instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: acpi_map_vaddr_lookup(acpi_physical_address phys, unsigned int size)
{
struct acpi_ioremap *map;
map = acpi_map_lookup(phys, size);
if (map)
return map->virt + (phys - map->phys);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: acpi: Disable ACPI table override if securelevel is set
From the kernel documentation (initrd_table_override.txt):
If the ACPI_INITRD_TABLE_OVERRIDE compile option is true, it is possible
to override nearly any ACPI table provided by the BIOS with an
instrumented, modified one.
When securelevel is set, the kernel should disallow any unauthenticated
changes to kernel space. ACPI tables contain code invoked by the kernel, so
do not allow ACPI tables to be overridden if securelevel is set.
Signed-off-by: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 53,830 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void parse_wait_interval(int argc, char *argv[], struct timeval *wait_interval)
{
const char *arg;
unsigned int usec;
int ret;
if (optarg)
arg = optarg;
else if (xs_has_arg(argc, argv))
arg = argv[optind++];
else
xtables_error(PARAMETER_PROBLEM, "wait interval value required");
ret = sscanf(arg, "%u", &usec);
if (ret == 1) {
if (usec > 999999)
xtables_error(PARAMETER_PROBLEM,
"too long usec wait %u > 999999 usec",
usec);
wait_interval->tv_sec = 0;
wait_interval->tv_usec = usec;
return;
}
xtables_error(PARAMETER_PROBLEM, "wait interval not numeric");
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 4,238 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void jas_tmr_stop(jas_tmr_t *tmr)
{
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 72,818 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AudioRendererAlgorithm::~AudioRendererAlgorithm() {}
Commit Message: Protect AudioRendererAlgorithm from invalid step sizes.
BUG=165430
TEST=unittests and asan pass.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11573023
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@173249 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 118,698 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserCommandController::UpdateCommandsForDevTools() {
bool dev_tools_enabled =
!profile()->GetPrefs()->GetBoolean(prefs::kDevToolsDisabled);
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_DEV_TOOLS,
dev_tools_enabled);
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_DEV_TOOLS_CONSOLE,
dev_tools_enabled);
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_DEV_TOOLS_INSPECT,
dev_tools_enabled);
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_DEV_TOOLS_TOGGLE,
dev_tools_enabled);
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 117,879 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool TabStripModel::IsTabSelected(int index) const {
DCHECK(ContainsIndex(index));
return selection_model_.IsSelected(index);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,109 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool PrintWebViewHelper::CalculateNumberOfPages(blink::WebLocalFrame* frame,
const blink::WebNode& node,
int* number_of_pages) {
DCHECK(frame);
bool fit_to_paper_size = !(PrintingNodeOrPdfFrame(frame, node));
if (!InitPrintSettings(fit_to_paper_size)) {
notify_browser_of_print_failure_ = false;
Send(new PrintHostMsg_ShowInvalidPrinterSettingsError(routing_id()));
return false;
}
const PrintMsg_Print_Params& params = print_pages_params_->params;
PrepareFrameAndViewForPrint prepare(params, frame, node, ignore_css_margins_);
prepare.StartPrinting();
*number_of_pages = prepare.GetExpectedPageCount();
return true;
}
Commit Message: Crash on nested IPC handlers in PrintWebViewHelper
Class is not designed to handle nested IPC. Regular flows also does not
expect them. Still during printing of plugging them may show message
boxes and start nested message loops.
For now we are going just crash. If stats show us that this case is
frequent we will have to do something more complicated.
BUG=502562
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1228693002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338100}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,604 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::LoadingStateChanged(bool to_different_document,
bool due_to_interstitial,
LoadNotificationDetails* details) {
if (ShowingInterstitialPage() &&
GetRenderManager()->interstitial_page()->pause_throbber() &&
!due_to_interstitial) {
return;
}
bool is_loading = IsLoading();
if (!is_loading) {
load_state_ = net::LoadStateWithParam(net::LOAD_STATE_IDLE,
base::string16());
load_state_host_.clear();
upload_size_ = 0;
upload_position_ = 0;
}
GetRenderManager()->SetIsLoading(is_loading);
waiting_for_response_ = is_loading;
is_load_to_different_document_ = to_different_document;
if (delegate_)
delegate_->LoadingStateChanged(this, to_different_document);
NotifyNavigationStateChanged(INVALIDATE_TYPE_LOAD);
std::string url = (details ? details->url.possibly_invalid_spec() : "NULL");
if (is_loading) {
TRACE_EVENT_ASYNC_BEGIN2("browser,navigation", "WebContentsImpl Loading",
this, "URL", url, "Main FrameTreeNode id",
GetFrameTree()->root()->frame_tree_node_id());
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.DidStartLoading();
} else {
TRACE_EVENT_ASYNC_END1("browser,navigation", "WebContentsImpl Loading",
this, "URL", url);
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.DidStopLoading();
}
int type = is_loading ? NOTIFICATION_LOAD_START : NOTIFICATION_LOAD_STOP;
NotificationDetails det = NotificationService::NoDetails();
if (details)
det = Details<LoadNotificationDetails>(details);
NotificationService::current()->Notify(
type, Source<NavigationController>(&controller_), det);
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 135,764 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gboolean webkit_web_view_search_text(WebKitWebView* webView, const gchar* string, gboolean caseSensitive, gboolean forward, gboolean shouldWrap)
{
g_return_val_if_fail(WEBKIT_IS_WEB_VIEW(webView), FALSE);
g_return_val_if_fail(string, FALSE);
TextCaseSensitivity caseSensitivity = caseSensitive ? TextCaseSensitive : TextCaseInsensitive;
FindDirection direction = forward ? FindDirectionForward : FindDirectionBackward;
return core(webView)->findString(String::fromUTF8(string), caseSensitivity, direction, shouldWrap);
}
Commit Message: 2011-06-02 Joone Hur <joone.hur@collabora.co.uk>
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
[GTK] Only load dictionaries if spell check is enabled
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32879
We don't need to call enchant if enable-spell-checking is false.
* webkit/webkitwebview.cpp:
(webkit_web_view_update_settings): Skip loading dictionaries when enable-spell-checking is false.
(webkit_web_view_settings_notify): Ditto.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@87925 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,631 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void MaybeEncodeTextContent(const String& text_content,
const char* buffer_data,
size_t buffer_size,
String* result,
bool* base64_encoded) {
if (!text_content.IsNull() &&
!text_content.Utf8(WTF::kStrictUTF8Conversion).IsNull()) {
*result = text_content;
*base64_encoded = false;
} else if (buffer_data) {
*result = Base64Encode(buffer_data, buffer_size);
*base64_encoded = true;
} else if (text_content.IsNull()) {
*result = "";
*base64_encoded = false;
} else {
DCHECK(!text_content.Is8Bit());
*result = Base64Encode(text_content.Utf8(WTF::kLenientUTF8Conversion));
*base64_encoded = true;
}
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 138,573 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ipmi_si_remove_by_dev(struct device *dev)
{
struct smi_info *e;
int rv = -ENOENT;
mutex_lock(&smi_infos_lock);
list_for_each_entry(e, &smi_infos, link) {
if (e->io.dev == dev) {
cleanup_one_si(e);
rv = 0;
break;
}
}
mutex_unlock(&smi_infos_lock);
return rv;
}
Commit Message: ipmi_si: fix use-after-free of resource->name
When we excute the following commands, we got oops
rmmod ipmi_si
cat /proc/ioports
[ 1623.482380] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff00000901d478
[ 1623.482382] Mem abort info:
[ 1623.482383] ESR = 0x96000007
[ 1623.482385] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 1623.482386] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 1623.482387] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 1623.482388] Data abort info:
[ 1623.482389] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000007
[ 1623.482390] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 1623.482393] swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000d7d94a66
[ 1623.482395] [ffff00000901d478] pgd=000000dffbfff003, pud=000000dffbffe003, pmd=0000003f5d06e003, pte=0000000000000000
[ 1623.482399] Internal error: Oops: 96000007 [#1] SMP
[ 1623.487407] Modules linked in: ipmi_si(E) nls_utf8 isofs rpcrdma ib_iser ib_srpt target_core_mod ib_srp scsi_transport_srp ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log iw_cm dm_mod aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ses ghash_ce sha2_ce enclosure sha256_arm64 sg sha1_ce hisi_sas_v2_hw hibmc_drm sbsa_gwdt hisi_sas_main ip_tables mlx5_ib ib_uverbs marvell ib_core mlx5_core ixgbe mdio hns_dsaf ipmi_devintf hns_enet_drv ipmi_msghandler hns_mdio [last unloaded: ipmi_si]
[ 1623.532410] CPU: 30 PID: 11438 Comm: cat Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E 5.0.0-rc3+ #168
[ 1623.541498] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.37 11/21/2017
[ 1623.548822] pstate: a0000005 (NzCv daif -PAN -UAO)
[ 1623.553684] pc : string+0x28/0x98
[ 1623.557040] lr : vsnprintf+0x368/0x5e8
[ 1623.560837] sp : ffff000013213a80
[ 1623.564191] x29: ffff000013213a80 x28: ffff00001138abb5
[ 1623.569577] x27: ffff000013213c18 x26: ffff805f67d06049
[ 1623.574963] x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffff00001138abb5
[ 1623.580349] x23: 0000000000000fb7 x22: ffff0000117ed000
[ 1623.585734] x21: ffff000011188fd8 x20: ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.591119] x19: ffff805f67d06061 x18: ffffffffffffffff
[ 1623.596505] x17: 0000000000000200 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.601890] x15: ffff0000117ed748 x14: ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.607276] x13: ffff805f67d0605e x12: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.612661] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.618046] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 000000000000000f
[ 1623.623432] x7 : ffff805f67d06061 x6 : fffffffffffffffe
[ 1623.628817] x5 : 0000000000000012 x4 : ffff00000901d478
[ 1623.634203] x3 : ffff0a00ffffff04 x2 : ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.639588] x1 : ffff805f67d07000 x0 : ffffffffffffffff
[ 1623.644974] Process cat (pid: 11438, stack limit = 0x000000008d4cbc10)
[ 1623.651592] Call trace:
[ 1623.654068] string+0x28/0x98
[ 1623.657071] vsnprintf+0x368/0x5e8
[ 1623.660517] seq_vprintf+0x70/0x98
[ 1623.668009] seq_printf+0x7c/0xa0
[ 1623.675530] r_show+0xc8/0xf8
[ 1623.682558] seq_read+0x330/0x440
[ 1623.689877] proc_reg_read+0x78/0xd0
[ 1623.697346] __vfs_read+0x60/0x1a0
[ 1623.704564] vfs_read+0x94/0x150
[ 1623.711339] ksys_read+0x6c/0xd8
[ 1623.717939] __arm64_sys_read+0x24/0x30
[ 1623.725077] el0_svc_common+0x120/0x148
[ 1623.732035] el0_svc_handler+0x30/0x40
[ 1623.738757] el0_svc+0x8/0xc
[ 1623.744520] Code: d1000406 aa0103e2 54000149 b4000080 (39400085)
[ 1623.753441] ---[ end trace f91b6a4937de9835 ]---
[ 1623.760871] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
[ 1623.768935] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 1623.775718] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 1623.781998] CPU features: 0x002,21006008
[ 1623.788777] Memory Limit: none
[ 1623.798329] Starting crashdump kernel...
[ 1623.805202] Bye!
If io_setup is called successful in try_smi_init() but try_smi_init()
goes out_err before calling ipmi_register_smi(), so ipmi_unregister_smi()
will not be called while removing module. It leads to the resource that
allocated in io_setup() can not be freed, but the name(DEVICE_NAME) of
resource is freed while removing the module. It causes use-after-free
when cat /proc/ioports.
Fix this by calling io_cleanup() while try_smi_init() goes to out_err.
and don't call io_cleanup() until io_setup() returns successful to avoid
warning prints.
Fixes: 93c303d2045b ("ipmi_si: Clean up shutdown a bit")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: NuoHan Qiao <qiaonuohan@huawei.com>
Suggested-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 90,232 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: restore_expand_strings(int save_expand_nmax, uschar **save_expand_nstring,
int *save_expand_nlength)
{
int i;
expand_nmax = save_expand_nmax;
for (i = 0; i <= expand_nmax; i++)
{
expand_nstring[i] = save_expand_nstring[i];
expand_nlength[i] = save_expand_nlength[i];
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 12,676 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void update_ovl_inode_times(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
bool rcu)
{
struct dentry *upperdentry;
/*
* Nothing to do if in rcu or if non-overlayfs
*/
if (rcu || likely(!(dentry->d_flags & DCACHE_OP_REAL)))
return;
upperdentry = d_real(dentry, NULL, 0, D_REAL_UPPER);
/*
* If file is on lower then we can't update atime, so no worries about
* stale mtime/ctime.
*/
if (upperdentry) {
struct inode *realinode = d_inode(upperdentry);
if ((!timespec64_equal(&inode->i_mtime, &realinode->i_mtime) ||
!timespec64_equal(&inode->i_ctime, &realinode->i_ctime))) {
inode->i_mtime = realinode->i_mtime;
inode->i_ctime = realinode->i_ctime;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fix up non-directory creation in SGID directories
sgid directories have special semantics, making newly created files in
the directory belong to the group of the directory, and newly created
subdirectories will also become sgid. This is historically used for
group-shared directories.
But group directories writable by non-group members should not imply
that such non-group members can magically join the group, so make sure
to clear the sgid bit on non-directories for non-members (but remember
that sgid without group execute means "mandatory locking", just to
confuse things even more).
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 79,862 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void Ins_SZP0( INS_ARG )
{
switch ( args[0] )
{
case 0:
CUR.zp0 = CUR.twilight;
break;
case 1:
CUR.zp0 = CUR.pts;
break;
default:
CUR.error = TT_Err_Invalid_Reference;
return;
break;
}
CUR.GS.gep0 = (Int)(args[0]);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 5,468 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ext4_block_truncate_page(handle_t *handle,
struct address_space *mapping, loff_t from)
{
unsigned offset = from & (PAGE_SIZE-1);
unsigned length;
unsigned blocksize;
struct inode *inode = mapping->host;
blocksize = inode->i_sb->s_blocksize;
length = blocksize - (offset & (blocksize - 1));
return ext4_block_zero_page_range(handle, mapping, from, length);
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix data exposure after a crash
Huang has reported that in his powerfail testing he is seeing stale
block contents in some of recently allocated blocks although he mounts
ext4 in data=ordered mode. After some investigation I have found out
that indeed when delayed allocation is used, we don't add inode to
transaction's list of inodes needing flushing before commit. Originally
we were doing that but commit f3b59291a69d removed the logic with a
flawed argument that it is not needed.
The problem is that although for delayed allocated blocks we write their
contents immediately after allocating them, there is no guarantee that
the IO scheduler or device doesn't reorder things and thus transaction
allocating blocks and attaching them to inode can reach stable storage
before actual block contents. Actually whenever we attach freshly
allocated blocks to inode using a written extent, we should add inode to
transaction's ordered inode list to make sure we properly wait for block
contents to be written before committing the transaction. So that is
what we do in this patch. This also handles other cases where stale data
exposure was possible - like filling hole via mmap in
data=ordered,nodelalloc mode.
The only exception to the above rule are extending direct IO writes where
blkdev_direct_IO() waits for IO to complete before increasing i_size and
thus stale data exposure is not possible. For now we don't complicate
the code with optimizing this special case since the overhead is pretty
low. In case this is observed to be a performance problem we can always
handle it using a special flag to ext4_map_blocks().
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: f3b59291a69d0b734be1fc8be489fef2dd846d3d
Reported-by: "HUANG Weller (CM/ESW12-CN)" <Weller.Huang@cn.bosch.com>
Tested-by: "HUANG Weller (CM/ESW12-CN)" <Weller.Huang@cn.bosch.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 67,510 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: string16 ConfirmEmailDialogDelegate::GetMessage() {
return l10n_util::GetStringFUTF16(
IDS_ONE_CLICK_SIGNIN_CONFIRM_EMAIL_DIALOG_MESSAGE,
UTF8ToUTF16(last_email_), UTF8ToUTF16(email_));
}
Commit Message: During redirects in the one click sign in flow, check the current URL
instead of original URL to validate gaia http headers.
BUG=307159
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/77343002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@236563 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 0 | 109,823 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline nsecs_t now() {
return systemTime(SYSTEM_TIME_MONOTONIC);
}
Commit Message: Add new MotionEvent flag for partially obscured windows.
Due to more complex window layouts resulting in lots of overlapping
windows, the policy around FLAG_WINDOW_IS_OBSCURED has changed to
only be set when the point at which the window was touched is
obscured. Unfortunately, this doesn't prevent tapjacking attacks that
overlay the dialog's text, making a potentially dangerous operation
seem innocuous. To avoid this on particularly sensitive dialogs,
introduce a new flag that really does tell you when your window is
being even partially overlapped.
We aren't exposing this as API since we plan on making the original
flag more robust. This is really a workaround for system dialogs
since we generally know their layout and screen position, and that
they're unlikely to be overlapped by other applications.
Bug: 26677796
Change-Id: I9e336afe90f262ba22015876769a9c510048fd47
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 163,804 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void write_ivf_frame_header(const vpx_codec_cx_pkt_t *const pkt,
FILE *const outfile) {
char header[12];
vpx_codec_pts_t pts;
if (pkt->kind != VPX_CODEC_CX_FRAME_PKT)
return;
pts = pkt->data.frame.pts;
mem_put_le32(header, static_cast<unsigned int>(pkt->data.frame.sz));
mem_put_le32(header + 4, pts & 0xFFFFFFFF);
mem_put_le32(header + 8, pts >> 32);
(void)fwrite(header, 1, 12, outfile);
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 164,496 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xfs_buf_get_maps(
struct xfs_buf *bp,
int map_count)
{
ASSERT(bp->b_maps == NULL);
bp->b_map_count = map_count;
if (map_count == 1) {
bp->b_maps = &bp->__b_map;
return 0;
}
bp->b_maps = kmem_zalloc(map_count * sizeof(struct xfs_buf_map),
KM_NOFS);
if (!bp->b_maps)
return ENOMEM;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: xfs: fix _xfs_buf_find oops on blocks beyond the filesystem end
When _xfs_buf_find is passed an out of range address, it will fail
to find a relevant struct xfs_perag and oops with a null
dereference. This can happen when trying to walk a filesystem with a
metadata inode that has a partially corrupted extent map (i.e. the
block number returned is corrupt, but is otherwise intact) and we
try to read from the corrupted block address.
In this case, just fail the lookup. If it is readahead being issued,
it will simply not be done, but if it is real read that fails we
will get an error being reported. Ideally this case should result
in an EFSCORRUPTED error being reported, but we cannot return an
error through xfs_buf_read() or xfs_buf_get() so this lookup failure
may result in ENOMEM or EIO errors being reported instead.
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 33,211 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderFrameHostImpl::~RenderFrameHostImpl() {
ResetChildren();
ResetNavigationRequests();
ClearAllWebUI();
SetLastCommittedSiteUrl(GURL());
if (overlay_routing_token_)
g_token_frame_map.Get().erase(*overlay_routing_token_);
site_instance_->RemoveObserver(this);
if (delegate_ && render_frame_created_)
delegate_->RenderFrameDeleted(this);
OnAudibleStateChanged(false);
GetSiteInstance()->DecrementActiveFrameCount();
if (render_frame_created_ && render_view_host_->GetMainFrame() != this)
CHECK(!is_active());
GetProcess()->RemoveRoute(routing_id_);
g_routing_id_frame_map.Get().erase(
RenderFrameHostID(GetProcess()->GetID(), routing_id_));
swapout_event_monitor_timeout_.reset();
for (auto& iter : visual_state_callbacks_)
std::move(iter.second).Run(false);
if (render_widget_host_ &&
render_widget_host_->owned_by_render_frame_host()) {
render_widget_host_->ShutdownAndDestroyWidget(true);
}
frame_tree_->ReleaseRenderViewHostRef(render_view_host_);
RenderFrameHostImpl* beforeunload_initiator = GetBeforeUnloadInitiator();
if (beforeunload_initiator && beforeunload_initiator != this) {
base::TimeTicks approx_renderer_start_time = send_before_unload_start_time_;
beforeunload_initiator->ProcessBeforeUnloadACKFromFrame(
true /* proceed */, false /* treat_as_final_ack */, this,
true /* is_frame_being_destroyed */, approx_renderer_start_time,
base::TimeTicks::Now());
}
}
Commit Message: Fix a crash on FileChooserImpl
If a renderer process is compromised, and it calls both of
FileChooserImpl::OpenFileChooser() and EnumerateChosenDirectory() via
Mojo, the browser process could crash because ResetOwner() for
the first FileChooserImpl::proxy_ instance was not called. We
should check nullness of proxy_ before updating it.
Bug: 941008
Change-Id: Ie0c1895ec46ce78d40594b543e49e43b420af675
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1520509
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#640580}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 151,785 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int crypto_cmac_digest_setkey(struct crypto_shash *parent,
const u8 *inkey, unsigned int keylen)
{
unsigned long alignmask = crypto_shash_alignmask(parent);
struct cmac_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_shash_ctx(parent);
unsigned int bs = crypto_shash_blocksize(parent);
__be64 *consts = PTR_ALIGN((void *)ctx->ctx, alignmask + 1);
u64 _const[2];
int i, err = 0;
u8 msb_mask, gfmask;
err = crypto_cipher_setkey(ctx->child, inkey, keylen);
if (err)
return err;
/* encrypt the zero block */
memset(consts, 0, bs);
crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(ctx->child, (u8 *)consts, (u8 *)consts);
switch (bs) {
case 16:
gfmask = 0x87;
_const[0] = be64_to_cpu(consts[1]);
_const[1] = be64_to_cpu(consts[0]);
/* gf(2^128) multiply zero-ciphertext with u and u^2 */
for (i = 0; i < 4; i += 2) {
msb_mask = ((s64)_const[1] >> 63) & gfmask;
_const[1] = (_const[1] << 1) | (_const[0] >> 63);
_const[0] = (_const[0] << 1) ^ msb_mask;
consts[i + 0] = cpu_to_be64(_const[1]);
consts[i + 1] = cpu_to_be64(_const[0]);
}
break;
case 8:
gfmask = 0x1B;
_const[0] = be64_to_cpu(consts[0]);
/* gf(2^64) multiply zero-ciphertext with u and u^2 */
for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
msb_mask = ((s64)_const[0] >> 63) & gfmask;
_const[0] = (_const[0] << 1) ^ msb_mask;
consts[i] = cpu_to_be64(_const[0]);
}
break;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 45,620 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PaintLayer* PaintLayerScrollableArea::Layer() const {
return layer_;
}
Commit Message: Always call UpdateCompositedScrollOffset, not just for the root layer
Bug: 927560
Change-Id: I1d5522aae4f11dd3f5b8947bb089bac1bf19bdb4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1452701
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mason Freed <masonfreed@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#628942}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 130,075 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Ins_CLEAR( TT_ExecContext exc )
{
exc->new_top = 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 10,584 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int jas_iccprof_setattr(jas_iccprof_t *prof, jas_iccattrname_t name,
jas_iccattrval_t *val)
{
int i;
if ((i = jas_iccattrtab_lookup(prof->attrtab, name)) >= 0) {
if (val) {
if (jas_iccattrtab_replace(prof->attrtab, i, name, val))
goto error;
} else {
jas_iccattrtab_delete(prof->attrtab, i);
}
} else {
if (val) {
if (jas_iccattrtab_add(prof->attrtab, -1, name, val))
goto error;
} else {
/* NOP */
}
}
return 0;
error:
return -1;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 72,725 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int gup_huge_pmd(pmd_t orig, pmd_t *pmdp, unsigned long addr,
unsigned long end, int write, struct page **pages, int *nr)
{
struct page *head, *page;
int refs;
if (write && !pmd_write(orig))
return 0;
refs = 0;
head = pmd_page(orig);
page = head + ((addr & ~PMD_MASK) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
do {
VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(compound_head(page) != head, page);
pages[*nr] = page;
(*nr)++;
page++;
refs++;
} while (addr += PAGE_SIZE, addr != end);
if (!page_cache_add_speculative(head, refs)) {
*nr -= refs;
return 0;
}
if (unlikely(pmd_val(orig) != pmd_val(*pmdp))) {
*nr -= refs;
while (refs--)
put_page(head);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: mm: remove gup_flags FOLL_WRITE games from __get_user_pages()
This is an ancient bug that was actually attempted to be fixed once
(badly) by me eleven years ago in commit 4ceb5db9757a ("Fix
get_user_pages() race for write access") but that was then undone due to
problems on s390 by commit f33ea7f404e5 ("fix get_user_pages bug").
In the meantime, the s390 situation has long been fixed, and we can now
fix it by checking the pte_dirty() bit properly (and do it better). The
s390 dirty bit was implemented in abf09bed3cce ("s390/mm: implement
software dirty bits") which made it into v3.9. Earlier kernels will
have to look at the page state itself.
Also, the VM has become more scalable, and what used a purely
theoretical race back then has become easier to trigger.
To fix it, we introduce a new internal FOLL_COW flag to mark the "yes,
we already did a COW" rather than play racy games with FOLL_WRITE that
is very fundamental, and then use the pte dirty flag to validate that
the FOLL_COW flag is still valid.
Reported-and-tested-by: Phil "not Paul" Oester <kernel@linuxace.com>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 52,112 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PDFEngineExports::RenderingSettings::RenderingSettings(int dpi_x,
int dpi_y,
const pp::Rect& bounds,
bool fit_to_bounds,
bool stretch_to_bounds,
bool keep_aspect_ratio,
bool center_in_bounds,
bool autorotate)
: dpi_x(dpi_x),
dpi_y(dpi_y),
bounds(bounds),
fit_to_bounds(fit_to_bounds),
stretch_to_bounds(stretch_to_bounds),
keep_aspect_ratio(keep_aspect_ratio),
center_in_bounds(center_in_bounds),
autorotate(autorotate) {}
Commit Message: [pdf] Defer page unloading in JS callback.
One of the callbacks from PDFium JavaScript into the embedder is to get the
current page number. In Chromium, this will trigger a call to
CalculateMostVisiblePage that method will determine the visible pages and unload
any non-visible pages. But, if the originating JS is on a non-visible page
we'll delete the page and annotations associated with that page. This will
cause issues as we are currently working with those objects when the JavaScript
returns.
This Cl defers the page unloading triggered by getting the most visible page
until the next event is handled by the Chromium embedder.
BUG=chromium:653090
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2418533002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#424781}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 140,408 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void jswrap_graphics_setRotation(JsVar *parent, int rotation, bool reflect) {
JsGraphics gfx; if (!graphicsGetFromVar(&gfx, parent)) return;
gfx.data.flags &= (JsGraphicsFlags)~(JSGRAPHICSFLAGS_SWAP_XY | JSGRAPHICSFLAGS_INVERT_X | JSGRAPHICSFLAGS_INVERT_Y);
switch (rotation) {
case 0:
break;
case 1:
gfx.data.flags |= JSGRAPHICSFLAGS_SWAP_XY | JSGRAPHICSFLAGS_INVERT_X;
break;
case 2:
gfx.data.flags |= JSGRAPHICSFLAGS_INVERT_X | JSGRAPHICSFLAGS_INVERT_Y;
break;
case 3:
gfx.data.flags |= JSGRAPHICSFLAGS_SWAP_XY | JSGRAPHICSFLAGS_INVERT_Y;
break;
}
if (reflect) {
if (gfx.data.flags & JSGRAPHICSFLAGS_SWAP_XY)
gfx.data.flags ^= JSGRAPHICSFLAGS_INVERT_Y;
else
gfx.data.flags ^= JSGRAPHICSFLAGS_INVERT_X;
}
graphicsSetVar(&gfx);
}
Commit Message: Add height check for Graphics.createArrayBuffer(...vertical_byte:true) (fix #1421)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 82,586 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void bta_av_api_disconnect(tBTA_AV_DATA* p_data) {
AVDT_DisconnectReq(p_data->api_discnt.bd_addr, bta_av_conn_cback);
alarm_cancel(bta_av_cb.link_signalling_timer);
}
Commit Message: Check packet length in bta_av_proc_meta_cmd
Bug: 111893951
Test: manual - connect A2DP
Change-Id: Ibbf347863dfd29ea3385312e9dde1082bc90d2f3
(cherry picked from commit ed51887f921263219bcd2fbf6650ead5ec8d334e)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 162,834 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ptrace_request(struct task_struct *child, long request,
unsigned long addr, unsigned long data)
{
bool seized = child->ptrace & PT_SEIZED;
int ret = -EIO;
kernel_siginfo_t siginfo, *si;
void __user *datavp = (void __user *) data;
unsigned long __user *datalp = datavp;
unsigned long flags;
switch (request) {
case PTRACE_PEEKTEXT:
case PTRACE_PEEKDATA:
return generic_ptrace_peekdata(child, addr, data);
case PTRACE_POKETEXT:
case PTRACE_POKEDATA:
return generic_ptrace_pokedata(child, addr, data);
#ifdef PTRACE_OLDSETOPTIONS
case PTRACE_OLDSETOPTIONS:
#endif
case PTRACE_SETOPTIONS:
ret = ptrace_setoptions(child, data);
break;
case PTRACE_GETEVENTMSG:
ret = put_user(child->ptrace_message, datalp);
break;
case PTRACE_PEEKSIGINFO:
ret = ptrace_peek_siginfo(child, addr, data);
break;
case PTRACE_GETSIGINFO:
ret = ptrace_getsiginfo(child, &siginfo);
if (!ret)
ret = copy_siginfo_to_user(datavp, &siginfo);
break;
case PTRACE_SETSIGINFO:
ret = copy_siginfo_from_user(&siginfo, datavp);
if (!ret)
ret = ptrace_setsiginfo(child, &siginfo);
break;
case PTRACE_GETSIGMASK: {
sigset_t *mask;
if (addr != sizeof(sigset_t)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
break;
}
if (test_tsk_restore_sigmask(child))
mask = &child->saved_sigmask;
else
mask = &child->blocked;
if (copy_to_user(datavp, mask, sizeof(sigset_t)))
ret = -EFAULT;
else
ret = 0;
break;
}
case PTRACE_SETSIGMASK: {
sigset_t new_set;
if (addr != sizeof(sigset_t)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
break;
}
if (copy_from_user(&new_set, datavp, sizeof(sigset_t))) {
ret = -EFAULT;
break;
}
sigdelsetmask(&new_set, sigmask(SIGKILL)|sigmask(SIGSTOP));
/*
* Every thread does recalc_sigpending() after resume, so
* retarget_shared_pending() and recalc_sigpending() are not
* called here.
*/
spin_lock_irq(&child->sighand->siglock);
child->blocked = new_set;
spin_unlock_irq(&child->sighand->siglock);
clear_tsk_restore_sigmask(child);
ret = 0;
break;
}
case PTRACE_INTERRUPT:
/*
* Stop tracee without any side-effect on signal or job
* control. At least one trap is guaranteed to happen
* after this request. If @child is already trapped, the
* current trap is not disturbed and another trap will
* happen after the current trap is ended with PTRACE_CONT.
*
* The actual trap might not be PTRACE_EVENT_STOP trap but
* the pending condition is cleared regardless.
*/
if (unlikely(!seized || !lock_task_sighand(child, &flags)))
break;
/*
* INTERRUPT doesn't disturb existing trap sans one
* exception. If ptracer issued LISTEN for the current
* STOP, this INTERRUPT should clear LISTEN and re-trap
* tracee into STOP.
*/
if (likely(task_set_jobctl_pending(child, JOBCTL_TRAP_STOP)))
ptrace_signal_wake_up(child, child->jobctl & JOBCTL_LISTENING);
unlock_task_sighand(child, &flags);
ret = 0;
break;
case PTRACE_LISTEN:
/*
* Listen for events. Tracee must be in STOP. It's not
* resumed per-se but is not considered to be in TRACED by
* wait(2) or ptrace(2). If an async event (e.g. group
* stop state change) happens, tracee will enter STOP trap
* again. Alternatively, ptracer can issue INTERRUPT to
* finish listening and re-trap tracee into STOP.
*/
if (unlikely(!seized || !lock_task_sighand(child, &flags)))
break;
si = child->last_siginfo;
if (likely(si && (si->si_code >> 8) == PTRACE_EVENT_STOP)) {
child->jobctl |= JOBCTL_LISTENING;
/*
* If NOTIFY is set, it means event happened between
* start of this trap and now. Trigger re-trap.
*/
if (child->jobctl & JOBCTL_TRAP_NOTIFY)
ptrace_signal_wake_up(child, true);
ret = 0;
}
unlock_task_sighand(child, &flags);
break;
case PTRACE_DETACH: /* detach a process that was attached. */
ret = ptrace_detach(child, data);
break;
#ifdef CONFIG_BINFMT_ELF_FDPIC
case PTRACE_GETFDPIC: {
struct mm_struct *mm = get_task_mm(child);
unsigned long tmp = 0;
ret = -ESRCH;
if (!mm)
break;
switch (addr) {
case PTRACE_GETFDPIC_EXEC:
tmp = mm->context.exec_fdpic_loadmap;
break;
case PTRACE_GETFDPIC_INTERP:
tmp = mm->context.interp_fdpic_loadmap;
break;
default:
break;
}
mmput(mm);
ret = put_user(tmp, datalp);
break;
}
#endif
#ifdef PTRACE_SINGLESTEP
case PTRACE_SINGLESTEP:
#endif
#ifdef PTRACE_SINGLEBLOCK
case PTRACE_SINGLEBLOCK:
#endif
#ifdef PTRACE_SYSEMU
case PTRACE_SYSEMU:
case PTRACE_SYSEMU_SINGLESTEP:
#endif
case PTRACE_SYSCALL:
case PTRACE_CONT:
return ptrace_resume(child, request, data);
case PTRACE_KILL:
if (child->exit_state) /* already dead */
return 0;
return ptrace_resume(child, request, SIGKILL);
#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK
case PTRACE_GETREGSET:
case PTRACE_SETREGSET: {
struct iovec kiov;
struct iovec __user *uiov = datavp;
if (!access_ok(uiov, sizeof(*uiov)))
return -EFAULT;
if (__get_user(kiov.iov_base, &uiov->iov_base) ||
__get_user(kiov.iov_len, &uiov->iov_len))
return -EFAULT;
ret = ptrace_regset(child, request, addr, &kiov);
if (!ret)
ret = __put_user(kiov.iov_len, &uiov->iov_len);
break;
}
#endif
case PTRACE_SECCOMP_GET_FILTER:
ret = seccomp_get_filter(child, addr, datavp);
break;
case PTRACE_SECCOMP_GET_METADATA:
ret = seccomp_get_metadata(child, addr, datavp);
break;
default:
break;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ptrace: Fix ->ptracer_cred handling for PTRACE_TRACEME
Fix two issues:
When called for PTRACE_TRACEME, ptrace_link() would obtain an RCU
reference to the parent's objective credentials, then give that pointer
to get_cred(). However, the object lifetime rules for things like
struct cred do not permit unconditionally turning an RCU reference into
a stable reference.
PTRACE_TRACEME records the parent's credentials as if the parent was
acting as the subject, but that's not the case. If a malicious
unprivileged child uses PTRACE_TRACEME and the parent is privileged, and
at a later point, the parent process becomes attacker-controlled
(because it drops privileges and calls execve()), the attacker ends up
with control over two processes with a privileged ptrace relationship,
which can be abused to ptrace a suid binary and obtain root privileges.
Fix both of these by always recording the credentials of the process
that is requesting the creation of the ptrace relationship:
current_cred() can't change under us, and current is the proper subject
for access control.
This change is theoretically userspace-visible, but I am not aware of
any code that it will actually break.
Fixes: 64b875f7ac8a ("ptrace: Capture the ptracer's creds not PT_PTRACE_CAP")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 89,072 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ExtensionApiTest::RunExtensionSubtest(const std::string& extension_name,
const std::string& page_url,
int flags) {
return RunExtensionSubtestWithArgAndFlags(extension_name, page_url, nullptr,
flags);
}
Commit Message: Call CanCaptureVisiblePage in page capture API.
Currently the pageCapture permission allows access
to arbitrary local files and chrome:// pages which
can be a security concern. In order to address this,
the page capture API needs to be changed similar to
the captureVisibleTab API. The API will now only allow
extensions to capture otherwise-restricted URLs if the
user has granted activeTab. In addition, file:// URLs are
only capturable with the "Allow on file URLs" option enabled.
Bug: 893087
Change-Id: I6d6225a3efb70fc033e2e1c031c633869afac624
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1330689
Commit-Queue: Bettina Dea <bdea@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Varun Khaneja <vakh@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#615248}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 151,552 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nfsd_inet6addr_event(struct notifier_block *this,
unsigned long event, void *ptr)
{
struct inet6_ifaddr *ifa = (struct inet6_ifaddr *)ptr;
struct net_device *dev = ifa->idev->dev;
struct net *net = dev_net(dev);
struct nfsd_net *nn = net_generic(net, nfsd_net_id);
struct sockaddr_in6 sin6;
if (event != NETDEV_DOWN)
goto out;
if (nn->nfsd_serv) {
dprintk("nfsd_inet6addr_event: removed %pI6\n", &ifa->addr);
sin6.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
sin6.sin6_addr = ifa->addr;
if (ipv6_addr_type(&sin6.sin6_addr) & IPV6_ADDR_LINKLOCAL)
sin6.sin6_scope_id = ifa->idev->dev->ifindex;
svc_age_temp_xprts_now(nn->nfsd_serv, (struct sockaddr *)&sin6);
}
out:
return NOTIFY_DONE;
}
Commit Message: nfsd: check for oversized NFSv2/v3 arguments
A client can append random data to the end of an NFSv2 or NFSv3 RPC call
without our complaining; we'll just stop parsing at the end of the
expected data and ignore the rest.
Encoded arguments and replies are stored together in an array of pages,
and if a call is too large it could leave inadequate space for the
reply. This is normally OK because NFS RPC's typically have either
short arguments and long replies (like READ) or long arguments and short
replies (like WRITE). But a client that sends an incorrectly long reply
can violate those assumptions. This was observed to cause crashes.
Also, several operations increment rq_next_page in the decode routine
before checking the argument size, which can leave rq_next_page pointing
well past the end of the page array, causing trouble later in
svc_free_pages.
So, following a suggestion from Neil Brown, add a central check to
enforce our expectation that no NFSv2/v3 call has both a large call and
a large reply.
As followup we may also want to rewrite the encoding routines to check
more carefully that they aren't running off the end of the page array.
We may also consider rejecting calls that have any extra garbage
appended. That would be safer, and within our rights by spec, but given
the age of our server and the NFS protocol, and the fact that we've
never enforced this before, we may need to balance that against the
possibility of breaking some oddball client.
Reported-by: Tuomas Haanpää <thaan@synopsys.com>
Reported-by: Ari Kauppi <ari@synopsys.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 67,137 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int compat_tcp_getsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
{
if (level != SOL_TCP)
return inet_csk_compat_getsockopt(sk, level, optname,
optval, optlen);
return do_tcp_getsockopt(sk, level, optname, optval, optlen);
}
Commit Message: net: Fix oops from tcp_collapse() when using splice()
tcp_read_sock() can have a eat skbs without immediately advancing copied_seq.
This can cause a panic in tcp_collapse() if it is called as a result
of the recv_actor dropping the socket lock.
A userspace program that splices data from a socket to either another
socket or to a file can trigger this bug.
Signed-off-by: Steven J. Magnani <steve@digidescorp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 31,854 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int hid_parse_report(struct hid_device *hid, __u8 *start, unsigned size)
{
hid->dev_rdesc = kmemdup(start, size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!hid->dev_rdesc)
return -ENOMEM;
hid->dev_rsize = size;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: HID: core: prevent out-of-bound readings
Plugging a Logitech DJ receiver with KASAN activated raises a bunch of
out-of-bound readings.
The fields are allocated up to MAX_USAGE, meaning that potentially, we do
not have enough fields to fit the incoming values.
Add checks and silence KASAN.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 49,507 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: char* engrave_tombstone(pid_t pid, pid_t tid, int signal, int original_si_code,
uintptr_t abort_msg_address, bool dump_sibling_threads,
bool* detach_failed, int* total_sleep_time_usec) {
log_t log;
log.current_tid = tid;
log.crashed_tid = tid;
if ((mkdir(TOMBSTONE_DIR, 0755) == -1) && (errno != EEXIST)) {
_LOG(&log, logtype::ERROR, "failed to create %s: %s\n", TOMBSTONE_DIR, strerror(errno));
}
if (chown(TOMBSTONE_DIR, AID_SYSTEM, AID_SYSTEM) == -1) {
_LOG(&log, logtype::ERROR, "failed to change ownership of %s: %s\n", TOMBSTONE_DIR, strerror(errno));
}
int fd = -1;
char* path = NULL;
if (selinux_android_restorecon(TOMBSTONE_DIR, 0) == 0) {
path = find_and_open_tombstone(&fd);
} else {
_LOG(&log, logtype::ERROR, "Failed to restore security context, not writing tombstone.\n");
}
if (fd < 0) {
_LOG(&log, logtype::ERROR, "Skipping tombstone write, nothing to do.\n");
*detach_failed = false;
return NULL;
}
log.tfd = fd;
int amfd = activity_manager_connect();
log.amfd = amfd;
*detach_failed = dump_crash(&log, pid, tid, signal, original_si_code, abort_msg_address,
dump_sibling_threads, total_sleep_time_usec);
ALOGI("\nTombstone written to: %s\n", path);
close(amfd);
close(fd);
return path;
}
Commit Message: Don't create tombstone directory.
Partial backport of cf79748.
Bug: http://b/26403620
Change-Id: Ib877ab6cfab6aef079830c5a50ba81141ead35ee
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 1 | 173,890 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: __declspec(dllexport)
#endif
SQLITE_API int sqlite3_fts3_init(
sqlite3 *db,
char **pzErrMsg,
const sqlite3_api_routines *pApi
){
SQLITE_EXTENSION_INIT2(pApi)
return sqlite3Fts3Init(db);
}
Commit Message: sqlite: safely move pointer values through SQL.
This lands https://www.sqlite.org/src/timeline?c=d6a44b35 in
third_party/sqlite/src/ and
third_party/sqlite/patches/0013-Add-new-interfaces-sqlite3_bind_pointer-sqlite3_resu.patch
and re-generates third_party/sqlite/amalgamation/* using the script at
third_party/sqlite/google_generate_amalgamation.sh.
The CL also adds a layout test that verifies the patch works as intended.
BUG=742407
Change-Id: I2e1a457459cd2e975e6241b630e7b79c82545981
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/572976
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#487275}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 136,265 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int check_content(CMS_ContentInfo *cms)
{
ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pos = CMS_get0_content(cms);
if (!pos || !*pos) {
CMSerr(CMS_F_CHECK_CONTENT, CMS_R_NO_CONTENT);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-311 | 0 | 11,947 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void l2cap_sock_init(struct sock *sk, struct sock *parent)
{
struct l2cap_pinfo *pi = l2cap_pi(sk);
BT_DBG("sk %p", sk);
if (parent) {
sk->sk_type = parent->sk_type;
bt_sk(sk)->defer_setup = bt_sk(parent)->defer_setup;
pi->imtu = l2cap_pi(parent)->imtu;
pi->omtu = l2cap_pi(parent)->omtu;
pi->mode = l2cap_pi(parent)->mode;
pi->fcs = l2cap_pi(parent)->fcs;
pi->sec_level = l2cap_pi(parent)->sec_level;
pi->role_switch = l2cap_pi(parent)->role_switch;
pi->force_reliable = l2cap_pi(parent)->force_reliable;
} else {
pi->imtu = L2CAP_DEFAULT_MTU;
pi->omtu = 0;
pi->mode = L2CAP_MODE_BASIC;
pi->fcs = L2CAP_FCS_CRC16;
pi->sec_level = BT_SECURITY_LOW;
pi->role_switch = 0;
pi->force_reliable = 0;
}
/* Default config options */
pi->conf_len = 0;
pi->flush_to = L2CAP_DEFAULT_FLUSH_TO;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: Add configuration support for ERTM and Streaming mode
Add support to config_req and config_rsp to configure ERTM and Streaming
mode. If the remote device specifies ERTM or Streaming mode, then the
same mode is proposed. Otherwise ERTM or Basic mode is used. And in case
of a state 2 device, the remote device should propose the same mode. If
not, then the channel gets disconnected.
Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan <gustavo@las.ic.unicamp.br>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 58,970 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RequestSender::SendInternal() {
DCHECK(cur_url_ != urls_.end());
DCHECK(cur_url_->is_valid());
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
GURL url(*cur_url_);
if (use_signing_) {
DCHECK(!public_key_.empty());
signer_ = client_update_protocol::Ecdsa::Create(kKeyVersion, public_key_);
std::string request_query_string;
signer_->SignRequest(request_body_, &request_query_string);
url = BuildUpdateUrl(url, request_query_string);
}
DVLOG(2) << "Sending Omaha request: " << request_body_;
network_fetcher_ = config_->GetNetworkFetcherFactory()->Create();
if (!network_fetcher_) {
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&RequestSender::SendInternalComplete,
base::Unretained(this),
static_cast<int>(ProtocolError::URL_FETCHER_FAILED),
std::string(), std::string(), 0));
}
network_fetcher_->PostRequest(
url, request_body_, request_extra_headers_,
base::BindOnce(&RequestSender::OnResponseStarted, base::Unretained(this)),
base::BindRepeating([](int64_t current) {}),
base::BindOnce(&RequestSender::OnNetworkFetcherComplete,
base::Unretained(this), url));
}
Commit Message: Fix error handling in the request sender and url fetcher downloader.
That means handling the network errors by primarily looking at net_error.
Bug: 1028369
Change-Id: I8181bced25f8b56144ea336a03883d0dceea5108
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1935428
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sorin Jianu <sorin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#719199}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 136,824 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: vrrp_group_track_if_handler(vector_t *strvec)
{
alloc_value_block(alloc_vrrp_group_track_if, vector_slot(strvec, 0));
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 76,007 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static av_cold int init(AVFilterContext *ctx)
{
BoxBlurContext *s = ctx->priv;
if (!s->luma_param.radius_expr) {
av_log(ctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Luma radius expression is not set.\n");
return AVERROR(EINVAL);
}
/* fill missing params */
if (!s->chroma_param.radius_expr) {
s->chroma_param.radius_expr = av_strdup(s->luma_param.radius_expr);
if (!s->chroma_param.radius_expr)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
if (s->chroma_param.power < 0)
s->chroma_param.power = s->luma_param.power;
if (!s->alpha_param.radius_expr) {
s->alpha_param.radius_expr = av_strdup(s->luma_param.radius_expr);
if (!s->alpha_param.radius_expr)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
if (s->alpha_param.power < 0)
s->alpha_param.power = s->luma_param.power;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avfilter: fix plane validity checks
Fixes out of array accesses
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 29,720 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ahci_write_fis_pio(AHCIDevice *ad, uint16_t len)
{
AHCIPortRegs *pr = &ad->port_regs;
uint8_t *pio_fis;
IDEState *s = &ad->port.ifs[0];
if (!ad->res_fis || !(pr->cmd & PORT_CMD_FIS_RX)) {
return;
}
pio_fis = &ad->res_fis[RES_FIS_PSFIS];
pio_fis[0] = SATA_FIS_TYPE_PIO_SETUP;
pio_fis[1] = (ad->hba->control_regs.irqstatus ? (1 << 6) : 0);
pio_fis[2] = s->status;
pio_fis[3] = s->error;
pio_fis[4] = s->sector;
pio_fis[5] = s->lcyl;
pio_fis[6] = s->hcyl;
pio_fis[7] = s->select;
pio_fis[8] = s->hob_sector;
pio_fis[9] = s->hob_lcyl;
pio_fis[10] = s->hob_hcyl;
pio_fis[11] = 0;
pio_fis[12] = s->nsector & 0xFF;
pio_fis[13] = (s->nsector >> 8) & 0xFF;
pio_fis[14] = 0;
pio_fis[15] = s->status;
pio_fis[16] = len & 255;
pio_fis[17] = len >> 8;
pio_fis[18] = 0;
pio_fis[19] = 0;
/* Update shadow registers: */
pr->tfdata = (ad->port.ifs[0].error << 8) |
ad->port.ifs[0].status;
if (pio_fis[2] & ERR_STAT) {
ahci_trigger_irq(ad->hba, ad, PORT_IRQ_TF_ERR);
}
ahci_trigger_irq(ad->hba, ad, PORT_IRQ_PIOS_FIS);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 5,886 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool MaybeLaunchInputMethodDaemon() {
if (!initialized_successfully_)
return false;
if (!should_launch_ime_) {
return false;
}
#if !defined(TOUCH_UI)
if (!candidate_window_controller_.get()) {
candidate_window_controller_.reset(new CandidateWindowController);
if (!candidate_window_controller_->Init()) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Failed to initialize the candidate window controller";
}
}
#endif
if (ibus_daemon_process_handle_ != base::kNullProcessHandle) {
return false; // ibus-daemon is already running.
}
const std::string ibus_daemon_command_line =
StringPrintf("%s --panel=disable --cache=none --restart --replace",
kIBusDaemonPath);
if (!LaunchInputMethodProcess(
ibus_daemon_command_line, &ibus_daemon_process_handle_)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to launch " << ibus_daemon_command_line;
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,837 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void cgtimer_sub(cgtimer_t *a, cgtimer_t *b, cgtimer_t *res)
{
res->tv_sec = a->tv_sec - b->tv_sec;
res->tv_nsec = a->tv_nsec - b->tv_nsec;
if (res->tv_nsec < 0) {
res->tv_nsec += 1000000000;
res->tv_sec--;
}
}
Commit Message: stratum: parse_notify(): Don't die on malformed bbversion/prev_hash/nbit/ntime.
Might have introduced a memory leak, don't have time to check. :(
Should the other hex2bin()'s be checked?
Thanks to Mick Ayzenberg <mick.dejavusecurity.com> for finding this.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 36,576 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void vga_dirty_log_start(VGACommonState *s)
{
memory_region_set_log(&s->vram, true, DIRTY_MEMORY_VGA);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 2,999 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Com_RandomBytes( byte *string, int len )
{
int i;
if( Sys_RandomBytes( string, len ) )
return;
Com_Printf( "Com_RandomBytes: using weak randomization\n" );
for( i = 0; i < len; i++ )
string[i] = (unsigned char)( rand() % 256 );
}
Commit Message: Merge some file writing extension checks from OpenJK.
Thanks Ensiform.
https://github.com/JACoders/OpenJK/commit/05928a57f9e4aae15a3bd0
https://github.com/JACoders/OpenJK/commit/ef124fd0fc48af164581176
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 95,480 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::clearBufferuiv(GLenum buffer,
GLint drawbuffer,
const Vector<GLuint>& value,
GLuint src_offset) {
if (isContextLost() ||
!ValidateClearBuffer("clearBufferuiv", buffer, value.size(), src_offset))
return;
ScopedRGBEmulationColorMask emulation_color_mask(this, color_mask_,
drawing_buffer_.get());
ContextGL()->ClearBufferuiv(buffer, drawbuffer, value.data() + src_offset);
UpdateBuffersToAutoClear(kClearBufferuiv, buffer, drawbuffer);
}
Commit Message: Validate all incoming WebGLObjects.
A few entry points were missing the correct validation.
Tested with improved conformance tests in
https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2654 .
Bug: 848914
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ib98a61cc5bf378d1b3338b04acd7e1bc4c2fe008
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1086718
Reviewed-by: Kai Ninomiya <kainino@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#565016}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 153,575 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int hns_roce_query_device(struct ib_device *ib_dev,
struct ib_device_attr *props,
struct ib_udata *uhw)
{
struct hns_roce_dev *hr_dev = to_hr_dev(ib_dev);
memset(props, 0, sizeof(*props));
props->sys_image_guid = cpu_to_be32(hr_dev->sys_image_guid);
props->max_mr_size = (u64)(~(0ULL));
props->page_size_cap = hr_dev->caps.page_size_cap;
props->vendor_id = hr_dev->vendor_id;
props->vendor_part_id = hr_dev->vendor_part_id;
props->hw_ver = hr_dev->hw_rev;
props->max_qp = hr_dev->caps.num_qps;
props->max_qp_wr = hr_dev->caps.max_wqes;
props->device_cap_flags = IB_DEVICE_PORT_ACTIVE_EVENT |
IB_DEVICE_RC_RNR_NAK_GEN;
props->max_sge = max(hr_dev->caps.max_sq_sg, hr_dev->caps.max_rq_sg);
props->max_sge_rd = 1;
props->max_cq = hr_dev->caps.num_cqs;
props->max_cqe = hr_dev->caps.max_cqes;
props->max_mr = hr_dev->caps.num_mtpts;
props->max_pd = hr_dev->caps.num_pds;
props->max_qp_rd_atom = hr_dev->caps.max_qp_dest_rdma;
props->max_qp_init_rd_atom = hr_dev->caps.max_qp_init_rdma;
props->atomic_cap = IB_ATOMIC_NONE;
props->max_pkeys = 1;
props->local_ca_ack_delay = hr_dev->caps.local_ca_ack_delay;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: RDMA/hns: Fix init resp when alloc ucontext
The data in resp will be copied from kernel to userspace, thus it needs to
be initialized to zeros to avoid copying uninited stack memory.
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Fixes: e088a685eae9 ("RDMA/hns: Support rq record doorbell for the user space")
Signed-off-by: Yixian Liu <liuyixian@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-665 | 0 | 87,744 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool PrintWebViewHelper::RenderPagesForPrint(blink::WebLocalFrame* frame,
const blink::WebNode& node) {
if (!frame || prep_frame_view_)
return false;
const PrintMsg_PrintPages_Params& params = *print_pages_params_;
const PrintMsg_Print_Params& print_params = params.params;
prep_frame_view_.reset(new PrepareFrameAndViewForPrint(
print_params, frame, node, ignore_css_margins_));
DCHECK(!print_pages_params_->params.selection_only ||
print_pages_params_->pages.empty());
prep_frame_view_->CopySelectionIfNeeded(
render_view()->GetWebkitPreferences(),
base::Bind(&PrintWebViewHelper::OnFramePreparedForPrintPages,
base::Unretained(this)));
return true;
}
Commit Message: Crash on nested IPC handlers in PrintWebViewHelper
Class is not designed to handle nested IPC. Regular flows also does not
expect them. Still during printing of plugging them may show message
boxes and start nested message loops.
For now we are going just crash. If stats show us that this case is
frequent we will have to do something more complicated.
BUG=502562
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1228693002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338100}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,667 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void *address_space_map(AddressSpace *as,
hwaddr addr,
hwaddr *plen,
bool is_write)
{
hwaddr len = *plen;
hwaddr done = 0;
hwaddr l, xlat, base;
MemoryRegion *mr, *this_mr;
ram_addr_t raddr;
if (len == 0) {
return NULL;
}
l = len;
mr = address_space_translate(as, addr, &xlat, &l, is_write);
if (!memory_access_is_direct(mr, is_write)) {
if (atomic_xchg(&bounce.in_use, true)) {
return NULL;
}
/* Avoid unbounded allocations */
l = MIN(l, TARGET_PAGE_SIZE);
bounce.buffer = qemu_memalign(TARGET_PAGE_SIZE, l);
bounce.addr = addr;
bounce.len = l;
memory_region_ref(mr);
bounce.mr = mr;
if (!is_write) {
address_space_read(as, addr, bounce.buffer, l);
}
*plen = l;
return bounce.buffer;
}
base = xlat;
raddr = memory_region_get_ram_addr(mr);
for (;;) {
len -= l;
addr += l;
done += l;
if (len == 0) {
break;
}
l = len;
this_mr = address_space_translate(as, addr, &xlat, &l, is_write);
if (this_mr != mr || xlat != base + done) {
break;
}
}
memory_region_ref(mr);
*plen = done;
return qemu_ram_ptr_length(raddr + base, plen);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 14,315 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ChromeContentBrowserClient::GetSpeechRecognitionManagerDelegate() {
#if defined(ENABLE_INPUT_SPEECH)
return new speech::ChromeSpeechRecognitionManagerDelegate();
#else
return NULL;
#endif
}
Commit Message: Ensure extensions and the Chrome Web Store are loaded in new BrowsingInstances.
BUG=174943
TEST=Can't post message to CWS. See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12301013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 115,760 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::NewWindow() {
if (browser_defaults::kAlwaysOpenIncognitoWindow &&
CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(switches::kIncognito) &&
incognito_mode_allowed_.GetValue()) {
NewIncognitoWindow();
return;
}
UserMetrics::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("NewWindow"), profile_);
SessionService* session_service =
profile_->GetOriginalProfile()->GetSessionService();
if (!session_service ||
!session_service->RestoreIfNecessary(std::vector<GURL>())) {
Browser::OpenEmptyWindow(profile_->GetOriginalProfile());
}
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,258 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: base::string16 DevToolsConfirmInfoBarDelegate::GetMessageText() const {
return message_;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move front-end URL handling to DevToolsUIBindingds
BUG=662859
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2607833002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#440926}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 138,320 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AllViewsStoppedLoadingObserver::CheckIfNoMorePendingLoads() {
if (!automation_) {
delete this;
return;
}
if (pending_tabs_.empty() &&
DidExtensionViewsStopLoading(extension_process_manager_)) {
AutomationJSONReply(automation_,
reply_message_.release()).SendSuccess(NULL);
delete this;
}
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 117,513 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RecordAppLauncherPromoHistogram(
apps::AppLauncherPromoHistogramValues value) {
DCHECK_LT(value, apps::APP_LAUNCHER_PROMO_MAX);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION(
"Apps.AppLauncherPromo", value, apps::APP_LAUNCHER_PROMO_MAX);
}
Commit Message: Remove --disable-app-shims.
App shims have been enabled by default for 3 milestones
(since r242711).
BUG=350161
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/298953002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@272786 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 110,348 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void opj_pi_destroy(opj_pi_iterator_t *p_pi,
OPJ_UINT32 p_nb_elements)
{
OPJ_UINT32 compno, pino;
opj_pi_iterator_t *l_current_pi = p_pi;
if (p_pi) {
if (p_pi->include) {
opj_free(p_pi->include);
p_pi->include = 00;
}
for (pino = 0; pino < p_nb_elements; ++pino) {
if (l_current_pi->comps) {
opj_pi_comp_t *l_current_component = l_current_pi->comps;
for (compno = 0; compno < l_current_pi->numcomps; compno++) {
if (l_current_component->resolutions) {
opj_free(l_current_component->resolutions);
l_current_component->resolutions = 00;
}
++l_current_component;
}
opj_free(l_current_pi->comps);
l_current_pi->comps = 0;
}
++l_current_pi;
}
opj_free(p_pi);
}
}
Commit Message: Avoid division by zero in opj_pi_next_rpcl, opj_pi_next_pcrl and opj_pi_next_cprl (#938)
Fixes issues with id:000026,sig:08,src:002419,op:int32,pos:60,val:+32 and
id:000019,sig:08,src:001098,op:flip1,pos:49
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 70,098 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RemoteFrame::ScheduleNavigation(Document& origin_document,
const KURL& url,
WebFrameLoadType frame_load_type,
UserGestureStatus user_gesture_status) {
FrameLoadRequest frame_request(&origin_document, ResourceRequest(url));
frame_request.GetResourceRequest().SetHasUserGesture(
user_gesture_status == UserGestureStatus::kActive);
frame_request.GetResourceRequest().SetFrameType(
IsMainFrame() ? network::mojom::RequestContextFrameType::kTopLevel
: network::mojom::RequestContextFrameType::kNested);
Navigate(frame_request, frame_load_type);
}
Commit Message: Add a check for disallowing remote frame navigations to local resources.
Previously, RemoteFrame navigations did not perform any renderer-side
checks and relied solely on the browser-side logic to block disallowed
navigations via mechanisms like FilterURL. This means that blocked
remote frame navigations were silently navigated to about:blank
without any console error message.
This CL adds a CanDisplay check to the remote navigation path to match
an equivalent check done for local frame navigations. This way, the
renderer can consistently block disallowed navigations in both cases
and output an error message.
Bug: 894399
Change-Id: I172f68f77c1676f6ca0172d2a6c78f7edc0e3b7a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1282390
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#601022}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 1 | 172,614 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ACTION_P(ScheduleRenameCallback, new_path) {
BrowserThread::PostTask(BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(arg3, new_path));
}
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
R=asanka@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 106,164 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MediaStreamImpl::OnStreamGenerated(
int request_id,
const std::string& label,
const media_stream::StreamDeviceInfoArray& audio_array,
const media_stream::StreamDeviceInfoArray& video_array) {
DCHECK(CalledOnValidThread());
EnsurePeerConnectionFactory();
WebKit::WebVector<WebKit::WebMediaStreamSource> source_vector(
audio_array.size() + video_array.size());
std::string track_label;
for (size_t i = 0; i < audio_array.size(); ++i) {
track_label = CreateTrackLabel(label, audio_array[i].session_id, false);
MediaStreamTrackPtr audio_track(
dependency_factory_->CreateLocalAudioTrack(audio_array[i].name, NULL));
local_tracks_.insert(
std::pair<std::string, MediaStreamTrackPtr>(track_label, audio_track));
source_vector[i].initialize(
UTF8ToUTF16(track_label),
WebKit::WebMediaStreamSource::TypeAudio,
UTF8ToUTF16(audio_array[i].name));
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < video_array.size(); ++i) {
track_label = CreateTrackLabel(label, video_array[i].session_id, true);
webrtc::VideoCaptureModule* vcm =
new VideoCaptureModuleImpl(video_array[i].session_id,
vc_manager_.get());
MediaStreamTrackPtr video_track(dependency_factory_->CreateLocalVideoTrack(
video_array[i].name,
webrtc::CreateVideoCapturer(vcm)));
local_tracks_.insert(
std::pair<std::string, MediaStreamTrackPtr>(track_label, video_track));
source_vector[audio_array.size() + i].initialize(
UTF8ToUTF16(track_label),
WebKit::WebMediaStreamSource::TypeVideo,
UTF8ToUTF16(video_array[i].name));
}
MediaRequestMap::iterator it = user_media_requests_.find(request_id);
if (it == user_media_requests_.end()) {
DVLOG(1) << "Request ID not found";
return;
}
WebKit::WebUserMediaRequest user_media_request = it->second;
user_media_requests_.erase(it);
user_media_request.requestSucceeded(source_vector);
}
Commit Message: Explicitly stopping thread in MediaStreamImpl dtor to avoid any racing issues.
This may solve the below bugs.
BUG=112408,111202
TEST=content_unittests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9307058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@120222 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 107,178 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: dequeue_runnable_load_avg(struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq, struct sched_entity *se) { }
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 92,525 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t Camera2Client::commandStartSmoothZoomL() {
ALOGE("%s: Unimplemented!", __FUNCTION__);
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Camera: Disallow dumping clients directly
Camera service dumps should only be initiated through
ICameraService::dump.
Bug: 26265403
Change-Id: If3ca4718ed74bf33ad8a416192689203029e2803
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 161,720 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init tcp_illinois_register(void)
{
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct illinois) > ICSK_CA_PRIV_SIZE);
return tcp_register_congestion_control(&tcp_illinois);
}
Commit Message: net: fix divide by zero in tcp algorithm illinois
Reading TCP stats when using TCP Illinois congestion control algorithm
can cause a divide by zero kernel oops.
The division by zero occur in tcp_illinois_info() at:
do_div(t, ca->cnt_rtt);
where ca->cnt_rtt can become zero (when rtt_reset is called)
Steps to Reproduce:
1. Register tcp_illinois:
# sysctl -w net.ipv4.tcp_congestion_control=illinois
2. Monitor internal TCP information via command "ss -i"
# watch -d ss -i
3. Establish new TCP conn to machine
Either it fails at the initial conn, or else it needs to wait
for a loss or a reset.
This is only related to reading stats. The function avg_delay() also
performs the same divide, but is guarded with a (ca->cnt_rtt > 0) at its
calling point in update_params(). Thus, simply fix tcp_illinois_info().
Function tcp_illinois_info() / get_info() is called without
socket lock. Thus, eliminate any race condition on ca->cnt_rtt
by using a local stack variable. Simply reuse info.tcpv_rttcnt,
as its already set to ca->cnt_rtt.
Function avg_delay() is not affected by this race condition, as
its called with the socket lock.
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@vyatta.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 18,532 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Element::addActiveAnimation(Animation* animation)
{
ElementRareData* rareData = ensureElementRareData();
if (!rareData->activeAnimations())
rareData->setActiveAnimations(adoptPtr(new Vector<Animation*>));
rareData->activeAnimations()->append(animation);
}
Commit Message: Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 112,187 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool IsValidBookmarkDropLocation(Profile* profile,
const bookmarks::BookmarkNodeData& data,
const BookmarkNode* drop_parent,
int index) {
if (!drop_parent->is_folder()) {
NOTREACHED();
return false;
}
if (!data.is_valid())
return false;
BookmarkModel* model = BookmarkModelFactory::GetForBrowserContext(profile);
if (!model->client()->CanBeEditedByUser(drop_parent))
return false;
const base::FilePath& profile_path = profile->GetPath();
if (data.IsFromProfilePath(profile_path)) {
std::vector<const BookmarkNode*> nodes = data.GetNodes(model, profile_path);
for (size_t i = 0; i < nodes.size(); ++i) {
const BookmarkNode* node = nodes[i];
int node_index = (drop_parent == node->parent()) ?
drop_parent->GetIndexOf(nodes[i]) : -1;
if (node_index != -1 && (index == node_index || index == node_index + 1))
return false;
if (drop_parent->HasAncestor(node))
return false;
}
return true;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Prevent interpretating userinfo as url scheme when editing bookmarks
Chrome's Edit Bookmark dialog formats urls for display such that a
url of http://javascript:scripttext@host.com is later converted to a
javascript url scheme, allowing persistence of a script injection
attack within the user's bookmarks.
This fix prevents such misinterpretations by always showing the
scheme when a userinfo component is present within the url.
BUG=639126
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2368593002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#422467}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 130,753 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int in_set_sample_rate(struct audio_stream *stream, uint32_t rate)
{
(void)stream;
(void)rate;
return -ENOSYS;
}
Commit Message: Fix audio record pre-processing
proc_buf_out consistently initialized.
intermediate scratch buffers consistently initialized.
prevent read failure from overwriting memory.
Test: POC, CTS, camera record
Bug: 62873231
Change-Id: Ie26e12a419a5819c1c5c3a0bcf1876d6d7aca686
(cherry picked from commit 6d7b330c27efba944817e647955da48e54fd74eb)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 162,297 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderFrameHostManager::InitRenderView(
RenderViewHostImpl* render_view_host,
RenderFrameProxyHost* proxy) {
if (!render_view_host->GetProcess()->Init())
return false;
if (render_view_host->IsRenderViewLive())
return true;
int opener_frame_routing_id =
GetOpenerRoutingID(render_view_host->GetSiteInstance());
bool created = delegate_->CreateRenderViewForRenderManager(
render_view_host, opener_frame_routing_id,
proxy ? proxy->GetRoutingID() : MSG_ROUTING_NONE,
frame_tree_node_->devtools_frame_token(),
frame_tree_node_->current_replication_state());
if (created && proxy)
proxy->set_render_frame_proxy_created(true);
return created;
}
Commit Message: Fix issue with pending NavigationEntry being discarded incorrectly
This CL fixes an issue where we would attempt to discard a pending
NavigationEntry when a cross-process navigation to this NavigationEntry
is interrupted by another navigation to the same NavigationEntry.
BUG=760342,797656,796135
Change-Id: I204deff1efd4d572dd2e0b20e492592d48d787d9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/850877
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528611}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 146,833 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: short Range::compareBoundaryPoints(Node* containerA, int offsetA, Node* containerB, int offsetB, ExceptionCode& ec)
{
ASSERT(containerA);
ASSERT(containerB);
if (!containerA)
return -1;
if (!containerB)
return 1;
if (containerA == containerB) {
if (offsetA == offsetB)
return 0; // A is equal to B
if (offsetA < offsetB)
return -1; // A is before B
else
return 1; // A is after B
}
Node* c = containerB;
while (c && c->parentNode() != containerA)
c = c->parentNode();
if (c) {
int offsetC = 0;
Node* n = containerA->firstChild();
while (n != c && offsetC < offsetA) {
offsetC++;
n = n->nextSibling();
}
if (offsetA <= offsetC)
return -1; // A is before B
else
return 1; // A is after B
}
c = containerA;
while (c && c->parentNode() != containerB)
c = c->parentNode();
if (c) {
int offsetC = 0;
Node* n = containerB->firstChild();
while (n != c && offsetC < offsetB) {
offsetC++;
n = n->nextSibling();
}
if (offsetC < offsetB)
return -1; // A is before B
else
return 1; // A is after B
}
Node* commonAncestor = commonAncestorContainer(containerA, containerB);
if (!commonAncestor) {
ec = WRONG_DOCUMENT_ERR;
return 0;
}
Node* childA = containerA;
while (childA && childA->parentNode() != commonAncestor)
childA = childA->parentNode();
if (!childA)
childA = commonAncestor;
Node* childB = containerB;
while (childB && childB->parentNode() != commonAncestor)
childB = childB->parentNode();
if (!childB)
childB = commonAncestor;
if (childA == childB)
return 0; // A is equal to B
Node* n = commonAncestor->firstChild();
while (n) {
if (n == childA)
return -1; // A is before B
if (n == childB)
return 1; // A is after B
n = n->nextSibling();
}
ASSERT_NOT_REACHED();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: There are too many poorly named functions to create a fragment from markup
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87339
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Source/WebCore:
Moved all functions that create a fragment from markup to markup.h/cpp.
There should be no behavioral change.
* dom/Range.cpp:
(WebCore::Range::createContextualFragment):
* dom/Range.h: Removed createDocumentFragmentForElement.
* dom/ShadowRoot.cpp:
(WebCore::ShadowRoot::setInnerHTML):
* editing/markup.cpp:
(WebCore::createFragmentFromMarkup):
(WebCore::createFragmentForInnerOuterHTML): Renamed from createFragmentFromSource.
(WebCore::createFragmentForTransformToFragment): Moved from XSLTProcessor.
(WebCore::removeElementPreservingChildren): Moved from Range.
(WebCore::createContextualFragment): Ditto.
* editing/markup.h:
* html/HTMLElement.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setInnerHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setOuterHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML):
* inspector/DOMPatchSupport.cpp:
(WebCore::DOMPatchSupport::patchNode): Added a FIXME since this code should be using
one of the functions listed in markup.h
* xml/XSLTProcessor.cpp:
(WebCore::XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment):
Source/WebKit/qt:
Replace calls to Range::createDocumentFragmentForElement by calls to
createContextualDocumentFragment.
* Api/qwebelement.cpp:
(QWebElement::appendInside):
(QWebElement::prependInside):
(QWebElement::prependOutside):
(QWebElement::appendOutside):
(QWebElement::encloseContentsWith):
(QWebElement::encloseWith):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118414 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 100,232 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GBool DCTStream::readBaselineSOF() {
int length;
int prec;
int i;
int c;
length = read16();
prec = str->getChar();
height = read16();
width = read16();
numComps = str->getChar();
if (numComps <= 0 || numComps > 4) {
error(errSyntaxError, getPos(), "Bad number of components in DCT stream");
numComps = 0;
return gFalse;
}
if (prec != 8) {
error(errSyntaxError, getPos(), "Bad DCT precision {0:d}", prec);
return gFalse;
}
for (i = 0; i < numComps; ++i) {
compInfo[i].id = str->getChar();
c = str->getChar();
compInfo[i].hSample = (c >> 4) & 0x0f;
compInfo[i].vSample = c & 0x0f;
compInfo[i].quantTable = str->getChar();
if (compInfo[i].hSample < 1 || compInfo[i].hSample > 4 ||
compInfo[i].vSample < 1 || compInfo[i].vSample > 4) {
error(errSyntaxError, getPos(), "Bad DCT sampling factor");
return gFalse;
}
if (compInfo[i].quantTable < 0 || compInfo[i].quantTable > 3) {
error(errSyntaxError, getPos(), "Bad DCT quant table selector");
return gFalse;
}
}
progressive = gFalse;
return gTrue;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 4,012 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param;
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id = vpm->id;
X509 *x = ctx->cert;
if (id->hosts && check_hosts(x, id) <= 0) {
if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH))
return 0;
}
if (id->email && X509_check_email(x, id->email, id->emaillen, 0) <= 0) {
if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH))
return 0;
}
if (id->ip && X509_check_ip(x, id->ip, id->iplen, 0) <= 0) {
if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH))
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 8,729 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: venc_dev::venc_dev(class omx_venc *venc_class)
{
int i = 0;
venc_handle = venc_class;
etb = ebd = ftb = fbd = 0;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_PORT; i++)
streaming[i] = false;
stopped = 1;
paused = false;
async_thread_created = false;
color_format = 0;
hw_overload = false;
pthread_mutex_init(&pause_resume_mlock, NULL);
pthread_cond_init(&pause_resume_cond, NULL);
memset(&extradata_info, 0, sizeof(extradata_info));
memset(&idrperiod, 0, sizeof(idrperiod));
memset(&multislice, 0, sizeof(multislice));
memset (&slice_mode, 0 , sizeof(slice_mode));
memset(&m_sVenc_cfg, 0, sizeof(m_sVenc_cfg));
memset(&rate_ctrl, 0, sizeof(rate_ctrl));
memset(&bitrate, 0, sizeof(bitrate));
memset(&intra_period, 0, sizeof(intra_period));
memset(&codec_profile, 0, sizeof(codec_profile));
memset(&set_param, 0, sizeof(set_param));
memset(&time_inc, 0, sizeof(time_inc));
memset(&m_sInput_buff_property, 0, sizeof(m_sInput_buff_property));
memset(&m_sOutput_buff_property, 0, sizeof(m_sOutput_buff_property));
memset(&session_qp, 0, sizeof(session_qp));
memset(&entropy, 0, sizeof(entropy));
memset(&dbkfilter, 0, sizeof(dbkfilter));
memset(&intra_refresh, 0, sizeof(intra_refresh));
memset(&hec, 0, sizeof(hec));
memset(&voptimecfg, 0, sizeof(voptimecfg));
memset(&capability, 0, sizeof(capability));
memset(&m_debug,0,sizeof(m_debug));
memset(&hier_layers,0,sizeof(hier_layers));
is_searchrange_set = false;
enable_mv_narrow_searchrange = false;
supported_rc_modes = RC_ALL;
camera_mode_enabled = false;
memset(<rinfo, 0, sizeof(ltrinfo));
sess_priority.priority = 1;
operating_rate = 0;
char property_value[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX] = {0};
property_get("vidc.enc.log.in", property_value, "0");
m_debug.in_buffer_log = atoi(property_value);
property_get("vidc.enc.log.out", property_value, "0");
m_debug.out_buffer_log = atoi(property_value);
property_get("vidc.enc.log.extradata", property_value, "0");
m_debug.extradata_log = atoi(property_value);
snprintf(m_debug.log_loc, PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX,
"%s", BUFFER_LOG_LOC);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: add checks before accessing heap pointers
Heap pointers do not point to user virtual addresses in case
of secure session.
Set them to NULL and add checks to avoid accesing them
Bug: 28815329
Bug: 28920116
Change-Id: I94fd5808e753b58654d65e175d3857ef46ffba26
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 159,256 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void free_pgpaths(struct list_head *pgpaths, struct dm_target *ti)
{
struct pgpath *pgpath, *tmp;
struct multipath *m = ti->private;
list_for_each_entry_safe(pgpath, tmp, pgpaths, list) {
list_del(&pgpath->list);
if (m->hw_handler_name)
scsi_dh_detach(bdev_get_queue(pgpath->path.dev->bdev));
dm_put_device(ti, pgpath->path.dev);
free_pgpath(pgpath);
}
}
Commit Message: dm: do not forward ioctls from logical volumes to the underlying device
A logical volume can map to just part of underlying physical volume.
In this case, it must be treated like a partition.
Based on a patch from Alasdair G Kergon.
Cc: Alasdair G Kergon <agk@redhat.com>
Cc: dm-devel@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 23,589 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: yyparse (void *yyscanner, RE_LEX_ENVIRONMENT *lex_env)
{
/* The lookahead symbol. */
int yychar;
/* The semantic value of the lookahead symbol. */
/* Default value used for initialization, for pacifying older GCCs
or non-GCC compilers. */
YY_INITIAL_VALUE (static YYSTYPE yyval_default;)
YYSTYPE yylval YY_INITIAL_VALUE (= yyval_default);
/* Number of syntax errors so far. */
int yynerrs;
int yystate;
/* Number of tokens to shift before error messages enabled. */
int yyerrstatus;
/* The stacks and their tools:
'yyss': related to states.
'yyvs': related to semantic values.
Refer to the stacks through separate pointers, to allow yyoverflow
to reallocate them elsewhere. */
/* The state stack. */
yytype_int16 yyssa[YYINITDEPTH];
yytype_int16 *yyss;
yytype_int16 *yyssp;
/* The semantic value stack. */
YYSTYPE yyvsa[YYINITDEPTH];
YYSTYPE *yyvs;
YYSTYPE *yyvsp;
YYSIZE_T yystacksize;
int yyn;
int yyresult;
/* Lookahead token as an internal (translated) token number. */
int yytoken = 0;
/* The variables used to return semantic value and location from the
action routines. */
YYSTYPE yyval;
#if YYERROR_VERBOSE
/* Buffer for error messages, and its allocated size. */
char yymsgbuf[128];
char *yymsg = yymsgbuf;
YYSIZE_T yymsg_alloc = sizeof yymsgbuf;
#endif
#define YYPOPSTACK(N) (yyvsp -= (N), yyssp -= (N))
/* The number of symbols on the RHS of the reduced rule.
Keep to zero when no symbol should be popped. */
int yylen = 0;
yyssp = yyss = yyssa;
yyvsp = yyvs = yyvsa;
yystacksize = YYINITDEPTH;
YYDPRINTF ((stderr, "Starting parse\n"));
yystate = 0;
yyerrstatus = 0;
yynerrs = 0;
yychar = YYEMPTY; /* Cause a token to be read. */
goto yysetstate;
/*------------------------------------------------------------.
| yynewstate -- Push a new state, which is found in yystate. |
`------------------------------------------------------------*/
yynewstate:
/* In all cases, when you get here, the value and location stacks
have just been pushed. So pushing a state here evens the stacks. */
yyssp++;
yysetstate:
*yyssp = yystate;
if (yyss + yystacksize - 1 <= yyssp)
{
/* Get the current used size of the three stacks, in elements. */
YYSIZE_T yysize = yyssp - yyss + 1;
#ifdef yyoverflow
{
/* Give user a chance to reallocate the stack. Use copies of
these so that the &'s don't force the real ones into
memory. */
YYSTYPE *yyvs1 = yyvs;
yytype_int16 *yyss1 = yyss;
/* Each stack pointer address is followed by the size of the
data in use in that stack, in bytes. This used to be a
conditional around just the two extra args, but that might
be undefined if yyoverflow is a macro. */
yyoverflow (YY_("memory exhausted"),
&yyss1, yysize * sizeof (*yyssp),
&yyvs1, yysize * sizeof (*yyvsp),
&yystacksize);
yyss = yyss1;
yyvs = yyvs1;
}
#else /* no yyoverflow */
# ifndef YYSTACK_RELOCATE
goto yyexhaustedlab;
# else
/* Extend the stack our own way. */
if (YYMAXDEPTH <= yystacksize)
goto yyexhaustedlab;
yystacksize *= 2;
if (YYMAXDEPTH < yystacksize)
yystacksize = YYMAXDEPTH;
{
yytype_int16 *yyss1 = yyss;
union yyalloc *yyptr =
(union yyalloc *) YYSTACK_ALLOC (YYSTACK_BYTES (yystacksize));
if (! yyptr)
goto yyexhaustedlab;
YYSTACK_RELOCATE (yyss_alloc, yyss);
YYSTACK_RELOCATE (yyvs_alloc, yyvs);
# undef YYSTACK_RELOCATE
if (yyss1 != yyssa)
YYSTACK_FREE (yyss1);
}
# endif
#endif /* no yyoverflow */
yyssp = yyss + yysize - 1;
yyvsp = yyvs + yysize - 1;
YYDPRINTF ((stderr, "Stack size increased to %lu\n",
(unsigned long int) yystacksize));
if (yyss + yystacksize - 1 <= yyssp)
YYABORT;
}
YYDPRINTF ((stderr, "Entering state %d\n", yystate));
if (yystate == YYFINAL)
YYACCEPT;
goto yybackup;
/*-----------.
| yybackup. |
`-----------*/
yybackup:
/* Do appropriate processing given the current state. Read a
lookahead token if we need one and don't already have one. */
/* First try to decide what to do without reference to lookahead token. */
yyn = yypact[yystate];
if (yypact_value_is_default (yyn))
goto yydefault;
/* Not known => get a lookahead token if don't already have one. */
/* YYCHAR is either YYEMPTY or YYEOF or a valid lookahead symbol. */
if (yychar == YYEMPTY)
{
YYDPRINTF ((stderr, "Reading a token: "));
yychar = yylex (&yylval, yyscanner, lex_env);
}
if (yychar <= YYEOF)
{
yychar = yytoken = YYEOF;
YYDPRINTF ((stderr, "Now at end of input.\n"));
}
else
{
yytoken = YYTRANSLATE (yychar);
YY_SYMBOL_PRINT ("Next token is", yytoken, &yylval, &yylloc);
}
/* If the proper action on seeing token YYTOKEN is to reduce or to
detect an error, take that action. */
yyn += yytoken;
if (yyn < 0 || YYLAST < yyn || yycheck[yyn] != yytoken)
goto yydefault;
yyn = yytable[yyn];
if (yyn <= 0)
{
if (yytable_value_is_error (yyn))
goto yyerrlab;
yyn = -yyn;
goto yyreduce;
}
/* Count tokens shifted since error; after three, turn off error
status. */
if (yyerrstatus)
yyerrstatus--;
/* Shift the lookahead token. */
YY_SYMBOL_PRINT ("Shifting", yytoken, &yylval, &yylloc);
/* Discard the shifted token. */
yychar = YYEMPTY;
yystate = yyn;
YY_IGNORE_MAYBE_UNINITIALIZED_BEGIN
*++yyvsp = yylval;
YY_IGNORE_MAYBE_UNINITIALIZED_END
goto yynewstate;
/*-----------------------------------------------------------.
| yydefault -- do the default action for the current state. |
`-----------------------------------------------------------*/
yydefault:
yyn = yydefact[yystate];
if (yyn == 0)
goto yyerrlab;
goto yyreduce;
/*-----------------------------.
| yyreduce -- Do a reduction. |
`-----------------------------*/
yyreduce:
/* yyn is the number of a rule to reduce with. */
yylen = yyr2[yyn];
/* If YYLEN is nonzero, implement the default value of the action:
'$$ = $1'.
Otherwise, the following line sets YYVAL to garbage.
This behavior is undocumented and Bison
users should not rely upon it. Assigning to YYVAL
unconditionally makes the parser a bit smaller, and it avoids a
GCC warning that YYVAL may be used uninitialized. */
yyval = yyvsp[1-yylen];
YY_REDUCE_PRINT (yyn);
switch (yyn)
{
case 2:
#line 105 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
RE_AST* re_ast = yyget_extra(yyscanner);
re_ast->root_node = (yyvsp[0].re_node);
}
#line 1340 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 4:
#line 114 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.re_node) = (yyvsp[0].re_node);
}
#line 1348 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 5:
#line 118 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
mark_as_not_fast_regexp();
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_ALT, (yyvsp[-2].re_node), (yyvsp[0].re_node));
DESTROY_NODE_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, (yyvsp[-2].re_node));
DESTROY_NODE_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, (yyvsp[0].re_node));
ERROR_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
}
#line 1363 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 6:
#line 129 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
RE_NODE* node;
mark_as_not_fast_regexp();
node = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_EMPTY, NULL, NULL);
DESTROY_NODE_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, (yyvsp[-1].re_node));
ERROR_IF(node == NULL, ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_ALT, (yyvsp[-1].re_node), node);
ERROR_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
}
#line 1382 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 7:
#line 147 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.re_node) = (yyvsp[0].re_node);
}
#line 1390 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 8:
#line 151 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_CONCAT, (yyvsp[-1].re_node), (yyvsp[0].re_node));
DESTROY_NODE_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, (yyvsp[-1].re_node));
DESTROY_NODE_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, (yyvsp[0].re_node));
ERROR_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
}
#line 1402 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 9:
#line 162 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
RE_AST* re_ast;
mark_as_not_fast_regexp();
re_ast = yyget_extra(yyscanner);
re_ast->flags |= RE_FLAGS_GREEDY;
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_STAR, (yyvsp[-1].re_node), NULL);
DESTROY_NODE_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, (yyvsp[-1].re_node));
ERROR_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
}
#line 1420 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 10:
#line 176 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
RE_AST* re_ast;
mark_as_not_fast_regexp();
re_ast = yyget_extra(yyscanner);
re_ast->flags |= RE_FLAGS_UNGREEDY;
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_STAR, (yyvsp[-2].re_node), NULL);
DESTROY_NODE_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, (yyvsp[-2].re_node));
ERROR_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
(yyval.re_node)->greedy = FALSE;
}
#line 1440 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 11:
#line 192 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
RE_AST* re_ast;
mark_as_not_fast_regexp();
re_ast = yyget_extra(yyscanner);
re_ast->flags |= RE_FLAGS_GREEDY;
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_PLUS, (yyvsp[-1].re_node), NULL);
DESTROY_NODE_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, (yyvsp[-1].re_node));
ERROR_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
}
#line 1458 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 12:
#line 206 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
RE_AST* re_ast;
mark_as_not_fast_regexp();
re_ast = yyget_extra(yyscanner);
re_ast->flags |= RE_FLAGS_UNGREEDY;
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_PLUS, (yyvsp[-2].re_node), NULL);
DESTROY_NODE_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, (yyvsp[-2].re_node));
ERROR_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
(yyval.re_node)->greedy = FALSE;
}
#line 1478 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 13:
#line 222 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
RE_AST* re_ast = yyget_extra(yyscanner);
re_ast->flags |= RE_FLAGS_GREEDY;
if ((yyvsp[-1].re_node)->type == RE_NODE_ANY)
{
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_RANGE_ANY, NULL, NULL);
DESTROY_NODE_IF(TRUE, (yyvsp[-1].re_node));
}
else
{
mark_as_not_fast_regexp();
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_RANGE, (yyvsp[-1].re_node), NULL);
DESTROY_NODE_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, (yyvsp[-1].re_node));
}
DESTROY_NODE_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, (yyvsp[-1].re_node));
ERROR_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
(yyval.re_node)->start = 0;
(yyval.re_node)->end = 1;
}
#line 1505 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 14:
#line 245 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
RE_AST* re_ast = yyget_extra(yyscanner);
re_ast->flags |= RE_FLAGS_UNGREEDY;
if ((yyvsp[-2].re_node)->type == RE_NODE_ANY)
{
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_RANGE_ANY, NULL, NULL);
DESTROY_NODE_IF(TRUE, (yyvsp[-2].re_node));
}
else
{
mark_as_not_fast_regexp();
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_RANGE, (yyvsp[-2].re_node), NULL);
DESTROY_NODE_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, (yyvsp[-2].re_node));
}
DESTROY_NODE_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, (yyvsp[-2].re_node));
ERROR_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
(yyval.re_node)->start = 0;
(yyval.re_node)->end = 1;
(yyval.re_node)->greedy = FALSE;
}
#line 1533 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 15:
#line 269 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
RE_AST* re_ast = yyget_extra(yyscanner);
re_ast->flags |= RE_FLAGS_GREEDY;
if ((yyvsp[-1].re_node)->type == RE_NODE_ANY)
{
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_RANGE_ANY, NULL, NULL);
DESTROY_NODE_IF(TRUE, (yyvsp[-1].re_node));
}
else
{
mark_as_not_fast_regexp();
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_RANGE, (yyvsp[-1].re_node), NULL);
DESTROY_NODE_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, (yyvsp[-1].re_node));
}
ERROR_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
(yyval.re_node)->start = (yyvsp[0].range) & 0xFFFF;;
(yyval.re_node)->end = (yyvsp[0].range) >> 16;;
}
#line 1559 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 16:
#line 291 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
RE_AST* re_ast = yyget_extra(yyscanner);
re_ast->flags |= RE_FLAGS_UNGREEDY;
if ((yyvsp[-2].re_node)->type == RE_NODE_ANY)
{
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_RANGE_ANY, NULL, NULL);
DESTROY_NODE_IF(TRUE, (yyvsp[-2].re_node));
}
else
{
mark_as_not_fast_regexp();
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_RANGE, (yyvsp[-2].re_node), NULL);
DESTROY_NODE_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, (yyvsp[-2].re_node));
}
ERROR_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
(yyval.re_node)->start = (yyvsp[-1].range) & 0xFFFF;;
(yyval.re_node)->end = (yyvsp[-1].range) >> 16;;
(yyval.re_node)->greedy = FALSE;
}
#line 1586 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 17:
#line 314 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.re_node) = (yyvsp[0].re_node);
}
#line 1594 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 18:
#line 318 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_WORD_BOUNDARY, NULL, NULL);
ERROR_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
}
#line 1604 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 19:
#line 324 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_NON_WORD_BOUNDARY, NULL, NULL);
ERROR_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
}
#line 1614 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 20:
#line 330 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_ANCHOR_START, NULL, NULL);
ERROR_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
}
#line 1624 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 21:
#line 336 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_ANCHOR_END, NULL, NULL);
ERROR_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
}
#line 1634 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 22:
#line 345 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.re_node) = (yyvsp[-1].re_node);
}
#line 1642 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 23:
#line 349 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_ANY, NULL, NULL);
ERROR_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
}
#line 1652 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 24:
#line 355 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_LITERAL, NULL, NULL);
ERROR_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
(yyval.re_node)->value = (yyvsp[0].integer);
}
#line 1664 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 25:
#line 363 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_WORD_CHAR, NULL, NULL);
ERROR_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
}
#line 1674 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 26:
#line 369 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_NON_WORD_CHAR, NULL, NULL);
ERROR_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
}
#line 1684 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 27:
#line 375 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_SPACE, NULL, NULL);
ERROR_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
}
#line 1694 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 28:
#line 381 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_NON_SPACE, NULL, NULL);
ERROR_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
}
#line 1704 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 29:
#line 387 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_DIGIT, NULL, NULL);
ERROR_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
}
#line 1714 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 30:
#line 393 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_NON_DIGIT, NULL, NULL);
ERROR_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
}
#line 1724 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 31:
#line 399 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_CLASS, NULL, NULL);
ERROR_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
(yyval.re_node)->class_vector = (yyvsp[0].class_vector);
}
#line 1736 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
#line 1740 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
default: break;
}
/* User semantic actions sometimes alter yychar, and that requires
that yytoken be updated with the new translation. We take the
approach of translating immediately before every use of yytoken.
One alternative is translating here after every semantic action,
but that translation would be missed if the semantic action invokes
YYABORT, YYACCEPT, or YYERROR immediately after altering yychar or
if it invokes YYBACKUP. In the case of YYABORT or YYACCEPT, an
incorrect destructor might then be invoked immediately. In the
case of YYERROR or YYBACKUP, subsequent parser actions might lead
to an incorrect destructor call or verbose syntax error message
before the lookahead is translated. */
YY_SYMBOL_PRINT ("-> $$ =", yyr1[yyn], &yyval, &yyloc);
YYPOPSTACK (yylen);
yylen = 0;
YY_STACK_PRINT (yyss, yyssp);
*++yyvsp = yyval;
/* Now 'shift' the result of the reduction. Determine what state
that goes to, based on the state we popped back to and the rule
number reduced by. */
yyn = yyr1[yyn];
yystate = yypgoto[yyn - YYNTOKENS] + *yyssp;
if (0 <= yystate && yystate <= YYLAST && yycheck[yystate] == *yyssp)
yystate = yytable[yystate];
else
yystate = yydefgoto[yyn - YYNTOKENS];
goto yynewstate;
/*--------------------------------------.
| yyerrlab -- here on detecting error. |
`--------------------------------------*/
yyerrlab:
/* Make sure we have latest lookahead translation. See comments at
user semantic actions for why this is necessary. */
yytoken = yychar == YYEMPTY ? YYEMPTY : YYTRANSLATE (yychar);
/* If not already recovering from an error, report this error. */
if (!yyerrstatus)
{
++yynerrs;
#if ! YYERROR_VERBOSE
yyerror (yyscanner, lex_env, YY_("syntax error"));
#else
# define YYSYNTAX_ERROR yysyntax_error (&yymsg_alloc, &yymsg, \
yyssp, yytoken)
{
char const *yymsgp = YY_("syntax error");
int yysyntax_error_status;
yysyntax_error_status = YYSYNTAX_ERROR;
if (yysyntax_error_status == 0)
yymsgp = yymsg;
else if (yysyntax_error_status == 1)
{
if (yymsg != yymsgbuf)
YYSTACK_FREE (yymsg);
yymsg = (char *) YYSTACK_ALLOC (yymsg_alloc);
if (!yymsg)
{
yymsg = yymsgbuf;
yymsg_alloc = sizeof yymsgbuf;
yysyntax_error_status = 2;
}
else
{
yysyntax_error_status = YYSYNTAX_ERROR;
yymsgp = yymsg;
}
}
yyerror (yyscanner, lex_env, yymsgp);
if (yysyntax_error_status == 2)
goto yyexhaustedlab;
}
# undef YYSYNTAX_ERROR
#endif
}
if (yyerrstatus == 3)
{
/* If just tried and failed to reuse lookahead token after an
error, discard it. */
if (yychar <= YYEOF)
{
/* Return failure if at end of input. */
if (yychar == YYEOF)
YYABORT;
}
else
{
yydestruct ("Error: discarding",
yytoken, &yylval, yyscanner, lex_env);
yychar = YYEMPTY;
}
}
/* Else will try to reuse lookahead token after shifting the error
token. */
goto yyerrlab1;
/*---------------------------------------------------.
| yyerrorlab -- error raised explicitly by YYERROR. |
`---------------------------------------------------*/
yyerrorlab:
/* Pacify compilers like GCC when the user code never invokes
YYERROR and the label yyerrorlab therefore never appears in user
code. */
if (/*CONSTCOND*/ 0)
goto yyerrorlab;
/* Do not reclaim the symbols of the rule whose action triggered
this YYERROR. */
YYPOPSTACK (yylen);
yylen = 0;
YY_STACK_PRINT (yyss, yyssp);
yystate = *yyssp;
goto yyerrlab1;
/*-------------------------------------------------------------.
| yyerrlab1 -- common code for both syntax error and YYERROR. |
`-------------------------------------------------------------*/
yyerrlab1:
yyerrstatus = 3; /* Each real token shifted decrements this. */
for (;;)
{
yyn = yypact[yystate];
if (!yypact_value_is_default (yyn))
{
yyn += YYTERROR;
if (0 <= yyn && yyn <= YYLAST && yycheck[yyn] == YYTERROR)
{
yyn = yytable[yyn];
if (0 < yyn)
break;
}
}
/* Pop the current state because it cannot handle the error token. */
if (yyssp == yyss)
YYABORT;
yydestruct ("Error: popping",
yystos[yystate], yyvsp, yyscanner, lex_env);
YYPOPSTACK (1);
yystate = *yyssp;
YY_STACK_PRINT (yyss, yyssp);
}
YY_IGNORE_MAYBE_UNINITIALIZED_BEGIN
*++yyvsp = yylval;
YY_IGNORE_MAYBE_UNINITIALIZED_END
/* Shift the error token. */
YY_SYMBOL_PRINT ("Shifting", yystos[yyn], yyvsp, yylsp);
yystate = yyn;
goto yynewstate;
/*-------------------------------------.
| yyacceptlab -- YYACCEPT comes here. |
`-------------------------------------*/
yyacceptlab:
yyresult = 0;
goto yyreturn;
/*-----------------------------------.
| yyabortlab -- YYABORT comes here. |
`-----------------------------------*/
yyabortlab:
yyresult = 1;
goto yyreturn;
#if !defined yyoverflow || YYERROR_VERBOSE
/*-------------------------------------------------.
| yyexhaustedlab -- memory exhaustion comes here. |
`-------------------------------------------------*/
yyexhaustedlab:
yyerror (yyscanner, lex_env, YY_("memory exhausted"));
yyresult = 2;
/* Fall through. */
#endif
yyreturn:
if (yychar != YYEMPTY)
{
/* Make sure we have latest lookahead translation. See comments at
user semantic actions for why this is necessary. */
yytoken = YYTRANSLATE (yychar);
yydestruct ("Cleanup: discarding lookahead",
yytoken, &yylval, yyscanner, lex_env);
}
/* Do not reclaim the symbols of the rule whose action triggered
this YYABORT or YYACCEPT. */
YYPOPSTACK (yylen);
YY_STACK_PRINT (yyss, yyssp);
while (yyssp != yyss)
{
yydestruct ("Cleanup: popping",
yystos[*yyssp], yyvsp, yyscanner, lex_env);
YYPOPSTACK (1);
}
#ifndef yyoverflow
if (yyss != yyssa)
YYSTACK_FREE (yyss);
#endif
#if YYERROR_VERBOSE
if (yymsg != yymsgbuf)
YYSTACK_FREE (yymsg);
#endif
return yyresult;
}
Commit Message: Fix issue #674. Move regexp limits to limits.h.
CWE ID: CWE-674 | 1 | 168,104 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void show_registers(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
const int field = 2 * sizeof(unsigned long);
__show_regs(regs);
print_modules();
printk("Process %s (pid: %d, threadinfo=%p, task=%p, tls=%0*lx)\n",
current->comm, current->pid, current_thread_info(), current,
field, current_thread_info()->tp_value);
if (cpu_has_userlocal) {
unsigned long tls;
tls = read_c0_userlocal();
if (tls != current_thread_info()->tp_value)
printk("*HwTLS: %0*lx\n", field, tls);
}
show_stacktrace(current, regs);
show_code((unsigned int __user *) regs->cp0_epc);
printk("\n");
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,427 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct page *new_page(struct page *page, unsigned long start, int **x)
{
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: mm/mempolicy.c: fix error handling in set_mempolicy and mbind.
In the case that compat_get_bitmap fails we do not want to copy the
bitmap to the user as it will contain uninitialized stack data and leak
sensitive data.
Signed-off-by: Chris Salls <salls@cs.ucsb.edu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-388 | 0 | 67,196 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool HTMLInputElement::IsInRange() const {
return willValidate() && input_type_->IsInRange(value());
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,046 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MessageLoopForUI::Start() {
static_cast<MessagePumpForUI*>(pump_.get())->Start(this);
}
Commit Message: Introduce RunLoop::Type::NESTABLE_TASKS_ALLOWED to replace MessageLoop::ScopedNestableTaskAllower.
(as well as MessageLoop::SetNestableTasksAllowed())
Surveying usage: the scoped object is always instantiated right before
RunLoop().Run(). The intent is really to allow nestable tasks in that
RunLoop so it's better to explicitly label that RunLoop as such and it
allows us to break the last dependency that forced some RunLoop users
to use MessageLoop APIs.
There's also the odd case of allowing nestable tasks for loops that are
reentrant from a native task (without going through RunLoop), these
are the minority but will have to be handled (after cleaning up the
majority of cases that are RunLoop induced).
As highlighted by robliao@ in https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/600517
(which was merged in this CL).
R=danakj@chromium.org
Bug: 750779
Change-Id: I43d122c93ec903cff3a6fe7b77ec461ea0656448
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/594713
Commit-Queue: Gabriel Charette <gab@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Liao <robliao@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: danakj <danakj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492263}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,562 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: tristring_equal (gconstpointer a,
gconstpointer b)
{
const char *ap = a;
const char *bp = b;
size_t len;
if (!strequal_len (ap, bp, &len))
return FALSE;
ap += len + 1;
bp += len + 1;
if (!strequal_len (ap, bp, &len))
return FALSE;
ap += len + 1;
bp += len + 1;
if (strcmp (ap, bp) != 0)
return FALSE;
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 5,563 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DevToolsUIBindings::AgentHostClosed(
content::DevToolsAgentHost* agent_host) {
DCHECK(agent_host == agent_host_.get());
agent_host_ = NULL;
delegate_->InspectedContentsClosing();
}
Commit Message: Improve sanitization of remoteFrontendUrl in DevTools
This change ensures that the decoded remoteFrontendUrl parameter cannot
contain any single quote in its value. As of this commit, none of the
permitted query params in SanitizeFrontendQueryParam can contain single
quotes.
Note that the existing SanitizeEndpoint function does not explicitly
check for single quotes. This is fine since single quotes in the query
string are already URL-encoded and the values validated by
SanitizeEndpoint are not url-decoded elsewhere.
BUG=798163
TEST=Manually, see https://crbug.com/798163#c1
TEST=./unit_tests --gtest_filter=DevToolsUIBindingsTest.SanitizeFrontendURL
Change-Id: I5a08e8ce6f1abc2c8d2a0983fef63e1e194cd242
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/846979
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Rob Wu <rob@robwu.nl>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#527250}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 146,889 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void UsbDeviceImpl::RefreshConfiguration() {
libusb_config_descriptor* platform_config;
int rv =
libusb_get_active_config_descriptor(platform_device_, &platform_config);
if (rv != LIBUSB_SUCCESS) {
USB_LOG(EVENT) << "Failed to get config descriptor: "
<< ConvertPlatformUsbErrorToString(rv);
return;
}
configuration_.reset(new UsbConfigDescriptor());
configuration_->configuration_value = platform_config->bConfigurationValue;
configuration_->self_powered = (platform_config->bmAttributes & 0x40) != 0;
configuration_->remote_wakeup = (platform_config->bmAttributes & 0x20) != 0;
configuration_->maximum_power = platform_config->MaxPower * 2;
for (size_t i = 0; i < platform_config->bNumInterfaces; ++i) {
const struct libusb_interface* platform_interface =
&platform_config->interface[i];
for (int j = 0; j < platform_interface->num_altsetting; ++j) {
const struct libusb_interface_descriptor* platform_alt_setting =
&platform_interface->altsetting[j];
UsbInterfaceDescriptor interface;
interface.interface_number = platform_alt_setting->bInterfaceNumber;
interface.alternate_setting = platform_alt_setting->bAlternateSetting;
interface.interface_class = platform_alt_setting->bInterfaceClass;
interface.interface_subclass = platform_alt_setting->bInterfaceSubClass;
interface.interface_protocol = platform_alt_setting->bInterfaceProtocol;
for (size_t k = 0; k < platform_alt_setting->bNumEndpoints; ++k) {
const struct libusb_endpoint_descriptor* platform_endpoint =
&platform_alt_setting->endpoint[k];
UsbEndpointDescriptor endpoint;
endpoint.address = platform_endpoint->bEndpointAddress;
endpoint.direction = GetDirection(platform_endpoint);
endpoint.maximum_packet_size = platform_endpoint->wMaxPacketSize;
endpoint.synchronization_type =
GetSynchronizationType(platform_endpoint);
endpoint.transfer_type = GetTransferType(platform_endpoint);
endpoint.usage_type = GetUsageType(platform_endpoint);
endpoint.polling_interval = platform_endpoint->bInterval;
endpoint.extra_data = std::vector<uint8_t>(
platform_endpoint->extra,
platform_endpoint->extra + platform_endpoint->extra_length);
interface.endpoints.push_back(endpoint);
}
interface.extra_data = std::vector<uint8_t>(
platform_alt_setting->extra,
platform_alt_setting->extra + platform_alt_setting->extra_length);
configuration_->interfaces.push_back(interface);
}
}
configuration_->extra_data = std::vector<uint8_t>(
platform_config->extra,
platform_config->extra + platform_config->extra_length);
libusb_free_config_descriptor(platform_config);
}
Commit Message: Remove fallback when requesting a single USB interface.
This reverts commit 2d475d0ed37bf8f19385537ad31e361f1b21624b. The
permission broker now supports opening devices that are partially
claimed through the OpenPath method and RequestPathAccess will always
fail for these devices so the fallback path from RequestPathAccess to
OpenPath is always taken.
BUG=500057
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1227313003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338354}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 123,364 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FPDF_BOOL PDFiumEngine::IsDataAvail(FX_FILEAVAIL* param,
size_t offset, size_t size) {
PDFiumEngine::FileAvail* file_avail =
static_cast<PDFiumEngine::FileAvail*>(param);
return file_avail->loader->IsDataAvailable(offset, size);
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Defer page unloading in JS callback.
One of the callbacks from PDFium JavaScript into the embedder is to get the
current page number. In Chromium, this will trigger a call to
CalculateMostVisiblePage that method will determine the visible pages and unload
any non-visible pages. But, if the originating JS is on a non-visible page
we'll delete the page and annotations associated with that page. This will
cause issues as we are currently working with those objects when the JavaScript
returns.
This Cl defers the page unloading triggered by getting the most visible page
until the next event is handled by the Chromium embedder.
BUG=chromium:653090
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2418533002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#424781}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 140,368 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline struct shmem_sb_info *SHMEM_SB(struct super_block *sb)
{
return sb->s_fs_info;
}
Commit Message: tmpfs: fix use-after-free of mempolicy object
The tmpfs remount logic preserves filesystem mempolicy if the mpol=M
option is not specified in the remount request. A new policy can be
specified if mpol=M is given.
Before this patch remounting an mpol bound tmpfs without specifying
mpol= mount option in the remount request would set the filesystem's
mempolicy object to a freed mempolicy object.
To reproduce the problem boot a DEBUG_PAGEALLOC kernel and run:
# mkdir /tmp/x
# mount -t tmpfs -o size=100M,mpol=interleave nodev /tmp/x
# grep /tmp/x /proc/mounts
nodev /tmp/x tmpfs rw,relatime,size=102400k,mpol=interleave:0-3 0 0
# mount -o remount,size=200M nodev /tmp/x
# grep /tmp/x /proc/mounts
nodev /tmp/x tmpfs rw,relatime,size=204800k,mpol=??? 0 0
# note ? garbage in mpol=... output above
# dd if=/dev/zero of=/tmp/x/f count=1
# panic here
Panic:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
IP: [< (null)>] (null)
[...]
Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
Call Trace:
mpol_shared_policy_init+0xa5/0x160
shmem_get_inode+0x209/0x270
shmem_mknod+0x3e/0xf0
shmem_create+0x18/0x20
vfs_create+0xb5/0x130
do_last+0x9a1/0xea0
path_openat+0xb3/0x4d0
do_filp_open+0x42/0xa0
do_sys_open+0xfe/0x1e0
compat_sys_open+0x1b/0x20
cstar_dispatch+0x7/0x1f
Non-debug kernels will not crash immediately because referencing the
dangling mpol will not cause a fault. Instead the filesystem will
reference a freed mempolicy object, which will cause unpredictable
behavior.
The problem boils down to a dropped mpol reference below if
shmem_parse_options() does not allocate a new mpol:
config = *sbinfo
shmem_parse_options(data, &config, true)
mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol)
sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol /* BUG: saves unreferenced mpol */
This patch avoids the crash by not releasing the mempolicy if
shmem_parse_options() doesn't create a new mpol.
How far back does this issue go? I see it in both 2.6.36 and 3.3. I did
not look back further.
Signed-off-by: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 33,476 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: explicit BlobWriteCallbackImpl(
base::WeakPtr<IndexedDBTransaction> transaction)
: transaction_(std::move(transaction)) {}
Commit Message: [IndexedDB] Fixing early destruction of connection during forceclose
Patch is as small as possible for merging.
Bug: 842990
Change-Id: I9968ffee1bf3279e61e1ec13e4d541f713caf12f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1062935
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#559383}
CWE ID: | 0 | 155,468 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const SkBitmap& ExtensionService::GetOmniboxPopupIcon(
const std::string& extension_id) {
return omnibox_popup_icon_manager_.GetIcon(extension_id);
}
Commit Message: Limit extent of webstore app to just chrome.google.com/webstore.
BUG=93497
TEST=Try installing extensions and apps from the webstore, starting both being
initially logged in, and not.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7719003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 98,582 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void check_preempt_curr(struct rq *rq, struct task_struct *p, int flags)
{
const struct sched_class *class;
if (p->sched_class == rq->curr->sched_class) {
rq->curr->sched_class->check_preempt_curr(rq, p, flags);
} else {
for_each_class(class) {
if (class == rq->curr->sched_class)
break;
if (class == p->sched_class) {
resched_task(rq->curr);
break;
}
}
}
/*
* A queue event has occurred, and we're going to schedule. In
* this case, we can save a useless back to back clock update.
*/
if (test_tsk_need_resched(rq->curr))
rq->skip_clock_update = 1;
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: | 1 | 165,675 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: s4u_identify_user(krb5_context context,
krb5_creds *in_creds,
krb5_data *subject_cert,
krb5_principal *canon_user)
{
krb5_error_code code;
krb5_preauthtype ptypes[1] = { KRB5_PADATA_S4U_X509_USER };
krb5_creds creds;
int use_master = 0;
krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opts = NULL;
krb5_principal_data client;
krb5_s4u_userid userid;
*canon_user = NULL;
if (in_creds->client == NULL && subject_cert == NULL) {
return EINVAL;
}
if (in_creds->client != NULL &&
in_creds->client->type != KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) {
int anonymous;
anonymous = krb5_principal_compare(context, in_creds->client,
krb5_anonymous_principal());
return krb5_copy_principal(context,
anonymous ? in_creds->server
: in_creds->client,
canon_user);
}
memset(&creds, 0, sizeof(creds));
memset(&userid, 0, sizeof(userid));
if (subject_cert != NULL)
userid.subject_cert = *subject_cert;
code = krb5_get_init_creds_opt_alloc(context, &opts);
if (code != 0)
goto cleanup;
krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_tkt_life(opts, 15);
krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_renew_life(opts, 0);
krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_forwardable(opts, 0);
krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_proxiable(opts, 0);
krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_canonicalize(opts, 1);
krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_preauth_list(opts, ptypes, 1);
if (in_creds->client != NULL) {
client = *in_creds->client;
client.realm = in_creds->server->realm;
} else {
client.magic = KV5M_PRINCIPAL;
client.realm = in_creds->server->realm;
/* should this be NULL, empty or a fixed string? XXX */
client.data = NULL;
client.length = 0;
client.type = KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL;
}
code = k5_get_init_creds(context, &creds, &client, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL,
opts, krb5_get_as_key_noop, &userid, &use_master,
NULL);
if (code == 0 || code == KRB5_PREAUTH_FAILED) {
*canon_user = userid.user;
userid.user = NULL;
code = 0;
}
cleanup:
krb5_free_cred_contents(context, &creds);
if (opts != NULL)
krb5_get_init_creds_opt_free(context, opts);
if (userid.user != NULL)
krb5_free_principal(context, userid.user);
return code;
}
Commit Message: Ignore password attributes for S4U2Self requests
For consistency with Windows KDCs, allow protocol transition to work
even if the password has expired or needs changing.
Also, when looking up an enterprise principal with an AS request,
treat ERR_KEY_EXP as confirmation that the client is present in the
realm.
[ghudson@mit.edu: added comment in kdc_process_s4u2self_req(); edited
commit message]
ticket: 8763 (new)
tags: pullup
target_version: 1.17
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 1 | 168,958 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: poolClear(STRING_POOL *pool)
{
if (!pool->freeBlocks)
pool->freeBlocks = pool->blocks;
else {
BLOCK *p = pool->blocks;
while (p) {
BLOCK *tem = p->next;
p->next = pool->freeBlocks;
pool->freeBlocks = p;
p = tem;
}
}
pool->blocks = NULL;
pool->start = NULL;
pool->ptr = NULL;
pool->end = NULL;
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Fix extraction of namespace prefix from XML name (#186)
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 0 | 92,355 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void s_stop(struct seq_file *m, void *p)
{
struct trace_iterator *iter = m->private;
#ifdef CONFIG_TRACER_MAX_TRACE
if (iter->snapshot && iter->trace->use_max_tr)
return;
#endif
if (!iter->snapshot)
atomic_dec(&trace_record_taskinfo_disabled);
trace_access_unlock(iter->cpu_file);
trace_event_read_unlock();
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 81,331 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(ini_get)
{
char *varname, *str;
int varname_len;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s", &varname, &varname_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
str = zend_ini_string(varname, varname_len + 1, 0);
if (!str) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETURN_STRING(str, 1);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 4,279 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err tpay_Read(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_TPAYBox *ptr = (GF_TPAYBox *)s;
ptr->nbBytes = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,556 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ZIPARCHIVE_METHOD(getFromIndex)
{
php_zip_get_from(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, 0);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72434: ZipArchive class Use After Free Vulnerability in PHP's GC algorithm and unserialize
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 51,285 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::Paste() {
UserMetrics::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("Paste"), profile_);
window()->Paste();
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,294 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int udf_build_ustr_exact(struct ustr *dest, dstring *ptr, int exactsize)
{
if ((!dest) || (!ptr) || (!exactsize))
return -1;
memset(dest, 0, sizeof(struct ustr));
dest->u_cmpID = ptr[0];
dest->u_len = exactsize - 1;
memcpy(dest->u_name, ptr + 1, exactsize - 1);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: udf: Check path length when reading symlink
Symlink reading code does not check whether the resulting path fits into
the page provided by the generic code. This isn't as easy as just
checking the symlink size because of various encoding conversions we
perform on path. So we have to check whether there is still enough space
in the buffer on the fly.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Carl Henrik Lunde <chlunde@ping.uio.no>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 45,272 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HEVC_RewriteESDescriptor(GF_MPEGVisualSampleEntryBox *hevc)
{
HEVC_RewriteESDescriptorEx(hevc, NULL);
}
Commit Message: fix some exploitable overflows (#994, #997)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 83,986 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: clock_gettime(clockid_t clk_id, struct timespec *tp)
{
FILETIME ft;
ULARGE_INTEGER li, li2;
BOOL ok = FALSE;
double d;
static double perfcnt_per_sec = 0.0;
static BOOL initialized = FALSE;
if (!initialized) {
QueryPerformanceFrequency((LARGE_INTEGER *)&li);
perfcnt_per_sec = 1.0 / li.QuadPart;
initialized = TRUE;
}
if (tp) {
memset(tp, 0, sizeof(*tp));
if (clk_id == CLOCK_REALTIME) {
/* BEGIN: CLOCK_REALTIME = wall clock (date and time) */
GetSystemTimeAsFileTime(&ft);
li.LowPart = ft.dwLowDateTime;
li.HighPart = ft.dwHighDateTime;
li.QuadPart -= 116444736000000000; /* 1.1.1970 in filedate */
tp->tv_sec = (time_t)(li.QuadPart / 10000000);
tp->tv_nsec = (long)(li.QuadPart % 10000000) * 100;
ok = TRUE;
/* END: CLOCK_REALTIME */
} else if (clk_id == CLOCK_MONOTONIC) {
/* BEGIN: CLOCK_MONOTONIC = stopwatch (time differences) */
QueryPerformanceCounter((LARGE_INTEGER *)&li);
d = li.QuadPart * perfcnt_per_sec;
tp->tv_sec = (time_t)d;
d -= (double)tp->tv_sec;
tp->tv_nsec = (long)(d * 1.0E9);
ok = TRUE;
/* END: CLOCK_MONOTONIC */
} else if (clk_id == CLOCK_THREAD) {
/* BEGIN: CLOCK_THREAD = CPU usage of thread */
FILETIME t_create, t_exit, t_kernel, t_user;
if (GetThreadTimes(GetCurrentThread(),
&t_create,
&t_exit,
&t_kernel,
&t_user)) {
li.LowPart = t_user.dwLowDateTime;
li.HighPart = t_user.dwHighDateTime;
li2.LowPart = t_kernel.dwLowDateTime;
li2.HighPart = t_kernel.dwHighDateTime;
li.QuadPart += li2.QuadPart;
tp->tv_sec = (time_t)(li.QuadPart / 10000000);
tp->tv_nsec = (long)(li.QuadPart % 10000000) * 100;
ok = TRUE;
}
/* END: CLOCK_THREAD */
} else if (clk_id == CLOCK_PROCESS) {
/* BEGIN: CLOCK_PROCESS = CPU usage of process */
FILETIME t_create, t_exit, t_kernel, t_user;
if (GetProcessTimes(GetCurrentProcess(),
&t_create,
&t_exit,
&t_kernel,
&t_user)) {
li.LowPart = t_user.dwLowDateTime;
li.HighPart = t_user.dwHighDateTime;
li2.LowPart = t_kernel.dwLowDateTime;
li2.HighPart = t_kernel.dwHighDateTime;
li.QuadPart += li2.QuadPart;
tp->tv_sec = (time_t)(li.QuadPart / 10000000);
tp->tv_nsec = (long)(li.QuadPart % 10000000) * 100;
ok = TRUE;
}
/* END: CLOCK_PROCESS */
} else {
/* BEGIN: unknown clock */
/* ok = FALSE; already set by init */
/* END: unknown clock */
}
}
return ok ? 0 : -1;
}
Commit Message: Check length of memcmp
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 81,634 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool vhost_sock_zcopy(struct socket *sock)
{
return unlikely(experimental_zcopytx) &&
sock_flag(sock->sk, SOCK_ZEROCOPY);
}
Commit Message: vhost-net: fix use-after-free in vhost_net_flush
vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait has a confusing name:
it will actually also free it's argument.
Thus since commit 1280c27f8e29acf4af2da914e80ec27c3dbd5c01
"vhost-net: flush outstanding DMAs on memory change"
vhost_net_flush tries to use the argument after passing it
to vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait, this results
in use after free.
To fix, don't free the argument in vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait,
add an new API for callers that want to free ubufs.
Acked-by: Asias He <asias@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 30,062 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DevToolsAgentHostImpl::NotifyDestroyed() {
DCHECK(g_devtools_instances.Get().find(id_) !=
g_devtools_instances.Get().end());
for (auto& observer : g_devtools_observers.Get())
observer.DevToolsAgentHostDestroyed(this);
g_devtools_instances.Get().erase(id_);
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow chrome.debugger to attach to web ui pages
If the page navigates to web ui, we force detach the debugger extension.
TBR=alexclarke@chromium.org
Bug: 798222
Change-Id: Idb46c2f59e839388397a8dfa6ce2e2a897698df3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/935961
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540916}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 155,765 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static __init int fsnotify_init(void)
{
int ret;
BUG_ON(hweight32(ALL_FSNOTIFY_EVENTS) != 23);
ret = init_srcu_struct(&fsnotify_mark_srcu);
if (ret)
panic("initializing fsnotify_mark_srcu");
fsnotify_mark_connector_cachep = KMEM_CACHE(fsnotify_mark_connector,
SLAB_PANIC);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: dentry name snapshots
take_dentry_name_snapshot() takes a safe snapshot of dentry name;
if the name is a short one, it gets copied into caller-supplied
structure, otherwise an extra reference to external name is grabbed
(those are never modified). In either case the pointer to stable
string is stored into the same structure.
dentry must be held by the caller of take_dentry_name_snapshot(),
but may be freely dropped afterwards - the snapshot will stay
until destroyed by release_dentry_name_snapshot().
Intended use:
struct name_snapshot s;
take_dentry_name_snapshot(&s, dentry);
...
access s.name
...
release_dentry_name_snapshot(&s);
Replaces fsnotify_oldname_...(), gets used in fsnotify to obtain the name
to pass down with event.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 67,473 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gfx::Rect BrowserWindowGtk::GetBounds() const {
return bounds_;
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 117,923 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: explicit InterstitialHostObserver(RenderViewHost* rvh)
: content::RenderViewHostObserver(rvh) {}
Commit Message: Check the content setting type is valid.
BUG=169770
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11875013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176687 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 117,334 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool SecurityContext::isSecureTransitionTo(const KURL& url) const
{
if (!haveInitializedSecurityOrigin())
return true;
RefPtr<SecurityOrigin> other = SecurityOrigin::create(url);
return securityOrigin()->canAccess(other.get());
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 102,939 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GahpClient::condor_job_update_lease(const char *schedd_name,
const SimpleList<PROC_ID> &jobs,
const SimpleList<int> &expirations,
SimpleList<PROC_ID> &updated )
{
static const char* command = "CONDOR_JOB_UPDATE_LEASE";
if (server->m_commands_supported->contains_anycase(command)==FALSE) {
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
ASSERT( jobs.Length() == expirations.Length() );
if (!schedd_name) schedd_name=NULLSTRING;
std::string reqline;
char *esc1 = strdup( escapeGahpString(schedd_name) );
int x = sprintf(reqline, "%s %d", esc1, jobs.Length());
free( esc1 );
ASSERT( x > 0 );
SimpleListIterator<PROC_ID> jobs_i (jobs);
SimpleListIterator<int> exps_i (expirations);
PROC_ID next_job;
int next_exp;
while ( jobs_i.Next( next_job ) && exps_i.Next( next_exp ) ) {
x = sprintf_cat( reqline, " %d.%d %d", next_job.cluster, next_job.proc,
next_exp );
ASSERT( x > 0 );
}
const char *buf = reqline.c_str();
if ( !is_pending(command,buf) ) {
if ( m_mode == results_only ) {
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_NOT_SUBMITTED;
}
now_pending(command,buf,deleg_proxy);
}
Gahp_Args* result = get_pending_result(command,buf);
if ( result ) {
if (result->argc != 4) {
EXCEPT("Bad %s Result",command);
}
int rc = 1;
if ( result->argv[1][0] == 'S' ) {
rc = 0;
}
if ( strcasecmp(result->argv[2], NULLSTRING) ) {
error_string = result->argv[2];
} else {
error_string = "";
}
updated.Clear();
char *ptr1 = result->argv[3];
while ( ptr1 != NULL && *ptr1 != '\0' ) {
int i;
PROC_ID job_id;
char *ptr2 = strchr( ptr1, ',' );
if ( ptr2 ) {
*ptr2 = '\0';
ptr2++;
}
i = sscanf( ptr1, "%d.%d", &job_id.cluster, &job_id.proc );
if ( i != 2 ) {
dprintf( D_ALWAYS, "condor_job_update_lease: skipping malformed job id '%s'\n", ptr1 );
} else {
updated.Append( job_id );
}
ptr1 = ptr2;
}
delete result;
return rc;
}
if ( check_pending_timeout(command,buf) ) {
sprintf( error_string, "%s timed out", command );
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_TIMED_OUT;
}
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_PENDING;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 16,151 |
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