembly buffer.
*/
osi_free(p_pkt);
*pp_pkt = p_rcb->p_rmsg;
/*
* Set offset to point to where to copy next - use the same
* reassembly logic as AVCT.
*/
p_rcb->p_rmsg->offset += p_rcb->p_rmsg->len;
req_continue = true;
} else if (p_rcb->p_rmsg == NULL) {
/* Received a CONTINUE/END, but no corresponding START
(or previous fragmented response was dropped) */
AVRC_TRACE_DEBUG(
"Received a CONTINUE/END without no corresponding START \
(or previous fragmented response was dropped)");
drop_code = 5;
osi_free(p_pkt);
*pp_pkt = NULL;
} else {
/* get size of buffer holding assembled message */
/*
* NOTE: The buffer is allocated above at the beginning of the
* reassembly, and is always of size BT_DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE.
*/
uint16_t buf_len = BT_DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE - sizeof(BT_HDR);
/* adjust offset and len of fragment for header byte */
p_pkt->offset += (AVRC_VENDOR_HDR_SIZE + AVRC_MIN_META_HDR_SIZE);
p_pkt->len -= (AVRC_VENDOR_HDR_SIZE + AVRC_MIN_META_HDR_SIZE);
/* verify length */
if ((p_rcb->p_rmsg->offset + p_pkt->len) > buf_len) {
AVRC_TRACE_WARNING(
"Fragmented message too big! - report the partial message");
p_pkt->len = buf_len - p_rcb->p_rmsg->offset;
pkt_type = AVRC_PKT_END;
buf_overflow = true;
}
/* copy contents of p_pkt to p_rx_msg */
memcpy((uint8_t*)(p_rcb->p_rmsg + 1) + p_rcb->p_rmsg->offset,
(uint8_t*)(p_pkt + 1) + p_pkt->offset, p_pkt->len);
if (pkt_type == AVRC_PKT_END) {
p_rcb->p_rmsg->offset = p_rcb->rasm_offset;
p_rcb->p_rmsg->len += p_pkt->len;
p_pkt_new = p_rcb->p_rmsg;
p_rcb->rasm_offset = 0;
p_rcb->p_rmsg = NULL;
p_msg->p_vendor_data = (uint8_t*)(p_pkt_new + 1) + p_pkt_new->offset;
p_msg->hdr.ctype = p_msg->p_vendor_data[0] & AVRC_CTYPE_MASK;
/* 6 = ctype, subunit*, opcode & CO_ID */
p_msg->p_vendor_data += AVRC_VENDOR_HDR_SIZE;
p_msg->vendor_len = p_pkt_new->len - AVRC_VENDOR_HDR_SIZE;
p_data = p_msg->p_vendor_data + 1; /* skip pdu */
*p_data++ = AVRC_PKT_SINGLE;
UINT16_TO_BE_STREAM(p_data,
(p_msg->vendor_len - AVRC_MIN_META_HDR_SIZE));
AVRC_TRACE_DEBUG("end frag:%d, total len:%d, offset:%d", p_pkt->len,
p_pkt_new->len, p_pkt_new->offset);
} else {
p_rcb->p_rmsg->offset += p_pkt->len;
p_rcb->p_rmsg->len += p_pkt->len;
p_pkt_new = NULL;
req_continue = true;
}
osi_free(p_pkt);
*pp_pkt = p_pkt_new;
}
}
if (cr == AVCT_CMD) {
p_rsp = avrc_proc_vendor_command(handle, label, *pp_pkt, p_msg);
if (p_rsp) {
AVCT_MsgReq(handle, label, AVCT_RSP, p_rsp);
osi_free_and_reset((void**)pp_pkt);
drop_code = 3;
} else if (p_msg->hdr.opcode == AVRC_OP_DROP) {
drop_code = 1;
} else if (p_msg->hdr.opcode == AVRC_OP_DROP_N_FREE)
drop_code = 4;
} else if (cr == AVCT_RSP) {
if (req_continue) {
avrc_cmd.pdu = AVRC_PDU_REQUEST_CONTINUATION_RSP;
drop_code = 2;
} else if (buf_overflow) {
/* Incoming message too big to fit in BT_DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE. Send abort
* to peer */
avrc_cmd.pdu = AVRC_PDU_ABORT_CONTINUATION_RSP;
drop_code = 4;
} else {
return drop_code;
}
avrc_cmd.status = AVRC_STS_NO_ERROR;
avrc_cmd.target_pdu = p_rcb->rasm_pdu;
tAVRC_COMMAND avrc_command;
avrc_command.continu = avrc_cmd;
status = AVRC_BldCommand(&avrc_command, &p_cmd);
if (status == AVRC_STS_NO_ERROR) {
AVRC_MsgReq(handle, (uint8_t)(label), AVRC_CMD_CTRL, p_cmd);
}
}
return drop_code;
}
Commit Message: Add missing AVRCP message length checks inside avrc_msg_cback
Explicitly check the length of the received message before
accessing the data.
Bug: 111803925
Bug: 79883824
Test: POC scripts
Change-Id: I00b1c6bd6dd7e18ac2c469ef2032c7ff10dcaecb
Merged-In: I00b1c6bd6dd7e18ac2c469ef2032c7ff10dcaecb
(cherry picked from commit 282deb3e27407aaa88b8ddbdbd7bb7d56ddc635f)
(cherry picked from commit 007868d05f4b761842c7345161aeda6fd40dd245)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 162,883 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void Sp_substring(js_State *J)
{
const char *str = checkstring(J, 0);
const char *ss, *ee;
int len = utflen(str);
int s = js_tointeger(J, 1);
int e = js_isdefined(J, 2) ? js_tointeger(J, 2) : len;
s = s < 0 ? 0 : s > len ? len : s;
e = e < 0 ? 0 : e > len ? len : e;
if (s < e) {
ss = js_utfidxtoptr(str, s);
ee = js_utfidxtoptr(ss, e - s);
} else {
ss = js_utfidxtoptr(str, e);
ee = js_utfidxtoptr(ss, s - e);
}
js_pushlstring(J, ss, ee - ss);
}
Commit Message: Bug 700937: Limit recursion in regexp matcher.
Also handle negative return code as an error in the JS bindings.
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 90,665 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE1(nice, int, increment)
{
long nice, retval;
/*
* Setpriority might change our priority at the same moment.
* We don't have to worry. Conceptually one call occurs first
* and we have a single winner.
*/
if (increment < -40)
increment = -40;
if (increment > 40)
increment = 40;
nice = TASK_NICE(current) + increment;
if (nice < -20)
nice = -20;
if (nice > 19)
nice = 19;
if (increment < 0 && !can_nice(current, nice))
return -EPERM;
retval = security_task_setnice(current, nice);
if (retval)
return retval;
set_user_nice(current, nice);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,284 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void smp_process_peer_nonce(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
uint8_t reason;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s start ", __func__);
if (p_cb->cert_failure == SMP_CONFIRM_VALUE_ERR) {
SMP_TRACE_ERROR("%s failure case = %d", __func__, p_cb->cert_failure);
reason = p_cb->failure = SMP_CONFIRM_VALUE_ERR;
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason);
return;
}
if ((p_cb->cert_failure == SMP_NUMERIC_COMPAR_FAIL) &&
(p_cb->selected_association_model == SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS) &&
(p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_SLAVE)) {
SMP_TRACE_ERROR("%s failure case = %d", __func__, p_cb->cert_failure);
reason = p_cb->failure = SMP_NUMERIC_COMPAR_FAIL;
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason);
return;
}
switch (p_cb->selected_association_model) {
case SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS:
case SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_NUM_COMP:
/* in these models only master receives commitment */
if (p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER) {
if (!smp_check_commitment(p_cb)) {
reason = p_cb->failure = SMP_CONFIRM_VALUE_ERR;
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason);
break;
}
} else {
/* slave sends local nonce */
smp_send_rand(p_cb, NULL);
}
if (p_cb->selected_association_model == SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS) {
/* go directly to phase 2 */
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_SC_PHASE1_CMPLT_EVT, NULL);
} else /* numeric comparison */
{
smp_set_state(SMP_STATE_WAIT_NONCE);
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_SC_CALC_NC_EVT, NULL);
}
break;
case SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_ENT:
case SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_DISP:
if (!smp_check_commitment(p_cb) &&
p_cb->cert_failure != SMP_NUMERIC_COMPAR_FAIL) {
reason = p_cb->failure = SMP_CONFIRM_VALUE_ERR;
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason);
break;
}
if (p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_SLAVE) {
smp_send_rand(p_cb, NULL);
}
if (++p_cb->round < 20) {
smp_set_state(SMP_STATE_SEC_CONN_PHS1_START);
p_cb->flags &= ~SMP_PAIR_FLAG_HAVE_PEER_COMM;
smp_start_nonce_generation(p_cb);
break;
}
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_SC_PHASE1_CMPLT_EVT, NULL);
break;
case SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_OOB:
if (p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_SLAVE) {
smp_send_rand(p_cb, NULL);
}
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_SC_PHASE1_CMPLT_EVT, NULL);
break;
default:
SMP_TRACE_ERROR("Association Model = %d is not used in LE SC",
p_cb->selected_association_model);
break;
}
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s end ", __func__);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix OOB read before buffer length check
Bug: 111936834
Test: manual
Change-Id: Ib98528fb62db0d724ebd9112d071e367f78e369d
(cherry picked from commit 4548f34c90803c6544f6bed03399f2eabeab2a8e)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 162,827 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ftrace_swap_ips(void *a, void *b, int size)
{
unsigned long *ipa = a;
unsigned long *ipb = b;
unsigned long t;
t = *ipa;
*ipa = *ipb;
*ipb = t;
}
Commit Message: tracing: Fix possible NULL pointer dereferences
Currently set_ftrace_pid and set_graph_function files use seq_lseek
for their fops. However seq_open() is called only for FMODE_READ in
the fops->open() so that if an user tries to seek one of those file
when she open it for writing, it sees NULL seq_file and then panic.
It can be easily reproduced with following command:
$ cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
$ echo 1234 | sudo tee -a set_ftrace_pid
In this example, GNU coreutils' tee opens the file with fopen(, "a")
and then the fopen() internally calls lseek().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365663302-2170-1-git-send-email-namhyung@kernel.org
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung.kim@lge.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 30,236 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: request_counter_remove_request (RequestCounter counter,
Request request)
{
guint i;
for (i = 0; i < REQUEST_TYPE_LAST; i++)
{
if (REQUEST_WANTS_TYPE (request, i))
{
counter[i]--;
}
}
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 60,992 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool GLES2DecoderImpl::GenQueriesEXTHelper(
GLsizei n, const GLuint* client_ids) {
for (GLsizei ii = 0; ii < n; ++ii) {
if (query_manager_->GetQuery(client_ids[ii])) {
return false;
}
}
query_manager_->GenQueries(n, client_ids);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 120,890 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LoadingStatsCollectorTest::TestRedirectStatusHistogram(
const std::string& initial_url,
const std::string& prediction_url,
const std::string& navigation_url,
RedirectStatus expected_status) {
const std::string& script_url = "https://cdn.google.com/script.js";
PreconnectPrediction prediction = CreatePreconnectPrediction(
GURL(prediction_url).host(), initial_url != prediction_url,
{{GURL(script_url).GetOrigin(), 1, net::NetworkIsolationKey()}});
EXPECT_CALL(*mock_predictor_, PredictPreconnectOrigins(GURL(initial_url), _))
.WillOnce(DoAll(SetArgPointee<1>(prediction), Return(true)));
std::vector<content::mojom::ResourceLoadInfoPtr> resources;
resources.push_back(
CreateResourceLoadInfoWithRedirects({initial_url, navigation_url}));
resources.push_back(
CreateResourceLoadInfo(script_url, content::ResourceType::kScript));
PageRequestSummary summary =
CreatePageRequestSummary(navigation_url, initial_url, resources);
stats_collector_->RecordPageRequestSummary(summary);
histogram_tester_->ExpectUniqueSample(
internal::kLoadingPredictorPreconnectLearningRedirectStatus,
static_cast<int>(expected_status), 1);
}
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 172,373 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: EventRouter* TestExtensionSystem::event_router() {
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Check prefs before allowing extension file access in the permissions API.
R=mpcomplete@chromium.org
BUG=169632
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11884008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176853 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 115,976 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: are_urls_equal (const char *u1, const char *u2)
{
const char *p, *q;
int pp, qq;
char ch1, ch2;
assert(u1 && u2);
p = u1;
q = u2;
while (*p && *q
&& (pp = getchar_from_escaped_string (p, &ch1))
&& (qq = getchar_from_escaped_string (q, &ch2))
&& (c_tolower(ch1) == c_tolower(ch2)))
{
p += pp;
q += qq;
}
return (*p == 0 && *q == 0 ? true : false);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-93 | 0 | 8,681 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TextCodecUTF8::HandleError(int character,
UChar*& destination,
bool stop_on_error,
bool& saw_error) {
saw_error = true;
if (stop_on_error)
return;
*destination++ = kReplacementCharacter;
DCHECK(IsNonCharacter(character));
int num_bytes_consumed = -character;
DCHECK_GE(num_bytes_consumed, 1);
DCHECK_LE(num_bytes_consumed, 3);
ConsumePartialSequenceBytes(num_bytes_consumed);
}
Commit Message: Add bounds CHECK to UTF-8 decoder memory allocation.
Avoid integer overflow when computing a total buffer size from a base
buffer and small partial sequence buffer.
Bug: 901030
Change-Id: Ic82db2c6af770bd748fb1ec881999d0dfaac30f0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1313833
Reviewed-by: Chris Palmer <palmer@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Joshua Bell <jsbell@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#605011}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 143,554 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int sock_prot_inuse_get(struct net *net, struct proto *prot)
{
int cpu, idx = prot->inuse_idx;
int res = 0;
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu)
res += per_cpu_ptr(net->core.inuse, cpu)->val[idx];
return res >= 0 ? res : 0;
}
Commit Message: net: sock: validate data_len before allocating skb in sock_alloc_send_pskb()
We need to validate the number of pages consumed by data_len, otherwise frags
array could be overflowed by userspace. So this patch validate data_len and
return -EMSGSIZE when data_len may occupies more frags than MAX_SKB_FRAGS.
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 20,193 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline struct hmac_ctx *hmac_ctx(struct crypto_shash *tfm)
{
return align_ptr(crypto_shash_ctx_aligned(tfm) +
crypto_shash_statesize(tfm) * 2,
crypto_tfm_ctx_alignment());
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 45,787 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gdImagePtr gdImageCreateFromJpegCtx (gdIOCtx * infile)
{
return gdImageCreateFromJpegCtxEx(infile, 1);
}
Commit Message: Sync with upstream
Even though libgd/libgd#492 is not a relevant bug fix for PHP, since
the binding doesn't use the `gdImage*Ptr()` functions at all, we're
porting the fix to stay in sync here.
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 91,508 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pdf_tos_make_trm(fz_context *ctx, pdf_text_object_state *tos, pdf_text_state *text, pdf_font_desc *fontdesc, int cid, fz_matrix *trm)
{
fz_matrix tsm;
tsm.a = text->size * text->scale;
tsm.b = 0;
tsm.c = 0;
tsm.d = text->size;
tsm.e = 0;
tsm.f = text->rise;
if (fontdesc->wmode == 0)
{
pdf_hmtx h = pdf_lookup_hmtx(ctx, fontdesc, cid);
float w0 = h.w * 0.001f;
tos->char_tx = (w0 * text->size + text->char_space) * text->scale;
tos->char_ty = 0;
}
if (fontdesc->wmode == 1)
{
pdf_vmtx v = pdf_lookup_vmtx(ctx, fontdesc, cid);
float w1 = v.w * 0.001f;
tsm.e -= v.x * fabsf(text->size) * 0.001f;
tsm.f -= v.y * text->size * 0.001f;
tos->char_tx = 0;
tos->char_ty = w1 * text->size + text->char_space;
}
fz_concat(trm, &tsm, &tos->tm);
tos->cid = cid;
tos->gid = pdf_font_cid_to_gid(ctx, fontdesc, cid);
tos->fontdesc = fontdesc;
/* Compensate for the glyph cache limited positioning precision */
fz_expand_rect(fz_bound_glyph(ctx, fontdesc->font, tos->gid, trm, &tos->char_bbox), 1);
return tos->gid;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 592 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void v9fs_path_init(V9fsPath *path)
{
path->data = NULL;
path->size = 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 1,498 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int llcp_sock_getname(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
int *len, int peer)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct nfc_llcp_sock *llcp_sock = nfc_llcp_sock(sk);
DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_nfc_llcp *, llcp_addr, uaddr);
if (llcp_sock == NULL || llcp_sock->dev == NULL)
return -EBADFD;
pr_debug("%p %d %d %d\n", sk, llcp_sock->target_idx,
llcp_sock->dsap, llcp_sock->ssap);
uaddr->sa_family = AF_NFC;
*len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_nfc_llcp);
llcp_addr->dev_idx = llcp_sock->dev->idx;
llcp_addr->target_idx = llcp_sock->target_idx;
llcp_addr->dsap = llcp_sock->dsap;
llcp_addr->ssap = llcp_sock->ssap;
llcp_addr->service_name_len = llcp_sock->service_name_len;
memcpy(llcp_addr->service_name, llcp_sock->service_name,
llcp_addr->service_name_len);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: NFC: llcp: fix info leaks via msg_name in llcp_sock_recvmsg()
The code in llcp_sock_recvmsg() does not initialize all the members of
struct sockaddr_nfc_llcp when filling the sockaddr info. Nor does it
initialize the padding bytes of the structure inserted by the compiler
for alignment.
Also, if the socket is in state LLCP_CLOSED or is shutting down during
receive the msg_namelen member is not updated to 0 while otherwise
returning with 0, i.e. "success". The msg_namelen update is also
missing for stream and seqpacket sockets which don't fill the sockaddr
info.
Both issues lead to the fact that the code will leak uninitialized
kernel stack bytes in net/socket.c.
Fix the first issue by initializing the memory used for sockaddr info
with memset(0). Fix the second one by setting msg_namelen to 0 early.
It will be updated later if we're going to fill the msg_name member.
Cc: Lauro Ramos Venancio <lauro.venancio@openbossa.org>
Cc: Aloisio Almeida Jr <aloisio.almeida@openbossa.org>
Cc: Samuel Ortiz <sameo@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 30,487 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int page_symlink(struct inode *inode, const char *symname, int len)
{
return __page_symlink(inode, symname, len,
!mapping_gfp_constraint(inode->i_mapping, __GFP_FS));
}
Commit Message: vfs: rename: check backing inode being equal
If a file is renamed to a hardlink of itself POSIX specifies that rename(2)
should do nothing and return success.
This condition is checked in vfs_rename(). However it won't detect hard
links on overlayfs where these are given separate inodes on the overlayfs
layer.
Overlayfs itself detects this condition and returns success without doing
anything, but then vfs_rename() will proceed as if this was a successful
rename (detach_mounts(), d_move()).
The correct thing to do is to detect this condition before even calling
into overlayfs. This patch does this by calling vfs_select_inode() to get
the underlying inodes.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.2+
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 51,039 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ~RestartTestJob() {}
Commit Message: Tests were marked as Flaky.
BUG=151811,151810
TBR=droger@chromium.org,shalev@chromium.org
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10968052
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@158204 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 102,302 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
{
int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
X509 *x=NULL;
unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
const unsigned char *p,*q;
unsigned char *d;
STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
-1,
s->max_cert_list,
&ok);
if (!ok) return((int)n);
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
{
if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
goto f_err;
}
/* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
goto f_err;
}
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
return(1);
}
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
{
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
n2l3(p,llen);
if (llen+3 != n)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
{
n2l3(p,l);
if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
q=p;
x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
if (x == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (p != (q+l))
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
x=NULL;
nc+=l+3;
}
if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
{
/* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
{
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
goto f_err;
}
/* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
goto f_err;
}
/* No client certificate so digest cached records */
if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
{
al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
}
else
{
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
if (i <= 0)
{
al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
goto f_err;
}
if (i > 1)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
goto f_err;
}
pkey = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
if (pkey == NULL)
{
al=SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
}
if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
X509_free(s->session->peer);
s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
/* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
* when we arrive here. */
if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
{
s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
}
if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
/* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
* peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
sk=NULL;
ret=1;
if (0)
{
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
}
err:
if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
return(ret);
}
Commit Message: Unauthenticated DH client certificate fix.
Fix to prevent use of DH client certificates without sending
certificate verify message.
If we've used a client certificate to generate the premaster secret
ssl3_get_client_key_exchange returns 2 and ssl3_get_cert_verify is
never called.
We can only skip the certificate verify message in
ssl3_get_cert_verify if the client didn't send a certificate.
Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue.
CVE-2015-0205
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 45,176 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static M_fs_error_t M_fs_move_file(const char *path_old, const char *path_new)
{
M_fs_error_t res;
/* Try to move the file. This will (should) fail if the file is cross volume. */
#ifdef _WIN32
if (MoveFileEx(path_old, path_new, MOVEFILE_REPLACE_EXISTING))
#else
if (rename(path_old, path_new) == 0)
#endif
{
res = M_FS_ERROR_SUCCESS;
} else {
#ifdef _WIN32
res = M_fs_error_from_syserr(GetLastError());
#else
res = M_fs_error_from_syserr(errno);
#endif
}
return res;
}
Commit Message: fs: Don't try to delete the file when copying. It could cause a security issue if the file exists and doesn't allow other's to read/write. delete could allow someone to create the file and have access to the data.
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 79,636 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ff_gradfun_blur_line_c(uint16_t *dc, uint16_t *buf, const uint16_t *buf1, const uint8_t *src, int src_linesize, int width)
{
int x, v, old;
for (x = 0; x < width; x++) {
v = buf1[x] + src[2 * x] + src[2 * x + 1] + src[2 * x + src_linesize] + src[2 * x + 1 + src_linesize];
old = buf[x];
buf[x] = v;
dc[x] = v - old;
}
}
Commit Message: avfilter: fix plane validity checks
Fixes out of array accesses
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 29,751 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: smp_fetch_body_param(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private)
{
struct http_msg *msg;
unsigned long len;
unsigned long block1;
char *body;
const char *name;
int name_len;
if (!args || (args[0].type && args[0].type != ARGT_STR))
return 0;
name = "";
name_len = 0;
if (args[0].type == ARGT_STR) {
name = args[0].data.str.str;
name_len = args[0].data.str.len;
}
if (!smp->ctx.a[0]) { // first call, find the query string
CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST();
if ((smp->opt & SMP_OPT_DIR) == SMP_OPT_DIR_REQ)
msg = &smp->strm->txn->req;
else
msg = &smp->strm->txn->rsp;
len = http_body_bytes(msg);
body = b_ptr(msg->chn->buf, -http_data_rewind(msg));
block1 = len;
if (block1 > msg->chn->buf->data + msg->chn->buf->size - body)
block1 = msg->chn->buf->data + msg->chn->buf->size - body;
if (block1 == len) {
/* buffer is not wrapped (or empty) */
smp->ctx.a[0] = body;
smp->ctx.a[1] = body + len;
/* Assume that the context is filled with NULL pointer
* before the first call.
* smp->ctx.a[2] = NULL;
* smp->ctx.a[3] = NULL;
*/
}
else {
/* buffer is wrapped, we need to defragment it */
smp->ctx.a[0] = body;
smp->ctx.a[1] = body + block1;
smp->ctx.a[2] = msg->chn->buf->data;
smp->ctx.a[3] = msg->chn->buf->data + ( len - block1 );
}
}
return smp_fetch_param('&', name, name_len, args, smp, kw, private);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 6,893 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TabLoader::HandleTabClosedOrLoaded(NavigationController* tab) {
RemoveTab(tab);
if (loading_)
LoadNextTab();
if (tabs_loading_.empty() && tabs_to_load_.empty()) {
base::TimeDelta time_to_load =
base::TimeTicks::Now() - restore_started_;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_CUSTOM_TIMES(
"SessionRestore.AllTabsLoaded",
time_to_load,
base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(10),
base::TimeDelta::FromSeconds(100),
100);
std::string time_for_count =
base::StringPrintf("SessionRestore.AllTabsLoaded_%d", tab_count_);
base::Histogram* counter_for_count =
base::Histogram::FactoryTimeGet(
time_for_count,
base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(10),
base::TimeDelta::FromSeconds(100),
100,
base::Histogram::kUmaTargetedHistogramFlag);
counter_for_count->AddTime(time_to_load);
}
}
Commit Message: Lands http://codereview.chromium.org/9316065/ for Marja. I reviewed
this, so I'm using TBR to land it.
Don't crash if multiple SessionRestoreImpl:s refer to the same
Profile.
It shouldn't ever happen but it seems to happen anyway.
BUG=111238
TEST=NONE
TBR=sky@chromium.org
R=marja@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9343005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@120648 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 108,653 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mac80211_hwsim_testmode_cmd(struct ieee80211_hw *hw,
struct ieee80211_vif *vif,
void *data, int len)
{
struct mac80211_hwsim_data *hwsim = hw->priv;
struct nlattr *tb[HWSIM_TM_ATTR_MAX + 1];
struct sk_buff *skb;
int err, ps;
err = nla_parse(tb, HWSIM_TM_ATTR_MAX, data, len,
hwsim_testmode_policy, NULL);
if (err)
return err;
if (!tb[HWSIM_TM_ATTR_CMD])
return -EINVAL;
switch (nla_get_u32(tb[HWSIM_TM_ATTR_CMD])) {
case HWSIM_TM_CMD_SET_PS:
if (!tb[HWSIM_TM_ATTR_PS])
return -EINVAL;
ps = nla_get_u32(tb[HWSIM_TM_ATTR_PS]);
return hwsim_fops_ps_write(hwsim, ps);
case HWSIM_TM_CMD_GET_PS:
skb = cfg80211_testmode_alloc_reply_skb(hw->wiphy,
nla_total_size(sizeof(u32)));
if (!skb)
return -ENOMEM;
if (nla_put_u32(skb, HWSIM_TM_ATTR_PS, hwsim->ps))
goto nla_put_failure;
return cfg80211_testmode_reply(skb);
case HWSIM_TM_CMD_STOP_QUEUES:
ieee80211_stop_queues(hw);
return 0;
case HWSIM_TM_CMD_WAKE_QUEUES:
ieee80211_wake_queues(hw);
return 0;
default:
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
nla_put_failure:
kfree_skb(skb);
return -ENOBUFS;
}
Commit Message: mac80211_hwsim: fix possible memory leak in hwsim_new_radio_nl()
'hwname' is malloced in hwsim_new_radio_nl() and should be freed
before leaving from the error handling cases, otherwise it will cause
memory leak.
Fixes: ff4dd73dd2b4 ("mac80211_hwsim: check HWSIM_ATTR_RADIO_NAME length")
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 83,866 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: init_tracer_tracefs(struct trace_array *tr, struct dentry *d_tracer)
{
struct trace_event_file *file;
int cpu;
trace_create_file("available_tracers", 0444, d_tracer,
tr, &show_traces_fops);
trace_create_file("current_tracer", 0644, d_tracer,
tr, &set_tracer_fops);
trace_create_file("tracing_cpumask", 0644, d_tracer,
tr, &tracing_cpumask_fops);
trace_create_file("trace_options", 0644, d_tracer,
tr, &tracing_iter_fops);
trace_create_file("trace", 0644, d_tracer,
tr, &tracing_fops);
trace_create_file("trace_pipe", 0444, d_tracer,
tr, &tracing_pipe_fops);
trace_create_file("buffer_size_kb", 0644, d_tracer,
tr, &tracing_entries_fops);
trace_create_file("buffer_total_size_kb", 0444, d_tracer,
tr, &tracing_total_entries_fops);
trace_create_file("free_buffer", 0200, d_tracer,
tr, &tracing_free_buffer_fops);
trace_create_file("trace_marker", 0220, d_tracer,
tr, &tracing_mark_fops);
file = __find_event_file(tr, "ftrace", "print");
if (file && file->dir)
trace_create_file("trigger", 0644, file->dir, file,
&event_trigger_fops);
tr->trace_marker_file = file;
trace_create_file("trace_marker_raw", 0220, d_tracer,
tr, &tracing_mark_raw_fops);
trace_create_file("trace_clock", 0644, d_tracer, tr,
&trace_clock_fops);
trace_create_file("tracing_on", 0644, d_tracer,
tr, &rb_simple_fops);
trace_create_file("timestamp_mode", 0444, d_tracer, tr,
&trace_time_stamp_mode_fops);
tr->buffer_percent = 50;
trace_create_file("buffer_percent", 0444, d_tracer,
tr, &buffer_percent_fops);
create_trace_options_dir(tr);
#if defined(CONFIG_TRACER_MAX_TRACE) || defined(CONFIG_HWLAT_TRACER)
trace_create_file("tracing_max_latency", 0644, d_tracer,
&tr->max_latency, &tracing_max_lat_fops);
#endif
if (ftrace_create_function_files(tr, d_tracer))
WARN(1, "Could not allocate function filter files");
#ifdef CONFIG_TRACER_SNAPSHOT
trace_create_file("snapshot", 0644, d_tracer,
tr, &snapshot_fops);
#endif
for_each_tracing_cpu(cpu)
tracing_init_tracefs_percpu(tr, cpu);
ftrace_init_tracefs(tr, d_tracer);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 96,905 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: apply_enable_disable(
attr_val_fifo * fifo,
int enable
)
{
attr_val *curr_flag;
int option;
#ifdef BC_LIST_FRAMEWORK_NOT_YET_USED
bc_entry *pentry;
#endif
for (curr_flag = HEAD_PFIFO(fifo);
curr_flag != NULL;
curr_flag = curr_flag->link) {
option = curr_flag->value.i;
switch (option) {
default:
msyslog(LOG_ERR,
"can not apply enable/disable token %d, unknown",
option);
break;
case T_Auth:
proto_config(PROTO_AUTHENTICATE, enable, 0., NULL);
break;
case T_Bclient:
proto_config(PROTO_BROADCLIENT, enable, 0., NULL);
break;
case T_Calibrate:
proto_config(PROTO_CAL, enable, 0., NULL);
break;
case T_Kernel:
proto_config(PROTO_KERNEL, enable, 0., NULL);
break;
case T_Monitor:
proto_config(PROTO_MONITOR, enable, 0., NULL);
break;
case T_Ntp:
proto_config(PROTO_NTP, enable, 0., NULL);
break;
case T_Stats:
proto_config(PROTO_FILEGEN, enable, 0., NULL);
break;
#ifdef BC_LIST_FRAMEWORK_NOT_YET_USED
case T_Bc_bugXXXX:
pentry = bc_list;
while (pentry->token) {
if (pentry->token == option)
break;
pentry++;
}
if (!pentry->token) {
msyslog(LOG_ERR,
"compat token %d not in bc_list[]",
option);
continue;
}
pentry->enabled = enable;
break;
#endif
}
}
}
Commit Message: [Bug 1773] openssl not detected during ./configure.
[Bug 1774] Segfaults if cryptostats enabled and built without OpenSSL.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 74,128 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void activate_task(struct rq *rq, struct task_struct *p, int flags)
{
if (task_contributes_to_load(p))
rq->nr_uninterruptible--;
enqueue_task(rq, p, flags);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 55,483 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int r;
parse_args(argc, argv);
establish_signal_handlers();
r = term_lib_init();
if ( r < 0 )
fatal("term_init failed: %s", term_strerror(term_errno, errno));
#ifdef UUCP_LOCK_DIR
if ( ! opts.nolock ) uucp_lockname(UUCP_LOCK_DIR, opts.port);
if ( uucp_lock() < 0 )
fatal("cannot lock %s: %s", opts.port, strerror(errno));
#endif
tty_fd = open(opts.port, O_RDWR | O_NONBLOCK | O_NOCTTY);
if (tty_fd < 0)
fatal("cannot open %s: %s", opts.port, strerror(errno));
#ifdef USE_FLOCK
if ( ! opts.nolock ) {
r = flock(tty_fd, LOCK_EX | LOCK_NB);
if ( r < 0 )
fatal("cannot lock %s: %s", opts.port, strerror(errno));
}
#endif
if ( opts.noinit ) {
r = term_add(tty_fd);
} else {
r = term_set(tty_fd,
1, /* raw mode. */
opts.baud, /* baud rate. */
opts.parity, /* parity. */
opts.databits, /* data bits. */
opts.flow, /* flow control. */
1, /* local or modem */
!opts.noreset); /* hup-on-close. */
}
if ( r < 0 )
fatal("failed to add device %s: %s",
opts.port, term_strerror(term_errno, errno));
r = term_apply(tty_fd);
if ( r < 0 )
fatal("failed to config device %s: %s",
opts.port, term_strerror(term_errno, errno));
set_tty_write_sz(term_get_baudrate(tty_fd, NULL));
r = term_add(STI);
if ( r < 0 )
fatal("failed to add I/O device: %s",
term_strerror(term_errno, errno));
term_set_raw(STI);
r = term_apply(STI);
if ( r < 0 )
fatal("failed to set I/O device to raw mode: %s",
term_strerror(term_errno, errno));
#ifdef LINENOISE
init_send_receive_history();
#endif
fd_printf(STO, "Terminal ready\r\n");
loop();
#ifdef LINENOISE
cleanup_send_receive_history();
#endif
fd_printf(STO, "\r\n");
if ( opts.noreset ) {
fd_printf(STO, "Skipping tty reset...\r\n");
term_erase(tty_fd);
}
if ( sig_exit )
fd_printf(STO, "Picocom was killed\r\n");
else
fd_printf(STO, "Thanks for using picocom\r\n");
/* wait a bit for output to drain */
sleep(1);
#ifdef UUCP_LOCK_DIR
uucp_unlock();
#endif
return EXIT_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Do not use "/bin/sh" to run external commands.
Picocom no longer uses /bin/sh to run external commands for
file-transfer operations. Parsing the command line and spliting it into
arguments is now performed internally by picocom, using quoting rules
very similar to those of the Unix shell. Hopefully, this makes it
impossible to inject shell-commands when supplying filenames or
extra arguments to the send- and receive-file commands.
CWE ID: CWE-77 | 0 | 73,981 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RendererSchedulerImpl::UseCase RendererSchedulerImpl::ComputeCurrentUseCase(
base::TimeTicks now,
base::TimeDelta* expected_use_case_duration) const {
any_thread_lock_.AssertAcquired();
if (any_thread().fling_compositor_escalation_deadline > now &&
!any_thread().awaiting_touch_start_response) {
*expected_use_case_duration =
any_thread().fling_compositor_escalation_deadline - now;
return UseCase::kCompositorGesture;
}
*expected_use_case_duration =
any_thread().user_model.TimeLeftInUserGesture(now);
if (*expected_use_case_duration > base::TimeDelta()) {
if (any_thread().awaiting_touch_start_response) {
return UseCase::kTouchstart;
}
if (any_thread().last_gesture_was_compositor_driven) {
if (any_thread().begin_main_frame_on_critical_path) {
return UseCase::kSynchronizedGesture;
} else {
return UseCase::kCompositorGesture;
}
}
if (any_thread().default_gesture_prevented) {
return UseCase::kMainThreadCustomInputHandling;
} else {
return UseCase::kMainThreadGesture;
}
}
if (any_thread().waiting_for_meaningful_paint &&
!any_thread().have_seen_input_since_navigation) {
return UseCase::kLoading;
}
return UseCase::kNone;
}
Commit Message: [scheduler] Remove implicit fallthrough in switch
Bail out early when a condition in the switch is fulfilled.
This does not change behaviour due to RemoveTaskObserver being no-op when
the task observer is not present in the list.
R=thakis@chromium.org
Bug: 177475
Change-Id: Ibc7772c79f8a8c8a1d63a997dabe1efda5d3a7bd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891187
Reviewed-by: Nico Weber <thakis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alexander Timin <altimin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532649}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 143,384 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PasswordAutofillAgent::OnWillSubmitForm(const WebFormElement& form) {
std::unique_ptr<RendererSavePasswordProgressLogger> logger;
if (logging_state_active_) {
logger.reset(new RendererSavePasswordProgressLogger(
GetPasswordManagerDriver().get()));
logger->LogMessage(Logger::STRING_WILL_SUBMIT_FORM_METHOD);
LogHTMLForm(logger.get(), Logger::STRING_HTML_FORM_FOR_SUBMIT, form);
}
std::unique_ptr<PasswordForm> submitted_form =
GetPasswordFormFromWebForm(form);
if (submitted_form) {
if (logger) {
logger->LogPasswordForm(Logger::STRING_CREATED_PASSWORD_FORM,
*submitted_form);
}
submitted_form->submission_event =
SubmissionIndicatorEvent::HTML_FORM_SUBMISSION;
submitted_form->form_data.submission_event =
SubmissionIndicatorEvent::HTML_FORM_SUBMISSION;
if (FrameCanAccessPasswordManager()) {
GetPasswordManagerDriver()->PasswordFormSubmitted(*submitted_form);
} else {
if (logger)
logger->LogMessage(Logger::STRING_SECURITY_ORIGIN_FAILURE);
}
browser_has_form_to_process_ = false;
} else if (logger) {
logger->LogMessage(Logger::STRING_FORM_IS_NOT_PASSWORD);
}
}
Commit Message: [Android][TouchToFill] Use FindPasswordInfoForElement for triggering
Use for TouchToFill the same triggering logic that is used for regular
suggestions.
Bug: 1010233
Change-Id: I111d4eac4ce94dd94b86097b6b6c98e08875e11a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1834230
Commit-Queue: Boris Sazonov <bsazonov@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vadym Doroshenko <dvadym@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#702058}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 137,647 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cryptd_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb)
{
struct crypto_attr_type *algt;
algt = crypto_get_attr_type(tb);
if (IS_ERR(algt))
return PTR_ERR(algt);
switch (algt->type & algt->mask & CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK) {
case CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_BLKCIPHER:
return cryptd_create_blkcipher(tmpl, tb, &queue);
case CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_DIGEST:
return cryptd_create_hash(tmpl, tb, &queue);
case CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD:
return cryptd_create_aead(tmpl, tb, &queue);
}
return -EINVAL;
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 45,647 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int alloc_pebs_buffer(int cpu)
{
struct debug_store *ds = per_cpu(cpu_hw_events, cpu).ds;
int node = cpu_to_node(cpu);
int max, thresh = 1; /* always use a single PEBS record */
void *buffer;
if (!x86_pmu.pebs)
return 0;
buffer = kmalloc_node(PEBS_BUFFER_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO, node);
if (unlikely(!buffer))
return -ENOMEM;
max = PEBS_BUFFER_SIZE / x86_pmu.pebs_record_size;
ds->pebs_buffer_base = (u64)(unsigned long)buffer;
ds->pebs_index = ds->pebs_buffer_base;
ds->pebs_absolute_maximum = ds->pebs_buffer_base +
max * x86_pmu.pebs_record_size;
ds->pebs_interrupt_threshold = ds->pebs_buffer_base +
thresh * x86_pmu.pebs_record_size;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,828 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: setContext(XML_Parser parser, const XML_Char *context)
{
DTD * const dtd = parser->m_dtd; /* save one level of indirection */
const XML_Char *s = context;
while (*context != XML_T('\0')) {
if (*s == CONTEXT_SEP || *s == XML_T('\0')) {
ENTITY *e;
if (!poolAppendChar(&parser->m_tempPool, XML_T('\0')))
return XML_FALSE;
e = (ENTITY *)lookup(parser, &dtd->generalEntities, poolStart(&parser->m_tempPool), 0);
if (e)
e->open = XML_TRUE;
if (*s != XML_T('\0'))
s++;
context = s;
poolDiscard(&parser->m_tempPool);
}
else if (*s == XML_T(ASCII_EQUALS)) {
PREFIX *prefix;
if (poolLength(&parser->m_tempPool) == 0)
prefix = &dtd->defaultPrefix;
else {
if (!poolAppendChar(&parser->m_tempPool, XML_T('\0')))
return XML_FALSE;
prefix = (PREFIX *)lookup(parser, &dtd->prefixes, poolStart(&parser->m_tempPool),
sizeof(PREFIX));
if (!prefix)
return XML_FALSE;
if (prefix->name == poolStart(&parser->m_tempPool)) {
prefix->name = poolCopyString(&dtd->pool, prefix->name);
if (!prefix->name)
return XML_FALSE;
}
poolDiscard(&parser->m_tempPool);
}
for (context = s + 1;
*context != CONTEXT_SEP && *context != XML_T('\0');
context++)
if (!poolAppendChar(&parser->m_tempPool, *context))
return XML_FALSE;
if (!poolAppendChar(&parser->m_tempPool, XML_T('\0')))
return XML_FALSE;
if (addBinding(parser, prefix, NULL, poolStart(&parser->m_tempPool),
&parser->m_inheritedBindings) != XML_ERROR_NONE)
return XML_FALSE;
poolDiscard(&parser->m_tempPool);
if (*context != XML_T('\0'))
++context;
s = context;
}
else {
if (!poolAppendChar(&parser->m_tempPool, *s))
return XML_FALSE;
s++;
}
}
return XML_TRUE;
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Fix extraction of namespace prefix from XML name (#186)
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 0 | 92,368 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void removeSBITS(const char *path)
{
struct stat stb;
if (lstat(path, &stb) == 0 && S_ISREG(stb.st_mode)) {
if ((stb.st_mode & 06000) != 0) {
(void) chmod(path, stb.st_mode & 0777);
}
#if WITH_CAP
if (stb.st_mode & (S_IXUSR|S_IXGRP|S_IXOTH)) {
(void) cap_set_file(path, NULL);
}
#endif
}
}
Commit Message: Don't follow symlinks on file creation (CVE-2017-7501)
Open newly created files with O_EXCL to prevent symlink tricks.
When reopening hardlinks for writing the actual content, use append
mode instead. This is compatible with the write-only permissions but
is not destructive in case we got redirected to somebody elses file,
verify the target before actually writing anything.
As these are files with the temporary suffix, errors mean a local
user with sufficient privileges to break the installation of the package
anyway is trying to goof us on purpose, don't bother trying to mend it
(we couldn't fix the hardlink case anyhow) but just bail out.
Based on a patch by Florian Festi.
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 67,504 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ssl_parse_client_dh_public( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char **p,
const unsigned char *end )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
size_t n;
/*
* Receive G^Y mod P, premaster = (G^Y)^X mod P
*/
if( *p + 2 > end )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
n = ( (*p)[0] << 8 ) | (*p)[1];
*p += 2;
if( *p + n > end )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
if( ( ret = mbedtls_dhm_read_public( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, *p, n ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_dhm_read_public", ret );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_RP );
}
*p += n;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: GY", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.GY );
return( ret );
}
Commit Message: Prevent bounds check bypass through overflow in PSK identity parsing
The check `if( *p + n > end )` in `ssl_parse_client_psk_identity` is
unsafe because `*p + n` might overflow, thus bypassing the check. As
`n` is a user-specified value up to 65K, this is relevant if the
library happens to be located in the last 65K of virtual memory.
This commit replaces the check by a safe version.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 86,122 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void mk_request_ka_next(struct client_session *cs)
{
cs->first_method = -1;
cs->body_pos_end = -1;
cs->body_length = 0;
cs->counter_connections++;
/* Update data for scheduler */
cs->init_time = log_current_utime;
cs->status = MK_REQUEST_STATUS_INCOMPLETE;
mk_list_add(&cs->request_incomplete, cs_incomplete);
}
Commit Message: Request: new request session flag to mark those files opened by FDT
This patch aims to fix a potential DDoS problem that can be caused
in the server quering repetitive non-existent resources.
When serving a static file, the core use Vhost FDT mechanism, but if
it sends a static error page it does a direct open(2). When closing
the resources for the same request it was just calling mk_vhost_close()
which did not clear properly the file descriptor.
This patch adds a new field on the struct session_request called 'fd_is_fdt',
which contains MK_TRUE or MK_FALSE depending of how fd_file was opened.
Thanks to Matthew Daley <mattd@bugfuzz.com> for report and troubleshoot this
problem.
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Silva <eduardo@monkey.io>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 36,158 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CompositedLayerRasterInvalidatorTest& Properties(
const TransformPaintPropertyNode* t,
const ClipPaintPropertyNode* c = ClipPaintPropertyNode::Root(),
const EffectPaintPropertyNode* e = EffectPaintPropertyNode::Root()) {
auto& state = data_.chunks.back().properties;
state.SetTransform(t);
state.SetClip(c);
state.SetEffect(e);
return *this;
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID: | 1 | 171,811 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xsltShutdownCtxtExt(xsltExtDataPtr data, xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt,
const xmlChar * URI)
{
xsltExtModulePtr module;
if ((data == NULL) || (ctxt == NULL) || (URI == NULL))
return;
module = data->extModule;
if ((module == NULL) || (module->shutdownFunc == NULL))
return;
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_EXTENSIONS
xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"Shutting down module : %s\n", URI);
#endif
module->shutdownFunc(ctxt, URI, data->extData);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 156,712 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cJSON *cJSON_GetObjectItem(cJSON *object,const char *string) {cJSON *c=object?object->child:0;while (c && cJSON_strcasecmp(c->string,string)) c=c->next; return c;}
Commit Message: fix buffer overflow (#30)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 93,714 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void* Type_Measurement_Dup(struct _cms_typehandler_struct* self, const void *Ptr, cmsUInt32Number n)
{
return _cmsDupMem(self ->ContextID, Ptr, sizeof(cmsICCMeasurementConditions));
cmsUNUSED_PARAMETER(n);
}
Commit Message: Added an extra check to MLU bounds
Thanks to Ibrahim el-sayed for spotting the bug
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 71,024 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethodWithOptional(ExecState* exec)
{
size_t argsCount = exec->argumentCount();
if (argsCount <= 0) {
JSC::JSValue result = jsNumber(TestObj::classMethodWithOptional());
return JSValue::encode(result);
}
int arg(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 0, DefaultIsUndefined).toInt32(exec));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
JSC::JSValue result = jsNumber(TestObj::classMethodWithOptional(arg));
return JSValue::encode(result);
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 101,236 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: daemon_msg_open_req(uint8 ver, struct daemon_slpars *pars, uint32 plen,
char *source, size_t sourcelen)
{
char errbuf[PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE]; // buffer for network errors
char errmsgbuf[PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE]; // buffer for errors to send to the client
pcap_t *fp; // pcap_t main variable
int nread;
char sendbuf[RPCAP_NETBUF_SIZE]; // temporary buffer in which data to be sent is buffered
int sendbufidx = 0; // index which keeps the number of bytes currently buffered
struct rpcap_openreply *openreply; // open reply message
if (plen > sourcelen - 1)
{
pcap_snprintf(errmsgbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE, "Source string too long");
goto error;
}
nread = sock_recv(pars->sockctrl, source, plen,
SOCK_RECEIVEALL_YES|SOCK_EOF_IS_ERROR, errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE);
if (nread == -1)
{
rpcapd_log(LOGPRIO_ERROR, "Read from client failed: %s", errbuf);
return -1;
}
source[nread] = '\0';
plen -= nread;
if ((fp = pcap_open_live(source,
1500 /* fake snaplen */,
0 /* no promis */,
1000 /* fake timeout */,
errmsgbuf)) == NULL)
goto error;
if (sock_bufferize(NULL, sizeof(struct rpcap_header), NULL, &sendbufidx,
RPCAP_NETBUF_SIZE, SOCKBUF_CHECKONLY, errmsgbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE) == -1)
goto error;
rpcap_createhdr((struct rpcap_header *) sendbuf, ver,
RPCAP_MSG_OPEN_REPLY, 0, sizeof(struct rpcap_openreply));
openreply = (struct rpcap_openreply *) &sendbuf[sendbufidx];
if (sock_bufferize(NULL, sizeof(struct rpcap_openreply), NULL, &sendbufidx,
RPCAP_NETBUF_SIZE, SOCKBUF_CHECKONLY, errmsgbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE) == -1)
goto error;
memset(openreply, 0, sizeof(struct rpcap_openreply));
openreply->linktype = htonl(pcap_datalink(fp));
openreply->tzoff = 0; /* This is always 0 for live captures */
pcap_close(fp);
if (sock_send(pars->sockctrl, sendbuf, sendbufidx, errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE) == -1)
{
rpcapd_log(LOGPRIO_ERROR, "Send to client failed: %s", errbuf);
return -1;
}
return 0;
error:
if (rpcap_senderror(pars->sockctrl, ver, PCAP_ERR_OPEN,
errmsgbuf, errbuf) == -1)
{
rpcapd_log(LOGPRIO_ERROR, "Send to client failed: %s", errbuf);
return -1;
}
if (rpcapd_discard(pars->sockctrl, plen) == -1)
{
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: In the open request, reject capture sources that are URLs.
You shouldn't be able to ask a server to open a remote device on some
*other* server; just open it yourself.
This addresses Include Security issue F13: [libpcap] Remote Packet
Capture Daemon Allows Opening Capture URLs.
CWE ID: CWE-918 | 1 | 169,540 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nodelist_add_node_and_family(smartlist_t *sl, const node_t *node)
{
const smartlist_t *all_nodes = nodelist_get_list();
const smartlist_t *declared_family;
const or_options_t *options = get_options();
tor_assert(node);
declared_family = node_get_declared_family(node);
/* Let's make sure that we have the node itself, if it's a real node. */
{
const node_t *real_node = node_get_by_id(node->identity);
if (real_node)
smartlist_add(sl, (node_t*)real_node);
}
/* First, add any nodes with similar network addresses. */
if (options->EnforceDistinctSubnets) {
tor_addr_t node_addr;
node_get_addr(node, &node_addr);
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(all_nodes, const node_t *, node2) {
tor_addr_t a;
node_get_addr(node2, &a);
if (addrs_in_same_network_family(&a, &node_addr))
smartlist_add(sl, (void*)node2);
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(node2);
}
/* Now, add all nodes in the declared_family of this node, if they
* also declare this node to be in their family. */
if (declared_family) {
/* Add every r such that router declares familyness with node, and node
* declares familyhood with router. */
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(declared_family, const char *, name) {
const node_t *node2;
const smartlist_t *family2;
if (!(node2 = node_get_by_nickname(name, 0)))
continue;
if (!(family2 = node_get_declared_family(node2)))
continue;
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(family2, const char *, name2) {
if (node_nickname_matches(node, name2)) {
smartlist_add(sl, (void*)node2);
break;
}
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(name2);
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(name);
}
/* If the user declared any families locally, honor those too. */
if (options->NodeFamilySets) {
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(options->NodeFamilySets, const routerset_t *, rs, {
if (routerset_contains_node(rs, node)) {
routerset_get_all_nodes(sl, rs, NULL, 0);
}
});
}
}
Commit Message: Consider the exit family when applying guard restrictions.
When the new path selection logic went into place, I accidentally
dropped the code that considered the _family_ of the exit node when
deciding if the guard was usable, and we didn't catch that during
code review.
This patch makes the guard_restriction_t code consider the exit
family as well, and adds some (hopefully redundant) checks for the
case where we lack a node_t for a guard but we have a bridge_info_t
for it.
Fixes bug 22753; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha. Tracked as TROVE-2016-006
and CVE-2017-0377.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 69,817 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int reset_terminal_fd(int fd, bool switch_to_text) {
struct termios termios;
int r = 0;
/* Set terminal to some sane defaults */
assert(fd >= 0);
/* We leave locked terminal attributes untouched, so that
* Plymouth may set whatever it wants to set, and we don't
* interfere with that. */
/* Disable exclusive mode, just in case */
(void) ioctl(fd, TIOCNXCL);
/* Switch to text mode */
if (switch_to_text)
(void) ioctl(fd, KDSETMODE, KD_TEXT);
/* Set default keyboard mode */
(void) vt_reset_keyboard(fd);
if (tcgetattr(fd, &termios) < 0) {
r = -errno;
goto finish;
}
/* We only reset the stuff that matters to the software. How
* hardware is set up we don't touch assuming that somebody
* else will do that for us */
termios.c_iflag &= ~(IGNBRK | BRKINT | ISTRIP | INLCR | IGNCR | IUCLC);
termios.c_iflag |= ICRNL | IMAXBEL | IUTF8;
termios.c_oflag |= ONLCR;
termios.c_cflag |= CREAD;
termios.c_lflag = ISIG | ICANON | IEXTEN | ECHO | ECHOE | ECHOK | ECHOCTL | ECHOPRT | ECHOKE;
termios.c_cc[VINTR] = 03; /* ^C */
termios.c_cc[VQUIT] = 034; /* ^\ */
termios.c_cc[VERASE] = 0177;
termios.c_cc[VKILL] = 025; /* ^X */
termios.c_cc[VEOF] = 04; /* ^D */
termios.c_cc[VSTART] = 021; /* ^Q */
termios.c_cc[VSTOP] = 023; /* ^S */
termios.c_cc[VSUSP] = 032; /* ^Z */
termios.c_cc[VLNEXT] = 026; /* ^V */
termios.c_cc[VWERASE] = 027; /* ^W */
termios.c_cc[VREPRINT] = 022; /* ^R */
termios.c_cc[VEOL] = 0;
termios.c_cc[VEOL2] = 0;
termios.c_cc[VTIME] = 0;
termios.c_cc[VMIN] = 1;
if (tcsetattr(fd, TCSANOW, &termios) < 0)
r = -errno;
finish:
/* Just in case, flush all crap out */
(void) tcflush(fd, TCIOFLUSH);
return r;
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #12378 from rbalint/vt-kbd-reset-check
VT kbd reset check
CWE ID: CWE-255 | 0 | 92,407 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: inline static unsigned short xml_encode_us_ascii(unsigned char c)
{
return (unsigned short)c;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 11,002 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FPDF_BOOL PDFiumEngine::Pause_NeedToPauseNow(IFSDK_PAUSE* param) {
PDFiumEngine* engine = static_cast<PDFiumEngine*>(param);
return base::Time::Now() - engine->last_progressive_start_time_ >
engine->progressive_paint_timeout_;
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Use a temporary list when unloading pages
When traversing the |deferred_page_unloads_| list and handling the
unloads it's possible for new pages to get added to the list which will
invalidate the iterator.
This CL swaps the list with an empty list and does the iteration on the
list copy. New items that are unloaded while handling the defers will be
unloaded at a later point.
Bug: 780450
Change-Id: Ic7ced1c82227109784fb536ce19a4dd51b9119ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758916
Commit-Queue: dsinclair <dsinclair@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#515056}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 146,189 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: YfromRGBint(int ir, int ig, int ib)
{
double r = ir;
double g = ig;
double b = ib;
return YfromRGB(r, g, b);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 0 | 159,860 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ShellSurface::GetWidgetHitTestMask(gfx::Path* mask) const {
DCHECK(WidgetHasHitTestMask());
surface_->GetHitTestMask(mask);
gfx::Point origin = surface_->window()->bounds().origin();
mask->offset(SkIntToScalar(origin.x()), SkIntToScalar(origin.y()));
}
Commit Message: exo: Reduce side-effects of dynamic activation code.
This code exists for clients that need to managed their own system
modal dialogs. Since the addition of the remote surface API we
can limit the impact of this to surfaces created for system modal
container.
BUG=29528396
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2084023003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#401115}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 120,073 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SynchronizeVisualPropertiesMessageFilter::WaitForRect() {
screen_space_rect_run_loop_->Run();
}
Commit Message: Apply ExtensionNavigationThrottle filesystem/blob checks to all frames.
BUG=836858
Change-Id: I34333a72501129fd40b5a9aa6378c9f35f1e7fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1028511
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nick Carter <nick@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553867}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 156,207 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool WebContentsImpl::AddMessageToConsole(int32_t level,
const base::string16& message,
int32_t line_no,
const base::string16& source_id) {
if (!delegate_)
return false;
return delegate_->AddMessageToConsole(this, level, message, line_no,
source_id);
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID: | 0 | 131,758 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bson_iter_symbol (const bson_iter_t *iter, /* IN */
uint32_t *length) /* OUT */
{
const char *ret = NULL;
uint32_t ret_length = 0;
BSON_ASSERT (iter);
if (ITER_TYPE (iter) == BSON_TYPE_SYMBOL) {
ret = (const char *) (iter->raw + iter->d2);
ret_length = bson_iter_utf8_len_unsafe (iter);
}
if (length) {
*length = ret_length;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix for CVE-2018-16790 -- Verify bounds before binary length read.
As reported here: https://jira.mongodb.org/browse/CDRIVER-2819,
a heap overread occurs due a failure to correctly verify data
bounds.
In the original check, len - o returns the data left including the
sizeof(l) we just read. Instead, the comparison should check
against the data left NOT including the binary int32, i.e. just
subtype (byte*) instead of int32 subtype (byte*).
Added in test for corrupted BSON example.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 77,858 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DocumentLoader::StartLoading() {
GetTiming().MarkNavigationStart();
DCHECK(!GetResource());
DCHECK_EQ(state_, kNotStarted);
state_ = kProvisional;
if (MaybeLoadEmpty())
return;
DCHECK(!GetTiming().NavigationStart().is_null());
ResourceLoaderOptions options;
options.data_buffering_policy = kDoNotBufferData;
options.initiator_info.name = FetchInitiatorTypeNames::document;
FetchParameters fetch_params(request_, options);
RawResource::FetchMainResource(fetch_params, Fetcher(), this,
substitute_data_);
request_ = GetResource()->IsLoading() ? GetResource()->GetResourceRequest()
: fetch_params.GetResourceRequest();
}
Commit Message: Prevent sandboxed documents from reusing the default window
Bug: 377995
Change-Id: Iff66c6d214dfd0cb7ea9c80f83afeedfff703541
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/983558
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567663}
CWE ID: CWE-285 | 0 | 154,915 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TransformPaintPropertyNode::NearestScrollTranslationNode() const {
const auto* transform = this;
while (!transform->ScrollNode()) {
transform = transform->Parent();
DCHECK(transform);
}
return *transform;
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID: | 0 | 125,710 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AudioInputRendererHost::OnDeviceStarted(
int session_id, const std::string& device_id) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
SessionEntryMap::iterator it = session_entries_.find(session_id);
if (it == session_entries_.end()) {
DLOG(WARNING) << "AudioInputRendererHost::OnDeviceStarted()"
" session does not exist.";
return;
}
Send(new AudioInputMsg_NotifyDeviceStarted(it->second, device_id));
}
Commit Message: Improve validation when creating audio streams.
BUG=166795
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11647012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@173981 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 118,544 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SMB2_negotiate(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_ses *ses)
{
struct smb_rqst rqst;
struct smb2_negotiate_req *req;
struct smb2_negotiate_rsp *rsp;
struct kvec iov[1];
struct kvec rsp_iov;
int rc = 0;
int resp_buftype;
struct TCP_Server_Info *server = ses->server;
int blob_offset, blob_length;
char *security_blob;
int flags = CIFS_NEG_OP;
unsigned int total_len;
cifs_dbg(FYI, "Negotiate protocol\n");
if (!server) {
WARN(1, "%s: server is NULL!\n", __func__);
return -EIO;
}
rc = smb2_plain_req_init(SMB2_NEGOTIATE, NULL, (void **) &req, &total_len);
if (rc)
return rc;
req->sync_hdr.SessionId = 0;
memset(server->preauth_sha_hash, 0, SMB2_PREAUTH_HASH_SIZE);
memset(ses->preauth_sha_hash, 0, SMB2_PREAUTH_HASH_SIZE);
if (strcmp(ses->server->vals->version_string,
SMB3ANY_VERSION_STRING) == 0) {
req->Dialects[0] = cpu_to_le16(SMB30_PROT_ID);
req->Dialects[1] = cpu_to_le16(SMB302_PROT_ID);
req->DialectCount = cpu_to_le16(2);
total_len += 4;
} else if (strcmp(ses->server->vals->version_string,
SMBDEFAULT_VERSION_STRING) == 0) {
req->Dialects[0] = cpu_to_le16(SMB21_PROT_ID);
req->Dialects[1] = cpu_to_le16(SMB30_PROT_ID);
req->Dialects[2] = cpu_to_le16(SMB302_PROT_ID);
req->Dialects[3] = cpu_to_le16(SMB311_PROT_ID);
req->DialectCount = cpu_to_le16(4);
total_len += 8;
} else {
/* otherwise send specific dialect */
req->Dialects[0] = cpu_to_le16(ses->server->vals->protocol_id);
req->DialectCount = cpu_to_le16(1);
total_len += 2;
}
/* only one of SMB2 signing flags may be set in SMB2 request */
if (ses->sign)
req->SecurityMode = cpu_to_le16(SMB2_NEGOTIATE_SIGNING_REQUIRED);
else if (global_secflags & CIFSSEC_MAY_SIGN)
req->SecurityMode = cpu_to_le16(SMB2_NEGOTIATE_SIGNING_ENABLED);
else
req->SecurityMode = 0;
req->Capabilities = cpu_to_le32(ses->server->vals->req_capabilities);
/* ClientGUID must be zero for SMB2.02 dialect */
if (ses->server->vals->protocol_id == SMB20_PROT_ID)
memset(req->ClientGUID, 0, SMB2_CLIENT_GUID_SIZE);
else {
memcpy(req->ClientGUID, server->client_guid,
SMB2_CLIENT_GUID_SIZE);
if ((ses->server->vals->protocol_id == SMB311_PROT_ID) ||
(strcmp(ses->server->vals->version_string,
SMBDEFAULT_VERSION_STRING) == 0))
assemble_neg_contexts(req, &total_len);
}
iov[0].iov_base = (char *)req;
iov[0].iov_len = total_len;
memset(&rqst, 0, sizeof(struct smb_rqst));
rqst.rq_iov = iov;
rqst.rq_nvec = 1;
rc = cifs_send_recv(xid, ses, &rqst, &resp_buftype, flags, &rsp_iov);
cifs_small_buf_release(req);
rsp = (struct smb2_negotiate_rsp *)rsp_iov.iov_base;
/*
* No tcon so can't do
* cifs_stats_inc(&tcon->stats.smb2_stats.smb2_com_fail[SMB2...]);
*/
if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "Dialect not supported by server. Consider "
"specifying vers=1.0 or vers=2.0 on mount for accessing"
" older servers\n");
goto neg_exit;
} else if (rc != 0)
goto neg_exit;
if (strcmp(ses->server->vals->version_string,
SMB3ANY_VERSION_STRING) == 0) {
if (rsp->DialectRevision == cpu_to_le16(SMB20_PROT_ID)) {
cifs_dbg(VFS,
"SMB2 dialect returned but not requested\n");
return -EIO;
} else if (rsp->DialectRevision == cpu_to_le16(SMB21_PROT_ID)) {
cifs_dbg(VFS,
"SMB2.1 dialect returned but not requested\n");
return -EIO;
}
} else if (strcmp(ses->server->vals->version_string,
SMBDEFAULT_VERSION_STRING) == 0) {
if (rsp->DialectRevision == cpu_to_le16(SMB20_PROT_ID)) {
cifs_dbg(VFS,
"SMB2 dialect returned but not requested\n");
return -EIO;
} else if (rsp->DialectRevision == cpu_to_le16(SMB21_PROT_ID)) {
/* ops set to 3.0 by default for default so update */
ses->server->ops = &smb21_operations;
} else if (rsp->DialectRevision == cpu_to_le16(SMB311_PROT_ID))
ses->server->ops = &smb311_operations;
} else if (le16_to_cpu(rsp->DialectRevision) !=
ses->server->vals->protocol_id) {
/* if requested single dialect ensure returned dialect matched */
cifs_dbg(VFS, "Illegal 0x%x dialect returned: not requested\n",
le16_to_cpu(rsp->DialectRevision));
return -EIO;
}
cifs_dbg(FYI, "mode 0x%x\n", rsp->SecurityMode);
if (rsp->DialectRevision == cpu_to_le16(SMB20_PROT_ID))
cifs_dbg(FYI, "negotiated smb2.0 dialect\n");
else if (rsp->DialectRevision == cpu_to_le16(SMB21_PROT_ID))
cifs_dbg(FYI, "negotiated smb2.1 dialect\n");
else if (rsp->DialectRevision == cpu_to_le16(SMB30_PROT_ID))
cifs_dbg(FYI, "negotiated smb3.0 dialect\n");
else if (rsp->DialectRevision == cpu_to_le16(SMB302_PROT_ID))
cifs_dbg(FYI, "negotiated smb3.02 dialect\n");
else if (rsp->DialectRevision == cpu_to_le16(SMB311_PROT_ID))
cifs_dbg(FYI, "negotiated smb3.1.1 dialect\n");
else {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "Illegal dialect returned by server 0x%x\n",
le16_to_cpu(rsp->DialectRevision));
rc = -EIO;
goto neg_exit;
}
server->dialect = le16_to_cpu(rsp->DialectRevision);
/*
* Keep a copy of the hash after negprot. This hash will be
* the starting hash value for all sessions made from this
* server.
*/
memcpy(server->preauth_sha_hash, ses->preauth_sha_hash,
SMB2_PREAUTH_HASH_SIZE);
/* SMB2 only has an extended negflavor */
server->negflavor = CIFS_NEGFLAVOR_EXTENDED;
/* set it to the maximum buffer size value we can send with 1 credit */
server->maxBuf = min_t(unsigned int, le32_to_cpu(rsp->MaxTransactSize),
SMB2_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE);
server->max_read = le32_to_cpu(rsp->MaxReadSize);
server->max_write = le32_to_cpu(rsp->MaxWriteSize);
server->sec_mode = le16_to_cpu(rsp->SecurityMode);
if ((server->sec_mode & SMB2_SEC_MODE_FLAGS_ALL) != server->sec_mode)
cifs_dbg(FYI, "Server returned unexpected security mode 0x%x\n",
server->sec_mode);
server->capabilities = le32_to_cpu(rsp->Capabilities);
/* Internal types */
server->capabilities |= SMB2_NT_FIND | SMB2_LARGE_FILES;
security_blob = smb2_get_data_area_len(&blob_offset, &blob_length,
(struct smb2_sync_hdr *)rsp);
/*
* See MS-SMB2 section 2.2.4: if no blob, client picks default which
* for us will be
* ses->sectype = RawNTLMSSP;
* but for time being this is our only auth choice so doesn't matter.
* We just found a server which sets blob length to zero expecting raw.
*/
if (blob_length == 0) {
cifs_dbg(FYI, "missing security blob on negprot\n");
server->sec_ntlmssp = true;
}
rc = cifs_enable_signing(server, ses->sign);
if (rc)
goto neg_exit;
if (blob_length) {
rc = decode_negTokenInit(security_blob, blob_length, server);
if (rc == 1)
rc = 0;
else if (rc == 0)
rc = -EIO;
}
if (rsp->DialectRevision == cpu_to_le16(SMB311_PROT_ID)) {
if (rsp->NegotiateContextCount)
rc = smb311_decode_neg_context(rsp, server,
rsp_iov.iov_len);
else
cifs_dbg(VFS, "Missing expected negotiate contexts\n");
}
neg_exit:
free_rsp_buf(resp_buftype, rsp);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: cifs: Fix use-after-free in SMB2_read
There is a KASAN use-after-free:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in SMB2_read+0x1136/0x1190
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880b4e45e50 by task ln/1009
Should not release the 'req' because it will use in the trace.
Fixes: eccb4422cf97 ("smb3: Add ftrace tracepoints for improved SMB3 debugging")
Signed-off-by: ZhangXiaoxu <zhangxiaoxu5@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> 4.18+
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 88,079 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: double LocalDOMWindow::scrollY() const {
if (!GetFrame() || !GetFrame()->GetPage())
return 0;
LocalFrameView* view = GetFrame()->View();
if (!view)
return 0;
document()->UpdateStyleAndLayoutIgnorePendingStylesheets();
double viewport_y =
view->LayoutViewportScrollableArea()->GetScrollOffset().Height();
return AdjustForAbsoluteZoom::AdjustScroll(viewport_y,
GetFrame()->PageZoomFactor());
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 125,974 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int mnt_clone_write(struct vfsmount *mnt)
{
/* superblock may be r/o */
if (__mnt_is_readonly(mnt))
return -EROFS;
preempt_disable();
mnt_inc_writers(real_mount(mnt));
preempt_enable();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: vfs: Carefully propogate mounts across user namespaces
As a matter of policy MNT_READONLY should not be changable if the
original mounter had more privileges than creator of the mount
namespace.
Add the flag CL_UNPRIVILEGED to note when we are copying a mount from
a mount namespace that requires more privileges to a mount namespace
that requires fewer privileges.
When the CL_UNPRIVILEGED flag is set cause clone_mnt to set MNT_NO_REMOUNT
if any of the mnt flags that should never be changed are set.
This protects both mount propagation and the initial creation of a less
privileged mount namespace.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 32,380 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void v9fs_device_unrealize_common(V9fsState *s, Error **errp)
{
g_free(s->ctx.fs_root);
g_free(s->tag);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 8,187 |
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