instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool LocalFrameClientImpl::NavigateBackForward(int offset) const {
WebViewImpl* webview = web_frame_->ViewImpl();
if (!webview->Client())
return false;
DCHECK(offset);
if (offset > webview->Client()->HistoryForwardListCount())
return false;
if (offset < -webview->Client()->HistoryBackListCount())
return false;
webview->Client()->NavigateBackForwardSoon(offset);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 1 | 172,649 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void emulator_set_cached_descriptor(struct desc_struct *desc, int seg,
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct kvm_segment var;
/* needed to preserve selector */
kvm_get_segment(vcpu, &var, seg);
var.base = get_desc_base(desc);
var.limit = get_desc_limit(desc);
if (desc->g)
var.limit = (var.limit << 12) | 0xfff;
var.type = desc->type;
var.present = desc->p;
var.dpl = desc->dpl;
var.db = desc->d;
var.s = desc->s;
var.l = desc->l;
var.g = desc->g;
var.avl = desc->avl;
var.present = desc->p;
var.unusable = !var.present;
var.padding = 0;
kvm_set_segment(vcpu, &var, seg);
return;
}
Commit Message: KVM: X86: Don't report L2 emulation failures to user-space
This patch prevents that emulation failures which result
from emulating an instruction for an L2-Guest results in
being reported to userspace.
Without this patch a malicious L2-Guest would be able to
kill the L1 by triggering a race-condition between an vmexit
and the instruction emulator.
With this patch the L2 will most likely only kill itself in
this situation.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <joerg.roedel@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 41,337 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nfs41_call_priv_sync_prepare(struct rpc_task *task, void *calldata)
{
rpc_task_set_priority(task, RPC_PRIORITY_PRIVILEGED);
nfs41_call_sync_prepare(task, calldata);
}
Commit Message: Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 19,845 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: raptor_rdfxml_parse_finish_factory(raptor_parser_factory* factory)
{
}
Commit Message: CVE-2012-0037
Enforce entity loading policy in raptor_libxml_resolveEntity
and raptor_libxml_getEntity by checking for file URIs and network URIs.
Add RAPTOR_OPTION_LOAD_EXTERNAL_ENTITIES / loadExternalEntities for
turning on loading of XML external entity loading, disabled by default.
This affects all the parsers that use SAX2: rdfxml, rss-tag-soup (and
aliases) and rdfa.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 22,014 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::ShowInsecureLocalhostWarningIfNeeded() {
bool allow_localhost = base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kAllowInsecureLocalhost);
if (!allow_localhost)
return;
content::NavigationEntry* entry = GetController().GetLastCommittedEntry();
if (!entry || !net::IsLocalhost(entry->GetURL()))
return;
content::SSLStatus ssl_status = entry->GetSSL();
bool is_cert_error = net::IsCertStatusError(ssl_status.cert_status) &&
!net::IsCertStatusMinorError(ssl_status.cert_status);
if (!is_cert_error)
return;
GetMainFrame()->AddMessageToConsole(
content::CONSOLE_MESSAGE_LEVEL_WARNING,
base::StringPrintf("This site does not have a valid SSL "
"certificate! Without SSL, your site's and "
"visitors' data is vulnerable to theft and "
"tampering. Get a valid SSL certificate before"
" releasing your website to the public."));
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 145,063 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pkinit_C_UnloadModule(void *handle)
{
dlclose(handle);
return CKR_OK;
}
Commit Message: PKINIT null pointer deref [CVE-2013-1415]
Don't dereference a null pointer when cleaning up.
The KDC plugin for PKINIT can dereference a null pointer when a
malformed packet causes processing to terminate early, leading to
a crash of the KDC process. An attacker would need to have a valid
PKINIT certificate or have observed a successful PKINIT authentication,
or an unauthenticated attacker could execute the attack if anonymous
PKINIT is enabled.
CVSSv2 vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:P/RL:O/RC:C
This is a minimal commit for pullup; style fixes in a followup.
[kaduk@mit.edu: reformat and edit commit message]
(cherry picked from commit c773d3c775e9b2d88bcdff5f8a8ba88d7ec4e8ed)
ticket: 7570
version_fixed: 1.11.1
status: resolved
CWE ID: | 0 | 33,649 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct page *alloc_fresh_huge_page_node(struct hstate *h, int nid)
{
struct page *page;
page = __alloc_pages_node(nid,
htlb_alloc_mask(h)|__GFP_COMP|__GFP_THISNODE|
__GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL|__GFP_NOWARN,
huge_page_order(h));
if (page) {
prep_new_huge_page(h, page, nid);
}
return page;
}
Commit Message: userfaultfd: hugetlbfs: prevent UFFDIO_COPY to fill beyond the end of i_size
This oops:
kernel BUG at fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c:484!
RIP: remove_inode_hugepages+0x3d0/0x410
Call Trace:
hugetlbfs_setattr+0xd9/0x130
notify_change+0x292/0x410
do_truncate+0x65/0xa0
do_sys_ftruncate.constprop.3+0x11a/0x180
SyS_ftruncate+0xe/0x10
tracesys+0xd9/0xde
was caused by the lack of i_size check in hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte.
mmap() can still succeed beyond the end of the i_size after vmtruncate
zapped vmas in those ranges, but the faults must not succeed, and that
includes UFFDIO_COPY.
We could differentiate the retval to userland to represent a SIGBUS like
a page fault would do (vs SIGSEGV), but it doesn't seem very useful and
we'd need to pick a random retval as there's no meaningful syscall
retval that would differentiate from SIGSEGV and SIGBUS, there's just
-EFAULT.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171016223914.2421-2-aarcange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 86,330 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool DevToolsAgentHostImpl::ShouldForceCreation() {
return !!s_force_creation_count_;
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow chrome.debugger to attach to web ui pages
If the page navigates to web ui, we force detach the debugger extension.
TBR=alexclarke@chromium.org
Bug: 798222
Change-Id: Idb46c2f59e839388397a8dfa6ce2e2a897698df3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/935961
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540916}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 155,770 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int GetWebRequestCountFromBackgroundPage(const Extension* extension,
content::BrowserContext* context) {
return GetCountFromBackgroundPage(extension, context,
"window.webRequestCount");
}
Commit Message: Hide DevTools frontend from webRequest API
Prevent extensions from observing requests for remote DevTools frontends
and add regression tests.
And update ExtensionTestApi to support initializing the embedded test
server and port from SetUpCommandLine (before SetUpOnMainThread).
BUG=797497,797500
TEST=browser_test --gtest_filter=DevToolsFrontendInWebRequestApiTest.HiddenRequests
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_mojo
Change-Id: Ic8f44b5771f2d5796f8c3de128f0a7ab88a77735
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/844316
Commit-Queue: Rob Wu <rob@robwu.nl>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528187}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 146,553 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void emitnumber(JF, double num)
{
if (num == 0) {
emit(J, F, OP_INTEGER);
emitarg(J, F, 32768);
if (signbit(num))
emit(J, F, OP_NEG);
} else {
double nv = num + 32768;
js_Instruction iv = nv;
if (nv == iv) {
emit(J, F, OP_INTEGER);
emitarg(J, F, iv);
} else {
emit(J, F, OP_NUMBER);
emitarg(J, F, addnumber(J, F, num));
}
}
}
Commit Message: Bug 700947: Add missing ENDTRY opcode in try/catch/finally byte code.
In one of the code branches in handling exceptions in the catch block
we forgot to call the ENDTRY opcode to pop the inner hidden try.
This leads to an unbalanced exception stack which can cause a crash
due to us jumping to a stack frame that has already been exited.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 90,734 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cifs_strict_writev(struct kiocb *iocb, const struct iovec *iov,
unsigned long nr_segs, loff_t pos)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(iocb->ki_filp);
struct cifsInodeInfo *cinode = CIFS_I(inode);
struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb = CIFS_SB(inode->i_sb);
struct cifsFileInfo *cfile = (struct cifsFileInfo *)
iocb->ki_filp->private_data;
struct cifs_tcon *tcon = tlink_tcon(cfile->tlink);
ssize_t written;
if (CIFS_CACHE_WRITE(cinode)) {
if (cap_unix(tcon->ses) &&
(CIFS_UNIX_FCNTL_CAP & le64_to_cpu(tcon->fsUnixInfo.Capability))
&& ((cifs_sb->mnt_cifs_flags & CIFS_MOUNT_NOPOSIXBRL) == 0))
return generic_file_aio_write(iocb, iov, nr_segs, pos);
return cifs_writev(iocb, iov, nr_segs, pos);
}
/*
* For non-oplocked files in strict cache mode we need to write the data
* to the server exactly from the pos to pos+len-1 rather than flush all
* affected pages because it may cause a error with mandatory locks on
* these pages but not on the region from pos to ppos+len-1.
*/
written = cifs_user_writev(iocb, iov, nr_segs, pos);
if (written > 0 && CIFS_CACHE_READ(cinode)) {
/*
* Windows 7 server can delay breaking level2 oplock if a write
* request comes - break it on the client to prevent reading
* an old data.
*/
cifs_invalidate_mapping(inode);
cifs_dbg(FYI, "Set no oplock for inode=%p after a write operation\n",
inode);
cinode->oplock = 0;
}
return written;
}
Commit Message: cifs: ensure that uncached writes handle unmapped areas correctly
It's possible for userland to pass down an iovec via writev() that has a
bogus user pointer in it. If that happens and we're doing an uncached
write, then we can end up getting less bytes than we expect from the
call to iov_iter_copy_from_user. This is CVE-2014-0069
cifs_iovec_write isn't set up to handle that situation however. It'll
blindly keep chugging through the page array and not filling those pages
with anything useful. Worse yet, we'll later end up with a negative
number in wdata->tailsz, which will confuse the sending routines and
cause an oops at the very least.
Fix this by having the copy phase of cifs_iovec_write stop copying data
in this situation and send the last write as a short one. At the same
time, we want to avoid sending a zero-length write to the server, so
break out of the loop and set rc to -EFAULT if that happens. This also
allows us to handle the case where no address in the iovec is valid.
[Note: Marking this for stable on v3.4+ kernels, but kernels as old as
v2.6.38 may have a similar problem and may need similar fix]
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.4+
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 40,015 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __dwc3_gadget_kick_transfer(struct dwc3_ep *dep)
{
struct dwc3_gadget_ep_cmd_params params;
struct dwc3_request *req;
int starting;
int ret;
u32 cmd;
if (!dwc3_calc_trbs_left(dep))
return 0;
starting = !(dep->flags & DWC3_EP_BUSY);
dwc3_prepare_trbs(dep);
req = next_request(&dep->started_list);
if (!req) {
dep->flags |= DWC3_EP_PENDING_REQUEST;
return 0;
}
memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
if (starting) {
params.param0 = upper_32_bits(req->trb_dma);
params.param1 = lower_32_bits(req->trb_dma);
cmd = DWC3_DEPCMD_STARTTRANSFER;
if (usb_endpoint_xfer_isoc(dep->endpoint.desc))
cmd |= DWC3_DEPCMD_PARAM(dep->frame_number);
} else {
cmd = DWC3_DEPCMD_UPDATETRANSFER |
DWC3_DEPCMD_PARAM(dep->resource_index);
}
ret = dwc3_send_gadget_ep_cmd(dep, cmd, ¶ms);
if (ret < 0) {
/*
* FIXME we need to iterate over the list of requests
* here and stop, unmap, free and del each of the linked
* requests instead of what we do now.
*/
if (req->trb)
memset(req->trb, 0, sizeof(struct dwc3_trb));
dep->queued_requests--;
dwc3_gadget_giveback(dep, req, ret);
return ret;
}
dep->flags |= DWC3_EP_BUSY;
if (starting) {
dep->resource_index = dwc3_gadget_ep_get_transfer_index(dep);
WARN_ON_ONCE(!dep->resource_index);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: usb: dwc3: gadget: never call ->complete() from ->ep_queue()
This is a requirement which has always existed but, somehow, wasn't
reflected in the documentation and problems weren't found until now
when Tuba Yavuz found a possible deadlock happening between dwc3 and
f_hid. She described the situation as follows:
spin_lock_irqsave(&hidg->write_spinlock, flags); // first acquire
/* we our function has been disabled by host */
if (!hidg->req) {
free_ep_req(hidg->in_ep, hidg->req);
goto try_again;
}
[...]
status = usb_ep_queue(hidg->in_ep, hidg->req, GFP_ATOMIC);
=>
[...]
=> usb_gadget_giveback_request
=>
f_hidg_req_complete
=>
spin_lock_irqsave(&hidg->write_spinlock, flags); // second acquire
Note that this happens because dwc3 would call ->complete() on a
failed usb_ep_queue() due to failed Start Transfer command. This is,
anyway, a theoretical situation because dwc3 currently uses "No
Response Update Transfer" command for Bulk and Interrupt endpoints.
It's still good to make this case impossible to happen even if the "No
Reponse Update Transfer" command is changed.
Reported-by: Tuba Yavuz <tuba@ece.ufl.edu>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 1 | 169,578 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int mov_get_stsc_samples(MOVStreamContext *sc, int index)
{
int chunk_count;
if (mov_stsc_index_valid(index, sc->stsc_count))
chunk_count = sc->stsc_data[index + 1].first - sc->stsc_data[index].first;
else
chunk_count = sc->chunk_count - (sc->stsc_data[index].first - 1);
return sc->stsc_data[index].count * chunk_count;
}
Commit Message: avformat/mov: Fix DoS in read_tfra()
Fixes: Missing EOF check in loop
No testcase
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-834 | 0 | 61,391 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int takedown_proc_entry( struct net_device *dev,
struct airo_info *apriv ) {
if ( !apriv->proc_entry->namelen ) return 0;
remove_proc_entry("Stats",apriv->proc_entry);
remove_proc_entry("StatsDelta",apriv->proc_entry);
remove_proc_entry("Status",apriv->proc_entry);
remove_proc_entry("Config",apriv->proc_entry);
remove_proc_entry("SSID",apriv->proc_entry);
remove_proc_entry("APList",apriv->proc_entry);
remove_proc_entry("BSSList",apriv->proc_entry);
remove_proc_entry("WepKey",apriv->proc_entry);
remove_proc_entry(apriv->proc_name,airo_entry);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 24,083 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void mipspmu_del(struct perf_event *event, int flags)
{
struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc = &__get_cpu_var(cpu_hw_events);
struct hw_perf_event *hwc = &event->hw;
int idx = hwc->idx;
WARN_ON(idx < 0 || idx >= mipspmu->num_counters);
mipspmu_stop(event, PERF_EF_UPDATE);
cpuc->events[idx] = NULL;
clear_bit(idx, cpuc->used_mask);
perf_event_update_userpage(event);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,368 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t Parcel::readString16(std::unique_ptr<String16>* pArg) const
{
const int32_t start = dataPosition();
int32_t size;
status_t status = readInt32(&size);
pArg->reset();
if (status != OK || size < 0) {
return status;
}
setDataPosition(start);
pArg->reset(new (std::nothrow) String16());
status = readString16(pArg->get());
if (status != OK) {
pArg->reset();
}
return status;
}
Commit Message: Add bound checks to utf16_to_utf8
Bug: 29250543
Change-Id: I518e7b2fe10aaa3f1c1987586a09b1110aff7e1a
(cherry picked from commit 7e93b2ddcb49b5365fbe1dab134ffb38e6f1c719)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 163,585 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FrameLoader::FrameLoader(Frame* frame, FrameLoaderClient* client)
: m_frame(frame)
, m_client(client)
, m_history(frame)
, m_notifer(frame)
, m_icon(adoptPtr(new IconController(frame)))
, m_mixedContentChecker(frame)
, m_state(FrameStateProvisional)
, m_loadType(FrameLoadTypeStandard)
, m_inStopAllLoaders(false)
, m_isComplete(false)
, m_containsPlugins(false)
, m_checkTimer(this, &FrameLoader::checkTimerFired)
, m_shouldCallCheckCompleted(false)
, m_opener(0)
, m_didAccessInitialDocument(false)
, m_didAccessInitialDocumentTimer(this, &FrameLoader::didAccessInitialDocumentTimerFired)
, m_suppressOpenerInNewFrame(false)
, m_startingClientRedirect(false)
, m_forcedSandboxFlags(SandboxNone)
{
}
Commit Message: Don't wait to notify client of spoof attempt if a modal dialog is created.
BUG=281256
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23620020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@157196 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 111,611 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ShellContentBrowserClient::~ShellContentBrowserClient() {
g_browser_client = NULL;
}
Commit Message: content: Rename webkit_test_helpers.{cc,h} to blink_test_helpers.{cc,h}
Now that webkit/ is gone, we are preparing ourselves for the merge of
third_party/WebKit into //blink.
BUG=None
BUG=content_shell && content_unittests
R=avi@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1118183003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#328202}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 123,487 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ppmd_free(void *p, void *address)
{
(void)p;
free(address);
}
Commit Message: Issue 719: Fix for TALOS-CAN-154
A RAR file with an invalid zero dictionary size was not being
rejected, leading to a zero-sized allocation for the dictionary
storage which was then overwritten during the dictionary initialization.
Thanks to the Open Source and Threat Intelligence project at Cisco for
reporting this.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 53,486 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SafeBrowsingPrivateEventRouter::ReportRealtimeEvent(const char* name,
base::Value event) {
base::Time::Exploded now_exploded;
base::Time::Now().UTCExplode(&now_exploded);
std::string now_str = base::StringPrintf(
"%d-%02d-%02dT%02d:%02d:%02d.%03dZ", now_exploded.year,
now_exploded.month, now_exploded.day_of_month, now_exploded.hour,
now_exploded.minute, now_exploded.second, now_exploded.millisecond);
base::Value wrapper(base::Value::Type::DICTIONARY);
wrapper.SetStringKey("time", now_str);
wrapper.SetKey(name, std::move(event));
client_->UploadRealtimeReport(
BuildRealtimeReport(Profile::FromBrowserContext(context_),
std::move(wrapper)),
base::DoNothing());
}
Commit Message: Add reporting for DLP deep scanning
For each triggered rule in the DLP response, we report the download as
violating that rule.
This also implements the UnsafeReportingEnabled enterprise policy, which
controls whether or not we do any reporting.
Bug: 980777
Change-Id: I48100cfb4dd5aa92ed80da1f34e64a6e393be2fa
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1772381
Commit-Queue: Daniel Rubery <drubery@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Karan Bhatia <karandeepb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Roger Tawa <rogerta@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#691371}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 137,824 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: choose_program (GtkDialog *message_dialog,
int response,
gpointer callback_data)
{
GtkWidget *dialog;
NautilusFile *file;
GFile *location;
ActivateParametersInstall *parameters = callback_data;
if (response != GTK_RESPONSE_ACCEPT)
{
gtk_widget_destroy (GTK_WIDGET (message_dialog));
activate_parameters_install_free (parameters);
return;
}
file = g_object_get_data (G_OBJECT (message_dialog), "mime-action:file");
g_assert (NAUTILUS_IS_FILE (file));
location = nautilus_file_get_location (file);
nautilus_file_ref (file);
/* Destroy the message dialog after ref:ing the file */
gtk_widget_destroy (GTK_WIDGET (message_dialog));
dialog = gtk_app_chooser_dialog_new (parameters->parent_window,
GTK_DIALOG_MODAL,
location);
g_object_set_data_full (G_OBJECT (dialog),
"mime-action:file",
nautilus_file_ref (file),
(GDestroyNotify) nautilus_file_unref);
gtk_widget_show (dialog);
g_signal_connect (dialog,
"response",
G_CALLBACK (open_with_response_cb),
parameters);
g_object_unref (location);
nautilus_file_unref (file);
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 61,178 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: copy_entries_to_user(unsigned int total_size,
const struct xt_table *table,
void __user *userptr)
{
unsigned int off, num;
const struct ip6t_entry *e;
struct xt_counters *counters;
const struct xt_table_info *private = table->private;
int ret = 0;
const void *loc_cpu_entry;
counters = alloc_counters(table);
if (IS_ERR(counters))
return PTR_ERR(counters);
loc_cpu_entry = private->entries;
if (copy_to_user(userptr, loc_cpu_entry, total_size) != 0) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto free_counters;
}
/* FIXME: use iterator macros --RR */
/* ... then go back and fix counters and names */
for (off = 0, num = 0; off < total_size; off += e->next_offset, num++){
unsigned int i;
const struct xt_entry_match *m;
const struct xt_entry_target *t;
e = (struct ip6t_entry *)(loc_cpu_entry + off);
if (copy_to_user(userptr + off
+ offsetof(struct ip6t_entry, counters),
&counters[num],
sizeof(counters[num])) != 0) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto free_counters;
}
for (i = sizeof(struct ip6t_entry);
i < e->target_offset;
i += m->u.match_size) {
m = (void *)e + i;
if (copy_to_user(userptr + off + i
+ offsetof(struct xt_entry_match,
u.user.name),
m->u.kernel.match->name,
strlen(m->u.kernel.match->name)+1)
!= 0) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto free_counters;
}
}
t = ip6t_get_target_c(e);
if (copy_to_user(userptr + off + e->target_offset
+ offsetof(struct xt_entry_target,
u.user.name),
t->u.kernel.target->name,
strlen(t->u.kernel.target->name)+1) != 0) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto free_counters;
}
}
free_counters:
vfree(counters);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: make sure e->next_offset covers remaining blob size
Otherwise this function may read data beyond the ruleset blob.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 52,343 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool GLES2DecoderImpl::SimulateAttrib0(
const char* function_name, GLuint max_vertex_accessed, bool* simulated) {
DCHECK(simulated);
*simulated = false;
if (gfx::GetGLImplementation() == gfx::kGLImplementationEGLGLES2)
return true;
const VertexAttrib* attrib =
state_.vertex_attrib_manager->GetVertexAttrib(0);
bool attrib_0_used =
state_.current_program->GetAttribInfoByLocation(0) != NULL;
if (attrib->enabled() && attrib_0_used) {
return true;
}
GLuint num_vertices = max_vertex_accessed + 1;
uint32 size_needed = 0;
if (num_vertices == 0 ||
!SafeMultiplyUint32(num_vertices, sizeof(Vec4), &size_needed) ||
size_needed > 0x7FFFFFFFU) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_OUT_OF_MEMORY, function_name, "Simulating attrib 0");
return false;
}
LOCAL_PERFORMANCE_WARNING(
"Attribute 0 is disabled. This has signficant performance penalty");
LOCAL_COPY_REAL_GL_ERRORS_TO_WRAPPER(function_name);
glBindBuffer(GL_ARRAY_BUFFER, attrib_0_buffer_id_);
bool new_buffer = static_cast<GLsizei>(size_needed) > attrib_0_size_;
if (new_buffer) {
glBufferData(GL_ARRAY_BUFFER, size_needed, NULL, GL_DYNAMIC_DRAW);
GLenum error = glGetError();
if (error != GL_NO_ERROR) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_OUT_OF_MEMORY, function_name, "Simulating attrib 0");
return false;
}
}
const Vec4& value = state_.attrib_values[0];
if (new_buffer ||
(attrib_0_used &&
(!attrib_0_buffer_matches_value_ ||
(value.v[0] != attrib_0_value_.v[0] ||
value.v[1] != attrib_0_value_.v[1] ||
value.v[2] != attrib_0_value_.v[2] ||
value.v[3] != attrib_0_value_.v[3])))) {
std::vector<Vec4> temp(num_vertices, value);
glBufferSubData(GL_ARRAY_BUFFER, 0, size_needed, &temp[0].v[0]);
attrib_0_buffer_matches_value_ = true;
attrib_0_value_ = value;
attrib_0_size_ = size_needed;
}
glVertexAttribPointer(0, 4, GL_FLOAT, GL_FALSE, 0, NULL);
if (attrib->divisor())
glVertexAttribDivisorANGLE(0, 0);
*simulated = true;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 121,043 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct dentry *ovl_workdir_create(struct vfsmount *mnt,
struct dentry *dentry)
{
struct inode *dir = dentry->d_inode;
struct dentry *work;
int err;
bool retried = false;
err = mnt_want_write(mnt);
if (err)
return ERR_PTR(err);
mutex_lock_nested(&dir->i_mutex, I_MUTEX_PARENT);
retry:
work = lookup_one_len(OVL_WORKDIR_NAME, dentry,
strlen(OVL_WORKDIR_NAME));
if (!IS_ERR(work)) {
struct kstat stat = {
.mode = S_IFDIR | 0,
};
if (work->d_inode) {
err = -EEXIST;
if (retried)
goto out_dput;
retried = true;
ovl_cleanup(dir, work);
dput(work);
goto retry;
}
err = ovl_create_real(dir, work, &stat, NULL, NULL, true);
if (err)
goto out_dput;
}
out_unlock:
mutex_unlock(&dir->i_mutex);
mnt_drop_write(mnt);
return work;
out_dput:
dput(work);
work = ERR_PTR(err);
goto out_unlock;
}
Commit Message: fs: limit filesystem stacking depth
Add a simple read-only counter to super_block that indicates how deep this
is in the stack of filesystems. Previously ecryptfs was the only stackable
filesystem and it explicitly disallowed multiple layers of itself.
Overlayfs, however, can be stacked recursively and also may be stacked
on top of ecryptfs or vice versa.
To limit the kernel stack usage we must limit the depth of the
filesystem stack. Initially the limit is set to 2.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 74,609 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual ~FakeCompositingWebViewClient()
{
}
Commit Message: Call didAccessInitialDocument when javascript: URLs are used.
BUG=265221
TEST=See bug for repro.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/22572004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@155790 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 111,294 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::SetMainFrameImportance(
ChildProcessImportance importance) {
GetMainFrame()->GetRenderWidgetHost()->SetImportance(importance);
if (ShowingInterstitialPage()) {
static_cast<RenderFrameHostImpl*>(interstitial_page_->GetMainFrame())
->GetRenderWidgetHost()
->SetImportance(importance);
}
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 145,049 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ftrace_startup_sysctl(void)
{
if (unlikely(ftrace_disabled))
return;
/* Force update next time */
saved_ftrace_func = NULL;
/* ftrace_start_up is true if we want ftrace running */
if (ftrace_start_up)
ftrace_run_update_code(FTRACE_UPDATE_CALLS);
}
Commit Message: tracing: Fix possible NULL pointer dereferences
Currently set_ftrace_pid and set_graph_function files use seq_lseek
for their fops. However seq_open() is called only for FMODE_READ in
the fops->open() so that if an user tries to seek one of those file
when she open it for writing, it sees NULL seq_file and then panic.
It can be easily reproduced with following command:
$ cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
$ echo 1234 | sudo tee -a set_ftrace_pid
In this example, GNU coreutils' tee opens the file with fopen(, "a")
and then the fopen() internally calls lseek().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365663302-2170-1-git-send-email-namhyung@kernel.org
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung.kim@lge.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 30,234 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int snd_usb_create_streams(struct snd_usb_audio *chip, int ctrlif)
{
struct usb_device *dev = chip->dev;
struct usb_host_interface *host_iface;
struct usb_interface_descriptor *altsd;
int i, protocol;
/* find audiocontrol interface */
host_iface = &usb_ifnum_to_if(dev, ctrlif)->altsetting[0];
altsd = get_iface_desc(host_iface);
protocol = altsd->bInterfaceProtocol;
switch (protocol) {
default:
dev_warn(&dev->dev,
"unknown interface protocol %#02x, assuming v1\n",
protocol);
/* fall through */
case UAC_VERSION_1: {
struct uac1_ac_header_descriptor *h1;
int rest_bytes;
h1 = snd_usb_find_csint_desc(host_iface->extra,
host_iface->extralen,
NULL, UAC_HEADER);
if (!h1) {
dev_err(&dev->dev, "cannot find UAC_HEADER\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
rest_bytes = (void *)(host_iface->extra +
host_iface->extralen) - (void *)h1;
/* just to be sure -- this shouldn't hit at all */
if (rest_bytes <= 0) {
dev_err(&dev->dev, "invalid control header\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (rest_bytes < sizeof(*h1)) {
dev_err(&dev->dev, "too short v1 buffer descriptor\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (!h1->bInCollection) {
dev_info(&dev->dev, "skipping empty audio interface (v1)\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (rest_bytes < h1->bLength) {
dev_err(&dev->dev, "invalid buffer length (v1)\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (h1->bLength < sizeof(*h1) + h1->bInCollection) {
dev_err(&dev->dev, "invalid UAC_HEADER (v1)\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
for (i = 0; i < h1->bInCollection; i++)
snd_usb_create_stream(chip, ctrlif, h1->baInterfaceNr[i]);
break;
}
case UAC_VERSION_2:
case UAC_VERSION_3: {
struct usb_interface_assoc_descriptor *assoc =
usb_ifnum_to_if(dev, ctrlif)->intf_assoc;
if (!assoc) {
/*
* Firmware writers cannot count to three. So to find
* the IAD on the NuForce UDH-100, also check the next
* interface.
*/
struct usb_interface *iface =
usb_ifnum_to_if(dev, ctrlif + 1);
if (iface &&
iface->intf_assoc &&
iface->intf_assoc->bFunctionClass == USB_CLASS_AUDIO &&
iface->intf_assoc->bFunctionProtocol == UAC_VERSION_2)
assoc = iface->intf_assoc;
}
if (!assoc) {
dev_err(&dev->dev, "Audio class v2/v3 interfaces need an interface association\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (protocol == UAC_VERSION_3) {
int badd = assoc->bFunctionSubClass;
if (badd != UAC3_FUNCTION_SUBCLASS_FULL_ADC_3_0 &&
(badd < UAC3_FUNCTION_SUBCLASS_GENERIC_IO ||
badd > UAC3_FUNCTION_SUBCLASS_SPEAKERPHONE)) {
dev_err(&dev->dev,
"Unsupported UAC3 BADD profile\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
chip->badd_profile = badd;
}
for (i = 0; i < assoc->bInterfaceCount; i++) {
int intf = assoc->bFirstInterface + i;
if (intf != ctrlif)
snd_usb_create_stream(chip, ctrlif, intf);
}
break;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: usb-audio: Fix UAF decrement if card has no live interfaces in card.c
If a USB sound card reports 0 interfaces, an error condition is triggered
and the function usb_audio_probe errors out. In the error path, there was a
use-after-free vulnerability where the memory object of the card was first
freed, followed by a decrement of the number of active chips. Moving the
decrement above the atomic_dec fixes the UAF.
[ The original problem was introduced in 3.1 kernel, while it was
developed in a different form. The Fixes tag below indicates the
original commit but it doesn't mean that the patch is applicable
cleanly. -- tiwai ]
Fixes: 362e4e49abe5 ("ALSA: usb-audio - clear chip->probing on error exit")
Reported-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Signed-off-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 75,659 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: parse_lease_state(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, struct smb2_create_rsp *rsp,
unsigned int *epoch)
{
char *data_offset;
struct create_context *cc;
unsigned int next = 0;
char *name;
data_offset = (char *)rsp + 4 + le32_to_cpu(rsp->CreateContextsOffset);
cc = (struct create_context *)data_offset;
do {
cc = (struct create_context *)((char *)cc + next);
name = le16_to_cpu(cc->NameOffset) + (char *)cc;
if (le16_to_cpu(cc->NameLength) != 4 ||
strncmp(name, "RqLs", 4)) {
next = le32_to_cpu(cc->Next);
continue;
}
return server->ops->parse_lease_buf(cc, epoch);
} while (next != 0);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: [CIFS] Possible null ptr deref in SMB2_tcon
As Raphael Geissert pointed out, tcon_error_exit can dereference tcon
and there is one path in which tcon can be null.
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.7+
Reported-by: Raphael Geissert <geissert@debian.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 36,001 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TabStrip::OnMouseReleased(const ui::MouseEvent& event) {
EndDrag(END_DRAG_COMPLETE);
UpdateStackedLayoutFromMouseEvent(this, event);
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 140,755 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: format_WRITE_ACTIONS(const struct ofpact_nest *a, struct ds *s)
{
ds_put_format(s, "%swrite_actions(%s", colors.paren, colors.end);
ofpacts_format(a->actions, ofpact_nest_get_action_len(a), s);
ds_put_format(s, "%s)%s", colors.paren, colors.end);
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 76,963 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: vips__foreign_convert_saveable( VipsImage *in, VipsImage **ready,
VipsSaveable saveable, VipsBandFormat *format, VipsCoding *coding,
VipsArrayDouble *background )
{
/* in holds a reference to the output of our chain as we build it.
*/
g_object_ref( in );
/* For coded images, can this class save the coding we are in now?
* Nothing to do.
*/
if( in->Coding != VIPS_CODING_NONE &&
coding[in->Coding] ) {
*ready = in;
return( 0 );
}
/* For uncoded images, if this saver supports ANY bands and this
* format we have nothing to do.
*/
if( in->Coding == VIPS_CODING_NONE &&
saveable == VIPS_SAVEABLE_ANY &&
format[in->BandFmt] == in->BandFmt ) {
*ready = in;
return( 0 );
}
/* Otherwise ... we need to decode and then (possibly) recode at the
* end.
*/
/* If this is an VIPS_CODING_LABQ, we can go straight to RGB.
*/
if( in->Coding == VIPS_CODING_LABQ ) {
VipsImage *out;
if( vips_LabQ2sRGB( in, &out, NULL ) ) {
g_object_unref( in );
return( -1 );
}
g_object_unref( in );
in = out;
}
/* If this is an VIPS_CODING_RAD, we unpack to float. This could be
* scRGB or XYZ.
*/
if( in->Coding == VIPS_CODING_RAD ) {
VipsImage *out;
if( vips_rad2float( in, &out, NULL ) ) {
g_object_unref( in );
return( -1 );
}
g_object_unref( in );
in = out;
}
/* If the saver supports RAD, we need to go to scRGB or XYZ.
*/
if( coding[VIPS_CODING_RAD] ) {
if( in->Type != VIPS_INTERPRETATION_scRGB &&
in->Type != VIPS_INTERPRETATION_XYZ ) {
VipsImage *out;
if( vips_colourspace( in, &out,
VIPS_INTERPRETATION_scRGB, NULL ) ) {
g_object_unref( in );
return( -1 );
}
g_object_unref( in );
in = out;
}
}
/* If this image is CMYK and the saver is RGB-only, use lcms to try to
* import to XYZ. This will only work if the image has an embedded
* profile.
*/
if( in->Type == VIPS_INTERPRETATION_CMYK &&
in->Bands >= 4 &&
(saveable == VIPS_SAVEABLE_RGB ||
saveable == VIPS_SAVEABLE_RGBA ||
saveable == VIPS_SAVEABLE_RGBA_ONLY) ) {
VipsImage *out;
if( vips_icc_import( in, &out,
"pcs", VIPS_PCS_XYZ,
NULL ) ) {
g_object_unref( in );
return( -1 );
}
g_object_unref( in );
in = out;
/* We've imported to PCS, we must remove the embedded profile,
* since it no longer matches the image.
*
* For example, when converting CMYK JPG to RGB PNG, we need
* to remove the CMYK profile on import, or the png writer will
* try to attach it when we write the image as RGB.
*/
vips_image_remove( in, VIPS_META_ICC_NAME );
}
/* If this is something other than CMYK or RAD, eg. maybe a LAB image,
* we need to transform to RGB.
*/
if( !coding[VIPS_CODING_RAD] &&
in->Bands >= 3 &&
in->Type != VIPS_INTERPRETATION_CMYK &&
vips_colourspace_issupported( in ) &&
(saveable == VIPS_SAVEABLE_RGB ||
saveable == VIPS_SAVEABLE_RGBA ||
saveable == VIPS_SAVEABLE_RGBA_ONLY ||
saveable == VIPS_SAVEABLE_RGB_CMYK) ) {
VipsImage *out;
VipsInterpretation interpretation;
/* Do we make RGB or RGB16? We don't want to squash a 16-bit
* RGB down to 8 bits if the saver supports 16.
*/
if( vips_band_format_is8bit( format[in->BandFmt] ) )
interpretation = VIPS_INTERPRETATION_sRGB;
else
interpretation = VIPS_INTERPRETATION_RGB16;
if( vips_colourspace( in, &out, interpretation, NULL ) ) {
g_object_unref( in );
return( -1 );
}
g_object_unref( in );
in = out;
}
/* VIPS_SAVEABLE_RGBA_ONLY does not support 1 or 2 bands ... convert
* to sRGB.
*/
if( !coding[VIPS_CODING_RAD] &&
in->Bands < 3 &&
vips_colourspace_issupported( in ) &&
saveable == VIPS_SAVEABLE_RGBA_ONLY ) {
VipsImage *out;
VipsInterpretation interpretation;
/* Do we make RGB or RGB16? We don't want to squash a 16-bit
* RGB down to 8 bits if the saver supports 16.
*/
if( vips_band_format_is8bit( format[in->BandFmt] ) )
interpretation = VIPS_INTERPRETATION_sRGB;
else
interpretation = VIPS_INTERPRETATION_RGB16;
if( vips_colourspace( in, &out, interpretation, NULL ) ) {
g_object_unref( in );
return( -1 );
}
g_object_unref( in );
in = out;
}
/* Get the bands right. We must do this after all colourspace
* transforms, since they can change the number of bands.
*/
if( in->Coding == VIPS_CODING_NONE ) {
/* Do we need to flatten out an alpha channel? There needs to
* be an alpha there now, and this writer needs to not support
* alpha.
*/
if( (in->Bands == 2 ||
(in->Bands == 4 &&
in->Type != VIPS_INTERPRETATION_CMYK)) &&
(saveable == VIPS_SAVEABLE_MONO ||
saveable == VIPS_SAVEABLE_RGB ||
saveable == VIPS_SAVEABLE_RGB_CMYK) ) {
VipsImage *out;
if( vips_flatten( in, &out,
"background", background,
NULL ) ) {
g_object_unref( in );
return( -1 );
}
g_object_unref( in );
in = out;
}
/* Other alpha removal strategies ... just drop the extra
* bands.
*/
else if( in->Bands > 3 &&
(saveable == VIPS_SAVEABLE_RGB ||
(saveable == VIPS_SAVEABLE_RGB_CMYK &&
in->Type != VIPS_INTERPRETATION_CMYK)) ) {
VipsImage *out;
/* Don't let 4 bands though unless the image really is
* a CMYK.
*
* Consider a RGBA png being saved as JPG. We can
* write CMYK jpg, but we mustn't do that for RGBA
* images.
*/
if( vips_extract_band( in, &out, 0,
"n", 3,
NULL ) ) {
g_object_unref( in );
return( -1 );
}
g_object_unref( in );
in = out;
}
else if( in->Bands > 4 &&
((saveable == VIPS_SAVEABLE_RGB_CMYK &&
in->Type == VIPS_INTERPRETATION_CMYK) ||
saveable == VIPS_SAVEABLE_RGBA ||
saveable == VIPS_SAVEABLE_RGBA_ONLY) ) {
VipsImage *out;
if( vips_extract_band( in, &out, 0,
"n", 4,
NULL ) ) {
g_object_unref( in );
return( -1 );
}
g_object_unref( in );
in = out;
}
else if( in->Bands > 1 &&
saveable == VIPS_SAVEABLE_MONO ) {
VipsImage *out;
if( vips_extract_band( in, &out, 0, NULL ) ) {
g_object_unref( in );
return( -1 );
}
g_object_unref( in );
in = out;
}
/* Else we have VIPS_SAVEABLE_ANY and we don't chop bands down.
*/
}
/* Handle the ushort interpretations.
*
* RGB16 and GREY16 use 0-65535 for black-white. If we have an image
* tagged like this, and it has more than 8 bits (we leave crazy uchar
* images tagged as RGB16 alone), we'll need to get it ready for the
* saver.
*/
if( (in->Type == VIPS_INTERPRETATION_RGB16 ||
in->Type == VIPS_INTERPRETATION_GREY16) &&
!vips_band_format_is8bit( in->BandFmt ) ) {
/* If the saver supports ushort, cast to ushort. It may be
* float at the moment, for example.
*
* If the saver does not support ushort, automatically shift
* it down. This is the behaviour we want for saving an RGB16
* image as JPG, for example.
*/
if( format[VIPS_FORMAT_USHORT] == VIPS_FORMAT_USHORT ) {
VipsImage *out;
if( vips_cast( in, &out, VIPS_FORMAT_USHORT, NULL ) ) {
g_object_unref( in );
return( -1 );
}
g_object_unref( in );
in = out;
}
else {
VipsImage *out;
if( vips_rshift_const1( in, &out, 8, NULL ) ) {
g_object_unref( in );
return( -1 );
}
g_object_unref( in );
in = out;
/* That could have produced an int image ... make sure
* we are now uchar.
*/
if( vips_cast( in, &out, VIPS_FORMAT_UCHAR, NULL ) ) {
g_object_unref( in );
return( -1 );
}
g_object_unref( in );
in = out;
}
}
/* Cast to the output format.
*/
{
VipsImage *out;
if( vips_cast( in, &out, format[in->BandFmt], NULL ) ) {
g_object_unref( in );
return( -1 );
}
g_object_unref( in );
in = out;
}
/* Does this class want a coded image? Search the coding table for the
* first one.
*/
if( coding[VIPS_CODING_NONE] ) {
/* Already NONE, nothing to do.
*/
}
else if( coding[VIPS_CODING_LABQ] ) {
VipsImage *out;
if( vips_Lab2LabQ( in, &out, NULL ) ) {
g_object_unref( in );
return( -1 );
}
g_object_unref( in );
in = out;
}
else if( coding[VIPS_CODING_RAD] ) {
VipsImage *out;
if( vips_float2rad( in, &out, NULL ) ) {
g_object_unref( in );
return( -1 );
}
g_object_unref( in );
in = out;
}
*ready = in;
return( 0 );
}
Commit Message: fix a crash with delayed load
If a delayed load failed, it could leave the pipeline only half-set up.
Sebsequent threads could then segv.
Set a load-has-failed flag and test before generate.
See https://github.com/jcupitt/libvips/issues/893
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 83,886 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int xbackup_addmbox(struct findall_data *data, void *rock)
{
if (!data) return 0;
ptrarray_t *list = (ptrarray_t *) rock;
if (!data->mbname) {
/* No partial matches */ /* FIXME ??? */
return 0;
}
/* Only add shared mailboxes or user INBOXes */
if (!mbname_localpart(data->mbname) ||
(!mbname_isdeleted(data->mbname) &&
!strarray_size(mbname_boxes(data->mbname)))) {
ptrarray_append(list, mbname_dup(data->mbname));
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: imapd: check for isadmin BEFORE parsing sync lines
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 95,268 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: e1000e_set_interrupt_cause(E1000ECore *core, uint32_t val)
{
trace_e1000e_irq_set_cause_entry(val, core->mac[ICR]);
val |= e1000e_intmgr_collect_delayed_causes(core);
core->mac[ICR] |= val;
trace_e1000e_irq_set_cause_exit(val, core->mac[ICR]);
e1000e_update_interrupt_state(core);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 6,066 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderViewImpl::LoadNavigationErrorPage(
WebFrame* frame,
const WebURLRequest& failed_request,
const WebURLError& error,
const std::string& html,
bool replace) {
std::string alt_html;
const std::string* error_html;
if (!html.empty()) {
error_html = &html;
} else {
content::GetContentClient()->renderer()->GetNavigationErrorStrings(
failed_request, error, &alt_html, NULL);
error_html = &alt_html;
}
frame->loadHTMLString(*error_html,
GURL(chrome::kUnreachableWebDataURL),
error.unreachableURL,
replace);
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 108,374 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static zval *php_zip_get_property_ptr_ptr(zval *object, zval *member, int type, void **cache_slot) /* {{{ */
{
ze_zip_object *obj;
zval tmp_member;
zval *retval = NULL;
zip_prop_handler *hnd = NULL;
zend_object_handlers *std_hnd;
if (Z_TYPE_P(member) != IS_STRING) {
ZVAL_COPY(&tmp_member, member);
convert_to_string(&tmp_member);
member = &tmp_member;
cache_slot = NULL;
}
obj = Z_ZIP_P(object);
if (obj->prop_handler != NULL) {
hnd = zend_hash_find_ptr(obj->prop_handler, Z_STR_P(member));
}
if (hnd == NULL) {
std_hnd = zend_get_std_object_handlers();
retval = std_hnd->get_property_ptr_ptr(object, member, type, cache_slot);
}
if (member == &tmp_member) {
zval_dtor(member);
}
return retval;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Fix bug #71923 - integer overflow in ZipArchive::getFrom*
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 54,427 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ServiceWorkerContextCore::UnprotectVersion(int64_t version_id) {
DCHECK(protected_versions_.find(version_id) != protected_versions_.end());
protected_versions_.erase(version_id);
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,493 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static php_zlib_context *php_zlib_output_handler_context_init(TSRMLS_D)
{
php_zlib_context *ctx = (php_zlib_context *) ecalloc(1, sizeof(php_zlib_context));
ctx->Z.zalloc = php_zlib_alloc;
ctx->Z.zfree = php_zlib_free;
return ctx;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 15,364 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DataReductionProxyConfigServiceClient::ApplySerializedConfig(
const std::string& config_value) {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
if (RemoteConfigApplied())
return;
if (!client_config_override_.empty())
return;
std::string decoded_config;
if (base::Base64Decode(config_value, &decoded_config)) {
ClientConfig config;
if (config.ParseFromString(decoded_config))
ParseAndApplyProxyConfig(config);
}
}
Commit Message: Disable all DRP URL fetches when holdback is enabled
Disable secure proxy checker, warmup url fetcher
and client config fetch when the client is in DRP
(Data Reduction Proxy) holdback.
This CL does not disable pingbacks when client is in the
holdback, but the pingback code is going away soon.
Change-Id: Icbb59d814d1452123869c609e0770d1439c1db51
Bug: 984964
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1709965
Commit-Queue: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#679649}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 137,896 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int crypto_givcipher_report(struct sk_buff *skb, struct crypto_alg *alg)
{
struct crypto_report_blkcipher rblkcipher;
snprintf(rblkcipher.type, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "%s", "givcipher");
snprintf(rblkcipher.geniv, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "%s",
alg->cra_ablkcipher.geniv ?: "<built-in>");
rblkcipher.blocksize = alg->cra_blocksize;
rblkcipher.min_keysize = alg->cra_ablkcipher.min_keysize;
rblkcipher.max_keysize = alg->cra_ablkcipher.max_keysize;
rblkcipher.ivsize = alg->cra_ablkcipher.ivsize;
if (nla_put(skb, CRYPTOCFGA_REPORT_BLKCIPHER,
sizeof(struct crypto_report_blkcipher), &rblkcipher))
goto nla_put_failure;
return 0;
nla_put_failure:
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 1 | 166,062 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ext4_ext_split(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode,
unsigned int flags,
struct ext4_ext_path *path,
struct ext4_extent *newext, int at)
{
struct buffer_head *bh = NULL;
int depth = ext_depth(inode);
struct ext4_extent_header *neh;
struct ext4_extent_idx *fidx;
int i = at, k, m, a;
ext4_fsblk_t newblock, oldblock;
__le32 border;
ext4_fsblk_t *ablocks = NULL; /* array of allocated blocks */
int err = 0;
/* make decision: where to split? */
/* FIXME: now decision is simplest: at current extent */
/* if current leaf will be split, then we should use
* border from split point */
if (unlikely(path[depth].p_ext > EXT_MAX_EXTENT(path[depth].p_hdr))) {
EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "p_ext > EXT_MAX_EXTENT!");
return -EIO;
}
if (path[depth].p_ext != EXT_MAX_EXTENT(path[depth].p_hdr)) {
border = path[depth].p_ext[1].ee_block;
ext_debug("leaf will be split."
" next leaf starts at %d\n",
le32_to_cpu(border));
} else {
border = newext->ee_block;
ext_debug("leaf will be added."
" next leaf starts at %d\n",
le32_to_cpu(border));
}
/*
* If error occurs, then we break processing
* and mark filesystem read-only. index won't
* be inserted and tree will be in consistent
* state. Next mount will repair buffers too.
*/
/*
* Get array to track all allocated blocks.
* We need this to handle errors and free blocks
* upon them.
*/
ablocks = kzalloc(sizeof(ext4_fsblk_t) * depth, GFP_NOFS);
if (!ablocks)
return -ENOMEM;
/* allocate all needed blocks */
ext_debug("allocate %d blocks for indexes/leaf\n", depth - at);
for (a = 0; a < depth - at; a++) {
newblock = ext4_ext_new_meta_block(handle, inode, path,
newext, &err, flags);
if (newblock == 0)
goto cleanup;
ablocks[a] = newblock;
}
/* initialize new leaf */
newblock = ablocks[--a];
if (unlikely(newblock == 0)) {
EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "newblock == 0!");
err = -EIO;
goto cleanup;
}
bh = sb_getblk(inode->i_sb, newblock);
if (unlikely(!bh)) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
lock_buffer(bh);
err = ext4_journal_get_create_access(handle, bh);
if (err)
goto cleanup;
neh = ext_block_hdr(bh);
neh->eh_entries = 0;
neh->eh_max = cpu_to_le16(ext4_ext_space_block(inode, 0));
neh->eh_magic = EXT4_EXT_MAGIC;
neh->eh_depth = 0;
/* move remainder of path[depth] to the new leaf */
if (unlikely(path[depth].p_hdr->eh_entries !=
path[depth].p_hdr->eh_max)) {
EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "eh_entries %d != eh_max %d!",
path[depth].p_hdr->eh_entries,
path[depth].p_hdr->eh_max);
err = -EIO;
goto cleanup;
}
/* start copy from next extent */
m = EXT_MAX_EXTENT(path[depth].p_hdr) - path[depth].p_ext++;
ext4_ext_show_move(inode, path, newblock, depth);
if (m) {
struct ext4_extent *ex;
ex = EXT_FIRST_EXTENT(neh);
memmove(ex, path[depth].p_ext, sizeof(struct ext4_extent) * m);
le16_add_cpu(&neh->eh_entries, m);
}
ext4_extent_block_csum_set(inode, neh);
set_buffer_uptodate(bh);
unlock_buffer(bh);
err = ext4_handle_dirty_metadata(handle, inode, bh);
if (err)
goto cleanup;
brelse(bh);
bh = NULL;
/* correct old leaf */
if (m) {
err = ext4_ext_get_access(handle, inode, path + depth);
if (err)
goto cleanup;
le16_add_cpu(&path[depth].p_hdr->eh_entries, -m);
err = ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + depth);
if (err)
goto cleanup;
}
/* create intermediate indexes */
k = depth - at - 1;
if (unlikely(k < 0)) {
EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "k %d < 0!", k);
err = -EIO;
goto cleanup;
}
if (k)
ext_debug("create %d intermediate indices\n", k);
/* insert new index into current index block */
/* current depth stored in i var */
i = depth - 1;
while (k--) {
oldblock = newblock;
newblock = ablocks[--a];
bh = sb_getblk(inode->i_sb, newblock);
if (unlikely(!bh)) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
lock_buffer(bh);
err = ext4_journal_get_create_access(handle, bh);
if (err)
goto cleanup;
neh = ext_block_hdr(bh);
neh->eh_entries = cpu_to_le16(1);
neh->eh_magic = EXT4_EXT_MAGIC;
neh->eh_max = cpu_to_le16(ext4_ext_space_block_idx(inode, 0));
neh->eh_depth = cpu_to_le16(depth - i);
fidx = EXT_FIRST_INDEX(neh);
fidx->ei_block = border;
ext4_idx_store_pblock(fidx, oldblock);
ext_debug("int.index at %d (block %llu): %u -> %llu\n",
i, newblock, le32_to_cpu(border), oldblock);
/* move remainder of path[i] to the new index block */
if (unlikely(EXT_MAX_INDEX(path[i].p_hdr) !=
EXT_LAST_INDEX(path[i].p_hdr))) {
EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode,
"EXT_MAX_INDEX != EXT_LAST_INDEX ee_block %d!",
le32_to_cpu(path[i].p_ext->ee_block));
err = -EIO;
goto cleanup;
}
/* start copy indexes */
m = EXT_MAX_INDEX(path[i].p_hdr) - path[i].p_idx++;
ext_debug("cur 0x%p, last 0x%p\n", path[i].p_idx,
EXT_MAX_INDEX(path[i].p_hdr));
ext4_ext_show_move(inode, path, newblock, i);
if (m) {
memmove(++fidx, path[i].p_idx,
sizeof(struct ext4_extent_idx) * m);
le16_add_cpu(&neh->eh_entries, m);
}
ext4_extent_block_csum_set(inode, neh);
set_buffer_uptodate(bh);
unlock_buffer(bh);
err = ext4_handle_dirty_metadata(handle, inode, bh);
if (err)
goto cleanup;
brelse(bh);
bh = NULL;
/* correct old index */
if (m) {
err = ext4_ext_get_access(handle, inode, path + i);
if (err)
goto cleanup;
le16_add_cpu(&path[i].p_hdr->eh_entries, -m);
err = ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + i);
if (err)
goto cleanup;
}
i--;
}
/* insert new index */
err = ext4_ext_insert_index(handle, inode, path + at,
le32_to_cpu(border), newblock);
cleanup:
if (bh) {
if (buffer_locked(bh))
unlock_buffer(bh);
brelse(bh);
}
if (err) {
/* free all allocated blocks in error case */
for (i = 0; i < depth; i++) {
if (!ablocks[i])
continue;
ext4_free_blocks(handle, inode, NULL, ablocks[i], 1,
EXT4_FREE_BLOCKS_METADATA);
}
}
kfree(ablocks);
return err;
}
Commit Message: ext4: allocate entire range in zero range
Currently there is a bug in zero range code which causes zero range
calls to only allocate block aligned portion of the range, while
ignoring the rest in some cases.
In some cases, namely if the end of the range is past i_size, we do
attempt to preallocate the last nonaligned block. However this might
cause kernel to BUG() in some carefully designed zero range requests
on setups where page size > block size.
Fix this problem by first preallocating the entire range, including
the nonaligned edges and converting the written extents to unwritten
in the next step. This approach will also give us the advantage of
having the range to be as linearly contiguous as possible.
Signed-off-by: Lukas Czerner <lczerner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 44,885 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::string OfflineLoadPage::GetHTMLContents() {
DictionaryValue strings;
int64 time_to_wait = std::max(
static_cast<int64>(0),
kMaxBlankPeriod -
NetworkStateNotifier::GetOfflineDuration().InMilliseconds());
strings.SetInteger("time_to_wait", static_cast<int>(time_to_wait));
SetString(&strings, "heading", IDS_OFFLINE_LOAD_HEADLINE);
SetString(&strings, "try_loading", IDS_OFFLINE_TRY_LOADING);
SetString(&strings, "network_settings", IDS_OFFLINE_NETWORK_SETTINGS);
strings.SetBoolean("show_activation", ShowActivationMessage());
bool rtl = base::i18n::IsRTL();
strings.SetString("textdirection", rtl ? "rtl" : "ltr");
string16 failed_url(ASCIIToUTF16(url().spec()));
if (rtl)
base::i18n::WrapStringWithLTRFormatting(&failed_url);
strings.SetString("url", failed_url);
Profile* profile = tab()->profile();
DCHECK(profile);
const Extension* extension = NULL;
ExtensionService* extensions_service = profile->GetExtensionService();
if (extensions_service)
extension = extensions_service->GetExtensionByWebExtent(url());
if (extension)
GetAppOfflineStrings(extension, failed_url, &strings);
else
GetNormalOfflineStrings(failed_url, &strings);
base::StringPiece html(
ResourceBundle::GetSharedInstance().GetRawDataResource(
IDR_OFFLINE_LOAD_HTML));
return jstemplate_builder::GetI18nTemplateHtml(html, &strings);
}
Commit Message: cros: The next 100 clang plugin errors.
BUG=none
TEST=none
TBR=dpolukhin
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7022008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@85418 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 101,508 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool StreamingProcessor::isStreamActive(const Vector<int32_t> &streams,
int32_t recordingStreamId) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < streams.size(); i++) {
if (streams[i] == recordingStreamId) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Camera: Adjust pointers to ANW buffers to avoid infoleak
Subtract address of a random static object from pointers being routed
through app process.
Bug: 28466701
Change-Id: Idcbfe81e9507433769672f3dc6d67db5eeed4e04
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 159,368 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool BaseRenderingContext2D::isPointInStroke(const double x, const double y) {
return IsPointInStrokeInternal(path_, x, y);
}
Commit Message: [PE] Distinguish between tainting due to canvas content and filter.
A filter on a canvas can itself lead to origin tainting, for reasons
other than that the canvas contents are tainted. This CL changes
to distinguish these two causes, so that we recompute filters
on content-tainting change.
Bug: 778506
Change-Id: I3cec8ef3b2772f2af78cdd4b290520113092cca6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/811767
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <fs@opera.com>
Commit-Queue: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522274}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 149,930 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: long long Block::GetTimeCode(const Cluster* pCluster) const {
if (pCluster == 0)
return m_timecode;
const long long tc0 = pCluster->GetTimeCode();
assert(tc0 >= 0);
const long long tc = tc0 + m_timecode;
return tc; // unscaled timecode units
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 160,808 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void mptsas_post_reply(MPTSASState *s, MPIDefaultReply *reply)
{
PCIDevice *pci = (PCIDevice *) s;
uint32_t addr_lo;
if (MPTSAS_FIFO_EMPTY(s, reply_free) || MPTSAS_FIFO_FULL(s, reply_post)) {
mptsas_set_fault(s, MPI_IOCSTATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES);
return;
}
addr_lo = MPTSAS_FIFO_GET(s, reply_free);
pci_dma_write(pci, addr_lo | s->host_mfa_high_addr, reply,
MIN(s->reply_frame_size, 4 * reply->MsgLength));
MPTSAS_FIFO_PUT(s, reply_post, MPI_ADDRESS_REPLY_A_BIT | (addr_lo >> 1));
s->intr_status |= MPI_HIS_REPLY_MESSAGE_INTERRUPT;
if (s->doorbell_state == DOORBELL_WRITE) {
s->doorbell_state = DOORBELL_NONE;
s->intr_status |= MPI_HIS_DOORBELL_INTERRUPT;
}
mptsas_update_interrupt(s);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 8,370 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PopupContainer::paintBorder(GraphicsContext* gc, const IntRect& rect)
{
Color borderColor(127, 157, 185);
gc->setStrokeStyle(NoStroke);
gc->setFillColor(borderColor, ColorSpaceDeviceRGB);
int tx = x();
int ty = y();
gc->drawRect(IntRect(tx, ty, width(), kBorderSize));
gc->drawRect(IntRect(tx, ty, kBorderSize, height()));
gc->drawRect(IntRect(tx, ty + height() - kBorderSize, width(), kBorderSize));
gc->drawRect(IntRect(tx + width() - kBorderSize, ty, kBorderSize, height()));
}
Commit Message: [REGRESSION] Refreshed autofill popup renders garbage
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=83255
http://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=118374
The code used to update only the PopupContainer coordinates as if they were the coordinates relative
to the root view. Instead, a WebWidget positioned relative to the screen origin holds the PopupContainer,
so it is the WebWidget that should be positioned in PopupContainer::refresh(), and the PopupContainer's
location should be (0, 0) (and their sizes should always be equal).
Reviewed by Kent Tamura.
No new tests, as the popup appearance is not testable in WebKit.
* platform/chromium/PopupContainer.cpp:
(WebCore::PopupContainer::layoutAndCalculateWidgetRect): Variable renamed.
(WebCore::PopupContainer::showPopup): Use m_originalFrameRect rather than frameRect()
for passing into chromeClient.
(WebCore::PopupContainer::showInRect): Set up the correct frameRect() for the container.
(WebCore::PopupContainer::refresh): Resize the container and position the WebWidget correctly.
* platform/chromium/PopupContainer.h:
(PopupContainer):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@113418 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 108,583 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual status_t setParameter(
node_id node, OMX_INDEXTYPE index,
const void *params, size_t size) {
Parcel data, reply;
data.writeInterfaceToken(IOMX::getInterfaceDescriptor());
data.writeInt32((int32_t)node);
data.writeInt32(index);
data.writeInt64(size);
data.write(params, size);
remote()->transact(SET_PARAMETER, data, &reply);
return reply.readInt32();
}
Commit Message: Fix size check for OMX_IndexParamConsumerUsageBits
since it doesn't follow the OMX convention. And remove support
for the kClientNeedsFrameBuffer flag.
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: Ia2c119e2456ebf9e2f4e1de5104ef9032a212255
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 160,693 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void tcp_v6_init_req(struct request_sock *req,
const struct sock *sk_listener,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct inet_request_sock *ireq = inet_rsk(req);
const struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk_listener);
ireq->ir_v6_rmt_addr = ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr;
ireq->ir_v6_loc_addr = ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr;
/* So that link locals have meaning */
if (!sk_listener->sk_bound_dev_if &&
ipv6_addr_type(&ireq->ir_v6_rmt_addr) & IPV6_ADDR_LINKLOCAL)
ireq->ir_iif = tcp_v6_iif(skb);
if (!TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_tw_isn &&
(ipv6_opt_accepted(sk_listener, skb, &TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->header.h6) ||
np->rxopt.bits.rxinfo ||
np->rxopt.bits.rxoinfo || np->rxopt.bits.rxhlim ||
np->rxopt.bits.rxohlim || np->repflow)) {
atomic_inc(&skb->users);
ireq->pktopts = skb;
}
}
Commit Message: tcp: take care of truncations done by sk_filter()
With syzkaller help, Marco Grassi found a bug in TCP stack,
crashing in tcp_collapse()
Root cause is that sk_filter() can truncate the incoming skb,
but TCP stack was not really expecting this to happen.
It probably was expecting a simple DROP or ACCEPT behavior.
We first need to make sure no part of TCP header could be removed.
Then we need to adjust TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq
Many thanks to syzkaller team and Marco for giving us a reproducer.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <marco.gra@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 49,293 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MediaPlayer::~MediaPlayer()
{
ALOGV("destructor");
if (mAudioAttributesParcel != NULL) {
delete mAudioAttributesParcel;
mAudioAttributesParcel = NULL;
}
AudioSystem::releaseAudioSessionId(mAudioSessionId, -1);
disconnect();
IPCThreadState::self()->flushCommands();
}
Commit Message: Don't use sp<>&
because they may end up pointing to NULL after a NULL check was performed.
Bug: 28166152
Change-Id: Iab2ea30395b620628cc6f3d067dd4f6fcda824fe
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 159,522 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual void TabReplacedAt(TabStripModel* tab_strip_model,
TabContentsWrapper* old_contents,
TabContentsWrapper* new_contents,
int index) {
State* s = new State(new_contents, index, REPLACED);
s ->src_contents = old_contents;
states_.push_back(s);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,182 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void init_reg_state(struct reg_state *regs)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) {
regs[i].type = NOT_INIT;
regs[i].imm = 0;
regs[i].map_ptr = NULL;
}
/* frame pointer */
regs[BPF_REG_FP].type = FRAME_PTR;
/* 1st arg to a function */
regs[BPF_REG_1].type = PTR_TO_CTX;
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix refcnt overflow
On a system with >32Gbyte of phyiscal memory and infinite RLIMIT_MEMLOCK,
the malicious application may overflow 32-bit bpf program refcnt.
It's also possible to overflow map refcnt on 1Tb system.
Impose 32k hard limit which means that the same bpf program or
map cannot be shared by more than 32k processes.
Fixes: 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 53,100 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool IsSigninToAdd() {
return LoginDisplayHost::default_host() &&
user_manager::UserManager::Get()->IsUserLoggedIn();
}
Commit Message: cros: Check initial auth type when showing views login.
Bug: 859611
Change-Id: I0298db9bbf4aed6bd40600aef2e1c5794e8cd058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1123056
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyin Hu <xiaoyinh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jacob Dufault <jdufault@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572224}
CWE ID: | 0 | 131,584 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int raw_local_deliver(struct sk_buff *skb, int protocol)
{
int hash;
struct sock *raw_sk;
hash = protocol & (RAW_HTABLE_SIZE - 1);
raw_sk = sk_head(&raw_v4_hashinfo.ht[hash]);
/* If there maybe a raw socket we must check - if not we
* don't care less
*/
if (raw_sk && !raw_v4_input(skb, ip_hdr(skb), hash))
raw_sk = NULL;
return raw_sk != NULL;
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 18,962 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GDataFileSystem::MoveEntryFromRootDirectory(
const FilePath& dir_path,
const FileOperationCallback& callback,
GDataFileError error,
const FilePath& file_path) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
DCHECK(!callback.is_null());
DCHECK_EQ(kGDataRootDirectory, file_path.DirName().value());
GDataEntry* entry = directory_service_->FindEntryByPathSync(file_path);
GDataEntry* dir_entry = directory_service_->FindEntryByPathSync(dir_path);
if (error == GDATA_FILE_OK) {
if (!entry || !dir_entry) {
error = GDATA_FILE_ERROR_NOT_FOUND;
} else {
if (!dir_entry->AsGDataDirectory())
error = GDATA_FILE_ERROR_NOT_A_DIRECTORY;
}
}
if (error != GDATA_FILE_OK ||
dir_entry->resource_id() == kGDataRootDirectoryResourceId) {
callback.Run(error);
return;
}
documents_service_->AddResourceToDirectory(
dir_entry->content_url(),
entry->edit_url(),
base::Bind(&GDataFileSystem::OnMoveEntryFromRootDirectoryCompleted,
ui_weak_ptr_,
callback,
file_path,
dir_path));
}
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 116,968 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int igmp_mc_seq_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
return seq_open_net(inode, file, &igmp_mc_seq_ops,
sizeof(struct igmp_mc_iter_state));
}
Commit Message: igmp: Avoid zero delay when receiving odd mixture of IGMP queries
Commit 5b7c84066733c5dfb0e4016d939757b38de189e4 ('ipv4: correct IGMP
behavior on v3 query during v2-compatibility mode') added yet another
case for query parsing, which can result in max_delay = 0. Substitute
a value of 1, as in the usual v3 case.
Reported-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@debian.org>
References: http://bugs.debian.org/654876
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 21,600 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE2(umount, char __user *, name, int, flags)
{
struct path path;
struct mount *mnt;
int retval;
int lookup_flags = 0;
if (flags & ~(MNT_FORCE | MNT_DETACH | MNT_EXPIRE | UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW))
return -EINVAL;
if (!may_mount())
return -EPERM;
if (!(flags & UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW))
lookup_flags |= LOOKUP_FOLLOW;
retval = user_path_mountpoint_at(AT_FDCWD, name, lookup_flags, &path);
if (retval)
goto out;
mnt = real_mount(path.mnt);
retval = -EINVAL;
if (path.dentry != path.mnt->mnt_root)
goto dput_and_out;
if (!check_mnt(mnt))
goto dput_and_out;
if (mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCKED)
goto dput_and_out;
retval = do_umount(mnt, flags);
dput_and_out:
/* we mustn't call path_put() as that would clear mnt_expiry_mark */
dput(path.dentry);
mntput_no_expire(mnt);
out:
return retval;
}
Commit Message: mnt: Correct permission checks in do_remount
While invesgiating the issue where in "mount --bind -oremount,ro ..."
would result in later "mount --bind -oremount,rw" succeeding even if
the mount started off locked I realized that there are several
additional mount flags that should be locked and are not.
In particular MNT_NOSUID, MNT_NODEV, MNT_NOEXEC, and the atime
flags in addition to MNT_READONLY should all be locked. These
flags are all per superblock, can all be changed with MS_BIND,
and should not be changable if set by a more privileged user.
The following additions to the current logic are added in this patch.
- nosuid may not be clearable by a less privileged user.
- nodev may not be clearable by a less privielged user.
- noexec may not be clearable by a less privileged user.
- atime flags may not be changeable by a less privileged user.
The logic with atime is that always setting atime on access is a
global policy and backup software and auditing software could break if
atime bits are not updated (when they are configured to be updated),
and serious performance degradation could result (DOS attack) if atime
updates happen when they have been explicitly disabled. Therefore an
unprivileged user should not be able to mess with the atime bits set
by a more privileged user.
The additional restrictions are implemented with the addition of
MNT_LOCK_NOSUID, MNT_LOCK_NODEV, MNT_LOCK_NOEXEC, and MNT_LOCK_ATIME
mnt flags.
Taken together these changes and the fixes for MNT_LOCK_READONLY
should make it safe for an unprivileged user to create a user
namespace and to call "mount --bind -o remount,... ..." without
the danger of mount flags being changed maliciously.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 36,177 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void nohz_balancer_kick(struct rq *rq) { }
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 92,614 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TestingPrefServiceSimple* profile_prefs() { return pref_service_.get(); }
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 142,800 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void vmxnet3_update_mcast_filters(VMXNET3State *s)
{
uint16_t list_bytes =
VMXNET3_READ_DRV_SHARED16(s->drv_shmem,
devRead.rxFilterConf.mfTableLen);
s->mcast_list_len = list_bytes / sizeof(s->mcast_list[0]);
s->mcast_list = g_realloc(s->mcast_list, list_bytes);
if (NULL == s->mcast_list) {
if (0 == s->mcast_list_len) {
VMW_CFPRN("Current multicast list is empty");
} else {
VMW_ERPRN("Failed to allocate multicast list of %d elements",
s->mcast_list_len);
}
s->mcast_list_len = 0;
} else {
int i;
hwaddr mcast_list_pa =
VMXNET3_READ_DRV_SHARED64(s->drv_shmem,
devRead.rxFilterConf.mfTablePA);
cpu_physical_memory_read(mcast_list_pa, s->mcast_list, list_bytes);
VMW_CFPRN("Current multicast list len is %d:", s->mcast_list_len);
for (i = 0; i < s->mcast_list_len; i++) {
VMW_CFPRN("\t" VMXNET_MF, VMXNET_MA(s->mcast_list[i].a));
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 15,609 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: negotiate_mech(gss_OID_set supported, gss_OID_set received,
OM_uint32 *negResult)
{
size_t i, j;
for (i = 0; i < received->count; i++) {
gss_OID mech_oid = &received->elements[i];
/* Accept wrong mechanism OID from MS clients */
if (g_OID_equal(mech_oid, &gss_mech_krb5_wrong_oid))
mech_oid = (gss_OID)&gss_mech_krb5_oid;
for (j = 0; j < supported->count; j++) {
if (g_OID_equal(mech_oid, &supported->elements[j])) {
*negResult = (i == 0) ? ACCEPT_INCOMPLETE :
REQUEST_MIC;
return &received->elements[i];
}
}
}
*negResult = REJECT;
return (NULL);
}
Commit Message: Fix null deref in SPNEGO acceptor [CVE-2014-4344]
When processing a continuation token, acc_ctx_cont was dereferencing
the initial byte of the token without checking the length. This could
result in a null dereference.
CVE-2014-4344:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and newer, an unauthenticated or partially
authenticated remote attacker can cause a NULL dereference and
application crash during a SPNEGO negotiation by sending an empty
token as the second or later context token from initiator to acceptor.
The attacker must provide at least one valid context token in the
security context negotiation before sending the empty token. This can
be done by an unauthenticated attacker by forcing SPNEGO to
renegotiate the underlying mechanism, or by using IAKERB to wrap an
unauthenticated AS-REQ as the first token.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[kaduk@mit.edu: CVE summary, CVSSv2 vector]
(cherry picked from commit 524688ce87a15fc75f87efc8c039ba4c7d5c197b)
ticket: 7970
version_fixed: 1.12.2
status: resolved
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 36,726 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int emulate_popcntb_inst(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 instword)
{
u32 ra,rs;
unsigned long tmp;
ra = (instword >> 16) & 0x1f;
rs = (instword >> 21) & 0x1f;
tmp = regs->gpr[rs];
tmp = tmp - ((tmp >> 1) & 0x5555555555555555ULL);
tmp = (tmp & 0x3333333333333333ULL) + ((tmp >> 2) & 0x3333333333333333ULL);
tmp = (tmp + (tmp >> 4)) & 0x0f0f0f0f0f0f0f0fULL;
regs->gpr[ra] = tmp;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: [POWERPC] Never panic when taking altivec exceptions from userspace
At the moment we rely on a cpu feature bit or a firmware property to
detect altivec. If we dont have either of these and the cpu does in fact
support altivec we can cause a panic from userspace.
It seems safer to always send a signal if we manage to get an 0xf20
exception from userspace.
Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 74,729 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sha1_ssse3_export(struct shash_desc *desc, void *out)
{
struct sha1_state *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
memcpy(out, sctx, sizeof(*sctx));
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 47,032 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: authentic_manage_sdo_generate(struct sc_card *card, struct sc_authentic_sdo *sdo)
{
struct sc_context *ctx = card->ctx;
struct sc_apdu apdu;
unsigned char rbuf[0x400];
unsigned char *data = NULL;
size_t data_len = 0;
int rv;
LOG_FUNC_CALLED(ctx);
sc_log(ctx, "Generate SDO(mech:%X,id:%X)", sdo->docp.mech, sdo->docp.id);
rv = authentic_manage_sdo_encode(card, sdo, SC_CARDCTL_AUTHENTIC_SDO_GENERATE, &data, &data_len);
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, rv, "Cannot encode SDO data");
sc_log(ctx, "encoded SDO length %"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u", data_len);
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_4_SHORT, 0x47, 0x00, 0x00);
apdu.data = data;
apdu.datalen = data_len;
apdu.lc = data_len;
apdu.resp = rbuf;
apdu.resplen = sizeof(rbuf);
apdu.le = 0x100;
rv = sc_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu);
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, rv, "APDU transmit failed");
rv = sc_check_sw(card, apdu.sw1, apdu.sw2);
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, rv, "authentic_sdo_create() SDO put data error");
rv = authentic_decode_pubkey_rsa(ctx, apdu.resp, apdu.resplen, &sdo->data.prvkey);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, rv, "cannot decode public key");
free(data);
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, rv);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 78,196 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ofputil_put_switch_features_port(const struct ofputil_phy_port *pp,
struct ofpbuf *b)
{
const struct ofp_header *oh = b->data;
if (oh->version < OFP13_VERSION) {
/* Try adding a port description to the message, but drop it again if
* the buffer overflows. (This possibility for overflow is why
* OpenFlow 1.3+ moved port descriptions into a multipart message.) */
size_t start_ofs = b->size;
ofputil_put_phy_port(oh->version, pp, b);
if (b->size > UINT16_MAX) {
b->size = start_ofs;
}
}
}
Commit Message: ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <pkusunyifeng@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 77,700 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: storeAtts(XML_Parser parser, const ENCODING *enc, const char *attStr,
TAG_NAME *tagNamePtr, BINDING **bindingsPtr) {
DTD *const dtd = parser->m_dtd; /* save one level of indirection */
ELEMENT_TYPE *elementType;
int nDefaultAtts;
const XML_Char **appAtts; /* the attribute list for the application */
int attIndex = 0;
int prefixLen;
int i;
int n;
XML_Char *uri;
int nPrefixes = 0;
BINDING *binding;
const XML_Char *localPart;
/* lookup the element type name */
elementType
= (ELEMENT_TYPE *)lookup(parser, &dtd->elementTypes, tagNamePtr->str, 0);
if (! elementType) {
const XML_Char *name = poolCopyString(&dtd->pool, tagNamePtr->str);
if (! name)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
elementType = (ELEMENT_TYPE *)lookup(parser, &dtd->elementTypes, name,
sizeof(ELEMENT_TYPE));
if (! elementType)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
if (parser->m_ns && ! setElementTypePrefix(parser, elementType))
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
}
nDefaultAtts = elementType->nDefaultAtts;
/* get the attributes from the tokenizer */
n = XmlGetAttributes(enc, attStr, parser->m_attsSize, parser->m_atts);
if (n + nDefaultAtts > parser->m_attsSize) {
int oldAttsSize = parser->m_attsSize;
ATTRIBUTE *temp;
#ifdef XML_ATTR_INFO
XML_AttrInfo *temp2;
#endif
parser->m_attsSize = n + nDefaultAtts + INIT_ATTS_SIZE;
temp = (ATTRIBUTE *)REALLOC(parser, (void *)parser->m_atts,
parser->m_attsSize * sizeof(ATTRIBUTE));
if (temp == NULL) {
parser->m_attsSize = oldAttsSize;
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
}
parser->m_atts = temp;
#ifdef XML_ATTR_INFO
temp2 = (XML_AttrInfo *)REALLOC(parser, (void *)parser->m_attInfo,
parser->m_attsSize * sizeof(XML_AttrInfo));
if (temp2 == NULL) {
parser->m_attsSize = oldAttsSize;
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
}
parser->m_attInfo = temp2;
#endif
if (n > oldAttsSize)
XmlGetAttributes(enc, attStr, n, parser->m_atts);
}
appAtts = (const XML_Char **)parser->m_atts;
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
ATTRIBUTE *currAtt = &parser->m_atts[i];
#ifdef XML_ATTR_INFO
XML_AttrInfo *currAttInfo = &parser->m_attInfo[i];
#endif
/* add the name and value to the attribute list */
ATTRIBUTE_ID *attId
= getAttributeId(parser, enc, currAtt->name,
currAtt->name + XmlNameLength(enc, currAtt->name));
if (! attId)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
#ifdef XML_ATTR_INFO
currAttInfo->nameStart
= parser->m_parseEndByteIndex - (parser->m_parseEndPtr - currAtt->name);
currAttInfo->nameEnd
= currAttInfo->nameStart + XmlNameLength(enc, currAtt->name);
currAttInfo->valueStart = parser->m_parseEndByteIndex
- (parser->m_parseEndPtr - currAtt->valuePtr);
currAttInfo->valueEnd = parser->m_parseEndByteIndex
- (parser->m_parseEndPtr - currAtt->valueEnd);
#endif
/* Detect duplicate attributes by their QNames. This does not work when
namespace processing is turned on and different prefixes for the same
namespace are used. For this case we have a check further down.
*/
if ((attId->name)[-1]) {
if (enc == parser->m_encoding)
parser->m_eventPtr = parser->m_atts[i].name;
return XML_ERROR_DUPLICATE_ATTRIBUTE;
}
(attId->name)[-1] = 1;
appAtts[attIndex++] = attId->name;
if (! parser->m_atts[i].normalized) {
enum XML_Error result;
XML_Bool isCdata = XML_TRUE;
/* figure out whether declared as other than CDATA */
if (attId->maybeTokenized) {
int j;
for (j = 0; j < nDefaultAtts; j++) {
if (attId == elementType->defaultAtts[j].id) {
isCdata = elementType->defaultAtts[j].isCdata;
break;
}
}
}
/* normalize the attribute value */
result = storeAttributeValue(
parser, enc, isCdata, parser->m_atts[i].valuePtr,
parser->m_atts[i].valueEnd, &parser->m_tempPool);
if (result)
return result;
appAtts[attIndex] = poolStart(&parser->m_tempPool);
poolFinish(&parser->m_tempPool);
} else {
/* the value did not need normalizing */
appAtts[attIndex] = poolStoreString(&parser->m_tempPool, enc,
parser->m_atts[i].valuePtr,
parser->m_atts[i].valueEnd);
if (appAtts[attIndex] == 0)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
poolFinish(&parser->m_tempPool);
}
/* handle prefixed attribute names */
if (attId->prefix) {
if (attId->xmlns) {
/* deal with namespace declarations here */
enum XML_Error result = addBinding(parser, attId->prefix, attId,
appAtts[attIndex], bindingsPtr);
if (result)
return result;
--attIndex;
} else {
/* deal with other prefixed names later */
attIndex++;
nPrefixes++;
(attId->name)[-1] = 2;
}
} else
attIndex++;
}
/* set-up for XML_GetSpecifiedAttributeCount and XML_GetIdAttributeIndex */
parser->m_nSpecifiedAtts = attIndex;
if (elementType->idAtt && (elementType->idAtt->name)[-1]) {
for (i = 0; i < attIndex; i += 2)
if (appAtts[i] == elementType->idAtt->name) {
parser->m_idAttIndex = i;
break;
}
} else
parser->m_idAttIndex = -1;
/* do attribute defaulting */
for (i = 0; i < nDefaultAtts; i++) {
const DEFAULT_ATTRIBUTE *da = elementType->defaultAtts + i;
if (! (da->id->name)[-1] && da->value) {
if (da->id->prefix) {
if (da->id->xmlns) {
enum XML_Error result = addBinding(parser, da->id->prefix, da->id,
da->value, bindingsPtr);
if (result)
return result;
} else {
(da->id->name)[-1] = 2;
nPrefixes++;
appAtts[attIndex++] = da->id->name;
appAtts[attIndex++] = da->value;
}
} else {
(da->id->name)[-1] = 1;
appAtts[attIndex++] = da->id->name;
appAtts[attIndex++] = da->value;
}
}
}
appAtts[attIndex] = 0;
/* expand prefixed attribute names, check for duplicates,
and clear flags that say whether attributes were specified */
i = 0;
if (nPrefixes) {
int j; /* hash table index */
unsigned long version = parser->m_nsAttsVersion;
int nsAttsSize = (int)1 << parser->m_nsAttsPower;
unsigned char oldNsAttsPower = parser->m_nsAttsPower;
/* size of hash table must be at least 2 * (# of prefixed attributes) */
if ((nPrefixes << 1)
>> parser->m_nsAttsPower) { /* true for m_nsAttsPower = 0 */
NS_ATT *temp;
/* hash table size must also be a power of 2 and >= 8 */
while (nPrefixes >> parser->m_nsAttsPower++)
;
if (parser->m_nsAttsPower < 3)
parser->m_nsAttsPower = 3;
nsAttsSize = (int)1 << parser->m_nsAttsPower;
temp = (NS_ATT *)REALLOC(parser, parser->m_nsAtts,
nsAttsSize * sizeof(NS_ATT));
if (! temp) {
/* Restore actual size of memory in m_nsAtts */
parser->m_nsAttsPower = oldNsAttsPower;
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
}
parser->m_nsAtts = temp;
version = 0; /* force re-initialization of m_nsAtts hash table */
}
/* using a version flag saves us from initializing m_nsAtts every time */
if (! version) { /* initialize version flags when version wraps around */
version = INIT_ATTS_VERSION;
for (j = nsAttsSize; j != 0;)
parser->m_nsAtts[--j].version = version;
}
parser->m_nsAttsVersion = --version;
/* expand prefixed names and check for duplicates */
for (; i < attIndex; i += 2) {
const XML_Char *s = appAtts[i];
if (s[-1] == 2) { /* prefixed */
ATTRIBUTE_ID *id;
const BINDING *b;
unsigned long uriHash;
struct siphash sip_state;
struct sipkey sip_key;
copy_salt_to_sipkey(parser, &sip_key);
sip24_init(&sip_state, &sip_key);
((XML_Char *)s)[-1] = 0; /* clear flag */
id = (ATTRIBUTE_ID *)lookup(parser, &dtd->attributeIds, s, 0);
if (! id || ! id->prefix) {
/* This code is walking through the appAtts array, dealing
* with (in this case) a prefixed attribute name. To be in
* the array, the attribute must have already been bound, so
* has to have passed through the hash table lookup once
* already. That implies that an entry for it already
* exists, so the lookup above will return a pointer to
* already allocated memory. There is no opportunaity for
* the allocator to fail, so the condition above cannot be
* fulfilled.
*
* Since it is difficult to be certain that the above
* analysis is complete, we retain the test and merely
* remove the code from coverage tests.
*/
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY; /* LCOV_EXCL_LINE */
}
b = id->prefix->binding;
if (! b)
return XML_ERROR_UNBOUND_PREFIX;
for (j = 0; j < b->uriLen; j++) {
const XML_Char c = b->uri[j];
if (! poolAppendChar(&parser->m_tempPool, c))
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
}
sip24_update(&sip_state, b->uri, b->uriLen * sizeof(XML_Char));
while (*s++ != XML_T(ASCII_COLON))
;
sip24_update(&sip_state, s, keylen(s) * sizeof(XML_Char));
do { /* copies null terminator */
if (! poolAppendChar(&parser->m_tempPool, *s))
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
} while (*s++);
uriHash = (unsigned long)sip24_final(&sip_state);
{ /* Check hash table for duplicate of expanded name (uriName).
Derived from code in lookup(parser, HASH_TABLE *table, ...).
*/
unsigned char step = 0;
unsigned long mask = nsAttsSize - 1;
j = uriHash & mask; /* index into hash table */
while (parser->m_nsAtts[j].version == version) {
/* for speed we compare stored hash values first */
if (uriHash == parser->m_nsAtts[j].hash) {
const XML_Char *s1 = poolStart(&parser->m_tempPool);
const XML_Char *s2 = parser->m_nsAtts[j].uriName;
/* s1 is null terminated, but not s2 */
for (; *s1 == *s2 && *s1 != 0; s1++, s2++)
;
if (*s1 == 0)
return XML_ERROR_DUPLICATE_ATTRIBUTE;
}
if (! step)
step = PROBE_STEP(uriHash, mask, parser->m_nsAttsPower);
j < step ? (j += nsAttsSize - step) : (j -= step);
}
}
if (parser->m_ns_triplets) { /* append namespace separator and prefix */
parser->m_tempPool.ptr[-1] = parser->m_namespaceSeparator;
s = b->prefix->name;
do {
if (! poolAppendChar(&parser->m_tempPool, *s))
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
} while (*s++);
}
/* store expanded name in attribute list */
s = poolStart(&parser->m_tempPool);
poolFinish(&parser->m_tempPool);
appAtts[i] = s;
/* fill empty slot with new version, uriName and hash value */
parser->m_nsAtts[j].version = version;
parser->m_nsAtts[j].hash = uriHash;
parser->m_nsAtts[j].uriName = s;
if (! --nPrefixes) {
i += 2;
break;
}
} else /* not prefixed */
((XML_Char *)s)[-1] = 0; /* clear flag */
}
}
/* clear flags for the remaining attributes */
for (; i < attIndex; i += 2)
((XML_Char *)(appAtts[i]))[-1] = 0;
for (binding = *bindingsPtr; binding; binding = binding->nextTagBinding)
binding->attId->name[-1] = 0;
if (! parser->m_ns)
return XML_ERROR_NONE;
/* expand the element type name */
if (elementType->prefix) {
binding = elementType->prefix->binding;
if (! binding)
return XML_ERROR_UNBOUND_PREFIX;
localPart = tagNamePtr->str;
while (*localPart++ != XML_T(ASCII_COLON))
;
} else if (dtd->defaultPrefix.binding) {
binding = dtd->defaultPrefix.binding;
localPart = tagNamePtr->str;
} else
return XML_ERROR_NONE;
prefixLen = 0;
if (parser->m_ns_triplets && binding->prefix->name) {
for (; binding->prefix->name[prefixLen++];)
; /* prefixLen includes null terminator */
}
tagNamePtr->localPart = localPart;
tagNamePtr->uriLen = binding->uriLen;
tagNamePtr->prefix = binding->prefix->name;
tagNamePtr->prefixLen = prefixLen;
for (i = 0; localPart[i++];)
; /* i includes null terminator */
n = i + binding->uriLen + prefixLen;
if (n > binding->uriAlloc) {
TAG *p;
uri = (XML_Char *)MALLOC(parser, (n + EXPAND_SPARE) * sizeof(XML_Char));
if (! uri)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
binding->uriAlloc = n + EXPAND_SPARE;
memcpy(uri, binding->uri, binding->uriLen * sizeof(XML_Char));
for (p = parser->m_tagStack; p; p = p->parent)
if (p->name.str == binding->uri)
p->name.str = uri;
FREE(parser, binding->uri);
binding->uri = uri;
}
/* if m_namespaceSeparator != '\0' then uri includes it already */
uri = binding->uri + binding->uriLen;
memcpy(uri, localPart, i * sizeof(XML_Char));
/* we always have a namespace separator between localPart and prefix */
if (prefixLen) {
uri += i - 1;
*uri = parser->m_namespaceSeparator; /* replace null terminator */
memcpy(uri + 1, binding->prefix->name, prefixLen * sizeof(XML_Char));
}
tagNamePtr->str = binding->uri;
return XML_ERROR_NONE;
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Deny internal entities closing the doctype
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 0 | 88,310 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int validate_acl(FFServerStream *stream, HTTPContext *c)
{
int ret = 0;
FFServerIPAddressACL *acl;
/* if stream->acl is null validate_acl_list will return 1 */
ret = validate_acl_list(stream->acl, c);
if (stream->dynamic_acl[0]) {
acl = parse_dynamic_acl(stream, c);
ret = validate_acl_list(acl, c);
free_acl_list(acl);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ffserver: Check chunk size
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: poc_ffserver.py
Found-by: Paul Cher <paulcher@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 70,840 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ASN1_INTEGER *ASN1_INTEGER_dup(const ASN1_INTEGER *x)
{
return M_ASN1_INTEGER_dup(x);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 12,825 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int32_t scalarproduct_int16_c(const int16_t * v1, const int16_t * v2, int order)
{
int res = 0;
while (order--)
res += *v1++ * *v2++;
return res;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/dsputil: fix signedness in sizeof() comparissions
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 28,179 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(openssl_pkcs7_verify)
{
X509_STORE * store = NULL;
zval * cainfo = NULL;
STACK_OF(X509) *signers= NULL;
STACK_OF(X509) *others = NULL;
PKCS7 * p7 = NULL;
BIO * in = NULL, * datain = NULL, * dataout = NULL;
long flags = 0;
char * filename; int filename_len;
char * extracerts = NULL; int extracerts_len = 0;
char * signersfilename = NULL; int signersfilename_len = 0;
char * datafilename = NULL; int datafilename_len = 0;
RETVAL_LONG(-1);
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "sl|sass", &filename, &filename_len,
&flags, &signersfilename, &signersfilename_len, &cainfo,
&extracerts, &extracerts_len, &datafilename, &datafilename_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (extracerts) {
others = load_all_certs_from_file(extracerts);
if (others == NULL) {
goto clean_exit;
}
}
flags = flags & ~PKCS7_DETACHED;
store = setup_verify(cainfo TSRMLS_CC);
if (!store) {
goto clean_exit;
}
if (php_openssl_safe_mode_chk(filename TSRMLS_CC)) {
goto clean_exit;
}
in = BIO_new_file(filename, (flags & PKCS7_BINARY) ? "rb" : "r");
if (in == NULL) {
goto clean_exit;
}
p7 = SMIME_read_PKCS7(in, &datain);
if (p7 == NULL) {
#if DEBUG_SMIME
zend_printf("SMIME_read_PKCS7 failed\n");
#endif
goto clean_exit;
}
if (datafilename) {
if (php_openssl_safe_mode_chk(datafilename TSRMLS_CC)) {
goto clean_exit;
}
dataout = BIO_new_file(datafilename, "w");
if (dataout == NULL) {
goto clean_exit;
}
}
#if DEBUG_SMIME
zend_printf("Calling PKCS7 verify\n");
#endif
if (PKCS7_verify(p7, others, store, datain, dataout, flags)) {
RETVAL_TRUE;
if (signersfilename) {
BIO *certout;
if (php_openssl_safe_mode_chk(signersfilename TSRMLS_CC)) {
goto clean_exit;
}
certout = BIO_new_file(signersfilename, "w");
if (certout) {
int i;
signers = PKCS7_get0_signers(p7, NULL, flags);
for(i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(signers); i++) {
PEM_write_bio_X509(certout, sk_X509_value(signers, i));
}
BIO_free(certout);
sk_X509_free(signers);
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "signature OK, but cannot open %s for writing", signersfilename);
RETVAL_LONG(-1);
}
}
goto clean_exit;
} else {
RETVAL_FALSE;
}
clean_exit:
X509_STORE_free(store);
BIO_free(datain);
BIO_free(in);
BIO_free(dataout);
PKCS7_free(p7);
sk_X509_free(others);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 118 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int em_sahf(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
u32 flags;
flags = EFLG_CF | EFLG_PF | EFLG_AF | EFLG_ZF | EFLG_SF;
flags &= *reg_rmw(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RAX) >> 8;
ctxt->eflags &= ~0xffUL;
ctxt->eflags |= flags | X86_EFLAGS_FIXED;
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
Commit Message: KVM: emulate: avoid accessing NULL ctxt->memopp
A failure to decode the instruction can cause a NULL pointer access.
This is fixed simply by moving the "done" label as close as possible
to the return.
This fixes CVE-2014-8481.
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 41061cdb98a0bec464278b4db8e894a3121671f5
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 35,551 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: user_reset_icon_file (User *user)
{
const char *icon_file;
gboolean icon_is_default;
const char *home_dir;
icon_file = accounts_user_get_icon_file (ACCOUNTS_USER (user));
if (icon_file == NULL || g_strcmp0 (icon_file, user->default_icon_file) == 0) {
icon_is_default = TRUE;
} else {
icon_is_default = FALSE;
}
g_free (user->default_icon_file);
home_dir = accounts_user_get_home_directory (ACCOUNTS_USER (user));
user->default_icon_file = g_build_filename (home_dir, ".face", NULL);
if (icon_is_default) {
accounts_user_set_icon_file (ACCOUNTS_USER (user), user->default_icon_file);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 4,745 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: aura::Window* CreateWindow(const gfx::Rect& bounds) {
aura::Window* window = CreateTestWindowInShellWithDelegate(
new SplitViewTestWindowDelegate, -1, bounds);
return window;
}
Commit Message: cros: Enable some tests in //ash/wm in ash_unittests --mash
For the ones that fail, disable them via filter file instead of in the
code, per our disablement policy.
Bug: 698085, 695556, 698878, 698888, 698093, 698894
Test: ash_unittests --mash
Change-Id: Ic145ab6a95508968d6884d14fac2a3ca08888d26
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/752423
Commit-Queue: James Cook <jamescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Steven Bennetts <stevenjb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513836}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,199 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ext4_dio_get_block_overwrite(struct inode *inode, sector_t iblock,
struct buffer_head *bh_result, int create)
{
int ret;
ext4_debug("ext4_dio_get_block_overwrite: inode %lu, create flag %d\n",
inode->i_ino, create);
/* We don't expect handle for direct IO */
WARN_ON_ONCE(ext4_journal_current_handle());
ret = _ext4_get_block(inode, iblock, bh_result, 0);
/*
* Blocks should have been preallocated! ext4_file_write_iter() checks
* that.
*/
WARN_ON_ONCE(!buffer_mapped(bh_result) || buffer_unwritten(bh_result));
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix data exposure after a crash
Huang has reported that in his powerfail testing he is seeing stale
block contents in some of recently allocated blocks although he mounts
ext4 in data=ordered mode. After some investigation I have found out
that indeed when delayed allocation is used, we don't add inode to
transaction's list of inodes needing flushing before commit. Originally
we were doing that but commit f3b59291a69d removed the logic with a
flawed argument that it is not needed.
The problem is that although for delayed allocated blocks we write their
contents immediately after allocating them, there is no guarantee that
the IO scheduler or device doesn't reorder things and thus transaction
allocating blocks and attaching them to inode can reach stable storage
before actual block contents. Actually whenever we attach freshly
allocated blocks to inode using a written extent, we should add inode to
transaction's ordered inode list to make sure we properly wait for block
contents to be written before committing the transaction. So that is
what we do in this patch. This also handles other cases where stale data
exposure was possible - like filling hole via mmap in
data=ordered,nodelalloc mode.
The only exception to the above rule are extending direct IO writes where
blkdev_direct_IO() waits for IO to complete before increasing i_size and
thus stale data exposure is not possible. For now we don't complicate
the code with optimizing this special case since the overhead is pretty
low. In case this is observed to be a performance problem we can always
handle it using a special flag to ext4_map_blocks().
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: f3b59291a69d0b734be1fc8be489fef2dd846d3d
Reported-by: "HUANG Weller (CM/ESW12-CN)" <Weller.Huang@cn.bosch.com>
Tested-by: "HUANG Weller (CM/ESW12-CN)" <Weller.Huang@cn.bosch.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 67,518 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static uint32_t __inline read_code (Bitstream *bs, uint32_t maxcode)
{
unsigned long local_sr;
uint32_t extras, code;
int bitcount;
if (maxcode < 2)
return maxcode ? getbit (bs) : 0;
bitcount = count_bits (maxcode);
#ifdef USE_BITMASK_TABLES
extras = bitset [bitcount] - maxcode - 1;
#else
extras = (1 << bitcount) - maxcode - 1;
#endif
local_sr = bs->sr;
while (bs->bc < bitcount) {
if (++(bs->ptr) == bs->end)
bs->wrap (bs);
local_sr |= (long)*(bs->ptr) << bs->bc;
bs->bc += sizeof (*(bs->ptr)) * 8;
}
#ifdef USE_BITMASK_TABLES
if ((code = local_sr & bitmask [bitcount - 1]) >= extras)
#else
if ((code = local_sr & ((1 << (bitcount - 1)) - 1)) >= extras)
#endif
code = (code << 1) - extras + ((local_sr >> (bitcount - 1)) & 1);
else
bitcount--;
if (sizeof (local_sr) < 8 && bs->bc > sizeof (local_sr) * 8) {
bs->bc -= bitcount;
bs->sr = *(bs->ptr) >> (sizeof (*(bs->ptr)) * 8 - bs->bc);
}
else {
bs->bc -= bitcount;
bs->sr = local_sr >> bitcount;
}
return code;
}
Commit Message: fixes for 4 fuzz failures posted to SourceForge mailing list
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 70,905 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AttachOffloadGPU(ScreenPtr pScreen, ScreenPtr new)
{
assert(new->isGPU);
assert(!new->is_offload_slave);
assert(new->current_master == pScreen);
new->is_offload_slave = TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,778 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int create_key_files(void)
{
sc_file_t *file;
int mod_lens[] = { 512, 768, 1024, 2048 };
int sizes[] = { 163, 243, 323, 643 };
int size = -1;
int r;
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(mod_lens) / sizeof(int); i++)
if (mod_lens[i] == opt_mod_length) {
size = sizes[i];
break;
}
if (size == -1) {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid modulus length.\n");
return 1;
}
if (verbose)
printf("Creating key files for %d keys.\n", opt_key_count);
file = sc_file_new();
if (!file) {
fprintf(stderr, "out of memory.\n");
return 1;
}
file->type = SC_FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF;
file->ef_structure = SC_FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT;
file->id = 0x0012;
file->size = opt_key_count * size + 3;
sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, SC_AC_OP_READ, SC_AC_NEVER, SC_AC_KEY_REF_NONE);
sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, SC_AC_OP_UPDATE, SC_AC_CHV, 1);
sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, SC_AC_OP_INVALIDATE, SC_AC_CHV, 1);
sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, SC_AC_OP_REHABILITATE, SC_AC_CHV, 1);
if (select_app_df()) {
sc_file_free(file);
return 1;
}
r = sc_create_file(card, file);
sc_file_free(file);
if (r) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unable to create private key file: %s\n", sc_strerror(r));
return 1;
}
file = sc_file_new();
if (!file) {
fprintf(stderr, "out of memory.\n");
return 1;
}
file->type = SC_FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF;
file->ef_structure = SC_FILE_EF_TRANSPARENT;
file->id = 0x1012;
file->size = opt_key_count * (size + 4) + 3;
sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, SC_AC_OP_READ, SC_AC_NONE, SC_AC_KEY_REF_NONE);
sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, SC_AC_OP_UPDATE, SC_AC_CHV, 1);
sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, SC_AC_OP_INVALIDATE, SC_AC_CHV, 1);
sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, SC_AC_OP_REHABILITATE, SC_AC_CHV, 1);
if (select_app_df()) {
sc_file_free(file);
return 1;
}
r = sc_create_file(card, file);
sc_file_free(file);
if (r) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unable to create public key file: %s\n", sc_strerror(r));
return 1;
}
if (verbose)
printf("Key files generated successfully.\n");
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds writes
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problems.
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 78,867 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio(handle_t *handle,
struct inode *inode,
struct ext4_map_blocks *map,
struct ext4_ext_path **ppath)
{
struct ext4_ext_path *path = *ppath;
struct ext4_extent *ex;
ext4_lblk_t ee_block;
unsigned int ee_len;
int depth;
int err = 0;
depth = ext_depth(inode);
ex = path[depth].p_ext;
ee_block = le32_to_cpu(ex->ee_block);
ee_len = ext4_ext_get_actual_len(ex);
ext_debug("ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio: inode %lu, logical"
"block %llu, max_blocks %u\n", inode->i_ino,
(unsigned long long)ee_block, ee_len);
/* If extent is larger than requested it is a clear sign that we still
* have some extent state machine issues left. So extent_split is still
* required.
* TODO: Once all related issues will be fixed this situation should be
* illegal.
*/
if (ee_block != map->m_lblk || ee_len > map->m_len) {
#ifdef EXT4_DEBUG
ext4_warning("Inode (%ld) finished: extent logical block %llu,"
" len %u; IO logical block %llu, len %u",
inode->i_ino, (unsigned long long)ee_block, ee_len,
(unsigned long long)map->m_lblk, map->m_len);
#endif
err = ext4_split_convert_extents(handle, inode, map, ppath,
EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CONVERT);
if (err < 0)
return err;
path = ext4_find_extent(inode, map->m_lblk, ppath, 0);
if (IS_ERR(path))
return PTR_ERR(path);
depth = ext_depth(inode);
ex = path[depth].p_ext;
}
err = ext4_ext_get_access(handle, inode, path + depth);
if (err)
goto out;
/* first mark the extent as initialized */
ext4_ext_mark_initialized(ex);
/* note: ext4_ext_correct_indexes() isn't needed here because
* borders are not changed
*/
ext4_ext_try_to_merge(handle, inode, path, ex);
/* Mark modified extent as dirty */
err = ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + path->p_depth);
out:
ext4_ext_show_leaf(inode, path);
return err;
}
Commit Message: ext4: zero out the unused memory region in the extent tree block
This commit zeroes out the unused memory region in the buffer_head
corresponding to the extent metablock after writing the extent header
and the corresponding extent node entries.
This is done to prevent random uninitialized data from getting into
the filesystem when the extent block is synced.
This fixes CVE-2019-11833.
Signed-off-by: Sriram Rajagopalan <sriramr@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 90,159 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: u64 kvm_read_l1_tsc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 host_tsc)
{
return kvm_x86_ops->read_l1_tsc(vcpu, kvm_scale_tsc(vcpu, host_tsc));
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Reload pit counters for all channels when restoring state
Currently if userspace restores the pit counters with a count of 0
on channels 1 or 2 and the guest attempts to read the count on those
channels, then KVM will perform a mod of 0 and crash. This will ensure
that 0 values are converted to 65536 as per the spec.
This is CVE-2015-7513.
Signed-off-by: Andy Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 57,743 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gfx::AcceleratedWidget Compositor::ReleaseAcceleratedWidget() {
DCHECK(!IsVisible());
host_->ReleaseLayerTreeFrameSink();
context_factory_->RemoveCompositor(this);
context_creation_weak_ptr_factory_.InvalidateWeakPtrs();
widget_valid_ = false;
gfx::AcceleratedWidget widget = widget_;
widget_ = gfx::kNullAcceleratedWidget;
return widget;
}
Commit Message: Fix PIP window being blank after minimize/show
DesktopWindowTreeHostX11::SetVisible only made the call into
OnNativeWidgetVisibilityChanged when transitioning from shown
to minimized and not vice versa. This is because this change
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1437263
considered IsVisible to be true when minimized, which made
IsVisible always true in this case. This caused layers to be hidden
but never shown again.
This is a reland of:
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1580103
Bug: 949199
Change-Id: I2151cd09e537d8ce8781897f43a3b8e9cec75996
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1584617
Reviewed-by: Scott Violet <sky@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: enne <enne@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654280}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 140,472 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void IOThread::ClearHostCache() {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
net::HostCache* host_cache = globals_->host_resolver->GetHostCache();
if (host_cache)
host_cache->clear();
}
Commit Message: Added daily UMA for non-data-reduction-proxy data usage when the proxy is enabled.
BUG=325325
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/106113002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@239897 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 113,500 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DragFromCenterBy(aura::Window* window, int dx, int dy) {
ui::test::EventGenerator generator(Shell::GetPrimaryRootWindow(), window);
generator.DragMouseBy(dx, dy);
}
Commit Message: cros: Enable some tests in //ash/wm in ash_unittests --mash
For the ones that fail, disable them via filter file instead of in the
code, per our disablement policy.
Bug: 698085, 695556, 698878, 698888, 698093, 698894
Test: ash_unittests --mash
Change-Id: Ic145ab6a95508968d6884d14fac2a3ca08888d26
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/752423
Commit-Queue: James Cook <jamescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Steven Bennetts <stevenjb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513836}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,304 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: qboolean FS_idPak(char *pak, char *base, int numPaks)
{
int i;
for ( i = 0; i < NUM_ID_PAKS; i++ ) {
if ( !FS_FilenameCompare( pak, va( "%s/pak%d", base, i ) ) ) {
break;
}
if ( !FS_FilenameCompare( pak, va( "%s/mp_pak%d",base,i ) ) ) {
break;
}
if ( !FS_FilenameCompare( pak, va( "%s/sp_pak%d",base,i + 1) ) ) {
break;
}
}
if ( i < numPaks ) {
return qtrue;
}
return qfalse;
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 95,936 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void gcm_hash_crypt_remain_done(struct crypto_async_request *areq,
int err)
{
struct aead_request *req = areq->data;
__gcm_hash_crypt_remain_done(req, err);
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 45,776 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OnCallback(mojom::PdfCompositor::Status status,
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferHandle handle) {
if (status == mojom::PdfCompositor::Status::SUCCESS)
CallbackOnSuccess(handle.get());
else
CallbackOnError(status);
run_loop_->Quit();
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 149,173 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int add_to_include_set(struct include_data *data,
const unsigned char *sha1,
int bitmap_pos)
{
khiter_t hash_pos;
if (data->seen && bitmap_get(data->seen, bitmap_pos))
return 0;
if (bitmap_get(data->base, bitmap_pos))
return 0;
hash_pos = kh_get_sha1(bitmap_git.bitmaps, sha1);
if (hash_pos < kh_end(bitmap_git.bitmaps)) {
struct stored_bitmap *st = kh_value(bitmap_git.bitmaps, hash_pos);
bitmap_or_ewah(data->base, lookup_stored_bitmap(st));
return 0;
}
bitmap_set(data->base, bitmap_pos);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 54,921 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(unsigned long *msr_bitmap,
u32 msr, int type)
{
int f = sizeof(unsigned long);
if (!cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap())
return;
/*
* See Intel PRM Vol. 3, 20.6.9 (MSR-Bitmap Address). Early manuals
* have the write-low and read-high bitmap offsets the wrong way round.
* We can control MSRs 0x00000000-0x00001fff and 0xc0000000-0xc0001fff.
*/
if (msr <= 0x1fff) {
if (type & MSR_TYPE_R)
/* read-low */
__set_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x000 / f);
if (type & MSR_TYPE_W)
/* write-low */
__set_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x800 / f);
} else if ((msr >= 0xc0000000) && (msr <= 0xc0001fff)) {
msr &= 0x1fff;
if (type & MSR_TYPE_R)
/* read-high */
__set_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x400 / f);
if (type & MSR_TYPE_W)
/* write-high */
__set_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0xc00 / f);
}
}
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 36,979 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RunLoopTestEnvironment(RunLoopTestType type) {
switch (type) {
case RunLoopTestType::kRealEnvironment:
task_environment_ = base::MakeUnique<test::ScopedTaskEnvironment>();
break;
case RunLoopTestType::kTestDelegate:
test_delegate_ = base::MakeUnique<TestDelegate>();
test_delegate_->BindToCurrentThread();
break;
}
}
Commit Message: Introduce RunLoop::Type::NESTABLE_TASKS_ALLOWED to replace MessageLoop::ScopedNestableTaskAllower.
(as well as MessageLoop::SetNestableTasksAllowed())
Surveying usage: the scoped object is always instantiated right before
RunLoop().Run(). The intent is really to allow nestable tasks in that
RunLoop so it's better to explicitly label that RunLoop as such and it
allows us to break the last dependency that forced some RunLoop users
to use MessageLoop APIs.
There's also the odd case of allowing nestable tasks for loops that are
reentrant from a native task (without going through RunLoop), these
are the minority but will have to be handled (after cleaning up the
majority of cases that are RunLoop induced).
As highlighted by robliao@ in https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/600517
(which was merged in this CL).
R=danakj@chromium.org
Bug: 750779
Change-Id: I43d122c93ec903cff3a6fe7b77ec461ea0656448
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/594713
Commit-Queue: Gabriel Charette <gab@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Liao <robliao@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: danakj <danakj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492263}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,601 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool IsOnlySiblingWithTagName(Element* element) {
DCHECK(element);
return (1U == NthIndexCache::NthOfTypeIndex(*element)) &&
(1U == NthIndexCache::NthLastOfTypeIndex(*element));
}
Commit Message: Consider scroll-padding when determining scroll anchor node
Scroll anchoring should not anchor to a node that is behind scroll
padding.
Bug: 1010002
Change-Id: Icbd89fb85ea2c97a6de635930a9896f6a87b8f07
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1887745
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nick Burris <nburris@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#711020}
CWE ID: | 0 | 136,984 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_vdec::set_parameter(OMX_IN OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp,
OMX_IN OMX_INDEXTYPE paramIndex,
OMX_IN OMX_PTR paramData)
{
OMX_ERRORTYPE eRet = OMX_ErrorNone;
int ret=0;
struct v4l2_format fmt;
#ifdef _ANDROID_
char property_value[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX] = {0};
#endif
if (m_state == OMX_StateInvalid) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Set Param in Invalid State");
return OMX_ErrorInvalidState;
}
if (paramData == NULL) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Get Param in Invalid paramData");
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if ((m_state != OMX_StateLoaded) &&
BITMASK_ABSENT(&m_flags,OMX_COMPONENT_OUTPUT_ENABLE_PENDING) &&
(m_out_bEnabled == OMX_TRUE) &&
BITMASK_ABSENT(&m_flags, OMX_COMPONENT_INPUT_ENABLE_PENDING) &&
(m_inp_bEnabled == OMX_TRUE)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Set Param in Invalid State");
return OMX_ErrorIncorrectStateOperation;
}
switch ((unsigned long)paramIndex) {
case OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition: {
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE);
OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *portDefn;
portDefn = (OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *) paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition H= %d, W = %d",
(int)portDefn->format.video.nFrameHeight,
(int)portDefn->format.video.nFrameWidth);
if (OMX_DirOutput == portDefn->eDir) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition OP port");
bool port_format_changed = false;
m_display_id = portDefn->format.video.pNativeWindow;
unsigned int buffer_size;
/* update output port resolution with client supplied dimensions
in case scaling is enabled, else it follows input resolution set
*/
if (is_down_scalar_enabled) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("SetParam OP: WxH(%u x %u)",
(unsigned int)portDefn->format.video.nFrameWidth,
(unsigned int)portDefn->format.video.nFrameHeight);
if (portDefn->format.video.nFrameHeight != 0x0 &&
portDefn->format.video.nFrameWidth != 0x0) {
memset(&fmt, 0x0, sizeof(struct v4l2_format));
fmt.type = V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_CAPTURE_MPLANE;
fmt.fmt.pix_mp.pixelformat = capture_capability;
ret = ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_G_FMT, &fmt);
if (ret) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Get Resolution failed");
eRet = OMX_ErrorHardware;
break;
}
if ((portDefn->format.video.nFrameHeight != (unsigned int)fmt.fmt.pix_mp.height) ||
(portDefn->format.video.nFrameWidth != (unsigned int)fmt.fmt.pix_mp.width)) {
port_format_changed = true;
}
update_resolution(portDefn->format.video.nFrameWidth,
portDefn->format.video.nFrameHeight,
portDefn->format.video.nFrameWidth,
portDefn->format.video.nFrameHeight);
/* set crop info */
rectangle.nLeft = 0;
rectangle.nTop = 0;
rectangle.nWidth = portDefn->format.video.nFrameWidth;
rectangle.nHeight = portDefn->format.video.nFrameHeight;
eRet = is_video_session_supported();
if (eRet)
break;
memset(&fmt, 0x0, sizeof(struct v4l2_format));
fmt.type = V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_CAPTURE_MPLANE;
fmt.fmt.pix_mp.height = drv_ctx.video_resolution.frame_height;
fmt.fmt.pix_mp.width = drv_ctx.video_resolution.frame_width;
fmt.fmt.pix_mp.pixelformat = capture_capability;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("fmt.fmt.pix_mp.height = %d , fmt.fmt.pix_mp.width = %d",
fmt.fmt.pix_mp.height, fmt.fmt.pix_mp.width);
ret = ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_FMT, &fmt);
if (ret) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Set Resolution failed");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
} else
eRet = get_buffer_req(&drv_ctx.op_buf);
}
if (eRet) {
break;
}
if (secure_mode) {
struct v4l2_control control;
control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_SECURE_SCALING_THRESHOLD;
if (ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_G_CTRL, &control) < 0) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed getting secure scaling threshold : %d, id was : %x", errno, control.id);
eRet = OMX_ErrorHardware;
} else {
/* This is a workaround for a bug in fw which uses stride
* and slice instead of width and height to check against
* the threshold.
*/
OMX_U32 stride, slice;
if (drv_ctx.output_format == VDEC_YUV_FORMAT_NV12) {
stride = VENUS_Y_STRIDE(COLOR_FMT_NV12, portDefn->format.video.nFrameWidth);
slice = VENUS_Y_SCANLINES(COLOR_FMT_NV12, portDefn->format.video.nFrameHeight);
} else {
stride = portDefn->format.video.nFrameWidth;
slice = portDefn->format.video.nFrameHeight;
}
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Stride is %d, slice is %d, sxs is %d\n", stride, slice, stride * slice);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Threshold value is %d\n", control.value);
if (stride * slice <= (OMX_U32)control.value) {
secure_scaling_to_non_secure_opb = true;
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("Enabling secure scalar out of CPZ");
control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_NON_SECURE_OUTPUT2;
control.value = 1;
if (ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_CTRL, &control) < 0) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Enabling non-secure output2 failed");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
}
}
}
}
if (eRet) {
break;
}
if (portDefn->nBufferCountActual > MAX_NUM_INPUT_OUTPUT_BUFFERS) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Requested o/p buf count (%u) exceeds limit (%u)",
portDefn->nBufferCountActual, MAX_NUM_INPUT_OUTPUT_BUFFERS);
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
} else if (!client_buffers.get_buffer_req(buffer_size)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Error in getting buffer requirements");
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
} else if (!port_format_changed) {
if (!release_output_done()) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Cannot change o/p buffer count since all buffers are not freed yet !");
eRet = OMX_ErrorInvalidState;
break;
}
if ( portDefn->nBufferCountActual >= drv_ctx.op_buf.mincount &&
portDefn->nBufferSize >= drv_ctx.op_buf.buffer_size ) {
drv_ctx.op_buf.actualcount = portDefn->nBufferCountActual;
drv_ctx.op_buf.buffer_size = portDefn->nBufferSize;
drv_ctx.extradata_info.count = drv_ctx.op_buf.actualcount;
drv_ctx.extradata_info.size = drv_ctx.extradata_info.count *
drv_ctx.extradata_info.buffer_size;
eRet = set_buffer_req(&drv_ctx.op_buf);
if (eRet == OMX_ErrorNone)
m_port_def = *portDefn;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: OP Requirements(#%d: %u) Requested(#%u: %u)",
drv_ctx.op_buf.mincount, (unsigned int)drv_ctx.op_buf.buffer_size,
(unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferCountActual, (unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferSize);
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
}
} else if (OMX_DirInput == portDefn->eDir) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition IP port");
bool port_format_changed = false;
if ((portDefn->format.video.xFramerate >> 16) > 0 &&
(portDefn->format.video.xFramerate >> 16) <= MAX_SUPPORTED_FPS) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("set_parameter: frame rate set by omx client : %u",
(unsigned int)portDefn->format.video.xFramerate >> 16);
Q16ToFraction(portDefn->format.video.xFramerate, drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_numerator,
drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_denominator);
if (!drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_numerator) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Numerator is zero setting to 30");
drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_numerator = 30;
}
if (drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_denominator)
drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_numerator = (int)
drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_numerator / drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_denominator;
drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_denominator = 1;
frm_int = drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_denominator * 1e6 /
drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_numerator;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: frm_int(%u) fps(%.2f)",
(unsigned int)frm_int, drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_numerator /
(float)drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_denominator);
struct v4l2_outputparm oparm;
/*XXX: we're providing timing info as seconds per frame rather than frames
* per second.*/
oparm.timeperframe.numerator = drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_denominator;
oparm.timeperframe.denominator = drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_numerator;
struct v4l2_streamparm sparm;
sparm.type = V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_OUTPUT_MPLANE;
sparm.parm.output = oparm;
if (ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_PARM, &sparm)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Unable to convey fps info to driver, performance might be affected");
eRet = OMX_ErrorHardware;
break;
}
}
if (drv_ctx.video_resolution.frame_height !=
portDefn->format.video.nFrameHeight ||
drv_ctx.video_resolution.frame_width !=
portDefn->format.video.nFrameWidth) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("SetParam IP: WxH(%u x %u)",
(unsigned int)portDefn->format.video.nFrameWidth,
(unsigned int)portDefn->format.video.nFrameHeight);
port_format_changed = true;
OMX_U32 frameWidth = portDefn->format.video.nFrameWidth;
OMX_U32 frameHeight = portDefn->format.video.nFrameHeight;
if (frameHeight != 0x0 && frameWidth != 0x0) {
if (m_smoothstreaming_mode &&
((frameWidth * frameHeight) <
(m_smoothstreaming_width * m_smoothstreaming_height))) {
frameWidth = m_smoothstreaming_width;
frameHeight = m_smoothstreaming_height;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("NOTE: Setting resolution %u x %u "
"for adaptive-playback/smooth-streaming",
(unsigned int)frameWidth, (unsigned int)frameHeight);
}
update_resolution(frameWidth, frameHeight,
frameWidth, frameHeight);
eRet = is_video_session_supported();
if (eRet)
break;
memset(&fmt, 0x0, sizeof(struct v4l2_format));
fmt.type = V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_OUTPUT_MPLANE;
fmt.fmt.pix_mp.height = drv_ctx.video_resolution.frame_height;
fmt.fmt.pix_mp.width = drv_ctx.video_resolution.frame_width;
fmt.fmt.pix_mp.pixelformat = output_capability;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("fmt.fmt.pix_mp.height = %d , fmt.fmt.pix_mp.width = %d",fmt.fmt.pix_mp.height,fmt.fmt.pix_mp.width);
ret = ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_FMT, &fmt);
if (ret) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Set Resolution failed");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
} else {
if (!is_down_scalar_enabled)
eRet = get_buffer_req(&drv_ctx.op_buf);
}
}
}
if (m_custom_buffersize.input_buffersize
&& (portDefn->nBufferSize > m_custom_buffersize.input_buffersize)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Custom buffer size set by client: %d, trying to set: %d",
m_custom_buffersize.input_buffersize, portDefn->nBufferSize);
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
break;
}
if (portDefn->nBufferCountActual > MAX_NUM_INPUT_OUTPUT_BUFFERS) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Requested i/p buf count (%u) exceeds limit (%u)",
portDefn->nBufferCountActual, MAX_NUM_INPUT_OUTPUT_BUFFERS);
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
break;
}
if (!release_input_done()) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Cannot change i/p buffer count since all buffers are not freed yet !");
eRet = OMX_ErrorInvalidState;
break;
}
if (portDefn->nBufferCountActual >= drv_ctx.ip_buf.mincount
|| portDefn->nBufferSize != drv_ctx.ip_buf.buffer_size) {
port_format_changed = true;
vdec_allocatorproperty *buffer_prop = &drv_ctx.ip_buf;
drv_ctx.ip_buf.actualcount = portDefn->nBufferCountActual;
drv_ctx.ip_buf.buffer_size = (portDefn->nBufferSize + buffer_prop->alignment - 1) &
(~(buffer_prop->alignment - 1));
eRet = set_buffer_req(buffer_prop);
}
if (false == port_format_changed) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: IP Requirements(#%d: %u) Requested(#%u: %u)",
drv_ctx.ip_buf.mincount, (unsigned int)drv_ctx.ip_buf.buffer_size,
(unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferCountActual, (unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferSize);
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
} else if (portDefn->eDir == OMX_DirMax) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR(" Set_parameter: Bad Port idx %d",
(int)portDefn->nPortIndex);
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
}
break;
case OMX_IndexParamVideoPortFormat: {
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE);
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *portFmt =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *)paramData;
int ret=0;
struct v4l2_format fmt;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoPortFormat 0x%x, port: %u",
portFmt->eColorFormat, (unsigned int)portFmt->nPortIndex);
memset(&fmt, 0x0, sizeof(struct v4l2_format));
if (1 == portFmt->nPortIndex) {
fmt.type = V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_CAPTURE_MPLANE;
fmt.fmt.pix_mp.height = drv_ctx.video_resolution.frame_height;
fmt.fmt.pix_mp.width = drv_ctx.video_resolution.frame_width;
fmt.fmt.pix_mp.pixelformat = capture_capability;
enum vdec_output_fromat op_format;
if (portFmt->eColorFormat == (OMX_COLOR_FORMATTYPE)
QOMX_COLOR_FORMATYUV420PackedSemiPlanar32m ||
portFmt->eColorFormat == (OMX_COLOR_FORMATTYPE)
QOMX_COLOR_FORMATYUV420PackedSemiPlanar32mMultiView ||
portFmt->eColorFormat == OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420Planar ||
portFmt->eColorFormat == OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420SemiPlanar)
op_format = (enum vdec_output_fromat)VDEC_YUV_FORMAT_NV12;
else
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
if (eRet == OMX_ErrorNone) {
drv_ctx.output_format = op_format;
ret = ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_FMT, &fmt);
if (ret) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Set output format failed");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
/*TODO: How to handle this case */
} else {
eRet = get_buffer_req(&drv_ctx.op_buf);
}
}
if (eRet == OMX_ErrorNone) {
if (!client_buffers.set_color_format(portFmt->eColorFormat)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Set color format failed");
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
}
}
}
break;
case OMX_QcomIndexPortDefn: {
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_QCOM_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE);
OMX_QCOM_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *portFmt =
(OMX_QCOM_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *) paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexQcomParamPortDefinitionType %u",
(unsigned int)portFmt->nFramePackingFormat);
/* Input port */
if (portFmt->nPortIndex == 0) {
if (portFmt->nFramePackingFormat == OMX_QCOM_FramePacking_Arbitrary) {
if (secure_mode) {
arbitrary_bytes = false;
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("setparameter: cannot set to arbitary bytes mode in secure session");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
} else {
arbitrary_bytes = true;
}
} else if (portFmt->nFramePackingFormat ==
OMX_QCOM_FramePacking_OnlyOneCompleteFrame) {
arbitrary_bytes = false;
#ifdef _ANDROID_
property_get("vidc.dec.debug.arbitrarybytes.mode", property_value, "0");
if (atoi(property_value)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("arbitrary_bytes enabled via property command");
arbitrary_bytes = true;
}
#endif
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Setparameter: unknown FramePacking format %u",
(unsigned int)portFmt->nFramePackingFormat);
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else if (portFmt->nPortIndex == OMX_CORE_OUTPUT_PORT_INDEX) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("set_parameter: OMX_IndexQcomParamPortDefinitionType OP Port");
if ( (portFmt->nMemRegion > OMX_QCOM_MemRegionInvalid &&
portFmt->nMemRegion < OMX_QCOM_MemRegionMax) &&
portFmt->nCacheAttr == OMX_QCOM_CacheAttrNone) {
m_out_mem_region_smi = OMX_TRUE;
if ((m_out_mem_region_smi && m_out_pvt_entry_pmem)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("set_parameter: OMX_IndexQcomParamPortDefinitionType OP Port: out pmem set");
m_use_output_pmem = OMX_TRUE;
}
}
}
}
break;
case OMX_IndexParamStandardComponentRole: {
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE);
OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *comp_role;
comp_role = (OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *) paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamStandardComponentRole %s",
comp_role->cRole);
if ((m_state == OMX_StateLoaded)&&
!BITMASK_PRESENT(&m_flags,OMX_COMPONENT_IDLE_PENDING)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Set Parameter called in valid state");
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Set Parameter called in Invalid State");
return OMX_ErrorIncorrectStateOperation;
}
if (!strncmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.avc",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if (!strncmp((char*)comp_role->cRole,"video_decoder.avc",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
strlcpy((char*)m_cRole,"video_decoder.avc",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Setparameter: unknown Index %s", comp_role->cRole);
eRet =OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else if (!strncmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.mvc", OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if (!strncmp((char*)comp_role->cRole, "video_decoder.mvc", OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
strlcpy((char*)m_cRole, "video_decoder.mvc", OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Setparameter: unknown Index %s", comp_role->cRole);
eRet =OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else if (!strncmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.mpeg4",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if (!strncmp((const char*)comp_role->cRole,"video_decoder.mpeg4",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
strlcpy((char*)m_cRole,"video_decoder.mpeg4",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Setparameter: unknown Index %s", comp_role->cRole);
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else if (!strncmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.h263",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if (!strncmp((const char*)comp_role->cRole,"video_decoder.h263",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
strlcpy((char*)m_cRole,"video_decoder.h263",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Setparameter: unknown Index %s", comp_role->cRole);
eRet =OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else if (!strncmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.mpeg2",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if (!strncmp((const char*)comp_role->cRole,"video_decoder.mpeg2",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
strlcpy((char*)m_cRole,"video_decoder.mpeg2",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Setparameter: unknown Index %s", comp_role->cRole);
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else if ((!strncmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.divx",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) ||
(!strncmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.divx311", OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) ||
(!strncmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.divx4", OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE))
) {
if (!strncmp((const char*)comp_role->cRole,"video_decoder.divx",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
strlcpy((char*)m_cRole,"video_decoder.divx",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Setparameter: unknown Index %s", comp_role->cRole);
eRet =OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else if ( (!strncmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.vc1",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) ||
(!strncmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.wmv",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE))
) {
if (!strncmp((const char*)comp_role->cRole,"video_decoder.vc1",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
strlcpy((char*)m_cRole,"video_decoder.vc1",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Setparameter: unknown Index %s", comp_role->cRole);
eRet =OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else if (!strncmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.vp8",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if (!strncmp((const char*)comp_role->cRole,"video_decoder.vp8",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE) ||
(!strncmp((const char*)comp_role->cRole,"video_decoder.vpx",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE))) {
strlcpy((char*)m_cRole,"video_decoder.vp8",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Setparameter: unknown Index %s", comp_role->cRole);
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else if (!strncmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.hevc", OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if (!strncmp((const char*)comp_role->cRole, "video_decoder.hevc", OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
strlcpy((char*)m_cRole, "video_decoder.hevc", OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Setparameter: unknown Index %s", comp_role->cRole);
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Setparameter: unknown param %s", drv_ctx.kind);
eRet = OMX_ErrorInvalidComponentName;
}
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamPriorityMgmt: {
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_PRIORITYMGMTTYPE);
if (m_state != OMX_StateLoaded) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Set Parameter called in Invalid State");
return OMX_ErrorIncorrectStateOperation;
}
OMX_PRIORITYMGMTTYPE *priorityMgmtype = (OMX_PRIORITYMGMTTYPE*) paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamPriorityMgmt %u",
(unsigned int)priorityMgmtype->nGroupID);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: priorityMgmtype %u",
(unsigned int)priorityMgmtype->nGroupPriority);
m_priority_mgm.nGroupID = priorityMgmtype->nGroupID;
m_priority_mgm.nGroupPriority = priorityMgmtype->nGroupPriority;
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamCompBufferSupplier: {
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_PARAM_BUFFERSUPPLIERTYPE);
OMX_PARAM_BUFFERSUPPLIERTYPE *bufferSupplierType = (OMX_PARAM_BUFFERSUPPLIERTYPE*) paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamCompBufferSupplier %d",
bufferSupplierType->eBufferSupplier);
if (bufferSupplierType->nPortIndex == 0 || bufferSupplierType->nPortIndex ==1)
m_buffer_supplier.eBufferSupplier = bufferSupplierType->eBufferSupplier;
else
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoAvc: {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoAvc %d",
paramIndex);
break;
}
case (OMX_INDEXTYPE)QOMX_IndexParamVideoMvc: {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: QOMX_IndexParamVideoMvc %d",
paramIndex);
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoH263: {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoH263 %d",
paramIndex);
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoMpeg4: {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoMpeg4 %d",
paramIndex);
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoMpeg2: {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoMpeg2 %d",
paramIndex);
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoDecoderPictureOrder: {
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, QOMX_VIDEO_DECODER_PICTURE_ORDER);
QOMX_VIDEO_DECODER_PICTURE_ORDER *pictureOrder =
(QOMX_VIDEO_DECODER_PICTURE_ORDER *)paramData;
struct v4l2_control control;
int pic_order,rc=0;
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("set_parameter: OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoDecoderPictureOrder %d",
pictureOrder->eOutputPictureOrder);
if (pictureOrder->eOutputPictureOrder == QOMX_VIDEO_DISPLAY_ORDER) {
pic_order = V4L2_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_OUTPUT_ORDER_DISPLAY;
} else if (pictureOrder->eOutputPictureOrder == QOMX_VIDEO_DECODE_ORDER) {
pic_order = V4L2_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_OUTPUT_ORDER_DECODE;
time_stamp_dts.set_timestamp_reorder_mode(false);
} else
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
if (eRet == OMX_ErrorNone) {
control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_OUTPUT_ORDER;
control.value = pic_order;
rc = ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_CTRL, &control);
if (rc) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Set picture order failed");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexParamConcealMBMapExtraData:
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, QOMX_ENABLETYPE);
eRet = enable_extradata(VDEC_EXTRADATA_MB_ERROR_MAP, false,
((QOMX_ENABLETYPE *)paramData)->bEnable);
break;
case OMX_QcomIndexParamFrameInfoExtraData:
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, QOMX_ENABLETYPE);
eRet = enable_extradata(OMX_FRAMEINFO_EXTRADATA, false,
((QOMX_ENABLETYPE *)paramData)->bEnable);
break;
case OMX_ExtraDataFrameDimension:
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, QOMX_ENABLETYPE);
eRet = enable_extradata(OMX_FRAMEDIMENSION_EXTRADATA, false,
((QOMX_ENABLETYPE *)paramData)->bEnable);
break;
case OMX_QcomIndexParamInterlaceExtraData:
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, QOMX_ENABLETYPE);
eRet = enable_extradata(OMX_INTERLACE_EXTRADATA, false,
((QOMX_ENABLETYPE *)paramData)->bEnable);
break;
case OMX_QcomIndexParamH264TimeInfo:
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, QOMX_ENABLETYPE);
eRet = enable_extradata(OMX_TIMEINFO_EXTRADATA, false,
((QOMX_ENABLETYPE *)paramData)->bEnable);
break;
case OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoFramePackingExtradata:
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, QOMX_ENABLETYPE);
eRet = enable_extradata(OMX_FRAMEPACK_EXTRADATA, false,
((QOMX_ENABLETYPE *)paramData)->bEnable);
break;
case OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoQPExtraData:
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, QOMX_ENABLETYPE);
eRet = enable_extradata(OMX_QP_EXTRADATA, false,
((QOMX_ENABLETYPE *)paramData)->bEnable);
break;
case OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoInputBitsInfoExtraData:
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, QOMX_ENABLETYPE);
eRet = enable_extradata(OMX_BITSINFO_EXTRADATA, false,
((QOMX_ENABLETYPE *)paramData)->bEnable);
break;
case OMX_QcomIndexEnableExtnUserData:
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, QOMX_ENABLETYPE);
eRet = enable_extradata(OMX_EXTNUSER_EXTRADATA, false,
((QOMX_ENABLETYPE *)paramData)->bEnable);
break;
case OMX_QcomIndexParamMpeg2SeqDispExtraData:
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, QOMX_ENABLETYPE);
eRet = enable_extradata(OMX_MPEG2SEQDISP_EXTRADATA, false,
((QOMX_ENABLETYPE *)paramData)->bEnable);
break;
case OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoDivx: {
QOMX_VIDEO_PARAM_DIVXTYPE* divXType = (QOMX_VIDEO_PARAM_DIVXTYPE *) paramData;
}
break;
case OMX_QcomIndexPlatformPvt: {
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_QCOM_PLATFORMPRIVATE_EXTN);
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("set_parameter: OMX_QcomIndexPlatformPvt OP Port");
OMX_QCOM_PLATFORMPRIVATE_EXTN* entryType = (OMX_QCOM_PLATFORMPRIVATE_EXTN *) paramData;
if (entryType->type != OMX_QCOM_PLATFORM_PRIVATE_PMEM) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("set_parameter: Platform Private entry type (%d) not supported.", entryType->type);
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
} else {
m_out_pvt_entry_pmem = OMX_TRUE;
if ((m_out_mem_region_smi && m_out_pvt_entry_pmem)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("set_parameter: OMX_QcomIndexPlatformPvt OP Port: out pmem set");
m_use_output_pmem = OMX_TRUE;
}
}
}
break;
case OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoSyncFrameDecodingMode: {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("set_parameter: OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoSyncFrameDecodingMode");
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("set idr only decoding for thumbnail mode");
struct v4l2_control control;
int rc;
drv_ctx.idr_only_decoding = 1;
control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_OUTPUT_ORDER;
control.value = V4L2_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_OUTPUT_ORDER_DECODE;
rc = ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_CTRL, &control);
if (rc) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Set picture order failed");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
} else {
control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_SYNC_FRAME_DECODE;
control.value = V4L2_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_SYNC_FRAME_DECODE_ENABLE;
rc = ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_CTRL, &control);
if (rc) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Sync frame setting failed");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
/*Setting sync frame decoding on driver might change buffer
* requirements so update them here*/
if (get_buffer_req(&drv_ctx.ip_buf)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Sync frame setting failed: falied to get buffer i/p requirements");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
if (get_buffer_req(&drv_ctx.op_buf)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Sync frame setting failed: falied to get buffer o/p requirements");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
}
}
break;
case OMX_QcomIndexParamIndexExtraDataType: {
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, QOMX_INDEXEXTRADATATYPE);
QOMX_INDEXEXTRADATATYPE *extradataIndexType = (QOMX_INDEXEXTRADATATYPE *) paramData;
if ((extradataIndexType->nIndex == OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition) &&
(extradataIndexType->bEnabled == OMX_TRUE) &&
(extradataIndexType->nPortIndex == 1)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("set_parameter: OMX_QcomIndexParamIndexExtraDataType SmoothStreaming");
eRet = enable_extradata(OMX_PORTDEF_EXTRADATA, false, extradataIndexType->bEnabled);
}
}
break;
case OMX_QcomIndexParamEnableSmoothStreaming: {
#ifndef SMOOTH_STREAMING_DISABLED
eRet = enable_smoothstreaming();
#else
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
#endif
}
break;
#if defined (_ANDROID_HONEYCOMB_) || defined (_ANDROID_ICS_)
/* Need to allow following two set_parameters even in Idle
* state. This is ANDROID architecture which is not in sync
* with openmax standard. */
case OMX_GoogleAndroidIndexEnableAndroidNativeBuffers: {
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, EnableAndroidNativeBuffersParams);
EnableAndroidNativeBuffersParams* enableNativeBuffers = (EnableAndroidNativeBuffersParams *) paramData;
if (enableNativeBuffers) {
m_enable_android_native_buffers = enableNativeBuffers->enable;
}
#if !defined(FLEXYUV_SUPPORTED)
if (m_enable_android_native_buffers) {
if(!client_buffers.set_color_format(getPreferredColorFormatDefaultMode(0))) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed to set native color format!");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
}
#endif
}
break;
case OMX_GoogleAndroidIndexUseAndroidNativeBuffer: {
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, UseAndroidNativeBufferParams);
eRet = use_android_native_buffer(hComp, paramData);
}
break;
#endif
case OMX_QcomIndexParamEnableTimeStampReorder: {
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, QOMX_INDEXTIMESTAMPREORDER);
QOMX_INDEXTIMESTAMPREORDER *reorder = (QOMX_INDEXTIMESTAMPREORDER *)paramData;
if (drv_ctx.picture_order == (vdec_output_order)QOMX_VIDEO_DISPLAY_ORDER) {
if (reorder->bEnable == OMX_TRUE) {
frm_int =0;
time_stamp_dts.set_timestamp_reorder_mode(true);
} else
time_stamp_dts.set_timestamp_reorder_mode(false);
} else {
time_stamp_dts.set_timestamp_reorder_mode(false);
if (reorder->bEnable == OMX_TRUE) {
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
}
}
break;
case OMX_IndexParamVideoProfileLevelCurrent: {
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PROFILELEVELTYPE);
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PROFILELEVELTYPE* pParam =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PROFILELEVELTYPE*)paramData;
if (pParam) {
m_profile_lvl.eProfile = pParam->eProfile;
m_profile_lvl.eLevel = pParam->eLevel;
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoMetaBufferMode:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, StoreMetaDataInBuffersParams);
StoreMetaDataInBuffersParams *metabuffer =
(StoreMetaDataInBuffersParams *)paramData;
if (!metabuffer) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Invalid param: %p", metabuffer);
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
break;
}
if (m_disable_dynamic_buf_mode) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("Dynamic buffer mode disabled by setprop");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
break;
}
if (metabuffer->nPortIndex == OMX_CORE_OUTPUT_PORT_INDEX) {
struct v4l2_control control;
struct v4l2_format fmt;
control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_ALLOC_MODE_OUTPUT;
if (metabuffer->bStoreMetaData == true) {
control.value = V4L2_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_DYNAMIC;
} else {
control.value = V4L2_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_STATIC;
}
int rc = ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_CTRL,&control);
if (!rc) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("%s buffer mode",
(metabuffer->bStoreMetaData == true)? "Enabled dynamic" : "Disabled dynamic");
dynamic_buf_mode = metabuffer->bStoreMetaData;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed to %s buffer mode",
(metabuffer->bStoreMetaData == true)? "enable dynamic" : "disable dynamic");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR(
"OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoMetaBufferMode not supported for port: %u",
(unsigned int)metabuffer->nPortIndex);
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoDownScalar:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, QOMX_INDEXDOWNSCALAR);
QOMX_INDEXDOWNSCALAR* pParam = (QOMX_INDEXDOWNSCALAR*)paramData;
struct v4l2_control control;
int rc;
if (pParam) {
is_down_scalar_enabled = pParam->bEnable;
if (is_down_scalar_enabled) {
control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_STREAM_OUTPUT_MODE;
control.value = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_STREAM_OUTPUT_SECONDARY;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoDownScalar value = %d", pParam->bEnable);
rc = ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_CTRL, &control);
if (rc < 0) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed to set down scalar on driver.");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_KEEP_ASPECT_RATIO;
control.value = 1;
rc = ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_CTRL, &control);
if (rc < 0) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed to set keep aspect ratio on driver.");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
}
}
break;
}
#ifdef ADAPTIVE_PLAYBACK_SUPPORTED
case OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoAdaptivePlaybackMode:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, PrepareForAdaptivePlaybackParams);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_GoogleAndroidIndexPrepareForAdaptivePlayback");
PrepareForAdaptivePlaybackParams* pParams =
(PrepareForAdaptivePlaybackParams *) paramData;
if (pParams->nPortIndex == OMX_CORE_OUTPUT_PORT_INDEX) {
if (!pParams->bEnable) {
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
if (pParams->nMaxFrameWidth > maxSmoothStreamingWidth
|| pParams->nMaxFrameHeight > maxSmoothStreamingHeight) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR(
"Adaptive playback request exceeds max supported resolution : [%u x %u] vs [%u x %u]",
(unsigned int)pParams->nMaxFrameWidth, (unsigned int)pParams->nMaxFrameHeight,
(unsigned int)maxSmoothStreamingWidth, (unsigned int)maxSmoothStreamingHeight);
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
} else {
eRet = enable_adaptive_playback(pParams->nMaxFrameWidth, pParams->nMaxFrameHeight);
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR(
"Prepare for adaptive playback supported only on output port");
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
break;
}
#endif
case OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoCustomBufferSize:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, QOMX_VIDEO_CUSTOM_BUFFERSIZE);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoCustomBufferSize");
QOMX_VIDEO_CUSTOM_BUFFERSIZE* pParam = (QOMX_VIDEO_CUSTOM_BUFFERSIZE*)paramData;
if (pParam->nPortIndex == OMX_CORE_INPUT_PORT_INDEX) {
struct v4l2_control control;
control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_BUFFER_SIZE_LIMIT;
control.value = pParam->nBufferSize;
if (ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_CTRL, &control)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed to set input buffer size");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
} else {
eRet = get_buffer_req(&drv_ctx.ip_buf);
if (eRet == OMX_ErrorNone) {
m_custom_buffersize.input_buffersize = drv_ctx.ip_buf.buffer_size;
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("Successfully set custom input buffer size = %d",
m_custom_buffersize.input_buffersize);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed to get buffer requirement");
}
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Custom buffer size in not supported on output port");
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
break;
}
default: {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Setparameter: unknown param %d", paramIndex);
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
}
}
if (eRet != OMX_ErrorNone)
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("set_parameter: Error: 0x%x, setting param 0x%x", eRet, paramIndex);
return eRet;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: vdec: Avoid processing ETBs/FTBs in invalid states
(per the spec) ETB/FTB should not be handled in states other than
Executing, Paused and Idle. This avoids accessing invalid buffers.
Also add a lock to protect the private-buffers from being deleted
while accessing from another thread.
Bug: 27890802
Security Vulnerability - Heap Use-After-Free and Possible LPE in
MediaServer (libOmxVdec problem #6)
CRs-Fixed: 1008882
Change-Id: Iaac2e383cd53cf9cf8042c9ed93ddc76dba3907e
CWE ID: | 0 | 160,329 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebPage::clearCurrentInputField()
{
if (d->m_page->defersLoading())
return;
d->m_inputHandler->clearField();
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,138 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void update_load_avg(struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq, struct sched_entity *se, int not_used1)
{
cfs_rq_util_change(cfs_rq, 0);
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 92,756 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: float GM2TabStyle::GetHoverOpacity() const {
const float range_start = float{GetStandardWidth()};
const float range_end = float{GetMinimumInactiveWidth()};
const float value_in_range = float{tab_->width()};
const float t = (value_in_range - range_start) / (range_end - range_start);
return tab_->controller()->GetHoverOpacityForTab(t * t);
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 140,824 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned LoadWPG2Flags(Image *image,char Precision,float *Angle,tCTM *CTM)
{
const unsigned char TPR=1,TRN=2,SKW=4,SCL=8,ROT=0x10,OID=0x20,LCK=0x80;
ssize_t x;
unsigned DenX;
unsigned Flags;
(void) memset(*CTM,0,sizeof(*CTM)); /*CTM.erase();CTM.resize(3,3);*/
(*CTM)[0][0]=1;
(*CTM)[1][1]=1;
(*CTM)[2][2]=1;
Flags=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if(Flags & LCK) (void) ReadBlobLSBLong(image); /*Edit lock*/
if(Flags & OID)
{
if(Precision==0)
{(void) ReadBlobLSBShort(image);} /*ObjectID*/
else
{(void) ReadBlobLSBLong(image);} /*ObjectID (Double precision)*/
}
if(Flags & ROT)
{
x=ReadBlobLSBLong(image); /*Rot Angle*/
if(Angle) *Angle=x/65536.0;
}
if(Flags & (ROT|SCL))
{
x=ReadBlobLSBLong(image); /*Sx*cos()*/
(*CTM)[0][0] = (float)x/0x10000;
x=ReadBlobLSBLong(image); /*Sy*cos()*/
(*CTM)[1][1] = (float)x/0x10000;
}
if(Flags & (ROT|SKW))
{
x=ReadBlobLSBLong(image); /*Kx*sin()*/
(*CTM)[1][0] = (float)x/0x10000;
x=ReadBlobLSBLong(image); /*Ky*sin()*/
(*CTM)[0][1] = (float)x/0x10000;
}
if(Flags & TRN)
{
x=ReadBlobLSBLong(image); DenX=ReadBlobLSBShort(image); /*Tx*/
if(x>=0) (*CTM)[0][2] = (float)x+(float)DenX/0x10000;
else (*CTM)[0][2] = (float)x-(float)DenX/0x10000;
x=ReadBlobLSBLong(image); DenX=ReadBlobLSBShort(image); /*Ty*/
(*CTM)[1][2]=(float)x + ((x>=0)?1:-1)*(float)DenX/0x10000;
if(x>=0) (*CTM)[1][2] = (float)x+(float)DenX/0x10000;
else (*CTM)[1][2] = (float)x-(float)DenX/0x10000;
}
if(Flags & TPR)
{
x=ReadBlobLSBShort(image); DenX=ReadBlobLSBShort(image); /*Px*/
(*CTM)[2][0] = x + (float)DenX/0x10000;;
x=ReadBlobLSBShort(image); DenX=ReadBlobLSBShort(image); /*Py*/
(*CTM)[2][1] = x + (float)DenX/0x10000;
}
return(Flags);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/85
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 59,738 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void RemoveResolutionFromResourceBlock(StringInfo *bim_profile)
{
register const unsigned char
*p;
size_t
length;
unsigned char
*datum;
unsigned int
count,
long_sans;
unsigned short
id,
short_sans;
length=GetStringInfoLength(bim_profile);
if (length < 16)
return;
datum=GetStringInfoDatum(bim_profile);
for (p=datum; (p >= datum) && (p < (datum+length-16)); )
{
register unsigned char
*q;
ssize_t
cnt;
q=(unsigned char *) p;
if (LocaleNCompare((const char *) p,"8BIM",4) != 0)
return;
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&long_sans);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&id);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&short_sans);
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&count);
cnt=PSDQuantum(count);
if (cnt < 0)
return;
if ((id == 0x000003ed) && (cnt < (ssize_t) (length-12)))
{
(void) CopyMagickMemory(q,q+cnt+12,length-(cnt+12)-(q-datum));
SetStringInfoLength(bim_profile,length-(cnt+12));
break;
}
p+=count;
if ((count & 0x01) != 0)
p++;
}
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/714
CWE ID: CWE-834 | 0 | 61,522 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ResizeLock(aura::RootWindow* root_window,
const gfx::Size new_size,
bool defer_compositor_lock)
: root_window_(root_window),
new_size_(new_size),
compositor_lock_(defer_compositor_lock ?
NULL :
root_window_->compositor()->GetCompositorLock()),
weak_ptr_factory_(this),
defer_compositor_lock_(defer_compositor_lock) {
root_window_->HoldMouseMoves();
BrowserThread::PostDelayedTask(
BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&RenderWidgetHostViewAura::ResizeLock::CancelLock,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr()),
base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(kResizeLockTimeoutMs));
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,888 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void process_mpa_reply(struct iwch_ep *ep, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct mpa_message *mpa;
u16 plen;
struct iwch_qp_attributes attrs;
enum iwch_qp_attr_mask mask;
int err;
PDBG("%s ep %p\n", __func__, ep);
/*
* Stop mpa timer. If it expired, then the state has
* changed and we bail since ep_timeout already aborted
* the connection.
*/
stop_ep_timer(ep);
if (state_read(&ep->com) != MPA_REQ_SENT)
return;
/*
* If we get more than the supported amount of private data
* then we must fail this connection.
*/
if (ep->mpa_pkt_len + skb->len > sizeof(ep->mpa_pkt)) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto err;
}
/*
* copy the new data into our accumulation buffer.
*/
skb_copy_from_linear_data(skb, &(ep->mpa_pkt[ep->mpa_pkt_len]),
skb->len);
ep->mpa_pkt_len += skb->len;
/*
* if we don't even have the mpa message, then bail.
*/
if (ep->mpa_pkt_len < sizeof(*mpa))
return;
mpa = (struct mpa_message *) ep->mpa_pkt;
/* Validate MPA header. */
if (mpa->revision != mpa_rev) {
err = -EPROTO;
goto err;
}
if (memcmp(mpa->key, MPA_KEY_REP, sizeof(mpa->key))) {
err = -EPROTO;
goto err;
}
plen = ntohs(mpa->private_data_size);
/*
* Fail if there's too much private data.
*/
if (plen > MPA_MAX_PRIVATE_DATA) {
err = -EPROTO;
goto err;
}
/*
* If plen does not account for pkt size
*/
if (ep->mpa_pkt_len > (sizeof(*mpa) + plen)) {
err = -EPROTO;
goto err;
}
ep->plen = (u8) plen;
/*
* If we don't have all the pdata yet, then bail.
* We'll continue process when more data arrives.
*/
if (ep->mpa_pkt_len < (sizeof(*mpa) + plen))
return;
if (mpa->flags & MPA_REJECT) {
err = -ECONNREFUSED;
goto err;
}
/*
* If we get here we have accumulated the entire mpa
* start reply message including private data. And
* the MPA header is valid.
*/
state_set(&ep->com, FPDU_MODE);
ep->mpa_attr.initiator = 1;
ep->mpa_attr.crc_enabled = (mpa->flags & MPA_CRC) | crc_enabled ? 1 : 0;
ep->mpa_attr.recv_marker_enabled = markers_enabled;
ep->mpa_attr.xmit_marker_enabled = mpa->flags & MPA_MARKERS ? 1 : 0;
ep->mpa_attr.version = mpa_rev;
PDBG("%s - crc_enabled=%d, recv_marker_enabled=%d, "
"xmit_marker_enabled=%d, version=%d\n", __func__,
ep->mpa_attr.crc_enabled, ep->mpa_attr.recv_marker_enabled,
ep->mpa_attr.xmit_marker_enabled, ep->mpa_attr.version);
attrs.mpa_attr = ep->mpa_attr;
attrs.max_ird = ep->ird;
attrs.max_ord = ep->ord;
attrs.llp_stream_handle = ep;
attrs.next_state = IWCH_QP_STATE_RTS;
mask = IWCH_QP_ATTR_NEXT_STATE |
IWCH_QP_ATTR_LLP_STREAM_HANDLE | IWCH_QP_ATTR_MPA_ATTR |
IWCH_QP_ATTR_MAX_IRD | IWCH_QP_ATTR_MAX_ORD;
/* bind QP and TID with INIT_WR */
err = iwch_modify_qp(ep->com.qp->rhp,
ep->com.qp, mask, &attrs, 1);
if (err)
goto err;
if (peer2peer && iwch_rqes_posted(ep->com.qp) == 0) {
iwch_post_zb_read(ep);
}
goto out;
err:
abort_connection(ep, skb, GFP_KERNEL);
out:
connect_reply_upcall(ep, err);
return;
}
Commit Message: iw_cxgb3: Fix incorrectly returning error on success
The cxgb3_*_send() functions return NET_XMIT_ values, which are
positive integers values. So don't treat positive return values
as an error.
Signed-off-by: Steve Wise <swise@opengridcomputing.com>
Signed-off-by: Hariprasad Shenai <hariprasad@chelsio.com>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 56,886 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int task_switch_32(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
u16 tss_selector, u16 old_tss_sel,
ulong old_tss_base, struct desc_struct *new_desc)
{
const struct x86_emulate_ops *ops = ctxt->ops;
struct tss_segment_32 tss_seg;
int ret;
u32 new_tss_base = get_desc_base(new_desc);
u32 eip_offset = offsetof(struct tss_segment_32, eip);
u32 ldt_sel_offset = offsetof(struct tss_segment_32, ldt_selector);
ret = ops->read_std(ctxt, old_tss_base, &tss_seg, sizeof tss_seg,
&ctxt->exception);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return ret;
save_state_to_tss32(ctxt, &tss_seg);
/* Only GP registers and segment selectors are saved */
ret = ops->write_std(ctxt, old_tss_base + eip_offset, &tss_seg.eip,
ldt_sel_offset - eip_offset, &ctxt->exception);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return ret;
ret = ops->read_std(ctxt, new_tss_base, &tss_seg, sizeof tss_seg,
&ctxt->exception);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return ret;
if (old_tss_sel != 0xffff) {
tss_seg.prev_task_link = old_tss_sel;
ret = ops->write_std(ctxt, new_tss_base,
&tss_seg.prev_task_link,
sizeof tss_seg.prev_task_link,
&ctxt->exception);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return ret;
}
return load_state_from_tss32(ctxt, &tss_seg);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: drop error recovery in em_jmp_far and em_ret_far
em_jmp_far and em_ret_far assumed that setting IP can only fail in 64
bit mode, but syzkaller proved otherwise (and SDM agrees).
Code segment was restored upon failure, but it was left uninitialized
outside of long mode, which could lead to a leak of host kernel stack.
We could have fixed that by always saving and restoring the CS, but we
take a simpler approach and just break any guest that manages to fail
as the error recovery is error-prone and modern CPUs don't need emulator
for this.
Found by syzkaller:
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 3668 at arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2217 em_ret_far+0x428/0x480
Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...
CPU: 2 PID: 3668 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 4.9.0-rc4+ #49
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
[...]
Call Trace:
[...] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15
[...] dump_stack+0xb3/0x118 lib/dump_stack.c:51
[...] panic+0x1b7/0x3a3 kernel/panic.c:179
[...] __warn+0x1c4/0x1e0 kernel/panic.c:542
[...] warn_slowpath_null+0x2c/0x40 kernel/panic.c:585
[...] em_ret_far+0x428/0x480 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2217
[...] em_ret_far_imm+0x17/0x70 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2227
[...] x86_emulate_insn+0x87a/0x3730 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:5294
[...] x86_emulate_instruction+0x520/0x1ba0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:5545
[...] emulate_instruction arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h:1116
[...] complete_emulated_io arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6870
[...] complete_emulated_mmio+0x4e9/0x710 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6934
[...] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x3b7a/0x5a90 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6978
[...] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x61e/0xdd0 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:2557
[...] vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:43
[...] do_vfs_ioctl+0x18c/0x1040 fs/ioctl.c:679
[...] SYSC_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:694
[...] SyS_ioctl+0x8f/0xc0 fs/ioctl.c:685
[...] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d1442d85cc30 ("KVM: x86: Handle errors when RIP is set during far jumps")
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 47,977 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int snd_msnd_activate_logical(int cfg, int num)
{
if (snd_msnd_write_cfg(cfg, IREG_LOGDEVICE, num))
return -EIO;
if (snd_msnd_write_cfg(cfg, IREG_ACTIVATE, LD_ACTIVATE))
return -EIO;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: msnd: Optimize / harden DSP and MIDI loops
The ISA msnd drivers have loops fetching the ring-buffer head, tail
and size values inside the loops. Such codes are inefficient and
fragile.
This patch optimizes it, and also adds the sanity check to avoid the
endless loops.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=196131
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=196133
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 64,108 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void aes_crypt_cfb( aes_context *ctx,
int mode,
int length,
int *iv_off,
unsigned char iv[16],
const unsigned char *input,
unsigned char *output )
{
int c, n = *iv_off;
if( mode == AES_DECRYPT )
{
while( length-- )
{
if( n == 0 )
aes_crypt_ecb( ctx, AES_ENCRYPT, iv, iv );
c = *input++;
*output++ = (unsigned char)( c ^ iv[n] );
iv[n] = (unsigned char) c;
n = (n + 1) & 0x0F;
}
}
else
{
while( length-- )
{
if( n == 0 )
aes_crypt_ecb( ctx, AES_ENCRYPT, iv, iv );
iv[n] = *output++ = (unsigned char)( iv[n] ^ *input++ );
n = (n + 1) & 0x0F;
}
}
*iv_off = n;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 3,233 |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.