instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFlexibleBox::freezeViolations(const Vector<Violation>& violations, LayoutUnit& availableFreeSpace, double& totalFlexGrow, double& totalWeightedFlexShrink, InflexibleFlexItemSize& inflexibleItems, bool hasInfiniteLineLength)
{
for (size_t i = 0; i < violations.size(); ++i) {
RenderBox* child = violations[i].child;
LayoutUnit childSize = violations[i].childSize;
LayoutUnit preferredChildSize = preferredMainAxisContentExtentForChild(child, hasInfiniteLineLength);
availableFreeSpace -= childSize - preferredChildSize;
totalFlexGrow -= child->style()->flexGrow();
totalWeightedFlexShrink -= child->style()->flexShrink() * preferredChildSize;
inflexibleItems.set(child, childSize);
}
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 116,673 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PersistentHistogramAllocator::Iterator::GetNextWithIgnore(Reference ignore) {
PersistentMemoryAllocator::Reference ref;
while ((ref = memory_iter_.GetNextOfType<PersistentHistogramData>()) != 0) {
if (ref != ignore)
return allocator_->GetHistogram(ref);
}
return nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Remove UMA.CreatePersistentHistogram.Result
This histogram isn't showing anything meaningful and the problems it
could show are better observed by looking at the allocators directly.
Bug: 831013
Change-Id: Ibe968597758230192e53a7675e7390e968c9e5b9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1008047
Commit-Queue: Brian White <bcwhite@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexei Svitkine <asvitkine@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#549986}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 131,119 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int jpc_dec_parseopts(char *optstr, jpc_dec_importopts_t *opts)
{
jas_tvparser_t *tvp;
opts->debug = 0;
opts->maxlyrs = JPC_MAXLYRS;
opts->maxpkts = -1;
if (!(tvp = jas_tvparser_create(optstr ? optstr : ""))) {
return -1;
}
while (!jas_tvparser_next(tvp)) {
switch (jas_taginfo_nonull(jas_taginfos_lookup(decopts,
jas_tvparser_gettag(tvp)))->id) {
case OPT_MAXLYRS:
opts->maxlyrs = atoi(jas_tvparser_getval(tvp));
break;
case OPT_DEBUG:
opts->debug = atoi(jas_tvparser_getval(tvp));
break;
case OPT_MAXPKTS:
opts->maxpkts = atoi(jas_tvparser_getval(tvp));
break;
default:
jas_eprintf("warning: ignoring invalid option %s\n",
jas_tvparser_gettag(tvp));
break;
}
}
jas_tvparser_destroy(tvp);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed an integral type promotion problem by adding a JAS_CAST.
Modified the jpc_tsfb_synthesize function so that it will be a noop for
an empty sequence (in order to avoid dereferencing a null pointer).
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 70,424 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void raw_sock_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, struct sock *sp, int i)
{
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sp);
__be32 dest = inet->inet_daddr,
src = inet->inet_rcv_saddr;
__u16 destp = 0,
srcp = inet->inet_num;
seq_printf(seq, "%4d: %08X:%04X %08X:%04X"
" %02X %08X:%08X %02X:%08lX %08X %5u %8d %lu %d %pK %d\n",
i, src, srcp, dest, destp, sp->sk_state,
sk_wmem_alloc_get(sp),
sk_rmem_alloc_get(sp),
0, 0L, 0,
from_kuid_munged(seq_user_ns(seq), sock_i_uid(sp)),
0, sock_i_ino(sp),
refcount_read(&sp->sk_refcnt), sp, atomic_read(&sp->sk_drops));
}
Commit Message: net: ipv4: fix for a race condition in raw_sendmsg
inet->hdrincl is racy, and could lead to uninitialized stack pointer
usage, so its value should be read only once.
Fixes: c008ba5bdc9f ("ipv4: Avoid reading user iov twice after raw_probe_proto_opt")
Signed-off-by: Mohamed Ghannam <simo.ghannam@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 59,216 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline String CanonicalizedTitle(Document* document,
const String& title) {
unsigned length = title.length();
unsigned builder_index = 0;
const CharacterType* characters = title.GetCharacters<CharacterType>();
StringBuffer<CharacterType> buffer(length);
bool pending_whitespace = false;
for (unsigned i = 0; i < length; ++i) {
UChar32 c = characters[i];
if ((c <= WTF::Unicode::kSpaceCharacter &&
c != WTF::Unicode::kLineTabulationCharacter) ||
c == WTF::Unicode::kDeleteCharacter) {
if (builder_index != 0)
pending_whitespace = true;
} else {
if (pending_whitespace) {
buffer[builder_index++] = ' ';
pending_whitespace = false;
}
buffer[builder_index++] = c;
}
}
buffer.Shrink(builder_index);
return String::Adopt(buffer);
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 134,035 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int wc_ecc_shared_secret_ex(ecc_key* private_key, ecc_point* point,
byte* out, word32 *outlen)
{
int err;
if (private_key == NULL || point == NULL || out == NULL ||
outlen == NULL) {
return BAD_FUNC_ARG;
}
/* type valid? */
if (private_key->type != ECC_PRIVATEKEY &&
private_key->type != ECC_PRIVATEKEY_ONLY) {
return ECC_BAD_ARG_E;
}
/* Verify domain params supplied */
if (wc_ecc_is_valid_idx(private_key->idx) == 0)
return ECC_BAD_ARG_E;
switch(private_key->state) {
case ECC_STATE_NONE:
case ECC_STATE_SHARED_SEC_GEN:
private_key->state = ECC_STATE_SHARED_SEC_GEN;
err = wc_ecc_shared_secret_gen(private_key, point, out, outlen);
if (err < 0) {
break;
}
FALL_THROUGH;
case ECC_STATE_SHARED_SEC_RES:
private_key->state = ECC_STATE_SHARED_SEC_RES;
#if defined(WOLFSSL_ASYNC_CRYPT) && defined(WC_ASYNC_ENABLE_ECC)
if (private_key->asyncDev.marker == WOLFSSL_ASYNC_MARKER_ECC) {
#ifdef HAVE_CAVIUM_V
/* verify the curve is supported by hardware */
if (NitroxEccIsCurveSupported(private_key)) {
/* copy output */
*outlen = private_key->dp->size;
XMEMCPY(out, private_key->e->raw.buf, *outlen);
}
#endif /* HAVE_CAVIUM_V */
}
#endif /* WOLFSSL_ASYNC_CRYPT */
err = 0;
break;
default:
err = BAD_STATE_E;
} /* switch */
/* if async pending then return and skip done cleanup below */
if (err == WC_PENDING_E) {
private_key->state++;
return err;
}
/* cleanup */
#ifdef WOLFSSL_ASYNC_CRYPT
wc_ecc_free_async(private_key);
#endif
private_key->state = ECC_STATE_NONE;
return err;
}
Commit Message: Change ECDSA signing to use blinding.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 81,922 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err mdat_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
GF_MediaDataBox *p;
const char *name = (a->type==GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_IDAT ? "ItemDataBox" : "MediaDataBox");
p = (GF_MediaDataBox *)a;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, name, trace);
fprintf(trace, "dataSize=\""LLD"\">\n", LLD_CAST p->dataSize);
gf_isom_box_dump_done(name, a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,787 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ssl_read( ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len )
{
int ret;
size_t n;
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> read" ) );
if( ssl->state != SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER )
{
if( ( ret = ssl_handshake( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_handshake", ret );
return( ret );
}
}
if( ssl->in_offt == NULL )
{
if( ( ret = ssl_read_record( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
if( ret == POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF )
return( 0 );
SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_read_record", ret );
return( ret );
}
if( ssl->in_msglen == 0 &&
ssl->in_msgtype == SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA )
{
/*
* OpenSSL sends empty messages to randomize the IV
*/
if( ( ret = ssl_read_record( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
if( ret == POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF )
return( 0 );
SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_read_record", ret );
return( ret );
}
}
if( ssl->in_msgtype == SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE )
{
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "received handshake message" ) );
if( ssl->endpoint == SSL_IS_CLIENT &&
( ssl->in_msg[0] != SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST ||
ssl->in_hslen != 4 ) )
{
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "handshake received (not HelloRequest)" ) );
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
}
if( ssl->disable_renegotiation == SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED ||
( ssl->secure_renegotiation == SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION &&
ssl->allow_legacy_renegotiation == SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION ) )
{
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ignoring renegotiation, sending alert" ) );
if( ssl->minor_ver == SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 )
{
/*
* SSLv3 does not have a "no_renegotiation" alert
*/
if( ( ret = ssl_send_fatal_handshake_failure( ssl ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
}
else
{
if( ( ret = ssl_send_alert_message( ssl,
SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING,
SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_RENEGOTIATION ) ) != 0 )
{
return( ret );
}
}
}
else
{
if( ( ret = ssl_renegotiate( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_renegotiate", ret );
return( ret );
}
return( POLARSSL_ERR_NET_WANT_READ );
}
}
else if( ssl->in_msgtype != SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA )
{
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad application data message" ) );
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
}
ssl->in_offt = ssl->in_msg;
}
n = ( len < ssl->in_msglen )
? len : ssl->in_msglen;
memcpy( buf, ssl->in_offt, n );
ssl->in_msglen -= n;
if( ssl->in_msglen == 0 )
/* all bytes consumed */
ssl->in_offt = NULL;
else
/* more data available */
ssl->in_offt += n;
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= read" ) );
return( (int) n );
}
Commit Message: ssl_parse_certificate() now calls x509parse_crt_der() directly
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 29,015 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GURL GetFileUrlWithQuery(const base::FilePath& path,
const std::string& query_string) {
GURL url = net::FilePathToFileURL(path);
if (!query_string.empty()) {
GURL::Replacements replacements;
replacements.SetQueryStr(query_string);
return url.ReplaceComponents(replacements);
}
return url;
}
Commit Message: Apply ExtensionNavigationThrottle filesystem/blob checks to all frames.
BUG=836858
Change-Id: I34333a72501129fd40b5a9aa6378c9f35f1e7fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1028511
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nick Carter <nick@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553867}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 156,073 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: is_read_comp_null (gnutls_session_t session)
{
if (session->security_parameters.read_compression_algorithm ==
GNUTLS_COMP_NULL)
return 0;
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 12,104 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool WebPluginDelegateProxy::OnMessageReceived(const IPC::Message& msg) {
content::GetContentClient()->SetActiveURL(page_url_);
bool handled = true;
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP(WebPluginDelegateProxy, msg)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PluginHostMsg_SetWindow, OnSetWindow)
#if defined(OS_WIN)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PluginHostMsg_SetWindowlessPumpEvent,
OnSetWindowlessPumpEvent)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PluginHostMsg_NotifyIMEStatus,
OnNotifyIMEStatus)
#endif
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PluginHostMsg_CancelResource, OnCancelResource)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PluginHostMsg_InvalidateRect, OnInvalidateRect)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PluginHostMsg_GetWindowScriptNPObject,
OnGetWindowScriptNPObject)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PluginHostMsg_GetPluginElement,
OnGetPluginElement)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PluginHostMsg_ResolveProxy, OnResolveProxy)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PluginHostMsg_SetCookie, OnSetCookie)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PluginHostMsg_GetCookies, OnGetCookies)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PluginHostMsg_URLRequest, OnHandleURLRequest)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PluginHostMsg_CancelDocumentLoad, OnCancelDocumentLoad)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PluginHostMsg_InitiateHTTPRangeRequest,
OnInitiateHTTPRangeRequest)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PluginHostMsg_DeferResourceLoading,
OnDeferResourceLoading)
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PluginHostMsg_FocusChanged,
OnFocusChanged);
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PluginHostMsg_StartIme,
OnStartIme);
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PluginHostMsg_BindFakePluginWindowHandle,
OnBindFakePluginWindowHandle);
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PluginHostMsg_AcceleratedSurfaceSetIOSurface,
OnAcceleratedSurfaceSetIOSurface)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PluginHostMsg_AcceleratedSurfaceSetTransportDIB,
OnAcceleratedSurfaceSetTransportDIB)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PluginHostMsg_AllocTransportDIB,
OnAcceleratedSurfaceAllocTransportDIB)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PluginHostMsg_FreeTransportDIB,
OnAcceleratedSurfaceFreeTransportDIB)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PluginHostMsg_AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped,
OnAcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PluginHostMsg_AcceleratedPluginEnabledRendering,
OnAcceleratedPluginEnabledRendering)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PluginHostMsg_AcceleratedPluginAllocatedIOSurface,
OnAcceleratedPluginAllocatedIOSurface)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PluginHostMsg_AcceleratedPluginSwappedIOSurface,
OnAcceleratedPluginSwappedIOSurface)
#endif
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PluginHostMsg_URLRedirectResponse,
OnURLRedirectResponse)
IPC_MESSAGE_UNHANDLED(handled = false)
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP()
DCHECK(handled);
return handled;
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 107,142 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FactoryRegistry* FactoryRegistry::GetInstance() {
return Singleton<FactoryRegistry>::get();
}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 99,652 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GestureEventConsumeDelegate()
: tap_(false),
tap_down_(false),
tap_cancel_(false),
begin_(false),
end_(false),
scroll_begin_(false),
scroll_update_(false),
scroll_end_(false),
pinch_begin_(false),
pinch_update_(false),
pinch_end_(false),
long_press_(false),
fling_(false),
two_finger_tap_(false),
show_press_(false),
swipe_left_(false),
swipe_right_(false),
swipe_up_(false),
swipe_down_(false),
scroll_x_(0),
scroll_y_(0),
scroll_velocity_x_(0),
scroll_velocity_y_(0),
velocity_x_(0),
velocity_y_(0),
scroll_x_hint_(0),
scroll_y_hint_(0),
tap_count_(0),
flags_(0),
wait_until_event_(ui::ET_UNKNOWN) {}
Commit Message: Pass ui::LatencyInfo correct with unified gesture detector on Aura.
BUG=379812
TEST=GestureRecognizerTest.LatencyPassedFromTouchEvent
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/309823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@274602 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 112,071 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ZEND_API int add_property_double_ex(zval *arg, const char *key, uint key_len, double d TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
zval *tmp;
zval *z_key;
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(tmp);
ZVAL_DOUBLE(tmp, d);
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(z_key);
ZVAL_STRINGL(z_key, key, key_len-1, 1);
Z_OBJ_HANDLER_P(arg, write_property)(arg, z_key, tmp, 0 TSRMLS_CC);
zval_ptr_dtor(&tmp); /* write_property will add 1 to refcount */
zval_ptr_dtor(&z_key);
return SUCCESS;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 13,749 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: megasas_fire_cmd_ppc(struct megasas_instance *instance,
dma_addr_t frame_phys_addr,
u32 frame_count,
struct megasas_register_set __iomem *regs)
{
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&instance->hba_lock, flags);
writel((frame_phys_addr | (frame_count<<1))|1,
&(regs)->inbound_queue_port);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&instance->hba_lock, flags);
}
Commit Message: scsi: megaraid_sas: return error when create DMA pool failed
when create DMA pool for cmd frames failed, we should return -ENOMEM,
instead of 0.
In some case in:
megasas_init_adapter_fusion()
-->megasas_alloc_cmds()
-->megasas_create_frame_pool
create DMA pool failed,
--> megasas_free_cmds() [1]
-->megasas_alloc_cmds_fusion()
failed, then goto fail_alloc_cmds.
-->megasas_free_cmds() [2]
we will call megasas_free_cmds twice, [1] will kfree cmd_list,
[2] will use cmd_list.it will cause a problem:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address
00000000
pgd = ffffffc000f70000
[00000000] *pgd=0000001fbf893003, *pud=0000001fbf893003,
*pmd=0000001fbf894003, *pte=006000006d000707
Internal error: Oops: 96000005 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 18 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted
task: ffffffdfb9290000 ti: ffffffdfb923c000 task.ti: ffffffdfb923c000
PC is at megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
LR is at megasas_free_cmds+0x24/0x70
...
Call trace:
[<ffffffc0005b779c>] megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
[<ffffffc0005bca74>] megasas_init_adapter_fusion+0x2f4/0x4d8
[<ffffffc0005b926c>] megasas_init_fw+0x2dc/0x760
[<ffffffc0005b9ab0>] megasas_probe_one+0x3c0/0xcd8
[<ffffffc0004a5abc>] local_pci_probe+0x4c/0xb4
[<ffffffc0004a5c40>] pci_device_probe+0x11c/0x14c
[<ffffffc00053a5e4>] driver_probe_device+0x1ec/0x430
[<ffffffc00053a92c>] __driver_attach+0xa8/0xb0
[<ffffffc000538178>] bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xc8
[<ffffffc000539e88>] driver_attach+0x28/0x34
[<ffffffc000539a18>] bus_add_driver+0x16c/0x248
[<ffffffc00053b234>] driver_register+0x6c/0x138
[<ffffffc0004a5350>] __pci_register_driver+0x5c/0x6c
[<ffffffc000ce3868>] megasas_init+0xc0/0x1a8
[<ffffffc000082a58>] do_one_initcall+0xe8/0x1ec
[<ffffffc000ca7be8>] kernel_init_freeable+0x1c8/0x284
[<ffffffc0008d90b8>] kernel_init+0x1c/0xe4
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Sumit Saxena <sumit.saxena@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 90,334 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ext4_releasepage(struct page *page, gfp_t wait)
{
journal_t *journal = EXT4_JOURNAL(page->mapping->host);
trace_ext4_releasepage(page);
/* Page has dirty journalled data -> cannot release */
if (PageChecked(page))
return 0;
if (journal)
return jbd2_journal_try_to_free_buffers(journal, page, wait);
else
return try_to_free_buffers(page);
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching
Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized.
This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we
are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus
we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly
freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same
race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against
i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes.
Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and
grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions
removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We
cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction
start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over
the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various
workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault
could have created pages with stale mapping information.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 56,601 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: timeval_diff(struct timeval * tv0, struct timeval * tv1)
{
double time1, time2;
time1 = tv0->tv_sec + (tv0->tv_usec / 1000000.0);
time2 = tv1->tv_sec + (tv1->tv_usec / 1000000.0);
time1 = time1 - time2;
if (time1 < 0)
time1 = -time1;
return time1;
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 53,455 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: do_nologin(struct passwd *pw)
{
FILE *f = NULL;
char buf[1024], *nl, *def_nl = _PATH_NOLOGIN;
struct stat sb;
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
if (login_getcapbool(lc, "ignorenologin", 0) || pw->pw_uid == 0)
return;
nl = login_getcapstr(lc, "nologin", def_nl, def_nl);
#else
if (pw->pw_uid == 0)
return;
nl = def_nl;
#endif
if (stat(nl, &sb) == -1) {
if (nl != def_nl)
free(nl);
return;
}
/* /etc/nologin exists. Print its contents if we can and exit. */
logit("User %.100s not allowed because %s exists", pw->pw_name, nl);
if ((f = fopen(nl, "r")) != NULL) {
while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f))
fputs(buf, stderr);
fclose(f);
}
exit(254);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 14,392 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void virtio_gpu_ctrl_response_nodata(VirtIOGPU *g,
struct virtio_gpu_ctrl_command *cmd,
enum virtio_gpu_ctrl_type type)
{
struct virtio_gpu_ctrl_hdr resp;
memset(&resp, 0, sizeof(resp));
resp.type = type;
virtio_gpu_ctrl_response(g, cmd, &resp, sizeof(resp));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 6,237 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ipv6_recv_error(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, int len, int *addr_len)
{
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct sock_exterr_skb *serr;
struct sk_buff *skb;
DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_in6 *, sin, msg->msg_name);
struct {
struct sock_extended_err ee;
struct sockaddr_in6 offender;
} errhdr;
int err;
int copied;
err = -EAGAIN;
skb = sock_dequeue_err_skb(sk);
if (!skb)
goto out;
copied = skb->len;
if (copied > len) {
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
copied = len;
}
err = skb_copy_datagram_msg(skb, 0, msg, copied);
if (err)
goto out_free_skb;
sock_recv_timestamp(msg, sk, skb);
serr = SKB_EXT_ERR(skb);
if (sin && ipv6_datagram_support_addr(serr)) {
const unsigned char *nh = skb_network_header(skb);
sin->sin6_family = AF_INET6;
sin->sin6_flowinfo = 0;
sin->sin6_port = serr->port;
if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) {
const struct ipv6hdr *ip6h = container_of((struct in6_addr *)(nh + serr->addr_offset),
struct ipv6hdr, daddr);
sin->sin6_addr = ip6h->daddr;
if (np->sndflow)
sin->sin6_flowinfo = ip6_flowinfo(ip6h);
sin->sin6_scope_id =
ipv6_iface_scope_id(&sin->sin6_addr,
IP6CB(skb)->iif);
} else {
ipv6_addr_set_v4mapped(*(__be32 *)(nh + serr->addr_offset),
&sin->sin6_addr);
sin->sin6_scope_id = 0;
}
*addr_len = sizeof(*sin);
}
memcpy(&errhdr.ee, &serr->ee, sizeof(struct sock_extended_err));
sin = &errhdr.offender;
memset(sin, 0, sizeof(*sin));
if (ip6_datagram_support_cmsg(skb, serr)) {
sin->sin6_family = AF_INET6;
if (np->rxopt.all)
ip6_datagram_recv_common_ctl(sk, msg, skb);
if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) {
sin->sin6_addr = ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr;
if (np->rxopt.all)
ip6_datagram_recv_specific_ctl(sk, msg, skb);
sin->sin6_scope_id =
ipv6_iface_scope_id(&sin->sin6_addr,
IP6CB(skb)->iif);
} else {
ipv6_addr_set_v4mapped(ip_hdr(skb)->saddr,
&sin->sin6_addr);
if (inet_sk(sk)->cmsg_flags)
ip_cmsg_recv(msg, skb);
}
}
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IPV6, IPV6_RECVERR, sizeof(errhdr), &errhdr);
/* Now we could try to dump offended packet options */
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_ERRQUEUE;
err = copied;
out_free_skb:
kfree_skb(skb);
out:
return err;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: add complete rcu protection around np->opt
This patch addresses multiple problems :
UDP/RAW sendmsg() need to get a stable struct ipv6_txoptions
while socket is not locked : Other threads can change np->opt
concurrently. Dmitry posted a syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller) program desmonstrating
use-after-free.
Starting with TCP/DCCP lockless listeners, tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock()
and dccp_v6_request_recv_sock() also need to use RCU protection
to dereference np->opt once (before calling ipv6_dup_options())
This patch adds full RCU protection to np->opt
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 53,671 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FLAC__bool read_metadata_seektable_(FLAC__StreamDecoder *decoder, FLAC__bool is_last, unsigned length)
{
FLAC__uint32 i, x;
FLAC__uint64 xx;
FLAC__ASSERT(FLAC__bitreader_is_consumed_byte_aligned(decoder->private_->input));
decoder->private_->seek_table.type = FLAC__METADATA_TYPE_SEEKTABLE;
decoder->private_->seek_table.is_last = is_last;
decoder->private_->seek_table.length = length;
decoder->private_->seek_table.data.seek_table.num_points = length / FLAC__STREAM_METADATA_SEEKPOINT_LENGTH;
/* use realloc since we may pass through here several times (e.g. after seeking) */
if(0 == (decoder->private_->seek_table.data.seek_table.points = safe_realloc_mul_2op_(decoder->private_->seek_table.data.seek_table.points, decoder->private_->seek_table.data.seek_table.num_points, /*times*/sizeof(FLAC__StreamMetadata_SeekPoint)))) {
decoder->protected_->state = FLAC__STREAM_DECODER_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_ERROR;
return false;
}
for(i = 0; i < decoder->private_->seek_table.data.seek_table.num_points; i++) {
if(!FLAC__bitreader_read_raw_uint64(decoder->private_->input, &xx, FLAC__STREAM_METADATA_SEEKPOINT_SAMPLE_NUMBER_LEN))
return false; /* read_callback_ sets the state for us */
decoder->private_->seek_table.data.seek_table.points[i].sample_number = xx;
if(!FLAC__bitreader_read_raw_uint64(decoder->private_->input, &xx, FLAC__STREAM_METADATA_SEEKPOINT_STREAM_OFFSET_LEN))
return false; /* read_callback_ sets the state for us */
decoder->private_->seek_table.data.seek_table.points[i].stream_offset = xx;
if(!FLAC__bitreader_read_raw_uint32(decoder->private_->input, &x, FLAC__STREAM_METADATA_SEEKPOINT_FRAME_SAMPLES_LEN))
return false; /* read_callback_ sets the state for us */
decoder->private_->seek_table.data.seek_table.points[i].frame_samples = x;
}
length -= (decoder->private_->seek_table.data.seek_table.num_points * FLAC__STREAM_METADATA_SEEKPOINT_LENGTH);
/* if there is a partial point left, skip over it */
if(length > 0) {
/*@@@ do a send_error_to_client_() here? there's an argument for either way */
if(!FLAC__bitreader_skip_byte_block_aligned_no_crc(decoder->private_->input, length))
return false; /* read_callback_ sets the state for us */
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Avoid free-before-initialize vulnerability in heap
Bug: 27211885
Change-Id: Ib9c93bd9ffdde2a5f8d31a86f06e267dc9c152db
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 161,235 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int mixer_init(struct audio_device *adev)
{
int i;
int card;
int retry_num;
struct mixer *mixer;
struct audio_route *audio_route;
char mixer_path[PATH_MAX];
struct mixer_card *mixer_card;
struct listnode *node;
list_init(&adev->mixer_list);
for (i = 0; pcm_devices[i] != NULL; i++) {
card = pcm_devices[i]->card;
if (adev_get_mixer_for_card(adev, card) == NULL) {
retry_num = 0;
do {
mixer = mixer_open(card);
if (mixer == NULL) {
if (++retry_num > RETRY_NUMBER) {
ALOGE("%s unable to open the mixer for--card %d, aborting.",
__func__, card);
goto error;
}
usleep(RETRY_US);
}
} while (mixer == NULL);
sprintf(mixer_path, "/system/etc/mixer_paths_%d.xml", card);
audio_route = audio_route_init(card, mixer_path);
if (!audio_route) {
ALOGE("%s: Failed to init audio route controls for card %d, aborting.",
__func__, card);
goto error;
}
mixer_card = calloc(1, sizeof(struct mixer_card));
mixer_card->card = card;
mixer_card->mixer = mixer;
mixer_card->audio_route = audio_route;
list_add_tail(&adev->mixer_list, &mixer_card->adev_list_node);
}
}
return 0;
error:
free_mixer_list(adev);
return -ENODEV;
}
Commit Message: Fix audio record pre-processing
proc_buf_out consistently initialized.
intermediate scratch buffers consistently initialized.
prevent read failure from overwriting memory.
Test: POC, CTS, camera record
Bug: 62873231
Change-Id: Ie26e12a419a5819c1c5c3a0bcf1876d6d7aca686
(cherry picked from commit 6d7b330c27efba944817e647955da48e54fd74eb)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 162,304 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Reset() {
bounds_change_count_ = 0;
requested_bounds_.clear();
requested_display_ids_.clear();
}
Commit Message: Ignore updatePipBounds before initial bounds is set
When PIP enter/exit transition happens, window state change and
initial bounds change are committed in the same commit. However,
as state change is applied first in OnPreWidgetCommit and the
bounds is update later, if updatePipBounds is called between the
gap, it ends up returning a wrong bounds based on the previous
bounds.
Currently, there are two callstacks that end up triggering
updatePipBounds between the gap: (i) The state change causes
OnWindowAddedToLayout and updatePipBounds is called in OnWMEvent,
(ii) updatePipBounds is called in UpdatePipState to prevent it
from being placed under some system ui.
As it doesn't make sense to call updatePipBounds before the first
bounds is not set, this CL adds a boolean to defer updatePipBounds.
position.
Bug: b130782006
Test: Got VLC into PIP and confirmed it was placed at the correct
Change-Id: I5b9f3644bfb2533fd3f905bc09d49708a5d08a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1578719
Commit-Queue: Kazuki Takise <takise@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Kazuki Takise <takise@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mitsuru Oshima <oshima@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#668724}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 137,747 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ScriptProcessorHandler::Process(size_t frames_to_process) {
AudioBus* input_bus = Input(0).Bus();
AudioBus* output_bus = Output(0).Bus();
unsigned double_buffer_index = this->DoubleBufferIndex();
bool is_double_buffer_index_good =
double_buffer_index < 2 && double_buffer_index < input_buffers_.size() &&
double_buffer_index < output_buffers_.size();
DCHECK(is_double_buffer_index_good);
if (!is_double_buffer_index_good)
return;
AudioBuffer* input_buffer = input_buffers_[double_buffer_index].Get();
AudioBuffer* output_buffer = output_buffers_[double_buffer_index].Get();
unsigned number_of_input_channels = internal_input_bus_->NumberOfChannels();
bool buffers_are_good =
output_buffer && BufferSize() == output_buffer->length() &&
buffer_read_write_index_ + frames_to_process <= BufferSize();
if (internal_input_bus_->NumberOfChannels())
buffers_are_good = buffers_are_good && input_buffer &&
BufferSize() == input_buffer->length();
DCHECK(buffers_are_good);
if (!buffers_are_good)
return;
bool is_frames_to_process_good = frames_to_process &&
BufferSize() >= frames_to_process &&
!(BufferSize() % frames_to_process);
DCHECK(is_frames_to_process_good);
if (!is_frames_to_process_good)
return;
unsigned number_of_output_channels = output_bus->NumberOfChannels();
bool channels_are_good =
(number_of_input_channels == number_of_input_channels_) &&
(number_of_output_channels == number_of_output_channels_);
DCHECK(channels_are_good);
if (!channels_are_good)
return;
for (unsigned i = 0; i < number_of_input_channels; ++i)
internal_input_bus_->SetChannelMemory(
i,
input_buffer->getChannelData(i).View()->Data() +
buffer_read_write_index_,
frames_to_process);
if (number_of_input_channels)
internal_input_bus_->CopyFrom(*input_bus);
for (unsigned i = 0; i < number_of_output_channels; ++i) {
memcpy(output_bus->Channel(i)->MutableData(),
output_buffer->getChannelData(i).View()->Data() +
buffer_read_write_index_,
sizeof(float) * frames_to_process);
}
buffer_read_write_index_ =
(buffer_read_write_index_ + frames_to_process) % BufferSize();
if (!buffer_read_write_index_) {
MutexTryLocker try_locker(process_event_lock_);
if (!try_locker.Locked()) {
output_buffer->Zero();
} else if (Context()->GetExecutionContext()) {
if (Context()->HasRealtimeConstraint()) {
TaskRunnerHelper::Get(TaskType::kMediaElementEvent,
Context()->GetExecutionContext())
->PostTask(BLINK_FROM_HERE,
CrossThreadBind(
&ScriptProcessorHandler::FireProcessEvent,
CrossThreadUnretained(this), double_buffer_index_));
} else {
std::unique_ptr<WaitableEvent> waitable_event =
WTF::MakeUnique<WaitableEvent>();
TaskRunnerHelper::Get(TaskType::kMediaElementEvent,
Context()->GetExecutionContext())
->PostTask(BLINK_FROM_HERE,
CrossThreadBind(
&ScriptProcessorHandler::
FireProcessEventForOfflineAudioContext,
CrossThreadUnretained(this), double_buffer_index_,
CrossThreadUnretained(waitable_event.get())));
waitable_event->Wait();
}
}
SwapBuffers();
}
}
Commit Message: Keep ScriptProcessorHandler alive across threads
When posting a task from the ScriptProcessorHandler::Process to fire a
process event, we need to keep the handler alive in case the
ScriptProcessorNode goes away (because it has no onaudioprocess
handler) and removes the its handler.
Bug: 765495
Test:
Change-Id: Ib4fa39d7b112c7051897700a1eff9f59a4a7a054
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/677137
Reviewed-by: Hongchan Choi <hongchan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#503629}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 1 | 172,943 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool BlockEntry::EOS() const { return (GetKind() == kBlockEOS); }
Commit Message: Fix ParseElementHeader to support 0 payload elements
Cherry-pick'ing Change 5c83bbec9a5f6f00a349674ddad85b753d2ea219
from upstream. This fixes regression in some edge cases for mkv
playback.
BUG=26499283
Change-Id: I88de03219a3d941b6b2f251d384e29c36bdd4d9b
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 164,202 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: COMPS_RTree * comps_rtree_clone(COMPS_RTree *rt) {
COMPS_HSList *to_clone, *tmplist, *new_subnodes;
COMPS_RTree *ret;
COMPS_HSListItem *it, *it2;
COMPS_RTreeData *rtdata;
void *new_data;
if (!rt) return NULL;
to_clone = comps_hslist_create();
comps_hslist_init(to_clone, NULL, NULL, NULL);
ret = comps_rtree_create(rt->data_constructor, rt->data_cloner,
rt->data_destructor);
for (it = rt->subnodes->first; it != NULL; it = it->next) {
rtdata = comps_rtree_data_create(ret,
((COMPS_RTreeData*)it->data)->key, NULL);
if (((COMPS_RTreeData*)it->data)->data != NULL)
new_data = rt->data_cloner(((COMPS_RTreeData*)it->data)->data);
else
new_data = NULL;
comps_hslist_destroy(&rtdata->subnodes);
rtdata->subnodes = ((COMPS_RTreeData*)it->data)->subnodes;
rtdata->data = new_data;
comps_hslist_append(ret->subnodes, rtdata, 0);
comps_hslist_append(to_clone, rtdata, 0);
}
while (to_clone->first) {
it2 = to_clone->first;
tmplist = ((COMPS_RTreeData*)it2->data)->subnodes;
comps_hslist_remove(to_clone, to_clone->first);
new_subnodes = comps_hslist_create();
comps_hslist_init(new_subnodes, NULL, NULL, &comps_rtree_data_destroy_v);
for (it = tmplist->first; it != NULL; it = it->next) {
rtdata = comps_rtree_data_create(ret,
((COMPS_RTreeData*)it->data)->key, NULL);
if (((COMPS_RTreeData*)it->data)->data != NULL)
new_data = rt->data_cloner(((COMPS_RTreeData*)it->data)->data);
else
new_data = NULL;
comps_hslist_destroy(&rtdata->subnodes);
rtdata->subnodes = ((COMPS_RTreeData*)it->data)->subnodes;
rtdata->data = new_data;
comps_hslist_append(new_subnodes, rtdata, 0);
comps_hslist_append(to_clone, rtdata, 0);
}
((COMPS_RTreeData*)it2->data)->subnodes = new_subnodes;
free(it2);
}
comps_hslist_destroy(&to_clone);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix UAF in comps_objmrtree_unite function
The added field is not used at all in many places and it is probably the
left-over of some copy-paste.
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 91,816 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool WebGL2RenderingContextBase::ValidateBufferBaseTarget(
const char* function_name,
GLenum target) {
switch (target) {
case GL_TRANSFORM_FEEDBACK_BUFFER:
case GL_UNIFORM_BUFFER:
return true;
default:
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, function_name, "invalid target");
return false;
}
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,345 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LoadResourceTraceData(unsigned long identifier, const KURL& url, int priority) {
String request_id = IdentifiersFactory::RequestId(identifier);
std::unique_ptr<TracedValue> value = TracedValue::Create();
value->SetString("requestId", request_id);
value->SetString("url", url.GetString());
value->SetInteger("priority", priority);
return value;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 138,761 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int fbiogetputcmap(struct fb_info *info, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
struct fbcmap32 __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
struct fbcmap __user *p = compat_alloc_user_space(sizeof(*p));
u32 addr;
int ret;
ret = copy_in_user(p, argp, 2 * sizeof(int));
ret |= get_user(addr, &argp->red);
ret |= put_user(compat_ptr(addr), &p->red);
ret |= get_user(addr, &argp->green);
ret |= put_user(compat_ptr(addr), &p->green);
ret |= get_user(addr, &argp->blue);
ret |= put_user(compat_ptr(addr), &p->blue);
if (ret)
return -EFAULT;
return info->fbops->fb_ioctl(info,
(cmd == FBIOPUTCMAP32) ?
FBIOPUTCMAP_SPARC : FBIOGETCMAP_SPARC,
(unsigned long)p);
}
Commit Message: fbdev: Fixing arbitrary kernel leak in case FBIOGETCMAP_SPARC in sbusfb_ioctl_helper().
Fixing arbitrary kernel leak in case FBIOGETCMAP_SPARC in
sbusfb_ioctl_helper().
'index' is defined as an int in sbusfb_ioctl_helper().
We retrieve this from the user:
if (get_user(index, &c->index) ||
__get_user(count, &c->count) ||
__get_user(ured, &c->red) ||
__get_user(ugreen, &c->green) ||
__get_user(ublue, &c->blue))
return -EFAULT;
and then we use 'index' in the following way:
red = cmap->red[index + i] >> 8;
green = cmap->green[index + i] >> 8;
blue = cmap->blue[index + i] >> 8;
This is a classic information leak vulnerability. 'index' should be
an unsigned int, given its usage above.
This patch is straight-forward; it changes 'index' to unsigned int
in two switch-cases: FBIOGETCMAP_SPARC && FBIOPUTCMAP_SPARC.
This patch fixes CVE-2018-6412.
Signed-off-by: Peter Malone <peter.malone@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Mathieu Malaterre <malat@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <b.zolnierkie@samsung.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 84,434 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static u32 vmx_pin_based_exec_ctrl(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
{
u32 pin_based_exec_ctrl = vmcs_config.pin_based_exec_ctrl;
if (!kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(&vmx->vcpu))
pin_based_exec_ctrl &= ~PIN_BASED_POSTED_INTR;
return pin_based_exec_ctrl;
}
Commit Message: kvm:vmx: more complete state update on APICv on/off
The function to update APICv on/off state (in particular, to deactivate
it when enabling Hyper-V SynIC) is incomplete: it doesn't adjust
APICv-related fields among secondary processor-based VM-execution
controls. As a result, Windows 2012 guests get stuck when SynIC-based
auto-EOI interrupt intersected with e.g. an IPI in the guest.
In addition, the MSR intercept bitmap isn't updated every time "virtualize
x2APIC mode" is toggled. This path can only be triggered by a malicious
guest, because Windows didn't use x2APIC but rather their own synthetic
APIC access MSRs; however a guest running in a SynIC-enabled VM could
switch to x2APIC and thus obtain direct access to host APIC MSRs
(CVE-2016-4440).
The patch fixes those omissions.
Signed-off-by: Roman Kagan <rkagan@virtuozzo.com>
Reported-by: Steve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com>
Reported-by: Yang Zhang <yang.zhang.wz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 53,326 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int IsDateTimeTag(unsigned short tag)
{
return ((tag == TAG_DATETIME)? TRUE: FALSE);
}
Commit Message: Fix possible out of bounds access
Bug: 28868315
Change-Id: I2b416c662f9ad7f9b3c6cf973a39c6693c66775a
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 159,458 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BGD_DECLARE(void) gdImageSetThickness (gdImagePtr im, int thickness)
{
im->thick = thickness;
}
Commit Message: Fix #340: System frozen
gdImageCreate() doesn't check for oversized images and as such is prone
to DoS vulnerabilities. We fix that by applying the same overflow check
that is already in place for gdImageCreateTrueColor().
CVE-2016-9317
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 73,088 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void __kprobes single_step_exception(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
regs->msr &= ~(MSR_SE | MSR_BE); /* Turn off 'trace' bits */
if (notify_die(DIE_SSTEP, "single_step", regs, 5,
5, SIGTRAP) == NOTIFY_STOP)
return;
if (debugger_sstep(regs))
return;
_exception(SIGTRAP, regs, TRAP_TRACE, regs->nip);
}
Commit Message: [POWERPC] Never panic when taking altivec exceptions from userspace
At the moment we rely on a cpu feature bit or a firmware property to
detect altivec. If we dont have either of these and the cpu does in fact
support altivec we can cause a panic from userspace.
It seems safer to always send a signal if we manage to get an 0xf20
exception from userspace.
Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 74,743 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ChromeContentRendererClient::ShouldFork(WebFrame* frame,
const GURL& url,
bool is_content_initiated,
bool* send_referrer) {
if (!CrossesExtensionExtents(frame, url))
return false;
*send_referrer = true;
if (is_content_initiated) {
const Extension* extension =
extension_dispatcher_->extensions()->GetByURL(url);
if (extension && extension->is_app()) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION(
extension_misc::kAppLaunchHistogram,
extension_misc::APP_LAUNCH_CONTENT_NAVIGATION,
extension_misc::APP_LAUNCH_BUCKET_BOUNDARY);
}
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,778 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int do_execve_common(const char *filename,
struct user_arg_ptr argv,
struct user_arg_ptr envp)
{
struct linux_binprm *bprm;
struct file *file;
struct files_struct *displaced;
bool clear_in_exec;
int retval;
/*
* We move the actual failure in case of RLIMIT_NPROC excess from
* set*uid() to execve() because too many poorly written programs
* don't check setuid() return code. Here we additionally recheck
* whether NPROC limit is still exceeded.
*/
if ((current->flags & PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED) &&
atomic_read(¤t_user()->processes) > rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC)) {
retval = -EAGAIN;
goto out_ret;
}
/* We're below the limit (still or again), so we don't want to make
* further execve() calls fail. */
current->flags &= ~PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED;
retval = unshare_files(&displaced);
if (retval)
goto out_ret;
retval = -ENOMEM;
bprm = kzalloc(sizeof(*bprm), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!bprm)
goto out_files;
retval = prepare_bprm_creds(bprm);
if (retval)
goto out_free;
retval = check_unsafe_exec(bprm);
if (retval < 0)
goto out_free;
clear_in_exec = retval;
current->in_execve = 1;
file = open_exec(filename);
retval = PTR_ERR(file);
if (IS_ERR(file))
goto out_unmark;
sched_exec();
bprm->file = file;
bprm->filename = filename;
bprm->interp = filename;
retval = bprm_mm_init(bprm);
if (retval)
goto out_file;
bprm->argc = count(argv, MAX_ARG_STRINGS);
if ((retval = bprm->argc) < 0)
goto out;
bprm->envc = count(envp, MAX_ARG_STRINGS);
if ((retval = bprm->envc) < 0)
goto out;
retval = prepare_binprm(bprm);
if (retval < 0)
goto out;
retval = copy_strings_kernel(1, &bprm->filename, bprm);
if (retval < 0)
goto out;
bprm->exec = bprm->p;
retval = copy_strings(bprm->envc, envp, bprm);
if (retval < 0)
goto out;
retval = copy_strings(bprm->argc, argv, bprm);
if (retval < 0)
goto out;
retval = exec_binprm(bprm);
if (retval < 0)
goto out;
/* execve succeeded */
current->fs->in_exec = 0;
current->in_execve = 0;
acct_update_integrals(current);
task_numa_free(current);
free_bprm(bprm);
if (displaced)
put_files_struct(displaced);
return retval;
out:
if (bprm->mm) {
acct_arg_size(bprm, 0);
mmput(bprm->mm);
}
out_file:
if (bprm->file) {
allow_write_access(bprm->file);
fput(bprm->file);
}
out_unmark:
if (clear_in_exec)
current->fs->in_exec = 0;
current->in_execve = 0;
out_free:
free_bprm(bprm);
out_files:
if (displaced)
reset_files_struct(displaced);
out_ret:
return retval;
}
Commit Message: exec/ptrace: fix get_dumpable() incorrect tests
The get_dumpable() return value is not boolean. Most users of the
function actually want to be testing for non-SUID_DUMP_USER(1) rather than
SUID_DUMP_DISABLE(0). The SUID_DUMP_ROOT(2) is also considered a
protected state. Almost all places did this correctly, excepting the two
places fixed in this patch.
Wrong logic:
if (dumpable == SUID_DUMP_DISABLE) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (dumpable == 0) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (!dumpable) { /* be protective */ }
Correct logic:
if (dumpable != SUID_DUMP_USER) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (dumpable != 1) { /* be protective */ }
Without this patch, if the system had set the sysctl fs/suid_dumpable=2, a
user was able to ptrace attach to processes that had dropped privileges to
that user. (This may have been partially mitigated if Yama was enabled.)
The macros have been moved into the file that declares get/set_dumpable(),
which means things like the ia64 code can see them too.
CVE-2013-2929
Reported-by: Vasily Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 30,896 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct sock * tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct request_sock *req,
struct dst_entry *dst)
{
struct inet6_request_sock *treq;
struct ipv6_pinfo *newnp, *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct tcp6_sock *newtcp6sk;
struct inet_sock *newinet;
struct tcp_sock *newtp;
struct sock *newsk;
struct ipv6_txoptions *opt;
#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG
struct tcp_md5sig_key *key;
#endif
if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) {
/*
* v6 mapped
*/
newsk = tcp_v4_syn_recv_sock(sk, skb, req, dst);
if (newsk == NULL)
return NULL;
newtcp6sk = (struct tcp6_sock *)newsk;
inet_sk(newsk)->pinet6 = &newtcp6sk->inet6;
newinet = inet_sk(newsk);
newnp = inet6_sk(newsk);
newtp = tcp_sk(newsk);
memcpy(newnp, np, sizeof(struct ipv6_pinfo));
ipv6_addr_set_v4mapped(newinet->inet_daddr, &newnp->daddr);
ipv6_addr_set_v4mapped(newinet->inet_saddr, &newnp->saddr);
ipv6_addr_copy(&newnp->rcv_saddr, &newnp->saddr);
inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_af_ops = &ipv6_mapped;
newsk->sk_backlog_rcv = tcp_v4_do_rcv;
#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG
newtp->af_specific = &tcp_sock_ipv6_mapped_specific;
#endif
newnp->pktoptions = NULL;
newnp->opt = NULL;
newnp->mcast_oif = inet6_iif(skb);
newnp->mcast_hops = ipv6_hdr(skb)->hop_limit;
/*
* No need to charge this sock to the relevant IPv6 refcnt debug socks count
* here, tcp_create_openreq_child now does this for us, see the comment in
* that function for the gory details. -acme
*/
/* It is tricky place. Until this moment IPv4 tcp
worked with IPv6 icsk.icsk_af_ops.
Sync it now.
*/
tcp_sync_mss(newsk, inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_pmtu_cookie);
return newsk;
}
treq = inet6_rsk(req);
opt = np->opt;
if (sk_acceptq_is_full(sk))
goto out_overflow;
if (!dst) {
dst = inet6_csk_route_req(sk, req);
if (!dst)
goto out;
}
newsk = tcp_create_openreq_child(sk, req, skb);
if (newsk == NULL)
goto out_nonewsk;
/*
* No need to charge this sock to the relevant IPv6 refcnt debug socks
* count here, tcp_create_openreq_child now does this for us, see the
* comment in that function for the gory details. -acme
*/
newsk->sk_gso_type = SKB_GSO_TCPV6;
__ip6_dst_store(newsk, dst, NULL, NULL);
newtcp6sk = (struct tcp6_sock *)newsk;
inet_sk(newsk)->pinet6 = &newtcp6sk->inet6;
newtp = tcp_sk(newsk);
newinet = inet_sk(newsk);
newnp = inet6_sk(newsk);
memcpy(newnp, np, sizeof(struct ipv6_pinfo));
ipv6_addr_copy(&newnp->daddr, &treq->rmt_addr);
ipv6_addr_copy(&newnp->saddr, &treq->loc_addr);
ipv6_addr_copy(&newnp->rcv_saddr, &treq->loc_addr);
newsk->sk_bound_dev_if = treq->iif;
/* Now IPv6 options...
First: no IPv4 options.
*/
newinet->inet_opt = NULL;
newnp->ipv6_fl_list = NULL;
/* Clone RX bits */
newnp->rxopt.all = np->rxopt.all;
/* Clone pktoptions received with SYN */
newnp->pktoptions = NULL;
if (treq->pktopts != NULL) {
newnp->pktoptions = skb_clone(treq->pktopts, GFP_ATOMIC);
kfree_skb(treq->pktopts);
treq->pktopts = NULL;
if (newnp->pktoptions)
skb_set_owner_r(newnp->pktoptions, newsk);
}
newnp->opt = NULL;
newnp->mcast_oif = inet6_iif(skb);
newnp->mcast_hops = ipv6_hdr(skb)->hop_limit;
/* Clone native IPv6 options from listening socket (if any)
Yes, keeping reference count would be much more clever,
but we make one more one thing there: reattach optmem
to newsk.
*/
if (opt) {
newnp->opt = ipv6_dup_options(newsk, opt);
if (opt != np->opt)
sock_kfree_s(sk, opt, opt->tot_len);
}
inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_ext_hdr_len = 0;
if (newnp->opt)
inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_ext_hdr_len = (newnp->opt->opt_nflen +
newnp->opt->opt_flen);
tcp_mtup_init(newsk);
tcp_sync_mss(newsk, dst_mtu(dst));
newtp->advmss = dst_metric_advmss(dst);
tcp_initialize_rcv_mss(newsk);
if (tcp_rsk(req)->snt_synack)
tcp_valid_rtt_meas(newsk,
tcp_time_stamp - tcp_rsk(req)->snt_synack);
newtp->total_retrans = req->retrans;
newinet->inet_daddr = newinet->inet_saddr = LOOPBACK4_IPV6;
newinet->inet_rcv_saddr = LOOPBACK4_IPV6;
#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG
/* Copy over the MD5 key from the original socket */
if ((key = tcp_v6_md5_do_lookup(sk, &newnp->daddr)) != NULL) {
/* We're using one, so create a matching key
* on the newsk structure. If we fail to get
* memory, then we end up not copying the key
* across. Shucks.
*/
char *newkey = kmemdup(key->key, key->keylen, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (newkey != NULL)
tcp_v6_md5_do_add(newsk, &newnp->daddr,
newkey, key->keylen);
}
#endif
if (__inet_inherit_port(sk, newsk) < 0) {
sock_put(newsk);
goto out;
}
__inet6_hash(newsk, NULL);
return newsk;
out_overflow:
NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_LISTENOVERFLOWS);
out_nonewsk:
if (opt && opt != np->opt)
sock_kfree_s(sk, opt, opt->tot_len);
dst_release(dst);
out:
NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_LISTENDROPS);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5.
Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.
MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)
Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic
regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and
use a full 32-bit sequence number.
For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.
Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 25,219 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void InspectorController::registerModuleAgent(PassOwnPtr<InspectorAgent> agent)
{
m_agents.append(agent);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: remove references to modules/device_orientation from core
BUG=340221
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/150913003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@166493 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 115,245 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static const struct cpumask *cpu_cpu_mask(int cpu)
{
return cpumask_of_node(cpu_to_node(cpu));
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 26,270 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeContentRendererClient::DidCreateIsolatedScriptContext(
WebFrame* frame) {
EventBindings::HandleContextCreated(frame, true, extension_dispatcher_.get());
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,767 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int get_free_idx(void)
{
struct thread_struct *t = ¤t->thread;
int idx;
for (idx = 0; idx < GDT_ENTRY_TLS_ENTRIES; idx++)
if (desc_empty(&t->tls_array[idx]))
return idx + GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN;
return -ESRCH;
}
Commit Message: x86/tls: Validate TLS entries to protect espfix
Installing a 16-bit RW data segment into the GDT defeats espfix.
AFAICT this will not affect glibc, Wine, or dosemu at all.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: security@kernel.org <security@kernel.org>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 35,627 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void StaticTestDictionaryMethodMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
TestDictionary* result = TestObject::staticTestDictionaryMethod();
V8SetReturnValue(info, result, info.GetIsolate()->GetCurrentContext()->Global());
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 135,186 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: dtdCopy(XML_Parser oldParser, DTD *newDtd, const DTD *oldDtd, const XML_Memory_Handling_Suite *ms)
{
HASH_TABLE_ITER iter;
/* Copy the prefix table. */
hashTableIterInit(&iter, &(oldDtd->prefixes));
for (;;) {
const XML_Char *name;
const PREFIX *oldP = (PREFIX *)hashTableIterNext(&iter);
if (!oldP)
break;
name = poolCopyString(&(newDtd->pool), oldP->name);
if (!name)
return 0;
if (!lookup(oldParser, &(newDtd->prefixes), name, sizeof(PREFIX)))
return 0;
}
hashTableIterInit(&iter, &(oldDtd->attributeIds));
/* Copy the attribute id table. */
for (;;) {
ATTRIBUTE_ID *newA;
const XML_Char *name;
const ATTRIBUTE_ID *oldA = (ATTRIBUTE_ID *)hashTableIterNext(&iter);
if (!oldA)
break;
/* Remember to allocate the scratch byte before the name. */
if (!poolAppendChar(&(newDtd->pool), XML_T('\0')))
return 0;
name = poolCopyString(&(newDtd->pool), oldA->name);
if (!name)
return 0;
++name;
newA = (ATTRIBUTE_ID *)lookup(oldParser, &(newDtd->attributeIds), name,
sizeof(ATTRIBUTE_ID));
if (!newA)
return 0;
newA->maybeTokenized = oldA->maybeTokenized;
if (oldA->prefix) {
newA->xmlns = oldA->xmlns;
if (oldA->prefix == &oldDtd->defaultPrefix)
newA->prefix = &newDtd->defaultPrefix;
else
newA->prefix = (PREFIX *)lookup(oldParser, &(newDtd->prefixes),
oldA->prefix->name, 0);
}
}
/* Copy the element type table. */
hashTableIterInit(&iter, &(oldDtd->elementTypes));
for (;;) {
int i;
ELEMENT_TYPE *newE;
const XML_Char *name;
const ELEMENT_TYPE *oldE = (ELEMENT_TYPE *)hashTableIterNext(&iter);
if (!oldE)
break;
name = poolCopyString(&(newDtd->pool), oldE->name);
if (!name)
return 0;
newE = (ELEMENT_TYPE *)lookup(oldParser, &(newDtd->elementTypes), name,
sizeof(ELEMENT_TYPE));
if (!newE)
return 0;
if (oldE->nDefaultAtts) {
newE->defaultAtts = (DEFAULT_ATTRIBUTE *)
ms->malloc_fcn(oldE->nDefaultAtts * sizeof(DEFAULT_ATTRIBUTE));
if (!newE->defaultAtts) {
return 0;
}
}
if (oldE->idAtt)
newE->idAtt = (ATTRIBUTE_ID *)
lookup(oldParser, &(newDtd->attributeIds), oldE->idAtt->name, 0);
newE->allocDefaultAtts = newE->nDefaultAtts = oldE->nDefaultAtts;
if (oldE->prefix)
newE->prefix = (PREFIX *)lookup(oldParser, &(newDtd->prefixes),
oldE->prefix->name, 0);
for (i = 0; i < newE->nDefaultAtts; i++) {
newE->defaultAtts[i].id = (ATTRIBUTE_ID *)
lookup(oldParser, &(newDtd->attributeIds), oldE->defaultAtts[i].id->name, 0);
newE->defaultAtts[i].isCdata = oldE->defaultAtts[i].isCdata;
if (oldE->defaultAtts[i].value) {
newE->defaultAtts[i].value
= poolCopyString(&(newDtd->pool), oldE->defaultAtts[i].value);
if (!newE->defaultAtts[i].value)
return 0;
}
else
newE->defaultAtts[i].value = NULL;
}
}
/* Copy the entity tables. */
if (!copyEntityTable(oldParser,
&(newDtd->generalEntities),
&(newDtd->pool),
&(oldDtd->generalEntities)))
return 0;
#ifdef XML_DTD
if (!copyEntityTable(oldParser,
&(newDtd->paramEntities),
&(newDtd->pool),
&(oldDtd->paramEntities)))
return 0;
newDtd->paramEntityRead = oldDtd->paramEntityRead;
#endif /* XML_DTD */
newDtd->keepProcessing = oldDtd->keepProcessing;
newDtd->hasParamEntityRefs = oldDtd->hasParamEntityRefs;
newDtd->standalone = oldDtd->standalone;
/* Don't want deep copying for scaffolding */
newDtd->in_eldecl = oldDtd->in_eldecl;
newDtd->scaffold = oldDtd->scaffold;
newDtd->contentStringLen = oldDtd->contentStringLen;
newDtd->scaffSize = oldDtd->scaffSize;
newDtd->scaffLevel = oldDtd->scaffLevel;
newDtd->scaffIndex = oldDtd->scaffIndex;
return 1;
} /* End dtdCopy */
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Fix extraction of namespace prefix from XML name (#186)
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 0 | 92,313 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool legitimize_mnt(struct vfsmount *bastard, unsigned seq)
{
int res = __legitimize_mnt(bastard, seq);
if (likely(!res))
return true;
if (unlikely(res < 0)) {
rcu_read_unlock();
mntput(bastard);
rcu_read_lock();
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: mnt: Add a per mount namespace limit on the number of mounts
CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com> pointed out that the semantics
of shared subtrees make it possible to create an exponentially
increasing number of mounts in a mount namespace.
mkdir /tmp/1 /tmp/2
mount --make-rshared /
for i in $(seq 1 20) ; do mount --bind /tmp/1 /tmp/2 ; done
Will create create 2^20 or 1048576 mounts, which is a practical problem
as some people have managed to hit this by accident.
As such CVE-2016-6213 was assigned.
Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net> described the situation for autofs users
as follows:
> The number of mounts for direct mount maps is usually not very large because of
> the way they are implemented, large direct mount maps can have performance
> problems. There can be anywhere from a few (likely case a few hundred) to less
> than 10000, plus mounts that have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> Indirect mounts have one autofs mount at the root plus the number of mounts that
> have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> The number of autofs indirect map entries can range from a few to the common
> case of several thousand and in rare cases up to between 30000 and 50000. I've
> not heard of people with maps larger than 50000 entries.
>
> The larger the number of map entries the greater the possibility for a large
> number of active mounts so it's not hard to expect cases of a 1000 or somewhat
> more active mounts.
So I am setting the default number of mounts allowed per mount
namespace at 100,000. This is more than enough for any use case I
know of, but small enough to quickly stop an exponential increase
in mounts. Which should be perfect to catch misconfigurations and
malfunctioning programs.
For anyone who needs a higher limit this can be changed by writing
to the new /proc/sys/fs/mount-max sysctl.
Tested-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 50,952 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Round_To_Double_Grid( TT_ExecContext exc,
FT_F26Dot6 distance,
FT_F26Dot6 compensation )
{
FT_F26Dot6 val;
FT_UNUSED( exc );
if ( distance >= 0 )
{
val = FT_PAD_ROUND_LONG( ADD_LONG( distance, compensation ), 32 );
if ( val < 0 )
val = 0;
}
else
{
val = NEG_LONG( FT_PAD_ROUND_LONG( SUB_LONG( compensation, distance ),
32 ) );
if ( val > 0 )
val = 0;
}
return val;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 10,708 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void dns_packet_set_flags(DnsPacket *p, bool dnssec_checking_disabled, bool truncated) {
DnsPacketHeader *h;
assert(p);
h = DNS_PACKET_HEADER(p);
switch(p->protocol) {
case DNS_PROTOCOL_LLMNR:
assert(!truncated);
h->flags = htobe16(DNS_PACKET_MAKE_FLAGS(0 /* qr */,
0 /* opcode */,
0 /* c */,
0 /* tc */,
0 /* t */,
0 /* ra */,
0 /* ad */,
0 /* cd */,
0 /* rcode */));
break;
case DNS_PROTOCOL_MDNS:
h->flags = htobe16(DNS_PACKET_MAKE_FLAGS(0 /* qr */,
0 /* opcode */,
0 /* aa */,
truncated /* tc */,
0 /* rd (ask for recursion) */,
0 /* ra */,
0 /* ad */,
0 /* cd */,
0 /* rcode */));
break;
default:
assert(!truncated);
h->flags = htobe16(DNS_PACKET_MAKE_FLAGS(0 /* qr */,
0 /* opcode */,
0 /* aa */,
0 /* tc */,
1 /* rd (ask for recursion) */,
0 /* ra */,
0 /* ad */,
dnssec_checking_disabled /* cd */,
0 /* rcode */));
}
}
Commit Message: resolved: bugfix of null pointer p->question dereferencing (#6020)
See https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/systemd/+bug/1621396
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 64,757 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void balance_callback(struct rq *rq)
{
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 55,486 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _dbus_read_socket (int fd,
DBusString *buffer,
int count)
{
int bytes_read;
int start;
char *data;
_dbus_assert (count >= 0);
start = _dbus_string_get_length (buffer);
if (!_dbus_string_lengthen (buffer, count))
{
_dbus_win_set_errno (ENOMEM);
return -1;
}
data = _dbus_string_get_data_len (buffer, start, count);
again:
_dbus_verbose ("recv: count=%d fd=%d\n", count, fd);
bytes_read = recv (fd, data, count, 0);
if (bytes_read == SOCKET_ERROR)
{
DBUS_SOCKET_SET_ERRNO();
_dbus_verbose ("recv: failed: %s (%d)\n", _dbus_strerror (errno), errno);
bytes_read = -1;
}
else
_dbus_verbose ("recv: = %d\n", bytes_read);
if (bytes_read < 0)
{
if (errno == EINTR)
goto again;
else
{
/* put length back (note that this doesn't actually realloc anything) */
_dbus_string_set_length (buffer, start);
return -1;
}
}
else
{
/* put length back (doesn't actually realloc) */
_dbus_string_set_length (buffer, start + bytes_read);
#if 0
if (bytes_read > 0)
_dbus_verbose_bytes_of_string (buffer, start, bytes_read);
#endif
return bytes_read;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 3,814 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::set<GURL> WebContentsImpl::GetSitesInTab() const {
BrowserContext* browser_context = GetBrowserContext();
std::set<GURL> sites;
if (!frame_tree_root_.get())
return sites;
FrameTreeNode* node = NULL;
std::queue<FrameTreeNode*> queue;
queue.push(frame_tree_root_.get());
while (!queue.empty()) {
node = queue.front();
queue.pop();
sites.insert(SiteInstance::GetSiteForURL(browser_context,
node->current_url()));
for (size_t i = 0; i < node->child_count(); ++i)
queue.push(node->child_at(i));
}
return sites;
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 110,666 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: copy_move_directory (CopyMoveJob *copy_job,
GFile *src,
GFile **dest,
gboolean same_fs,
gboolean create_dest,
char **parent_dest_fs_type,
SourceInfo *source_info,
TransferInfo *transfer_info,
GHashTable *debuting_files,
gboolean *skipped_file,
gboolean readonly_source_fs)
{
GFileInfo *info;
GError *error;
GFile *src_file;
GFileEnumerator *enumerator;
char *primary, *secondary, *details;
char *dest_fs_type;
int response;
gboolean skip_error;
gboolean local_skipped_file;
CommonJob *job;
GFileCopyFlags flags;
job = (CommonJob *) copy_job;
if (create_dest)
{
switch (create_dest_dir (job, src, dest, same_fs, parent_dest_fs_type))
{
case CREATE_DEST_DIR_RETRY:
{
/* next time copy_move_directory() is called,
* create_dest will be FALSE if a directory already
* exists under the new name (i.e. WOULD_RECURSE)
*/
return FALSE;
}
case CREATE_DEST_DIR_FAILED:
{
*skipped_file = TRUE;
return TRUE;
}
case CREATE_DEST_DIR_SUCCESS:
default:
{
}
break;
}
if (debuting_files)
{
g_hash_table_replace (debuting_files, g_object_ref (*dest), GINT_TO_POINTER (TRUE));
}
}
local_skipped_file = FALSE;
dest_fs_type = NULL;
skip_error = should_skip_readdir_error (job, src);
retry:
error = NULL;
enumerator = g_file_enumerate_children (src,
G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_STANDARD_NAME,
G_FILE_QUERY_INFO_NOFOLLOW_SYMLINKS,
job->cancellable,
&error);
if (enumerator)
{
error = NULL;
while (!job_aborted (job) &&
(info = g_file_enumerator_next_file (enumerator, job->cancellable, skip_error ? NULL : &error)) != NULL)
{
src_file = g_file_get_child (src,
g_file_info_get_name (info));
copy_move_file (copy_job, src_file, *dest, same_fs, FALSE, &dest_fs_type,
source_info, transfer_info, NULL, NULL, FALSE, &local_skipped_file,
readonly_source_fs);
if (local_skipped_file)
{
transfer_add_file_to_count (src_file, job, transfer_info);
report_copy_progress (copy_job, source_info, transfer_info);
}
g_object_unref (src_file);
g_object_unref (info);
}
g_file_enumerator_close (enumerator, job->cancellable, NULL);
g_object_unref (enumerator);
if (error && IS_IO_ERROR (error, CANCELLED))
{
g_error_free (error);
}
else if (error)
{
if (copy_job->is_move)
{
primary = f (_("Error while moving."));
}
else
{
primary = f (_("Error while copying."));
}
details = NULL;
if (IS_IO_ERROR (error, PERMISSION_DENIED))
{
secondary = f (_("Files in the folder “%B” cannot be copied because you do "
"not have permissions to see them."), src);
}
else
{
secondary = f (_("There was an error getting information about the files in the folder “%B”."), src);
details = error->message;
}
response = run_warning (job,
primary,
secondary,
details,
FALSE,
CANCEL, _("_Skip files"),
NULL);
g_error_free (error);
if (response == 0 || response == GTK_RESPONSE_DELETE_EVENT)
{
abort_job (job);
}
else if (response == 1)
{
/* Skip: Do Nothing */
local_skipped_file = TRUE;
}
else
{
g_assert_not_reached ();
}
}
/* Count the copied directory as a file */
transfer_info->num_files++;
report_copy_progress (copy_job, source_info, transfer_info);
if (debuting_files)
{
g_hash_table_replace (debuting_files, g_object_ref (*dest), GINT_TO_POINTER (create_dest));
}
}
else if (IS_IO_ERROR (error, CANCELLED))
{
g_error_free (error);
}
else
{
if (copy_job->is_move)
{
primary = f (_("Error while moving."));
}
else
{
primary = f (_("Error while copying."));
}
details = NULL;
if (IS_IO_ERROR (error, PERMISSION_DENIED))
{
secondary = f (_("The folder “%B” cannot be copied because you do not have "
"permissions to read it."), src);
}
else
{
secondary = f (_("There was an error reading the folder “%B”."), src);
details = error->message;
}
response = run_warning (job,
primary,
secondary,
details,
FALSE,
CANCEL, SKIP, RETRY,
NULL);
g_error_free (error);
if (response == 0 || response == GTK_RESPONSE_DELETE_EVENT)
{
abort_job (job);
}
else if (response == 1)
{
/* Skip: Do Nothing */
local_skipped_file = TRUE;
}
else if (response == 2)
{
goto retry;
}
else
{
g_assert_not_reached ();
}
}
if (create_dest)
{
flags = (readonly_source_fs) ? G_FILE_COPY_NOFOLLOW_SYMLINKS | G_FILE_COPY_TARGET_DEFAULT_PERMS
: G_FILE_COPY_NOFOLLOW_SYMLINKS;
/* Ignore errors here. Failure to copy metadata is not a hard error */
g_file_copy_attributes (src, *dest,
flags,
job->cancellable, NULL);
}
if (!job_aborted (job) && copy_job->is_move &&
/* Don't delete source if there was a skipped file */
!local_skipped_file)
{
if (!g_file_delete (src, job->cancellable, &error))
{
if (job->skip_all_error)
{
goto skip;
}
primary = f (_("Error while moving “%B”."), src);
secondary = f (_("Could not remove the source folder."));
details = error->message;
response = run_cancel_or_skip_warning (job,
primary,
secondary,
details,
source_info->num_files,
source_info->num_files - transfer_info->num_files);
if (response == 0 || response == GTK_RESPONSE_DELETE_EVENT)
{
abort_job (job);
}
else if (response == 1) /* skip all */
{
job->skip_all_error = TRUE;
local_skipped_file = TRUE;
}
else if (response == 2) /* skip */
{
local_skipped_file = TRUE;
}
else
{
g_assert_not_reached ();
}
skip:
g_error_free (error);
}
}
if (local_skipped_file)
{
*skipped_file = TRUE;
}
g_free (dest_fs_type);
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 61,024 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool HasNonDeviceLocalAccounts(const user_manager::UserList& users) {
for (const auto* user : users) {
if (!policy::IsDeviceLocalAccountUser(user->GetAccountId().GetUserEmail(),
nullptr))
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: [reland] Do not set default wallpaper unless it should do so.
TBR=bshe@chromium.org, alemate@chromium.org
Bug: 751382
Change-Id: Id0793dfe467f737526a95b1e66ed01fbb8860bda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/619754
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <xdai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Alekseev <alemate@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Biao She <bshe@chromium.org>
Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498325}
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/646430
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498982}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 127,985 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xfs_attr3_leaf_read(
struct xfs_trans *tp,
struct xfs_inode *dp,
xfs_dablk_t bno,
xfs_daddr_t mappedbno,
struct xfs_buf **bpp)
{
int err;
err = xfs_da_read_buf(tp, dp, bno, mappedbno, bpp,
XFS_ATTR_FORK, &xfs_attr3_leaf_buf_ops);
if (!err && tp && *bpp)
xfs_trans_buf_set_type(tp, *bpp, XFS_BLFT_ATTR_LEAF_BUF);
return err;
}
Commit Message: xfs: don't call xfs_da_shrink_inode with NULL bp
xfs_attr3_leaf_create may have errored out before instantiating a buffer,
for example if the blkno is out of range. In that case there is no work
to do to remove it, and in fact xfs_da_shrink_inode will lead to an oops
if we try.
This also seems to fix a flaw where the original error from
xfs_attr3_leaf_create gets overwritten in the cleanup case, and it
removes a pointless assignment to bp which isn't used after this.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199969
Reported-by: Xu, Wen <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Tested-by: Xu, Wen <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 79,919 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AP_DECLARE(void) ap_setup_make_content_type(apr_pool_t *pool)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; needcset[i]; i++) {
continue;
}
needcset_patterns = (const apr_strmatch_pattern **)
apr_palloc(pool, (i + 1) * sizeof(apr_strmatch_pattern *));
for (i = 0; needcset[i]; i++) {
needcset_patterns[i] = apr_strmatch_precompile(pool, needcset[i], 0);
}
needcset_patterns[i] = NULL;
charset_pattern = apr_strmatch_precompile(pool, "charset=", 0);
}
Commit Message: *) SECURITY: CVE-2015-0253 (cve.mitre.org)
core: Fix a crash introduced in with ErrorDocument 400 pointing
to a local URL-path with the INCLUDES filter active, introduced
in 2.4.11. PR 57531. [Yann Ylavic]
Submitted By: ylavic
Committed By: covener
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1664205 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: | 0 | 45,002 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int search_dirblock(struct buffer_head *bh,
struct inode *dir,
const struct qstr *d_name,
unsigned int offset,
struct ext4_dir_entry_2 **res_dir)
{
return search_dir(bh, bh->b_data, dir->i_sb->s_blocksize, dir,
d_name, offset, res_dir);
}
Commit Message: ext4: avoid hang when mounting non-journal filesystems with orphan list
When trying to mount a file system which does not contain a journal,
but which does have a orphan list containing an inode which needs to
be truncated, the mount call with hang forever in
ext4_orphan_cleanup() because ext4_orphan_del() will return
immediately without removing the inode from the orphan list, leading
to an uninterruptible loop in kernel code which will busy out one of
the CPU's on the system.
This can be trivially reproduced by trying to mount the file system
found in tests/f_orphan_extents_inode/image.gz from the e2fsprogs
source tree. If a malicious user were to put this on a USB stick, and
mount it on a Linux desktop which has automatic mounts enabled, this
could be considered a potential denial of service attack. (Not a big
deal in practice, but professional paranoids worry about such things,
and have even been known to allocate CVE numbers for such problems.)
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Zheng Liu <wenqing.lz@taobao.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 32,306 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool WebContentsImpl::WillNotifyDisconnection() const {
return notify_disconnection_;
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 110,815 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType WritePDBImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image)
{
const char
*comment;
int
bits;
MagickBooleanType
status;
PDBImage
pdb_image;
PDBInfo
pdb_info;
QuantumInfo
*quantum_info;
register const PixelPacket
*p;
register ssize_t
x;
register unsigned char
*q;
size_t
bits_per_pixel,
literal,
packets,
packet_size,
repeat;
ssize_t
y;
unsigned char
*buffer,
*runlength,
*scanline;
/*
Open output image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
if ((image -> colors <= 2 ) ||
(GetImageType(image,&image->exception ) == BilevelType)) {
bits_per_pixel=1;
} else if (image->colors <= 4) {
bits_per_pixel=2;
} else if (image->colors <= 8) {
bits_per_pixel=3;
} else {
bits_per_pixel=4;
}
(void) ResetMagickMemory(pdb_info.name,0,32);
(void) CopyMagickString(pdb_info.name,image_info->filename,32);
pdb_info.attributes=0;
pdb_info.version=0;
pdb_info.create_time=time(NULL);
pdb_info.modify_time=pdb_info.create_time;
pdb_info.archive_time=0;
pdb_info.modify_number=0;
pdb_info.application_info=0;
pdb_info.sort_info=0;
(void) CopyMagickMemory(pdb_info.type,"vIMG",4);
(void) CopyMagickMemory(pdb_info.id,"View",4);
pdb_info.seed=0;
pdb_info.next_record=0;
comment=GetImageProperty(image,"comment");
pdb_info.number_records=(comment == (const char *) NULL ? 1 : 2);
(void) WriteBlob(image,32,(unsigned char *) pdb_info.name);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) pdb_info.attributes);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) pdb_info.version);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) pdb_info.create_time);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) pdb_info.modify_time);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) pdb_info.archive_time);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) pdb_info.modify_number);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) pdb_info.application_info);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) pdb_info.sort_info);
(void) WriteBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) pdb_info.type);
(void) WriteBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) pdb_info.id);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) pdb_info.seed);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) pdb_info.next_record);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) pdb_info.number_records);
(void) CopyMagickString(pdb_image.name,pdb_info.name,32);
pdb_image.version=1; /* RLE Compressed */
switch (bits_per_pixel)
{
case 1: pdb_image.type=(unsigned char) 0xff; break; /* monochrome */
case 2: pdb_image.type=(unsigned char) 0x00; break; /* 2 bit gray */
default: pdb_image.type=(unsigned char) 0x02; /* 4 bit gray */
}
pdb_image.reserved_1=0;
pdb_image.note=0;
pdb_image.x_last=0;
pdb_image.y_last=0;
pdb_image.reserved_2=0;
pdb_image.x_anchor=(unsigned short) 0xffff;
pdb_image.y_anchor=(unsigned short) 0xffff;
pdb_image.width=(short) image->columns;
if (image->columns % 16)
pdb_image.width=(short) (16*(image->columns/16+1));
pdb_image.height=(short) image->rows;
packets=((bits_per_pixel*image->columns+7)/8)*image->rows;
runlength=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(2UL*packets,
sizeof(*runlength));
if (runlength == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
buffer=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(256UL,sizeof(*buffer));
if (buffer == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
packet_size=(size_t) (image->depth > 8 ? 2: 1);
scanline=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->columns,packet_size*
sizeof(*scanline));
if (scanline == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if (IssRGBCompatibleColorspace(image->colorspace) == MagickFalse)
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
/*
Convert to GRAY raster scanline.
*/
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
bits=8/(int) bits_per_pixel-1; /* start at most significant bits */
literal=0;
repeat=0;
q=runlength;
buffer[0]=0x00;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
(void) ExportQuantumPixels(image,(const CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
GrayQuantum,scanline,&image->exception);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) pdb_image.width; x++)
{
if (x < (ssize_t) image->columns)
buffer[literal+repeat]|=(0xff-scanline[x*packet_size]) >>
(8-bits_per_pixel) << bits*bits_per_pixel;
bits--;
if (bits < 0)
{
if (((literal+repeat) > 0) &&
(buffer[literal+repeat] == buffer[literal+repeat-1]))
{
if (repeat == 0)
{
literal--;
repeat++;
}
repeat++;
if (0x7f < repeat)
{
q=EncodeRLE(q,buffer,literal,repeat);
literal=0;
repeat=0;
}
}
else
{
if (repeat >= 2)
literal+=repeat;
else
{
q=EncodeRLE(q,buffer,literal,repeat);
buffer[0]=buffer[literal+repeat];
literal=0;
}
literal++;
repeat=0;
if (0x7f < literal)
{
q=EncodeRLE(q,buffer,(literal < 0x80 ? literal : 0x80),0);
(void) CopyMagickMemory(buffer,buffer+literal+repeat,0x80);
literal-=0x80;
}
}
bits=8/(int) bits_per_pixel-1;
buffer[literal+repeat]=0x00;
}
}
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
q=EncodeRLE(q,buffer,literal,repeat);
scanline=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(scanline);
buffer=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(buffer);
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
/*
Write the Image record header.
*/
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) (TellBlob(image)+8*
pdb_info.number_records));
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,0x40);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,0x6f);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,0x80);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,0);
if (pdb_info.number_records > 1)
{
/*
Write the comment record header.
*/
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) (TellBlob(image)+8+58+q-
runlength));
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,0x40);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,0x6f);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,0x80);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,1);
}
/*
Write the Image data.
*/
(void) WriteBlob(image,32,(unsigned char *) pdb_image.name);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) pdb_image.version);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,pdb_image.type);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) pdb_image.reserved_1);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) pdb_image.note);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) pdb_image.x_last);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) pdb_image.y_last);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) pdb_image.reserved_2);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,pdb_image.x_anchor);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,pdb_image.y_anchor);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) pdb_image.width);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) pdb_image.height);
(void) WriteBlob(image,(size_t) (q-runlength),runlength);
runlength=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(runlength);
if (pdb_info.number_records > 1)
(void) WriteBlobString(image,comment);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 71,638 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AutofillExternalDelegate::DidAcceptSuggestion(const base::string16& value,
int identifier,
int position) {
if (identifier == POPUP_ITEM_ID_AUTOFILL_OPTIONS) {
manager_->ShowAutofillSettings(popup_type_ == PopupType::kCreditCards);
} else if (identifier == POPUP_ITEM_ID_CLEAR_FORM) {
driver_->RendererShouldClearFilledSection();
} else if (identifier == POPUP_ITEM_ID_PASSWORD_ENTRY ||
identifier == POPUP_ITEM_ID_USERNAME_ENTRY) {
NOTREACHED(); // Should be handled elsewhere.
} else if (identifier == POPUP_ITEM_ID_DATALIST_ENTRY) {
driver_->RendererShouldAcceptDataListSuggestion(value);
} else if (identifier == POPUP_ITEM_ID_AUTOCOMPLETE_ENTRY) {
driver_->RendererShouldFillFieldWithValue(value);
AutofillMetrics::LogAutocompleteSuggestionAcceptedIndex(position);
} else if (identifier == POPUP_ITEM_ID_SCAN_CREDIT_CARD) {
manager_->client()->ScanCreditCard(base::Bind(
&AutofillExternalDelegate::OnCreditCardScanned, GetWeakPtr()));
} else if (identifier == POPUP_ITEM_ID_CREDIT_CARD_SIGNIN_PROMO) {
manager_->client()->ExecuteCommand(identifier);
} else if (identifier == POPUP_ITEM_ID_SHOW_ACCOUNT_CARDS) {
manager_->OnUserAcceptedCardsFromAccountOption();
} else {
if (identifier > 0) // Denotes an Autofill suggestion.
AutofillMetrics::LogAutofillSuggestionAcceptedIndex(position);
FillAutofillFormData(identifier, false);
}
if (should_show_scan_credit_card_) {
AutofillMetrics::LogScanCreditCardPromptMetric(
identifier == POPUP_ITEM_ID_SCAN_CREDIT_CARD
? AutofillMetrics::SCAN_CARD_ITEM_SELECTED
: AutofillMetrics::SCAN_CARD_OTHER_ITEM_SELECTED);
}
if (identifier == POPUP_ITEM_ID_SHOW_ACCOUNT_CARDS) {
should_show_cards_from_account_option_ = false;
manager_->RefetchCardsAndUpdatePopup(query_id_, query_form_, query_field_);
} else {
manager_->client()->HideAutofillPopup();
}
}
Commit Message: [Autofill] Remove AutofillPopupViewViews and associated feature.
Bug: 906135,831603
Change-Id: I3c982f8b3ffb4928c7c878e74e10113999106499
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1387124
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <rkaplow@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vasilii Sukhanov <vasilii@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Tirelo <ftirelo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Martino <tmartino@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mathieu Perreault <mathp@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621360}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 130,607 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BasicFindMainFallbackResponseInDatabase() {
BasicFindMainFallbackResponse(true);
}
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 151,325 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void Create(chrome::mojom::ZipFileCreatorRequest request) {
mojo::MakeStrongBinding(base::MakeUnique<ZipFileCreatorImpl>(),
std::move(request));
}
Commit Message: Use pdf compositor service for printing when OOPIF is enabled
When OOPIF is enabled (by site-per-process flag or
top-document-isolation feature), use the pdf compositor service for
converting PaintRecord to PDF on renderers.
In the future, this will make compositing PDF from multiple renderers
possible.
TBR=jzfeng@chromium.org
BUG=455764
Change-Id: I3c28f03f4358e4228239fe1a33384f85e7716e8f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/699765
Commit-Queue: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511616}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 126,825 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ffm_set_write_index(AVFormatContext *s, int64_t pos,
int64_t file_size)
{
av_opt_set_int(s, "server_attached", 1, AV_OPT_SEARCH_CHILDREN);
av_opt_set_int(s, "ffm_write_index", pos, AV_OPT_SEARCH_CHILDREN);
av_opt_set_int(s, "ffm_file_size", file_size, AV_OPT_SEARCH_CHILDREN);
}
Commit Message: ffserver: Check chunk size
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: poc_ffserver.py
Found-by: Paul Cher <paulcher@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 70,792 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::close() {
if (!GetScriptableDocumentParser() ||
!GetScriptableDocumentParser()->WasCreatedByScript() ||
!GetScriptableDocumentParser()->IsParsing())
return;
parser_->Finish();
if (!parser_ || !parser_->IsParsing())
SetReadyState(kComplete);
CheckCompleted();
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 129,941 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct sk_buff *rtmsg_ifinfo_build_skb(int type, struct net_device *dev,
unsigned int change, gfp_t flags)
{
struct net *net = dev_net(dev);
struct sk_buff *skb;
int err = -ENOBUFS;
size_t if_info_size;
skb = nlmsg_new((if_info_size = if_nlmsg_size(dev, 0)), flags);
if (skb == NULL)
goto errout;
err = rtnl_fill_ifinfo(skb, dev, type, 0, 0, change, 0, 0);
if (err < 0) {
/* -EMSGSIZE implies BUG in if_nlmsg_size() */
WARN_ON(err == -EMSGSIZE);
kfree_skb(skb);
goto errout;
}
return skb;
errout:
if (err < 0)
rtnl_set_sk_err(net, RTNLGRP_LINK, err);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: net: fix infoleak in rtnetlink
The stack object “map” has a total size of 32 bytes. Its last 4
bytes are padding generated by compiler. These padding bytes are
not initialized and sent out via “nla_put”.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 53,134 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static jboolean RegionIter_next(JNIEnv* env, jobject, jlong pairHandle, jobject rectObject)
{
RgnIterPair* pair = reinterpret_cast<RgnIterPair*>(pairHandle);
SkASSERT(pair);
SkASSERT(rectObject);
if (!pair->fIter.done()) {
GraphicsJNI::irect_to_jrect(pair->fIter.rect(), env, rectObject);
pair->fIter.next();
return JNI_TRUE;
}
return JNI_FALSE;
}
Commit Message: Check that the parcel contained the expected amount of region data. DO NOT MERGE
bug:20883006
Change-Id: Ib47a8ec8696dbc37e958b8dbceb43fcbabf6605b
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 157,222 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int may_follow_link(struct nameidata *nd)
{
const struct inode *inode;
const struct inode *parent;
if (!sysctl_protected_symlinks)
return 0;
/* Allowed if owner and follower match. */
inode = nd->stack[0].inode;
if (uid_eq(current_cred()->fsuid, inode->i_uid))
return 0;
/* Allowed if parent directory not sticky and world-writable. */
parent = nd->inode;
if ((parent->i_mode & (S_ISVTX|S_IWOTH)) != (S_ISVTX|S_IWOTH))
return 0;
/* Allowed if parent directory and link owner match. */
if (uid_eq(parent->i_uid, inode->i_uid))
return 0;
if (nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU)
return -ECHILD;
audit_log_link_denied("follow_link", &nd->stack[0].link);
return -EACCES;
}
Commit Message: vfs: Test for and handle paths that are unreachable from their mnt_root
In rare cases a directory can be renamed out from under a bind mount.
In those cases without special handling it becomes possible to walk up
the directory tree to the root dentry of the filesystem and down
from the root dentry to every other file or directory on the filesystem.
Like division by zero .. from an unconnected path can not be given
a useful semantic as there is no predicting at which path component
the code will realize it is unconnected. We certainly can not match
the current behavior as the current behavior is a security hole.
Therefore when encounting .. when following an unconnected path
return -ENOENT.
- Add a function path_connected to verify path->dentry is reachable
from path->mnt.mnt_root. AKA to validate that rename did not do
something nasty to the bind mount.
To avoid races path_connected must be called after following a path
component to it's next path component.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 43,668 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::didAddWheelEventHandler()
{
++m_wheelEventHandlerCount;
Frame* mainFrame = page() ? page()->mainFrame() : 0;
if (mainFrame)
mainFrame->notifyChromeClientWheelEventHandlerCountChanged();
wheelEventHandlerCountChanged(this);
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 105,489 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DaemonProcess::DeleteAllDesktopSessions() {
while (!desktop_sessions_.empty()) {
delete desktop_sessions_.front();
desktop_sessions_.pop_front();
}
}
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 118,763 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: XineramaTryClientEventsResult(ClientPtr client,
GrabPtr grab, Mask mask, Mask filter)
{
if ((client) && (client != serverClient) && (!client->clientGone) &&
((filter == CantBeFiltered) || (mask & filter))) {
if (grab && !SameClient(grab, client))
return -1;
else
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 4,911 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: enum act_parse_ret parse_http_set_status(const char **args, int *orig_arg, struct proxy *px,
struct act_rule *rule, char **err)
{
char *error;
rule->action = ACT_CUSTOM;
rule->action_ptr = action_http_set_status;
/* Check if an argument is available */
if (!*args[*orig_arg]) {
memprintf(err, "expects 1 argument: <status>; or 3 arguments: <status> reason <fmt>");
return ACT_RET_PRS_ERR;
}
/* convert status code as integer */
rule->arg.status.code = strtol(args[*orig_arg], &error, 10);
if (*error != '\0' || rule->arg.status.code < 100 || rule->arg.status.code > 999) {
memprintf(err, "expects an integer status code between 100 and 999");
return ACT_RET_PRS_ERR;
}
(*orig_arg)++;
/* set custom reason string */
rule->arg.status.reason = NULL; // If null, we use the default reason for the status code.
if (*args[*orig_arg] && strcmp(args[*orig_arg], "reason") == 0 &&
(*args[*orig_arg + 1] && strcmp(args[*orig_arg + 1], "if") != 0 && strcmp(args[*orig_arg + 1], "unless") != 0)) {
(*orig_arg)++;
rule->arg.status.reason = strdup(args[*orig_arg]);
(*orig_arg)++;
}
return ACT_RET_PRS_OK;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 6,878 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int TabStripModel::GetIndexOfLastTabContentsOpenedBy(
const NavigationController* opener, int start_index) const {
DCHECK(opener);
DCHECK(ContainsIndex(start_index));
TabContentsDataVector::const_iterator end =
contents_data_.begin() + start_index;
TabContentsDataVector::const_iterator iter = contents_data_.end();
TabContentsDataVector::const_iterator next;
for (; iter != end; --iter) {
next = iter - 1;
if (next == end)
break;
if ((*next)->opener == opener)
return static_cast<int>(next - contents_data_.begin());
}
return kNoTab;
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,088 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bt_status_t btif_dut_mode_configure(uint8_t enable)
{
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __FUNCTION__);
if (!stack_manager_get_interface()->get_stack_is_running()) {
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("btif_dut_mode_configure : Bluetooth not enabled");
return BT_STATUS_NOT_READY;
}
btif_dut_mode = enable;
if (enable == 1) {
BTA_EnableTestMode();
} else {
BTA_DisableTestMode();
}
return BT_STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 158,533 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BOOL CALLBACK ShowWindowsCallback(HWND window, LPARAM param) {
RenderWidgetHostViewAura* widget =
reinterpret_cast<RenderWidgetHostViewAura*>(param);
HWND parent =
widget->GetNativeView()->GetRootWindow()->GetAcceleratedWidget();
if (GetProp(window, kWidgetOwnerProperty) == widget)
SetParent(window, parent);
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,907 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: rdp_out_newpointer_caps(STREAM s)
{
out_uint16_le(s, RDP_CAPSET_POINTER);
out_uint16_le(s, RDP_CAPLEN_NEWPOINTER);
out_uint16_le(s, 1); /* Colour pointer */
out_uint16_le(s, 20); /* Cache size */
out_uint16_le(s, 20); /* Cache size for new pointers */
}
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 93,012 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderViewImpl::didFinishResourceLoad(
WebFrame* frame, unsigned identifier) {
DocumentState* document_state =
DocumentState::FromDataSource(frame->dataSource());
if (!document_state->use_error_page())
return;
if (devtools_agent_->IsAttached())
return;
int http_status_code = document_state->http_status_code();
if (http_status_code == 404) {
const GURL& document_url = frame->document().url();
const GURL& error_page_url =
GetAlternateErrorPageURL(document_url, HTTP_404);
if (error_page_url.is_valid()) {
WebURLError original_error;
original_error.domain = "http";
original_error.reason = 404;
original_error.unreachableURL = document_url;
document_state->set_alt_error_page_fetcher(
new AltErrorPageResourceFetcher(
error_page_url, frame, original_error,
base::Bind(&RenderViewImpl::AltErrorPageFinished,
base::Unretained(this))));
return;
}
}
std::string error_domain;
if (GetContentClient()->renderer()->HasErrorPage(
http_status_code, &error_domain)) {
WebURLError error;
error.unreachableURL = frame->document().url();
error.domain = WebString::fromUTF8(error_domain);
error.reason = http_status_code;
LoadNavigationErrorPage(
frame, frame->dataSource()->request(), error, std::string(), true);
}
}
Commit Message: Let the browser handle external navigations from DevTools.
BUG=180555
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12531004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@186793 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 115,627 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned long cmd_input_size(unsigned int cmd)
{
/* Size of structure up to and including 'field' */
#define CMDINSIZE(cmd, type, field) \
case VIDIOC_##cmd: \
return offsetof(struct v4l2_##type, field) + \
sizeof(((struct v4l2_##type *)0)->field);
switch (cmd) {
CMDINSIZE(ENUM_FMT, fmtdesc, type);
CMDINSIZE(G_FMT, format, type);
CMDINSIZE(QUERYBUF, buffer, length);
CMDINSIZE(G_PARM, streamparm, type);
CMDINSIZE(ENUMSTD, standard, index);
CMDINSIZE(ENUMINPUT, input, index);
CMDINSIZE(G_CTRL, control, id);
CMDINSIZE(G_TUNER, tuner, index);
CMDINSIZE(QUERYCTRL, queryctrl, id);
CMDINSIZE(QUERYMENU, querymenu, index);
CMDINSIZE(ENUMOUTPUT, output, index);
CMDINSIZE(G_MODULATOR, modulator, index);
CMDINSIZE(G_FREQUENCY, frequency, tuner);
CMDINSIZE(CROPCAP, cropcap, type);
CMDINSIZE(G_CROP, crop, type);
CMDINSIZE(ENUMAUDIO, audio, index);
CMDINSIZE(ENUMAUDOUT, audioout, index);
CMDINSIZE(ENCODER_CMD, encoder_cmd, flags);
CMDINSIZE(TRY_ENCODER_CMD, encoder_cmd, flags);
CMDINSIZE(G_SLICED_VBI_CAP, sliced_vbi_cap, type);
CMDINSIZE(ENUM_FRAMESIZES, frmsizeenum, pixel_format);
CMDINSIZE(ENUM_FRAMEINTERVALS, frmivalenum, height);
default:
return _IOC_SIZE(cmd);
}
}
Commit Message: [media] v4l: Share code between video_usercopy and video_ioctl2
The two functions are mostly identical. They handle the copy_from_user
and copy_to_user operations related with V4L2 ioctls and call the real
ioctl handler.
Create a __video_usercopy function that implements the core of
video_usercopy and video_ioctl2, and call that function from both.
Signed-off-by: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart@ideasonboard.com>
Acked-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil@xs4all.nl>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 74,692 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CairoImage::CairoImage (double x1, double y1, double x2, double y2) {
this->image = NULL;
this->x1 = x1;
this->y1 = y1;
this->x2 = x2;
this->y2 = y2;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 878 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err padb_Size(GF_Box *s)
{
GF_PaddingBitsBox *ptr = (GF_PaddingBitsBox *)s;
ptr->size += 4;
if (ptr->SampleCount) ptr->size += (ptr->SampleCount + 1) / 2;
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,303 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CronTab::nextRunTime( ) {
return ( this->nextRunTime( (long)time( NULL ) ) );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 16,544 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MockNetworkTransaction::SetWebSocketHandshakeStreamCreateHelper(
WebSocketHandshakeStreamBase::CreateHelper* create_helper) {
websocket_handshake_stream_create_helper_ = create_helper;
}
Commit Message: Replace fixed string uses of AddHeaderFromString
Uses of AddHeaderFromString() with a static string may as well be
replaced with SetHeader(). Do so.
BUG=None
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2236933005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#418161}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 119,350 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
int fmtid;
int id;
char *infile;
jas_stream_t *instream;
jas_image_t *image;
int width;
int height;
int depth;
int numcmpts;
int verbose;
char *fmtname;
if (jas_init()) {
abort();
}
cmdname = argv[0];
infile = 0;
verbose = 0;
/* Parse the command line options. */
while ((id = jas_getopt(argc, argv, opts)) >= 0) {
switch (id) {
case OPT_VERBOSE:
verbose = 1;
break;
case OPT_VERSION:
printf("%s\n", JAS_VERSION);
exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
break;
case OPT_INFILE:
infile = jas_optarg;
break;
case OPT_HELP:
default:
usage();
break;
}
}
/* Open the image file. */
if (infile) {
/* The image is to be read from a file. */
if (!(instream = jas_stream_fopen(infile, "rb"))) {
fprintf(stderr, "cannot open input image file %s\n", infile);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
} else {
/* The image is to be read from standard input. */
if (!(instream = jas_stream_fdopen(0, "rb"))) {
fprintf(stderr, "cannot open standard input\n");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
}
if ((fmtid = jas_image_getfmt(instream)) < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "unknown image format\n");
}
/* Decode the image. */
if (!(image = jas_image_decode(instream, fmtid, 0))) {
fprintf(stderr, "cannot load image\n");
return EXIT_FAILURE;
}
/* Close the image file. */
jas_stream_close(instream);
numcmpts = jas_image_numcmpts(image);
width = jas_image_cmptwidth(image, 0);
height = jas_image_cmptheight(image, 0);
depth = jas_image_cmptprec(image, 0);
if (!(fmtname = jas_image_fmttostr(fmtid))) {
abort();
}
printf("%s %d %d %d %d %ld\n", fmtname, numcmpts, width, height, depth, (long) jas_image_rawsize(image));
jas_image_destroy(image);
jas_image_clearfmts();
return EXIT_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Fixed a sanitizer failure in the BMP codec.
Also, added a --debug-level command line option to the imginfo command
for debugging purposes.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 1 | 168,761 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GfxState::setStrokePattern(GfxPattern *pattern) {
if (strokePattern) {
delete strokePattern;
}
strokePattern = pattern;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 1,119 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: jbig2_find_segment(Jbig2Ctx *ctx, uint32_t number)
{
int index, index_max = ctx->segment_index - 1;
const Jbig2Ctx *global_ctx = ctx->global_ctx;
/* FIXME: binary search would be better */
for (index = index_max; index >= 0; index--)
if (ctx->segments[index]->number == number)
return (ctx->segments[index]);
if (global_ctx)
for (index = global_ctx->segment_index - 1; index >= 0; index--)
if (global_ctx->segments[index]->number == number)
return (global_ctx->segments[index]);
/* didn't find a match */
return NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 18,069 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: blink::WebApplicationCacheHost* RenderFrameImpl::createApplicationCacheHost(
blink::WebLocalFrame* frame,
blink::WebApplicationCacheHostClient* client) {
if (!frame || !frame->view())
return NULL;
DCHECK(!frame_ || frame_ == frame);
return new RendererWebApplicationCacheHostImpl(
RenderViewImpl::FromWebView(frame->view()), client,
RenderThreadImpl::current()->appcache_dispatcher()->backend_proxy());
}
Commit Message: Add logging to figure out which IPC we're failing to deserialize in RenderFrame.
BUG=369553
R=creis@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/263833020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@268565 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 110,221 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Horizontal_Sweep_Step( RAS_ARG )
{
/* Nothing, really */
FT_UNUSED_RASTER;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 7,028 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int kvm_read_guest_virt_system(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
gva_t addr, void *val, unsigned int bytes,
struct x86_exception *exception)
{
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = emul_to_vcpu(ctxt);
return kvm_read_guest_virt_helper(addr, val, bytes, vcpu, 0, exception);
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 20,806 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int suspend_set_state(struct regulator_dev *rdev,
struct regulator_state *rstate)
{
int ret = 0;
/* If we have no suspend mode configration don't set anything;
* only warn if the driver implements set_suspend_voltage or
* set_suspend_mode callback.
*/
if (!rstate->enabled && !rstate->disabled) {
if (rdev->desc->ops->set_suspend_voltage ||
rdev->desc->ops->set_suspend_mode)
rdev_warn(rdev, "No configuration\n");
return 0;
}
if (rstate->enabled && rstate->disabled) {
rdev_err(rdev, "invalid configuration\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (rstate->enabled && rdev->desc->ops->set_suspend_enable)
ret = rdev->desc->ops->set_suspend_enable(rdev);
else if (rstate->disabled && rdev->desc->ops->set_suspend_disable)
ret = rdev->desc->ops->set_suspend_disable(rdev);
else /* OK if set_suspend_enable or set_suspend_disable is NULL */
ret = 0;
if (ret < 0) {
rdev_err(rdev, "failed to enabled/disable\n");
return ret;
}
if (rdev->desc->ops->set_suspend_voltage && rstate->uV > 0) {
ret = rdev->desc->ops->set_suspend_voltage(rdev, rstate->uV);
if (ret < 0) {
rdev_err(rdev, "failed to set voltage\n");
return ret;
}
}
if (rdev->desc->ops->set_suspend_mode && rstate->mode > 0) {
ret = rdev->desc->ops->set_suspend_mode(rdev, rstate->mode);
if (ret < 0) {
rdev_err(rdev, "failed to set mode\n");
return ret;
}
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: regulator: core: Fix regualtor_ena_gpio_free not to access pin after freeing
After freeing pin from regulator_ena_gpio_free, loop can access
the pin. So this patch fixes not to access pin after freeing.
Signed-off-by: Seung-Woo Kim <sw0312.kim@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 74,566 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool check_underflow(const struct ipt_entry *e)
{
const struct xt_entry_target *t;
unsigned int verdict;
if (!unconditional(&e->ip))
return false;
t = ipt_get_target_c(e);
if (strcmp(t->u.user.name, XT_STANDARD_TARGET) != 0)
return false;
verdict = ((struct xt_standard_target *)t)->verdict;
verdict = -verdict - 1;
return verdict == NF_DROP || verdict == NF_ACCEPT;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: make sure e->next_offset covers remaining blob size
Otherwise this function may read data beyond the ruleset blob.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 52,273 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void simple_free_urb(struct urb *urb)
{
unsigned long offset = buffer_offset(urb->transfer_buffer);
if (urb->transfer_flags & URB_NO_TRANSFER_DMA_MAP)
usb_free_coherent(
urb->dev,
urb->transfer_buffer_length + offset,
urb->transfer_buffer - offset,
urb->transfer_dma - offset);
else
kfree(urb->transfer_buffer - offset);
usb_free_urb(urb);
}
Commit Message: usb: usbtest: fix NULL pointer dereference
If the usbtest driver encounters a device with an IN bulk endpoint but
no OUT bulk endpoint, it will try to dereference a NULL pointer
(out->desc.bEndpointAddress). The problem can be solved by adding a
missing test.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 59,866 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int streamCompareID(streamID *a, streamID *b) {
if (a->ms > b->ms) return 1;
else if (a->ms < b->ms) return -1;
/* The ms part is the same. Check the sequence part. */
else if (a->seq > b->seq) return 1;
else if (a->seq < b->seq) return -1;
/* Everything is the same: IDs are equal. */
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Abort in XGROUP if the key is not a stream
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 81,785 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void IndexedDBTransaction::RemovePendingObservers(
const std::vector<int32_t>& pending_observer_ids) {
const auto& it = std::remove_if(
pending_observers_.begin(), pending_observers_.end(),
[&pending_observer_ids](const std::unique_ptr<IndexedDBObserver>& o) {
return base::ContainsValue(pending_observer_ids, o->id());
});
if (it != pending_observers_.end())
pending_observers_.erase(it, pending_observers_.end());
}
Commit Message: [IndexedDB] Fixing early destruction of connection during forceclose
Patch is as small as possible for merging.
Bug: 842990
Change-Id: I9968ffee1bf3279e61e1ec13e4d541f713caf12f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1062935
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#559383}
CWE ID: | 0 | 155,482 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int gdImageTileGet (gdImagePtr im, int x, int y)
{
int srcx, srcy;
int tileColor,p;
if (!im->tile) {
return -1;
}
srcx = x % gdImageSX(im->tile);
srcy = y % gdImageSY(im->tile);
p = gdImageGetPixel(im->tile, srcx, srcy);
if (p == im->tile->transparent) {
tileColor = im->transparent;
} else if (im->trueColor) {
if (im->tile->trueColor) {
tileColor = p;
} else {
tileColor = gdTrueColorAlpha( gdImageRed(im->tile,p), gdImageGreen(im->tile,p), gdImageBlue (im->tile,p), gdImageAlpha (im->tile,p));
}
} else {
if (im->tile->trueColor) {
tileColor = gdImageColorResolveAlpha(im, gdTrueColorGetRed (p), gdTrueColorGetGreen (p), gdTrueColorGetBlue (p), gdTrueColorGetAlpha (p));
} else {
tileColor = gdImageColorResolveAlpha(im, gdImageRed (im->tile,p), gdImageGreen (im->tile,p), gdImageBlue (im->tile,p), gdImageAlpha (im->tile,p));
}
}
return tileColor;
}
Commit Message: Fix #340: System frozen
gdImageCreate() doesn't check for oversized images and as such is prone
to DoS vulnerabilities. We fix that by applying the same overflow check
that is already in place for gdImageCreateTrueColor().
CVE-2016-9317
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 73,095 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool jsvIsBasicVarEqual(JsVar *a, JsVar *b) {
if (a==b) return true;
if (!a || !b) return false; // one of them is undefined
assert(jsvIsBasic(a) && jsvIsBasic(b));
if (jsvIsNumeric(a) && jsvIsNumeric(b)) {
if (jsvIsIntegerish(a)) {
if (jsvIsIntegerish(b)) {
return a->varData.integer == b->varData.integer;
} else {
assert(jsvIsFloat(b));
return a->varData.integer == b->varData.floating;
}
} else {
assert(jsvIsFloat(a));
if (jsvIsIntegerish(b)) {
return a->varData.floating == b->varData.integer;
} else {
assert(jsvIsFloat(b));
return a->varData.floating == b->varData.floating;
}
}
} else if (jsvIsString(a) && jsvIsString(b)) {
JsvStringIterator ita, itb;
jsvStringIteratorNew(&ita, a, 0);
jsvStringIteratorNew(&itb, b, 0);
while (true) {
char a = jsvStringIteratorGetChar(&ita);
char b = jsvStringIteratorGetChar(&itb);
if (a != b) {
jsvStringIteratorFree(&ita);
jsvStringIteratorFree(&itb);
return false;
}
if (!a) { // equal, but end of string
jsvStringIteratorFree(&ita);
jsvStringIteratorFree(&itb);
return true;
}
jsvStringIteratorNext(&ita);
jsvStringIteratorNext(&itb);
}
return false; // make compiler happy
} else {
return false;
}
}
Commit Message: fix jsvGetString regression
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 82,457 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t SoftOpus::initDecoder() {
return OK;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE codecs: check OMX buffer size before use in (vorbis|opus)dec
Bug: 27833616
Change-Id: I1ccdd16a00741da072527a6d13e87fd7c7fe8c54
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 160,608 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const gfx::ImageSkia* ChromeContentBrowserClient::GetDefaultFavicon() {
ui::ResourceBundle& rb = ui::ResourceBundle::GetSharedInstance();
return rb.GetNativeImageNamed(IDR_DEFAULT_FAVICON).ToImageSkia();
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 142,644 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void netlink_ring_set_copied(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct netlink_sock *nlk = nlk_sk(sk);
struct netlink_ring *ring = &nlk->rx_ring;
struct nl_mmap_hdr *hdr;
spin_lock_bh(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock);
hdr = netlink_current_frame(ring, NL_MMAP_STATUS_UNUSED);
if (hdr == NULL) {
spin_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock);
kfree_skb(skb);
netlink_overrun(sk);
return;
}
netlink_increment_head(ring);
__skb_queue_tail(&sk->sk_receive_queue, skb);
spin_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock);
hdr->nm_len = skb->len;
hdr->nm_group = NETLINK_CB(skb).dst_group;
hdr->nm_pid = NETLINK_CB(skb).creds.pid;
hdr->nm_uid = from_kuid(sk_user_ns(sk), NETLINK_CB(skb).creds.uid);
hdr->nm_gid = from_kgid(sk_user_ns(sk), NETLINK_CB(skb).creds.gid);
netlink_set_status(hdr, NL_MMAP_STATUS_COPY);
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 40,552 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void duplicate(char *name) {
char *fname = check_dir_or_file(name);
if (arg_debug)
printf("Private home: duplicating %s\n", fname);
assert(strncmp(fname, cfg.homedir, strlen(cfg.homedir)) == 0);
struct stat s;
if (stat(fname, &s) == -1) {
free(fname);
return;
}
if(nftw(fname, fs_copydir, 1, FTW_PHYS) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: unable to copy template dir\n");
exit(1);
}
fs_logger_print(); // save the current log
free(fname);
}
Commit Message: security fix
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 68,472 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool show_press() const { return show_press_; }
Commit Message: Pass ui::LatencyInfo correct with unified gesture detector on Aura.
BUG=379812
TEST=GestureRecognizerTest.LatencyPassedFromTouchEvent
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/309823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@274602 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 112,127 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int btrfs_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
umode_t mode, dev_t rdev)
{
struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans;
struct btrfs_root *root = BTRFS_I(dir)->root;
struct inode *inode = NULL;
int err;
int drop_inode = 0;
u64 objectid;
u64 index = 0;
if (!new_valid_dev(rdev))
return -EINVAL;
/*
* 2 for inode item and ref
* 2 for dir items
* 1 for xattr if selinux is on
*/
trans = btrfs_start_transaction(root, 5);
if (IS_ERR(trans))
return PTR_ERR(trans);
err = btrfs_find_free_ino(root, &objectid);
if (err)
goto out_unlock;
inode = btrfs_new_inode(trans, root, dir, dentry->d_name.name,
dentry->d_name.len, btrfs_ino(dir), objectid,
mode, &index);
if (IS_ERR(inode)) {
err = PTR_ERR(inode);
goto out_unlock;
}
/*
* If the active LSM wants to access the inode during
* d_instantiate it needs these. Smack checks to see
* if the filesystem supports xattrs by looking at the
* ops vector.
*/
inode->i_op = &btrfs_special_inode_operations;
init_special_inode(inode, inode->i_mode, rdev);
err = btrfs_init_inode_security(trans, inode, dir, &dentry->d_name);
if (err)
goto out_unlock_inode;
err = btrfs_add_nondir(trans, dir, dentry, inode, 0, index);
if (err) {
goto out_unlock_inode;
} else {
btrfs_update_inode(trans, root, inode);
unlock_new_inode(inode);
d_instantiate(dentry, inode);
}
out_unlock:
btrfs_end_transaction(trans, root);
btrfs_balance_delayed_items(root);
btrfs_btree_balance_dirty(root);
if (drop_inode) {
inode_dec_link_count(inode);
iput(inode);
}
return err;
out_unlock_inode:
drop_inode = 1;
unlock_new_inode(inode);
goto out_unlock;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix truncation of compressed and inlined extents
When truncating a file to a smaller size which consists of an inline
extent that is compressed, we did not discard (or made unusable) the
data between the new file size and the old file size, wasting metadata
space and allowing for the truncated data to be leaked and the data
corruption/loss mentioned below.
We were also not correctly decrementing the number of bytes used by the
inode, we were setting it to zero, giving a wrong report for callers of
the stat(2) syscall. The fsck tool also reported an error about a mismatch
between the nbytes of the file versus the real space used by the file.
Now because we weren't discarding the truncated region of the file, it
was possible for a caller of the clone ioctl to actually read the data
that was truncated, allowing for a security breach without requiring root
access to the system, using only standard filesystem operations. The
scenario is the following:
1) User A creates a file which consists of an inline and compressed
extent with a size of 2000 bytes - the file is not accessible to
any other users (no read, write or execution permission for anyone
else);
2) The user truncates the file to a size of 1000 bytes;
3) User A makes the file world readable;
4) User B creates a file consisting of an inline extent of 2000 bytes;
5) User B issues a clone operation from user A's file into its own
file (using a length argument of 0, clone the whole range);
6) User B now gets to see the 1000 bytes that user A truncated from
its file before it made its file world readbale. User B also lost
the bytes in the range [1000, 2000[ bytes from its own file, but
that might be ok if his/her intention was reading stale data from
user A that was never supposed to be public.
Note that this contrasts with the case where we truncate a file from 2000
bytes to 1000 bytes and then truncate it back from 1000 to 2000 bytes. In
this case reading any byte from the range [1000, 2000[ will return a value
of 0x00, instead of the original data.
This problem exists since the clone ioctl was added and happens both with
and without my recent data loss and file corruption fixes for the clone
ioctl (patch "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents").
So fix this by truncating the compressed inline extents as we do for the
non-compressed case, which involves decompressing, if the data isn't already
in the page cache, compressing the truncated version of the extent, writing
the compressed content into the inline extent and then truncate it.
The following test case for fstests reproduces the problem. In order for
the test to pass both this fix and my previous fix for the clone ioctl
that forbids cloning a smaller inline extent into a larger one,
which is titled "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents", are needed. Without that other fix the test fails in a
different way that does not leak the truncated data, instead part of
destination file gets replaced with zeroes (because the destination file
has a larger inline extent than the source).
seq=`basename $0`
seqres=$RESULT_DIR/$seq
echo "QA output created by $seq"
tmp=/tmp/$$
status=1 # failure is the default!
trap "_cleanup; exit \$status" 0 1 2 3 15
_cleanup()
{
rm -f $tmp.*
}
# get standard environment, filters and checks
. ./common/rc
. ./common/filter
# real QA test starts here
_need_to_be_root
_supported_fs btrfs
_supported_os Linux
_require_scratch
_require_cloner
rm -f $seqres.full
_scratch_mkfs >>$seqres.full 2>&1
_scratch_mount "-o compress"
# Create our test files. File foo is going to be the source of a clone operation
# and consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of 512 bytes,
# while file bar consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of
# 256 bytes. For our test's purpose, it's important that file bar has an inline
# extent with a size smaller than foo's inline extent.
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xa1 0 128" \
-c "pwrite -S 0x2a 128 384" \
$SCRATCH_MNT/foo | _filter_xfs_io
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xbb 0 256" $SCRATCH_MNT/bar | _filter_xfs_io
# Now durably persist all metadata and data. We do this to make sure that we get
# on disk an inline extent with a size of 512 bytes for file foo.
sync
# Now truncate our file foo to a smaller size. Because it consists of a
# compressed and inline extent, btrfs did not shrink the inline extent to the
# new size (if the extent was not compressed, btrfs would shrink it to 128
# bytes), it only updates the inode's i_size to 128 bytes.
$XFS_IO_PROG -c "truncate 128" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo
# Now clone foo's inline extent into bar.
# This clone operation should fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP because the source
# file consists only of an inline extent and the file's size is smaller than
# the inline extent of the destination (128 bytes < 256 bytes). However the
# clone ioctl was not prepared to deal with a file that has a size smaller
# than the size of its inline extent (something that happens only for compressed
# inline extents), resulting in copying the full inline extent from the source
# file into the destination file.
#
# Note that btrfs' clone operation for inline extents consists of removing the
# inline extent from the destination inode and copy the inline extent from the
# source inode into the destination inode, meaning that if the destination
# inode's inline extent is larger (N bytes) than the source inode's inline
# extent (M bytes), some bytes (N - M bytes) will be lost from the destination
# file. Btrfs could copy the source inline extent's data into the destination's
# inline extent so that we would not lose any data, but that's currently not
# done due to the complexity that would be needed to deal with such cases
# (specially when one or both extents are compressed), returning EOPNOTSUPP, as
# it's normally not a very common case to clone very small files (only case
# where we get inline extents) and copying inline extents does not save any
# space (unlike for normal, non-inlined extents).
$CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Now because the above clone operation used to succeed, and due to foo's inline
# extent not being shinked by the truncate operation, our file bar got the whole
# inline extent copied from foo, making us lose the last 128 bytes from bar
# which got replaced by the bytes in range [128, 256[ from foo before foo was
# truncated - in other words, data loss from bar and being able to read old and
# stale data from foo that should not be possible to read anymore through normal
# filesystem operations. Contrast with the case where we truncate a file from a
# size N to a smaller size M, truncate it back to size N and then read the range
# [M, N[, we should always get the value 0x00 for all the bytes in that range.
# We expected the clone operation to fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP and therefore
# not modify our file's bar data/metadata. So its content should be 256 bytes
# long with all bytes having the value 0xbb.
#
# Without the btrfs bug fix, the clone operation succeeded and resulted in
# leaking truncated data from foo, the bytes that belonged to its range
# [128, 256[, and losing data from bar in that same range. So reading the
# file gave us the following content:
#
# 0000000 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1
# *
# 0000200 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a
# *
# 0000400
echo "File bar's content after the clone operation:"
od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Also because the foo's inline extent was not shrunk by the truncate
# operation, btrfs' fsck, which is run by the fstests framework everytime a
# test completes, failed reporting the following error:
#
# root 5 inode 257 errors 400, nbytes wrong
status=0
exit
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 41,655 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NavigationRequest::CommitErrorPage(
RenderFrameHostImpl* render_frame_host,
const base::Optional<std::string>& error_page_content) {
UpdateRequestNavigationParamsHistory();
frame_tree_node_->TransferNavigationRequestOwnership(render_frame_host);
if (IsPerNavigationMojoInterfaceEnabled() && request_navigation_client_ &&
request_navigation_client_.is_bound()) {
IgnorePipeDisconnection();
if (associated_site_instance_id_ ==
render_frame_host->GetSiteInstance()->GetId()) {
commit_navigation_client_ = std::move(request_navigation_client_);
}
associated_site_instance_id_.reset();
}
navigation_handle_->ReadyToCommitNavigation(render_frame_host, true);
render_frame_host->FailedNavigation(
navigation_handle_->GetNavigationId(), common_params_, request_params_,
has_stale_copy_in_cache_, net_error_, error_page_content);
}
Commit Message: Use an opaque URL rather than an empty URL for request's site for cookies.
Apparently this makes a big difference to the cookie settings backend.
Bug: 881715
Change-Id: Id87fa0c6a858bae6a3f8fff4d6af3f974b00d5e4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1212846
Commit-Queue: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#589512}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 132,938 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: EXPORTED int mboxlist_alluser(user_cb *proc, void *rock)
{
struct alluser_rock urock;
int r = 0;
urock.prev = NULL;
urock.proc = proc;
urock.rock = rock;
r = mboxlist_allmbox(NULL, alluser_cb, &urock, /*flags*/0);
free(urock.prev);
return r;
}
Commit Message: mboxlist: fix uninitialised memory use where pattern is "Other Users"
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 61,246 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static u64 __get_spte_lockless(u64 *sptep)
{
return ACCESS_ONCE(*sptep);
}
Commit Message: nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <nyh@il.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <xinhao.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 37,386 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void activeExpireCycle(int type) {
/* This function has some global state in order to continue the work
* incrementally across calls. */
static unsigned int current_db = 0; /* Last DB tested. */
static int timelimit_exit = 0; /* Time limit hit in previous call? */
static long long last_fast_cycle = 0; /* When last fast cycle ran. */
int j, iteration = 0;
int dbs_per_call = CRON_DBS_PER_CALL;
long long start = ustime(), timelimit;
if (type == ACTIVE_EXPIRE_CYCLE_FAST) {
/* Don't start a fast cycle if the previous cycle did not exited
* for time limt. Also don't repeat a fast cycle for the same period
* as the fast cycle total duration itself. */
if (!timelimit_exit) return;
if (start < last_fast_cycle + ACTIVE_EXPIRE_CYCLE_FAST_DURATION*2) return;
last_fast_cycle = start;
}
/* We usually should test CRON_DBS_PER_CALL per iteration, with
* two exceptions:
*
* 1) Don't test more DBs than we have.
* 2) If last time we hit the time limit, we want to scan all DBs
* in this iteration, as there is work to do in some DB and we don't want
* expired keys to use memory for too much time. */
if (dbs_per_call > server.dbnum || timelimit_exit)
dbs_per_call = server.dbnum;
/* We can use at max ACTIVE_EXPIRE_CYCLE_SLOW_TIME_PERC percentage of CPU time
* per iteration. Since this function gets called with a frequency of
* server.hz times per second, the following is the max amount of
* microseconds we can spend in this function. */
timelimit = 1000000*ACTIVE_EXPIRE_CYCLE_SLOW_TIME_PERC/server.hz/100;
timelimit_exit = 0;
if (timelimit <= 0) timelimit = 1;
if (type == ACTIVE_EXPIRE_CYCLE_FAST)
timelimit = ACTIVE_EXPIRE_CYCLE_FAST_DURATION; /* in microseconds. */
for (j = 0; j < dbs_per_call; j++) {
int expired;
redisDb *db = server.db+(current_db % server.dbnum);
/* Increment the DB now so we are sure if we run out of time
* in the current DB we'll restart from the next. This allows to
* distribute the time evenly across DBs. */
current_db++;
/* Continue to expire if at the end of the cycle more than 25%
* of the keys were expired. */
do {
unsigned long num, slots;
long long now, ttl_sum;
int ttl_samples;
/* If there is nothing to expire try next DB ASAP. */
if ((num = dictSize(db->expires)) == 0) {
db->avg_ttl = 0;
break;
}
slots = dictSlots(db->expires);
now = mstime();
/* When there are less than 1% filled slots getting random
* keys is expensive, so stop here waiting for better times...
* The dictionary will be resized asap. */
if (num && slots > DICT_HT_INITIAL_SIZE &&
(num*100/slots < 1)) break;
/* The main collection cycle. Sample random keys among keys
* with an expire set, checking for expired ones. */
expired = 0;
ttl_sum = 0;
ttl_samples = 0;
if (num > ACTIVE_EXPIRE_CYCLE_LOOKUPS_PER_LOOP)
num = ACTIVE_EXPIRE_CYCLE_LOOKUPS_PER_LOOP;
while (num--) {
dictEntry *de;
long long ttl;
if ((de = dictGetRandomKey(db->expires)) == NULL) break;
ttl = dictGetSignedIntegerVal(de)-now;
if (activeExpireCycleTryExpire(db,de,now)) expired++;
if (ttl > 0) {
/* We want the average TTL of keys yet not expired. */
ttl_sum += ttl;
ttl_samples++;
}
}
/* Update the average TTL stats for this database. */
if (ttl_samples) {
long long avg_ttl = ttl_sum/ttl_samples;
/* Do a simple running average with a few samples.
* We just use the current estimate with a weight of 2%
* and the previous estimate with a weight of 98%. */
if (db->avg_ttl == 0) db->avg_ttl = avg_ttl;
db->avg_ttl = (db->avg_ttl/50)*49 + (avg_ttl/50);
}
/* We can't block forever here even if there are many keys to
* expire. So after a given amount of milliseconds return to the
* caller waiting for the other active expire cycle. */
iteration++;
if ((iteration & 0xf) == 0) { /* check once every 16 iterations. */
long long elapsed = ustime()-start;
latencyAddSampleIfNeeded("expire-cycle",elapsed/1000);
if (elapsed > timelimit) timelimit_exit = 1;
}
if (timelimit_exit) return;
/* We don't repeat the cycle if there are less than 25% of keys
* found expired in the current DB. */
} while (expired > ACTIVE_EXPIRE_CYCLE_LOOKUPS_PER_LOOP/4);
}
}
Commit Message: Security: Cross Protocol Scripting protection.
This is an attempt at mitigating problems due to cross protocol
scripting, an attack targeting services using line oriented protocols
like Redis that can accept HTTP requests as valid protocol, by
discarding the invalid parts and accepting the payloads sent, for
example, via a POST request.
For this to be effective, when we detect POST and Host: and terminate
the connection asynchronously, the networking code was modified in order
to never process further input. It was later verified that in a
pipelined request containing a POST command, the successive commands are
not executed.
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 69,991 |
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