instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ofproto_get_stp_status(struct ofproto *ofproto,
struct ofproto_stp_status *s)
{
return (ofproto->ofproto_class->get_stp_status
? ofproto->ofproto_class->get_stp_status(ofproto, s)
: EOPNOTSUPP);
}
Commit Message: ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <vishal.deep.ajmera@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 77,322 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DownloadItemImplDelegate::CheckForFileRemoval(
DownloadItemImpl* download_item) {}
Commit Message: Downloads : Fixed an issue of opening incorrect download file
When one download overwrites another completed download, calling download.open in the old download causes the new download to open, which could be dangerous and undesirable. In this CL, we are trying to avoid this by blocking the opening of the old download.
Bug: 793620
Change-Id: Ic948175756700ad7c08489c3cc347330daedb6f8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/826477
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <dtrainor@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Shakti Sahu <shaktisahu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525810}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 146,397 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void run_pending_requests(h2o_http2_conn_t *conn)
{
while (!h2o_linklist_is_empty(&conn->_pending_reqs) && can_run_requests(conn)) {
/* fetch and detach a pending stream */
h2o_http2_stream_t *stream = H2O_STRUCT_FROM_MEMBER(h2o_http2_stream_t, _refs.link, conn->_pending_reqs.next);
h2o_linklist_unlink(&stream->_refs.link);
/* handle it */
h2o_http2_stream_set_state(conn, stream, H2O_HTTP2_STREAM_STATE_SEND_HEADERS);
if (!h2o_http2_stream_is_push(stream->stream_id) && conn->pull_stream_ids.max_processed < stream->stream_id)
conn->pull_stream_ids.max_processed = stream->stream_id;
h2o_process_request(&stream->req);
}
}
Commit Message: h2: use after free on premature connection close #920
lib/http2/connection.c:on_read() calls parse_input(), which might free
`conn`. It does so in particular if the connection preface isn't
the expected one in expect_preface(). `conn` is then used after the free
in `if (h2o_timeout_is_linked(&conn->_write.timeout_entry)`.
We fix this by adding a return value to close_connection that returns a
negative value if `conn` has been free'd and can't be used anymore.
Credits for finding the bug to Tim Newsham.
CWE ID: | 0 | 52,579 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int do_spice_init(SpiceCoreInterface *core_interface)
{
spice_info("starting %s", version_string);
if (core_interface->base.major_version != SPICE_INTERFACE_CORE_MAJOR) {
spice_warning("bad core interface version");
goto err;
}
core = core_interface;
reds->listen_socket = -1;
reds->secure_listen_socket = -1;
init_vd_agent_resources();
ring_init(&reds->clients);
reds->num_clients = 0;
main_dispatcher_init(core);
ring_init(&reds->channels);
ring_init(&reds->mig_target_clients);
ring_init(&reds->char_devs_states);
ring_init(&reds->mig_wait_disconnect_clients);
reds->vm_running = TRUE; /* for backward compatibility */
if (!(reds->mig_timer = core->timer_add(migrate_timeout, NULL))) {
spice_error("migration timer create failed");
}
#ifdef RED_STATISTICS
int shm_name_len;
int fd;
shm_name_len = strlen(SPICE_STAT_SHM_NAME) + 20;
reds->stat_shm_name = (char *)spice_malloc(shm_name_len);
snprintf(reds->stat_shm_name, shm_name_len, SPICE_STAT_SHM_NAME, getpid());
if ((fd = shm_open(reds->stat_shm_name, O_CREAT | O_RDWR, 0444)) == -1) {
spice_error("statistics shm_open failed, %s", strerror(errno));
}
if (ftruncate(fd, REDS_STAT_SHM_SIZE) == -1) {
spice_error("statistics ftruncate failed, %s", strerror(errno));
}
reds->stat = (SpiceStat *)mmap(NULL, REDS_STAT_SHM_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
if (reds->stat == (SpiceStat *)MAP_FAILED) {
spice_error("statistics mmap failed, %s", strerror(errno));
}
memset(reds->stat, 0, REDS_STAT_SHM_SIZE);
reds->stat->magic = SPICE_STAT_MAGIC;
reds->stat->version = SPICE_STAT_VERSION;
reds->stat->root_index = INVALID_STAT_REF;
if (pthread_mutex_init(&reds->stat_lock, NULL)) {
spice_error("mutex init failed");
}
#endif
if (!(reds->mm_timer = core->timer_add(mm_timer_proc, NULL))) {
spice_error("mm timer create failed");
}
reds_enable_mm_timer();
if (reds_init_net() < 0) {
goto err;
}
if (reds->secure_listen_socket != -1) {
if (reds_init_ssl() < 0) {
goto err;
}
}
#if HAVE_SASL
int saslerr;
if ((saslerr = sasl_server_init(NULL, sasl_appname ?
sasl_appname : "spice")) != SASL_OK) {
spice_error("Failed to initialize SASL auth %s",
sasl_errstring(saslerr, NULL, NULL));
goto err;
}
#endif
reds->main_channel = main_channel_init();
inputs_init();
reds->mouse_mode = SPICE_MOUSE_MODE_SERVER;
reds_client_monitors_config_cleanup();
reds->allow_multiple_clients = getenv(SPICE_DEBUG_ALLOW_MC_ENV) != NULL;
if (reds->allow_multiple_clients) {
spice_warning("spice: allowing multiple client connections (crashy)");
}
atexit(reds_exit);
return 0;
err:
return -1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 1,833 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int WM_GetOutput_Linear(midi * handle, int8_t *buffer, uint32_t size) {
uint32_t buffer_used = 0;
uint32_t i;
struct _mdi *mdi = (struct _mdi *) handle;
uint32_t real_samples_to_mix = 0;
uint32_t data_pos;
int32_t premix, left_mix, right_mix;
struct _note *note_data = NULL;
uint32_t count;
struct _event *event = mdi->current_event;
int32_t *tmp_buffer;
int32_t *out_buffer;
_WM_Lock(&mdi->lock);
buffer_used = 0;
memset(buffer, 0, size);
if ( (size / 2) > mdi->mix_buffer_size) {
if ( (size / 2) <= ( mdi->mix_buffer_size * 2 )) {
mdi->mix_buffer_size += MEM_CHUNK;
} else {
mdi->mix_buffer_size = size / 2;
}
mdi->mix_buffer = realloc(mdi->mix_buffer, mdi->mix_buffer_size * sizeof(int32_t));
}
tmp_buffer = mdi->mix_buffer;
memset(tmp_buffer, 0, ((size / 2) * sizeof(int32_t)));
out_buffer = tmp_buffer;
do {
if (__builtin_expect((!mdi->samples_to_mix), 0)) {
while ((!mdi->samples_to_mix) && (event->do_event)) {
event->do_event(mdi, &event->event_data);
if ((mdi->extra_info.mixer_options & WM_MO_LOOP) && (event[0].do_event == *_WM_do_meta_endoftrack)) {
_WM_ResetToStart(mdi);
event = mdi->current_event;
} else {
mdi->samples_to_mix = event->samples_to_next;
event++;
mdi->current_event = event;
}
}
if (__builtin_expect((!mdi->samples_to_mix), 0)) {
if (mdi->extra_info.current_sample >= mdi->extra_info.approx_total_samples) {
break;
} else if ((mdi->extra_info.approx_total_samples
- mdi->extra_info.current_sample) > (size >> 2)) {
mdi->samples_to_mix = size >> 2;
} else {
mdi->samples_to_mix = mdi->extra_info.approx_total_samples
- mdi->extra_info.current_sample;
}
}
}
if (__builtin_expect((mdi->samples_to_mix > (size >> 2)), 1)) {
real_samples_to_mix = size >> 2;
} else {
real_samples_to_mix = mdi->samples_to_mix;
if (real_samples_to_mix == 0) {
continue;
}
}
/* do mixing here */
count = real_samples_to_mix;
do {
note_data = mdi->note;
left_mix = right_mix = 0;
RESAMPLE_DEBUGI("SAMPLES_TO_MIX",count);
if (__builtin_expect((note_data != NULL), 1)) {
RESAMPLE_DEBUGS("Processing Notes");
while (note_data) {
/*
* ===================
* resample the sample
* ===================
*/
data_pos = note_data->sample_pos >> FPBITS;
premix = ((note_data->sample->data[data_pos] + (((note_data->sample->data[data_pos + 1] - note_data->sample->data[data_pos]) * (int32_t)(note_data->sample_pos & FPMASK)) / 1024)) * (note_data->env_level >> 12)) / 1024;
left_mix += (premix * (int32_t)note_data->left_mix_volume) / 1024;
right_mix += (premix * (int32_t)note_data->right_mix_volume) / 1024;
/*
* ========================
* sample position checking
* ========================
*/
#ifdef DEBUG_RESAMPLE
fprintf(stderr,"\r\n%d -> INC %i, ENV %i, LEVEL %i, TARGET %d, RATE %i, SAMPLE POS %i, SAMPLE LENGTH %i, PREMIX %i (%i:%i)",
(uint32_t)note_data,
note_data->env_inc,
note_data->env, note_data->env_level,
note_data->sample->env_target[note_data->env],
note_data->sample->env_rate[note_data->env],
note_data->sample_pos,
note_data->sample->data_length,
premix, left_mix, right_mix);
if (note_data->modes & SAMPLE_LOOP)
fprintf(stderr,", LOOP %i + %i",
note_data->sample->loop_start,
note_data->sample->loop_size);
fprintf(stderr,"\r\n");
#endif
note_data->sample_pos += note_data->sample_inc;
if (__builtin_expect((note_data->modes & SAMPLE_LOOP), 1)) {
if (__builtin_expect(
(note_data->sample_pos > note_data->sample->loop_end),
0)) {
note_data->sample_pos = note_data->sample->loop_start
+ ((note_data->sample_pos
- note_data->sample->loop_start)
% note_data->sample->loop_size);
}
} else if (__builtin_expect(
(note_data->sample_pos
>= note_data->sample->data_length),
0)) {
goto _END_THIS_NOTE;
}
if (__builtin_expect((note_data->env_inc == 0), 0)) {
note_data = note_data->next;
RESAMPLE_DEBUGS("Next Note: 0 env_inc");
continue;
}
note_data->env_level += note_data->env_inc;
if (note_data->env_inc < 0) {
if (__builtin_expect((note_data->env_level
> note_data->sample->env_target[note_data->env]), 0)) {
note_data = note_data->next;
RESAMPLE_DEBUGS("Next Note: env_lvl > env_target");
continue;
}
} else if (note_data->env_inc > 0) {
if (__builtin_expect((note_data->env_level
< note_data->sample->env_target[note_data->env]), 0)) {
note_data = note_data->next;
RESAMPLE_DEBUGS("Next Note: env_lvl < env_target");
continue;
}
}
note_data->env_level =
note_data->sample->env_target[note_data->env];
switch (note_data->env) {
case 0:
if (!(note_data->modes & SAMPLE_ENVELOPE)) {
note_data->env_inc = 0;
note_data = note_data->next;
RESAMPLE_DEBUGS("Next Note: No Envelope");
continue;
}
break;
case 2:
if (note_data->modes & SAMPLE_SUSTAIN /*|| note_data->hold*/) {
note_data->env_inc = 0;
note_data = note_data->next;
RESAMPLE_DEBUGS("Next Note: SAMPLE_SUSTAIN");
continue;
} else if (note_data->modes & SAMPLE_CLAMPED) {
note_data->env = 5;
if (note_data->env_level
> note_data->sample->env_target[5]) {
note_data->env_inc =
-note_data->sample->env_rate[5];
} else {
note_data->env_inc =
note_data->sample->env_rate[5];
}
continue;
}
break;
case 5:
if (__builtin_expect((note_data->env_level == 0), 1)) {
goto _END_THIS_NOTE;
}
/* sample release */
if (note_data->modes & SAMPLE_LOOP)
note_data->modes ^= SAMPLE_LOOP;
note_data->env_inc = 0;
note_data = note_data->next;
RESAMPLE_DEBUGS("Next Note: Sample Release");
continue;
case 6:
_END_THIS_NOTE:
if (__builtin_expect((note_data->replay != NULL), 1)) {
note_data->active = 0;
{
struct _note *prev_note = NULL;
struct _note *nte_array = mdi->note;
if (nte_array != note_data) {
do {
prev_note = nte_array;
nte_array = nte_array->next;
} while (nte_array != note_data);
}
if (prev_note) {
prev_note->next = note_data->replay;
} else {
mdi->note = note_data->replay;
}
note_data->replay->next = note_data->next;
note_data = note_data->replay;
note_data->active = 1;
}
} else {
note_data->active = 0;
{
struct _note *prev_note = NULL;
struct _note *nte_array = mdi->note;
if (nte_array != note_data) {
do {
prev_note = nte_array;
nte_array = nte_array->next;
} while ((nte_array != note_data)
&& (nte_array));
}
if (prev_note) {
prev_note->next = note_data->next;
} else {
mdi->note = note_data->next;
}
note_data = note_data->next;
}
}
RESAMPLE_DEBUGS("Next Note: Killed Off Note");
continue;
}
note_data->env++;
if (note_data->is_off == 1) {
_WM_do_note_off_extra(note_data);
} else {
if (note_data->env_level
>= note_data->sample->env_target[note_data->env]) {
note_data->env_inc =
-note_data->sample->env_rate[note_data->env];
} else {
note_data->env_inc =
note_data->sample->env_rate[note_data->env];
}
}
note_data = note_data->next;
#ifdef DEBUG_RESAMPLE
if (note_data != NULL)
RESAMPLE_DEBUGI("Next Note: Next ENV ", note_data->env);
else
RESAMPLE_DEBUGS("Next Note: Next ENV");
#endif
continue;
}
}
*tmp_buffer++ = left_mix;
*tmp_buffer++ = right_mix;
} while (--count);
buffer_used += real_samples_to_mix * 4;
size -= (real_samples_to_mix << 2);
mdi->extra_info.current_sample += real_samples_to_mix;
mdi->samples_to_mix -= real_samples_to_mix;
} while (size);
tmp_buffer = out_buffer;
if (mdi->extra_info.mixer_options & WM_MO_REVERB) {
_WM_do_reverb(mdi->reverb, tmp_buffer, (buffer_used / 2));
}
for (i = 0; i < buffer_used; i += 4) {
left_mix = *tmp_buffer++;
right_mix = *tmp_buffer++;
/*
* ===================
* Write to the buffer
* ===================
*/
#ifdef WORDS_BIGENDIAN
(*buffer++) = ((left_mix >> 8) & 0x7f) | ((left_mix >> 24) & 0x80);
(*buffer++) = left_mix & 0xff;
(*buffer++) = ((right_mix >> 8) & 0x7f) | ((right_mix >> 24) & 0x80);
(*buffer++) = right_mix & 0xff;
#else
(*buffer++) = left_mix & 0xff;
(*buffer++) = ((left_mix >> 8) & 0x7f) | ((left_mix >> 24) & 0x80);
(*buffer++) = right_mix & 0xff;
(*buffer++) = ((right_mix >> 8) & 0x7f) | ((right_mix >> 24) & 0x80);
#endif
}
_WM_Unlock(&mdi->lock);
return (buffer_used);
}
Commit Message: wildmidi_lib.c (WildMidi_Open, WildMidi_OpenBuffer): refuse to proceed if less then 18 bytes of input
Fixes bug #178.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 85,095 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int macvlan_changelink(struct net_device *dev,
struct nlattr *tb[], struct nlattr *data[])
{
struct macvlan_dev *vlan = netdev_priv(dev);
if (data && data[IFLA_MACVLAN_MODE])
vlan->mode = nla_get_u32(data[IFLA_MACVLAN_MODE]);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 23,798 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool card_id_ok(struct snd_card *card, const char *id)
{
int i;
if (!snd_info_check_reserved_words(id))
return false;
for (i = 0; i < snd_ecards_limit; i++) {
if (snd_cards[i] && snd_cards[i] != card &&
!strcmp(snd_cards[i]->id, id))
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: control: Protect user controls against concurrent access
The user-control put and get handlers as well as the tlv do not protect against
concurrent access from multiple threads. Since the state of the control is not
updated atomically it is possible that either two write operations or a write
and a read operation race against each other. Both can lead to arbitrary memory
disclosure. This patch introduces a new lock that protects user-controls from
concurrent access. Since applications typically access controls sequentially
than in parallel a single lock per card should be fine.
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 36,502 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t handle_pwritev(FsContext *ctx, V9fsFidOpenState *fs,
const struct iovec *iov,
int iovcnt, off_t offset)
{
ssize_t ret;
#ifdef CONFIG_PREADV
ret = pwritev(fs->fd, iov, iovcnt, offset);
#else
int err = lseek(fs->fd, offset, SEEK_SET);
if (err == -1) {
return err;
} else {
ret = writev(fs->fd, iov, iovcnt);
}
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_SYNC_FILE_RANGE
if (ret > 0 && ctx->export_flags & V9FS_IMMEDIATE_WRITEOUT) {
/*
* Initiate a writeback. This is not a data integrity sync.
* We want to ensure that we don't leave dirty pages in the cache
* after write when writeout=immediate is sepcified.
*/
sync_file_range(fs->fd, offset, ret,
SYNC_FILE_RANGE_WAIT_BEFORE | SYNC_FILE_RANGE_WRITE);
}
#endif
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 7,686 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: options_from_list(w, priv)
struct wordlist *w;
int priv;
{
char *argv[MAXARGS];
option_t *opt;
int i, n, ret = 0;
struct wordlist *w0;
privileged_option = priv;
option_source = "secrets file";
option_priority = OPRIO_SECFILE;
while (w != NULL) {
opt = find_option(w->word);
if (opt == NULL) {
option_error("In secrets file: unrecognized option '%s'",
w->word);
goto err;
}
n = n_arguments(opt);
w0 = w;
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
w = w->next;
if (w == NULL) {
option_error(
"In secrets file: too few parameters for option '%s'",
w0->word);
goto err;
}
argv[i] = w->word;
}
if (!process_option(opt, w0->word, argv))
goto err;
w = w->next;
}
ret = 1;
err:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: pppd: Eliminate potential integer overflow in option parsing
When we are reading in a word from an options file, we maintain a count
of the length we have seen so far in 'len', which is an int. When len
exceeds MAXWORDLEN - 1 (i.e. 1023) we cease storing characters in the
buffer but we continue to increment len. Since len is an int, it will
wrap around to -2147483648 after it reaches 2147483647. At that point
our test of (len < MAXWORDLEN-1) will succeed and we will start writing
characters to memory again.
This may enable an attacker to overwrite the heap and thereby corrupt
security-relevant variables. For this reason it has been assigned a
CVE identifier, CVE-2014-3158.
This fixes the bug by ceasing to increment len once it reaches MAXWORDLEN.
Reported-by: Lee Campbell <leecam@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 38,164 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int validate_scan_freqs(struct nlattr *freqs)
{
struct nlattr *attr1, *attr2;
int n_channels = 0, tmp1, tmp2;
nla_for_each_nested(attr1, freqs, tmp1) {
n_channels++;
/*
* Some hardware has a limited channel list for
* scanning, and it is pretty much nonsensical
* to scan for a channel twice, so disallow that
* and don't require drivers to check that the
* channel list they get isn't longer than what
* they can scan, as long as they can scan all
* the channels they registered at once.
*/
nla_for_each_nested(attr2, freqs, tmp2)
if (attr1 != attr2 &&
nla_get_u32(attr1) == nla_get_u32(attr2))
return 0;
}
return n_channels;
}
Commit Message: nl80211: fix check for valid SSID size in scan operations
In both trigger_scan and sched_scan operations, we were checking for
the SSID length before assigning the value correctly. Since the
memory was just kzalloc'ed, the check was always failing and SSID with
over 32 characters were allowed to go through.
This was causing a buffer overflow when copying the actual SSID to the
proper place.
This bug has been there since 2.6.29-rc4.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Luciano Coelho <coelho@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 26,793 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: syncable::ModelTypeSet ProfileSyncService::GetRegisteredDataTypes() const {
syncable::ModelTypeSet registered_types;
for (DataTypeController::TypeMap::const_iterator it =
data_type_controllers_.begin();
it != data_type_controllers_.end(); ++it) {
registered_types.Put(it->first);
}
return registered_types;
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 104,938 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void ModulateHSL(const double percent_hue,
const double percent_saturation,const double percent_lightness,double *red,
double *green,double *blue)
{
double
hue,
lightness,
saturation;
/*
Increase or decrease color lightness, saturation, or hue.
*/
ConvertRGBToHSL(*red,*green,*blue,&hue,&saturation,&lightness);
hue+=0.5*(0.01*percent_hue-1.0);
while (hue < 0.0)
hue+=1.0;
while (hue >= 1.0)
hue-=1.0;
saturation*=0.01*percent_saturation;
lightness*=0.01*percent_lightness;
ConvertHSLToRGB(hue,saturation,lightness,red,green,blue);
}
Commit Message: Evaluate lazy pixel cache morphology to prevent buffer overflow (bug report from Ibrahim M. El-Sayed)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 50,561 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Dispatcher::SetNotImplemented(const std::string& pattern) {
mg_set_uri_callback(context_, (root_ + pattern).c_str(),
&SendNotImplementedError, NULL);
}
Commit Message: In chromedriver, add /log url to get the contents of the chromedriver log
remotely. Also add a 'chrome.verbose' boolean startup option.
Remove usage of VLOG(1) in chromedriver. We do not need as complicated
logging as in Chrome.
BUG=85241
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7104085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88591 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,744 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static BROTLI_INLINE int DecodeDistanceBlockSwitchInternal(int safe,
BrotliState* s) {
if (!DecodeBlockTypeAndLength(safe, s, 2)) {
return 0;
}
s->dist_context_map_slice =
s->dist_context_map + (s->block_type_rb[5] << kDistanceContextBits);
s->dist_htree_index = s->dist_context_map_slice[s->distance_context];
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Cherry pick underflow fix.
BUG=583607
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1662313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373736}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,104 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Extension::RuntimeData::GetTabSpecificPermissions(int tab_id) const {
CHECK_GE(tab_id, 0);
TabPermissionsMap::const_iterator it = tab_specific_permissions_.find(tab_id);
return (it != tab_specific_permissions_.end()) ? it->second : NULL;
}
Commit Message: Tighten restrictions on hosted apps calling extension APIs
Only allow component apps to make any API calls, and for them only allow the namespaces they explicitly have permission for (plus chrome.test - I need to see if I can rework some WebStore tests to remove even this).
BUG=172369
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12095095
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180426 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 114,307 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _gdScalePass(const gdImagePtr pSrc, const unsigned int src_len,
const gdImagePtr pDst, const unsigned int dst_len,
const unsigned int num_lines,
const gdAxis axis)
{
unsigned int line_ndx;
LineContribType * contrib;
/* Same dim, just copy it. */
assert(dst_len != src_len); // TODO: caller should handle this.
contrib = _gdContributionsCalc(dst_len, src_len,
(double)dst_len / (double)src_len,
pSrc->interpolation);
if (contrib == NULL) {
return 0;
}
/* Scale each line */
for (line_ndx = 0; line_ndx < num_lines; line_ndx++) {
_gdScaleOneAxis(pSrc, pDst, dst_len, line_ndx, contrib, axis);
}
_gdContributionsFree (contrib);
return 1;
}/* _gdScalePass*/
Commit Message: Fix potential unsigned underflow
No need to decrease `u`, so we don't do it. While we're at it, we also factor
out the overflow check of the loop, what improves performance and readability.
This issue has been reported by Stefan Esser to security@libgd.org.
CWE ID: CWE-191 | 0 | 70,913 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderBlockFlow::createFloatingObjects()
{
m_floatingObjects = adoptPtr(new FloatingObjects(this, isHorizontalWritingMode()));
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 116,358 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int skb_checksum_help(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
__wsum csum;
int ret = 0, offset;
if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_COMPLETE)
goto out_set_summed;
if (unlikely(skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size)) {
skb_warn_bad_offload(skb);
return -EINVAL;
}
/* Before computing a checksum, we should make sure no frag could
* be modified by an external entity : checksum could be wrong.
*/
if (skb_has_shared_frag(skb)) {
ret = __skb_linearize(skb);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
offset = skb_checksum_start_offset(skb);
BUG_ON(offset >= skb_headlen(skb));
csum = skb_checksum(skb, offset, skb->len - offset, 0);
offset += skb->csum_offset;
BUG_ON(offset + sizeof(__sum16) > skb_headlen(skb));
if (skb_cloned(skb) &&
!skb_clone_writable(skb, offset + sizeof(__sum16))) {
ret = pskb_expand_head(skb, 0, 0, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
*(__sum16 *)(skb->data + offset) = csum_fold(csum);
out_set_summed:
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
out:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 48,942 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct ip_tunnel * ipip_tunnel_lookup(struct net *net,
__be32 remote, __be32 local)
{
unsigned int h0 = HASH(remote);
unsigned int h1 = HASH(local);
struct ip_tunnel *t;
struct ipip_net *ipn = net_generic(net, ipip_net_id);
for_each_ip_tunnel_rcu(ipn->tunnels_r_l[h0 ^ h1])
if (local == t->parms.iph.saddr &&
remote == t->parms.iph.daddr && (t->dev->flags&IFF_UP))
return t;
for_each_ip_tunnel_rcu(ipn->tunnels_r[h0])
if (remote == t->parms.iph.daddr && (t->dev->flags&IFF_UP))
return t;
for_each_ip_tunnel_rcu(ipn->tunnels_l[h1])
if (local == t->parms.iph.saddr && (t->dev->flags&IFF_UP))
return t;
t = rcu_dereference(ipn->tunnels_wc[0]);
if (t && (t->dev->flags&IFF_UP))
return t;
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: net: don't allow CAP_NET_ADMIN to load non-netdev kernel modules
Since a8f80e8ff94ecba629542d9b4b5f5a8ee3eb565c any process with
CAP_NET_ADMIN may load any module from /lib/modules/. This doesn't mean
that CAP_NET_ADMIN is a superset of CAP_SYS_MODULE as modules are
limited to /lib/modules/**. However, CAP_NET_ADMIN capability shouldn't
allow anybody load any module not related to networking.
This patch restricts an ability of autoloading modules to netdev modules
with explicit aliases. This fixes CVE-2011-1019.
Arnd Bergmann suggested to leave untouched the old pre-v2.6.32 behavior
of loading netdev modules by name (without any prefix) for processes
with CAP_SYS_MODULE to maintain the compatibility with network scripts
that use autoloading netdev modules by aliases like "eth0", "wlan0".
Currently there are only three users of the feature in the upstream
kernel: ipip, ip_gre and sit.
root@albatros:~# capsh --drop=$(seq -s, 0 11),$(seq -s, 13 34) --
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: fffffff800001000
CapEff: fffffff800001000
CapBnd: fffffff800001000
root@albatros:~# modprobe xfs
FATAL: Error inserting xfs
(/lib/modules/2.6.38-rc6-00001-g2bf4ca3/kernel/fs/xfs/xfs.ko): Operation not permitted
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit
sit: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit0
sit0 Link encap:IPv6-in-IPv4
NOARP MTU:1480 Metric:1
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
sit 10457 0
tunnel4 2957 1 sit
For CAP_SYS_MODULE module loading is still relaxed:
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: ffffffffffffffff
CapEff: ffffffffffffffff
CapBnd: ffffffffffffffff
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
xfs 745319 0
Reference: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/24/203
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 35,351 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebLocalFrameImpl::BlinkFeatureUsageReport(const std::set<int>& features) {
DCHECK(!features.empty());
for (int feature : features) {
UseCounter::Count(GetFrame(), static_cast<WebFeature>(feature));
}
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 134,251 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Element::detachAttrNodeFromElementWithValue(Attr* attrNode, const AtomicString& value)
{
ASSERT(hasSyntheticAttrChildNodes());
attrNode->detachFromElementWithValue(value);
AttrNodeList* attrNodeList = attrNodeListForElement(this);
for (unsigned i = 0; i < attrNodeList->size(); ++i) {
if (attrNodeList->at(i)->qualifiedName() == attrNode->qualifiedName()) {
attrNodeList->remove(i);
if (attrNodeList->isEmpty())
removeAttrNodeListForElement(this);
return;
}
}
ASSERT_NOT_REACHED();
}
Commit Message: Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 112,248 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static char *parse_value(void)
{
static char value[1024];
int quote = 0, comment = 0, space = 0;
size_t len = 0;
for (;;) {
int c = get_next_char();
if (len >= sizeof(value) - 1)
return NULL;
if (c == '\n') {
if (quote)
return NULL;
value[len] = 0;
return value;
}
if (comment)
continue;
if (isspace(c) && !quote) {
space = 1;
continue;
}
if (!quote) {
if (c == ';' || c == '#') {
comment = 1;
continue;
}
}
if (space) {
if (len)
value[len++] = ' ';
space = 0;
}
if (c == '\\') {
c = get_next_char();
switch (c) {
case '\n':
continue;
case 't':
c = '\t';
break;
case 'b':
c = '\b';
break;
case 'n':
c = '\n';
break;
/* Some characters escape as themselves */
case '\\': case '"':
break;
/* Reject unknown escape sequences */
default:
return NULL;
}
value[len++] = c;
continue;
}
if (c == '"') {
quote = 1-quote;
continue;
}
value[len++] = c;
}
}
Commit Message: perf tools: do not look at ./config for configuration
In addition to /etc/perfconfig and $HOME/.perfconfig, perf looks for
configuration in the file ./config, imitating git which looks at
$GIT_DIR/config. If ./config is not a perf configuration file, it
fails, or worse, treats it as a configuration file and changes behavior
in some unexpected way.
"config" is not an unusual name for a file to be lying around and perf
does not have a private directory dedicated for its own use, so let's
just stop looking for configuration in the cwd. Callers needing
context-sensitive configuration can use the PERF_CONFIG environment
variable.
Requested-by: Christian Ohm <chr.ohm@gmx.net>
Cc: 632923@bugs.debian.org
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Cc: Christian Ohm <chr.ohm@gmx.net>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20110805165838.GA7237@elie.gateway.2wire.net
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Nieder <jrnieder@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 34,834 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PseudoramiXDebug(const char *format, ...)
{
va_list ap;
va_start(ap, format);
LogVMessageVerb(X_NONE, 3, format, ap);
va_end(ap);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,539 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ListenToGuestWebContents(
AccessibilityNotificationWaiter* accessibility_waiter,
WebContents* web_contents) {
accessibility_waiter->ListenToAdditionalFrame(
static_cast<RenderFrameHostImpl*>(web_contents->GetMainFrame()));
return true;
}
Commit Message: Apply ExtensionNavigationThrottle filesystem/blob checks to all frames.
BUG=836858
Change-Id: I34333a72501129fd40b5a9aa6378c9f35f1e7fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1028511
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nick Carter <nick@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553867}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 156,097 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void js_RegExp_prototype_exec(js_State *J, js_Regexp *re, const char *text)
{
int i;
int opts;
Resub m;
opts = 0;
if (re->flags & JS_REGEXP_G) {
if (re->last > strlen(text)) {
re->last = 0;
js_pushnull(J);
return;
}
if (re->last > 0) {
text += re->last;
opts |= REG_NOTBOL;
}
}
if (!js_regexec(re->prog, text, &m, opts)) {
js_newarray(J);
js_pushstring(J, text);
js_setproperty(J, -2, "input");
js_pushnumber(J, js_utfptrtoidx(text, m.sub[0].sp));
js_setproperty(J, -2, "index");
for (i = 0; i < m.nsub; ++i) {
js_pushlstring(J, m.sub[i].sp, m.sub[i].ep - m.sub[i].sp);
js_setindex(J, -2, i);
}
if (re->flags & JS_REGEXP_G)
re->last = re->last + (m.sub[0].ep - text);
return;
}
if (re->flags & JS_REGEXP_G)
re->last = 0;
js_pushnull(J);
}
Commit Message: Bug 700937: Limit recursion in regexp matcher.
Also handle negative return code as an error in the JS bindings.
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 1 | 169,697 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: tt_cmap14_char_index( TT_CMap cmap,
FT_UInt32 char_code )
{
FT_UNUSED( cmap );
FT_UNUSED( char_code );
/* This can't happen */
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 7,097 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cassignop1(JF, js_Ast *lhs)
{
switch (lhs->type) {
case EXP_IDENTIFIER:
emitline(J, F, lhs);
emitlocal(J, F, OP_GETLOCAL, OP_GETVAR, lhs);
break;
case EXP_INDEX:
cexp(J, F, lhs->a);
cexp(J, F, lhs->b);
emitline(J, F, lhs);
emit(J, F, OP_DUP2);
emit(J, F, OP_GETPROP);
break;
case EXP_MEMBER:
cexp(J, F, lhs->a);
emitline(J, F, lhs);
emit(J, F, OP_DUP);
emitstring(J, F, OP_GETPROP_S, lhs->b->string);
break;
default:
jsC_error(J, lhs, "invalid l-value in assignment");
}
}
Commit Message: Bug 700947: Add missing ENDTRY opcode in try/catch/finally byte code.
In one of the code branches in handling exceptions in the catch block
we forgot to call the ENDTRY opcode to pop the inner hidden try.
This leads to an unbalanced exception stack which can cause a crash
due to us jumping to a stack frame that has already been exited.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 90,708 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ipv4_sk_redirect(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk)
{
const struct iphdr *iph = (const struct iphdr *) skb->data;
struct flowi4 fl4;
struct rtable *rt;
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
__build_flow_key(net, &fl4, sk, iph, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
rt = __ip_route_output_key(net, &fl4);
if (!IS_ERR(rt)) {
__ip_do_redirect(rt, skb, &fl4, false);
ip_rt_put(rt);
}
}
Commit Message: net: check and errout if res->fi is NULL when RTM_F_FIB_MATCH is set
Syzkaller hit 'general protection fault in fib_dump_info' bug on
commit 4.13-rc5..
Guilty file: net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 2808 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.13.0-rc5 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
task: ffff880078562700 task.stack: ffff880078110000
RIP: 0010:fib_dump_info+0x388/0x1170 net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c:1314
RSP: 0018:ffff880078117010 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 00000000000000fe RCX: 0000000000000002
RDX: 0000000000000006 RSI: ffff880078117084 RDI: 0000000000000030
RBP: ffff880078117268 R08: 000000000000000c R09: ffff8800780d80c8
R10: 0000000058d629b4 R11: 0000000067fce681 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffff8800784bd540 R14: ffff8800780d80b5 R15: ffff8800780d80a4
FS: 00000000022fa940(0000) GS:ffff88007fc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000004387d0 CR3: 0000000079135000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Call Trace:
inet_rtm_getroute+0xc89/0x1f50 net/ipv4/route.c:2766
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x288/0x680 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4217
netlink_rcv_skb+0x340/0x470 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2397
rtnetlink_rcv+0x28/0x30 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4223
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1265 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x4c4/0x6e0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1291
netlink_sendmsg+0x8c4/0xca0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1854
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:633 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:643
___sys_sendmsg+0x779/0x8d0 net/socket.c:2035
__sys_sendmsg+0xd1/0x170 net/socket.c:2069
SYSC_sendmsg net/socket.c:2080 [inline]
SyS_sendmsg+0x2d/0x50 net/socket.c:2076
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1a/0xa5
RIP: 0033:0x4512e9
RSP: 002b:00007ffc75584cc8 EFLAGS: 00000216 ORIG_RAX:
000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 00000000004512e9
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020f2cfc8 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 000000000000000e R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000216 R12: fffffffffffffffe
R13: 0000000000718000 R14: 0000000020c44ff0 R15: 0000000000000000
Code: 00 0f b6 8d ec fd ff ff 48 8b 85 f0 fd ff ff 88 48 17 48 8b 45
28 48 8d 78 30 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03
<0f>
b6 04 02 84 c0 74 08 3c 03 0f 8e cb 0c 00 00 48 8b 45 28 44
RIP: fib_dump_info+0x388/0x1170 net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c:1314 RSP:
ffff880078117010
---[ end trace 254a7af28348f88b ]---
This patch adds a res->fi NULL check.
example run:
$ip route get 0.0.0.0 iif virt1-0
broadcast 0.0.0.0 dev lo
cache <local,brd> iif virt1-0
$ip route get 0.0.0.0 iif virt1-0 fibmatch
RTNETLINK answers: No route to host
Reported-by: idaifish <idaifish@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Fixes: b61798130f1b ("net: ipv4: RTM_GETROUTE: return matched fib result when requested")
Signed-off-by: Roopa Prabhu <roopa@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 62,070 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HandleMousePressEvent(int x, int y) {
WebMouseEvent event(
WebInputEvent::kMouseDown, WebFloatPoint(x, y), WebFloatPoint(x, y),
WebPointerProperties::Button::kLeft, 0,
WebInputEvent::Modifiers::kLeftButtonDown, CurrentTimeTicksInSeconds());
event.SetFrameScale(1);
GetEventHandler().HandleMousePressEvent(event);
}
Commit Message: Reset virtual time state in scrollbar tests
This prevents ScrollbarTestWithVirtualTimer from polluting global state
for tests following it.
Bug: 791742
Change-Id: Iae3440451833408a6a5bd24b3319b307cd6d3547
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/969582
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Clarke <alexclarke@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#544691}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 132,190 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool WebContentsImpl::IsCurrentlyAudible() {
return is_currently_audible_;
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 144,986 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ext4_inode_table_set(struct super_block *sb,
struct ext4_group_desc *bg, ext4_fsblk_t blk)
{
bg->bg_inode_table_lo = cpu_to_le32((u32)blk);
if (EXT4_DESC_SIZE(sb) >= EXT4_MIN_DESC_SIZE_64BIT)
bg->bg_inode_table_hi = cpu_to_le32(blk >> 32);
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix undefined behavior in ext4_fill_flex_info()
Commit 503358ae01b70ce6909d19dd01287093f6b6271c ("ext4: avoid divide by
zero when trying to mount a corrupted file system") fixes CVE-2009-4307
by performing a sanity check on s_log_groups_per_flex, since it can be
set to a bogus value by an attacker.
sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex = sbi->s_es->s_log_groups_per_flex;
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex < 2) { ... }
This patch fixes two potential issues in the previous commit.
1) The sanity check might only work on architectures like PowerPC.
On x86, 5 bits are used for the shifting amount. That means, given a
large s_log_groups_per_flex value like 36, groups_per_flex = 1 << 36
is essentially 1 << 4 = 16, rather than 0. This will bypass the check,
leaving s_log_groups_per_flex and groups_per_flex inconsistent.
2) The sanity check relies on undefined behavior, i.e., oversized shift.
A standard-confirming C compiler could rewrite the check in unexpected
ways. Consider the following equivalent form, assuming groups_per_flex
is unsigned for simplicity.
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex == 0 || groups_per_flex == 1) {
We compile the code snippet using Clang 3.0 and GCC 4.6. Clang will
completely optimize away the check groups_per_flex == 0, leaving the
patched code as vulnerable as the original. GCC keeps the check, but
there is no guarantee that future versions will do the same.
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 20,491 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ap_lua_ssl_is_https(conn_rec *c)
{
return lua_ssl_is_https ? lua_ssl_is_https(c) : 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge r1642499 from trunk:
*) SECURITY: CVE-2014-8109 (cve.mitre.org)
mod_lua: Fix handling of the Require line when a LuaAuthzProvider is
used in multiple Require directives with different arguments.
PR57204 [Edward Lu <Chaosed0 gmail.com>]
Submitted By: Edward Lu
Committed By: covener
Submitted by: covener
Reviewed/backported by: jim
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/branches/2.4.x@1642861 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 35,677 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool need_emulate_wbinvd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
return vcpu->kvm->arch.iommu_domain &&
!(vcpu->kvm->arch.iommu_flags & KVM_IOMMU_CACHE_COHERENCY);
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 20,866 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FakeScrollClient& ScrollClient() { return scroll_client_; }
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID: | 0 | 125,562 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::WasOccluded() {
if (capturer_count_ > 0)
return;
for (RenderWidgetHostView* view : GetRenderWidgetHostViewsInTree())
view->WasOccluded();
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 135,916 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void init_numa_balancing(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct *p)
{
int mm_users = 0;
struct mm_struct *mm = p->mm;
if (mm) {
mm_users = atomic_read(&mm->mm_users);
if (mm_users == 1) {
mm->numa_next_scan = jiffies + msecs_to_jiffies(sysctl_numa_balancing_scan_delay);
mm->numa_scan_seq = 0;
}
}
p->node_stamp = 0;
p->numa_scan_seq = mm ? mm->numa_scan_seq : 0;
p->numa_scan_period = sysctl_numa_balancing_scan_delay;
p->numa_work.next = &p->numa_work;
p->numa_faults = NULL;
p->numa_group = NULL;
p->last_task_numa_placement = 0;
p->last_sum_exec_runtime = 0;
/* New address space, reset the preferred nid */
if (!(clone_flags & CLONE_VM)) {
p->numa_preferred_nid = -1;
return;
}
/*
* New thread, keep existing numa_preferred_nid which should be copied
* already by arch_dup_task_struct but stagger when scans start.
*/
if (mm) {
unsigned int delay;
delay = min_t(unsigned int, task_scan_max(current),
current->numa_scan_period * mm_users * NSEC_PER_MSEC);
delay += 2 * TICK_NSEC;
p->node_stamp = delay;
}
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 92,593 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline String canonicalizedTitle(Document* document, const String& title)
{
const CharacterType* characters = title.getCharacters<CharacterType>();
unsigned length = title.length();
unsigned i;
StringBuffer<CharacterType> buffer(length);
unsigned builderIndex = 0;
for (i = 0; i < length; ++i) {
CharacterType c = characters[i];
if (!(c <= 0x20 || c == 0x7F))
break;
}
if (i == length)
return String();
bool previousCharWasWS = false;
for (; i < length; ++i) {
CharacterType c = characters[i];
if (c <= 0x20 || c == 0x7F || (WTF::Unicode::category(c) & (WTF::Unicode::Separator_Line | WTF::Unicode::Separator_Paragraph))) {
if (previousCharWasWS)
continue;
buffer[builderIndex++] = ' ';
previousCharWasWS = true;
} else {
buffer[builderIndex++] = c;
previousCharWasWS = false;
}
}
while (builderIndex > 0) {
--builderIndex;
if (buffer[builderIndex] != ' ')
break;
}
if (!builderIndex && buffer[builderIndex] == ' ')
return String();
buffer.shrink(builderIndex + 1);
return String::adopt(buffer);
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 102,637 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: asmlinkage void do_divide_error(unsigned long r4, unsigned long r5,
unsigned long r6, unsigned long r7,
struct pt_regs __regs)
{
siginfo_t info;
switch (r4) {
case TRAP_DIVZERO_ERROR:
info.si_code = FPE_INTDIV;
break;
case TRAP_DIVOVF_ERROR:
info.si_code = FPE_INTOVF;
break;
}
force_sig_info(SIGFPE, &info, current);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,549 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SiteInstanceTest()
: ui_thread_(BrowserThread::UI, &message_loop_),
old_browser_client_(NULL) {
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 1 | 171,011 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct tcp_md5sig_pool *tcp_get_md5sig_pool(void)
{
local_bh_disable();
if (tcp_md5sig_pool_populated) {
/* coupled with smp_wmb() in __tcp_alloc_md5sig_pool() */
smp_rmb();
return this_cpu_ptr(&tcp_md5sig_pool);
}
local_bh_enable();
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: tcp: initialize rcv_mss to TCP_MIN_MSS instead of 0
When tcp_disconnect() is called, inet_csk_delack_init() sets
icsk->icsk_ack.rcv_mss to 0.
This could potentially cause tcp_recvmsg() => tcp_cleanup_rbuf() =>
__tcp_select_window() call path to have division by 0 issue.
So this patch initializes rcv_mss to TCP_MIN_MSS instead of 0.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 61,742 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PPResultAndExceptionToNPResult::~PPResultAndExceptionToNPResult() {
DCHECK(checked_exception_);
ObjectVar::PluginReleasePPVar(exception_);
}
Commit Message: Fix invalid read in ppapi code
BUG=77493
TEST=attached test
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6883059
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@82172 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 100,880 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int should_end_transaction(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
struct btrfs_root *root)
{
int ret;
ret = btrfs_block_rsv_check(root, &root->fs_info->global_block_rsv, 5);
return ret ? 1 : 0;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <chris.mason@fusionio.com>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <pascal@junod.info>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 34,494 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool address_space_rw(AddressSpace *as, hwaddr addr, uint8_t *buf,
int len, bool is_write)
{
hwaddr l;
uint8_t *ptr;
uint64_t val;
hwaddr addr1;
MemoryRegion *mr;
bool error = false;
while (len > 0) {
l = len;
mr = address_space_translate(as, addr, &addr1, &l, is_write);
if (is_write) {
if (!memory_access_is_direct(mr, is_write)) {
l = memory_access_size(mr, l, addr1);
/* XXX: could force current_cpu to NULL to avoid
potential bugs */
switch (l) {
case 8:
/* 64 bit write access */
val = ldq_p(buf);
error |= io_mem_write(mr, addr1, val, 8);
break;
case 4:
/* 32 bit write access */
val = ldl_p(buf);
error |= io_mem_write(mr, addr1, val, 4);
break;
case 2:
/* 16 bit write access */
val = lduw_p(buf);
error |= io_mem_write(mr, addr1, val, 2);
break;
case 1:
/* 8 bit write access */
val = ldub_p(buf);
error |= io_mem_write(mr, addr1, val, 1);
break;
default:
abort();
}
} else {
addr1 += memory_region_get_ram_addr(mr);
/* RAM case */
ptr = qemu_get_ram_ptr(addr1);
memcpy(ptr, buf, l);
invalidate_and_set_dirty(addr1, l);
}
} else {
if (!memory_access_is_direct(mr, is_write)) {
/* I/O case */
l = memory_access_size(mr, l, addr1);
switch (l) {
case 8:
/* 64 bit read access */
error |= io_mem_read(mr, addr1, &val, 8);
stq_p(buf, val);
break;
case 4:
/* 32 bit read access */
error |= io_mem_read(mr, addr1, &val, 4);
stl_p(buf, val);
break;
case 2:
/* 16 bit read access */
error |= io_mem_read(mr, addr1, &val, 2);
stw_p(buf, val);
break;
case 1:
/* 8 bit read access */
error |= io_mem_read(mr, addr1, &val, 1);
stb_p(buf, val);
break;
default:
abort();
}
} else {
/* RAM case */
ptr = qemu_get_ram_ptr(mr->ram_addr + addr1);
memcpy(buf, ptr, l);
}
}
len -= l;
buf += l;
addr += l;
}
return error;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 14,317 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TestRenderWidgetHostView::RenderProcessGone(base::TerminationStatus status,
int error_code) {
delete this;
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,941 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pch_char (lin line)
{
return p_Char[line];
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-78 | 0 | 2,693 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: content::WebContents* OpenNewTab(Browser* browser, const GURL& url) {
ui_test_utils::NavigateToURLWithDisposition(
browser, url, WindowOpenDisposition::NEW_FOREGROUND_TAB,
ui_test_utils::BROWSER_TEST_WAIT_FOR_TAB |
ui_test_utils::BROWSER_TEST_WAIT_FOR_NAVIGATION);
return browser->tab_strip_model()->GetActiveWebContents();
}
Commit Message: Local NTP: add smoke tests for doodles
Split LogoService into LogoService interface and LogoServiceImpl to make
it easier to provide fake data to the test.
Bug: 768419
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:closure_compilation
Change-Id: I84639189d2db1b24a2e139936c99369352bab587
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/690198
Reviewed-by: Sylvain Defresne <sdefresne@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Marc Treib <treib@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Chris Pickel <sfiera@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#505374}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 127,672 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: jbig2_build_huffman_table(Jbig2Ctx *ctx, const Jbig2HuffmanParams *params)
{
int *LENCOUNT;
int LENMAX = -1;
const int lencountcount = 256;
const Jbig2HuffmanLine *lines = params->lines;
int n_lines = params->n_lines;
int i, j;
int max_j;
int log_table_size = 0;
Jbig2HuffmanTable *result;
Jbig2HuffmanEntry *entries;
int CURLEN;
int firstcode = 0;
int CURCODE;
int CURTEMP;
LENCOUNT = jbig2_new(ctx, int, lencountcount);
if (LENCOUNT == NULL) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, -1, "couldn't allocate storage for huffman histogram");
return NULL;
}
memset(LENCOUNT, 0, sizeof(int) * lencountcount);
/* B.3, 1. */
for (i = 0; i < params->n_lines; i++) {
int PREFLEN = lines[i].PREFLEN;
int lts;
if (PREFLEN > LENMAX) {
for (j = LENMAX + 1; j < PREFLEN + 1; j++)
LENCOUNT[j] = 0;
LENMAX = PREFLEN;
}
LENCOUNT[PREFLEN]++;
lts = PREFLEN + lines[i].RANGELEN;
if (lts > LOG_TABLE_SIZE_MAX)
lts = PREFLEN;
if (lts <= LOG_TABLE_SIZE_MAX && log_table_size < lts)
log_table_size = lts;
}
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_DEBUG, -1, "constructing huffman table log size %d", log_table_size);
max_j = 1 << log_table_size;
result = jbig2_new(ctx, Jbig2HuffmanTable, 1);
if (result == NULL) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, -1, "couldn't allocate result storage in jbig2_build_huffman_table");
jbig2_free(ctx->allocator, LENCOUNT);
return NULL;
}
result->log_table_size = log_table_size;
entries = jbig2_new(ctx, Jbig2HuffmanEntry, max_j);
if (entries == NULL) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, -1, "couldn't allocate entries storage in jbig2_build_huffman_table");
jbig2_free(ctx->allocator, result);
jbig2_free(ctx->allocator, LENCOUNT);
return NULL;
}
/* fill now to catch missing JBIG2Globals later */
memset(entries, 0xFF, sizeof(Jbig2HuffmanEntry) * max_j);
result->entries = entries;
LENCOUNT[0] = 0;
for (CURLEN = 1; CURLEN <= LENMAX; CURLEN++) {
int shift = log_table_size - CURLEN;
/* B.3 3.(a) */
firstcode = (firstcode + LENCOUNT[CURLEN - 1]) << 1;
CURCODE = firstcode;
/* B.3 3.(b) */
for (CURTEMP = 0; CURTEMP < n_lines; CURTEMP++) {
int PREFLEN = lines[CURTEMP].PREFLEN;
if (PREFLEN == CURLEN) {
int RANGELEN = lines[CURTEMP].RANGELEN;
int start_j = CURCODE << shift;
int end_j = (CURCODE + 1) << shift;
byte eflags = 0;
if (end_j > max_j) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, -1, "ran off the end of the entries table! (%d >= %d)", end_j, max_j);
jbig2_free(ctx->allocator, result->entries);
jbig2_free(ctx->allocator, result);
jbig2_free(ctx->allocator, LENCOUNT);
return NULL;
}
/* todo: build extension tables */
if (params->HTOOB && CURTEMP == n_lines - 1)
eflags |= JBIG2_HUFFMAN_FLAGS_ISOOB;
if (CURTEMP == n_lines - (params->HTOOB ? 3 : 2))
eflags |= JBIG2_HUFFMAN_FLAGS_ISLOW;
if (PREFLEN + RANGELEN > LOG_TABLE_SIZE_MAX) {
for (j = start_j; j < end_j; j++) {
entries[j].u.RANGELOW = lines[CURTEMP].RANGELOW;
entries[j].PREFLEN = PREFLEN;
entries[j].RANGELEN = RANGELEN;
entries[j].flags = eflags;
}
} else {
for (j = start_j; j < end_j; j++) {
int32_t HTOFFSET = (j >> (shift - RANGELEN)) & ((1 << RANGELEN) - 1);
if (eflags & JBIG2_HUFFMAN_FLAGS_ISLOW)
entries[j].u.RANGELOW = lines[CURTEMP].RANGELOW - HTOFFSET;
else
entries[j].u.RANGELOW = lines[CURTEMP].RANGELOW + HTOFFSET;
entries[j].PREFLEN = PREFLEN + RANGELEN;
entries[j].RANGELEN = 0;
entries[j].flags = eflags;
}
}
CURCODE++;
}
}
}
jbig2_free(ctx->allocator, LENCOUNT);
return result;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 18,038 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::unique_ptr<BlobDataHandle> SetupBasicBlob(const std::string& id) {
BlobDataBuilder builder(id);
builder.AppendData("1", 1);
builder.set_content_type("text/plain");
return context_->AddFinishedBlob(builder);
}
Commit Message: [BlobStorage] Fixing potential overflow
Bug: 779314
Change-Id: I74612639d20544e4c12230569c7b88fbe669ec03
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747725
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#512977}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 150,318 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ScriptValue WebGL2RenderingContextBase::getActiveUniformBlockParameter(
ScriptState* script_state,
WebGLProgram* program,
GLuint uniform_block_index,
GLenum pname) {
if (isContextLost() ||
!ValidateWebGLObject("getActiveUniformBlockParameter", program))
return ScriptValue::CreateNull(script_state);
if (!ValidateUniformBlockIndex("getActiveUniformBlockParameter", program,
uniform_block_index))
return ScriptValue::CreateNull(script_state);
switch (pname) {
case GL_UNIFORM_BLOCK_BINDING:
case GL_UNIFORM_BLOCK_DATA_SIZE:
case GL_UNIFORM_BLOCK_ACTIVE_UNIFORMS: {
GLint int_value = 0;
ContextGL()->GetActiveUniformBlockiv(
ObjectOrZero(program), uniform_block_index, pname, &int_value);
return WebGLAny(script_state, static_cast<unsigned>(int_value));
}
case GL_UNIFORM_BLOCK_ACTIVE_UNIFORM_INDICES: {
GLint uniform_count = 0;
ContextGL()->GetActiveUniformBlockiv(
ObjectOrZero(program), uniform_block_index,
GL_UNIFORM_BLOCK_ACTIVE_UNIFORMS, &uniform_count);
Vector<GLint> indices(uniform_count);
ContextGL()->GetActiveUniformBlockiv(
ObjectOrZero(program), uniform_block_index, pname, indices.data());
return WebGLAny(
script_state,
DOMUint32Array::Create(reinterpret_cast<GLuint*>(indices.data()),
indices.size()));
}
case GL_UNIFORM_BLOCK_REFERENCED_BY_VERTEX_SHADER:
case GL_UNIFORM_BLOCK_REFERENCED_BY_FRAGMENT_SHADER: {
GLint bool_value = 0;
ContextGL()->GetActiveUniformBlockiv(
ObjectOrZero(program), uniform_block_index, pname, &bool_value);
return WebGLAny(script_state, static_cast<bool>(bool_value));
}
default:
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "getActiveUniformBlockParameter",
"invalid parameter name");
return ScriptValue::CreateNull(script_state);
}
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,418 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mov_read_dpxe(MOVContext *c, AVIOContext *pb, MOVAtom atom)
{
return mov_read_extradata(c, pb, atom, AV_CODEC_ID_R10K);
}
Commit Message: avformat/mov: Fix DoS in read_tfra()
Fixes: Missing EOF check in loop
No testcase
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-834 | 0 | 61,429 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: daemon_linux_lvm2_vg_remove_pv (Daemon *daemon,
const gchar *vg_uuid,
const gchar *pv_uuid,
gchar **options,
DBusGMethodInvocation *context)
{
daemon_local_check_auth (daemon,
NULL,
"org.freedesktop.udisks.linux-lvm2",
"LinuxLvm2VGRemovePV",
TRUE,
daemon_linux_lvm2_vg_remove_pv_authorized_cb,
context,
3,
g_strdup (vg_uuid),
g_free,
g_strdup (pv_uuid),
g_free,
g_strdupv (options),
g_strfreev);
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 11,595 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SparseHistogram::SparseHistogram(PersistentHistogramAllocator* allocator,
const std::string& name,
HistogramSamples::Metadata* meta,
HistogramSamples::Metadata* logged_meta)
: HistogramBase(name),
samples_(new PersistentSampleMap(HashMetricName(name), allocator, meta)),
logged_samples_(
new PersistentSampleMap(samples_->id() + 1, allocator, logged_meta)) {
}
Commit Message: Convert DCHECKs to CHECKs for histogram types
When a histogram is looked up by name, there is currently a DCHECK that
verifies the type of the stored histogram matches the expected type.
A mismatch represents a significant problem because the returned
HistogramBase is cast to a Histogram in ValidateRangeChecksum,
potentially causing a crash.
This CL converts the DCHECK to a CHECK to prevent the possibility of
type confusion in release builds.
BUG=651443
R=isherman@chromium.org
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2381893003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#421929}
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 140,101 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void kvm_get_time_scale(uint32_t scaled_khz, uint32_t base_khz,
s8 *pshift, u32 *pmultiplier)
{
uint64_t scaled64;
int32_t shift = 0;
uint64_t tps64;
uint32_t tps32;
tps64 = base_khz * 1000LL;
scaled64 = scaled_khz * 1000LL;
while (tps64 > scaled64*2 || tps64 & 0xffffffff00000000ULL) {
tps64 >>= 1;
shift--;
}
tps32 = (uint32_t)tps64;
while (tps32 <= scaled64 || scaled64 & 0xffffffff00000000ULL) {
if (scaled64 & 0xffffffff00000000ULL || tps32 & 0x80000000)
scaled64 >>= 1;
else
tps32 <<= 1;
shift++;
}
*pshift = shift;
*pmultiplier = div_frac(scaled64, tps32);
pr_debug("%s: base_khz %u => %u, shift %d, mul %u\n",
__func__, base_khz, scaled_khz, shift, *pmultiplier);
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 20,775 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MojoResult Core::AttachSerializedMessageBuffer(MojoMessageHandle message_handle,
uint32_t payload_size,
const MojoHandle* handles,
uint32_t num_handles,
void** buffer,
uint32_t* buffer_size) {
if (!message_handle || (num_handles && !handles) || !buffer || !buffer_size)
return MOJO_RESULT_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
RequestContext request_context;
auto* message = reinterpret_cast<ports::UserMessageEvent*>(message_handle)
->GetMessage<UserMessageImpl>();
MojoResult rv = message->AttachSerializedMessageBuffer(payload_size, handles,
num_handles);
if (rv != MOJO_RESULT_OK)
return rv;
*buffer = message->user_payload();
*buffer_size = base::checked_cast<uint32_t>(message->user_payload_capacity());
return MOJO_RESULT_OK;
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 149,570 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DevToolsHttpHandler::AcceptWebSocket(
int connection_id,
const net::HttpServerRequestInfo& request) {
if (!thread_)
return;
thread_->task_runner()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::BindOnce(&ServerWrapper::AcceptWebSocket,
base::Unretained(server_wrapper_.get()),
connection_id, request));
}
Commit Message: DevTools: check Host header for being IP or localhost when connecting over RDP.
Bug: 813540
Change-Id: I9338aa2475c15090b8a60729be25502eb866efb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/952522
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#541547}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 148,245 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: uint32_t smb2cli_conn_server_capabilities(struct smbXcli_conn *conn)
{
return conn->smb2.server.capabilities;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 2,437 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int queue_access_lock(struct snd_seq_queue *q, int client)
{
unsigned long flags;
int access_ok;
spin_lock_irqsave(&q->owner_lock, flags);
access_ok = check_access(q, client);
if (access_ok)
q->klocked = 1;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&q->owner_lock, flags);
return access_ok;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: seq: Fix race at timer setup and close
ALSA sequencer code has an open race between the timer setup ioctl and
the close of the client. This was triggered by syzkaller fuzzer, and
a use-after-free was caught there as a result.
This patch papers over it by adding a proper queue->timer_mutex lock
around the timer-related calls in the relevant code path.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 54,636 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void generate_seqset(struct Buffer *b, struct ImapData *idata,
unsigned int msn_begin, unsigned int msn_end)
{
int chunks = 0;
int state = 0; /* 1: single msn, 2: range of msn */
unsigned int msn, range_begin, range_end;
for (msn = msn_begin; msn <= msn_end + 1; msn++)
{
if (msn <= msn_end && !idata->msn_index[msn - 1])
{
switch (state)
{
case 1: /* single: convert to a range */
state = 2;
/* fallthrough */
case 2: /* extend range ending */
range_end = msn;
break;
default:
state = 1;
range_begin = msn;
break;
}
}
else if (state)
{
if (chunks++)
mutt_buffer_addch(b, ',');
if (chunks == 150)
break;
if (state == 1)
mutt_buffer_printf(b, "%u", range_begin);
else if (state == 2)
mutt_buffer_printf(b, "%u:%u", range_begin, range_end);
state = 0;
}
}
/* Too big. Just query the whole range then. */
if (chunks == 150 || mutt_str_strlen(b->data) > 500)
{
b->dptr = b->data;
mutt_buffer_printf(b, "%u:%u", msn_begin, msn_end);
}
}
Commit Message: Don't overflow stack buffer in msg_parse_fetch
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 79,530 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int kvm_io_bus_write(struct kvm *kvm, enum kvm_bus bus_idx, gpa_t addr,
int len, const void *val)
{
int idx;
struct kvm_io_bus *bus;
struct kvm_io_range range;
range = (struct kvm_io_range) {
.addr = addr,
.len = len,
};
bus = srcu_dereference(kvm->buses[bus_idx], &kvm->srcu);
idx = kvm_io_bus_get_first_dev(bus, addr, len);
if (idx < 0)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
while (idx < bus->dev_count &&
kvm_io_bus_sort_cmp(&range, &bus->range[idx]) == 0) {
if (!kvm_iodevice_write(bus->range[idx].dev, addr, len, val))
return 0;
idx++;
}
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
Commit Message: KVM: unmap pages from the iommu when slots are removed
commit 32f6daad4651a748a58a3ab6da0611862175722f upstream.
We've been adding new mappings, but not destroying old mappings.
This can lead to a page leak as pages are pinned using
get_user_pages, but only unpinned with put_page if they still
exist in the memslots list on vm shutdown. A memslot that is
destroyed while an iommu domain is enabled for the guest will
therefore result in an elevated page reference count that is
never cleared.
Additionally, without this fix, the iommu is only programmed
with the first translation for a gpa. This can result in
peer-to-peer errors if a mapping is destroyed and replaced by a
new mapping at the same gpa as the iommu will still be pointing
to the original, pinned memory address.
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 20,364 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::LoadInfo::LoadInfo() {}
Commit Message: When turning a download into a navigation, navigate the right frame
Code changes from Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Bug: 926105
Change-Id: I098599394e6ebe7d2fce5af838014297a337d294
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1454962
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629547}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 152,021 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ScreenLayoutObserver::UpdateDisplayInfo(
ScreenLayoutObserver::DisplayInfoMap* old_info) {
if (old_info)
old_info->swap(display_info_);
display_info_.clear();
display::DisplayManager* display_manager = GetDisplayManager();
for (size_t i = 0; i < display_manager->GetNumDisplays(); ++i) {
int64_t id = display_manager->GetDisplayAt(i).id();
display_info_[id] = display_manager->GetDisplayInfo(id);
}
}
Commit Message: Avoid Showing rotation change notification when source is accelerometer
BUG=717252
TEST=Manually rotate device with accelerometer and observe there's no notification
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2853113005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#469058}
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 129,500 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int fill_thread_core_info(struct elf_thread_core_info *t,
const struct user_regset_view *view,
long signr, size_t *total)
{
unsigned int i;
/*
* NT_PRSTATUS is the one special case, because the regset data
* goes into the pr_reg field inside the note contents, rather
* than being the whole note contents. We fill the reset in here.
* We assume that regset 0 is NT_PRSTATUS.
*/
fill_prstatus(&t->prstatus, t->task, signr);
(void) view->regsets[0].get(t->task, &view->regsets[0],
0, PR_REG_SIZE(t->prstatus.pr_reg),
PR_REG_PTR(&t->prstatus), NULL);
fill_note(&t->notes[0], "CORE", NT_PRSTATUS,
PRSTATUS_SIZE(t->prstatus), &t->prstatus);
*total += notesize(&t->notes[0]);
do_thread_regset_writeback(t->task, &view->regsets[0]);
/*
* Each other regset might generate a note too. For each regset
* that has no core_note_type or is inactive, we leave t->notes[i]
* all zero and we'll know to skip writing it later.
*/
for (i = 1; i < view->n; ++i) {
const struct user_regset *regset = &view->regsets[i];
do_thread_regset_writeback(t->task, regset);
if (regset->core_note_type && regset->get &&
(!regset->active || regset->active(t->task, regset))) {
int ret;
size_t size = regset->n * regset->size;
void *data = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (unlikely(!data))
return 0;
ret = regset->get(t->task, regset,
0, size, data, NULL);
if (unlikely(ret))
kfree(data);
else {
if (regset->core_note_type != NT_PRFPREG)
fill_note(&t->notes[i], "LINUX",
regset->core_note_type,
size, data);
else {
SET_PR_FPVALID(&t->prstatus, 1);
fill_note(&t->notes[i], "CORE",
NT_PRFPREG, size, data);
}
*total += notesize(&t->notes[i]);
}
}
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: x86, mm/ASLR: Fix stack randomization on 64-bit systems
The issue is that the stack for processes is not properly randomized on
64 bit architectures due to an integer overflow.
The affected function is randomize_stack_top() in file
"fs/binfmt_elf.c":
static unsigned long randomize_stack_top(unsigned long stack_top)
{
unsigned int random_variable = 0;
if ((current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE) &&
!(current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE)) {
random_variable = get_random_int() & STACK_RND_MASK;
random_variable <<= PAGE_SHIFT;
}
return PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top) + random_variable;
return PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top) - random_variable;
}
Note that, it declares the "random_variable" variable as "unsigned int".
Since the result of the shifting operation between STACK_RND_MASK (which
is 0x3fffff on x86_64, 22 bits) and PAGE_SHIFT (which is 12 on x86_64):
random_variable <<= PAGE_SHIFT;
then the two leftmost bits are dropped when storing the result in the
"random_variable". This variable shall be at least 34 bits long to hold
the (22+12) result.
These two dropped bits have an impact on the entropy of process stack.
Concretely, the total stack entropy is reduced by four: from 2^28 to
2^30 (One fourth of expected entropy).
This patch restores back the entropy by correcting the types involved
in the operations in the functions randomize_stack_top() and
stack_maxrandom_size().
The successful fix can be tested with:
$ for i in `seq 1 10`; do cat /proc/self/maps | grep stack; done
7ffeda566000-7ffeda587000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
7fff5a332000-7fff5a353000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
7ffcdb7a1000-7ffcdb7c2000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
7ffd5e2c4000-7ffd5e2e5000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
...
Once corrected, the leading bytes should be between 7ffc and 7fff,
rather than always being 7fff.
Signed-off-by: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es>
Signed-off-by: Ismael Ripoll <iripoll@upv.es>
[ Rebased, fixed 80 char bugs, cleaned up commit message, added test example and CVE ]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Fixes: CVE-2015-1593
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150214173350.GA18393@www.outflux.net
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 44,290 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_rle4_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData,
OPJ_UINT32 stride, OPJ_UINT32 width, OPJ_UINT32 height)
{
OPJ_UINT32 x, y;
OPJ_UINT8 *pix;
const OPJ_UINT8 *beyond;
beyond = pData + stride * height;
pix = pData;
x = y = 0U;
while (y < height) {
int c = getc(IN);
if (c == EOF) {
break;
}
if (c) { /* encoded mode */
int j;
OPJ_UINT8 c1 = (OPJ_UINT8)getc(IN);
for (j = 0; (j < c) && (x < width) &&
((OPJ_SIZE_T)pix < (OPJ_SIZE_T)beyond); j++, x++, pix++) {
*pix = (OPJ_UINT8)((j & 1) ? (c1 & 0x0fU) : ((c1 >> 4) & 0x0fU));
}
} else { /* absolute mode */
c = getc(IN);
if (c == EOF) {
break;
}
if (c == 0x00) { /* EOL */
x = 0;
y++;
pix = pData + y * stride;
} else if (c == 0x01) { /* EOP */
break;
} else if (c == 0x02) { /* MOVE by dxdy */
c = getc(IN);
x += (OPJ_UINT32)c;
c = getc(IN);
y += (OPJ_UINT32)c;
pix = pData + y * stride + x;
} else { /* 03 .. 255 : absolute mode */
int j;
OPJ_UINT8 c1 = 0U;
for (j = 0; (j < c) && (x < width) &&
((OPJ_SIZE_T)pix < (OPJ_SIZE_T)beyond); j++, x++, pix++) {
if ((j & 1) == 0) {
c1 = (OPJ_UINT8)getc(IN);
}
*pix = (OPJ_UINT8)((j & 1) ? (c1 & 0x0fU) : ((c1 >> 4) & 0x0fU));
}
if (((c & 3) == 1) || ((c & 3) == 2)) { /* skip padding byte */
getc(IN);
}
}
}
} /* while(y < height) */
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
Commit Message: bmp_read_info_header(): reject bmp files with biBitCount == 0 (#983)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 62,530 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: set_error(struct archive_read *a, int ret)
{
switch (ret) {
case LZMA_STREAM_END: /* Found end of stream. */
case LZMA_OK: /* Decompressor made some progress. */
break;
case LZMA_MEM_ERROR:
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM,
"Lzma library error: Cannot allocate memory");
break;
case LZMA_MEMLIMIT_ERROR:
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM,
"Lzma library error: Out of memory");
break;
case LZMA_FORMAT_ERROR:
archive_set_error(&a->archive,
ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"Lzma library error: format not recognized");
break;
case LZMA_OPTIONS_ERROR:
archive_set_error(&a->archive,
ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"Lzma library error: Invalid options");
break;
case LZMA_DATA_ERROR:
archive_set_error(&a->archive,
ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"Lzma library error: Corrupted input data");
break;
case LZMA_BUF_ERROR:
archive_set_error(&a->archive,
ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"Lzma library error: No progress is possible");
break;
default:
/* Return an error. */
archive_set_error(&a->archive,
ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"Lzma decompression failed: Unknown error");
break;
}
}
Commit Message: Issue #718: Fix TALOS-CAN-152
If a 7-Zip archive declares a rediculously large number of substreams,
it can overflow an internal counter, leading a subsequent memory
allocation to be too small for the substream data.
Thanks to the Open Source and Threat Intelligence project at Cisco
for reporting this issue.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 53,574 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t MediaHTTP::initCheck() const {
return mInitCheck;
}
Commit Message: Fix free-after-use for MediaHTTP
fix free-after-use when we reconnect to an HTTP media source.
Change-Id: I96da5a79f5382409a545f8b4e22a24523f287464
Tests: compilation and eyeballs
Bug: 31373622
(cherry picked from commit dd81e1592ffa77812998b05761eb840b70fed121)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 157,800 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool available_free_memory(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, int type)
{
struct f2fs_nm_info *nm_i = NM_I(sbi);
struct sysinfo val;
unsigned long avail_ram;
unsigned long mem_size = 0;
bool res = false;
si_meminfo(&val);
/* only uses low memory */
avail_ram = val.totalram - val.totalhigh;
/*
* give 25%, 25%, 50%, 50%, 50% memory for each components respectively
*/
if (type == FREE_NIDS) {
mem_size = (nm_i->nid_cnt[FREE_NID_LIST] *
sizeof(struct free_nid)) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
res = mem_size < ((avail_ram * nm_i->ram_thresh / 100) >> 2);
} else if (type == NAT_ENTRIES) {
mem_size = (nm_i->nat_cnt * sizeof(struct nat_entry)) >>
PAGE_SHIFT;
res = mem_size < ((avail_ram * nm_i->ram_thresh / 100) >> 2);
if (excess_cached_nats(sbi))
res = false;
} else if (type == DIRTY_DENTS) {
if (sbi->sb->s_bdi->wb.dirty_exceeded)
return false;
mem_size = get_pages(sbi, F2FS_DIRTY_DENTS);
res = mem_size < ((avail_ram * nm_i->ram_thresh / 100) >> 1);
} else if (type == INO_ENTRIES) {
int i;
for (i = 0; i <= UPDATE_INO; i++)
mem_size += sbi->im[i].ino_num *
sizeof(struct ino_entry);
mem_size >>= PAGE_SHIFT;
res = mem_size < ((avail_ram * nm_i->ram_thresh / 100) >> 1);
} else if (type == EXTENT_CACHE) {
mem_size = (atomic_read(&sbi->total_ext_tree) *
sizeof(struct extent_tree) +
atomic_read(&sbi->total_ext_node) *
sizeof(struct extent_node)) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
res = mem_size < ((avail_ram * nm_i->ram_thresh / 100) >> 1);
} else {
if (!sbi->sb->s_bdi->wb.dirty_exceeded)
return true;
}
return res;
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix race condition in between free nid allocator/initializer
In below concurrent case, allocated nid can be loaded into free nid cache
and be allocated again.
Thread A Thread B
- f2fs_create
- f2fs_new_inode
- alloc_nid
- __insert_nid_to_list(ALLOC_NID_LIST)
- f2fs_balance_fs_bg
- build_free_nids
- __build_free_nids
- scan_nat_page
- add_free_nid
- __lookup_nat_cache
- f2fs_add_link
- init_inode_metadata
- new_inode_page
- new_node_page
- set_node_addr
- alloc_nid_done
- __remove_nid_from_list(ALLOC_NID_LIST)
- __insert_nid_to_list(FREE_NID_LIST)
This patch makes nat cache lookup and free nid list operation being atomical
to avoid this race condition.
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 85,252 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeContentBrowserClient::CancelDesktopNotification(
int render_process_id,
int render_view_id,
int notification_id) {
RenderViewHost* rvh = RenderViewHost::FromID(
render_process_id, render_view_id);
if (!rvh) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
RenderProcessHost* process = rvh->process();
DesktopNotificationService* service =
DesktopNotificationServiceFactory::GetForProfile(process->profile());
service->CancelDesktopNotification(
render_process_id, render_view_id, notification_id);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,726 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TabStrip::UpdateAccessibleTabIndices() {
const int num_tabs = tab_count();
for (int i = 0; i < num_tabs; ++i)
tab_at(i)->GetViewAccessibility().OverridePosInSet(i + 1, num_tabs);
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 140,803 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void bmp_mask_get_shift_and_prec(OPJ_UINT32 mask, OPJ_UINT32* shift,
OPJ_UINT32* prec)
{
OPJ_UINT32 l_shift, l_prec;
l_shift = l_prec = 0U;
if (mask != 0U) {
while ((mask & 1U) == 0U) {
mask >>= 1;
l_shift++;
}
while (mask & 1U) {
mask >>= 1;
l_prec++;
}
}
*shift = l_shift;
*prec = l_prec;
}
Commit Message: bmp_read_info_header(): reject bmp files with biBitCount == 0 (#983)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 62,527 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int OBJ_txt2nid(const char *s)
{
ASN1_OBJECT *obj;
int nid;
obj = OBJ_txt2obj(s, 0);
nid = OBJ_obj2nid(obj);
ASN1_OBJECT_free(obj);
return nid;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 12,476 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ProcCopyArea(ClientPtr client)
{
DrawablePtr pDst;
DrawablePtr pSrc;
GC *pGC;
REQUEST(xCopyAreaReq);
RegionPtr pRgn;
int rc;
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xCopyAreaReq);
VALIDATE_DRAWABLE_AND_GC(stuff->dstDrawable, pDst, DixWriteAccess);
if (stuff->dstDrawable != stuff->srcDrawable) {
rc = dixLookupDrawable(&pSrc, stuff->srcDrawable, client, 0,
DixReadAccess);
if (rc != Success)
return rc;
if ((pDst->pScreen != pSrc->pScreen) || (pDst->depth != pSrc->depth)) {
client->errorValue = stuff->dstDrawable;
return BadMatch;
}
}
else
pSrc = pDst;
pRgn = (*pGC->ops->CopyArea) (pSrc, pDst, pGC, stuff->srcX, stuff->srcY,
stuff->width, stuff->height,
stuff->dstX, stuff->dstY);
if (pGC->graphicsExposures) {
SendGraphicsExpose(client, pRgn, stuff->dstDrawable, X_CopyArea, 0);
if (pRgn)
RegionDestroy(pRgn);
}
return Success;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 14,959 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xscale1pmu_start(void)
{
unsigned long flags, val;
raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&pmu_lock, flags);
val = xscale1pmu_read_pmnc();
val |= XSCALE_PMU_ENABLE;
xscale1pmu_write_pmnc(val);
raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&pmu_lock, flags);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,288 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: grub_ext2_label (grub_device_t device, char **label)
{
struct grub_ext2_data *data;
grub_disk_t disk = device->disk;
grub_dl_ref (my_mod);
data = grub_ext2_mount (disk);
if (data)
*label = grub_strndup (data->sblock.volume_name, 14);
else
*label = NULL;
grub_dl_unref (my_mod);
grub_free (data);
return grub_errno;
}
Commit Message: Fix ext2 buffer overflow in r2_sbu_grub_memmove
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 64,155 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: tt_cmap6_char_next( TT_CMap cmap,
FT_UInt32 *pchar_code )
{
FT_Byte* table = cmap->data;
FT_UInt32 result = 0;
FT_UInt32 char_code = *pchar_code + 1;
FT_UInt gindex = 0;
FT_Byte* p = table + 6;
FT_UInt start = TT_NEXT_USHORT( p );
FT_UInt count = TT_NEXT_USHORT( p );
FT_UInt idx;
if ( char_code >= 0x10000UL )
goto Exit;
if ( char_code < start )
char_code = start;
idx = (FT_UInt)( char_code - start );
p += 2 * idx;
for ( ; idx < count; idx++ )
{
gindex = TT_NEXT_USHORT( p );
if ( gindex != 0 )
{
result = char_code;
break;
}
char_code++;
}
Exit:
*pchar_code = result;
return gindex;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 4,194 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int tcp_disconnect(struct sock *sk, int flags)
{
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
int err = 0;
int old_state = sk->sk_state;
if (old_state != TCP_CLOSE)
tcp_set_state(sk, TCP_CLOSE);
/* ABORT function of RFC793 */
if (old_state == TCP_LISTEN) {
inet_csk_listen_stop(sk);
} else if (unlikely(tp->repair)) {
sk->sk_err = ECONNABORTED;
} else if (tcp_need_reset(old_state) ||
(tp->snd_nxt != tp->write_seq &&
(1 << old_state) & (TCPF_CLOSING | TCPF_LAST_ACK))) {
/* The last check adjusts for discrepancy of Linux wrt. RFC
* states
*/
tcp_send_active_reset(sk, gfp_any());
sk->sk_err = ECONNRESET;
} else if (old_state == TCP_SYN_SENT)
sk->sk_err = ECONNRESET;
tcp_clear_xmit_timers(sk);
__skb_queue_purge(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
tcp_write_queue_purge(sk);
tcp_fastopen_active_disable_ofo_check(sk);
skb_rbtree_purge(&tp->out_of_order_queue);
inet->inet_dport = 0;
if (!(sk->sk_userlocks & SOCK_BINDADDR_LOCK))
inet_reset_saddr(sk);
sk->sk_shutdown = 0;
sock_reset_flag(sk, SOCK_DONE);
tp->srtt_us = 0;
tp->write_seq += tp->max_window + 2;
if (tp->write_seq == 0)
tp->write_seq = 1;
icsk->icsk_backoff = 0;
tp->snd_cwnd = 2;
icsk->icsk_probes_out = 0;
tp->packets_out = 0;
tp->snd_ssthresh = TCP_INFINITE_SSTHRESH;
tp->snd_cwnd_cnt = 0;
tp->window_clamp = 0;
tcp_set_ca_state(sk, TCP_CA_Open);
tcp_clear_retrans(tp);
inet_csk_delack_init(sk);
tcp_init_send_head(sk);
memset(&tp->rx_opt, 0, sizeof(tp->rx_opt));
__sk_dst_reset(sk);
tcp_saved_syn_free(tp);
/* Clean up fastopen related fields */
tcp_free_fastopen_req(tp);
inet->defer_connect = 0;
WARN_ON(inet->inet_num && !icsk->icsk_bind_hash);
sk->sk_error_report(sk);
return err;
}
Commit Message: tcp: initialize rcv_mss to TCP_MIN_MSS instead of 0
When tcp_disconnect() is called, inet_csk_delack_init() sets
icsk->icsk_ack.rcv_mss to 0.
This could potentially cause tcp_recvmsg() => tcp_cleanup_rbuf() =>
__tcp_select_window() call path to have division by 0 issue.
So this patch initializes rcv_mss to TCP_MIN_MSS instead of 0.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 1 | 167,772 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLMediaElement::RejectScheduledPlayPromises() {
DCHECK(play_promise_error_code_ == kAbortError ||
play_promise_error_code_ == kNotSupportedError);
if (play_promise_error_code_ == kAbortError) {
RecordPlayPromiseRejected(PlayPromiseRejectReason::kInterruptedByPause);
RejectPlayPromisesInternal(kAbortError,
"The play() request was interrupted by a call "
"to pause(). https://goo.gl/LdLk22");
} else {
RecordPlayPromiseRejected(PlayPromiseRejectReason::kNoSupportedSources);
RejectPlayPromisesInternal(
kNotSupportedError,
"Failed to load because no supported source was found.");
}
}
Commit Message: defeat cors attacks on audio/video tags
Neutralize error messages and fire no progress events
until media metadata has been loaded for media loaded
from cross-origin locations.
Bug: 828265, 826187
Change-Id: Iaf15ef38676403687d6a913cbdc84f2d70a6f5c6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1015794
Reviewed-by: Mounir Lamouri <mlamouri@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dale Curtis <dalecurtis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#557312}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 154,141 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ModuleExport size_t RegisterHDRImage(void)
{
MagickInfo
*entry;
entry=SetMagickInfo("HDR");
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadHDRImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WriteHDRImage;
entry->description=ConstantString("Radiance RGBE image format");
entry->module=ConstantString("HDR");
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsHDR;
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
return(MagickImageCoderSignature);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 71,567 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8TestObject::VoidMethodArrayOfDoubleOrDOMStringArgMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_voidMethodArrayOfDoubleOrDOMStringArg");
test_object_v8_internal::VoidMethodArrayOfDoubleOrDOMStringArgMethod(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 135,351 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool jslNeedSpaceBetween(unsigned char lastch, unsigned char ch) {
return (lastch>=_LEX_R_LIST_START || ch>=_LEX_R_LIST_START) &&
(lastch>=_LEX_R_LIST_START || isAlpha((char)lastch) || isNumeric((char)lastch)) &&
(ch>=_LEX_R_LIST_START || isAlpha((char)ch) || isNumeric((char)ch));
}
Commit Message: Fix strncat/cpy bounding issues (fix #1425)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 82,534 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nfs4_opendata_to_nfs4_state(struct nfs4_opendata *data)
{
if (data->o_arg.claim == NFS4_OPEN_CLAIM_PREVIOUS)
return _nfs4_opendata_reclaim_to_nfs4_state(data);
return _nfs4_opendata_to_nfs4_state(data);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Check for buffer length in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
Commit 1f1ea6c "NFSv4: Fix buffer overflow checking in
__nfs4_get_acl_uncached" accidently dropped the checking for too small
result buffer length.
If someone uses getxattr on "system.nfs4_acl" on an NFSv4 mount
supporting ACLs, the ACL has not been cached and the buffer suplied is
too short, we still copy the complete ACL, resulting in kernel and user
space memory corruption.
Signed-off-by: Sven Wegener <sven.wegener@stealer.net>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 29,186 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: unsigned long Track::GetContentEncodingCount() const {
const ptrdiff_t count =
content_encoding_entries_end_ - content_encoding_entries_;
assert(count >= 0);
return static_cast<unsigned long>(count);
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 160,745 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MidiManagerUsb::MidiManagerUsb(scoped_ptr<UsbMidiDevice::Factory> factory)
: device_factory_(factory.Pass()) {
}
Commit Message: MidiManagerUsb should not trust indices provided by renderer.
MidiManagerUsb::DispatchSendMidiData takes |port_index| parameter. As it is
provided by a renderer possibly under the control of an attacker, we must
validate the given index before using it.
BUG=456516
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/907793002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#315303}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 128,697 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int setkey(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen)
{
struct aead_alg *aead = crypto_aead_alg(tfm);
unsigned long alignmask = crypto_aead_alignmask(tfm);
if ((unsigned long)key & alignmask)
return setkey_unaligned(tfm, key, keylen);
return aead->setkey(tfm, key, keylen);
}
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 31,229 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: EventListener* Document::getWindowAttributeEventListener(const AtomicString& eventType)
{
DOMWindow* domWindow = this->domWindow();
if (!domWindow)
return 0;
return domWindow->getAttributeEventListener(eventType);
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 105,525 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GSList *gslist_find_icase_string(GSList *list, const char *key)
{
for (; list != NULL; list = list->next)
if (g_ascii_strcasecmp(list->data, key) == 0) return list;
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'security' into 'master'
Security
Closes #10
See merge request !17
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 63,646 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LocalFrameClientImpl::Trace(blink::Visitor* visitor) {
visitor->Trace(web_frame_);
LocalFrameClient::Trace(visitor);
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 145,318 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mmtimer_int_pending(int comparator)
{
if (HUB_L((unsigned long *)LOCAL_MMR_ADDR(SH_EVENT_OCCURRED)) &
SH_EVENT_OCCURRED_RTC1_INT_MASK << comparator)
return 1;
else
return 0;
}
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 24,650 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::RenderWidgetCreated(
RenderWidgetHostImpl* render_widget_host) {
created_widgets_.insert(render_widget_host);
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID: | 0 | 131,961 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t store_user_store(struct kmem_cache *s,
const char *buf, size_t length)
{
if (any_slab_objects(s))
return -EBUSY;
s->flags &= ~SLAB_STORE_USER;
if (buf[0] == '1')
s->flags |= SLAB_STORE_USER;
calculate_sizes(s, -1);
return length;
}
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 24,927 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SPL_METHOD(Array, current)
{
zval *object = getThis();
spl_array_object *intern = (spl_array_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(object TSRMLS_CC);
zval **entry;
HashTable *aht = spl_array_get_hash_table(intern, 0 TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (spl_array_object_verify_pos(intern, aht TSRMLS_CC) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (zend_hash_get_current_data_ex(aht, (void **) &entry, &intern->pos) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETVAL_ZVAL(*entry, 1, 0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 12,346 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void jpc_qmfb_join_col(jpc_fix_t *a, int numrows, int stride,
int parity)
{
int bufsize = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(numrows, 1);
jpc_fix_t joinbuf[QMFB_JOINBUFSIZE];
jpc_fix_t *buf = joinbuf;
register jpc_fix_t *srcptr;
register jpc_fix_t *dstptr;
register int n;
int hstartcol;
/* Allocate memory for the join buffer from the heap. */
if (bufsize > QMFB_JOINBUFSIZE) {
if (!(buf = jas_alloc2(bufsize, sizeof(jpc_fix_t)))) {
/* We have no choice but to commit suicide. */
abort();
}
}
hstartcol = (numrows + 1 - parity) >> 1;
/* Save the samples from the lowpass channel. */
n = hstartcol;
srcptr = &a[0];
dstptr = buf;
while (n-- > 0) {
*dstptr = *srcptr;
srcptr += stride;
++dstptr;
}
/* Copy the samples from the highpass channel into place. */
srcptr = &a[hstartcol * stride];
dstptr = &a[(1 - parity) * stride];
n = numrows - hstartcol;
while (n-- > 0) {
*dstptr = *srcptr;
dstptr += 2 * stride;
srcptr += stride;
}
/* Copy the samples from the lowpass channel into place. */
srcptr = buf;
dstptr = &a[parity * stride];
n = hstartcol;
while (n-- > 0) {
*dstptr = *srcptr;
dstptr += 2 * stride;
++srcptr;
}
/* If the join buffer was allocated on the heap, free this memory. */
if (buf != joinbuf) {
jas_free(buf);
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed a buffer overrun problem in the QMFB code in the JPC codec
that was caused by a buffer being allocated with a size that was too small
in some cases.
Added a new regression test case.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 86,558 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int i8042_controller_init(void)
{
unsigned long flags;
int n = 0;
unsigned char ctr[2];
/*
* Save the CTR for restore on unload / reboot.
*/
do {
if (n >= 10) {
pr_err("Unable to get stable CTR read\n");
return -EIO;
}
if (n != 0)
udelay(50);
if (i8042_command(&ctr[n++ % 2], I8042_CMD_CTL_RCTR)) {
pr_err("Can't read CTR while initializing i8042\n");
return -EIO;
}
} while (n < 2 || ctr[0] != ctr[1]);
i8042_initial_ctr = i8042_ctr = ctr[0];
/*
* Disable the keyboard interface and interrupt.
*/
i8042_ctr |= I8042_CTR_KBDDIS;
i8042_ctr &= ~I8042_CTR_KBDINT;
/*
* Handle keylock.
*/
spin_lock_irqsave(&i8042_lock, flags);
if (~i8042_read_status() & I8042_STR_KEYLOCK) {
if (i8042_unlock)
i8042_ctr |= I8042_CTR_IGNKEYLOCK;
else
pr_warn("Warning: Keylock active\n");
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&i8042_lock, flags);
/*
* If the chip is configured into nontranslated mode by the BIOS, don't
* bother enabling translating and be happy.
*/
if (~i8042_ctr & I8042_CTR_XLATE)
i8042_direct = true;
/*
* Set nontranslated mode for the kbd interface if requested by an option.
* After this the kbd interface becomes a simple serial in/out, like the aux
* interface is. We don't do this by default, since it can confuse notebook
* BIOSes.
*/
if (i8042_direct)
i8042_ctr &= ~I8042_CTR_XLATE;
/*
* Write CTR back.
*/
if (i8042_command(&i8042_ctr, I8042_CMD_CTL_WCTR)) {
pr_err("Can't write CTR while initializing i8042\n");
return -EIO;
}
/*
* Flush whatever accumulated while we were disabling keyboard port.
*/
i8042_flush();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Input: i8042 - fix crash at boot time
The driver checks port->exists twice in i8042_interrupt(), first when
trying to assign temporary "serio" variable, and second time when deciding
whether it should call serio_interrupt(). The value of port->exists may
change between the 2 checks, and we may end up calling serio_interrupt()
with a NULL pointer:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000050
IP: [<ffffffff8150feaf>] _spin_lock_irqsave+0x1f/0x40
PGD 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
last sysfs file:
CPU 0
Modules linked in:
Pid: 1, comm: swapper Not tainted 2.6.32-358.el6.x86_64 #1 QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996)
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8150feaf>] [<ffffffff8150feaf>] _spin_lock_irqsave+0x1f/0x40
RSP: 0018:ffff880028203cc0 EFLAGS: 00010082
RAX: 0000000000010000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000282 RSI: 0000000000000098 RDI: 0000000000000050
RBP: ffff880028203cc0 R08: ffff88013e79c000 R09: ffff880028203ee0
R10: 0000000000000298 R11: 0000000000000282 R12: 0000000000000050
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000098
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880028200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0018 ES: 0018 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 0000000000000050 CR3: 0000000001a85000 CR4: 00000000001407f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Process swapper (pid: 1, threadinfo ffff88013e79c000, task ffff88013e79b500)
Stack:
ffff880028203d00 ffffffff813de186 ffffffffffffff02 0000000000000000
<d> 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000098
<d> ffff880028203d70 ffffffff813e0162 ffff880028203d20 ffffffff8103b8ac
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffff813de186>] serio_interrupt+0x36/0xa0
[<ffffffff813e0162>] i8042_interrupt+0x132/0x3a0
[<ffffffff8103b8ac>] ? kvm_clock_read+0x1c/0x20
[<ffffffff8103b8b9>] ? kvm_clock_get_cycles+0x9/0x10
[<ffffffff810e1640>] handle_IRQ_event+0x60/0x170
[<ffffffff8103b154>] ? kvm_guest_apic_eoi_write+0x44/0x50
[<ffffffff810e3d8e>] handle_edge_irq+0xde/0x180
[<ffffffff8100de89>] handle_irq+0x49/0xa0
[<ffffffff81516c8c>] do_IRQ+0x6c/0xf0
[<ffffffff8100b9d3>] ret_from_intr+0x0/0x11
[<ffffffff81076f63>] ? __do_softirq+0x73/0x1e0
[<ffffffff8109b75b>] ? hrtimer_interrupt+0x14b/0x260
[<ffffffff8100c1cc>] ? call_softirq+0x1c/0x30
[<ffffffff8100de05>] ? do_softirq+0x65/0xa0
[<ffffffff81076d95>] ? irq_exit+0x85/0x90
[<ffffffff81516d80>] ? smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x70/0x9b
[<ffffffff8100bb93>] ? apic_timer_interrupt+0x13/0x20
To avoid the issue let's change the second check to test whether serio is
NULL or not.
Also, let's take i8042_lock in i8042_start() and i8042_stop() instead of
trying to be overly smart and using memory barriers.
Signed-off-by: Chen Hong <chenhong3@huawei.com>
[dtor: take lock in i8042_start()/i8042_stop()]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 86,207 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nfnl_err_add(struct list_head *list, struct nlmsghdr *nlh, int err)
{
struct nfnl_err *nfnl_err;
nfnl_err = kmalloc(sizeof(struct nfnl_err), GFP_KERNEL);
if (nfnl_err == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
nfnl_err->nlh = nlh;
nfnl_err->err = err;
list_add_tail(&nfnl_err->head, list);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: nfnetlink: correctly validate length of batch messages
If nlh->nlmsg_len is zero then an infinite loop is triggered because
'skb_pull(skb, msglen);' pulls zero bytes.
The calculation in nlmsg_len() underflows if 'nlh->nlmsg_len <
NLMSG_HDRLEN' which bypasses the length validation and will later
trigger an out-of-bound read.
If the length validation does fail then the malformed batch message is
copied back to userspace. However, we cannot do this because the
nlh->nlmsg_len can be invalid. This leads to an out-of-bounds read in
netlink_ack:
[ 41.455421] ==================================================================
[ 41.456431] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in memcpy+0x1d/0x40 at addr ffff880119e79340
[ 41.456431] Read of size 4294967280 by task a.out/987
[ 41.456431] =============================================================================
[ 41.456431] BUG kmalloc-512 (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
[ 41.456431] -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
...
[ 41.456431] Bytes b4 ffff880119e79310: 00 00 00 00 d5 03 00 00 b0 fb fe ff 00 00 00 00 ................
[ 41.456431] Object ffff880119e79320: 20 00 00 00 10 00 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ...............
[ 41.456431] Object ffff880119e79330: 14 00 0a 00 01 03 fc 40 45 56 11 22 33 10 00 05 .......@EV."3...
[ 41.456431] Object ffff880119e79340: f0 ff ff ff 88 99 aa bb 00 14 00 0a 00 06 fe fb ................
^^ start of batch nlmsg with
nlmsg_len=4294967280
...
[ 41.456431] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 41.456431] ffff880119e79400: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 41.456431] ffff880119e79480: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 41.456431] >ffff880119e79500: 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 41.456431] ^
[ 41.456431] ffff880119e79580: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 41.456431] ffff880119e79600: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 41.456431] ==================================================================
Fix this with better validation of nlh->nlmsg_len and by setting
NFNL_BATCH_FAILURE if any batch message fails length validation.
CAP_NET_ADMIN is required to trigger the bugs.
Fixes: 9ea2aa8b7dba ("netfilter: nfnetlink: validate nfnetlink header from batch")
Signed-off-by: Phil Turnbull <phil.turnbull@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 49,380 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: close_job(cupsd_client_t *con, /* I - Client connection */
ipp_attribute_t *uri) /* I - Printer URI */
{
cupsd_job_t *job; /* Job */
ipp_attribute_t *attr; /* Attribute */
char job_uri[HTTP_MAX_URI],
/* Job URI */
username[256]; /* User name */
cupsdLogMessage(CUPSD_LOG_DEBUG2, "close_job(%p[%d], %s)", con,
con->number, uri->values[0].string.text);
/*
* See if we have a job URI or a printer URI...
*/
if (strcmp(uri->name, "printer-uri"))
{
/*
* job-uri is not supported by Close-Job!
*/
send_ipp_status(con, IPP_BAD_REQUEST,
_("Close-Job doesn't support the job-uri attribute."));
return;
}
/*
* Got a printer URI; see if we also have a job-id attribute...
*/
if ((attr = ippFindAttribute(con->request, "job-id",
IPP_TAG_INTEGER)) == NULL)
{
send_ipp_status(con, IPP_BAD_REQUEST,
_("Got a printer-uri attribute but no job-id."));
return;
}
if ((job = cupsdFindJob(attr->values[0].integer)) == NULL)
{
/*
* Nope - return a "not found" error...
*/
send_ipp_status(con, IPP_NOT_FOUND, _("Job #%d does not exist."),
attr->values[0].integer);
return;
}
/*
* See if the job is owned by the requesting user...
*/
if (!validate_user(job, con, job->username, username, sizeof(username)))
{
send_http_error(con, con->username[0] ? HTTP_FORBIDDEN : HTTP_UNAUTHORIZED,
cupsdFindDest(job->dest));
return;
}
/*
* Add any ending sheet...
*/
if (cupsdTimeoutJob(job))
return;
if (job->state_value == IPP_JOB_STOPPED)
{
job->state->values[0].integer = IPP_JOB_PENDING;
job->state_value = IPP_JOB_PENDING;
}
else if (job->state_value == IPP_JOB_HELD)
{
if ((attr = ippFindAttribute(job->attrs, "job-hold-until",
IPP_TAG_KEYWORD)) == NULL)
attr = ippFindAttribute(job->attrs, "job-hold-until", IPP_TAG_NAME);
if (!attr || !strcmp(attr->values[0].string.text, "no-hold"))
{
job->state->values[0].integer = IPP_JOB_PENDING;
job->state_value = IPP_JOB_PENDING;
}
}
job->dirty = 1;
cupsdMarkDirty(CUPSD_DIRTY_JOBS);
/*
* Fill in the response info...
*/
httpAssembleURIf(HTTP_URI_CODING_ALL, job_uri, sizeof(job_uri), "ipp", NULL,
con->clientname, con->clientport, "/jobs/%d", job->id);
ippAddString(con->response, IPP_TAG_JOB, IPP_TAG_URI, "job-uri", NULL,
job_uri);
ippAddInteger(con->response, IPP_TAG_JOB, IPP_TAG_INTEGER, "job-id", job->id);
ippAddInteger(con->response, IPP_TAG_JOB, IPP_TAG_ENUM, "job-state",
job->state_value);
con->response->request.status.status_code = IPP_OK;
/*
* Start the job if necessary...
*/
cupsdCheckJobs();
}
Commit Message: DBUS notifications could crash the scheduler (Issue #5143)
- scheduler/ipp.c: Make sure requesting-user-name string is valid UTF-8.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 85,321 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void methodWithEnforceRangeUInt16Method(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
ExceptionState exceptionState(ExceptionState::ExecutionContext, "methodWithEnforceRangeUInt16", "TestObject", info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate());
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() < 1)) {
exceptionState.throwTypeError(ExceptionMessages::notEnoughArguments(1, info.Length()));
exceptionState.throwIfNeeded();
return;
}
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_EXCEPTION_VOID(unsigned, value, toUInt16(info[0], EnforceRange, exceptionState), exceptionState);
imp->methodWithEnforceRangeUInt16(value);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 121,783 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void anyAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
v8SetReturnValue(info, imp->anyAttribute().v8Value());
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 121,559 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BlinkTestRunner::ResetScreenOrientation() {
MockScreenOrientationClient* mock_client =
proxy()->GetScreenOrientationClientMock();
mock_client->ResetData();
}
Commit Message: content: Rename webkit_test_helpers.{cc,h} to blink_test_helpers.{cc,h}
Now that webkit/ is gone, we are preparing ourselves for the merge of
third_party/WebKit into //blink.
BUG=None
BUG=content_shell && content_unittests
R=avi@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1118183003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#328202}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 123,589 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __devinit airo_pci_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev,
const struct pci_device_id *pent)
{
struct net_device *dev;
if (pci_enable_device(pdev))
return -ENODEV;
pci_set_master(pdev);
if (pdev->device == 0x5000 || pdev->device == 0xa504)
dev = _init_airo_card(pdev->irq, pdev->resource[0].start, 0, pdev, &pdev->dev);
else
dev = _init_airo_card(pdev->irq, pdev->resource[2].start, 0, pdev, &pdev->dev);
if (!dev) {
pci_disable_device(pdev);
return -ENODEV;
}
pci_set_drvdata(pdev, dev);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 23,980 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int inode_change_ok(const struct inode *inode, struct iattr *attr)
{
unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid;
/*
* First check size constraints. These can't be overriden using
* ATTR_FORCE.
*/
if (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) {
int error = inode_newsize_ok(inode, attr->ia_size);
if (error)
return error;
}
/* If force is set do it anyway. */
if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
return 0;
/* Make sure a caller can chown. */
if ((ia_valid & ATTR_UID) &&
(!uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid) ||
!uid_eq(attr->ia_uid, inode->i_uid)) &&
!inode_capable(inode, CAP_CHOWN))
return -EPERM;
/* Make sure caller can chgrp. */
if ((ia_valid & ATTR_GID) &&
(!uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid) ||
(!in_group_p(attr->ia_gid) && !gid_eq(attr->ia_gid, inode->i_gid))) &&
!inode_capable(inode, CAP_CHOWN))
return -EPERM;
/* Make sure a caller can chmod. */
if (ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) {
if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
return -EPERM;
/* Also check the setgid bit! */
if (!in_group_p((ia_valid & ATTR_GID) ? attr->ia_gid :
inode->i_gid) &&
!inode_capable(inode, CAP_FSETID))
attr->ia_mode &= ~S_ISGID;
}
/* Check for setting the inode time. */
if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET)) {
if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
return -EPERM;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fs,userns: Change inode_capable to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid
The kernel has no concept of capabilities with respect to inodes; inodes
exist independently of namespaces. For example, inode_capable(inode,
CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) would be nonsense.
This patch changes inode_capable to check for uid and gid mappings and
renames it to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid, which should make it more
obvious what it does.
Fixes CVE-2014-4014.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 1 | 166,317 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void dup_mm_exe_file(struct mm_struct *oldmm, struct mm_struct *newmm)
{
/* It's safe to write the exe_file pointer without exe_file_lock because
* this is called during fork when the task is not yet in /proc */
newmm->exe_file = get_mm_exe_file(oldmm);
}
Commit Message: userns: Don't allow CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_FS
Don't allowing sharing the root directory with processes in a
different user namespace. There doesn't seem to be any point, and to
allow it would require the overhead of putting a user namespace
reference in fs_struct (for permission checks) and incrementing that
reference count on practically every call to fork.
So just perform the inexpensive test of forbidding sharing fs_struct
acrosss processes in different user namespaces. We already disallow
other forms of threading when unsharing a user namespace so this
should be no real burden in practice.
This updates setns, clone, and unshare to disallow multiple user
namespaces sharing an fs_struct.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 32,875 |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.