instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool DesktopWindowTreeHostX11::IsAlwaysOnTop() const {
return is_always_on_top_;
}
Commit Message: Fix PIP window being blank after minimize/show
DesktopWindowTreeHostX11::SetVisible only made the call into
OnNativeWidgetVisibilityChanged when transitioning from shown
to minimized and not vice versa. This is because this change
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1437263
considered IsVisible to be true when minimized, which made
IsVisible always true in this case. This caused layers to be hidden
but never shown again.
This is a reland of:
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1580103
Bug: 949199
Change-Id: I2151cd09e537d8ce8781897f43a3b8e9cec75996
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1584617
Reviewed-by: Scott Violet <sky@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: enne <enne@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654280}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 140,555 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: megasas_fire_cmd_xscale(struct megasas_instance *instance,
dma_addr_t frame_phys_addr,
u32 frame_count,
struct megasas_register_set __iomem *regs)
{
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&instance->hba_lock, flags);
writel((frame_phys_addr >> 3)|(frame_count),
&(regs)->inbound_queue_port);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&instance->hba_lock, flags);
}
Commit Message: scsi: megaraid_sas: return error when create DMA pool failed
when create DMA pool for cmd frames failed, we should return -ENOMEM,
instead of 0.
In some case in:
megasas_init_adapter_fusion()
-->megasas_alloc_cmds()
-->megasas_create_frame_pool
create DMA pool failed,
--> megasas_free_cmds() [1]
-->megasas_alloc_cmds_fusion()
failed, then goto fail_alloc_cmds.
-->megasas_free_cmds() [2]
we will call megasas_free_cmds twice, [1] will kfree cmd_list,
[2] will use cmd_list.it will cause a problem:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address
00000000
pgd = ffffffc000f70000
[00000000] *pgd=0000001fbf893003, *pud=0000001fbf893003,
*pmd=0000001fbf894003, *pte=006000006d000707
Internal error: Oops: 96000005 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 18 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted
task: ffffffdfb9290000 ti: ffffffdfb923c000 task.ti: ffffffdfb923c000
PC is at megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
LR is at megasas_free_cmds+0x24/0x70
...
Call trace:
[<ffffffc0005b779c>] megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
[<ffffffc0005bca74>] megasas_init_adapter_fusion+0x2f4/0x4d8
[<ffffffc0005b926c>] megasas_init_fw+0x2dc/0x760
[<ffffffc0005b9ab0>] megasas_probe_one+0x3c0/0xcd8
[<ffffffc0004a5abc>] local_pci_probe+0x4c/0xb4
[<ffffffc0004a5c40>] pci_device_probe+0x11c/0x14c
[<ffffffc00053a5e4>] driver_probe_device+0x1ec/0x430
[<ffffffc00053a92c>] __driver_attach+0xa8/0xb0
[<ffffffc000538178>] bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xc8
[<ffffffc000539e88>] driver_attach+0x28/0x34
[<ffffffc000539a18>] bus_add_driver+0x16c/0x248
[<ffffffc00053b234>] driver_register+0x6c/0x138
[<ffffffc0004a5350>] __pci_register_driver+0x5c/0x6c
[<ffffffc000ce3868>] megasas_init+0xc0/0x1a8
[<ffffffc000082a58>] do_one_initcall+0xe8/0x1ec
[<ffffffc000ca7be8>] kernel_init_freeable+0x1c8/0x284
[<ffffffc0008d90b8>] kernel_init+0x1c/0xe4
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Sumit Saxena <sumit.saxena@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 90,336 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::postTask(PassOwnPtr<Task> task)
{
callOnMainThread(didReceiveTask, new PerformTaskContext(m_weakFactory.createWeakPtr(), task));
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 105,563 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err strk_Read(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_Err e;
GF_SubTrackBox *ptr = (GF_SubTrackBox *)s;
e = gf_isom_box_array_read(s, bs, strk_AddBox);
if (e) return e;
if (!ptr->info) {
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_ERROR, GF_LOG_CONTAINER, ("[iso file] Missing SubTrackInformationBox\n"));
return GF_ISOM_INVALID_FILE;
}
return e;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,457 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: doshn(struct magic_set *ms, int clazz, int swap, int fd, off_t off, int num,
size_t size, off_t fsize, int mach, int strtab, int *flags,
uint16_t *notecount)
{
Elf32_Shdr sh32;
Elf64_Shdr sh64;
int stripped = 1;
size_t nbadcap = 0;
void *nbuf;
off_t noff, coff, name_off;
uint64_t cap_hw1 = 0; /* SunOS 5.x hardware capabilites */
uint64_t cap_sf1 = 0; /* SunOS 5.x software capabilites */
char name[50];
ssize_t namesize;
if (size != xsh_sizeof) {
if (file_printf(ms, ", corrupted section header size") == -1)
return -1;
return 0;
}
/* Read offset of name section to be able to read section names later */
if (pread(fd, xsh_addr, xsh_sizeof, CAST(off_t, (off + size * strtab)))
< (ssize_t)xsh_sizeof) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
name_off = xsh_offset;
for ( ; num; num--) {
/* Read the name of this section. */
if ((namesize = pread(fd, name, sizeof(name) - 1, name_off + xsh_name)) == -1) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
name[namesize] = '\0';
if (strcmp(name, ".debug_info") == 0)
stripped = 0;
if (pread(fd, xsh_addr, xsh_sizeof, off) < (ssize_t)xsh_sizeof) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
off += size;
/* Things we can determine before we seek */
switch (xsh_type) {
case SHT_SYMTAB:
#if 0
case SHT_DYNSYM:
#endif
stripped = 0;
break;
default:
if (fsize != SIZE_UNKNOWN && xsh_offset > fsize) {
/* Perhaps warn here */
continue;
}
break;
}
/* Things we can determine when we seek */
switch (xsh_type) {
case SHT_NOTE:
if ((uintmax_t)(xsh_size + xsh_offset) >
(uintmax_t)fsize) {
if (file_printf(ms,
", note offset/size 0x%" INTMAX_T_FORMAT
"x+0x%" INTMAX_T_FORMAT "x exceeds"
" file size 0x%" INTMAX_T_FORMAT "x",
(uintmax_t)xsh_offset, (uintmax_t)xsh_size,
(uintmax_t)fsize) == -1)
return -1;
return 0;
}
if ((nbuf = malloc(xsh_size)) == NULL) {
file_error(ms, errno, "Cannot allocate memory"
" for note");
return -1;
}
if (pread(fd, nbuf, xsh_size, xsh_offset) <
(ssize_t)xsh_size) {
file_badread(ms);
free(nbuf);
return -1;
}
noff = 0;
for (;;) {
if (noff >= (off_t)xsh_size)
break;
noff = donote(ms, nbuf, (size_t)noff,
xsh_size, clazz, swap, 4, flags, notecount,
fd, 0, 0, 0);
if (noff == 0)
break;
}
free(nbuf);
break;
case SHT_SUNW_cap:
switch (mach) {
case EM_SPARC:
case EM_SPARCV9:
case EM_IA_64:
case EM_386:
case EM_AMD64:
break;
default:
goto skip;
}
if (nbadcap > 5)
break;
if (lseek(fd, xsh_offset, SEEK_SET) == (off_t)-1) {
file_badseek(ms);
return -1;
}
coff = 0;
for (;;) {
Elf32_Cap cap32;
Elf64_Cap cap64;
char cbuf[/*CONSTCOND*/
MAX(sizeof cap32, sizeof cap64)];
if ((coff += xcap_sizeof) > (off_t)xsh_size)
break;
if (read(fd, cbuf, (size_t)xcap_sizeof) !=
(ssize_t)xcap_sizeof) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
if (cbuf[0] == 'A') {
#ifdef notyet
char *p = cbuf + 1;
uint32_t len, tag;
memcpy(&len, p, sizeof(len));
p += 4;
len = getu32(swap, len);
if (memcmp("gnu", p, 3) != 0) {
if (file_printf(ms,
", unknown capability %.3s", p)
== -1)
return -1;
break;
}
p += strlen(p) + 1;
tag = *p++;
memcpy(&len, p, sizeof(len));
p += 4;
len = getu32(swap, len);
if (tag != 1) {
if (file_printf(ms, ", unknown gnu"
" capability tag %d", tag)
== -1)
return -1;
break;
}
#endif
break;
}
(void)memcpy(xcap_addr, cbuf, xcap_sizeof);
switch (xcap_tag) {
case CA_SUNW_NULL:
break;
case CA_SUNW_HW_1:
cap_hw1 |= xcap_val;
break;
case CA_SUNW_SF_1:
cap_sf1 |= xcap_val;
break;
default:
if (file_printf(ms,
", with unknown capability "
"0x%" INT64_T_FORMAT "x = 0x%"
INT64_T_FORMAT "x",
(unsigned long long)xcap_tag,
(unsigned long long)xcap_val) == -1)
return -1;
if (nbadcap++ > 2)
coff = xsh_size;
break;
}
}
/*FALLTHROUGH*/
skip:
default:
break;
}
}
if (file_printf(ms, ", %sstripped", stripped ? "" : "not ") == -1)
return -1;
if (cap_hw1) {
const cap_desc_t *cdp;
switch (mach) {
case EM_SPARC:
case EM_SPARC32PLUS:
case EM_SPARCV9:
cdp = cap_desc_sparc;
break;
case EM_386:
case EM_IA_64:
case EM_AMD64:
cdp = cap_desc_386;
break;
default:
cdp = NULL;
break;
}
if (file_printf(ms, ", uses") == -1)
return -1;
if (cdp) {
while (cdp->cd_name) {
if (cap_hw1 & cdp->cd_mask) {
if (file_printf(ms,
" %s", cdp->cd_name) == -1)
return -1;
cap_hw1 &= ~cdp->cd_mask;
}
++cdp;
}
if (cap_hw1)
if (file_printf(ms,
" unknown hardware capability 0x%"
INT64_T_FORMAT "x",
(unsigned long long)cap_hw1) == -1)
return -1;
} else {
if (file_printf(ms,
" hardware capability 0x%" INT64_T_FORMAT "x",
(unsigned long long)cap_hw1) == -1)
return -1;
}
}
if (cap_sf1) {
if (cap_sf1 & SF1_SUNW_FPUSED) {
if (file_printf(ms,
(cap_sf1 & SF1_SUNW_FPKNWN)
? ", uses frame pointer"
: ", not known to use frame pointer") == -1)
return -1;
}
cap_sf1 &= ~SF1_SUNW_MASK;
if (cap_sf1)
if (file_printf(ms,
", with unknown software capability 0x%"
INT64_T_FORMAT "x",
(unsigned long long)cap_sf1) == -1)
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Extend build-id reporting to 8-byte IDs that lld can generate (Ed Maste)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 95,074 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GetChildDirectoryPaths(GDataEntry* entry,
std::set<FilePath>* changed_dirs) {
GDataDirectory* dir = entry->AsGDataDirectory();
if (!dir)
return;
for (GDataDirectoryCollection::const_iterator it =
dir->child_directories().begin();
it != dir->child_directories().end(); ++it) {
GDataDirectory* child_dir = it->second;
changed_dirs->insert(child_dir->GetFilePath());
GetChildDirectoryPaths(child_dir, changed_dirs);
}
}
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 117,137 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CueTimeline::UpdateActiveCues(double movie_time) {
if (IgnoreUpdateRequests())
return;
HTMLMediaElement& media_element = MediaElement();
if (media_element.GetDocument().IsDetached())
return;
CueList current_cues;
if (media_element.getReadyState() != HTMLMediaElement::kHaveNothing &&
media_element.GetWebMediaPlayer())
current_cues =
cue_tree_.AllOverlaps(cue_tree_.CreateInterval(movie_time, movie_time));
CueList previous_cues;
CueList missed_cues;
previous_cues = currently_active_cues_;
double last_time = last_update_time_;
double last_seek_time = media_element.LastSeekTime();
if (last_time >= 0 && last_seek_time < movie_time) {
CueList potentially_skipped_cues =
cue_tree_.AllOverlaps(cue_tree_.CreateInterval(last_time, movie_time));
for (CueInterval cue : potentially_skipped_cues) {
if (cue.Low() > std::max(last_seek_time, last_time) &&
cue.High() < movie_time)
missed_cues.push_back(cue);
}
}
last_update_time_ = movie_time;
if (!media_element.seeking() && last_seek_time < last_time)
media_element.ScheduleTimeupdateEvent(true);
size_t missed_cues_size = missed_cues.size();
size_t previous_cues_size = previous_cues.size();
bool active_set_changed = missed_cues_size;
for (size_t i = 0; !active_set_changed && i < previous_cues_size; ++i) {
if (!current_cues.Contains(previous_cues[i]) &&
previous_cues[i].Data()->IsActive())
active_set_changed = true;
}
for (CueInterval current_cue : current_cues) {
if (current_cue.Data()->IsActive())
current_cue.Data()->UpdatePastAndFutureNodes(movie_time);
else
active_set_changed = true;
}
if (!active_set_changed)
return;
for (size_t i = 0; !media_element.paused() && i < previous_cues_size; ++i) {
if (previous_cues[i].Data()->pauseOnExit() &&
previous_cues[i].Data()->IsActive() &&
!current_cues.Contains(previous_cues[i]))
media_element.pause();
}
for (size_t i = 0; !media_element.paused() && i < missed_cues_size; ++i) {
if (missed_cues[i].Data()->pauseOnExit())
media_element.pause();
}
HeapVector<std::pair<double, Member<TextTrackCue>>> event_tasks;
HeapVector<Member<TextTrack>> affected_tracks;
for (const auto& missed_cue : missed_cues) {
event_tasks.push_back(
std::make_pair(missed_cue.Data()->startTime(), missed_cue.Data()));
if (missed_cue.Data()->startTime() < missed_cue.Data()->endTime()) {
event_tasks.push_back(
std::make_pair(missed_cue.Data()->endTime(), missed_cue.Data()));
}
}
for (const auto& previous_cue : previous_cues) {
if (!current_cues.Contains(previous_cue)) {
event_tasks.push_back(
std::make_pair(previous_cue.Data()->endTime(), previous_cue.Data()));
}
}
for (const auto& current_cue : current_cues) {
if (!previous_cues.Contains(current_cue)) {
event_tasks.push_back(
std::make_pair(current_cue.Data()->startTime(), current_cue.Data()));
}
}
NonCopyingSort(event_tasks.begin(), event_tasks.end(), EventTimeCueCompare);
for (const auto& task : event_tasks) {
if (!affected_tracks.Contains(task.second->track()))
affected_tracks.push_back(task.second->track());
if (task.second->startTime() >= task.second->endTime()) {
media_element.ScheduleEvent(
CreateEventWithTarget(EventTypeNames::enter, task.second.Get()));
media_element.ScheduleEvent(
CreateEventWithTarget(EventTypeNames::exit, task.second.Get()));
} else {
bool is_enter_event = task.first == task.second->startTime();
AtomicString event_name =
is_enter_event ? EventTypeNames::enter : EventTypeNames::exit;
media_element.ScheduleEvent(
CreateEventWithTarget(event_name, task.second.Get()));
}
}
NonCopyingSort(affected_tracks.begin(), affected_tracks.end(),
TrackIndexCompare);
for (const auto& track : affected_tracks) {
media_element.ScheduleEvent(
CreateEventWithTarget(EventTypeNames::cuechange, track.Get()));
if (track->TrackType() == TextTrack::kTrackElement) {
HTMLTrackElement* track_element =
ToLoadableTextTrack(track.Get())->TrackElement();
DCHECK(track_element);
media_element.ScheduleEvent(
CreateEventWithTarget(EventTypeNames::cuechange, track_element));
}
}
for (const auto& cue : current_cues)
cue.Data()->SetIsActive(true);
for (const auto& previous_cue : previous_cues) {
if (!current_cues.Contains(previous_cue)) {
TextTrackCue* cue = previous_cue.Data();
cue->SetIsActive(false);
cue->RemoveDisplayTree();
}
}
currently_active_cues_ = current_cues;
media_element.UpdateTextTrackDisplay();
}
Commit Message: Support negative timestamps of TextTrackCue
Ensure proper behaviour for negative timestamps of TextTrackCue.
1. Cues with negative startTime should become active from 0s.
2. Cues with negative startTime and endTime should never be active.
Bug: 314032
Change-Id: Ib53710e58be0be770c933ea8c3c4709a0e5dec0d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/863270
Commit-Queue: srirama chandra sekhar <srirama.m@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <fs@opera.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529012}
CWE ID: | 1 | 171,767 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TIFFReadDirEntryCheckRangeLongSlong8(int64 value)
{
if ((value < 0) || (value > (int64) TIFF_UINT32_MAX))
return(TIFFReadDirEntryErrRange);
else
return(TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk);
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_dirread.c: modify ChopUpSingleUncompressedStrip() to
instanciate compute ntrips as TIFFhowmany_32(td->td_imagelength, rowsperstrip),
instead of a logic based on the total size of data. Which is faulty is
the total size of data is not sufficient to fill the whole image, and thus
results in reading outside of the StripByCounts/StripOffsets arrays when
using TIFFReadScanline().
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2608.
* libtiff/tif_strip.c: revert the change in TIFFNumberOfStrips() done
for http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2587 / CVE-2016-9273 since
the above change is a better fix that makes it unnecessary.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 70,148 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::OnReload(bool bypass_cache) {
frame_->StartReload(bypass_cache ? WebFrameLoadType::kReloadBypassingCache
: WebFrameLoadType::kReload);
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,766 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static Corner CornerToAnchor(const ScrollableArea* scroller) {
const ComputedStyle* style = ScrollerLayoutBox(scroller)->Style();
if (style->IsFlippedBlocksWritingMode())
return Corner::kTopRight;
return Corner::kTopLeft;
}
Commit Message: Consider scroll-padding when determining scroll anchor node
Scroll anchoring should not anchor to a node that is behind scroll
padding.
Bug: 1010002
Change-Id: Icbd89fb85ea2c97a6de635930a9896f6a87b8f07
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1887745
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nick Burris <nburris@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#711020}
CWE ID: | 0 | 136,979 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::Reshape(int width, int height) {
if (isContextLost())
return;
GLint buffer = 0;
if (IsWebGL2OrHigher()) {
ContextGL()->GetIntegerv(GL_PIXEL_UNPACK_BUFFER_BINDING, &buffer);
if (buffer) {
ContextGL()->BindBuffer(GL_PIXEL_UNPACK_BUFFER, 0);
}
}
GLint max_size = std::min(max_texture_size_, max_renderbuffer_size_);
GLint max_width = std::min(max_size, max_viewport_dims_[0]);
GLint max_height = std::min(max_size, max_viewport_dims_[1]);
width = Clamp(width, 1, max_width);
height = Clamp(height, 1, max_height);
const int kMaxArea = 4096 * 4096;
int current_area = width * height;
if (current_area > kMaxArea) {
float scale_factor =
sqrtf(static_cast<float>(kMaxArea) / static_cast<float>(current_area));
width = std::max(1, static_cast<int>(width * scale_factor));
height = std::max(1, static_cast<int>(height * scale_factor));
}
GetDrawingBuffer()->Resize(IntSize(width, height));
if (buffer) {
ContextGL()->BindBuffer(GL_PIXEL_UNPACK_BUFFER,
static_cast<GLuint>(buffer));
}
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,676 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int _regulator_call_set_voltage_sel(struct regulator_dev *rdev,
int uV, unsigned selector)
{
struct pre_voltage_change_data data;
int ret;
data.old_uV = _regulator_get_voltage(rdev);
data.min_uV = uV;
data.max_uV = uV;
ret = _notifier_call_chain(rdev, REGULATOR_EVENT_PRE_VOLTAGE_CHANGE,
&data);
if (ret & NOTIFY_STOP_MASK)
return -EINVAL;
ret = rdev->desc->ops->set_voltage_sel(rdev, selector);
if (ret >= 0)
return ret;
_notifier_call_chain(rdev, REGULATOR_EVENT_ABORT_VOLTAGE_CHANGE,
(void *)data.old_uV);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: regulator: core: Fix regualtor_ena_gpio_free not to access pin after freeing
After freeing pin from regulator_ena_gpio_free, loop can access
the pin. So this patch fixes not to access pin after freeing.
Signed-off-by: Seung-Woo Kim <sw0312.kim@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 74,448 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ZSTD_reduceTable(U32* const table, U32 const size, U32 const reducerValue)
{
ZSTD_reduceTable_internal(table, size, reducerValue, 0);
}
Commit Message: fixed T36302429
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 90,102 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct tm* localtime64_r_override(const time_t* timep, struct tm* result) {
if (g_am_zygote_or_renderer) {
ProxyLocaltimeCallToBrowser(*timep, result, NULL, 0);
return result;
}
CHECK_EQ(0, pthread_once(&g_libc_localtime_funcs_guard,
InitLibcLocaltimeFunctions));
struct tm* res = g_libc_localtime64_r(timep, result);
#if defined(MEMORY_SANITIZER)
if (res) __msan_unpoison(res, sizeof(*res));
if (res->tm_zone) __msan_unpoison_string(res->tm_zone);
#endif
return res;
}
Commit Message: Serialize struct tm in a safe way.
BUG=765512
Change-Id: If235b8677eb527be2ac0fe621fc210e4116a7566
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/679441
Commit-Queue: Chris Palmer <palmer@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Julien Tinnes <jln@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#503948}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 150,267 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: megasas_fire_cmd_gen2(struct megasas_instance *instance,
dma_addr_t frame_phys_addr,
u32 frame_count,
struct megasas_register_set __iomem *regs)
{
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&instance->hba_lock, flags);
writel((frame_phys_addr | (frame_count<<1))|1,
&(regs)->inbound_queue_port);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&instance->hba_lock, flags);
}
Commit Message: scsi: megaraid_sas: return error when create DMA pool failed
when create DMA pool for cmd frames failed, we should return -ENOMEM,
instead of 0.
In some case in:
megasas_init_adapter_fusion()
-->megasas_alloc_cmds()
-->megasas_create_frame_pool
create DMA pool failed,
--> megasas_free_cmds() [1]
-->megasas_alloc_cmds_fusion()
failed, then goto fail_alloc_cmds.
-->megasas_free_cmds() [2]
we will call megasas_free_cmds twice, [1] will kfree cmd_list,
[2] will use cmd_list.it will cause a problem:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address
00000000
pgd = ffffffc000f70000
[00000000] *pgd=0000001fbf893003, *pud=0000001fbf893003,
*pmd=0000001fbf894003, *pte=006000006d000707
Internal error: Oops: 96000005 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 18 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted
task: ffffffdfb9290000 ti: ffffffdfb923c000 task.ti: ffffffdfb923c000
PC is at megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
LR is at megasas_free_cmds+0x24/0x70
...
Call trace:
[<ffffffc0005b779c>] megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
[<ffffffc0005bca74>] megasas_init_adapter_fusion+0x2f4/0x4d8
[<ffffffc0005b926c>] megasas_init_fw+0x2dc/0x760
[<ffffffc0005b9ab0>] megasas_probe_one+0x3c0/0xcd8
[<ffffffc0004a5abc>] local_pci_probe+0x4c/0xb4
[<ffffffc0004a5c40>] pci_device_probe+0x11c/0x14c
[<ffffffc00053a5e4>] driver_probe_device+0x1ec/0x430
[<ffffffc00053a92c>] __driver_attach+0xa8/0xb0
[<ffffffc000538178>] bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xc8
[<ffffffc000539e88>] driver_attach+0x28/0x34
[<ffffffc000539a18>] bus_add_driver+0x16c/0x248
[<ffffffc00053b234>] driver_register+0x6c/0x138
[<ffffffc0004a5350>] __pci_register_driver+0x5c/0x6c
[<ffffffc000ce3868>] megasas_init+0xc0/0x1a8
[<ffffffc000082a58>] do_one_initcall+0xe8/0x1ec
[<ffffffc000ca7be8>] kernel_init_freeable+0x1c8/0x284
[<ffffffc0008d90b8>] kernel_init+0x1c/0xe4
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Sumit Saxena <sumit.saxena@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 90,333 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int snd_compr_partial_drain(struct snd_compr_stream *stream)
{
int retval;
if (stream->runtime->state == SNDRV_PCM_STATE_PREPARED ||
stream->runtime->state == SNDRV_PCM_STATE_SETUP)
return -EPERM;
/* stream can be drained only when next track has been signalled */
if (stream->next_track == false)
return -EPERM;
retval = stream->ops->trigger(stream, SND_COMPR_TRIGGER_PARTIAL_DRAIN);
if (retval) {
pr_debug("Partial drain returned failure\n");
wake_up(&stream->runtime->sleep);
return retval;
}
stream->next_track = false;
return snd_compress_wait_for_drain(stream);
}
Commit Message: ALSA: compress: fix an integer overflow check
I previously added an integer overflow check here but looking at it now,
it's still buggy.
The bug happens in snd_compr_allocate_buffer(). We multiply
".fragments" and ".fragment_size" and that doesn't overflow but then we
save it in an unsigned int so it truncates the high bits away and we
allocate a smaller than expected size.
Fixes: b35cc8225845 ('ALSA: compress_core: integer overflow in snd_compr_allocate_buffer()')
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: | 0 | 58,085 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CheckFocusedElementTask() { }
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 102,605 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool TabStrip::ShouldPaintAsActiveFrame() const {
return controller_->ShouldPaintAsActiveFrame();
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 140,784 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int do_move_page_to_node_array(struct mm_struct *mm,
struct page_to_node *pm,
int migrate_all)
{
int err;
struct page_to_node *pp;
LIST_HEAD(pagelist);
down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
/*
* Build a list of pages to migrate
*/
for (pp = pm; pp->node != MAX_NUMNODES; pp++) {
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
struct page *page;
err = -EFAULT;
vma = find_vma(mm, pp->addr);
if (!vma || pp->addr < vma->vm_start || !vma_migratable(vma))
goto set_status;
/* FOLL_DUMP to ignore special (like zero) pages */
page = follow_page(vma, pp->addr,
FOLL_GET | FOLL_SPLIT | FOLL_DUMP);
err = PTR_ERR(page);
if (IS_ERR(page))
goto set_status;
err = -ENOENT;
if (!page)
goto set_status;
pp->page = page;
err = page_to_nid(page);
if (err == pp->node)
/*
* Node already in the right place
*/
goto put_and_set;
err = -EACCES;
if (page_mapcount(page) > 1 &&
!migrate_all)
goto put_and_set;
if (PageHuge(page)) {
if (PageHead(page))
isolate_huge_page(page, &pagelist);
goto put_and_set;
}
err = isolate_lru_page(page);
if (!err) {
list_add_tail(&page->lru, &pagelist);
inc_zone_page_state(page, NR_ISOLATED_ANON +
page_is_file_cache(page));
}
put_and_set:
/*
* Either remove the duplicate refcount from
* isolate_lru_page() or drop the page ref if it was
* not isolated.
*/
put_page(page);
set_status:
pp->status = err;
}
err = 0;
if (!list_empty(&pagelist)) {
err = migrate_pages(&pagelist, new_page_node, NULL,
(unsigned long)pm, MIGRATE_SYNC, MR_SYSCALL);
if (err)
putback_movable_pages(&pagelist);
}
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
return err;
}
Commit Message: mm: migrate dirty page without clear_page_dirty_for_io etc
clear_page_dirty_for_io() has accumulated writeback and memcg subtleties
since v2.6.16 first introduced page migration; and the set_page_dirty()
which completed its migration of PageDirty, later had to be moderated to
__set_page_dirty_nobuffers(); then PageSwapBacked had to skip that too.
No actual problems seen with this procedure recently, but if you look into
what the clear_page_dirty_for_io(page)+set_page_dirty(newpage) is actually
achieving, it turns out to be nothing more than moving the PageDirty flag,
and its NR_FILE_DIRTY stat from one zone to another.
It would be good to avoid a pile of irrelevant decrementations and
incrementations, and improper event counting, and unnecessary descent of
the radix_tree under tree_lock (to set the PAGECACHE_TAG_DIRTY which
radix_tree_replace_slot() left in place anyway).
Do the NR_FILE_DIRTY movement, like the other stats movements, while
interrupts still disabled in migrate_page_move_mapping(); and don't even
bother if the zone is the same. Do the PageDirty movement there under
tree_lock too, where old page is frozen and newpage not yet visible:
bearing in mind that as soon as newpage becomes visible in radix_tree, an
un-page-locked set_page_dirty() might interfere (or perhaps that's just
not possible: anything doing so should already hold an additional
reference to the old page, preventing its migration; but play safe).
But we do still need to transfer PageDirty in migrate_page_copy(), for
those who don't go the mapping route through migrate_page_move_mapping().
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 54,470 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: buf_new(void)
{
buf_t *buf = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(buf_t));
buf->magic = BUFFER_MAGIC;
buf->default_chunk_size = 4096;
return buf;
}
Commit Message: Add a one-word sentinel value of 0x0 at the end of each buf_t chunk
This helps protect against bugs where any part of a buf_t's memory
is passed to a function that expects a NUL-terminated input.
It also closes TROVE-2016-10-001 (aka bug 20384).
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 73,153 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int vfs_path_lookup(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
const char *name, unsigned int flags,
struct path *path)
{
struct path root = {.mnt = mnt, .dentry = dentry};
/* the first argument of filename_lookup() is ignored with root */
return filename_lookup(AT_FDCWD, getname_kernel(name),
flags , path, &root);
}
Commit Message: vfs: Test for and handle paths that are unreachable from their mnt_root
In rare cases a directory can be renamed out from under a bind mount.
In those cases without special handling it becomes possible to walk up
the directory tree to the root dentry of the filesystem and down
from the root dentry to every other file or directory on the filesystem.
Like division by zero .. from an unconnected path can not be given
a useful semantic as there is no predicting at which path component
the code will realize it is unconnected. We certainly can not match
the current behavior as the current behavior is a security hole.
Therefore when encounting .. when following an unconnected path
return -ENOENT.
- Add a function path_connected to verify path->dentry is reachable
from path->mnt.mnt_root. AKA to validate that rename did not do
something nasty to the bind mount.
To avoid races path_connected must be called after following a path
component to it's next path component.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 43,694 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ksba_ocsp_release (ksba_ocsp_t ocsp)
{
struct ocsp_reqitem_s *ri;
if (!ocsp)
return;
xfree (ocsp->digest_oid);
xfree (ocsp->request_buffer);
for (; (ri=ocsp->requestlist); ri = ocsp->requestlist )
{
ocsp->requestlist = ri->next;
ksba_cert_release (ri->cert);
ksba_cert_release (ri->issuer_cert);
release_ocsp_extensions (ri->single_extensions);
xfree (ri->serialno);
}
xfree (ocsp->sigval);
xfree (ocsp->responder_id.name);
xfree (ocsp->responder_id.keyid);
release_ocsp_certlist (ocsp->received_certs);
release_ocsp_extensions (ocsp->response_extensions);
xfree (ocsp);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 10,908 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void logsignal(int s) {
if (!arg_debug)
return;
openlog("firejail", LOG_NDELAY | LOG_PID, LOG_USER);
syslog(LOG_INFO, "Signal %d caught", s);
closelog();
}
Commit Message: replace copy_file with copy_file_as_user
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 96,086 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void _php_date_tzinfo_dtor(void *tzinfo)
{
timelib_tzinfo **tzi = (timelib_tzinfo **)tzinfo;
timelib_tzinfo_dtor(*tzi);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 6,299 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int fr_lmi_recv(struct net_device *dev, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
hdlc_device *hdlc = dev_to_hdlc(dev);
pvc_device *pvc;
u8 rxseq, txseq;
int lmi = state(hdlc)->settings.lmi;
int dce = state(hdlc)->settings.dce;
int stat_len = (lmi == LMI_CISCO) ? 6 : 3, reptype, error, no_ram, i;
if (skb->len < (lmi == LMI_ANSI ? LMI_ANSI_LENGTH :
LMI_CCITT_CISCO_LENGTH)) {
netdev_info(dev, "Short LMI frame\n");
return 1;
}
if (skb->data[3] != (lmi == LMI_CISCO ? NLPID_CISCO_LMI :
NLPID_CCITT_ANSI_LMI)) {
netdev_info(dev, "Received non-LMI frame with LMI DLCI\n");
return 1;
}
if (skb->data[4] != LMI_CALLREF) {
netdev_info(dev, "Invalid LMI Call reference (0x%02X)\n",
skb->data[4]);
return 1;
}
if (skb->data[5] != (dce ? LMI_STATUS_ENQUIRY : LMI_STATUS)) {
netdev_info(dev, "Invalid LMI Message type (0x%02X)\n",
skb->data[5]);
return 1;
}
if (lmi == LMI_ANSI) {
if (skb->data[6] != LMI_ANSI_LOCKSHIFT) {
netdev_info(dev, "Not ANSI locking shift in LMI message (0x%02X)\n",
skb->data[6]);
return 1;
}
i = 7;
} else
i = 6;
if (skb->data[i] != (lmi == LMI_CCITT ? LMI_CCITT_REPTYPE :
LMI_ANSI_CISCO_REPTYPE)) {
netdev_info(dev, "Not an LMI Report type IE (0x%02X)\n",
skb->data[i]);
return 1;
}
if (skb->data[++i] != LMI_REPT_LEN) {
netdev_info(dev, "Invalid LMI Report type IE length (%u)\n",
skb->data[i]);
return 1;
}
reptype = skb->data[++i];
if (reptype != LMI_INTEGRITY && reptype != LMI_FULLREP) {
netdev_info(dev, "Unsupported LMI Report type (0x%02X)\n",
reptype);
return 1;
}
if (skb->data[++i] != (lmi == LMI_CCITT ? LMI_CCITT_ALIVE :
LMI_ANSI_CISCO_ALIVE)) {
netdev_info(dev, "Not an LMI Link integrity verification IE (0x%02X)\n",
skb->data[i]);
return 1;
}
if (skb->data[++i] != LMI_INTEG_LEN) {
netdev_info(dev, "Invalid LMI Link integrity verification IE length (%u)\n",
skb->data[i]);
return 1;
}
i++;
state(hdlc)->rxseq = skb->data[i++]; /* TX sequence from peer */
rxseq = skb->data[i++]; /* Should confirm our sequence */
txseq = state(hdlc)->txseq;
if (dce)
state(hdlc)->last_poll = jiffies;
error = 0;
if (!state(hdlc)->reliable)
error = 1;
if (rxseq == 0 || rxseq != txseq) { /* Ask for full report next time */
state(hdlc)->n391cnt = 0;
error = 1;
}
if (dce) {
if (state(hdlc)->fullrep_sent && !error) {
/* Stop sending full report - the last one has been confirmed by DTE */
state(hdlc)->fullrep_sent = 0;
pvc = state(hdlc)->first_pvc;
while (pvc) {
if (pvc->state.new) {
pvc->state.new = 0;
/* Tell DTE that new PVC is now active */
state(hdlc)->dce_changed = 1;
}
pvc = pvc->next;
}
}
if (state(hdlc)->dce_changed) {
reptype = LMI_FULLREP;
state(hdlc)->fullrep_sent = 1;
state(hdlc)->dce_changed = 0;
}
state(hdlc)->request = 1; /* got request */
fr_lmi_send(dev, reptype == LMI_FULLREP ? 1 : 0);
return 0;
}
/* DTE */
state(hdlc)->request = 0; /* got response, no request pending */
if (error)
return 0;
if (reptype != LMI_FULLREP)
return 0;
pvc = state(hdlc)->first_pvc;
while (pvc) {
pvc->state.deleted = 1;
pvc = pvc->next;
}
no_ram = 0;
while (skb->len >= i + 2 + stat_len) {
u16 dlci;
u32 bw;
unsigned int active, new;
if (skb->data[i] != (lmi == LMI_CCITT ? LMI_CCITT_PVCSTAT :
LMI_ANSI_CISCO_PVCSTAT)) {
netdev_info(dev, "Not an LMI PVC status IE (0x%02X)\n",
skb->data[i]);
return 1;
}
if (skb->data[++i] != stat_len) {
netdev_info(dev, "Invalid LMI PVC status IE length (%u)\n",
skb->data[i]);
return 1;
}
i++;
new = !! (skb->data[i + 2] & 0x08);
active = !! (skb->data[i + 2] & 0x02);
if (lmi == LMI_CISCO) {
dlci = (skb->data[i] << 8) | skb->data[i + 1];
bw = (skb->data[i + 3] << 16) |
(skb->data[i + 4] << 8) |
(skb->data[i + 5]);
} else {
dlci = ((skb->data[i] & 0x3F) << 4) |
((skb->data[i + 1] & 0x78) >> 3);
bw = 0;
}
pvc = add_pvc(dev, dlci);
if (!pvc && !no_ram) {
netdev_warn(dev, "Memory squeeze on fr_lmi_recv()\n");
no_ram = 1;
}
if (pvc) {
pvc->state.exist = 1;
pvc->state.deleted = 0;
if (active != pvc->state.active ||
new != pvc->state.new ||
bw != pvc->state.bandwidth ||
!pvc->state.exist) {
pvc->state.new = new;
pvc->state.active = active;
pvc->state.bandwidth = bw;
pvc_carrier(active, pvc);
fr_log_dlci_active(pvc);
}
}
i += stat_len;
}
pvc = state(hdlc)->first_pvc;
while (pvc) {
if (pvc->state.deleted && pvc->state.exist) {
pvc_carrier(0, pvc);
pvc->state.active = pvc->state.new = 0;
pvc->state.exist = 0;
pvc->state.bandwidth = 0;
fr_log_dlci_active(pvc);
}
pvc = pvc->next;
}
/* Next full report after N391 polls */
state(hdlc)->n391cnt = state(hdlc)->settings.n391;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 23,913 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: unsigned long vma_kernel_pagesize(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
struct hstate *hstate;
if (!is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma))
return PAGE_SIZE;
hstate = hstate_vma(vma);
return 1UL << huge_page_shift(hstate);
}
Commit Message: userfaultfd: hugetlbfs: prevent UFFDIO_COPY to fill beyond the end of i_size
This oops:
kernel BUG at fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c:484!
RIP: remove_inode_hugepages+0x3d0/0x410
Call Trace:
hugetlbfs_setattr+0xd9/0x130
notify_change+0x292/0x410
do_truncate+0x65/0xa0
do_sys_ftruncate.constprop.3+0x11a/0x180
SyS_ftruncate+0xe/0x10
tracesys+0xd9/0xde
was caused by the lack of i_size check in hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte.
mmap() can still succeed beyond the end of the i_size after vmtruncate
zapped vmas in those ranges, but the faults must not succeed, and that
includes UFFDIO_COPY.
We could differentiate the retval to userland to represent a SIGBUS like
a page fault would do (vs SIGSEGV), but it doesn't seem very useful and
we'd need to pick a random retval as there's no meaningful syscall
retval that would differentiate from SIGSEGV and SIGBUS, there's just
-EFAULT.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171016223914.2421-2-aarcange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 86,441 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void VoidMethodSequenceTestInterfaceEmptyArgMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
ExceptionState exception_state(info.GetIsolate(), ExceptionState::kExecutionContext, "TestObject", "voidMethodSequenceTestInterfaceEmptyArg");
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() < 1)) {
exception_state.ThrowTypeError(ExceptionMessages::NotEnoughArguments(1, info.Length()));
return;
}
HeapVector<Member<TestInterfaceEmpty>> test_interface_empty_sequence_arg;
test_interface_empty_sequence_arg = NativeValueTraits<IDLSequence<TestInterfaceEmpty>>::NativeValue(info.GetIsolate(), info[0], exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return;
impl->voidMethodSequenceTestInterfaceEmptyArg(test_interface_empty_sequence_arg);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 135,469 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int truncate_xattr_node(struct inode *inode, struct page *page)
{
struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = F2FS_I_SB(inode);
nid_t nid = F2FS_I(inode)->i_xattr_nid;
struct dnode_of_data dn;
struct page *npage;
if (!nid)
return 0;
npage = get_node_page(sbi, nid);
if (IS_ERR(npage))
return PTR_ERR(npage);
f2fs_i_xnid_write(inode, 0);
set_new_dnode(&dn, inode, page, npage, nid);
if (page)
dn.inode_page_locked = true;
truncate_node(&dn);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix race condition in between free nid allocator/initializer
In below concurrent case, allocated nid can be loaded into free nid cache
and be allocated again.
Thread A Thread B
- f2fs_create
- f2fs_new_inode
- alloc_nid
- __insert_nid_to_list(ALLOC_NID_LIST)
- f2fs_balance_fs_bg
- build_free_nids
- __build_free_nids
- scan_nat_page
- add_free_nid
- __lookup_nat_cache
- f2fs_add_link
- init_inode_metadata
- new_inode_page
- new_node_page
- set_node_addr
- alloc_nid_done
- __remove_nid_from_list(ALLOC_NID_LIST)
- __insert_nid_to_list(FREE_NID_LIST)
This patch makes nat cache lookup and free nid list operation being atomical
to avoid this race condition.
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 85,302 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLFormControlElement::setFormAction(const AtomicString& value) {
setAttribute(formactionAttr, value);
}
Commit Message: Form validation: Do not show validation bubble if the page is invisible.
BUG=673163
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2572813003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#438476}
CWE ID: CWE-1021 | 0 | 139,990 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: vips_foreign_load_gif_file_init( VipsForeignLoadGifFile *file )
{
}
Commit Message: fetch map after DGifGetImageDesc()
Earlier refactoring broke GIF map fetch.
CWE ID: | 0 | 87,353 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int cg_mkdir(const char *path, mode_t mode)
{
struct fuse_context *fc = fuse_get_context();
char *fpath = NULL, *path1, *cgdir = NULL, *controller, *next = NULL;
const char *cgroup;
int ret;
if (!fc)
return -EIO;
controller = pick_controller_from_path(fc, path);
if (!controller)
return -EINVAL;
cgroup = find_cgroup_in_path(path);
if (!cgroup)
return -EINVAL;
get_cgdir_and_path(cgroup, &cgdir, &fpath);
if (!fpath)
path1 = "/";
else
path1 = cgdir;
if (!caller_is_in_ancestor(fc->pid, controller, path1, &next)) {
if (fpath && strcmp(next, fpath) == 0)
ret = -EEXIST;
else
ret = -ENOENT;
goto out;
}
if (!fc_may_access(fc, controller, path1, NULL, O_RDWR)) {
ret = -EACCES;
goto out;
}
if (!caller_is_in_ancestor(fc->pid, controller, path1, NULL)) {
ret = -EACCES;
goto out;
}
ret = cgfs_create(controller, cgroup, fc->uid, fc->gid);
printf("cgfs_create returned %d for %s %s\n", ret, controller, cgroup);
out:
free(cgdir);
free(next);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Implement privilege check when moving tasks
When writing pids to a tasks file in lxcfs, lxcfs was checking
for privilege over the tasks file but not over the pid being
moved. Since the cgm_movepid request is done as root on the host,
not with the requestor's credentials, we must copy the check which
cgmanager was doing to ensure that the requesting task is allowed
to change the victim task's cgroup membership.
This is CVE-2015-1344
https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/lxcfs/+bug/1512854
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 44,378 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static RList *r_bin_wasm_get_code_entries (RBinWasmObj *bin, RBinWasmSection *sec) {
RList *ret = NULL;
RBinWasmCodeEntry *ptr = NULL;
if (!(ret = r_list_newf ((RListFree)free))) {
return NULL;
}
ut8* buf = bin->buf->buf + (ut32)sec->payload_data;
ut32 len = sec->payload_len;
ut32 count = sec->count;
ut32 i = 0, j = 0, r = 0;
size_t n = 0;
while (i < len && r < count) {
if (!(ptr = R_NEW0 (RBinWasmCodeEntry))) {
return ret;
}
if (!(n = consume_u32 (buf + i, buf + len, &ptr->body_size, &i))) {
free (ptr);
return ret;
}
if (!(i + ptr->body_size - 1 < len)) {
free (ptr);
return ret;
}
j = i;
if (!(n = consume_u32 (buf + i, buf + len, &ptr->local_count, &i))) {
free (ptr);
return ret;
}
if ((n = consume_locals (buf + i, buf + len, ptr->local_count,ptr, &i)) < ptr->local_count) {
free (ptr);
return ret;
}
ptr->code = sec->payload_data + i;
ptr->len = ptr->body_size - (i - j);
i += ptr->len - 1; // consume bytecode
if (!(consume_u8 (buf + i, buf + len, &ptr->byte, &i))) {
free (ptr);
return ret;
}
if (ptr->byte != R_BIN_WASM_END_OF_CODE) {
free (ptr);
return ret;
}
r_list_append (ret, ptr);
r += 1;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix crash in fuzzed wasm r2_hoobr_consume_init_expr
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 67,074 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: smb_ofile_set_quota_resume(smb_ofile_t *ofile, char *resume)
{
ASSERT(ofile);
mutex_enter(&ofile->f_mutex);
if (resume == NULL)
bzero(ofile->f_quota_resume, SMB_SID_STRSZ);
else
(void) strlcpy(ofile->f_quota_resume, resume, SMB_SID_STRSZ);
mutex_exit(&ofile->f_mutex);
}
Commit Message: 7483 SMB flush on pipe triggers NULL pointer dereference in module smbsrv
Reviewed by: Gordon Ross <gwr@nexenta.com>
Reviewed by: Matt Barden <matt.barden@nexenta.com>
Reviewed by: Evan Layton <evan.layton@nexenta.com>
Reviewed by: Dan McDonald <danmcd@omniti.com>
Approved by: Gordon Ross <gwr@nexenta.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 73,774 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int f2fs_statfs(struct dentry *dentry, struct kstatfs *buf)
{
struct super_block *sb = dentry->d_sb;
struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = F2FS_SB(sb);
u64 id = huge_encode_dev(sb->s_bdev->bd_dev);
block_t total_count, user_block_count, start_count, ovp_count;
u64 avail_node_count;
total_count = le64_to_cpu(sbi->raw_super->block_count);
user_block_count = sbi->user_block_count;
start_count = le32_to_cpu(sbi->raw_super->segment0_blkaddr);
ovp_count = SM_I(sbi)->ovp_segments << sbi->log_blocks_per_seg;
buf->f_type = F2FS_SUPER_MAGIC;
buf->f_bsize = sbi->blocksize;
buf->f_blocks = total_count - start_count;
buf->f_bfree = user_block_count - valid_user_blocks(sbi) + ovp_count;
buf->f_bavail = user_block_count - valid_user_blocks(sbi) -
sbi->reserved_blocks;
avail_node_count = sbi->total_node_count - F2FS_RESERVED_NODE_NUM;
if (avail_node_count > user_block_count) {
buf->f_files = user_block_count;
buf->f_ffree = buf->f_bavail;
} else {
buf->f_files = avail_node_count;
buf->f_ffree = min(avail_node_count - valid_node_count(sbi),
buf->f_bavail);
}
buf->f_namelen = F2FS_NAME_LEN;
buf->f_fsid.val[0] = (u32)id;
buf->f_fsid.val[1] = (u32)(id >> 32);
#ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA
if (is_inode_flag_set(dentry->d_inode, FI_PROJ_INHERIT) &&
sb_has_quota_limits_enabled(sb, PRJQUOTA)) {
f2fs_statfs_project(sb, F2FS_I(dentry->d_inode)->i_projid, buf);
}
#endif
return 0;
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix potential panic during fstrim
As Ju Hyung Park reported:
"When 'fstrim' is called for manual trim, a BUG() can be triggered
randomly with this patch.
I'm seeing this issue on both x86 Desktop and arm64 Android phone.
On x86 Desktop, this was caused during Ubuntu boot-up. I have a
cronjob installed which calls 'fstrim -v /' during boot. On arm64
Android, this was caused during GC looping with 1ms gc_min_sleep_time
& gc_max_sleep_time."
Root cause of this issue is that f2fs_wait_discard_bios can only be
used by f2fs_put_super, because during put_super there must be no
other referrers, so it can ignore discard entry's reference count
when removing the entry, otherwise in other caller we will hit bug_on
in __remove_discard_cmd as there may be other issuer added reference
count in discard entry.
Thread A Thread B
- issue_discard_thread
- f2fs_ioc_fitrim
- f2fs_trim_fs
- f2fs_wait_discard_bios
- __issue_discard_cmd
- __submit_discard_cmd
- __wait_discard_cmd
- dc->ref++
- __wait_one_discard_bio
- __wait_discard_cmd
- __remove_discard_cmd
- f2fs_bug_on(sbi, dc->ref)
Fixes: 969d1b180d987c2be02de890d0fff0f66a0e80de
Reported-by: Ju Hyung Park <qkrwngud825@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 86,059 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderSVGImage::invalidateBufferedForeground()
{
m_bufferedForeground.clear();
}
Commit Message: Avoid drawing SVG image content when the image is of zero size.
R=pdr
BUG=330420
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/109753004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@164536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 123,632 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool fwnet_pd_is_complete(struct fwnet_partial_datagram *pd)
{
struct fwnet_fragment_info *fi;
fi = list_entry(pd->fi_list.next, struct fwnet_fragment_info, fi_link);
return fi->len == pd->datagram_size;
}
Commit Message: firewire: net: guard against rx buffer overflows
The IP-over-1394 driver firewire-net lacked input validation when
handling incoming fragmented datagrams. A maliciously formed fragment
with a respectively large datagram_offset would cause a memcpy past the
datagram buffer.
So, drop any packets carrying a fragment with offset + length larger
than datagram_size.
In addition, ensure that
- GASP header, unfragmented encapsulation header, or fragment
encapsulation header actually exists before we access it,
- the encapsulated datagram or fragment is of nonzero size.
Reported-by: Eyal Itkin <eyal.itkin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Eyal Itkin <eyal.itkin@gmail.com>
Fixes: CVE 2016-8633
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stefan Richter <stefanr@s5r6.in-berlin.de>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 49,341 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int read_capacity_10(struct scsi_disk *sdkp, struct scsi_device *sdp,
unsigned char *buffer)
{
unsigned char cmd[16];
struct scsi_sense_hdr sshdr;
int sense_valid = 0;
int the_result;
int retries = 3, reset_retries = READ_CAPACITY_RETRIES_ON_RESET;
sector_t lba;
unsigned sector_size;
do {
cmd[0] = READ_CAPACITY;
memset(&cmd[1], 0, 9);
memset(buffer, 0, 8);
the_result = scsi_execute_req(sdp, cmd, DMA_FROM_DEVICE,
buffer, 8, &sshdr,
SD_TIMEOUT, SD_MAX_RETRIES, NULL);
if (media_not_present(sdkp, &sshdr))
return -ENODEV;
if (the_result) {
sense_valid = scsi_sense_valid(&sshdr);
if (sense_valid &&
sshdr.sense_key == UNIT_ATTENTION &&
sshdr.asc == 0x29 && sshdr.ascq == 0x00)
/* Device reset might occur several times,
* give it one more chance */
if (--reset_retries > 0)
continue;
}
retries--;
} while (the_result && retries);
if (the_result) {
sd_printk(KERN_NOTICE, sdkp, "READ CAPACITY failed\n");
read_capacity_error(sdkp, sdp, &sshdr, sense_valid, the_result);
return -EINVAL;
}
sector_size = get_unaligned_be32(&buffer[4]);
lba = get_unaligned_be32(&buffer[0]);
if (sdp->no_read_capacity_16 && (lba == 0xffffffff)) {
/* Some buggy (usb cardreader) devices return an lba of
0xffffffff when the want to report a size of 0 (with
which they really mean no media is present) */
sdkp->capacity = 0;
sdkp->physical_block_size = sector_size;
return sector_size;
}
if ((sizeof(sdkp->capacity) == 4) && (lba == 0xffffffff)) {
sd_printk(KERN_ERR, sdkp, "Too big for this kernel. Use a "
"kernel compiled with support for large block "
"devices.\n");
sdkp->capacity = 0;
return -EOVERFLOW;
}
sdkp->capacity = lba + 1;
sdkp->physical_block_size = sector_size;
return sector_size;
}
Commit Message: block: fail SCSI passthrough ioctls on partition devices
Linux allows executing the SG_IO ioctl on a partition or LVM volume, and
will pass the command to the underlying block device. This is
well-known, but it is also a large security problem when (via Unix
permissions, ACLs, SELinux or a combination thereof) a program or user
needs to be granted access only to part of the disk.
This patch lets partitions forward a small set of harmless ioctls;
others are logged with printk so that we can see which ioctls are
actually sent. In my tests only CDROM_GET_CAPABILITY actually occurred.
Of course it was being sent to a (partition on a) hard disk, so it would
have failed with ENOTTY and the patch isn't changing anything in
practice. Still, I'm treating it specially to avoid spamming the logs.
In principle, this restriction should include programs running with
CAP_SYS_RAWIO. If for example I let a program access /dev/sda2 and
/dev/sdb, it still should not be able to read/write outside the
boundaries of /dev/sda2 independent of the capabilities. However, for
now programs with CAP_SYS_RAWIO will still be allowed to send the
ioctls. Their actions will still be logged.
This patch does not affect the non-libata IDE driver. That driver
however already tests for bd != bd->bd_contains before issuing some
ioctl; it could be restricted further to forbid these ioctls even for
programs running with CAP_SYS_ADMIN/CAP_SYS_RAWIO.
Cc: linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: James Bottomley <JBottomley@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
[ Make it also print the command name when warning - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 94,377 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool WebContentsImpl::AddDomainInfoToRapporSample(rappor::Sample* sample) {
sample->SetStringField("Domain", ::rappor::GetDomainAndRegistrySampleFromGURL(
GetLastCommittedURL()));
return true;
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 135,629 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int security_port_sid(u8 protocol, u16 port, u32 *out_sid)
{
struct ocontext *c;
int rc = 0;
read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_PORT];
while (c) {
if (c->u.port.protocol == protocol &&
c->u.port.low_port <= port &&
c->u.port.high_port >= port)
break;
c = c->next;
}
if (c) {
if (!c->sid[0]) {
rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
&c->context[0],
&c->sid[0]);
if (rc)
goto out;
}
*out_sid = c->sid[0];
} else {
*out_sid = SECINITSID_PORT;
}
out:
read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: SELinux: Fix kernel BUG on empty security contexts.
Setting an empty security context (length=0) on a file will
lead to incorrectly dereferencing the type and other fields
of the security context structure, yielding a kernel BUG.
As a zero-length security context is never valid, just reject
all such security contexts whether coming from userspace
via setxattr or coming from the filesystem upon a getxattr
request by SELinux.
Setting a security context value (empty or otherwise) unknown to
SELinux in the first place is only possible for a root process
(CAP_MAC_ADMIN), and, if running SELinux in enforcing mode, only
if the corresponding SELinux mac_admin permission is also granted
to the domain by policy. In Fedora policies, this is only allowed for
specific domains such as livecd for setting down security contexts
that are not defined in the build host policy.
Reproducer:
su
setenforce 0
touch foo
setfattr -n security.selinux foo
Caveat:
Relabeling or removing foo after doing the above may not be possible
without booting with SELinux disabled. Any subsequent access to foo
after doing the above will also trigger the BUG.
BUG output from Matthew Thode:
[ 473.893141] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 473.962110] kernel BUG at security/selinux/ss/services.c:654!
[ 473.995314] invalid opcode: 0000 [#6] SMP
[ 474.027196] Modules linked in:
[ 474.058118] CPU: 0 PID: 8138 Comm: ls Tainted: G D I
3.13.0-grsec #1
[ 474.116637] Hardware name: Supermicro X8ST3/X8ST3, BIOS 2.0
07/29/10
[ 474.149768] task: ffff8805f50cd010 ti: ffff8805f50cd488 task.ti:
ffff8805f50cd488
[ 474.183707] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff814681c7>] [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 474.219954] RSP: 0018:ffff8805c0ac3c38 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 474.252253] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8805c0ac3d94 RCX:
0000000000000100
[ 474.287018] RDX: ffff8805e8aac000 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI:
ffff8805e8aaa000
[ 474.321199] RBP: ffff8805c0ac3cb8 R08: 0000000000000010 R09:
0000000000000006
[ 474.357446] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8805c567a000 R12:
0000000000000006
[ 474.419191] R13: ffff8805c2b74e88 R14: 00000000000001da R15:
0000000000000000
[ 474.453816] FS: 00007f2e75220800(0000) GS:ffff88061fc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 474.489254] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 474.522215] CR2: 00007f2e74716090 CR3: 00000005c085e000 CR4:
00000000000207f0
[ 474.556058] Stack:
[ 474.584325] ffff8805c0ac3c98 ffffffff811b549b ffff8805c0ac3c98
ffff8805f1190a40
[ 474.618913] ffff8805a6202f08 ffff8805c2b74e88 00068800d0464990
ffff8805e8aac860
[ 474.653955] ffff8805c0ac3cb8 000700068113833a ffff880606c75060
ffff8805c0ac3d94
[ 474.690461] Call Trace:
[ 474.723779] [<ffffffff811b549b>] ? lookup_fast+0x1cd/0x22a
[ 474.778049] [<ffffffff81468824>] security_compute_av+0xf4/0x20b
[ 474.811398] [<ffffffff8196f419>] avc_compute_av+0x2a/0x179
[ 474.843813] [<ffffffff8145727b>] avc_has_perm+0x45/0xf4
[ 474.875694] [<ffffffff81457d0e>] inode_has_perm+0x2a/0x31
[ 474.907370] [<ffffffff81457e76>] selinux_inode_getattr+0x3c/0x3e
[ 474.938726] [<ffffffff81455cf6>] security_inode_getattr+0x1b/0x22
[ 474.970036] [<ffffffff811b057d>] vfs_getattr+0x19/0x2d
[ 475.000618] [<ffffffff811b05e5>] vfs_fstatat+0x54/0x91
[ 475.030402] [<ffffffff811b063b>] vfs_lstat+0x19/0x1b
[ 475.061097] [<ffffffff811b077e>] SyS_newlstat+0x15/0x30
[ 475.094595] [<ffffffff8113c5c1>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xa1/0xc3
[ 475.148405] [<ffffffff8197791e>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[ 475.179201] Code: 00 48 85 c0 48 89 45 b8 75 02 0f 0b 48 8b 45 a0 48
8b 3d 45 d0 b6 00 8b 40 08 89 c6 ff ce e8 d1 b0 06 00 48 85 c0 49 89 c7
75 02 <0f> 0b 48 8b 45 b8 4c 8b 28 eb 1e 49 8d 7d 08 be 80 01 00 00 e8
[ 475.255884] RIP [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 475.296120] RSP <ffff8805c0ac3c38>
[ 475.328734] ---[ end trace f076482e9d754adc ]---
Reported-by: Matthew Thode <mthode@mthode.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 39,292 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pRxNetDescriptor ReceiveQueueGetBuffer(PPARANDIS_RECEIVE_QUEUE pQueue)
{
PLIST_ENTRY pListEntry = NdisInterlockedRemoveHeadList(&pQueue->BuffersList, &pQueue->Lock);
return pListEntry ? CONTAINING_RECORD(pListEntry, RxNetDescriptor, ReceiveQueueListEntry) : NULL;
}
Commit Message: NetKVM: BZ#1169718: More rigoruous testing of incoming packet
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <yhindin@rehat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 74,399 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int iwbmp_read_palette(struct iwbmprcontext *rctx)
{
size_t i;
iw_byte buf[4*256];
size_t b;
unsigned int valid_palette_entries;
size_t valid_palette_nbytes;
b = (rctx->bmpversion==2) ? 3 : 4; // bytes per palette entry
if(rctx->infoheader_size==64) {
if(rctx->fileheader_size + rctx->infoheader_size + rctx->palette_entries*3 ==
rctx->bfOffBits)
{
iw_warning(rctx->ctx,"BMP bitmap overlaps colormap; assuming colormap uses 3 bytes per entry instead of 4");
b = 3;
rctx->palette_nbytes = 3*rctx->palette_entries;
}
}
valid_palette_entries = (rctx->palette_entries<=256) ? rctx->palette_entries : 256;
valid_palette_nbytes = valid_palette_entries * b;
if(!iwbmp_read(rctx,buf,valid_palette_nbytes)) return 0;
rctx->palette.num_entries = valid_palette_entries;
for(i=0;i<valid_palette_entries;i++) {
rctx->palette.entry[i].b = buf[i*b+0];
rctx->palette.entry[i].g = buf[i*b+1];
rctx->palette.entry[i].r = buf[i*b+2];
rctx->palette.entry[i].a = 255;
}
if(rctx->palette_nbytes > valid_palette_nbytes) {
iwbmp_skip_bytes(rctx, rctx->palette_nbytes - valid_palette_nbytes);
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Fixed a bug that could cause invalid memory to be accessed
The bug could happen when transparency is removed from an image.
Also fixed a semi-related BMP error handling logic bug.
Fixes issue #21
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 64,868 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int checkTestFile(const char *filename) {
struct stat buf;
if (stat(filename, &buf) == -1)
return(0);
#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(__CYGWIN__)
if (!(buf.st_mode & _S_IFREG))
return(0);
#else
if (!S_ISREG(buf.st_mode))
return(0);
#endif
return(1);
}
Commit Message: Fix handling of parameter-entity references
There were two bugs where parameter-entity references could lead to an
unexpected change of the input buffer in xmlParseNameComplex and
xmlDictLookup being called with an invalid pointer.
Percent sign in DTD Names
=========================
The NEXTL macro used to call xmlParserHandlePEReference. When parsing
"complex" names inside the DTD, this could result in entity expansion
which created a new input buffer. The fix is to simply remove the call
to xmlParserHandlePEReference from the NEXTL macro. This is safe because
no users of the macro require expansion of parameter entities.
- xmlParseNameComplex
- xmlParseNCNameComplex
- xmlParseNmtoken
The percent sign is not allowed in names, which are grammatical tokens.
- xmlParseEntityValue
Parameter-entity references in entity values are expanded but this
happens in a separate step in this function.
- xmlParseSystemLiteral
Parameter-entity references are ignored in the system literal.
- xmlParseAttValueComplex
- xmlParseCharDataComplex
- xmlParseCommentComplex
- xmlParsePI
- xmlParseCDSect
Parameter-entity references are ignored outside the DTD.
- xmlLoadEntityContent
This function is only called from xmlStringLenDecodeEntities and
entities are replaced in a separate step immediately after the function
call.
This bug could also be triggered with an internal subset and double
entity expansion.
This fixes bug 766956 initially reported by Wei Lei and independently by
Chromium's ClusterFuzz, Hanno Böck, and Marco Grassi. Thanks to everyone
involved.
xmlParseNameComplex with XML_PARSE_OLD10
========================================
When parsing Names inside an expanded parameter entity with the
XML_PARSE_OLD10 option, xmlParseNameComplex would call xmlGROW via the
GROW macro if the input buffer was exhausted. At the end of the
parameter entity's replacement text, this function would then call
xmlPopInput which invalidated the input buffer.
There should be no need to invoke GROW in this situation because the
buffer is grown periodically every XML_PARSER_CHUNK_SIZE characters and,
at least for UTF-8, in xmlCurrentChar. This also matches the code path
executed when XML_PARSE_OLD10 is not set.
This fixes bugs 781205 (CVE-2017-9049) and 781361 (CVE-2017-9050).
Thanks to Marcel Böhme and Thuan Pham for the report.
Additional hardening
====================
A separate check was added in xmlParseNameComplex to validate the
buffer size.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 59,568 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void set_vma_resv_map(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct resv_map *map)
{
VM_BUG_ON(!is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma));
VM_BUG_ON(vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYSHARE);
set_vma_private_data(vma, (get_vma_private_data(vma) &
HPAGE_RESV_MASK) | (unsigned long)map);
}
Commit Message: hugetlb: fix resv_map leak in error path
When called for anonymous (non-shared) mappings, hugetlb_reserve_pages()
does a resv_map_alloc(). It depends on code in hugetlbfs's
vm_ops->close() to release that allocation.
However, in the mmap() failure path, we do a plain unmap_region() without
the remove_vma() which actually calls vm_ops->close().
This is a decent fix. This leak could get reintroduced if new code (say,
after hugetlb_reserve_pages() in hugetlbfs_file_mmap()) decides to return
an error. But, I think it would have to unroll the reservation anyway.
Christoph's test case:
http://marc.info/?l=linux-mm&m=133728900729735
This patch applies to 3.4 and later. A version for earlier kernels is at
https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/5/22/418.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie>
Acked-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Reported-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Tested-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [2.6.32+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 19,759 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: on_refresh_button_clicked(void *user_data, Evas_Object *refresh_button, void *event_info)
{
Browser_Window *app_data = (Browser_Window *)user_data;
Evas *evas = evas_object_evas_get(refresh_button);
Eina_Bool ctrlPressed = evas_key_modifier_is_set(evas_key_modifier_get(evas), "Control");
if (ctrlPressed) {
info("Reloading and bypassing cache...\n");
ewk_view_reload_bypass_cache(app_data->webview);
} else {
info("Reloading...\n");
ewk_view_reload(app_data->webview);
}
}
Commit Message: [EFL][WK2] Add --window-size command line option to EFL MiniBrowser
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=100942
Patch by Mikhail Pozdnyakov <mikhail.pozdnyakov@intel.com> on 2012-11-05
Reviewed by Kenneth Rohde Christiansen.
Added window-size (-s) command line option to EFL MiniBrowser.
* MiniBrowser/efl/main.c:
(window_create):
(parse_window_size):
(elm_main):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@133450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 106,632 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void append_buffer_info( MyString &url, const char *method, char const *path )
{
MyString buffer_list;
MyString buffer_string;
MyString dir;
MyString file;
int s,bs,ps;
int result;
filename_split(path,dir,file);
/* Do not buffer special device files, whether local or remote */
if(!strncmp(path,"/dev/",5)) return;
/* Get the default buffer setting */
pseudo_get_buffer_info( &s, &bs, &ps );
/* Now check for individual file overrides */
/* These lines have the same syntax as a remap list */
if(Shadow->getJobAd()->LookupString(ATTR_BUFFER_FILES,buffer_list)) {
if( filename_remap_find(buffer_list.Value(),path,buffer_string) ||
filename_remap_find(buffer_list.Value(),file.Value(),buffer_string) ) {
/* If the file is merely mentioned, turn on the default buffer */
url += "buffer:";
/* If there is also a size setting, use that */
result = sscanf(buffer_string.Value(),"(%d,%d)",&s,&bs);
if( result==2 ) url += buffer_string;
return;
}
}
/* Turn on buffering if the value is set and is not special or local */
/* In this case, use the simple syntax 'buffer:' so as not to confuse old libs */
if( s>0 && bs>0 && strcmp(method,"local") && strcmp(method,"special") ) {
url += "buffer:";
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 16,360 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void dwc3_gadget_disconnect_interrupt(struct dwc3 *dwc)
{
int reg;
reg = dwc3_readl(dwc->regs, DWC3_DCTL);
reg &= ~DWC3_DCTL_INITU1ENA;
dwc3_writel(dwc->regs, DWC3_DCTL, reg);
reg &= ~DWC3_DCTL_INITU2ENA;
dwc3_writel(dwc->regs, DWC3_DCTL, reg);
dwc3_disconnect_gadget(dwc);
dwc->gadget.speed = USB_SPEED_UNKNOWN;
dwc->setup_packet_pending = false;
usb_gadget_set_state(&dwc->gadget, USB_STATE_NOTATTACHED);
dwc->connected = false;
}
Commit Message: usb: dwc3: gadget: never call ->complete() from ->ep_queue()
This is a requirement which has always existed but, somehow, wasn't
reflected in the documentation and problems weren't found until now
when Tuba Yavuz found a possible deadlock happening between dwc3 and
f_hid. She described the situation as follows:
spin_lock_irqsave(&hidg->write_spinlock, flags); // first acquire
/* we our function has been disabled by host */
if (!hidg->req) {
free_ep_req(hidg->in_ep, hidg->req);
goto try_again;
}
[...]
status = usb_ep_queue(hidg->in_ep, hidg->req, GFP_ATOMIC);
=>
[...]
=> usb_gadget_giveback_request
=>
f_hidg_req_complete
=>
spin_lock_irqsave(&hidg->write_spinlock, flags); // second acquire
Note that this happens because dwc3 would call ->complete() on a
failed usb_ep_queue() due to failed Start Transfer command. This is,
anyway, a theoretical situation because dwc3 currently uses "No
Response Update Transfer" command for Bulk and Interrupt endpoints.
It's still good to make this case impossible to happen even if the "No
Reponse Update Transfer" command is changed.
Reported-by: Tuba Yavuz <tuba@ece.ufl.edu>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 88,652 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static __net_init int pppoe_init_net(struct net *net)
{
struct pppoe_net *pn = pppoe_pernet(net);
struct proc_dir_entry *pde;
rwlock_init(&pn->hash_lock);
pde = proc_create("pppoe", S_IRUGO, net->proc_net, &pppoe_seq_fops);
#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
if (!pde)
return -ENOMEM;
#endif
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 40,286 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gsm_xsmp_server_finalize (GObject *object)
{
GsmXsmpServer *xsmp_server;
g_return_if_fail (object != NULL);
g_return_if_fail (GSM_IS_XSMP_SERVER (object));
xsmp_server = GSM_XSMP_SERVER (object);
g_return_if_fail (xsmp_server->priv != NULL);
IceFreeListenObjs (xsmp_server->priv->num_xsmp_sockets,
xsmp_server->priv->xsmp_sockets);
if (xsmp_server->priv->client_store != NULL) {
g_object_unref (xsmp_server->priv->client_store);
}
G_OBJECT_CLASS (gsm_xsmp_server_parent_class)->finalize (object);
}
Commit Message: [gsm] Delay the creation of the GsmXSMPClient until it really exists
We used to create the GsmXSMPClient before the XSMP connection is really
accepted. This can lead to some issues, though. An example is:
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=598211#c19. Quoting:
"What is happening is that a new client (probably metacity in your
case) is opening an ICE connection in the GSM_MANAGER_PHASE_END_SESSION
phase, which causes a new GsmXSMPClient to be added to the client
store. The GSM_MANAGER_PHASE_EXIT phase then begins before the client
has had a chance to establish a xsmp connection, which means that
client->priv->conn will not be initialized at the point that xsmp_stop
is called on the new unregistered client."
The fix is to create the GsmXSMPClient object when there's a real XSMP
connection. This implies moving the timeout that makes sure we don't
have an empty client to the XSMP server.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=598211
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 63,595 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SubresourceFilter* FrameFetchContext::GetSubresourceFilter() const {
if (IsDetached())
return nullptr;
DocumentLoader* document_loader = MasterDocumentLoader();
return document_loader ? document_loader->GetSubresourceFilter() : nullptr;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 138,755 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const GURL& ExecuteCodeInTabFunction::GetWebViewSrc() const {
return GURL::EmptyGURL();
}
Commit Message: Call CanCaptureVisiblePage in page capture API.
Currently the pageCapture permission allows access
to arbitrary local files and chrome:// pages which
can be a security concern. In order to address this,
the page capture API needs to be changed similar to
the captureVisibleTab API. The API will now only allow
extensions to capture otherwise-restricted URLs if the
user has granted activeTab. In addition, file:// URLs are
only capturable with the "Allow on file URLs" option enabled.
Bug: 893087
Change-Id: I6d6225a3efb70fc033e2e1c031c633869afac624
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1330689
Commit-Queue: Bettina Dea <bdea@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Varun Khaneja <vakh@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#615248}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 151,493 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: char *http_escape_string(const char *inp, char *buf,
const unsigned int len)
{
int max;
char *index_c;
unsigned char c;
int found_a_colon = 0;
max = len * 3;
if (buf == NULL && max)
buf = malloc(sizeof (unsigned char) * (max + 1));
if (buf == NULL)
return NULL;
index_c = buf;
while ((c = *inp++)) {
if (c == ':' && !found_a_colon && index_c > buf) {
found_a_colon = 1;
memmove(buf + 2, buf, (index_c - buf));
*buf = '.';
*(buf + 1) = '/';
index_c += 2;
*index_c++ = ':';
} else if (needs_escape((unsigned int) c) || c == '?') {
*index_c++ = '%';
*index_c++ = INT_TO_HEX((c >> 4) & 0xf);
*index_c++ = INT_TO_HEX(c & 0xf);
} else
*index_c++ = c;
}
*index_c = '\0';
return buf;
}
Commit Message: misc oom and possible memory leak fix
CWE ID: | 0 | 91,837 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: luks_unlock_device_not_seen_cb (gpointer user_data)
{
UnlockEncryptionData *data = user_data;
g_signal_handler_disconnect (data->device->priv->daemon, data->device_added_signal_handler_id);
g_signal_handler_disconnect (data->device->priv->daemon, data->device_changed_signal_handler_id);
throw_error (data->context,
ERROR_FAILED,
"Error unlocking device: timeout (10s) waiting for cleartext device to show up");
if (data->hook_func != NULL)
{
data->hook_func (data->context, NULL, data->hook_user_data);
}
unlock_encryption_data_unref (data);
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 11,773 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void UserCloudPolicyManagerFactoryChromeOS::BrowserContextShutdown(
content::BrowserContext* context) {
Profile* profile = static_cast<Profile*>(context);
if (profile->IsOffTheRecord())
return;
UserCloudPolicyManagerChromeOS* manager = GetManagerForProfile(profile);
if (manager)
manager->Shutdown();
}
Commit Message: Make the policy fetch for first time login blocking
The CL makes policy fetching for first time login blocking for all users, except the ones that are known to be non-enterprise users.
BUG=334584
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/330843002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@282925 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 110,404 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LocalSiteCharacteristicsDataImpl::NotifyLoadedSiteForegrounded() {
DecrementNumLoadedBackgroundTabs();
}
Commit Message: Connect the LocalDB to TabManager.
Bug: 773382
Change-Id: Iec8fe5226ee175105d51f300f30b4865478ac099
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1118611
Commit-Queue: Sébastien Marchand <sebmarchand@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <fdoray@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572871}
CWE ID: | 0 | 132,056 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeContentBrowserClientExtensionsPart::ResourceDispatcherHostCreated() {
content::ResourceDispatcherHost::Get()->RegisterInterceptor(
"Origin", kExtensionScheme, base::Bind(&OnHttpHeaderReceived));
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Update navigations across hypothetical extension extents
Update code to treat navigations across hypothetical extension extents
(e.g. for nonexistent extensions) the same as we do for navigations
crossing installed extension extents.
Bug: 598265
Change-Id: Ibdf2f563ce1fd108ead279077901020a24de732b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/617180
Commit-Queue: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#495779}
CWE ID: | 0 | 151,006 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoActiveTexture(GLenum texture_unit) {
GLuint texture_index = texture_unit - GL_TEXTURE0;
if (texture_index >= group_->max_texture_units()) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "glActiveTexture: texture_unit out of range.");
return;
}
active_texture_unit_ = texture_index;
glActiveTexture(texture_unit);
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 99,116 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: authenticate (const struct passwd *pw)
{
const struct passwd *lpw = NULL;
const char *cp, *srvname = NULL;
int retval;
switch (su_mode) {
case SU_MODE:
srvname = simulate_login ? PAM_SRVNAME_SU_L : PAM_SRVNAME_SU;
break;
case RUNUSER_MODE:
srvname = simulate_login ? PAM_SRVNAME_RUNUSER_L : PAM_SRVNAME_RUNUSER;
break;
default:
abort();
break;
}
retval = pam_start (srvname, pw->pw_name, &conv, &pamh);
if (is_pam_failure(retval))
goto done;
if (isatty (0) && (cp = ttyname (0)) != NULL)
{
const char *tty;
if (strncmp (cp, "/dev/", 5) == 0)
tty = cp + 5;
else
tty = cp;
retval = pam_set_item (pamh, PAM_TTY, tty);
if (is_pam_failure(retval))
goto done;
}
lpw = current_getpwuid ();
if (lpw && lpw->pw_name)
{
retval = pam_set_item (pamh, PAM_RUSER, (const void *) lpw->pw_name);
if (is_pam_failure(retval))
goto done;
}
if (su_mode == RUNUSER_MODE)
{
/*
* This is the only difference between runuser(1) and su(1). The command
* runuser(1) does not required authentication, because user is root.
*/
if (restricted)
errx(EXIT_FAILURE, _("may not be used by non-root users"));
return;
}
retval = pam_authenticate (pamh, 0);
if (is_pam_failure(retval))
goto done;
retval = pam_acct_mgmt (pamh, 0);
if (retval == PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD)
{
/* Password has expired. Offer option to change it. */
retval = pam_chauthtok (pamh, PAM_CHANGE_EXPIRED_AUTHTOK);
}
done:
log_syslog(pw, !is_pam_failure(retval));
if (is_pam_failure(retval))
{
const char *msg;
log_btmp(pw);
msg = pam_strerror(pamh, retval);
pam_end(pamh, retval);
sleep (getlogindefs_num ("FAIL_DELAY", 1));
errx (EXIT_FAILURE, "%s", msg?msg:_("incorrect password"));
}
}
Commit Message: su: properly clear child PID
Reported-by: Tobias Stöckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 86,493 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ext3_mark_dquot_dirty(struct dquot *dquot)
{
/* Are we journaling quotas? */
if (EXT3_SB(dquot->dq_sb)->s_qf_names[USRQUOTA] ||
EXT3_SB(dquot->dq_sb)->s_qf_names[GRPQUOTA]) {
dquot_mark_dquot_dirty(dquot);
return ext3_write_dquot(dquot);
} else {
return dquot_mark_dquot_dirty(dquot);
}
}
Commit Message: ext3: Fix format string issues
ext3_msg() takes the printk prefix as the second parameter and the
format string as the third parameter. Two callers of ext3_msg omit the
prefix and pass the format string as the second parameter and the first
parameter to the format string as the third parameter. In both cases
this string comes from an arbitrary source. Which means the string may
contain format string characters, which will
lead to undefined and potentially harmful behavior.
The issue was introduced in commit 4cf46b67eb("ext3: Unify log messages
in ext3") and is fixed by this patch.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 32,933 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int aiptek_open(struct input_dev *inputdev)
{
struct aiptek *aiptek = input_get_drvdata(inputdev);
aiptek->urb->dev = aiptek->usbdev;
if (usb_submit_urb(aiptek->urb, GFP_KERNEL) != 0)
return -EIO;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Input: aiptek - fix crash on detecting device without endpoints
The aiptek driver crashes in aiptek_probe() when a specially crafted USB
device without endpoints is detected. This fix adds a check that the device
has proper configuration expected by the driver. Also an error return value
is changed to more matching one in one of the error paths.
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <ralf@spenneberg.net>
Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 57,623 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NavigationRequest::ResetForCrossDocumentRestart() {
DCHECK(
FrameMsg_Navigate_Type::IsSameDocument(common_params_.navigation_type));
navigation_handle_.reset();
if (common_params_.navigation_type ==
FrameMsg_Navigate_Type::HISTORY_SAME_DOCUMENT) {
common_params_.navigation_type =
FrameMsg_Navigate_Type::HISTORY_DIFFERENT_DOCUMENT;
} else {
DCHECK(common_params_.navigation_type ==
FrameMsg_Navigate_Type::SAME_DOCUMENT);
common_params_.navigation_type = FrameMsg_Navigate_Type::DIFFERENT_DOCUMENT;
}
state_ = NOT_STARTED;
}
Commit Message: Check ancestors when setting an <iframe> navigation's "site for cookies".
Currently, we're setting the "site for cookies" only by looking at the
top-level document. We ought to be verifying that the ancestor frames
are same-site before doing so. We do this correctly in Blink (see
`Document::SiteForCookies`), but didn't do so when navigating in the
browser.
This patch addresses the majority of the problem by walking the ancestor
chain when processing a NavigationRequest. If all the ancestors are
same-site, we set the "site for cookies" to the top-level document's URL.
If they aren't all same-site, we set it to an empty URL to ensure that
we don't send SameSite cookies.
Bug: 833847
Change-Id: Icd77f31fa618fa9f8b59fc3b15e1bed6ee05aabd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1025772
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553942}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 144,129 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int pmcraid_copy_sglist(
struct pmcraid_sglist *sglist,
unsigned long buffer,
u32 len,
int direction
)
{
struct scatterlist *scatterlist;
void *kaddr;
int bsize_elem;
int i;
int rc = 0;
/* Determine the actual number of bytes per element */
bsize_elem = PAGE_SIZE * (1 << sglist->order);
scatterlist = sglist->scatterlist;
for (i = 0; i < (len / bsize_elem); i++, buffer += bsize_elem) {
struct page *page = sg_page(&scatterlist[i]);
kaddr = kmap(page);
if (direction == DMA_TO_DEVICE)
rc = __copy_from_user(kaddr,
(void *)buffer,
bsize_elem);
else
rc = __copy_to_user((void *)buffer, kaddr, bsize_elem);
kunmap(page);
if (rc) {
pmcraid_err("failed to copy user data into sg list\n");
return -EFAULT;
}
scatterlist[i].length = bsize_elem;
}
if (len % bsize_elem) {
struct page *page = sg_page(&scatterlist[i]);
kaddr = kmap(page);
if (direction == DMA_TO_DEVICE)
rc = __copy_from_user(kaddr,
(void *)buffer,
len % bsize_elem);
else
rc = __copy_to_user((void *)buffer,
kaddr,
len % bsize_elem);
kunmap(page);
scatterlist[i].length = len % bsize_elem;
}
if (rc) {
pmcraid_err("failed to copy user data into sg list\n");
rc = -EFAULT;
}
return rc;
}
Commit Message: [SCSI] pmcraid: reject negative request size
There's a code path in pmcraid that can be reached via device ioctl that
causes all sorts of ugliness, including heap corruption or triggering the
OOM killer due to consecutive allocation of large numbers of pages.
First, the user can call pmcraid_chr_ioctl(), with a type
PMCRAID_PASSTHROUGH_IOCTL. This calls through to
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough(). Next, a pmcraid_passthrough_ioctl_buffer
is copied in, and the request_size variable is set to
buffer->ioarcb.data_transfer_length, which is an arbitrary 32-bit
signed value provided by the user. If a negative value is provided
here, bad things can happen. For example,
pmcraid_build_passthrough_ioadls() is called with this request_size,
which immediately calls pmcraid_alloc_sglist() with a negative size.
The resulting math on allocating a scatter list can result in an
overflow in the kzalloc() call (if num_elem is 0, the sglist will be
smaller than expected), or if num_elem is unexpectedly large the
subsequent loop will call alloc_pages() repeatedly, a high number of
pages will be allocated and the OOM killer might be invoked.
It looks like preventing this value from being negative in
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough() would be sufficient.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <JBottomley@Parallels.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 26,430 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void UrlFetcher::SetUploadData(const std::string& upload_content_type,
const std::string& upload_content) {
core_->SetUploadData(upload_content_type, upload_content);
}
Commit Message: Remove UrlFetcher from remoting and use the one in net instead.
BUG=133790
TEST=Stop and restart the Me2Me host. It should still work.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10637008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143798 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 105,307 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: zip_alloc_decryption_buffer(struct archive_read *a)
{
struct zip *zip = (struct zip *)(a->format->data);
size_t bs = 256 * 1024;
if (zip->decrypted_buffer == NULL) {
zip->decrypted_buffer_size = bs;
zip->decrypted_buffer = malloc(bs);
if (zip->decrypted_buffer == NULL) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM,
"No memory for ZIP decryption");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
}
zip->decrypted_ptr = zip->decrypted_buffer;
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
Commit Message: Issue #656: Fix CVE-2016-1541, VU#862384
When reading OS X metadata entries in Zip archives that were stored
without compression, libarchive would use the uncompressed entry size
to allocate a buffer but would use the compressed entry size to limit
the amount of data copied into that buffer. Since the compressed
and uncompressed sizes are provided by data in the archive itself,
an attacker could manipulate these values to write data beyond
the end of the allocated buffer.
This fix provides three new checks to guard against such
manipulation and to make libarchive generally more robust when
handling this type of entry:
1. If an OS X metadata entry is stored without compression,
abort the entire archive if the compressed and uncompressed
data sizes do not match.
2. When sanity-checking the size of an OS X metadata entry,
abort this entry if either the compressed or uncompressed
size is larger than 4MB.
3. When copying data into the allocated buffer, check the copy
size against both the compressed entry size and uncompressed
entry size.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 55,733 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Box *mfro_New()
{
ISOM_DECL_BOX_ALLOC(GF_MovieFragmentRandomAccessOffsetBox, GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_MFRO);
return (GF_Box *)tmp;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,242 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void write_ecryptfs_marker(char *page_virt, size_t *written)
{
u32 m_1, m_2;
get_random_bytes(&m_1, (MAGIC_ECRYPTFS_MARKER_SIZE_BYTES / 2));
m_2 = (m_1 ^ MAGIC_ECRYPTFS_MARKER);
put_unaligned_be32(m_1, page_virt);
page_virt += (MAGIC_ECRYPTFS_MARKER_SIZE_BYTES / 2);
put_unaligned_be32(m_2, page_virt);
(*written) = MAGIC_ECRYPTFS_MARKER_SIZE_BYTES;
}
Commit Message: eCryptfs: Remove buggy and unnecessary write in file name decode routine
Dmitry Chernenkov used KASAN to discover that eCryptfs writes past the
end of the allocated buffer during encrypted filename decoding. This
fix corrects the issue by getting rid of the unnecessary 0 write when
the current bit offset is 2.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v2.6.29+: 51ca58d eCryptfs: Filename Encryption: Encoding and encryption functions
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 45,453 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool AXNodeObject::isReadOnly() const {
Node* node = this->getNode();
if (!node)
return true;
if (isHTMLTextAreaElement(*node))
return toHTMLTextAreaElement(*node).isReadOnly();
if (isHTMLInputElement(*node)) {
HTMLInputElement& input = toHTMLInputElement(*node);
if (input.isTextField())
return input.isReadOnly();
}
return !hasEditableStyle(*node);
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,184 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mrb_obj_extend(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_int argc, mrb_value *argv, mrb_value obj)
{
mrb_int i;
if (argc == 0) {
mrb_raise(mrb, E_ARGUMENT_ERROR, "wrong number of arguments (at least 1)");
}
for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
mrb_check_type(mrb, argv[i], MRB_TT_MODULE);
}
while (argc--) {
mrb_funcall(mrb, argv[argc], "extend_object", 1, obj);
mrb_funcall(mrb, argv[argc], "extended", 1, obj);
}
return obj;
}
Commit Message: Allow `Object#clone` to copy frozen status only; fix #4036
Copying all flags from the original object may overwrite the clone's
flags e.g. the embedded flag.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 82,188 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: noinline struct pt_regs * __cpuinit __attribute__((weak)) idle_regs(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
memset(regs, 0, sizeof(struct pt_regs));
return regs;
}
Commit Message: pids: fix fork_idle() to setup ->pids correctly
copy_process(pid => &init_struct_pid) doesn't do attach_pid/etc.
It shouldn't, but this means that the idle threads run with the wrong
pids copied from the caller's task_struct. In x86 case the caller is
either kernel_init() thread or keventd.
In particular, this means that after the series of cpu_up/cpu_down an
idle thread (which never exits) can run with .pid pointing to nowhere.
Change fork_idle() to initialize idle->pids[] correctly. We only set
.pid = &init_struct_pid but do not add .node to list, INIT_TASK() does
the same for the boot-cpu idle thread (swapper).
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Cedric Le Goater <clg@fr.ibm.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Herbert Poetzl <herbert@13thfloor.at>
Cc: Mathias Krause <Mathias.Krause@secunet.com>
Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 96,417 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void key_alloc_serial(struct key *key)
{
struct rb_node *parent, **p;
struct key *xkey;
/* propose a random serial number and look for a hole for it in the
* serial number tree */
do {
get_random_bytes(&key->serial, sizeof(key->serial));
key->serial >>= 1; /* negative numbers are not permitted */
} while (key->serial < 3);
spin_lock(&key_serial_lock);
attempt_insertion:
parent = NULL;
p = &key_serial_tree.rb_node;
while (*p) {
parent = *p;
xkey = rb_entry(parent, struct key, serial_node);
if (key->serial < xkey->serial)
p = &(*p)->rb_left;
else if (key->serial > xkey->serial)
p = &(*p)->rb_right;
else
goto serial_exists;
}
/* we've found a suitable hole - arrange for this key to occupy it */
rb_link_node(&key->serial_node, parent, p);
rb_insert_color(&key->serial_node, &key_serial_tree);
spin_unlock(&key_serial_lock);
return;
/* we found a key with the proposed serial number - walk the tree from
* that point looking for the next unused serial number */
serial_exists:
for (;;) {
key->serial++;
if (key->serial < 3) {
key->serial = 3;
goto attempt_insertion;
}
parent = rb_next(parent);
if (!parent)
goto attempt_insertion;
xkey = rb_entry(parent, struct key, serial_node);
if (key->serial < xkey->serial)
goto attempt_insertion;
}
}
Commit Message: KEYS: potential uninitialized variable
If __key_link_begin() failed then "edit" would be uninitialized. I've
added a check to fix that.
This allows a random user to crash the kernel, though it's quite
difficult to achieve. There are three ways it can be done as the user
would have to cause an error to occur in __key_link():
(1) Cause the kernel to run out of memory. In practice, this is difficult
to achieve without ENOMEM cropping up elsewhere and aborting the
attempt.
(2) Revoke the destination keyring between the keyring ID being looked up
and it being tested for revocation. In practice, this is difficult to
time correctly because the KEYCTL_REJECT function can only be used
from the request-key upcall process. Further, users can only make use
of what's in /sbin/request-key.conf, though this does including a
rejection debugging test - which means that the destination keyring
has to be the caller's session keyring in practice.
(3) Have just enough key quota available to create a key, a new session
keyring for the upcall and a link in the session keyring, but not then
sufficient quota to create a link in the nominated destination keyring
so that it fails with EDQUOT.
The bug can be triggered using option (3) above using something like the
following:
echo 80 >/proc/sys/kernel/keys/root_maxbytes
keyctl request2 user debug:fred negate @t
The above sets the quota to something much lower (80) to make the bug
easier to trigger, but this is dependent on the system. Note also that
the name of the keyring created contains a random number that may be
between 1 and 10 characters in size, so may throw the test off by
changing the amount of quota used.
Assuming the failure occurs, something like the following will be seen:
kfree_debugcheck: out of range ptr 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b68h
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at ../mm/slab.c:2821!
...
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff811600f9>] kfree_debugcheck+0x20/0x25
RSP: 0018:ffff8804014a7de8 EFLAGS: 00010092
RAX: 0000000000000034 RBX: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b68 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000040001 RSI: 00000000000000f6 RDI: 0000000000000300
RBP: ffff8804014a7df0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff8804014a7e68 R11: 0000000000000054 R12: 0000000000000202
R13: ffffffff81318a66 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000001
...
Call Trace:
kfree+0xde/0x1bc
assoc_array_cancel_edit+0x1f/0x36
__key_link_end+0x55/0x63
key_reject_and_link+0x124/0x155
keyctl_reject_key+0xb6/0xe0
keyctl_negate_key+0x10/0x12
SyS_keyctl+0x9f/0xe7
do_syscall_64+0x63/0x13a
entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
Fixes: f70e2e06196a ('KEYS: Do preallocation for __key_link()')
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 53,297 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoTexParameteri(
GLenum target, GLenum pname, GLint param) {
TextureManager::TextureInfo* info = GetTextureInfoForTarget(target);
if (!info) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glTexParameteri: unknown texture");
return;
}
if (!texture_manager()->SetParameter(feature_info_, info, pname, param)) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "glTexParameteri: param GL_INVALID_ENUM");
return;
}
glTexParameteri(target, pname, param);
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 99,173 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SyncBackendHost::StartSyncingWithServer() {
VLOG(1) << "SyncBackendHost::StartSyncingWithServer called.";
core_thread_.message_loop()->PostTask(FROM_HERE,
NewRunnableMethod(core_.get(), &SyncBackendHost::Core::DoStartSyncing));
}
Commit Message: Enable HistoryModelWorker by default, now that bug 69561 is fixed.
BUG=69561
TEST=Run sync manually and run integration tests, sync should not crash.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7016007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@85211 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 101,487 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: menu_add_separator(WebKitWebView *page, GArray *argv, GString *result) {
(void) page;
(void) result;
add_separator_to_menu(argv, WEBKIT_HIT_TEST_RESULT_CONTEXT_DOCUMENT);
}
Commit Message: disable Uzbl javascript object because of security problem.
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 18,372 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int SRP_Verify_A_mod_N(BIGNUM *A, BIGNUM *N)
{
/* Checks if A % N == 0 */
return SRP_Verify_B_mod_N(A,N) ;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 12,457 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::WheelEventAck(
const blink::WebMouseWheelEvent& event,
InputEventAckState ack_result) {
if (overscroll_controller_) {
overscroll_controller_->ReceivedEventACK(
event, (INPUT_EVENT_ACK_STATE_CONSUMED == ack_result));
}
}
Commit Message: Allocate a FrameSinkId for RenderWidgetHostViewAura in mus+ash
RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame expects its parent to have a valid
FrameSinkId. Make sure RenderWidgetHostViewAura has a FrameSinkId even
if DelegatedFrameHost is not used (in mus+ash).
BUG=706553
TBR=jam@chromium.org
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2847253003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468179}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 132,321 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void __ksm_exit(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
struct mm_slot *mm_slot;
int easy_to_free = 0;
/*
* This process is exiting: if it's straightforward (as is the
* case when ksmd was never running), free mm_slot immediately.
* But if it's at the cursor or has rmap_items linked to it, use
* mmap_sem to synchronize with any break_cows before pagetables
* are freed, and leave the mm_slot on the list for ksmd to free.
* Beware: ksm may already have noticed it exiting and freed the slot.
*/
spin_lock(&ksm_mmlist_lock);
mm_slot = get_mm_slot(mm);
if (mm_slot && ksm_scan.mm_slot != mm_slot) {
if (!mm_slot->rmap_list) {
hlist_del(&mm_slot->link);
list_del(&mm_slot->mm_list);
easy_to_free = 1;
} else {
list_move(&mm_slot->mm_list,
&ksm_scan.mm_slot->mm_list);
}
}
spin_unlock(&ksm_mmlist_lock);
if (easy_to_free) {
free_mm_slot(mm_slot);
clear_bit(MMF_VM_MERGEABLE, &mm->flags);
mmdrop(mm);
} else if (mm_slot) {
down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
}
}
Commit Message: ksm: fix NULL pointer dereference in scan_get_next_rmap_item()
Andrea Righi reported a case where an exiting task can race against
ksmd::scan_get_next_rmap_item (http://lkml.org/lkml/2011/6/1/742) easily
triggering a NULL pointer dereference in ksmd.
ksm_scan.mm_slot == &ksm_mm_head with only one registered mm
CPU 1 (__ksm_exit) CPU 2 (scan_get_next_rmap_item)
list_empty() is false
lock slot == &ksm_mm_head
list_del(slot->mm_list)
(list now empty)
unlock
lock
slot = list_entry(slot->mm_list.next)
(list is empty, so slot is still ksm_mm_head)
unlock
slot->mm == NULL ... Oops
Close this race by revalidating that the new slot is not simply the list
head again.
Andrea's test case:
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#define BUFSIZE getpagesize()
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
void *ptr;
if (posix_memalign(&ptr, getpagesize(), BUFSIZE) < 0) {
perror("posix_memalign");
exit(1);
}
if (madvise(ptr, BUFSIZE, MADV_MERGEABLE) < 0) {
perror("madvise");
exit(1);
}
*(char *)NULL = 0;
return 0;
}
Reported-by: Andrea Righi <andrea@betterlinux.com>
Tested-by: Andrea Righi <andrea@betterlinux.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 27,248 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xfs_setattr_time(
struct xfs_inode *ip,
struct iattr *iattr)
{
struct inode *inode = VFS_I(ip);
ASSERT(xfs_isilocked(ip, XFS_ILOCK_EXCL));
if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_ATIME)
inode->i_atime = iattr->ia_atime;
if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_CTIME)
inode->i_ctime = iattr->ia_ctime;
if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_MTIME)
inode->i_mtime = iattr->ia_mtime;
}
Commit Message: xfs: fix missing ILOCK unlock when xfs_setattr_nonsize fails due to EDQUOT
Benjamin Moody reported to Debian that XFS partially wedges when a chgrp
fails on account of being out of disk quota. I ran his reproducer
script:
# adduser dummy
# adduser dummy plugdev
# dd if=/dev/zero bs=1M count=100 of=test.img
# mkfs.xfs test.img
# mount -t xfs -o gquota test.img /mnt
# mkdir -p /mnt/dummy
# chown -c dummy /mnt/dummy
# xfs_quota -xc 'limit -g bsoft=100k bhard=100k plugdev' /mnt
(and then as user dummy)
$ dd if=/dev/urandom bs=1M count=50 of=/mnt/dummy/foo
$ chgrp plugdev /mnt/dummy/foo
and saw:
================================================
WARNING: lock held when returning to user space!
5.3.0-rc5 #rc5 Tainted: G W
------------------------------------------------
chgrp/47006 is leaving the kernel with locks still held!
1 lock held by chgrp/47006:
#0: 000000006664ea2d (&xfs_nondir_ilock_class){++++}, at: xfs_ilock+0xd2/0x290 [xfs]
...which is clearly caused by xfs_setattr_nonsize failing to unlock the
ILOCK after the xfs_qm_vop_chown_reserve call fails. Add the missing
unlock.
Reported-by: benjamin.moody@gmail.com
Fixes: 253f4911f297 ("xfs: better xfs_trans_alloc interface")
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 88,335 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void nfc_llcp_recv(void *data, struct sk_buff *skb, int err)
{
struct nfc_llcp_local *local = (struct nfc_llcp_local *) data;
pr_debug("Received an LLCP PDU\n");
if (err < 0) {
pr_err("err %d\n", err);
return;
}
__nfc_llcp_recv(local, skb);
}
Commit Message: net: nfc: Fix NULL dereference on nfc_llcp_build_tlv fails
KASAN report this:
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in nfc_llcp_build_gb+0x37f/0x540 [nfc]
Read of size 3 at addr 0000000000000000 by task syz-executor.0/5401
CPU: 0 PID: 5401 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc7+ #45
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0xfa/0x1ce lib/dump_stack.c:113
kasan_report+0x171/0x18d mm/kasan/report.c:321
memcpy+0x1f/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:130
nfc_llcp_build_gb+0x37f/0x540 [nfc]
nfc_llcp_register_device+0x6eb/0xb50 [nfc]
nfc_register_device+0x50/0x1d0 [nfc]
nfcsim_device_new+0x394/0x67d [nfcsim]
? 0xffffffffc1080000
nfcsim_init+0x6b/0x1000 [nfcsim]
do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887
do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460
load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808
__do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902
do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f9cb79dcc58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000280 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f9cb79dcc70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f9cb79dd6bc
R13: 00000000004bcefb R14: 00000000006f7030 R15: 0000000000000004
nfc_llcp_build_tlv will return NULL on fails, caller should check it,
otherwise will trigger a NULL dereference.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: eda21f16a5ed ("NFC: Set MIU and RW values from CONNECT and CC LLCP frames")
Fixes: d646960f7986 ("NFC: Initial LLCP support")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 89,705 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: viz::HostFrameSinkManager* CompositorImpl::GetHostFrameSinkManager() {
return &CompositorDependencies::Get().host_frame_sink_manager;
}
Commit Message: gpu/android : Add support for partial swap with surface control.
Add support for PostSubBuffer to GLSurfaceEGLSurfaceControl. This should
allow the display compositor to draw the minimum sub-rect necessary from
the damage tracking in BufferQueue on the client-side, and also to pass
this damage rect to the framework.
R=piman@chromium.org
Bug: 926020
Change-Id: I73d3320cab68250d4c6865bf21c5531682d8bf61
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1457467
Commit-Queue: Khushal <khushalsagar@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Khushal <khushalsagar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629852}
CWE ID: | 0 | 130,826 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int sigprocmask(int how, sigset_t *set, sigset_t *oldset)
{
int error;
spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
if (oldset)
*oldset = current->blocked;
error = 0;
switch (how) {
case SIG_BLOCK:
sigorsets(¤t->blocked, ¤t->blocked, set);
break;
case SIG_UNBLOCK:
signandsets(¤t->blocked, ¤t->blocked, set);
break;
case SIG_SETMASK:
current->blocked = *set;
break;
default:
error = -EINVAL;
}
recalc_sigpending();
spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
return error;
}
Commit Message: Prevent rt_sigqueueinfo and rt_tgsigqueueinfo from spoofing the signal code
Userland should be able to trust the pid and uid of the sender of a
signal if the si_code is SI_TKILL.
Unfortunately, the kernel has historically allowed sigqueueinfo() to
send any si_code at all (as long as it was negative - to distinguish it
from kernel-generated signals like SIGILL etc), so it could spoof a
SI_TKILL with incorrect siginfo values.
Happily, it looks like glibc has always set si_code to the appropriate
SI_QUEUE, so there are probably no actual user code that ever uses
anything but the appropriate SI_QUEUE flag.
So just tighten the check for si_code (we used to allow any negative
value), and add a (one-time) warning in case there are binaries out
there that might depend on using other si_code values.
Signed-off-by: Julien Tinnes <jln@google.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 35,194 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ContentSuggestionsNotifierService::RegisterProfilePrefs(
user_prefs::PrefRegistrySyncable* registry) {
registry->RegisterIntegerPref(
prefs::kContentSuggestionsConsecutiveIgnoredPrefName, 0);
registry->RegisterStringPref(kNotificationIDWithinCategory, std::string());
}
Commit Message: NTP: cap number of notifications/day
1 by default; Finch-configurable.
BUG=689465
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2691023002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450389}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 172,038 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MojoResult DataPipeConsumerDispatcher::ReadData(
const MojoReadDataOptions& options,
void* elements,
uint32_t* num_bytes) {
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
if (!shared_ring_buffer_.IsValid() || in_transit_)
return MOJO_RESULT_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (in_two_phase_read_)
return MOJO_RESULT_BUSY;
const bool had_new_data = new_data_available_;
new_data_available_ = false;
if ((options.flags & MOJO_READ_DATA_FLAG_QUERY)) {
if ((options.flags & MOJO_READ_DATA_FLAG_PEEK) ||
(options.flags & MOJO_READ_DATA_FLAG_DISCARD))
return MOJO_RESULT_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
DCHECK(!(options.flags & MOJO_READ_DATA_FLAG_DISCARD)); // Handled above.
DVLOG_IF(2, elements) << "Query mode: ignoring non-null |elements|";
*num_bytes = static_cast<uint32_t>(bytes_available_);
if (had_new_data)
watchers_.NotifyState(GetHandleSignalsStateNoLock());
return MOJO_RESULT_OK;
}
bool discard = false;
if ((options.flags & MOJO_READ_DATA_FLAG_DISCARD)) {
if (options.flags & MOJO_READ_DATA_FLAG_PEEK)
return MOJO_RESULT_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
DVLOG_IF(2, elements) << "Discard mode: ignoring non-null |elements|";
discard = true;
}
uint32_t max_num_bytes_to_read = *num_bytes;
if (max_num_bytes_to_read % options_.element_num_bytes != 0)
return MOJO_RESULT_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
bool all_or_none = options.flags & MOJO_READ_DATA_FLAG_ALL_OR_NONE;
uint32_t min_num_bytes_to_read = all_or_none ? max_num_bytes_to_read : 0;
if (min_num_bytes_to_read > bytes_available_) {
if (had_new_data)
watchers_.NotifyState(GetHandleSignalsStateNoLock());
return peer_closed_ ? MOJO_RESULT_FAILED_PRECONDITION
: MOJO_RESULT_OUT_OF_RANGE;
}
uint32_t bytes_to_read = std::min(max_num_bytes_to_read, bytes_available_);
if (bytes_to_read == 0) {
if (had_new_data)
watchers_.NotifyState(GetHandleSignalsStateNoLock());
return peer_closed_ ? MOJO_RESULT_FAILED_PRECONDITION
: MOJO_RESULT_SHOULD_WAIT;
}
if (!discard) {
const uint8_t* data =
static_cast<const uint8_t*>(ring_buffer_mapping_.memory());
CHECK(data);
uint8_t* destination = static_cast<uint8_t*>(elements);
CHECK(destination);
DCHECK_LE(read_offset_, options_.capacity_num_bytes);
uint32_t tail_bytes_to_copy =
std::min(options_.capacity_num_bytes - read_offset_, bytes_to_read);
uint32_t head_bytes_to_copy = bytes_to_read - tail_bytes_to_copy;
if (tail_bytes_to_copy > 0)
memcpy(destination, data + read_offset_, tail_bytes_to_copy);
if (head_bytes_to_copy > 0)
memcpy(destination + tail_bytes_to_copy, data, head_bytes_to_copy);
}
*num_bytes = bytes_to_read;
bool peek = !!(options.flags & MOJO_READ_DATA_FLAG_PEEK);
if (discard || !peek) {
read_offset_ = (read_offset_ + bytes_to_read) % options_.capacity_num_bytes;
bytes_available_ -= bytes_to_read;
base::AutoUnlock unlock(lock_);
NotifyRead(bytes_to_read);
}
watchers_.NotifyState(GetHandleSignalsStateNoLock());
return MOJO_RESULT_OK;
}
Commit Message: [mojo-core] Validate data pipe endpoint metadata
Ensures that we don't blindly trust specified buffer size and offset
metadata when deserializing data pipe consumer and producer handles.
Bug: 877182
Change-Id: I30f3eceafb5cee06284c2714d08357ef911d6fd9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1192922
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586704}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 154,392 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebBluetoothServiceImpl::RequestDevice(
blink::mojom::WebBluetoothRequestDeviceOptionsPtr options,
RequestDeviceCallback callback) {
RecordRequestDeviceOptions(options);
if (!GetAdapter()) {
if (BluetoothAdapterFactoryWrapper::Get().IsLowEnergySupported()) {
BluetoothAdapterFactoryWrapper::Get().AcquireAdapter(
this, base::BindOnce(&WebBluetoothServiceImpl::RequestDeviceImpl,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
std::move(options), std::move(callback)));
return;
}
RecordRequestDeviceOutcome(
UMARequestDeviceOutcome::BLUETOOTH_LOW_ENERGY_NOT_AVAILABLE);
std::move(callback).Run(
blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult::BLUETOOTH_LOW_ENERGY_NOT_AVAILABLE,
nullptr /* device */);
return;
}
RequestDeviceImpl(std::move(options), std::move(callback), GetAdapter());
}
Commit Message: bluetooth: Implement getAvailability()
This change implements the getAvailability() method for
navigator.bluetooth as defined in the specification.
Bug: 707640
Change-Id: I9e9b3e7f8ea7f259e975f71cb6d9570e5f04b479
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1651516
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Giovanni Ortuño Urquidi <ortuno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#688987}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 138,148 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int udpv6_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
{
struct ipv6_txoptions opt_space;
struct udp_sock *up = udp_sk(sk);
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_in6 *, sin6, msg->msg_name);
struct in6_addr *daddr, *final_p, final;
struct ipv6_txoptions *opt = NULL;
struct ipv6_txoptions *opt_to_free = NULL;
struct ip6_flowlabel *flowlabel = NULL;
struct flowi6 fl6;
struct dst_entry *dst;
int addr_len = msg->msg_namelen;
int ulen = len;
int hlimit = -1;
int tclass = -1;
int dontfrag = -1;
int corkreq = up->corkflag || msg->msg_flags&MSG_MORE;
int err;
int connected = 0;
int is_udplite = IS_UDPLITE(sk);
int (*getfrag)(void *, char *, int, int, int, struct sk_buff *);
/* destination address check */
if (sin6) {
if (addr_len < offsetof(struct sockaddr, sa_data))
return -EINVAL;
switch (sin6->sin6_family) {
case AF_INET6:
if (addr_len < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
return -EINVAL;
daddr = &sin6->sin6_addr;
break;
case AF_INET:
goto do_udp_sendmsg;
case AF_UNSPEC:
msg->msg_name = sin6 = NULL;
msg->msg_namelen = addr_len = 0;
daddr = NULL;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
} else if (!up->pending) {
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
return -EDESTADDRREQ;
daddr = &sk->sk_v6_daddr;
} else
daddr = NULL;
if (daddr) {
if (ipv6_addr_v4mapped(daddr)) {
struct sockaddr_in sin;
sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
sin.sin_port = sin6 ? sin6->sin6_port : inet->inet_dport;
sin.sin_addr.s_addr = daddr->s6_addr32[3];
msg->msg_name = &sin;
msg->msg_namelen = sizeof(sin);
do_udp_sendmsg:
if (__ipv6_only_sock(sk))
return -ENETUNREACH;
return udp_sendmsg(sk, msg, len);
}
}
if (up->pending == AF_INET)
return udp_sendmsg(sk, msg, len);
/* Rough check on arithmetic overflow,
better check is made in ip6_append_data().
*/
if (len > INT_MAX - sizeof(struct udphdr))
return -EMSGSIZE;
getfrag = is_udplite ? udplite_getfrag : ip_generic_getfrag;
if (up->pending) {
/*
* There are pending frames.
* The socket lock must be held while it's corked.
*/
lock_sock(sk);
if (likely(up->pending)) {
if (unlikely(up->pending != AF_INET6)) {
release_sock(sk);
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
}
dst = NULL;
goto do_append_data;
}
release_sock(sk);
}
ulen += sizeof(struct udphdr);
memset(&fl6, 0, sizeof(fl6));
if (sin6) {
if (sin6->sin6_port == 0)
return -EINVAL;
fl6.fl6_dport = sin6->sin6_port;
daddr = &sin6->sin6_addr;
if (np->sndflow) {
fl6.flowlabel = sin6->sin6_flowinfo&IPV6_FLOWINFO_MASK;
if (fl6.flowlabel&IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MASK) {
flowlabel = fl6_sock_lookup(sk, fl6.flowlabel);
if (!flowlabel)
return -EINVAL;
}
}
/*
* Otherwise it will be difficult to maintain
* sk->sk_dst_cache.
*/
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_ESTABLISHED &&
ipv6_addr_equal(daddr, &sk->sk_v6_daddr))
daddr = &sk->sk_v6_daddr;
if (addr_len >= sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6) &&
sin6->sin6_scope_id &&
__ipv6_addr_needs_scope_id(__ipv6_addr_type(daddr)))
fl6.flowi6_oif = sin6->sin6_scope_id;
} else {
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
return -EDESTADDRREQ;
fl6.fl6_dport = inet->inet_dport;
daddr = &sk->sk_v6_daddr;
fl6.flowlabel = np->flow_label;
connected = 1;
}
if (!fl6.flowi6_oif)
fl6.flowi6_oif = sk->sk_bound_dev_if;
if (!fl6.flowi6_oif)
fl6.flowi6_oif = np->sticky_pktinfo.ipi6_ifindex;
fl6.flowi6_mark = sk->sk_mark;
if (msg->msg_controllen) {
opt = &opt_space;
memset(opt, 0, sizeof(struct ipv6_txoptions));
opt->tot_len = sizeof(*opt);
err = ip6_datagram_send_ctl(sock_net(sk), sk, msg, &fl6, opt,
&hlimit, &tclass, &dontfrag);
if (err < 0) {
fl6_sock_release(flowlabel);
return err;
}
if ((fl6.flowlabel&IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MASK) && !flowlabel) {
flowlabel = fl6_sock_lookup(sk, fl6.flowlabel);
if (!flowlabel)
return -EINVAL;
}
if (!(opt->opt_nflen|opt->opt_flen))
opt = NULL;
connected = 0;
}
if (!opt) {
opt = txopt_get(np);
opt_to_free = opt;
}
if (flowlabel)
opt = fl6_merge_options(&opt_space, flowlabel, opt);
opt = ipv6_fixup_options(&opt_space, opt);
fl6.flowi6_proto = sk->sk_protocol;
if (!ipv6_addr_any(daddr))
fl6.daddr = *daddr;
else
fl6.daddr.s6_addr[15] = 0x1; /* :: means loopback (BSD'ism) */
if (ipv6_addr_any(&fl6.saddr) && !ipv6_addr_any(&np->saddr))
fl6.saddr = np->saddr;
fl6.fl6_sport = inet->inet_sport;
final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, opt, &final);
if (final_p)
connected = 0;
if (!fl6.flowi6_oif && ipv6_addr_is_multicast(&fl6.daddr)) {
fl6.flowi6_oif = np->mcast_oif;
connected = 0;
} else if (!fl6.flowi6_oif)
fl6.flowi6_oif = np->ucast_oif;
security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl6));
dst = ip6_sk_dst_lookup_flow(sk, &fl6, final_p);
if (IS_ERR(dst)) {
err = PTR_ERR(dst);
dst = NULL;
goto out;
}
if (hlimit < 0)
hlimit = ip6_sk_dst_hoplimit(np, &fl6, dst);
if (tclass < 0)
tclass = np->tclass;
if (msg->msg_flags&MSG_CONFIRM)
goto do_confirm;
back_from_confirm:
/* Lockless fast path for the non-corking case */
if (!corkreq) {
struct sk_buff *skb;
skb = ip6_make_skb(sk, getfrag, msg, ulen,
sizeof(struct udphdr), hlimit, tclass, opt,
&fl6, (struct rt6_info *)dst,
msg->msg_flags, dontfrag);
err = PTR_ERR(skb);
if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(skb))
err = udp_v6_send_skb(skb, &fl6);
goto release_dst;
}
lock_sock(sk);
if (unlikely(up->pending)) {
/* The socket is already corked while preparing it. */
/* ... which is an evident application bug. --ANK */
release_sock(sk);
net_dbg_ratelimited("udp cork app bug 2\n");
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
up->pending = AF_INET6;
do_append_data:
if (dontfrag < 0)
dontfrag = np->dontfrag;
up->len += ulen;
err = ip6_append_data(sk, getfrag, msg, ulen,
sizeof(struct udphdr), hlimit, tclass, opt, &fl6,
(struct rt6_info *)dst,
corkreq ? msg->msg_flags|MSG_MORE : msg->msg_flags, dontfrag);
if (err)
udp_v6_flush_pending_frames(sk);
else if (!corkreq)
err = udp_v6_push_pending_frames(sk);
else if (unlikely(skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_write_queue)))
up->pending = 0;
if (err > 0)
err = np->recverr ? net_xmit_errno(err) : 0;
release_sock(sk);
release_dst:
if (dst) {
if (connected) {
ip6_dst_store(sk, dst,
ipv6_addr_equal(&fl6.daddr, &sk->sk_v6_daddr) ?
&sk->sk_v6_daddr : NULL,
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_SUBTREES
ipv6_addr_equal(&fl6.saddr, &np->saddr) ?
&np->saddr :
#endif
NULL);
} else {
dst_release(dst);
}
dst = NULL;
}
out:
dst_release(dst);
fl6_sock_release(flowlabel);
txopt_put(opt_to_free);
if (!err)
return len;
/*
* ENOBUFS = no kernel mem, SOCK_NOSPACE = no sndbuf space. Reporting
* ENOBUFS might not be good (it's not tunable per se), but otherwise
* we don't have a good statistic (IpOutDiscards but it can be too many
* things). We could add another new stat but at least for now that
* seems like overkill.
*/
if (err == -ENOBUFS || test_bit(SOCK_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags)) {
UDP6_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk),
UDP_MIB_SNDBUFERRORS, is_udplite);
}
return err;
do_confirm:
dst_confirm(dst);
if (!(msg->msg_flags&MSG_PROBE) || len)
goto back_from_confirm;
err = 0;
goto out;
}
Commit Message: udp: properly support MSG_PEEK with truncated buffers
Backport of this upstream commit into stable kernels :
89c22d8c3b27 ("net: Fix skb csum races when peeking")
exposed a bug in udp stack vs MSG_PEEK support, when user provides
a buffer smaller than skb payload.
In this case,
skb_copy_and_csum_datagram_iovec(skb, sizeof(struct udphdr),
msg->msg_iov);
returns -EFAULT.
This bug does not happen in upstream kernels since Al Viro did a great
job to replace this into :
skb_copy_and_csum_datagram_msg(skb, sizeof(struct udphdr), msg);
This variant is safe vs short buffers.
For the time being, instead reverting Herbert Xu patch and add back
skb->ip_summed invalid changes, simply store the result of
udp_lib_checksum_complete() so that we avoid computing the checksum a
second time, and avoid the problematic
skb_copy_and_csum_datagram_iovec() call.
This patch can be applied on recent kernels as it avoids a double
checksumming, then backported to stable kernels as a bug fix.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-358 | 0 | 70,475 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: wb_drawop(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pkt_dop *dop, u_int len)
{
ND_PRINT((ndo, " wb-dop:"));
if (len < sizeof(*dop) || !ND_TTEST(*dop))
return (-1);
len -= sizeof(*dop);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s:%u<%u:%u>",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &dop->pd_page.p_sid),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dop->pd_page.p_uid),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dop->pd_sseq),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dop->pd_eseq)));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
return (wb_dops(ndo, dop,
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dop->pd_sseq),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dop->pd_eseq)));
return (0);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13014/White Board: Do more bounds checks.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Yannick Formaggio.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
While we're at it, print a truncation error if the packets are
truncated, rather than just, in effect, ignoring the result of the
routines that print particular packet types.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 62,369 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void jswrap_graphics_fillRect(JsVar *parent, int x1, int y1, int x2, int y2) {
JsGraphics gfx; if (!graphicsGetFromVar(&gfx, parent)) return;
graphicsFillRect(&gfx, (short)x1,(short)y1,(short)x2,(short)y2);
graphicsSetVar(&gfx); // gfx data changed because modified area
}
Commit Message: Add height check for Graphics.createArrayBuffer(...vertical_byte:true) (fix #1421)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 82,571 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ctr_des3_decrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
unsigned int nbytes)
{
struct s390_des_ctx *ctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
struct blkcipher_walk walk;
blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
return ctr_desall_crypt(desc, KMCTR_TDEA_192_DECRYPT, ctx, &walk);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 46,690 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct mount *clone_mnt(struct mount *old, struct dentry *root,
int flag)
{
struct super_block *sb = old->mnt.mnt_sb;
struct mount *mnt;
int err;
mnt = alloc_vfsmnt(old->mnt_devname);
if (!mnt)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
if (flag & (CL_SLAVE | CL_PRIVATE | CL_SHARED_TO_SLAVE))
mnt->mnt_group_id = 0; /* not a peer of original */
else
mnt->mnt_group_id = old->mnt_group_id;
if ((flag & CL_MAKE_SHARED) && !mnt->mnt_group_id) {
err = mnt_alloc_group_id(mnt);
if (err)
goto out_free;
}
mnt->mnt.mnt_flags = old->mnt.mnt_flags & ~MNT_WRITE_HOLD;
atomic_inc(&sb->s_active);
mnt->mnt.mnt_sb = sb;
mnt->mnt.mnt_root = dget(root);
mnt->mnt_mountpoint = mnt->mnt.mnt_root;
mnt->mnt_parent = mnt;
br_write_lock(&vfsmount_lock);
list_add_tail(&mnt->mnt_instance, &sb->s_mounts);
br_write_unlock(&vfsmount_lock);
if ((flag & CL_SLAVE) ||
((flag & CL_SHARED_TO_SLAVE) && IS_MNT_SHARED(old))) {
list_add(&mnt->mnt_slave, &old->mnt_slave_list);
mnt->mnt_master = old;
CLEAR_MNT_SHARED(mnt);
} else if (!(flag & CL_PRIVATE)) {
if ((flag & CL_MAKE_SHARED) || IS_MNT_SHARED(old))
list_add(&mnt->mnt_share, &old->mnt_share);
if (IS_MNT_SLAVE(old))
list_add(&mnt->mnt_slave, &old->mnt_slave);
mnt->mnt_master = old->mnt_master;
}
if (flag & CL_MAKE_SHARED)
set_mnt_shared(mnt);
/* stick the duplicate mount on the same expiry list
* as the original if that was on one */
if (flag & CL_EXPIRE) {
if (!list_empty(&old->mnt_expire))
list_add(&mnt->mnt_expire, &old->mnt_expire);
}
return mnt;
out_free:
free_vfsmnt(mnt);
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
Commit Message: userns: Don't allow creation if the user is chrooted
Guarantee that the policy of which files may be access that is
established by setting the root directory will not be violated
by user namespaces by verifying that the root directory points
to the root of the mount namespace at the time of user namespace
creation.
Changing the root is a privileged operation, and as a matter of policy
it serves to limit unprivileged processes to files below the current
root directory.
For reasons of simplicity and comprehensibility the privilege to
change the root directory is gated solely on the CAP_SYS_CHROOT
capability in the user namespace. Therefore when creating a user
namespace we must ensure that the policy of which files may be access
can not be violated by changing the root directory.
Anyone who runs a processes in a chroot and would like to use user
namespace can setup the same view of filesystems with a mount
namespace instead. With this result that this is not a practical
limitation for using user namespaces.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 32,438 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void tcp_v4_early_demux(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
const struct iphdr *iph;
const struct tcphdr *th;
struct sock *sk;
if (skb->pkt_type != PACKET_HOST)
return;
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, skb_transport_offset(skb) + sizeof(struct tcphdr)))
return;
iph = ip_hdr(skb);
th = tcp_hdr(skb);
if (th->doff < sizeof(struct tcphdr) / 4)
return;
sk = __inet_lookup_established(dev_net(skb->dev), &tcp_hashinfo,
iph->saddr, th->source,
iph->daddr, ntohs(th->dest),
skb->skb_iif);
if (sk) {
skb->sk = sk;
skb->destructor = sock_edemux;
if (sk_fullsock(sk)) {
struct dst_entry *dst = READ_ONCE(sk->sk_rx_dst);
if (dst)
dst = dst_check(dst, 0);
if (dst &&
inet_sk(sk)->rx_dst_ifindex == skb->skb_iif)
skb_dst_set_noref(skb, dst);
}
}
}
Commit Message: tcp: take care of truncations done by sk_filter()
With syzkaller help, Marco Grassi found a bug in TCP stack,
crashing in tcp_collapse()
Root cause is that sk_filter() can truncate the incoming skb,
but TCP stack was not really expecting this to happen.
It probably was expecting a simple DROP or ACCEPT behavior.
We first need to make sure no part of TCP header could be removed.
Then we need to adjust TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq
Many thanks to syzkaller team and Marco for giving us a reproducer.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <marco.gra@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 49,261 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::unique_ptr<DocumentState> BuildDocumentStateFromParams(
const CommonNavigationParams& common_params,
const CommitNavigationParams& commit_params,
base::TimeTicks time_commit_requested,
mojom::FrameNavigationControl::CommitNavigationCallback commit_callback,
mojom::NavigationClient::CommitNavigationCallback
per_navigation_mojo_interface_commit_callback,
const network::ResourceResponseHead* head,
std::unique_ptr<NavigationClient> navigation_client,
int request_id,
bool was_initiated_in_this_frame) {
std::unique_ptr<DocumentState> document_state(new DocumentState());
InternalDocumentStateData* internal_data =
InternalDocumentStateData::FromDocumentState(document_state.get());
DCHECK(!common_params.navigation_start.is_null());
DCHECK(!common_params.url.SchemeIs(url::kJavaScriptScheme));
if (common_params.navigation_type == FrameMsg_Navigate_Type::RESTORE) {
internal_data->set_cache_policy_override(
blink::mojom::FetchCacheMode::kDefault);
}
internal_data->set_is_overriding_user_agent(
commit_params.is_overriding_user_agent);
internal_data->set_must_reset_scroll_and_scale_state(
common_params.navigation_type ==
FrameMsg_Navigate_Type::RELOAD_ORIGINAL_REQUEST_URL);
internal_data->set_previews_state(common_params.previews_state);
internal_data->set_request_id(request_id);
document_state->set_can_load_local_resources(
commit_params.can_load_local_resources);
if (head) {
if (head->headers)
internal_data->set_http_status_code(head->headers->response_code());
else if (common_params.url.SchemeIs(url::kDataScheme))
internal_data->set_http_status_code(200);
document_state->set_was_fetched_via_spdy(head->was_fetched_via_spdy);
document_state->set_was_alpn_negotiated(head->was_alpn_negotiated);
document_state->set_alpn_negotiated_protocol(
head->alpn_negotiated_protocol);
document_state->set_was_alternate_protocol_available(
head->was_alternate_protocol_available);
document_state->set_connection_info(head->connection_info);
internal_data->set_effective_connection_type(
head->effective_connection_type);
}
bool load_data = !common_params.base_url_for_data_url.is_empty() &&
!common_params.history_url_for_data_url.is_empty() &&
common_params.url.SchemeIs(url::kDataScheme);
document_state->set_was_load_data_with_base_url_request(load_data);
if (load_data)
document_state->set_data_url(common_params.url);
InternalDocumentStateData::FromDocumentState(document_state.get())
->set_navigation_state(NavigationState::CreateBrowserInitiated(
common_params, commit_params, time_commit_requested,
std::move(commit_callback),
std::move(per_navigation_mojo_interface_commit_callback),
std::move(navigation_client), was_initiated_in_this_frame));
return document_state;
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,529 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int decode_commit(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct nfs_writeres *res)
{
int status;
status = decode_op_hdr(xdr, OP_COMMIT);
if (!status)
status = decode_verifier(xdr, res->verf->verifier);
return status;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 23,293 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void encode_lockt(struct xdr_stream *xdr, const struct nfs_lockt_args *args, struct compound_hdr *hdr)
{
__be32 *p;
p = reserve_space(xdr, 24);
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(OP_LOCKT);
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(nfs4_lock_type(args->fl, 0));
p = xdr_encode_hyper(p, args->fl->fl_start);
p = xdr_encode_hyper(p, nfs4_lock_length(args->fl));
encode_lockowner(xdr, &args->lock_owner);
hdr->nops++;
hdr->replen += decode_lockt_maxsz;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 23,370 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(mb_ereg_replace_callback)
{
_php_mb_regex_ereg_replace_exec(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, 0, 1);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72402: _php_mb_regex_ereg_replace_exec - double free
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 51,380 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ch9_postconfig(struct usbtest_dev *dev)
{
struct usb_interface *iface = dev->intf;
struct usb_device *udev = interface_to_usbdev(iface);
int i, alt, retval;
/* [9.2.3] if there's more than one altsetting, we need to be able to
* set and get each one. mostly trusts the descriptors from usbcore.
*/
for (i = 0; i < iface->num_altsetting; i++) {
/* 9.2.3 constrains the range here */
alt = iface->altsetting[i].desc.bAlternateSetting;
if (alt < 0 || alt >= iface->num_altsetting) {
dev_err(&iface->dev,
"invalid alt [%d].bAltSetting = %d\n",
i, alt);
}
/* [real world] get/set unimplemented if there's only one */
if (realworld && iface->num_altsetting == 1)
continue;
/* [9.4.10] set_interface */
retval = set_altsetting(dev, alt);
if (retval) {
dev_err(&iface->dev, "can't set_interface = %d, %d\n",
alt, retval);
return retval;
}
/* [9.4.4] get_interface always works */
retval = get_altsetting(dev);
if (retval != alt) {
dev_err(&iface->dev, "get alt should be %d, was %d\n",
alt, retval);
return (retval < 0) ? retval : -EDOM;
}
}
/* [real world] get_config unimplemented if there's only one */
if (!realworld || udev->descriptor.bNumConfigurations != 1) {
int expected = udev->actconfig->desc.bConfigurationValue;
/* [9.4.2] get_configuration always works
* ... although some cheap devices (like one TI Hub I've got)
* won't return config descriptors except before set_config.
*/
retval = usb_control_msg(udev, usb_rcvctrlpipe(udev, 0),
USB_REQ_GET_CONFIGURATION,
USB_DIR_IN | USB_RECIP_DEVICE,
0, 0, dev->buf, 1, USB_CTRL_GET_TIMEOUT);
if (retval != 1 || dev->buf[0] != expected) {
dev_err(&iface->dev, "get config --> %d %d (1 %d)\n",
retval, dev->buf[0], expected);
return (retval < 0) ? retval : -EDOM;
}
}
/* there's always [9.4.3] a device descriptor [9.6.1] */
retval = usb_get_descriptor(udev, USB_DT_DEVICE, 0,
dev->buf, sizeof(udev->descriptor));
if (retval != sizeof(udev->descriptor)) {
dev_err(&iface->dev, "dev descriptor --> %d\n", retval);
return (retval < 0) ? retval : -EDOM;
}
/*
* there's always [9.4.3] a bos device descriptor [9.6.2] in USB
* 3.0 spec
*/
if (le16_to_cpu(udev->descriptor.bcdUSB) >= 0x0210) {
struct usb_bos_descriptor *bos = NULL;
struct usb_dev_cap_header *header = NULL;
unsigned total, num, length;
u8 *buf;
retval = usb_get_descriptor(udev, USB_DT_BOS, 0, dev->buf,
sizeof(*udev->bos->desc));
if (retval != sizeof(*udev->bos->desc)) {
dev_err(&iface->dev, "bos descriptor --> %d\n", retval);
return (retval < 0) ? retval : -EDOM;
}
bos = (struct usb_bos_descriptor *)dev->buf;
total = le16_to_cpu(bos->wTotalLength);
num = bos->bNumDeviceCaps;
if (total > TBUF_SIZE)
total = TBUF_SIZE;
/*
* get generic device-level capability descriptors [9.6.2]
* in USB 3.0 spec
*/
retval = usb_get_descriptor(udev, USB_DT_BOS, 0, dev->buf,
total);
if (retval != total) {
dev_err(&iface->dev, "bos descriptor set --> %d\n",
retval);
return (retval < 0) ? retval : -EDOM;
}
length = sizeof(*udev->bos->desc);
buf = dev->buf;
for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
buf += length;
if (buf + sizeof(struct usb_dev_cap_header) >
dev->buf + total)
break;
header = (struct usb_dev_cap_header *)buf;
length = header->bLength;
if (header->bDescriptorType !=
USB_DT_DEVICE_CAPABILITY) {
dev_warn(&udev->dev, "not device capability descriptor, skip\n");
continue;
}
switch (header->bDevCapabilityType) {
case USB_CAP_TYPE_EXT:
if (buf + USB_DT_USB_EXT_CAP_SIZE >
dev->buf + total ||
!is_good_ext(dev, buf)) {
dev_err(&iface->dev, "bogus usb 2.0 extension descriptor\n");
return -EDOM;
}
break;
case USB_SS_CAP_TYPE:
if (buf + USB_DT_USB_SS_CAP_SIZE >
dev->buf + total ||
!is_good_ss_cap(dev, buf)) {
dev_err(&iface->dev, "bogus superspeed device capability descriptor\n");
return -EDOM;
}
break;
case CONTAINER_ID_TYPE:
if (buf + USB_DT_USB_SS_CONTN_ID_SIZE >
dev->buf + total ||
!is_good_con_id(dev, buf)) {
dev_err(&iface->dev, "bogus container id descriptor\n");
return -EDOM;
}
break;
default:
break;
}
}
}
/* there's always [9.4.3] at least one config descriptor [9.6.3] */
for (i = 0; i < udev->descriptor.bNumConfigurations; i++) {
retval = usb_get_descriptor(udev, USB_DT_CONFIG, i,
dev->buf, TBUF_SIZE);
if (!is_good_config(dev, retval)) {
dev_err(&iface->dev,
"config [%d] descriptor --> %d\n",
i, retval);
return (retval < 0) ? retval : -EDOM;
}
/* FIXME cross-checking udev->config[i] to make sure usbcore
* parsed it right (etc) would be good testing paranoia
*/
}
/* and sometimes [9.2.6.6] speed dependent descriptors */
if (le16_to_cpu(udev->descriptor.bcdUSB) == 0x0200) {
struct usb_qualifier_descriptor *d = NULL;
/* device qualifier [9.6.2] */
retval = usb_get_descriptor(udev,
USB_DT_DEVICE_QUALIFIER, 0, dev->buf,
sizeof(struct usb_qualifier_descriptor));
if (retval == -EPIPE) {
if (udev->speed == USB_SPEED_HIGH) {
dev_err(&iface->dev,
"hs dev qualifier --> %d\n",
retval);
return retval;
}
/* usb2.0 but not high-speed capable; fine */
} else if (retval != sizeof(struct usb_qualifier_descriptor)) {
dev_err(&iface->dev, "dev qualifier --> %d\n", retval);
return (retval < 0) ? retval : -EDOM;
} else
d = (struct usb_qualifier_descriptor *) dev->buf;
/* might not have [9.6.2] any other-speed configs [9.6.4] */
if (d) {
unsigned max = d->bNumConfigurations;
for (i = 0; i < max; i++) {
retval = usb_get_descriptor(udev,
USB_DT_OTHER_SPEED_CONFIG, i,
dev->buf, TBUF_SIZE);
if (!is_good_config(dev, retval)) {
dev_err(&iface->dev,
"other speed config --> %d\n",
retval);
return (retval < 0) ? retval : -EDOM;
}
}
}
}
/* FIXME fetch strings from at least the device descriptor */
/* [9.4.5] get_status always works */
retval = usb_get_status(udev, USB_RECIP_DEVICE, 0, dev->buf);
if (retval) {
dev_err(&iface->dev, "get dev status --> %d\n", retval);
return retval;
}
/* FIXME configuration.bmAttributes says if we could try to set/clear
* the device's remote wakeup feature ... if we can, test that here
*/
retval = usb_get_status(udev, USB_RECIP_INTERFACE,
iface->altsetting[0].desc.bInterfaceNumber, dev->buf);
if (retval) {
dev_err(&iface->dev, "get interface status --> %d\n", retval);
return retval;
}
/* FIXME get status for each endpoint in the interface */
return 0;
}
Commit Message: usb: usbtest: fix NULL pointer dereference
If the usbtest driver encounters a device with an IN bulk endpoint but
no OUT bulk endpoint, it will try to dereference a NULL pointer
(out->desc.bEndpointAddress). The problem can be solved by adding a
missing test.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 59,843 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void bitmap_writer_build_type_index(struct pack_idx_entry **index,
uint32_t index_nr)
{
uint32_t i;
writer.commits = ewah_new();
writer.trees = ewah_new();
writer.blobs = ewah_new();
writer.tags = ewah_new();
for (i = 0; i < index_nr; ++i) {
struct object_entry *entry = (struct object_entry *)index[i];
enum object_type real_type;
entry->in_pack_pos = i;
switch (entry->type) {
case OBJ_COMMIT:
case OBJ_TREE:
case OBJ_BLOB:
case OBJ_TAG:
real_type = entry->type;
break;
default:
real_type = sha1_object_info(entry->idx.sha1, NULL);
break;
}
switch (real_type) {
case OBJ_COMMIT:
ewah_set(writer.commits, i);
break;
case OBJ_TREE:
ewah_set(writer.trees, i);
break;
case OBJ_BLOB:
ewah_set(writer.blobs, i);
break;
case OBJ_TAG:
ewah_set(writer.tags, i);
break;
default:
die("Missing type information for %s (%d/%d)",
sha1_to_hex(entry->idx.sha1), real_type, entry->type);
}
}
}
Commit Message: list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 54,901 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void Run(scoped_refptr<base::MessageLoopProxy> relay_proxy,
const base::Callback<void(T1, scoped_ptr<T2>)>& callback,
T1 arg1,
scoped_ptr<T2> arg2) {
if (callback.is_null())
return;
RunTaskOnThread(relay_proxy,
base::Bind(callback, arg1, base::Passed(&arg2)));
}
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 117,037 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool venc_dev::venc_set_perf_level(QOMX_VIDEO_PERF_LEVEL ePerfLevel)
{
bool status = true;
struct v4l2_control control;
int rc = 0;
control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_SET_PERF_LEVEL;
switch (ePerfLevel) {
case OMX_QCOM_PerfLevelNominal:
control.value = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_PERF_LEVEL_NOMINAL;
break;
case OMX_QCOM_PerfLevelTurbo:
control.value = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_PERF_LEVEL_TURBO;
break;
default:
status = false;
break;
}
if (status) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Calling IOCTL set control for id=%d, val=%d", control.id, control.value);
rc = ioctl(m_nDriver_fd, VIDIOC_S_CTRL, &control);
if (rc) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed to set control for id=%d, val=%d", control.id, control.value);
return false;
}
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Success IOCTL set control for id=%d, value=%d", control.id, control.value);
}
return status;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: add checks before accessing heap pointers
Heap pointers do not point to user virtual addresses in case
of secure session.
Set them to NULL and add checks to avoid accesing them
Bug: 28815329
Bug: 28920116
Change-Id: I94fd5808e753b58654d65e175d3857ef46ffba26
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 159,303 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void StaticLongAttributeAttributeSetter(
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value, const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Isolate* isolate = info.GetIsolate();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(holder);
ExceptionState exception_state(isolate, ExceptionState::kSetterContext, "TestObject", "staticLongAttribute");
int32_t cpp_value = NativeValueTraits<IDLLong>::NativeValue(info.GetIsolate(), v8_value, exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return;
TestObject::setStaticLongAttribute(cpp_value);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 135,176 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WGC3Denum WebGraphicsContext3DCommandBufferImpl::getGraphicsResetStatusARB() {
if (IsCommandBufferContextLost() &&
context_lost_reason_ == GL_NO_ERROR) {
return GL_UNKNOWN_CONTEXT_RESET_ARB;
}
return context_lost_reason_;
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 106,815 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: unsigned int ebt_do_table (unsigned int hook, struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct net_device *in, const struct net_device *out,
struct ebt_table *table)
{
int i, nentries;
struct ebt_entry *point;
struct ebt_counter *counter_base, *cb_base;
const struct ebt_entry_target *t;
int verdict, sp = 0;
struct ebt_chainstack *cs;
struct ebt_entries *chaininfo;
const char *base;
const struct ebt_table_info *private;
struct xt_action_param acpar;
acpar.family = NFPROTO_BRIDGE;
acpar.in = in;
acpar.out = out;
acpar.hotdrop = false;
acpar.hooknum = hook;
read_lock_bh(&table->lock);
private = table->private;
cb_base = COUNTER_BASE(private->counters, private->nentries,
smp_processor_id());
if (private->chainstack)
cs = private->chainstack[smp_processor_id()];
else
cs = NULL;
chaininfo = private->hook_entry[hook];
nentries = private->hook_entry[hook]->nentries;
point = (struct ebt_entry *)(private->hook_entry[hook]->data);
counter_base = cb_base + private->hook_entry[hook]->counter_offset;
/* base for chain jumps */
base = private->entries;
i = 0;
while (i < nentries) {
if (ebt_basic_match(point, skb, in, out))
goto letscontinue;
if (EBT_MATCH_ITERATE(point, ebt_do_match, skb, &acpar) != 0)
goto letscontinue;
if (acpar.hotdrop) {
read_unlock_bh(&table->lock);
return NF_DROP;
}
/* increase counter */
(*(counter_base + i)).pcnt++;
(*(counter_base + i)).bcnt += skb->len;
/* these should only watch: not modify, nor tell us
what to do with the packet */
EBT_WATCHER_ITERATE(point, ebt_do_watcher, skb, &acpar);
t = (struct ebt_entry_target *)
(((char *)point) + point->target_offset);
/* standard target */
if (!t->u.target->target)
verdict = ((struct ebt_standard_target *)t)->verdict;
else {
acpar.target = t->u.target;
acpar.targinfo = t->data;
verdict = t->u.target->target(skb, &acpar);
}
if (verdict == EBT_ACCEPT) {
read_unlock_bh(&table->lock);
return NF_ACCEPT;
}
if (verdict == EBT_DROP) {
read_unlock_bh(&table->lock);
return NF_DROP;
}
if (verdict == EBT_RETURN) {
letsreturn:
#ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER_DEBUG
if (sp == 0) {
BUGPRINT("RETURN on base chain");
/* act like this is EBT_CONTINUE */
goto letscontinue;
}
#endif
sp--;
/* put all the local variables right */
i = cs[sp].n;
chaininfo = cs[sp].chaininfo;
nentries = chaininfo->nentries;
point = cs[sp].e;
counter_base = cb_base +
chaininfo->counter_offset;
continue;
}
if (verdict == EBT_CONTINUE)
goto letscontinue;
#ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER_DEBUG
if (verdict < 0) {
BUGPRINT("bogus standard verdict\n");
read_unlock_bh(&table->lock);
return NF_DROP;
}
#endif
/* jump to a udc */
cs[sp].n = i + 1;
cs[sp].chaininfo = chaininfo;
cs[sp].e = ebt_next_entry(point);
i = 0;
chaininfo = (struct ebt_entries *) (base + verdict);
#ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER_DEBUG
if (chaininfo->distinguisher) {
BUGPRINT("jump to non-chain\n");
read_unlock_bh(&table->lock);
return NF_DROP;
}
#endif
nentries = chaininfo->nentries;
point = (struct ebt_entry *)chaininfo->data;
counter_base = cb_base + chaininfo->counter_offset;
sp++;
continue;
letscontinue:
point = ebt_next_entry(point);
i++;
}
/* I actually like this :) */
if (chaininfo->policy == EBT_RETURN)
goto letsreturn;
if (chaininfo->policy == EBT_ACCEPT) {
read_unlock_bh(&table->lock);
return NF_ACCEPT;
}
read_unlock_bh(&table->lock);
return NF_DROP;
}
Commit Message: bridge: netfilter: fix information leak
Struct tmp is copied from userspace. It is not checked whether the "name"
field is NULL terminated. This may lead to buffer overflow and passing
contents of kernel stack as a module name to try_then_request_module() and,
consequently, to modprobe commandline. It would be seen by all userspace
processes.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 27,694 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void end_block_io_op(struct bio *bio)
{
__end_block_io_op(bio->bi_private, bio->bi_error);
bio_put(bio);
}
Commit Message: xen-blkback: don't leak stack data via response ring
Rather than constructing a local structure instance on the stack, fill
the fields directly on the shared ring, just like other backends do.
Build on the fact that all response structure flavors are actually
identical (the old code did make this assumption too).
This is XSA-216.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 63,729 |
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