instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NavigationControllerImpl::NavigateFromFrameProxy(
RenderFrameHostImpl* render_frame_host,
const GURL& url,
bool is_renderer_initiated,
SiteInstance* source_site_instance,
const Referrer& referrer,
ui::PageTransition page_transition,
bool should_replace_current_entry,
const std::string& method,
scoped_refptr<network::ResourceRequestBody> post_body,
const std::string& extra_headers,
scoped_refptr<network::SharedURLLoaderFactory> blob_url_loader_factory) {
FrameTreeNode* node = render_frame_host->frame_tree_node();
std::unique_ptr<NavigationEntryImpl> entry;
if (!node->IsMainFrame()) {
if (GetLastCommittedEntry()) {
entry = GetLastCommittedEntry()->Clone();
entry->set_extra_headers(extra_headers);
} else {
entry = NavigationEntryImpl::FromNavigationEntry(CreateNavigationEntry(
GURL(url::kAboutBlankURL), referrer, page_transition,
is_renderer_initiated, extra_headers, browser_context_,
nullptr /* blob_url_loader_factory */));
}
entry->AddOrUpdateFrameEntry(
node, -1, -1, nullptr,
static_cast<SiteInstanceImpl*>(source_site_instance), url, referrer,
std::vector<GURL>(), PageState(), method, -1, blob_url_loader_factory);
} else {
entry = NavigationEntryImpl::FromNavigationEntry(CreateNavigationEntry(
url, referrer, page_transition, is_renderer_initiated, extra_headers,
browser_context_, blob_url_loader_factory));
entry->root_node()->frame_entry->set_source_site_instance(
static_cast<SiteInstanceImpl*>(source_site_instance));
entry->root_node()->frame_entry->set_method(method);
}
if (should_replace_current_entry && GetEntryCount() > 0)
entry->set_should_replace_entry(true);
if (GetLastCommittedEntry() &&
GetLastCommittedEntry()->GetIsOverridingUserAgent()) {
entry->SetIsOverridingUserAgent(true);
}
scoped_refptr<FrameNavigationEntry> frame_entry(entry->GetFrameEntry(node));
if (!frame_entry) {
frame_entry = new FrameNavigationEntry(
node->unique_name(), -1, -1, nullptr,
static_cast<SiteInstanceImpl*>(source_site_instance), url, referrer,
std::vector<GURL>(), PageState(), method, -1, blob_url_loader_factory);
}
std::unique_ptr<NavigationRequest> request = CreateNavigationRequest(
render_frame_host->frame_tree_node(), *entry, frame_entry.get(),
ReloadType::NONE, false /* is_same_document_history_load */,
false /* is_history_navigation_in_new_child */, post_body, nullptr);
if (!request)
return;
render_frame_host->frame_tree_node()->navigator()->Navigate(
std::move(request), ReloadType::NONE, RestoreType::NONE);
}
Commit Message: Preserve renderer-initiated bit when reloading in a new process.
BUG=847718
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Change-Id: I6c3461793fbb23f1a4d731dc27b4e77312f29227
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1080235
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563312}
CWE ID: | 0 | 153,990 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserView::SaveWindowPlacement(const gfx::Rect& bounds,
ui::WindowShowState show_state) {
if (!IsFullscreen() && frame_->ShouldSaveWindowPlacement() &&
chrome::ShouldSaveWindowPlacement(browser_.get())) {
WidgetDelegate::SaveWindowPlacement(bounds, show_state);
chrome::SaveWindowPlacement(browser_.get(), bounds, show_state);
}
}
Commit Message: Mac: turn popups into new tabs while in fullscreen.
It's platform convention to show popups as new tabs while in
non-HTML5 fullscreen. (Popups cause tabs to lose HTML5 fullscreen.)
This was implemented for Cocoa in a BrowserWindow override, but
it makes sense to just stick it into Browser and remove a ton
of override code put in just to support this.
BUG=858929, 868416
TEST=as in bugs
Change-Id: I43471f242813ec1159d9c690bab73dab3e610b7d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1153455
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <sdy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#578755}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 155,255 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __begin_wqe(struct mlx5_ib_qp *qp, void **seg,
struct mlx5_wqe_ctrl_seg **ctrl,
const struct ib_send_wr *wr, unsigned *idx,
int *size, int nreq, bool send_signaled, bool solicited)
{
if (unlikely(mlx5_wq_overflow(&qp->sq, nreq, qp->ibqp.send_cq)))
return -ENOMEM;
*idx = qp->sq.cur_post & (qp->sq.wqe_cnt - 1);
*seg = mlx5_get_send_wqe(qp, *idx);
*ctrl = *seg;
*(uint32_t *)(*seg + 8) = 0;
(*ctrl)->imm = send_ieth(wr);
(*ctrl)->fm_ce_se = qp->sq_signal_bits |
(send_signaled ? MLX5_WQE_CTRL_CQ_UPDATE : 0) |
(solicited ? MLX5_WQE_CTRL_SOLICITED : 0);
*seg += sizeof(**ctrl);
*size = sizeof(**ctrl) / 16;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: IB/mlx5: Fix leaking stack memory to userspace
mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp was never initialized and only the first 4 bytes
were written.
Fixes: 41d902cb7c32 ("RDMA/mlx5: Fix definition of mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 92,072 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: set_xattrs(struct archive_write_disk *a)
{
struct archive_entry *entry = a->entry;
static int warning_done = 0;
int ret = ARCHIVE_OK;
int i = archive_entry_xattr_reset(entry);
while (i--) {
const char *name;
const void *value;
size_t size;
archive_entry_xattr_next(entry, &name, &value, &size);
if (name != NULL) {
int e;
int namespace;
if (strncmp(name, "user.", 5) == 0) {
/* "user." attributes go to user namespace */
name += 5;
namespace = EXTATTR_NAMESPACE_USER;
} else {
/* Warn about other extended attributes. */
archive_set_error(&a->archive,
ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Can't restore extended attribute ``%s''",
name);
ret = ARCHIVE_WARN;
continue;
}
errno = 0;
#if HAVE_EXTATTR_SET_FD
if (a->fd >= 0)
e = extattr_set_fd(a->fd, namespace, name, value, size);
else
#endif
/* TODO: should we use extattr_set_link() instead? */
{
e = extattr_set_file(archive_entry_pathname(entry),
namespace, name, value, size);
}
if (e != (int)size) {
if (errno == ENOTSUP || errno == ENOSYS) {
if (!warning_done) {
warning_done = 1;
archive_set_error(&a->archive, errno,
"Cannot restore extended "
"attributes on this file "
"system");
}
} else {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, errno,
"Failed to set extended attribute");
}
ret = ARCHIVE_WARN;
}
}
}
return (ret);
}
Commit Message: Add ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS option
This fixes a directory traversal in the cpio tool.
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 43,940 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PrepareForNonInterceptedRequest(uint32_t* out_options) {
if (!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(network::features::kNetworkService)) {
DCHECK(!interceptors_.empty());
DCHECK(default_request_handler_factory_);
DCHECK(blink::ServiceWorkerUtils::IsServicificationEnabled() ||
signed_exchange_utils::IsSignedExchangeHandlingEnabled());
default_loader_used_ = true;
if (url_chain_.size() > 0) {
request_info_ = CreateNavigationRequestInfoForRedirect(
*request_info_, *resource_request_);
}
bool was_request_intercepted = subresource_loader_params_.has_value();
*out_options = network::mojom::kURLLoadOptionNone;
return base::MakeRefCounted<SingleRequestURLLoaderFactory>(
default_request_handler_factory_.Run(was_request_intercepted));
}
scoped_refptr<network::SharedURLLoaderFactory> factory;
if (!IsURLHandledByDefaultLoader(resource_request_->url)) {
if (known_schemes_.find(resource_request_->url.scheme()) ==
known_schemes_.end()) {
bool handled = GetContentClient()->browser()->HandleExternalProtocol(
resource_request_->url, web_contents_getter_,
ChildProcessHost::kInvalidUniqueID, navigation_ui_data_.get(),
resource_request_->resource_type == RESOURCE_TYPE_MAIN_FRAME,
static_cast<ui::PageTransition>(resource_request_->transition_type),
resource_request_->has_user_gesture);
factory = base::MakeRefCounted<SingleRequestURLLoaderFactory>(
base::BindOnce(UnknownSchemeCallback, handled));
} else {
network::mojom::URLLoaderFactoryPtr& non_network_factory =
non_network_url_loader_factories_[resource_request_->url.scheme()];
if (!non_network_factory.is_bound()) {
base::PostTaskWithTraits(
FROM_HERE, {BrowserThread::UI},
base::BindOnce(&NavigationURLLoaderImpl ::
BindNonNetworkURLLoaderFactoryRequest,
owner_, frame_tree_node_id_,
resource_request_->url,
mojo::MakeRequest(&non_network_factory)));
}
factory =
base::MakeRefCounted<network::WeakWrapperSharedURLLoaderFactory>(
non_network_factory.get());
}
} else {
default_loader_used_ = true;
if (proxied_factory_request_.is_pending() &&
!resource_request_->url.SchemeIs(url::kDataScheme)) {
DCHECK(proxied_factory_info_.is_valid());
network_loader_factory_->Clone(std::move(proxied_factory_request_));
factory = base::MakeRefCounted<network::WrapperSharedURLLoaderFactory>(
std::move(proxied_factory_info_));
} else {
factory = network_loader_factory_;
}
}
url_chain_.push_back(resource_request_->url);
*out_options = GetURLLoaderOptions(resource_request_->resource_type ==
RESOURCE_TYPE_MAIN_FRAME);
return factory;
}
Commit Message: Abort navigations on 304 responses.
A recent change (https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1161479)
accidentally resulted in treating 304 responses as downloads. This CL
treats them as ERR_ABORTED instead. This doesn't exactly match old
behavior, which passed them on to the renderer, which then aborted them.
The new code results in correctly restoring the original URL in the
omnibox, and has a shiny new test to prevent future regressions.
Bug: 882270
Change-Id: Ic73dcce9e9596d43327b13acde03b4ed9bd0c82e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1252684
Commit-Queue: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#595641}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 145,384 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int JBIG2MMRDecoder::getWhiteCode() {
const CCITTCode *p;
Guint code;
if (bufLen == 0) {
buf = str->getChar() & 0xff;
bufLen = 8;
++nBytesRead;
}
while (1) {
if (bufLen >= 11 && ((buf >> (bufLen - 7)) & 0x7f) == 0) {
if (bufLen <= 12) {
code = buf << (12 - bufLen);
} else {
code = buf >> (bufLen - 12);
}
p = &whiteTab1[code & 0x1f];
} else {
if (bufLen <= 9) {
code = buf << (9 - bufLen);
} else {
code = buf >> (bufLen - 9);
}
p = &whiteTab2[code & 0x1ff];
}
if (p->bits > 0 && p->bits <= (int)bufLen) {
bufLen -= p->bits;
return p->n;
}
if (bufLen >= 12) {
break;
}
buf = (buf << 8) | (str->getChar() & 0xff);
bufLen += 8;
++nBytesRead;
}
error(errSyntaxError, str->getPos(), "Bad white code in JBIG2 MMR stream");
--bufLen;
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 14,701 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline const unsigned char *ReadResourceLong(const unsigned char *p,
unsigned int *quantum)
{
*quantum=(unsigned int) (*p++) << 24;
*quantum|=(unsigned int) (*p++) << 16;
*quantum|=(unsigned int) (*p++) << 8;
*quantum|=(unsigned int) (*p++) << 0;
return(p);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/280
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 73,396 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE5(waitid,
int, which, compat_pid_t, pid,
struct compat_siginfo __user *, infop, int, options,
struct compat_rusage __user *, uru)
{
struct rusage ru;
struct waitid_info info = {.status = 0};
long err = kernel_waitid(which, pid, &info, options, uru ? &ru : NULL);
int signo = 0;
if (err > 0) {
signo = SIGCHLD;
err = 0;
}
if (!err && uru) {
/* kernel_waitid() overwrites everything in ru */
if (COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME)
err = copy_to_user(uru, &ru, sizeof(ru));
else
err = put_compat_rusage(&ru, uru);
if (err)
return -EFAULT;
}
if (!infop)
return err;
user_access_begin();
unsafe_put_user(signo, &infop->si_signo, Efault);
unsafe_put_user(0, &infop->si_errno, Efault);
unsafe_put_user(info.cause, &infop->si_code, Efault);
unsafe_put_user(info.pid, &infop->si_pid, Efault);
unsafe_put_user(info.uid, &infop->si_uid, Efault);
unsafe_put_user(info.status, &infop->si_status, Efault);
user_access_end();
return err;
Efault:
user_access_end();
return -EFAULT;
}
Commit Message: fix infoleak in waitid(2)
kernel_waitid() can return a PID, an error or 0. rusage is filled in the first
case and waitid(2) rusage should've been copied out exactly in that case, *not*
whenever kernel_waitid() has not returned an error. Compat variant shares that
braino; none of kernel_wait4() callers do, so the below ought to fix it.
Reported-and-tested-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Fixes: ce72a16fa705 ("wait4(2)/waitid(2): separate copying rusage to userland")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.13
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 1 | 167,742 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static uint8_t arcmsr_hbaA_abort_allcmd(struct AdapterControlBlock *acb)
{
struct MessageUnit_A __iomem *reg = acb->pmuA;
writel(ARCMSR_INBOUND_MESG0_ABORT_CMD, ®->inbound_msgaddr0);
if (!arcmsr_hbaA_wait_msgint_ready(acb)) {
printk(KERN_NOTICE
"arcmsr%d: wait 'abort all outstanding command' timeout\n"
, acb->host->host_no);
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: scsi: arcmsr: Buffer overflow in arcmsr_iop_message_xfer()
We need to put an upper bound on "user_len" so the memcpy() doesn't
overflow.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <marco.gra@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Henzl <thenzl@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 49,759 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SPR_GetHostCPS(struct rx_call *call, afs_int32 ahost, prlist *alist,
afs_int32 *over)
{
afs_int32 code;
code = getHostCPS(call, ahost, alist, over);
osi_auditU(call, PTS_GetHCPSEvent, code, AUD_HOST, htonl(ahost), AUD_END);
ViceLog(125, ("PTS_GetHostCPS: code %d ahost %d\n", code, ahost));
return code;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 12,512 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Profile* GetFallbackStartupProfile() {
ProfileManager* profile_manager = g_browser_process->profile_manager();
auto* storage = &profile_manager->GetProfileAttributesStorage();
for (Profile* profile : ProfileManager::GetLastOpenedProfiles()) {
ProfileAttributesEntry* entry;
bool has_entry = storage->GetProfileAttributesWithPath(profile->GetPath(),
&entry);
if (!has_entry || !entry->IsSigninRequired())
return profile;
}
Profile* guest_profile =
profile_manager->GetProfile(ProfileManager::GetGuestProfilePath());
Profile* system_profile =
profile_manager->GetProfile(ProfileManager::GetSystemProfilePath());
if (guest_profile && system_profile)
return guest_profile;
for (ProfileAttributesEntry* entry : storage->GetAllProfilesAttributes()) {
if (!entry->IsSigninRequired()) {
Profile* profile = profile_manager->GetProfile(entry->GetPath());
if (profile)
return profile;
}
}
return nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Prevent regular mode session startup pref type turning to default.
When user loses past session tabs of regular mode after
invoking a new window from the incognito mode.
This was happening because the SessionStartUpPref type was being set
to default, from last, for regular user mode. This was happening in
the RestoreIfNecessary method where the restoration was taking place
for users whose SessionStartUpPref type was set to last.
The fix was to make the protocol of changing the pref type to
default more explicit to incognito users and not regular users
of pref type last.
Bug: 481373
Change-Id: I96efb4cf196949312181c83c6dcd45986ddded13
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1774441
Reviewed-by: Tommy Martino <tmartino@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ramin Halavati <rhalavati@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Rohit Agarwal <roagarwal@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#691726}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 137,495 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void intel_snb_check_microcode(void)
{
int pebs_broken = 0;
int cpu;
get_online_cpus();
for_each_online_cpu(cpu) {
if ((pebs_broken = intel_snb_pebs_broken(cpu)))
break;
}
put_online_cpus();
if (pebs_broken == x86_pmu.pebs_broken)
return;
/*
* Serialized by the microcode lock..
*/
if (x86_pmu.pebs_broken) {
pr_info("PEBS enabled due to microcode update\n");
x86_pmu.pebs_broken = 0;
} else {
pr_info("PEBS disabled due to CPU errata, please upgrade microcode\n");
x86_pmu.pebs_broken = 1;
}
}
Commit Message: perf/x86: Fix offcore_rsp valid mask for SNB/IVB
The valid mask for both offcore_response_0 and
offcore_response_1 was wrong for SNB/SNB-EP,
IVB/IVB-EP. It was possible to write to
reserved bit and cause a GP fault crashing
the kernel.
This patch fixes the problem by correctly marking the
reserved bits in the valid mask for all the processors
mentioned above.
A distinction between desktop and server parts is introduced
because bits 24-30 are only available on the server parts.
This version of the patch is just a rebase to perf/urgent tree
and should apply to older kernels as well.
Signed-off-by: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: jolsa@redhat.com
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: security@kernel.org
Cc: ak@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 31,691 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CheckAutoLaunchCallback() {
if (!auto_launch_trial::IsInAutoLaunchGroup())
return;
Browser* browser = BrowserList::GetLastActive();
TabContentsWrapper* tab = browser->GetSelectedTabContentsWrapper();
InfoBarTabHelper* infobar_helper = tab->infobar_tab_helper();
if (infobar_helper->infobar_count() > 0)
return;
infobar_helper->AddInfoBar(
new AutolaunchInfoBarDelegate(infobar_helper,
tab->profile()->GetPrefs()));
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Move audio, power, and UI files into subdirs.
This moves more files from chrome/browser/chromeos/ into
subdirectories.
BUG=chromium-os:22896
TEST=did chrome os builds both with and without aura
TBR=sky
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9125006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 109,364 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PaymentRequestState::AddObserver(Observer* observer) {
CHECK(observer);
observers_.AddObserver(observer);
}
Commit Message: [Payment Handler] Don't wait for response from closed payment app.
Before this patch, tapping the back button on top of the payment handler
window on desktop would not affect the |response_helper_|, which would
continue waiting for a response from the payment app. The service worker
of the closed payment app could timeout after 5 minutes and invoke the
|response_helper_|. Depending on what else the user did afterwards, in
the best case scenario, the payment sheet would display a "Transaction
failed" error message. In the worst case scenario, the
|response_helper_| would be used after free.
This patch clears the |response_helper_| in the PaymentRequestState and
in the ServiceWorkerPaymentInstrument after the payment app is closed.
After this patch, the cancelled payment app does not show "Transaction
failed" and does not use memory after it was freed.
Bug: 956597
Change-Id: I64134b911a4f8c154cb56d537a8243a68a806394
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1588682
Reviewed-by: anthonyvd <anthonyvd@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Rouslan Solomakhin <rouslan@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654995}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 151,131 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void process_constructors (RBinFile *bf, RList *ret, int bits) {
RList *secs = sections (bf);
RListIter *iter;
RBinSection *sec;
int i, type;
r_list_foreach (secs, iter, sec) {
type = -1;
if (!strcmp (sec->name, ".fini_array")) {
type = R_BIN_ENTRY_TYPE_FINI;
} else if (!strcmp (sec->name, ".init_array")) {
type = R_BIN_ENTRY_TYPE_INIT;
} else if (!strcmp (sec->name, ".preinit_array")) {
type = R_BIN_ENTRY_TYPE_PREINIT;
}
if (type != -1) {
ut8 *buf = calloc (sec->size, 1);
if (!buf) {
continue;
}
(void)r_buf_read_at (bf->buf, sec->paddr, buf, sec->size);
if (bits == 32) {
for (i = 0; i < sec->size; i += 4) {
ut32 addr32 = r_read_le32 (buf + i);
if (addr32) {
RBinAddr *ba = newEntry (sec->paddr + i, (ut64)addr32, type, bits);
r_list_append (ret, ba);
}
}
} else {
for (i = 0; i < sec->size; i += 8) {
ut64 addr64 = r_read_le64 (buf + i);
if (addr64) {
RBinAddr *ba = newEntry (sec->paddr + i, addr64, type, bits);
r_list_append (ret, ba);
}
}
}
free (buf);
}
}
r_list_free (secs);
}
Commit Message: Fix #9904 - crash in r2_hoobr_r_read_le32 (over 9000 entrypoints) and read_le oobread (#9923)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 169,232 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ItemMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
ExceptionState exception_state(info.GetIsolate(), ExceptionState::kExecutionContext, "TestObject", "item");
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
ScriptState* script_state = ScriptState::ForRelevantRealm(info);
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() < 1)) {
exception_state.ThrowTypeError(ExceptionMessages::NotEnoughArguments(1, info.Length()));
return;
}
uint32_t index;
index = NativeValueTraits<IDLUnsignedLong>::NativeValue(info.GetIsolate(), info[0], exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return;
ScriptValue result = impl->item(script_state, index);
V8SetReturnValue(info, result.V8Value());
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 134,782 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
struct shared_msr_entry *msr;
int ret = 0;
u32 msr_index = msr_info->index;
u64 data = msr_info->data;
switch (msr_index) {
case MSR_EFER:
ret = kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info);
break;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
case MSR_FS_BASE:
vmx_segment_cache_clear(vmx);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_FS_BASE, data);
break;
case MSR_GS_BASE:
vmx_segment_cache_clear(vmx);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_GS_BASE, data);
break;
case MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE:
vmx_load_host_state(vmx);
vmx->msr_guest_kernel_gs_base = data;
break;
#endif
case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS:
vmcs_write32(GUEST_SYSENTER_CS, data);
break;
case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP:
vmcs_writel(GUEST_SYSENTER_EIP, data);
break;
case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP:
vmcs_writel(GUEST_SYSENTER_ESP, data);
break;
case MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS:
if (!vmx_mpx_supported())
return 1;
vmcs_write64(GUEST_BNDCFGS, data);
break;
case MSR_IA32_TSC:
kvm_write_tsc(vcpu, msr_info);
break;
case MSR_IA32_CR_PAT:
if (vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PAT) {
if (!kvm_mtrr_valid(vcpu, MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, data))
return 1;
vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_PAT, data);
vcpu->arch.pat = data;
break;
}
ret = kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info);
break;
case MSR_IA32_TSC_ADJUST:
ret = kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info);
break;
case MSR_IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL:
if (!nested_vmx_allowed(vcpu) ||
(to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.msr_ia32_feature_control &
FEATURE_CONTROL_LOCKED && !msr_info->host_initiated))
return 1;
vmx->nested.msr_ia32_feature_control = data;
if (msr_info->host_initiated && data == 0)
vmx_leave_nested(vcpu);
break;
case MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC ... MSR_IA32_VMX_VMFUNC:
return 1; /* they are read-only */
case MSR_TSC_AUX:
if (!vmx->rdtscp_enabled)
return 1;
/* Check reserved bit, higher 32 bits should be zero */
if ((data >> 32) != 0)
return 1;
/* Otherwise falls through */
default:
msr = find_msr_entry(vmx, msr_index);
if (msr) {
u64 old_msr_data = msr->data;
msr->data = data;
if (msr - vmx->guest_msrs < vmx->save_nmsrs) {
preempt_disable();
ret = kvm_set_shared_msr(msr->index, msr->data,
msr->mask);
preempt_enable();
if (ret)
msr->data = old_msr_data;
}
break;
}
ret = kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: kvm: vmx: handle invvpid vm exit gracefully
On systems with invvpid instruction support (corresponding bit in
IA32_VMX_EPT_VPID_CAP MSR is set) guest invocation of invvpid
causes vm exit, which is currently not handled and results in
propagation of unknown exit to userspace.
Fix this by installing an invvpid vm exit handler.
This is CVE-2014-3646.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 37,378 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static size_t resp_hdr_cb(void *ptr, size_t size, size_t nmemb, void *user_data)
{
struct header_info *hi = (struct header_info *)user_data;
size_t remlen, slen, ptrlen = size * nmemb;
char *rem, *val = NULL, *key = NULL;
void *tmp;
val = (char *)calloc(1, ptrlen);
key = (char *)calloc(1, ptrlen);
if (!key || !val)
goto out;
tmp = memchr(ptr, ':', ptrlen);
if (!tmp || (tmp == ptr)) /* skip empty keys / blanks */
goto out;
slen = (uint8_t*)tmp - (uint8_t*)ptr;
if ((slen + 1) == ptrlen) /* skip key w/ no value */
goto out;
memcpy(key, ptr, slen); /* store & nul term key */
key[slen] = 0;
rem = (char*)ptr + slen + 1; /* trim value's leading whitespace */
remlen = ptrlen - slen - 1;
while ((remlen > 0) && (isspace(*rem))) {
remlen--;
rem++;
}
memcpy(val, rem, remlen); /* store value, trim trailing ws */
val[remlen] = 0;
while ((*val) && (isspace(val[strlen(val) - 1])))
val[strlen(val) - 1] = 0;
if (!*val) /* skip blank value */
goto out;
if (opt_protocol)
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "HTTP hdr(%s): %s", key, val);
if (!strcasecmp("X-Roll-Ntime", key)) {
hi->hadrolltime = true;
if (!strncasecmp("N", val, 1))
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "X-Roll-Ntime: N found");
else {
hi->canroll = true;
/* Check to see if expire= is supported and if not, set
* the rolltime to the default scantime */
if (strlen(val) > 7 && !strncasecmp("expire=", val, 7)) {
sscanf(val + 7, "%d", &hi->rolltime);
hi->hadexpire = true;
} else
hi->rolltime = opt_scantime;
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "X-Roll-Ntime expiry set to %d", hi->rolltime);
}
}
if (!strcasecmp("X-Long-Polling", key)) {
hi->lp_path = val; /* steal memory reference */
val = NULL;
}
if (!strcasecmp("X-Reject-Reason", key)) {
hi->reason = val; /* steal memory reference */
val = NULL;
}
if (!strcasecmp("X-Stratum", key)) {
hi->stratum_url = val;
val = NULL;
}
out:
free(key);
free(val);
return ptrlen;
}
Commit Message: stratum: parse_notify(): Don't die on malformed bbversion/prev_hash/nbit/ntime.
Might have introduced a memory leak, don't have time to check. :(
Should the other hex2bin()'s be checked?
Thanks to Mick Ayzenberg <mick.dejavusecurity.com> for finding this.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 36,617 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int rt_fast_clean(struct rtable *rth)
{
/* Kill broadcast/multicast entries very aggresively, if they
collide in hash table with more useful entries */
return (rth->rt_flags & (RTCF_BROADCAST | RTCF_MULTICAST)) &&
rt_is_input_route(rth) && rth->dst.rt_next;
}
Commit Message: net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5.
Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.
MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)
Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic
regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and
use a full 32-bit sequence number.
For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.
Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 25,170 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ParamTraits<unsigned short>::Write(Message* m, const param_type& p) {
m->WriteBytes(&p, sizeof(param_type));
}
Commit Message: Validate that paths don't contain embedded NULLs at deserialization.
BUG=166867
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11743009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@174935 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 117,407 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline bool sched_debug(void)
{
return sched_debug_enabled;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 55,592 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static v8::Persistent<v8::FunctionTemplate> ConfigureV8TestInterfaceTemplate(v8::Persistent<v8::FunctionTemplate> desc)
{
desc->ReadOnlyPrototype();
v8::Local<v8::Signature> defaultSignature;
defaultSignature = configureTemplate(desc, "TestInterface", v8::Persistent<v8::FunctionTemplate>(), V8TestInterface::internalFieldCount,
TestInterfaceAttrs, WTF_ARRAY_LENGTH(TestInterfaceAttrs),
TestInterfaceCallbacks, WTF_ARRAY_LENGTH(TestInterfaceCallbacks));
UNUSED_PARAM(defaultSignature); // In some cases, it will not be used.
desc->SetCallHandler(V8TestInterface::constructorCallback);
v8::Local<v8::ObjectTemplate> instance = desc->InstanceTemplate();
v8::Local<v8::ObjectTemplate> proto = desc->PrototypeTemplate();
UNUSED_PARAM(instance); // In some cases, it will not be used.
UNUSED_PARAM(proto); // In some cases, it will not be used.
const int supplementalMethod2Argc = 2;
v8::Handle<v8::FunctionTemplate> supplementalMethod2Argv[supplementalMethod2Argc] = { v8::Handle<v8::FunctionTemplate>(), V8TestObj::GetRawTemplate() };
v8::Handle<v8::Signature> supplementalMethod2Signature = v8::Signature::New(desc, supplementalMethod2Argc, supplementalMethod2Argv);
#if ENABLE(Condition11) || ENABLE(Condition12)
proto->Set(v8::String::New("supplementalMethod2"), v8::FunctionTemplate::New(TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback, v8::Handle<v8::Value>(), supplementalMethod2Signature));
#endif // ENABLE(Condition11) || ENABLE(Condition12)
#if ENABLE(Condition11) || ENABLE(Condition12)
desc->Set(v8::String::New("supplementalMethod4"), v8::FunctionTemplate::New(TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod4Callback, v8::Handle<v8::Value>(), v8::Local<v8::Signature>()));
#endif // ENABLE(Condition11) || ENABLE(Condition12)
batchConfigureConstants(desc, proto, TestInterfaceConsts, WTF_ARRAY_LENGTH(TestInterfaceConsts));
desc->Set(getToStringName(), getToStringTemplate());
return desc;
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 109,488 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: do_pax_note(struct magic_set *ms, unsigned char *nbuf, uint32_t type,
int swap, uint32_t namesz, uint32_t descsz,
size_t noff, size_t doff, int *flags)
{
if (namesz == 4 && strcmp((char *)&nbuf[noff], "PaX") == 0 &&
type == NT_NETBSD_PAX && descsz == 4) {
static const char *pax[] = {
"+mprotect",
"-mprotect",
"+segvguard",
"-segvguard",
"+ASLR",
"-ASLR",
};
uint32_t desc;
size_t i;
int did = 0;
*flags |= FLAGS_DID_NETBSD_PAX;
(void)memcpy(&desc, &nbuf[doff], sizeof(desc));
desc = elf_getu32(swap, desc);
if (desc && file_printf(ms, ", PaX: ") == -1)
return 1;
for (i = 0; i < __arraycount(pax); i++) {
if (((1 << (int)i) & desc) == 0)
continue;
if (file_printf(ms, "%s%s", did++ ? "," : "",
pax[i]) == -1)
return 1;
}
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix always true condition (Thomas Jarosch)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 58,983 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: inline void copyLineARGB32(QRgb* dst, const char* src, int width)
{
const char* end = src + width * 4;
for (; src != end; ++dst, src+=4) {
*dst = qRgba(src[0], src[1], src[2], src[3]);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 10,851 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void pi_post_block(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct pi_desc *pi_desc = vcpu_to_pi_desc(vcpu);
struct pi_desc old, new;
unsigned int dest;
unsigned long flags;
if (!kvm_arch_has_assigned_device(vcpu->kvm) ||
!irq_remapping_cap(IRQ_POSTING_CAP) ||
!kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
return;
do {
old.control = new.control = pi_desc->control;
dest = cpu_physical_id(vcpu->cpu);
if (x2apic_enabled())
new.ndst = dest;
else
new.ndst = (dest << 8) & 0xFF00;
/* Allow posting non-urgent interrupts */
new.sn = 0;
/* set 'NV' to 'notification vector' */
new.nv = POSTED_INTR_VECTOR;
} while (cmpxchg(&pi_desc->control, old.control,
new.control) != old.control);
if(vcpu->pre_pcpu != -1) {
spin_lock_irqsave(
&per_cpu(blocked_vcpu_on_cpu_lock,
vcpu->pre_pcpu), flags);
list_del(&vcpu->blocked_vcpu_list);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(
&per_cpu(blocked_vcpu_on_cpu_lock,
vcpu->pre_pcpu), flags);
vcpu->pre_pcpu = -1;
}
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Allow L1 to intercept software exceptions (#BP and #OF)
When L2 exits to L0 due to "exception or NMI", software exceptions
(#BP and #OF) for which L1 has requested an intercept should be
handled by L1 rather than L0. Previously, only hardware exceptions
were forwarded to L1.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-388 | 0 | 48,085 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool closeComposite(v8::Handle<v8::Value>* object)
{
if (!m_openCompositeReferenceStack.size())
return false;
uint32_t objectReference = m_openCompositeReferenceStack[m_openCompositeReferenceStack.size() - 1];
m_openCompositeReferenceStack.shrink(m_openCompositeReferenceStack.size() - 1);
if (objectReference >= m_objectPool.size())
return false;
*object = m_objectPool[objectReference];
return true;
}
Commit Message: Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings
BUG=390928
R=dcarney@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 120,437 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE2(io_setup, unsigned, nr_events, aio_context_t __user *, ctxp)
{
struct kioctx *ioctx = NULL;
unsigned long ctx;
long ret;
ret = get_user(ctx, ctxp);
if (unlikely(ret))
goto out;
ret = -EINVAL;
if (unlikely(ctx || nr_events == 0)) {
pr_debug("EINVAL: io_setup: ctx %lu nr_events %u\n",
ctx, nr_events);
goto out;
}
ioctx = ioctx_alloc(nr_events);
ret = PTR_ERR(ioctx);
if (!IS_ERR(ioctx)) {
ret = put_user(ioctx->user_id, ctxp);
if (ret)
kill_ioctx(current->mm, ioctx, NULL);
percpu_ref_put(&ioctx->users);
}
out:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: aio: fix kernel memory disclosure in io_getevents() introduced in v3.10
A kernel memory disclosure was introduced in aio_read_events_ring() in v3.10
by commit a31ad380bed817aa25f8830ad23e1a0480fef797. The changes made to
aio_read_events_ring() failed to correctly limit the index into
ctx->ring_pages[], allowing an attacked to cause the subsequent kmap() of
an arbitrary page with a copy_to_user() to copy the contents into userspace.
This vulnerability has been assigned CVE-2014-0206. Thanks to Mateusz and
Petr for disclosing this issue.
This patch applies to v3.12+. A separate backport is needed for 3.10/3.11.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin LaHaise <bcrl@kvack.org>
Cc: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com>
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Kent Overstreet <kmo@daterainc.com>
Cc: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: | 0 | 39,586 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void init_session_cache_ctx(SSL_CTX *sctx)
{
SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(sctx,
SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL |
SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(sctx, add_session);
SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(sctx, get_session);
SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb(sctx, del_session);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 13,633 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int rtecp_list_files(sc_card_t *card, u8 *buf, size_t buflen)
{
sc_apdu_t apdu;
u8 rbuf[SC_MAX_APDU_BUFFER_SIZE], previd[2];
const u8 *tag;
size_t taglen, len = 0;
int r;
assert(card && card->ctx && buf);
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_2_SHORT, 0xA4, 0, 0);
for (;;)
{
apdu.resp = rbuf;
apdu.resplen = sizeof(rbuf);
apdu.le = 256;
r = sc_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, r, "APDU transmit failed");
if (apdu.sw1 == 0x6A && apdu.sw2 == 0x82)
break; /* Next file not found */
r = sc_check_sw(card, apdu.sw1, apdu.sw2);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, r, "");
if (apdu.resplen <= 2)
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, SC_ERROR_WRONG_LENGTH);
/* save first file(dir) ID */
tag = sc_asn1_find_tag(card->ctx, apdu.resp + 2, apdu.resplen - 2,
0x83, &taglen);
if (!tag || taglen != sizeof(previd))
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, SC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_DATA_RECEIVED);
memcpy(previd, tag, sizeof(previd));
if (len + sizeof(previd) <= buflen)
{
memcpy(&buf[len], previd, sizeof(previd));
len += sizeof(previd);
}
tag = sc_asn1_find_tag(card->ctx, apdu.resp + 2, apdu.resplen - 2,
0x82, &taglen);
if (!tag || taglen != 2)
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, SC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_DATA_RECEIVED);
if (tag[0] == 0x38)
{
/* Select parent DF of the current DF */
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_1, 0xA4, 0x03, 0);
r = sc_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, r, "APDU transmit failed");
r = sc_check_sw(card, apdu.sw1, apdu.sw2);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, r, "");
}
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_4_SHORT, 0xA4, 0, 0x02);
apdu.lc = sizeof(previd);
apdu.data = previd;
apdu.datalen = sizeof(previd);
}
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE, len);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 78,672 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool SVGElement::IsOutermostSVGSVGElement() const {
if (!IsSVGSVGElement(*this))
return false;
if (!parentNode())
return true;
if (IsSVGForeignObjectElement(*parentNode()))
return true;
if (InUseShadowTree() && ParentOrShadowHostElement() &&
ParentOrShadowHostElement()->IsSVGElement())
return false;
return !parentNode()->IsSVGElement();
}
Commit Message: Fix SVG crash for v0 distribution into foreignObject.
We require a parent element to be an SVG element for non-svg-root
elements in order to create a LayoutObject for them. However, we checked
the light tree parent element, not the flat tree one which is the parent
for the layout tree construction. Note that this is just an issue in
Shadow DOM v0 since v1 does not allow shadow roots on SVG elements.
Bug: 915469
Change-Id: Id81843abad08814fae747b5bc81c09666583f130
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1382494
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <fs@opera.com>
Commit-Queue: Rune Lillesveen <futhark@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#617487}
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 152,774 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Box *hinf_New()
{
ISOM_DECL_BOX_ALLOC(GF_HintInfoBox, GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_HINF);
tmp->other_boxes = gf_list_new();
return (GF_Box *)tmp;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,166 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int RenderBox::horizontalScrollbarHeight() const
{
if (!hasOverflowClip() || style()->overflowX() == OOVERLAY)
return 0;
return layer()->scrollableArea()->horizontalScrollbarHeight();
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 116,535 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: daemon_linux_md_start (Daemon *daemon,
GPtrArray *components,
char **options,
DBusGMethodInvocation *context)
{
gchar **components_as_strv;
guint n;
components_as_strv = g_new0 (gchar *, components->len + 1);
for (n = 0; n < components->len; n++)
components_as_strv[n] = g_strdup (components->pdata[n]);
daemon_local_check_auth (daemon,
NULL,
"org.freedesktop.udisks.linux-md",
"LinuxMdStart",
TRUE,
daemon_linux_md_start_authorized_cb,
context,
2,
components_as_strv,
g_strfreev,
g_strdupv (options),
g_strfreev);
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 11,605 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t Camera3Device::setStreamTransform(int id,
int transform) {
ATRACE_CALL();
Mutex::Autolock il(mInterfaceLock);
Mutex::Autolock l(mLock);
switch (mStatus) {
case STATUS_ERROR:
CLOGE("Device has encountered a serious error");
return INVALID_OPERATION;
case STATUS_UNINITIALIZED:
CLOGE("Device not initialized");
return INVALID_OPERATION;
case STATUS_UNCONFIGURED:
case STATUS_CONFIGURED:
case STATUS_ACTIVE:
break;
default:
SET_ERR_L("Unexpected status: %d", mStatus);
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
ssize_t idx = mOutputStreams.indexOfKey(id);
if (idx == NAME_NOT_FOUND) {
CLOGE("Stream %d does not exist",
id);
return BAD_VALUE;
}
return mOutputStreams.editValueAt(idx)->setTransform(transform);
}
Commit Message: Camera3Device: Validate template ID
Validate template ID before creating a default request.
Bug: 26866110
Bug: 27568958
Change-Id: Ifda457024f1d5c2b1382f189c1a8d5fda852d30d
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 161,101 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void unfold_conds(struct condition *cnd, u_int32 a, u_int32 b)
{
struct unfold_elm *ue = NULL;
do {
/* the progress bar */
ef_debug(1, "?");
/* insert the condition as is */
SAFE_CALLOC(ue, 1, sizeof(struct unfold_elm));
memcpy(&ue->fop, &cnd->fop, sizeof(struct filter_op));
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&unfolded_tree, ue, next);
/* insert the conditional jump */
SAFE_CALLOC(ue, 1, sizeof(struct unfold_elm));
if (cnd->op == COND_OR) {
ue->fop.opcode = FOP_JTRUE;
ue->fop.op.jmp = a;
} else {
/* AND and single instructions behave equally */
ue->fop.opcode = FOP_JFALSE;
ue->fop.op.jmp = b;
}
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&unfolded_tree, ue, next);
} while ((cnd = cnd->next));
}
Commit Message: Exit gracefully in case of corrupted filters (Closes issue #782)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 68,069 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ipx_remove_socket(struct sock *sk)
{
/* Determine interface with which socket is associated */
struct ipx_interface *intrfc = ipx_sk(sk)->intrfc;
if (!intrfc)
goto out;
ipxitf_hold(intrfc);
spin_lock_bh(&intrfc->if_sklist_lock);
sk_del_node_init(sk);
spin_unlock_bh(&intrfc->if_sklist_lock);
ipxitf_put(intrfc);
out:
return;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 40,436 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void VerifyGetFromCache(base::PlatformFileError error,
const std::string& resource_id,
const std::string& md5,
const FilePath& cache_file_path) {
++num_callback_invocations_;
EXPECT_EQ(expected_error_, error);
if (error == base::PLATFORM_FILE_OK) {
FilePath base_name = cache_file_path.BaseName();
EXPECT_EQ(util::EscapeCacheFileName(resource_id) +
FilePath::kExtensionSeparator +
util::EscapeCacheFileName(
expected_file_extension_.empty() ?
md5 : expected_file_extension_),
base_name.value());
} else {
EXPECT_TRUE(cache_file_path.empty());
}
}
Commit Message: gdata: Define the resource ID for the root directory
Per the spec, the resource ID for the root directory is defined
as "folder:root". Add the resource ID to the root directory in our
file system representation so we can look up the root directory by
the resource ID.
BUG=127697
TEST=add unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332253
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137928 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,663 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: vips_tracked_open( const char *pathname, int flags, ... )
{
int fd;
mode_t mode;
va_list ap;
/* mode_t is promoted to int in ..., so we have to pull it out as an
* int.
*/
va_start( ap, flags );
mode = va_arg( ap, int );
va_end( ap );
if( (fd = vips__open( pathname, flags, mode )) == -1 )
return( -1 );
vips_tracked_init();
g_mutex_lock( vips_tracked_mutex );
vips_tracked_files += 1;
#ifdef DEBUG_VERBOSE
printf( "vips_tracked_open: %s = %d (%d)\n",
pathname, fd, vips_tracked_files );
#endif /*DEBUG_VERBOSE*/
g_mutex_unlock( vips_tracked_mutex );
return( fd );
}
Commit Message: zero memory on malloc
to prevent write of uninit memory under some error conditions
thanks Balint
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 91,540 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Unsupported_Handler(UNSUPPORT_INFO*, int type) {
if (!g_engine_for_unsupported) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
g_engine_for_unsupported->UnsupportedFeature(type);
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Defer page unloading in JS callback.
One of the callbacks from PDFium JavaScript into the embedder is to get the
current page number. In Chromium, this will trigger a call to
CalculateMostVisiblePage that method will determine the visible pages and unload
any non-visible pages. But, if the originating JS is on a non-visible page
we'll delete the page and annotations associated with that page. This will
cause issues as we are currently working with those objects when the JavaScript
returns.
This Cl defers the page unloading triggered by getting the most visible page
until the next event is handled by the Chromium embedder.
BUG=chromium:653090
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2418533002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#424781}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 140,439 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void resetTriggered() { m_triggered = false; }
Commit Message: Call didAccessInitialDocument when javascript: URLs are used.
BUG=265221
TEST=See bug for repro.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/22572004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@155790 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 111,280 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int jpc_streamlist_numstreams(jpc_streamlist_t *streamlist)
{
return streamlist->numstreams;
}
Commit Message: Fixed an integral type promotion problem by adding a JAS_CAST.
Modified the jpc_tsfb_synthesize function so that it will be a noop for
an empty sequence (in order to avoid dereferencing a null pointer).
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 70,462 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: smp_fetch_stcode(struct proxy *px, struct session *l4, void *l7, unsigned int opt,
const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw)
{
struct http_txn *txn = l7;
char *ptr;
int len;
CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST();
if (txn->rsp.msg_state < HTTP_MSG_BODY)
return 0;
len = txn->rsp.sl.st.c_l;
ptr = txn->rsp.chn->buf->p + txn->rsp.sl.st.c;
smp->type = SMP_T_UINT;
smp->data.uint = __strl2ui(ptr, len);
smp->flags = SMP_F_VOL_1ST;
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 9,860 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool mtrr_lookup_fixed_start(struct mtrr_iter *iter)
{
int seg, index;
if (!fixed_mtrr_is_enabled(iter->mtrr_state))
return false;
seg = fixed_mtrr_addr_to_seg(iter->start);
if (seg < 0)
return false;
iter->fixed = true;
index = fixed_mtrr_addr_seg_to_range_index(iter->start, seg);
iter->index = index;
iter->seg = seg;
return true;
}
Commit Message: KVM: MTRR: remove MSR 0x2f8
MSR 0x2f8 accessed the 124th Variable Range MTRR ever since MTRR support
was introduced by 9ba075a664df ("KVM: MTRR support").
0x2f8 became harmful when 910a6aae4e2e ("KVM: MTRR: exactly define the
size of variable MTRRs") shrinked the array of VR MTRRs from 256 to 8,
which made access to index 124 out of bounds. The surrounding code only
WARNs in this situation, thus the guest gained a limited read/write
access to struct kvm_arch_vcpu.
0x2f8 is not a valid VR MTRR MSR, because KVM has/advertises only 16 VR
MTRR MSRs, 0x200-0x20f. Every VR MTRR is set up using two MSRs, 0x2f8
was treated as a PHYSBASE and 0x2f9 would be its PHYSMASK, but 0x2f9 was
not implemented in KVM, therefore 0x2f8 could never do anything useful
and getting rid of it is safe.
This fixes CVE-2016-3713.
Fixes: 910a6aae4e2e ("KVM: MTRR: exactly define the size of variable MTRRs")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 53,768 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int set_segment_reg(struct task_struct *task,
unsigned long offset, u16 value)
{
/*
* The value argument was already truncated to 16 bits.
*/
if (invalid_selector(value))
return -EIO;
switch (offset) {
case offsetof(struct user_regs_struct,fs):
/*
* If this is setting fs as for normal 64-bit use but
* setting fs_base has implicitly changed it, leave it.
*/
if ((value == FS_TLS_SEL && task->thread.fsindex == 0 &&
task->thread.fs != 0) ||
(value == 0 && task->thread.fsindex == FS_TLS_SEL &&
task->thread.fs == 0))
break;
task->thread.fsindex = value;
if (task == current)
loadsegment(fs, task->thread.fsindex);
break;
case offsetof(struct user_regs_struct,gs):
/*
* If this is setting gs as for normal 64-bit use but
* setting gs_base has implicitly changed it, leave it.
*/
if ((value == GS_TLS_SEL && task->thread.gsindex == 0 &&
task->thread.gs != 0) ||
(value == 0 && task->thread.gsindex == GS_TLS_SEL &&
task->thread.gs == 0))
break;
task->thread.gsindex = value;
if (task == current)
load_gs_index(task->thread.gsindex);
break;
case offsetof(struct user_regs_struct,ds):
task->thread.ds = value;
if (task == current)
loadsegment(ds, task->thread.ds);
break;
case offsetof(struct user_regs_struct,es):
task->thread.es = value;
if (task == current)
loadsegment(es, task->thread.es);
break;
/*
* Can't actually change these in 64-bit mode.
*/
case offsetof(struct user_regs_struct,cs):
if (unlikely(value == 0))
return -EIO;
#ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION
if (test_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_IA32))
task_pt_regs(task)->cs = value;
#endif
break;
case offsetof(struct user_regs_struct,ss):
if (unlikely(value == 0))
return -EIO;
#ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION
if (test_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_IA32))
task_pt_regs(task)->ss = value;
#endif
break;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,916 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void hevc_luma_mv_mvp_mode(HEVCContext *s, int x0, int y0, int nPbW,
int nPbH, int log2_cb_size, int part_idx,
int merge_idx, MvField *mv)
{
HEVCLocalContext *lc = s->HEVClc;
enum InterPredIdc inter_pred_idc = PRED_L0;
int mvp_flag;
ff_hevc_set_neighbour_available(s, x0, y0, nPbW, nPbH);
mv->pred_flag = 0;
if (s->sh.slice_type == HEVC_SLICE_B)
inter_pred_idc = ff_hevc_inter_pred_idc_decode(s, nPbW, nPbH);
if (inter_pred_idc != PRED_L1) {
if (s->sh.nb_refs[L0])
mv->ref_idx[0]= ff_hevc_ref_idx_lx_decode(s, s->sh.nb_refs[L0]);
mv->pred_flag = PF_L0;
ff_hevc_hls_mvd_coding(s, x0, y0, 0);
mvp_flag = ff_hevc_mvp_lx_flag_decode(s);
ff_hevc_luma_mv_mvp_mode(s, x0, y0, nPbW, nPbH, log2_cb_size,
part_idx, merge_idx, mv, mvp_flag, 0);
mv->mv[0].x += lc->pu.mvd.x;
mv->mv[0].y += lc->pu.mvd.y;
}
if (inter_pred_idc != PRED_L0) {
if (s->sh.nb_refs[L1])
mv->ref_idx[1]= ff_hevc_ref_idx_lx_decode(s, s->sh.nb_refs[L1]);
if (s->sh.mvd_l1_zero_flag == 1 && inter_pred_idc == PRED_BI) {
AV_ZERO32(&lc->pu.mvd);
} else {
ff_hevc_hls_mvd_coding(s, x0, y0, 1);
}
mv->pred_flag += PF_L1;
mvp_flag = ff_hevc_mvp_lx_flag_decode(s);
ff_hevc_luma_mv_mvp_mode(s, x0, y0, nPbW, nPbH, log2_cb_size,
part_idx, merge_idx, mv, mvp_flag, 1);
mv->mv[1].x += lc->pu.mvd.x;
mv->mv[1].y += lc->pu.mvd.y;
}
}
Commit Message: avcodec/hevcdec: Avoid only partly skiping duplicate first slices
Fixes: NULL pointer dereference and out of array access
Fixes: 13871/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-ffmpeg_AV_CODEC_ID_HEVC_fuzzer-5746167087890432
Fixes: 13845/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-ffmpeg_AV_CODEC_ID_HEVC_fuzzer-5650370728034304
This also fixes the return code for explode mode
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/projects/ffmpeg
Reviewed-by: James Almer <jamrial@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 90,765 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline size_t MagickMin(const size_t x,
const size_t y)
{
if (x < y)
return(x);
return(y);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 71,705 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlParsePEReference(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt)
{
const xmlChar *name;
xmlEntityPtr entity = NULL;
xmlParserInputPtr input;
if (RAW != '%')
return;
NEXT;
name = xmlParseName(ctxt);
if (name == NULL) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_REQUIRED,
"xmlParsePEReference: no name\n");
return;
}
if (RAW != ';') {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITYREF_SEMICOL_MISSING, NULL);
return;
}
NEXT;
/*
* Increate the number of entity references parsed
*/
ctxt->nbentities++;
/*
* Request the entity from SAX
*/
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) &&
(ctxt->sax->getParameterEntity != NULL))
entity = ctxt->sax->getParameterEntity(ctxt->userData, name);
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)
return;
if (entity == NULL) {
/*
* [ WFC: Entity Declared ]
* In a document without any DTD, a document with only an
* internal DTD subset which contains no parameter entity
* references, or a document with "standalone='yes'", ...
* ... The declaration of a parameter entity must precede
* any reference to it...
*/
if ((ctxt->standalone == 1) ||
((ctxt->hasExternalSubset == 0) &&
(ctxt->hasPErefs == 0))) {
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_UNDECLARED_ENTITY,
"PEReference: %%%s; not found\n",
name);
} else {
/*
* [ VC: Entity Declared ]
* In a document with an external subset or external
* parameter entities with "standalone='no'", ...
* ... The declaration of a parameter entity must
* precede any reference to it...
*/
xmlWarningMsg(ctxt, XML_WAR_UNDECLARED_ENTITY,
"PEReference: %%%s; not found\n",
name, NULL);
ctxt->valid = 0;
}
xmlParserEntityCheck(ctxt, 0, NULL, 0);
} else {
/*
* Internal checking in case the entity quest barfed
*/
if ((entity->etype != XML_INTERNAL_PARAMETER_ENTITY) &&
(entity->etype != XML_EXTERNAL_PARAMETER_ENTITY)) {
xmlWarningMsg(ctxt, XML_WAR_UNDECLARED_ENTITY,
"Internal: %%%s; is not a parameter entity\n",
name, NULL);
} else if (ctxt->input->free != deallocblankswrapper) {
input = xmlNewBlanksWrapperInputStream(ctxt, entity);
if (xmlPushInput(ctxt, input) < 0)
return;
} else {
/*
* TODO !!!
* handle the extra spaces added before and after
* c.f. http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-xml#as-PE
*/
input = xmlNewEntityInputStream(ctxt, entity);
if (xmlPushInput(ctxt, input) < 0)
return;
if ((entity->etype == XML_EXTERNAL_PARAMETER_ENTITY) &&
(CMP5(CUR_PTR, '<', '?', 'x', 'm', 'l')) &&
(IS_BLANK_CH(NXT(5)))) {
xmlParseTextDecl(ctxt);
if (ctxt->errNo ==
XML_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ENCODING) {
/*
* The XML REC instructs us to stop parsing
* right here
*/
xmlHaltParser(ctxt);
return;
}
}
}
}
ctxt->hasPErefs = 1;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Add validation for eternal enities
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=780691
Bug: 36556310
Change-Id: I9450743e167c3c73af5e4071f3fc85e81d061648
(cherry picked from commit bef9af3d89d241bcb518c20cba6da2a2fd9ba049)
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 1 | 174,120 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: isis_clear_checksum_lifetime(void *header)
{
struct isis_lsp_header *header_lsp = (struct isis_lsp_header *) header;
header_lsp->checksum[0] = 0;
header_lsp->checksum[1] = 0;
header_lsp->remaining_lifetime[0] = 0;
header_lsp->remaining_lifetime[1] = 0;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13055/IS-IS: fix an Extended IS Reachability sub-TLV
In isis_print_is_reach_subtlv() one of the case blocks did not check that
the sub-TLV "V" is actually present and could over-read the input buffer.
Add a length check to fix that and remove a useless boundary check from
a loop because the boundary is tested for the full length of "V" before
the switch block.
Update one of the prior test cases as it turns out it depended on this
previously incorrect code path to make it to its own malformed structure
further down the buffer, the bugfix has changed its output.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 62,217 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: poppler_page_get_text (PopplerPage *page,
PopplerSelectionStyle style,
PopplerRectangle *selection)
{
GooString *sel_text;
double height;
char *result;
SelectionStyle selection_style = selectionStyleGlyph;
PDFRectangle pdf_selection;
g_return_val_if_fail (POPPLER_IS_PAGE (page), FALSE);
g_return_val_if_fail (selection != NULL, NULL);
poppler_page_get_size (page, NULL, &height);
pdf_selection.x1 = selection->x1;
pdf_selection.y1 = height - selection->y2;
pdf_selection.x2 = selection->x2;
pdf_selection.y2 = height - selection->y1;
switch (style)
{
case POPPLER_SELECTION_GLYPH:
selection_style = selectionStyleGlyph;
break;
case POPPLER_SELECTION_WORD:
selection_style = selectionStyleWord;
break;
case POPPLER_SELECTION_LINE:
selection_style = selectionStyleLine;
break;
}
#if defined (HAVE_CAIRO)
TextPage *text;
text = poppler_page_get_text_page (page);
sel_text = text->getSelectionText (&pdf_selection, selection_style);
#else
TextOutputDev *text_dev;
text_dev = poppler_page_get_text_output_dev (page);
sel_text = text_dev->getSelectionText (&pdf_selection, selection_style);
#endif
result = g_strdup (sel_text->getCString ());
delete sel_text;
return result;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 789 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mount_cifs_usage(FILE * stream)
{
fprintf(stream, "\nUsage: %s <remotetarget> <dir> -o <options>\n",
thisprogram);
fprintf(stream, "\nMount the remote target, specified as a UNC name,");
fprintf(stream, " to a local directory.\n\nOptions:\n");
fprintf(stream, "\tuser=<arg>\n\tpass=<arg>\n\tdom=<arg>\n");
fprintf(stream, "\nLess commonly used options:");
fprintf(stream,
"\n\tcredentials=<filename>,guest,perm,noperm,setuids,nosetuids,rw,ro,");
fprintf(stream,
"\n\tsep=<char>,iocharset=<codepage>,suid,nosuid,exec,noexec,serverino,");
fprintf(stream,
"\n\tmapchars,nomapchars,nolock,servernetbiosname=<SRV_RFC1001NAME>");
fprintf(stream,
"\n\tdirectio,nounix,cifsacl,sec=<authentication mechanism>,sign,fsc");
fprintf(stream,
"\n\nOptions not needed for servers supporting CIFS Unix extensions");
fprintf(stream,
"\n\t(e.g. unneeded for mounts to most Samba versions):");
fprintf(stream,
"\n\tuid=<uid>,gid=<gid>,dir_mode=<mode>,file_mode=<mode>,sfu");
fprintf(stream, "\n\nRarely used options:");
fprintf(stream,
"\n\tport=<tcpport>,rsize=<size>,wsize=<size>,unc=<unc_name>,ip=<ip_address>,");
fprintf(stream,
"\n\tdev,nodev,nouser_xattr,netbiosname=<OUR_RFC1001NAME>,hard,soft,intr,");
fprintf(stream,
"\n\tnointr,ignorecase,noposixpaths,noacl,prefixpath=<path>,nobrl");
fprintf(stream,
"\n\nOptions are described in more detail in the manual page");
fprintf(stream, "\n\tman 8 mount.cifs\n");
fprintf(stream, "\nTo display the version number of the mount helper:");
fprintf(stream, "\n\t%s -V\n", thisprogram);
if (stream == stderr)
return EX_USAGE;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 2,039 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sshpkt_fatal(struct ssh *ssh, const char *tag, int r)
{
switch (r) {
case SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED:
logit("Connection closed by %.200s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh));
cleanup_exit(255);
case SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT:
logit("Connection to %.200s timed out", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh));
cleanup_exit(255);
case SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED:
logit("Disconnected from %.200s",
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh));
cleanup_exit(255);
case SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR:
if (errno == ECONNRESET) {
logit("Connection reset by %.200s",
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh));
cleanup_exit(255);
}
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case SSH_ERR_NO_CIPHER_ALG_MATCH:
case SSH_ERR_NO_MAC_ALG_MATCH:
case SSH_ERR_NO_COMPRESS_ALG_MATCH:
case SSH_ERR_NO_KEX_ALG_MATCH:
case SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_ALG_MATCH:
if (ssh && ssh->kex && ssh->kex->failed_choice) {
fatal("Unable to negotiate with %.200s: %s. "
"Their offer: %s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
ssh_err(r), ssh->kex->failed_choice);
}
/* FALLTHROUGH */
default:
fatal("%s%sConnection to %.200s: %s",
tag != NULL ? tag : "", tag != NULL ? ": " : "",
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_err(r));
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,005 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ContentSecurityPolicy::dispatchViolationEvents(
const SecurityPolicyViolationEventInit& violationData,
Element* element) {
EventQueue* queue = m_executionContext->getEventQueue();
if (!queue)
return;
SecurityPolicyViolationEvent* event = SecurityPolicyViolationEvent::create(
EventTypeNames::securitypolicyviolation, violationData);
DCHECK(event->bubbles());
if (m_executionContext->isDocument()) {
Document* document = toDocument(m_executionContext);
if (element && element->isConnected() && element->document() == document)
event->setTarget(element);
else
event->setTarget(document);
} else if (m_executionContext->isWorkerGlobalScope()) {
event->setTarget(toWorkerGlobalScope(m_executionContext));
}
queue->enqueueEvent(event);
}
Commit Message: CSP: Strip the fragment from reported URLs.
We should have been stripping the fragment from the URL we report for
CSP violations, but we weren't. Now we are, by running the URLs through
`stripURLForUseInReport()`, which implements the stripping algorithm
from CSP2: https://www.w3.org/TR/CSP2/#strip-uri-for-reporting
Eventually, we will migrate more completely to the CSP3 world that
doesn't require such detailed stripping, as it exposes less data to the
reports, but we're not there yet.
BUG=678776
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2619783002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#458045}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 136,755 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static v8::Local<v8::Function> CreateFunction(
ScriptState* script_state,
ReadableStreamBytesConsumer* consumer) {
return (new OnFulfilled(script_state, consumer))->BindToV8Function();
}
Commit Message: ReadableStreamBytesConsumer should check read results
ReadableStreamBytesConsumer expected that the results from
ReadableStreamReaderDefaultRead should be Promise<Object> because that
is provided from ReadableStream provided by blink, but it's possible to
inject arbitrary values with the promise assimilation.
This CL adds additional checks for such injection.
Bug: 840320
Change-Id: I7b3c6a8bfcf563dd860b133ff0295dd7a5d5fea5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1049413
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Rice <ricea@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#556751}
CWE ID: | 0 | 155,415 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: __ip_vs_get_timeouts(struct ip_vs_timeout_user *u)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_VS_PROTO_TCP
u->tcp_timeout =
ip_vs_protocol_tcp.timeout_table[IP_VS_TCP_S_ESTABLISHED] / HZ;
u->tcp_fin_timeout =
ip_vs_protocol_tcp.timeout_table[IP_VS_TCP_S_FIN_WAIT] / HZ;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_VS_PROTO_UDP
u->udp_timeout =
ip_vs_protocol_udp.timeout_table[IP_VS_UDP_S_NORMAL] / HZ;
#endif
}
Commit Message: ipvs: Add boundary check on ioctl arguments
The ipvs code has a nifty system for doing the size of ioctl command
copies; it defines an array with values into which it indexes the cmd
to find the right length.
Unfortunately, the ipvs code forgot to check if the cmd was in the
range that the array provides, allowing for an index outside of the
array, which then gives a "garbage" result into the length, which
then gets used for copying into a stack buffer.
Fix this by adding sanity checks on these as well as the copy size.
[ horms@verge.net.au: adjusted limit to IP_VS_SO_GET_MAX ]
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 29,229 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int xfrm6_tunnel_input(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
return skb_network_header(skb)[IP6CB(skb)->nhoff];
}
Commit Message: tunnels: fix netns vs proto registration ordering
Same stuff as in ip_gre patch: receive hook can be called before netns
setup is done, oopsing in net_generic().
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 27,468 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int f2fs_set_acl(struct inode *inode, struct posix_acl *acl, int type)
{
return __f2fs_set_acl(inode, type, acl, NULL);
}
Commit Message: posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting file permissions
When file permissions are modified via chmod(2) and the user is not in
the owning group or capable of CAP_FSETID, the setgid bit is cleared in
inode_change_ok(). Setting a POSIX ACL via setxattr(2) sets the file
permissions as well as the new ACL, but doesn't clear the setgid bit in
a similar way; this allows to bypass the check in chmod(2). Fix that.
References: CVE-2016-7097
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-285 | 0 | 50,341 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tg3_setup_fiber_mii_phy(struct tg3 *tp, int force_reset)
{
int current_link_up, err = 0;
u32 bmsr, bmcr;
u16 current_speed;
u8 current_duplex;
u32 local_adv, remote_adv;
tp->mac_mode |= MAC_MODE_PORT_MODE_GMII;
tw32_f(MAC_MODE, tp->mac_mode);
udelay(40);
tw32(MAC_EVENT, 0);
tw32_f(MAC_STATUS,
(MAC_STATUS_SYNC_CHANGED |
MAC_STATUS_CFG_CHANGED |
MAC_STATUS_MI_COMPLETION |
MAC_STATUS_LNKSTATE_CHANGED));
udelay(40);
if (force_reset)
tg3_phy_reset(tp);
current_link_up = 0;
current_speed = SPEED_UNKNOWN;
current_duplex = DUPLEX_UNKNOWN;
tp->link_config.rmt_adv = 0;
err |= tg3_readphy(tp, MII_BMSR, &bmsr);
err |= tg3_readphy(tp, MII_BMSR, &bmsr);
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5714) {
if (tr32(MAC_TX_STATUS) & TX_STATUS_LINK_UP)
bmsr |= BMSR_LSTATUS;
else
bmsr &= ~BMSR_LSTATUS;
}
err |= tg3_readphy(tp, MII_BMCR, &bmcr);
if ((tp->link_config.autoneg == AUTONEG_ENABLE) && !force_reset &&
(tp->phy_flags & TG3_PHYFLG_PARALLEL_DETECT)) {
/* do nothing, just check for link up at the end */
} else if (tp->link_config.autoneg == AUTONEG_ENABLE) {
u32 adv, newadv;
err |= tg3_readphy(tp, MII_ADVERTISE, &adv);
newadv = adv & ~(ADVERTISE_1000XFULL | ADVERTISE_1000XHALF |
ADVERTISE_1000XPAUSE |
ADVERTISE_1000XPSE_ASYM |
ADVERTISE_SLCT);
newadv |= tg3_advert_flowctrl_1000X(tp->link_config.flowctrl);
newadv |= ethtool_adv_to_mii_adv_x(tp->link_config.advertising);
if ((newadv != adv) || !(bmcr & BMCR_ANENABLE)) {
tg3_writephy(tp, MII_ADVERTISE, newadv);
bmcr |= BMCR_ANENABLE | BMCR_ANRESTART;
tg3_writephy(tp, MII_BMCR, bmcr);
tw32_f(MAC_EVENT, MAC_EVENT_LNKSTATE_CHANGED);
tp->serdes_counter = SERDES_AN_TIMEOUT_5714S;
tp->phy_flags &= ~TG3_PHYFLG_PARALLEL_DETECT;
return err;
}
} else {
u32 new_bmcr;
bmcr &= ~BMCR_SPEED1000;
new_bmcr = bmcr & ~(BMCR_ANENABLE | BMCR_FULLDPLX);
if (tp->link_config.duplex == DUPLEX_FULL)
new_bmcr |= BMCR_FULLDPLX;
if (new_bmcr != bmcr) {
/* BMCR_SPEED1000 is a reserved bit that needs
* to be set on write.
*/
new_bmcr |= BMCR_SPEED1000;
/* Force a linkdown */
if (tp->link_up) {
u32 adv;
err |= tg3_readphy(tp, MII_ADVERTISE, &adv);
adv &= ~(ADVERTISE_1000XFULL |
ADVERTISE_1000XHALF |
ADVERTISE_SLCT);
tg3_writephy(tp, MII_ADVERTISE, adv);
tg3_writephy(tp, MII_BMCR, bmcr |
BMCR_ANRESTART |
BMCR_ANENABLE);
udelay(10);
tg3_carrier_off(tp);
}
tg3_writephy(tp, MII_BMCR, new_bmcr);
bmcr = new_bmcr;
err |= tg3_readphy(tp, MII_BMSR, &bmsr);
err |= tg3_readphy(tp, MII_BMSR, &bmsr);
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5714) {
if (tr32(MAC_TX_STATUS) & TX_STATUS_LINK_UP)
bmsr |= BMSR_LSTATUS;
else
bmsr &= ~BMSR_LSTATUS;
}
tp->phy_flags &= ~TG3_PHYFLG_PARALLEL_DETECT;
}
}
if (bmsr & BMSR_LSTATUS) {
current_speed = SPEED_1000;
current_link_up = 1;
if (bmcr & BMCR_FULLDPLX)
current_duplex = DUPLEX_FULL;
else
current_duplex = DUPLEX_HALF;
local_adv = 0;
remote_adv = 0;
if (bmcr & BMCR_ANENABLE) {
u32 common;
err |= tg3_readphy(tp, MII_ADVERTISE, &local_adv);
err |= tg3_readphy(tp, MII_LPA, &remote_adv);
common = local_adv & remote_adv;
if (common & (ADVERTISE_1000XHALF |
ADVERTISE_1000XFULL)) {
if (common & ADVERTISE_1000XFULL)
current_duplex = DUPLEX_FULL;
else
current_duplex = DUPLEX_HALF;
tp->link_config.rmt_adv =
mii_adv_to_ethtool_adv_x(remote_adv);
} else if (!tg3_flag(tp, 5780_CLASS)) {
/* Link is up via parallel detect */
} else {
current_link_up = 0;
}
}
}
if (current_link_up == 1 && current_duplex == DUPLEX_FULL)
tg3_setup_flow_control(tp, local_adv, remote_adv);
tp->mac_mode &= ~MAC_MODE_HALF_DUPLEX;
if (tp->link_config.active_duplex == DUPLEX_HALF)
tp->mac_mode |= MAC_MODE_HALF_DUPLEX;
tw32_f(MAC_MODE, tp->mac_mode);
udelay(40);
tw32_f(MAC_EVENT, MAC_EVENT_LNKSTATE_CHANGED);
tp->link_config.active_speed = current_speed;
tp->link_config.active_duplex = current_duplex;
tg3_test_and_report_link_chg(tp, current_link_up);
return err;
}
Commit Message: tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <oded@privatecore.com>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matt Carlson <mcarlson@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 32,761 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int js_isnumber(js_State *J, int idx) { return stackidx(J, idx)->type == JS_TNUMBER; }
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,445 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ipv6_rcv_saddr_equal(const struct sock *sk, const struct sock *sk2)
{
const struct in6_addr *sk2_rcv_saddr6 = inet6_rcv_saddr(sk2);
int sk2_ipv6only = inet_v6_ipv6only(sk2);
int addr_type = ipv6_addr_type(&sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr);
int addr_type2 = sk2_rcv_saddr6 ? ipv6_addr_type(sk2_rcv_saddr6) : IPV6_ADDR_MAPPED;
/* if both are mapped, treat as IPv4 */
if (addr_type == IPV6_ADDR_MAPPED && addr_type2 == IPV6_ADDR_MAPPED)
return (!sk2_ipv6only &&
(!sk->sk_rcv_saddr || !sk2->sk_rcv_saddr ||
sk->sk_rcv_saddr == sk2->sk_rcv_saddr));
if (addr_type2 == IPV6_ADDR_ANY &&
!(sk2_ipv6only && addr_type == IPV6_ADDR_MAPPED))
return 1;
if (addr_type == IPV6_ADDR_ANY &&
!(ipv6_only_sock(sk) && addr_type2 == IPV6_ADDR_MAPPED))
return 1;
if (sk2_rcv_saddr6 &&
ipv6_addr_equal(&sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr, sk2_rcv_saddr6))
return 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: udp: fix behavior of wrong checksums
We have two problems in UDP stack related to bogus checksums :
1) We return -EAGAIN to application even if receive queue is not empty.
This breaks applications using edge trigger epoll()
2) Under UDP flood, we can loop forever without yielding to other
processes, potentially hanging the host, especially on non SMP.
This patch is an attempt to make things better.
We might in the future add extra support for rt applications
wanting to better control time spent doing a recv() in a hostile
environment. For example we could validate checksums before queuing
packets in socket receive queue.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 42,620 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: media::AudioSystem* MediaStreamManager::audio_system() {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
return audio_system_;
}
Commit Message: Fix MediaObserver notifications in MediaStreamManager.
This CL fixes the stream type used to notify MediaObserver about
cancelled MediaStream requests.
Before this CL, NUM_MEDIA_TYPES was used as stream type to indicate
that all stream types should be cancelled.
However, the MediaObserver end does not interpret NUM_MEDIA_TYPES this
way and the request to update the UI is ignored.
This CL sends a separate notification for each stream type so that the
UI actually gets updated for all stream types in use.
Bug: 816033
Change-Id: Ib7d3b3046d1dd0976627f8ab38abf086eacc9405
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/939630
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540122}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 148,366 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: evdns_getaddrinfo_timeout_cb(evutil_socket_t fd, short what, void *ptr)
{
int v4_timedout = 0, v6_timedout = 0;
struct evdns_getaddrinfo_request *data = ptr;
/* Cancel any pending requests, and note which one */
if (data->ipv4_request.r) {
/* XXXX This does nothing if the request's callback is already
* running (pending_cb is set). */
evdns_cancel_request(NULL, data->ipv4_request.r);
v4_timedout = 1;
EVDNS_LOCK(data->evdns_base);
++data->evdns_base->getaddrinfo_ipv4_timeouts;
EVDNS_UNLOCK(data->evdns_base);
}
if (data->ipv6_request.r) {
/* XXXX This does nothing if the request's callback is already
* running (pending_cb is set). */
evdns_cancel_request(NULL, data->ipv6_request.r);
v6_timedout = 1;
EVDNS_LOCK(data->evdns_base);
++data->evdns_base->getaddrinfo_ipv6_timeouts;
EVDNS_UNLOCK(data->evdns_base);
}
/* We only use this timeout callback when we have an answer for
* one address. */
EVUTIL_ASSERT(!v4_timedout || !v6_timedout);
/* Report the outcome of the other request that didn't time out. */
if (data->pending_result) {
add_cname_to_reply(data, data->pending_result);
data->user_cb(0, data->pending_result, data->user_data);
data->pending_result = NULL;
} else {
int e = data->pending_error;
if (!e)
e = EVUTIL_EAI_AGAIN;
data->user_cb(e, NULL, data->user_data);
}
data->user_cb = NULL; /* prevent double-call if evdns callbacks are
* in-progress. XXXX It would be better if this
* weren't necessary. */
if (!v4_timedout && !v6_timedout) {
/* should be impossible? XXXX */
free_getaddrinfo_request(data);
}
}
Commit Message: evdns: fix searching empty hostnames
From #332:
Here follows a bug report by **Guido Vranken** via the _Tor bug bounty program_. Please credit Guido accordingly.
## Bug report
The DNS code of Libevent contains this rather obvious OOB read:
```c
static char *
search_make_new(const struct search_state *const state, int n, const char *const base_name) {
const size_t base_len = strlen(base_name);
const char need_to_append_dot = base_name[base_len - 1] == '.' ? 0 : 1;
```
If the length of ```base_name``` is 0, then line 3125 reads 1 byte before the buffer. This will trigger a crash on ASAN-protected builds.
To reproduce:
Build libevent with ASAN:
```
$ CFLAGS='-fomit-frame-pointer -fsanitize=address' ./configure && make -j4
```
Put the attached ```resolv.conf``` and ```poc.c``` in the source directory and then do:
```
$ gcc -fsanitize=address -fomit-frame-pointer poc.c .libs/libevent.a
$ ./a.out
=================================================================
==22201== ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60060000efdf at pc 0x4429da bp 0x7ffe1ed47300 sp 0x7ffe1ed472f8
READ of size 1 at 0x60060000efdf thread T0
```
P.S. we can add a check earlier, but since this is very uncommon, I didn't add it.
Fixes: #332
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 70,614 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int _addReplyToBuffer(client *c, const char *s, size_t len) {
size_t available = sizeof(c->buf)-c->bufpos;
if (c->flags & CLIENT_CLOSE_AFTER_REPLY) return C_OK;
/* If there already are entries in the reply list, we cannot
* add anything more to the static buffer. */
if (listLength(c->reply) > 0) return C_ERR;
/* Check that the buffer has enough space available for this string. */
if (len > available) return C_ERR;
memcpy(c->buf+c->bufpos,s,len);
c->bufpos+=len;
return C_OK;
}
Commit Message: Security: Cross Protocol Scripting protection.
This is an attempt at mitigating problems due to cross protocol
scripting, an attack targeting services using line oriented protocols
like Redis that can accept HTTP requests as valid protocol, by
discarding the invalid parts and accepting the payloads sent, for
example, via a POST request.
For this to be effective, when we detect POST and Host: and terminate
the connection asynchronously, the networking code was modified in order
to never process further input. It was later verified that in a
pipelined request containing a POST command, the successive commands are
not executed.
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 69,925 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static INLINE void IncrementX963KdfCounter(byte* inOutCtr)
{
int i;
/* in network byte order so start at end and work back */
for (i = 3; i >= 0; i--) {
if (++inOutCtr[i]) /* we're done unless we overflow */
return;
}
}
Commit Message: Change ECDSA signing to use blinding.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 81,824 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OJPEGReadHeaderInfoSecStreamSos(TIFF* tif)
{
/* this marker needs to be checked, and part of its data needs to be saved for regeneration later on */
static const char module[]="OJPEGReadHeaderInfoSecStreamSos";
OJPEGState* sp=(OJPEGState*)tif->tif_data;
uint16 m;
uint8 n;
uint8 o;
assert(sp->subsamplingcorrect==0);
if (sp->sof_log==0)
{
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata,module,"Corrupt SOS marker in JPEG data");
return(0);
}
/* Ls */
if (OJPEGReadWord(sp,&m)==0)
return(0);
if (m!=6+sp->samples_per_pixel_per_plane*2)
{
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata,module,"Corrupt SOS marker in JPEG data");
return(0);
}
/* Ns */
if (OJPEGReadByte(sp,&n)==0)
return(0);
if (n!=sp->samples_per_pixel_per_plane)
{
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata,module,"Corrupt SOS marker in JPEG data");
return(0);
}
/* Cs, Td, and Ta */
for (o=0; o<sp->samples_per_pixel_per_plane; o++)
{
/* Cs */
if (OJPEGReadByte(sp,&n)==0)
return(0);
sp->sos_cs[sp->plane_sample_offset+o]=n;
/* Td and Ta */
if (OJPEGReadByte(sp,&n)==0)
return(0);
sp->sos_tda[sp->plane_sample_offset+o]=n;
}
/* skip Ss, Se, Ah, en Al -> no check, as per Tom Lane recommendation, as per LibJpeg source */
OJPEGReadSkip(sp,3);
return(1);
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_ojpeg.c: make OJPEGDecode() early exit in case of failure in
OJPEGPreDecode(). This will avoid a divide by zero, and potential other issues.
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2611
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 70,300 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: get_sampled_guard_with_id(guard_selection_t *gs,
const uint8_t *rsa_id)
{
tor_assert(gs);
tor_assert(rsa_id);
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(gs->sampled_entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, guard) {
if (tor_memeq(guard->identity, rsa_id, DIGEST_LEN))
return guard;
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(guard);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Consider the exit family when applying guard restrictions.
When the new path selection logic went into place, I accidentally
dropped the code that considered the _family_ of the exit node when
deciding if the guard was usable, and we didn't catch that during
code review.
This patch makes the guard_restriction_t code consider the exit
family as well, and adds some (hopefully redundant) checks for the
case where we lack a node_t for a guard but we have a bridge_info_t
for it.
Fixes bug 22753; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha. Tracked as TROVE-2016-006
and CVE-2017-0377.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 69,725 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OxideQQuickWebViewPrivate::detachContextSignals(
OxideQQuickWebContextPrivate* context) {
Q_Q(OxideQQuickWebView);
if (!context) {
return;
}
QObject::disconnect(context, SIGNAL(constructed()),
q, SLOT(contextConstructed()));
QObject::disconnect(context, SIGNAL(destroyed()),
q, SLOT(contextDestroyed()));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,086 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool on_found_plugin_process_host_called() const {
return on_found_plugin_process_host_called_;
}
Commit Message: Follow-on fixes and naming changes for https://codereview.chromium.org/12086077/
BUG=172573
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12177018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180600 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 0 | 116,824 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::UnlockMouse() {
aura::RootWindow* root_window = window_->GetRootWindow();
if (!mouse_locked_ || !root_window)
return;
mouse_locked_ = false;
window_->ReleaseCapture();
window_->MoveCursorTo(unlocked_mouse_position_);
aura::client::CursorClient* cursor_client =
aura::client::GetCursorClient(root_window);
if (cursor_client)
cursor_client->ShowCursor(true);
if (aura::client::GetTooltipClient(root_window))
aura::client::GetTooltipClient(root_window)->SetTooltipsEnabled(true);
host_->LostMouseLock();
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,910 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLInputElement::reportMemoryUsage(MemoryObjectInfo* memoryObjectInfo) const
{
MemoryClassInfo info(memoryObjectInfo, this, WebCoreMemoryTypes::DOM);
HTMLTextFormControlElement::reportMemoryUsage(memoryObjectInfo);
info.addMember(m_name, "name");
info.addMember(m_valueIfDirty, "valueIfDirty");
info.addMember(m_suggestedValue, "suggestedValue");
info.addMember(m_inputType, "inputType");
info.addMember(m_listAttributeTargetObserver, "listAttributeTargetObserver");
}
Commit Message: Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 112,973 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mkfs_data_unref (MkfsData *data)
{
g_free (data);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 11,783 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int __glXDisp_DestroyContext(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc)
{
xGLXDestroyContextReq *req = (xGLXDestroyContextReq *) pc;
__GLXcontext *glxc;
int err;
if (!validGlxContext(cl->client, req->context, DixDestroyAccess,
&glxc, &err))
return err;
FreeResourceByType(req->context, __glXContextRes, FALSE);
return Success;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 14,154 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nfsd_unlink(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, int type,
char *fname, int flen)
{
struct dentry *dentry, *rdentry;
struct inode *dirp;
__be32 err;
int host_err;
err = nfserr_acces;
if (!flen || isdotent(fname, flen))
goto out;
err = fh_verify(rqstp, fhp, S_IFDIR, NFSD_MAY_REMOVE);
if (err)
goto out;
host_err = fh_want_write(fhp);
if (host_err)
goto out_nfserr;
fh_lock_nested(fhp, I_MUTEX_PARENT);
dentry = fhp->fh_dentry;
dirp = d_inode(dentry);
rdentry = lookup_one_len(fname, dentry, flen);
host_err = PTR_ERR(rdentry);
if (IS_ERR(rdentry))
goto out_nfserr;
if (d_really_is_negative(rdentry)) {
dput(rdentry);
err = nfserr_noent;
goto out;
}
if (!type)
type = d_inode(rdentry)->i_mode & S_IFMT;
if (type != S_IFDIR)
host_err = vfs_unlink(dirp, rdentry, NULL);
else
host_err = vfs_rmdir(dirp, rdentry);
if (!host_err)
host_err = commit_metadata(fhp);
dput(rdentry);
out_nfserr:
err = nfserrno(host_err);
out:
return err;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,914 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NuPlayer::NuPlayerStreamListener::start() {
for (size_t i = 0; i < kNumBuffers; ++i) {
mSource->onBufferAvailable(i);
}
}
Commit Message: NuPlayerStreamListener: NULL and bounds check before memcpy
Bug: 27533704
Change-Id: I992a7709b92b1cbc3114c97bec48a3fc5b22ba6e
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 161,130 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int muscle_get_challenge(sc_card_t *card, u8 *rnd, size_t len)
{
if (len == 0)
return SC_SUCCESS;
else {
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,
msc_get_challenge(card, len, 0, NULL, rnd),
"GET CHALLENGE cmd failed");
return (int) len;
}
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds writes
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problems.
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 78,758 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void wc_ecc_del_point(ecc_point* p)
{
wc_ecc_del_point_h(p, NULL);
}
Commit Message: Change ECDSA signing to use blinding.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 81,867 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void discard_receive_data(int f_in, OFF_T length)
{
receive_data(f_in, NULL, -1, 0, NULL, -1, length);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 681 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DrawingBuffer::CreateOrRecycleColorBuffer() {
DCHECK(state_restorer_);
if (!recycled_color_buffer_queue_.IsEmpty()) {
RefPtr<ColorBuffer> recycled = recycled_color_buffer_queue_.TakeLast();
if (recycled->receive_sync_token.HasData())
gl_->WaitSyncTokenCHROMIUM(recycled->receive_sync_token.GetData());
DCHECK(recycled->size == size_);
return recycled;
}
return CreateColorBuffer(size_);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,943 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::InitializeUserMediaClient() {
RenderThreadImpl* render_thread = RenderThreadImpl::current();
if (!render_thread) // Will be NULL during unit tests.
return;
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_WEBRTC)
DCHECK(!web_user_media_client_);
web_user_media_client_ = new UserMediaClientImpl(
this, RenderThreadImpl::current()->GetPeerConnectionDependencyFactory(),
std::make_unique<MediaStreamDeviceObserver>(this));
#endif
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID: | 0 | 147,816 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int StreamTcpSegmentForEach(const Packet *p, uint8_t flag, StreamSegmentCallback CallbackFunc, void *data)
{
TcpSession *ssn = NULL;
TcpStream *stream = NULL;
int ret = 0;
int cnt = 0;
if (p->flow == NULL)
return 0;
ssn = (TcpSession *)p->flow->protoctx;
if (ssn == NULL) {
return 0;
}
if (flag & FLOW_PKT_TOSERVER) {
stream = &(ssn->server);
} else {
stream = &(ssn->client);
}
/* for IDS, return ack'd segments. For IPS all. */
TcpSegment *seg = stream->seg_list;
for (; seg != NULL &&
((stream_config.flags & STREAMTCP_INIT_FLAG_INLINE)
|| SEQ_LT(seg->seq, stream->last_ack));)
{
const uint8_t *seg_data;
uint32_t seg_datalen;
StreamingBufferSegmentGetData(&stream->sb, &seg->sbseg, &seg_data, &seg_datalen);
ret = CallbackFunc(p, data, seg_data, seg_datalen);
if (ret != 1) {
SCLogDebug("Callback function has failed");
return -1;
}
seg = seg->next;
cnt++;
}
return cnt;
}
Commit Message: stream: support RST getting lost/ignored
In case of a valid RST on a SYN, the state is switched to 'TCP_CLOSED'.
However, the target of the RST may not have received it, or may not
have accepted it. Also, the RST may have been injected, so the supposed
sender may not actually be aware of the RST that was sent in it's name.
In this case the previous behavior was to switch the state to CLOSED and
accept no further TCP updates or stream reassembly.
This patch changes this. It still switches the state to CLOSED, as this
is by far the most likely to be correct. However, it will reconsider
the state if the receiver continues to talk.
To do this on each state change the previous state will be recorded in
TcpSession::pstate. If a non-RST packet is received after a RST, this
TcpSession::pstate is used to try to continue the conversation.
If the (supposed) sender of the RST is also continueing the conversation
as normal, it's highly likely it didn't send the RST. In this case
a stream event is generated.
Ticket: #2501
Reported-By: Kirill Shipulin
CWE ID: | 0 | 79,218 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static CURLcode nss_load_cert(struct ssl_connect_data *ssl,
const char *filename, PRBool cacert)
{
CURLcode result = (cacert)
? CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE
: CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM;
/* libnsspem.so leaks memory if the requested file does not exist. For more
* details, go to <https://bugzilla.redhat.com/734760>. */
if(is_file(filename))
result = nss_create_object(ssl, CKO_CERTIFICATE, filename, cacert);
if(!result && !cacert) {
/* we have successfully loaded a client certificate */
CERTCertificate *cert;
char *nickname = NULL;
char *n = strrchr(filename, '/');
if(n)
n++;
/* The following undocumented magic helps to avoid a SIGSEGV on call
* of PK11_ReadRawAttribute() from SelectClientCert() when using an
* immature version of libnsspem.so. For more details, go to
* <https://bugzilla.redhat.com/733685>. */
nickname = aprintf("PEM Token #1:%s", n);
if(nickname) {
cert = PK11_FindCertFromNickname(nickname, NULL);
if(cert)
CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
free(nickname);
}
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: nss: refuse previously loaded certificate from file
... when we are not asked to use a certificate from file
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 0 | 50,110 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void lrw_exit_tfm(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
{
struct cast6_lrw_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
lrw_free_table(&ctx->lrw_table);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 46,918 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MaybeStartInputMethodDaemon(const std::string& section,
const std::string& config_name,
const ImeConfigValue& value) {
if (section == language_prefs::kGeneralSectionName &&
config_name == language_prefs::kPreloadEnginesConfigName &&
value.type == ImeConfigValue::kValueTypeStringList &&
!value.string_list_value.empty()) {
if (ContainOnlyOneKeyboardLayout(value) || defer_ime_startup_) {
return;
}
const bool just_started = StartInputMethodDaemon();
if (!just_started) {
return;
}
if (tentative_current_input_method_id_.empty()) {
tentative_current_input_method_id_ = current_input_method_.id;
}
if (std::find(value.string_list_value.begin(),
value.string_list_value.end(),
tentative_current_input_method_id_)
== value.string_list_value.end()) {
tentative_current_input_method_id_.clear();
}
}
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 170,499 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(pg_send_execute)
{
zval *pgsql_link;
zval *pv_param_arr, *tmp;
int num_params = 0;
char **params = NULL;
char *stmtname;
size_t stmtname_len;
int id = -1;
PGconn *pgsql;
int is_non_blocking;
int ret;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "rsa", &pgsql_link, &stmtname, &stmtname_len, &pv_param_arr) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (pgsql_link == NULL) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE2(pgsql, PGconn *, pgsql_link, id, "PostgreSQL link", le_link, le_plink);
is_non_blocking = PQisnonblocking(pgsql);
if (is_non_blocking == 0 && PQ_SETNONBLOCKING(pgsql, 1) == -1) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_NOTICE, "Cannot set connection to nonblocking mode");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (_php_pgsql_link_has_results(pgsql)) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_NOTICE,
"There are results on this connection. Call pg_get_result() until it returns FALSE");
}
num_params = zend_hash_num_elements(Z_ARRVAL_P(pv_param_arr));
if (num_params > 0) {
int i = 0;
params = (char **)safe_emalloc(sizeof(char *), num_params, 0);
ZEND_HASH_FOREACH_VAL(Z_ARRVAL_P(pv_param_arr), tmp) {
if (Z_TYPE_P(tmp) == IS_NULL) {
params[i] = NULL;
} else {
zval tmp_val;
ZVAL_COPY(&tmp_val, tmp);
convert_to_string(&tmp_val);
if (Z_TYPE(tmp_val) != IS_STRING) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING,"Error converting parameter");
zval_ptr_dtor(&tmp_val);
_php_pgsql_free_params(params, num_params);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
params[i] = estrndup(Z_STRVAL(tmp_val), Z_STRLEN(tmp_val));
zval_ptr_dtor(&tmp_val);
}
i++;
} ZEND_HASH_FOREACH_END();
}
if (PQsendQueryPrepared(pgsql, stmtname, num_params, (const char * const *)params, NULL, NULL, 0)) {
_php_pgsql_free_params(params, num_params);
} else if (is_non_blocking) {
_php_pgsql_free_params(params, num_params);
RETURN_FALSE;
} else {
if ((PGG(auto_reset_persistent) & 2) && PQstatus(pgsql) != CONNECTION_OK) {
PQreset(pgsql);
}
if (!PQsendQueryPrepared(pgsql, stmtname, num_params, (const char * const *)params, NULL, NULL, 0)) {
_php_pgsql_free_params(params, num_params);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
if (is_non_blocking) {
ret = PQflush(pgsql);
} else {
/* Wait to finish sending buffer */
while ((ret = PQflush(pgsql))) {
if (ret == -1) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_NOTICE, "Could not empty PostgreSQL send buffer");
break;
}
usleep(10000);
}
if (PQ_SETNONBLOCKING(pgsql, 0) != 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_NOTICE, "Cannot set connection to blocking mode");
}
}
if (ret == 0) {
RETURN_TRUE;
} else if (ret == -1) {
RETURN_FALSE;
} else {
RETURN_LONG(0);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 5,190 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void progressStarted()
{
ASSERT(m_frame->page());
if (!m_inProgress)
m_frame->page()->progress().progressStarted(m_frame);
m_inProgress = true;
}
Commit Message: Don't wait to notify client of spoof attempt if a modal dialog is created.
BUG=281256
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23620020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@157196 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 111,666 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int airo_get_encode(struct net_device *dev,
struct iw_request_info *info,
struct iw_point *dwrq,
char *extra)
{
struct airo_info *local = dev->ml_priv;
int index = (dwrq->flags & IW_ENCODE_INDEX) - 1;
int wep_key_len;
u8 buf[16];
if (!local->wep_capable)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
readConfigRid(local, 1);
/* Check encryption mode */
switch(local->config.authType) {
case AUTH_ENCRYPT:
dwrq->flags = IW_ENCODE_OPEN;
break;
case AUTH_SHAREDKEY:
dwrq->flags = IW_ENCODE_RESTRICTED;
break;
default:
case AUTH_OPEN:
dwrq->flags = IW_ENCODE_DISABLED;
break;
}
/* We can't return the key, so set the proper flag and return zero */
dwrq->flags |= IW_ENCODE_NOKEY;
memset(extra, 0, 16);
/* Which key do we want ? -1 -> tx index */
if (!valid_index(local, index)) {
index = get_wep_tx_idx(local);
if (index < 0)
index = 0;
}
dwrq->flags |= index + 1;
/* Copy the key to the user buffer */
wep_key_len = get_wep_key(local, index, &buf[0], sizeof(buf));
if (wep_key_len < 0) {
dwrq->length = 0;
} else {
dwrq->length = wep_key_len;
memcpy(extra, buf, dwrq->length);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 23,950 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void set_bad_200(bool value) { bad_200_ = value; }
Commit Message: Http cache: Test deleting an entry with a pending_entry when
adding the truncated flag.
BUG=125159
TEST=net_unittests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10356113
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139331 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 108,118 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: zfile(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p)
{
os_ptr op = osp;
char file_access[4];
gs_parsed_file_name_t pname;
int code = parse_file_access_string(op, file_access);
stream *s;
if (code < 0)
return code;
code = parse_file_name(op-1, &pname, i_ctx_p->LockFilePermissions, imemory);
if (code < 0)
return code;
/*
* HACK: temporarily patch the current context pointer into the
* state pointer for stdio-related devices. See ziodev.c for
* more information.
*/
if (pname.iodev && pname.iodev->dtype == iodev_dtype_stdio) {
bool statement = (strcmp(pname.iodev->dname, "%statementedit%") == 0);
bool lineedit = (strcmp(pname.iodev->dname, "%lineedit%") == 0);
if (pname.fname)
return_error(gs_error_invalidfileaccess);
if (statement || lineedit) {
/* These need special code to support callouts */
gx_io_device *indev = gs_findiodevice(imemory,
(const byte *)"%stdin", 6);
stream *ins;
if (strcmp(file_access, "r"))
return_error(gs_error_invalidfileaccess);
indev->state = i_ctx_p;
code = (indev->procs.open_device)(indev, file_access, &ins, imemory);
indev->state = 0;
if (code < 0)
return code;
check_ostack(2);
push(2);
make_stream_file(op - 3, ins, file_access);
make_bool(op-2, statement);
make_int(op-1, 0);
make_string(op, icurrent_space, 0, NULL);
return zfilelineedit(i_ctx_p);
}
pname.iodev->state = i_ctx_p;
code = (*pname.iodev->procs.open_device)(pname.iodev,
file_access, &s, imemory);
pname.iodev->state = NULL;
} else {
if (pname.iodev == NULL)
pname.iodev = iodev_default(imemory);
code = zopen_file(i_ctx_p, &pname, file_access, &s, imemory);
}
if (code < 0)
return code;
code = ssetfilename(s, op[-1].value.const_bytes, r_size(op - 1));
if (code < 0) {
sclose(s);
return_error(gs_error_VMerror);
}
make_stream_file(op - 1, s, file_access);
pop(1);
return code;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 3,359 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int bzImage64_cleanup(void *loader_data)
{
struct bzimage64_data *ldata = loader_data;
if (!ldata)
return 0;
kfree(ldata->bootparams_buf);
ldata->bootparams_buf = NULL;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: kexec/uefi: copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot
Kexec reboot in case secure boot being enabled does not keep the secure
boot mode in new kernel, so later one can load unsigned kernel via legacy
kexec_load. In this state, the system is missing the protections provided
by secure boot. Adding a patch to fix this by retain the secure_boot flag
in original kernel.
secure_boot flag in boot_params is set in EFI stub, but kexec bypasses the
stub. Fixing this issue by copying secure_boot flag across kexec reboot.
Signed-off-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 74,084 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: choose_pool(struct svc_serv *serv, struct svc_pool *pool, unsigned int *state)
{
if (pool != NULL)
return pool;
return &serv->sv_pools[(*state)++ % serv->sv_nrpools];
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,925 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE2(timer_gettime, timer_t, timer_id,
struct itimerspec __user *, setting)
{
struct itimerspec64 cur_setting;
int ret = do_timer_gettime(timer_id, &cur_setting);
if (!ret) {
if (put_itimerspec64(&cur_setting, setting))
ret = -EFAULT;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: posix-timer: Properly check sigevent->sigev_notify
timer_create() specifies via sigevent->sigev_notify the signal delivery for
the new timer. The valid modes are SIGEV_NONE, SIGEV_SIGNAL, SIGEV_THREAD
and (SIGEV_SIGNAL | SIGEV_THREAD_ID).
The sanity check in good_sigevent() is only checking the valid combination
for the SIGEV_THREAD_ID bit, i.e. SIGEV_SIGNAL, but if SIGEV_THREAD_ID is
not set it accepts any random value.
This has no real effects on the posix timer and signal delivery code, but
it affects show_timer() which handles the output of /proc/$PID/timers. That
function uses a string array to pretty print sigev_notify. The access to
that array has no bound checks, so random sigev_notify cause access beyond
the array bounds.
Add proper checks for the valid notify modes and remove the SIGEV_THREAD_ID
masking from various code pathes as SIGEV_NONE can never be set in
combination with SIGEV_THREAD_ID.
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reported-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 85,127 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pcf_get_properties( FT_Stream stream,
PCF_Face face )
{
PCF_ParseProperty props = 0;
PCF_Property properties = NULL;
FT_ULong nprops, i;
FT_ULong format, size;
FT_Error error;
FT_Memory memory = FT_FACE( face )->memory;
FT_ULong string_size;
FT_String* strings = 0;
error = pcf_seek_to_table_type( stream,
face->toc.tables,
face->toc.count,
PCF_PROPERTIES,
&format,
&size );
if ( error )
goto Bail;
if ( FT_READ_ULONG_LE( format ) )
goto Bail;
FT_TRACE4(( "pcf_get_properties:\n" ));
FT_TRACE4(( " format = %ld\n", format ));
if ( !PCF_FORMAT_MATCH( format, PCF_DEFAULT_FORMAT ) )
goto Bail;
if ( PCF_BYTE_ORDER( format ) == MSBFirst )
(void)FT_READ_ULONG( nprops );
else
(void)FT_READ_ULONG_LE( nprops );
if ( error )
goto Bail;
FT_TRACE4(( " nprop = %d (truncate %d props)\n",
(int)nprops, nprops - (int)nprops ));
nprops = (int)nprops;
/* rough estimate */
if ( nprops > size / PCF_PROPERTY_SIZE )
{
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_Table );
goto Bail;
}
face->nprops = (int)nprops;
if ( FT_NEW_ARRAY( props, nprops ) )
goto Bail;
for ( i = 0; i < nprops; i++ )
{
if ( PCF_BYTE_ORDER( format ) == MSBFirst )
{
if ( FT_STREAM_READ_FIELDS( pcf_property_msb_header, props + i ) )
goto Bail;
}
else
{
if ( FT_STREAM_READ_FIELDS( pcf_property_header, props + i ) )
goto Bail;
}
}
/* pad the property array */
/* */
/* clever here - nprops is the same as the number of odd-units read, */
/* as only isStringProp are odd length (Keith Packard) */
/* */
if ( nprops & 3 )
{
i = 4 - ( nprops & 3 );
if ( FT_STREAM_SKIP( i ) )
{
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_Stream_Skip );
goto Bail;
}
}
if ( PCF_BYTE_ORDER( format ) == MSBFirst )
(void)FT_READ_ULONG( string_size );
else
(void)FT_READ_ULONG_LE( string_size );
if ( error )
goto Bail;
FT_TRACE4(( " string_size = %ld\n", string_size ));
/* rough estimate */
if ( string_size > size - nprops * PCF_PROPERTY_SIZE )
{
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_Table );
goto Bail;
}
/* allocate one more byte so that we have a final null byte */
if ( FT_NEW_ARRAY( strings, string_size + 1 ) )
goto Bail;
error = FT_Stream_Read( stream, (FT_Byte*)strings, string_size );
if ( error )
goto Bail;
if ( FT_NEW_ARRAY( properties, nprops ) )
goto Bail;
face->properties = properties;
for ( i = 0; i < nprops; i++ )
{
FT_Long name_offset = props[i].name;
if ( ( name_offset < 0 ) ||
( (FT_ULong)name_offset > string_size ) )
{
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_Offset );
goto Bail;
}
if ( FT_STRDUP( properties[i].name, strings + name_offset ) )
goto Bail;
FT_TRACE4(( " %s:", properties[i].name ));
properties[i].isString = props[i].isString;
if ( props[i].isString )
{
FT_Long value_offset = props[i].value;
if ( ( value_offset < 0 ) ||
( (FT_ULong)value_offset > string_size ) )
{
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_Offset );
goto Bail;
}
if ( FT_STRDUP( properties[i].value.atom, strings + value_offset ) )
goto Bail;
FT_TRACE4(( " `%s'\n", properties[i].value.atom ));
}
else
{
properties[i].value.l = props[i].value;
FT_TRACE4(( " %d\n", properties[i].value.l ));
}
}
error = FT_Err_Ok;
Bail:
FT_FREE( props );
FT_FREE( strings );
return error;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 6,965 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static TriState StateJustifyRight(LocalFrame& frame, Event*) {
return StateStyle(frame, CSSPropertyTextAlign, "right");
}
Commit Message: Move Editor::Transpose() out of Editor class
This patch moves |Editor::Transpose()| out of |Editor| class as preparation of
expanding it into |ExecutTranspose()| in "EditorCommand.cpp" to make |Editor|
class simpler for improving code health.
Following patch will expand |Transpose()| into |ExecutTranspose()|.
Bug: 672405
Change-Id: Icde253623f31813d2b4517c4da7d4798bd5fadf6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/583880
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#489518}
CWE ID: | 0 | 128,647 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::CreateNewWindow(
mojom::CreateNewWindowParamsPtr params,
CreateNewWindowCallback callback) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
TRACE_EVENT2("navigation", "RenderFrameHostImpl::CreateNewWindow",
"frame_tree_node", frame_tree_node_->frame_tree_node_id(), "url",
params->target_url.possibly_invalid_spec());
bool no_javascript_access = false;
GetProcess()->FilterURL(false, ¶ms->target_url);
bool can_create_window =
IsCurrent() && render_frame_created_ &&
GetContentClient()->browser()->CanCreateWindow(
this, GetLastCommittedURL(),
frame_tree_node_->frame_tree()->GetMainFrame()->GetLastCommittedURL(),
last_committed_origin_.GetURL(), params->window_container_type,
params->target_url, params->referrer, params->frame_name,
params->disposition, *params->features, params->user_gesture,
params->opener_suppressed, &no_javascript_access);
if (!can_create_window) {
std::move(callback).Run(mojom::CreateNewWindowStatus::kIgnore, nullptr);
return;
}
if (!render_view_host_->GetWebkitPreferences().supports_multiple_windows) {
std::move(callback).Run(mojom::CreateNewWindowStatus::kReuse, nullptr);
return;
}
StoragePartition* storage_partition = BrowserContext::GetStoragePartition(
GetSiteInstance()->GetBrowserContext(), GetSiteInstance());
DOMStorageContextWrapper* dom_storage_context =
static_cast<DOMStorageContextWrapper*>(
storage_partition->GetDOMStorageContext());
auto cloned_namespace = base::MakeRefCounted<SessionStorageNamespaceImpl>(
dom_storage_context, params->session_storage_namespace_id);
int render_view_route_id = MSG_ROUTING_NONE;
int main_frame_route_id = MSG_ROUTING_NONE;
int main_frame_widget_route_id = MSG_ROUTING_NONE;
int render_process_id = GetProcess()->GetID();
if (!params->opener_suppressed && !no_javascript_access) {
render_view_route_id = GetProcess()->GetNextRoutingID();
main_frame_route_id = GetProcess()->GetNextRoutingID();
main_frame_widget_route_id = render_view_route_id;
auto block_requests_for_route = base::Bind(
[](const GlobalFrameRoutingId& id) {
auto* rdh = ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::Get();
if (rdh)
rdh->BlockRequestsForRoute(id);
},
GlobalFrameRoutingId(render_process_id, main_frame_route_id));
BrowserThread::PostTask(BrowserThread::IO, FROM_HERE,
block_requests_for_route);
}
DCHECK(IsRenderFrameLive());
delegate_->CreateNewWindow(this, render_view_route_id, main_frame_route_id,
main_frame_widget_route_id, *params,
cloned_namespace.get());
if (main_frame_route_id == MSG_ROUTING_NONE) {
std::move(callback).Run(mojom::CreateNewWindowStatus::kIgnore, nullptr);
return;
}
bool succeeded =
RenderWidgetHost::FromID(render_process_id, main_frame_widget_route_id) !=
nullptr;
if (!succeeded) {
DCHECK(!RenderFrameHost::FromID(render_process_id, main_frame_route_id));
DCHECK(!RenderViewHost::FromID(render_process_id, render_view_route_id));
std::move(callback).Run(mojom::CreateNewWindowStatus::kIgnore, nullptr);
return;
}
DCHECK(RenderViewHost::FromID(render_process_id, render_view_route_id));
RenderFrameHostImpl* rfh =
RenderFrameHostImpl::FromID(GetProcess()->GetID(), main_frame_route_id);
DCHECK(rfh);
service_manager::mojom::InterfaceProviderPtrInfo
main_frame_interface_provider_info;
rfh->BindInterfaceProviderRequest(
mojo::MakeRequest(&main_frame_interface_provider_info));
mojom::CreateNewWindowReplyPtr reply = mojom::CreateNewWindowReply::New(
render_view_route_id, main_frame_route_id, main_frame_widget_route_id,
std::move(main_frame_interface_provider_info), cloned_namespace->id(),
rfh->GetDevToolsFrameToken());
std::move(callback).Run(mojom::CreateNewWindowStatus::kSuccess,
std::move(reply));
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID: | 0 | 147,617 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void wakeupdispatch(struct tipc_port *tport)
{
struct sock *sk = (struct sock *)tport->usr_handle;
sk->sk_write_space(sk);
}
Commit Message: tipc: fix info leaks via msg_name in recv_msg/recv_stream
The code in set_orig_addr() does not initialize all of the members of
struct sockaddr_tipc when filling the sockaddr info -- namely the union
is only partly filled. This will make recv_msg() and recv_stream() --
the only users of this function -- leak kernel stack memory as the
msg_name member is a local variable in net/socket.c.
Additionally to that both recv_msg() and recv_stream() fail to update
the msg_namelen member to 0 while otherwise returning with 0, i.e.
"success". This is the case for, e.g., non-blocking sockets. This will
lead to a 128 byte kernel stack leak in net/socket.c.
Fix the first issue by initializing the memory of the union with
memset(0). Fix the second one by setting msg_namelen to 0 early as it
will be updated later if we're going to fill the msg_name member.
Cc: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com>
Cc: Allan Stephens <allan.stephens@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 30,471 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: data_available(ftpbuf_t *ftp, php_socket_t s)
{
int n;
n = php_pollfd_for_ms(s, PHP_POLLREADABLE, 1000);
if (n < 1) {
#if !defined(PHP_WIN32) && !(defined(NETWARE) && defined(USE_WINSOCK))
if (n == 0) {
errno = ETIMEDOUT;
}
#endif
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 14,781 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SecurityExploitBrowserTest::TestFileChooserWithPath(
const base::FilePath& path) {
GURL foo("http://foo.com/simple_page.html");
NavigateToURL(shell(), foo);
EXPECT_EQ(base::ASCIIToUTF16("OK"), shell()->web_contents()->GetTitle());
RenderFrameHost* compromised_renderer =
shell()->web_contents()->GetMainFrame();
RenderProcessHostKillWaiter kill_waiter(compromised_renderer->GetProcess());
blink::mojom::FileChooserParams params;
params.default_file_name = path;
FrameHostMsg_RunFileChooser evil(compromised_renderer->GetRoutingID(),
params);
IpcSecurityTestUtil::PwnMessageReceived(
compromised_renderer->GetProcess()->GetChannel(), evil);
EXPECT_EQ(bad_message::RFH_FILE_CHOOSER_PATH, kill_waiter.Wait());
}
Commit Message: Lock down blob/filesystem URL creation with a stronger CPSP::CanCommitURL()
ChildProcessSecurityPolicy::CanCommitURL() is a security check that's
supposed to tell whether a given renderer process is allowed to commit
a given URL. It is currently used to validate (1) blob and filesystem
URL creation, and (2) Origin headers. Currently, it has scheme-based
checks that disallow things like web renderers creating
blob/filesystem URLs in chrome-extension: origins, but it cannot stop
one web origin from creating those URLs for another origin.
This CL locks down its use for (1) to also consult
CanAccessDataForOrigin(). With site isolation, this will check origin
locks and ensure that foo.com cannot create blob/filesystem URLs for
other origins.
For now, this CL does not provide the same enforcements for (2),
Origin header validation, which has additional constraints that need
to be solved first (see https://crbug.com/515309).
Bug: 886976, 888001
Change-Id: I743ef05469e4000b2c0bee840022162600cc237f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1235343
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#594914}
CWE ID: | 0 | 143,759 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int main(int argc, char **argv) {
test_conf_files_list(false);
test_conf_files_list(true);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: util-lib: use MODE_INVALID as invalid value for mode_t everywhere
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 96,139 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Box *moov_New()
{
ISOM_DECL_BOX_ALLOC(GF_MovieBox, GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_MOOV);
tmp->trackList = gf_list_new();
if (!tmp->trackList) {
gf_free(tmp);
return NULL;
}
return (GF_Box *)tmp;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,260 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ask_replace_old_private_group_name(void)
{
char *message = xasprintf(_("Private ticket is requested but the group name 'private' has been deprecated. "
"We kindly ask you to use 'fedora_contrib_private' group name. "
"Click Yes button or update the configuration manually. Or click No button, if you really want to use 'private' group.\n\n"
"If you are not sure what this dialogue means, please trust us and click Yes button.\n\n"
"Read more about the private bug reports at:\n"
"https://github.com/abrt/abrt/wiki/FAQ#creating-private-bugzilla-tickets\n"
"https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1044653\n"));
char *markup_message = xasprintf(_("Private ticket is requested but the group name <i>private</i> has been deprecated. "
"We kindly ask you to use <i>fedora_contrib_private</i> group name. "
"Click Yes button or update the configuration manually. Or click No button, if you really want to use <i>private</i> group.\n\n"
"If you are not sure what this dialogue means, please trust us and click Yes button.\n\n"
"Read more about the private bug reports at:\n"
"<a href=\"https://github.com/abrt/abrt/wiki/FAQ#creating-private-bugzilla-tickets\">"
"https://github.com/abrt/abrt/wiki/FAQ#creating-private-bugzilla-tickets</a>\n"
"<a href=\"https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1044653\">https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1044653</a>\n"));
GtkWidget *old_private_group = gtk_message_dialog_new(GTK_WINDOW(g_wnd_assistant),
GTK_DIALOG_MODAL | GTK_DIALOG_DESTROY_WITH_PARENT,
GTK_MESSAGE_WARNING,
GTK_BUTTONS_YES_NO,
message);
gtk_window_set_transient_for(GTK_WINDOW(old_private_group), GTK_WINDOW(g_wnd_assistant));
gtk_message_dialog_set_markup(GTK_MESSAGE_DIALOG(old_private_group),
markup_message);
free(message);
free(markup_message);
/* Esc -> No, Enter -> Yes */
gtk_dialog_set_default_response(GTK_DIALOG(old_private_group), GTK_RESPONSE_YES);
gint result = gtk_dialog_run(GTK_DIALOG(old_private_group));
gtk_widget_destroy(old_private_group);
return result == GTK_RESPONSE_YES;
}
Commit Message: wizard: fix save users changes after reviewing dump dir files
If the user reviewed the dump dir's files during reporting the crash, the
changes was thrown away and original data was passed to the bugzilla bug
report.
report-gtk saves the first text view buffer and then reloads data from the
reported problem directory, which causes that the changes made to those text
views are thrown away.
Function save_text_if_changed(), except of saving text, also reload the files
from dump dir and update gui state from the dump dir. The commit moves the
reloading and updating gui functions away from this function.
Related to rhbz#1270235
Signed-off-by: Matej Habrnal <mhabrnal@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 42,794 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlParseStringName(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, const xmlChar** str) {
xmlChar buf[XML_MAX_NAMELEN + 5];
const xmlChar *cur = *str;
int len = 0, l;
int c;
#ifdef DEBUG
nbParseStringName++;
#endif
c = CUR_SCHAR(cur, l);
if (!xmlIsNameStartChar(ctxt, c)) {
return(NULL);
}
COPY_BUF(l,buf,len,c);
cur += l;
c = CUR_SCHAR(cur, l);
while (xmlIsNameChar(ctxt, c)) {
COPY_BUF(l,buf,len,c);
cur += l;
c = CUR_SCHAR(cur, l);
if (len >= XML_MAX_NAMELEN) { /* test bigentname.xml */
/*
* Okay someone managed to make a huge name, so he's ready to pay
* for the processing speed.
*/
xmlChar *buffer;
int max = len * 2;
buffer = (xmlChar *) xmlMallocAtomic(max * sizeof(xmlChar));
if (buffer == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
return(NULL);
}
memcpy(buffer, buf, len);
while (xmlIsNameChar(ctxt, c)) {
if (len + 10 > max) {
xmlChar *tmp;
if ((len > XML_MAX_NAME_LENGTH) &&
((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_TOO_LONG, "NCName");
xmlFree(buffer);
return(NULL);
}
max *= 2;
tmp = (xmlChar *) xmlRealloc(buffer,
max * sizeof(xmlChar));
if (tmp == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
xmlFree(buffer);
return(NULL);
}
buffer = tmp;
}
COPY_BUF(l,buffer,len,c);
cur += l;
c = CUR_SCHAR(cur, l);
}
buffer[len] = 0;
*str = cur;
return(buffer);
}
}
if ((len > XML_MAX_NAME_LENGTH) &&
((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_TOO_LONG, "NCName");
return(NULL);
}
*str = cur;
return(xmlStrndup(buf, len));
}
Commit Message: Detect infinite recursion in parameter entities
When expanding a parameter entity in a DTD, infinite recursion could
lead to an infinite loop or memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Wei Lei for the first of many reports.
Fixes bug 759579.
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 59,520 |
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