instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void smb2cli_req_set_credit_charge(struct tevent_req *req, uint16_t charge)
{
struct smbXcli_req_state *state =
tevent_req_data(req,
struct smbXcli_req_state);
state->smb2.credit_charge = charge;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 2,450 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool bsg_complete(struct bsg_device *bd)
{
bool ret = false;
bool spin;
do {
spin_lock_irq(&bd->lock);
BUG_ON(bd->done_cmds > bd->queued_cmds);
/*
* All commands consumed.
*/
if (bd->done_cmds == bd->queued_cmds)
ret = true;
spin = !test_bit(BSG_F_BLOCK, &bd->flags);
spin_unlock_irq(&bd->lock);
} while (!ret && spin);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: sg_write()/bsg_write() is not fit to be called under KERNEL_DS
Both damn things interpret userland pointers embedded into the payload;
worse, they are actually traversing those. Leaving aside the bad
API design, this is very much _not_ safe to call with KERNEL_DS.
Bail out early if that happens.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 47,652 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PreconnectManager* LoadingPredictor::preconnect_manager() {
if (shutdown_ || !IsPreconnectFeatureEnabled())
return nullptr;
if (!preconnect_manager_) {
preconnect_manager_ =
std::make_unique<PreconnectManager>(GetWeakPtr(), profile_);
}
return preconnect_manager_.get();
}
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 136,860 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoTexParameterfv(
GLenum target, GLenum pname, const GLfloat* params) {
TextureManager::TextureInfo* info = GetTextureInfoForTarget(target);
if (!info) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glTexParameterfv: unknown texture");
return;
}
if (!texture_manager()->SetParameter(
feature_info_, info, pname, static_cast<GLint>(params[0]))) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "glTexParameterfv: param GL_INVALID_ENUM");
return;
}
glTexParameterfv(target, pname, params);
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 99,172 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void SetAssociatedAlpha(const Image *image,CubeInfo *cube_info)
{
MagickBooleanType
associate_alpha;
associate_alpha=image->matte;
if ((cube_info->quantize_info->number_colors == 2) &&
(cube_info->quantize_info->colorspace == GRAYColorspace))
associate_alpha=MagickFalse;
cube_info->associate_alpha=associate_alpha;
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/574
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 62,730 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool venc_dev::venc_get_peak_bitrate(OMX_U32 *peakbitrate)
{
if (!peakbitrate) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Null pointer error");
return false;
} else {
*peakbitrate = peak_bitrate.peakbitrate;
return true;
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: add checks before accessing heap pointers
Heap pointers do not point to user virtual addresses in case
of secure session.
Set them to NULL and add checks to avoid accesing them
Bug: 28815329
Bug: 28920116
Change-Id: I94fd5808e753b58654d65e175d3857ef46ffba26
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 159,264 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void vhost_vq_reset(struct vhost_dev *dev,
struct vhost_virtqueue *vq)
{
vq->num = 1;
vq->desc = NULL;
vq->avail = NULL;
vq->used = NULL;
vq->last_avail_idx = 0;
vq->avail_idx = 0;
vq->last_used_idx = 0;
vq->signalled_used = 0;
vq->signalled_used_valid = false;
vq->used_flags = 0;
vq->log_used = false;
vq->log_addr = -1ull;
vq->private_data = NULL;
vq->acked_features = 0;
vq->log_base = NULL;
vq->error_ctx = NULL;
vq->error = NULL;
vq->kick = NULL;
vq->call_ctx = NULL;
vq->call = NULL;
vq->log_ctx = NULL;
vq->memory = NULL;
vq->is_le = virtio_legacy_is_little_endian();
vhost_vq_reset_user_be(vq);
}
Commit Message: vhost: actually track log eventfd file
While reviewing vhost log code, I found out that log_file is never
set. Note: I haven't tested the change (QEMU doesn't use LOG_FD yet).
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 42,240 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TitleCard(const base::string16& message, views::ButtonListener* listener,
views::ImageButton** back_button) {
back_button_ = CreateBackButton(listener);
*back_button = back_button_;
title_label_ =
new views::Label(message, views::style::CONTEXT_DIALOG_TITLE);
title_label_->SetHorizontalAlignment(gfx::ALIGN_CENTER);
AddChildView(back_button_);
AddChildView(title_label_);
}
Commit Message: [signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <droger@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <isherman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <msarda@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 143,179 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cleanup_pathname_win(struct archive_write_disk *a)
{
wchar_t wc;
char *p;
size_t alen, l;
int mb, complete, utf8;
alen = 0;
mb = 0;
complete = 1;
utf8 = (strcmp(nl_langinfo(CODESET), "UTF-8") == 0)? 1: 0;
for (p = a->name; *p != '\0'; p++) {
++alen;
if (*p == '\\') {
/* If previous byte is smaller than 128,
* this is not second byte of multibyte characters,
* so we can replace '\' with '/'. */
if (utf8 || !mb)
*p = '/';
else
complete = 0;/* uncompleted. */
} else if (*(unsigned char *)p > 127)
mb = 1;
else
mb = 0;
/* Rewrite the path name if its next character is unusable. */
if (*p == ':' || *p == '*' || *p == '?' || *p == '"' ||
*p == '<' || *p == '>' || *p == '|')
*p = '_';
}
if (complete)
return;
/*
* Convert path separator in wide-character.
*/
p = a->name;
while (*p != '\0' && alen) {
l = mbtowc(&wc, p, alen);
if (l == (size_t)-1) {
while (*p != '\0') {
if (*p == '\\')
*p = '/';
++p;
}
break;
}
if (l == 1 && wc == L'\\')
*p = '/';
p += l;
alen -= l;
}
}
Commit Message: Add ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS option
This fixes a directory traversal in the cpio tool.
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 43,902 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool btif_config_get_int(const char *section, const char *key, int *value) {
assert(config != NULL);
assert(section != NULL);
assert(key != NULL);
assert(value != NULL);
pthread_mutex_lock(&lock);
bool ret = config_has_key(config, section, key);
if (ret)
*value = config_get_int(config, section, key, *value);
pthread_mutex_unlock(&lock);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Add guest mode functionality (2/3)
Add a flag to enable() to start Bluetooth in restricted
mode. In restricted mode, all devices that are paired during
restricted mode are deleted upon leaving restricted mode.
Right now restricted mode is only entered while a guest
user is active.
Bug: 27410683
Change-Id: I8f23d28ef0aa3a8df13d469c73005c8e1b894d19
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 159,658 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SpdyWriteQueue::RemovePendingWritesForStream(
const base::WeakPtr<SpdyStream>& stream) {
CHECK(!removing_writes_);
removing_writes_ = true;
RequestPriority priority = stream->priority();
CHECK_GE(priority, MINIMUM_PRIORITY);
CHECK_LE(priority, MAXIMUM_PRIORITY);
DCHECK(stream.get());
#if DCHECK_IS_ON
for (int i = MINIMUM_PRIORITY; i <= MAXIMUM_PRIORITY; ++i) {
if (priority == i)
continue;
for (std::deque<PendingWrite>::const_iterator it = queue_[i].begin();
it != queue_[i].end(); ++it) {
DCHECK_NE(it->stream.get(), stream.get());
}
}
#endif
std::deque<PendingWrite>* queue = &queue_[priority];
std::deque<PendingWrite>::iterator out_it = queue->begin();
for (std::deque<PendingWrite>::const_iterator it = queue->begin();
it != queue->end(); ++it) {
if (it->stream.get() == stream.get()) {
delete it->frame_producer;
} else {
*out_it = *it;
++out_it;
}
}
queue->erase(out_it, queue->end());
removing_writes_ = false;
}
Commit Message: These can post callbacks which re-enter into SpdyWriteQueue.
BUG=369539
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/265933007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@268730 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 1 | 171,674 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int encode_write(struct xdr_stream *xdr, const struct nfs_writeargs *args)
{
__be32 *p;
RESERVE_SPACE(4);
WRITE32(OP_WRITE);
encode_stateid(xdr, args->context);
RESERVE_SPACE(16);
WRITE64(args->offset);
WRITE32(args->stable);
WRITE32(args->count);
xdr_write_pages(xdr, args->pages, args->pgbase, args->count);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 23,093 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2Implementation::RequestExtensionCHROMIUM(const char* extension) {
GPU_CLIENT_SINGLE_THREAD_CHECK();
GPU_CLIENT_LOG("[" << GetLogPrefix() << "] glRequestExtensionCHROMIUM("
<< extension << ")");
InvalidateCachedExtensions();
SetBucketAsCString(kResultBucketId, extension);
helper_->RequestExtensionCHROMIUM(kResultBucketId);
helper_->SetBucketSize(kResultBucketId, 0);
struct ExtensionCheck {
const char* extension;
ExtensionStatus* status;
};
const ExtensionCheck checks[] = {
{
"GL_CHROMIUM_framebuffer_multisample",
&chromium_framebuffer_multisample_,
},
};
const size_t kNumChecks = sizeof(checks) / sizeof(checks[0]);
for (size_t ii = 0; ii < kNumChecks; ++ii) {
const ExtensionCheck& check = checks[ii];
if (*check.status == kUnavailableExtensionStatus &&
!strcmp(extension, check.extension)) {
*check.status = kUnknownExtensionStatus;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,108 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __split_and_process_non_flush(struct clone_info *ci)
{
struct bio *bio = ci->bio;
struct dm_target *ti;
unsigned len;
int r;
if (unlikely(bio_op(bio) == REQ_OP_DISCARD))
return __send_discard(ci);
else if (unlikely(bio_op(bio) == REQ_OP_WRITE_SAME))
return __send_write_same(ci);
else if (unlikely(bio_op(bio) == REQ_OP_WRITE_ZEROES))
return __send_write_zeroes(ci);
ti = dm_table_find_target(ci->map, ci->sector);
if (!dm_target_is_valid(ti))
return -EIO;
if (bio_op(bio) == REQ_OP_ZONE_REPORT)
len = ci->sector_count;
else
len = min_t(sector_t, max_io_len(ci->sector, ti),
ci->sector_count);
r = __clone_and_map_data_bio(ci, ti, ci->sector, &len);
if (r < 0)
return r;
ci->sector += len;
ci->sector_count -= len;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: dm: fix race between dm_get_from_kobject() and __dm_destroy()
The following BUG_ON was hit when testing repeat creation and removal of
DM devices:
kernel BUG at drivers/md/dm.c:2919!
CPU: 7 PID: 750 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 4.1.44
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81649e8b>] dm_get_from_kobject+0x34/0x3a
[<ffffffff81650ef1>] dm_attr_show+0x2b/0x5e
[<ffffffff817b46d1>] ? mutex_lock+0x26/0x44
[<ffffffff811df7f5>] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x83/0xcf
[<ffffffff811de257>] kernfs_seq_show+0x23/0x25
[<ffffffff81199118>] seq_read+0x16f/0x325
[<ffffffff811de994>] kernfs_fop_read+0x3a/0x13f
[<ffffffff8117b625>] __vfs_read+0x26/0x9d
[<ffffffff8130eb59>] ? security_file_permission+0x3c/0x44
[<ffffffff8117bdb8>] ? rw_verify_area+0x83/0xd9
[<ffffffff8117be9d>] vfs_read+0x8f/0xcf
[<ffffffff81193e34>] ? __fdget_pos+0x12/0x41
[<ffffffff8117c686>] SyS_read+0x4b/0x76
[<ffffffff817b606e>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x71
The bug can be easily triggered, if an extra delay (e.g. 10ms) is added
between the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and dm_get() in
dm_get_from_kobject().
To fix it, we need to ensure the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and
dm_get() are done in an atomic way, so _minor_lock is used.
The other callers of dm_get() have also been checked to be OK: some
callers invoke dm_get() under _minor_lock, some callers invoke it under
_hash_lock, and dm_start_request() invoke it after increasing
md->open_count.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 85,854 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static u64 *rmap_get_next(struct rmap_iterator *iter)
{
if (iter->desc) {
if (iter->pos < PTE_LIST_EXT - 1) {
u64 *sptep;
++iter->pos;
sptep = iter->desc->sptes[iter->pos];
if (sptep)
return sptep;
}
iter->desc = iter->desc->more;
if (iter->desc) {
iter->pos = 0;
/* desc->sptes[0] cannot be NULL */
return iter->desc->sptes[iter->pos];
}
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <nyh@il.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <xinhao.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 37,581 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static long ffs_epfile_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned code,
unsigned long value)
{
struct ffs_epfile *epfile = file->private_data;
int ret;
ENTER();
if (WARN_ON(epfile->ffs->state != FFS_ACTIVE))
return -ENODEV;
spin_lock_irq(&epfile->ffs->eps_lock);
if (likely(epfile->ep)) {
switch (code) {
case FUNCTIONFS_FIFO_STATUS:
ret = usb_ep_fifo_status(epfile->ep->ep);
break;
case FUNCTIONFS_FIFO_FLUSH:
usb_ep_fifo_flush(epfile->ep->ep);
ret = 0;
break;
case FUNCTIONFS_CLEAR_HALT:
ret = usb_ep_clear_halt(epfile->ep->ep);
break;
case FUNCTIONFS_ENDPOINT_REVMAP:
ret = epfile->ep->num;
break;
case FUNCTIONFS_ENDPOINT_DESC:
{
int desc_idx;
struct usb_endpoint_descriptor *desc;
switch (epfile->ffs->gadget->speed) {
case USB_SPEED_SUPER:
desc_idx = 2;
break;
case USB_SPEED_HIGH:
desc_idx = 1;
break;
default:
desc_idx = 0;
}
desc = epfile->ep->descs[desc_idx];
spin_unlock_irq(&epfile->ffs->eps_lock);
ret = copy_to_user((void *)value, desc, sizeof(*desc));
if (ret)
ret = -EFAULT;
return ret;
}
default:
ret = -ENOTTY;
}
} else {
ret = -ENODEV;
}
spin_unlock_irq(&epfile->ffs->eps_lock);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: usb: gadget: f_fs: Fix use-after-free
When using asynchronous read or write operations on the USB endpoints the
issuer of the IO request is notified by calling the ki_complete() callback
of the submitted kiocb when the URB has been completed.
Calling this ki_complete() callback will free kiocb. Make sure that the
structure is no longer accessed beyond that point, otherwise undefined
behaviour might occur.
Fixes: 2e4c7553cd6f ("usb: gadget: f_fs: add aio support")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.15+
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 49,603 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int should_retry(AVIOContext *pb, int error_code) {
if (error_code == AVERROR_EOF || avio_feof(pb))
return 0;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: avformat/mov: Fix DoS in read_tfra()
Fixes: Missing EOF check in loop
No testcase
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-834 | 0 | 61,490 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tun_attach_filter(struct tun_struct *tun)
{
int i, ret = 0;
struct tun_file *tfile;
for (i = 0; i < tun->numqueues; i++) {
tfile = rtnl_dereference(tun->tfiles[i]);
lock_sock(tfile->socket.sk);
ret = sk_attach_filter(&tun->fprog, tfile->socket.sk);
release_sock(tfile->socket.sk);
if (ret) {
tun_detach_filter(tun, i);
return ret;
}
}
tun->filter_attached = true;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: tun: call dev_get_valid_name() before register_netdevice()
register_netdevice() could fail early when we have an invalid
dev name, in which case ->ndo_uninit() is not called. For tun
device, this is a problem because a timer etc. are already
initialized and it expects ->ndo_uninit() to clean them up.
We could move these initializations into a ->ndo_init() so
that register_netdevice() knows better, however this is still
complicated due to the logic in tun_detach().
Therefore, I choose to just call dev_get_valid_name() before
register_netdevice(), which is quicker and much easier to audit.
And for this specific case, it is already enough.
Fixes: 96442e42429e ("tuntap: choose the txq based on rxq")
Reported-by: Dmitry Alexeev <avekceeb@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 93,262 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PlatformSensorAccelerometerMac::PollForData() {
float axis_value[3];
if (!sudden_motion_sensor_->ReadSensorValues(axis_value))
return;
SensorReading reading;
reading.accel.timestamp =
(base::TimeTicks::Now() - base::TimeTicks()).InSecondsF();
reading.accel.x = axis_value[0] * kMeanGravity;
reading.accel.y = axis_value[1] * kMeanGravity;
reading.accel.z = axis_value[2] * kMeanGravity;
if (IsSignificantlyDifferent(reading_, reading)) {
reading_ = reading;
UpdateSharedBufferAndNotifyClients(reading);
}
}
Commit Message: android: Fix sensors in device service.
This patch fixes a bug that prevented more than one sensor data
to be available at once when using the device motion/orientation
API.
The issue was introduced by this other patch [1] which fixed
some security-related issues in the way shared memory region
handles are managed throughout Chromium (more details at
https://crbug.com/789959).
The device service´s sensor implementation doesn´t work
correctly because it assumes it is possible to create a
writable mapping of a given shared memory region at any
time. This assumption is not correct on Android, once an
Ashmem region has been turned read-only, such mappings
are no longer possible.
To fix the implementation, this CL changes the following:
- PlatformSensor used to require moving a
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping into the newly-created
instance. Said mapping being owned by and destroyed
with the PlatformSensor instance.
With this patch, the constructor instead takes a single
pointer to the corresponding SensorReadingSharedBuffer,
i.e. the area in memory where the sensor-specific
reading data is located, and can be either updated
or read-from.
Note that the PlatformSensor does not own the mapping
anymore.
- PlatformSensorProviderBase holds the *single* writable
mapping that is used to store all SensorReadingSharedBuffer
buffers. It is created just after the region itself,
and thus can be used even after the region's access
mode has been changed to read-only.
Addresses within the mapping will be passed to
PlatformSensor constructors, computed from the
mapping's base address plus a sensor-specific
offset.
The mapping is now owned by the
PlatformSensorProviderBase instance.
Note that, security-wise, nothing changes, because all
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping before the patch actually
pointed to the same writable-page in memory anyway.
Since unit or integration tests didn't catch the regression
when [1] was submitted, this patch was tested manually by
running a newly-built Chrome apk in the Android emulator
and on a real device running Android O.
[1] https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/805238
BUG=805146
R=mattcary@chromium.org,alexilin@chromium.org,juncai@chromium.org,reillyg@chromium.org
Change-Id: I7d60a1cad278f48c361d2ece5a90de10eb082b44
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891180
Commit-Queue: David Turner <digit@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Cary <mattcary@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandr Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532607}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 148,930 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: put_ofp14_queue_rate(struct ofpbuf *reply,
enum ofp14_queue_desc_prop_type type, uint16_t rate)
{
if (rate != UINT16_MAX) {
ofpprop_put_u16(reply, type, rate);
}
}
Commit Message: ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <pkusunyifeng@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 77,740 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: JsVar *jsvAsFlatString(JsVar *var) {
if (jsvIsFlatString(var)) return jsvLockAgain(var);
JsVar *str = jsvAsString(var, false);
size_t len = jsvGetStringLength(str);
JsVar *flat = jsvNewFlatStringOfLength((unsigned int)len);
if (flat) {
JsvStringIterator src;
JsvStringIterator dst;
jsvStringIteratorNew(&src, str, 0);
jsvStringIteratorNew(&dst, flat, 0);
while (len--) {
jsvStringIteratorSetChar(&dst, jsvStringIteratorGetChar(&src));
if (len>0) {
jsvStringIteratorNext(&src);
jsvStringIteratorNext(&dst);
}
}
jsvStringIteratorFree(&src);
jsvStringIteratorFree(&dst);
}
jsvUnLock(str);
return flat;
}
Commit Message: fix jsvGetString regression
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 82,375 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: dissect_macd_pdu_data_type_2(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree,
int offset, guint16 length, guint16 number_of_pdus,
struct fp_info *fpi, void *data)
{
int pdu;
proto_item *pdus_ti = NULL;
proto_tree *data_tree = NULL;
int first_offset = offset;
gboolean dissected = FALSE;
/* Add data subtree */
if (tree) {
pdus_ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_fp_data, tvb, offset, -1, ENC_NA);
proto_item_set_text(pdus_ti, "%u MAC-d PDUs of %u bytes", number_of_pdus, length);
data_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(pdus_ti, ett_fp_data);
}
/* Now for the PDUs */
for (pdu=0; pdu < number_of_pdus; pdu++) {
proto_item *pdu_ti;
/* Data bytes! */
if (data_tree) {
pdu_ti = proto_tree_add_item(data_tree, hf_fp_mac_d_pdu, tvb,
offset, length, ENC_NA);
proto_item_set_text(pdu_ti, "MAC-d PDU (PDU %u)", pdu+1);
}
if (preferences_call_mac_dissectors /*&& !rlc_is_ciphered(pinfo)*/) {
tvbuff_t *next_tvb = tvb_new_subset(tvb, offset, length, -1);
fpi->cur_tb = pdu; /*Set proper pdu index for MAC and higher layers*/
call_dissector_with_data(mac_fdd_hsdsch_handle, next_tvb, pinfo, top_level_tree, data);
dissected = TRUE;
}
/* Advance offset */
offset += length;
}
/* Data tree should cover entire length */
proto_item_set_len(pdus_ti, offset-first_offset);
/* Show summary in info column */
if (!dissected) {
col_append_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, " %u PDUs of %u bits",
number_of_pdus, length*8);
}
return offset;
}
Commit Message: UMTS_FP: fix handling reserved C/T value
The spec puts the reserved value at 0xf but our internal table has 'unknown' at
0; since all the other values seem to be offset-by-one, just take the modulus
0xf to avoid running off the end of the table.
Bug: 12191
Change-Id: I83c8fb66797bbdee52a2246fb1eea6e37cbc7eb0
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15722
Reviewed-by: Evan Huus <eapache@gmail.com>
Petri-Dish: Evan Huus <eapache@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <buildbot-no-reply@wireshark.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 51,878 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLCanvasElement::PageVisibilityChanged() {
bool hidden = !GetPage()->IsPageVisible();
SetSuspendOffscreenCanvasAnimation(hidden);
if (!context_)
return;
context_->SetIsHidden(hidden);
if (hidden && Is3d())
DiscardResourceProvider();
}
Commit Message: Clean up CanvasResourceDispatcher on finalizer
We may have pending mojo messages after GC, so we want to drop the
dispatcher as soon as possible.
Bug: 929757,913964
Change-Id: I5789bcbb55aada4a74c67a28758f07686f8911c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489175
Reviewed-by: Ken Rockot <rockot@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#635833}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 152,104 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: decode_OFPAT_RAW11_SET_NW_ECN(uint8_t ecn,
enum ofp_version ofp_version OVS_UNUSED,
struct ofpbuf *out)
{
if (ecn & ~IP_ECN_MASK) {
return OFPERR_OFPBAC_BAD_ARGUMENT;
} else {
ofpact_put_SET_IP_ECN(out)->ecn = ecn;
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 76,826 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int BitReaderCore::bits_read() const {
return bits_read_;
}
Commit Message: Cleanup media BitReader ReadBits() calls
Initialize temporary values, check return values.
Small tweaks to solution proposed by adtolbar@microsoft.com.
Bug: 929962
Change-Id: Iaa7da7534174882d040ec7e4c353ba5cd0da5735
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1481085
Commit-Queue: Chrome Cunningham <chcunningham@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dan Sanders <sandersd@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#634889}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 151,858 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: next_entry_size (GstQTDemux * demux)
{
QtDemuxStream *stream;
int i;
int smallidx = -1;
guint64 smalloffs = (guint64) - 1;
GST_LOG_OBJECT (demux, "Finding entry at offset %lld", demux->offset);
for (i = 0; i < demux->n_streams; i++) {
stream = demux->streams[i];
if (stream->sample_index == -1)
stream->sample_index = 0;
GST_LOG_OBJECT (demux,
"Checking Stream %d (sample_index:%d / offset:%lld / size:%d / chunk:%d)",
i, stream->sample_index, stream->samples[stream->sample_index].offset,
stream->samples[stream->sample_index].size,
stream->samples[stream->sample_index].chunk);
if (((smalloffs == -1)
|| (stream->samples[stream->sample_index].offset < smalloffs))
&& (stream->samples[stream->sample_index].size)) {
smallidx = i;
smalloffs = stream->samples[stream->sample_index].offset;
}
}
GST_LOG_OBJECT (demux, "stream %d offset %lld demux->offset :%lld",
smallidx, smalloffs, demux->offset);
if (smallidx == -1)
return -1;
stream = demux->streams[smallidx];
if (stream->samples[stream->sample_index].offset >= demux->offset) {
demux->todrop =
stream->samples[stream->sample_index].offset - demux->offset;
return stream->samples[stream->sample_index].size + demux->todrop;
}
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (demux, "There wasn't any entry at offset %lld",
demux->offset);
return -1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 4,959 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tg3_set_pauseparam(struct net_device *dev, struct ethtool_pauseparam *epause)
{
struct tg3 *tp = netdev_priv(dev);
int err = 0;
if (tg3_flag(tp, USE_PHYLIB)) {
u32 newadv;
struct phy_device *phydev;
phydev = tp->mdio_bus->phy_map[TG3_PHY_MII_ADDR];
if (!(phydev->supported & SUPPORTED_Pause) ||
(!(phydev->supported & SUPPORTED_Asym_Pause) &&
(epause->rx_pause != epause->tx_pause)))
return -EINVAL;
tp->link_config.flowctrl = 0;
if (epause->rx_pause) {
tp->link_config.flowctrl |= FLOW_CTRL_RX;
if (epause->tx_pause) {
tp->link_config.flowctrl |= FLOW_CTRL_TX;
newadv = ADVERTISED_Pause;
} else
newadv = ADVERTISED_Pause |
ADVERTISED_Asym_Pause;
} else if (epause->tx_pause) {
tp->link_config.flowctrl |= FLOW_CTRL_TX;
newadv = ADVERTISED_Asym_Pause;
} else
newadv = 0;
if (epause->autoneg)
tg3_flag_set(tp, PAUSE_AUTONEG);
else
tg3_flag_clear(tp, PAUSE_AUTONEG);
if (tp->phy_flags & TG3_PHYFLG_IS_CONNECTED) {
u32 oldadv = phydev->advertising &
(ADVERTISED_Pause | ADVERTISED_Asym_Pause);
if (oldadv != newadv) {
phydev->advertising &=
~(ADVERTISED_Pause |
ADVERTISED_Asym_Pause);
phydev->advertising |= newadv;
if (phydev->autoneg) {
/*
* Always renegotiate the link to
* inform our link partner of our
* flow control settings, even if the
* flow control is forced. Let
* tg3_adjust_link() do the final
* flow control setup.
*/
return phy_start_aneg(phydev);
}
}
if (!epause->autoneg)
tg3_setup_flow_control(tp, 0, 0);
} else {
tp->link_config.advertising &=
~(ADVERTISED_Pause |
ADVERTISED_Asym_Pause);
tp->link_config.advertising |= newadv;
}
} else {
int irq_sync = 0;
if (netif_running(dev)) {
tg3_netif_stop(tp);
irq_sync = 1;
}
tg3_full_lock(tp, irq_sync);
if (epause->autoneg)
tg3_flag_set(tp, PAUSE_AUTONEG);
else
tg3_flag_clear(tp, PAUSE_AUTONEG);
if (epause->rx_pause)
tp->link_config.flowctrl |= FLOW_CTRL_RX;
else
tp->link_config.flowctrl &= ~FLOW_CTRL_RX;
if (epause->tx_pause)
tp->link_config.flowctrl |= FLOW_CTRL_TX;
else
tp->link_config.flowctrl &= ~FLOW_CTRL_TX;
if (netif_running(dev)) {
tg3_halt(tp, RESET_KIND_SHUTDOWN, 1);
err = tg3_restart_hw(tp, 1);
if (!err)
tg3_netif_start(tp);
}
tg3_full_unlock(tp);
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <oded@privatecore.com>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matt Carlson <mcarlson@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 32,752 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE4(rt_sigprocmask, int, how, sigset_t __user *, set,
sigset_t __user *, oset, size_t, sigsetsize)
{
int error = -EINVAL;
sigset_t old_set, new_set;
/* XXX: Don't preclude handling different sized sigset_t's. */
if (sigsetsize != sizeof(sigset_t))
goto out;
if (set) {
error = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&new_set, set, sizeof(*set)))
goto out;
sigdelsetmask(&new_set, sigmask(SIGKILL)|sigmask(SIGSTOP));
error = sigprocmask(how, &new_set, &old_set);
if (error)
goto out;
if (oset)
goto set_old;
} else if (oset) {
spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
old_set = current->blocked;
spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
set_old:
error = -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(oset, &old_set, sizeof(*oset)))
goto out;
}
error = 0;
out:
return error;
}
Commit Message: Prevent rt_sigqueueinfo and rt_tgsigqueueinfo from spoofing the signal code
Userland should be able to trust the pid and uid of the sender of a
signal if the si_code is SI_TKILL.
Unfortunately, the kernel has historically allowed sigqueueinfo() to
send any si_code at all (as long as it was negative - to distinguish it
from kernel-generated signals like SIGILL etc), so it could spoof a
SI_TKILL with incorrect siginfo values.
Happily, it looks like glibc has always set si_code to the appropriate
SI_QUEUE, so there are probably no actual user code that ever uses
anything but the appropriate SI_QUEUE flag.
So just tighten the check for si_code (we used to allow any negative
value), and add a (one-time) warning in case there are binaries out
there that might depend on using other si_code values.
Signed-off-by: Julien Tinnes <jln@google.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 35,162 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: psf_fsync (SF_PRIVATE *psf)
{
#if HAVE_FSYNC
if (psf->file.mode == SFM_WRITE || psf->file.mode == SFM_RDWR)
fsync (psf->file.filedes) ;
#else
psf = NULL ;
#endif
} /* psf_fsync */
Commit Message: src/file_io.c : Prevent potential divide-by-zero.
Closes: https://github.com/erikd/libsndfile/issues/92
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 45,224 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static RBinFile *r_bin_file_new_from_bytes(RBin *bin, const char *file,
const ut8 *bytes, ut64 sz,
ut64 file_sz, int rawstr,
ut64 baseaddr, ut64 loadaddr,
int fd, const char *pluginname,
const char *xtrname, ut64 offset,
bool steal_ptr) {
ut8 binfile_created = false;
RBinPlugin *plugin = NULL;
RBinXtrPlugin *xtr = NULL;
RBinObject *o = NULL;
RBinFile *bf = NULL;
if (sz == UT64_MAX) {
return NULL;
}
if (xtrname) {
xtr = r_bin_get_xtrplugin_by_name (bin, xtrname);
}
if (xtr && xtr->check_bytes (bytes, sz)) {
return r_bin_file_xtr_load_bytes (bin, xtr, file,
bytes, sz, file_sz, baseaddr, loadaddr, 0,
fd, rawstr);
}
if (!bf) {
bf = r_bin_file_create_append (bin, file, bytes, sz, file_sz,
rawstr, fd, xtrname, steal_ptr);
if (!bf) {
if (!steal_ptr) { // we own the ptr, free on error
free ((void*) bytes);
}
return NULL;
}
binfile_created = true;
}
if (bin->force) {
plugin = r_bin_get_binplugin_by_name (bin, bin->force);
}
if (!plugin) {
if (pluginname) {
plugin = r_bin_get_binplugin_by_name (bin, pluginname);
}
if (!plugin) {
plugin = r_bin_get_binplugin_by_bytes (bin, bytes, sz);
if (!plugin) {
plugin = r_bin_get_binplugin_any (bin);
}
}
}
o = r_bin_object_new (bf, plugin, baseaddr, loadaddr, 0, r_buf_size (bf->buf));
if (o && !o->size) {
o->size = file_sz;
}
if (!o) {
if (bf && binfile_created) {
r_list_delete_data (bin->binfiles, bf);
}
return NULL;
}
/* WTF */
if (strcmp (plugin->name, "any")) {
bf->narch = 1;
}
/* free unnecessary rbuffer (???) */
return bf;
}
Commit Message: Fix #8748 - Fix oobread on string search
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 60,131 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: H264Picture* H264DPB::GetLongRefPicByLongTermPicNum(int pic_num) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < pics_.size(); ++i) {
H264Picture* pic = pics_[i];
if (pic->ref && pic->long_term && pic->long_term_pic_num == pic_num)
return pic;
}
DVLOG(1) << "Missing long term pic num: " << pic_num;
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Revert 137988 - VAVDA is the hardware video decode accelerator for Chrome on Linux and ChromeOS for Intel CPUs (Sandy Bridge and newer).
This CL enables VAVDA acceleration for ChromeOS, both for HTML5 video and Flash.
The feature is currently hidden behind a command line flag and can be enabled by adding the --enable-vaapi parameter to command line.
BUG=117062
TEST=Manual runs of test streams.
Change-Id: I386e16739e2ef2230f52a0a434971b33d8654699
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9814001
This is causing crbug.com/129103
TBR=posciak@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10411066
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@138208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 103,000 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Node* EventTargetNodeForDocument(Document* doc) {
if (!doc)
return 0;
Node* node = doc->FocusedElement();
if (!node && doc->IsPluginDocument()) {
PluginDocument* plugin_document = ToPluginDocument(doc);
node = plugin_document->PluginNode();
}
if (!node && doc->IsHTMLDocument())
node = doc->body();
if (!node)
node = doc->documentElement();
return node;
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 134,067 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderFrameImpl::UniqueNameFrameAdapter::UniqueNameFrameAdapter(
RenderFrameImpl* render_frame)
: render_frame_(render_frame) {}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,871 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int shm_fsync(struct file *file, loff_t start, loff_t end, int datasync)
{
struct shm_file_data *sfd = shm_file_data(file);
if (!sfd->file->f_op->fsync)
return -EINVAL;
return sfd->file->f_op->fsync(sfd->file, start, end, datasync);
}
Commit Message: ipc,shm: fix shm_file deletion races
When IPC_RMID races with other shm operations there's potential for
use-after-free of the shm object's associated file (shm_file).
Here's the race before this patch:
TASK 1 TASK 2
------ ------
shm_rmid()
ipc_lock_object()
shmctl()
shp = shm_obtain_object_check()
shm_destroy()
shum_unlock()
fput(shp->shm_file)
ipc_lock_object()
shmem_lock(shp->shm_file)
<OOPS>
The oops is caused because shm_destroy() calls fput() after dropping the
ipc_lock. fput() clears the file's f_inode, f_path.dentry, and
f_path.mnt, which causes various NULL pointer references in task 2. I
reliably see the oops in task 2 if with shmlock, shmu
This patch fixes the races by:
1) set shm_file=NULL in shm_destroy() while holding ipc_object_lock().
2) modify at risk operations to check shm_file while holding
ipc_object_lock().
Example workloads, which each trigger oops...
Workload 1:
while true; do
id=$(shmget 1 4096)
shm_rmid $id &
shmlock $id &
wait
done
The oops stack shows accessing NULL f_inode due to racing fput:
_raw_spin_lock
shmem_lock
SyS_shmctl
Workload 2:
while true; do
id=$(shmget 1 4096)
shmat $id 4096 &
shm_rmid $id &
wait
done
The oops stack is similar to workload 1 due to NULL f_inode:
touch_atime
shmem_mmap
shm_mmap
mmap_region
do_mmap_pgoff
do_shmat
SyS_shmat
Workload 3:
while true; do
id=$(shmget 1 4096)
shmlock $id
shm_rmid $id &
shmunlock $id &
wait
done
The oops stack shows second fput tripping on an NULL f_inode. The
first fput() completed via from shm_destroy(), but a racing thread did
a get_file() and queued this fput():
locks_remove_flock
__fput
____fput
task_work_run
do_notify_resume
int_signal
Fixes: c2c737a0461e ("ipc,shm: shorten critical region for shmat")
Fixes: 2caacaa82a51 ("ipc,shm: shorten critical region for shmctl")
Signed-off-by: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.10.17+ 3.11.6+
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 27,966 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: UrlData::~UrlData() {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_MEMORY_KB("Media.BytesReadFromCache",
BytesReadFromCache() >> 10);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_MEMORY_KB("Media.BytesReadFromNetwork",
BytesReadFromNetwork() >> 10);
DCHECK_EQ(0, playing_);
DCHECK_EQ(0, preloading_);
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 144,359 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FrameFetchContext::RecordDataUriWithOctothorpe() {
CountDeprecation(WebFeature::kDataUriHasOctothorpe);
}
Commit Message: Do not forward resource timing to parent frame after back-forward navigation
LocalFrame has |should_send_resource_timing_info_to_parent_| flag not to
send timing info to parent except for the first navigation. This flag is
cleared when the first timing is sent to parent, however this does not happen
if iframe's first navigation was by back-forward navigation. For such
iframes, we shouldn't send timings to parent at all.
Bug: 876822
Change-Id: I128b51a82ef278c439548afc8283ae63abdef5c5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1186215
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kunihiko Sakamoto <ksakamoto@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#585736}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 145,820 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GLsizei TextureManager::ComputeMipMapCount(
GLsizei width, GLsizei height, GLsizei depth) {
return 1 + base::bits::Log2Floor(std::max(std::max(width, height), depth));
}
Commit Message: Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 103,715 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CairoOutputDev::endPage() {
if (text) {
text->endPage();
text->coalesce(gTrue, gFalse);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 898 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: long keyctl_keyring_clear(key_serial_t ringid)
{
key_ref_t keyring_ref;
struct key *keyring;
long ret;
keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
/* Root is permitted to invalidate certain special keyrings */
if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref))
goto error;
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_CLEAR,
&key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref)->flags))
goto clear;
goto error_put;
}
goto error;
}
clear:
keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref);
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP, &keyring->flags))
ret = -EPERM;
else
ret = keyring_clear(keyring);
error_put:
key_ref_put(keyring_ref);
error:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.
(2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.
(3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.
This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.
The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.
The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.
Additionally, barriering is included:
(1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.
(2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.
Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.
Fixes: 146aa8b1453b ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 60,238 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static loff_t shmem_file_llseek(struct file *file, loff_t offset, int whence)
{
struct address_space *mapping = file->f_mapping;
struct inode *inode = mapping->host;
pgoff_t start, end;
loff_t new_offset;
if (whence != SEEK_DATA && whence != SEEK_HOLE)
return generic_file_llseek_size(file, offset, whence,
MAX_LFS_FILESIZE, i_size_read(inode));
mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
/* We're holding i_mutex so we can access i_size directly */
if (offset < 0)
offset = -EINVAL;
else if (offset >= inode->i_size)
offset = -ENXIO;
else {
start = offset >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
end = (inode->i_size + PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
new_offset = shmem_seek_hole_data(mapping, start, end, whence);
new_offset <<= PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
if (new_offset > offset) {
if (new_offset < inode->i_size)
offset = new_offset;
else if (whence == SEEK_DATA)
offset = -ENXIO;
else
offset = inode->i_size;
}
}
if (offset >= 0 && offset != file->f_pos) {
file->f_pos = offset;
file->f_version = 0;
}
mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
return offset;
}
Commit Message: tmpfs: fix use-after-free of mempolicy object
The tmpfs remount logic preserves filesystem mempolicy if the mpol=M
option is not specified in the remount request. A new policy can be
specified if mpol=M is given.
Before this patch remounting an mpol bound tmpfs without specifying
mpol= mount option in the remount request would set the filesystem's
mempolicy object to a freed mempolicy object.
To reproduce the problem boot a DEBUG_PAGEALLOC kernel and run:
# mkdir /tmp/x
# mount -t tmpfs -o size=100M,mpol=interleave nodev /tmp/x
# grep /tmp/x /proc/mounts
nodev /tmp/x tmpfs rw,relatime,size=102400k,mpol=interleave:0-3 0 0
# mount -o remount,size=200M nodev /tmp/x
# grep /tmp/x /proc/mounts
nodev /tmp/x tmpfs rw,relatime,size=204800k,mpol=??? 0 0
# note ? garbage in mpol=... output above
# dd if=/dev/zero of=/tmp/x/f count=1
# panic here
Panic:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
IP: [< (null)>] (null)
[...]
Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
Call Trace:
mpol_shared_policy_init+0xa5/0x160
shmem_get_inode+0x209/0x270
shmem_mknod+0x3e/0xf0
shmem_create+0x18/0x20
vfs_create+0xb5/0x130
do_last+0x9a1/0xea0
path_openat+0xb3/0x4d0
do_filp_open+0x42/0xa0
do_sys_open+0xfe/0x1e0
compat_sys_open+0x1b/0x20
cstar_dispatch+0x7/0x1f
Non-debug kernels will not crash immediately because referencing the
dangling mpol will not cause a fault. Instead the filesystem will
reference a freed mempolicy object, which will cause unpredictable
behavior.
The problem boils down to a dropped mpol reference below if
shmem_parse_options() does not allocate a new mpol:
config = *sbinfo
shmem_parse_options(data, &config, true)
mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol)
sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol /* BUG: saves unreferenced mpol */
This patch avoids the crash by not releasing the mempolicy if
shmem_parse_options() doesn't create a new mpol.
How far back does this issue go? I see it in both 2.6.36 and 3.3. I did
not look back further.
Signed-off-by: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 33,499 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AppCache::AppCache(AppCacheStorage* storage, int64_t cache_id)
: cache_id_(cache_id),
owning_group_(nullptr),
online_whitelist_all_(false),
is_complete_(false),
cache_size_(0),
storage_(storage) {
storage_->working_set()->AddCache(this);
}
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 1 | 172,969 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int snd_timer_start1(struct snd_timer_instance *timeri,
bool start, unsigned long ticks)
{
struct snd_timer *timer;
int result;
unsigned long flags;
timer = timeri->timer;
if (!timer)
return -EINVAL;
spin_lock_irqsave(&timer->lock, flags);
if (timer->card && timer->card->shutdown) {
result = -ENODEV;
goto unlock;
}
if (timeri->flags & (SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_RUNNING |
SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_START)) {
result = -EBUSY;
goto unlock;
}
if (start)
timeri->ticks = timeri->cticks = ticks;
else if (!timeri->cticks)
timeri->cticks = 1;
timeri->pticks = 0;
list_move_tail(&timeri->active_list, &timer->active_list_head);
if (timer->running) {
if (timer->hw.flags & SNDRV_TIMER_HW_SLAVE)
goto __start_now;
timer->flags |= SNDRV_TIMER_FLG_RESCHED;
timeri->flags |= SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_START;
result = 1; /* delayed start */
} else {
if (start)
timer->sticks = ticks;
timer->hw.start(timer);
__start_now:
timer->running++;
timeri->flags |= SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_RUNNING;
result = 0;
}
snd_timer_notify1(timeri, start ? SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_START :
SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_CONTINUE);
unlock:
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&timer->lock, flags);
return result;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: timer: Fix leak in events via snd_timer_user_tinterrupt
The stack object “r1” has a total size of 32 bytes. Its field
“event” and “val” both contain 4 bytes padding. These 8 bytes
padding bytes are sent to user without being initialized.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 52,715 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool do_read_pids(pid_t tpid, const char *contrl, const char *cg, const char *file, char **d)
{
int sock[2] = {-1, -1};
char *tmpdata = NULL;
int ret;
pid_t qpid, cpid = -1;
bool answer = false;
char v = '0';
struct ucred cred;
struct timeval tv;
size_t sz = 0, asz = 0;
fd_set s;
if (!cgfs_get_value(contrl, cg, file, &tmpdata))
return false;
/*
* Now we read the pids from returned data one by one, pass
* them into a child in the target namespace, read back the
* translated pids, and put them into our to-return data
*/
if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_DGRAM, 0, sock) < 0) {
perror("socketpair");
free(tmpdata);
return false;
}
cpid = fork();
if (cpid == -1)
goto out;
if (!cpid) // child
pid_to_ns_wrapper(sock[1], tpid);
char *ptr = tmpdata;
cred.uid = 0;
cred.gid = 0;
while (sscanf(ptr, "%d\n", &qpid) == 1) {
cred.pid = qpid;
ret = send_creds(sock[0], &cred, v, true);
if (ret == SEND_CREDS_NOTSK)
goto next;
if (ret == SEND_CREDS_FAIL)
goto out;
FD_ZERO(&s);
FD_SET(sock[0], &s);
tv.tv_sec = 2;
tv.tv_usec = 0;
ret = select(sock[0]+1, &s, NULL, NULL, &tv);
if (ret <= 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: select error waiting for pid from child: %s\n",
__func__, strerror(errno));
goto out;
}
if (read(sock[0], &qpid, sizeof(qpid)) != sizeof(qpid)) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: error reading pid from child: %s\n",
__func__, strerror(errno));
goto out;
}
must_strcat_pid(d, &sz, &asz, qpid);
next:
ptr = strchr(ptr, '\n');
if (!ptr)
break;
ptr++;
}
cred.pid = getpid();
v = '1';
if (send_creds(sock[0], &cred, v, true) != SEND_CREDS_OK) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: failed to ask child to exit: %s\n",
__func__, strerror(errno));
goto out;
}
answer = true;
out:
free(tmpdata);
if (cpid != -1)
wait_for_pid(cpid);
if (sock[0] != -1) {
close(sock[0]);
close(sock[1]);
}
return answer;
}
Commit Message: Implement privilege check when moving tasks
When writing pids to a tasks file in lxcfs, lxcfs was checking
for privilege over the tasks file but not over the pid being
moved. Since the cgm_movepid request is done as root on the host,
not with the requestor's credentials, we must copy the check which
cgmanager was doing to ensure that the requesting task is allowed
to change the victim task's cgroup membership.
This is CVE-2015-1344
https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/lxcfs/+bug/1512854
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 44,388 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: e1000e_rx_l4_cso_enabled(E1000ECore *core)
{
return !!(core->mac[RXCSUM] & E1000_RXCSUM_TUOFLD);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 6,044 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Ins_GPV( INS_ARG )
{
DO_GPV
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 10,111 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: views::Label* GetLabelView(WindowSelectorItem* window) {
return window->label_view_;
}
Commit Message: cros: Enable some tests in //ash/wm in ash_unittests --mash
For the ones that fail, disable them via filter file instead of in the
code, per our disablement policy.
Bug: 698085, 695556, 698878, 698888, 698093, 698894
Test: ash_unittests --mash
Change-Id: Ic145ab6a95508968d6884d14fac2a3ca08888d26
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/752423
Commit-Queue: James Cook <jamescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Steven Bennetts <stevenjb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513836}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,208 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void srpt_add_one(struct ib_device *device)
{
struct srpt_device *sdev;
struct srpt_port *sport;
struct ib_srq_init_attr srq_attr;
int i;
pr_debug("device = %p, device->dma_ops = %p\n", device,
device->dma_ops);
sdev = kzalloc(sizeof *sdev, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sdev)
goto err;
sdev->device = device;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sdev->rch_list);
init_waitqueue_head(&sdev->ch_releaseQ);
spin_lock_init(&sdev->spinlock);
sdev->pd = ib_alloc_pd(device);
if (IS_ERR(sdev->pd))
goto free_dev;
sdev->srq_size = min(srpt_srq_size, sdev->device->attrs.max_srq_wr);
srq_attr.event_handler = srpt_srq_event;
srq_attr.srq_context = (void *)sdev;
srq_attr.attr.max_wr = sdev->srq_size;
srq_attr.attr.max_sge = 1;
srq_attr.attr.srq_limit = 0;
srq_attr.srq_type = IB_SRQT_BASIC;
sdev->srq = ib_create_srq(sdev->pd, &srq_attr);
if (IS_ERR(sdev->srq))
goto err_pd;
pr_debug("%s: create SRQ #wr= %d max_allow=%d dev= %s\n",
__func__, sdev->srq_size, sdev->device->attrs.max_srq_wr,
device->name);
if (!srpt_service_guid)
srpt_service_guid = be64_to_cpu(device->node_guid);
sdev->cm_id = ib_create_cm_id(device, srpt_cm_handler, sdev);
if (IS_ERR(sdev->cm_id))
goto err_srq;
/* print out target login information */
pr_debug("Target login info: id_ext=%016llx,ioc_guid=%016llx,"
"pkey=ffff,service_id=%016llx\n", srpt_service_guid,
srpt_service_guid, srpt_service_guid);
/*
* We do not have a consistent service_id (ie. also id_ext of target_id)
* to identify this target. We currently use the guid of the first HCA
* in the system as service_id; therefore, the target_id will change
* if this HCA is gone bad and replaced by different HCA
*/
if (ib_cm_listen(sdev->cm_id, cpu_to_be64(srpt_service_guid), 0))
goto err_cm;
INIT_IB_EVENT_HANDLER(&sdev->event_handler, sdev->device,
srpt_event_handler);
if (ib_register_event_handler(&sdev->event_handler))
goto err_cm;
sdev->ioctx_ring = (struct srpt_recv_ioctx **)
srpt_alloc_ioctx_ring(sdev, sdev->srq_size,
sizeof(*sdev->ioctx_ring[0]),
srp_max_req_size, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
if (!sdev->ioctx_ring)
goto err_event;
for (i = 0; i < sdev->srq_size; ++i)
srpt_post_recv(sdev, sdev->ioctx_ring[i]);
WARN_ON(sdev->device->phys_port_cnt > ARRAY_SIZE(sdev->port));
for (i = 1; i <= sdev->device->phys_port_cnt; i++) {
sport = &sdev->port[i - 1];
sport->sdev = sdev;
sport->port = i;
sport->port_attrib.srp_max_rdma_size = DEFAULT_MAX_RDMA_SIZE;
sport->port_attrib.srp_max_rsp_size = DEFAULT_MAX_RSP_SIZE;
sport->port_attrib.srp_sq_size = DEF_SRPT_SQ_SIZE;
INIT_WORK(&sport->work, srpt_refresh_port_work);
if (srpt_refresh_port(sport)) {
pr_err("MAD registration failed for %s-%d.\n",
srpt_sdev_name(sdev), i);
goto err_ring;
}
snprintf(sport->port_guid, sizeof(sport->port_guid),
"0x%016llx%016llx",
be64_to_cpu(sport->gid.global.subnet_prefix),
be64_to_cpu(sport->gid.global.interface_id));
}
spin_lock(&srpt_dev_lock);
list_add_tail(&sdev->list, &srpt_dev_list);
spin_unlock(&srpt_dev_lock);
out:
ib_set_client_data(device, &srpt_client, sdev);
pr_debug("added %s.\n", device->name);
return;
err_ring:
srpt_free_ioctx_ring((struct srpt_ioctx **)sdev->ioctx_ring, sdev,
sdev->srq_size, srp_max_req_size,
DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
err_event:
ib_unregister_event_handler(&sdev->event_handler);
err_cm:
ib_destroy_cm_id(sdev->cm_id);
err_srq:
ib_destroy_srq(sdev->srq);
err_pd:
ib_dealloc_pd(sdev->pd);
free_dev:
kfree(sdev);
err:
sdev = NULL;
pr_info("%s(%s) failed.\n", __func__, device->name);
goto out;
}
Commit Message: IB/srpt: Simplify srpt_handle_tsk_mgmt()
Let the target core check task existence instead of the SRP target
driver. Additionally, let the target core check the validity of the
task management request instead of the ib_srpt driver.
This patch fixes the following kernel crash:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000001
IP: [<ffffffffa0565f37>] srpt_handle_new_iu+0x6d7/0x790 [ib_srpt]
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
Call Trace:
[<ffffffffa05660ce>] srpt_process_completion+0xde/0x570 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffffa056669f>] srpt_compl_thread+0x13f/0x160 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffff8109726f>] kthread+0xcf/0xe0
[<ffffffff81613cfc>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@sandisk.com>
Fixes: 3e4f574857ee ("ib_srpt: Convert TMR path to target_submit_tmr")
Tested-by: Alex Estrin <alex.estrin@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
Cc: Sagi Grimberg <sagig@mellanox.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 50,623 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: String InputType::SanitizeValue(const String& proposed_value) const {
return proposed_value;
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,231 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void on_bt_approve_toggle(GtkToggleButton *togglebutton, gpointer user_data)
{
gtk_widget_set_sensitive(g_btn_next, gtk_toggle_button_get_active(g_tb_approve_bt));
}
Commit Message: wizard: fix save users changes after reviewing dump dir files
If the user reviewed the dump dir's files during reporting the crash, the
changes was thrown away and original data was passed to the bugzilla bug
report.
report-gtk saves the first text view buffer and then reloads data from the
reported problem directory, which causes that the changes made to those text
views are thrown away.
Function save_text_if_changed(), except of saving text, also reload the files
from dump dir and update gui state from the dump dir. The commit moves the
reloading and updating gui functions away from this function.
Related to rhbz#1270235
Signed-off-by: Matej Habrnal <mhabrnal@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 42,837 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mm_answer_audit_event(int socket, Buffer *m)
{
ssh_audit_event_t event;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
event = buffer_get_int(m);
switch(event) {
case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY:
case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED:
case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI:
case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES:
case SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED:
case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE:
case SSH_INVALID_USER:
audit_event(event);
break;
default:
fatal("Audit event type %d not permitted", event);
}
return (0);
}
Commit Message: set sshpam_ctxt to NULL after free
Avoids use-after-free in monitor when privsep child is compromised.
Reported by Moritz Jodeit; ok dtucker@
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 42,084 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ar6000_open(struct net_device *dev)
{
unsigned long flags;
struct ar6_softc *ar = (struct ar6_softc *)ar6k_priv(dev);
spin_lock_irqsave(&ar->arLock, flags);
if(ar->arWlanState == WLAN_DISABLED) {
ar->arWlanState = WLAN_ENABLED;
}
if( ar->arConnected || bypasswmi) {
netif_carrier_on(dev);
/* Wake up the queues */
netif_wake_queue(dev);
}
else
netif_carrier_off(dev);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ar->arLock, flags);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 24,201 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderBlock::markFixedPositionObjectForLayoutIfNeeded(RenderObject* child, SubtreeLayoutScope& layoutScope)
{
if (child->style()->position() != FixedPosition)
return;
bool hasStaticBlockPosition = child->style()->hasStaticBlockPosition(isHorizontalWritingMode());
bool hasStaticInlinePosition = child->style()->hasStaticInlinePosition(isHorizontalWritingMode());
if (!hasStaticBlockPosition && !hasStaticInlinePosition)
return;
RenderObject* o = child->parent();
while (o && !o->isRenderView() && o->style()->position() != AbsolutePosition)
o = o->parent();
if (o->style()->position() != AbsolutePosition)
return;
RenderBox* box = toRenderBox(child);
if (hasStaticInlinePosition) {
LogicalExtentComputedValues computedValues;
box->computeLogicalWidth(computedValues);
LayoutUnit newLeft = computedValues.m_position;
if (newLeft != box->logicalLeft())
layoutScope.setChildNeedsLayout(child);
} else if (hasStaticBlockPosition) {
LayoutUnit oldTop = box->logicalTop();
box->updateLogicalHeight();
if (box->logicalTop() != oldTop)
layoutScope.setChildNeedsLayout(child);
}
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 116,244 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ScopedMessagePipeHandle Core::CreatePartialMessagePipe(ports::PortRef* peer) {
RequestContext request_context;
ports::PortRef local_port;
GetNodeController()->node()->CreatePortPair(&local_port, peer);
MojoHandle handle = AddDispatcher(new MessagePipeDispatcher(
GetNodeController(), local_port, kUnknownPipeIdForDebug, 0));
return ScopedMessagePipeHandle(MessagePipeHandle(handle));
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 149,582 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebKit::WebString TestWebKitPlatformSupport::defaultLocale() {
return ASCIIToUTF16("en-US");
}
Commit Message: Use a new scheme for swapping out RenderViews.
BUG=118664
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9720004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@127986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 108,628 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mcs_init(int length)
{
STREAM s;
s = iso_init(length + 8);
s_push_layer(s, mcs_hdr, 8);
return s;
}
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 92,945 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct ieee80211_sta *ieee80211_find_sta_by_ifaddr(struct ieee80211_hw *hw,
const u8 *addr,
const u8 *localaddr)
{
struct sta_info *sta, *nxt;
/*
* Just return a random station if localaddr is NULL
* ... first in list.
*/
for_each_sta_info(hw_to_local(hw), addr, sta, nxt) {
if (localaddr &&
!ether_addr_equal(sta->sdata->vif.addr, localaddr))
continue;
if (!sta->uploaded)
return NULL;
return &sta->sta;
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: mac80211: fix AP powersave TX vs. wakeup race
There is a race between the TX path and the STA wakeup: while
a station is sleeping, mac80211 buffers frames until it wakes
up, then the frames are transmitted. However, the RX and TX
path are concurrent, so the packet indicating wakeup can be
processed while a packet is being transmitted.
This can lead to a situation where the buffered frames list
is emptied on the one side, while a frame is being added on
the other side, as the station is still seen as sleeping in
the TX path.
As a result, the newly added frame will not be send anytime
soon. It might be sent much later (and out of order) when the
station goes to sleep and wakes up the next time.
Additionally, it can lead to the crash below.
Fix all this by synchronising both paths with a new lock.
Both path are not fastpath since they handle PS situations.
In a later patch we'll remove the extra skb queue locks to
reduce locking overhead.
BUG: unable to handle kernel
NULL pointer dereference at 000000b0
IP: [<ff6f1791>] ieee80211_report_used_skb+0x11/0x3e0 [mac80211]
*pde = 00000000
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
EIP: 0060:[<ff6f1791>] EFLAGS: 00210282 CPU: 1
EIP is at ieee80211_report_used_skb+0x11/0x3e0 [mac80211]
EAX: e5900da0 EBX: 00000000 ECX: 00000001 EDX: 00000000
ESI: e41d00c0 EDI: e5900da0 EBP: ebe458e4 ESP: ebe458b0
DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068
CR0: 8005003b CR2: 000000b0 CR3: 25a78000 CR4: 000407d0
DR0: 00000000 DR1: 00000000 DR2: 00000000 DR3: 00000000
DR6: ffff0ff0 DR7: 00000400
Process iperf (pid: 3934, ti=ebe44000 task=e757c0b0 task.ti=ebe44000)
iwlwifi 0000:02:00.0: I iwl_pcie_enqueue_hcmd Sending command LQ_CMD (#4e), seq: 0x0903, 92 bytes at 3[3]:9
Stack:
e403b32c ebe458c4 00200002 00200286 e403b338 ebe458cc c10960bb e5900da0
ff76a6ec ebe458d8 00000000 e41d00c0 e5900da0 ebe458f0 ff6f1b75 e403b210
ebe4598c ff723dc1 00000000 ff76a6ec e597c978 e403b758 00000002 00000002
Call Trace:
[<ff6f1b75>] ieee80211_free_txskb+0x15/0x20 [mac80211]
[<ff723dc1>] invoke_tx_handlers+0x1661/0x1780 [mac80211]
[<ff7248a5>] ieee80211_tx+0x75/0x100 [mac80211]
[<ff7249bf>] ieee80211_xmit+0x8f/0xc0 [mac80211]
[<ff72550e>] ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0x4fe/0xe20 [mac80211]
[<c149ef70>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x450/0x950
[<c14b9aa9>] sch_direct_xmit+0xa9/0x250
[<c14b9c9b>] __qdisc_run+0x4b/0x150
[<c149f732>] dev_queue_xmit+0x2c2/0xca0
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Yaara Rozenblum <yaara.rozenblum@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com>
[reword commit log, use a separate lock]
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 38,575 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: person_clear_queue(person_t* person)
{
person->num_commands = 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c (#268)
* Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c
There's a buffer overflow bug in the function layer_resize. It allocates
a buffer `tilemap` with size `x_size * y_size * sizeof(struct map_tile)`.
But it didn't check for integer overflow, so if x_size and y_size are
very large, it's possible that the buffer size is smaller than needed,
causing a buffer overflow later.
PoC: `SetLayerSize(0, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF);`
* move malloc to a separate line
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 75,071 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int dispatch_rw_block_io(struct xen_blkif *blkif,
struct blkif_request *req,
struct pending_req *pending_req)
{
struct phys_req preq;
struct seg_buf *seg = pending_req->seg;
unsigned int nseg;
struct bio *bio = NULL;
struct bio **biolist = pending_req->biolist;
int i, nbio = 0;
int operation;
struct blk_plug plug;
bool drain = false;
struct grant_page **pages = pending_req->segments;
unsigned short req_operation;
req_operation = req->operation == BLKIF_OP_INDIRECT ?
req->u.indirect.indirect_op : req->operation;
if ((req->operation == BLKIF_OP_INDIRECT) &&
(req_operation != BLKIF_OP_READ) &&
(req_operation != BLKIF_OP_WRITE)) {
pr_debug(DRV_PFX "Invalid indirect operation (%u)\n",
req_operation);
goto fail_response;
}
switch (req_operation) {
case BLKIF_OP_READ:
blkif->st_rd_req++;
operation = READ;
break;
case BLKIF_OP_WRITE:
blkif->st_wr_req++;
operation = WRITE_ODIRECT;
break;
case BLKIF_OP_WRITE_BARRIER:
drain = true;
case BLKIF_OP_FLUSH_DISKCACHE:
blkif->st_f_req++;
operation = WRITE_FLUSH;
break;
default:
operation = 0; /* make gcc happy */
goto fail_response;
break;
}
/* Check that the number of segments is sane. */
nseg = req->operation == BLKIF_OP_INDIRECT ?
req->u.indirect.nr_segments : req->u.rw.nr_segments;
if (unlikely(nseg == 0 && operation != WRITE_FLUSH) ||
unlikely((req->operation != BLKIF_OP_INDIRECT) &&
(nseg > BLKIF_MAX_SEGMENTS_PER_REQUEST)) ||
unlikely((req->operation == BLKIF_OP_INDIRECT) &&
(nseg > MAX_INDIRECT_SEGMENTS))) {
pr_debug(DRV_PFX "Bad number of segments in request (%d)\n",
nseg);
/* Haven't submitted any bio's yet. */
goto fail_response;
}
preq.nr_sects = 0;
pending_req->blkif = blkif;
pending_req->id = req->u.rw.id;
pending_req->operation = req_operation;
pending_req->status = BLKIF_RSP_OKAY;
pending_req->nr_pages = nseg;
if (req->operation != BLKIF_OP_INDIRECT) {
preq.dev = req->u.rw.handle;
preq.sector_number = req->u.rw.sector_number;
for (i = 0; i < nseg; i++) {
pages[i]->gref = req->u.rw.seg[i].gref;
seg[i].nsec = req->u.rw.seg[i].last_sect -
req->u.rw.seg[i].first_sect + 1;
seg[i].offset = (req->u.rw.seg[i].first_sect << 9);
if ((req->u.rw.seg[i].last_sect >= (PAGE_SIZE >> 9)) ||
(req->u.rw.seg[i].last_sect <
req->u.rw.seg[i].first_sect))
goto fail_response;
preq.nr_sects += seg[i].nsec;
}
} else {
preq.dev = req->u.indirect.handle;
preq.sector_number = req->u.indirect.sector_number;
if (xen_blkbk_parse_indirect(req, pending_req, seg, &preq))
goto fail_response;
}
if (xen_vbd_translate(&preq, blkif, operation) != 0) {
pr_debug(DRV_PFX "access denied: %s of [%llu,%llu] on dev=%04x\n",
operation == READ ? "read" : "write",
preq.sector_number,
preq.sector_number + preq.nr_sects,
blkif->vbd.pdevice);
goto fail_response;
}
/*
* This check _MUST_ be done after xen_vbd_translate as the preq.bdev
* is set there.
*/
for (i = 0; i < nseg; i++) {
if (((int)preq.sector_number|(int)seg[i].nsec) &
((bdev_logical_block_size(preq.bdev) >> 9) - 1)) {
pr_debug(DRV_PFX "Misaligned I/O request from domain %d",
blkif->domid);
goto fail_response;
}
}
/* Wait on all outstanding I/O's and once that has been completed
* issue the WRITE_FLUSH.
*/
if (drain)
xen_blk_drain_io(pending_req->blkif);
/*
* If we have failed at this point, we need to undo the M2P override,
* set gnttab_set_unmap_op on all of the grant references and perform
* the hypercall to unmap the grants - that is all done in
* xen_blkbk_unmap.
*/
if (xen_blkbk_map_seg(pending_req))
goto fail_flush;
/*
* This corresponding xen_blkif_put is done in __end_block_io_op, or
* below (in "!bio") if we are handling a BLKIF_OP_DISCARD.
*/
xen_blkif_get(blkif);
for (i = 0; i < nseg; i++) {
while ((bio == NULL) ||
(bio_add_page(bio,
pages[i]->page,
seg[i].nsec << 9,
seg[i].offset) == 0)) {
bio = bio_alloc(GFP_KERNEL, nseg-i);
if (unlikely(bio == NULL))
goto fail_put_bio;
biolist[nbio++] = bio;
bio->bi_bdev = preq.bdev;
bio->bi_private = pending_req;
bio->bi_end_io = end_block_io_op;
bio->bi_sector = preq.sector_number;
}
preq.sector_number += seg[i].nsec;
}
/* This will be hit if the operation was a flush or discard. */
if (!bio) {
BUG_ON(operation != WRITE_FLUSH);
bio = bio_alloc(GFP_KERNEL, 0);
if (unlikely(bio == NULL))
goto fail_put_bio;
biolist[nbio++] = bio;
bio->bi_bdev = preq.bdev;
bio->bi_private = pending_req;
bio->bi_end_io = end_block_io_op;
}
atomic_set(&pending_req->pendcnt, nbio);
blk_start_plug(&plug);
for (i = 0; i < nbio; i++)
submit_bio(operation, biolist[i]);
/* Let the I/Os go.. */
blk_finish_plug(&plug);
if (operation == READ)
blkif->st_rd_sect += preq.nr_sects;
else if (operation & WRITE)
blkif->st_wr_sect += preq.nr_sects;
return 0;
fail_flush:
xen_blkbk_unmap(blkif, pending_req->segments,
pending_req->nr_pages);
fail_response:
/* Haven't submitted any bio's yet. */
make_response(blkif, req->u.rw.id, req_operation, BLKIF_RSP_ERROR);
free_req(blkif, pending_req);
msleep(1); /* back off a bit */
return -EIO;
fail_put_bio:
for (i = 0; i < nbio; i++)
bio_put(biolist[i]);
atomic_set(&pending_req->pendcnt, 1);
__end_block_io_op(pending_req, -EINVAL);
msleep(1); /* back off a bit */
return -EIO;
}
Commit Message: xen/blkback: Check device permissions before allowing OP_DISCARD
We need to make sure that the device is not RO or that
the request is not past the number of sectors we want to
issue the DISCARD operation for.
This fixes CVE-2013-2140.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com>
[v1: Made it pr_warn instead of pr_debug]
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 31,826 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: lock_encryption_data_new (DBusGMethodInvocation *context,
Device *luks_device,
Device *cleartext_device)
{
LockEncryptionData *data;
data = g_new0 (LockEncryptionData, 1);
data->refcount = 1;
data->context = context;
data->luks_device = g_object_ref (luks_device);
data->cleartext_device = g_object_ref (cleartext_device);
return data;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 11,762 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ContextState::RestoreGlobalState(const ContextState* prev_state) const {
InitCapabilities(prev_state);
InitState(prev_state);
}
Commit Message: Fix tabs sharing TEXTURE_2D_ARRAY/TEXTURE_3D data.
In linux and android, we are seeing an issue where texture data from one
tab overwrites the texture data of another tab. This is happening for apps
which are using webgl2 texture of type TEXTURE_2D_ARRAY/TEXTURE_3D.
Due to a bug in virtual context save/restore code for above texture formats,
the texture data is not properly restored while switching tabs. Hence
texture data from one tab overwrites other.
This CL has fix for that issue, an update for existing test expectations
and a new unit test for this bug.
Bug: 788448
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ie933984cdd2d1381f42eb4638f730c8245207a28
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/930327
Reviewed-by: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: vikas soni <vikassoni@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#539111}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 150,001 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int call_netdevice_notifiers(unsigned long val, struct net_device *dev)
{
struct netdev_notifier_info info;
return call_netdevice_notifiers_info(val, dev, &info);
}
Commit Message: tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 48,768 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NuPlayer::GenericSource::setDrmPlaybackStatusIfNeeded(int playbackStatus, int64_t position) {
if (mDecryptHandle != NULL) {
mDrmManagerClient->setPlaybackStatus(mDecryptHandle, playbackStatus, position);
}
mSubtitleTrack.mPackets = new AnotherPacketSource(NULL);
mTimedTextTrack.mPackets = new AnotherPacketSource(NULL);
}
Commit Message: MPEG4Extractor: ensure kKeyTrackID exists before creating an MPEG4Source as track.
GenericSource: return error when no track exists.
SampleIterator: make sure mSamplesPerChunk is not zero before using it as divisor.
Bug: 21657957
Bug: 23705695
Bug: 22802344
Bug: 28799341
Change-Id: I7664992ade90b935d3f255dcd43ecc2898f30b04
(cherry picked from commit 0386c91b8a910a134e5898ffa924c1b6c7560b13)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 160,441 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nfs_write_completion(struct nfs_pgio_header *hdr)
{
struct nfs_commit_info cinfo;
unsigned long bytes = 0;
if (test_bit(NFS_IOHDR_REDO, &hdr->flags))
goto out;
nfs_init_cinfo_from_inode(&cinfo, hdr->inode);
while (!list_empty(&hdr->pages)) {
struct nfs_page *req = nfs_list_entry(hdr->pages.next);
bytes += req->wb_bytes;
nfs_list_remove_request(req);
if (test_bit(NFS_IOHDR_ERROR, &hdr->flags) &&
(hdr->good_bytes < bytes)) {
nfs_set_pageerror(req->wb_page);
nfs_context_set_write_error(req->wb_context, hdr->error);
goto remove_req;
}
if (test_bit(NFS_IOHDR_NEED_RESCHED, &hdr->flags)) {
nfs_mark_request_dirty(req);
goto next;
}
if (test_bit(NFS_IOHDR_NEED_COMMIT, &hdr->flags)) {
memcpy(&req->wb_verf, &hdr->verf->verifier, sizeof(req->wb_verf));
nfs_mark_request_commit(req, hdr->lseg, &cinfo);
goto next;
}
remove_req:
nfs_inode_remove_request(req);
next:
nfs_unlock_request(req);
nfs_end_page_writeback(req->wb_page);
nfs_release_request(req);
}
out:
hdr->release(hdr);
}
Commit Message: nfs: always make sure page is up-to-date before extending a write to cover the entire page
We should always make sure the cached page is up-to-date when we're
determining whether we can extend a write to cover the full page -- even
if we've received a write delegation from the server.
Commit c7559663 added logic to skip this check if we have a write
delegation, which can lead to data corruption such as the following
scenario if client B receives a write delegation from the NFS server:
Client A:
# echo 123456789 > /mnt/file
Client B:
# echo abcdefghi >> /mnt/file
# cat /mnt/file
0�D0�abcdefghi
Just because we hold a write delegation doesn't mean that we've read in
the entire page contents.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.11+
Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 39,203 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ScriptValue WebGLRenderingContextBase::getExtension(ScriptState* script_state,
const String& name) {
WebGLExtension* extension = nullptr;
if (!isContextLost()) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < extensions_.size(); ++i) {
ExtensionTracker* tracker = extensions_[i];
if (tracker->MatchesNameWithPrefixes(name)) {
if (ExtensionSupportedAndAllowed(tracker)) {
extension = tracker->GetExtension(this);
if (extension) {
if (!extension_enabled_[extension->GetName()]) {
extension_enabled_[extension->GetName()] = true;
}
}
}
break;
}
}
}
v8::Local<v8::Value> wrapped_extension =
ToV8(extension, script_state->GetContext()->Global(),
script_state->GetIsolate());
return ScriptValue(script_state, wrapped_extension);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,827 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void restore_tm_state(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
unsigned long msr_diff;
clear_thread_flag(TIF_RESTORE_TM);
if (!MSR_TM_ACTIVE(regs->msr))
return;
msr_diff = current->thread.tm_orig_msr & ~regs->msr;
msr_diff &= MSR_FP | MSR_VEC | MSR_VSX;
if (msr_diff & MSR_FP) {
fp_enable();
load_fp_state(¤t->thread.fp_state);
regs->msr |= current->thread.fpexc_mode;
}
if (msr_diff & MSR_VEC) {
vec_enable();
load_vr_state(¤t->thread.vr_state);
}
regs->msr |= msr_diff;
}
Commit Message: powerpc/tm: Fix crash when forking inside a transaction
When we fork/clone we currently don't copy any of the TM state to the new
thread. This results in a TM bad thing (program check) when the new process is
switched in as the kernel does a tmrechkpt with TEXASR FS not set. Also, since
R1 is from userspace, we trigger the bad kernel stack pointer detection. So we
end up with something like this:
Bad kernel stack pointer 0 at c0000000000404fc
cpu 0x2: Vector: 700 (Program Check) at [c00000003ffefd40]
pc: c0000000000404fc: restore_gprs+0xc0/0x148
lr: 0000000000000000
sp: 0
msr: 9000000100201030
current = 0xc000001dd1417c30
paca = 0xc00000000fe00800 softe: 0 irq_happened: 0x01
pid = 0, comm = swapper/2
WARNING: exception is not recoverable, can't continue
The below fixes this by flushing the TM state before we copy the task_struct to
the clone. To do this we go through the tmreclaim patch, which removes the
checkpointed registers from the CPU and transitions the CPU out of TM suspend
mode. Hence we need to call tmrechkpt after to restore the checkpointed state
and the TM mode for the current task.
To make this fail from userspace is simply:
tbegin
li r0, 2
sc
<boom>
Kudos to Adhemerval Zanella Neto for finding this.
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
cc: Adhemerval Zanella Neto <azanella@br.ibm.com>
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 38,640 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void testQueryDissection_Bug3590761() {
int res;
UriQueryListA * queryList;
int itemCount;
const char * const pair = "q=hello&x=&y=";
res = uriDissectQueryMallocA(&queryList, &itemCount, pair, pair + strlen(pair));
TEST_ASSERT(res == URI_SUCCESS);
TEST_ASSERT(queryList != NULL);
TEST_ASSERT(itemCount == 3);
TEST_ASSERT(!strcmp(queryList->key, "q"));
TEST_ASSERT(!strcmp(queryList->value, "hello"));
TEST_ASSERT(!strcmp(queryList->next->key, "x"));
TEST_ASSERT(!strcmp(queryList->next->value, ""));
TEST_ASSERT(!strcmp(queryList->next->next->key, "y"));
TEST_ASSERT(!strcmp(queryList->next->next->value, ""));
TEST_ASSERT(! queryList->next->next->next);
uriFreeQueryListA(queryList);
}
Commit Message: UriQuery.c: Fix out-of-bounds-write in ComposeQuery and ...Ex
Reported by Google Autofuzz team
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 75,749 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool DefaultTabHandler::CanCloseContentsAt(int index) {
return delegate_->AsBrowser()->CanCloseContentsAt(index);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 170,301 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TextTrackLoader::getNewRegions(HeapVector<Member<VTTRegion>>& outputRegions)
{
DCHECK(m_cueParser);
if (m_cueParser)
m_cueParser->getNewRegions(outputRegions);
}
Commit Message: Check CORS policy on redirect in TextTrackLoader
BUG=633885
TEST=new case in http/tests/security/text-track-crossorigin.html
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2367583002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#421919}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 130,669 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool PasswordPopupSuggestionView::ShouldUseCustomFontWeightForPrimaryInfo(
gfx::Font::Weight* font_weight) const {
return false;
}
Commit Message: [Autofill] Remove AutofillPopupViewViews and associated feature.
Bug: 906135,831603
Change-Id: I3c982f8b3ffb4928c7c878e74e10113999106499
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1387124
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <rkaplow@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vasilii Sukhanov <vasilii@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Tirelo <ftirelo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Martino <tmartino@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mathieu Perreault <mathp@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621360}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 130,577 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SSLErrorHandler::CompleteCancelRequest(int error) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
DCHECK(!request_has_been_notified_);
if (request_has_been_notified_)
return;
SSLCertErrorHandler* cert_error = AsSSLCertErrorHandler();
const SSLInfo* ssl_info = NULL;
if (cert_error)
ssl_info = &cert_error->ssl_info();
if (delegate_)
delegate_->CancelSSLRequest(request_id_, error, ssl_info);
request_has_been_notified_ = true;
Release();
}
Commit Message: Inherits SupportsWeakPtr<T> instead of having WeakPtrFactory<T>
This change refines r137676.
BUG=122654
TEST=browser_test
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332233
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139771 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 107,936 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void prl_entry_destroy_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
{
kfree(container_of(head, struct ip_tunnel_prl_entry, rcu_head));
}
Commit Message: tunnels: fix netns vs proto registration ordering
Same stuff as in ip_gre patch: receive hook can be called before netns
setup is done, oopsing in net_generic().
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 27,454 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t Camera2Client::commandStopSmoothZoomL() {
ALOGE("%s: Unimplemented!", __FUNCTION__);
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Camera: Disallow dumping clients directly
Camera service dumps should only be initiated through
ICameraService::dump.
Bug: 26265403
Change-Id: If3ca4718ed74bf33ad8a416192689203029e2803
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 161,722 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int efx_ethtool_get_rxfh_indir(struct net_device *net_dev,
struct ethtool_rxfh_indir *indir)
{
struct efx_nic *efx = netdev_priv(net_dev);
size_t copy_size =
min_t(size_t, indir->size, ARRAY_SIZE(efx->rx_indir_table));
if (efx_nic_rev(efx) < EFX_REV_FALCON_B0)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
indir->size = ARRAY_SIZE(efx->rx_indir_table);
memcpy(indir->ring_index, efx->rx_indir_table,
copy_size * sizeof(indir->ring_index[0]));
return 0;
}
Commit Message: sfc: Fix maximum number of TSO segments and minimum TX queue size
[ Upstream commit 7e6d06f0de3f74ca929441add094518ae332257c ]
Currently an skb requiring TSO may not fit within a minimum-size TX
queue. The TX queue selected for the skb may stall and trigger the TX
watchdog repeatedly (since the problem skb will be retried after the
TX reset). This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3412.
Set the maximum number of TSO segments for our devices to 100. This
should make no difference to behaviour unless the actual MSS is less
than about 700. Increase the minimum TX queue size accordingly to
allow for 2 worst-case skbs, so that there will definitely be space
to add an skb after we wake a queue.
To avoid invalidating existing configurations, change
efx_ethtool_set_ringparam() to fix up values that are too small rather
than returning -EINVAL.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 19,453 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ContentBrowserClient::AllowSaveLocalState(ResourceContext* context) {
return true;
}
Commit Message: Ensure extensions and the Chrome Web Store are loaded in new BrowsingInstances.
BUG=174943
TEST=Can't post message to CWS. See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12301013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 115,829 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLSelectElement::updateSelectedState(int listIndex, bool multi, bool shift)
{
ASSERT(listIndex >= 0);
saveLastSelection();
m_activeSelectionState = true;
bool shiftSelect = m_multiple && shift;
bool multiSelect = m_multiple && multi && !shift;
HTMLElement* clickedElement = listItems()[listIndex];
if (clickedElement->hasTagName(optionTag)) {
if (toHTMLOptionElement(clickedElement)->selected() && multiSelect)
m_activeSelectionState = false;
if (!m_activeSelectionState)
toHTMLOptionElement(clickedElement)->setSelectedState(false);
}
if (!shiftSelect && !multiSelect)
deselectItemsWithoutValidation(clickedElement);
if (m_activeSelectionAnchorIndex < 0 && !multiSelect)
setActiveSelectionAnchorIndex(selectedIndex());
if (clickedElement->hasTagName(optionTag) && !toHTMLOptionElement(clickedElement)->isDisabledFormControl())
toHTMLOptionElement(clickedElement)->setSelectedState(true);
if (m_activeSelectionAnchorIndex < 0 || !shiftSelect)
setActiveSelectionAnchorIndex(listIndex);
setActiveSelectionEndIndex(listIndex);
updateListBoxSelection(!multiSelect);
}
Commit Message: SelectElement should remove an option when null is assigned by indexed setter
Fix bug embedded in r151449
see
http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?revision=151449&view=revision
R=haraken@chromium.org, tkent@chromium.org, eseidel@chromium.org
BUG=262365
TEST=fast/forms/select/select-assign-null.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/19947008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@154743 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 103,124 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ChromeMetricsServiceClient::IsUMACellularUploadLogicEnabled() {
return metrics::IsCellularLogicEnabled();
}
Commit Message: Add CPU metrics provider and Add CPU/GPU provider for UKM.
Bug: 907674
Change-Id: I61b88aeac8d2a7ff81d812fa5a267f48203ec7e2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1381376
Commit-Queue: Nik Bhagat <nikunjb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <rkaplow@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#618037}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 130,424 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xsltGenerateIdFunction(xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, int nargs){
static char base_address;
xmlNodePtr cur = NULL;
xmlXPathObjectPtr obj = NULL;
long val;
xmlChar str[30];
xmlDocPtr doc;
if (nargs == 0) {
cur = ctxt->context->node;
} else if (nargs == 1) {
xmlNodeSetPtr nodelist;
int i, ret;
if ((ctxt->value == NULL) || (ctxt->value->type != XPATH_NODESET)) {
ctxt->error = XPATH_INVALID_TYPE;
xsltTransformError(xsltXPathGetTransformContext(ctxt), NULL, NULL,
"generate-id() : invalid arg expecting a node-set\n");
return;
}
obj = valuePop(ctxt);
nodelist = obj->nodesetval;
if ((nodelist == NULL) || (nodelist->nodeNr <= 0)) {
xmlXPathFreeObject(obj);
valuePush(ctxt, xmlXPathNewCString(""));
return;
}
cur = nodelist->nodeTab[0];
for (i = 1;i < nodelist->nodeNr;i++) {
ret = xmlXPathCmpNodes(cur, nodelist->nodeTab[i]);
if (ret == -1)
cur = nodelist->nodeTab[i];
}
} else {
xsltTransformError(xsltXPathGetTransformContext(ctxt), NULL, NULL,
"generate-id() : invalid number of args %d\n", nargs);
ctxt->error = XPATH_INVALID_ARITY;
return;
}
/*
* Okay this is ugly but should work, use the NodePtr address
* to forge the ID
*/
if (cur->type != XML_NAMESPACE_DECL)
doc = cur->doc;
else {
xmlNsPtr ns = (xmlNsPtr) cur;
if (ns->context != NULL)
doc = ns->context;
else
doc = ctxt->context->doc;
}
if (obj)
xmlXPathFreeObject(obj);
val = (long)((char *)cur - (char *)&base_address);
if (val >= 0) {
sprintf((char *)str, "idp%ld", val);
} else {
sprintf((char *)str, "idm%ld", -val);
}
valuePush(ctxt, xmlXPathNewString(str));
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 173,302 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::runModalAlertDialog(const blink::WebString& message) {
RunJavaScriptMessage(JAVASCRIPT_MESSAGE_TYPE_ALERT,
message,
base::string16(),
frame_->document().url(),
NULL);
}
Commit Message: Add logging to figure out which IPC we're failing to deserialize in RenderFrame.
BUG=369553
R=creis@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/263833020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@268565 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 110,275 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int crypto_cbcmac_digest_update(struct shash_desc *pdesc, const u8 *p,
unsigned int len)
{
struct crypto_shash *parent = pdesc->tfm;
struct cbcmac_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_shash_ctx(parent);
struct cbcmac_desc_ctx *ctx = shash_desc_ctx(pdesc);
struct crypto_cipher *tfm = tctx->child;
int bs = crypto_shash_digestsize(parent);
u8 *dg = (u8 *)ctx + crypto_shash_descsize(parent) - bs;
while (len > 0) {
unsigned int l = min(len, bs - ctx->len);
crypto_xor(dg + ctx->len, p, l);
ctx->len +=l;
len -= l;
p += l;
if (ctx->len == bs) {
crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm, dg, dg);
ctx->len = 0;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: ccm - move cbcmac input off the stack
Commit f15f05b0a5de ("crypto: ccm - switch to separate cbcmac driver")
refactored the CCM driver to allow separate implementations of the
underlying MAC to be provided by a platform. However, in doing so, it
moved some data from the linear region to the stack, which violates the
SG constraints when the stack is virtually mapped.
So move idata/odata back to the request ctx struct, of which we can
reasonably expect that it has been allocated using kmalloc() et al.
Reported-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Fixes: f15f05b0a5de ("crypto: ccm - switch to separate cbcmac driver")
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 66,651 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::DidFailProvisionalLoadWithError(
RenderFrameHostImpl* render_frame_host,
const FrameHostMsg_DidFailProvisionalLoadWithError_Params& params) {
GURL validated_url(params.url);
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(WebContentsObserver,
observers_,
DidFailProvisionalLoad(render_frame_host,
validated_url,
params.error_code,
params.error_description,
params.was_ignored_by_handler));
FrameTreeNode* ftn = render_frame_host->frame_tree_node();
BrowserAccessibilityManager* manager =
ftn->current_frame_host()->browser_accessibility_manager();
if (manager)
manager->NavigationFailed();
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID: | 0 | 131,799 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::string TestURLLoader::TestUntrustedHttpRequests() {
{
ASSERT_EQ(PP_ERROR_NOACCESS, OpenUntrusted("cOnNeCt", std::string()));
ASSERT_EQ(PP_ERROR_NOACCESS, OpenUntrusted("tRaCk", std::string()));
ASSERT_EQ(PP_ERROR_NOACCESS, OpenUntrusted("tRaCe", std::string()));
ASSERT_EQ(PP_ERROR_NOACCESS,
OpenUntrusted("POST\x0d\x0ax-csrf-token:\x20test1234", std::string()));
}
{
ASSERT_EQ(PP_ERROR_NOACCESS, OpenUntrusted("GET", "Accept-Charset:\n"));
ASSERT_EQ(PP_ERROR_NOACCESS, OpenUntrusted("GET", "Accept-Encoding:\n"));
ASSERT_EQ(PP_ERROR_NOACCESS, OpenUntrusted("GET", "Connection:\n"));
ASSERT_EQ(PP_ERROR_NOACCESS, OpenUntrusted("GET", "Content-Length:\n"));
ASSERT_EQ(PP_ERROR_NOACCESS, OpenUntrusted("GET", "Cookie:\n"));
ASSERT_EQ(PP_ERROR_NOACCESS, OpenUntrusted("GET", "Cookie2:\n"));
ASSERT_EQ(PP_ERROR_NOACCESS, OpenUntrusted("GET", "Date:\n"));
ASSERT_EQ(PP_ERROR_NOACCESS, OpenUntrusted("GET", "Dnt:\n"));
ASSERT_EQ(PP_ERROR_NOACCESS, OpenUntrusted("GET", "Expect:\n"));
ASSERT_EQ(PP_ERROR_NOACCESS, OpenUntrusted("GET", "Host:\n"));
ASSERT_EQ(PP_ERROR_NOACCESS, OpenUntrusted("GET", "Keep-Alive:\n"));
ASSERT_EQ(PP_ERROR_NOACCESS, OpenUntrusted("GET", "Referer:\n"));
ASSERT_EQ(PP_ERROR_NOACCESS, OpenUntrusted("GET", "TE:\n"));
ASSERT_EQ(PP_ERROR_NOACCESS, OpenUntrusted("GET", "Trailer:\n"));
ASSERT_EQ(PP_ERROR_NOACCESS,
OpenUntrusted("GET", "Transfer-Encoding:\n"));
ASSERT_EQ(PP_ERROR_NOACCESS, OpenUntrusted("GET", "Upgrade:\n"));
ASSERT_EQ(PP_ERROR_NOACCESS, OpenUntrusted("GET", "User-Agent:\n"));
ASSERT_EQ(PP_ERROR_NOACCESS, OpenUntrusted("GET", "Via:\n"));
ASSERT_EQ(PP_ERROR_NOACCESS, OpenUntrusted(
"GET", "Proxy-Authorization: Basic dXNlcjpwYXNzd29yZA==:\n"));
ASSERT_EQ(PP_ERROR_NOACCESS, OpenUntrusted("GET", "Sec-foo:\n"));
}
{
pp::URLRequestInfo request(instance_);
request.SetCustomReferrerURL("http://www.google.com/");
int32_t rv = OpenUntrusted(request, NULL);
if (rv != PP_ERROR_NOACCESS)
return ReportError(
"Untrusted request with custom referrer restriction", rv);
}
{
pp::URLRequestInfo request(instance_);
request.SetCustomContentTransferEncoding("foo");
int32_t rv = OpenUntrusted(request, NULL);
if (rv != PP_ERROR_NOACCESS)
return ReportError(
"Untrusted request with content-transfer-encoding restriction", rv);
}
PASS();
}
Commit Message: Fix one implicit 64-bit -> 32-bit implicit conversion in a PPAPI test.
../../ppapi/tests/test_url_loader.cc:877:11: warning: implicit conversion loses integer precision: 'int64_t' (aka 'long long') to 'int32_t' (aka 'int') [-Wshorten-64-to-32]
total_bytes_to_be_received);
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
BUG=879657
Change-Id: I152f456368131fe7a2891ff0c97bf83f26ef0906
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1220173
Commit-Queue: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#600182}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 156,468 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: u64 secure_dccp_sequence_number(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
__be16 sport, __be16 dport)
{
u64 seq;
__u32 hash[4];
struct keydata *keyptr = get_keyptr();
hash[0] = (__force u32)saddr;
hash[1] = (__force u32)daddr;
hash[2] = ((__force u16)sport << 16) + (__force u16)dport;
hash[3] = keyptr->secret[11];
seq = half_md4_transform(hash, keyptr->secret);
seq |= ((u64)keyptr->count) << (32 - HASH_BITS);
seq += ktime_to_ns(ktime_get_real());
seq &= (1ull << 48) - 1;
return seq;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: make fragment identifications less predictable
IPv6 fragment identification generation is way beyond what we use for
IPv4 : It uses a single generator. Its not scalable and allows DOS
attacks.
Now inetpeer is IPv6 aware, we can use it to provide a more secure and
scalable frag ident generator (per destination, instead of system wide)
This patch :
1) defines a new secure_ipv6_id() helper
2) extends inet_getid() to provide 32bit results
3) extends ipv6_select_ident() with a new dest parameter
Reported-by: Fernando Gont <fernando@gont.com.ar>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 26,599 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int UDPSocketWin::JoinGroup(
const IPAddressNumber& group_address) const {
DCHECK(CalledOnValidThread());
if (!is_connected())
return ERR_SOCKET_NOT_CONNECTED;
switch (group_address.size()) {
case kIPv4AddressSize: {
if (addr_family_ != AF_INET)
return ERR_ADDRESS_INVALID;
ip_mreq mreq;
mreq.imr_interface.s_addr = htonl(multicast_interface_);
memcpy(&mreq.imr_multiaddr, &group_address[0], kIPv4AddressSize);
int rv = setsockopt(socket_, IPPROTO_IP, IP_ADD_MEMBERSHIP,
reinterpret_cast<const char*>(&mreq),
sizeof(mreq));
if (rv)
return MapSystemError(WSAGetLastError());
return OK;
}
case kIPv6AddressSize: {
if (addr_family_ != AF_INET6)
return ERR_ADDRESS_INVALID;
ipv6_mreq mreq;
mreq.ipv6mr_interface = multicast_interface_;
memcpy(&mreq.ipv6mr_multiaddr, &group_address[0], kIPv6AddressSize);
int rv = setsockopt(socket_, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_ADD_MEMBERSHIP,
reinterpret_cast<const char*>(&mreq),
sizeof(mreq));
if (rv)
return MapSystemError(WSAGetLastError());
return OK;
}
default:
NOTREACHED() << "Invalid address family";
return ERR_ADDRESS_INVALID;
}
}
Commit Message: Map posix error codes in bind better, and fix one windows mapping.
r=wtc
BUG=330233
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/101193008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@242224 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 113,447 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int crypto_authenc_esn_iverify(struct aead_request *req, u8 *iv,
unsigned int cryptlen)
{
struct crypto_aead *authenc_esn = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
struct authenc_esn_request_ctx *areq_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
struct scatterlist *src = req->src;
struct scatterlist *assoc = req->assoc;
struct scatterlist *cipher = areq_ctx->cipher;
struct scatterlist *hsg = areq_ctx->hsg;
struct scatterlist *tsg = areq_ctx->tsg;
struct scatterlist *assoc1;
struct scatterlist *assoc2;
unsigned int ivsize = crypto_aead_ivsize(authenc_esn);
struct page *srcp;
u8 *vsrc;
srcp = sg_page(src);
vsrc = PageHighMem(srcp) ? NULL : page_address(srcp) + src->offset;
if (ivsize) {
sg_init_table(cipher, 2);
sg_set_buf(cipher, iv, ivsize);
scatterwalk_crypto_chain(cipher, src, vsrc == iv + ivsize, 2);
src = cipher;
cryptlen += ivsize;
}
if (sg_is_last(assoc))
return -EINVAL;
assoc1 = assoc + 1;
if (sg_is_last(assoc1))
return -EINVAL;
assoc2 = assoc + 2;
if (!sg_is_last(assoc2))
return -EINVAL;
sg_init_table(hsg, 2);
sg_set_page(hsg, sg_page(assoc), assoc->length, assoc->offset);
sg_set_page(hsg + 1, sg_page(assoc2), assoc2->length, assoc2->offset);
sg_init_table(tsg, 1);
sg_set_page(tsg, sg_page(assoc1), assoc1->length, assoc1->offset);
areq_ctx->cryptlen = cryptlen;
areq_ctx->headlen = assoc->length + assoc2->length;
areq_ctx->trailen = assoc1->length;
areq_ctx->sg = src;
areq_ctx->complete = authenc_esn_verify_ahash_done;
areq_ctx->update_complete = authenc_esn_verify_ahash_update_done;
areq_ctx->update_complete2 = authenc_esn_verify_ahash_update_done2;
return crypto_authenc_esn_verify(req);
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 45,551 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool AXObjectCacheImpl::nodeIsTextControl(const Node* node) {
if (!node)
return false;
const AXObject* axObject = getOrCreate(const_cast<Node*>(node));
return axObject && axObject->isTextControl();
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,369 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: QuicStreamSequencerBuffer::~QuicStreamSequencerBuffer() {
Clear();
destruction_indicator_ = 654321;
}
Commit Message: Fix OOB Write in QuicStreamSequencerBuffer::OnStreamData
BUG=778505
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_cronet_tester;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
Change-Id: I1dfd1d26a2c7ee8fe047f7fe6e4ac2e9b97efa52
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/748282
Commit-Queue: Ryan Hamilton <rch@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Zhongyi Shi <zhongyi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513144}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 150,190 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual void TabInsertedAt(TabContentsWrapper* contents,
int index,
bool foreground) {
empty_ = false;
State* s = new State(contents, index, INSERT);
s->foreground = foreground;
states_.push_back(s);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,179 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static jobject android_net_wifi_get_tdls_status(JNIEnv *env,jclass cls, jint iface,jstring addr) {
JNIHelper helper(env);
wifi_interface_handle handle = getIfaceHandle(helper, cls, iface);
mac_addr address;
parseMacAddress(env, addr, address);
wifi_tdls_status status;
wifi_error ret;
ret = hal_fn.wifi_get_tdls_status(handle, address, &status );
if (ret != WIFI_SUCCESS) {
return NULL;
} else {
JNIObject<jobject> tdls_status = helper.createObject(
"com/android/server/wifi/WifiNative$TdlsStatus");
helper.setIntField(tdls_status, "channel", status.channel);
helper.setIntField(tdls_status, "global_operating_class", status.global_operating_class);
helper.setIntField(tdls_status, "state", status.state);
helper.setIntField(tdls_status, "reason", status.reason);
return tdls_status.detach();
}
}
Commit Message: Deal correctly with short strings
The parseMacAddress function anticipates only properly formed
MAC addresses (6 hexadecimal octets separated by ":"). This
change properly deals with situations where the string is
shorter than expected, making sure that the passed in char*
reference in parseHexByte never exceeds the end of the string.
BUG: 28164077
TEST: Added a main function:
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
unsigned char addr[6];
if (argc > 1) {
memset(addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
parseMacAddress(argv[1], addr);
printf("Result: %02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x\n",
addr[0], addr[1], addr[2], addr[3], addr[4], addr[5]);
}
}
Tested with "", "a" "ab" "ab:c" "abxc".
Change-Id: I0db8d0037e48b62333d475296a45b22ab0efe386
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 159,086 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SSLManager::DidLoadFromMemoryCache(LoadFromMemoryCacheDetails* details) {
scoped_refptr<SSLRequestInfo> info(new SSLRequestInfo(
details->url(),
ResourceType::SUB_RESOURCE,
details->pid(),
details->ssl_cert_id(),
details->ssl_cert_status()));
policy()->OnRequestStarted(info.get());
}
Commit Message: Inherits SupportsWeakPtr<T> instead of having WeakPtrFactory<T>
This change refines r137676.
BUG=122654
TEST=browser_test
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332233
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139771 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 107,948 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void doWriteWebCoreString(const String& string)
{
StringUTF8Adaptor stringUTF8(string);
doWriteString(stringUTF8.data(), stringUTF8.length());
}
Commit Message: Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings
BUG=390928
R=dcarney@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 120,476 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2Implementation::PushGroupMarkerEXT(GLsizei length,
const GLchar* marker) {
GPU_CLIENT_SINGLE_THREAD_CHECK();
GPU_CLIENT_LOG("[" << GetLogPrefix() << "] glPushGroupMarkerEXT(" << length
<< ", " << marker << ")");
if (!marker) {
marker = "";
}
SetBucketAsString(kResultBucketId, (length ? std::string(marker, length)
: std::string(marker)));
helper_->PushGroupMarkerEXT(kResultBucketId);
helper_->SetBucketSize(kResultBucketId, 0);
debug_marker_manager_.PushGroup(length ? std::string(marker, length)
: std::string(marker));
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,103 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: errorDebug(void *ctx ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, const char *msg, ...)
{
va_list args;
callbacks++;
if (quiet)
return;
va_start(args, msg);
fprintf(SAXdebug, "SAX.error: ");
vfprintf(SAXdebug, msg, args);
va_end(args);
}
Commit Message: Fix handling of parameter-entity references
There were two bugs where parameter-entity references could lead to an
unexpected change of the input buffer in xmlParseNameComplex and
xmlDictLookup being called with an invalid pointer.
Percent sign in DTD Names
=========================
The NEXTL macro used to call xmlParserHandlePEReference. When parsing
"complex" names inside the DTD, this could result in entity expansion
which created a new input buffer. The fix is to simply remove the call
to xmlParserHandlePEReference from the NEXTL macro. This is safe because
no users of the macro require expansion of parameter entities.
- xmlParseNameComplex
- xmlParseNCNameComplex
- xmlParseNmtoken
The percent sign is not allowed in names, which are grammatical tokens.
- xmlParseEntityValue
Parameter-entity references in entity values are expanded but this
happens in a separate step in this function.
- xmlParseSystemLiteral
Parameter-entity references are ignored in the system literal.
- xmlParseAttValueComplex
- xmlParseCharDataComplex
- xmlParseCommentComplex
- xmlParsePI
- xmlParseCDSect
Parameter-entity references are ignored outside the DTD.
- xmlLoadEntityContent
This function is only called from xmlStringLenDecodeEntities and
entities are replaced in a separate step immediately after the function
call.
This bug could also be triggered with an internal subset and double
entity expansion.
This fixes bug 766956 initially reported by Wei Lei and independently by
Chromium's ClusterFuzz, Hanno Böck, and Marco Grassi. Thanks to everyone
involved.
xmlParseNameComplex with XML_PARSE_OLD10
========================================
When parsing Names inside an expanded parameter entity with the
XML_PARSE_OLD10 option, xmlParseNameComplex would call xmlGROW via the
GROW macro if the input buffer was exhausted. At the end of the
parameter entity's replacement text, this function would then call
xmlPopInput which invalidated the input buffer.
There should be no need to invoke GROW in this situation because the
buffer is grown periodically every XML_PARSER_CHUNK_SIZE characters and,
at least for UTF-8, in xmlCurrentChar. This also matches the code path
executed when XML_PARSE_OLD10 is not set.
This fixes bugs 781205 (CVE-2017-9049) and 781361 (CVE-2017-9050).
Thanks to Marcel Böhme and Thuan Pham for the report.
Additional hardening
====================
A separate check was added in xmlParseNameComplex to validate the
buffer size.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 59,578 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserView::ChildPreferredSizeChanged(View* child) {
Layout();
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 118,308 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::TabMoved(TabContentsWrapper* contents,
int from_index,
int to_index) {
DCHECK(from_index >= 0 && to_index >= 0);
SyncHistoryWithTabs(std::min(from_index, to_index));
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 97,401 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void iput_final(struct inode *inode)
{
struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
const struct super_operations *op = inode->i_sb->s_op;
int drop;
WARN_ON(inode->i_state & I_NEW);
if (op->drop_inode)
drop = op->drop_inode(inode);
else
drop = generic_drop_inode(inode);
if (!drop && (sb->s_flags & SB_ACTIVE)) {
inode_add_lru(inode);
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
return;
}
if (!drop) {
inode->i_state |= I_WILL_FREE;
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
write_inode_now(inode, 1);
spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
WARN_ON(inode->i_state & I_NEW);
inode->i_state &= ~I_WILL_FREE;
}
inode->i_state |= I_FREEING;
if (!list_empty(&inode->i_lru))
inode_lru_list_del(inode);
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
evict(inode);
}
Commit Message: Fix up non-directory creation in SGID directories
sgid directories have special semantics, making newly created files in
the directory belong to the group of the directory, and newly created
subdirectories will also become sgid. This is historically used for
group-shared directories.
But group directories writable by non-group members should not imply
that such non-group members can magically join the group, so make sure
to clear the sgid bit on non-directories for non-members (but remember
that sgid without group execute means "mandatory locking", just to
confuse things even more).
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 79,851 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::OnReload(bool bypass_cache) {
frame_->Reload(bypass_cache ? WebFrameLoadType::kReloadBypassingCache
: WebFrameLoadType::kReload);
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID: | 0 | 147,863 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GahpClient::Startup()
{
return server->Startup();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 16,123 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline long parse_iv(const unsigned char *p)
{
return parse_iv2(p, NULL);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 7,551 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: local void single_compress(int reset)
{
size_t got; /* amount of data in in[] */
size_t more; /* amount of data in next[] (0 if eof) */
size_t start; /* start of data in next[] */
size_t have; /* bytes in current block for -i */
size_t hist; /* offset of permitted history */
int fresh; /* if true, reset compression history */
unsigned hash; /* hash for rsyncable */
unsigned char *scan; /* pointer for hash computation */
size_t left; /* bytes left to compress after hash hit */
unsigned long head; /* header length */
unsigned long ulen; /* total uncompressed size (overflow ok) */
unsigned long clen; /* total compressed size (overflow ok) */
unsigned long check; /* check value of uncompressed data */
static unsigned out_size; /* size of output buffer */
static unsigned char *in, *next, *out; /* reused i/o buffers */
static z_stream *strm = NULL; /* reused deflate structure */
/* if requested, just release the allocations and return */
if (reset) {
if (strm != NULL) {
(void)deflateEnd(strm);
FREE(strm);
FREE(out);
FREE(next);
FREE(in);
strm = NULL;
}
return;
}
/* initialize the deflate structure if this is the first time */
if (strm == NULL) {
out_size = g.block > MAXP2 ? MAXP2 : (unsigned)g.block;
if ((in = MALLOC(g.block + DICT)) == NULL ||
(next = MALLOC(g.block + DICT)) == NULL ||
(out = MALLOC(out_size)) == NULL ||
(strm = MALLOC(sizeof(z_stream))) == NULL)
bail("not enough memory", "");
strm->zfree = ZFREE;
strm->zalloc = ZALLOC;
strm->opaque = OPAQUE;
if (deflateInit2(strm, 6, Z_DEFLATED, -15, 8, Z_DEFAULT_STRATEGY) !=
Z_OK)
bail("not enough memory", "");
}
/* write header */
head = put_header();
/* set compression level in case it changed */
if (g.level <= 9) {
(void)deflateReset(strm);
(void)deflateParams(strm, g.level, Z_DEFAULT_STRATEGY);
}
/* do raw deflate and calculate check value */
got = 0;
more = readn(g.ind, next, g.block);
ulen = (unsigned long)more;
start = 0;
hist = 0;
clen = 0;
have = 0;
check = CHECK(0L, Z_NULL, 0);
hash = RSYNCHIT;
do {
/* get data to compress, see if there is any more input */
if (got == 0) {
scan = in; in = next; next = scan;
strm->next_in = in + start;
got = more;
if (g.level > 9) {
left = start + more - hist;
if (left > DICT)
left = DICT;
memcpy(next, in + ((start + more) - left), left);
start = left;
hist = 0;
}
else
start = 0;
more = readn(g.ind, next + start, g.block);
ulen += (unsigned long)more;
}
/* if rsyncable, compute hash until a hit or the end of the block */
left = 0;
if (g.rsync && got) {
scan = strm->next_in;
left = got;
do {
if (left == 0) {
/* went to the end -- if no more or no hit in size bytes,
then proceed to do a flush or finish with got bytes */
if (more == 0 || got == g.block)
break;
/* fill in[] with what's left there and as much as possible
from next[] -- set up to continue hash hit search */
if (g.level > 9) {
left = (strm->next_in - in) - hist;
if (left > DICT)
left = DICT;
}
memmove(in, strm->next_in - left, left + got);
hist = 0;
strm->next_in = in + left;
scan = in + left + got;
left = more > g.block - got ? g.block - got : more;
memcpy(scan, next + start, left);
got += left;
more -= left;
start += left;
/* if that emptied the next buffer, try to refill it */
if (more == 0) {
more = readn(g.ind, next, g.block);
ulen += (unsigned long)more;
start = 0;
}
}
left--;
hash = ((hash << 1) ^ *scan++) & RSYNCMASK;
} while (hash != RSYNCHIT);
got -= left;
}
/* clear history for --independent option */
fresh = 0;
if (!g.setdict) {
have += got;
if (have > g.block) {
fresh = 1;
have = got;
}
}
if (g.level <= 9) {
/* clear history if requested */
if (fresh)
(void)deflateReset(strm);
/* compress MAXP2-size chunks in case unsigned type is small */
while (got > MAXP2) {
strm->avail_in = MAXP2;
check = CHECK(check, strm->next_in, strm->avail_in);
DEFLATE_WRITE(Z_NO_FLUSH);
got -= MAXP2;
}
/* compress the remainder, emit a block, finish if end of input */
strm->avail_in = (unsigned)got;
got = left;
check = CHECK(check, strm->next_in, strm->avail_in);
if (more || got) {
#if ZLIB_VERNUM >= 0x1260
int bits;
DEFLATE_WRITE(Z_BLOCK);
(void)deflatePending(strm, Z_NULL, &bits);
if (bits & 1)
DEFLATE_WRITE(Z_SYNC_FLUSH);
else if (bits & 7) {
do {
bits = deflatePrime(strm, 10, 2);
assert(bits == Z_OK);
(void)deflatePending(strm, Z_NULL, &bits);
} while (bits & 7);
DEFLATE_WRITE(Z_NO_FLUSH);
}
#else
DEFLATE_WRITE(Z_SYNC_FLUSH);
#endif
}
else
DEFLATE_WRITE(Z_FINISH);
}
else {
/* compress got bytes using zopfli, bring to byte boundary */
unsigned char bits, *out;
size_t outsize, off;
/* discard history if requested */
off = strm->next_in - in;
if (fresh)
hist = off;
out = NULL;
outsize = 0;
bits = 0;
ZopfliDeflatePart(&g.zopts, 2, !(more || left),
in + hist, off - hist, (off - hist) + got,
&bits, &out, &outsize);
bits &= 7;
if ((more || left) && bits) {
if (bits & 1) {
writen(g.outd, out, outsize);
if (bits == 7)
writen(g.outd, (unsigned char *)"\0", 1);
writen(g.outd, (unsigned char *)"\0\0\xff\xff", 4);
}
else {
assert(outsize > 0);
writen(g.outd, out, outsize - 1);
do {
out[outsize - 1] += 2 << bits;
writen(g.outd, out + outsize - 1, 1);
out[outsize - 1] = 0;
bits += 2;
} while (bits < 8);
writen(g.outd, out + outsize - 1, 1);
}
}
else
writen(g.outd, out, outsize);
free(out);
while (got > MAXP2) {
check = CHECK(check, strm->next_in, MAXP2);
strm->next_in += MAXP2;
got -= MAXP2;
}
check = CHECK(check, strm->next_in, (unsigned)got);
strm->next_in += got;
got = left;
}
/* do until no more input */
} while (more || got);
/* write trailer */
put_trailer(ulen, clen, check, head);
}
Commit Message: When decompressing with -N or -NT, strip any path from header name.
This uses the path of the compressed file combined with the name
from the header as the name of the decompressed output file. Any
path information in the header name is stripped. This avoids a
possible vulnerability where absolute or descending paths are put
in the gzip header.
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 44,830 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebInspectorProxy::initializeInspectorClientGtk(const WKInspectorClientGtk* inspectorClient)
{
m_client.initialize(inspectorClient);
}
Commit Message: [GTK] Inspector should set a default attached height before being attached
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=90767
Reviewed by Xan Lopez.
We are currently using the minimum attached height in
WebKitWebViewBase as the default height for the inspector when
attached. It would be easier for WebKitWebViewBase and embedders
implementing attach() if the inspector already had an attached
height set when it's being attached.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/WebKitWebViewBase.cpp:
(webkitWebViewBaseContainerAdd): Don't initialize
inspectorViewHeight.
(webkitWebViewBaseSetInspectorViewHeight): Allow to set the
inspector view height before having an inpector view, but only
queue a resize when the view already has an inspector view.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/tests/TestInspector.cpp:
(testInspectorDefault):
(testInspectorManualAttachDetach):
* UIProcess/gtk/WebInspectorProxyGtk.cpp:
(WebKit::WebInspectorProxy::platformAttach): Set the default
attached height before attach the inspector view.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124479 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 108,929 |
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