instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void bio_free(struct bio *bio)
{
struct bio_set *bs = bio->bi_pool;
void *p;
bio_uninit(bio);
if (bs) {
bvec_free(bs->bvec_pool, bio->bi_io_vec, BVEC_POOL_IDX(bio));
/*
* If we have front padding, adjust the bio pointer before freeing
*/
p = bio;
p -= bs->front_pad;
mempool_free(p, bs->bio_pool);
} else {
/* Bio was allocated by bio_kmalloc() */
kfree(bio);
}
}
Commit Message: fix unbalanced page refcounting in bio_map_user_iov
bio_map_user_iov and bio_unmap_user do unbalanced pages refcounting if
IO vector has small consecutive buffers belonging to the same page.
bio_add_pc_page merges them into one, but the page reference is never
dropped.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Mayatskikh <v.mayatskih@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 62,831 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool TabsRemoveFunction::RemoveTab(int tab_id, std::string* error) {
Browser* browser = NULL;
WebContents* contents = NULL;
if (!GetTabById(tab_id, browser_context(), include_incognito_information(),
&browser, nullptr, &contents, nullptr, error)) {
return false;
}
if (!browser->window()->IsTabStripEditable()) {
*error = tabs_constants::kTabStripNotEditableError;
return false;
}
contents->Close();
return true;
}
Commit Message: Call CanCaptureVisiblePage in page capture API.
Currently the pageCapture permission allows access
to arbitrary local files and chrome:// pages which
can be a security concern. In order to address this,
the page capture API needs to be changed similar to
the captureVisibleTab API. The API will now only allow
extensions to capture otherwise-restricted URLs if the
user has granted activeTab. In addition, file:// URLs are
only capturable with the "Allow on file URLs" option enabled.
Bug: 893087
Change-Id: I6d6225a3efb70fc033e2e1c031c633869afac624
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1330689
Commit-Queue: Bettina Dea <bdea@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Varun Khaneja <vakh@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#615248}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 151,507 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void f2fs_invalidate_page(struct page *page, unsigned int offset,
unsigned int length)
{
struct inode *inode = page->mapping->host;
struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = F2FS_I_SB(inode);
if (inode->i_ino >= F2FS_ROOT_INO(sbi) &&
(offset % PAGE_SIZE || length != PAGE_SIZE))
return;
if (PageDirty(page)) {
if (inode->i_ino == F2FS_META_INO(sbi)) {
dec_page_count(sbi, F2FS_DIRTY_META);
} else if (inode->i_ino == F2FS_NODE_INO(sbi)) {
dec_page_count(sbi, F2FS_DIRTY_NODES);
} else {
inode_dec_dirty_pages(inode);
remove_dirty_inode(inode);
}
}
/* This is atomic written page, keep Private */
if (IS_ATOMIC_WRITTEN_PAGE(page))
return;
set_page_private(page, 0);
ClearPagePrivate(page);
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix a dead loop in f2fs_fiemap()
A dead loop can be triggered in f2fs_fiemap() using the test case
as below:
...
fd = open();
fallocate(fd, 0, 0, 4294967296);
ioctl(fd, FS_IOC_FIEMAP, fiemap_buf);
...
It's caused by an overflow in __get_data_block():
...
bh->b_size = map.m_len << inode->i_blkbits;
...
map.m_len is an unsigned int, and bh->b_size is a size_t which is 64 bits
on 64 bits archtecture, type conversion from an unsigned int to a size_t
will result in an overflow.
In the above-mentioned case, bh->b_size will be zero, and f2fs_fiemap()
will call get_data_block() at block 0 again an again.
Fix this by adding a force conversion before left shift.
Signed-off-by: Wei Fang <fangwei1@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 85,166 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void vm_entry_controls_clearbit(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 val)
{
vm_entry_controls_set(vmx, vm_entry_controls_get(vmx) & ~val);
}
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 37,184 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ContentSecurityPolicy::UsesStyleHashAlgorithms(uint8_t algorithms) {
style_hash_algorithms_used_ |= algorithms;
}
Commit Message: Inherit the navigation initiator when navigating instead of the parent/opener
Spec PR: https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-csp/pull/358
Bug: 905301, 894228, 836148
Change-Id: I43ada2266d42d1cd56dbe3c6dd89d115e878a83a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1314633
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#610850}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 152,539 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LayerTreeHost::RequestMainFrameUpdate() {
client_->UpdateLayerTreeHost();
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 137,145 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t MediaPlayerService::pullBatteryData(Parcel* reply) {
Mutex::Autolock lock(mLock);
int32_t time = systemTime() / 1000000L; //in ms
int32_t totalTime;
for (int i = 0; i < NUM_AUDIO_DEVICES; i++) {
totalTime = mBatteryAudio.totalTime[i];
if (mBatteryAudio.deviceOn[i]
&& (mBatteryAudio.lastTime[i] != 0)) {
int32_t tmpTime = mBatteryAudio.lastTime[i] + time;
totalTime += tmpTime;
}
reply->writeInt32(totalTime);
mBatteryAudio.totalTime[i] = 0;
}
BatteryUsageInfo info;
int size = mBatteryData.size();
reply->writeInt32(size);
int i = 0;
while (i < size) {
info = mBatteryData.valueAt(i);
reply->writeInt32(mBatteryData.keyAt(i)); //UID
reply->writeInt32(info.audioTotalTime);
reply->writeInt32(info.videoTotalTime);
info.audioTotalTime = 0;
info.videoTotalTime = 0;
if (info.refCount <= 0) {
mBatteryData.removeItemsAt(i);
size --;
i --;
}
i++;
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: MediaPlayerService: avoid invalid static cast
Bug: 30204103
Change-Id: Ie0dd3568a375f1e9fed8615ad3d85184bcc99028
(cherry picked from commit ee0a0e39acdcf8f97e0d6945c31ff36a06a36e9d)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 158,016 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int rio_get_settings(struct net_device *dev, struct ethtool_cmd *cmd)
{
struct netdev_private *np = netdev_priv(dev);
if (np->phy_media) {
/* fiber device */
cmd->supported = SUPPORTED_Autoneg | SUPPORTED_FIBRE;
cmd->advertising= ADVERTISED_Autoneg | ADVERTISED_FIBRE;
cmd->port = PORT_FIBRE;
cmd->transceiver = XCVR_INTERNAL;
} else {
/* copper device */
cmd->supported = SUPPORTED_10baseT_Half |
SUPPORTED_10baseT_Full | SUPPORTED_100baseT_Half
| SUPPORTED_100baseT_Full | SUPPORTED_1000baseT_Full |
SUPPORTED_Autoneg | SUPPORTED_MII;
cmd->advertising = ADVERTISED_10baseT_Half |
ADVERTISED_10baseT_Full | ADVERTISED_100baseT_Half |
ADVERTISED_100baseT_Full | ADVERTISED_1000baseT_Full|
ADVERTISED_Autoneg | ADVERTISED_MII;
cmd->port = PORT_MII;
cmd->transceiver = XCVR_INTERNAL;
}
if ( np->link_status ) {
ethtool_cmd_speed_set(cmd, np->speed);
cmd->duplex = np->full_duplex ? DUPLEX_FULL : DUPLEX_HALF;
} else {
ethtool_cmd_speed_set(cmd, -1);
cmd->duplex = -1;
}
if ( np->an_enable)
cmd->autoneg = AUTONEG_ENABLE;
else
cmd->autoneg = AUTONEG_DISABLE;
cmd->phy_address = np->phy_addr;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: dl2k: Clean up rio_ioctl
The dl2k driver's rio_ioctl call has a few issues:
- No permissions checking
- Implements SIOCGMIIREG and SIOCGMIIREG using the SIOCDEVPRIVATE numbers
- Has a few ioctls that may have been used for debugging at one point
but have no place in the kernel proper.
This patch removes all but the MII ioctls, renumbers them to use the
standard ones, and adds the proper permission check for SIOCSMIIREG.
We can also get rid of the dl2k-specific struct mii_data in favor of
the generic struct mii_ioctl_data.
Since we have the phyid on hand, we can add the SIOCGMIIPHY ioctl too.
Most of the MII code for the driver could probably be converted to use
the generic MII library but I don't have a device to test the results.
Reported-by: Stephan Mueller <stephan.mueller@atsec.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 20,096 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SelectionController::InitializeSelectionState() {
selection_state_ = SelectionState::kHaveNotStartedSelection;
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 124,924 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int getClientType(client *c) {
if (c->flags & CLIENT_MASTER) return CLIENT_TYPE_MASTER;
if ((c->flags & CLIENT_SLAVE) && !(c->flags & CLIENT_MONITOR))
return CLIENT_TYPE_SLAVE;
if (c->flags & CLIENT_PUBSUB) return CLIENT_TYPE_PUBSUB;
return CLIENT_TYPE_NORMAL;
}
Commit Message: Security: Cross Protocol Scripting protection.
This is an attempt at mitigating problems due to cross protocol
scripting, an attack targeting services using line oriented protocols
like Redis that can accept HTTP requests as valid protocol, by
discarding the invalid parts and accepting the payloads sent, for
example, via a POST request.
For this to be effective, when we detect POST and Host: and terminate
the connection asynchronously, the networking code was modified in order
to never process further input. It was later verified that in a
pipelined request containing a POST command, the successive commands are
not executed.
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 69,969 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlParseNCNameComplex(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
int len = 0, l;
int c;
int count = 0;
#ifdef DEBUG
nbParseNCNameComplex++;
#endif
/*
* Handler for more complex cases
*/
GROW;
c = CUR_CHAR(l);
if ((c == ' ') || (c == '>') || (c == '/') || /* accelerators */
(!xmlIsNameStartChar(ctxt, c) || (c == ':'))) {
return(NULL);
}
while ((c != ' ') && (c != '>') && (c != '/') && /* test bigname.xml */
(xmlIsNameChar(ctxt, c) && (c != ':'))) {
if (count++ > 100) {
count = 0;
GROW;
}
len += l;
NEXTL(l);
c = CUR_CHAR(l);
}
return(xmlDictLookup(ctxt->dict, ctxt->input->cur - len, len));
}
Commit Message: libxml: XML_PARSER_EOF checks from upstream
BUG=229019
TBR=cpu
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14053009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@196804 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 171,295 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool requiresLineBoxForContent(RenderInline* flow, const LineInfo& lineInfo)
{
RenderObject* parent = flow->parent();
if (flow->document().inNoQuirksMode()
&& (flow->style(lineInfo.isFirstLine())->lineHeight() != parent->style(lineInfo.isFirstLine())->lineHeight()
|| flow->style()->verticalAlign() != parent->style()->verticalAlign()
|| !parent->style()->font().fontMetrics().hasIdenticalAscentDescentAndLineGap(flow->style()->font().fontMetrics())))
return true;
return false;
}
Commit Message: Update containtingIsolate to go back all the way to top isolate from current root, rather than stopping at the first isolate it finds. This works because the current root is always updated with each isolate run.
BUG=279277
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23972003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@157268 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 111,392 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int decode_write(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct nfs_writeres *res)
{
__be32 *p;
int status;
status = decode_op_hdr(xdr, OP_WRITE);
if (status)
return status;
p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, 16);
if (unlikely(!p))
goto out_overflow;
res->count = be32_to_cpup(p++);
res->verf->committed = be32_to_cpup(p++);
memcpy(res->verf->verifier, p, 8);
return 0;
out_overflow:
print_overflow_msg(__func__, xdr);
return -EIO;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 23,338 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void bmdma_start_dma(IDEDMA *dma, IDEState *s,
BlockCompletionFunc *dma_cb)
{
BMDMAState *bm = DO_UPCAST(BMDMAState, dma, dma);
bm->unit = s->unit;
bm->dma_cb = dma_cb;
bm->cur_prd_last = 0;
bm->cur_prd_addr = 0;
bm->cur_prd_len = 0;
bm->sector_num = ide_get_sector(s);
bm->nsector = s->nsector;
if (bm->status & BM_STATUS_DMAING) {
bm->dma_cb(bmdma_active_if(bm), 0);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 6,779 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ntlm_read_message_fields_buffer(wStream* s, NTLM_MESSAGE_FIELDS* fields)
{
if (fields->Len > 0)
{
if ((fields->BufferOffset + fields->Len) > Stream_Length(s))
return -1;
fields->Buffer = (PBYTE) malloc(fields->Len);
if (!fields->Buffer)
return -1;
Stream_SetPosition(s, fields->BufferOffset);
Stream_Read(s, fields->Buffer, fields->Len);
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8789
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 169,277 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: jpeg_decompress_struct* info() { return &m_info; }
Commit Message: Progressive JPEG outputScanlines() calls should handle failure
outputScanlines() can fail and delete |this|, so any attempt to access
members thereafter should be avoided. Copy the decoder pointer member,
and use that copy to detect and handle the failure case.
BUG=232763
R=pkasting@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/14844003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@150545 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 119,073 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void media_device_kpad_to_upad(const struct media_pad *kpad,
struct media_pad_desc *upad)
{
upad->entity = kpad->entity->id;
upad->index = kpad->index;
upad->flags = kpad->flags;
}
Commit Message: [media] media-device: fix infoleak in ioctl media_enum_entities()
This fixes CVE-2014-1739.
Signed-off-by: Salva Peiró <speiro@ai2.upv.es>
Acked-by: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart@ideasonboard.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <m.chehab@samsung.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 39,317 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ContextualSearchDelegate::~ContextualSearchDelegate() {
}
Commit Message: [Contextual Search] Change "Now on Tap" to "Contextual Cards"
BUG=644934
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2361163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#420899}
CWE ID: | 0 | 120,224 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int board_init(void)
{
/* address of boot parameters */
gd->bd->bi_boot_params = mvebu_sdram_bar(0) + 0x100;
/*
* The KM_FLASH_GPIO_PIN switches between using a
* NAND or a SPI FLASH. Set this pin on start
* to NAND mode.
*/
kw_gpio_set_valid(KM_FLASH_GPIO_PIN, 1);
kw_gpio_direction_output(KM_FLASH_GPIO_PIN, 1);
#if defined(CONFIG_SYS_I2C_SOFT)
/*
* Reinit the GPIO for I2C Bitbang driver so that the now
* available gpio framework is consistent. The calls to
* direction output in are not necessary, they are already done in
* board_early_init_f
*/
kw_gpio_set_valid(KM_KIRKWOOD_SDA_PIN, 1);
kw_gpio_set_valid(KM_KIRKWOOD_SCL_PIN, 1);
#endif
#if defined(CONFIG_SYS_EEPROM_WREN)
kw_gpio_set_valid(KM_KIRKWOOD_ENV_WP, 38);
kw_gpio_direction_output(KM_KIRKWOOD_ENV_WP, 1);
#endif
#if defined(CONFIG_KM_FPGA_CONFIG)
trigger_fpga_config();
#endif
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch '2020-01-22-master-imports'
- Re-add U8500 platform support
- Add bcm968360bg support
- Assorted Keymile fixes
- Other assorted bugfixes
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 89,298 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::DidDisplayInsecureContent() {
Send(new FrameHostMsg_DidDisplayInsecureContent(routing_id_));
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,592 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void reuse_conn(struct connectdata *old_conn,
struct connectdata *conn)
{
free_fixed_hostname(&old_conn->http_proxy.host);
free_fixed_hostname(&old_conn->socks_proxy.host);
free(old_conn->http_proxy.host.rawalloc);
free(old_conn->socks_proxy.host.rawalloc);
/* free the SSL config struct from this connection struct as this was
allocated in vain and is targeted for destruction */
Curl_free_primary_ssl_config(&old_conn->ssl_config);
Curl_free_primary_ssl_config(&old_conn->proxy_ssl_config);
conn->data = old_conn->data;
/* get the user+password information from the old_conn struct since it may
* be new for this request even when we re-use an existing connection */
conn->bits.user_passwd = old_conn->bits.user_passwd;
if(conn->bits.user_passwd) {
/* use the new user name and password though */
Curl_safefree(conn->user);
Curl_safefree(conn->passwd);
conn->user = old_conn->user;
conn->passwd = old_conn->passwd;
old_conn->user = NULL;
old_conn->passwd = NULL;
}
conn->bits.proxy_user_passwd = old_conn->bits.proxy_user_passwd;
if(conn->bits.proxy_user_passwd) {
/* use the new proxy user name and proxy password though */
Curl_safefree(conn->http_proxy.user);
Curl_safefree(conn->socks_proxy.user);
Curl_safefree(conn->http_proxy.passwd);
Curl_safefree(conn->socks_proxy.passwd);
conn->http_proxy.user = old_conn->http_proxy.user;
conn->socks_proxy.user = old_conn->socks_proxy.user;
conn->http_proxy.passwd = old_conn->http_proxy.passwd;
conn->socks_proxy.passwd = old_conn->socks_proxy.passwd;
old_conn->http_proxy.user = NULL;
old_conn->socks_proxy.user = NULL;
old_conn->http_proxy.passwd = NULL;
old_conn->socks_proxy.passwd = NULL;
}
/* host can change, when doing keepalive with a proxy or if the case is
different this time etc */
free_fixed_hostname(&conn->host);
free_fixed_hostname(&conn->conn_to_host);
Curl_safefree(conn->host.rawalloc);
Curl_safefree(conn->conn_to_host.rawalloc);
conn->host = old_conn->host;
conn->conn_to_host = old_conn->conn_to_host;
conn->conn_to_port = old_conn->conn_to_port;
conn->remote_port = old_conn->remote_port;
/* persist connection info in session handle */
Curl_persistconninfo(conn);
conn_reset_all_postponed_data(old_conn); /* free buffers */
/* re-use init */
conn->bits.reuse = TRUE; /* yes, we're re-using here */
Curl_safefree(old_conn->user);
Curl_safefree(old_conn->passwd);
Curl_safefree(old_conn->options);
Curl_safefree(old_conn->http_proxy.user);
Curl_safefree(old_conn->socks_proxy.user);
Curl_safefree(old_conn->http_proxy.passwd);
Curl_safefree(old_conn->socks_proxy.passwd);
Curl_safefree(old_conn->localdev);
Curl_llist_destroy(&old_conn->send_pipe, NULL);
Curl_llist_destroy(&old_conn->recv_pipe, NULL);
Curl_safefree(old_conn->master_buffer);
#ifdef USE_UNIX_SOCKETS
Curl_safefree(old_conn->unix_domain_socket);
#endif
}
Commit Message: Curl_close: clear data->multi_easy on free to avoid use-after-free
Regression from b46cfbc068 (7.59.0)
CVE-2018-16840
Reported-by: Brian Carpenter (Geeknik Labs)
Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/CVE-2018-16840.html
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 77,812 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::~RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl()
{
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r127612, r127660, and r127664.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127612
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127660
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127664
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95920
Source/Platform:
* Platform.gypi:
* chromium/public/WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebKit):
(WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* chromium/public/WebRTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
Source/WebCore:
* CMakeLists.txt:
* GNUmakefile.list.am:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCErrorCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnection::createOffer):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCPeerConnection):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCSessionDescriptionCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::create):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestSucceeded):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestFailed):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::clear):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.h:
(RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.cpp: Removed.
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.h: Removed.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/chromium/support/WebRTCVoidRequest.cpp: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebCore):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::~RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* platform/mediastream/RTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.cpp:
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.h:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium):
Tools:
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::SuccessCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::FailureCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::createOffer):
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(SuccessCallbackTask):
(FailureCallbackTask):
LayoutTests:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-createOffer.html:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription.html: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription.html: Removed.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@127679 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 99,382 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int crypto_init_blkcipher_ops(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u32 type, u32 mask)
{
struct blkcipher_alg *alg = &tfm->__crt_alg->cra_blkcipher;
if (alg->ivsize > PAGE_SIZE / 8)
return -EINVAL;
if ((mask & CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK) == CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK)
return crypto_init_blkcipher_ops_sync(tfm);
else
return crypto_init_blkcipher_ops_async(tfm);
}
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 31,290 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int jas_iccgetuint8(jas_stream_t *in, jas_iccuint8_t *val)
{
int c;
if ((c = jas_stream_getc(in)) == EOF)
return -1;
*val = c;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 72,697 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void GetModePixelList(PixelList *pixel_list,MagickPixelPacket *pixel)
{
register SkipList
*list;
register ssize_t
channel;
size_t
color,
max_count,
mode;
ssize_t
count;
unsigned short
channels[5];
/*
Make each pixel the 'predominant color' of the specified neighborhood.
*/
for (channel=0; channel < 5; channel++)
{
list=pixel_list->lists+channel;
color=65536L;
mode=color;
max_count=list->nodes[mode].count;
count=0;
do
{
color=list->nodes[color].next[0];
if (list->nodes[color].count > max_count)
{
mode=color;
max_count=list->nodes[mode].count;
}
count+=list->nodes[color].count;
} while (count < (ssize_t) pixel_list->length);
channels[channel]=(unsigned short) mode;
}
pixel->red=(MagickRealType) ScaleShortToQuantum(channels[0]);
pixel->green=(MagickRealType) ScaleShortToQuantum(channels[1]);
pixel->blue=(MagickRealType) ScaleShortToQuantum(channels[2]);
pixel->opacity=(MagickRealType) ScaleShortToQuantum(channels[3]);
pixel->index=(MagickRealType) ScaleShortToQuantum(channels[4]);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1615
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 88,941 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virDomainGetSecurityLabel(virDomainPtr domain, virSecurityLabelPtr seclabel)
{
virConnectPtr conn;
VIR_DOMAIN_DEBUG(domain, "seclabel=%p", seclabel);
virResetLastError();
virCheckDomainReturn(domain, -1);
conn = domain->conn;
virCheckNonNullArgGoto(seclabel, error);
if (conn->driver->domainGetSecurityLabel) {
int ret;
ret = conn->driver->domainGetSecurityLabel(domain, seclabel);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
return ret;
}
virReportUnsupportedError();
error:
virDispatchError(domain->conn);
return -1;
}
Commit Message: virDomainGetTime: Deny on RO connections
We have a policy that if API may end up talking to a guest agent
it should require RW connection. We don't obey the rule in
virDomainGetTime().
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 93,821 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DownloadRequestLimiter::CanDownloadImpl(
content::WebContents* originating_contents,
const std::string& request_method,
const Callback& callback) {
DCHECK(originating_contents);
TabDownloadState* state =
GetDownloadState(originating_contents, originating_contents, true);
state->set_download_seen();
bool ret = true;
switch (state->download_status()) {
case ALLOW_ALL_DOWNLOADS:
if (state->download_count() &&
!(state->download_count() %
DownloadRequestLimiter::kMaxDownloadsAtOnce)) {
state->SetDownloadStatusAndNotify(PROMPT_BEFORE_DOWNLOAD);
} else {
state->SetDownloadStatusAndNotify(ALLOW_ALL_DOWNLOADS);
}
callback.Run(true);
state->increment_download_count();
break;
case ALLOW_ONE_DOWNLOAD:
state->SetDownloadStatusAndNotify(PROMPT_BEFORE_DOWNLOAD);
callback.Run(true);
state->increment_download_count();
break;
case DOWNLOADS_NOT_ALLOWED:
state->SetDownloadStatusAndNotify(DOWNLOADS_NOT_ALLOWED);
ret = false;
callback.Run(false);
break;
case PROMPT_BEFORE_DOWNLOAD: {
HostContentSettingsMap* content_settings =
GetContentSettings(originating_contents);
ContentSetting setting = CONTENT_SETTING_ASK;
if (content_settings) {
setting = content_settings->GetContentSetting(
originating_contents->GetURL(), originating_contents->GetURL(),
CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_AUTOMATIC_DOWNLOADS, std::string());
}
switch (setting) {
case CONTENT_SETTING_ALLOW: {
state->SetDownloadStatusAndNotify(ALLOW_ALL_DOWNLOADS);
callback.Run(true);
state->increment_download_count();
break;
}
case CONTENT_SETTING_BLOCK: {
state->SetDownloadStatusAndNotify(DOWNLOADS_NOT_ALLOWED);
ret = false;
callback.Run(false);
break;
}
case CONTENT_SETTING_DEFAULT:
case CONTENT_SETTING_ASK:
state->PromptUserForDownload(callback);
state->increment_download_count();
break;
case CONTENT_SETTING_SESSION_ONLY:
case CONTENT_SETTING_NUM_SETTINGS:
default:
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
break;
}
default:
NOTREACHED();
}
if (!on_can_download_decided_callback_.is_null())
on_can_download_decided_callback_.Run(ret);
}
Commit Message: Don't reset TabDownloadState on history back/forward
Currently performing forward/backward on a tab will reset the TabDownloadState.
Which allows javascript code to do trigger multiple downloads.
This CL disables that behavior by not resetting the TabDownloadState on
forward/back.
It is still possible to reset the TabDownloadState through user gesture
or using browser initiated download.
BUG=848535
Change-Id: I7f9bf6e8fb759b4dcddf5ac0c214e8c6c9f48863
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1108959
Commit-Queue: Min Qin <qinmin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#574437}
CWE ID: | 0 | 154,718 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void hfsplus_cat_build_key_uni(hfsplus_btree_key *key, u32 parent,
struct hfsplus_unistr *name)
{
int ustrlen;
ustrlen = be16_to_cpu(name->length);
key->cat.parent = cpu_to_be32(parent);
key->cat.name.length = cpu_to_be16(ustrlen);
ustrlen *= 2;
memcpy(key->cat.name.unicode, name->unicode, ustrlen);
key->key_len = cpu_to_be16(6 + ustrlen);
}
Commit Message: hfsplus: Fix potential buffer overflows
Commit ec81aecb2966 ("hfs: fix a potential buffer overflow") fixed a few
potential buffer overflows in the hfs filesystem. But as Timo Warns
pointed out, these changes also need to be made on the hfsplus
filesystem as well.
Reported-by: Timo Warns <warns@pre-sense.de>
Acked-by: WANG Cong <amwang@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Khoroshilov <khoroshilov@ispras.ru>
Cc: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Cc: Sage Weil <sage@newdream.net>
Cc: Eugene Teo <eteo@redhat.com>
Cc: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Anderson <anderson@redhat.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 20,055 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: no_checker_emails_handler(vector_t *strvec)
{
int res = true;
if (vector_size(strvec) >= 2) {
res = check_true_false(strvec_slot(strvec,1));
if (res < 0) {
report_config_error(CONFIG_GENERAL_ERROR, "Invalid value '%s' for global no_checker_emails specified", FMT_STR_VSLOT(strvec, 1));
return;
}
}
global_data->no_checker_emails = res;
}
Commit Message: Add command line and configuration option to set umask
Issue #1048 identified that files created by keepalived are created
with mode 0666. This commit changes the default to 0644, and also
allows the umask to be specified in the configuration or as a command
line option.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 75,839 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int genl_allocate_reserve_groups(int n_groups, int *first_id)
{
unsigned long *new_groups;
int start = 0;
int i;
int id;
bool fits;
do {
if (start == 0)
id = find_first_zero_bit(mc_groups,
mc_groups_longs *
BITS_PER_LONG);
else
id = find_next_zero_bit(mc_groups,
mc_groups_longs * BITS_PER_LONG,
start);
fits = true;
for (i = id;
i < min_t(int, id + n_groups,
mc_groups_longs * BITS_PER_LONG);
i++) {
if (test_bit(i, mc_groups)) {
start = i;
fits = false;
break;
}
}
if (id + n_groups > mc_groups_longs * BITS_PER_LONG) {
unsigned long new_longs = mc_groups_longs +
BITS_TO_LONGS(n_groups);
size_t nlen = new_longs * sizeof(unsigned long);
if (mc_groups == &mc_group_start) {
new_groups = kzalloc(nlen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!new_groups)
return -ENOMEM;
mc_groups = new_groups;
*mc_groups = mc_group_start;
} else {
new_groups = krealloc(mc_groups, nlen,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!new_groups)
return -ENOMEM;
mc_groups = new_groups;
for (i = 0; i < BITS_TO_LONGS(n_groups); i++)
mc_groups[mc_groups_longs + i] = 0;
}
mc_groups_longs = new_longs;
}
} while (!fits);
for (i = id; i < id + n_groups; i++)
set_bit(i, mc_groups);
*first_id = id;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: genetlink: Fix a memory leak on error path
In genl_register_family(), when idr_alloc() fails,
we forget to free the memory we possibly allocate for
family->attrbuf.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: 2ae0f17df1cd ("genetlink: use idr to track families")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 88,035 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: explicit TestNavigationObserver(RenderViewHost* render_view_host)
: RenderViewHostObserver(render_view_host) {
}
Commit Message: Delete unneeded pending entries in DidFailProvisionalLoad to prevent a spoof.
BUG=280512
BUG=278899
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23978003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@222146 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 111,587 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void testUriUserInfoHostPort5() {
UriParserStateA stateA;
UriUriA uriA;
stateA.uri = &uriA;
const char * const input = "http" "://" "localhost";
TEST_ASSERT(0 == uriParseUriA(&stateA, input));
TEST_ASSERT(uriA.userInfo.first == NULL);
TEST_ASSERT(uriA.userInfo.afterLast == NULL);
TEST_ASSERT(uriA.hostText.first == input + 4 + 3);
TEST_ASSERT(uriA.hostText.afterLast == input + 4 + 3 + 9);
TEST_ASSERT(uriA.portText.first == NULL);
TEST_ASSERT(uriA.portText.afterLast == NULL);
uriFreeUriMembersA(&uriA);
}
Commit Message: UriQuery.c: Fix out-of-bounds-write in ComposeQuery and ...Ex
Reported by Google Autofuzz team
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 75,786 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: conv_swap2bytes(const UChar* s, const UChar* end, UChar* conv)
{
while (s < end) {
*conv++ = s[1];
*conv++ = s[0];
s += 2;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix CVE-2019-13224: don't allow different encodings for onig_new_deluxe()
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 89,250 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool kvm_hv_msr_partition_wide(u32 msr)
{
bool r = false;
switch (msr) {
case HV_X64_MSR_GUEST_OS_ID:
case HV_X64_MSR_HYPERCALL:
r = true;
break;
}
return r;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 20,778 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nfsd4_decode_putfh(struct nfsd4_compoundargs *argp, struct nfsd4_putfh *putfh)
{
DECODE_HEAD;
READ_BUF(4);
putfh->pf_fhlen = be32_to_cpup(p++);
if (putfh->pf_fhlen > NFS4_FHSIZE)
goto xdr_error;
READ_BUF(putfh->pf_fhlen);
SAVEMEM(putfh->pf_fhval, putfh->pf_fhlen);
DECODE_TAIL;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,765 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t WriteCALSRecord(Image *image,const char *data)
{
char
pad[128];
register const char
*p;
register ssize_t
i;
ssize_t
count;
i=0;
count=0;
if (data != (const char *) NULL)
{
p=data;
for (i=0; (i < 128) && (p[i] != '\0'); i++);
count=WriteBlob(image,(size_t) i,(const unsigned char *) data);
}
if (i < 128)
{
i=128-i;
(void) memset(pad,' ',(size_t) i);
count=WriteBlob(image,(size_t) i,(const unsigned char *) pad);
}
return(count);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1199
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 77,966 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: read_name(uschar *name, int max, uschar *s, uschar *extras)
{
int ptr = 0;
while (*s != 0 && (isalnum(*s) || Ustrchr(extras, *s) != NULL))
{
if (ptr < max-1) name[ptr++] = *s;
s++;
}
name[ptr] = 0;
return s;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 12,672 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void *timers_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos)
{
struct timers_private *tp = m->private;
return seq_list_next(v, &tp->task->signal->posix_timers, pos);
}
Commit Message: proc: prevent accessing /proc/<PID>/environ until it's ready
If /proc/<PID>/environ gets read before the envp[] array is fully set up
in create_{aout,elf,elf_fdpic,flat}_tables(), we might end up trying to
read more bytes than are actually written, as env_start will already be
set but env_end will still be zero, making the range calculation
underflow, allowing to read beyond the end of what has been written.
Fix this as it is done for /proc/<PID>/cmdline by testing env_end for
zero. It is, apparently, intentionally set last in create_*_tables().
This bug was found by the PaX size_overflow plugin that detected the
arithmetic underflow of 'this_len = env_end - (env_start + src)' when
env_end is still zero.
The expected consequence is that userland trying to access
/proc/<PID>/environ of a not yet fully set up process may get
inconsistent data as we're in the middle of copying in the environment
variables.
Fixes: https://forums.grsecurity.net/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=4363
Fixes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=116461
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Cc: Pax Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 49,465 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void virtqueue_discard(VirtQueue *vq, const VirtQueueElement *elem,
unsigned int len)
{
vq->last_avail_idx--;
virtqueue_unmap_sg(vq, elem, len);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 9,256 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int handle_early_requeue_pi_wakeup(struct futex_hash_bucket *hb,
struct futex_q *q, union futex_key *key2,
struct hrtimer_sleeper *timeout)
{
int ret = 0;
/*
* With the hb lock held, we avoid races while we process the wakeup.
* We only need to hold hb (and not hb2) to ensure atomicity as the
* wakeup code can't change q.key from uaddr to uaddr2 if we hold hb.
* It can't be requeued from uaddr2 to something else since we don't
* support a PI aware source futex for requeue.
*/
if (!match_futex(&q->key, key2)) {
WARN_ON(q->lock_ptr && (&hb->lock != q->lock_ptr));
/*
* We were woken prior to requeue by a timeout or a signal.
* Unqueue the futex_q and determine which it was.
*/
plist_del(&q->list, &q->list.plist);
/* Handle spurious wakeups gracefully */
ret = -EWOULDBLOCK;
if (timeout && !timeout->task)
ret = -ETIMEDOUT;
else if (signal_pending(current))
ret = -ERESTARTNOINTR;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: futex: Fix errors in nested key ref-counting
futex_wait() is leaking key references due to futex_wait_setup()
acquiring an additional reference via the queue_lock() routine. The
nested key ref-counting has been masking bugs and complicating code
analysis. queue_lock() is only called with a previously ref-counted
key, so remove the additional ref-counting from the queue_(un)lock()
functions.
Also futex_wait_requeue_pi() drops one key reference too many in
unqueue_me_pi(). Remove the key reference handling from
unqueue_me_pi(). This was paired with a queue_lock() in
futex_lock_pi(), so the count remains unchanged.
Document remaining nested key ref-counting sites.
Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Reported-and-tested-by: Matthieu Fertré<matthieu.fertre@kerlabs.com>
Reported-by: Louis Rilling<louis.rilling@kerlabs.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: John Kacur <jkacur@redhat.com>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
LKML-Reference: <4CBB17A8.70401@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 39,642 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebFrame* RenderViewTest::GetMainFrame() {
return view_->GetWebView()->mainFrame();
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 108,506 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::InstallCreateHook(
CreateRenderFrameImplFunction create_frame,
CreateRenderWidgetForChildLocalRootFunction create_widget,
RenderWidgetForChildLocalRootInitializedCallback widget_initialized) {
DCHECK(!g_create_render_frame_impl);
DCHECK(!g_create_render_widget);
DCHECK(!g_render_widget_initialized);
g_create_render_frame_impl = create_frame;
g_create_render_widget = create_widget;
g_render_widget_initialized = widget_initialized;
}
Commit Message: Fix crashes in RenderFrameImpl::OnSelectPopupMenuItem(s)
ExternalPopupMenu::DidSelectItem(s) can delete the RenderFrameImpl.
We need to reset external_popup_menu_ before calling it.
Bug: 912211
Change-Id: Ia9a628e144464a2ebb14ab77d3a693fd5cead6fc
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1381325
Commit-Queue: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#618026}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 152,881 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mrb_funcall_argv(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_value self, mrb_sym mid, mrb_int argc, const mrb_value *argv)
{
return mrb_funcall_with_block(mrb, self, mid, argc, argv, mrb_nil_value());
}
Commit Message: Check length of env stack before accessing upvar; fix #3995
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 83,180 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AttributeChange(PassRefPtr<Element> element, const QualifiedName& name, const String& value)
: m_element(element), m_name(name), m_value(value)
{
}
Commit Message: There are too many poorly named functions to create a fragment from markup
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87339
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Source/WebCore:
Moved all functions that create a fragment from markup to markup.h/cpp.
There should be no behavioral change.
* dom/Range.cpp:
(WebCore::Range::createContextualFragment):
* dom/Range.h: Removed createDocumentFragmentForElement.
* dom/ShadowRoot.cpp:
(WebCore::ShadowRoot::setInnerHTML):
* editing/markup.cpp:
(WebCore::createFragmentFromMarkup):
(WebCore::createFragmentForInnerOuterHTML): Renamed from createFragmentFromSource.
(WebCore::createFragmentForTransformToFragment): Moved from XSLTProcessor.
(WebCore::removeElementPreservingChildren): Moved from Range.
(WebCore::createContextualFragment): Ditto.
* editing/markup.h:
* html/HTMLElement.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setInnerHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setOuterHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML):
* inspector/DOMPatchSupport.cpp:
(WebCore::DOMPatchSupport::patchNode): Added a FIXME since this code should be using
one of the functions listed in markup.h
* xml/XSLTProcessor.cpp:
(WebCore::XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment):
Source/WebKit/qt:
Replace calls to Range::createDocumentFragmentForElement by calls to
createContextualDocumentFragment.
* Api/qwebelement.cpp:
(QWebElement::appendInside):
(QWebElement::prependInside):
(QWebElement::prependOutside):
(QWebElement::appendOutside):
(QWebElement::encloseContentsWith):
(QWebElement::encloseWith):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118414 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 100,306 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const QualifiedName& ImageInputType::subResourceAttributeName() const
{
return srcAttr;
}
Commit Message: ImageInputType::ensurePrimaryContent should recreate UA shadow tree.
Once the fallback shadow tree was created, it was never recreated even if
ensurePrimaryContent was called. Such situation happens by updating |src|
attribute.
BUG=589838
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1732753004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#377804}
CWE ID: CWE-361 | 0 | 133,022 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewGuest::Show() {
WasShown();
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 115,056 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static u32 dwc3_calc_trbs_left(struct dwc3_ep *dep)
{
struct dwc3_trb *tmp;
u8 trbs_left;
/*
* If enqueue & dequeue are equal than it is either full or empty.
*
* One way to know for sure is if the TRB right before us has HWO bit
* set or not. If it has, then we're definitely full and can't fit any
* more transfers in our ring.
*/
if (dep->trb_enqueue == dep->trb_dequeue) {
tmp = dwc3_ep_prev_trb(dep, dep->trb_enqueue);
if (tmp->ctrl & DWC3_TRB_CTRL_HWO)
return 0;
return DWC3_TRB_NUM - 1;
}
trbs_left = dep->trb_dequeue - dep->trb_enqueue;
trbs_left &= (DWC3_TRB_NUM - 1);
if (dep->trb_dequeue < dep->trb_enqueue)
trbs_left--;
return trbs_left;
}
Commit Message: usb: dwc3: gadget: never call ->complete() from ->ep_queue()
This is a requirement which has always existed but, somehow, wasn't
reflected in the documentation and problems weren't found until now
when Tuba Yavuz found a possible deadlock happening between dwc3 and
f_hid. She described the situation as follows:
spin_lock_irqsave(&hidg->write_spinlock, flags); // first acquire
/* we our function has been disabled by host */
if (!hidg->req) {
free_ep_req(hidg->in_ep, hidg->req);
goto try_again;
}
[...]
status = usb_ep_queue(hidg->in_ep, hidg->req, GFP_ATOMIC);
=>
[...]
=> usb_gadget_giveback_request
=>
f_hidg_req_complete
=>
spin_lock_irqsave(&hidg->write_spinlock, flags); // second acquire
Note that this happens because dwc3 would call ->complete() on a
failed usb_ep_queue() due to failed Start Transfer command. This is,
anyway, a theoretical situation because dwc3 currently uses "No
Response Update Transfer" command for Bulk and Interrupt endpoints.
It's still good to make this case impossible to happen even if the "No
Reponse Update Transfer" command is changed.
Reported-by: Tuba Yavuz <tuba@ece.ufl.edu>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 88,638 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static zval *_xml_xmlchar_zval(const XML_Char *s, int len, const XML_Char *encoding)
{
zval *ret;
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(ret);
if (s == NULL) {
ZVAL_FALSE(ret);
return ret;
}
if (len == 0) {
len = _xml_xmlcharlen(s);
}
Z_TYPE_P(ret) = IS_STRING;
Z_STRVAL_P(ret) = xml_utf8_decode(s, len, &Z_STRLEN_P(ret), encoding);
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 165,044 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mov_metadata_track_or_disc_number(MOVContext *c, AVIOContext *pb,
unsigned len, const char *key)
{
char buf[16];
short current, total = 0;
avio_rb16(pb); // unknown
current = avio_rb16(pb);
if (len >= 6)
total = avio_rb16(pb);
if (!total)
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d", current);
else
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d/%d", current, total);
c->fc->event_flags |= AVFMT_EVENT_FLAG_METADATA_UPDATED;
av_dict_set(&c->fc->metadata, key, buf, 0);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/mov: Fix DoS in read_tfra()
Fixes: Missing EOF check in loop
No testcase
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-834 | 0 | 61,398 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gboolean webkit_web_view_get_view_source_mode (WebKitWebView* webView)
{
g_return_val_if_fail(WEBKIT_IS_WEB_VIEW(webView), FALSE);
if (Frame* mainFrame = core(webView)->mainFrame())
return mainFrame->inViewSourceMode();
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message: 2011-06-02 Joone Hur <joone.hur@collabora.co.uk>
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
[GTK] Only load dictionaries if spell check is enabled
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32879
We don't need to call enchant if enable-spell-checking is false.
* webkit/webkitwebview.cpp:
(webkit_web_view_update_settings): Skip loading dictionaries when enable-spell-checking is false.
(webkit_web_view_settings_notify): Ditto.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@87925 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,579 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const char *ga_fsfreeze_hook(GAState *s)
{
return s->fsfreeze_hook;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 3,847 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual void SetUp() {
InitializeContext("OpenGL ES 3.0",
"GL_OES_texture_float GL_EXT_color_buffer_float");
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 120,732 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::OnIsPageTranslatedChanged(content::WebContents* source) {
DCHECK(source);
if (tab_strip_model_->GetActiveWebContents() == source) {
window_->SetTranslateIconToggled(
ChromeTranslateClient::FromWebContents(
source)->GetLanguageState().IsPageTranslated());
}
}
Commit Message: Don't focus the location bar for NTP navigations in non-selected tabs.
BUG=677716
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2624373002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#443338}
CWE ID: | 0 | 139,029 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void sk_stop_timer(struct sock *sk, struct timer_list* timer)
{
if (timer_pending(timer) && del_timer(timer))
__sock_put(sk);
}
Commit Message: net: sock: validate data_len before allocating skb in sock_alloc_send_pskb()
We need to validate the number of pages consumed by data_len, otherwise frags
array could be overflowed by userspace. So this patch validate data_len and
return -EMSGSIZE when data_len may occupies more frags than MAX_SKB_FRAGS.
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 20,151 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool ide_cd_is_medium_locked(void *opaque)
{
return ((IDEState *)opaque)->tray_locked;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 6,716 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlCtxtReadDoc(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, const xmlChar * cur,
const char *URL, const char *encoding, int options)
{
xmlParserInputPtr stream;
if (cur == NULL)
return (NULL);
if (ctxt == NULL)
return (NULL);
xmlInitParser();
xmlCtxtReset(ctxt);
stream = xmlNewStringInputStream(ctxt, cur);
if (stream == NULL) {
return (NULL);
}
inputPush(ctxt, stream);
return (xmlDoRead(ctxt, URL, encoding, options, 1));
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Add validation for eternal enities
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=780691
Bug: 36556310
Change-Id: I9450743e167c3c73af5e4071f3fc85e81d061648
(cherry picked from commit bef9af3d89d241bcb518c20cba6da2a2fd9ba049)
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 0 | 163,398 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::InitBrowserWindow() {
DCHECK(!window_);
window_ = CreateBrowserWindow();
#if defined(OS_WIN)
{
base::ThreadRestrictions::ScopedAllowIO allow_io;
app::win::SetAppIdForWindow(
type_ & TYPE_APP ?
ShellIntegration::GetAppId(UTF8ToWide(app_name_), profile_->GetPath()) :
ShellIntegration::GetChromiumAppId(profile_->GetPath()),
window()->GetNativeHandle());
}
#endif
NotificationService::current()->Notify(
NotificationType::BROWSER_WINDOW_READY,
Source<Browser>(this),
NotificationService::NoDetails());
PrefService* local_state = g_browser_process->local_state();
if (!local_state)
return;
if (local_state->FindPreference(prefs::kShouldShowFirstRunBubble) &&
local_state->GetBoolean(prefs::kShouldShowFirstRunBubble)) {
FirstRun::BubbleType bubble_type = FirstRun::LARGE_BUBBLE;
if (local_state->
FindPreference(prefs::kShouldUseOEMFirstRunBubble) &&
local_state->GetBoolean(prefs::kShouldUseOEMFirstRunBubble)) {
bubble_type = FirstRun::OEM_BUBBLE;
} else if (local_state->
FindPreference(prefs::kShouldUseMinimalFirstRunBubble) &&
local_state->GetBoolean(prefs::kShouldUseMinimalFirstRunBubble)) {
bubble_type = FirstRun::MINIMAL_BUBBLE;
}
local_state->ClearPref(prefs::kShouldShowFirstRunBubble);
window_->GetLocationBar()->ShowFirstRunBubble(bubble_type);
}
if (local_state->FindPreference(
prefs::kAutofillPersonalDataManagerFirstRun) &&
local_state->GetBoolean(prefs::kAutofillPersonalDataManagerFirstRun)) {
#if defined(OS_WIN)
ImportAutofillDataWin(profile_->GetPersonalDataManager());
#endif // defined(OS_WIN)
local_state->ClearPref(prefs::kAutofillPersonalDataManagerFirstRun);
}
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,248 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::GetServiceTextureId(
uint32_t client_texture_id,
uint32_t* service_texture_id) {
return resources_->texture_id_map.GetServiceID(client_texture_id,
service_texture_id);
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,773 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int qeth_alloc_qdio_buffers(struct qeth_card *card)
{
int i, j;
QETH_DBF_TEXT(SETUP, 2, "allcqdbf");
if (atomic_cmpxchg(&card->qdio.state, QETH_QDIO_UNINITIALIZED,
QETH_QDIO_ALLOCATED) != QETH_QDIO_UNINITIALIZED)
return 0;
card->qdio.in_q = kzalloc(sizeof(struct qeth_qdio_q),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!card->qdio.in_q)
goto out_nomem;
QETH_DBF_TEXT(SETUP, 2, "inq");
QETH_DBF_HEX(SETUP, 2, &card->qdio.in_q, sizeof(void *));
memset(card->qdio.in_q, 0, sizeof(struct qeth_qdio_q));
/* give inbound qeth_qdio_buffers their qdio_buffers */
for (i = 0; i < QDIO_MAX_BUFFERS_PER_Q; ++i) {
card->qdio.in_q->bufs[i].buffer =
&card->qdio.in_q->qdio_bufs[i];
card->qdio.in_q->bufs[i].rx_skb = NULL;
}
/* inbound buffer pool */
if (qeth_alloc_buffer_pool(card))
goto out_freeinq;
/* outbound */
card->qdio.out_qs =
kzalloc(card->qdio.no_out_queues *
sizeof(struct qeth_qdio_out_q *), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!card->qdio.out_qs)
goto out_freepool;
for (i = 0; i < card->qdio.no_out_queues; ++i) {
card->qdio.out_qs[i] = kzalloc(sizeof(struct qeth_qdio_out_q),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!card->qdio.out_qs[i])
goto out_freeoutq;
QETH_DBF_TEXT_(SETUP, 2, "outq %i", i);
QETH_DBF_HEX(SETUP, 2, &card->qdio.out_qs[i], sizeof(void *));
card->qdio.out_qs[i]->queue_no = i;
/* give outbound qeth_qdio_buffers their qdio_buffers */
for (j = 0; j < QDIO_MAX_BUFFERS_PER_Q; ++j) {
WARN_ON(card->qdio.out_qs[i]->bufs[j] != NULL);
if (qeth_init_qdio_out_buf(card->qdio.out_qs[i], j))
goto out_freeoutqbufs;
}
}
/* completion */
if (qeth_alloc_cq(card))
goto out_freeoutq;
return 0;
out_freeoutqbufs:
while (j > 0) {
--j;
kmem_cache_free(qeth_qdio_outbuf_cache,
card->qdio.out_qs[i]->bufs[j]);
card->qdio.out_qs[i]->bufs[j] = NULL;
}
out_freeoutq:
while (i > 0) {
kfree(card->qdio.out_qs[--i]);
qeth_clear_outq_buffers(card->qdio.out_qs[i], 1);
}
kfree(card->qdio.out_qs);
card->qdio.out_qs = NULL;
out_freepool:
qeth_free_buffer_pool(card);
out_freeinq:
kfree(card->qdio.in_q);
card->qdio.in_q = NULL;
out_nomem:
atomic_set(&card->qdio.state, QETH_QDIO_UNINITIALIZED);
return -ENOMEM;
}
Commit Message: qeth: avoid buffer overflow in snmp ioctl
Check user-defined length in snmp ioctl request and allow request
only if it fits into a qeth command buffer.
Signed-off-by: Ursula Braun <ursula.braun@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Frank Blaschka <frank.blaschka@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heicars2@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 28,479 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftVorbis::internalSetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, const OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamStandardComponentRole:
{
const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *roleParams =
(const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(roleParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (strncmp((const char *)roleParams->cRole,
"audio_decoder.vorbis",
OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE - 1)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioVorbis:
{
const OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_VORBISTYPE *vorbisParams =
(const OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_VORBISTYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(vorbisParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (vorbisParams->nPortIndex != 0) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalSetParameter(index, params);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE codecs: check OMX buffer size before use in (vorbis|opus)dec
Bug: 27833616
Change-Id: I1ccdd16a00741da072527a6d13e87fd7c7fe8c54
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 160,623 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Editor::UnappliedEditing(UndoStep* cmd) {
EventQueueScope scope;
DispatchEditableContentChangedEvents(cmd->StartingRootEditableElement(),
cmd->EndingRootEditableElement());
DispatchInputEventEditableContentChanged(
cmd->StartingRootEditableElement(), cmd->EndingRootEditableElement(),
InputEvent::InputType::kHistoryUndo, g_null_atom,
InputEvent::EventIsComposing::kNotComposing);
const SelectionInDOMTree& new_selection = CorrectedSelectionAfterCommand(
cmd->StartingSelection(), GetFrame().GetDocument());
ChangeSelectionAfterCommand(
new_selection,
FrameSelection::kCloseTyping | FrameSelection::kClearTypingStyle);
last_edit_command_ = nullptr;
undo_stack_->RegisterRedoStep(cmd);
RespondToChangedContents(new_selection.Base());
}
Commit Message: Move Editor::Transpose() out of Editor class
This patch moves |Editor::Transpose()| out of |Editor| class as preparation of
expanding it into |ExecutTranspose()| in "EditorCommand.cpp" to make |Editor|
class simpler for improving code health.
Following patch will expand |Transpose()| into |ExecutTranspose()|.
Bug: 672405
Change-Id: Icde253623f31813d2b4517c4da7d4798bd5fadf6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/583880
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#489518}
CWE ID: | 0 | 128,473 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t Parcel::readIntPtr(intptr_t *pArg) const
{
return readAligned(pArg);
}
Commit Message: Disregard alleged binder entities beyond parcel bounds
When appending one parcel's contents to another, ignore binder
objects within the source Parcel that appear to lie beyond the
formal bounds of that Parcel's data buffer.
Bug 17312693
Change-Id: If592a260f3fcd9a56fc160e7feb2c8b44c73f514
(cherry picked from commit 27182be9f20f4f5b48316666429f09b9ecc1f22e)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 157,304 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int main(int argc, const char **argv)
{
int result = 1;
if (argc == 3)
{
png_image image;
/* Only the image structure version number needs to be set. */
memset(&image, 0, sizeof image);
image.version = PNG_IMAGE_VERSION;
if (png_image_begin_read_from_file(&image, argv[1]))
{
png_bytep buffer;
/* Change this to try different formats! If you set a colormap format
* then you must also supply a colormap below.
*/
image.format = PNG_FORMAT_RGBA;
buffer = malloc(PNG_IMAGE_SIZE(image));
if (buffer != NULL)
{
if (png_image_finish_read(&image, NULL/*background*/, buffer,
0/*row_stride*/, NULL/*colormap for PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_COLORMAP */))
{
if (png_image_write_to_file(&image, argv[2],
0/*convert_to_8bit*/, buffer, 0/*row_stride*/,
NULL/*colormap*/))
result = 0;
else
fprintf(stderr, "pngtopng: write %s: %s\n", argv[2],
image.message);
free(buffer);
}
else
{
fprintf(stderr, "pngtopng: read %s: %s\n", argv[1],
image.message);
/* This is the only place where a 'free' is required; libpng does
* the cleanup on error and success, but in this case we couldn't
* complete the read because of running out of memory.
*/
png_image_free(&image);
}
}
else
fprintf(stderr, "pngtopng: out of memory: %lu bytes\n",
(unsigned long)PNG_IMAGE_SIZE(image));
}
else
/* Failed to read the first argument: */
fprintf(stderr, "pngtopng: %s: %s\n", argv[1], image.message);
}
else
/* Wrong number of arguments */
fprintf(stderr, "pngtopng: usage: pngtopng input-file output-file\n");
return result;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 0 | 159,775 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __clear_all_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_func_state *state)
{
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *reg;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++)
if (reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(®s[i]))
mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, i);
for (i = 0; i < state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) {
if (state->stack[i].slot_type[0] != STACK_SPILL)
continue;
reg = &state->stack[i].spilled_ptr;
if (reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(reg))
__mark_reg_unknown(reg);
}
}
Commit Message: bpf: 32-bit RSH verification must truncate input before the ALU op
When I wrote commit 468f6eafa6c4 ("bpf: fix 32-bit ALU op verification"), I
assumed that, in order to emulate 64-bit arithmetic with 32-bit logic, it
is sufficient to just truncate the output to 32 bits; and so I just moved
the register size coercion that used to be at the start of the function to
the end of the function.
That assumption is true for almost every op, but not for 32-bit right
shifts, because those can propagate information towards the least
significant bit. Fix it by always truncating inputs for 32-bit ops to 32
bits.
Also get rid of the coerce_reg_to_size() after the ALU op, since that has
no effect.
Fixes: 468f6eafa6c4 ("bpf: fix 32-bit ALU op verification")
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 76,347 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AXTree::RemoveObserver(const AXTreeObserver* observer) {
observers_.RemoveObserver(observer);
}
Commit Message: Position info (item n of m) incorrect if hidden focusable items in list
Bug: 836997
Change-Id: I971fa7076f72d51829b36af8e379260d48ca25ec
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1450235
Commit-Queue: Aaron Leventhal <aleventhal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nektarios Paisios <nektar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#628890}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 130,272 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Packet *StreamTcpPseudoSetup(Packet *parent, uint8_t *pkt, uint32_t len)
{
SCEnter();
if (len == 0) {
SCReturnPtr(NULL, "Packet");
}
Packet *p = PacketGetFromQueueOrAlloc();
if (p == NULL) {
SCReturnPtr(NULL, "Packet");
}
/* set the root ptr to the lowest layer */
if (parent->root != NULL)
p->root = parent->root;
else
p->root = parent;
/* copy packet and set lenght, proto */
p->proto = parent->proto;
p->datalink = parent->datalink;
PacketCopyData(p, pkt, len);
p->recursion_level = parent->recursion_level + 1;
p->ts.tv_sec = parent->ts.tv_sec;
p->ts.tv_usec = parent->ts.tv_usec;
FlowReference(&p->flow, parent->flow);
/* set tunnel flags */
/* tell new packet it's part of a tunnel */
SET_TUNNEL_PKT(p);
/* tell parent packet it's part of a tunnel */
SET_TUNNEL_PKT(parent);
/* increment tunnel packet refcnt in the root packet */
TUNNEL_INCR_PKT_TPR(p);
return p;
}
Commit Message: stream: support RST getting lost/ignored
In case of a valid RST on a SYN, the state is switched to 'TCP_CLOSED'.
However, the target of the RST may not have received it, or may not
have accepted it. Also, the RST may have been injected, so the supposed
sender may not actually be aware of the RST that was sent in it's name.
In this case the previous behavior was to switch the state to CLOSED and
accept no further TCP updates or stream reassembly.
This patch changes this. It still switches the state to CLOSED, as this
is by far the most likely to be correct. However, it will reconsider
the state if the receiver continues to talk.
To do this on each state change the previous state will be recorded in
TcpSession::pstate. If a non-RST packet is received after a RST, this
TcpSession::pstate is used to try to continue the conversation.
If the (supposed) sender of the RST is also continueing the conversation
as normal, it's highly likely it didn't send the RST. In this case
a stream event is generated.
Ticket: #2501
Reported-By: Kirill Shipulin
CWE ID: | 0 | 79,215 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::IssueKeepAliveHandle(
mojom::KeepAliveHandleRequest request) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
if (!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(
features::kKeepAliveRendererForKeepaliveRequests)) {
bad_message::ReceivedBadMessage(
GetProcess(), bad_message::RFH_KEEP_ALIVE_HANDLE_REQUESTED_INCORRECTLY);
return;
}
if (GetProcess()->IsKeepAliveRefCountDisabled())
return;
if (!keep_alive_handle_factory_) {
keep_alive_handle_factory_ =
std::make_unique<KeepAliveHandleFactory>(GetProcess());
keep_alive_handle_factory_->SetTimeout(keep_alive_timeout_);
}
keep_alive_handle_factory_->Create(std::move(request));
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID: | 0 | 147,638 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int CopyOrLinkDragOperation(int drag_operation) {
if (drag_operation & ui::DragDropTypes::DRAG_COPY)
return ui::DragDropTypes::DRAG_COPY;
if (drag_operation & ui::DragDropTypes::DRAG_LINK)
return ui::DragDropTypes::DRAG_LINK;
return ui::DragDropTypes::DRAG_NONE;
}
Commit Message: Change omnibox behavior when stripping javascript schema to navigate after stripping the schema on drag drop.
BUG=109245
TEST=N/A
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9116016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116692 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 107,425 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool SessionService::IsOnlyOneTabLeft() {
if (!profile()) {
return false;
}
int window_count = 0;
for (BrowserList::const_iterator i = BrowserList::begin();
i != BrowserList::end(); ++i) {
const SessionID::id_type window_id = (*i)->session_id().id();
if (should_track_changes_for_browser_type((*i)->type()) &&
(*i)->profile() == profile() &&
window_closing_ids_.find(window_id) == window_closing_ids_.end()) {
if (++window_count > 1)
return false;
if ((*i)->tab_count() > 0)
return false;
}
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Metrics for measuring how much overhead reading compressed content states adds.
BUG=104293
TEST=NONE
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9426039
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@123733 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 108,817 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BluetoothAdapterChromeOS::AdapterRemoved(
const dbus::ObjectPath& object_path) {
if (object_path == object_path_)
RemoveAdapter();
}
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 112,506 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TabStripModel::MoveTabContentsAt(int index,
int to_position,
bool select_after_move) {
DCHECK(ContainsIndex(index));
if (index == to_position)
return;
int first_non_mini_tab = IndexOfFirstNonMiniTab();
if ((index < first_non_mini_tab && to_position >= first_non_mini_tab) ||
(to_position < first_non_mini_tab && index >= first_non_mini_tab)) {
return;
}
MoveTabContentsAtImpl(index, to_position, select_after_move);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,112 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t SoundTriggerHwService::Module::loadSoundModel(const sp<IMemory>& modelMemory,
sound_model_handle_t *handle)
{
ALOGV("loadSoundModel() handle");
if (!captureHotwordAllowed()) {
return PERMISSION_DENIED;
}
if (modelMemory == 0 || modelMemory->pointer() == NULL) {
ALOGE("loadSoundModel() modelMemory is 0 or has NULL pointer()");
return BAD_VALUE;
}
struct sound_trigger_sound_model *sound_model =
(struct sound_trigger_sound_model *)modelMemory->pointer();
AutoMutex lock(mLock);
if (mModels.size() >= mDescriptor.properties.max_sound_models) {
ALOGW("loadSoundModel(): Not loading, max number of models (%d) would be exceeded",
mDescriptor.properties.max_sound_models);
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
status_t status = mHwDevice->load_sound_model(mHwDevice, sound_model,
SoundTriggerHwService::soundModelCallback,
this, handle);
if (status != NO_ERROR) {
return status;
}
audio_session_t session;
audio_io_handle_t ioHandle;
audio_devices_t device;
status = AudioSystem::acquireSoundTriggerSession(&session, &ioHandle, &device);
if (status != NO_ERROR) {
return status;
}
sp<Model> model = new Model(*handle, session, ioHandle, device, sound_model->type);
mModels.replaceValueFor(*handle, model);
return status;
}
Commit Message: soundtrigger: add size check on sound model and recogntion data
Bug: 30148546
Change-Id: I082f535a853c96571887eeea37c6d41ecee7d8c0
(cherry picked from commit bb00d8f139ff51336ab3c810d35685003949bcf8)
(cherry picked from commit ef0c91518446e65533ca8bab6726a845f27c73fd)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 1 | 173,399 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int irda_recvmsg_stream(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
size_t size, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct irda_sock *self = irda_sk(sk);
int noblock = flags & MSG_DONTWAIT;
size_t copied = 0;
int target, err;
long timeo;
if ((err = sock_error(sk)) < 0)
return err;
if (sock->flags & __SO_ACCEPTCON)
return -EINVAL;
err =-EOPNOTSUPP;
if (flags & MSG_OOB)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
err = 0;
target = sock_rcvlowat(sk, flags & MSG_WAITALL, size);
timeo = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, noblock);
do {
int chunk;
struct sk_buff *skb = skb_dequeue(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
if (skb == NULL) {
DEFINE_WAIT(wait);
err = 0;
if (copied >= target)
break;
prepare_to_wait_exclusive(sk_sleep(sk), &wait, TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
/*
* POSIX 1003.1g mandates this order.
*/
err = sock_error(sk);
if (err)
;
else if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN)
;
else if (noblock)
err = -EAGAIN;
else if (signal_pending(current))
err = sock_intr_errno(timeo);
else if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
err = -ENOTCONN;
else if (skb_peek(&sk->sk_receive_queue) == NULL)
/* Wait process until data arrives */
schedule();
finish_wait(sk_sleep(sk), &wait);
if (err)
return err;
if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN)
break;
continue;
}
chunk = min_t(unsigned int, skb->len, size);
if (memcpy_to_msg(msg, skb->data, chunk)) {
skb_queue_head(&sk->sk_receive_queue, skb);
if (copied == 0)
copied = -EFAULT;
break;
}
copied += chunk;
size -= chunk;
/* Mark read part of skb as used */
if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK)) {
skb_pull(skb, chunk);
/* put the skb back if we didn't use it up.. */
if (skb->len) {
pr_debug("%s(), back on q!\n",
__func__);
skb_queue_head(&sk->sk_receive_queue, skb);
break;
}
kfree_skb(skb);
} else {
pr_debug("%s() questionable!?\n", __func__);
/* put message back and return */
skb_queue_head(&sk->sk_receive_queue, skb);
break;
}
} while (size);
/*
* Check if we have previously stopped IrTTP and we know
* have more free space in our rx_queue. If so tell IrTTP
* to start delivering frames again before our rx_queue gets
* empty
*/
if (self->rx_flow == FLOW_STOP) {
if ((atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc) << 2) <= sk->sk_rcvbuf) {
pr_debug("%s(), Starting IrTTP\n", __func__);
self->rx_flow = FLOW_START;
irttp_flow_request(self->tsap, FLOW_START);
}
}
return copied;
}
Commit Message: net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument
郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:
int socket_fd;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
addr.sin_port = 0;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
addr.sin_family = 10;
socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
connect(socket_fd , &addr,16);
AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
store a zero in the protocol fields.
This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
is NULL for raw sockets.
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: [<ffffffff816db90e>] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
kernel: [<ffffffff816db9a4>] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff81645069>] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
kernel: [<ffffffff810ac51b>] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff810236d8>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
kernel: [<ffffffff81645e0e>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
kernel: [<ffffffff81779515>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89
I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.
CVE: CVE-2015-8543
Cc: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
Reported-by: 郭永刚 <guoyonggang@360.cn>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 41,594 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void vga_init(VGACommonState *s, Object *obj, MemoryRegion *address_space,
MemoryRegion *address_space_io, bool init_vga_ports)
{
MemoryRegion *vga_io_memory;
const MemoryRegionPortio *vga_ports, *vbe_ports;
qemu_register_reset(vga_reset, s);
s->bank_offset = 0;
s->legacy_address_space = address_space;
vga_io_memory = vga_init_io(s, obj, &vga_ports, &vbe_ports);
memory_region_add_subregion_overlap(address_space,
0x000a0000,
vga_io_memory,
1);
memory_region_set_coalescing(vga_io_memory);
if (init_vga_ports) {
portio_list_init(&s->vga_port_list, obj, vga_ports, s, "vga");
portio_list_set_flush_coalesced(&s->vga_port_list);
portio_list_add(&s->vga_port_list, address_space_io, 0x3b0);
}
if (vbe_ports) {
portio_list_init(&s->vbe_port_list, obj, vbe_ports, s, "vbe");
portio_list_add(&s->vbe_port_list, address_space_io, 0x1ce);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 3,010 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t AudioFlinger::EffectHandle::enable()
{
ALOGV("enable %p", this);
if (!mHasControl) {
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
if (mEffect == 0) {
return DEAD_OBJECT;
}
if (mEnabled) {
return NO_ERROR;
}
mEnabled = true;
sp<ThreadBase> thread = mEffect->thread().promote();
if (thread != 0) {
thread->checkSuspendOnEffectEnabled(mEffect, true, mEffect->sessionId());
}
if (mEffect->suspended()) {
return NO_ERROR;
}
status_t status = mEffect->setEnabled(true);
if (status != NO_ERROR) {
if (thread != 0) {
thread->checkSuspendOnEffectEnabled(mEffect, false, mEffect->sessionId());
}
mEnabled = false;
} else {
if (thread != 0) {
if (thread->type() == ThreadBase::OFFLOAD) {
PlaybackThread *t = (PlaybackThread *)thread.get();
Mutex::Autolock _l(t->mLock);
t->broadcast_l();
}
if (!mEffect->isOffloadable()) {
if (thread->type() == ThreadBase::OFFLOAD) {
PlaybackThread *t = (PlaybackThread *)thread.get();
t->invalidateTracks(AUDIO_STREAM_MUSIC);
}
if (mEffect->sessionId() == AUDIO_SESSION_OUTPUT_MIX) {
thread->mAudioFlinger->onNonOffloadableGlobalEffectEnable();
}
}
}
}
return status;
}
Commit Message: Add EFFECT_CMD_SET_PARAM parameter checking
Bug: 30204301
Change-Id: Ib9c3ee1c2f23c96f8f7092dd9e146bc453d7a290
(cherry picked from commit e4a1d91501d47931dbae19c47815952378787ab6)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 157,825 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tcp_v4_md5_add_func(struct sock *sk, struct sock *addr_sk,
u8 *newkey, u8 newkeylen)
{
return tcp_v4_md5_do_add(sk, inet_sk(addr_sk)->inet_daddr,
newkey, newkeylen);
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 19,030 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::OnMessageReceived(
const IPC::Message& message,
ResourceMessageFilter* filter) {
filter_ = filter;
bool handled = true;
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP(ResourceDispatcherHostImpl, message)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ResourceHostMsg_RequestResource, OnRequestResource)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER_DELAY_REPLY(ResourceHostMsg_SyncLoad, OnSyncLoad)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ResourceHostMsg_ReleaseDownloadedFile,
OnReleaseDownloadedFile)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ResourceHostMsg_DataDownloaded_ACK, OnDataDownloadedACK)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ResourceHostMsg_CancelRequest, OnCancelRequest)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ResourceHostMsg_DidChangePriority, OnDidChangePriority)
IPC_MESSAGE_UNHANDLED(handled = false)
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP()
if (!handled && IPC_MESSAGE_ID_CLASS(message.type()) == ResourceMsgStart) {
base::PickleIterator iter(message);
int request_id = -1;
bool ok = iter.ReadInt(&request_id);
DCHECK(ok);
GlobalRequestID id(filter_->child_id(), request_id);
DelegateMap::iterator it = delegate_map_.find(id);
if (it != delegate_map_.end()) {
base::ObserverList<ResourceMessageDelegate>::Iterator del_it(it->second);
ResourceMessageDelegate* delegate;
while (!handled && (delegate = del_it.GetNext()) != NULL) {
handled = delegate->OnMessageReceived(message);
}
}
handled = true;
}
filter_ = NULL;
return handled;
}
Commit Message: Block a compromised renderer from reusing request ids.
BUG=578882
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1608573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#372547}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 132,835 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::GenerateMHTML(
const base::FilePath& file,
const base::Callback<void(int64_t)>& callback) {
MHTMLGenerationManager::GetInstance()->SaveMHTML(this, file, callback);
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID: | 0 | 131,832 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: explicit WindowedPersonalDataManagerObserver(Browser* browser)
: alerted_(false),
has_run_message_loop_(false),
browser_(browser),
infobar_service_(NULL) {
PersonalDataManagerFactory::GetForProfile(browser_->profile())->
AddObserver(this);
registrar_.Add(this, chrome::NOTIFICATION_TAB_CONTENTS_INFOBAR_ADDED,
content::NotificationService::AllSources());
}
Commit Message: Disable AutofillInteractiveTest.OnChangeAfterAutofill test.
Failing due to http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=revision&revision=170278.
BUG=353691
TBR=isherman@chromium.org, dbeam@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/216853002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@260106 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 112,173 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebMediaPlayerImpl::OnVolumeMultiplierUpdate(double multiplier) {
volume_multiplier_ = multiplier;
SetVolume(volume_);
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 144,474 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LaunchServiceProcessControl(bool wait) {
ServiceProcessControl::GetInstance()->Launch(
base::Bind(&ServiceProcessControlBrowserTest::ProcessControlLaunched,
base::Unretained(this)),
base::Bind(
&ServiceProcessControlBrowserTest::ProcessControlLaunchFailed,
base::Unretained(this)));
if (wait)
content::RunMessageLoop();
}
Commit Message: Migrate ServiceProcessControl tests off of QuitCurrent*Deprecated().
Bug: 844016
Change-Id: I9403b850456c8ee06cd2539f7cec9599302e81a0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1126576
Commit-Queue: Wez <wez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#573131}
CWE ID: CWE-94 | 1 | 172,051 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void __init idt_setup_traps(void)
{
idt_setup_from_table(idt_table, def_idts, ARRAY_SIZE(def_idts), true);
}
Commit Message: x86/entry/64: Don't use IST entry for #BP stack
There's nothing IST-worthy about #BP/int3. We don't allow kprobes
in the small handful of places in the kernel that run at CPL0 with
an invalid stack, and 32-bit kernels have used normal interrupt
gates for #BP forever.
Furthermore, we don't allow kprobes in places that have usergs while
in kernel mode, so "paranoid" is also unnecessary.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 83,480 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TabStripGtk::StartHighlightTabsForCommand(
TabStripModel::ContextMenuCommand command_id, TabGtk* tab) {
if (command_id == TabStripModel::CommandCloseOtherTabs ||
command_id == TabStripModel::CommandCloseTabsToRight) {
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
}
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 118,161 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const QList<Smb4KShare *> &Smb4KGlobal::mountedSharesList()
{
return p->mountedSharesList;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 6,571 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void pegasus_set_multicast(struct net_device *net)
{
pegasus_t *pegasus = netdev_priv(net);
if (net->flags & IFF_PROMISC) {
pegasus->eth_regs[EthCtrl2] |= RX_PROMISCUOUS;
netif_info(pegasus, link, net, "Promiscuous mode enabled\n");
} else if (!netdev_mc_empty(net) || (net->flags & IFF_ALLMULTI)) {
pegasus->eth_regs[EthCtrl0] |= RX_MULTICAST;
pegasus->eth_regs[EthCtrl2] &= ~RX_PROMISCUOUS;
netif_dbg(pegasus, link, net, "set allmulti\n");
} else {
pegasus->eth_regs[EthCtrl0] &= ~RX_MULTICAST;
pegasus->eth_regs[EthCtrl2] &= ~RX_PROMISCUOUS;
}
update_eth_regs_async(pegasus);
}
Commit Message: pegasus: Use heap buffers for all register access
Allocating USB buffers on the stack is not portable, and no longer
works on x86_64 (with VMAP_STACK enabled as per default).
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
References: https://bugs.debian.org/852556
Reported-by: Lisandro Damián Nicanor Pérez Meyer <lisandro@debian.org>
Tested-by: Lisandro Damián Nicanor Pérez Meyer <lisandro@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 66,553 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: __do_replace(struct net *net, const char *name, unsigned int valid_hooks,
struct xt_table_info *newinfo, unsigned int num_counters,
void __user *counters_ptr)
{
int ret;
struct xt_table *t;
struct xt_table_info *oldinfo;
struct xt_counters *counters;
struct ip6t_entry *iter;
ret = 0;
counters = vzalloc(num_counters * sizeof(struct xt_counters));
if (!counters) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
t = try_then_request_module(xt_find_table_lock(net, AF_INET6, name),
"ip6table_%s", name);
if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(t)) {
ret = t ? PTR_ERR(t) : -ENOENT;
goto free_newinfo_counters_untrans;
}
/* You lied! */
if (valid_hooks != t->valid_hooks) {
duprintf("Valid hook crap: %08X vs %08X\n",
valid_hooks, t->valid_hooks);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto put_module;
}
oldinfo = xt_replace_table(t, num_counters, newinfo, &ret);
if (!oldinfo)
goto put_module;
/* Update module usage count based on number of rules */
duprintf("do_replace: oldnum=%u, initnum=%u, newnum=%u\n",
oldinfo->number, oldinfo->initial_entries, newinfo->number);
if ((oldinfo->number > oldinfo->initial_entries) ||
(newinfo->number <= oldinfo->initial_entries))
module_put(t->me);
if ((oldinfo->number > oldinfo->initial_entries) &&
(newinfo->number <= oldinfo->initial_entries))
module_put(t->me);
/* Get the old counters, and synchronize with replace */
get_counters(oldinfo, counters);
/* Decrease module usage counts and free resource */
xt_entry_foreach(iter, oldinfo->entries, oldinfo->size)
cleanup_entry(iter, net);
xt_free_table_info(oldinfo);
if (copy_to_user(counters_ptr, counters,
sizeof(struct xt_counters) * num_counters) != 0) {
/* Silent error, can't fail, new table is already in place */
net_warn_ratelimited("ip6tables: counters copy to user failed while replacing table\n");
}
vfree(counters);
xt_table_unlock(t);
return ret;
put_module:
module_put(t->me);
xt_table_unlock(t);
free_newinfo_counters_untrans:
vfree(counters);
out:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: make sure e->next_offset covers remaining blob size
Otherwise this function may read data beyond the ruleset blob.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 52,321 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void removePaddingBits(unsigned char* out, const unsigned char* in,
size_t olinebits, size_t ilinebits, unsigned h)
{
/*
After filtering there are still padding bits if scanlines have non multiple of 8 bit amounts. They need
to be removed (except at last scanline of (Adam7-reduced) image) before working with pure image buffers
for the Adam7 code, the color convert code and the output to the user.
in and out are allowed to be the same buffer, in may also be higher but still overlapping; in must
have >= ilinebits*h bits, out must have >= olinebits*h bits, olinebits must be <= ilinebits
also used to move bits after earlier such operations happened, e.g. in a sequence of reduced images from Adam7
only useful if (ilinebits - olinebits) is a value in the range 1..7
*/
unsigned y;
size_t diff = ilinebits - olinebits;
size_t ibp = 0, obp = 0; /*input and output bit pointers*/
for(y = 0; y < h; y++)
{
size_t x;
for(x = 0; x < olinebits; x++)
{
unsigned char bit = readBitFromReversedStream(&ibp, in);
setBitOfReversedStream(&obp, out, bit);
}
ibp += diff;
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed #5645: realloc return handling
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 87,591 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: skip_hex_digits (char const *str)
{
char const *s;
for (s = str; (*s >= '0' && *s <= '9') || (*s >= 'a' && *s <= 'f'); s++)
/* do nothing */ ;
return s == str ? NULL : s;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-78 | 0 | 2,719 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CMS_ContentInfo *CMS_compress(BIO *in, int comp_nid, unsigned int flags)
{
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_COMPRESS, CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Canonicalise input in CMS_verify.
If content is detached and not binary mode translate the input to
CRLF format. Before this change the input was verified verbatim
which lead to a discrepancy between sign and verify.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 44,175 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium::createOffer(PassRefPtr<RTCSessionDescriptionRequest> request, PassRefPtr<MediaConstraints> constraints)
{
if (!m_webHandler)
return;
m_webHandler->createOffer(request, constraints);
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r127612, r127660, and r127664.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127612
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127660
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127664
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95920
Source/Platform:
* Platform.gypi:
* chromium/public/WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebKit):
(WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* chromium/public/WebRTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
Source/WebCore:
* CMakeLists.txt:
* GNUmakefile.list.am:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCErrorCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnection::createOffer):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCPeerConnection):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCSessionDescriptionCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::create):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestSucceeded):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestFailed):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::clear):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.h:
(RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.cpp: Removed.
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.h: Removed.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/chromium/support/WebRTCVoidRequest.cpp: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebCore):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::~RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* platform/mediastream/RTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.cpp:
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.h:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium):
Tools:
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::SuccessCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::FailureCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::createOffer):
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(SuccessCallbackTask):
(FailureCallbackTask):
LayoutTests:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-createOffer.html:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription.html: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription.html: Removed.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@127679 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 99,412 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int ioc_batching(struct request_queue *q, struct io_context *ioc)
{
if (!ioc)
return 0;
/*
* Make sure the process is able to allocate at least 1 request
* even if the batch times out, otherwise we could theoretically
* lose wakeups.
*/
return ioc->nr_batch_requests == q->nr_batching ||
(ioc->nr_batch_requests > 0
&& time_before(jiffies, ioc->last_waited + BLK_BATCH_TIME));
}
Commit Message: block: blk_init_allocated_queue() set q->fq as NULL in the fail case
We find the memory use-after-free issue in __blk_drain_queue()
on the kernel 4.14. After read the latest kernel 4.18-rc6 we
think it has the same problem.
Memory is allocated for q->fq in the blk_init_allocated_queue().
If the elevator init function called with error return, it will
run into the fail case to free the q->fq.
Then the __blk_drain_queue() uses the same memory after the free
of the q->fq, it will lead to the unpredictable event.
The patch is to set q->fq as NULL in the fail case of
blk_init_allocated_queue().
Fixes: commit 7c94e1c157a2 ("block: introduce blk_flush_queue to drive flush machinery")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: xiao jin <jin.xiao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 92,056 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleShaderBinary(
uint32_t immediate_data_size,
const volatile void* cmd_data) {
#if 1 // No binary shader support.
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "glShaderBinary", "not supported");
return error::kNoError;
#else
GLsizei n = static_cast<GLsizei>(c.n);
if (n < 0) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glShaderBinary", "n < 0");
return error::kNoError;
}
GLsizei length = static_cast<GLsizei>(c.length);
if (length < 0) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glShaderBinary", "length < 0");
return error::kNoError;
}
uint32_t data_size;
if (!base::CheckMul(n, sizeof(GLuint)).AssignIfValid(&data_size)) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
const GLuint* shaders = GetSharedMemoryAs<const GLuint*>(
c.shaders_shm_id, c.shaders_shm_offset, data_size);
GLenum binaryformat = static_cast<GLenum>(c.binaryformat);
const void* binary = GetSharedMemoryAs<const void*>(
c.binary_shm_id, c.binary_shm_offset, length);
if (shaders == nullptr || binary == nullptr) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
std::unique_ptr<GLuint[]> service_ids(new GLuint[n]);
for (GLsizei ii = 0; ii < n; ++ii) {
Shader* shader = GetShader(shaders[ii]);
if (!shader) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glShaderBinary", "unknown shader");
return error::kNoError;
}
service_ids[ii] = shader->service_id();
}
return error::kNoError;
#endif
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,585 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cms_kari_set1_pkey(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
EVP_PKEY *pk, X509 *cert)
{
int i;
STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey) *reks;
CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek;
reks = CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_reks(ri);
if (!cert)
return 0;
for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_num(reks); i++)
{
int rv;
rek = sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_value(reks, i);
if (CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_cert_cmp(rek, cert))
continue;
CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_set0_pkey(ri, pk);
rv = CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_decrypt(cms, ri, rek);
CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_set0_pkey(ri, NULL);
if (rv > 0)
return 1;
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Canonicalise input in CMS_verify.
If content is detached and not binary mode translate the input to
CRLF format. Before this change the input was verified verbatim
which lead to a discrepancy between sign and verify.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 44,192 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: __releases(kernel_lock)
__acquires(kernel_lock)
{
char *orig_data = kstrdup(data, GFP_KERNEL);
struct buffer_head *bh;
struct ext4_super_block *es = NULL;
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi;
ext4_fsblk_t block;
ext4_fsblk_t sb_block = get_sb_block(&data);
ext4_fsblk_t logical_sb_block;
unsigned long offset = 0;
unsigned long journal_devnum = 0;
unsigned long def_mount_opts;
struct inode *root;
char *cp;
const char *descr;
int ret = -ENOMEM;
int blocksize;
unsigned int db_count;
unsigned int i;
int needs_recovery, has_huge_files;
__u64 blocks_count;
int err;
unsigned int journal_ioprio = DEFAULT_JOURNAL_IOPRIO;
ext4_group_t first_not_zeroed;
sbi = kzalloc(sizeof(*sbi), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sbi)
goto out_free_orig;
sbi->s_blockgroup_lock =
kzalloc(sizeof(struct blockgroup_lock), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sbi->s_blockgroup_lock) {
kfree(sbi);
goto out_free_orig;
}
sb->s_fs_info = sbi;
sbi->s_mount_opt = 0;
sbi->s_resuid = EXT4_DEF_RESUID;
sbi->s_resgid = EXT4_DEF_RESGID;
sbi->s_inode_readahead_blks = EXT4_DEF_INODE_READAHEAD_BLKS;
sbi->s_sb_block = sb_block;
if (sb->s_bdev->bd_part)
sbi->s_sectors_written_start =
part_stat_read(sb->s_bdev->bd_part, sectors[1]);
/* Cleanup superblock name */
for (cp = sb->s_id; (cp = strchr(cp, '/'));)
*cp = '!';
ret = -EINVAL;
blocksize = sb_min_blocksize(sb, EXT4_MIN_BLOCK_SIZE);
if (!blocksize) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "unable to set blocksize");
goto out_fail;
}
/*
* The ext4 superblock will not be buffer aligned for other than 1kB
* block sizes. We need to calculate the offset from buffer start.
*/
if (blocksize != EXT4_MIN_BLOCK_SIZE) {
logical_sb_block = sb_block * EXT4_MIN_BLOCK_SIZE;
offset = do_div(logical_sb_block, blocksize);
} else {
logical_sb_block = sb_block;
}
if (!(bh = sb_bread(sb, logical_sb_block))) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "unable to read superblock");
goto out_fail;
}
/*
* Note: s_es must be initialized as soon as possible because
* some ext4 macro-instructions depend on its value
*/
es = (struct ext4_super_block *) (((char *)bh->b_data) + offset);
sbi->s_es = es;
sb->s_magic = le16_to_cpu(es->s_magic);
if (sb->s_magic != EXT4_SUPER_MAGIC)
goto cantfind_ext4;
sbi->s_kbytes_written = le64_to_cpu(es->s_kbytes_written);
/* Set defaults before we parse the mount options */
def_mount_opts = le32_to_cpu(es->s_default_mount_opts);
set_opt(sb, INIT_INODE_TABLE);
if (def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_DEBUG)
set_opt(sb, DEBUG);
if (def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_BSDGROUPS) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, deprecated_msg, "bsdgroups",
"2.6.38");
set_opt(sb, GRPID);
}
if (def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_UID16)
set_opt(sb, NO_UID32);
/* xattr user namespace & acls are now defaulted on */
#ifdef CONFIG_EXT4_FS_XATTR
set_opt(sb, XATTR_USER);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_EXT4_FS_POSIX_ACL
set_opt(sb, POSIX_ACL);
#endif
set_opt(sb, MBLK_IO_SUBMIT);
if ((def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_JMODE) == EXT4_DEFM_JMODE_DATA)
set_opt(sb, JOURNAL_DATA);
else if ((def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_JMODE) == EXT4_DEFM_JMODE_ORDERED)
set_opt(sb, ORDERED_DATA);
else if ((def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_JMODE) == EXT4_DEFM_JMODE_WBACK)
set_opt(sb, WRITEBACK_DATA);
if (le16_to_cpu(sbi->s_es->s_errors) == EXT4_ERRORS_PANIC)
set_opt(sb, ERRORS_PANIC);
else if (le16_to_cpu(sbi->s_es->s_errors) == EXT4_ERRORS_CONTINUE)
set_opt(sb, ERRORS_CONT);
else
set_opt(sb, ERRORS_RO);
if (def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_BLOCK_VALIDITY)
set_opt(sb, BLOCK_VALIDITY);
if (def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_DISCARD)
set_opt(sb, DISCARD);
sbi->s_resuid = le16_to_cpu(es->s_def_resuid);
sbi->s_resgid = le16_to_cpu(es->s_def_resgid);
sbi->s_commit_interval = JBD2_DEFAULT_MAX_COMMIT_AGE * HZ;
sbi->s_min_batch_time = EXT4_DEF_MIN_BATCH_TIME;
sbi->s_max_batch_time = EXT4_DEF_MAX_BATCH_TIME;
if ((def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_NOBARRIER) == 0)
set_opt(sb, BARRIER);
/*
* enable delayed allocation by default
* Use -o nodelalloc to turn it off
*/
if (!IS_EXT3_SB(sb) &&
((def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_NODELALLOC) == 0))
set_opt(sb, DELALLOC);
if (!parse_options((char *) sbi->s_es->s_mount_opts, sb,
&journal_devnum, &journal_ioprio, NULL, 0)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING,
"failed to parse options in superblock: %s",
sbi->s_es->s_mount_opts);
}
if (!parse_options((char *) data, sb, &journal_devnum,
&journal_ioprio, NULL, 0))
goto failed_mount;
sb->s_flags = (sb->s_flags & ~MS_POSIXACL) |
(test_opt(sb, POSIX_ACL) ? MS_POSIXACL : 0);
if (le32_to_cpu(es->s_rev_level) == EXT4_GOOD_OLD_REV &&
(EXT4_HAS_COMPAT_FEATURE(sb, ~0U) ||
EXT4_HAS_RO_COMPAT_FEATURE(sb, ~0U) ||
EXT4_HAS_INCOMPAT_FEATURE(sb, ~0U)))
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING,
"feature flags set on rev 0 fs, "
"running e2fsck is recommended");
/*
* Check feature flags regardless of the revision level, since we
* previously didn't change the revision level when setting the flags,
* so there is a chance incompat flags are set on a rev 0 filesystem.
*/
if (!ext4_feature_set_ok(sb, (sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY)))
goto failed_mount;
blocksize = BLOCK_SIZE << le32_to_cpu(es->s_log_block_size);
if (blocksize < EXT4_MIN_BLOCK_SIZE ||
blocksize > EXT4_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"Unsupported filesystem blocksize %d", blocksize);
goto failed_mount;
}
if (sb->s_blocksize != blocksize) {
/* Validate the filesystem blocksize */
if (!sb_set_blocksize(sb, blocksize)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "bad block size %d",
blocksize);
goto failed_mount;
}
brelse(bh);
logical_sb_block = sb_block * EXT4_MIN_BLOCK_SIZE;
offset = do_div(logical_sb_block, blocksize);
bh = sb_bread(sb, logical_sb_block);
if (!bh) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"Can't read superblock on 2nd try");
goto failed_mount;
}
es = (struct ext4_super_block *)(((char *)bh->b_data) + offset);
sbi->s_es = es;
if (es->s_magic != cpu_to_le16(EXT4_SUPER_MAGIC)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"Magic mismatch, very weird!");
goto failed_mount;
}
}
has_huge_files = EXT4_HAS_RO_COMPAT_FEATURE(sb,
EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_HUGE_FILE);
sbi->s_bitmap_maxbytes = ext4_max_bitmap_size(sb->s_blocksize_bits,
has_huge_files);
sb->s_maxbytes = ext4_max_size(sb->s_blocksize_bits, has_huge_files);
if (le32_to_cpu(es->s_rev_level) == EXT4_GOOD_OLD_REV) {
sbi->s_inode_size = EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE;
sbi->s_first_ino = EXT4_GOOD_OLD_FIRST_INO;
} else {
sbi->s_inode_size = le16_to_cpu(es->s_inode_size);
sbi->s_first_ino = le32_to_cpu(es->s_first_ino);
if ((sbi->s_inode_size < EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE) ||
(!is_power_of_2(sbi->s_inode_size)) ||
(sbi->s_inode_size > blocksize)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"unsupported inode size: %d",
sbi->s_inode_size);
goto failed_mount;
}
if (sbi->s_inode_size > EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE)
sb->s_time_gran = 1 << (EXT4_EPOCH_BITS - 2);
}
sbi->s_desc_size = le16_to_cpu(es->s_desc_size);
if (EXT4_HAS_INCOMPAT_FEATURE(sb, EXT4_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_64BIT)) {
if (sbi->s_desc_size < EXT4_MIN_DESC_SIZE_64BIT ||
sbi->s_desc_size > EXT4_MAX_DESC_SIZE ||
!is_power_of_2(sbi->s_desc_size)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"unsupported descriptor size %lu",
sbi->s_desc_size);
goto failed_mount;
}
} else
sbi->s_desc_size = EXT4_MIN_DESC_SIZE;
sbi->s_blocks_per_group = le32_to_cpu(es->s_blocks_per_group);
sbi->s_inodes_per_group = le32_to_cpu(es->s_inodes_per_group);
if (EXT4_INODE_SIZE(sb) == 0 || EXT4_INODES_PER_GROUP(sb) == 0)
goto cantfind_ext4;
sbi->s_inodes_per_block = blocksize / EXT4_INODE_SIZE(sb);
if (sbi->s_inodes_per_block == 0)
goto cantfind_ext4;
sbi->s_itb_per_group = sbi->s_inodes_per_group /
sbi->s_inodes_per_block;
sbi->s_desc_per_block = blocksize / EXT4_DESC_SIZE(sb);
sbi->s_sbh = bh;
sbi->s_mount_state = le16_to_cpu(es->s_state);
sbi->s_addr_per_block_bits = ilog2(EXT4_ADDR_PER_BLOCK(sb));
sbi->s_desc_per_block_bits = ilog2(EXT4_DESC_PER_BLOCK(sb));
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
sbi->s_hash_seed[i] = le32_to_cpu(es->s_hash_seed[i]);
sbi->s_def_hash_version = es->s_def_hash_version;
i = le32_to_cpu(es->s_flags);
if (i & EXT2_FLAGS_UNSIGNED_HASH)
sbi->s_hash_unsigned = 3;
else if ((i & EXT2_FLAGS_SIGNED_HASH) == 0) {
#ifdef __CHAR_UNSIGNED__
es->s_flags |= cpu_to_le32(EXT2_FLAGS_UNSIGNED_HASH);
sbi->s_hash_unsigned = 3;
#else
es->s_flags |= cpu_to_le32(EXT2_FLAGS_SIGNED_HASH);
#endif
sb->s_dirt = 1;
}
if (sbi->s_blocks_per_group > blocksize * 8) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"#blocks per group too big: %lu",
sbi->s_blocks_per_group);
goto failed_mount;
}
if (sbi->s_inodes_per_group > blocksize * 8) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"#inodes per group too big: %lu",
sbi->s_inodes_per_group);
goto failed_mount;
}
/*
* Test whether we have more sectors than will fit in sector_t,
* and whether the max offset is addressable by the page cache.
*/
err = generic_check_addressable(sb->s_blocksize_bits,
ext4_blocks_count(es));
if (err) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "filesystem"
" too large to mount safely on this system");
if (sizeof(sector_t) < 8)
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, "CONFIG_LBDAF not enabled");
ret = err;
goto failed_mount;
}
if (EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(sb) == 0)
goto cantfind_ext4;
/* check blocks count against device size */
blocks_count = sb->s_bdev->bd_inode->i_size >> sb->s_blocksize_bits;
if (blocks_count && ext4_blocks_count(es) > blocks_count) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, "bad geometry: block count %llu "
"exceeds size of device (%llu blocks)",
ext4_blocks_count(es), blocks_count);
goto failed_mount;
}
/*
* It makes no sense for the first data block to be beyond the end
* of the filesystem.
*/
if (le32_to_cpu(es->s_first_data_block) >= ext4_blocks_count(es)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, "bad geometry: first data"
"block %u is beyond end of filesystem (%llu)",
le32_to_cpu(es->s_first_data_block),
ext4_blocks_count(es));
goto failed_mount;
}
blocks_count = (ext4_blocks_count(es) -
le32_to_cpu(es->s_first_data_block) +
EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(sb) - 1);
do_div(blocks_count, EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(sb));
if (blocks_count > ((uint64_t)1<<32) - EXT4_DESC_PER_BLOCK(sb)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, "groups count too large: %u "
"(block count %llu, first data block %u, "
"blocks per group %lu)", sbi->s_groups_count,
ext4_blocks_count(es),
le32_to_cpu(es->s_first_data_block),
EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(sb));
goto failed_mount;
}
sbi->s_groups_count = blocks_count;
sbi->s_blockfile_groups = min_t(ext4_group_t, sbi->s_groups_count,
(EXT4_MAX_BLOCK_FILE_PHYS / EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(sb)));
db_count = (sbi->s_groups_count + EXT4_DESC_PER_BLOCK(sb) - 1) /
EXT4_DESC_PER_BLOCK(sb);
sbi->s_group_desc = kmalloc(db_count * sizeof(struct buffer_head *),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (sbi->s_group_desc == NULL) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "not enough memory");
goto failed_mount;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
if (ext4_proc_root)
sbi->s_proc = proc_mkdir(sb->s_id, ext4_proc_root);
#endif
bgl_lock_init(sbi->s_blockgroup_lock);
for (i = 0; i < db_count; i++) {
block = descriptor_loc(sb, logical_sb_block, i);
sbi->s_group_desc[i] = sb_bread(sb, block);
if (!sbi->s_group_desc[i]) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"can't read group descriptor %d", i);
db_count = i;
goto failed_mount2;
}
}
if (!ext4_check_descriptors(sb, &first_not_zeroed)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "group descriptors corrupted!");
goto failed_mount2;
}
if (EXT4_HAS_INCOMPAT_FEATURE(sb, EXT4_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_FLEX_BG))
if (!ext4_fill_flex_info(sb)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"unable to initialize "
"flex_bg meta info!");
goto failed_mount2;
}
sbi->s_gdb_count = db_count;
get_random_bytes(&sbi->s_next_generation, sizeof(u32));
spin_lock_init(&sbi->s_next_gen_lock);
err = percpu_counter_init(&sbi->s_freeblocks_counter,
ext4_count_free_blocks(sb));
if (!err) {
err = percpu_counter_init(&sbi->s_freeinodes_counter,
ext4_count_free_inodes(sb));
}
if (!err) {
err = percpu_counter_init(&sbi->s_dirs_counter,
ext4_count_dirs(sb));
}
if (!err) {
err = percpu_counter_init(&sbi->s_dirtyblocks_counter, 0);
}
if (err) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "insufficient memory");
goto failed_mount3;
}
sbi->s_stripe = ext4_get_stripe_size(sbi);
sbi->s_max_writeback_mb_bump = 128;
/*
* set up enough so that it can read an inode
*/
if (!test_opt(sb, NOLOAD) &&
EXT4_HAS_COMPAT_FEATURE(sb, EXT4_FEATURE_COMPAT_HAS_JOURNAL))
sb->s_op = &ext4_sops;
else
sb->s_op = &ext4_nojournal_sops;
sb->s_export_op = &ext4_export_ops;
sb->s_xattr = ext4_xattr_handlers;
#ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA
sb->s_qcop = &ext4_qctl_operations;
sb->dq_op = &ext4_quota_operations;
#endif
memcpy(sb->s_uuid, es->s_uuid, sizeof(es->s_uuid));
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbi->s_orphan); /* unlinked but open files */
mutex_init(&sbi->s_orphan_lock);
mutex_init(&sbi->s_resize_lock);
sb->s_root = NULL;
needs_recovery = (es->s_last_orphan != 0 ||
EXT4_HAS_INCOMPAT_FEATURE(sb,
EXT4_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_RECOVER));
/*
* The first inode we look at is the journal inode. Don't try
* root first: it may be modified in the journal!
*/
if (!test_opt(sb, NOLOAD) &&
EXT4_HAS_COMPAT_FEATURE(sb, EXT4_FEATURE_COMPAT_HAS_JOURNAL)) {
if (ext4_load_journal(sb, es, journal_devnum))
goto failed_mount3;
} else if (test_opt(sb, NOLOAD) && !(sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY) &&
EXT4_HAS_INCOMPAT_FEATURE(sb, EXT4_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_RECOVER)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "required journal recovery "
"suppressed and not mounted read-only");
goto failed_mount_wq;
} else {
clear_opt(sb, DATA_FLAGS);
set_opt(sb, WRITEBACK_DATA);
sbi->s_journal = NULL;
needs_recovery = 0;
goto no_journal;
}
if (ext4_blocks_count(es) > 0xffffffffULL &&
!jbd2_journal_set_features(EXT4_SB(sb)->s_journal, 0, 0,
JBD2_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_64BIT)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "Failed to set 64-bit journal feature");
goto failed_mount_wq;
}
if (test_opt(sb, JOURNAL_ASYNC_COMMIT)) {
jbd2_journal_set_features(sbi->s_journal,
JBD2_FEATURE_COMPAT_CHECKSUM, 0,
JBD2_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_ASYNC_COMMIT);
} else if (test_opt(sb, JOURNAL_CHECKSUM)) {
jbd2_journal_set_features(sbi->s_journal,
JBD2_FEATURE_COMPAT_CHECKSUM, 0, 0);
jbd2_journal_clear_features(sbi->s_journal, 0, 0,
JBD2_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_ASYNC_COMMIT);
} else {
jbd2_journal_clear_features(sbi->s_journal,
JBD2_FEATURE_COMPAT_CHECKSUM, 0,
JBD2_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_ASYNC_COMMIT);
}
/* We have now updated the journal if required, so we can
* validate the data journaling mode. */
switch (test_opt(sb, DATA_FLAGS)) {
case 0:
/* No mode set, assume a default based on the journal
* capabilities: ORDERED_DATA if the journal can
* cope, else JOURNAL_DATA
*/
if (jbd2_journal_check_available_features
(sbi->s_journal, 0, 0, JBD2_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_REVOKE))
set_opt(sb, ORDERED_DATA);
else
set_opt(sb, JOURNAL_DATA);
break;
case EXT4_MOUNT_ORDERED_DATA:
case EXT4_MOUNT_WRITEBACK_DATA:
if (!jbd2_journal_check_available_features
(sbi->s_journal, 0, 0, JBD2_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_REVOKE)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "Journal does not support "
"requested data journaling mode");
goto failed_mount_wq;
}
default:
break;
}
set_task_ioprio(sbi->s_journal->j_task, journal_ioprio);
/*
* The journal may have updated the bg summary counts, so we
* need to update the global counters.
*/
percpu_counter_set(&sbi->s_freeblocks_counter,
ext4_count_free_blocks(sb));
percpu_counter_set(&sbi->s_freeinodes_counter,
ext4_count_free_inodes(sb));
percpu_counter_set(&sbi->s_dirs_counter,
ext4_count_dirs(sb));
percpu_counter_set(&sbi->s_dirtyblocks_counter, 0);
no_journal:
/*
* The maximum number of concurrent works can be high and
* concurrency isn't really necessary. Limit it to 1.
*/
EXT4_SB(sb)->dio_unwritten_wq =
alloc_workqueue("ext4-dio-unwritten", WQ_MEM_RECLAIM | WQ_UNBOUND, 1);
if (!EXT4_SB(sb)->dio_unwritten_wq) {
printk(KERN_ERR "EXT4-fs: failed to create DIO workqueue\n");
goto failed_mount_wq;
}
/*
* The jbd2_journal_load will have done any necessary log recovery,
* so we can safely mount the rest of the filesystem now.
*/
root = ext4_iget(sb, EXT4_ROOT_INO);
if (IS_ERR(root)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "get root inode failed");
ret = PTR_ERR(root);
root = NULL;
goto failed_mount4;
}
if (!S_ISDIR(root->i_mode) || !root->i_blocks || !root->i_size) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "corrupt root inode, run e2fsck");
goto failed_mount4;
}
sb->s_root = d_alloc_root(root);
if (!sb->s_root) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "get root dentry failed");
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto failed_mount4;
}
ext4_setup_super(sb, es, sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY);
/* determine the minimum size of new large inodes, if present */
if (sbi->s_inode_size > EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE) {
sbi->s_want_extra_isize = sizeof(struct ext4_inode) -
EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE;
if (EXT4_HAS_RO_COMPAT_FEATURE(sb,
EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_EXTRA_ISIZE)) {
if (sbi->s_want_extra_isize <
le16_to_cpu(es->s_want_extra_isize))
sbi->s_want_extra_isize =
le16_to_cpu(es->s_want_extra_isize);
if (sbi->s_want_extra_isize <
le16_to_cpu(es->s_min_extra_isize))
sbi->s_want_extra_isize =
le16_to_cpu(es->s_min_extra_isize);
}
}
/* Check if enough inode space is available */
if (EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE + sbi->s_want_extra_isize >
sbi->s_inode_size) {
sbi->s_want_extra_isize = sizeof(struct ext4_inode) -
EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE;
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_INFO, "required extra inode space not"
"available");
}
if (test_opt(sb, DELALLOC) &&
(test_opt(sb, DATA_FLAGS) == EXT4_MOUNT_JOURNAL_DATA)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, "Ignoring delalloc option - "
"requested data journaling mode");
clear_opt(sb, DELALLOC);
}
if (test_opt(sb, DIOREAD_NOLOCK)) {
if (test_opt(sb, DATA_FLAGS) == EXT4_MOUNT_JOURNAL_DATA) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, "Ignoring dioread_nolock "
"option - requested data journaling mode");
clear_opt(sb, DIOREAD_NOLOCK);
}
if (sb->s_blocksize < PAGE_SIZE) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, "Ignoring dioread_nolock "
"option - block size is too small");
clear_opt(sb, DIOREAD_NOLOCK);
}
}
err = ext4_setup_system_zone(sb);
if (err) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "failed to initialize system "
"zone (%d)", err);
goto failed_mount4;
}
ext4_ext_init(sb);
err = ext4_mb_init(sb, needs_recovery);
if (err) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "failed to initialize mballoc (%d)",
err);
goto failed_mount4;
}
err = ext4_register_li_request(sb, first_not_zeroed);
if (err)
goto failed_mount4;
sbi->s_kobj.kset = ext4_kset;
init_completion(&sbi->s_kobj_unregister);
err = kobject_init_and_add(&sbi->s_kobj, &ext4_ktype, NULL,
"%s", sb->s_id);
if (err) {
ext4_mb_release(sb);
ext4_ext_release(sb);
goto failed_mount4;
};
EXT4_SB(sb)->s_mount_state |= EXT4_ORPHAN_FS;
ext4_orphan_cleanup(sb, es);
EXT4_SB(sb)->s_mount_state &= ~EXT4_ORPHAN_FS;
if (needs_recovery) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_INFO, "recovery complete");
ext4_mark_recovery_complete(sb, es);
}
if (EXT4_SB(sb)->s_journal) {
if (test_opt(sb, DATA_FLAGS) == EXT4_MOUNT_JOURNAL_DATA)
descr = " journalled data mode";
else if (test_opt(sb, DATA_FLAGS) == EXT4_MOUNT_ORDERED_DATA)
descr = " ordered data mode";
else
descr = " writeback data mode";
} else
descr = "out journal";
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_INFO, "mounted filesystem with%s. "
"Opts: %s%s%s", descr, sbi->s_es->s_mount_opts,
*sbi->s_es->s_mount_opts ? "; " : "", orig_data);
init_timer(&sbi->s_err_report);
sbi->s_err_report.function = print_daily_error_info;
sbi->s_err_report.data = (unsigned long) sb;
if (es->s_error_count)
mod_timer(&sbi->s_err_report, jiffies + 300*HZ); /* 5 minutes */
kfree(orig_data);
return 0;
cantfind_ext4:
if (!silent)
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "VFS: Can't find ext4 filesystem");
goto failed_mount;
failed_mount4:
iput(root);
sb->s_root = NULL;
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "mount failed");
destroy_workqueue(EXT4_SB(sb)->dio_unwritten_wq);
failed_mount_wq:
ext4_release_system_zone(sb);
if (sbi->s_journal) {
jbd2_journal_destroy(sbi->s_journal);
sbi->s_journal = NULL;
}
failed_mount3:
if (sbi->s_flex_groups) {
if (is_vmalloc_addr(sbi->s_flex_groups))
vfree(sbi->s_flex_groups);
else
kfree(sbi->s_flex_groups);
}
percpu_counter_destroy(&sbi->s_freeblocks_counter);
percpu_counter_destroy(&sbi->s_freeinodes_counter);
percpu_counter_destroy(&sbi->s_dirs_counter);
percpu_counter_destroy(&sbi->s_dirtyblocks_counter);
failed_mount2:
for (i = 0; i < db_count; i++)
brelse(sbi->s_group_desc[i]);
kfree(sbi->s_group_desc);
failed_mount:
if (sbi->s_proc) {
remove_proc_entry(sb->s_id, ext4_proc_root);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA
for (i = 0; i < MAXQUOTAS; i++)
kfree(sbi->s_qf_names[i]);
#endif
ext4_blkdev_remove(sbi);
brelse(bh);
out_fail:
sb->s_fs_info = NULL;
kfree(sbi->s_blockgroup_lock);
kfree(sbi);
out_free_orig:
kfree(orig_data);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ext4: init timer earlier to avoid a kernel panic in __save_error_info
During mount, when we fail to open journal inode or root inode, the
__save_error_info will mod_timer. But actually s_err_report isn't
initialized yet and the kernel oops. The detailed information can
be found https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32082.
The best way is to check whether the timer s_err_report is initialized
or not. But it seems that in include/linux/timer.h, we can't find a
good function to check the status of this timer, so this patch just
move the initializtion of s_err_report earlier so that we can avoid
the kernel panic. The corresponding del_timer is also added in the
error path.
Reported-by: Sami Liedes <sliedes@cc.hut.fi>
Signed-off-by: Tao Ma <boyu.mt@taobao.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: | 1 | 165,861 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: T1_Open_Face( T1_Face face )
{
T1_LoaderRec loader;
T1_Parser parser;
T1_Font type1 = &face->type1;
PS_Private priv = &type1->private_dict;
FT_Error error;
PSAux_Service psaux = (PSAux_Service)face->psaux;
t1_init_loader( &loader, face );
/* default values */
face->ndv_idx = -1;
face->cdv_idx = -1;
face->len_buildchar = 0;
priv->blue_shift = 7;
priv->blue_fuzz = 1;
priv->lenIV = 4;
priv->expansion_factor = (FT_Fixed)( 0.06 * 0x10000L );
priv->blue_scale = (FT_Fixed)( 0.039625 * 0x10000L * 1000 );
parser = &loader.parser;
error = T1_New_Parser( parser,
face->root.stream,
face->root.memory,
psaux );
if ( error )
goto Exit;
error = parse_dict( face, &loader,
parser->base_dict, parser->base_len );
if ( error )
goto Exit;
error = T1_Get_Private_Dict( parser, psaux );
if ( error )
goto Exit;
error = parse_dict( face, &loader,
parser->private_dict, parser->private_len );
if ( error )
goto Exit;
/* ensure even-ness of `num_blue_values' */
priv->num_blue_values &= ~1;
#ifndef T1_CONFIG_OPTION_NO_MM_SUPPORT
if ( face->blend &&
face->blend->num_default_design_vector != 0 &&
face->blend->num_default_design_vector != face->blend->num_axis )
{
/* we don't use it currently so just warn, reset, and ignore */
FT_ERROR(( "T1_Open_Face(): /DesignVector contains %u entries "
"while there are %u axes.\n",
face->blend->num_default_design_vector,
face->blend->num_axis ));
face->blend->num_default_design_vector = 0;
}
/* the following can happen for MM instances; we then treat the */
/* font as a normal PS font */
if ( face->blend &&
( !face->blend->num_designs || !face->blend->num_axis ) )
T1_Done_Blend( face );
/* another safety check */
if ( face->blend )
{
FT_UInt i;
for ( i = 0; i < face->blend->num_axis; i++ )
if ( !face->blend->design_map[i].num_points )
{
T1_Done_Blend( face );
break;
}
}
if ( face->blend )
{
if ( face->len_buildchar > 0 )
{
FT_Memory memory = face->root.memory;
if ( FT_NEW_ARRAY( face->buildchar, face->len_buildchar ) )
{
FT_ERROR(( "T1_Open_Face: cannot allocate BuildCharArray\n" ));
face->len_buildchar = 0;
goto Exit;
}
}
}
else
face->len_buildchar = 0;
#endif /* !T1_CONFIG_OPTION_NO_MM_SUPPORT */
/* now, propagate the subrs, charstrings, and glyphnames tables */
/* to the Type1 data */
type1->num_glyphs = loader.num_glyphs;
if ( loader.subrs.init )
{
loader.subrs.init = 0;
type1->num_subrs = loader.num_subrs;
type1->subrs_block = loader.subrs.block;
type1->subrs = loader.subrs.elements;
type1->subrs_len = loader.subrs.lengths;
}
if ( !IS_INCREMENTAL )
if ( !loader.charstrings.init )
{
FT_ERROR(( "T1_Open_Face: no `/CharStrings' array in face\n" ));
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
}
loader.charstrings.init = 0;
type1->charstrings_block = loader.charstrings.block;
type1->charstrings = loader.charstrings.elements;
type1->charstrings_len = loader.charstrings.lengths;
/* we copy the glyph names `block' and `elements' fields; */
/* the `lengths' field must be released later */
type1->glyph_names_block = loader.glyph_names.block;
type1->glyph_names = (FT_String**)loader.glyph_names.elements;
loader.glyph_names.block = 0;
loader.glyph_names.elements = 0;
/* we must now build type1.encoding when we have a custom array */
if ( type1->encoding_type == T1_ENCODING_TYPE_ARRAY )
{
FT_Int charcode, idx, min_char, max_char;
FT_Byte* glyph_name;
/* OK, we do the following: for each element in the encoding */
/* table, look up the index of the glyph having the same name */
/* the index is then stored in type1.encoding.char_index, and */
/* the name to type1.encoding.char_name */
min_char = 0;
max_char = 0;
charcode = 0;
for ( ; charcode < loader.encoding_table.max_elems; charcode++ )
{
FT_Byte* char_name;
type1->encoding.char_index[charcode] = 0;
type1->encoding.char_name [charcode] = (char *)".notdef";
char_name = loader.encoding_table.elements[charcode];
if ( char_name )
for ( idx = 0; idx < type1->num_glyphs; idx++ )
{
glyph_name = (FT_Byte*)type1->glyph_names[idx];
if ( ft_strcmp( (const char*)char_name,
(const char*)glyph_name ) == 0 )
{
type1->encoding.char_index[charcode] = (FT_UShort)idx;
type1->encoding.char_name [charcode] = (char*)glyph_name;
/* Change min/max encoded char only if glyph name is */
/* not /.notdef */
if ( ft_strcmp( (const char*)".notdef",
(const char*)glyph_name ) != 0 )
{
if ( charcode < min_char )
min_char = charcode;
if ( charcode >= max_char )
max_char = charcode + 1;
}
break;
}
}
}
type1->encoding.code_first = min_char;
type1->encoding.code_last = max_char;
type1->encoding.num_chars = loader.num_chars;
}
Exit:
t1_done_loader( &loader );
return error;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 7,063 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int posix_get_boottime(const clockid_t which_clock, struct timespec64 *tp)
{
get_monotonic_boottime64(tp);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: posix-timer: Properly check sigevent->sigev_notify
timer_create() specifies via sigevent->sigev_notify the signal delivery for
the new timer. The valid modes are SIGEV_NONE, SIGEV_SIGNAL, SIGEV_THREAD
and (SIGEV_SIGNAL | SIGEV_THREAD_ID).
The sanity check in good_sigevent() is only checking the valid combination
for the SIGEV_THREAD_ID bit, i.e. SIGEV_SIGNAL, but if SIGEV_THREAD_ID is
not set it accepts any random value.
This has no real effects on the posix timer and signal delivery code, but
it affects show_timer() which handles the output of /proc/$PID/timers. That
function uses a string array to pretty print sigev_notify. The access to
that array has no bound checks, so random sigev_notify cause access beyond
the array bounds.
Add proper checks for the valid notify modes and remove the SIGEV_THREAD_ID
masking from various code pathes as SIGEV_NONE can never be set in
combination with SIGEV_THREAD_ID.
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reported-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 85,139 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bgp_attr_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
u_int atype, const u_char *pptr, u_int len)
{
int i;
uint16_t af;
uint8_t safi, snpa, nhlen;
union { /* copy buffer for bandwidth values */
float f;
uint32_t i;
} bw;
int advance;
u_int tlen;
const u_char *tptr;
char buf[MAXHOSTNAMELEN + 100];
int as_size;
tptr = pptr;
tlen=len;
switch (atype) {
case BGPTYPE_ORIGIN:
if (len != 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
else {
ND_TCHECK(*tptr);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tok2str(bgp_origin_values,
"Unknown Origin Typecode",
tptr[0])));
}
break;
/*
* Process AS4 byte path and AS2 byte path attributes here.
*/
case BGPTYPE_AS4_PATH:
case BGPTYPE_AS_PATH:
if (len % 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
if (!len) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "empty"));
break;
}
/*
* BGP updates exchanged between New speakers that support 4
* byte AS, ASs are always encoded in 4 bytes. There is no
* definitive way to find this, just by the packet's
* contents. So, check for packet's TLV's sanity assuming
* 2 bytes first, and it does not pass, assume that ASs are
* encoded in 4 bytes format and move on.
*/
as_size = bgp_attr_get_as_size(ndo, atype, pptr, len);
while (tptr < pptr + len) {
ND_TCHECK(tptr[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tok2str(bgp_as_path_segment_open_values,
"?", tptr[0])));
ND_TCHECK(tptr[1]);
for (i = 0; i < tptr[1] * as_size; i += as_size) {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[2 + i], as_size);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s ",
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr),
as_size == 2 ?
EXTRACT_16BITS(&tptr[2 + i]) :
EXTRACT_32BITS(&tptr[2 + i]))));
}
ND_TCHECK(tptr[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tok2str(bgp_as_path_segment_close_values,
"?", tptr[0])));
ND_TCHECK(tptr[1]);
tptr += 2 + tptr[1] * as_size;
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_NEXT_HOP:
if (len != 4)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_MULTI_EXIT_DISC:
case BGPTYPE_LOCAL_PREF:
if (len != 4)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%u", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)));
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_ATOMIC_AGGREGATE:
if (len != 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
case BGPTYPE_AGGREGATOR:
/*
* Depending on the AS encoded is of 2 bytes or of 4 bytes,
* the length of this PA can be either 6 bytes or 8 bytes.
*/
if (len != 6 && len != 8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], len);
if (len == 6) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " AS #%s, origin %s",
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr), EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr)),
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr + 2)));
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " AS #%s, origin %s",
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)), ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr + 4)));
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_AGGREGATOR4:
if (len != 8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " AS #%s, origin %s",
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr), EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)),
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr + 4)));
break;
case BGPTYPE_COMMUNITIES:
if (len % 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
while (tlen>0) {
uint32_t comm;
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
comm = EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr);
switch (comm) {
case BGP_COMMUNITY_NO_EXPORT:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " NO_EXPORT"));
break;
case BGP_COMMUNITY_NO_ADVERT:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " NO_ADVERTISE"));
break;
case BGP_COMMUNITY_NO_EXPORT_SUBCONFED:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " NO_EXPORT_SUBCONFED"));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%u:%u%s",
(comm >> 16) & 0xffff,
comm & 0xffff,
(tlen>4) ? ", " : ""));
break;
}
tlen -=4;
tptr +=4;
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_ORIGINATOR_ID:
if (len != 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s",ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
break;
case BGPTYPE_CLUSTER_LIST:
if (len % 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
while (tlen>0) {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s%s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr),
(tlen>4) ? ", " : ""));
tlen -=4;
tptr +=4;
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_MP_REACH_NLRI:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 3);
af = EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr);
safi = tptr[2];
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t AFI: %s (%u), %sSAFI: %s (%u)",
tok2str(af_values, "Unknown AFI", af),
af,
(safi>128) ? "vendor specific " : "", /* 128 is meanwhile wellknown */
tok2str(bgp_safi_values, "Unknown SAFI", safi),
safi));
switch(af<<8 | safi) {
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_RT_ROUTING_INFO):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST_VPN):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MDT):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_VPLS<<8 | SAFNUM_VPLS):
break;
default:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], tlen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t no AFI %u / SAFI %u decoder", af, safi));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", tlen);
goto done;
break;
}
tptr +=3;
ND_TCHECK(tptr[0]);
nhlen = tptr[0];
tlen = nhlen;
tptr++;
if (tlen) {
int nnh = 0;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t nexthop: "));
while (tlen > 0) {
if ( nnh++ > 0 ) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", " ));
}
switch(af<<8 | safi) {
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_RT_ROUTING_INFO):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST_VPN):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MDT):
if (tlen < (int)sizeof(struct in_addr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
tlen = 0;
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], sizeof(struct in_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s",ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
tlen -= sizeof(struct in_addr);
tptr += sizeof(struct in_addr);
}
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
if (tlen < (int)(sizeof(struct in_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
tlen = 0;
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], sizeof(struct in_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "RD: %s, %s",
bgp_vpn_rd_print(ndo, tptr),
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN)));
tlen -= (sizeof(struct in_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
tptr += (sizeof(struct in_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
}
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
if (tlen < (int)sizeof(struct in6_addr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
tlen = 0;
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], sizeof(struct in6_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ip6addr_string(ndo, tptr)));
tlen -= sizeof(struct in6_addr);
tptr += sizeof(struct in6_addr);
}
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
if (tlen < (int)(sizeof(struct in6_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
tlen = 0;
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], sizeof(struct in6_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "RD: %s, %s",
bgp_vpn_rd_print(ndo, tptr),
ip6addr_string(ndo, tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN)));
tlen -= (sizeof(struct in6_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
tptr += (sizeof(struct in6_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
}
break;
case (AFNUM_VPLS<<8 | SAFNUM_VPLS):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
if (tlen < (int)sizeof(struct in_addr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
tlen = 0;
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], sizeof(struct in_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
tlen -= (sizeof(struct in_addr));
tptr += (sizeof(struct in_addr));
}
break;
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], tlen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", isonsap_string(ndo, tptr, tlen)));
tptr += tlen;
tlen = 0;
break;
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
if (tlen < BGP_VPN_RD_LEN+1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
tlen = 0;
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], tlen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "RD: %s, %s",
bgp_vpn_rd_print(ndo, tptr),
isonsap_string(ndo, tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN,tlen-BGP_VPN_RD_LEN)));
/* rfc986 mapped IPv4 address ? */
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN) == 0x47000601)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " = %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN+4)));
/* rfc1888 mapped IPv6 address ? */
else if (EXTRACT_24BITS(tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN) == 0x350000)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " = %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN+3)));
tptr += tlen;
tlen = 0;
}
break;
default:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], tlen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "no AFI %u/SAFI %u decoder", af, safi));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", tlen);
tptr += tlen;
tlen = 0;
goto done;
break;
}
}
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", nh-length: %u", nhlen));
tptr += tlen;
ND_TCHECK(tptr[0]);
snpa = tptr[0];
tptr++;
if (snpa) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %u SNPA", snpa));
for (/*nothing*/; snpa > 0; snpa--) {
ND_TCHECK(tptr[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %d bytes", tptr[0]));
tptr += tptr[0] + 1;
}
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", no SNPA"));
}
while (tptr < pptr + len) {
switch (af<<8 | safi) {
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_prefix4(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_prefix4(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_prefix4(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_RT_ROUTING_INFO):
advance = decode_rt_routing_info(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST_VPN): /* fall through */
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST_VPN):
advance = decode_multicast_vpn(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MDT):
advance = decode_mdt_vpn_nlri(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_prefix6(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_prefix6(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_prefix6(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_VPLS<<8 | SAFNUM_VPLS):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_l2(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_clnp_prefix(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_clnp_prefix(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
default:
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr,tlen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t no AFI %u / SAFI %u decoder", af, safi));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", tlen);
advance = 0;
tptr = pptr + len;
break;
}
if (advance < 0)
break;
tptr += advance;
}
done:
break;
case BGPTYPE_MP_UNREACH_NLRI:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], BGP_MP_NLRI_MINSIZE);
af = EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr);
safi = tptr[2];
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t AFI: %s (%u), %sSAFI: %s (%u)",
tok2str(af_values, "Unknown AFI", af),
af,
(safi>128) ? "vendor specific " : "", /* 128 is meanwhile wellknown */
tok2str(bgp_safi_values, "Unknown SAFI", safi),
safi));
if (len == BGP_MP_NLRI_MINSIZE)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t End-of-Rib Marker (empty NLRI)"));
tptr += 3;
while (tptr < pptr + len) {
switch (af<<8 | safi) {
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_prefix4(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_prefix4(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_prefix4(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_prefix6(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_prefix6(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_prefix6(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_VPLS<<8 | SAFNUM_VPLS):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_l2(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_clnp_prefix(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_clnp_prefix(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MDT):
advance = decode_mdt_vpn_nlri(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST_VPN): /* fall through */
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST_VPN):
advance = decode_multicast_vpn(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
default:
ND_TCHECK2(*(tptr-3),tlen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "no AFI %u / SAFI %u decoder", af, safi));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr-3, "\n\t ", tlen);
advance = 0;
tptr = pptr + len;
break;
}
if (advance < 0)
break;
tptr += advance;
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_EXTD_COMMUNITIES:
if (len % 8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
while (tlen>0) {
uint16_t extd_comm;
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 2);
extd_comm=EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s (0x%04x), Flags [%s]",
tok2str(bgp_extd_comm_subtype_values,
"unknown extd community typecode",
extd_comm),
extd_comm,
bittok2str(bgp_extd_comm_flag_values, "none", extd_comm)));
ND_TCHECK2(*(tptr+2), 6);
switch(extd_comm) {
case BGP_EXT_COM_RT_0:
case BGP_EXT_COM_RO_0:
case BGP_EXT_COM_L2VPN_RT_0:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": %u:%u (= %s)",
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+2),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+4),
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+4)));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_RT_1:
case BGP_EXT_COM_RO_1:
case BGP_EXT_COM_L2VPN_RT_1:
case BGP_EXT_COM_VRF_RT_IMP:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": %s:%u",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+2),
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+6)));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_RT_2:
case BGP_EXT_COM_RO_2:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": %s:%u",
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+2)), EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+6)));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_LINKBAND:
bw.i = EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+2);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": bandwidth: %.3f Mbps",
bw.f*8/1000000));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_VPN_ORIGIN:
case BGP_EXT_COM_VPN_ORIGIN2:
case BGP_EXT_COM_VPN_ORIGIN3:
case BGP_EXT_COM_VPN_ORIGIN4:
case BGP_EXT_COM_OSPF_RID:
case BGP_EXT_COM_OSPF_RID2:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+2)));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_OSPF_RTYPE:
case BGP_EXT_COM_OSPF_RTYPE2:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": area:%s, router-type:%s, metric-type:%s%s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+2),
tok2str(bgp_extd_comm_ospf_rtype_values,
"unknown (0x%02x)",
*(tptr+6)),
(*(tptr+7) & BGP_OSPF_RTYPE_METRIC_TYPE) ? "E2" : "",
((*(tptr+6) == BGP_OSPF_RTYPE_EXT) || (*(tptr+6) == BGP_OSPF_RTYPE_NSSA)) ? "E1" : ""));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_L2INFO:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": %s Control Flags [0x%02x]:MTU %u",
tok2str(l2vpn_encaps_values,
"unknown encaps",
*(tptr+2)),
*(tptr+3),
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+4)));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_SOURCE_AS:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": AS %u", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+2)));
break;
default:
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr,8);
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", 8);
break;
}
tlen -=8;
tptr +=8;
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_PMSI_TUNNEL:
{
uint8_t tunnel_type, flags;
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 5);
tunnel_type = *(tptr+1);
flags = *tptr;
tlen = len;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Tunnel-type %s (%u), Flags [%s], MPLS Label %u",
tok2str(bgp_pmsi_tunnel_values, "Unknown", tunnel_type),
tunnel_type,
bittok2str(bgp_pmsi_flag_values, "none", flags),
EXTRACT_24BITS(tptr+2)>>4));
tptr +=5;
tlen -= 5;
switch (tunnel_type) {
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_PIM_SM: /* fall through */
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_PIM_BIDIR:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Sender %s, P-Group %s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr),
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+4)));
break;
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_PIM_SSM:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Root-Node %s, P-Group %s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr),
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+4)));
break;
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_INGRESS:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Tunnel-Endpoint %s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
break;
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_LDP_P2MP: /* fall through */
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_LDP_MP2MP:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Root-Node %s, LSP-ID 0x%08x",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+4)));
break;
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_RSVP_P2MP:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Extended-Tunnel-ID %s, P2MP-ID 0x%08x",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+4)));
break;
default:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1) {
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", tlen);
}
}
break;
}
case BGPTYPE_AIGP:
{
uint8_t type;
uint16_t length;
tlen = len;
while (tlen >= 3) {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 3);
type = *tptr;
length = EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+1);
tptr += 3;
tlen -= 3;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s TLV (%u), length %u",
tok2str(bgp_aigp_values, "Unknown", type),
type, length));
if (length < 3)
goto trunc;
length -= 3;
/*
* Check if we can read the TLV data.
*/
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[3], length);
switch (type) {
case BGP_AIGP_TLV:
if (length < 8)
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", metric %" PRIu64,
EXTRACT_64BITS(tptr)));
break;
default:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1) {
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr,"\n\t ", length);
}
}
tptr += length;
tlen -= length;
}
break;
}
case BGPTYPE_ATTR_SET:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
if (len < 4)
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Origin AS: %s",
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr), EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr))));
tptr+=4;
len -=4;
while (len) {
u_int aflags, alenlen, alen;
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 2);
if (len < 2)
goto trunc;
aflags = *tptr;
atype = *(tptr + 1);
tptr += 2;
len -= 2;
alenlen = bgp_attr_lenlen(aflags, tptr);
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], alenlen);
if (len < alenlen)
goto trunc;
alen = bgp_attr_len(aflags, tptr);
tptr += alenlen;
len -= alenlen;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s (%u), length: %u",
tok2str(bgp_attr_values,
"Unknown Attribute", atype),
atype,
alen));
if (aflags) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Flags [%s%s%s%s",
aflags & 0x80 ? "O" : "",
aflags & 0x40 ? "T" : "",
aflags & 0x20 ? "P" : "",
aflags & 0x10 ? "E" : ""));
if (aflags & 0xf)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "+%x", aflags & 0xf));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "]: "));
}
/* FIXME check for recursion */
if (!bgp_attr_print(ndo, atype, tptr, alen))
return 0;
tptr += alen;
len -= alen;
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_LARGE_COMMUNITY:
if (len == 0 || len % 12) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t "));
while (len > 0) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 12);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%u:%u:%u%s",
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr + 4),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr + 8),
(len > 12) ? ", " : ""));
tptr += 12;
len -= 12;
}
break;
default:
ND_TCHECK2(*pptr,len);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t no Attribute %u decoder", atype)); /* we have no decoder for the attribute */
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, pptr, "\n\t ", len);
break;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1 && len) { /* omit zero length attributes*/
ND_TCHECK2(*pptr,len);
print_unknown_data(ndo, pptr, "\n\t ", len);
}
return 1;
trunc:
return 0;
}
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-16230/BGP: fix decoding of MP_REACH_NLRI
When bgp_attr_print() tried to decode the variable-length nexthop value
for the NSAP VPN case, it did not check that the declared length is good
to interpret the value as a mapped IPv4 or IPv6 address. Add missing
checks to make this safe.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Include Security working
under the Mozilla SOS program in 2018 by means of code audit.
Bhargava Shastry, SecT/TU Berlin, had independently identified this
vulnerability by means of fuzzing and provided the packet capture file
for the test.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 169,818 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: v8::Local<v8::Object> V8InjectedScriptHost::create(v8::Local<v8::Context> context, V8InspectorImpl* inspector)
{
v8::Isolate* isolate = inspector->isolate();
v8::Local<v8::Object> injectedScriptHost = v8::Object::New(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::External> debuggerExternal = v8::External::New(isolate, inspector);
setFunctionProperty(context, injectedScriptHost, "internalConstructorName", V8InjectedScriptHost::internalConstructorNameCallback, debuggerExternal);
setFunctionProperty(context, injectedScriptHost, "formatAccessorsAsProperties", V8InjectedScriptHost::formatAccessorsAsProperties, debuggerExternal);
setFunctionProperty(context, injectedScriptHost, "subtype", V8InjectedScriptHost::subtypeCallback, debuggerExternal);
setFunctionProperty(context, injectedScriptHost, "getInternalProperties", V8InjectedScriptHost::getInternalPropertiesCallback, debuggerExternal);
setFunctionProperty(context, injectedScriptHost, "objectHasOwnProperty", V8InjectedScriptHost::objectHasOwnPropertyCallback, debuggerExternal);
setFunctionProperty(context, injectedScriptHost, "bind", V8InjectedScriptHost::bindCallback, debuggerExternal);
setFunctionProperty(context, injectedScriptHost, "proxyTargetValue", V8InjectedScriptHost::proxyTargetValueCallback, debuggerExternal);
return injectedScriptHost;
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Copy objects from debugger context to inspected context properly.
BUG=637594
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2253643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#412436}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 1 | 172,069 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WorkerProcessLauncher::Core::OnObjectSignaled(HANDLE object) {
DCHECK(caller_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
DCHECK(process_watcher_.GetWatchedObject() == NULL);
StopWorker();
}
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 118,811 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: double ScriptProcessorHandler::LatencyTime() const {
return std::numeric_limits<double>::infinity();
}
Commit Message: Keep ScriptProcessorHandler alive across threads
When posting a task from the ScriptProcessorHandler::Process to fire a
process event, we need to keep the handler alive in case the
ScriptProcessorNode goes away (because it has no onaudioprocess
handler) and removes the its handler.
Bug: 765495
Test:
Change-Id: Ib4fa39d7b112c7051897700a1eff9f59a4a7a054
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/677137
Reviewed-by: Hongchan Choi <hongchan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#503629}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 150,735 |
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