instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: my_object_error_get_type (void)
{
static GType etype = 0;
if (etype == 0)
{
static const GEnumValue values[] =
{
ENUM_ENTRY (MY_OBJECT_ERROR_FOO, "Foo"),
ENUM_ENTRY (MY_OBJECT_ERROR_BAR, "Bar"),
{ 0, 0, 0 }
};
etype = g_enum_register_static ("MyObjectError", values);
}
return etype;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 1 | 165,097 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void bandwidth_pid(pid_t pid, const char *command, const char *dev, int down, int up) {
EUID_ASSERT();
EUID_ROOT();
char *comm = pid_proc_comm(pid);
EUID_USER();
if (!comm) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: cannot find sandbox\n");
exit(1);
}
if (strcmp(comm, "firejail") != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: cannot find sandbox\n");
exit(1);
}
free(comm);
char *name;
if (asprintf(&name, "/run/firejail/network/%d-netmap", pid) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
struct stat s;
if (stat(name, &s) == -1) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: the sandbox doesn't use a new network namespace\n");
exit(1);
}
pid_t child;
if (find_child(pid, &child) == -1) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: cannot join the network namespace\n");
exit(1);
}
EUID_ROOT();
if (join_namespace(child, "net")) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: cannot join the network namespace\n");
exit(1);
}
if (strcmp(command, "set") == 0)
bandwidth_set(pid, dev, down, up);
else if (strcmp(command, "clear") == 0)
bandwidth_remove(pid, dev);
char *devname = NULL;
if (dev) {
char *fname;
if (asprintf(&fname, "%s/%d-netmap", RUN_FIREJAIL_NETWORK_DIR, (int) pid) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
FILE *fp = fopen(fname, "r");
if (!fp) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: cannot read network map file %s\n", fname);
exit(1);
}
char buf[1024];
int len = strlen(dev);
while (fgets(buf, 1024, fp)) {
char *ptr = strchr(buf, '\n');
if (ptr)
*ptr = '\0';
if (*buf == '\0')
break;
if (strncmp(buf, dev, len) == 0 && buf[len] == ':') {
devname = strdup(buf + len + 1);
if (!devname)
errExit("strdup");
if (if_nametoindex(devname) == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: cannot find network device %s\n", devname);
exit(1);
}
break;
}
}
free(fname);
fclose(fp);
}
char *cmd = NULL;
if (devname) {
if (strcmp(command, "set") == 0) {
if (asprintf(&cmd, "%s/firejail/fshaper.sh --%s %s %d %d",
LIBDIR, command, devname, down, up) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
}
else {
if (asprintf(&cmd, "%s/firejail/fshaper.sh --%s %s",
LIBDIR, command, devname) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
}
}
else {
if (asprintf(&cmd, "%s/firejail/fshaper.sh --%s", LIBDIR, command) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
}
assert(cmd);
environ = NULL;
if (setreuid(0, 0))
errExit("setreuid");
if (setregid(0, 0))
errExit("setregid");
if (!cfg.shell)
cfg.shell = guess_shell();
if (!cfg.shell) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: no POSIX shell found, please use --shell command line option\n");
exit(1);
}
char *arg[4];
arg[0] = cfg.shell;
arg[1] = "-c";
arg[2] = cmd;
arg[3] = NULL;
clearenv();
execvp(arg[0], arg);
errExit("execvp");
}
Commit Message: security fix
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 1 | 168,418 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: lookup_protoid(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *pi)
{
register u_int i, j;
struct protoidmem *tp;
/* 5 octets won't be aligned */
i = (((pi[0] << 8) + pi[1]) << 8) + pi[2];
j = (pi[3] << 8) + pi[4];
/* XXX should be endian-insensitive, but do big-endian testing XXX */
tp = &protoidtable[(i ^ j) & (HASHNAMESIZE-1)];
while (tp->p_nxt)
if (tp->p_oui == i && tp->p_proto == j)
return tp;
else
tp = tp->p_nxt;
tp->p_oui = i;
tp->p_proto = j;
tp->p_nxt = (struct protoidmem *)calloc(1, sizeof(*tp));
if (tp->p_nxt == NULL)
(*ndo->ndo_error)(ndo, "lookup_protoid: calloc");
return tp;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12894/In lookup_bytestring(), take the length of the byte string into account.
Otherwise, if, in our search of the hash table, we come across a byte
string that's shorter than the string we're looking for, we'll search
past the end of the string in the hash table.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 62,601 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AudioOutputDeviceTest::ExpectRenderCallback(bool synchronized_io) {
const int kMemorySize = CalculateMemorySize(synchronized_io);
EXPECT_CALL(audio_output_ipc_, PlayStream(kStreamId))
.WillOnce(SendPendingBytes(&browser_socket_, kMemorySize));
if (synchronized_io) {
EXPECT_CALL(callback_, RenderIO(_, _, _))
.WillOnce(QuitLoop(io_loop_.message_loop_proxy()));
} else {
const int kNumberOfFramesToProcess = 0;
EXPECT_CALL(callback_, Render(_, _))
.WillOnce(DoAll(
QuitLoop(io_loop_.message_loop_proxy()),
Return(kNumberOfFramesToProcess)));
}
}
Commit Message: Revert r157378 as it caused WebRTC to dereference null pointers when restarting a call.
I've kept my unit test changes intact but disabled until I get a proper fix.
BUG=147499,150805
TBR=henrika
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/10946040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@157626 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 103,035 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AXNodeObject::detach() {
AXObject::detach();
m_node = nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,140 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int allmbox_cb(void *rock,
const char *key,
size_t keylen,
const char *data,
size_t datalen)
{
struct allmb_rock *mbrock = (struct allmb_rock *)rock;
if (!mbrock->mbentry) {
int r = mboxlist_parse_entry(&mbrock->mbentry, key, keylen, data, datalen);
if (r) return r;
}
return mbrock->proc(mbrock->mbentry, mbrock->rock);
}
Commit Message: mboxlist: fix uninitialised memory use where pattern is "Other Users"
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 61,237 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: uint VideoDecoderErrorDetected(VideoDecData *)
{
/* This is only used for trapping bitstream error for debuging */
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix NPDs in h263 decoder
Bug: 35269635
Test: decoded PoC with and without patch
Change-Id: I636a14360c7801cc5bca63c9cb44d1d235df8fd8
(cherry picked from commit 2ad2a92318a3b9daf78ebcdc597085adbf32600d)
CWE ID: | 0 | 162,455 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void xfrm6_tunnel_free_spi(struct net *net, xfrm_address_t *saddr)
{
struct xfrm6_tunnel_net *xfrm6_tn = xfrm6_tunnel_pernet(net);
struct xfrm6_tunnel_spi *x6spi;
struct hlist_node *pos, *n;
spin_lock_bh(&xfrm6_tunnel_spi_lock);
hlist_for_each_entry_safe(x6spi, pos, n,
&xfrm6_tn->spi_byaddr[xfrm6_tunnel_spi_hash_byaddr(saddr)],
list_byaddr)
{
if (memcmp(&x6spi->addr, saddr, sizeof(x6spi->addr)) == 0) {
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&x6spi->refcnt)) {
hlist_del_rcu(&x6spi->list_byaddr);
hlist_del_rcu(&x6spi->list_byspi);
call_rcu(&x6spi->rcu_head, x6spi_destroy_rcu);
break;
}
}
}
spin_unlock_bh(&xfrm6_tunnel_spi_lock);
}
Commit Message: tunnels: fix netns vs proto registration ordering
Same stuff as in ip_gre patch: receive hook can be called before netns
setup is done, oopsing in net_generic().
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 27,467 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int btpan_tap_send(int tap_fd, const BD_ADDR src, const BD_ADDR dst, UINT16 proto, const char* buf,
UINT16 len, BOOLEAN ext, BOOLEAN forward)
{
UNUSED(ext);
UNUSED(forward);
if (tap_fd != INVALID_FD)
{
tETH_HDR eth_hdr;
memcpy(ð_hdr.h_dest, dst, ETH_ADDR_LEN);
memcpy(ð_hdr.h_src, src, ETH_ADDR_LEN);
eth_hdr.h_proto = htons(proto);
char packet[TAP_MAX_PKT_WRITE_LEN + sizeof(tETH_HDR)];
memcpy(packet, ð_hdr, sizeof(tETH_HDR));
if (len > TAP_MAX_PKT_WRITE_LEN)
{
LOG_ERROR("btpan_tap_send eth packet size:%d is exceeded limit!", len);
return -1;
}
memcpy(packet + sizeof(tETH_HDR), buf, len);
/* Send data to network interface */
int ret = write(tap_fd, packet, len + sizeof(tETH_HDR));
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("ret:%d", ret);
return ret;
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 1 | 173,446 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_vdec::describeColorFormat(OMX_PTR pParam) {
#ifndef FLEXYUV_SUPPORTED
(void) pParam;
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
#else
if (pParam == NULL) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("describeColorFormat: invalid params");
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
DescribeColorFormatParams *params = (DescribeColorFormatParams*)pParam;
MediaImage *img = &(params->sMediaImage);
switch(params->eColorFormat) {
case QOMX_COLOR_FORMATYUV420PackedSemiPlanar32m:
{
img->mType = MediaImage::MEDIA_IMAGE_TYPE_YUV;
img->mNumPlanes = 3;
img->mWidth = params->nFrameWidth;
img->mHeight = params->nFrameHeight;
size_t planeWidth = VENUS_Y_STRIDE(COLOR_FMT_NV12, params->nFrameWidth);
size_t planeHeight = VENUS_Y_SCANLINES(COLOR_FMT_NV12, params->nFrameHeight);
img->mBitDepth = 8;
img->mPlane[MediaImage::Y].mOffset = 0;
img->mPlane[MediaImage::Y].mColInc = 1;
img->mPlane[MediaImage::Y].mRowInc = planeWidth; //same as stride
img->mPlane[MediaImage::Y].mHorizSubsampling = 1;
img->mPlane[MediaImage::Y].mVertSubsampling = 1;
img->mPlane[MediaImage::U].mOffset = planeWidth * planeHeight;
img->mPlane[MediaImage::U].mColInc = 2; //interleaved UV
img->mPlane[MediaImage::U].mRowInc =
VENUS_UV_STRIDE(COLOR_FMT_NV12, params->nFrameWidth);
img->mPlane[MediaImage::U].mHorizSubsampling = 2;
img->mPlane[MediaImage::U].mVertSubsampling = 2;
img->mPlane[MediaImage::V].mOffset = planeWidth * planeHeight + 1;
img->mPlane[MediaImage::V].mColInc = 2; //interleaved UV
img->mPlane[MediaImage::V].mRowInc =
VENUS_UV_STRIDE(COLOR_FMT_NV12, params->nFrameWidth);
img->mPlane[MediaImage::V].mHorizSubsampling = 2;
img->mPlane[MediaImage::V].mVertSubsampling = 2;
break;
}
case OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420Planar:
case OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420SemiPlanar:
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
default:
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("color-format %x is not flexible", params->eColorFormat);
img->mType = MediaImage::MEDIA_IMAGE_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
};
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("NOTE: Describe color format : %x", params->eColorFormat);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW(" FrameWidth x FrameHeight : %d x %d", params->nFrameWidth, params->nFrameHeight);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW(" YWidth x YHeight : %d x %d", img->mWidth, img->mHeight);
for (size_t i = 0; i < img->mNumPlanes; ++i) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW(" Plane[%d] : offset=%d / xStep=%d / yStep = %d",
i, img->mPlane[i].mOffset, img->mPlane[i].mColInc, img->mPlane[i].mRowInc);
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
#endif //FLEXYUV_SUPPORTED
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: vdec: Avoid processing ETBs/FTBs in invalid states
(per the spec) ETB/FTB should not be handled in states other than
Executing, Paused and Idle. This avoids accessing invalid buffers.
Also add a lock to protect the private-buffers from being deleted
while accessing from another thread.
Bug: 27890802
Security Vulnerability - Heap Use-After-Free and Possible LPE in
MediaServer (libOmxVdec problem #6)
CRs-Fixed: 1008882
Change-Id: Iaac2e383cd53cf9cf8042c9ed93ddc76dba3907e
CWE ID: | 0 | 160,256 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int test_signed_short_formatting(void)
{
int i, j;
int num_sshort_tests;
int failed = 0;
#if (SIZEOF_SHORT == 1)
i=1; ss_test[i].num = 0x7F; ss_test[i].expected = "127";
i++; ss_test[i].num = 0x70; ss_test[i].expected = "112";
i++; ss_test[i].num = 0x07; ss_test[i].expected = "7";
i++; ss_test[i].num = 0x50; ss_test[i].expected = "80";
i++; ss_test[i].num = 0x05; ss_test[i].expected = "5";
i++; ss_test[i].num = 0x01; ss_test[i].expected = "1";
i++; ss_test[i].num = 0x00; ss_test[i].expected = "0";
i++; ss_test[i].num = -0x7F -1; ss_test[i].expected = "-128";
i++; ss_test[i].num = -0x70 -1; ss_test[i].expected = "-113";
i++; ss_test[i].num = -0x07 -1; ss_test[i].expected = "-8";
i++; ss_test[i].num = -0x50 -1; ss_test[i].expected = "-81";
i++; ss_test[i].num = -0x05 -1; ss_test[i].expected = "-6";
i++; ss_test[i].num = 0x00 -1; ss_test[i].expected = "-1";
num_sshort_tests = i;
#elif (SIZEOF_SHORT == 2)
i=1; ss_test[i].num = 0x7FFF; ss_test[i].expected = "32767";
i++; ss_test[i].num = 0x7FFE; ss_test[i].expected = "32766";
i++; ss_test[i].num = 0x7FFD; ss_test[i].expected = "32765";
i++; ss_test[i].num = 0x7F00; ss_test[i].expected = "32512";
i++; ss_test[i].num = 0x07F0; ss_test[i].expected = "2032";
i++; ss_test[i].num = 0x007F; ss_test[i].expected = "127";
i++; ss_test[i].num = 0x7000; ss_test[i].expected = "28672";
i++; ss_test[i].num = 0x0700; ss_test[i].expected = "1792";
i++; ss_test[i].num = 0x0070; ss_test[i].expected = "112";
i++; ss_test[i].num = 0x0007; ss_test[i].expected = "7";
i++; ss_test[i].num = 0x5000; ss_test[i].expected = "20480";
i++; ss_test[i].num = 0x0500; ss_test[i].expected = "1280";
i++; ss_test[i].num = 0x0050; ss_test[i].expected = "80";
i++; ss_test[i].num = 0x0005; ss_test[i].expected = "5";
i++; ss_test[i].num = 0x0001; ss_test[i].expected = "1";
i++; ss_test[i].num = 0x0000; ss_test[i].expected = "0";
i++; ss_test[i].num = -0x7FFF -1; ss_test[i].expected = "-32768";
i++; ss_test[i].num = -0x7FFE -1; ss_test[i].expected = "-32767";
i++; ss_test[i].num = -0x7FFD -1; ss_test[i].expected = "-32766";
i++; ss_test[i].num = -0x7F00 -1; ss_test[i].expected = "-32513";
i++; ss_test[i].num = -0x07F0 -1; ss_test[i].expected = "-2033";
i++; ss_test[i].num = -0x007F -1; ss_test[i].expected = "-128";
i++; ss_test[i].num = -0x7000 -1; ss_test[i].expected = "-28673";
i++; ss_test[i].num = -0x0700 -1; ss_test[i].expected = "-1793";
i++; ss_test[i].num = -0x0070 -1; ss_test[i].expected = "-113";
i++; ss_test[i].num = -0x0007 -1; ss_test[i].expected = "-8";
i++; ss_test[i].num = -0x5000 -1; ss_test[i].expected = "-20481";
i++; ss_test[i].num = -0x0500 -1; ss_test[i].expected = "-1281";
i++; ss_test[i].num = -0x0050 -1; ss_test[i].expected = "-81";
i++; ss_test[i].num = -0x0005 -1; ss_test[i].expected = "-6";
i++; ss_test[i].num = 0x0000 -1; ss_test[i].expected = "-1";
num_sshort_tests = i;
#elif (SIZEOF_SHORT == 4)
i=1; ss_test[i].num = 0x7FFFFFFF; ss_test[i].expected = "2147483647";
i++; ss_test[i].num = 0x7FFFFFFE; ss_test[i].expected = "2147483646";
i++; ss_test[i].num = 0x7FFFFFFD; ss_test[i].expected = "2147483645";
i++; ss_test[i].num = 0x7FFF0000; ss_test[i].expected = "2147418112";
i++; ss_test[i].num = 0x00007FFF; ss_test[i].expected = "32767";
i++; ss_test[i].num = 0x7F000000; ss_test[i].expected = "2130706432";
i++; ss_test[i].num = 0x007F0000; ss_test[i].expected = "8323072";
i++; ss_test[i].num = 0x00007F00; ss_test[i].expected = "32512";
i++; ss_test[i].num = 0x0000007F; ss_test[i].expected = "127";
i++; ss_test[i].num = 0x70000000; ss_test[i].expected = "1879048192";
i++; ss_test[i].num = 0x07000000; ss_test[i].expected = "117440512";
i++; ss_test[i].num = 0x00700000; ss_test[i].expected = "7340032";
i++; ss_test[i].num = 0x00070000; ss_test[i].expected = "458752";
i++; ss_test[i].num = 0x00007000; ss_test[i].expected = "28672";
i++; ss_test[i].num = 0x00000700; ss_test[i].expected = "1792";
i++; ss_test[i].num = 0x00000070; ss_test[i].expected = "112";
i++; ss_test[i].num = 0x00000007; ss_test[i].expected = "7";
i++; ss_test[i].num = 0x50000000; ss_test[i].expected = "1342177280";
i++; ss_test[i].num = 0x05000000; ss_test[i].expected = "83886080";
i++; ss_test[i].num = 0x00500000; ss_test[i].expected = "5242880";
i++; ss_test[i].num = 0x00050000; ss_test[i].expected = "327680";
i++; ss_test[i].num = 0x00005000; ss_test[i].expected = "20480";
i++; ss_test[i].num = 0x00000500; ss_test[i].expected = "1280";
i++; ss_test[i].num = 0x00000050; ss_test[i].expected = "80";
i++; ss_test[i].num = 0x00000005; ss_test[i].expected = "5";
i++; ss_test[i].num = 0x00000001; ss_test[i].expected = "1";
i++; ss_test[i].num = 0x00000000; ss_test[i].expected = "0";
i++; ss_test[i].num = -0x7FFFFFFF -1; ss_test[i].expected = "-2147483648";
i++; ss_test[i].num = -0x7FFFFFFE -1; ss_test[i].expected = "-2147483647";
i++; ss_test[i].num = -0x7FFFFFFD -1; ss_test[i].expected = "-2147483646";
i++; ss_test[i].num = -0x7FFF0000 -1; ss_test[i].expected = "-2147418113";
i++; ss_test[i].num = -0x00007FFF -1; ss_test[i].expected = "-32768";
i++; ss_test[i].num = -0x7F000000 -1; ss_test[i].expected = "-2130706433";
i++; ss_test[i].num = -0x007F0000 -1; ss_test[i].expected = "-8323073";
i++; ss_test[i].num = -0x00007F00 -1; ss_test[i].expected = "-32513";
i++; ss_test[i].num = -0x0000007F -1; ss_test[i].expected = "-128";
i++; ss_test[i].num = -0x70000000 -1; ss_test[i].expected = "-1879048193";
i++; ss_test[i].num = -0x07000000 -1; ss_test[i].expected = "-117440513";
i++; ss_test[i].num = -0x00700000 -1; ss_test[i].expected = "-7340033";
i++; ss_test[i].num = -0x00070000 -1; ss_test[i].expected = "-458753";
i++; ss_test[i].num = -0x00007000 -1; ss_test[i].expected = "-28673";
i++; ss_test[i].num = -0x00000700 -1; ss_test[i].expected = "-1793";
i++; ss_test[i].num = -0x00000070 -1; ss_test[i].expected = "-113";
i++; ss_test[i].num = -0x00000007 -1; ss_test[i].expected = "-8";
i++; ss_test[i].num = -0x50000000 -1; ss_test[i].expected = "-1342177281";
i++; ss_test[i].num = -0x05000000 -1; ss_test[i].expected = "-83886081";
i++; ss_test[i].num = -0x00500000 -1; ss_test[i].expected = "-5242881";
i++; ss_test[i].num = -0x00050000 -1; ss_test[i].expected = "-327681";
i++; ss_test[i].num = -0x00005000 -1; ss_test[i].expected = "-20481";
i++; ss_test[i].num = -0x00000500 -1; ss_test[i].expected = "-1281";
i++; ss_test[i].num = -0x00000050 -1; ss_test[i].expected = "-81";
i++; ss_test[i].num = -0x00000005 -1; ss_test[i].expected = "-6";
i++; ss_test[i].num = 0x00000000 -1; ss_test[i].expected = "-1";
num_sshort_tests = i;
#endif
for(i=1; i<=num_sshort_tests; i++) {
for(j=0; j<BUFSZ; j++)
ss_test[i].result[j] = 'X';
ss_test[i].result[BUFSZ-1] = '\0';
(void)curl_msprintf(ss_test[i].result, "%hd", ss_test[i].num);
if(memcmp(ss_test[i].result,
ss_test[i].expected,
strlen(ss_test[i].expected))) {
printf("signed short test #%.2d: Failed (Expected: %s Got: %s)\n",
i, ss_test[i].expected, ss_test[i].result);
failed++;
}
}
if(!failed)
printf("All curl_mprintf() signed short tests OK!\n");
else
printf("Some curl_mprintf() signed short tests Failed!\n");
return failed;
}
Commit Message: printf: fix floating point buffer overflow issues
... and add a bunch of floating point printf tests
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 86,526 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cmsTagTypeSignature DecideLUTtypeA2B(cmsFloat64Number ICCVersion, const void *Data)
{
cmsPipeline* Lut = (cmsPipeline*) Data;
if (ICCVersion < 4.0) {
if (Lut ->SaveAs8Bits) return cmsSigLut8Type;
return cmsSigLut16Type;
}
else {
return cmsSigLutAtoBType;
}
}
Commit Message: Added an extra check to MLU bounds
Thanks to Ibrahim el-sayed for spotting the bug
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 70,932 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: smp_fetch_capture_header_res(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private)
{
struct proxy *fe = strm_fe(smp->strm);
int idx;
if (!args || args->type != ARGT_SINT)
return 0;
idx = args->data.sint;
if (idx > (fe->nb_rsp_cap - 1) || smp->strm->res_cap == NULL || smp->strm->res_cap[idx] == NULL)
return 0;
smp->data.type = SMP_T_STR;
smp->flags |= SMP_F_CONST;
smp->data.u.str.str = smp->strm->res_cap[idx];
smp->data.u.str.len = strlen(smp->strm->res_cap[idx]);
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 6,896 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int32 RenderThreadImpl::RoutingIDForCurrentContext() {
int32 routing_id = MSG_ROUTING_CONTROL;
if (v8::Context::InContext()) {
WebFrame* frame = WebFrame::frameForCurrentContext();
if (frame) {
RenderViewImpl* view = RenderViewImpl::FromWebView(frame->view());
if (view)
routing_id = view->routing_id();
}
} else {
DLOG(WARNING) << "Not called within a script context!";
}
return routing_id;
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 107,114 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int jpc_dec_tileinit(jpc_dec_t *dec, jpc_dec_tile_t *tile)
{
jpc_dec_tcomp_t *tcomp;
int compno;
int rlvlno;
jpc_dec_rlvl_t *rlvl;
jpc_dec_band_t *band;
jpc_dec_prc_t *prc;
int bndno;
jpc_tsfb_band_t *bnd;
int bandno;
jpc_dec_ccp_t *ccp;
int prccnt;
jpc_dec_cblk_t *cblk;
int cblkcnt;
uint_fast32_t tlprcxstart;
uint_fast32_t tlprcystart;
uint_fast32_t brprcxend;
uint_fast32_t brprcyend;
uint_fast32_t tlcbgxstart;
uint_fast32_t tlcbgystart;
uint_fast32_t brcbgxend;
uint_fast32_t brcbgyend;
uint_fast32_t cbgxstart;
uint_fast32_t cbgystart;
uint_fast32_t cbgxend;
uint_fast32_t cbgyend;
uint_fast32_t tlcblkxstart;
uint_fast32_t tlcblkystart;
uint_fast32_t brcblkxend;
uint_fast32_t brcblkyend;
uint_fast32_t cblkxstart;
uint_fast32_t cblkystart;
uint_fast32_t cblkxend;
uint_fast32_t cblkyend;
uint_fast32_t tmpxstart;
uint_fast32_t tmpystart;
uint_fast32_t tmpxend;
uint_fast32_t tmpyend;
jpc_dec_cp_t *cp;
jpc_tsfb_band_t bnds[64];
jpc_pchg_t *pchg;
int pchgno;
jpc_dec_cmpt_t *cmpt;
cp = tile->cp;
tile->realmode = 0;
if (cp->mctid == JPC_MCT_ICT) {
tile->realmode = 1;
}
for (compno = 0, tcomp = tile->tcomps, cmpt = dec->cmpts; compno <
dec->numcomps; ++compno, ++tcomp, ++cmpt) {
ccp = &tile->cp->ccps[compno];
if (ccp->qmfbid == JPC_COX_INS) {
tile->realmode = 1;
}
tcomp->numrlvls = ccp->numrlvls;
if (!(tcomp->rlvls = jas_alloc2(tcomp->numrlvls,
sizeof(jpc_dec_rlvl_t)))) {
return -1;
}
if (!(tcomp->data = jas_seq2d_create(JPC_CEILDIV(tile->xstart,
cmpt->hstep), JPC_CEILDIV(tile->ystart, cmpt->vstep),
JPC_CEILDIV(tile->xend, cmpt->hstep), JPC_CEILDIV(tile->yend,
cmpt->vstep)))) {
return -1;
}
if (!(tcomp->tsfb = jpc_cod_gettsfb(ccp->qmfbid,
tcomp->numrlvls - 1))) {
return -1;
}
{
jpc_tsfb_getbands(tcomp->tsfb, jas_seq2d_xstart(tcomp->data),
jas_seq2d_ystart(tcomp->data), jas_seq2d_xend(tcomp->data),
jas_seq2d_yend(tcomp->data), bnds);
}
for (rlvlno = 0, rlvl = tcomp->rlvls; rlvlno < tcomp->numrlvls;
++rlvlno, ++rlvl) {
rlvl->bands = 0;
rlvl->xstart = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(tcomp->xstart,
tcomp->numrlvls - 1 - rlvlno);
rlvl->ystart = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(tcomp->ystart,
tcomp->numrlvls - 1 - rlvlno);
rlvl->xend = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(tcomp->xend,
tcomp->numrlvls - 1 - rlvlno);
rlvl->yend = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(tcomp->yend,
tcomp->numrlvls - 1 - rlvlno);
rlvl->prcwidthexpn = ccp->prcwidthexpns[rlvlno];
rlvl->prcheightexpn = ccp->prcheightexpns[rlvlno];
tlprcxstart = JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(rlvl->xstart,
rlvl->prcwidthexpn) << rlvl->prcwidthexpn;
tlprcystart = JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(rlvl->ystart,
rlvl->prcheightexpn) << rlvl->prcheightexpn;
brprcxend = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(rlvl->xend,
rlvl->prcwidthexpn) << rlvl->prcwidthexpn;
brprcyend = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(rlvl->yend,
rlvl->prcheightexpn) << rlvl->prcheightexpn;
rlvl->numhprcs = (brprcxend - tlprcxstart) >>
rlvl->prcwidthexpn;
rlvl->numvprcs = (brprcyend - tlprcystart) >>
rlvl->prcheightexpn;
rlvl->numprcs = rlvl->numhprcs * rlvl->numvprcs;
if (rlvl->xstart >= rlvl->xend || rlvl->ystart >= rlvl->yend) {
rlvl->bands = 0;
rlvl->numprcs = 0;
rlvl->numhprcs = 0;
rlvl->numvprcs = 0;
continue;
}
if (!rlvlno) {
tlcbgxstart = tlprcxstart;
tlcbgystart = tlprcystart;
brcbgxend = brprcxend;
brcbgyend = brprcyend;
rlvl->cbgwidthexpn = rlvl->prcwidthexpn;
rlvl->cbgheightexpn = rlvl->prcheightexpn;
} else {
tlcbgxstart = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(tlprcxstart, 1);
tlcbgystart = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(tlprcystart, 1);
brcbgxend = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(brprcxend, 1);
brcbgyend = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(brprcyend, 1);
rlvl->cbgwidthexpn = rlvl->prcwidthexpn - 1;
rlvl->cbgheightexpn = rlvl->prcheightexpn - 1;
}
rlvl->cblkwidthexpn = JAS_MIN(ccp->cblkwidthexpn,
rlvl->cbgwidthexpn);
rlvl->cblkheightexpn = JAS_MIN(ccp->cblkheightexpn,
rlvl->cbgheightexpn);
rlvl->numbands = (!rlvlno) ? 1 : 3;
if (!(rlvl->bands = jas_alloc2(rlvl->numbands,
sizeof(jpc_dec_band_t)))) {
return -1;
}
for (bandno = 0, band = rlvl->bands;
bandno < rlvl->numbands; ++bandno, ++band) {
bndno = (!rlvlno) ? 0 : (3 * (rlvlno - 1) +
bandno + 1);
bnd = &bnds[bndno];
band->orient = bnd->orient;
band->stepsize = ccp->stepsizes[bndno];
band->analgain = JPC_NOMINALGAIN(ccp->qmfbid,
tcomp->numrlvls - 1, rlvlno, band->orient);
band->absstepsize = jpc_calcabsstepsize(band->stepsize,
cmpt->prec + band->analgain);
band->numbps = ccp->numguardbits +
JPC_QCX_GETEXPN(band->stepsize) - 1;
band->roishift = (ccp->roishift + band->numbps >= JPC_PREC) ?
(JPC_PREC - 1 - band->numbps) : ccp->roishift;
band->data = 0;
band->prcs = 0;
if (bnd->xstart == bnd->xend || bnd->ystart == bnd->yend) {
continue;
}
if (!(band->data = jas_seq2d_create(0, 0, 0, 0))) {
return -1;
}
jas_seq2d_bindsub(band->data, tcomp->data, bnd->locxstart,
bnd->locystart, bnd->locxend, bnd->locyend);
jas_seq2d_setshift(band->data, bnd->xstart, bnd->ystart);
assert(rlvl->numprcs);
if (!(band->prcs = jas_alloc2(rlvl->numprcs,
sizeof(jpc_dec_prc_t)))) {
return -1;
}
/************************************************/
cbgxstart = tlcbgxstart;
cbgystart = tlcbgystart;
for (prccnt = rlvl->numprcs, prc = band->prcs;
prccnt > 0; --prccnt, ++prc) {
cbgxend = cbgxstart + (1 << rlvl->cbgwidthexpn);
cbgyend = cbgystart + (1 << rlvl->cbgheightexpn);
prc->xstart = JAS_MAX(cbgxstart, JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t,
jas_seq2d_xstart(band->data)));
prc->ystart = JAS_MAX(cbgystart, JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t,
jas_seq2d_ystart(band->data)));
prc->xend = JAS_MIN(cbgxend, JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t,
jas_seq2d_xend(band->data)));
prc->yend = JAS_MIN(cbgyend, JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t,
jas_seq2d_yend(band->data)));
if (prc->xend > prc->xstart && prc->yend > prc->ystart) {
tlcblkxstart = JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(prc->xstart,
rlvl->cblkwidthexpn) << rlvl->cblkwidthexpn;
tlcblkystart = JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(prc->ystart,
rlvl->cblkheightexpn) << rlvl->cblkheightexpn;
brcblkxend = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(prc->xend,
rlvl->cblkwidthexpn) << rlvl->cblkwidthexpn;
brcblkyend = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(prc->yend,
rlvl->cblkheightexpn) << rlvl->cblkheightexpn;
prc->numhcblks = (brcblkxend - tlcblkxstart) >>
rlvl->cblkwidthexpn;
prc->numvcblks = (brcblkyend - tlcblkystart) >>
rlvl->cblkheightexpn;
prc->numcblks = prc->numhcblks * prc->numvcblks;
assert(prc->numcblks > 0);
if (!(prc->incltagtree = jpc_tagtree_create(
prc->numhcblks, prc->numvcblks))) {
return -1;
}
if (!(prc->numimsbstagtree = jpc_tagtree_create(
prc->numhcblks, prc->numvcblks))) {
return -1;
}
if (!(prc->cblks = jas_alloc2(prc->numcblks,
sizeof(jpc_dec_cblk_t)))) {
return -1;
}
cblkxstart = cbgxstart;
cblkystart = cbgystart;
for (cblkcnt = prc->numcblks, cblk = prc->cblks; cblkcnt > 0;) {
cblkxend = cblkxstart + (1 << rlvl->cblkwidthexpn);
cblkyend = cblkystart + (1 << rlvl->cblkheightexpn);
tmpxstart = JAS_MAX(cblkxstart, prc->xstart);
tmpystart = JAS_MAX(cblkystart, prc->ystart);
tmpxend = JAS_MIN(cblkxend, prc->xend);
tmpyend = JAS_MIN(cblkyend, prc->yend);
if (tmpxend > tmpxstart && tmpyend > tmpystart) {
cblk->firstpassno = -1;
cblk->mqdec = 0;
cblk->nulldec = 0;
cblk->flags = 0;
cblk->numpasses = 0;
cblk->segs.head = 0;
cblk->segs.tail = 0;
cblk->curseg = 0;
cblk->numimsbs = 0;
cblk->numlenbits = 3;
cblk->flags = 0;
if (!(cblk->data = jas_seq2d_create(0, 0, 0, 0))) {
return -1;
}
jas_seq2d_bindsub(cblk->data, band->data,
tmpxstart, tmpystart, tmpxend, tmpyend);
++cblk;
--cblkcnt;
}
cblkxstart += 1 << rlvl->cblkwidthexpn;
if (cblkxstart >= cbgxend) {
cblkxstart = cbgxstart;
cblkystart += 1 << rlvl->cblkheightexpn;
}
}
} else {
prc->cblks = 0;
prc->incltagtree = 0;
prc->numimsbstagtree = 0;
}
cbgxstart += 1 << rlvl->cbgwidthexpn;
if (cbgxstart >= brcbgxend) {
cbgxstart = tlcbgxstart;
cbgystart += 1 << rlvl->cbgheightexpn;
}
}
/********************************************/
}
}
}
if (!(tile->pi = jpc_dec_pi_create(dec, tile))) {
return -1;
}
for (pchgno = 0; pchgno < jpc_pchglist_numpchgs(tile->cp->pchglist);
++pchgno) {
pchg = jpc_pchg_copy(jpc_pchglist_get(tile->cp->pchglist, pchgno));
assert(pchg);
jpc_pi_addpchg(tile->pi, pchg);
}
jpc_pi_init(tile->pi);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed an integral type promotion problem by adding a JAS_CAST.
Modified the jpc_tsfb_synthesize function so that it will be a noop for
an empty sequence (in order to avoid dereferencing a null pointer).
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 70,443 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void sctp_get_local_addr_list(struct net *net)
{
struct net_device *dev;
struct list_head *pos;
struct sctp_af *af;
rcu_read_lock();
for_each_netdev_rcu(net, dev) {
list_for_each(pos, &sctp_address_families) {
af = list_entry(pos, struct sctp_af, list);
af->copy_addrlist(&net->sctp.local_addr_list, dev);
}
}
rcu_read_unlock();
}
Commit Message: sctp: fix race on protocol/netns initialization
Consider sctp module is unloaded and is being requested because an user
is creating a sctp socket.
During initialization, sctp will add the new protocol type and then
initialize pernet subsys:
status = sctp_v4_protosw_init();
if (status)
goto err_protosw_init;
status = sctp_v6_protosw_init();
if (status)
goto err_v6_protosw_init;
status = register_pernet_subsys(&sctp_net_ops);
The problem is that after those calls to sctp_v{4,6}_protosw_init(), it
is possible for userspace to create SCTP sockets like if the module is
already fully loaded. If that happens, one of the possible effects is
that we will have readers for net->sctp.local_addr_list list earlier
than expected and sctp_net_init() does not take precautions while
dealing with that list, leading to a potential panic but not limited to
that, as sctp_sock_init() will copy a bunch of blank/partially
initialized values from net->sctp.
The race happens like this:
CPU 0 | CPU 1
socket() |
__sock_create | socket()
inet_create | __sock_create
list_for_each_entry_rcu( |
answer, &inetsw[sock->type], |
list) { | inet_create
/* no hits */ |
if (unlikely(err)) { |
... |
request_module() |
/* socket creation is blocked |
* the module is fully loaded |
*/ |
sctp_init |
sctp_v4_protosw_init |
inet_register_protosw |
list_add_rcu(&p->list, |
last_perm); |
| list_for_each_entry_rcu(
| answer, &inetsw[sock->type],
sctp_v6_protosw_init | list) {
| /* hit, so assumes protocol
| * is already loaded
| */
| /* socket creation continues
| * before netns is initialized
| */
register_pernet_subsys |
Simply inverting the initialization order between
register_pernet_subsys() and sctp_v4_protosw_init() is not possible
because register_pernet_subsys() will create a control sctp socket, so
the protocol must be already visible by then. Deferring the socket
creation to a work-queue is not good specially because we loose the
ability to handle its errors.
So, as suggested by Vlad, the fix is to split netns initialization in
two moments: defaults and control socket, so that the defaults are
already loaded by when we register the protocol, while control socket
initialization is kept at the same moment it is today.
Fixes: 4db67e808640 ("sctp: Make the address lists per network namespace")
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 42,911 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static uint64_t xhci_cap_read(void *ptr, hwaddr reg, unsigned size)
{
XHCIState *xhci = ptr;
uint32_t ret;
switch (reg) {
case 0x00: /* HCIVERSION, CAPLENGTH */
ret = 0x01000000 | LEN_CAP;
break;
case 0x04: /* HCSPARAMS 1 */
ret = ((xhci->numports_2+xhci->numports_3)<<24)
| (xhci->numintrs<<8) | xhci->numslots;
break;
case 0x08: /* HCSPARAMS 2 */
ret = 0x0000000f;
break;
case 0x0c: /* HCSPARAMS 3 */
ret = 0x00000000;
break;
case 0x10: /* HCCPARAMS */
if (sizeof(dma_addr_t) == 4) {
ret = 0x00087000;
} else {
ret = 0x00087001;
}
break;
case 0x14: /* DBOFF */
ret = OFF_DOORBELL;
break;
case 0x18: /* RTSOFF */
ret = OFF_RUNTIME;
break;
/* extended capabilities */
case 0x20: /* Supported Protocol:00 */
ret = 0x02000402; /* USB 2.0 */
break;
case 0x24: /* Supported Protocol:04 */
ret = 0x20425355; /* "USB " */
break;
case 0x28: /* Supported Protocol:08 */
if (xhci_get_flag(xhci, XHCI_FLAG_SS_FIRST)) {
ret = (xhci->numports_2<<8) | (xhci->numports_3+1);
} else {
ret = (xhci->numports_2<<8) | 1;
}
break;
case 0x2c: /* Supported Protocol:0c */
ret = 0x00000000; /* reserved */
break;
case 0x30: /* Supported Protocol:00 */
ret = 0x03000002; /* USB 3.0 */
break;
case 0x34: /* Supported Protocol:04 */
ret = 0x20425355; /* "USB " */
break;
case 0x38: /* Supported Protocol:08 */
if (xhci_get_flag(xhci, XHCI_FLAG_SS_FIRST)) {
ret = (xhci->numports_3<<8) | 1;
} else {
ret = (xhci->numports_3<<8) | (xhci->numports_2+1);
}
break;
case 0x3c: /* Supported Protocol:0c */
ret = 0x00000000; /* reserved */
break;
default:
trace_usb_xhci_unimplemented("cap read", reg);
ret = 0;
}
trace_usb_xhci_cap_read(reg, ret);
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 10,735 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType ReadPSDChannelRLE(Image *image,const PSDInfo *psd_info,
const ssize_t type,MagickOffsetType *offsets,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
MagickBooleanType
status;
size_t
length,
row_size;
ssize_t
count,
y;
unsigned char
*compact_pixels,
*pixels;
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" layer data is RLE compressed");
row_size=GetPSDRowSize(image);
pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(row_size,sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
length=0;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
if ((MagickOffsetType) length < offsets[y])
length=(size_t) offsets[y];
compact_pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length,sizeof(*pixels));
if (compact_pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixels);
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
}
(void) ResetMagickMemory(compact_pixels,0,length*sizeof(*compact_pixels));
status=MagickTrue;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
status=MagickFalse;
count=ReadBlob(image,(size_t) offsets[y],compact_pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) offsets[y])
break;
count=DecodePSDPixels((size_t) offsets[y],compact_pixels,
(ssize_t) (image->depth == 1 ? 123456 : image->depth),row_size,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) row_size)
break;
status=ReadPSDChannelPixels(image,psd_info->channels,y,type,pixels,
exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
compact_pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(compact_pixels);
pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixels);
return(status);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/148
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 73,526 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t map_offset_show(struct uio_mem *mem, char *buf)
{
return sprintf(buf, "0x%llx\n", (unsigned long long)mem->addr & ~PAGE_MASK);
}
Commit Message: Fix a few incorrectly checked [io_]remap_pfn_range() calls
Nico Golde reports a few straggling uses of [io_]remap_pfn_range() that
really should use the vm_iomap_memory() helper. This trivially converts
two of them to the helper, and comments about why the third one really
needs to continue to use remap_pfn_range(), and adds the missing size
check.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 28,292 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static boolean t1_open_fontfile(const char *open_name_prefix)
{
if (!t1_open()) {
char *msg = concat ("! Couldn't find font file ", cur_file_name);
error(msg);
}
t1_init_params(open_name_prefix);
return true; /* font file found */
}
Commit Message: writet1 protection against buffer overflow
git-svn-id: svn://tug.org/texlive/trunk/Build/source@48697 c570f23f-e606-0410-a88d-b1316a301751
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 76,656 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const uint8_t *get_submv_prob(uint32_t left, uint32_t top, int is_vp7)
{
if (is_vp7)
return vp7_submv_prob;
if (left == top)
return vp8_submv_prob[4 - !!left];
if (!top)
return vp8_submv_prob[2];
return vp8_submv_prob[1 - !!left];
}
Commit Message: avcodec/webp: Always set pix_fmt
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: 1434/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6314998085189632
Fixes: 1435/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6483783723253760
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Reviewed-by: "Ronald S. Bultje" <rsbultje@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 63,969 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void user_enable_single_step(struct task_struct *child)
{
unsigned long pc = get_stack_long(child, offsetof(struct pt_regs, pc));
set_tsk_thread_flag(child, TIF_SINGLESTEP);
if (ptrace_get_breakpoints(child) < 0)
return;
set_single_step(child, pc);
ptrace_put_breakpoints(child);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,544 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nfs4_locku_done(struct rpc_task *task, void *data)
{
struct nfs4_unlockdata *calldata = data;
if (!nfs4_sequence_done(task, &calldata->res.seq_res))
return;
switch (task->tk_status) {
case 0:
renew_lease(calldata->server, calldata->timestamp);
do_vfs_lock(calldata->lsp->ls_state->inode, &calldata->fl);
if (nfs4_update_lock_stateid(calldata->lsp,
&calldata->res.stateid))
break;
case -NFS4ERR_BAD_STATEID:
case -NFS4ERR_OLD_STATEID:
case -NFS4ERR_STALE_STATEID:
case -NFS4ERR_EXPIRED:
if (!nfs4_stateid_match(&calldata->arg.stateid,
&calldata->lsp->ls_stateid))
rpc_restart_call_prepare(task);
break;
default:
if (nfs4_async_handle_error(task, calldata->server,
NULL, NULL) == -EAGAIN)
rpc_restart_call_prepare(task);
}
nfs_release_seqid(calldata->arg.seqid);
}
Commit Message: NFS: Fix a NULL pointer dereference of migration recovery ops for v4.2 client
---Steps to Reproduce--
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
<nfs-client>
# mount -t nfs nfs-server:/nfs/ /mnt/
# ll /mnt/*/
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt,refer=/nfs/old/@nfs-server)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
# service nfs restart
<nfs-client>
# ll /mnt/*/ --->>>>> oops here
[ 5123.102925] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 5123.103363] IP: [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.103752] PGD 587b9067 PUD 3cbf5067 PMD 0
[ 5123.104131] Oops: 0000 [#1]
[ 5123.104529] Modules linked in: nfsv4(OE) nfs(OE) fscache(E) nfsd(OE) xfs libcrc32c iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ppdev vmw_balloon parport_pc parport i2c_piix4 shpchp auth_rpcgss nfs_acl vmw_vmci lockd grace sunrpc vmwgfx drm_kms_helper ttm drm mptspi serio_raw scsi_transport_spi e1000 mptscsih mptbase ata_generic pata_acpi [last unloaded: nfsd]
[ 5123.105887] CPU: 0 PID: 15853 Comm: ::1-manager Tainted: G OE 4.2.0-rc6+ #214
[ 5123.106358] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/20/2014
[ 5123.106860] task: ffff88007620f300 ti: ffff88005877c000 task.ti: ffff88005877c000
[ 5123.107363] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa03ed38b>] [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.107909] RSP: 0018:ffff88005877fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 5123.108435] RAX: ffff880053f3bc00 RBX: ffff88006ce6c908 RCX: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.108968] RDX: ffffea0000e6d940 RSI: ffff8800399a0000 RDI: ffff88006ce6c908
[ 5123.109503] RBP: ffff88005877fe28 R08: ffffffff81c708a0 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 5123.110045] R10: 00000000000001a2 R11: ffff88003ba7f5c8 R12: ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.110618] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880053a0d240 R15: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.111169] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffffff81c27000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5123.111726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5123.112286] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000054cac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
[ 5123.112888] Stack:
[ 5123.113458] ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 00000000000167d0 0000000000000000
[ 5123.114049] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000a7ec82c6
[ 5123.114662] ffff88005877fe18 ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.115264] Call Trace:
[ 5123.115868] [<ffffffffa03fb44b>] nfs4_try_migration+0xbb/0x220 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.116487] [<ffffffffa03fcb3b>] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x4ab/0x7b0 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117104] [<ffffffffa03fc690>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x510/0x510 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117813] [<ffffffff810a4527>] kthread+0xd7/0xf0
[ 5123.118456] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.119108] [<ffffffff816d9cdf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 5123.119723] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.120329] Code: 4c 8b 6a 58 74 17 eb 52 48 8d 55 a8 89 c6 4c 89 e7 e8 4a b5 ff ff 8b 45 b0 85 c0 74 1c 4c 89 f9 48 8b 55 90 48 8b 75 98 48 89 df <41> ff 55 00 3d e8 d8 ff ff 41 89 c6 74 cf 48 8b 4d c8 65 48 33
[ 5123.121643] RIP [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.122308] RSP <ffff88005877fdb8>
[ 5123.122942] CR2: 0000000000000000
Fixes: ec011fe847 ("NFS: Introduce a vector of migration recovery ops")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 57,160 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: selaRead(const char *fname)
{
FILE *fp;
SELA *sela;
PROCNAME("selaRead");
if (!fname)
return (SELA *)ERROR_PTR("fname not defined", procName, NULL);
if ((fp = fopenReadStream(fname)) == NULL)
return (SELA *)ERROR_PTR("stream not opened", procName, NULL);
if ((sela = selaReadStream(fp)) == NULL) {
fclose(fp);
return (SELA *)ERROR_PTR("sela not returned", procName, NULL);
}
fclose(fp);
return sela;
}
Commit Message: Security fixes: expect final changes for release 1.75.3.
* Fixed a debian security issue with fscanf() reading a string with
possible buffer overflow.
* There were also a few similar situations with sscanf().
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 84,237 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: kern_path_mountpoint(int dfd, const char *name, struct path *path,
unsigned int flags)
{
struct filename s = {.name = name};
return filename_mountpoint(dfd, &s, path, flags);
}
Commit Message: fs: umount on symlink leaks mnt count
Currently umount on symlink blocks following umount:
/vz is separate mount
# ls /vz/ -al | grep test
drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root 4096 Jul 19 01:14 testdir
lrwxrwxrwx. 1 root root 11 Jul 19 01:16 testlink -> /vz/testdir
# umount -l /vz/testlink
umount: /vz/testlink: not mounted (expected)
# lsof /vz
# umount /vz
umount: /vz: device is busy. (unexpected)
In this case mountpoint_last() gets an extra refcount on path->mnt
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 36,334 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int MockNetworkTransaction::RestartWithAuth(
const AuthCredentials& credentials,
const CompletionCallback& callback) {
if (!IsReadyToRestartForAuth())
return ERR_FAILED;
HttpRequestInfo auth_request_info = *request_;
auth_request_info.extra_headers.AddHeaderFromString("Authorization: Bar");
return StartInternal(&auth_request_info, callback, BoundNetLog());
}
Commit Message: Replace fixed string uses of AddHeaderFromString
Uses of AddHeaderFromString() with a static string may as well be
replaced with SetHeader(). Do so.
BUG=None
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2236933005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#418161}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 171,601 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void php_imagepolygon(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS, int filled)
{
zval *IM, *POINTS;
long NPOINTS, COL;
zval **var = NULL;
gdImagePtr im;
gdPointPtr points;
int npoints, col, nelem, i;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rall", &IM, &POINTS, &NPOINTS, &COL) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(im, gdImagePtr, &IM, -1, "Image", le_gd);
npoints = NPOINTS;
col = COL;
nelem = zend_hash_num_elements(Z_ARRVAL_P(POINTS));
if (nelem < 6) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "You must have at least 3 points in your array");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (npoints <= 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "You must give a positive number of points");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (nelem < npoints * 2) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Trying to use %d points in array with only %d points", npoints, nelem/2);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
points = (gdPointPtr) safe_emalloc(npoints, sizeof(gdPoint), 0);
for (i = 0; i < npoints; i++) {
if (zend_hash_index_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(POINTS), (i * 2), (void **) &var) == SUCCESS) {
SEPARATE_ZVAL((var));
convert_to_long(*var);
points[i].x = Z_LVAL_PP(var);
}
if (zend_hash_index_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(POINTS), (i * 2) + 1, (void **) &var) == SUCCESS) {
SEPARATE_ZVAL(var);
convert_to_long(*var);
points[i].y = Z_LVAL_PP(var);
}
}
if (filled) {
gdImageFilledPolygon(im, points, npoints, col);
} else {
gdImagePolygon(im, points, npoints, col);
}
efree(points);
RETURN_TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 15,209 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int dell_poweredge_bt_xaction_handler(struct notifier_block *self,
unsigned long unused,
void *in)
{
struct smi_info *smi_info = in;
unsigned char *data = smi_info->curr_msg->data;
unsigned int size = smi_info->curr_msg->data_size;
if (size >= 8 &&
(data[0]>>2) == STORAGE_NETFN &&
data[1] == STORAGE_CMD_GET_SDR &&
data[7] == 0x3A) {
return_hosed_msg_badsize(smi_info);
return NOTIFY_STOP;
}
return NOTIFY_DONE;
}
Commit Message: ipmi_si: fix use-after-free of resource->name
When we excute the following commands, we got oops
rmmod ipmi_si
cat /proc/ioports
[ 1623.482380] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff00000901d478
[ 1623.482382] Mem abort info:
[ 1623.482383] ESR = 0x96000007
[ 1623.482385] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 1623.482386] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 1623.482387] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 1623.482388] Data abort info:
[ 1623.482389] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000007
[ 1623.482390] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 1623.482393] swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000d7d94a66
[ 1623.482395] [ffff00000901d478] pgd=000000dffbfff003, pud=000000dffbffe003, pmd=0000003f5d06e003, pte=0000000000000000
[ 1623.482399] Internal error: Oops: 96000007 [#1] SMP
[ 1623.487407] Modules linked in: ipmi_si(E) nls_utf8 isofs rpcrdma ib_iser ib_srpt target_core_mod ib_srp scsi_transport_srp ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log iw_cm dm_mod aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ses ghash_ce sha2_ce enclosure sha256_arm64 sg sha1_ce hisi_sas_v2_hw hibmc_drm sbsa_gwdt hisi_sas_main ip_tables mlx5_ib ib_uverbs marvell ib_core mlx5_core ixgbe mdio hns_dsaf ipmi_devintf hns_enet_drv ipmi_msghandler hns_mdio [last unloaded: ipmi_si]
[ 1623.532410] CPU: 30 PID: 11438 Comm: cat Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E 5.0.0-rc3+ #168
[ 1623.541498] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.37 11/21/2017
[ 1623.548822] pstate: a0000005 (NzCv daif -PAN -UAO)
[ 1623.553684] pc : string+0x28/0x98
[ 1623.557040] lr : vsnprintf+0x368/0x5e8
[ 1623.560837] sp : ffff000013213a80
[ 1623.564191] x29: ffff000013213a80 x28: ffff00001138abb5
[ 1623.569577] x27: ffff000013213c18 x26: ffff805f67d06049
[ 1623.574963] x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffff00001138abb5
[ 1623.580349] x23: 0000000000000fb7 x22: ffff0000117ed000
[ 1623.585734] x21: ffff000011188fd8 x20: ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.591119] x19: ffff805f67d06061 x18: ffffffffffffffff
[ 1623.596505] x17: 0000000000000200 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.601890] x15: ffff0000117ed748 x14: ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.607276] x13: ffff805f67d0605e x12: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.612661] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.618046] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 000000000000000f
[ 1623.623432] x7 : ffff805f67d06061 x6 : fffffffffffffffe
[ 1623.628817] x5 : 0000000000000012 x4 : ffff00000901d478
[ 1623.634203] x3 : ffff0a00ffffff04 x2 : ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.639588] x1 : ffff805f67d07000 x0 : ffffffffffffffff
[ 1623.644974] Process cat (pid: 11438, stack limit = 0x000000008d4cbc10)
[ 1623.651592] Call trace:
[ 1623.654068] string+0x28/0x98
[ 1623.657071] vsnprintf+0x368/0x5e8
[ 1623.660517] seq_vprintf+0x70/0x98
[ 1623.668009] seq_printf+0x7c/0xa0
[ 1623.675530] r_show+0xc8/0xf8
[ 1623.682558] seq_read+0x330/0x440
[ 1623.689877] proc_reg_read+0x78/0xd0
[ 1623.697346] __vfs_read+0x60/0x1a0
[ 1623.704564] vfs_read+0x94/0x150
[ 1623.711339] ksys_read+0x6c/0xd8
[ 1623.717939] __arm64_sys_read+0x24/0x30
[ 1623.725077] el0_svc_common+0x120/0x148
[ 1623.732035] el0_svc_handler+0x30/0x40
[ 1623.738757] el0_svc+0x8/0xc
[ 1623.744520] Code: d1000406 aa0103e2 54000149 b4000080 (39400085)
[ 1623.753441] ---[ end trace f91b6a4937de9835 ]---
[ 1623.760871] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
[ 1623.768935] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 1623.775718] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 1623.781998] CPU features: 0x002,21006008
[ 1623.788777] Memory Limit: none
[ 1623.798329] Starting crashdump kernel...
[ 1623.805202] Bye!
If io_setup is called successful in try_smi_init() but try_smi_init()
goes out_err before calling ipmi_register_smi(), so ipmi_unregister_smi()
will not be called while removing module. It leads to the resource that
allocated in io_setup() can not be freed, but the name(DEVICE_NAME) of
resource is freed while removing the module. It causes use-after-free
when cat /proc/ioports.
Fix this by calling io_cleanup() while try_smi_init() goes to out_err.
and don't call io_cleanup() until io_setup() returns successful to avoid
warning prints.
Fixes: 93c303d2045b ("ipmi_si: Clean up shutdown a bit")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: NuoHan Qiao <qiaonuohan@huawei.com>
Suggested-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 90,215 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int compat_put_timeval(const struct timeval *tv, void __user *utv)
{
if (COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME)
return copy_to_user(utv, tv, sizeof(*tv)) ? -EFAULT : 0;
else
return __compat_put_timeval(tv, utv);
}
Commit Message: compat: fix 4-byte infoleak via uninitialized struct field
Commit 3a4d44b61625 ("ntp: Move adjtimex related compat syscalls to
native counterparts") removed the memset() in compat_get_timex(). Since
then, the compat adjtimex syscall can invoke do_adjtimex() with an
uninitialized ->tai.
If do_adjtimex() doesn't write to ->tai (e.g. because the arguments are
invalid), compat_put_timex() then copies the uninitialized ->tai field
to userspace.
Fix it by adding the memset() back.
Fixes: 3a4d44b61625 ("ntp: Move adjtimex related compat syscalls to native counterparts")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 82,644 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AutofillExternalDelegate::RegisterDeletionCallback(
base::OnceClosure deletion_callback) {
deletion_callback_ = std::move(deletion_callback);
}
Commit Message: [Autofill] Remove AutofillPopupViewViews and associated feature.
Bug: 906135,831603
Change-Id: I3c982f8b3ffb4928c7c878e74e10113999106499
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1387124
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <rkaplow@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vasilii Sukhanov <vasilii@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Tirelo <ftirelo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Martino <tmartino@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mathieu Perreault <mathp@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621360}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 130,625 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int vfs_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry,
struct inode **delegated_inode, unsigned int flags)
{
int error;
bool is_dir = d_is_dir(old_dentry);
const unsigned char *old_name;
struct inode *source = old_dentry->d_inode;
struct inode *target = new_dentry->d_inode;
bool new_is_dir = false;
unsigned max_links = new_dir->i_sb->s_max_links;
if (source == target)
return 0;
error = may_delete(old_dir, old_dentry, is_dir);
if (error)
return error;
if (!target) {
error = may_create(new_dir, new_dentry);
} else {
new_is_dir = d_is_dir(new_dentry);
if (!(flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE))
error = may_delete(new_dir, new_dentry, is_dir);
else
error = may_delete(new_dir, new_dentry, new_is_dir);
}
if (error)
return error;
if (!old_dir->i_op->rename)
return -EPERM;
/*
* If we are going to change the parent - check write permissions,
* we'll need to flip '..'.
*/
if (new_dir != old_dir) {
if (is_dir) {
error = inode_permission(source, MAY_WRITE);
if (error)
return error;
}
if ((flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) && new_is_dir) {
error = inode_permission(target, MAY_WRITE);
if (error)
return error;
}
}
error = security_inode_rename(old_dir, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry,
flags);
if (error)
return error;
old_name = fsnotify_oldname_init(old_dentry->d_name.name);
dget(new_dentry);
if (!is_dir || (flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE))
lock_two_nondirectories(source, target);
else if (target)
inode_lock(target);
error = -EBUSY;
if (is_local_mountpoint(old_dentry) || is_local_mountpoint(new_dentry))
goto out;
if (max_links && new_dir != old_dir) {
error = -EMLINK;
if (is_dir && !new_is_dir && new_dir->i_nlink >= max_links)
goto out;
if ((flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) && !is_dir && new_is_dir &&
old_dir->i_nlink >= max_links)
goto out;
}
if (is_dir && !(flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) && target)
shrink_dcache_parent(new_dentry);
if (!is_dir) {
error = try_break_deleg(source, delegated_inode);
if (error)
goto out;
}
if (target && !new_is_dir) {
error = try_break_deleg(target, delegated_inode);
if (error)
goto out;
}
error = old_dir->i_op->rename(old_dir, old_dentry,
new_dir, new_dentry, flags);
if (error)
goto out;
if (!(flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) && target) {
if (is_dir)
target->i_flags |= S_DEAD;
dont_mount(new_dentry);
detach_mounts(new_dentry);
}
if (!(old_dir->i_sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_RENAME_DOES_D_MOVE)) {
if (!(flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE))
d_move(old_dentry, new_dentry);
else
d_exchange(old_dentry, new_dentry);
}
out:
if (!is_dir || (flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE))
unlock_two_nondirectories(source, target);
else if (target)
inode_unlock(target);
dput(new_dentry);
if (!error) {
fsnotify_move(old_dir, new_dir, old_name, is_dir,
!(flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) ? target : NULL, old_dentry);
if (flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) {
fsnotify_move(new_dir, old_dir, old_dentry->d_name.name,
new_is_dir, NULL, new_dentry);
}
}
fsnotify_oldname_free(old_name);
return error;
}
Commit Message: dentry name snapshots
take_dentry_name_snapshot() takes a safe snapshot of dentry name;
if the name is a short one, it gets copied into caller-supplied
structure, otherwise an extra reference to external name is grabbed
(those are never modified). In either case the pointer to stable
string is stored into the same structure.
dentry must be held by the caller of take_dentry_name_snapshot(),
but may be freely dropped afterwards - the snapshot will stay
until destroyed by release_dentry_name_snapshot().
Intended use:
struct name_snapshot s;
take_dentry_name_snapshot(&s, dentry);
...
access s.name
...
release_dentry_name_snapshot(&s);
Replaces fsnotify_oldname_...(), gets used in fsnotify to obtain the name
to pass down with event.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 1 | 168,263 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ASN1_TYPE *PKCS7_get_attribute(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si, int nid)
{
return (get_attribute(si->unauth_attr, nid));
}
Commit Message: PKCS#7: Fix NULL dereference with missing EncryptedContent.
CVE-2015-1790
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 44,223 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::BlockRequestsForFrame() {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
NotifyForEachFrameFromUI(
this,
base::BindRepeating(&ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::BlockRequestsForRoute));
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID: | 0 | 147,606 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebView* webView() const { return m_helper.webView(); }
Commit Message: Make WebPageSerializerImpl to escape URL attribute values in result.
This patch makes |WebPageSerializerImpl| to escape URL attribute values rather
than directly output URL attribute values into result.
BUG=542054
TEST=webkit_unit_tests --gtest_filter=WebPageSerializerTest.URLAttributeValues
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1398453005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#353712}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 124,027 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int shash_final_unaligned(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
{
struct crypto_shash *tfm = desc->tfm;
unsigned long alignmask = crypto_shash_alignmask(tfm);
struct shash_alg *shash = crypto_shash_alg(tfm);
unsigned int ds = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
u8 ubuf[shash_align_buffer_size(ds, alignmask)]
__attribute__ ((aligned));
u8 *buf = PTR_ALIGN(&ubuf[0], alignmask + 1);
int err;
err = shash->final(desc, buf);
if (err)
goto out;
memcpy(out, buf, ds);
out:
memset(buf, 0, ds);
return err;
}
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 31,368 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cac_parse_CCC(sc_card_t *card, cac_private_data_t *priv, u8 *tl,
size_t tl_len, u8 *val, size_t val_len)
{
size_t len = 0;
u8 *tl_end = tl + tl_len;
u8 *val_end = val + val_len;
sc_path_t new_path;
int r;
for (; (tl < tl_end) && (val< val_end); val += len) {
/* get the tag and the length */
u8 tag;
if (sc_simpletlv_read_tag(&tl, tl_end - tl, &tag, &len) != SC_SUCCESS)
break;
switch (tag) {
case CAC_TAG_CUID:
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE,"TAG:CUID");
r = cac_parse_cuid(card, priv, (cac_cuid_t *)val, len);
if (r < 0)
return r;
break;
case CAC_TAG_CC_VERSION_NUMBER:
if (len != 1) {
sc_log(card->ctx, "TAG: CC Version: "
"Invalid length %"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u", len);
break;
}
/* ignore the version numbers for now */
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE,
"TAG: CC Version = 0x%02x", *val);
break;
case CAC_TAG_GRAMMAR_VERION_NUMBER:
if (len != 1) {
sc_log(card->ctx, "TAG: Grammar Version: "
"Invalid length %"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u", len);
break;
}
/* ignore the version numbers for now */
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE,
"TAG: Grammar Version = 0x%02x", *val);
break;
case CAC_TAG_CARDURL:
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE,"TAG:CARDURL");
r = cac_parse_cardurl(card, priv, (cac_card_url_t *)val, len);
if (r < 0)
return r;
break;
/*
* The following are really for file systems cards. This code only cares about CAC VM cards
*/
case CAC_TAG_PKCS15:
if (len != 1) {
sc_log(card->ctx, "TAG: PKCS15: "
"Invalid length %"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u", len);
break;
}
/* TODO should verify that this is '0'. If it's not
* zero, we should drop out of here and let the PKCS 15
* code handle this card */
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE,"TAG: PKCS15 = 0x%02x", *val);
break;
case CAC_TAG_DATA_MODEL:
case CAC_TAG_CARD_APDU:
case CAC_TAG_CAPABILITY_TUPLES:
case CAC_TAG_STATUS_TUPLES:
case CAC_TAG_REDIRECTION:
case CAC_TAG_ERROR_CODES:
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE,"TAG:FSSpecific(0x%02x)", tag);
break;
case CAC_TAG_ACCESS_CONTROL:
/* TODO handle access control later */
sc_log_hex(card->ctx, "TAG:ACCESS Control", val, len);
break;
case CAC_TAG_NEXT_CCC:
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE,"TAG:NEXT CCC");
r = cac_path_from_cardurl(card, &new_path, (cac_card_url_t *)val, len);
if (r < 0)
return r;
r = cac_select_file_by_type(card, &new_path, NULL, SC_CARD_TYPE_CAC_II);
if (r < 0)
return r;
r = cac_process_CCC(card, priv);
if (r < 0)
return r;
break;
default:
/* ignore tags we don't understand */
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE,"TAG:Unknown (0x%02x)",tag );
break;
}
}
return SC_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 78,247 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void add_coins(Coin* c1, const Coin* c2)
{
size_t i;
for(i = 0; i < c2->symbols.size; i++) uivector_push_back(&c1->symbols, c2->symbols.data[i]);
c1->weight += c2->weight;
}
Commit Message: Fixed #5645: realloc return handling
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 87,457 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ShouldForgetOpenersForTransition(PageTransition::Type transition) {
return transition == PageTransition::TYPED ||
transition == PageTransition::AUTO_BOOKMARK ||
transition == PageTransition::GENERATED ||
transition == PageTransition::KEYWORD ||
transition == PageTransition::START_PAGE;
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,130 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TransportTexture::OnTexturesCreated(std::vector<int> textures) {
bool ret = decoder_->MakeCurrent();
if (!ret) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to switch context";
return;
}
output_textures_->clear();
for (size_t i = 0; i < textures.size(); ++i) {
uint32 gl_texture = 0;
ret = decoder_->GetServiceTextureId(textures[i], &gl_texture);
DCHECK(ret) << "Cannot translate client texture ID to service ID";
output_textures_->push_back(gl_texture);
texture_map_.insert(std::make_pair(gl_texture, textures[i]));
}
create_task_->Run();
create_task_.reset();
output_textures_ = NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fixing Coverity bugs (DEAD_CODE and PASS_BY_VALUE)
CIDs 16230, 16439, 16610, 16635
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7215029
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@90134 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 170,313 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DocumentLoader::DocumentLoader(
LocalFrame* frame,
const ResourceRequest& req,
const SubstituteData& substitute_data,
ClientRedirectPolicy client_redirect_policy,
const base::UnguessableToken& devtools_navigation_token)
: frame_(frame),
fetcher_(FrameFetchContext::CreateFetcherFromDocumentLoader(this)),
original_request_(req),
substitute_data_(substitute_data),
request_(req),
load_type_(WebFrameLoadType::kStandard),
is_client_redirect_(client_redirect_policy ==
ClientRedirectPolicy::kClientRedirect),
replaces_current_history_item_(false),
data_received_(false),
navigation_type_(kWebNavigationTypeOther),
document_load_timing_(*this),
application_cache_host_(ApplicationCacheHost::Create(this)),
was_blocked_after_csp_(false),
state_(kNotStarted),
committed_data_buffer_(nullptr),
in_data_received_(false),
data_buffer_(SharedBuffer::Create()),
devtools_navigation_token_(devtools_navigation_token),
user_activated_(false) {
DCHECK(frame_);
if (is_client_redirect_)
AppendRedirect(frame_->GetDocument()->Url());
}
Commit Message: Prevent sandboxed documents from reusing the default window
Bug: 377995
Change-Id: Iff66c6d214dfd0cb7ea9c80f83afeedfff703541
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/983558
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567663}
CWE ID: CWE-285 | 0 | 154,908 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static PHP_INI_MH(OnUpdateTransSid) /* {{{ */
{
SESSION_CHECK_ACTIVE_STATE;
if (!strncasecmp(new_value, "on", sizeof("on"))) {
PS(use_trans_sid) = (zend_bool) 1;
} else {
PS(use_trans_sid) = (zend_bool) atoi(new_value);
}
return SUCCESS;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 9,599 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DOMStringMap* Element::dataset()
{
ElementRareData* data = ensureElementRareData();
if (!data->dataset())
data->setDataset(DatasetDOMStringMap::create(this));
return data->dataset();
}
Commit Message: Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 112,243 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int fsmCommit(char **path, rpmfi fi, rpmFileAction action, const char *suffix)
{
int rc = 0;
/* XXX Special case /dev/log, which shouldn't be packaged anyways */
if (!(S_ISSOCK(rpmfiFMode(fi)) && IS_DEV_LOG(*path))) {
const char *nsuffix = (action == FA_ALTNAME) ? SUFFIX_RPMNEW : NULL;
char *dest = *path;
/* Construct final destination path (nsuffix is usually NULL) */
if (suffix)
dest = fsmFsPath(fi, nsuffix);
/* Rename temporary to final file name if needed. */
if (dest != *path) {
rc = fsmRename(*path, dest);
if (!rc && nsuffix) {
char * opath = fsmFsPath(fi, NULL);
rpmlog(RPMLOG_WARNING, _("%s created as %s\n"),
opath, dest);
free(opath);
}
free(*path);
*path = dest;
}
}
return rc;
}
Commit Message: Don't follow symlinks on file creation (CVE-2017-7501)
Open newly created files with O_EXCL to prevent symlink tricks.
When reopening hardlinks for writing the actual content, use append
mode instead. This is compatible with the write-only permissions but
is not destructive in case we got redirected to somebody elses file,
verify the target before actually writing anything.
As these are files with the temporary suffix, errors mean a local
user with sufficient privileges to break the installation of the package
anyway is trying to goof us on purpose, don't bother trying to mend it
(we couldn't fix the hardlink case anyhow) but just bail out.
Based on a patch by Florian Festi.
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 67,488 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: size_t ZSTD_initCStream_srcSize(ZSTD_CStream* zcs, int compressionLevel, unsigned long long pss)
{
U64 const pledgedSrcSize = (pss==0) ? ZSTD_CONTENTSIZE_UNKNOWN : pss; /* temporary : 0 interpreted as "unknown" during transition period. Users willing to specify "unknown" **must** use ZSTD_CONTENTSIZE_UNKNOWN. `0` will be interpreted as "empty" in the future */
ZSTD_CCtxParams_init(&zcs->requestedParams, compressionLevel);
return ZSTD_initCStream_internal(zcs, NULL, 0, NULL, zcs->requestedParams, pledgedSrcSize);
}
Commit Message: fixed T36302429
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 90,083 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int get_compat_msghdr(struct msghdr *kmsg, struct compat_msghdr __user *umsg)
{
compat_uptr_t tmp1, tmp2, tmp3;
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, umsg, sizeof(*umsg)) ||
__get_user(tmp1, &umsg->msg_name) ||
__get_user(kmsg->msg_namelen, &umsg->msg_namelen) ||
__get_user(tmp2, &umsg->msg_iov) ||
__get_user(kmsg->msg_iovlen, &umsg->msg_iovlen) ||
__get_user(tmp3, &umsg->msg_control) ||
__get_user(kmsg->msg_controllen, &umsg->msg_controllen) ||
__get_user(kmsg->msg_flags, &umsg->msg_flags))
return -EFAULT;
if (kmsg->msg_namelen > sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage))
kmsg->msg_namelen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage);
kmsg->msg_name = compat_ptr(tmp1);
kmsg->msg_iov = compat_ptr(tmp2);
kmsg->msg_control = compat_ptr(tmp3);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: x86, x32: Correct invalid use of user timespec in the kernel
The x32 case for the recvmsg() timout handling is broken:
asmlinkage long compat_sys_recvmmsg(int fd, struct compat_mmsghdr __user *mmsg,
unsigned int vlen, unsigned int flags,
struct compat_timespec __user *timeout)
{
int datagrams;
struct timespec ktspec;
if (flags & MSG_CMSG_COMPAT)
return -EINVAL;
if (COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME)
return __sys_recvmmsg(fd, (struct mmsghdr __user *)mmsg, vlen,
flags | MSG_CMSG_COMPAT,
(struct timespec *) timeout);
...
The timeout pointer parameter is provided by userland (hence the __user
annotation) but for x32 syscalls it's simply cast to a kernel pointer
and is passed to __sys_recvmmsg which will eventually directly
dereference it for both reading and writing. Other callers to
__sys_recvmmsg properly copy from userland to the kernel first.
The bug was introduced by commit ee4fa23c4bfc ("compat: Use
COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME in net/compat.c") and should affect all kernels
since 3.4 (and perhaps vendor kernels if they backported x32 support
along with this code).
Note that CONFIG_X86_X32_ABI gets enabled at build time and only if
CONFIG_X86_X32 is enabled and ld can build x32 executables.
Other uses of COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME seem fine.
This addresses CVE-2014-0038.
Signed-off-by: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.4+
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 40,081 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cast6_decrypt(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *outbuf, const u8 *inbuf)
{
__cast6_decrypt(crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm), outbuf, inbuf);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 47,182 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SetErrorToEpicFail() {
set_error("epic fail");
}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 99,680 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ioctl_fsfreeze(struct file *filp)
{
struct super_block *sb = file_inode(filp)->i_sb;
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
/* If filesystem doesn't support freeze feature, return. */
if (sb->s_op->freeze_fs == NULL && sb->s_op->freeze_super == NULL)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
/* Freeze */
if (sb->s_op->freeze_super)
return sb->s_op->freeze_super(sb);
return freeze_super(sb);
}
Commit Message: vfs: ioctl: prevent double-fetch in dedupe ioctl
This prevents a double-fetch from user space that can lead to to an
undersized allocation and heap overflow.
Fixes: 54dbc1517237 ("vfs: hoist the btrfs deduplication ioctl to the vfs")
Signed-off-by: Scott Bauer <sbauer@plzdonthack.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 50,585 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: fz_drop_link_key(fz_context *ctx, void *key_)
{
fz_link_key *key = (fz_link_key *)key_;
if (fz_drop_imp(ctx, key, &key->refs))
fz_free(ctx, key);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 374 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init lz4hc_mod_init(void)
{
return crypto_register_alg(&alg_lz4hc);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 47,269 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGraphicsContext3DCommandBufferImpl::deleteTexture(WebGLId texture) {
gl_->DeleteTextures(1, &texture);
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 106,805 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ResFindAllRes(void *value, XID id, RESTYPE type, void *cdata)
{
int *counts = (int *) cdata;
counts[(type & TypeMask) - 1]++;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,446 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int check(RBinFile *arch) {
const ut8 *bytes = arch ? r_buf_buffer (arch->buf) : NULL;
ut64 sz = arch ? r_buf_size (arch->buf): 0;
if (!bytes || !sz) {
return false;
}
return check_bytes (bytes, sz);
}
Commit Message: Fix #6829 oob write because of using wrong struct
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 68,264 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void Com_DetectSSE(void)
{
#if !idx64
cpuFeatures_t feat;
feat = Sys_GetProcessorFeatures();
if(feat & CF_SSE)
{
if(feat & CF_SSE2)
Q_SnapVector = qsnapvectorsse;
else
Q_SnapVector = qsnapvectorx87;
Q_ftol = qftolsse;
#endif
Q_VMftol = qvmftolsse;
Com_Printf("SSE instruction set enabled\n");
#if !idx64
}
else
{
Q_ftol = qftolx87;
Q_VMftol = qvmftolx87;
Q_SnapVector = qsnapvectorx87;
Com_Printf("SSE instruction set not available\n");
}
#endif
}
Commit Message: Merge some file writing extension checks from OpenJK.
Thanks Ensiform.
https://github.com/JACoders/OpenJK/commit/05928a57f9e4aae15a3bd0
https://github.com/JACoders/OpenJK/commit/ef124fd0fc48af164581176
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 95,447 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: NTSTATUS TCStartThreadInProcess (PKSTART_ROUTINE threadProc, PVOID threadArg, PKTHREAD *kThread, PEPROCESS process)
{
NTSTATUS status;
HANDLE threadHandle;
HANDLE processHandle = NULL;
OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES threadObjAttributes;
if (process)
{
status = ObOpenObjectByPointer (process, OBJ_KERNEL_HANDLE, NULL, 0, NULL, KernelMode, &processHandle);
if (!NT_SUCCESS (status))
return status;
}
InitializeObjectAttributes (&threadObjAttributes, NULL, OBJ_KERNEL_HANDLE, NULL, NULL);
status = PsCreateSystemThread (&threadHandle, THREAD_ALL_ACCESS, &threadObjAttributes, processHandle, NULL, threadProc, threadArg);
if (!NT_SUCCESS (status))
return status;
status = ObReferenceObjectByHandle (threadHandle, THREAD_ALL_ACCESS, NULL, KernelMode, (PVOID *) kThread, NULL);
if (!NT_SUCCESS (status))
{
ZwClose (threadHandle);
*kThread = NULL;
return status;
}
if (processHandle)
ZwClose (processHandle);
ZwClose (threadHandle);
return STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Windows: fix low severity vulnerability in driver that allowed reading 3 bytes of kernel stack memory (with a rare possibility of 25 additional bytes). Reported by Tim Harrison.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 87,216 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int create_align_transfer_quirk(struct snd_usb_audio *chip,
struct usb_interface *iface,
struct usb_driver *driver,
const struct snd_usb_audio_quirk *quirk)
{
chip->txfr_quirk = 1;
return 1; /* Continue with creating streams and mixer */
}
Commit Message: ALSA: usb-audio: Fix NULL dereference in create_fixed_stream_quirk()
create_fixed_stream_quirk() may cause a NULL-pointer dereference by
accessing the non-existing endpoint when a USB device with a malformed
USB descriptor is used.
This patch avoids it simply by adding a sanity check of bNumEndpoints
before the accesses.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=971125
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: | 0 | 55,236 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void overloadedMethodAMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectV8Internal::overloadedMethodAMethod(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 121,859 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mxf_read_index_entry_array(AVIOContext *pb, MXFIndexTableSegment *segment)
{
int i, length;
segment->nb_index_entries = avio_rb32(pb);
length = avio_rb32(pb);
if (!(segment->temporal_offset_entries=av_calloc(segment->nb_index_entries, sizeof(*segment->temporal_offset_entries))) ||
!(segment->flag_entries = av_calloc(segment->nb_index_entries, sizeof(*segment->flag_entries))) ||
!(segment->stream_offset_entries = av_calloc(segment->nb_index_entries, sizeof(*segment->stream_offset_entries)))) {
av_freep(&segment->temporal_offset_entries);
av_freep(&segment->flag_entries);
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
for (i = 0; i < segment->nb_index_entries; i++) {
segment->temporal_offset_entries[i] = avio_r8(pb);
avio_r8(pb); /* KeyFrameOffset */
segment->flag_entries[i] = avio_r8(pb);
segment->stream_offset_entries[i] = avio_rb64(pb);
avio_skip(pb, length - 11);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/mxfdec: Fix DoS issues in mxf_read_index_entry_array()
Fixes: 20170829A.mxf
Co-Author: 张洪亮(望初)" <wangchu.zhl@alibaba-inc.com>
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-834 | 1 | 167,765 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Bluetooth::IsScanActive(mojo::BindingId id) const {
return client_bindings_.HasBinding(id);
}
Commit Message: bluetooth: Implement getAvailability()
This change implements the getAvailability() method for
navigator.bluetooth as defined in the specification.
Bug: 707640
Change-Id: I9e9b3e7f8ea7f259e975f71cb6d9570e5f04b479
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1651516
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Giovanni Ortuño Urquidi <ortuno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#688987}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 138,267 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: psf_log_SF_INFO (SF_PRIVATE *psf)
{ psf_log_printf (psf, "---------------------------------\n") ;
psf_log_printf (psf, " Sample rate : %d\n", psf->sf.samplerate) ;
if (psf->sf.frames == SF_COUNT_MAX)
psf_log_printf (psf, " Frames : unknown\n") ;
else
psf_log_printf (psf, " Frames : %D\n", psf->sf.frames) ;
psf_log_printf (psf, " Channels : %d\n", psf->sf.channels) ;
psf_log_printf (psf, " Format : 0x%X\n", psf->sf.format) ;
psf_log_printf (psf, " Sections : %d\n", psf->sf.sections) ;
psf_log_printf (psf, " Seekable : %s\n", psf->sf.seekable ? "TRUE" : "FALSE") ;
psf_log_printf (psf, "---------------------------------\n") ;
} /* psf_dump_SFINFO */
Commit Message: src/ : Move to a variable length header buffer
Previously, the `psf->header` buffer was a fixed length specified by
`SF_HEADER_LEN` which was set to `12292`. This was problematic for
two reasons; this value was un-necessarily large for the majority
of files and too small for some others.
Now the size of the header buffer starts at 256 bytes and grows as
necessary up to a maximum of 100k.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 95,338 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int chacha20_poly1305_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
{
EVP_CHACHA_AEAD_CTX *actx = aead_data(ctx);
if (actx)
OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->cipher_data, sizeof(*ctx) + Poly1305_ctx_size());
return 1;
}
Commit Message: crypto/evp: harden AEAD ciphers.
Originally a crash in 32-bit build was reported CHACHA20-POLY1305
cipher. The crash is triggered by truncated packet and is result
of excessive hashing to the edge of accessible memory. Since hash
operation is read-only it is not considered to be exploitable
beyond a DoS condition. Other ciphers were hardened.
Thanks to Robert Święcki for report.
CVE-2017-3731
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 69,353 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ClientControlledShellSurface::SetMinimized() {
TRACE_EVENT0("exo", "ClientControlledShellSurface::SetMinimized");
pending_window_state_ = ash::WindowStateType::kMinimized;
}
Commit Message: Ignore updatePipBounds before initial bounds is set
When PIP enter/exit transition happens, window state change and
initial bounds change are committed in the same commit. However,
as state change is applied first in OnPreWidgetCommit and the
bounds is update later, if updatePipBounds is called between the
gap, it ends up returning a wrong bounds based on the previous
bounds.
Currently, there are two callstacks that end up triggering
updatePipBounds between the gap: (i) The state change causes
OnWindowAddedToLayout and updatePipBounds is called in OnWMEvent,
(ii) updatePipBounds is called in UpdatePipState to prevent it
from being placed under some system ui.
As it doesn't make sense to call updatePipBounds before the first
bounds is not set, this CL adds a boolean to defer updatePipBounds.
position.
Bug: b130782006
Test: Got VLC into PIP and confirmed it was placed at the correct
Change-Id: I5b9f3644bfb2533fd3f905bc09d49708a5d08a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1578719
Commit-Queue: Kazuki Takise <takise@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Kazuki Takise <takise@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mitsuru Oshima <oshima@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#668724}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 137,716 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool V8TestInterfaceNode::hasInstance(v8::Local<v8::Value> v8Value, v8::Isolate* isolate)
{
return V8PerIsolateData::from(isolate)->hasInstance(&wrapperTypeInfo, v8Value);
}
Commit Message: binding: Removes unused code in templates/attributes.cpp.
Faking {{cpp_class}} and {{c8_class}} doesn't make sense.
Probably it made sense before the introduction of virtual
ScriptWrappable::wrap().
Checking the existence of window->document() doesn't seem
making sense to me, and CQ tests seem passing without the
check.
BUG=
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2268433002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#413375}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 119,261 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static __be32 nfsd4_encode_readv(struct nfsd4_compoundres *resp,
struct nfsd4_read *read,
struct file *file, unsigned long maxcount)
{
struct xdr_stream *xdr = &resp->xdr;
u32 eof;
int v;
int starting_len = xdr->buf->len - 8;
long len;
int thislen;
__be32 nfserr;
__be32 tmp;
__be32 *p;
u32 zzz = 0;
int pad;
len = maxcount;
v = 0;
thislen = min_t(long, len, ((void *)xdr->end - (void *)xdr->p));
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, (thislen+3)&~3);
WARN_ON_ONCE(!p);
resp->rqstp->rq_vec[v].iov_base = p;
resp->rqstp->rq_vec[v].iov_len = thislen;
v++;
len -= thislen;
while (len) {
thislen = min_t(long, len, PAGE_SIZE);
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, (thislen+3)&~3);
WARN_ON_ONCE(!p);
resp->rqstp->rq_vec[v].iov_base = p;
resp->rqstp->rq_vec[v].iov_len = thislen;
v++;
len -= thislen;
}
read->rd_vlen = v;
len = maxcount;
nfserr = nfsd_readv(file, read->rd_offset, resp->rqstp->rq_vec,
read->rd_vlen, &maxcount);
if (nfserr)
return nfserr;
xdr_truncate_encode(xdr, starting_len + 8 + ((maxcount+3)&~3));
eof = nfsd_eof_on_read(len, maxcount, read->rd_offset,
d_inode(read->rd_fhp->fh_dentry)->i_size);
tmp = htonl(eof);
write_bytes_to_xdr_buf(xdr->buf, starting_len , &tmp, 4);
tmp = htonl(maxcount);
write_bytes_to_xdr_buf(xdr->buf, starting_len + 4, &tmp, 4);
pad = (maxcount&3) ? 4 - (maxcount&3) : 0;
write_bytes_to_xdr_buf(xdr->buf, starting_len + 8 + maxcount,
&zzz, pad);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,826 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: XRRFreeOutputInfo (XRROutputInfo *outputInfo)
{
Xfree (outputInfo);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 8,294 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int esil_avr_fini(RAnalEsil *esil) {
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix #9943 - Invalid free on RAnal.avr
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 82,787 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int kvm_init_debug(void)
{
int r = -EFAULT;
struct kvm_stats_debugfs_item *p;
kvm_debugfs_dir = debugfs_create_dir("kvm", NULL);
if (kvm_debugfs_dir == NULL)
goto out;
for (p = debugfs_entries; p->name; ++p) {
p->dentry = debugfs_create_file(p->name, 0444, kvm_debugfs_dir,
(void *)(long)p->offset,
stat_fops[p->kind]);
if (p->dentry == NULL)
goto out_dir;
}
return 0;
out_dir:
debugfs_remove_recursive(kvm_debugfs_dir);
out:
return r;
}
Commit Message: KVM: unmap pages from the iommu when slots are removed
commit 32f6daad4651a748a58a3ab6da0611862175722f upstream.
We've been adding new mappings, but not destroying old mappings.
This can lead to a page leak as pages are pinned using
get_user_pages, but only unpinned with put_page if they still
exist in the memslots list on vm shutdown. A memslot that is
destroyed while an iommu domain is enabled for the guest will
therefore result in an elevated page reference count that is
never cleared.
Additionally, without this fix, the iommu is only programmed
with the first translation for a gpa. This can result in
peer-to-peer errors if a mapping is destroyed and replaced by a
new mapping at the same gpa as the iommu will still be pointing
to the original, pinned memory address.
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 20,353 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: VOID VolumeThreadProc (PVOID Context)
{
PTHREAD_BLOCK pThreadBlock = (PTHREAD_BLOCK) Context;
PDEVICE_OBJECT DeviceObject = pThreadBlock->DeviceObject;
PEXTENSION Extension = (PEXTENSION) DeviceObject->DeviceExtension;
BOOL bDevice;
/* Set thread priority to lowest realtime level. */
KeSetPriorityThread (KeGetCurrentThread (), LOW_REALTIME_PRIORITY);
Dump ("Mount THREAD OPENING VOLUME BEGIN\n");
if ( !IsDeviceName (pThreadBlock->mount->wszVolume))
{
RtlStringCbCopyW (pThreadBlock->wszMountVolume, sizeof(pThreadBlock->wszMountVolume),WIDE ("\\??\\"));
RtlStringCbCatW (pThreadBlock->wszMountVolume, sizeof(pThreadBlock->wszMountVolume),pThreadBlock->mount->wszVolume);
bDevice = FALSE;
}
else
{
pThreadBlock->wszMountVolume[0] = 0;
RtlStringCbCatW (pThreadBlock->wszMountVolume, sizeof(pThreadBlock->wszMountVolume),pThreadBlock->mount->wszVolume);
bDevice = TRUE;
}
Dump ("Mount THREAD request for File %ls DriveNumber %d Device = %d\n",
pThreadBlock->wszMountVolume, pThreadBlock->mount->nDosDriveNo, bDevice);
pThreadBlock->ntCreateStatus = TCOpenVolume (DeviceObject,
Extension,
pThreadBlock->mount,
pThreadBlock->wszMountVolume,
bDevice);
if (!NT_SUCCESS (pThreadBlock->ntCreateStatus) || pThreadBlock->mount->nReturnCode != 0)
{
KeSetEvent (&Extension->keCreateEvent, 0, FALSE);
PsTerminateSystemThread (STATUS_SUCCESS);
}
Extension->Queue.IsFilterDevice = FALSE;
Extension->Queue.DeviceObject = DeviceObject;
Extension->Queue.CryptoInfo = Extension->cryptoInfo;
Extension->Queue.HostFileHandle = Extension->hDeviceFile;
Extension->Queue.VirtualDeviceLength = Extension->DiskLength;
Extension->Queue.MaxReadAheadOffset.QuadPart = Extension->HostLength;
if (Extension->SecurityClientContextValid)
Extension->Queue.SecurityClientContext = &Extension->SecurityClientContext;
else
Extension->Queue.SecurityClientContext = NULL;
pThreadBlock->ntCreateStatus = EncryptedIoQueueStart (&Extension->Queue);
if (!NT_SUCCESS (pThreadBlock->ntCreateStatus))
{
TCCloseVolume (DeviceObject, Extension);
pThreadBlock->mount->nReturnCode = ERR_OS_ERROR;
KeSetEvent (&Extension->keCreateEvent, 0, FALSE);
PsTerminateSystemThread (STATUS_SUCCESS);
}
KeSetEvent (&Extension->keCreateEvent, 0, FALSE);
/* From this point on pThreadBlock cannot be used as it will have been released! */
pThreadBlock = NULL;
for (;;)
{
/* Wait for a request from the dispatch routines. */
KeWaitForSingleObject ((PVOID) & Extension->RequestSemaphore, Executive, KernelMode, FALSE, NULL);
for (;;)
{
PIO_STACK_LOCATION irpSp;
PLIST_ENTRY request;
PIRP irp;
request = ExInterlockedRemoveHeadList (&Extension->ListEntry, &Extension->ListSpinLock);
if (request == NULL)
break;
irp = CONTAINING_RECORD (request, IRP, Tail.Overlay.ListEntry);
irpSp = IoGetCurrentIrpStackLocation (irp);
ASSERT (irpSp->MajorFunction == IRP_MJ_DEVICE_CONTROL);
ProcessVolumeDeviceControlIrp (DeviceObject, Extension, irp);
IoReleaseRemoveLock (&Extension->Queue.RemoveLock, irp);
}
if (Extension->bThreadShouldQuit)
{
Dump ("Closing volume\n");
EncryptedIoQueueStop (&Extension->Queue);
TCCloseVolume (DeviceObject, Extension);
PsTerminateSystemThread (STATUS_SUCCESS);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Windows: fix low severity vulnerability in driver that allowed reading 3 bytes of kernel stack memory (with a rare possibility of 25 additional bytes). Reported by Tim Harrison.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 87,228 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline unsigned long zap_pmd_range(struct mmu_gather *tlb,
struct vm_area_struct *vma, pud_t *pud,
unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
struct zap_details *details)
{
pmd_t *pmd;
unsigned long next;
pmd = pmd_offset(pud, addr);
do {
next = pmd_addr_end(addr, end);
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
continue;
next = zap_pte_range(tlb, vma, pmd, addr, next, details);
cond_resched();
} while (pmd++, addr = next, addr != end);
return addr;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 1 | 165,633 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WallpaperManager::SetDefaultWallpaperPath(
const base::FilePath& default_small_wallpaper_file,
std::unique_ptr<gfx::ImageSkia> small_wallpaper_image,
const base::FilePath& default_large_wallpaper_file,
std::unique_ptr<gfx::ImageSkia> large_wallpaper_image) {
default_small_wallpaper_file_ = default_small_wallpaper_file;
default_large_wallpaper_file_ = default_large_wallpaper_file;
ash::WallpaperController* controller =
ash::Shell::Get()->wallpaper_controller();
const bool need_update_screen =
default_wallpaper_image_.get() &&
controller->WallpaperIsAlreadyLoaded(default_wallpaper_image_->image(),
false /* compare_layouts */,
wallpaper::WALLPAPER_LAYOUT_CENTER);
default_wallpaper_image_.reset();
if (GetAppropriateResolution() == WALLPAPER_RESOLUTION_SMALL) {
if (small_wallpaper_image) {
default_wallpaper_image_.reset(
new user_manager::UserImage(*small_wallpaper_image));
default_wallpaper_image_->set_file_path(default_small_wallpaper_file);
}
} else {
if (large_wallpaper_image) {
default_wallpaper_image_.reset(
new user_manager::UserImage(*large_wallpaper_image));
default_wallpaper_image_->set_file_path(default_large_wallpaper_file);
}
}
if (need_update_screen)
DoSetDefaultWallpaper(EmptyAccountId(), MovableOnDestroyCallbackHolder());
}
Commit Message: [reland] Do not set default wallpaper unless it should do so.
TBR=bshe@chromium.org, alemate@chromium.org
Bug: 751382
Change-Id: Id0793dfe467f737526a95b1e66ed01fbb8860bda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/619754
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <xdai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Alekseev <alemate@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Biao She <bshe@chromium.org>
Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498325}
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/646430
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498982}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 1 | 171,970 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool CParaNdisTX::RestartQueue(bool DoKick)
{
TSpinLocker LockedContext(m_Lock);
auto res = ParaNdis_SynchronizeWithInterrupt(m_Context,
m_messageIndex,
CParaNdisTX::RestartQueueSynchronously,
this) ? true : false;
if(DoKick)
{
Kick();
}
return res;
}
Commit Message: NetKVM: BZ#1169718: Checking the length only on read
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <yhindin@rehat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 96,334 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void dns_resolve_send(struct dgram_conn *dgram)
{
struct dns_resolvers *resolvers;
struct dns_nameserver *ns;
struct dns_resolution *res;
int fd;
fd = dgram->t.sock.fd;
/* check if ready for sending */
if (!fd_send_ready(fd))
return;
/* we don't want/need to be waked up any more for sending */
fd_stop_send(fd);
/* no need to go further if we can't retrieve the nameserver */
if ((ns = dgram->owner) == NULL)
return;
resolvers = ns->resolvers;
HA_SPIN_LOCK(DNS_LOCK, &resolvers->lock);
list_for_each_entry(res, &resolvers->resolutions.curr, list) {
int ret, len;
if (res->nb_queries == resolvers->nb_nameservers)
continue;
len = dns_build_query(res->query_id, res->query_type,
resolvers->accepted_payload_size,
res->hostname_dn, res->hostname_dn_len,
trash.area, trash.size);
if (len == -1)
goto snd_error;
ret = send(fd, trash.area, len, 0);
if (ret != len)
goto snd_error;
ns->counters.sent++;
res->nb_queries++;
continue;
snd_error:
ns->counters.snd_error++;
res->nb_queries++;
}
HA_SPIN_UNLOCK(DNS_LOCK, &resolvers->lock);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 727 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nfs_reqs_to_commit(struct nfs_commit_info *cinfo)
{
return cinfo->mds->ncommit;
}
Commit Message: nfs: always make sure page is up-to-date before extending a write to cover the entire page
We should always make sure the cached page is up-to-date when we're
determining whether we can extend a write to cover the full page -- even
if we've received a write delegation from the server.
Commit c7559663 added logic to skip this check if we have a write
delegation, which can lead to data corruption such as the following
scenario if client B receives a write delegation from the NFS server:
Client A:
# echo 123456789 > /mnt/file
Client B:
# echo abcdefghi >> /mnt/file
# cat /mnt/file
0�D0�abcdefghi
Just because we hold a write delegation doesn't mean that we've read in
the entire page contents.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.11+
Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 39,187 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct crypto_template *crypto_lookup_template(const char *name)
{
return try_then_request_module(__crypto_lookup_template(name), "%s",
name);
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 1 | 166,771 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void tg3_full_unlock(struct tg3 *tp)
{
spin_unlock_bh(&tp->lock);
}
Commit Message: tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <oded@privatecore.com>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matt Carlson <mcarlson@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 32,540 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ecryptfs_process_key_cipher(struct crypto_blkcipher **key_tfm,
char *cipher_name, size_t *key_size)
{
char dummy_key[ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEY_BYTES];
char *full_alg_name = NULL;
int rc;
*key_tfm = NULL;
if (*key_size > ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEY_BYTES) {
rc = -EINVAL;
printk(KERN_ERR "Requested key size is [%zd] bytes; maximum "
"allowable is [%d]\n", *key_size, ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEY_BYTES);
goto out;
}
rc = ecryptfs_crypto_api_algify_cipher_name(&full_alg_name, cipher_name,
"ecb");
if (rc)
goto out;
*key_tfm = crypto_alloc_blkcipher(full_alg_name, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
if (IS_ERR(*key_tfm)) {
rc = PTR_ERR(*key_tfm);
printk(KERN_ERR "Unable to allocate crypto cipher with name "
"[%s]; rc = [%d]\n", full_alg_name, rc);
goto out;
}
crypto_blkcipher_set_flags(*key_tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_WEAK_KEY);
if (*key_size == 0) {
struct blkcipher_alg *alg = crypto_blkcipher_alg(*key_tfm);
*key_size = alg->max_keysize;
}
get_random_bytes(dummy_key, *key_size);
rc = crypto_blkcipher_setkey(*key_tfm, dummy_key, *key_size);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "Error attempting to set key of size [%zd] for "
"cipher [%s]; rc = [%d]\n", *key_size, full_alg_name,
rc);
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
out:
kfree(full_alg_name);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: eCryptfs: Remove buggy and unnecessary write in file name decode routine
Dmitry Chernenkov used KASAN to discover that eCryptfs writes past the
end of the allocated buffer during encrypted filename decoding. This
fix corrects the issue by getting rid of the unnecessary 0 write when
the current bit offset is 2.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v2.6.29+: 51ca58d eCryptfs: Filename Encryption: Encoding and encryption functions
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 45,430 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool BinaryUploadService::ShouldBlockFileSize(size_t file_size) {
int block_large_file_transfer = g_browser_process->local_state()->GetInteger(
prefs::kBlockLargeFileTransfer);
if (block_large_file_transfer !=
BlockLargeFileTransferValues::BLOCK_LARGE_DOWNLOADS &&
block_large_file_transfer !=
BlockLargeFileTransferValues::BLOCK_LARGE_UPLOADS_AND_DOWNLOADS)
return false;
return (file_size > kMaxUploadSizeBytes);
}
Commit Message: Migrate download_protection code to new DM token class.
Migrates RetrieveDMToken calls to use the new BrowserDMToken class.
Bug: 1020296
Change-Id: Icef580e243430d73b6c1c42b273a8540277481d9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1904234
Commit-Queue: Dominique Fauteux-Chapleau <domfc@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tien Mai <tienmai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Rubery <drubery@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#714196}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 136,683 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cdf_read_short_sector(const cdf_stream_t *sst, void *buf, size_t offs,
size_t len, const cdf_header_t *h, cdf_secid_t id)
{
assert((size_t)CDF_SHORT_SEC_SIZE(h) == len);
(void)memcpy(((char *)buf) + offs,
((const char *)sst->sst_tab) + CDF_SHORT_SEC_POS(h, id), len);
return len;
}
Commit Message: add more check found by cert's fuzzer.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 169,884 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: IW_IMPL(void) iw_make_linear_csdescr(struct iw_csdescr *cs)
{
cs->cstype = IW_CSTYPE_LINEAR;
cs->gamma = 0.0;
cs->srgb_intent = 0;
}
Commit Message: Double-check that the input image's density is valid
Fixes a bug that could result in division by zero, at least for a JPEG
source image.
Fixes issues #19, #20
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 64,976 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ext4_file_open(struct inode * inode, struct file * filp)
{
struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb);
struct vfsmount *mnt = filp->f_path.mnt;
struct path path;
char buf[64], *cp;
if (unlikely(!(sbi->s_mount_flags & EXT4_MF_MNTDIR_SAMPLED) &&
!(sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY))) {
sbi->s_mount_flags |= EXT4_MF_MNTDIR_SAMPLED;
/*
* Sample where the filesystem has been mounted and
* store it in the superblock for sysadmin convenience
* when trying to sort through large numbers of block
* devices or filesystem images.
*/
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
path.mnt = mnt;
path.dentry = mnt->mnt_root;
cp = d_path(&path, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (!IS_ERR(cp)) {
handle_t *handle;
int err;
handle = ext4_journal_start_sb(sb, EXT4_HT_MISC, 1);
if (IS_ERR(handle))
return PTR_ERR(handle);
err = ext4_journal_get_write_access(handle, sbi->s_sbh);
if (err) {
ext4_journal_stop(handle);
return err;
}
strlcpy(sbi->s_es->s_last_mounted, cp,
sizeof(sbi->s_es->s_last_mounted));
ext4_handle_dirty_super(handle, sb);
ext4_journal_stop(handle);
}
}
/*
* Set up the jbd2_inode if we are opening the inode for
* writing and the journal is present
*/
if (filp->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
int ret = ext4_inode_attach_jinode(inode);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
}
return dquot_file_open(inode, filp);
}
Commit Message: ->splice_write() via ->write_iter()
iter_file_splice_write() - a ->splice_write() instance that gathers the
pipe buffers, builds a bio_vec-based iov_iter covering those and feeds
it to ->write_iter(). A bunch of simple cases coverted to that...
[AV: fixed the braino spotted by Cyrill]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 46,297 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLMediaElement::ContextDestroyed(ExecutionContext*) {
BLINK_MEDIA_LOG << "contextDestroyed(" << (void*)this << ")";
CancelPendingEventsAndCallbacks();
async_event_queue_->Close();
ClearMediaPlayer();
ready_state_ = kHaveNothing;
ready_state_maximum_ = kHaveNothing;
SetNetworkState(kNetworkEmpty);
SetShouldDelayLoadEvent(false);
current_source_node_ = nullptr;
official_playback_position_ = 0;
official_playback_position_needs_update_ = true;
GetCueTimeline().UpdateActiveCues(0);
playing_ = false;
paused_ = true;
seeking_ = false;
if (GetLayoutObject())
GetLayoutObject()->UpdateFromElement();
StopPeriodicTimers();
DCHECK(!HasPendingActivity());
}
Commit Message: defeat cors attacks on audio/video tags
Neutralize error messages and fire no progress events
until media metadata has been loaded for media loaded
from cross-origin locations.
Bug: 828265, 826187
Change-Id: Iaf15ef38676403687d6a913cbdc84f2d70a6f5c6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1015794
Reviewed-by: Mounir Lamouri <mlamouri@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dale Curtis <dalecurtis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#557312}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 154,110 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ofpact_hdrs_hash(const struct ofpact_hdrs *hdrs)
{
return hash_2words(hdrs->vendor, (hdrs->type << 16) | hdrs->ofp_version);
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 76,990 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void sf_markstate(struct ip_mc_list *pmc)
{
struct ip_sf_list *psf;
int mca_xcount = pmc->sfcount[MCAST_EXCLUDE];
for (psf=pmc->sources; psf; psf=psf->sf_next)
if (pmc->sfcount[MCAST_EXCLUDE]) {
psf->sf_oldin = mca_xcount ==
psf->sf_count[MCAST_EXCLUDE] &&
!psf->sf_count[MCAST_INCLUDE];
} else
psf->sf_oldin = psf->sf_count[MCAST_INCLUDE] != 0;
}
Commit Message: igmp: Avoid zero delay when receiving odd mixture of IGMP queries
Commit 5b7c84066733c5dfb0e4016d939757b38de189e4 ('ipv4: correct IGMP
behavior on v3 query during v2-compatibility mode') added yet another
case for query parsing, which can result in max_delay = 0. Substitute
a value of 1, as in the usual v3 case.
Reported-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@debian.org>
References: http://bugs.debian.org/654876
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 21,653 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: partition_table_create_data_ref (CreatePartitionTableData *data)
{
data->refcount++;
return data;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 11,800 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ffs_user_copy_worker(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct ffs_io_data *io_data = container_of(work, struct ffs_io_data,
work);
int ret = io_data->req->status ? io_data->req->status :
io_data->req->actual;
if (io_data->read && ret > 0) {
use_mm(io_data->mm);
ret = copy_to_iter(io_data->buf, ret, &io_data->data);
if (iov_iter_count(&io_data->data))
ret = -EFAULT;
unuse_mm(io_data->mm);
}
io_data->kiocb->ki_complete(io_data->kiocb, ret, ret);
if (io_data->ffs->ffs_eventfd &&
!(io_data->kiocb->ki_flags & IOCB_EVENTFD))
eventfd_signal(io_data->ffs->ffs_eventfd, 1);
usb_ep_free_request(io_data->ep, io_data->req);
io_data->kiocb->private = NULL;
if (io_data->read)
kfree(io_data->to_free);
kfree(io_data->buf);
kfree(io_data);
}
Commit Message: usb: gadget: f_fs: Fix use-after-free
When using asynchronous read or write operations on the USB endpoints the
issuer of the IO request is notified by calling the ki_complete() callback
of the submitted kiocb when the URB has been completed.
Calling this ki_complete() callback will free kiocb. Make sure that the
structure is no longer accessed beyond that point, otherwise undefined
behaviour might occur.
Fixes: 2e4c7553cd6f ("usb: gadget: f_fs: add aio support")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.15+
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 1 | 166,924 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t BufferQueueConsumer::attachBuffer(int* outSlot,
const sp<android::GraphicBuffer>& buffer) {
ATRACE_CALL();
if (outSlot == NULL) {
BQ_LOGE("attachBuffer(P): outSlot must not be NULL");
return BAD_VALUE;
} else if (buffer == NULL) {
BQ_LOGE("attachBuffer(P): cannot attach NULL buffer");
return BAD_VALUE;
}
Mutex::Autolock lock(mCore->mMutex);
int numAcquiredBuffers = 0;
int found = BufferQueueCore::INVALID_BUFFER_SLOT;
for (int s = 0; s < BufferQueueDefs::NUM_BUFFER_SLOTS; ++s) {
if (mSlots[s].mBufferState == BufferSlot::ACQUIRED) {
++numAcquiredBuffers;
} else if (mSlots[s].mBufferState == BufferSlot::FREE) {
if (found == BufferQueueCore::INVALID_BUFFER_SLOT ||
mSlots[s].mFrameNumber < mSlots[found].mFrameNumber) {
found = s;
}
}
}
if (numAcquiredBuffers >= mCore->mMaxAcquiredBufferCount + 1) {
BQ_LOGE("attachBuffer(P): max acquired buffer count reached: %d "
"(max %d)", numAcquiredBuffers,
mCore->mMaxAcquiredBufferCount);
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
if (found == BufferQueueCore::INVALID_BUFFER_SLOT) {
BQ_LOGE("attachBuffer(P): could not find free buffer slot");
return NO_MEMORY;
}
*outSlot = found;
ATRACE_BUFFER_INDEX(*outSlot);
BQ_LOGV("attachBuffer(C): returning slot %d", *outSlot);
mSlots[*outSlot].mGraphicBuffer = buffer;
mSlots[*outSlot].mBufferState = BufferSlot::ACQUIRED;
mSlots[*outSlot].mAttachedByConsumer = true;
mSlots[*outSlot].mNeedsCleanupOnRelease = false;
mSlots[*outSlot].mFence = Fence::NO_FENCE;
mSlots[*outSlot].mFrameNumber = 0;
mSlots[*outSlot].mAcquireCalled = false;
return NO_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: Add SN logging
Bug 27046057
Change-Id: Iede7c92e59e60795df1ec7768ebafd6b090f1c27
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 161,324 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: remove_from_menu(GArray *argv, guint context) {
GUI *g = &uzbl.gui;
MenuItem *mi;
gchar *name = NULL;
guint i=0;
if(!g->menu_items)
return;
if(!argv_idx(argv, 0))
return;
else
name = argv_idx(argv, 0);
for(i=0; i < g->menu_items->len; i++) {
mi = g_ptr_array_index(g->menu_items, i);
if((context == mi->context) && !strcmp(name, mi->name)) {
g_free(mi->name);
g_free(mi->cmd);
g_free(mi);
g_ptr_array_remove_index(g->menu_items, i);
}
}
}
Commit Message: disable Uzbl javascript object because of security problem.
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 18,386 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static u32 *ipv4_cow_metrics(struct dst_entry *dst, unsigned long old)
{
WARN_ON(1);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: ipv4: try to cache dst_entries which would cause a redirect
Not caching dst_entries which cause redirects could be exploited by hosts
on the same subnet, causing a severe DoS attack. This effect aggravated
since commit f88649721268999 ("ipv4: fix dst race in sk_dst_get()").
Lookups causing redirects will be allocated with DST_NOCACHE set which
will force dst_release to free them via RCU. Unfortunately waiting for
RCU grace period just takes too long, we can end up with >1M dst_entries
waiting to be released and the system will run OOM. rcuos threads cannot
catch up under high softirq load.
Attaching the flag to emit a redirect later on to the specific skb allows
us to cache those dst_entries thus reducing the pressure on allocation
and deallocation.
This issue was discovered by Marcelo Leitner.
Cc: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 44,339 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Ins_SPVTL( TT_ExecContext exc,
FT_Long* args )
{
if ( Ins_SxVTL( exc,
(FT_UShort)args[1],
(FT_UShort)args[0],
&exc->GS.projVector ) == SUCCESS )
{
exc->GS.dualVector = exc->GS.projVector;
Compute_Funcs( exc );
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 10,675 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual ~FwdTrans8x8TestBase() {}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 164,457 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool PermissionsData::HasEffectiveAccessToAllHosts() const {
return active_permissions()->HasEffectiveAccessToAllHosts();
}
Commit Message: Have the Debugger extension api check that it has access to the tab
Check PermissionsData::CanAccessTab() prior to attaching the debugger.
BUG=367567
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/352523003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@280354 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 120,653 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gsicc_set_device_blackptcomp(gx_device *dev, gsicc_blackptcomp_t blackptcomp,
gsicc_profile_types_t profile_type)
{
int code = 0;
cmm_dev_profile_t *profile_struct;
if (dev->procs.get_profile == NULL) {
profile_struct = dev->icc_struct;
} else {
code = dev_proc(dev, get_profile)(dev, &profile_struct);
}
if (profile_struct == NULL)
return 0;
profile_struct->rendercond[profile_type].black_point_comp = blackptcomp;
return code;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 13,994 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static BROTLI_INLINE uint32_t DecodeSymbol(uint32_t bits,
const HuffmanCode* table,
BrotliBitReader* br) {
table += bits & HUFFMAN_TABLE_MASK;
if (table->bits > HUFFMAN_TABLE_BITS) {
uint32_t nbits = table->bits - HUFFMAN_TABLE_BITS;
BrotliDropBits(br, HUFFMAN_TABLE_BITS);
table += table->value;
table += (bits >> HUFFMAN_TABLE_BITS) & BitMask(nbits);
}
BrotliDropBits(br, table->bits);
return table->value;
}
Commit Message: Cherry pick underflow fix.
BUG=583607
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1662313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373736}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,108 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: JSRetainPtr<JSStringRef> AccessibilityUIElement::attributesOfRowHeaders()
{
return JSStringCreateWithCharacters(0, 0);
}
Commit Message: [GTK][WTR] Implement AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=102951
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
Implement AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue in the ATK backend
in the same manner it is implemented in DumpRenderTree.
* WebKitTestRunner/InjectedBundle/atk/AccessibilityUIElementAtk.cpp:
(WTR::replaceCharactersForResults):
(WTR):
(WTR::AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@135485 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 106,331 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pdf_dict_getsa(fz_context *ctx, pdf_obj *obj, const char *key, const char *abbrev)
{
pdf_obj *v;
v = pdf_dict_gets(ctx, obj, key);
if (v)
return v;
return pdf_dict_gets(ctx, obj, abbrev);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 13,891 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int put_sigset_t(sigset_t __user *uset, sigset_t *set)
{
return copy_to_user(uset, set, sizeof(*uset));
}
Commit Message: powerpc/tm: Block signal return setting invalid MSR state
Currently we allow both the MSR T and S bits to be set by userspace on
a signal return. Unfortunately this is a reserved configuration and
will cause a TM Bad Thing exception if attempted (via rfid).
This patch checks for this case in both the 32 and 64 bit signals
code. If both T and S are set, we mark the context as invalid.
Found using a syscall fuzzer.
Fixes: 2b0a576d15e0 ("powerpc: Add new transactional memory state to the signal context")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.9+
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 56,478 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: v8::Handle<v8::Value> V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.WebGLRenderingContext.getParameter()");
if (args.Length() != 1)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
WebGLRenderingContext* context = V8WebGLRenderingContext::toNative(args.Holder());
unsigned pname = toInt32(args[0]);
WebGLGetInfo info = context->getParameter(pname, ec);
if (ec) {
V8Proxy::setDOMException(ec, args.GetIsolate());
return v8::Undefined();
}
return toV8Object(info, args.GetIsolate());
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 1 | 171,124 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void exclusive_event_destroy(struct perf_event *event)
{
struct pmu *pmu = event->pmu;
if (!(pmu->capabilities & PERF_PMU_CAP_EXCLUSIVE))
return;
/* see comment in exclusive_event_init() */
if (event->attach_state & PERF_ATTACH_TASK)
atomic_dec(&pmu->exclusive_cnt);
else
atomic_inc(&pmu->exclusive_cnt);
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix race in swevent hash
There's a race on CPU unplug where we free the swevent hash array
while it can still have events on. This will result in a
use-after-free which is BAD.
Simply do not free the hash array on unplug. This leaves the thing
around and no use-after-free takes place.
When the last swevent dies, we do a for_each_possible_cpu() iteration
anyway to clean these up, at which time we'll free it, so no leakage
will occur.
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 56,044 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void put_numa_group(struct numa_group *grp)
{
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&grp->refcount))
kfree_rcu(grp, rcu);
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 92,640 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: intuit_diff_type (bool need_header, mode_t *p_file_type)
{
file_offset this_line = 0;
file_offset first_command_line = -1;
char first_ed_command_letter = 0;
lin fcl_line = 0; /* Pacify `gcc -W'. */
bool this_is_a_command = false;
bool stars_this_line = false;
bool git_diff = false;
bool extended_headers = false;
enum nametype i;
struct stat st[3];
int stat_errno[3];
int version_controlled[3];
enum diff retval;
mode_t file_type;
for (i = OLD; i <= INDEX; i++)
if (p_name[i]) {
free (p_name[i]);
p_name[i] = 0;
}
for (i = OLD; i <= NEW; i++)
if (p_timestr[i])
{
free(p_timestr[i]);
p_timestr[i] = 0;
}
for (i = OLD; i <= NEW; i++)
{
p_mode[i] = 0;
p_copy[i] = false;
p_rename[i] = false;
}
/* Ed and normal format patches don't have filename headers. */
if (diff_type == ED_DIFF || diff_type == NORMAL_DIFF)
need_header = false;
version_controlled[OLD] = -1;
version_controlled[NEW] = -1;
version_controlled[INDEX] = -1;
p_rfc934_nesting = 0;
p_timestamp[OLD].tv_sec = p_timestamp[NEW].tv_sec = -1;
p_says_nonexistent[OLD] = p_says_nonexistent[NEW] = 0;
Fseek (pfp, p_base, SEEK_SET);
p_input_line = p_bline - 1;
for (;;) {
char *s;
char *t;
file_offset previous_line = this_line;
bool last_line_was_command = this_is_a_command;
bool stars_last_line = stars_this_line;
size_t indent = 0;
char ed_command_letter;
bool strip_trailing_cr;
size_t chars_read;
this_line = file_tell (pfp);
chars_read = pget_line (0, 0, false, false);
if (chars_read == (size_t) -1)
xalloc_die ();
if (! chars_read) {
if (first_ed_command_letter) {
/* nothing but deletes!? */
p_start = first_command_line;
p_sline = fcl_line;
retval = ED_DIFF;
goto scan_exit;
}
else {
p_start = this_line;
p_sline = p_input_line;
if (extended_headers)
{
/* Patch contains no hunks; any diff type will do. */
retval = UNI_DIFF;
goto scan_exit;
}
return NO_DIFF;
}
}
strip_trailing_cr = 2 <= chars_read && buf[chars_read - 2] == '\r';
for (s = buf; *s == ' ' || *s == '\t' || *s == 'X'; s++) {
if (*s == '\t')
indent = (indent + 8) & ~7;
else
indent++;
}
if (ISDIGIT (*s))
{
for (t = s + 1; ISDIGIT (*t) || *t == ','; t++)
/* do nothing */ ;
if (*t == 'd' || *t == 'c' || *t == 'a')
{
for (t++; ISDIGIT (*t) || *t == ','; t++)
/* do nothing */ ;
for (; *t == ' ' || *t == '\t'; t++)
/* do nothing */ ;
if (*t == '\r')
t++;
this_is_a_command = (*t == '\n');
}
}
if (! need_header
&& first_command_line < 0
&& ((ed_command_letter = get_ed_command_letter (s))
|| this_is_a_command)) {
first_command_line = this_line;
first_ed_command_letter = ed_command_letter;
fcl_line = p_input_line;
p_indent = indent; /* assume this for now */
p_strip_trailing_cr = strip_trailing_cr;
}
if (!stars_last_line && strnEQ(s, "*** ", 4))
{
fetchname (s+4, strippath, git_diff, &p_name[OLD], &p_timestr[OLD],
&p_timestamp[OLD]);
need_header = false;
}
else if (strnEQ(s, "+++ ", 4))
{
/* Swap with NEW below. */
fetchname (s+4, strippath, git_diff, &p_name[OLD], &p_timestr[OLD],
&p_timestamp[OLD]);
need_header = false;
p_strip_trailing_cr = strip_trailing_cr;
}
else if (strnEQ(s, "Index:", 6))
{
fetchname (s+6, strippath, git_diff, &p_name[INDEX], (char **) 0, NULL);
need_header = false;
p_strip_trailing_cr = strip_trailing_cr;
}
else if (strnEQ(s, "Prereq:", 7))
{
for (t = s + 7; ISSPACE ((unsigned char) *t); t++)
/* do nothing */ ;
revision = t;
for (t = revision; *t; t++)
if (ISSPACE ((unsigned char) *t))
{
char const *u;
for (u = t + 1; ISSPACE ((unsigned char) *u); u++)
/* do nothing */ ;
if (*u)
{
char numbuf[LINENUM_LENGTH_BOUND + 1];
say ("Prereq: with multiple words at line %s of patch\n",
format_linenum (numbuf, this_line));
}
break;
}
if (t == revision)
revision = 0;
else {
char oldc = *t;
*t = '\0';
revision = savestr (revision);
*t = oldc;
}
}
else if (strnEQ (s, "diff --git ", 11))
{
char const *u;
if (extended_headers)
{
p_start = this_line;
p_sline = p_input_line;
/* Patch contains no hunks; any diff type will do. */
retval = UNI_DIFF;
goto scan_exit;
}
for (i = OLD; i <= NEW; i++)
{
free (p_name[i]);
p_name[i] = 0;
}
if (! ((p_name[OLD] = parse_name (s + 11, strippath, &u))
&& ISSPACE ((unsigned char) *u)
&& (p_name[NEW] = parse_name (u, strippath, &u))
&& (u = skip_spaces (u), ! *u)))
for (i = OLD; i <= NEW; i++)
{
free (p_name[i]);
p_name[i] = 0;
}
git_diff = true;
}
else if (git_diff && strnEQ (s, "index ", 6))
{
char const *u, *v;
if ((u = skip_hex_digits (s + 6))
&& u[0] == '.' && u[1] == '.'
&& (v = skip_hex_digits (u + 2))
&& (! *v || ISSPACE ((unsigned char) *v)))
{
p_says_nonexistent[OLD] = sha1_says_nonexistent (s + 6, u);
p_says_nonexistent[NEW] = sha1_says_nonexistent (u + 2, v);
if (*(v = skip_spaces (v)))
p_mode[OLD] = p_mode[NEW] = fetchmode (v);
extended_headers = true;
}
}
else if (git_diff && strnEQ (s, "old mode ", 9))
{
p_mode[OLD] = fetchmode (s + 9);
extended_headers = true;
}
else if (git_diff && strnEQ (s, "new mode ", 9))
{
p_mode[NEW] = fetchmode (s + 9);
extended_headers = true;
}
else if (git_diff && strnEQ (s, "deleted file mode ", 18))
{
p_mode[OLD] = fetchmode (s + 18);
p_says_nonexistent[NEW] = 2;
extended_headers = true;
}
else if (git_diff && strnEQ (s, "new file mode ", 14))
{
p_mode[NEW] = fetchmode (s + 14);
p_says_nonexistent[OLD] = 2;
extended_headers = true;
}
else if (git_diff && strnEQ (s, "rename from ", 12))
{
/* Git leaves out the prefix in the file name in this header,
so we can only ignore the file name. */
p_rename[OLD] = true;
extended_headers = true;
}
else if (git_diff && strnEQ (s, "rename to ", 10))
{
/* Git leaves out the prefix in the file name in this header,
so we can only ignore the file name. */
p_rename[NEW] = true;
extended_headers = true;
}
else if (git_diff && strnEQ (s, "copy from ", 10))
{
/* Git leaves out the prefix in the file name in this header,
so we can only ignore the file name. */
p_copy[OLD] = true;
extended_headers = true;
}
else if (git_diff && strnEQ (s, "copy to ", 8))
{
/* Git leaves out the prefix in the file name in this header,
so we can only ignore the file name. */
p_copy[NEW] = true;
extended_headers = true;
}
else if (git_diff && strnEQ (s, "GIT binary patch", 16))
{
p_start = this_line;
p_sline = p_input_line;
retval = GIT_BINARY_DIFF;
goto scan_exit;
}
else
{
for (t = s; t[0] == '-' && t[1] == ' '; t += 2)
/* do nothing */ ;
if (strnEQ(t, "--- ", 4))
{
struct timespec timestamp;
timestamp.tv_sec = -1;
fetchname (t+4, strippath, git_diff, &p_name[NEW], &p_timestr[NEW],
×tamp);
need_header = false;
if (timestamp.tv_sec != -1)
{
p_timestamp[NEW] = timestamp;
p_rfc934_nesting = (t - s) >> 1;
}
p_strip_trailing_cr = strip_trailing_cr;
}
}
if (need_header)
continue;
if ((diff_type == NO_DIFF || diff_type == ED_DIFF) &&
first_command_line >= 0 &&
strEQ(s, ".\n") ) {
p_start = first_command_line;
p_sline = fcl_line;
retval = ED_DIFF;
goto scan_exit;
}
if ((diff_type == NO_DIFF || diff_type == UNI_DIFF)
&& strnEQ(s, "@@ -", 4)) {
/* `p_name', `p_timestr', and `p_timestamp' are backwards;
swap them. */
struct timespec ti = p_timestamp[OLD];
p_timestamp[OLD] = p_timestamp[NEW];
p_timestamp[NEW] = ti;
t = p_name[OLD];
p_name[OLD] = p_name[NEW];
p_name[NEW] = t;
t = p_timestr[OLD];
p_timestr[OLD] = p_timestr[NEW];
p_timestr[NEW] = t;
s += 4;
if (s[0] == '0' && !ISDIGIT (s[1]))
p_says_nonexistent[OLD] = 1 + ! p_timestamp[OLD].tv_sec;
while (*s != ' ' && *s != '\n')
s++;
while (*s == ' ')
s++;
if (s[0] == '+' && s[1] == '0' && !ISDIGIT (s[2]))
p_says_nonexistent[NEW] = 1 + ! p_timestamp[NEW].tv_sec;
p_indent = indent;
p_start = this_line;
p_sline = p_input_line;
retval = UNI_DIFF;
if (! ((p_name[OLD] || ! p_timestamp[OLD].tv_sec)
&& (p_name[NEW] || ! p_timestamp[NEW].tv_sec))
&& ! p_name[INDEX] && need_header)
{
char numbuf[LINENUM_LENGTH_BOUND + 1];
say ("missing header for unified diff at line %s of patch\n",
format_linenum (numbuf, p_sline));
}
goto scan_exit;
}
stars_this_line = strnEQ(s, "********", 8);
if ((diff_type == NO_DIFF
|| diff_type == CONTEXT_DIFF
|| diff_type == NEW_CONTEXT_DIFF)
&& stars_last_line && strnEQ (s, "*** ", 4)) {
s += 4;
if (s[0] == '0' && !ISDIGIT (s[1]))
p_says_nonexistent[OLD] = 1 + ! p_timestamp[OLD].tv_sec;
/* if this is a new context diff the character just before */
/* the newline is a '*'. */
while (*s != '\n')
s++;
p_indent = indent;
p_strip_trailing_cr = strip_trailing_cr;
p_start = previous_line;
p_sline = p_input_line - 1;
retval = (*(s-1) == '*' ? NEW_CONTEXT_DIFF : CONTEXT_DIFF);
{
/* Scan the first hunk to see whether the file contents
appear to have been deleted. */
file_offset saved_p_base = p_base;
lin saved_p_bline = p_bline;
Fseek (pfp, previous_line, SEEK_SET);
p_input_line -= 2;
if (another_hunk (retval, false)
&& ! p_repl_lines && p_newfirst == 1)
p_says_nonexistent[NEW] = 1 + ! p_timestamp[NEW].tv_sec;
next_intuit_at (saved_p_base, saved_p_bline);
}
if (! ((p_name[OLD] || ! p_timestamp[OLD].tv_sec)
&& (p_name[NEW] || ! p_timestamp[NEW].tv_sec))
&& ! p_name[INDEX] && need_header)
{
char numbuf[LINENUM_LENGTH_BOUND + 1];
say ("missing header for context diff at line %s of patch\n",
format_linenum (numbuf, p_sline));
}
goto scan_exit;
}
if ((diff_type == NO_DIFF || diff_type == NORMAL_DIFF) &&
last_line_was_command &&
(strnEQ(s, "< ", 2) || strnEQ(s, "> ", 2)) ) {
p_start = previous_line;
p_sline = p_input_line - 1;
p_indent = indent;
retval = NORMAL_DIFF;
goto scan_exit;
}
}
scan_exit:
/* The old, new, or old and new file types may be defined. When both
file types are defined, make sure they are the same, or else assume
we do not know the file type. */
file_type = p_mode[OLD] & S_IFMT;
if (file_type)
{
mode_t new_file_type = p_mode[NEW] & S_IFMT;
if (new_file_type && file_type != new_file_type)
file_type = 0;
}
else
{
file_type = p_mode[NEW] & S_IFMT;
if (! file_type)
file_type = S_IFREG;
}
*p_file_type = file_type;
/* To intuit `inname', the name of the file to patch,
use the algorithm specified by POSIX 1003.1-2001 XCU lines 25680-26599
(with some modifications if posixly_correct is zero):
- Take the old and new names from the context header if present,
and take the index name from the `Index:' line if present and
if either the old and new names are both absent
or posixly_correct is nonzero.
Consider the file names to be in the order (old, new, index).
- If some named files exist, use the first one if posixly_correct
is nonzero, the best one otherwise.
- If patch_get is nonzero, and no named files exist,
but an RCS or SCCS master file exists,
use the first named file with an RCS or SCCS master.
- If no named files exist, no RCS or SCCS master was found,
some names are given, posixly_correct is zero,
and the patch appears to create a file, then use the best name
requiring the creation of the fewest directories.
- Otherwise, report failure by setting `inname' to 0;
this causes our invoker to ask the user for a file name. */
i = NONE;
if (!inname)
{
enum nametype i0 = NONE;
if (! posixly_correct && (p_name[OLD] || p_name[NEW]) && p_name[INDEX])
{
free (p_name[INDEX]);
p_name[INDEX] = 0;
}
for (i = OLD; i <= INDEX; i++)
if (p_name[i])
{
if (i0 != NONE && strcmp (p_name[i0], p_name[i]) == 0)
{
/* It's the same name as before; reuse stat results. */
stat_errno[i] = stat_errno[i0];
if (! stat_errno[i])
st[i] = st[i0];
}
else if (lstat (p_name[i], &st[i]) != 0)
stat_errno[i] = errno;
else
{
stat_errno[i] = 0;
if (posixly_correct)
break;
}
i0 = i;
}
if (! posixly_correct)
{
/* The best of all existing files. */
i = best_name (p_name, stat_errno);
if (i == NONE && patch_get)
{
enum nametype nope = NONE;
for (i = OLD; i <= INDEX; i++)
if (p_name[i])
{
char const *cs;
char *getbuf;
char *diffbuf;
bool readonly = (outfile
&& strcmp (outfile, p_name[i]) != 0);
if (nope == NONE || strcmp (p_name[nope], p_name[i]) != 0)
{
cs = (version_controller
(p_name[i], readonly, (struct stat *) 0,
&getbuf, &diffbuf));
version_controlled[i] = !! cs;
if (cs)
{
if (version_get (p_name[i], cs, false, readonly,
getbuf, &st[i]))
stat_errno[i] = 0;
else
version_controlled[i] = 0;
free (getbuf);
if (diffbuf)
free (diffbuf);
if (! stat_errno[i])
break;
}
}
nope = i;
}
}
if (i0 != NONE
&& (i == NONE || (st[i].st_mode & S_IFMT) == file_type)
&& maybe_reverse (p_name[i == NONE ? i0 : i], i == NONE,
i == NONE || st[i].st_size == 0)
&& i == NONE)
i = i0;
if (i == NONE && p_says_nonexistent[reverse])
{
int newdirs[3];
int newdirs_min = INT_MAX;
int distance_from_minimum[3];
for (i = OLD; i <= INDEX; i++)
if (p_name[i])
{
newdirs[i] = (prefix_components (p_name[i], false)
- prefix_components (p_name[i], true));
if (newdirs[i] < newdirs_min)
newdirs_min = newdirs[i];
}
for (i = OLD; i <= INDEX; i++)
if (p_name[i])
distance_from_minimum[i] = newdirs[i] - newdirs_min;
/* The best of the filenames which create the fewest directories. */
i = best_name (p_name, distance_from_minimum);
}
}
}
if (i == NONE)
{
if (inname)
{
inerrno = lstat (inname, &instat) == 0 ? 0 : errno;
if (inerrno || (instat.st_mode & S_IFMT) == file_type)
maybe_reverse (inname, inerrno, inerrno || instat.st_size == 0);
}
else
inerrno = -1;
}
else
{
inname = savestr(p_name[i]);
inerrno = stat_errno[i];
invc = version_controlled[i];
instat = st[i];
}
return retval;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 5,624 |
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