instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void perf_output_get_handle(struct perf_output_handle *handle)
{
struct ring_buffer *rb = handle->rb;
preempt_disable();
local_inc(&rb->nest);
handle->wakeup = local_read(&rb->wakeup);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 26,233 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DownloadItemImplDelegate::~DownloadItemImplDelegate() {
DCHECK_EQ(0, count_);
}
Commit Message: Downloads : Fixed an issue of opening incorrect download file
When one download overwrites another completed download, calling download.open in the old download causes the new download to open, which could be dangerous and undesirable. In this CL, we are trying to avoid this by blocking the opening of the old download.
Bug: 793620
Change-Id: Ic948175756700ad7c08489c3cc347330daedb6f8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/826477
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <dtrainor@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Shakti Sahu <shaktisahu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525810}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 146,411 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void advanceClock(double seconds)
{
m_proxyPlatform.advanceClock(seconds);
}
Commit Message: Add assertions that the empty Platform::cryptographicallyRandomValues() overrides are not being used.
These implementations are not safe and look scary if not accompanied by an assertion. Also one of the comments was incorrect.
BUG=552749
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1419293005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#359229}
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 132,391 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: png_get_fixed_point(png_structrp png_ptr, png_const_bytep buf)
{
png_uint_32 uval = png_get_uint_32(buf);
if (uval <= PNG_UINT_31_MAX)
return (png_fixed_point)uval; /* known to be in range */
/* The caller can turn off the warning by passing NULL. */
if (png_ptr != NULL)
png_warning(png_ptr, "PNG fixed point integer out of range");
return PNG_FIXED_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: [libpng16] Fix the calculation of row_factor in png_check_chunk_length
(Bug report by Thuan Pham, SourceForge issue #278)
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 79,723 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ServiceManagerConnectionImpl::SetConnectionLostClosure(
const base::Closure& closure) {
connection_lost_handler_ = closure;
}
Commit Message: media: Support hosting mojo CDM in a standalone service
Currently when mojo CDM is enabled it is hosted in the MediaService
running in the process specified by "mojo_media_host". However, on
some platforms we need to run mojo CDM and other mojo media services in
different processes. For example, on desktop platforms, we want to run
mojo video decoder in the GPU process, but run the mojo CDM in the
utility process.
This CL adds a new build flag "enable_standalone_cdm_service". When
enabled, the mojo CDM service will be hosted in a standalone "cdm"
service running in the utility process. All other mojo media services
will sill be hosted in the "media" servie running in the process
specified by "mojo_media_host".
BUG=664364
TEST=Encrypted media browser tests using mojo CDM is still working.
Change-Id: I95be6e05adc9ebcff966b26958ef1d7becdfb487
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/567172
Commit-Queue: Xiaohan Wang <xhwang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dan Sanders <sandersd@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486947}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 127,477 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LayerTreeHost::BeginMainFrameNotExpectedSoon() {
client_->BeginMainFrameNotExpectedSoon();
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 137,099 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SoftAAC2::~SoftAAC2() {
aacDecoder_Close(mAACDecoder);
delete[] mOutputDelayRingBuffer;
}
Commit Message: SoftAAC2: fix crash on all-zero adts buffer
Bug: 29153599
Change-Id: I1cb81c054098b86cf24f024f8479909ca7bc85a6
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 159,399 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool CNB::MapDataToVirtioSGL(CTXDescriptor &Descriptor, ULONG Offset) const
{
for (ULONG i = 0; i < m_SGL->NumberOfElements; i++)
{
if (Offset < m_SGL->Elements[i].Length)
{
PHYSICAL_ADDRESS PA;
PA.QuadPart = m_SGL->Elements[i].Address.QuadPart + Offset;
if (!Descriptor.AddDataChunk(PA, m_SGL->Elements[i].Length - Offset))
{
return false;
}
Offset = 0;
}
else
{
Offset -= m_SGL->Elements[i].Length;
}
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: NetKVM: BZ#1169718: Checking the length only on read
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <yhindin@rehat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 96,314 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: inline void perf_swevent_put_recursion_context(int rctx)
{
struct swevent_htable *swhash = &__get_cpu_var(swevent_htable);
put_recursion_context(swhash->recursion, rctx);
}
Commit Message: perf: Treat attr.config as u64 in perf_swevent_init()
Trinity discovered that we fail to check all 64 bits of
attr.config passed by user space, resulting to out-of-bounds
access of the perf_swevent_enabled array in
sw_perf_event_destroy().
Introduced in commit b0a873ebb ("perf: Register PMU
implementations").
Signed-off-by: Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: davej@redhat.com
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@ghostprotocols.net>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365882554-30259-1-git-send-email-tt.rantala@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 31,983 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static long dns_resolver_read(const struct key *key,
char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)
{
int err = PTR_ERR(key->payload.data[dns_key_error]);
if (err)
return err;
return user_read(key, buffer, buflen);
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.
(2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.
(3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.
This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.
The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.
The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.
Additionally, barriering is included:
(1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.
(2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.
Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.
Fixes: 146aa8b1453b ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 60,197 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WallpaperManager::RemovePendingWallpaperFromList(
PendingWallpaper* pending) {
DCHECK(loading_.size() > 0);
for (WallpaperManager::PendingList::iterator i = loading_.begin();
i != loading_.end();
++i) {
if (i->get() == pending) {
loading_.erase(i);
break;
}
}
if (loading_.empty()) {
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.OnPendingListEmptyForTesting();
}
}
Commit Message: [reland] Do not set default wallpaper unless it should do so.
TBR=bshe@chromium.org, alemate@chromium.org
Bug: 751382
Change-Id: Id0793dfe467f737526a95b1e66ed01fbb8860bda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/619754
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <xdai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Alekseev <alemate@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Biao She <bshe@chromium.org>
Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498325}
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/646430
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498982}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 128,001 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int atalk_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,
struct packet_type *pt, struct net_device *orig_dev)
{
struct ddpehdr *ddp;
struct sock *sock;
struct atalk_iface *atif;
struct sockaddr_at tosat;
int origlen;
__u16 len_hops;
if (!net_eq(dev_net(dev), &init_net))
goto drop;
/* Don't mangle buffer if shared */
if (!(skb = skb_share_check(skb, GFP_ATOMIC)))
goto out;
/* Size check and make sure header is contiguous */
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(*ddp)))
goto drop;
ddp = ddp_hdr(skb);
len_hops = ntohs(ddp->deh_len_hops);
/* Trim buffer in case of stray trailing data */
origlen = skb->len;
skb_trim(skb, min_t(unsigned int, skb->len, len_hops & 1023));
/*
* Size check to see if ddp->deh_len was crap
* (Otherwise we'll detonate most spectacularly
* in the middle of atalk_checksum() or recvmsg()).
*/
if (skb->len < sizeof(*ddp) || skb->len < (len_hops & 1023)) {
pr_debug("AppleTalk: dropping corrupted frame (deh_len=%u, "
"skb->len=%u)\n", len_hops & 1023, skb->len);
goto drop;
}
/*
* Any checksums. Note we don't do htons() on this == is assumed to be
* valid for net byte orders all over the networking code...
*/
if (ddp->deh_sum &&
atalk_checksum(skb, len_hops & 1023) != ddp->deh_sum)
/* Not a valid AppleTalk frame - dustbin time */
goto drop;
/* Check the packet is aimed at us */
if (!ddp->deh_dnet) /* Net 0 is 'this network' */
atif = atalk_find_anynet(ddp->deh_dnode, dev);
else
atif = atalk_find_interface(ddp->deh_dnet, ddp->deh_dnode);
if (!atif) {
/* Not ours, so we route the packet via the correct
* AppleTalk iface
*/
return atalk_route_packet(skb, dev, ddp, len_hops, origlen);
}
/* if IP over DDP is not selected this code will be optimized out */
if (is_ip_over_ddp(skb))
return handle_ip_over_ddp(skb);
/*
* Which socket - atalk_search_socket() looks for a *full match*
* of the <net, node, port> tuple.
*/
tosat.sat_addr.s_net = ddp->deh_dnet;
tosat.sat_addr.s_node = ddp->deh_dnode;
tosat.sat_port = ddp->deh_dport;
sock = atalk_search_socket(&tosat, atif);
if (!sock) /* But not one of our sockets */
goto drop;
/* Queue packet (standard) */
skb->sk = sock;
if (sock_queue_rcv_skb(sock, skb) < 0)
goto drop;
return NET_RX_SUCCESS;
drop:
kfree_skb(skb);
out:
return NET_RX_DROP;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 40,318 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: POINTER_NEW_UPDATE* update_read_pointer_new(rdpUpdate* update, wStream* s)
{
POINTER_NEW_UPDATE* pointer_new = calloc(1, sizeof(POINTER_NEW_UPDATE));
if (!pointer_new)
goto fail;
if (Stream_GetRemainingLength(s) < 2)
goto fail;
Stream_Read_UINT16(s, pointer_new->xorBpp); /* xorBpp (2 bytes) */
if ((pointer_new->xorBpp < 1) || (pointer_new->xorBpp > 32))
{
WLog_ERR(TAG, "invalid xorBpp %"PRIu32"", pointer_new->xorBpp);
goto fail;
}
if (!_update_read_pointer_color(s, &pointer_new->colorPtrAttr,
pointer_new->xorBpp)) /* colorPtrAttr */
goto fail;
return pointer_new;
fail:
free_pointer_new_update(update->context, pointer_new);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8786
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 83,569 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: R_API int r_flag_bind(RFlag *f, RFlagBind *fb) {
fb->f = f;
fb->exist_at = r_flag_exist_at;
fb->get = r_flag_get;
fb->get_at = r_flag_get_at;
fb->set = r_flag_set;
fb->set_fs = r_flag_space_set;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix crash in wasm disassembler
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 60,467 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool omx_venc::dev_color_align(OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *buffer,
OMX_U32 width, OMX_U32 height)
{
if(secure_session) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Cannot align colors in secure session.");
return OMX_FALSE;
}
return handle->venc_color_align(buffer, width,height);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: add checks before accessing heap pointers
Heap pointers do not point to user virtual addresses in case
of secure session.
Set them to NULL and add checks to avoid accesing them
Bug: 28815329
Bug: 28920116
Change-Id: I94fd5808e753b58654d65e175d3857ef46ffba26
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 159,211 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Camera3Device::RequestThread::isRepeatingRequestLocked(const sp<CaptureRequest> requestIn) {
if (mRepeatingRequests.empty()) {
return false;
}
int32_t requestId = requestIn->mResultExtras.requestId;
const RequestList &repeatRequests = mRepeatingRequests;
const sp<CaptureRequest> firstRequest = *repeatRequests.begin();
return (firstRequest->mResultExtras.requestId == requestId);
}
Commit Message: Camera3Device: Validate template ID
Validate template ID before creating a default request.
Bug: 26866110
Bug: 27568958
Change-Id: Ifda457024f1d5c2b1382f189c1a8d5fda852d30d
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 161,067 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE1(times, struct tms __user *, tbuf)
{
if (tbuf) {
struct tms tmp;
do_sys_times(&tmp);
if (copy_to_user(tbuf, &tmp, sizeof(struct tms)))
return -EFAULT;
}
force_successful_syscall_return();
return (long) jiffies_64_to_clock_t(get_jiffies_64());
}
Commit Message: kernel/sys.c: fix stack memory content leak via UNAME26
Calling uname() with the UNAME26 personality set allows a leak of kernel
stack contents. This fixes it by defensively calculating the length of
copy_to_user() call, making the len argument unsigned, and initializing
the stack buffer to zero (now technically unneeded, but hey, overkill).
CVE-2012-0957
Reported-by: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-16 | 0 | 21,516 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void sum_init(int csum_type, int seed)
{
char s[4];
if (csum_type < 0)
csum_type = parse_csum_name(NULL, 0);
cursum_type = csum_type;
switch (csum_type) {
case CSUM_MD5:
md5_begin(&md);
break;
case CSUM_MD4:
mdfour_begin(&md);
sumresidue = 0;
break;
case CSUM_MD4_OLD:
case CSUM_MD4_BUSTED:
case CSUM_MD4_ARCHAIC:
mdfour_begin(&md);
sumresidue = 0;
SIVAL(s, 0, seed);
sum_update(s, 4);
break;
case CSUM_NONE:
break;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-354 | 0 | 1,633 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderFrameHostImpl::GetFindInPage() {
if (!find_in_page_ || !find_in_page_.is_bound() ||
find_in_page_.encountered_error())
GetRemoteAssociatedInterfaces()->GetInterface(&find_in_page_);
return find_in_page_;
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,283 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int snd_pcm_hw_rule_noresample_func(struct snd_pcm_hw_params *params,
struct snd_pcm_hw_rule *rule)
{
unsigned int base_rate = (unsigned int)(uintptr_t)rule->private;
struct snd_interval *rate;
rate = hw_param_interval(params, SNDRV_PCM_HW_PARAM_RATE);
return snd_interval_list(rate, 1, &base_rate, 0);
}
Commit Message: ALSA: pcm : Call kill_fasync() in stream lock
Currently kill_fasync() is called outside the stream lock in
snd_pcm_period_elapsed(). This is potentially racy, since the stream
may get released even during the irq handler is running. Although
snd_pcm_release_substream() calls snd_pcm_drop(), this doesn't
guarantee that the irq handler finishes, thus the kill_fasync() call
outside the stream spin lock may be invoked after the substream is
detached, as recently reported by KASAN.
As a quick workaround, move kill_fasync() call inside the stream
lock. The fasync is rarely used interface, so this shouldn't have a
big impact from the performance POV.
Ideally, we should implement some sync mechanism for the proper finish
of stream and irq handler. But this oneliner should suffice for most
cases, so far.
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 47,824 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void XSLStyleSheet::clearDocuments()
{
m_stylesheetDoc = 0;
for (unsigned i = 0; i < m_children.size(); ++i) {
XSLImportRule* import = m_children.at(i).get();
if (import->styleSheet())
import->styleSheet()->clearDocuments();
}
}
Commit Message: Avoid reparsing an XSLT stylesheet after the first failure.
Certain libxslt versions appear to leave the doc in an invalid state when parsing fails. We should cache this result and avoid re-parsing.
(The test cannot be converted to text-only due to its invalid stylesheet).
R=inferno@chromium.org,abarth@chromium.org,pdr@chromium.org
BUG=271939
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23103007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@156248 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 111,464 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: HFSIterator::HFSIterator(ReadStream* stream)
: stream_(stream),
volume_header_() {
}
Commit Message: Add the SandboxedDMGParser and wire it up to the DownloadProtectionService.
BUG=496898,464083
R=isherman@chromium.org, kenrb@chromium.org, mattm@chromium.org, thestig@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1299223006 .
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344876}
CWE ID: | 0 | 123,794 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned int br_nf_pre_routing(unsigned int hook, struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct net_device *in,
const struct net_device *out,
int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
{
struct net_bridge_port *p;
struct net_bridge *br;
__u32 len = nf_bridge_encap_header_len(skb);
if (unlikely(!pskb_may_pull(skb, len)))
return NF_DROP;
p = br_port_get_rcu(in);
if (p == NULL)
return NF_DROP;
br = p->br;
if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6) || IS_VLAN_IPV6(skb) ||
IS_PPPOE_IPV6(skb)) {
if (!brnf_call_ip6tables && !br->nf_call_ip6tables)
return NF_ACCEPT;
nf_bridge_pull_encap_header_rcsum(skb);
return br_nf_pre_routing_ipv6(hook, skb, in, out, okfn);
}
if (!brnf_call_iptables && !br->nf_call_iptables)
return NF_ACCEPT;
if (skb->protocol != htons(ETH_P_IP) && !IS_VLAN_IP(skb) &&
!IS_PPPOE_IP(skb))
return NF_ACCEPT;
nf_bridge_pull_encap_header_rcsum(skb);
if (br_parse_ip_options(skb))
return NF_DROP;
nf_bridge_put(skb->nf_bridge);
if (!nf_bridge_alloc(skb))
return NF_DROP;
if (!setup_pre_routing(skb))
return NF_DROP;
store_orig_dstaddr(skb);
skb->protocol = htons(ETH_P_IP);
NF_HOOK(NFPROTO_IPV4, NF_INET_PRE_ROUTING, skb, skb->dev, NULL,
br_nf_pre_routing_finish);
return NF_STOLEN;
}
Commit Message: bridge: reset IPCB in br_parse_ip_options
Commit 462fb2af9788a82 (bridge : Sanitize skb before it enters the IP
stack), missed one IPCB init before calling ip_options_compile()
Thanks to Scot Doyle for his tests and bug reports.
Reported-by: Scot Doyle <lkml@scotdoyle.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Hiroaki SHIMODA <shimoda.hiroaki@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Bandan Das <bandan.das@stratus.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@vyatta.com>
Cc: Jan Lübbe <jluebbe@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 34,714 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: image_transform_reset_count(void)
{
image_transform *next = image_transform_first;
int count = 0;
while (next != &image_transform_end)
{
next->local_use = 0;
next->next = 0;
next = next->list;
++count;
}
/* This can only happen if we every have more than 32 transforms (excluding
* the end) in the list.
*/
if (count > 32) abort();
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 0 | 159,986 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual void didCreateFrame(WebFrame* parent, WebFrame* child)
{
m_frameCount++;
if (!m_parent)
m_parent = parent;
}
Commit Message: Call didAccessInitialDocument when javascript: URLs are used.
BUG=265221
TEST=See bug for repro.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/22572004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@155790 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 111,265 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ExprResolveMaskLookup(struct xkb_context *ctx, const ExprDef *expr,
unsigned int *val_rtrn, IdentLookupFunc lookup,
const void *lookupPriv)
{
bool ok = false;
unsigned int l = 0, r = 0;
int v;
ExprDef *left, *right;
const char *bogus = NULL;
switch (expr->expr.op) {
case EXPR_VALUE:
if (expr->expr.value_type != EXPR_TYPE_INT) {
log_err(ctx,
"Found constant of type %s where a mask was expected\n",
expr_value_type_to_string(expr->expr.value_type));
return false;
}
*val_rtrn = (unsigned int) expr->integer.ival;
return true;
case EXPR_IDENT:
ok = lookup(ctx, lookupPriv, expr->ident.ident, EXPR_TYPE_INT,
val_rtrn);
if (!ok)
log_err(ctx, "Identifier \"%s\" of type int is unknown\n",
xkb_atom_text(ctx, expr->ident.ident));
return ok;
case EXPR_FIELD_REF:
log_err(ctx, "Default \"%s.%s\" of type int is unknown\n",
xkb_atom_text(ctx, expr->field_ref.element),
xkb_atom_text(ctx, expr->field_ref.field));
return false;
case EXPR_ARRAY_REF:
bogus = "array reference";
/* fallthrough */
case EXPR_ACTION_DECL:
if (bogus == NULL)
bogus = "function use";
log_err(ctx,
"Unexpected %s in mask expression; Expression Ignored\n",
bogus);
return false;
case EXPR_ADD:
case EXPR_SUBTRACT:
case EXPR_MULTIPLY:
case EXPR_DIVIDE:
left = expr->binary.left;
right = expr->binary.right;
if (!ExprResolveMaskLookup(ctx, left, &l, lookup, lookupPriv) ||
!ExprResolveMaskLookup(ctx, right, &r, lookup, lookupPriv))
return false;
switch (expr->expr.op) {
case EXPR_ADD:
*val_rtrn = l | r;
break;
case EXPR_SUBTRACT:
*val_rtrn = l & (~r);
break;
case EXPR_MULTIPLY:
case EXPR_DIVIDE:
log_err(ctx, "Cannot %s masks; Illegal operation ignored\n",
(expr->expr.op == EXPR_DIVIDE ? "divide" : "multiply"));
return false;
default:
break;
}
return true;
case EXPR_ASSIGN:
log_wsgo(ctx, "Assignment operator not implemented yet\n");
break;
case EXPR_INVERT:
left = expr->unary.child;
if (!ExprResolveIntegerLookup(ctx, left, &v, lookup, lookupPriv))
return false;
*val_rtrn = ~v;
return true;
case EXPR_UNARY_PLUS:
case EXPR_NEGATE:
case EXPR_NOT:
left = expr->unary.child;
if (!ExprResolveIntegerLookup(ctx, left, &v, lookup, lookupPriv))
log_err(ctx, "The %s operator cannot be used with a mask\n",
(expr->expr.op == EXPR_NEGATE ? "-" : "!"));
return false;
default:
log_wsgo(ctx, "Unknown operator %d in ResolveMask\n",
expr->expr.op);
break;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: xkbcomp: Don't explode on invalid virtual modifiers
testcase: 'virtualModifiers=LevelThreC'
Signed-off-by: Daniel Stone <daniels@collabora.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 78,951 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void UrlmonUrlRequest::TerminateTransaction() {
if (cleanup_transaction_ && bind_context_ && moniker_) {
static const int kUrlmonTerminateTransactionFlags = 0x2000000;
base::win::ScopedComPtr<BindContextInfo> info;
BindContextInfo::FromBindContext(bind_context_, info.Receive());
DCHECK(info);
if (info && info->protocol()) {
info->protocol()->Terminate(kUrlmonTerminateTransactionFlags);
}
}
bind_context_.Release();
}
Commit Message: iwyu: Include callback_old.h where appropriate, final.
BUG=82098
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@85003 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 100,977 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: param_without_default( const char *name )
{
char *val = NULL;
char param_name[MAX_PARAM_LEN];
const char *local = get_mySubSystem()->getLocalName();
if ( (NULL == val) && local ) {
snprintf(param_name,MAX_PARAM_LEN,"%s.%s.%s",
get_mySubSystem()->getName(),
local,
name);
param_name[MAX_PARAM_LEN-1]='\0';
strlwr(param_name);
val = lookup_macro_lower( param_name, ConfigTab, TABLESIZE );
}
if ( (NULL == val) && local ) {
snprintf(param_name,MAX_PARAM_LEN,"%s.%s",
local,
name);
param_name[MAX_PARAM_LEN-1]='\0';
strlwr(param_name);
val = lookup_macro_lower( param_name, ConfigTab, TABLESIZE );
}
if ( NULL == val ) {
snprintf(param_name,MAX_PARAM_LEN,"%s.%s",
get_mySubSystem()->getName(),
name);
param_name[MAX_PARAM_LEN-1]='\0';
strlwr(param_name);
val = lookup_macro_lower( param_name, ConfigTab, TABLESIZE );
}
if ( NULL == val ) {
snprintf(param_name,MAX_PARAM_LEN,"%s",name);
param_name[MAX_PARAM_LEN-1]='\0';
strlwr(param_name);
val = lookup_macro_lower( param_name, ConfigTab, TABLESIZE );
}
if ( (NULL == val) || (*val=='\0') ) {
return NULL;
}
if( DebugFlags & D_CONFIG ) {
if( strlen(name) < strlen(param_name) ) {
param_name[strlen(param_name)-strlen(name)] = '\0';
dprintf( D_CONFIG, "Config '%s': using prefix '%s' ==> '%s'\n",
name, param_name, val );
}
else {
dprintf( D_CONFIG, "Config '%s': no prefix ==> '%s'\n", name, val );
}
}
val = expand_macro( val, ConfigTab, TABLESIZE );
if( val == NULL ) {
return NULL;
} else if ( val[0] == '\0' ) {
free( val );
return( NULL );
} else {
return val;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 16,520 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int scsi_disk_initfn(SCSIDevice *dev)
{
DriveInfo *dinfo;
uint8_t scsi_type;
if (!dev->conf.bs) {
scsi_type = TYPE_DISK; /* will die in scsi_initfn() */
} else {
dinfo = drive_get_by_blockdev(dev->conf.bs);
scsi_type = dinfo->media_cd ? TYPE_ROM : TYPE_DISK;
}
return scsi_initfn(dev, scsi_type);
}
Commit Message: scsi-disk: lazily allocate bounce buffer
It will not be needed for reads and writes if the HBA provides a sglist.
In addition, this lets scsi-disk refuse commands with an excessive
allocation length, as well as limit memory on usual well-behaved guests.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 41,258 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void report_wakeup_requests(struct usb_hub *hub)
{
struct usb_device *hdev = hub->hdev;
struct usb_device *udev;
struct usb_hcd *hcd;
unsigned long resuming_ports;
int i;
if (hdev->parent)
return; /* Not a root hub */
hcd = bus_to_hcd(hdev->bus);
if (hcd->driver->get_resuming_ports) {
/*
* The get_resuming_ports() method returns a bitmap (origin 0)
* of ports which have started wakeup signaling but have not
* yet finished resuming. During system resume we will
* resume all the enabled ports, regardless of any wakeup
* signals, which means the wakeup requests would be lost.
* To prevent this, report them to the PM core here.
*/
resuming_ports = hcd->driver->get_resuming_ports(hcd);
for (i = 0; i < hdev->maxchild; ++i) {
if (test_bit(i, &resuming_ports)) {
udev = hub->ports[i]->child;
if (udev)
pm_wakeup_event(&udev->dev, 0);
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: USB: check usb_get_extra_descriptor for proper size
When reading an extra descriptor, we need to properly check the minimum
and maximum size allowed, to prevent from invalid data being sent by a
device.
Reported-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Co-developed-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 75,517 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ptaDestroy(PTA **ppta)
{
PTA *pta;
PROCNAME("ptaDestroy");
if (ppta == NULL) {
L_WARNING("ptr address is NULL!\n", procName);
return;
}
if ((pta = *ppta) == NULL)
return;
ptaChangeRefcount(pta, -1);
if (ptaGetRefcount(pta) <= 0) {
LEPT_FREE(pta->x);
LEPT_FREE(pta->y);
LEPT_FREE(pta);
}
*ppta = NULL;
return;
}
Commit Message: Security fixes: expect final changes for release 1.75.3.
* Fixed a debian security issue with fscanf() reading a string with
possible buffer overflow.
* There were also a few similar situations with sscanf().
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 84,169 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: smp_fetch_uniqueid(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private)
{
if (LIST_ISEMPTY(&smp->sess->fe->format_unique_id))
return 0;
if (!smp->strm->unique_id) {
if ((smp->strm->unique_id = pool_alloc(pool_head_uniqueid)) == NULL)
return 0;
smp->strm->unique_id[0] = '\0';
}
smp->data.u.str.len = build_logline(smp->strm, smp->strm->unique_id,
UNIQUEID_LEN, &smp->sess->fe->format_unique_id);
smp->data.type = SMP_T_STR;
smp->data.u.str.str = smp->strm->unique_id;
smp->flags = SMP_F_CONST;
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 6,924 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool isInt(const std::string &s)
{
for(size_t i = 0; i < s.length(); i++){
if(!isdigit(s[i]))
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Do not allow enters/returns in arguments (thanks to Fabio Carretto)
CWE ID: CWE-93 | 0 | 90,941 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void tun_cleanup(void)
{
misc_deregister(&tun_miscdev);
rtnl_link_unregister(&tun_link_ops);
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 23,851 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s)
{
pitem *item;
SSL3_BUFFER *rb;
SSL3_RECORD *rr;
DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap;
unsigned int is_next_epoch;
int replayok = 1;
item = pqueue_peek(s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.q);
if (item) {
/* Check if epoch is current. */
if (s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->rlayer.d->r_epoch)
return 1; /* Nothing to do. */
rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer);
rb = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer);
if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rb) > 0) {
/*
* We've still got data from the current packet to read. There could
* be a record from the new epoch in it - so don't overwrite it
* with the unprocessed records yet (we'll do it when we've
* finished reading the current packet).
*/
return 1;
}
/* Process all the records. */
while (pqueue_peek(s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.q)) {
dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s);
bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch);
if (bitmap == NULL) {
/*
* Should not happen. This will only ever be NULL when the
* current record is from a different epoch. But that cannot
* be the case because we already checked the epoch above
*/
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_BUFFERED_RECORDS,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
/* Only do replay check if no SCTP bio */
if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)))
#endif
{
/*
* Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record. We did this
* check once already when we first received the record - but
* we might have updated the window since then due to
* records we subsequently processed.
*/
replayok = dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap);
}
if (!replayok || !dtls1_process_record(s, bitmap)) {
/* dump this record */
rr->length = 0;
RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
continue;
}
if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->rlayer.d->processed_rcds),
SSL3_RECORD_get_seq_num(s->rlayer.rrec)) < 0)
return 0;
}
}
/*
* sync epoch numbers once all the unprocessed records have been
* processed
*/
s->rlayer.d->processed_rcds.epoch = s->rlayer.d->r_epoch;
s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.epoch = s->rlayer.d->r_epoch + 1;
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 13,907 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cpu_cgroup_css_online(struct cgroup_subsys_state *css)
{
struct task_group *tg = css_tg(css);
struct task_group *parent = css_tg(css_parent(css));
if (parent)
sched_online_group(tg, parent);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: sched: Fix information leak in sys_sched_getattr()
We're copying the on-stack structure to userspace, but forgot to give
the right number of bytes to copy. This allows the calling process to
obtain up to PAGE_SIZE bytes from the stack (and possibly adjacent
kernel memory).
This fix copies only as much as we actually have on the stack
(attr->size defaults to the size of the struct) and leaves the rest of
the userspace-provided buffer untouched.
Found using kmemcheck + trinity.
Fixes: d50dde5a10f30 ("sched: Add new scheduler syscalls to support an extended scheduling parameters ABI")
Cc: Dario Faggioli <raistlin@linux.it>
Cc: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1392585857-10725-1-git-send-email-vegard.nossum@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 58,144 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ChromeWebContentsDelegateAndroid::~ChromeWebContentsDelegateAndroid() {
notification_registrar_.RemoveAll();
}
Commit Message: Revert "Load web contents after tab is created."
This reverts commit 4c55f398def3214369aefa9f2f2e8f5940d3799d.
BUG=432562
TBR=tedchoc@chromium.org,jbudorick@chromium.org,sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/894003005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#314469}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 109,868 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool inode_owner_or_capable(const struct inode *inode)
{
struct user_namespace *ns;
if (uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid))
return true;
ns = current_user_ns();
if (kuid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_uid) && ns_capable(ns, CAP_FOWNER))
return true;
return false;
}
Commit Message: Fix up non-directory creation in SGID directories
sgid directories have special semantics, making newly created files in
the directory belong to the group of the directory, and newly created
subdirectories will also become sgid. This is historically used for
group-shared directories.
But group directories writable by non-group members should not imply
that such non-group members can magically join the group, so make sure
to clear the sgid bit on non-directories for non-members (but remember
that sgid without group execute means "mandatory locking", just to
confuse things even more).
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 79,845 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool bin_strings(RCore *r, int mode, int va) {
RList *list;
RBinFile *binfile = r_bin_cur (r->bin);
RBinPlugin *plugin = r_bin_file_cur_plugin (binfile);
int rawstr = r_config_get_i (r->config, "bin.rawstr");
if (!binfile) {
return false;
}
if (!r_config_get_i (r->config, "bin.strings")) {
return false;
}
if (!plugin) {
return false;
}
if (plugin->info && plugin->name) {
if (strcmp (plugin->name, "any") == 0 && !rawstr) {
if (IS_MODE_JSON (mode)) {
r_cons_print("[]");
}
return false;
}
}
if (!(list = r_bin_get_strings (r->bin))) {
return false;
}
_print_strings (r, list, mode, va);
return true;
}
Commit Message: More fixes for the CVE-2019-14745
CWE ID: CWE-78 | 0 | 96,616 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandlePathCommandsCHROMIUM(
uint32_t immediate_data_size,
const volatile void* cmd_data) {
static const char kFunctionName[] = "glPathCommandsCHROMIUM";
const volatile gles2::cmds::PathCommandsCHROMIUM& c =
*static_cast<const volatile gles2::cmds::PathCommandsCHROMIUM*>(cmd_data);
if (!features().chromium_path_rendering)
return error::kUnknownCommand;
GLuint service_id = 0;
if (!path_manager()->GetPath(static_cast<GLuint>(c.path), &service_id)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, kFunctionName,
"invalid path name");
return error::kNoError;
}
GLsizei num_commands = static_cast<GLsizei>(c.numCommands);
if (num_commands < 0) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, kFunctionName, "numCommands < 0");
return error::kNoError;
}
GLsizei num_coords = static_cast<uint32_t>(c.numCoords);
if (num_coords < 0) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, kFunctionName, "numCoords < 0");
return error::kNoError;
}
GLenum coord_type = static_cast<uint32_t>(c.coordType);
if (!validators_->path_coord_type.IsValid(static_cast<GLint>(coord_type))) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_ENUM, kFunctionName, "invalid coordType");
return error::kNoError;
}
std::unique_ptr<GLubyte[]> commands;
base::CheckedNumeric<GLsizei> num_coords_expected = 0;
if (num_commands > 0) {
uint32_t commands_shm_id = static_cast<uint32_t>(c.commands_shm_id);
uint32_t commands_shm_offset = static_cast<uint32_t>(c.commands_shm_offset);
if (commands_shm_id != 0 || commands_shm_offset != 0) {
const GLubyte* shared_commands = GetSharedMemoryAs<const GLubyte*>(
commands_shm_id, commands_shm_offset, num_commands);
if (shared_commands) {
commands.reset(new GLubyte[num_commands]);
memcpy(commands.get(), shared_commands, num_commands);
}
}
if (!commands)
return error::kOutOfBounds;
for (GLsizei i = 0; i < num_commands; ++i) {
switch (commands[i]) {
case GL_CLOSE_PATH_CHROMIUM:
break;
case GL_MOVE_TO_CHROMIUM:
case GL_LINE_TO_CHROMIUM:
num_coords_expected += 2;
break;
case GL_QUADRATIC_CURVE_TO_CHROMIUM:
num_coords_expected += 4;
break;
case GL_CUBIC_CURVE_TO_CHROMIUM:
num_coords_expected += 6;
break;
case GL_CONIC_CURVE_TO_CHROMIUM:
num_coords_expected += 5;
break;
default:
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_ENUM, kFunctionName, "invalid command");
return error::kNoError;
}
}
}
if (!num_coords_expected.IsValid() ||
num_coords != num_coords_expected.ValueOrDefault(0)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, kFunctionName,
"numCoords does not match commands");
return error::kNoError;
}
const void* coords = nullptr;
if (num_coords > 0) {
uint32_t coords_size = 0;
uint32_t coord_type_size =
GLES2Util::GetGLTypeSizeForPathCoordType(coord_type);
if (!SafeMultiplyUint32(num_coords, coord_type_size, &coords_size))
return error::kOutOfBounds;
uint32_t coords_shm_id = static_cast<uint32_t>(c.coords_shm_id);
uint32_t coords_shm_offset = static_cast<uint32_t>(c.coords_shm_offset);
if (coords_shm_id != 0 || coords_shm_offset != 0)
coords = GetSharedMemoryAs<const void*>(coords_shm_id, coords_shm_offset,
coords_size);
if (!coords)
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
api()->glPathCommandsNVFn(service_id, num_commands, commands.get(),
num_coords, coord_type, coords);
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Implement immutable texture base/max level clamping
It seems some drivers fail to handle that gracefully, so let's always clamp
to be on the safe side.
BUG=877874
TEST=test case in the bug, gpu_unittests
R=kbr@chromium.org
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I6d93cb9389ea70525df4604112223604577582a2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1194994
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#587264}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 145,911 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int is_efer_nx(void)
{
unsigned long long efer = 0;
rdmsrl_safe(MSR_EFER, &efer);
return efer & EFER_NX;
}
Commit Message: KVM: X86: Don't report L2 emulation failures to user-space
This patch prevents that emulation failures which result
from emulating an instruction for an L2-Guest results in
being reported to userspace.
Without this patch a malicious L2-Guest would be able to
kill the L1 by triggering a race-condition between an vmexit
and the instruction emulator.
With this patch the L2 will most likely only kill itself in
this situation.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <joerg.roedel@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 41,349 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static long region_add(struct resv_map *resv, long f, long t)
{
struct list_head *head = &resv->regions;
struct file_region *rg, *nrg, *trg;
long add = 0;
spin_lock(&resv->lock);
/* Locate the region we are either in or before. */
list_for_each_entry(rg, head, link)
if (f <= rg->to)
break;
/*
* If no region exists which can be expanded to include the
* specified range, the list must have been modified by an
* interleving call to region_del(). Pull a region descriptor
* from the cache and use it for this range.
*/
if (&rg->link == head || t < rg->from) {
VM_BUG_ON(resv->region_cache_count <= 0);
resv->region_cache_count--;
nrg = list_first_entry(&resv->region_cache, struct file_region,
link);
list_del(&nrg->link);
nrg->from = f;
nrg->to = t;
list_add(&nrg->link, rg->link.prev);
add += t - f;
goto out_locked;
}
/* Round our left edge to the current segment if it encloses us. */
if (f > rg->from)
f = rg->from;
/* Check for and consume any regions we now overlap with. */
nrg = rg;
list_for_each_entry_safe(rg, trg, rg->link.prev, link) {
if (&rg->link == head)
break;
if (rg->from > t)
break;
/* If this area reaches higher then extend our area to
* include it completely. If this is not the first area
* which we intend to reuse, free it. */
if (rg->to > t)
t = rg->to;
if (rg != nrg) {
/* Decrement return value by the deleted range.
* Another range will span this area so that by
* end of routine add will be >= zero
*/
add -= (rg->to - rg->from);
list_del(&rg->link);
kfree(rg);
}
}
add += (nrg->from - f); /* Added to beginning of region */
nrg->from = f;
add += t - nrg->to; /* Added to end of region */
nrg->to = t;
out_locked:
resv->adds_in_progress--;
spin_unlock(&resv->lock);
VM_BUG_ON(add < 0);
return add;
}
Commit Message: userfaultfd: hugetlbfs: prevent UFFDIO_COPY to fill beyond the end of i_size
This oops:
kernel BUG at fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c:484!
RIP: remove_inode_hugepages+0x3d0/0x410
Call Trace:
hugetlbfs_setattr+0xd9/0x130
notify_change+0x292/0x410
do_truncate+0x65/0xa0
do_sys_ftruncate.constprop.3+0x11a/0x180
SyS_ftruncate+0xe/0x10
tracesys+0xd9/0xde
was caused by the lack of i_size check in hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte.
mmap() can still succeed beyond the end of the i_size after vmtruncate
zapped vmas in those ranges, but the faults must not succeed, and that
includes UFFDIO_COPY.
We could differentiate the retval to userland to represent a SIGBUS like
a page fault would do (vs SIGSEGV), but it doesn't seem very useful and
we'd need to pick a random retval as there's no meaningful syscall
retval that would differentiate from SIGSEGV and SIGBUS, there's just
-EFAULT.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171016223914.2421-2-aarcange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 86,417 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static PHP_MINFO_FUNCTION(zip)
{
php_info_print_table_start();
php_info_print_table_row(2, "Zip", "enabled");
php_info_print_table_row(2, "Zip version", PHP_ZIP_VERSION);
php_info_print_table_row(2, "Libzip version", LIBZIP_VERSION);
php_info_print_table_end();
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #71923 - integer overflow in ZipArchive::getFrom*
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 54,378 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLMediaElement::Seek(double time) {
BLINK_MEDIA_LOG << "seek(" << (void*)this << ", " << time << ")";
if (!web_media_player_ || ready_state_ == kHaveNothing)
return;
SetIgnorePreloadNone();
double now = currentTime();
seeking_ = true;
time = std::min(time, duration());
time = std::max(time, EarliestPossiblePosition());
double media_time = GetWebMediaPlayer()->MediaTimeForTimeValue(time);
if (time != media_time) {
BLINK_MEDIA_LOG << "seek(" << (void*)this << ", " << time
<< ") - media timeline equivalent is " << media_time;
time = media_time;
}
TimeRanges* seekable_ranges = seekable();
if (!seekable_ranges->length()) {
seeking_ = false;
return;
}
time = seekable_ranges->Nearest(time, now);
if (playing_ && last_seek_time_ < now)
AddPlayedRange(last_seek_time_, now);
last_seek_time_ = time;
ScheduleEvent(EventTypeNames::seeking);
GetWebMediaPlayer()->Seek(time);
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 144,578 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void print_fatal_signal(int signr)
{
struct pt_regs *regs = signal_pt_regs();
printk("%s/%d: potentially unexpected fatal signal %d.\n",
current->comm, task_pid_nr(current), signr);
#if defined(__i386__) && !defined(__arch_um__)
printk("code at %08lx: ", regs->ip);
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
unsigned char insn;
if (get_user(insn, (unsigned char *)(regs->ip + i)))
break;
printk("%02x ", insn);
}
}
#endif
printk("\n");
preempt_disable();
show_regs(regs);
preempt_enable();
}
Commit Message: ptrace: ensure arch_ptrace/ptrace_request can never race with SIGKILL
putreg() assumes that the tracee is not running and pt_regs_access() can
safely play with its stack. However a killed tracee can return from
ptrace_stop() to the low-level asm code and do RESTORE_REST, this means
that debugger can actually read/modify the kernel stack until the tracee
does SAVE_REST again.
set_task_blockstep() can race with SIGKILL too and in some sense this
race is even worse, the very fact the tracee can be woken up breaks the
logic.
As Linus suggested we can clear TASK_WAKEKILL around the arch_ptrace()
call, this ensures that nobody can ever wakeup the tracee while the
debugger looks at it. Not only this fixes the mentioned problems, we
can do some cleanups/simplifications in arch_ptrace() paths.
Probably ptrace_unfreeze_traced() needs more callers, for example it
makes sense to make the tracee killable for oom-killer before
access_process_vm().
While at it, add the comment into may_ptrace_stop() to explain why
ptrace_stop() still can't rely on SIGKILL and signal_pending_state().
Reported-by: Salman Qazi <sqazi@google.com>
Reported-by: Suleiman Souhlal <suleiman@google.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 33,721 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t MediaPlayerService::AudioOutput::setPlaybackRate(const AudioPlaybackRate &rate)
{
ALOGV("setPlaybackRate(%f %f %d %d)",
rate.mSpeed, rate.mPitch, rate.mFallbackMode, rate.mStretchMode);
Mutex::Autolock lock(mLock);
if (mTrack == 0) {
mPlaybackRate = rate;
return OK;
}
status_t res = mTrack->setPlaybackRate(rate);
if (res != NO_ERROR) {
return res;
}
CHECK_GT(rate.mSpeed, 0.f);
mPlaybackRate = rate;
if (mSampleRateHz != 0) {
mMsecsPerFrame = 1E3f / (rate.mSpeed * mSampleRateHz);
}
return res;
}
Commit Message: MediaPlayerService: avoid invalid static cast
Bug: 30204103
Change-Id: Ie0dd3568a375f1e9fed8615ad3d85184bcc99028
(cherry picked from commit ee0a0e39acdcf8f97e0d6945c31ff36a06a36e9d)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 158,039 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SyncManager::SetEncryptionPassphrase(const std::string& passphrase,
bool is_explicit) {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
data_->SetEncryptionPassphrase(passphrase, is_explicit);
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 105,167 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WaitForGuestSurfaceReady(content::WebContents* guest_web_contents) {
RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame* child_view =
static_cast<RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame*>(
guest_web_contents->GetRenderWidgetHostView());
RenderWidgetHostViewBase* root_view = static_cast<RenderWidgetHostViewBase*>(
static_cast<content::WebContentsImpl*>(guest_web_contents)
->GetOuterWebContents()
->GetRenderWidgetHostView());
SurfaceHitTestReadyNotifier notifier(child_view);
notifier.WaitForSurfaceReady(root_view);
}
Commit Message: Apply ExtensionNavigationThrottle filesystem/blob checks to all frames.
BUG=836858
Change-Id: I34333a72501129fd40b5a9aa6378c9f35f1e7fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1028511
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nick Carter <nick@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553867}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 156,199 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool HTMLInputElement::hasCustomFocusLogic() const
{
return m_inputType->hasCustomFocusLogic();
}
Commit Message: Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 112,902 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cryptd_queue_worker(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct cryptd_cpu_queue *cpu_queue;
struct crypto_async_request *req, *backlog;
cpu_queue = container_of(work, struct cryptd_cpu_queue, work);
/*
* Only handle one request at a time to avoid hogging crypto workqueue.
* preempt_disable/enable is used to prevent being preempted by
* cryptd_enqueue_request(). local_bh_disable/enable is used to prevent
* cryptd_enqueue_request() being accessed from software interrupts.
*/
local_bh_disable();
preempt_disable();
backlog = crypto_get_backlog(&cpu_queue->queue);
req = crypto_dequeue_request(&cpu_queue->queue);
preempt_enable();
local_bh_enable();
if (!req)
return;
if (backlog)
backlog->complete(backlog, -EINPROGRESS);
req->complete(req, 0);
if (cpu_queue->queue.qlen)
queue_work(kcrypto_wq, &cpu_queue->work);
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 45,677 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ssh_packet_init_compression(struct ssh *ssh)
{
if (!ssh->state->compression_buffer &&
((ssh->state->compression_buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL))
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 12,966 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: fbFetch_a4 (const FbBits *bits, int x, int width, CARD32 *buffer, miIndexedPtr indexed)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < width; ++i) {
CARD32 p = Fetch4(bits, i + x);
p |= p << 4;
WRITE(buffer++, p << 24);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 11,443 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int compat_setdrvprm(int drive,
struct compat_floppy_drive_params __user *arg)
{
struct compat_floppy_drive_params v;
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (copy_from_user(&v, arg, sizeof(struct compat_floppy_drive_params)))
return -EFAULT;
if (!valid_floppy_drive_params(v.autodetect, v.native_format))
return -EINVAL;
mutex_lock(&floppy_mutex);
UDP->cmos = v.cmos;
UDP->max_dtr = v.max_dtr;
UDP->hlt = v.hlt;
UDP->hut = v.hut;
UDP->srt = v.srt;
UDP->spinup = v.spinup;
UDP->spindown = v.spindown;
UDP->spindown_offset = v.spindown_offset;
UDP->select_delay = v.select_delay;
UDP->rps = v.rps;
UDP->tracks = v.tracks;
UDP->timeout = v.timeout;
UDP->interleave_sect = v.interleave_sect;
UDP->max_errors = v.max_errors;
UDP->flags = v.flags;
UDP->read_track = v.read_track;
memcpy(UDP->autodetect, v.autodetect, sizeof(v.autodetect));
UDP->checkfreq = v.checkfreq;
UDP->native_format = v.native_format;
mutex_unlock(&floppy_mutex);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: floppy: fix out-of-bounds read in copy_buffer
This fixes a global out-of-bounds read access in the copy_buffer
function of the floppy driver.
The FDDEFPRM ioctl allows one to set the geometry of a disk. The sect
and head fields (unsigned int) of the floppy_drive structure are used to
compute the max_sector (int) in the make_raw_rw_request function. It is
possible to overflow the max_sector. Next, max_sector is passed to the
copy_buffer function and used in one of the memcpy calls.
An unprivileged user could trigger the bug if the device is accessible,
but requires a floppy disk to be inserted.
The patch adds the check for the .sect * .head multiplication for not
overflowing in the set_geometry function.
The bug was found by syzkaller.
Signed-off-by: Denis Efremov <efremov@ispras.ru>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 88,848 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ssl3_peek(SSL *s, void *buf, int len)
{
return ssl3_read_internal(s, buf, len, 1);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 90 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: jas_image_t *bmp_decode(jas_stream_t *in, char *optstr)
{
jas_image_t *image;
bmp_hdr_t hdr;
bmp_info_t *info;
uint_fast16_t cmptno;
jas_image_cmptparm_t cmptparms[3];
jas_image_cmptparm_t *cmptparm;
uint_fast16_t numcmpts;
long n;
if (optstr) {
jas_eprintf("warning: ignoring BMP decoder options\n");
}
jas_eprintf(
"THE BMP FORMAT IS NOT FULLY SUPPORTED!\n"
"THAT IS, THE JASPER SOFTWARE CANNOT DECODE ALL TYPES OF BMP DATA.\n"
"IF YOU HAVE ANY PROBLEMS, PLEASE TRY CONVERTING YOUR IMAGE DATA\n"
"TO THE PNM FORMAT, AND USING THIS FORMAT INSTEAD.\n"
);
/* Read the bitmap header. */
if (bmp_gethdr(in, &hdr)) {
jas_eprintf("cannot get header\n");
return 0;
}
JAS_DBGLOG(1, (
"BMP header: magic 0x%x; siz %d; res1 %d; res2 %d; off %d\n",
hdr.magic, hdr.siz, hdr.reserved1, hdr.reserved2, hdr.off
));
/* Read the bitmap information. */
if (!(info = bmp_getinfo(in))) {
jas_eprintf("cannot get info\n");
return 0;
}
JAS_DBGLOG(1,
("BMP information: len %d; width %d; height %d; numplanes %d; "
"depth %d; enctype %d; siz %d; hres %d; vres %d; numcolors %d; "
"mincolors %d\n", info->len, info->width, info->height, info->numplanes,
info->depth, info->enctype, info->siz, info->hres, info->vres,
info->numcolors, info->mincolors));
/* Ensure that we support this type of BMP file. */
if (!bmp_issupported(&hdr, info)) {
jas_eprintf("error: unsupported BMP encoding\n");
bmp_info_destroy(info);
return 0;
}
/* Skip over any useless data between the end of the palette
and start of the bitmap data. */
if ((n = hdr.off - (BMP_HDRLEN + BMP_INFOLEN + BMP_PALLEN(info))) < 0) {
jas_eprintf("error: possibly bad bitmap offset?\n");
return 0;
}
if (n > 0) {
jas_eprintf("skipping unknown data in BMP file\n");
if (bmp_gobble(in, n)) {
bmp_info_destroy(info);
return 0;
}
}
/* Get the number of components. */
numcmpts = bmp_numcmpts(info);
for (cmptno = 0, cmptparm = cmptparms; cmptno < numcmpts; ++cmptno,
++cmptparm) {
cmptparm->tlx = 0;
cmptparm->tly = 0;
cmptparm->hstep = 1;
cmptparm->vstep = 1;
cmptparm->width = info->width;
cmptparm->height = info->height;
cmptparm->prec = 8;
cmptparm->sgnd = false;
}
/* Create image object. */
if (!(image = jas_image_create(numcmpts, cmptparms,
JAS_CLRSPC_UNKNOWN))) {
bmp_info_destroy(info);
return 0;
}
if (numcmpts == 3) {
jas_image_setclrspc(image, JAS_CLRSPC_SRGB);
jas_image_setcmpttype(image, 0,
JAS_IMAGE_CT_COLOR(JAS_CLRSPC_CHANIND_RGB_R));
jas_image_setcmpttype(image, 1,
JAS_IMAGE_CT_COLOR(JAS_CLRSPC_CHANIND_RGB_G));
jas_image_setcmpttype(image, 2,
JAS_IMAGE_CT_COLOR(JAS_CLRSPC_CHANIND_RGB_B));
} else {
jas_image_setclrspc(image, JAS_CLRSPC_SGRAY);
jas_image_setcmpttype(image, 0,
JAS_IMAGE_CT_COLOR(JAS_CLRSPC_CHANIND_GRAY_Y));
}
/* Read the bitmap data. */
if (bmp_getdata(in, info, image)) {
bmp_info_destroy(info);
jas_image_destroy(image);
return 0;
}
bmp_info_destroy(info);
return image;
}
Commit Message: Fixed a problem with a null pointer dereference in the BMP decoder.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 1 | 168,756 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ASN1_item_verify(const ASN1_ITEM *it, X509_ALGOR *a, ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature,
void *asn, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
const EVP_MD *type = NULL;
unsigned char *buf_in=NULL;
int ret= -1,inl;
int mdnid, pknid;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
/* Convert signature OID into digest and public key OIDs */
if (type == NULL)
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM);
goto err;
}
/* Check public key OID matches public key type */
if (EVP_PKEY_type(pknid) != pkey->ameth->pkey_id)
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ASN1_R_WRONG_PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE);
goto err;
}
if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&ctx,type, NULL))
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
ret=0;
goto err;
}
inl = ASN1_item_i2d(asn, &buf_in, it);
if (buf_in == NULL)
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&ctx,(unsigned char *)buf_in,inl);
OPENSSL_cleanse(buf_in,(unsigned int)inl);
OPENSSL_free(buf_in);
if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&ctx,(unsigned char *)signature->data,
(unsigned int)signature->length,pkey) <= 0)
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
ret=0;
goto err;
}
/* we don't need to zero the 'ctx' because we just checked
* public information */
/* memset(&ctx,0,sizeof(ctx)); */
ret=1;
err:
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
return(ret);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 1 | 164,793 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: explicit DummyCapsLockDelegate(bool consume)
: consume_(consume),
handle_caps_lock_count_(0) {
}
Commit Message: accelerators: Remove deprecated Accelerator ctor that takes booleans.
BUG=128242
R=ben@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10399085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137957 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 106,504 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void do_renew_lease(struct nfs_client *clp, unsigned long timestamp)
{
spin_lock(&clp->cl_lock);
if (time_before(clp->cl_last_renewal,timestamp))
clp->cl_last_renewal = timestamp;
spin_unlock(&clp->cl_lock);
}
Commit Message: Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 19,844 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: send_data(u_int32_t id, const u_char *data, int dlen)
{
debug("request %u: sent data len %d", id, dlen);
send_data_or_handle(SSH2_FXP_DATA, id, data, dlen);
}
Commit Message: disallow creation (of empty files) in read-only mode; reported by
Michal Zalewski, feedback & ok deraadt@
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 60,375 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init pfault_irq_init(void)
{
int rc;
if (!MACHINE_IS_VM)
return 0;
rc = register_external_interrupt(0x2603, pfault_interrupt);
if (rc)
goto out_extint;
rc = pfault_init() == 0 ? 0 : -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (rc)
goto out_pfault;
service_subclass_irq_register();
hotcpu_notifier(pfault_cpu_notify, 0);
return 0;
out_pfault:
unregister_external_interrupt(0x2603, pfault_interrupt);
out_extint:
pfault_disable = 1;
return rc;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,523 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: do_block_io_op(struct xen_blkif *blkif)
{
union blkif_back_rings *blk_rings = &blkif->blk_rings;
int more_to_do;
do {
more_to_do = __do_block_io_op(blkif);
if (more_to_do)
break;
RING_FINAL_CHECK_FOR_REQUESTS(&blk_rings->common, more_to_do);
} while (more_to_do);
return more_to_do;
}
Commit Message: xen/blkback: Check device permissions before allowing OP_DISCARD
We need to make sure that the device is not RO or that
the request is not past the number of sectors we want to
issue the DISCARD operation for.
This fixes CVE-2013-2140.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com>
[v1: Made it pr_warn instead of pr_debug]
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 31,827 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int error_handler(Display *display, XErrorEvent *error)
{
trapped_error_code = error->error_code;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 27,033 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: dump_keywords(vector_t *keydump, int level, FILE *fp)
{
unsigned int i;
keyword_t *keyword_vec;
char file_name[21];
if (!level) {
snprintf(file_name, sizeof(file_name), "/tmp/keywords.%d", getpid());
fp = fopen(file_name, "w");
if (!fp)
return;
}
for (i = 0; i < vector_size(keydump); i++) {
keyword_vec = vector_slot(keydump, i);
fprintf(fp, "%*sKeyword : %s (%s)\n", level * 2, "", keyword_vec->string, keyword_vec->active ? "active": "disabled");
if (keyword_vec->sub)
dump_keywords(keyword_vec->sub, level + 1, fp);
}
if (!level)
fclose(fp);
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 1 | 168,997 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void whiteheat_release(struct usb_serial *serial)
{
struct usb_serial_port *command_port;
/* free up our private data for our command port */
command_port = serial->port[COMMAND_PORT];
kfree(usb_get_serial_port_data(command_port));
}
Commit Message: USB: whiteheat: Added bounds checking for bulk command response
This patch fixes a potential security issue in the whiteheat USB driver
which might allow a local attacker to cause kernel memory corrpution. This
is due to an unchecked memcpy into a fixed size buffer (of 64 bytes). On
EHCI and XHCI busses it's possible to craft responses greater than 64
bytes leading a buffer overflow.
Signed-off-by: James Forshaw <forshaw@google.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 38,104 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: qtdemux_sink_activate_pull (GstPad * sinkpad, gboolean active)
{
GstQTDemux *demux = GST_QTDEMUX (GST_PAD_PARENT (sinkpad));
if (active) {
demux->pullbased = TRUE;
demux->segment_running = TRUE;
return gst_pad_start_task (sinkpad, (GstTaskFunction) gst_qtdemux_loop,
sinkpad);
} else {
demux->segment_running = FALSE;
return gst_pad_stop_task (sinkpad);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 4,973 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool MultibufferDataSource::IsStreaming() {
return streaming_;
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 144,220 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct sock *rfcomm_get_sock_by_channel(int state, u8 channel, bdaddr_t *src)
{
struct sock *sk = NULL, *sk1 = NULL;
struct hlist_node *node;
read_lock(&rfcomm_sk_list.lock);
sk_for_each(sk, node, &rfcomm_sk_list.head) {
if (state && sk->sk_state != state)
continue;
if (rfcomm_pi(sk)->channel == channel) {
/* Exact match. */
if (!bacmp(&bt_sk(sk)->src, src))
break;
/* Closest match */
if (!bacmp(&bt_sk(sk)->src, BDADDR_ANY))
sk1 = sk;
}
}
read_unlock(&rfcomm_sk_list.lock);
return node ? sk : sk1;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: RFCOMM - Fix info leak via getsockname()
The RFCOMM code fails to initialize the trailing padding byte of struct
sockaddr_rc added for alignment. It that for leaks one byte kernel stack
via the getsockname() syscall. Add an explicit memset(0) before filling
the structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 34,111 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ath_txq_schedule(struct ath_softc *sc, struct ath_txq *txq)
{
struct ath_atx_ac *ac, *last_ac;
struct ath_atx_tid *tid, *last_tid;
bool sent = false;
if (test_bit(SC_OP_HW_RESET, &sc->sc_flags) ||
list_empty(&txq->axq_acq))
return;
rcu_read_lock();
last_ac = list_entry(txq->axq_acq.prev, struct ath_atx_ac, list);
while (!list_empty(&txq->axq_acq)) {
bool stop = false;
ac = list_first_entry(&txq->axq_acq, struct ath_atx_ac, list);
last_tid = list_entry(ac->tid_q.prev, struct ath_atx_tid, list);
list_del(&ac->list);
ac->sched = false;
while (!list_empty(&ac->tid_q)) {
tid = list_first_entry(&ac->tid_q, struct ath_atx_tid,
list);
list_del(&tid->list);
tid->sched = false;
if (tid->paused)
continue;
if (ath_tx_sched_aggr(sc, txq, tid, &stop))
sent = true;
/*
* add tid to round-robin queue if more frames
* are pending for the tid
*/
if (ath_tid_has_buffered(tid))
ath_tx_queue_tid(txq, tid);
if (stop || tid == last_tid)
break;
}
if (!list_empty(&ac->tid_q) && !ac->sched) {
ac->sched = true;
list_add_tail(&ac->list, &txq->axq_acq);
}
if (stop)
break;
if (ac == last_ac) {
if (!sent)
break;
sent = false;
last_ac = list_entry(txq->axq_acq.prev,
struct ath_atx_ac, list);
}
}
rcu_read_unlock();
}
Commit Message: ath9k: protect tid->sched check
We check tid->sched without a lock taken on ath_tx_aggr_sleep(). That
is race condition which can result of doing list_del(&tid->list) twice
(second time with poisoned list node) and cause crash like shown below:
[424271.637220] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00100104
[424271.637328] IP: [<f90fc072>] ath_tx_aggr_sleep+0x62/0xe0 [ath9k]
...
[424271.639953] Call Trace:
[424271.639998] [<f90f6900>] ? ath9k_get_survey+0x110/0x110 [ath9k]
[424271.640083] [<f90f6942>] ath9k_sta_notify+0x42/0x50 [ath9k]
[424271.640177] [<f809cfef>] sta_ps_start+0x8f/0x1c0 [mac80211]
[424271.640258] [<c10f730e>] ? free_compound_page+0x2e/0x40
[424271.640346] [<f809e915>] ieee80211_rx_handlers+0x9d5/0x2340 [mac80211]
[424271.640437] [<c112f048>] ? kmem_cache_free+0x1d8/0x1f0
[424271.640510] [<c1345a84>] ? kfree_skbmem+0x34/0x90
[424271.640578] [<c10fc23c>] ? put_page+0x2c/0x40
[424271.640640] [<c1345a84>] ? kfree_skbmem+0x34/0x90
[424271.640706] [<c1345a84>] ? kfree_skbmem+0x34/0x90
[424271.640787] [<f809dde3>] ? ieee80211_rx_handlers_result+0x73/0x1d0 [mac80211]
[424271.640897] [<f80a07a0>] ieee80211_prepare_and_rx_handle+0x520/0xad0 [mac80211]
[424271.641009] [<f809e22d>] ? ieee80211_rx_handlers+0x2ed/0x2340 [mac80211]
[424271.641104] [<c13846ce>] ? ip_output+0x7e/0xd0
[424271.641182] [<f80a1057>] ieee80211_rx+0x307/0x7c0 [mac80211]
[424271.641266] [<f90fa6ee>] ath_rx_tasklet+0x88e/0xf70 [ath9k]
[424271.641358] [<f80a0f2c>] ? ieee80211_rx+0x1dc/0x7c0 [mac80211]
[424271.641445] [<f90f82db>] ath9k_tasklet+0xcb/0x130 [ath9k]
Bug report:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=70551
Reported-and-tested-by: Max Sydorenko <maxim.stargazer@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 38,714 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int json_integer_equal(json_t *integer1, json_t *integer2)
{
return json_integer_value(integer1) == json_integer_value(integer2);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2013-6401: Change hash function, randomize hashes
Thanks to Florian Weimer and Eric Sesterhenn for reporting, reviewing
and testing.
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 40,904 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: uint32_t vga_ioport_read(void *opaque, uint32_t addr)
{
VGACommonState *s = opaque;
int val, index;
if (vga_ioport_invalid(s, addr)) {
val = 0xff;
} else {
switch(addr) {
case VGA_ATT_W:
if (s->ar_flip_flop == 0) {
val = s->ar_index;
} else {
val = 0;
}
break;
case VGA_ATT_R:
index = s->ar_index & 0x1f;
if (index < VGA_ATT_C) {
val = s->ar[index];
} else {
val = 0;
}
break;
case VGA_MIS_W:
val = s->st00;
break;
case VGA_SEQ_I:
val = s->sr_index;
break;
case VGA_SEQ_D:
val = s->sr[s->sr_index];
#ifdef DEBUG_VGA_REG
printf("vga: read SR%x = 0x%02x\n", s->sr_index, val);
#endif
break;
case VGA_PEL_IR:
val = s->dac_state;
break;
case VGA_PEL_IW:
val = s->dac_write_index;
break;
case VGA_PEL_D:
val = s->palette[s->dac_read_index * 3 + s->dac_sub_index];
if (++s->dac_sub_index == 3) {
s->dac_sub_index = 0;
s->dac_read_index++;
}
break;
case VGA_FTC_R:
val = s->fcr;
break;
case VGA_MIS_R:
val = s->msr;
break;
case VGA_GFX_I:
val = s->gr_index;
break;
case VGA_GFX_D:
val = s->gr[s->gr_index];
#ifdef DEBUG_VGA_REG
printf("vga: read GR%x = 0x%02x\n", s->gr_index, val);
#endif
break;
case VGA_CRT_IM:
case VGA_CRT_IC:
val = s->cr_index;
break;
case VGA_CRT_DM:
case VGA_CRT_DC:
val = s->cr[s->cr_index];
#ifdef DEBUG_VGA_REG
printf("vga: read CR%x = 0x%02x\n", s->cr_index, val);
#endif
break;
case VGA_IS1_RM:
case VGA_IS1_RC:
/* just toggle to fool polling */
val = s->st01 = s->retrace(s);
s->ar_flip_flop = 0;
break;
default:
val = 0x00;
break;
}
}
trace_vga_std_read_io(addr, val);
return val;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 3,016 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: char *js_strdup(js_State *J, const char *s)
{
int n = strlen(s) + 1;
char *p = js_malloc(J, n);
memcpy(p, s, n);
return p;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,488 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool HTMLInputElement::rangeUnderflow() const
{
return willValidate() && m_inputType->rangeUnderflow(value());
}
Commit Message: Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 112,967 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: InspectorStyleInvalidatorInvalidateEvent::SelectorPart(
Element& element,
const char* reason,
const InvalidationSet& invalidation_set,
const String& selector_part) {
std::unique_ptr<TracedValue> value = FillCommonPart(element, reason);
value->BeginArray("invalidationList");
invalidation_set.ToTracedValue(value.get());
value->EndArray();
value->SetString("selectorPart", selector_part);
return value;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 138,688 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int get_client_master_key(SSL *s)
{
int is_export, i, n, keya, ek;
unsigned long len;
unsigned char *p;
const SSL_CIPHER *cp;
const EVP_CIPHER *c;
const EVP_MD *md;
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
if (s->state == SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_A) {
i = ssl2_read(s, (char *)&(p[s->init_num]), 10 - s->init_num);
if (i < (10 - s->init_num))
return (ssl2_part_read(s, SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, i));
s->init_num = 10;
if (*(p++) != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY) {
if (p[-1] != SSL2_MT_ERROR) {
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,
SSL_R_READ_WRONG_PACKET_TYPE);
} else
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, SSL_R_PEER_ERROR);
return (-1);
}
cp = ssl2_get_cipher_by_char(p);
if (cp == NULL) {
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_NO_CIPHER);
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
return (-1);
}
s->session->cipher = cp;
p += 3;
n2s(p, i);
s->s2->tmp.clear = i;
n2s(p, i);
s->s2->tmp.enc = i;
n2s(p, i);
if (i > SSL_MAX_KEY_ARG_LENGTH) {
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, SSL_R_KEY_ARG_TOO_LONG);
return -1;
}
s->session->key_arg_length = i;
s->state = SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_B;
}
/* SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_B */
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
if (s->init_buf->length < SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER) {
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
keya = s->session->key_arg_length;
len =
10 + (unsigned long)s->s2->tmp.clear + (unsigned long)s->s2->tmp.enc +
(unsigned long)keya;
if (len > SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER) {
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, SSL_R_MESSAGE_TOO_LONG);
return -1;
}
n = (int)len - s->init_num;
i = ssl2_read(s, (char *)&(p[s->init_num]), n);
if (i != n)
return (ssl2_part_read(s, SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, i));
if (s->msg_callback) {
/* CLIENT-MASTER-KEY */
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, 0, p, (size_t)len, s,
s->msg_callback_arg);
}
p += 10;
memcpy(s->session->key_arg, &(p[s->s2->tmp.clear + s->s2->tmp.enc]),
(unsigned int)keya);
if (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL) {
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, SSL_R_NO_PRIVATEKEY);
return (-1);
}
i = ssl_rsa_private_decrypt(s->cert, s->s2->tmp.enc,
&(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]),
&(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]),
(s->s2->ssl2_rollback) ? RSA_SSLV23_PADDING :
RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
is_export = SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->session->cipher);
(s->s2->ssl2_rollback) ? RSA_SSLV23_PADDING :
RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
is_export = SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->session->cipher);
if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session, &c, &md, NULL, NULL, NULL)) {
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_NO_CIPHER);
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,
SSL_R_PROBLEMS_MAPPING_CIPHER_FUNCTIONS);
return (0);
} else
ek = 5;
/* bad decrypt */
# if 1
/*
* If a bad decrypt, continue with protocol but with a random master
* secret (Bleichenbacher attack)
*/
if ((i < 0) || ((!is_export && (i != EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)))
|| (is_export && ((i != ek)
|| (s->s2->tmp.clear +
(unsigned int)i != (unsigned int)
EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)))))) {
ERR_clear_error();
if (is_export)
i = ek;
else
i = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, i) <= 0)
return 0;
}
# else
unsigned long len;
unsigned char *p;
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cs; /* a stack of SSL_CIPHERS */
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cl; /* the ones we want to use */
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *prio, *allow;
int z;
/*
* This is a bit of a hack to check for the correct packet type the first
* time round.
*/
if (s->state == SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_A) {
s->first_packet = 1;
s->state = SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_B;
}
# endif
if (is_export)
i += s->s2->tmp.clear;
if (i > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
if (*(p++) != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
if (p[-1] != SSL2_MT_ERROR) {
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_READ_WRONG_PACKET_TYPE);
} else
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PEER_ERROR);
return (-1);
}
n2s(p, i);
if (i < s->version)
s->version = i;
n2s(p, i);
s->s2->tmp.cipher_spec_length = i;
n2s(p, i);
s->s2->tmp.session_id_length = i;
n2s(p, i);
s->s2->challenge_length = i;
if ((i < SSL2_MIN_CHALLENGE_LENGTH) ||
(i > SSL2_MAX_CHALLENGE_LENGTH)) {
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INVALID_CHALLENGE_LENGTH);
return (-1);
}
s->state = SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_C;
}
/* SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_C */
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
len =
9 + (unsigned long)s->s2->tmp.cipher_spec_length +
(unsigned long)s->s2->challenge_length +
(unsigned long)s->s2->tmp.session_id_length;
if (len > SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER) {
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MESSAGE_TOO_LONG);
return -1;
}
n = (int)len - s->init_num;
i = ssl2_read(s, (char *)&(p[s->init_num]), n);
if (i != n)
return (ssl2_part_read(s, SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, i));
if (s->msg_callback) {
/* CLIENT-HELLO */
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, 0, p, (size_t)len, s,
s->msg_callback_arg);
}
p += 9;
/*
* get session-id before cipher stuff so we can get out session structure
* if it is cached
*/
/* session-id */
if ((s->s2->tmp.session_id_length != 0) &&
(s->s2->tmp.session_id_length != SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)) {
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH);
return (-1);
}
if (s->s2->tmp.session_id_length == 0) {
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
return (-1);
}
} else {
i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, &(p[s->s2->tmp.cipher_spec_length]),
s->s2->tmp.session_id_length, NULL);
if (i == 1) { /* previous session */
s->hit = 1;
} else if (i == -1) {
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
return (-1);
} else {
if (s->cert == NULL) {
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_NO_CERTIFICATE);
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
return (-1);
}
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
return (-1);
}
}
}
if (!s->hit) {
cs = ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, p, s->s2->tmp.cipher_spec_length,
&s->session->ciphers);
if (cs == NULL)
goto mem_err;
cl = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) {
prio = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(cl);
if (prio == NULL)
goto mem_err;
allow = cs;
} else {
prio = cs;
allow = cl;
}
for (z = 0; z < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(prio); z++) {
if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(allow, sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(prio, z)) < 0) {
(void)sk_SSL_CIPHER_delete(prio, z);
z--;
}
}
if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) {
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
s->session->ciphers = prio;
}
/*
* s->session->ciphers should now have a list of ciphers that are on
* both the client and server. This list is ordered by the order the
* client sent the ciphers or in the order of the server's preference
* if SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE was set.
*/
}
p += s->s2->tmp.cipher_spec_length;
/* done cipher selection */
/* session id extracted already */
p += s->s2->tmp.session_id_length;
/* challenge */
if (s->s2->challenge_length > sizeof s->s2->challenge) {
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
memcpy(s->s2->challenge, p, (unsigned int)s->s2->challenge_length);
return (1);
mem_err:
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return (0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 164,802 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int btrfs_start_delalloc_roots(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, int delay_iput,
int nr)
{
struct btrfs_root *root;
struct list_head splice;
int ret;
if (test_bit(BTRFS_FS_STATE_ERROR, &fs_info->fs_state))
return -EROFS;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&splice);
mutex_lock(&fs_info->delalloc_root_mutex);
spin_lock(&fs_info->delalloc_root_lock);
list_splice_init(&fs_info->delalloc_roots, &splice);
while (!list_empty(&splice) && nr) {
root = list_first_entry(&splice, struct btrfs_root,
delalloc_root);
root = btrfs_grab_fs_root(root);
BUG_ON(!root);
list_move_tail(&root->delalloc_root,
&fs_info->delalloc_roots);
spin_unlock(&fs_info->delalloc_root_lock);
ret = __start_delalloc_inodes(root, delay_iput, nr);
btrfs_put_fs_root(root);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
if (nr != -1) {
nr -= ret;
WARN_ON(nr < 0);
}
spin_lock(&fs_info->delalloc_root_lock);
}
spin_unlock(&fs_info->delalloc_root_lock);
ret = 0;
atomic_inc(&fs_info->async_submit_draining);
while (atomic_read(&fs_info->nr_async_submits) ||
atomic_read(&fs_info->async_delalloc_pages)) {
wait_event(fs_info->async_submit_wait,
(atomic_read(&fs_info->nr_async_submits) == 0 &&
atomic_read(&fs_info->async_delalloc_pages) == 0));
}
atomic_dec(&fs_info->async_submit_draining);
out:
if (!list_empty_careful(&splice)) {
spin_lock(&fs_info->delalloc_root_lock);
list_splice_tail(&splice, &fs_info->delalloc_roots);
spin_unlock(&fs_info->delalloc_root_lock);
}
mutex_unlock(&fs_info->delalloc_root_mutex);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix truncation of compressed and inlined extents
When truncating a file to a smaller size which consists of an inline
extent that is compressed, we did not discard (or made unusable) the
data between the new file size and the old file size, wasting metadata
space and allowing for the truncated data to be leaked and the data
corruption/loss mentioned below.
We were also not correctly decrementing the number of bytes used by the
inode, we were setting it to zero, giving a wrong report for callers of
the stat(2) syscall. The fsck tool also reported an error about a mismatch
between the nbytes of the file versus the real space used by the file.
Now because we weren't discarding the truncated region of the file, it
was possible for a caller of the clone ioctl to actually read the data
that was truncated, allowing for a security breach without requiring root
access to the system, using only standard filesystem operations. The
scenario is the following:
1) User A creates a file which consists of an inline and compressed
extent with a size of 2000 bytes - the file is not accessible to
any other users (no read, write or execution permission for anyone
else);
2) The user truncates the file to a size of 1000 bytes;
3) User A makes the file world readable;
4) User B creates a file consisting of an inline extent of 2000 bytes;
5) User B issues a clone operation from user A's file into its own
file (using a length argument of 0, clone the whole range);
6) User B now gets to see the 1000 bytes that user A truncated from
its file before it made its file world readbale. User B also lost
the bytes in the range [1000, 2000[ bytes from its own file, but
that might be ok if his/her intention was reading stale data from
user A that was never supposed to be public.
Note that this contrasts with the case where we truncate a file from 2000
bytes to 1000 bytes and then truncate it back from 1000 to 2000 bytes. In
this case reading any byte from the range [1000, 2000[ will return a value
of 0x00, instead of the original data.
This problem exists since the clone ioctl was added and happens both with
and without my recent data loss and file corruption fixes for the clone
ioctl (patch "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents").
So fix this by truncating the compressed inline extents as we do for the
non-compressed case, which involves decompressing, if the data isn't already
in the page cache, compressing the truncated version of the extent, writing
the compressed content into the inline extent and then truncate it.
The following test case for fstests reproduces the problem. In order for
the test to pass both this fix and my previous fix for the clone ioctl
that forbids cloning a smaller inline extent into a larger one,
which is titled "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents", are needed. Without that other fix the test fails in a
different way that does not leak the truncated data, instead part of
destination file gets replaced with zeroes (because the destination file
has a larger inline extent than the source).
seq=`basename $0`
seqres=$RESULT_DIR/$seq
echo "QA output created by $seq"
tmp=/tmp/$$
status=1 # failure is the default!
trap "_cleanup; exit \$status" 0 1 2 3 15
_cleanup()
{
rm -f $tmp.*
}
# get standard environment, filters and checks
. ./common/rc
. ./common/filter
# real QA test starts here
_need_to_be_root
_supported_fs btrfs
_supported_os Linux
_require_scratch
_require_cloner
rm -f $seqres.full
_scratch_mkfs >>$seqres.full 2>&1
_scratch_mount "-o compress"
# Create our test files. File foo is going to be the source of a clone operation
# and consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of 512 bytes,
# while file bar consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of
# 256 bytes. For our test's purpose, it's important that file bar has an inline
# extent with a size smaller than foo's inline extent.
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xa1 0 128" \
-c "pwrite -S 0x2a 128 384" \
$SCRATCH_MNT/foo | _filter_xfs_io
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xbb 0 256" $SCRATCH_MNT/bar | _filter_xfs_io
# Now durably persist all metadata and data. We do this to make sure that we get
# on disk an inline extent with a size of 512 bytes for file foo.
sync
# Now truncate our file foo to a smaller size. Because it consists of a
# compressed and inline extent, btrfs did not shrink the inline extent to the
# new size (if the extent was not compressed, btrfs would shrink it to 128
# bytes), it only updates the inode's i_size to 128 bytes.
$XFS_IO_PROG -c "truncate 128" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo
# Now clone foo's inline extent into bar.
# This clone operation should fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP because the source
# file consists only of an inline extent and the file's size is smaller than
# the inline extent of the destination (128 bytes < 256 bytes). However the
# clone ioctl was not prepared to deal with a file that has a size smaller
# than the size of its inline extent (something that happens only for compressed
# inline extents), resulting in copying the full inline extent from the source
# file into the destination file.
#
# Note that btrfs' clone operation for inline extents consists of removing the
# inline extent from the destination inode and copy the inline extent from the
# source inode into the destination inode, meaning that if the destination
# inode's inline extent is larger (N bytes) than the source inode's inline
# extent (M bytes), some bytes (N - M bytes) will be lost from the destination
# file. Btrfs could copy the source inline extent's data into the destination's
# inline extent so that we would not lose any data, but that's currently not
# done due to the complexity that would be needed to deal with such cases
# (specially when one or both extents are compressed), returning EOPNOTSUPP, as
# it's normally not a very common case to clone very small files (only case
# where we get inline extents) and copying inline extents does not save any
# space (unlike for normal, non-inlined extents).
$CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Now because the above clone operation used to succeed, and due to foo's inline
# extent not being shinked by the truncate operation, our file bar got the whole
# inline extent copied from foo, making us lose the last 128 bytes from bar
# which got replaced by the bytes in range [128, 256[ from foo before foo was
# truncated - in other words, data loss from bar and being able to read old and
# stale data from foo that should not be possible to read anymore through normal
# filesystem operations. Contrast with the case where we truncate a file from a
# size N to a smaller size M, truncate it back to size N and then read the range
# [M, N[, we should always get the value 0x00 for all the bytes in that range.
# We expected the clone operation to fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP and therefore
# not modify our file's bar data/metadata. So its content should be 256 bytes
# long with all bytes having the value 0xbb.
#
# Without the btrfs bug fix, the clone operation succeeded and resulted in
# leaking truncated data from foo, the bytes that belonged to its range
# [128, 256[, and losing data from bar in that same range. So reading the
# file gave us the following content:
#
# 0000000 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1
# *
# 0000200 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a
# *
# 0000400
echo "File bar's content after the clone operation:"
od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Also because the foo's inline extent was not shrunk by the truncate
# operation, btrfs' fsck, which is run by the fstests framework everytime a
# test completes, failed reporting the following error:
#
# root 5 inode 257 errors 400, nbytes wrong
status=0
exit
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 41,681 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ipmi_validate_addr(struct ipmi_addr *addr, int len)
{
if (len < sizeof(struct ipmi_system_interface_addr))
return -EINVAL;
if (addr->addr_type == IPMI_SYSTEM_INTERFACE_ADDR_TYPE) {
if (addr->channel != IPMI_BMC_CHANNEL)
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
if ((addr->channel == IPMI_BMC_CHANNEL)
|| (addr->channel >= IPMI_MAX_CHANNELS)
|| (addr->channel < 0))
return -EINVAL;
if (is_ipmb_addr(addr) || is_ipmb_bcast_addr(addr)) {
if (len < sizeof(struct ipmi_ipmb_addr))
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
if (is_lan_addr(addr)) {
if (len < sizeof(struct ipmi_lan_addr))
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
return -EINVAL;
}
Commit Message: ipmi: fix use-after-free of user->release_barrier.rda
When we do the following test, we got oops in ipmi_msghandler driver
while((1))
do
service ipmievd restart & service ipmievd restart
done
---------------------------------------------------------------
[ 294.230186] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000803fea6ea008
[ 294.230188] Mem abort info:
[ 294.230190] ESR = 0x96000004
[ 294.230191] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 294.230193] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 294.230194] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 294.230195] Data abort info:
[ 294.230196] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004
[ 294.230197] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 294.230199] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000a1c1b75a
[ 294.230201] [0000803fea6ea008] pgd=0000000000000000
[ 294.230204] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP
[ 294.235211] Modules linked in: nls_utf8 isofs rpcrdma ib_iser ib_srpt target_core_mod ib_srp scsi_transport_srp ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm iw_cm dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce sha2_ce ses sha256_arm64 sha1_ce hibmc_drm hisi_sas_v2_hw enclosure sg hisi_sas_main sbsa_gwdt ip_tables mlx5_ib ib_uverbs marvell ib_core mlx5_core ixgbe ipmi_si mdio hns_dsaf ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler hns_enet_drv hns_mdio
[ 294.277745] CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.0.0-rc2+ #113
[ 294.285511] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.37 11/21/2017
[ 294.292835] pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO)
[ 294.297695] pc : __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.301940] lr : acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.307853] sp : ffff00001001bc80
[ 294.311208] x29: ffff00001001bc80 x28: ffff0000117e5000
[ 294.316594] x27: 0000000000000000 x26: dead000000000100
[ 294.321980] x25: dead000000000200 x24: ffff803f6bd06800
[ 294.327366] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000000
[ 294.332752] x21: ffff00001001bd04 x20: ffff80df33d19018
[ 294.338137] x19: ffff80df33d19018 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 294.343523] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 294.348908] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000002
[ 294.354293] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 294.359679] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000100000
[ 294.365065] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 0000000000000004
[ 294.370451] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffff80df34558678
[ 294.375836] x5 : 000000000000000c x4 : 0000000000000000
[ 294.381221] x3 : 0000000000000001 x2 : 0000803fea6ea000
[ 294.386607] x1 : 0000803fea6ea008 x0 : 0000000000000001
[ 294.391994] Process swapper/3 (pid: 0, stack limit = 0x0000000083087293)
[ 294.398791] Call trace:
[ 294.401266] __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.405154] acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.410716] deliver_response+0x80/0xf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.416189] deliver_local_response+0x28/0x68 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.422193] handle_one_recv_msg+0x158/0xcf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.432050] handle_new_recv_msgs+0xc0/0x210 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.441984] smi_recv_tasklet+0x8c/0x158 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.451618] tasklet_action_common.isra.5+0x88/0x138
[ 294.460661] tasklet_action+0x2c/0x38
[ 294.468191] __do_softirq+0x120/0x2f8
[ 294.475561] irq_exit+0x134/0x140
[ 294.482445] __handle_domain_irq+0x6c/0xc0
[ 294.489954] gic_handle_irq+0xb8/0x178
[ 294.497037] el1_irq+0xb0/0x140
[ 294.503381] arch_cpu_idle+0x34/0x1a8
[ 294.510096] do_idle+0x1d4/0x290
[ 294.516322] cpu_startup_entry+0x28/0x30
[ 294.523230] secondary_start_kernel+0x184/0x1d0
[ 294.530657] Code: d538d082 d2800023 8b010c81 8b020021 (c85f7c25)
[ 294.539746] ---[ end trace 8a7a880dee570b29 ]---
[ 294.547341] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
[ 294.556837] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 294.563996] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 294.570515] CPU features: 0x002,21006008
[ 294.577638] Memory Limit: none
[ 294.587178] Starting crashdump kernel...
[ 294.594314] Bye!
Because the user->release_barrier.rda is freed in ipmi_destroy_user(), but
the refcount is not zero, when acquire_ipmi_user() uses user->release_barrier.rda
in __srcu_read_lock(), it causes oops.
Fix this by calling cleanup_srcu_struct() when the refcount is zero.
Fixes: e86ee2d44b44 ("ipmi: Rework locking and shutdown for hot remove")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.18
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 91,299 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderViewHostImpl::OnRequestMove(const gfx::Rect& pos) {
if (!is_swapped_out_)
delegate_->RequestMove(pos);
Send(new ViewMsg_Move_ACK(GetRoutingID()));
}
Commit Message: Filter more incoming URLs in the CreateWindow path.
BUG=170532
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12036002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@178728 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 117,257 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static php_pgsql_data_type php_pgsql_get_data_type(const char *type_name, size_t len)
{
/* This is stupid way to do. I'll fix it when I decied how to support
user defined types. (Yasuo) */
/* boolean */
if (!strcmp(type_name, "bool")|| !strcmp(type_name, "boolean"))
return PG_BOOL;
/* object id */
if (!strcmp(type_name, "oid"))
return PG_OID;
/* integer */
if (!strcmp(type_name, "int2") || !strcmp(type_name, "smallint"))
return PG_INT2;
if (!strcmp(type_name, "int4") || !strcmp(type_name, "integer"))
return PG_INT4;
if (!strcmp(type_name, "int8") || !strcmp(type_name, "bigint"))
return PG_INT8;
/* real and other */
if (!strcmp(type_name, "float4") || !strcmp(type_name, "real"))
return PG_FLOAT4;
if (!strcmp(type_name, "float8") || !strcmp(type_name, "double precision"))
return PG_FLOAT8;
if (!strcmp(type_name, "numeric"))
return PG_NUMERIC;
if (!strcmp(type_name, "money"))
return PG_MONEY;
/* character */
if (!strcmp(type_name, "text"))
return PG_TEXT;
if (!strcmp(type_name, "bpchar") || !strcmp(type_name, "character"))
return PG_CHAR;
if (!strcmp(type_name, "varchar") || !strcmp(type_name, "character varying"))
return PG_VARCHAR;
/* time and interval */
if (!strcmp(type_name, "abstime"))
return PG_UNIX_TIME;
if (!strcmp(type_name, "reltime"))
return PG_UNIX_TIME_INTERVAL;
if (!strcmp(type_name, "tinterval"))
return PG_UNIX_TIME_INTERVAL;
if (!strcmp(type_name, "date"))
return PG_DATE;
if (!strcmp(type_name, "time"))
return PG_TIME;
if (!strcmp(type_name, "time with time zone") || !strcmp(type_name, "timetz"))
return PG_TIME_WITH_TIMEZONE;
if (!strcmp(type_name, "timestamp without time zone") || !strcmp(type_name, "timestamp"))
return PG_TIMESTAMP;
if (!strcmp(type_name, "timestamp with time zone") || !strcmp(type_name, "timestamptz"))
return PG_TIMESTAMP_WITH_TIMEZONE;
if (!strcmp(type_name, "interval"))
return PG_INTERVAL;
/* binary */
if (!strcmp(type_name, "bytea"))
return PG_BYTEA;
/* network */
if (!strcmp(type_name, "cidr"))
return PG_CIDR;
if (!strcmp(type_name, "inet"))
return PG_INET;
if (!strcmp(type_name, "macaddr"))
return PG_MACADDR;
/* bit */
if (!strcmp(type_name, "bit"))
return PG_BIT;
if (!strcmp(type_name, "bit varying"))
return PG_VARBIT;
/* geometric */
if (!strcmp(type_name, "line"))
return PG_LINE;
if (!strcmp(type_name, "lseg"))
return PG_LSEG;
if (!strcmp(type_name, "box"))
return PG_BOX;
if (!strcmp(type_name, "path"))
return PG_PATH;
if (!strcmp(type_name, "point"))
return PG_POINT;
if (!strcmp(type_name, "polygon"))
return PG_POLYGON;
if (!strcmp(type_name, "circle"))
return PG_CIRCLE;
return PG_UNKNOWN;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 5,238 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void btif_hl_tmr_hdlr(TIMER_LIST_ENT *tle)
{
btif_hl_mcl_cb_t *p_mcb;
UINT8 i,j;
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s timer_in_use=%d", __FUNCTION__, tle->in_use );
for (i=0; i < BTA_HL_NUM_APPS ; i ++)
{
for (j=0; j< BTA_HL_NUM_MCLS; j++)
{
p_mcb =BTIF_HL_GET_MCL_CB_PTR(i,j);
if (p_mcb->cch_timer_active)
{
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%app_idx=%d, mcl_idx=%d mcl-connected=%d",
i, j, p_mcb->is_connected);
p_mcb->cch_timer_active = FALSE;
if (p_mcb->is_connected)
{
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("Idle timeout Close CCH app_idx=%d mcl_idx=%d mcl_handle=%d",
i ,j, p_mcb->mcl_handle);
BTA_HlCchClose(p_mcb->mcl_handle);
}
else
{
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("CCH idle timeout But CCH not connected app_idx=%d mcl_idx=%d ",i,j);
}
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 158,759 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void sas_suspend_devices(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct asd_sas_phy *phy;
struct domain_device *dev;
struct sas_discovery_event *ev = to_sas_discovery_event(work);
struct asd_sas_port *port = ev->port;
struct Scsi_Host *shost = port->ha->core.shost;
struct sas_internal *si = to_sas_internal(shost->transportt);
clear_bit(DISCE_SUSPEND, &port->disc.pending);
sas_suspend_sata(port);
/* lldd is free to forget the domain_device across the
* suspension, we force the issue here to keep the reference
* counts aligned
*/
list_for_each_entry(dev, &port->dev_list, dev_list_node)
sas_notify_lldd_dev_gone(dev);
/* we are suspending, so we know events are disabled and
* phy_list is not being mutated
*/
list_for_each_entry(phy, &port->phy_list, port_phy_el) {
if (si->dft->lldd_port_formed)
si->dft->lldd_port_deformed(phy);
phy->suspended = 1;
port->suspended = 1;
}
}
Commit Message: scsi: libsas: direct call probe and destruct
In commit 87c8331fcf72 ("[SCSI] libsas: prevent domain rediscovery
competing with ata error handling") introduced disco mutex to prevent
rediscovery competing with ata error handling and put the whole
revalidation in the mutex. But the rphy add/remove needs to wait for the
error handling which also grabs the disco mutex. This may leads to dead
lock.So the probe and destruct event were introduce to do the rphy
add/remove asynchronously and out of the lock.
The asynchronously processed workers makes the whole discovery process
not atomic, the other events may interrupt the process. For example,
if a loss of signal event inserted before the probe event, the
sas_deform_port() is called and the port will be deleted.
And sas_port_delete() may run before the destruct event, but the
port-x:x is the top parent of end device or expander. This leads to
a kernel WARNING such as:
[ 82.042979] sysfs group 'power' not found for kobject 'phy-1:0:22'
[ 82.042983] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 82.042986] WARNING: CPU: 54 PID: 1714 at fs/sysfs/group.c:237
sysfs_remove_group+0x94/0xa0
[ 82.043059] Call trace:
[ 82.043082] [<ffff0000082e7624>] sysfs_remove_group+0x94/0xa0
[ 82.043085] [<ffff00000864e320>] dpm_sysfs_remove+0x60/0x70
[ 82.043086] [<ffff00000863ee10>] device_del+0x138/0x308
[ 82.043089] [<ffff00000869a2d0>] sas_phy_delete+0x38/0x60
[ 82.043091] [<ffff00000869a86c>] do_sas_phy_delete+0x6c/0x80
[ 82.043093] [<ffff00000863dc20>] device_for_each_child+0x58/0xa0
[ 82.043095] [<ffff000008696f80>] sas_remove_children+0x40/0x50
[ 82.043100] [<ffff00000869d1bc>] sas_destruct_devices+0x64/0xa0
[ 82.043102] [<ffff0000080e93bc>] process_one_work+0x1fc/0x4b0
[ 82.043104] [<ffff0000080e96c0>] worker_thread+0x50/0x490
[ 82.043105] [<ffff0000080f0364>] kthread+0xfc/0x128
[ 82.043107] [<ffff0000080836c0>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x50
Make probe and destruct a direct call in the disco and revalidate function,
but put them outside the lock. The whole discovery or revalidate won't
be interrupted by other events. And the DISCE_PROBE and DISCE_DESTRUCT
event are deleted as a result of the direct call.
Introduce a new list to destruct the sas_port and put the port delete after
the destruct. This makes sure the right order of destroying the sysfs
kobject and fix the warning above.
In sas_ex_revalidate_domain() have a loop to find all broadcasted
device, and sometimes we have a chance to find the same expander twice.
Because the sas_port will be deleted at the end of the whole revalidate
process, sas_port with the same name cannot be added before this.
Otherwise the sysfs will complain of creating duplicate filename. Since
the LLDD will send broadcast for every device change, we can only
process one expander's revalidation.
[mkp: kbuild test robot warning]
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
CC: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
CC: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
CC: Ewan Milne <emilne@redhat.com>
CC: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
CC: Tomas Henzl <thenzl@redhat.com>
CC: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 85,474 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static av_cold int compact_init(WriterContext *wctx)
{
CompactContext *compact = wctx->priv;
if (strlen(compact->item_sep_str) != 1) {
av_log(wctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Item separator '%s' specified, but must contain a single character\n",
compact->item_sep_str);
return AVERROR(EINVAL);
}
compact->item_sep = compact->item_sep_str[0];
if (!strcmp(compact->escape_mode_str, "none")) compact->escape_str = none_escape_str;
else if (!strcmp(compact->escape_mode_str, "c" )) compact->escape_str = c_escape_str;
else if (!strcmp(compact->escape_mode_str, "csv" )) compact->escape_str = csv_escape_str;
else {
av_log(wctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Unknown escape mode '%s'\n", compact->escape_mode_str);
return AVERROR(EINVAL);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ffprobe: Fix null pointer dereference with color primaries
Found-by: AD-lab of venustech
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 61,318 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *vrule)
{
struct selinux_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
if (rule) {
context_destroy(&rule->au_ctxt);
kfree(rule);
}
}
Commit Message: SELinux: Fix kernel BUG on empty security contexts.
Setting an empty security context (length=0) on a file will
lead to incorrectly dereferencing the type and other fields
of the security context structure, yielding a kernel BUG.
As a zero-length security context is never valid, just reject
all such security contexts whether coming from userspace
via setxattr or coming from the filesystem upon a getxattr
request by SELinux.
Setting a security context value (empty or otherwise) unknown to
SELinux in the first place is only possible for a root process
(CAP_MAC_ADMIN), and, if running SELinux in enforcing mode, only
if the corresponding SELinux mac_admin permission is also granted
to the domain by policy. In Fedora policies, this is only allowed for
specific domains such as livecd for setting down security contexts
that are not defined in the build host policy.
Reproducer:
su
setenforce 0
touch foo
setfattr -n security.selinux foo
Caveat:
Relabeling or removing foo after doing the above may not be possible
without booting with SELinux disabled. Any subsequent access to foo
after doing the above will also trigger the BUG.
BUG output from Matthew Thode:
[ 473.893141] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 473.962110] kernel BUG at security/selinux/ss/services.c:654!
[ 473.995314] invalid opcode: 0000 [#6] SMP
[ 474.027196] Modules linked in:
[ 474.058118] CPU: 0 PID: 8138 Comm: ls Tainted: G D I
3.13.0-grsec #1
[ 474.116637] Hardware name: Supermicro X8ST3/X8ST3, BIOS 2.0
07/29/10
[ 474.149768] task: ffff8805f50cd010 ti: ffff8805f50cd488 task.ti:
ffff8805f50cd488
[ 474.183707] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff814681c7>] [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 474.219954] RSP: 0018:ffff8805c0ac3c38 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 474.252253] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8805c0ac3d94 RCX:
0000000000000100
[ 474.287018] RDX: ffff8805e8aac000 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI:
ffff8805e8aaa000
[ 474.321199] RBP: ffff8805c0ac3cb8 R08: 0000000000000010 R09:
0000000000000006
[ 474.357446] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8805c567a000 R12:
0000000000000006
[ 474.419191] R13: ffff8805c2b74e88 R14: 00000000000001da R15:
0000000000000000
[ 474.453816] FS: 00007f2e75220800(0000) GS:ffff88061fc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 474.489254] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 474.522215] CR2: 00007f2e74716090 CR3: 00000005c085e000 CR4:
00000000000207f0
[ 474.556058] Stack:
[ 474.584325] ffff8805c0ac3c98 ffffffff811b549b ffff8805c0ac3c98
ffff8805f1190a40
[ 474.618913] ffff8805a6202f08 ffff8805c2b74e88 00068800d0464990
ffff8805e8aac860
[ 474.653955] ffff8805c0ac3cb8 000700068113833a ffff880606c75060
ffff8805c0ac3d94
[ 474.690461] Call Trace:
[ 474.723779] [<ffffffff811b549b>] ? lookup_fast+0x1cd/0x22a
[ 474.778049] [<ffffffff81468824>] security_compute_av+0xf4/0x20b
[ 474.811398] [<ffffffff8196f419>] avc_compute_av+0x2a/0x179
[ 474.843813] [<ffffffff8145727b>] avc_has_perm+0x45/0xf4
[ 474.875694] [<ffffffff81457d0e>] inode_has_perm+0x2a/0x31
[ 474.907370] [<ffffffff81457e76>] selinux_inode_getattr+0x3c/0x3e
[ 474.938726] [<ffffffff81455cf6>] security_inode_getattr+0x1b/0x22
[ 474.970036] [<ffffffff811b057d>] vfs_getattr+0x19/0x2d
[ 475.000618] [<ffffffff811b05e5>] vfs_fstatat+0x54/0x91
[ 475.030402] [<ffffffff811b063b>] vfs_lstat+0x19/0x1b
[ 475.061097] [<ffffffff811b077e>] SyS_newlstat+0x15/0x30
[ 475.094595] [<ffffffff8113c5c1>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xa1/0xc3
[ 475.148405] [<ffffffff8197791e>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[ 475.179201] Code: 00 48 85 c0 48 89 45 b8 75 02 0f 0b 48 8b 45 a0 48
8b 3d 45 d0 b6 00 8b 40 08 89 c6 ff ce e8 d1 b0 06 00 48 85 c0 49 89 c7
75 02 <0f> 0b 48 8b 45 b8 4c 8b 28 eb 1e 49 8d 7d 08 be 80 01 00 00 e8
[ 475.255884] RIP [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 475.296120] RSP <ffff8805c0ac3c38>
[ 475.328734] ---[ end trace f076482e9d754adc ]---
Reported-by: Matthew Thode <mthode@mthode.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 39,303 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void smp_task_done(struct sas_task *task)
{
if (!del_timer(&task->slow_task->timer))
return;
complete(&task->slow_task->completion);
}
Commit Message: scsi: libsas: fix a race condition when smp task timeout
When the lldd is processing the complete sas task in interrupt and set the
task stat as SAS_TASK_STATE_DONE, the smp timeout timer is able to be
triggered at the same time. And smp_task_timedout() will complete the task
wheter the SAS_TASK_STATE_DONE is set or not. Then the sas task may freed
before lldd end the interrupt process. Thus a use-after-free will happen.
Fix this by calling the complete() only when SAS_TASK_STATE_DONE is not
set. And remove the check of the return value of the del_timer(). Once the
LLDD sets DONE, it must call task->done(), which will call
smp_task_done()->complete() and the task will be completed and freed
correctly.
Reported-by: chenxiang <chenxiang66@hisilicon.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
CC: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
CC: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
CC: Ewan Milne <emilne@redhat.com>
CC: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
CC: Tomas Henzl <thenzl@redhat.com>
CC: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
CC: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 1 | 169,782 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int fuse_copy_page(struct fuse_copy_state *cs, struct page **pagep,
unsigned offset, unsigned count, int zeroing)
{
int err;
struct page *page = *pagep;
if (page && zeroing && count < PAGE_SIZE)
clear_highpage(page);
while (count) {
if (cs->write && cs->pipebufs && page) {
return fuse_ref_page(cs, page, offset, count);
} else if (!cs->len) {
if (cs->move_pages && page &&
offset == 0 && count == PAGE_SIZE) {
err = fuse_try_move_page(cs, pagep);
if (err <= 0)
return err;
} else {
err = fuse_copy_fill(cs);
if (err)
return err;
}
}
if (page) {
void *mapaddr = kmap_atomic(page);
void *buf = mapaddr + offset;
offset += fuse_copy_do(cs, &buf, &count);
kunmap_atomic(mapaddr);
} else
offset += fuse_copy_do(cs, NULL, &count);
}
if (page && !cs->write)
flush_dcache_page(page);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 96,795 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void callCollNeeded(sqlite3 *db, int enc, const char *zName){
assert( !db->xCollNeeded || !db->xCollNeeded16 );
if( db->xCollNeeded ){
char *zExternal = sqlite3DbStrDup(db, zName);
if( !zExternal ) return;
db->xCollNeeded(db->pCollNeededArg, db, enc, zExternal);
sqlite3DbFree(db, zExternal);
}
#ifndef SQLITE_OMIT_UTF16
if( db->xCollNeeded16 ){
char const *zExternal;
sqlite3_value *pTmp = sqlite3ValueNew(db);
sqlite3ValueSetStr(pTmp, -1, zName, SQLITE_UTF8, SQLITE_STATIC);
zExternal = sqlite3ValueText(pTmp, SQLITE_UTF16NATIVE);
if( zExternal ){
db->xCollNeeded16(db->pCollNeededArg, db, (int)ENC(db), zExternal);
}
sqlite3ValueFree(pTmp);
}
#endif
}
Commit Message: sqlite: safely move pointer values through SQL.
This lands https://www.sqlite.org/src/timeline?c=d6a44b35 in
third_party/sqlite/src/ and
third_party/sqlite/patches/0013-Add-new-interfaces-sqlite3_bind_pointer-sqlite3_resu.patch
and re-generates third_party/sqlite/amalgamation/* using the script at
third_party/sqlite/google_generate_amalgamation.sh.
The CL also adds a layout test that verifies the patch works as intended.
BUG=742407
Change-Id: I2e1a457459cd2e975e6241b630e7b79c82545981
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/572976
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#487275}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 136,362 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct sock *__l2cap_get_chan_by_scid(struct l2cap_chan_list *l, u16 cid)
{
struct sock *s;
for (s = l->head; s; s = l2cap_pi(s)->next_c) {
if (l2cap_pi(s)->scid == cid)
break;
}
return s;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: Add configuration support for ERTM and Streaming mode
Add support to config_req and config_rsp to configure ERTM and Streaming
mode. If the remote device specifies ERTM or Streaming mode, then the
same mode is proposed. Otherwise ERTM or Basic mode is used. And in case
of a state 2 device, the remote device should propose the same mode. If
not, then the channel gets disconnected.
Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan <gustavo@las.ic.unicamp.br>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 58,912 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int run_buffer(char *buffer)
{
struct lxc_popen_FILE *f;
char *output;
int ret;
f = lxc_popen(buffer);
if (!f) {
SYSERROR("popen failed");
return -1;
}
output = malloc(LXC_LOG_BUFFER_SIZE);
if (!output) {
ERROR("failed to allocate memory for script output");
lxc_pclose(f);
return -1;
}
while(fgets(output, LXC_LOG_BUFFER_SIZE, f->f))
DEBUG("script output: %s", output);
free(output);
ret = lxc_pclose(f);
if (ret == -1) {
SYSERROR("Script exited on error");
return -1;
} else if (WIFEXITED(ret) && WEXITSTATUS(ret) != 0) {
ERROR("Script exited with status %d", WEXITSTATUS(ret));
return -1;
} else if (WIFSIGNALED(ret)) {
ERROR("Script terminated by signal %d (%s)", WTERMSIG(ret),
strsignal(WTERMSIG(ret)));
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 44,623 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cpu_rt_period_write_uint(struct cgroup *cgrp, struct cftype *cftype,
u64 rt_period_us)
{
return sched_group_set_rt_period(cgroup_tg(cgrp), rt_period_us);
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,378 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ewk_frame_editor_client_contents_changed(Evas_Object* ewkFrame)
{
evas_object_smart_callback_call(ewkFrame, "editorclient,contents,changed", 0);
EWK_FRAME_SD_GET_OR_RETURN(ewkFrame, smartData);
ewk_view_editor_client_contents_changed(smartData->view);
}
Commit Message: [EFL] fast/frames/frame-crash-with-page-cache.html is crashing
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85879
Patch by Mikhail Pozdnyakov <mikhail.pozdnyakov@intel.com> on 2012-05-17
Reviewed by Noam Rosenthal.
Source/WebKit/efl:
_ewk_frame_smart_del() is considering now that the frame can be present in cache.
loader()->detachFromParent() is only applied for the main frame.
loader()->cancelAndClear() is not used anymore.
* ewk/ewk_frame.cpp:
(_ewk_frame_smart_del):
LayoutTests:
* platform/efl/test_expectations.txt: Removed fast/frames/frame-crash-with-page-cache.html.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117409 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 107,645 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebKit::WebString WebGraphicsContext3DCommandBufferImpl::getShaderInfoLog(
WebGLId shader) {
GLint logLength = 0;
gl_->GetShaderiv(shader, GL_INFO_LOG_LENGTH, &logLength);
if (!logLength)
return WebKit::WebString();
scoped_array<GLchar> log(new GLchar[logLength]);
if (!log.get())
return WebKit::WebString();
GLsizei returnedLogLength = 0;
gl_->GetShaderInfoLog(
shader, logLength, &returnedLogLength, log.get());
DCHECK_EQ(logLength, returnedLogLength + 1);
WebKit::WebString res =
WebKit::WebString::fromUTF8(log.get(), returnedLogLength);
return res;
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 106,819 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: __perf_event_exit_task(struct perf_event *child_event,
struct perf_event_context *child_ctx,
struct task_struct *child)
{
if (child_event->parent) {
raw_spin_lock_irq(&child_ctx->lock);
perf_group_detach(child_event);
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&child_ctx->lock);
}
perf_remove_from_context(child_event);
/*
* It can happen that the parent exits first, and has events
* that are still around due to the child reference. These
* events need to be zapped.
*/
if (child_event->parent) {
sync_child_event(child_event, child);
free_event(child_event);
}
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,963 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLFormElement::InvalidateDefaultButtonStyle() const {
for (const auto& control : ListedElements()) {
if (!control->IsFormControlElement())
continue;
if (ToHTMLFormControlElement(control)->CanBeSuccessfulSubmitButton()) {
ToHTMLFormControlElement(control)->PseudoStateChanged(
CSSSelector::kPseudoDefault);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Move user activation check to RemoteFrame::Navigate's callers.
Currently RemoteFrame::Navigate is the user of
Frame::HasTransientUserActivation that passes a RemoteFrame*, and
it seems wrong because the user activation (user gesture) needed by
the navigation should belong to the LocalFrame that initiated the
navigation.
Follow-up CLs after this one will update UserActivation code in
Frame to take a LocalFrame* instead of a Frame*, and get rid of
redundant IPCs.
Bug: 811414
Change-Id: I771c1694043edb54374a44213d16715d9c7da704
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/914736
Commit-Queue: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#536728}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 152,226 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: explicit EventTestWindow(bool modal) : TestWindow(modal), mouse_presses_(0) {}
Commit Message: cros: Enable some tests in //ash/wm in ash_unittests --mash
For the ones that fail, disable them via filter file instead of in the
code, per our disablement policy.
Bug: 698085, 695556, 698878, 698888, 698093, 698894
Test: ash_unittests --mash
Change-Id: Ic145ab6a95508968d6884d14fac2a3ca08888d26
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/752423
Commit-Queue: James Cook <jamescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Steven Bennetts <stevenjb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513836}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,274 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cdf_read_sector(const cdf_info_t *info, void *buf, size_t offs, size_t len,
const cdf_header_t *h, cdf_secid_t id)
{
assert((size_t)CDF_SEC_SIZE(h) == len);
return cdf_read(info, (off_t)CDF_SEC_POS(h, id),
((char *)buf) + offs, len);
}
Commit Message: add more check found by cert's fuzzer.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 169,883 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderThreadImpl::IsGpuRasterizationForced() {
return is_gpu_rasterization_forced_;
}
Commit Message: Roll src/third_party/boringssl/src 664e99a64..696c13bd6
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+log/664e99a6486c293728097c661332f92bf2d847c6..696c13bd6ab78011adfe7b775519c8b7cc82b604
BUG=778101
Change-Id: I8dda4f3db952597148e3c7937319584698d00e1c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747941
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513774}
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 150,543 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OffscreenCanvas::RenderingContextFactories() {
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(ContextFactoryVector, context_factories,
(CanvasRenderingContext::kMaxValue));
return context_factories;
}
Commit Message: Clean up CanvasResourceDispatcher on finalizer
We may have pending mojo messages after GC, so we want to drop the
dispatcher as soon as possible.
Bug: 929757,913964
Change-Id: I5789bcbb55aada4a74c67a28758f07686f8911c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489175
Reviewed-by: Ken Rockot <rockot@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#635833}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 152,156 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FLAC__StreamDecoderTellStatus FLACParser::tellCallback(
FLAC__uint64 *absolute_byte_offset)
{
*absolute_byte_offset = mCurrentPos;
return FLAC__STREAM_DECODER_TELL_STATUS_OK;
}
Commit Message: FLACExtractor: copy protect mWriteBuffer
Bug: 30895578
Change-Id: I4cba36bbe3502678210e5925181683df9726b431
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 162,534 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: programming_error (const char *format, ...)
#else
programming_error (format, va_alist)
const char *format;
va_dcl
#endif
{
va_list args;
char *h;
#if defined (JOB_CONTROL)
give_terminal_to (shell_pgrp, 0);
#endif /* JOB_CONTROL */
SH_VA_START (args, format);
vfprintf (stderr, format, args);
fprintf (stderr, "\n");
va_end (args);
#if defined (HISTORY)
if (remember_on_history)
{
h = last_history_line ();
fprintf (stderr, _("last command: %s\n"), h ? h : "(null)");
}
#endif
#if 0
fprintf (stderr, "Report this to %s\n", the_current_maintainer);
#endif
fprintf (stderr, _("Aborting..."));
fflush (stderr);
abort ();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 17,308 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int handle_one_ref(const char *path, const struct object_id *oid,
int flag, void *cb_data)
{
struct all_refs_cb *cb = cb_data;
struct object *object;
if (ref_excluded(cb->all_revs->ref_excludes, path))
return 0;
object = get_reference(cb->all_revs, path, oid->hash, cb->all_flags);
add_rev_cmdline(cb->all_revs, object, path, REV_CMD_REF, cb->all_flags);
add_pending_sha1(cb->all_revs, path, oid->hash, cb->all_flags);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 55,001 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void megasas_free_ctrl_mem(struct megasas_instance *instance)
{
kfree(instance->reply_map);
if (instance->adapter_type == MFI_SERIES) {
if (instance->producer)
dma_free_coherent(&instance->pdev->dev, sizeof(u32),
instance->producer,
instance->producer_h);
if (instance->consumer)
dma_free_coherent(&instance->pdev->dev, sizeof(u32),
instance->consumer,
instance->consumer_h);
} else {
megasas_free_fusion_context(instance);
}
}
Commit Message: scsi: megaraid_sas: return error when create DMA pool failed
when create DMA pool for cmd frames failed, we should return -ENOMEM,
instead of 0.
In some case in:
megasas_init_adapter_fusion()
-->megasas_alloc_cmds()
-->megasas_create_frame_pool
create DMA pool failed,
--> megasas_free_cmds() [1]
-->megasas_alloc_cmds_fusion()
failed, then goto fail_alloc_cmds.
-->megasas_free_cmds() [2]
we will call megasas_free_cmds twice, [1] will kfree cmd_list,
[2] will use cmd_list.it will cause a problem:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address
00000000
pgd = ffffffc000f70000
[00000000] *pgd=0000001fbf893003, *pud=0000001fbf893003,
*pmd=0000001fbf894003, *pte=006000006d000707
Internal error: Oops: 96000005 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 18 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted
task: ffffffdfb9290000 ti: ffffffdfb923c000 task.ti: ffffffdfb923c000
PC is at megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
LR is at megasas_free_cmds+0x24/0x70
...
Call trace:
[<ffffffc0005b779c>] megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
[<ffffffc0005bca74>] megasas_init_adapter_fusion+0x2f4/0x4d8
[<ffffffc0005b926c>] megasas_init_fw+0x2dc/0x760
[<ffffffc0005b9ab0>] megasas_probe_one+0x3c0/0xcd8
[<ffffffc0004a5abc>] local_pci_probe+0x4c/0xb4
[<ffffffc0004a5c40>] pci_device_probe+0x11c/0x14c
[<ffffffc00053a5e4>] driver_probe_device+0x1ec/0x430
[<ffffffc00053a92c>] __driver_attach+0xa8/0xb0
[<ffffffc000538178>] bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xc8
[<ffffffc000539e88>] driver_attach+0x28/0x34
[<ffffffc000539a18>] bus_add_driver+0x16c/0x248
[<ffffffc00053b234>] driver_register+0x6c/0x138
[<ffffffc0004a5350>] __pci_register_driver+0x5c/0x6c
[<ffffffc000ce3868>] megasas_init+0xc0/0x1a8
[<ffffffc000082a58>] do_one_initcall+0xe8/0x1ec
[<ffffffc000ca7be8>] kernel_init_freeable+0x1c8/0x284
[<ffffffc0008d90b8>] kernel_init+0x1c/0xe4
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Sumit Saxena <sumit.saxena@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 90,340 |
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