instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::SetAsFocusedWebContentsIfNecessary() {
WebContentsImpl* old_contents = GetFocusedWebContents();
if (old_contents == this)
return;
GetOutermostWebContents()->node_.SetFocusedWebContents(this);
if (!GuestMode::IsCrossProcessFrameGuest(this) && browser_plugin_guest_)
return;
if (old_contents)
old_contents->GetMainFrame()->GetRenderWidgetHost()->SetPageFocus(false);
if (GetRenderManager()->GetProxyToOuterDelegate())
GetRenderManager()->GetProxyToOuterDelegate()->SetFocusedFrame();
if (ShowingInterstitialPage()) {
static_cast<RenderFrameHostImpl*>(
GetRenderManager()->interstitial_page()->GetMainFrame())
->GetRenderWidgetHost()
->SetPageFocus(true);
} else {
GetMainFrame()->GetRenderWidgetHost()->SetPageFocus(true);
}
}
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 172,333 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AXSVGRoot* AXLayoutObject::remoteSVGRootElement() const {
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,080 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static const ut8* r_bin_dwarf_parse_spec_opcode(
const RBin *a, const ut8 *obuf, size_t len,
const RBinDwarfLNPHeader *hdr,
RBinDwarfSMRegisters *regs,
ut8 opcode, FILE *f, int mode) {
const ut8 *buf = obuf;
ut8 adj_opcode = 0;
ut64 advance_adr;
RBinFile *binfile = a ? a->cur : NULL;
if (!obuf || !hdr || !regs) {
return NULL;
}
adj_opcode = opcode - hdr->opcode_base;
if (!hdr->line_range) {
return NULL;
}
advance_adr = adj_opcode / hdr->line_range;
regs->address += advance_adr;
regs->line += hdr->line_base + (adj_opcode % hdr->line_range);
if (f) {
fprintf (f, "Special opcode %d: ", adj_opcode);
fprintf (f, "advance Address by %"PFMT64d" to %"PFMT64x" and Line by %d to %"PFMT64d"\n",
advance_adr, regs->address, hdr->line_base +
(adj_opcode % hdr->line_range), regs->line);
}
if (binfile && binfile->sdb_addrinfo && hdr->file_names) {
int idx = regs->file -1;
if (idx >= 0 && idx < hdr->file_names_count) {
add_sdb_addrline (binfile->sdb_addrinfo, regs->address,
hdr->file_names[idx].name,
regs->line, f, mode);
}
}
regs->basic_block = DWARF_FALSE;
regs->prologue_end = DWARF_FALSE;
regs->epilogue_begin = DWARF_FALSE;
regs->discriminator = 0;
return buf;
}
Commit Message: Fix #8813 - segfault in dwarf parser
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 59,717 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void png_handle_row(PNGDecContext *s)
{
uint8_t *ptr, *last_row;
int got_line;
if (!s->interlace_type) {
ptr = s->image_buf + s->image_linesize * (s->y + s->y_offset) + s->x_offset * s->bpp;
if (s->y == 0)
last_row = s->last_row;
else
last_row = ptr - s->image_linesize;
png_filter_row(&s->dsp, ptr, s->crow_buf[0], s->crow_buf + 1,
last_row, s->row_size, s->bpp);
/* loco lags by 1 row so that it doesn't interfere with top prediction */
if (s->filter_type == PNG_FILTER_TYPE_LOCO && s->y > 0) {
if (s->bit_depth == 16) {
deloco_rgb16((uint16_t *)(ptr - s->image_linesize), s->row_size / 2,
s->color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB_ALPHA);
} else {
deloco_rgb8(ptr - s->image_linesize, s->row_size,
s->color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB_ALPHA);
}
}
s->y++;
if (s->y == s->cur_h) {
s->state |= PNG_ALLIMAGE;
if (s->filter_type == PNG_FILTER_TYPE_LOCO) {
if (s->bit_depth == 16) {
deloco_rgb16((uint16_t *)ptr, s->row_size / 2,
s->color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB_ALPHA);
} else {
deloco_rgb8(ptr, s->row_size,
s->color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB_ALPHA);
}
}
}
} else {
got_line = 0;
for (;;) {
ptr = s->image_buf + s->image_linesize * (s->y + s->y_offset) + s->x_offset * s->bpp;
if ((ff_png_pass_ymask[s->pass] << (s->y & 7)) & 0x80) {
/* if we already read one row, it is time to stop to
* wait for the next one */
if (got_line)
break;
png_filter_row(&s->dsp, s->tmp_row, s->crow_buf[0], s->crow_buf + 1,
s->last_row, s->pass_row_size, s->bpp);
FFSWAP(uint8_t *, s->last_row, s->tmp_row);
FFSWAP(unsigned int, s->last_row_size, s->tmp_row_size);
got_line = 1;
}
if ((png_pass_dsp_ymask[s->pass] << (s->y & 7)) & 0x80) {
png_put_interlaced_row(ptr, s->cur_w, s->bits_per_pixel, s->pass,
s->color_type, s->last_row);
}
s->y++;
if (s->y == s->cur_h) {
memset(s->last_row, 0, s->row_size);
for (;;) {
if (s->pass == NB_PASSES - 1) {
s->state |= PNG_ALLIMAGE;
goto the_end;
} else {
s->pass++;
s->y = 0;
s->pass_row_size = ff_png_pass_row_size(s->pass,
s->bits_per_pixel,
s->cur_w);
s->crow_size = s->pass_row_size + 1;
if (s->pass_row_size != 0)
break;
/* skip pass if empty row */
}
}
}
}
the_end:;
}
}
Commit Message: avcodec/pngdec: Fix off by 1 size in decode_zbuf()
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: 444/fuzz-2-ffmpeg_VIDEO_AV_CODEC_ID_PNG_fuzzer
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 66,939 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::FlushNetworkAndNavigationInterfacesForTesting() {
DCHECK(network_service_connection_error_handler_holder_);
network_service_connection_error_handler_holder_.FlushForTesting();
if (!navigation_control_)
GetNavigationControl();
DCHECK(navigation_control_);
navigation_control_.FlushForTesting();
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,264 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: armv6pmu_start(void)
{
unsigned long flags, val;
raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&pmu_lock, flags);
val = armv6_pmcr_read();
val |= ARMV6_PMCR_ENABLE;
armv6_pmcr_write(val);
raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&pmu_lock, flags);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,252 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ChromeExtensionsAPIClient::GetMediaPerceptionAPIDelegate() {
if (!media_perception_api_delegate_) {
media_perception_api_delegate_ =
std::make_unique<MediaPerceptionAPIDelegateChromeOS>();
}
return media_perception_api_delegate_.get();
}
Commit Message: Hide DevTools frontend from webRequest API
Prevent extensions from observing requests for remote DevTools frontends
and add regression tests.
And update ExtensionTestApi to support initializing the embedded test
server and port from SetUpCommandLine (before SetUpOnMainThread).
BUG=797497,797500
TEST=browser_test --gtest_filter=DevToolsFrontendInWebRequestApiTest.HiddenRequests
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_mojo
Change-Id: Ic8f44b5771f2d5796f8c3de128f0a7ab88a77735
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/844316
Commit-Queue: Rob Wu <rob@robwu.nl>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528187}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 146,544 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void read_sse_reg(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, sse128_t *data, int reg)
{
ctxt->ops->get_fpu(ctxt);
switch (reg) {
case 0: asm("movdqu %%xmm0, %0" : "=m"(*data)); break;
case 1: asm("movdqu %%xmm1, %0" : "=m"(*data)); break;
case 2: asm("movdqu %%xmm2, %0" : "=m"(*data)); break;
case 3: asm("movdqu %%xmm3, %0" : "=m"(*data)); break;
case 4: asm("movdqu %%xmm4, %0" : "=m"(*data)); break;
case 5: asm("movdqu %%xmm5, %0" : "=m"(*data)); break;
case 6: asm("movdqu %%xmm6, %0" : "=m"(*data)); break;
case 7: asm("movdqu %%xmm7, %0" : "=m"(*data)); break;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
case 8: asm("movdqu %%xmm8, %0" : "=m"(*data)); break;
case 9: asm("movdqu %%xmm9, %0" : "=m"(*data)); break;
case 10: asm("movdqu %%xmm10, %0" : "=m"(*data)); break;
case 11: asm("movdqu %%xmm11, %0" : "=m"(*data)); break;
case 12: asm("movdqu %%xmm12, %0" : "=m"(*data)); break;
case 13: asm("movdqu %%xmm13, %0" : "=m"(*data)); break;
case 14: asm("movdqu %%xmm14, %0" : "=m"(*data)); break;
case 15: asm("movdqu %%xmm15, %0" : "=m"(*data)); break;
#endif
default: BUG();
}
ctxt->ops->put_fpu(ctxt);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: fix missing checks in syscall emulation
On hosts without this patch, 32bit guests will crash (and 64bit guests
may behave in a wrong way) for example by simply executing following
nasm-demo-application:
[bits 32]
global _start
SECTION .text
_start: syscall
(I tested it with winxp and linux - both always crashed)
Disassembly of section .text:
00000000 <_start>:
0: 0f 05 syscall
The reason seems a missing "invalid opcode"-trap (int6) for the
syscall opcode "0f05", which is not available on Intel CPUs
within non-longmodes, as also on some AMD CPUs within legacy-mode.
(depending on CPU vendor, MSR_EFER and cpuid)
Because previous mentioned OSs may not engage corresponding
syscall target-registers (STAR, LSTAR, CSTAR), they remain
NULL and (non trapping) syscalls are leading to multiple
faults and finally crashs.
Depending on the architecture (AMD or Intel) pretended by
guests, various checks according to vendor's documentation
are implemented to overcome the current issue and behave
like the CPUs physical counterparts.
[mtosatti: cleanup/beautify code]
Signed-off-by: Stephan Baerwolf <stephan.baerwolf@tu-ilmenau.de>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 21,831 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int check_alu_op(struct verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
{
struct reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs;
u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
int err;
if (opcode == BPF_END || opcode == BPF_NEG) {
if (opcode == BPF_NEG) {
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != 0 ||
insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 ||
insn->off != 0 || insn->imm != 0) {
verbose("BPF_NEG uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
} else {
if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0 ||
(insn->imm != 16 && insn->imm != 32 && insn->imm != 64)) {
verbose("BPF_END uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
}
/* check src operand */
err = check_reg_arg(regs, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
if (err)
return err;
if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->dst_reg)) {
verbose("R%d pointer arithmetic prohibited\n",
insn->dst_reg);
return -EACCES;
}
/* check dest operand */
err = check_reg_arg(regs, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP);
if (err)
return err;
} else if (opcode == BPF_MOV) {
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
if (insn->imm != 0 || insn->off != 0) {
verbose("BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
/* check src operand */
err = check_reg_arg(regs, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
if (err)
return err;
} else {
if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0) {
verbose("BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
}
/* check dest operand */
err = check_reg_arg(regs, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP);
if (err)
return err;
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) {
/* case: R1 = R2
* copy register state to dest reg
*/
regs[insn->dst_reg] = regs[insn->src_reg];
} else {
if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) {
verbose("R%d partial copy of pointer\n",
insn->src_reg);
return -EACCES;
}
regs[insn->dst_reg].type = UNKNOWN_VALUE;
regs[insn->dst_reg].map_ptr = NULL;
}
} else {
/* case: R = imm
* remember the value we stored into this reg
*/
regs[insn->dst_reg].type = CONST_IMM;
regs[insn->dst_reg].imm = insn->imm;
}
} else if (opcode > BPF_END) {
verbose("invalid BPF_ALU opcode %x\n", opcode);
return -EINVAL;
} else { /* all other ALU ops: and, sub, xor, add, ... */
bool stack_relative = false;
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
if (insn->imm != 0 || insn->off != 0) {
verbose("BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
/* check src1 operand */
err = check_reg_arg(regs, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
if (err)
return err;
} else {
if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0) {
verbose("BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
}
/* check src2 operand */
err = check_reg_arg(regs, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
if (err)
return err;
if ((opcode == BPF_MOD || opcode == BPF_DIV) &&
BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K && insn->imm == 0) {
verbose("div by zero\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if ((opcode == BPF_LSH || opcode == BPF_RSH ||
opcode == BPF_ARSH) && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) {
int size = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64 ? 64 : 32;
if (insn->imm < 0 || insn->imm >= size) {
verbose("invalid shift %d\n", insn->imm);
return -EINVAL;
}
}
/* pattern match 'bpf_add Rx, imm' instruction */
if (opcode == BPF_ADD && BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64 &&
regs[insn->dst_reg].type == FRAME_PTR &&
BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) {
stack_relative = true;
} else if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->dst_reg)) {
verbose("R%d pointer arithmetic prohibited\n",
insn->dst_reg);
return -EACCES;
} else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X &&
is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) {
verbose("R%d pointer arithmetic prohibited\n",
insn->src_reg);
return -EACCES;
}
/* check dest operand */
err = check_reg_arg(regs, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP);
if (err)
return err;
if (stack_relative) {
regs[insn->dst_reg].type = PTR_TO_STACK;
regs[insn->dst_reg].imm = insn->imm;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix refcnt overflow
On a system with >32Gbyte of phyiscal memory and infinite RLIMIT_MEMLOCK,
the malicious application may overflow 32-bit bpf program refcnt.
It's also possible to overflow map refcnt on 1Tb system.
Impose 32k hard limit which means that the same bpf program or
map cannot be shared by more than 32k processes.
Fixes: 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 53,082 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int is_cover_image(const AVStream *st)
{
/* Eg. AV_DISPOSITION_ATTACHED_PIC | AV_DISPOSITION_TIMED_THUMBNAILS
* is encoded as sparse video track */
return st && st->disposition == AV_DISPOSITION_ATTACHED_PIC;
}
Commit Message: avformat/movenc: Write version 2 of audio atom if channels is not known
The version 1 needs the channel count and would divide by 0
Fixes: division by 0
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_1.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_2.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_3.wav
Found-by: #CHEN HONGXU# <HCHEN017@e.ntu.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 79,298 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Plugin::ReportLoadError(const ErrorInfo& error_info) {
PLUGIN_PRINTF(("Plugin::ReportLoadError (error='%s')\n",
error_info.message().c_str()));
set_nacl_ready_state(DONE);
set_nexe_error_reported(true);
nacl::string message = nacl::string("NaCl module load failed: ") +
error_info.message();
set_last_error_string(message);
AddToConsole(message);
ShutdownProxy();
EnqueueProgressEvent(kProgressEventError);
EnqueueProgressEvent(kProgressEventLoadEnd);
HistogramEnumerateLoadStatus(error_info.error_code());
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 103,388 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned int Sys_CountFileList( char **list ) {
int i = 0;
if (list)
{
while (*list)
{
list++;
i++;
}
}
return i;
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 95,937 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t OggSource::stop() {
mStarted = false;
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Fix memory leak in OggExtractor
Test: added a temporal log and run poc
Bug: 63581671
Change-Id: I436a08e54d5e831f9fbdb33c26d15397ce1fbeba
(cherry picked from commit 63079e7c8e12cda4eb124fbe565213d30b9ea34c)
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 162,199 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PassRefPtrWillBeRawPtr<Node> ContainerNode::appendChild(PassRefPtrWillBeRawPtr<Node> newChild, ExceptionState& exceptionState)
{
RefPtrWillBeRawPtr<ContainerNode> protect(this);
#if !ENABLE(OILPAN)
ASSERT(refCount() || parentOrShadowHostNode());
#endif
if (!checkAcceptChild(newChild.get(), 0, exceptionState)) {
if (exceptionState.hadException())
return nullptr;
return newChild;
}
ASSERT(newChild);
if (newChild == m_lastChild) // nothing to do
return newChild;
NodeVector targets;
collectChildrenAndRemoveFromOldParent(*newChild, targets, exceptionState);
if (exceptionState.hadException())
return nullptr;
if (targets.isEmpty())
return newChild;
if (!checkAcceptChildGuaranteedNodeTypes(*newChild, nullptr, exceptionState)) {
if (exceptionState.hadException())
return nullptr;
return newChild;
}
InspectorInstrumentation::willInsertDOMNode(this);
ChildListMutationScope mutation(*this);
for (const auto& targetNode : targets) {
ASSERT(targetNode);
Node& child = *targetNode;
if (child.parentNode())
break;
{
EventDispatchForbiddenScope assertNoEventDispatch;
ScriptForbiddenScope forbidScript;
treeScope().adoptIfNeeded(child);
appendChildCommon(child);
}
updateTreeAfterInsertion(child);
}
dispatchSubtreeModifiedEvent();
return newChild;
}
Commit Message: Fix an optimisation in ContainerNode::notifyNodeInsertedInternal
R=tkent@chromium.org
BUG=544020
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1420653003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#355240}
CWE ID: | 0 | 125,058 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int js_toint32(js_State *J, int idx)
{
return jsV_numbertoint32(jsV_tonumber(J, stackidx(J, idx)));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,492 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderWidgetHostImpl::GetOrCreateRootBrowserAccessibilityManager() {
return delegate_ ?
delegate_->GetOrCreateRootBrowserAccessibilityManager() : NULL;
}
Commit Message: Check that RWHI isn't deleted manually while owned by a scoped_ptr in RVHI
BUG=590284
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1747183002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#378844}
CWE ID: | 0 | 130,957 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Browser::ShouldPreserveAbortedURLs(WebContents* source) {
Profile* profile = Profile::FromBrowserContext(source->GetBrowserContext());
if (!profile || !source->GetController().GetLastCommittedEntry())
return false;
GURL committed_url(source->GetController().GetLastCommittedEntry()->GetURL());
return search::IsNTPURL(committed_url, profile);
}
Commit Message: Don't focus the location bar for NTP navigations in non-selected tabs.
BUG=677716
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2624373002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#443338}
CWE ID: | 0 | 139,059 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: yyparse (void *yyscanner, HEX_LEX_ENVIRONMENT *lex_env)
{
/* The lookahead symbol. */
int yychar;
/* The semantic value of the lookahead symbol. */
/* Default value used for initialization, for pacifying older GCCs
or non-GCC compilers. */
YY_INITIAL_VALUE (static YYSTYPE yyval_default;)
YYSTYPE yylval YY_INITIAL_VALUE (= yyval_default);
/* Number of syntax errors so far. */
int yynerrs;
int yystate;
/* Number of tokens to shift before error messages enabled. */
int yyerrstatus;
/* The stacks and their tools:
'yyss': related to states.
'yyvs': related to semantic values.
Refer to the stacks through separate pointers, to allow yyoverflow
to reallocate them elsewhere. */
/* The state stack. */
yytype_int16 yyssa[YYINITDEPTH];
yytype_int16 *yyss;
yytype_int16 *yyssp;
/* The semantic value stack. */
YYSTYPE yyvsa[YYINITDEPTH];
YYSTYPE *yyvs;
YYSTYPE *yyvsp;
YYSIZE_T yystacksize;
int yyn;
int yyresult;
/* Lookahead token as an internal (translated) token number. */
int yytoken = 0;
/* The variables used to return semantic value and location from the
action routines. */
YYSTYPE yyval;
#if YYERROR_VERBOSE
/* Buffer for error messages, and its allocated size. */
char yymsgbuf[128];
char *yymsg = yymsgbuf;
YYSIZE_T yymsg_alloc = sizeof yymsgbuf;
#endif
#define YYPOPSTACK(N) (yyvsp -= (N), yyssp -= (N))
/* The number of symbols on the RHS of the reduced rule.
Keep to zero when no symbol should be popped. */
int yylen = 0;
yyssp = yyss = yyssa;
yyvsp = yyvs = yyvsa;
yystacksize = YYINITDEPTH;
YYDPRINTF ((stderr, "Starting parse\n"));
yystate = 0;
yyerrstatus = 0;
yynerrs = 0;
yychar = YYEMPTY; /* Cause a token to be read. */
goto yysetstate;
/*------------------------------------------------------------.
| yynewstate -- Push a new state, which is found in yystate. |
`------------------------------------------------------------*/
yynewstate:
/* In all cases, when you get here, the value and location stacks
have just been pushed. So pushing a state here evens the stacks. */
yyssp++;
yysetstate:
*yyssp = yystate;
if (yyss + yystacksize - 1 <= yyssp)
{
/* Get the current used size of the three stacks, in elements. */
YYSIZE_T yysize = yyssp - yyss + 1;
#ifdef yyoverflow
{
/* Give user a chance to reallocate the stack. Use copies of
these so that the &'s don't force the real ones into
memory. */
YYSTYPE *yyvs1 = yyvs;
yytype_int16 *yyss1 = yyss;
/* Each stack pointer address is followed by the size of the
data in use in that stack, in bytes. This used to be a
conditional around just the two extra args, but that might
be undefined if yyoverflow is a macro. */
yyoverflow (YY_("memory exhausted"),
&yyss1, yysize * sizeof (*yyssp),
&yyvs1, yysize * sizeof (*yyvsp),
&yystacksize);
yyss = yyss1;
yyvs = yyvs1;
}
#else /* no yyoverflow */
# ifndef YYSTACK_RELOCATE
goto yyexhaustedlab;
# else
/* Extend the stack our own way. */
if (YYMAXDEPTH <= yystacksize)
goto yyexhaustedlab;
yystacksize *= 2;
if (YYMAXDEPTH < yystacksize)
yystacksize = YYMAXDEPTH;
{
yytype_int16 *yyss1 = yyss;
union yyalloc *yyptr =
(union yyalloc *) YYSTACK_ALLOC (YYSTACK_BYTES (yystacksize));
if (! yyptr)
goto yyexhaustedlab;
YYSTACK_RELOCATE (yyss_alloc, yyss);
YYSTACK_RELOCATE (yyvs_alloc, yyvs);
# undef YYSTACK_RELOCATE
if (yyss1 != yyssa)
YYSTACK_FREE (yyss1);
}
# endif
#endif /* no yyoverflow */
yyssp = yyss + yysize - 1;
yyvsp = yyvs + yysize - 1;
YYDPRINTF ((stderr, "Stack size increased to %lu\n",
(unsigned long int) yystacksize));
if (yyss + yystacksize - 1 <= yyssp)
YYABORT;
}
YYDPRINTF ((stderr, "Entering state %d\n", yystate));
if (yystate == YYFINAL)
YYACCEPT;
goto yybackup;
/*-----------.
| yybackup. |
`-----------*/
yybackup:
/* Do appropriate processing given the current state. Read a
lookahead token if we need one and don't already have one. */
/* First try to decide what to do without reference to lookahead token. */
yyn = yypact[yystate];
if (yypact_value_is_default (yyn))
goto yydefault;
/* Not known => get a lookahead token if don't already have one. */
/* YYCHAR is either YYEMPTY or YYEOF or a valid lookahead symbol. */
if (yychar == YYEMPTY)
{
YYDPRINTF ((stderr, "Reading a token: "));
yychar = yylex (&yylval, yyscanner, lex_env);
}
if (yychar <= YYEOF)
{
yychar = yytoken = YYEOF;
YYDPRINTF ((stderr, "Now at end of input.\n"));
}
else
{
yytoken = YYTRANSLATE (yychar);
YY_SYMBOL_PRINT ("Next token is", yytoken, &yylval, &yylloc);
}
/* If the proper action on seeing token YYTOKEN is to reduce or to
detect an error, take that action. */
yyn += yytoken;
if (yyn < 0 || YYLAST < yyn || yycheck[yyn] != yytoken)
goto yydefault;
yyn = yytable[yyn];
if (yyn <= 0)
{
if (yytable_value_is_error (yyn))
goto yyerrlab;
yyn = -yyn;
goto yyreduce;
}
/* Count tokens shifted since error; after three, turn off error
status. */
if (yyerrstatus)
yyerrstatus--;
/* Shift the lookahead token. */
YY_SYMBOL_PRINT ("Shifting", yytoken, &yylval, &yylloc);
/* Discard the shifted token. */
yychar = YYEMPTY;
yystate = yyn;
YY_IGNORE_MAYBE_UNINITIALIZED_BEGIN
*++yyvsp = yylval;
YY_IGNORE_MAYBE_UNINITIALIZED_END
goto yynewstate;
/*-----------------------------------------------------------.
| yydefault -- do the default action for the current state. |
`-----------------------------------------------------------*/
yydefault:
yyn = yydefact[yystate];
if (yyn == 0)
goto yyerrlab;
goto yyreduce;
/*-----------------------------.
| yyreduce -- Do a reduction. |
`-----------------------------*/
yyreduce:
/* yyn is the number of a rule to reduce with. */
yylen = yyr2[yyn];
/* If YYLEN is nonzero, implement the default value of the action:
'$$ = $1'.
Otherwise, the following line sets YYVAL to garbage.
This behavior is undocumented and Bison
users should not rely upon it. Assigning to YYVAL
unconditionally makes the parser a bit smaller, and it avoids a
GCC warning that YYVAL may be used uninitialized. */
yyval = yyvsp[1-yylen];
YY_REDUCE_PRINT (yyn);
switch (yyn)
{
case 2:
#line 106 "hex_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
RE_AST* re_ast = yyget_extra(yyscanner);
re_ast->root_node = (yyvsp[-1].re_node);
}
#line 1330 "hex_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 3:
#line 115 "hex_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.re_node) = (yyvsp[0].re_node);
}
#line 1338 "hex_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 4:
#line 119 "hex_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_CONCAT, (yyvsp[-1].re_node), (yyvsp[0].re_node));
DESTROY_NODE_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, (yyvsp[-1].re_node));
DESTROY_NODE_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, (yyvsp[0].re_node));
ERROR_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
}
#line 1351 "hex_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 5:
#line 128 "hex_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
RE_NODE* new_concat;
RE_NODE* leftmost_concat = NULL;
RE_NODE* leftmost_node = (yyvsp[-1].re_node);
(yyval.re_node) = NULL;
/*
Some portions of the code (i.e: yr_re_split_at_chaining_point)
expect a left-unbalanced tree where the right child of a concat node
can't be another concat node. A concat node must be always the left
child of its parent if the parent is also a concat. For this reason
the can't simply create two new concat nodes arranged like this:
concat
/ \
/ \
token's \
subtree concat
/ \
/ \
/ \
token_sequence's token's
subtree subtree
Instead we must insert the subtree for the first token as the
leftmost node of the token_sequence subtree.
*/
while (leftmost_node->type == RE_NODE_CONCAT)
{
leftmost_concat = leftmost_node;
leftmost_node = leftmost_node->left;
}
new_concat = yr_re_node_create(
RE_NODE_CONCAT, (yyvsp[-2].re_node), leftmost_node);
if (new_concat != NULL)
{
if (leftmost_concat != NULL)
{
leftmost_concat->left = new_concat;
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_CONCAT, (yyvsp[-1].re_node), (yyvsp[0].re_node));
}
else
{
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_CONCAT, new_concat, (yyvsp[0].re_node));
}
}
DESTROY_NODE_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, (yyvsp[-2].re_node));
DESTROY_NODE_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, (yyvsp[-1].re_node));
DESTROY_NODE_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, (yyvsp[0].re_node));
ERROR_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
}
#line 1413 "hex_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 6:
#line 190 "hex_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.re_node) = (yyvsp[0].re_node);
}
#line 1421 "hex_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 7:
#line 194 "hex_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_CONCAT, (yyvsp[-1].re_node), (yyvsp[0].re_node));
DESTROY_NODE_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, (yyvsp[-1].re_node));
DESTROY_NODE_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, (yyvsp[0].re_node));
ERROR_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
}
#line 1434 "hex_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 8:
#line 207 "hex_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.re_node) = (yyvsp[0].re_node);
}
#line 1442 "hex_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 9:
#line 211 "hex_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.re_node) = (yyvsp[0].re_node);
(yyval.re_node)->greedy = FALSE;
}
#line 1451 "hex_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 10:
#line 220 "hex_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
lex_env->token_count++;
if (lex_env->token_count > MAX_HEX_STRING_TOKENS)
{
yr_re_node_destroy((yyvsp[0].re_node));
yyerror(yyscanner, lex_env, "string too long");
YYABORT;
}
(yyval.re_node) = (yyvsp[0].re_node);
}
#line 1468 "hex_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 11:
#line 233 "hex_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
lex_env->inside_or++;
}
#line 1476 "hex_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 12:
#line 237 "hex_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.re_node) = (yyvsp[-1].re_node);
lex_env->inside_or--;
}
#line 1485 "hex_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 13:
#line 246 "hex_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
if ((yyvsp[-1].integer) <= 0)
{
yyerror(yyscanner, lex_env, "invalid jump length");
YYABORT;
}
if (lex_env->inside_or && (yyvsp[-1].integer) > STRING_CHAINING_THRESHOLD)
{
yyerror(yyscanner, lex_env, "jumps over "
STR(STRING_CHAINING_THRESHOLD)
" now allowed inside alternation (|)");
YYABORT;
}
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_RANGE_ANY, NULL, NULL);
ERROR_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
(yyval.re_node)->start = (int) (yyvsp[-1].integer);
(yyval.re_node)->end = (int) (yyvsp[-1].integer);
}
#line 1512 "hex_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 14:
#line 269 "hex_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
if (lex_env->inside_or &&
((yyvsp[-3].integer) > STRING_CHAINING_THRESHOLD ||
(yyvsp[-1].integer) > STRING_CHAINING_THRESHOLD) )
{
yyerror(yyscanner, lex_env, "jumps over "
STR(STRING_CHAINING_THRESHOLD)
" now allowed inside alternation (|)");
YYABORT;
}
if ((yyvsp[-3].integer) < 0 || (yyvsp[-1].integer) < 0)
{
yyerror(yyscanner, lex_env, "invalid negative jump length");
YYABORT;
}
if ((yyvsp[-3].integer) > (yyvsp[-1].integer))
{
yyerror(yyscanner, lex_env, "invalid jump range");
YYABORT;
}
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_RANGE_ANY, NULL, NULL);
ERROR_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
(yyval.re_node)->start = (int) (yyvsp[-3].integer);
(yyval.re_node)->end = (int) (yyvsp[-1].integer);
}
#line 1548 "hex_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 15:
#line 301 "hex_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
if (lex_env->inside_or)
{
yyerror(yyscanner, lex_env,
"unbounded jumps not allowed inside alternation (|)");
YYABORT;
}
if ((yyvsp[-2].integer) < 0)
{
yyerror(yyscanner, lex_env, "invalid negative jump length");
YYABORT;
}
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_RANGE_ANY, NULL, NULL);
ERROR_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
(yyval.re_node)->start = (int) (yyvsp[-2].integer);
(yyval.re_node)->end = INT_MAX;
}
#line 1574 "hex_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 16:
#line 323 "hex_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
if (lex_env->inside_or)
{
yyerror(yyscanner, lex_env,
"unbounded jumps not allowed inside alternation (|)");
YYABORT;
}
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_RANGE_ANY, NULL, NULL);
ERROR_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
(yyval.re_node)->start = 0;
(yyval.re_node)->end = INT_MAX;
}
#line 1594 "hex_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 17:
#line 343 "hex_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.re_node) = (yyvsp[0].re_node);
}
#line 1602 "hex_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 18:
#line 347 "hex_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
mark_as_not_fast_regexp();
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_ALT, (yyvsp[-2].re_node), (yyvsp[0].re_node));
DESTROY_NODE_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, (yyvsp[-2].re_node));
DESTROY_NODE_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, (yyvsp[0].re_node));
ERROR_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
}
#line 1617 "hex_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 19:
#line 361 "hex_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_LITERAL, NULL, NULL);
ERROR_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
(yyval.re_node)->value = (int) (yyvsp[0].integer);
}
#line 1629 "hex_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 20:
#line 369 "hex_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
uint8_t mask = (uint8_t) ((yyvsp[0].integer) >> 8);
if (mask == 0x00)
{
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_ANY, NULL, NULL);
ERROR_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
}
else
{
(yyval.re_node) = yr_re_node_create(RE_NODE_MASKED_LITERAL, NULL, NULL);
ERROR_IF((yyval.re_node) == NULL, ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
(yyval.re_node)->value = (yyvsp[0].integer) & 0xFF;
(yyval.re_node)->mask = mask;
}
}
#line 1653 "hex_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
#line 1657 "hex_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
default: break;
}
/* User semantic actions sometimes alter yychar, and that requires
that yytoken be updated with the new translation. We take the
approach of translating immediately before every use of yytoken.
One alternative is translating here after every semantic action,
but that translation would be missed if the semantic action invokes
YYABORT, YYACCEPT, or YYERROR immediately after altering yychar or
if it invokes YYBACKUP. In the case of YYABORT or YYACCEPT, an
incorrect destructor might then be invoked immediately. In the
case of YYERROR or YYBACKUP, subsequent parser actions might lead
to an incorrect destructor call or verbose syntax error message
before the lookahead is translated. */
YY_SYMBOL_PRINT ("-> $$ =", yyr1[yyn], &yyval, &yyloc);
YYPOPSTACK (yylen);
yylen = 0;
YY_STACK_PRINT (yyss, yyssp);
*++yyvsp = yyval;
/* Now 'shift' the result of the reduction. Determine what state
that goes to, based on the state we popped back to and the rule
number reduced by. */
yyn = yyr1[yyn];
yystate = yypgoto[yyn - YYNTOKENS] + *yyssp;
if (0 <= yystate && yystate <= YYLAST && yycheck[yystate] == *yyssp)
yystate = yytable[yystate];
else
yystate = yydefgoto[yyn - YYNTOKENS];
goto yynewstate;
/*--------------------------------------.
| yyerrlab -- here on detecting error. |
`--------------------------------------*/
yyerrlab:
/* Make sure we have latest lookahead translation. See comments at
user semantic actions for why this is necessary. */
yytoken = yychar == YYEMPTY ? YYEMPTY : YYTRANSLATE (yychar);
/* If not already recovering from an error, report this error. */
if (!yyerrstatus)
{
++yynerrs;
#if ! YYERROR_VERBOSE
yyerror (yyscanner, lex_env, YY_("syntax error"));
#else
# define YYSYNTAX_ERROR yysyntax_error (&yymsg_alloc, &yymsg, \
yyssp, yytoken)
{
char const *yymsgp = YY_("syntax error");
int yysyntax_error_status;
yysyntax_error_status = YYSYNTAX_ERROR;
if (yysyntax_error_status == 0)
yymsgp = yymsg;
else if (yysyntax_error_status == 1)
{
if (yymsg != yymsgbuf)
YYSTACK_FREE (yymsg);
yymsg = (char *) YYSTACK_ALLOC (yymsg_alloc);
if (!yymsg)
{
yymsg = yymsgbuf;
yymsg_alloc = sizeof yymsgbuf;
yysyntax_error_status = 2;
}
else
{
yysyntax_error_status = YYSYNTAX_ERROR;
yymsgp = yymsg;
}
}
yyerror (yyscanner, lex_env, yymsgp);
if (yysyntax_error_status == 2)
goto yyexhaustedlab;
}
# undef YYSYNTAX_ERROR
#endif
}
if (yyerrstatus == 3)
{
/* If just tried and failed to reuse lookahead token after an
error, discard it. */
if (yychar <= YYEOF)
{
/* Return failure if at end of input. */
if (yychar == YYEOF)
YYABORT;
}
else
{
yydestruct ("Error: discarding",
yytoken, &yylval, yyscanner, lex_env);
yychar = YYEMPTY;
}
}
/* Else will try to reuse lookahead token after shifting the error
token. */
goto yyerrlab1;
/*---------------------------------------------------.
| yyerrorlab -- error raised explicitly by YYERROR. |
`---------------------------------------------------*/
yyerrorlab:
/* Pacify compilers like GCC when the user code never invokes
YYERROR and the label yyerrorlab therefore never appears in user
code. */
if (/*CONSTCOND*/ 0)
goto yyerrorlab;
/* Do not reclaim the symbols of the rule whose action triggered
this YYERROR. */
YYPOPSTACK (yylen);
yylen = 0;
YY_STACK_PRINT (yyss, yyssp);
yystate = *yyssp;
goto yyerrlab1;
/*-------------------------------------------------------------.
| yyerrlab1 -- common code for both syntax error and YYERROR. |
`-------------------------------------------------------------*/
yyerrlab1:
yyerrstatus = 3; /* Each real token shifted decrements this. */
for (;;)
{
yyn = yypact[yystate];
if (!yypact_value_is_default (yyn))
{
yyn += YYTERROR;
if (0 <= yyn && yyn <= YYLAST && yycheck[yyn] == YYTERROR)
{
yyn = yytable[yyn];
if (0 < yyn)
break;
}
}
/* Pop the current state because it cannot handle the error token. */
if (yyssp == yyss)
YYABORT;
yydestruct ("Error: popping",
yystos[yystate], yyvsp, yyscanner, lex_env);
YYPOPSTACK (1);
yystate = *yyssp;
YY_STACK_PRINT (yyss, yyssp);
}
YY_IGNORE_MAYBE_UNINITIALIZED_BEGIN
*++yyvsp = yylval;
YY_IGNORE_MAYBE_UNINITIALIZED_END
/* Shift the error token. */
YY_SYMBOL_PRINT ("Shifting", yystos[yyn], yyvsp, yylsp);
yystate = yyn;
goto yynewstate;
/*-------------------------------------.
| yyacceptlab -- YYACCEPT comes here. |
`-------------------------------------*/
yyacceptlab:
yyresult = 0;
goto yyreturn;
/*-----------------------------------.
| yyabortlab -- YYABORT comes here. |
`-----------------------------------*/
yyabortlab:
yyresult = 1;
goto yyreturn;
#if !defined yyoverflow || YYERROR_VERBOSE
/*-------------------------------------------------.
| yyexhaustedlab -- memory exhaustion comes here. |
`-------------------------------------------------*/
yyexhaustedlab:
yyerror (yyscanner, lex_env, YY_("memory exhausted"));
yyresult = 2;
/* Fall through. */
#endif
yyreturn:
if (yychar != YYEMPTY)
{
/* Make sure we have latest lookahead translation. See comments at
user semantic actions for why this is necessary. */
yytoken = YYTRANSLATE (yychar);
yydestruct ("Cleanup: discarding lookahead",
yytoken, &yylval, yyscanner, lex_env);
}
/* Do not reclaim the symbols of the rule whose action triggered
this YYABORT or YYACCEPT. */
YYPOPSTACK (yylen);
YY_STACK_PRINT (yyss, yyssp);
while (yyssp != yyss)
{
yydestruct ("Cleanup: popping",
yystos[*yyssp], yyvsp, yyscanner, lex_env);
YYPOPSTACK (1);
}
#ifndef yyoverflow
if (yyss != yyssa)
YYSTACK_FREE (yyss);
#endif
#if YYERROR_VERBOSE
if (yymsg != yymsgbuf)
YYSTACK_FREE (yymsg);
#endif
return yyresult;
}
Commit Message: Fix issue #674 for hex strings.
CWE ID: CWE-674 | 1 | 168,101 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Core::PassNodeControllerToIOThread(
std::unique_ptr<NodeController> node_controller) {
node_controller.release()->DestroyOnIOThreadShutdown();
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 149,604 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void freeze_limited_counters(struct cpu_hw_events *cpuhw,
unsigned long pmc5, unsigned long pmc6)
{
struct perf_event *event;
u64 val, prev, delta;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < cpuhw->n_limited; ++i) {
event = cpuhw->limited_counter[i];
if (!event->hw.idx)
continue;
val = (event->hw.idx == 5) ? pmc5 : pmc6;
prev = local64_read(&event->hw.prev_count);
event->hw.idx = 0;
delta = (val - prev) & 0xfffffffful;
local64_add(delta, &event->count);
}
}
Commit Message: perf, powerpc: Handle events that raise an exception without overflowing
Events on POWER7 can roll back if a speculative event doesn't
eventually complete. Unfortunately in some rare cases they will
raise a performance monitor exception. We need to catch this to
ensure we reset the PMC. In all cases the PMC will be 256 or less
cycles from overflow.
Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> # as far back as it applies cleanly
LKML-Reference: <20110309143842.6c22845e@kryten>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 22,675 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: dissect_rpcap_findalldevs_reply (tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo _U_,
proto_tree *parent_tree, gint offset, guint16 no_devs)
{
proto_tree *tree;
proto_item *ti;
guint16 i;
ti = proto_tree_add_item (parent_tree, hf_findalldevs_reply, tvb, offset, -1, ENC_NA);
tree = proto_item_add_subtree (ti, ett_findalldevs_reply);
for (i = 0; i < no_devs; i++) {
offset = dissect_rpcap_findalldevs_if (tvb, pinfo, tree, offset);
if (tvb_reported_length_remaining (tvb, offset) < 0) {
/* No more data in packet */
expert_add_info(pinfo, ti, &ei_no_more_data);
break;
}
}
proto_item_append_text (ti, ", %d item%s", no_devs, plurality (no_devs, "", "s"));
}
Commit Message: The WTAP_ENCAP_ETHERNET dissector needs to be passed a struct eth_phdr.
We now require that. Make it so.
Bug: 12440
Change-Id: Iffee520976b013800699bde3c6092a3e86be0d76
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15424
Reviewed-by: Guy Harris <guy@alum.mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 51,751 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoUniformMatrix3x2fv(
GLint location,
GLsizei count,
GLboolean transpose,
const volatile GLfloat* value) {
api()->glUniformMatrix3x2fvFn(location, count, transpose,
const_cast<const GLfloat*>(value));
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 142,166 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlXPtrBuildRangeNodeList(xmlXPathObjectPtr range) {
/* pointers to generated nodes */
xmlNodePtr list = NULL, last = NULL, parent = NULL, tmp;
/* pointers to traversal nodes */
xmlNodePtr start, cur, end;
int index1, index2;
if (range == NULL)
return(NULL);
if (range->type != XPATH_RANGE)
return(NULL);
start = (xmlNodePtr) range->user;
if (start == NULL)
return(NULL);
end = range->user2;
if (end == NULL)
return(xmlCopyNode(start, 1));
cur = start;
index1 = range->index;
index2 = range->index2;
while (cur != NULL) {
if (cur == end) {
if (cur->type == XML_TEXT_NODE) {
const xmlChar *content = cur->content;
int len;
if (content == NULL) {
tmp = xmlNewTextLen(NULL, 0);
} else {
len = index2;
if ((cur == start) && (index1 > 1)) {
content += (index1 - 1);
len -= (index1 - 1);
index1 = 0;
} else {
len = index2;
}
tmp = xmlNewTextLen(content, len);
}
/* single sub text node selection */
if (list == NULL)
return(tmp);
/* prune and return full set */
if (last != NULL)
xmlAddNextSibling(last, tmp);
else
xmlAddChild(parent, tmp);
return(list);
} else {
tmp = xmlCopyNode(cur, 0);
if (list == NULL)
list = tmp;
else {
if (last != NULL)
xmlAddNextSibling(last, tmp);
else
xmlAddChild(parent, tmp);
}
last = NULL;
parent = tmp;
if (index2 > 1) {
end = xmlXPtrGetNthChild(cur, index2 - 1);
index2 = 0;
}
if ((cur == start) && (index1 > 1)) {
cur = xmlXPtrGetNthChild(cur, index1 - 1);
index1 = 0;
} else {
cur = cur->children;
}
/*
* Now gather the remaining nodes from cur to end
*/
continue; /* while */
}
} else if ((cur == start) &&
(list == NULL) /* looks superfluous but ... */ ) {
if ((cur->type == XML_TEXT_NODE) ||
(cur->type == XML_CDATA_SECTION_NODE)) {
const xmlChar *content = cur->content;
if (content == NULL) {
tmp = xmlNewTextLen(NULL, 0);
} else {
if (index1 > 1) {
content += (index1 - 1);
}
tmp = xmlNewText(content);
}
last = list = tmp;
} else {
if ((cur == start) && (index1 > 1)) {
tmp = xmlCopyNode(cur, 0);
list = tmp;
parent = tmp;
last = NULL;
cur = xmlXPtrGetNthChild(cur, index1 - 1);
index1 = 0;
/*
* Now gather the remaining nodes from cur to end
*/
continue; /* while */
}
tmp = xmlCopyNode(cur, 1);
list = tmp;
parent = NULL;
last = tmp;
}
} else {
tmp = NULL;
switch (cur->type) {
case XML_DTD_NODE:
case XML_ELEMENT_DECL:
case XML_ATTRIBUTE_DECL:
case XML_ENTITY_NODE:
/* Do not copy DTD informations */
break;
case XML_ENTITY_DECL:
TODO /* handle crossing entities -> stack needed */
break;
case XML_XINCLUDE_START:
case XML_XINCLUDE_END:
/* don't consider it part of the tree content */
break;
case XML_ATTRIBUTE_NODE:
/* Humm, should not happen ! */
STRANGE
break;
default:
tmp = xmlCopyNode(cur, 1);
break;
}
if (tmp != NULL) {
if ((list == NULL) || ((last == NULL) && (parent == NULL))) {
STRANGE
return(NULL);
}
if (last != NULL)
xmlAddNextSibling(last, tmp);
else {
xmlAddChild(parent, tmp);
last = tmp;
}
}
}
/*
* Skip to next node in document order
*/
if ((list == NULL) || ((last == NULL) && (parent == NULL))) {
STRANGE
return(NULL);
}
cur = xmlXPtrAdvanceNode(cur, NULL);
}
return(list);
}
Commit Message: Fix XPointer bug.
BUG=125462
AUTHOR=asd@ut.ee
R=cevans@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10344022
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@135174 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 109,040 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool vmx_rdseed_supported(void)
{
return vmcs_config.cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl &
SECONDARY_EXEC_RDSEED_EXITING;
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Enforce cpl=0 for VMX instructions
VMX instructions executed inside a L1 VM will always trigger a VM exit
even when executed with cpl 3. This means we must perform the
privilege check in software.
Fixes: 70f3aac964ae("kvm: nVMX: Remove superfluous VMX instruction fault checks")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Felix Wilhelm <fwilhelm@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 81,054 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: grub_disk_read (grub_disk_t disk, grub_disk_addr_t sector,
grub_off_t offset, grub_size_t size, void *buf)
{
char *tmp_buf;
unsigned real_offset;
/* First of all, check if the region is within the disk. */
if (grub_disk_adjust_range (disk, §or, &offset, size) != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
{
grub_error_push ();
grub_dprintf ("disk", "Read out of range: sector 0x%llx (%s).\n",
(unsigned long long) sector, grub_errmsg);
grub_error_pop ();
return grub_errno;
}
real_offset = offset;
/* Allocate a temporary buffer. */
tmp_buf = grub_malloc (GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_SIZE << GRUB_DISK_CACHE_BITS);
if (! tmp_buf)
return grub_errno;
/* Until SIZE is zero... */
while (size)
{
char *data;
grub_disk_addr_t start_sector;
grub_size_t len;
grub_size_t pos;
/* For reading bulk data. */
start_sector = sector & ~(GRUB_DISK_CACHE_SIZE - 1);
pos = (sector - start_sector) << GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_BITS;
len = ((GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_SIZE << GRUB_DISK_CACHE_BITS)
- pos - real_offset);
if (len > size)
len = size;
/* Fetch the cache. */
data = grub_disk_cache_fetch (disk->dev->id, disk->id, start_sector);
if (data)
{
/* Just copy it! */
if (buf)
grub_memcpy (buf, data + pos + real_offset, len);
grub_disk_cache_unlock (disk->dev->id, disk->id, start_sector);
}
else
{
/* Otherwise read data from the disk actually. */
if (start_sector + GRUB_DISK_CACHE_SIZE > disk->total_sectors
|| (disk->dev->read) (disk, start_sector,
GRUB_DISK_CACHE_SIZE, tmp_buf)
!= GRUB_ERR_NONE)
{
/* Uggh... Failed. Instead, just read necessary data. */
unsigned num;
char *p;
grub_errno = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
num = ((size + real_offset + GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_SIZE - 1)
>> GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_BITS);
p = grub_realloc (tmp_buf, num << GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_BITS);
if (!p)
goto finish;
tmp_buf = p;
if ((disk->dev->read) (disk, sector, num, tmp_buf))
{
grub_error_push ();
grub_dprintf ("disk", "%s read failed\n", disk->name);
grub_error_pop ();
goto finish;
}
if (buf)
grub_memcpy (buf, tmp_buf + real_offset, size);
/* Call the read hook, if any. */
if (disk->read_hook)
while (size)
{
grub_size_t to_read;
to_read = size;
if (real_offset + to_read > GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_SIZE)
to_read = GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_SIZE - real_offset;
(disk->read_hook) (sector, real_offset,
to_read, disk->closure);
if (grub_errno != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
goto finish;
sector++;
size -= to_read;
real_offset = 0;
}
/* This must be the end. */
goto finish;
}
/* Copy it and store it in the disk cache. */
if (buf)
grub_memcpy (buf, tmp_buf + pos + real_offset, len);
grub_disk_cache_store (disk->dev->id, disk->id,
start_sector, tmp_buf);
}
/* Call the read hook, if any. */
if (disk->read_hook)
{
grub_disk_addr_t s = sector;
grub_size_t l = len;
while (l)
{
(disk->read_hook) (s, real_offset,
((l > GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_SIZE)
? GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_SIZE
: l), disk->closure);
if (l < GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_SIZE - real_offset)
break;
s++;
l -= GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_SIZE - real_offset;
real_offset = 0;
}
}
sector = start_sector + GRUB_DISK_CACHE_SIZE;
if (buf)
buf = (char *) buf + len;
size -= len;
real_offset = 0;
}
finish:
grub_free (tmp_buf);
return grub_errno;
}
Commit Message: Fix r2_hbo_grub_memmove ext2 crash
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 168,058 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int32_t TestURLLoader::OpenFileSystem(pp::FileSystem* file_system,
std::string* message) {
TestCompletionCallback callback(instance_->pp_instance(), callback_type());
callback.WaitForResult(file_system->Open(1024, callback.GetCallback()));
if (callback.failed()) {
message->assign(callback.errors());
return callback.result();
}
if (callback.result() != PP_OK) {
message->assign("FileSystem::Open");
return callback.result();
}
return callback.result();
}
Commit Message: Fix one implicit 64-bit -> 32-bit implicit conversion in a PPAPI test.
../../ppapi/tests/test_url_loader.cc:877:11: warning: implicit conversion loses integer precision: 'int64_t' (aka 'long long') to 'int32_t' (aka 'int') [-Wshorten-64-to-32]
total_bytes_to_be_received);
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
BUG=879657
Change-Id: I152f456368131fe7a2891ff0c97bf83f26ef0906
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1220173
Commit-Queue: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#600182}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 156,436 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void kvm_apic_post_state_restore(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_lapic_state *s)
{
struct kvm_lapic *apic = vcpu->arch.apic;
kvm_lapic_set_base(vcpu, vcpu->arch.apic_base);
/* set SPIV separately to get count of SW disabled APICs right */
apic_set_spiv(apic, *((u32 *)(s->regs + APIC_SPIV)));
memcpy(vcpu->arch.apic->regs, s->regs, sizeof *s);
/* call kvm_apic_set_id() to put apic into apic_map */
kvm_apic_set_id(apic, kvm_apic_id(apic));
kvm_apic_set_version(vcpu);
apic_update_ppr(apic);
hrtimer_cancel(&apic->lapic_timer.timer);
update_divide_count(apic);
start_apic_timer(apic);
apic->irr_pending = true;
apic->isr_count = kvm_apic_vid_enabled(vcpu->kvm) ?
1 : count_vectors(apic->regs + APIC_ISR);
apic->highest_isr_cache = -1;
kvm_x86_ops->hwapic_isr_update(vcpu->kvm, apic_find_highest_isr(apic));
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
kvm_rtc_eoi_tracking_restore_one(vcpu);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: fix guest-initiated crash with x2apic (CVE-2013-6376)
A guest can cause a BUG_ON() leading to a host kernel crash.
When the guest writes to the ICR to request an IPI, while in x2apic
mode the following things happen, the destination is read from
ICR2, which is a register that the guest can control.
kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic_fast uses the high 16 bits of ICR2 as the
cluster id. A BUG_ON is triggered, which is a protection against
accessing map->logical_map with an out-of-bounds access and manages
to avoid that anything really unsafe occurs.
The logic in the code is correct from real HW point of view. The problem
is that KVM supports only one cluster with ID 0 in clustered mode, but
the code that has the bug does not take this into account.
Reported-by: Lars Bull <larsbull@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 28,757 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: set_VD_bp(unsigned char *bp, enum VD_type type, unsigned char ver)
{
/* Volume Descriptor Type */
bp[1] = (unsigned char)type;
/* Standard Identifier */
memcpy(bp + 2, "CD001", 5);
/* Volume Descriptor Version */
bp[7] = ver;
}
Commit Message: Issue 711: Be more careful about verifying filename lengths when writing ISO9660 archives
* Don't cast size_t to int, since this can lead to overflow
on machines where sizeof(int) < sizeof(size_t)
* Check a + b > limit by writing it as
a > limit || b > limit || a + b > limit
to avoid problems when a + b wraps around.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 50,864 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: setmodir(argv)
char **argv;
{
if(*argv == NULL)
return 0;
if(!strcmp(*argv,"in")) {
maxoctets_dir = PPP_OCTETS_DIRECTION_IN;
} else if (!strcmp(*argv,"out")) {
maxoctets_dir = PPP_OCTETS_DIRECTION_OUT;
} else if (!strcmp(*argv,"max")) {
maxoctets_dir = PPP_OCTETS_DIRECTION_MAXOVERAL;
} else {
maxoctets_dir = PPP_OCTETS_DIRECTION_SUM;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: pppd: Eliminate potential integer overflow in option parsing
When we are reading in a word from an options file, we maintain a count
of the length we have seen so far in 'len', which is an int. When len
exceeds MAXWORDLEN - 1 (i.e. 1023) we cease storing characters in the
buffer but we continue to increment len. Since len is an int, it will
wrap around to -2147483648 after it reaches 2147483647. At that point
our test of (len < MAXWORDLEN-1) will succeed and we will start writing
characters to memory again.
This may enable an attacker to overwrite the heap and thereby corrupt
security-relevant variables. For this reason it has been assigned a
CVE identifier, CVE-2014-3158.
This fixes the bug by ceasing to increment len once it reaches MAXWORDLEN.
Reported-by: Lee Campbell <leecam@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 38,176 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: iasecc_chv_verify(struct sc_card *card, struct sc_pin_cmd_data *pin_cmd,
int *tries_left)
{
struct sc_context *ctx = card->ctx;
struct sc_acl_entry acl = pin_cmd->pin1.acls[IASECC_ACLS_CHV_VERIFY];
struct sc_apdu apdu;
int rv;
LOG_FUNC_CALLED(ctx);
sc_log(ctx, "Verify CHV PIN(ref:%i,len:%i,acl:%X:%X)", pin_cmd->pin_reference, pin_cmd->pin1.len,
acl.method, acl.key_ref);
if (acl.method & IASECC_SCB_METHOD_SM) {
rv = iasecc_sm_pin_verify(card, acl.key_ref, pin_cmd, tries_left);
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, rv);
}
if (pin_cmd->pin1.data && !pin_cmd->pin1.len) {
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_1, 0x20, 0, pin_cmd->pin_reference);
}
else if (pin_cmd->pin1.data && pin_cmd->pin1.len) {
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_3_SHORT, 0x20, 0, pin_cmd->pin_reference);
apdu.data = pin_cmd->pin1.data;
apdu.datalen = pin_cmd->pin1.len;
apdu.lc = pin_cmd->pin1.len;
}
else if ((card->reader->capabilities & SC_READER_CAP_PIN_PAD) && !pin_cmd->pin1.data && !pin_cmd->pin1.len) {
rv = iasecc_chv_verify_pinpad(card, pin_cmd, tries_left);
sc_log(ctx, "Result of verifying CHV with PIN pad %i", rv);
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, rv);
}
else {
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED);
}
rv = sc_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu);
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, rv, "APDU transmit failed");
if (tries_left && apdu.sw1 == 0x63 && (apdu.sw2 & 0xF0) == 0xC0)
*tries_left = apdu.sw2 & 0x0F;
rv = sc_check_sw(card, apdu.sw1, apdu.sw2);
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, rv);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 78,476 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void longSequenceAttrAttrSetter(v8::Local<v8::String> name, v8::Local<v8::Value> value, const v8::AccessorInfo& info)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.longSequenceAttr._set");
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(info.Holder());
Vector<long> v = toNativeArray<long>(value);
imp->setLongSequenceAttr(v);
return;
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 109,574 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TIFFNumberOfStrips(TIFF* tif)
{
TIFFDirectory *td = &tif->tif_dir;
uint32 nstrips;
/* If the value was already computed and store in td_nstrips, then return it,
since ChopUpSingleUncompressedStrip might have altered and resized the
since the td_stripbytecount and td_stripoffset arrays to the new value
after the initial affectation of td_nstrips = TIFFNumberOfStrips() in
tif_dirread.c ~line 3612.
See http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2587 */
if( td->td_nstrips )
return td->td_nstrips;
nstrips = (td->td_rowsperstrip == (uint32) -1 ? 1 :
TIFFhowmany_32(td->td_imagelength, td->td_rowsperstrip));
if (td->td_planarconfig == PLANARCONFIG_SEPARATE)
nstrips = _TIFFMultiply32(tif, nstrips, (uint32)td->td_samplesperpixel,
"TIFFNumberOfStrips");
return (nstrips);
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_dirread.c: modify ChopUpSingleUncompressedStrip() to
instanciate compute ntrips as TIFFhowmany_32(td->td_imagelength, rowsperstrip),
instead of a logic based on the total size of data. Which is faulty is
the total size of data is not sufficient to fill the whole image, and thus
results in reading outside of the StripByCounts/StripOffsets arrays when
using TIFFReadScanline().
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2608.
* libtiff/tif_strip.c: revert the change in TIFFNumberOfStrips() done
for http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2587 / CVE-2016-9273 since
the above change is a better fix that makes it unnecessary.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 168,463 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebLocalFrameImpl::FindMatchRects(WebVector<WebFloatRect>& output_rects) {
EnsureTextFinder().FindMatchRects(output_rects);
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 134,303 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nfsd4_decode_read(struct nfsd4_compoundargs *argp, struct nfsd4_read *read)
{
DECODE_HEAD;
status = nfsd4_decode_stateid(argp, &read->rd_stateid);
if (status)
return status;
READ_BUF(12);
p = xdr_decode_hyper(p, &read->rd_offset);
read->rd_length = be32_to_cpup(p++);
DECODE_TAIL;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,767 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AppListController::UpdateArrowPositionAndAnchorPoint(
const gfx::Point& cursor) {
gfx::Screen* screen =
gfx::Screen::GetScreenFor(current_view_->GetWidget()->GetNativeView());
gfx::Display display = screen->GetDisplayNearestPoint(cursor);
current_view_->SetBubbleArrow(views::BubbleBorder::FLOAT);
current_view_->SetAnchorPoint(FindAnchorPoint(display, cursor));
}
Commit Message: Upgrade old app host to new app launcher on startup
This patch is a continuation of https://codereview.chromium.org/16805002/.
BUG=248825
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17022015
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@209604 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 113,650 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OnUpdateViewportIntersection(const gfx::Rect& viewport_intersection,
const gfx::Rect& compositing_rect) {
content::BrowserThread::PostTask(
content::BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&UpdateViewportIntersectionMessageFilter::
OnUpdateViewportIntersectionOnUI,
this, compositing_rect));
}
Commit Message: Avoid sharing process for blob URLs with null origin.
Previously, when a frame with a unique origin, such as from a data
URL, created a blob URL, the blob URL looked like blob:null/guid and
resulted in a site URL of "blob:" when navigated to. This incorrectly
allowed all such blob URLs to share a process, even if they were
created by different sites.
This CL changes the site URL assigned in such cases to be the full
blob URL, which includes the GUID. This avoids process sharing for
all blob URLs with unique origins.
This fix is conservative in the sense that it would also isolate
different blob URLs created by the same unique origin from each other.
This case isn't expected to be common, so it's unlikely to affect
process count. There's ongoing work to maintain a GUID for unique
origins, so longer-term, we could try using that to track down the
creator and potentially use that GUID in the site URL instead of the
blob URL's GUID, to avoid unnecessary process isolation in scenarios
like this.
Note that as part of this, we discovered a bug where data URLs aren't
able to script blob URLs that they create: https://crbug.com/865254.
This scripting bug should be fixed independently of this CL, and as
far as we can tell, this CL doesn't regress scripting cases like this
further.
Bug: 863623
Change-Id: Ib50407adbba3d5ee0cf6d72d3df7f8d8f24684ee
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1142389
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#576318}
CWE ID: CWE-285 | 0 | 154,561 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GraphicsContext::clearPlatformShadow()
{
if (paintingDisabled())
return;
platformContext()->setDrawLooper(0);
}
Commit Message: [skia] not all convex paths are convex, so recompute convexity for the problematic ones
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=75960
Reviewed by Stephen White.
No new tests.
See related chrome issue
http://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=108605
* platform/graphics/skia/GraphicsContextSkia.cpp:
(WebCore::setPathFromConvexPoints):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@104609 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 107,556 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int logi_dj_ll_raw_request(struct hid_device *hid,
unsigned char reportnum, __u8 *buf,
size_t count, unsigned char report_type,
int reqtype)
{
struct dj_device *djdev = hid->driver_data;
struct dj_receiver_dev *djrcv_dev = djdev->dj_receiver_dev;
u8 *out_buf;
int ret;
if (buf[0] != REPORT_TYPE_LEDS)
return -EINVAL;
out_buf = kzalloc(DJREPORT_SHORT_LENGTH, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!out_buf)
return -ENOMEM;
if (count > DJREPORT_SHORT_LENGTH - 2)
count = DJREPORT_SHORT_LENGTH - 2;
out_buf[0] = REPORT_ID_DJ_SHORT;
out_buf[1] = djdev->device_index;
memcpy(out_buf + 2, buf, count);
ret = hid_hw_raw_request(djrcv_dev->hdev, out_buf[0], out_buf,
DJREPORT_SHORT_LENGTH, report_type, reqtype);
kfree(out_buf);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: HID: logitech: perform bounds checking on device_id early enough
device_index is a char type and the size of paired_dj_deivces is 7
elements, therefore proper bounds checking has to be applied to
device_index before it is used.
We are currently performing the bounds checking in
logi_dj_recv_add_djhid_device(), which is too late, as malicious device
could send REPORT_TYPE_NOTIF_DEVICE_UNPAIRED early enough and trigger the
problem in one of the report forwarding functions called from
logi_dj_raw_event().
Fix this by performing the check at the earliest possible ocasion in
logi_dj_raw_event().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 38,144 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DatabaseImpl::IDBThreadHelper::CreateTransaction(
int64_t transaction_id,
const std::vector<int64_t>& object_store_ids,
blink::WebIDBTransactionMode mode) {
DCHECK(idb_thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
if (!connection_->IsConnected())
return;
connection_->database()->CreateTransaction(transaction_id, connection_.get(),
object_store_ids, mode);
}
Commit Message: [IndexedDB] Fixed transaction use-after-free vuln
Bug: 725032
Change-Id: I689ded6c74d5563403587b149c3f3e02e807e4aa
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/518483
Reviewed-by: Joshua Bell <jsbell@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#475952}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 1 | 172,351 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void encode_setattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, const struct nfs_setattrargs *arg, const struct nfs_server *server, struct compound_hdr *hdr)
{
__be32 *p;
p = reserve_space(xdr, 4+NFS4_STATEID_SIZE);
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(OP_SETATTR);
xdr_encode_opaque_fixed(p, arg->stateid.data, NFS4_STATEID_SIZE);
hdr->nops++;
hdr->replen += decode_setattr_maxsz;
encode_attrs(xdr, arg->iap, server);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 23,395 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport QuantumFormatType GetQuantumFormat(const QuantumInfo *quantum_info)
{
assert(quantum_info != (QuantumInfo *) NULL);
assert(quantum_info->signature == MagickSignature);
return(quantum_info->format);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/110
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 96,167 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nfs_set_rootarg(struct nfs_priv *npriv, struct fs_device_d *fsdev)
{
char *str, *tmp;
const char *bootargs;
str = basprintf("root=/dev/nfs nfsroot=%pI4:%s%s%s", &npriv->server, npriv->path,
rootnfsopts[0] ? "," : "", rootnfsopts);
/* forward specific mount options on demand */
if (npriv->manual_nfs_port == 1) {
tmp = basprintf("%s,port=%hu", str, npriv->nfs_port);
free(str);
str = tmp;
}
if (npriv->manual_mount_port == 1) {
tmp = basprintf("%s,mountport=%hu", str, npriv->mount_port);
free(str);
str = tmp;
}
bootargs = dev_get_param(&npriv->con->edev->dev, "linux.bootargs");
if (bootargs) {
tmp = basprintf("%s %s", str, bootargs);
free(str);
str = tmp;
}
fsdev_set_linux_rootarg(fsdev, str);
free(str);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 1,353 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: R_API RConfigNode* r_config_set_cb(RConfig *cfg, const char *name, const char *value, RConfigCallback cb) {
RConfigNode *node = r_config_set (cfg, name, value);
if (node && (node->setter = cb)) {
if (!cb (cfg->user, node)) {
return NULL;
}
}
return node;
}
Commit Message: Fix #7698 - UAF in r_config_set when loading a dex
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 64,492 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int i8042_set_mux_mode(bool multiplex, unsigned char *mux_version)
{
unsigned char param, val;
/*
* Get rid of bytes in the queue.
*/
i8042_flush();
/*
* Internal loopback test - send three bytes, they should come back from the
* mouse interface, the last should be version.
*/
param = val = 0xf0;
if (i8042_command(¶m, I8042_CMD_AUX_LOOP) || param != val)
return -1;
param = val = multiplex ? 0x56 : 0xf6;
if (i8042_command(¶m, I8042_CMD_AUX_LOOP) || param != val)
return -1;
param = val = multiplex ? 0xa4 : 0xa5;
if (i8042_command(¶m, I8042_CMD_AUX_LOOP) || param == val)
return -1;
/*
* Workaround for interference with USB Legacy emulation
* that causes a v10.12 MUX to be found.
*/
if (param == 0xac)
return -1;
if (mux_version)
*mux_version = param;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Input: i8042 - fix crash at boot time
The driver checks port->exists twice in i8042_interrupt(), first when
trying to assign temporary "serio" variable, and second time when deciding
whether it should call serio_interrupt(). The value of port->exists may
change between the 2 checks, and we may end up calling serio_interrupt()
with a NULL pointer:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000050
IP: [<ffffffff8150feaf>] _spin_lock_irqsave+0x1f/0x40
PGD 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
last sysfs file:
CPU 0
Modules linked in:
Pid: 1, comm: swapper Not tainted 2.6.32-358.el6.x86_64 #1 QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996)
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8150feaf>] [<ffffffff8150feaf>] _spin_lock_irqsave+0x1f/0x40
RSP: 0018:ffff880028203cc0 EFLAGS: 00010082
RAX: 0000000000010000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000282 RSI: 0000000000000098 RDI: 0000000000000050
RBP: ffff880028203cc0 R08: ffff88013e79c000 R09: ffff880028203ee0
R10: 0000000000000298 R11: 0000000000000282 R12: 0000000000000050
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000098
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880028200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0018 ES: 0018 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 0000000000000050 CR3: 0000000001a85000 CR4: 00000000001407f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Process swapper (pid: 1, threadinfo ffff88013e79c000, task ffff88013e79b500)
Stack:
ffff880028203d00 ffffffff813de186 ffffffffffffff02 0000000000000000
<d> 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000098
<d> ffff880028203d70 ffffffff813e0162 ffff880028203d20 ffffffff8103b8ac
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffff813de186>] serio_interrupt+0x36/0xa0
[<ffffffff813e0162>] i8042_interrupt+0x132/0x3a0
[<ffffffff8103b8ac>] ? kvm_clock_read+0x1c/0x20
[<ffffffff8103b8b9>] ? kvm_clock_get_cycles+0x9/0x10
[<ffffffff810e1640>] handle_IRQ_event+0x60/0x170
[<ffffffff8103b154>] ? kvm_guest_apic_eoi_write+0x44/0x50
[<ffffffff810e3d8e>] handle_edge_irq+0xde/0x180
[<ffffffff8100de89>] handle_irq+0x49/0xa0
[<ffffffff81516c8c>] do_IRQ+0x6c/0xf0
[<ffffffff8100b9d3>] ret_from_intr+0x0/0x11
[<ffffffff81076f63>] ? __do_softirq+0x73/0x1e0
[<ffffffff8109b75b>] ? hrtimer_interrupt+0x14b/0x260
[<ffffffff8100c1cc>] ? call_softirq+0x1c/0x30
[<ffffffff8100de05>] ? do_softirq+0x65/0xa0
[<ffffffff81076d95>] ? irq_exit+0x85/0x90
[<ffffffff81516d80>] ? smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x70/0x9b
[<ffffffff8100bb93>] ? apic_timer_interrupt+0x13/0x20
To avoid the issue let's change the second check to test whether serio is
NULL or not.
Also, let's take i8042_lock in i8042_start() and i8042_stop() instead of
trying to be overly smart and using memory barriers.
Signed-off-by: Chen Hong <chenhong3@huawei.com>
[dtor: take lock in i8042_start()/i8042_stop()]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 86,237 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void VoidMethodBooleanOrElementSequenceArgMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
ExceptionState exception_state(info.GetIsolate(), ExceptionState::kExecutionContext, "TestObject", "voidMethodBooleanOrElementSequenceArg");
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() < 1)) {
exception_state.ThrowTypeError(ExceptionMessages::NotEnoughArguments(1, info.Length()));
return;
}
BooleanOrElementSequence arg;
V8BooleanOrElementSequence::ToImpl(info.GetIsolate(), info[0], arg, UnionTypeConversionMode::kNotNullable, exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return;
impl->voidMethodBooleanOrElementSequenceArg(arg);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 135,356 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nfs4_layoutget_prepare(struct rpc_task *task, void *calldata)
{
struct nfs4_layoutget *lgp = calldata;
struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(lgp->args.inode);
dprintk("--> %s\n", __func__);
/* Note the is a race here, where a CB_LAYOUTRECALL can come in
* right now covering the LAYOUTGET we are about to send.
* However, that is not so catastrophic, and there seems
* to be no way to prevent it completely.
*/
if (nfs4_setup_sequence(server, &lgp->args.seq_args,
&lgp->res.seq_res, task))
return;
if (pnfs_choose_layoutget_stateid(&lgp->args.stateid,
NFS_I(lgp->args.inode)->layout,
lgp->args.ctx->state)) {
rpc_exit(task, NFS4_OK);
return;
}
rpc_call_start(task);
}
Commit Message: Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 19,924 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ProcRenderSetPictureFilter (ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST (xRenderSetPictureFilterReq);
PicturePtr pPicture;
int result;
xFixed *params;
int nparams;
char *name;
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE (xRenderSetPictureFilterReq);
VERIFY_PICTURE (pPicture, stuff->picture, client, DixSetAttrAccess);
name = (char *) (stuff + 1);
params = (xFixed *) (name + pad_to_int32(stuff->nbytes));
nparams = ((xFixed *) stuff + client->req_len) - params;
result = SetPictureFilter (pPicture, name, stuff->nbytes, params, nparams);
return result;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 14,080 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8TestObject::VoidMethodArrayBufferOrArrayBufferViewOrDictionaryArgMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_voidMethodArrayBufferOrArrayBufferViewOrDictionaryArg");
test_object_v8_internal::VoidMethodArrayBufferOrArrayBufferViewOrDictionaryArgMethod(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 135,346 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void *t_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos)
{
int cpu;
local_irq_disable();
cpu = smp_processor_id();
per_cpu(trace_active, cpu)++;
arch_spin_lock(&max_stack_lock);
if (*pos == 0)
return SEQ_START_TOKEN;
return __next(m, pos);
}
Commit Message: tracing: Fix possible NULL pointer dereferences
Currently set_ftrace_pid and set_graph_function files use seq_lseek
for their fops. However seq_open() is called only for FMODE_READ in
the fops->open() so that if an user tries to seek one of those file
when she open it for writing, it sees NULL seq_file and then panic.
It can be easily reproduced with following command:
$ cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
$ echo 1234 | sudo tee -a set_ftrace_pid
In this example, GNU coreutils' tee opens the file with fopen(, "a")
and then the fopen() internally calls lseek().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365663302-2170-1-git-send-email-namhyung@kernel.org
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung.kim@lge.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 30,307 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int validation_gamma(int argc, char **argv)
{
double gamma[9] = { 2.2, 1.8, 1.52, 1.45, 1., 1/1.45, 1/1.52, 1/1.8, 1/2.2 };
double maxerr;
int i, silent=0, onlygamma=0;
/* Silence the output with -s, just test the gamma functions with -g: */
while (--argc > 0)
if (strcmp(*++argv, "-s") == 0)
silent = 1;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "-g") == 0)
onlygamma = 1;
else
{
fprintf(stderr, "unknown argument %s\n", *argv);
return 1;
}
if (!onlygamma)
{
/* First validate the log functions: */
maxerr = 0;
for (i=0; i<256; ++i)
{
double correct = -log(i/255.)/log(2.)*65536;
double error = png_log8bit(i) - correct;
if (i != 0 && fabs(error) > maxerr)
maxerr = fabs(error);
if (i == 0 && png_log8bit(i) != 0xffffffff ||
i != 0 && png_log8bit(i) != floor(correct+.5))
{
fprintf(stderr, "8 bit log error: %d: got %u, expected %f\n",
i, png_log8bit(i), correct);
}
}
if (!silent)
printf("maximum 8 bit log error = %f\n", maxerr);
maxerr = 0;
for (i=0; i<65536; ++i)
{
double correct = -log(i/65535.)/log(2.)*65536;
double error = png_log16bit(i) - correct;
if (i != 0 && fabs(error) > maxerr)
maxerr = fabs(error);
if (i == 0 && png_log16bit(i) != 0xffffffff ||
i != 0 && png_log16bit(i) != floor(correct+.5))
{
if (error > .68) /* By experiment error is less than .68 */
{
fprintf(stderr, "16 bit log error: %d: got %u, expected %f"
" error: %f\n", i, png_log16bit(i), correct, error);
}
}
}
if (!silent)
printf("maximum 16 bit log error = %f\n", maxerr);
/* Now exponentiations. */
maxerr = 0;
for (i=0; i<=0xfffff; ++i)
{
double correct = exp(-i/65536. * log(2.)) * (65536. * 65536);
double error = png_exp(i) - correct;
if (fabs(error) > maxerr)
maxerr = fabs(error);
if (fabs(error) > 1883) /* By experiment. */
{
fprintf(stderr, "32 bit exp error: %d: got %u, expected %f"
" error: %f\n", i, png_exp(i), correct, error);
}
}
if (!silent)
printf("maximum 32 bit exp error = %f\n", maxerr);
maxerr = 0;
for (i=0; i<=0xfffff; ++i)
{
double correct = exp(-i/65536. * log(2.)) * 255;
double error = png_exp8bit(i) - correct;
if (fabs(error) > maxerr)
maxerr = fabs(error);
if (fabs(error) > .50002) /* By experiment */
{
fprintf(stderr, "8 bit exp error: %d: got %u, expected %f"
" error: %f\n", i, png_exp8bit(i), correct, error);
}
}
if (!silent)
printf("maximum 8 bit exp error = %f\n", maxerr);
maxerr = 0;
for (i=0; i<=0xfffff; ++i)
{
double correct = exp(-i/65536. * log(2.)) * 65535;
double error = png_exp16bit(i) - correct;
if (fabs(error) > maxerr)
maxerr = fabs(error);
if (fabs(error) > .524) /* By experiment */
{
fprintf(stderr, "16 bit exp error: %d: got %u, expected %f"
" error: %f\n", i, png_exp16bit(i), correct, error);
}
}
if (!silent)
printf("maximum 16 bit exp error = %f\n", maxerr);
} /* !onlygamma */
/* Test the overall gamma correction. */
for (i=0; i<9; ++i)
{
unsigned j;
double g = gamma[i];
png_fixed_point gfp = floor(g * PNG_FP_1 + .5);
if (!silent)
printf("Test gamma %f\n", g);
maxerr = 0;
for (j=0; j<256; ++j)
{
double correct = pow(j/255., g) * 255;
png_byte out = png_gamma_8bit_correct(j, gfp);
double error = out - correct;
if (fabs(error) > maxerr)
maxerr = fabs(error);
if (out != floor(correct+.5))
{
fprintf(stderr, "8bit %d ^ %f: got %d expected %f error %f\n",
j, g, out, correct, error);
}
}
if (!silent)
printf("gamma %f: maximum 8 bit error %f\n", g, maxerr);
maxerr = 0;
for (j=0; j<65536; ++j)
{
double correct = pow(j/65535., g) * 65535;
png_uint_16 out = png_gamma_16bit_correct(j, gfp);
double error = out - correct;
if (fabs(error) > maxerr)
maxerr = fabs(error);
if (fabs(error) > 1.62)
{
fprintf(stderr, "16bit %d ^ %f: got %d expected %f error %f\n",
j, g, out, correct, error);
}
}
if (!silent)
printf("gamma %f: maximum 16 bit error %f\n", g, maxerr);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 1 | 173,720 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gst_asf_demux_handle_seek_push (GstASFDemux * demux, GstEvent * event)
{
gdouble rate;
GstFormat format;
GstSeekFlags flags;
GstSeekType cur_type, stop_type;
gint64 cur, stop;
guint packet;
gboolean res;
GstEvent *byte_event;
gst_event_parse_seek (event, &rate, &format, &flags, &cur_type, &cur,
&stop_type, &stop);
stop_type = GST_SEEK_TYPE_NONE;
stop = -1;
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (demux, "seeking to %" GST_TIME_FORMAT, GST_TIME_ARGS (cur));
/* determine packet, by index or by estimation */
if (!gst_asf_demux_seek_index_lookup (demux, &packet, cur, NULL, NULL, FALSE,
NULL)) {
packet =
(guint) gst_util_uint64_scale (demux->num_packets, cur,
demux->play_time);
}
if (packet > demux->num_packets) {
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (demux, "could not determine packet to seek to, "
"seek aborted.");
return FALSE;
}
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (demux, "seeking to packet %d", packet);
cur = demux->data_offset + ((guint64) packet * demux->packet_size);
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (demux, "Pushing BYTE seek rate %g, "
"start %" G_GINT64_FORMAT ", stop %" G_GINT64_FORMAT, rate, cur, stop);
/* BYTE seek event */
byte_event = gst_event_new_seek (rate, GST_FORMAT_BYTES, flags, cur_type,
cur, stop_type, stop);
gst_event_set_seqnum (byte_event, gst_event_get_seqnum (event));
res = gst_pad_push_event (demux->sinkpad, byte_event);
return res;
}
Commit Message: asfdemux: Check that we have enough data available before parsing bool/uint extended content descriptors
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777955
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 68,555 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: clear_fifo_list ()
{
register int i;
if (nfds == 0)
return;
for (i = 0; nfds && i < totfds; i++)
clear_fifo (i);
nfds = 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 9,290 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int crypto_ahash_report(struct sk_buff *skb, struct crypto_alg *alg)
{
struct crypto_report_hash rhash;
snprintf(rhash.type, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "%s", "ahash");
rhash.blocksize = alg->cra_blocksize;
rhash.digestsize = __crypto_hash_alg_common(alg)->digestsize;
if (nla_put(skb, CRYPTOCFGA_REPORT_HASH,
sizeof(struct crypto_report_hash), &rhash))
goto nla_put_failure;
return 0;
nla_put_failure:
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 1 | 166,065 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderView::OnCopy() {
if (!webview())
return;
webview()->focusedFrame()->executeCommand(WebString::fromUTF8("Copy"),
context_menu_node_);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,930 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct inode *isofs_iget(struct super_block *sb,
unsigned long block,
unsigned long offset)
{
unsigned long hashval;
struct inode *inode;
struct isofs_iget5_callback_data data;
long ret;
if (offset >= 1ul << sb->s_blocksize_bits)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
data.block = block;
data.offset = offset;
hashval = (block << sb->s_blocksize_bits) | offset;
inode = iget5_locked(sb, hashval, &isofs_iget5_test,
&isofs_iget5_set, &data);
if (!inode)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
if (inode->i_state & I_NEW) {
ret = isofs_read_inode(inode);
if (ret < 0) {
iget_failed(inode);
inode = ERR_PTR(ret);
} else {
unlock_new_inode(inode);
}
}
return inode;
}
Commit Message: isofs: Fix unbounded recursion when processing relocated directories
We did not check relocated directory in any way when processing Rock
Ridge 'CL' tag. Thus a corrupted isofs image can possibly have a CL
entry pointing to another CL entry leading to possibly unbounded
recursion in kernel code and thus stack overflow or deadlocks (if there
is a loop created from CL entries).
Fix the problem by not allowing CL entry to point to a directory entry
with CL entry (such use makes no good sense anyway) and by checking
whether CL entry doesn't point to itself.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Chris Evans <cevans@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 166,268 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoUniform4iv(
GLint location,
GLsizei count,
const volatile GLint* v) {
api()->glUniform4ivFn(location, count, const_cast<const GLint*>(v));
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 142,158 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: venc_dev::~venc_dev()
{
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: add checks before accessing heap pointers
Heap pointers do not point to user virtual addresses in case
of secure session.
Set them to NULL and add checks to avoid accesing them
Bug: 28815329
Bug: 28920116
Change-Id: I94fd5808e753b58654d65e175d3857ef46ffba26
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 159,322 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OneClickSigninHelper::Offer OneClickSigninHelper::CanOfferOnIOThreadImpl(
const GURL& url,
const std::string& referrer,
base::SupportsUserData* request,
ProfileIOData* io_data) {
if (!gaia::IsGaiaSignonRealm(url.GetOrigin()))
return IGNORE_REQUEST;
if (!io_data)
return DONT_OFFER;
if (io_data->is_incognito())
return DONT_OFFER;
if (!SigninManager::IsSigninAllowedOnIOThread(io_data))
return DONT_OFFER;
if (!io_data->reverse_autologin_enabled()->GetValue())
return DONT_OFFER;
if (!io_data->google_services_username()->GetValue().empty())
return DONT_OFFER;
if (!ChromeSigninManagerDelegate::SettingsAllowSigninCookies(
io_data->GetCookieSettings()))
return DONT_OFFER;
const std::string& pending_email = io_data->reverse_autologin_pending_email();
if (!pending_email.empty()) {
if (!SigninManager::IsUsernameAllowedByPolicy(pending_email,
io_data->google_services_username_pattern()->GetValue())) {
return DONT_OFFER;
}
std::vector<std::string> rejected_emails =
io_data->one_click_signin_rejected_email_list()->GetValue();
if (std::count_if(rejected_emails.begin(), rejected_emails.end(),
std::bind2nd(std::equal_to<std::string>(),
pending_email)) > 0) {
return DONT_OFFER;
}
if (io_data->signin_names()->GetEmails().count(
UTF8ToUTF16(pending_email)) > 0) {
return DONT_OFFER;
}
}
return CAN_OFFER;
}
Commit Message: During redirects in the one click sign in flow, check the current URL
instead of original URL to validate gaia http headers.
BUG=307159
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/77343002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@236563 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 0 | 109,810 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::write(const SegmentedString& text,
Document* entered_document,
ExceptionState& exception_state) {
if (ImportLoader()) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
kInvalidStateError, "Imported document doesn't support write().");
return;
}
if (!IsHTMLDocument()) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(kInvalidStateError,
"Only HTML documents support write().");
return;
}
if (throw_on_dynamic_markup_insertion_count_) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
kInvalidStateError,
"Custom Element constructor should not use write().");
return;
}
if (entered_document &&
!GetSecurityOrigin()->IsSameSchemeHostPortAndSuborigin(
entered_document->GetSecurityOrigin())) {
exception_state.ThrowSecurityError(
"Can only call write() on same-origin documents.");
return;
}
NestingLevelIncrementer nesting_level_incrementer(write_recursion_depth_);
write_recursion_is_too_deep_ =
(write_recursion_depth_ > 1) && write_recursion_is_too_deep_;
write_recursion_is_too_deep_ =
(write_recursion_depth_ > kCMaxWriteRecursionDepth) ||
write_recursion_is_too_deep_;
if (write_recursion_is_too_deep_)
return;
bool has_insertion_point = parser_ && parser_->HasInsertionPoint();
if (!has_insertion_point && ignore_destructive_write_count_) {
AddConsoleMessage(
ConsoleMessage::Create(kJSMessageSource, kWarningMessageLevel,
ExceptionMessages::FailedToExecute(
"write", "Document",
"It isn't possible to write into a document "
"from an asynchronously-loaded external "
"script unless it is explicitly opened.")));
return;
}
if (!has_insertion_point)
open(entered_document, ASSERT_NO_EXCEPTION);
DCHECK(parser_);
PerformanceMonitor::ReportGenericViolation(
this, PerformanceMonitor::kDiscouragedAPIUse,
"Avoid using document.write().", 0, nullptr);
probe::breakableLocation(this, "Document.write");
parser_->insert(text);
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 134,240 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: digest_authentication_encode (const char *au, const char *user,
const char *passwd, const char *method,
const char *path, uerr_t *auth_err)
{
static char *realm, *opaque, *nonce, *qop, *algorithm;
static struct {
const char *name;
char **variable;
} options[] = {
{ "realm", &realm },
{ "opaque", &opaque },
{ "nonce", &nonce },
{ "qop", &qop },
{ "algorithm", &algorithm }
};
char cnonce[16] = "";
char *res = NULL;
int res_len;
size_t res_size;
param_token name, value;
realm = opaque = nonce = algorithm = qop = NULL;
au += 6; /* skip over `Digest' */
while (extract_param (&au, &name, &value, ',', NULL))
{
size_t i;
size_t namelen = name.e - name.b;
for (i = 0; i < countof (options); i++)
if (namelen == strlen (options[i].name)
&& 0 == strncmp (name.b, options[i].name,
namelen))
{
*options[i].variable = strdupdelim (value.b, value.e);
break;
}
}
if (qop && strcmp (qop, "auth"))
{
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("Unsupported quality of protection '%s'.\n"), qop);
xfree (qop); /* force freeing mem and continue */
}
else if (algorithm && strcmp (algorithm,"MD5") && strcmp (algorithm,"MD5-sess"))
{
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("Unsupported algorithm '%s'.\n"), algorithm);
xfree (algorithm); /* force freeing mem and continue */
}
if (!realm || !nonce || !user || !passwd || !path || !method)
{
*auth_err = ATTRMISSING;
goto cleanup;
}
/* Calculate the digest value. */
{
struct md5_ctx ctx;
unsigned char hash[MD5_DIGEST_SIZE];
char a1buf[MD5_DIGEST_SIZE * 2 + 1], a2buf[MD5_DIGEST_SIZE * 2 + 1];
char response_digest[MD5_DIGEST_SIZE * 2 + 1];
/* A1BUF = H(user ":" realm ":" password) */
md5_init_ctx (&ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)user, strlen (user), &ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)":", 1, &ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)realm, strlen (realm), &ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)":", 1, &ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)passwd, strlen (passwd), &ctx);
md5_finish_ctx (&ctx, hash);
dump_hash (a1buf, hash);
if (algorithm && !strcmp (algorithm, "MD5-sess"))
{
/* A1BUF = H( H(user ":" realm ":" password) ":" nonce ":" cnonce ) */
snprintf (cnonce, sizeof (cnonce), "%08x",
(unsigned) random_number (INT_MAX));
md5_init_ctx (&ctx);
/* md5_process_bytes (hash, MD5_DIGEST_SIZE, &ctx); */
md5_process_bytes (a1buf, MD5_DIGEST_SIZE * 2, &ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)":", 1, &ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)nonce, strlen (nonce), &ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)":", 1, &ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)cnonce, strlen (cnonce), &ctx);
md5_finish_ctx (&ctx, hash);
dump_hash (a1buf, hash);
}
/* A2BUF = H(method ":" path) */
md5_init_ctx (&ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)method, strlen (method), &ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)":", 1, &ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)path, strlen (path), &ctx);
md5_finish_ctx (&ctx, hash);
dump_hash (a2buf, hash);
if (qop && !strcmp (qop, "auth"))
{
/* RFC 2617 Digest Access Authentication */
/* generate random hex string */
if (!*cnonce)
snprintf (cnonce, sizeof (cnonce), "%08x",
(unsigned) random_number (INT_MAX));
/* RESPONSE_DIGEST = H(A1BUF ":" nonce ":" noncecount ":" clientnonce ":" qop ": " A2BUF) */
md5_init_ctx (&ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)a1buf, MD5_DIGEST_SIZE * 2, &ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)":", 1, &ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)nonce, strlen (nonce), &ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)":", 1, &ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)"00000001", 8, &ctx); /* TODO: keep track of server nonce values */
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)":", 1, &ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)cnonce, strlen (cnonce), &ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)":", 1, &ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)qop, strlen (qop), &ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)":", 1, &ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)a2buf, MD5_DIGEST_SIZE * 2, &ctx);
md5_finish_ctx (&ctx, hash);
}
else
{
/* RFC 2069 Digest Access Authentication */
/* RESPONSE_DIGEST = H(A1BUF ":" nonce ":" A2BUF) */
md5_init_ctx (&ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)a1buf, MD5_DIGEST_SIZE * 2, &ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)":", 1, &ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)nonce, strlen (nonce), &ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)":", 1, &ctx);
md5_process_bytes ((unsigned char *)a2buf, MD5_DIGEST_SIZE * 2, &ctx);
md5_finish_ctx (&ctx, hash);
}
dump_hash (response_digest, hash);
res_size = strlen (user)
+ strlen (realm)
+ strlen (nonce)
+ strlen (path)
+ 2 * MD5_DIGEST_SIZE /*strlen (response_digest)*/
+ (opaque ? strlen (opaque) : 0)
+ (algorithm ? strlen (algorithm) : 0)
+ (qop ? 128: 0)
+ strlen (cnonce)
+ 128;
res = xmalloc (res_size);
if (qop && !strcmp (qop, "auth"))
{
res_len = snprintf (res, res_size, "Digest "\
"username=\"%s\", realm=\"%s\", nonce=\"%s\", uri=\"%s\", response=\"%s\""\
", qop=auth, nc=00000001, cnonce=\"%s\"",
user, realm, nonce, path, response_digest, cnonce);
}
else
{
res_len = snprintf (res, res_size, "Digest "\
"username=\"%s\", realm=\"%s\", nonce=\"%s\", uri=\"%s\", response=\"%s\"",
user, realm, nonce, path, response_digest);
}
if (opaque)
{
res_len += snprintf (res + res_len, res_size - res_len, ", opaque=\"%s\"", opaque);
}
if (algorithm)
{
snprintf (res + res_len, res_size - res_len, ", algorithm=\"%s\"", algorithm);
}
}
cleanup:
xfree (realm);
xfree (opaque);
xfree (nonce);
xfree (qop);
xfree (algorithm);
return res;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 15,475 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BookmarkManagerView* BookmarkManagerView::current() {
return manager;
}
Commit Message: Relands cl 16982 as it wasn't the cause of the build breakage. Here's
the description for that cl:
Lands http://codereview.chromium.org/115505 for bug
http://crbug.com/4030 for tyoshino.
BUG=http://crbug.com/4030
TEST=make sure control-w dismisses bookmark manager.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/113902
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@16987 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 109,129 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MediaControlPanelElement::didBecomeVisible() {
DCHECK(m_isDisplayed && m_opaque);
mediaElement().mediaControlsDidBecomeVisible();
}
Commit Message: Fixed volume slider element event handling
MediaControlVolumeSliderElement::defaultEventHandler has making
redundant calls to setVolume() & setMuted() on mouse activity. E.g. if
a mouse click changed the slider position, the above calls were made 4
times, once for each of these events: mousedown, input, mouseup,
DOMActive, click. This crack got exposed when PointerEvents are enabled
by default on M55, adding pointermove, pointerdown & pointerup to the
list.
This CL fixes the code to trigger the calls to setVolume() & setMuted()
only when the slider position is changed. Also added pointer events to
certain lists of mouse events in the code.
BUG=677900
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2622273003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#446032}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 126,955 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nfsd_link(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *ffhp,
char *name, int len, struct svc_fh *tfhp)
{
struct dentry *ddir, *dnew, *dold;
struct inode *dirp;
__be32 err;
int host_err;
err = fh_verify(rqstp, ffhp, S_IFDIR, NFSD_MAY_CREATE);
if (err)
goto out;
err = fh_verify(rqstp, tfhp, 0, NFSD_MAY_NOP);
if (err)
goto out;
err = nfserr_isdir;
if (d_is_dir(tfhp->fh_dentry))
goto out;
err = nfserr_perm;
if (!len)
goto out;
err = nfserr_exist;
if (isdotent(name, len))
goto out;
host_err = fh_want_write(tfhp);
if (host_err) {
err = nfserrno(host_err);
goto out;
}
fh_lock_nested(ffhp, I_MUTEX_PARENT);
ddir = ffhp->fh_dentry;
dirp = d_inode(ddir);
dnew = lookup_one_len(name, ddir, len);
host_err = PTR_ERR(dnew);
if (IS_ERR(dnew))
goto out_nfserr;
dold = tfhp->fh_dentry;
err = nfserr_noent;
if (d_really_is_negative(dold))
goto out_dput;
host_err = vfs_link(dold, dirp, dnew, NULL);
if (!host_err) {
err = nfserrno(commit_metadata(ffhp));
if (!err)
err = nfserrno(commit_metadata(tfhp));
} else {
if (host_err == -EXDEV && rqstp->rq_vers == 2)
err = nfserr_acces;
else
err = nfserrno(host_err);
}
out_dput:
dput(dnew);
out_unlock:
fh_unlock(ffhp);
fh_drop_write(tfhp);
out:
return err;
out_nfserr:
err = nfserrno(host_err);
goto out_unlock;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,893 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NetworkThrottleManagerImpl::RecomputeOutstanding() {
base::TimeTicks now(tick_clock_->NowTicks());
base::TimeDelta age_horizon(base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds((
kMedianLifetimeMultiple * lifetime_median_estimate_.current_estimate())));
while (!outstanding_throttles_.empty()) {
ThrottleImpl* throttle = *outstanding_throttles_.begin();
if (throttle->start_time() + age_horizon >= now)
break;
outstanding_throttles_.erase(outstanding_throttles_.begin());
throttle->SetAged();
throttle->set_queue_pointer(outstanding_throttles_.end());
}
if (outstanding_throttles_.empty())
return;
if (outstanding_recomputation_timer_->IsRunning())
return;
ThrottleImpl* first_throttle(*outstanding_throttles_.begin());
DCHECK_GE(first_throttle->start_time() + age_horizon, now);
outstanding_recomputation_timer_->Start(
FROM_HERE,
((first_throttle->start_time() + age_horizon) - now +
base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(kTimerFudgeInMs)),
base::Bind(&NetworkThrottleManagerImpl::MaybeUnblockThrottles,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
Commit Message: Replace base::MakeUnique with std::make_unique in net/.
base/memory/ptr_util.h includes will be cleaned up later.
Bug: 755727
Change-Id: Ibaf46f05c9b02b76f9a91e819984b087a8c0d434
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/627300
Commit-Queue: Jeremy Roman <jbroman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Bence Béky <bnc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498123}
CWE ID: CWE-311 | 0 | 156,313 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ZEND_API uint32_t ZEND_FASTCALL zend_hash_iterator_add(HashTable *ht, HashPosition pos)
{
HashTableIterator *iter = EG(ht_iterators);
HashTableIterator *end = iter + EG(ht_iterators_count);
uint32_t idx;
if (EXPECTED(ht->u.v.nIteratorsCount != 255)) {
ht->u.v.nIteratorsCount++;
}
while (iter != end) {
if (iter->ht == NULL) {
iter->ht = ht;
iter->pos = pos;
idx = iter - EG(ht_iterators);
if (idx + 1 > EG(ht_iterators_used)) {
EG(ht_iterators_used) = idx + 1;
}
return idx;
}
iter++;
}
if (EG(ht_iterators) == EG(ht_iterators_slots)) {
EG(ht_iterators) = emalloc(sizeof(HashTableIterator) * (EG(ht_iterators_count) + 8));
memcpy(EG(ht_iterators), EG(ht_iterators_slots), sizeof(HashTableIterator) * EG(ht_iterators_count));
} else {
EG(ht_iterators) = erealloc(EG(ht_iterators), sizeof(HashTableIterator) * (EG(ht_iterators_count) + 8));
}
iter = EG(ht_iterators) + EG(ht_iterators_count);
EG(ht_iterators_count) += 8;
iter->ht = ht;
iter->pos = pos;
memset(iter + 1, 0, sizeof(HashTableIterator) * 7);
idx = iter - EG(ht_iterators);
EG(ht_iterators_used) = idx + 1;
return idx;
}
Commit Message: Fix #73832 - leave the table in a safe state if the size is too big.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 69,196 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int proc_setgroups_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
{
struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private;
unsigned long userns_flags = READ_ONCE(ns->flags);
seq_printf(seq, "%s\n",
(userns_flags & USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED) ?
"allow" : "deny");
return 0;
}
Commit Message: userns: also map extents in the reverse map to kernel IDs
The current logic first clones the extent array and sorts both copies, then
maps the lower IDs of the forward mapping into the lower namespace, but
doesn't map the lower IDs of the reverse mapping.
This means that code in a nested user namespace with >5 extents will see
incorrect IDs. It also breaks some access checks, like
inode_owner_or_capable() and privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(), so a process
can incorrectly appear to be capable relative to an inode.
To fix it, we have to make sure that the "lower_first" members of extents
in both arrays are translated; and we have to make sure that the reverse
map is sorted *after* the translation (since otherwise the translation can
break the sorting).
This is CVE-2018-18955.
Fixes: 6397fac4915a ("userns: bump idmap limits to 340")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Tested-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 76,195 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: hash_insert( char* key,
size_t data,
hashtable* ht,
FT_Memory memory )
{
hashnode nn, *bp = hash_bucket( key, ht );
FT_Error error = BDF_Err_Ok;
nn = *bp;
if ( !nn )
{
if ( FT_NEW( nn ) )
goto Exit;
*bp = nn;
nn->key = key;
nn->data = data;
if ( ht->used >= ht->limit )
{
error = hash_rehash( ht, memory );
if ( error )
goto Exit;
}
ht->used++;
}
else
nn->data = data;
Exit:
return error;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 6,527 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::FocusSearch() {
UserMetrics::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("FocusSearch"), profile_);
window_->GetLocationBar()->FocusSearch();
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,236 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int setcalgrayspace(i_ctx_t * i_ctx_p, ref *r, int *stage, int *cont, int CIESubst)
{
ref graydict;
int code = 0;
float gamma, white[3], black[3];
double dflt_gamma = 1.0;
static const float dflt_black[3] = {0,0,0}, dflt_white[3] = {0,0,0};
gs_client_color cc;
*cont = 0;
code = array_get(imemory, r, 1, &graydict);
if (code < 0)
return code;
/* Get all the parts */
code = dict_float_param(&graydict, "Gamma",
dflt_gamma, &gamma);
if (code < 0)
return code;
if (gamma <= 0 )
return_error(gs_error_rangecheck);
code = dict_floats_param( imemory,
&graydict,
"BlackPoint",
3,
black,
dflt_black );
if (code < 0)
return code;
code = dict_floats_param( imemory,
&graydict,
"WhitePoint",
3,
white,
dflt_white );
if (code < 0)
return code;
if (white[0] <= 0 || white[1] != 1.0 || white[2] <= 0)
return_error(gs_error_rangecheck);
code = seticc_cal(i_ctx_p, white, black, &gamma, NULL, 1,
graydict.value.saveid);
if ( code < 0)
return gs_rethrow(code, "setting CalGray color space");
cc.pattern = 0x00;
cc.paint.values[0] = 0;
code = gs_setcolor(igs, &cc);
return code;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 3,133 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: raptor_option_is_valid_for_area(const raptor_option option,
raptor_option_area area)
{
if(option > RAPTOR_OPTION_LAST)
return 0;
return (raptor_options_list[option].area & area) != 0;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2012-0037
Enforce entity loading policy in raptor_libxml_resolveEntity
and raptor_libxml_getEntity by checking for file URIs and network URIs.
Add RAPTOR_OPTION_LOAD_EXTERNAL_ENTITIES / loadExternalEntities for
turning on loading of XML external entity loading, disabled by default.
This affects all the parsers that use SAX2: rdfxml, rss-tag-soup (and
aliases) and rdfa.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 21,993 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int nfs_writepages(struct address_space *mapping, struct writeback_control *wbc)
{
struct inode *inode = mapping->host;
unsigned long *bitlock = &NFS_I(inode)->flags;
struct nfs_pageio_descriptor pgio;
int err;
/* Stop dirtying of new pages while we sync */
err = wait_on_bit_lock(bitlock, NFS_INO_FLUSHING,
nfs_wait_bit_killable, TASK_KILLABLE);
if (err)
goto out_err;
nfs_inc_stats(inode, NFSIOS_VFSWRITEPAGES);
NFS_PROTO(inode)->write_pageio_init(&pgio, inode, wb_priority(wbc), &nfs_async_write_completion_ops);
err = write_cache_pages(mapping, wbc, nfs_writepages_callback, &pgio);
nfs_pageio_complete(&pgio);
clear_bit_unlock(NFS_INO_FLUSHING, bitlock);
smp_mb__after_clear_bit();
wake_up_bit(bitlock, NFS_INO_FLUSHING);
if (err < 0)
goto out_err;
err = pgio.pg_error;
if (err < 0)
goto out_err;
return 0;
out_err:
return err;
}
Commit Message: nfs: always make sure page is up-to-date before extending a write to cover the entire page
We should always make sure the cached page is up-to-date when we're
determining whether we can extend a write to cover the full page -- even
if we've received a write delegation from the server.
Commit c7559663 added logic to skip this check if we have a write
delegation, which can lead to data corruption such as the following
scenario if client B receives a write delegation from the NFS server:
Client A:
# echo 123456789 > /mnt/file
Client B:
# echo abcdefghi >> /mnt/file
# cat /mnt/file
0�D0�abcdefghi
Just because we hold a write delegation doesn't mean that we've read in
the entire page contents.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.11+
Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 39,219 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MemoryInstrumentation::RequestGlobalDump(
RequestGlobalDumpCallback callback) {
RequestGlobalDump({}, callback);
}
Commit Message: memory-infra: split up memory-infra coordinator service into two
This allows for heap profiler to use its own service with correct
capabilities and all other instances to use the existing coordinator
service.
Bug: 792028
Change-Id: I84e4ec71f5f1d00991c0516b1424ce7334bcd3cd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/836896
Commit-Queue: Lalit Maganti <lalitm@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: oysteine <oysteine@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Albert J. Wong <ajwong@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Hector Dearman <hjd@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529059}
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 150,108 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: HTMLInputElement::FilesFromFileInputFormControlState(
const FormControlState& state) {
return FileInputType::FilesFromFormControlState(state);
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,024 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void srpt_event_handler(struct ib_event_handler *handler,
struct ib_event *event)
{
struct srpt_device *sdev;
struct srpt_port *sport;
sdev = ib_get_client_data(event->device, &srpt_client);
if (!sdev || sdev->device != event->device)
return;
pr_debug("ASYNC event= %d on device= %s\n", event->event,
srpt_sdev_name(sdev));
switch (event->event) {
case IB_EVENT_PORT_ERR:
if (event->element.port_num <= sdev->device->phys_port_cnt) {
sport = &sdev->port[event->element.port_num - 1];
sport->lid = 0;
sport->sm_lid = 0;
}
break;
case IB_EVENT_PORT_ACTIVE:
case IB_EVENT_LID_CHANGE:
case IB_EVENT_PKEY_CHANGE:
case IB_EVENT_SM_CHANGE:
case IB_EVENT_CLIENT_REREGISTER:
case IB_EVENT_GID_CHANGE:
/* Refresh port data asynchronously. */
if (event->element.port_num <= sdev->device->phys_port_cnt) {
sport = &sdev->port[event->element.port_num - 1];
if (!sport->lid && !sport->sm_lid)
schedule_work(&sport->work);
}
break;
default:
pr_err("received unrecognized IB event %d\n",
event->event);
break;
}
}
Commit Message: IB/srpt: Simplify srpt_handle_tsk_mgmt()
Let the target core check task existence instead of the SRP target
driver. Additionally, let the target core check the validity of the
task management request instead of the ib_srpt driver.
This patch fixes the following kernel crash:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000001
IP: [<ffffffffa0565f37>] srpt_handle_new_iu+0x6d7/0x790 [ib_srpt]
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
Call Trace:
[<ffffffffa05660ce>] srpt_process_completion+0xde/0x570 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffffa056669f>] srpt_compl_thread+0x13f/0x160 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffff8109726f>] kthread+0xcf/0xe0
[<ffffffff81613cfc>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@sandisk.com>
Fixes: 3e4f574857ee ("ib_srpt: Convert TMR path to target_submit_tmr")
Tested-by: Alex Estrin <alex.estrin@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
Cc: Sagi Grimberg <sagig@mellanox.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 50,650 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int seqiv_aead_givencrypt_first(struct aead_givcrypt_request *req)
{
struct crypto_aead *geniv = aead_givcrypt_reqtfm(req);
struct seqiv_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(geniv);
int err = 0;
spin_lock_bh(&ctx->lock);
if (crypto_aead_crt(geniv)->givencrypt != seqiv_aead_givencrypt_first)
goto unlock;
crypto_aead_crt(geniv)->givencrypt = seqiv_aead_givencrypt;
err = crypto_rng_get_bytes(crypto_default_rng, ctx->salt,
crypto_aead_ivsize(geniv));
unlock:
spin_unlock_bh(&ctx->lock);
if (err)
return err;
return seqiv_aead_givencrypt(req);
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 45,890 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: double GfxState::getTransformedFontSize() {
double x1, y1, x2, y2;
x1 = textMat[2] * fontSize;
y1 = textMat[3] * fontSize;
x2 = ctm[0] * x1 + ctm[2] * y1;
y2 = ctm[1] * x1 + ctm[3] * y1;
return sqrt(x2 * x2 + y2 * y2);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 1,076 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LayerTreeCoordinator::scheduleLayerFlush()
{
if (!m_layerFlushSchedulingEnabled)
return;
if (!m_layerFlushTimer.isActive())
m_layerFlushTimer.startOneShot(0);
}
Commit Message: [WK2] LayerTreeCoordinator should release unused UpdatedAtlases
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95072
Reviewed by Jocelyn Turcotte.
Release graphic buffers that haven't been used for a while in order to save memory.
This way we can give back memory to the system when no user interaction happens
after a period of time, for example when we are in the background.
* Shared/ShareableBitmap.h:
* WebProcess/WebPage/CoordinatedGraphics/LayerTreeCoordinator.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::LayerTreeCoordinator):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::beginContentUpdate):
(WebKit):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::scheduleReleaseInactiveAtlases):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::releaseInactiveAtlasesTimerFired):
* WebProcess/WebPage/CoordinatedGraphics/LayerTreeCoordinator.h:
(LayerTreeCoordinator):
* WebProcess/WebPage/UpdateAtlas.cpp:
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::UpdateAtlas):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::didSwapBuffers):
Don't call buildLayoutIfNeeded here. It's enought to call it in beginPaintingOnAvailableBuffer
and this way we can track whether this atlas is used with m_areaAllocator.
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::beginPaintingOnAvailableBuffer):
* WebProcess/WebPage/UpdateAtlas.h:
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::addTimeInactive):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::isInactive):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::isInUse):
(UpdateAtlas):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@128473 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 97,601 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void mwifiex_set_sys_config_invalid_data(struct mwifiex_uap_bss_param *config)
{
config->bcast_ssid_ctl = 0x7F;
config->radio_ctl = 0x7F;
config->dtim_period = 0x7F;
config->beacon_period = 0x7FFF;
config->auth_mode = 0x7F;
config->rts_threshold = 0x7FFF;
config->frag_threshold = 0x7FFF;
config->retry_limit = 0x7F;
config->qos_info = 0xFF;
}
Commit Message: mwifiex: Fix three heap overflow at parsing element in cfg80211_ap_settings
mwifiex_update_vs_ie(),mwifiex_set_uap_rates() and
mwifiex_set_wmm_params() call memcpy() without checking
the destination size.Since the source is given from
user-space, this may trigger a heap buffer overflow.
Fix them by putting the length check before performing memcpy().
This fix addresses CVE-2019-14814,CVE-2019-14815,CVE-2019-14816.
Signed-off-by: Wen Huang <huangwenabc@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Ganapathi Bhat <gbhat@marvell.comg>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
CWE ID: CWE-120 | 0 | 88,617 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: scoped_refptr<ui::ContextProviderCommandBuffer> CreateOffscreenContext(
scoped_refptr<gpu::GpuChannelHost> gpu_channel_host,
const gpu::SharedMemoryLimits& limits,
bool support_locking,
bool support_oop_rasterization,
ui::command_buffer_metrics::ContextType type,
int32_t stream_id,
gpu::SchedulingPriority stream_priority) {
DCHECK(gpu_channel_host);
gpu::gles2::ContextCreationAttribHelper attributes;
attributes.alpha_size = -1;
attributes.depth_size = 0;
attributes.stencil_size = 0;
attributes.samples = 0;
attributes.sample_buffers = 0;
attributes.bind_generates_resource = false;
attributes.lose_context_when_out_of_memory = true;
attributes.enable_oop_rasterization = support_oop_rasterization;
const bool automatic_flushes = false;
return base::MakeRefCounted<ui::ContextProviderCommandBuffer>(
std::move(gpu_channel_host), stream_id, stream_priority,
gpu::kNullSurfaceHandle,
GURL("chrome://gpu/RenderThreadImpl::CreateOffscreenContext/" +
ui::command_buffer_metrics::ContextTypeToString(type)),
automatic_flushes, support_locking, limits, attributes, nullptr, type);
}
Commit Message: Roll src/third_party/boringssl/src 664e99a64..696c13bd6
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+log/664e99a6486c293728097c661332f92bf2d847c6..696c13bd6ab78011adfe7b775519c8b7cc82b604
BUG=778101
Change-Id: I8dda4f3db952597148e3c7937319584698d00e1c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747941
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513774}
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 150,501 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MockAudioRendererHost(base::RunLoop* auth_run_loop,
int render_process_id,
media::AudioManager* audio_manager,
AudioMirroringManager* mirroring_manager,
MediaStreamManager* media_stream_manager,
const std::string& salt)
: AudioRendererHost(render_process_id,
audio_manager,
mirroring_manager,
media_stream_manager,
salt),
shared_memory_length_(0),
auth_run_loop_(auth_run_loop) {
set_render_frame_id_validate_function_for_testing(&ValidateRenderFrameId);
}
Commit Message: Switching AudioOutputAuthorizationHandler from using AudioManager interface to AudioSystem one.
BUG=672468
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2692203003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450939}
CWE ID: | 1 | 171,986 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static zend_object_value spl_heap_object_new_ex(zend_class_entry *class_type, spl_heap_object **obj, zval *orig, int clone_orig TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
zend_object_value retval;
spl_heap_object *intern;
zend_class_entry *parent = class_type;
int inherited = 0;
intern = ecalloc(1, sizeof(spl_heap_object));
*obj = intern;
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(intern->retval);
zend_object_std_init(&intern->std, class_type TSRMLS_CC);
object_properties_init(&intern->std, class_type);
intern->flags = 0;
intern->fptr_cmp = NULL;
intern->debug_info = NULL;
if (orig) {
spl_heap_object *other = (spl_heap_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(orig TSRMLS_CC);
intern->ce_get_iterator = other->ce_get_iterator;
if (clone_orig) {
int i;
intern->heap = spl_ptr_heap_clone(other->heap TSRMLS_CC);
for (i = 0; i < intern->heap->count; ++i) {
if (intern->heap->elements[i]) {
Z_ADDREF_P((zval *)intern->heap->elements[i]);
}
}
} else {
intern->heap = other->heap;
}
intern->flags = other->flags;
} else {
intern->heap = spl_ptr_heap_init(spl_ptr_heap_zval_max_cmp, spl_ptr_heap_zval_ctor, spl_ptr_heap_zval_dtor);
}
retval.handlers = &spl_handler_SplHeap;
while (parent) {
if (parent == spl_ce_SplPriorityQueue) {
intern->heap->cmp = spl_ptr_pqueue_zval_cmp;
intern->flags = SPL_PQUEUE_EXTR_DATA;
retval.handlers = &spl_handler_SplPriorityQueue;
break;
}
if (parent == spl_ce_SplMinHeap) {
intern->heap->cmp = spl_ptr_heap_zval_min_cmp;
break;
}
if (parent == spl_ce_SplMaxHeap) {
intern->heap->cmp = spl_ptr_heap_zval_max_cmp;
break;
}
if (parent == spl_ce_SplHeap) {
break;
}
parent = parent->parent;
inherited = 1;
}
retval.handle = zend_objects_store_put(intern, (zend_objects_store_dtor_t)zend_objects_destroy_object, spl_heap_object_free_storage, NULL TSRMLS_CC);
if (!parent) { /* this must never happen */
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_COMPILE_ERROR, "Internal compiler error, Class is not child of SplHeap");
}
if (inherited) {
zend_hash_find(&class_type->function_table, "compare", sizeof("compare"), (void **) &intern->fptr_cmp);
if (intern->fptr_cmp->common.scope == parent) {
intern->fptr_cmp = NULL;
}
zend_hash_find(&class_type->function_table, "count", sizeof("count"), (void **) &intern->fptr_count);
if (intern->fptr_count->common.scope == parent) {
intern->fptr_count = NULL;
}
}
return retval;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 14,907 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int uas_queuecommand_lck(struct scsi_cmnd *cmnd,
void (*done)(struct scsi_cmnd *))
{
struct scsi_device *sdev = cmnd->device;
struct uas_dev_info *devinfo = sdev->hostdata;
struct uas_cmd_info *cmdinfo = (void *)&cmnd->SCp;
unsigned long flags;
int idx, err;
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct uas_cmd_info) > sizeof(struct scsi_pointer));
/* Re-check scsi_block_requests now that we've the host-lock */
if (cmnd->device->host->host_self_blocked)
return SCSI_MLQUEUE_DEVICE_BUSY;
if ((devinfo->flags & US_FL_NO_ATA_1X) &&
(cmnd->cmnd[0] == ATA_12 || cmnd->cmnd[0] == ATA_16)) {
memcpy(cmnd->sense_buffer, usb_stor_sense_invalidCDB,
sizeof(usb_stor_sense_invalidCDB));
cmnd->result = SAM_STAT_CHECK_CONDITION;
cmnd->scsi_done(cmnd);
return 0;
}
spin_lock_irqsave(&devinfo->lock, flags);
if (devinfo->resetting) {
cmnd->result = DID_ERROR << 16;
cmnd->scsi_done(cmnd);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&devinfo->lock, flags);
return 0;
}
/* Find a free uas-tag */
for (idx = 0; idx < devinfo->qdepth; idx++) {
if (!devinfo->cmnd[idx])
break;
}
if (idx == devinfo->qdepth) {
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&devinfo->lock, flags);
return SCSI_MLQUEUE_DEVICE_BUSY;
}
cmnd->scsi_done = done;
memset(cmdinfo, 0, sizeof(*cmdinfo));
cmdinfo->uas_tag = idx + 1; /* uas-tag == usb-stream-id, so 1 based */
cmdinfo->state = SUBMIT_STATUS_URB | ALLOC_CMD_URB | SUBMIT_CMD_URB;
switch (cmnd->sc_data_direction) {
case DMA_FROM_DEVICE:
cmdinfo->state |= ALLOC_DATA_IN_URB | SUBMIT_DATA_IN_URB;
break;
case DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL:
cmdinfo->state |= ALLOC_DATA_IN_URB | SUBMIT_DATA_IN_URB;
case DMA_TO_DEVICE:
cmdinfo->state |= ALLOC_DATA_OUT_URB | SUBMIT_DATA_OUT_URB;
case DMA_NONE:
break;
}
if (!devinfo->use_streams)
cmdinfo->state &= ~(SUBMIT_DATA_IN_URB | SUBMIT_DATA_OUT_URB);
err = uas_submit_urbs(cmnd, devinfo);
if (err) {
/* If we did nothing, give up now */
if (cmdinfo->state & SUBMIT_STATUS_URB) {
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&devinfo->lock, flags);
return SCSI_MLQUEUE_DEVICE_BUSY;
}
uas_add_work(cmdinfo);
}
devinfo->cmnd[idx] = cmnd;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&devinfo->lock, flags);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: USB: uas: fix bug in handling of alternate settings
The uas driver has a subtle bug in the way it handles alternate
settings. The uas_find_uas_alt_setting() routine returns an
altsetting value (the bAlternateSetting number in the descriptor), but
uas_use_uas_driver() then treats that value as an index to the
intf->altsetting array, which it isn't.
Normally this doesn't cause any problems because the various
alternate settings have bAlternateSetting values 0, 1, 2, ..., so the
value is equal to the index in the array. But this is not guaranteed,
and Andrey Konovalov used the syzkaller fuzzer with KASAN to get a
slab-out-of-bounds error by violating this assumption.
This patch fixes the bug by making uas_find_uas_alt_setting() return a
pointer to the altsetting entry rather than either the value or the
index. Pointers are less subject to misinterpretation.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
CC: Oliver Neukum <oneukum@suse.com>
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 59,907 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PluginDelegate::Broker* PluginModule::GetBroker() {
return broker_;
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 103,418 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual void drawLayersOnCCThread(CCLayerTreeHostImpl* impl)
{
if (!impl->sourceFrameNumber())
postSetNeedsCommitThenRedrawToMainThread();
else if (impl->sourceFrameNumber() == 1)
endTest();
}
Commit Message: [chromium] Fix shutdown race when posting main thread task to CCThreadProxy and enable tests
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=70161
Reviewed by David Levin.
Source/WebCore:
Adds a weak pointer mechanism to cancel main thread tasks posted to CCThreadProxy instances from the compositor
thread. Previously there was a race condition where main thread tasks could run even after the CCThreadProxy was
destroyed.
This race does not exist in the other direction because when tearing down a CCThreadProxy we first post a quit
task to the compositor thread and then suspend execution of the main thread until all compositor tasks for the
CCThreadProxy have been drained.
Covered by the now-enabled CCLayerTreeHostTest* unit tests.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCScopedMainThreadProxy.h: Added.
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::create):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::postTask):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::shutdown):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::CCScopedMainThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::runTaskIfNotShutdown):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.cpp:
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::~CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::createBeginFrameAndCommitTaskOnCCThread):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.h:
Source/WebKit/chromium:
Enables the CCLayerTreeHostTest* tests by default. Most tests are run twice in a single thread and multiple
thread configuration. Some tests run only in the multiple thread configuration if they depend on the compositor
thread scheduling draws by itself.
* tests/CCLayerTreeHostTest.cpp:
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::timeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::clearTimeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::CCLayerTreeHostTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::onEndTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::clearTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::~TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::Run):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::doBeginTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestThreadOnly::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestSetNeedsRedraw::commitCompleteOnCCThread):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@97784 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 97,910 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Camera3Device::RequestThread::waitForNextRequestBatch() {
Mutex::Autolock l(mRequestLock);
assert(mNextRequests.empty());
NextRequest nextRequest;
nextRequest.captureRequest = waitForNextRequestLocked();
if (nextRequest.captureRequest == nullptr) {
return;
}
nextRequest.halRequest = camera3_capture_request_t();
nextRequest.submitted = false;
mNextRequests.add(nextRequest);
const size_t batchSize = nextRequest.captureRequest->mBatchSize;
for (size_t i = 1; i < batchSize; i++) {
NextRequest additionalRequest;
additionalRequest.captureRequest = waitForNextRequestLocked();
if (additionalRequest.captureRequest == nullptr) {
break;
}
additionalRequest.halRequest = camera3_capture_request_t();
additionalRequest.submitted = false;
mNextRequests.add(additionalRequest);
}
if (mNextRequests.size() < batchSize) {
ALOGE("RequestThread: only get %d out of %d requests. Skipping requests.",
mNextRequests.size(), batchSize);
cleanUpFailedRequests(/*sendRequestError*/true);
}
return;
}
Commit Message: Camera3Device: Validate template ID
Validate template ID before creating a default request.
Bug: 26866110
Bug: 27568958
Change-Id: Ifda457024f1d5c2b1382f189c1a8d5fda852d30d
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 161,116 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int32_t bitstream_id() const { return bitstream_id_; }
Commit Message: vaapi vda: Delete owned objects on worker thread in Cleanup()
This CL adds a SEQUENCE_CHECKER to Vaapi*Accelerator classes, and
posts the destruction of those objects to the appropriate thread on
Cleanup().
Also makes {H264,VP8,VP9}Picture RefCountedThreadSafe, see miu@
comment in
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/794091#message-a64bed985cfaf8a19499a517bb110a7ce581dc0f
TEST=play back VP9/VP8/H264 w/ simplechrome on soraka, Release build
unstripped, let video play for a few seconds then navigate back; no
crashes. Unittests as before:
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp9:320:240:250:250:35:150:12
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp8:320:240:250:250:35:150:11
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.h264:320:240:250:258:35:150:1
Bug: 789160
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I7d96aaf89c92bf46f00c8b8b36798e057a842ed2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/794091
Reviewed-by: Pawel Osciak <posciak@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Miguel Casas <mcasas@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#523372}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 148,894 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int getlblockinc(Jpeg2000DecoderContext *s)
{
int res = 0, ret;
while (ret = get_bits(s, 1)) {
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
res++;
}
return res;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/jpeg2000dec: prevent out of array accesses in pixel addressing
Fixes Ticket2921
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 28,005 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport MagickBooleanType IsTaintImage(const Image *image)
{
char
magick[MaxTextExtent],
filename[MaxTextExtent];
register const Image
*p;
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"...");
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
(void) CopyMagickString(magick,image->magick,MaxTextExtent);
(void) CopyMagickString(filename,image->filename,MaxTextExtent);
for (p=image; p != (Image *) NULL; p=GetNextImageInList(p))
{
if (p->taint != MagickFalse)
return(MagickTrue);
if (LocaleCompare(p->magick,magick) != 0)
return(MagickTrue);
if (LocaleCompare(p->filename,filename) != 0)
return(MagickTrue);
}
return(MagickFalse);
}
Commit Message: Fixed incorrect call to DestroyImage reported in #491.
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 64,522 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool DownloadManagerDelegate::ShouldCompleteDownload(
DownloadItem* item,
const base::Closure& callback) {
return true;
}
Commit Message: Downloads : Fixed an issue of opening incorrect download file
When one download overwrites another completed download, calling download.open in the old download causes the new download to open, which could be dangerous and undesirable. In this CL, we are trying to avoid this by blocking the opening of the old download.
Bug: 793620
Change-Id: Ic948175756700ad7c08489c3cc347330daedb6f8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/826477
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <dtrainor@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Shakti Sahu <shaktisahu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525810}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 146,474 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LocalFileSystem::requestFileSystem(ExecutionContext* context, FileSystemType type, long long size, PassOwnPtr<AsyncFileSystemCallbacks> callbacks)
{
RefPtrWillBeRawPtr<ExecutionContext> contextPtr(context);
RefPtr<CallbackWrapper> wrapper = adoptRef(new CallbackWrapper(callbacks));
requestFileSystemAccessInternal(context,
bind(&LocalFileSystem::fileSystemAllowedInternal, this, contextPtr, type, wrapper),
bind(&LocalFileSystem::fileSystemNotAllowedInternal, this, contextPtr, wrapper));
}
Commit Message: Oilpan: Ship Oilpan for SyncCallbackHelper, CreateFileResult and CallbackWrapper in filesystem/
These are leftovers when we shipped Oilpan for filesystem/ once.
BUG=340522
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/501263003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180909 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 171,429 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: explicit TestCustomButton()
: CustomButton(this) {
}
Commit Message: Custom buttons should only handle accelerators when focused.
BUG=541415
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1437523005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#360130}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 132,360 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: extention_matches_script(
struct mg_connection *conn, /* in: request (must be valid) */
const char *filename /* in: filename (must be valid) */
)
{
#if !defined(NO_CGI)
if (match_prefix(conn->dom_ctx->config[CGI_EXTENSIONS],
strlen(conn->dom_ctx->config[CGI_EXTENSIONS]),
filename) > 0) {
return 1;
}
#endif
#if defined(USE_LUA)
if (match_prefix(conn->dom_ctx->config[LUA_SCRIPT_EXTENSIONS],
strlen(conn->dom_ctx->config[LUA_SCRIPT_EXTENSIONS]),
filename) > 0) {
return 1;
}
#endif
#if defined(USE_DUKTAPE)
if (match_prefix(conn->dom_ctx->config[DUKTAPE_SCRIPT_EXTENSIONS],
strlen(conn->dom_ctx->config[DUKTAPE_SCRIPT_EXTENSIONS]),
filename) > 0) {
return 1;
}
#endif
/* filename and conn could be unused, if all preocessor conditions
* are false (no script language supported). */
(void)filename;
(void)conn;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Check length of memcmp
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 81,665 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static BOOL update_read_bitmap_data(rdpUpdate* update, wStream* s,
BITMAP_DATA* bitmapData)
{
if (Stream_GetRemainingLength(s) < 18)
return FALSE;
Stream_Read_UINT16(s, bitmapData->destLeft);
Stream_Read_UINT16(s, bitmapData->destTop);
Stream_Read_UINT16(s, bitmapData->destRight);
Stream_Read_UINT16(s, bitmapData->destBottom);
Stream_Read_UINT16(s, bitmapData->width);
Stream_Read_UINT16(s, bitmapData->height);
Stream_Read_UINT16(s, bitmapData->bitsPerPixel);
Stream_Read_UINT16(s, bitmapData->flags);
Stream_Read_UINT16(s, bitmapData->bitmapLength);
if (bitmapData->flags & BITMAP_COMPRESSION)
{
if (!(bitmapData->flags & NO_BITMAP_COMPRESSION_HDR))
{
Stream_Read_UINT16(s,
bitmapData->cbCompFirstRowSize); /* cbCompFirstRowSize (2 bytes) */
Stream_Read_UINT16(s,
bitmapData->cbCompMainBodySize); /* cbCompMainBodySize (2 bytes) */
Stream_Read_UINT16(s, bitmapData->cbScanWidth); /* cbScanWidth (2 bytes) */
Stream_Read_UINT16(s,
bitmapData->cbUncompressedSize); /* cbUncompressedSize (2 bytes) */
bitmapData->bitmapLength = bitmapData->cbCompMainBodySize;
}
bitmapData->compressed = TRUE;
}
else
bitmapData->compressed = FALSE;
if (Stream_GetRemainingLength(s) < bitmapData->bitmapLength)
return FALSE;
if (bitmapData->bitmapLength > 0)
{
bitmapData->bitmapDataStream = malloc(bitmapData->bitmapLength);
if (!bitmapData->bitmapDataStream)
return FALSE;
memcpy(bitmapData->bitmapDataStream, Stream_Pointer(s), bitmapData->bitmapLength);
Stream_Seek(s, bitmapData->bitmapLength);
}
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8786
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 83,564 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int dispatch_other_io(struct xen_blkif_ring *ring,
struct blkif_request *req,
struct pending_req *pending_req)
{
free_req(ring, pending_req);
make_response(ring, req->u.other.id, req->operation,
BLKIF_RSP_EOPNOTSUPP);
return -EIO;
}
Commit Message: xen-blkback: don't leak stack data via response ring
Rather than constructing a local structure instance on the stack, fill
the fields directly on the shared ring, just like other backends do.
Build on the fact that all response structure flavors are actually
identical (the old code did make this assumption too).
This is XSA-216.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 63,726 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void pagefault_out_of_memory(void)
{
struct oom_control oc = {
.zonelist = NULL,
.nodemask = NULL,
.memcg = NULL,
.gfp_mask = 0,
.order = 0,
};
if (mem_cgroup_oom_synchronize(true))
return;
if (!mutex_trylock(&oom_lock))
return;
out_of_memory(&oc);
mutex_unlock(&oom_lock);
}
Commit Message: mm, oom_reaper: gather each vma to prevent leaking TLB entry
tlb_gather_mmu(&tlb, mm, 0, -1) means gathering the whole virtual memory
space. In this case, tlb->fullmm is true. Some archs like arm64
doesn't flush TLB when tlb->fullmm is true:
commit 5a7862e83000 ("arm64: tlbflush: avoid flushing when fullmm == 1").
Which causes leaking of tlb entries.
Will clarifies his patch:
"Basically, we tag each address space with an ASID (PCID on x86) which
is resident in the TLB. This means we can elide TLB invalidation when
pulling down a full mm because we won't ever assign that ASID to
another mm without doing TLB invalidation elsewhere (which actually
just nukes the whole TLB).
I think that means that we could potentially not fault on a kernel
uaccess, because we could hit in the TLB"
There could be a window between complete_signal() sending IPI to other
cores and all threads sharing this mm are really kicked off from cores.
In this window, the oom reaper may calls tlb_flush_mmu_tlbonly() to
flush TLB then frees pages. However, due to the above problem, the TLB
entries are not really flushed on arm64. Other threads are possible to
access these pages through TLB entries. Moreover, a copy_to_user() can
also write to these pages without generating page fault, causes
use-after-free bugs.
This patch gathers each vma instead of gathering full vm space. In this
case tlb->fullmm is not true. The behavior of oom reaper become similar
to munmapping before do_exit, which should be safe for all archs.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171107095453.179940-1-wangnan0@huawei.com
Fixes: aac453635549 ("mm, oom: introduce oom reaper")
Signed-off-by: Wang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Bob Liu <liubo95@huawei.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 85,994 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int NaClIPCAdapter::TakeClientFileDescriptor() {
return io_thread_data_.channel_->TakeClientFileDescriptor();
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 170,731 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int rfcomm_sock_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
int err = 0;
BT_DBG("sk %p backlog %d", sk, backlog);
lock_sock(sk);
if (sk->sk_state != BT_BOUND) {
err = -EBADFD;
goto done;
}
if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_STREAM) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto done;
}
if (!rfcomm_pi(sk)->channel) {
bdaddr_t *src = &rfcomm_pi(sk)->src;
u8 channel;
err = -EINVAL;
write_lock(&rfcomm_sk_list.lock);
for (channel = 1; channel < 31; channel++)
if (!__rfcomm_get_listen_sock_by_addr(channel, src)) {
rfcomm_pi(sk)->channel = channel;
err = 0;
break;
}
write_unlock(&rfcomm_sk_list.lock);
if (err < 0)
goto done;
}
sk->sk_max_ack_backlog = backlog;
sk->sk_ack_backlog = 0;
sk->sk_state = BT_LISTEN;
done:
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: Fix potential NULL dereference in RFCOMM bind callback
addr can be NULL and it should not be dereferenced before NULL checking.
Signed-off-by: Jaganath Kanakkassery <jaganath.k@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 56,174 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(finfo_close)
{
struct php_fileinfo *finfo;
zval *zfinfo;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "r", &zfinfo) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(finfo, struct php_fileinfo *, &zfinfo, -1, "file_info", le_fileinfo);
zend_list_delete(Z_RESVAL_P(zfinfo));
RETURN_TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 15,084 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: wStream* transport_send_stream_init(rdpTransport* transport, int size)
{
wStream* s;
s = StreamPool_Take(transport->ReceivePool, size);
Stream_EnsureCapacity(s, size);
Stream_SetPosition(s, 0);
return s;
}
Commit Message: nla: invalidate sec handle after creation
If sec pointer isn't invalidated after creation it is not possible
to check if the upper and lower pointers are valid.
This fixes a segfault in the server part if the client disconnects before
the authentication was finished.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 58,566 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: scoped_ptr<BackgroundTracingConfig> CreateReactiveConfig() {
base::DictionaryValue dict;
dict.SetString("mode", "REACTIVE_TRACING_MODE");
scoped_ptr<base::ListValue> rules_list(new base::ListValue());
{
scoped_ptr<base::DictionaryValue> rules_dict(new base::DictionaryValue());
rules_dict->SetString("rule", "TRACE_ON_NAVIGATION_UNTIL_TRIGGER_OR_FULL");
rules_dict->SetString("trigger_name", "reactive_test");
rules_dict->SetString("category", "BENCHMARK");
rules_list->Append(rules_dict.Pass());
}
dict.Set("configs", rules_list.Pass());
scoped_ptr<BackgroundTracingConfig> config(
BackgroundTracingConfigImpl::FromDict(&dict));
EXPECT_TRUE(config);
return config.Pass();
}
Commit Message: Tracing: Add support for PII whitelisting of individual trace event arguments
R=dsinclair,shatch
BUG=546093
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1415013003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356690}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 121,413 |
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