instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGLObject::detach()
{
m_attachmentCount = 0; // Make sure OpenGL resource is deleted.
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, build fix for unused argument warning after r104954.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=75906
Also fixed up somebody's bad merge in Source/WebCore/ChangeLog.
* html/canvas/WebGLObject.cpp:
(WebCore::WebGLObject::WebGLObject):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@104959 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 97,121 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AudioRendererAlgorithm::AudioRendererAlgorithm()
: channels_(0),
samples_per_second_(0),
bytes_per_channel_(0),
playback_rate_(0.0f),
audio_buffer_(0, kStartingBufferSizeInBytes),
bytes_in_crossfade_(0),
bytes_per_frame_(0),
index_into_window_(0),
crossfade_frame_number_(0),
muted_(false),
needs_more_data_(false),
window_size_(0) {
}
Commit Message: Protect AudioRendererAlgorithm from invalid step sizes.
BUG=165430
TEST=unittests and asan pass.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11573023
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@173249 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 118,682 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void hwahc_op_endpoint_disable(struct usb_hcd *usb_hcd,
struct usb_host_endpoint *ep)
{
struct wusbhc *wusbhc = usb_hcd_to_wusbhc(usb_hcd);
struct hwahc *hwahc = container_of(wusbhc, struct hwahc, wusbhc);
rpipe_ep_disable(&hwahc->wa, ep);
}
Commit Message: USB: check usb_get_extra_descriptor for proper size
When reading an extra descriptor, we need to properly check the minimum
and maximum size allowed, to prevent from invalid data being sent by a
device.
Reported-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Co-developed-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 75,585 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SkiaOutputSurfaceImpl::BindFramebuffer() {
}
Commit Message: SkiaRenderer: Support changing color space
SkiaOutputSurfaceImpl did not handle the color space changing after it
was created previously. The SkSurfaceCharacterization color space was
only set during the first time Reshape() ran when the charactization is
returned from the GPU thread. If the color space was changed later the
SkSurface and SkDDL color spaces no longer matched and draw failed.
Bug: 1009452
Change-Id: Ib6d2083efc7e7eb6f94782342e92a809b69d6fdc
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1841811
Reviewed-by: Peng Huang <penghuang@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: kylechar <kylechar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#702946}
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 135,948 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderFrameHostCreatedObserver(WebContents* web_contents,
int expected_frame_count)
: WebContentsObserver(web_contents),
expected_frame_count_(expected_frame_count),
frames_created_(0),
message_loop_runner_(new MessageLoopRunner) {}
Commit Message: Avoid sharing process for blob URLs with null origin.
Previously, when a frame with a unique origin, such as from a data
URL, created a blob URL, the blob URL looked like blob:null/guid and
resulted in a site URL of "blob:" when navigated to. This incorrectly
allowed all such blob URLs to share a process, even if they were
created by different sites.
This CL changes the site URL assigned in such cases to be the full
blob URL, which includes the GUID. This avoids process sharing for
all blob URLs with unique origins.
This fix is conservative in the sense that it would also isolate
different blob URLs created by the same unique origin from each other.
This case isn't expected to be common, so it's unlikely to affect
process count. There's ongoing work to maintain a GUID for unique
origins, so longer-term, we could try using that to track down the
creator and potentially use that GUID in the site URL instead of the
blob URL's GUID, to avoid unnecessary process isolation in scenarios
like this.
Note that as part of this, we discovered a bug where data URLs aren't
able to script blob URLs that they create: https://crbug.com/865254.
This scripting bug should be fixed independently of this CL, and as
far as we can tell, this CL doesn't regress scripting cases like this
further.
Bug: 863623
Change-Id: Ib50407adbba3d5ee0cf6d72d3df7f8d8f24684ee
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1142389
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#576318}
CWE ID: CWE-285 | 0 | 154,565 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool AXARIAGridCell::isAriaColumnHeader() const {
const AtomicString& role = getAttribute(HTMLNames::roleAttr);
return equalIgnoringCase(role, "columnheader");
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 1 | 171,901 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int dtls1_send_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, int a, int b)
{
unsigned char *p;
if (s->state == a)
{
p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
*p++=SSL3_MT_CCS;
s->d1->handshake_write_seq = s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq;
s->init_num=DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH;
if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq++;
s2n(s->d1->handshake_write_seq,p);
s->init_num+=2;
}
s->init_off=0;
dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, SSL3_MT_CCS, 0,
s->d1->handshake_write_seq, 0, 0);
/* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
dtls1_buffer_message(s, 1);
s->state=b;
}
/* SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B */
return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 14,365 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool PluginInfoMessageFilter::OnMessageReceived(const IPC::Message& message,
bool* message_was_ok) {
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP_EX(PluginInfoMessageFilter, message, *message_was_ok)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER_DELAY_REPLY(ChromeViewHostMsg_GetPluginInfo,
OnGetPluginInfo)
IPC_MESSAGE_UNHANDLED(return false)
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP()
return true;
}
Commit Message: Handle crashing Pepper plug-ins the same as crashing NPAPI plug-ins.
BUG=151895
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10956065
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@158364 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 103,135 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AXLayoutObject::ariaLabelledbyElements(AXObjectVector& labelledby) const {
accessibilityChildrenFromAttribute(aria_labelledbyAttr, labelledby);
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,017 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gdImagePtr _php_image_create_from_string(zval **data, char *tn, gdImagePtr (*ioctx_func_p)() TSRMLS_DC)
{
gdImagePtr im;
gdIOCtx *io_ctx;
io_ctx = gdNewDynamicCtxEx(Z_STRLEN_PP(data), Z_STRVAL_PP(data), 0);
if (!io_ctx) {
return NULL;
}
im = (*ioctx_func_p)(io_ctx);
if (!im) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Passed data is not in '%s' format", tn);
#if HAVE_LIBGD204
io_ctx->gd_free(io_ctx);
#else
io_ctx->free(io_ctx);
#endif
return NULL;
}
#if HAVE_LIBGD204
io_ctx->gd_free(io_ctx);
#else
io_ctx->free(io_ctx);
#endif
return im;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 15,185 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void l2cap_sock_init(struct sock *sk, struct sock *parent)
{
struct l2cap_pinfo *pi = l2cap_pi(sk);
struct l2cap_chan *chan = pi->chan;
BT_DBG("sk %p", sk);
if (parent) {
struct l2cap_chan *pchan = l2cap_pi(parent)->chan;
sk->sk_type = parent->sk_type;
bt_sk(sk)->flags = bt_sk(parent)->flags;
chan->chan_type = pchan->chan_type;
chan->imtu = pchan->imtu;
chan->omtu = pchan->omtu;
chan->conf_state = pchan->conf_state;
chan->mode = pchan->mode;
chan->fcs = pchan->fcs;
chan->max_tx = pchan->max_tx;
chan->tx_win = pchan->tx_win;
chan->tx_win_max = pchan->tx_win_max;
chan->sec_level = pchan->sec_level;
chan->flags = pchan->flags;
security_sk_clone(parent, sk);
} else {
switch (sk->sk_type) {
case SOCK_RAW:
chan->chan_type = L2CAP_CHAN_RAW;
break;
case SOCK_DGRAM:
chan->chan_type = L2CAP_CHAN_CONN_LESS;
break;
case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
case SOCK_STREAM:
chan->chan_type = L2CAP_CHAN_CONN_ORIENTED;
break;
}
chan->imtu = L2CAP_DEFAULT_MTU;
chan->omtu = 0;
if (!disable_ertm && sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM) {
chan->mode = L2CAP_MODE_ERTM;
set_bit(CONF_STATE2_DEVICE, &chan->conf_state);
} else {
chan->mode = L2CAP_MODE_BASIC;
}
l2cap_chan_set_defaults(chan);
}
/* Default config options */
chan->flush_to = L2CAP_DEFAULT_FLUSH_TO;
chan->data = sk;
chan->ops = &l2cap_chan_ops;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: L2CAP - Fix info leak via getsockname()
The L2CAP code fails to initialize the l2_bdaddr_type member of struct
sockaddr_l2 and the padding byte added for alignment. It that for leaks
two bytes kernel stack via the getsockname() syscall. Add an explicit
memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 94,525 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: current_type(struct file *file, int code)
/* Guess the actual chunk type that causes a stop() */
{
/* This may return png_IDAT for errors detected (late) in the header; that
* includes any inter-chunk consistency check that libpng performs. Assume
* that if the chunk_type is png_IDAT and the file write count is 8 this is
* what is happening.
*/
if (file->chunk != NULL)
{
png_uint_32 type = file->chunk->chunk_type;
/* This is probably wrong for the excess IDATs case, because then libpng
* whines about too many of them (apparently in some cases erroneously)
* when the header is read.
*/
if (code <= LIBPNG_ERROR_CODE && type == png_IDAT &&
file->write_count == 8)
type = 0; /* magic */
return type;
}
else
return file->type;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 0 | 160,120 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SyncBackendHost::InitCore(const Core::DoInitializeOptions& options) {
core_thread_.message_loop()->PostTask(FROM_HERE,
NewRunnableMethod(core_.get(), &SyncBackendHost::Core::DoInitialize,
options));
}
Commit Message: Enable HistoryModelWorker by default, now that bug 69561 is fixed.
BUG=69561
TEST=Run sync manually and run integration tests, sync should not crash.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7016007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@85211 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 101,456 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CCLayerTreeHostTestSetNeedsCommit2()
: m_numCommits(0)
, m_numDraws(0)
{
}
Commit Message: [chromium] Fix shutdown race when posting main thread task to CCThreadProxy and enable tests
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=70161
Reviewed by David Levin.
Source/WebCore:
Adds a weak pointer mechanism to cancel main thread tasks posted to CCThreadProxy instances from the compositor
thread. Previously there was a race condition where main thread tasks could run even after the CCThreadProxy was
destroyed.
This race does not exist in the other direction because when tearing down a CCThreadProxy we first post a quit
task to the compositor thread and then suspend execution of the main thread until all compositor tasks for the
CCThreadProxy have been drained.
Covered by the now-enabled CCLayerTreeHostTest* unit tests.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCScopedMainThreadProxy.h: Added.
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::create):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::postTask):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::shutdown):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::CCScopedMainThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::runTaskIfNotShutdown):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.cpp:
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::~CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::createBeginFrameAndCommitTaskOnCCThread):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.h:
Source/WebKit/chromium:
Enables the CCLayerTreeHostTest* tests by default. Most tests are run twice in a single thread and multiple
thread configuration. Some tests run only in the multiple thread configuration if they depend on the compositor
thread scheduling draws by itself.
* tests/CCLayerTreeHostTest.cpp:
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::timeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::clearTimeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::CCLayerTreeHostTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::onEndTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::clearTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::~TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::Run):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::doBeginTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestThreadOnly::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestSetNeedsRedraw::commitCompleteOnCCThread):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@97784 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 97,863 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static double FxChannelStatistics(FxInfo *fx_info,Image *image,
PixelChannel channel,const char *symbol,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
ChannelType
channel_mask;
char
key[MagickPathExtent],
statistic[MagickPathExtent];
const char
*value;
register const char
*p;
channel_mask=UndefinedChannel;
for (p=symbol; (*p != '.') && (*p != '\0'); p++) ;
if (*p == '.')
{
ssize_t
option;
option=ParseCommandOption(MagickPixelChannelOptions,MagickTrue,p+1);
if (option >= 0)
{
channel=(PixelChannel) option;
channel_mask=(ChannelType) (channel_mask | (1 << channel));
(void) SetPixelChannelMask(image,channel_mask);
}
}
(void) FormatLocaleString(key,MagickPathExtent,"%p.%.20g.%s",(void *) image,
(double) channel,symbol);
value=(const char *) GetValueFromSplayTree(fx_info->symbols,key);
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
{
if (channel_mask != UndefinedChannel)
(void) SetPixelChannelMask(image,channel_mask);
return(QuantumScale*StringToDouble(value,(char **) NULL));
}
(void) DeleteNodeFromSplayTree(fx_info->symbols,key);
if (LocaleNCompare(symbol,"depth",5) == 0)
{
size_t
depth;
depth=GetImageDepth(image,exception);
(void) FormatLocaleString(statistic,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g",(double)
depth);
}
if (LocaleNCompare(symbol,"kurtosis",8) == 0)
{
double
kurtosis,
skewness;
(void) GetImageKurtosis(image,&kurtosis,&skewness,exception);
(void) FormatLocaleString(statistic,MagickPathExtent,"%g",kurtosis);
}
if (LocaleNCompare(symbol,"maxima",6) == 0)
{
double
maxima,
minima;
(void) GetImageRange(image,&minima,&maxima,exception);
(void) FormatLocaleString(statistic,MagickPathExtent,"%g",maxima);
}
if (LocaleNCompare(symbol,"mean",4) == 0)
{
double
mean,
standard_deviation;
(void) GetImageMean(image,&mean,&standard_deviation,exception);
(void) FormatLocaleString(statistic,MagickPathExtent,"%g",mean);
}
if (LocaleNCompare(symbol,"minima",6) == 0)
{
double
maxima,
minima;
(void) GetImageRange(image,&minima,&maxima,exception);
(void) FormatLocaleString(statistic,MagickPathExtent,"%g",minima);
}
if (LocaleNCompare(symbol,"skewness",8) == 0)
{
double
kurtosis,
skewness;
(void) GetImageKurtosis(image,&kurtosis,&skewness,exception);
(void) FormatLocaleString(statistic,MagickPathExtent,"%g",skewness);
}
if (LocaleNCompare(symbol,"standard_deviation",18) == 0)
{
double
mean,
standard_deviation;
(void) GetImageMean(image,&mean,&standard_deviation,exception);
(void) FormatLocaleString(statistic,MagickPathExtent,"%g",
standard_deviation);
}
if (channel_mask != UndefinedChannel)
(void) SetPixelChannelMask(image,channel_mask);
(void) AddValueToSplayTree(fx_info->symbols,ConstantString(key),
ConstantString(statistic));
return(QuantumScale*StringToDouble(statistic,(char **) NULL));
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/296
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 73,114 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType ReadRectangle(Image *image,PICTRectangle *rectangle)
{
rectangle->top=(short) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
rectangle->left=(short) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
rectangle->bottom=(short) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
rectangle->right=(short) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
if ((rectangle->left > rectangle->right) ||
(rectangle->top > rectangle->bottom))
return(MagickFalse);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 71,641 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SetCursiveFontFamilyWrapper(WebSettings* settings,
const base::string16& font,
UScriptCode script) {
settings->SetCursiveFontFamily(WebString::FromUTF16(font), script);
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 145,169 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sp<Camera3Device::CaptureRequest> Camera3Device::createCaptureRequest(
const CameraMetadata &request) {
ATRACE_CALL();
status_t res;
sp<CaptureRequest> newRequest = new CaptureRequest;
newRequest->mSettings = request;
camera_metadata_entry_t inputStreams =
newRequest->mSettings.find(ANDROID_REQUEST_INPUT_STREAMS);
if (inputStreams.count > 0) {
if (mInputStream == NULL ||
mInputStream->getId() != inputStreams.data.i32[0]) {
CLOGE("Request references unknown input stream %d",
inputStreams.data.u8[0]);
return NULL;
}
if (mInputStream->isConfiguring()) {
res = mInputStream->finishConfiguration(mHal3Device);
if (res != OK) {
SET_ERR_L("Unable to finish configuring input stream %d:"
" %s (%d)",
mInputStream->getId(), strerror(-res), res);
return NULL;
}
}
if (mInputStream->isPreparing()) {
CLOGE("Request references an input stream that's being prepared!");
return NULL;
}
newRequest->mInputStream = mInputStream;
newRequest->mSettings.erase(ANDROID_REQUEST_INPUT_STREAMS);
}
camera_metadata_entry_t streams =
newRequest->mSettings.find(ANDROID_REQUEST_OUTPUT_STREAMS);
if (streams.count == 0) {
CLOGE("Zero output streams specified!");
return NULL;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < streams.count; i++) {
int idx = mOutputStreams.indexOfKey(streams.data.i32[i]);
if (idx == NAME_NOT_FOUND) {
CLOGE("Request references unknown stream %d",
streams.data.u8[i]);
return NULL;
}
sp<Camera3OutputStreamInterface> stream =
mOutputStreams.editValueAt(idx);
if (stream->isConfiguring()) {
res = stream->finishConfiguration(mHal3Device);
if (res != OK) {
SET_ERR_L("Unable to finish configuring stream %d: %s (%d)",
stream->getId(), strerror(-res), res);
return NULL;
}
}
if (stream->isPreparing()) {
CLOGE("Request references an output stream that's being prepared!");
return NULL;
}
newRequest->mOutputStreams.push(stream);
}
newRequest->mSettings.erase(ANDROID_REQUEST_OUTPUT_STREAMS);
newRequest->mBatchSize = 1;
return newRequest;
}
Commit Message: Camera3Device: Validate template ID
Validate template ID before creating a default request.
Bug: 26866110
Bug: 27568958
Change-Id: Ifda457024f1d5c2b1382f189c1a8d5fda852d30d
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 161,035 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t ib_uverbs_event_read(struct ib_uverbs_event_queue *ev_queue,
struct ib_uverbs_file *uverbs_file,
struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *pos,
size_t eventsz)
{
struct ib_uverbs_event *event;
int ret = 0;
spin_lock_irq(&ev_queue->lock);
while (list_empty(&ev_queue->event_list)) {
spin_unlock_irq(&ev_queue->lock);
if (filp->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK)
return -EAGAIN;
if (wait_event_interruptible(ev_queue->poll_wait,
(!list_empty(&ev_queue->event_list) ||
/* The barriers built into wait_event_interruptible()
* and wake_up() guarentee this will see the null set
* without using RCU
*/
!uverbs_file->device->ib_dev)))
return -ERESTARTSYS;
/* If device was disassociated and no event exists set an error */
if (list_empty(&ev_queue->event_list) &&
!uverbs_file->device->ib_dev)
return -EIO;
spin_lock_irq(&ev_queue->lock);
}
event = list_entry(ev_queue->event_list.next, struct ib_uverbs_event, list);
if (eventsz > count) {
ret = -EINVAL;
event = NULL;
} else {
list_del(ev_queue->event_list.next);
if (event->counter) {
++(*event->counter);
list_del(&event->obj_list);
}
}
spin_unlock_irq(&ev_queue->lock);
if (event) {
if (copy_to_user(buf, event, eventsz))
ret = -EFAULT;
else
ret = eventsz;
}
kfree(event);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: coredump: fix race condition between mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and core dumping
The core dumping code has always run without holding the mmap_sem for
writing, despite that is the only way to ensure that the entire vma
layout will not change from under it. Only using some signal
serialization on the processes belonging to the mm is not nearly enough.
This was pointed out earlier. For example in Hugh's post from Jul 2017:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1707191716030.2055@eggly.anvils
"Not strictly relevant here, but a related note: I was very surprised
to discover, only quite recently, how handle_mm_fault() may be called
without down_read(mmap_sem) - when core dumping. That seems a
misguided optimization to me, which would also be nice to correct"
In particular because the growsdown and growsup can move the
vm_start/vm_end the various loops the core dump does around the vma will
not be consistent if page faults can happen concurrently.
Pretty much all users calling mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and then
taking the mmap_sem had the potential to introduce unexpected side
effects in the core dumping code.
Adding mmap_sem for writing around the ->core_dump invocation is a
viable long term fix, but it requires removing all copy user and page
faults and to replace them with get_dump_page() for all binary formats
which is not suitable as a short term fix.
For the time being this solution manually covers the places that can
confuse the core dump either by altering the vma layout or the vma flags
while it runs. Once ->core_dump runs under mmap_sem for writing the
function mmget_still_valid() can be dropped.
Allowing mmap_sem protected sections to run in parallel with the
coredump provides some minor parallelism advantage to the swapoff code
(which seems to be safe enough by never mangling any vma field and can
keep doing swapins in parallel to the core dumping) and to some other
corner case.
In order to facilitate the backporting I added "Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6"
however the side effect of this same race condition in /proc/pid/mem
should be reproducible since before 2.6.12-rc2 so I couldn't add any
other "Fixes:" because there's no hash beyond the git genesis commit.
Because find_extend_vma() is the only location outside of the process
context that could modify the "mm" structures under mmap_sem for
reading, by adding the mmget_still_valid() check to it, all other cases
that take the mmap_sem for reading don't need the new check after
mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm(). The expand_stack() in page fault
context also doesn't need the new check, because all tasks under core
dumping are frozen.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325224949.11068-1-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 90,456 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CompareCharArraysWithHexError(
const string& description,
const char* actual,
const int actual_len,
const char* expected,
const int expected_len) {
const int min_len = min(actual_len, expected_len);
const int max_len = max(actual_len, expected_len);
scoped_array<bool> marks(new bool[max_len]);
bool identical = (actual_len == expected_len);
for (int i = 0; i < min_len; ++i) {
if (actual[i] != expected[i]) {
marks[i] = true;
identical = false;
} else {
marks[i] = false;
}
}
for (int i = min_len; i < max_len; ++i) {
marks[i] = true;
}
if (identical) return;
ADD_FAILURE()
<< "Description:\n"
<< description
<< "\n\nExpected:\n"
<< HexDumpWithMarks(expected, expected_len, marks.get(), max_len)
<< "\nActual:\n"
<< HexDumpWithMarks(actual, actual_len, marks.get(), max_len);
}
Commit Message: Add QuicStream and friends to QUIC code.
Fix bug in tests that caused failures.
Revert 165859
First Landed as 165858
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11367082
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@165864 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 117,480 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderViewTest::GoForward(const PageState& state) {
GoToOffset(1, state);
}
Commit Message: Connect WebUSB client interface to the devices app
This provides a basic WebUSB client interface in
content/renderer. Most of the interface is unimplemented,
but this CL hooks up navigator.usb.getDevices() to the
browser's Mojo devices app to enumerate available USB
devices.
BUG=492204
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1293253002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344881}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 123,076 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: vrrp_smtp_handler(__attribute__((unused)) vector_t *strvec)
{
vrrp_t *vrrp = LIST_TAIL_DATA(vrrp_data->vrrp);
int res = true;
if (vector_size(strvec) >= 2) {
res = check_true_false(strvec_slot(strvec, 1));
if (res == -1) {
report_config_error(CONFIG_GENERAL_ERROR, "Invalid vrrp_instance smtp_alert parameter %s", FMT_STR_VSLOT(strvec, 1));
return;
}
}
vrrp->smtp_alert = res;
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 76,033 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int regulator_unregister_notifier(struct regulator *regulator,
struct notifier_block *nb)
{
return blocking_notifier_chain_unregister(®ulator->rdev->notifier,
nb);
}
Commit Message: regulator: core: Fix regualtor_ena_gpio_free not to access pin after freeing
After freeing pin from regulator_ena_gpio_free, loop can access
the pin. So this patch fixes not to access pin after freeing.
Signed-off-by: Seung-Woo Kim <sw0312.kim@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 74,560 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AutocompleteMatch HistoryQuickProvider::QuickMatchToACMatch(
const ScoredHistoryMatch& history_match,
int score) {
const history::URLRow& info = history_match.url_info;
AutocompleteMatch match(this, score, !!info.visit_count(),
history_match.url_matches.empty() ?
AutocompleteMatch::HISTORY_URL : AutocompleteMatch::HISTORY_TITLE);
match.destination_url = info.url();
DCHECK(match.destination_url.is_valid());
std::vector<size_t> offsets =
OffsetsFromTermMatches(history_match.url_matches);
const net::FormatUrlTypes format_types = net::kFormatUrlOmitAll &
~(!history_match.match_in_scheme ? 0 : net::kFormatUrlOmitHTTP);
match.fill_into_edit =
AutocompleteInput::FormattedStringWithEquivalentMeaning(info.url(),
net::FormatUrlWithOffsets(info.url(), languages_, format_types,
net::UnescapeRule::SPACES, NULL, NULL, &offsets));
history::TermMatches new_matches =
ReplaceOffsetsInTermMatches(history_match.url_matches, offsets);
match.contents = net::FormatUrl(info.url(), languages_, format_types,
net::UnescapeRule::SPACES, NULL, NULL, NULL);
match.contents_class =
SpansFromTermMatch(new_matches, match.contents.length(), true);
if (!history_match.can_inline) {
match.inline_autocomplete_offset = string16::npos;
} else {
DCHECK(!new_matches.empty());
match.inline_autocomplete_offset = new_matches[0].offset +
new_matches[0].length;
if (match.inline_autocomplete_offset > match.fill_into_edit.length())
match.inline_autocomplete_offset = match.fill_into_edit.length();
}
match.description = info.title();
match.description_class = SpansFromTermMatch(
history_match.title_matches, match.description.length(), false);
return match;
}
Commit Message: Fix icon returned for HQP matches; the two icons were reversed.
BUG=none
TEST=none
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9695022
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126296 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 1 | 170,999 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: long long jsvGetLongIntegerAndUnLock(JsVar *v) {
long long i = jsvGetLongInteger(v);
jsvUnLock(v);
return i;
}
Commit Message: fix jsvGetString regression
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 82,432 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gfx::Image CreateBitmap(SkColor color) {
SkBitmap thumbnail;
thumbnail.allocN32Pixels(4, 4);
thumbnail.eraseColor(color);
return gfx::Image::CreateFrom1xBitmap(thumbnail); // adds ref.
}
Commit Message: TopSites: Clear thumbnails from the cache when their URLs get removed
We already cleared the thumbnails from persistent storage, but they
remained in the in-memory cache, so they remained accessible (until the
next Chrome restart) even after all browsing data was cleared.
Bug: 758169
Change-Id: Id916d22358430a82e6d5043ac04fa463a32f824f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758640
Commit-Queue: Marc Treib <treib@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sylvain Defresne <sdefresne@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#514861}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 147,109 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CreateContextProviderOnWorkerThread(
Platform::ContextAttributes context_attributes,
Platform::GraphicsInfo* gl_info,
bool* using_gpu_compositing,
const KURL& url) {
WaitableEvent waitable_event;
ContextProviderCreationInfo creation_info;
creation_info.context_attributes = context_attributes;
creation_info.gl_info = gl_info;
creation_info.url = url.Copy();
creation_info.using_gpu_compositing = using_gpu_compositing;
scoped_refptr<WebTaskRunner> task_runner =
Platform::Current()->MainThread()->GetWebTaskRunner();
task_runner->PostTask(
BLINK_FROM_HERE, CrossThreadBind(&CreateContextProviderOnMainThread,
CrossThreadUnretained(&creation_info),
CrossThreadUnretained(&waitable_event)));
waitable_event.Wait();
return std::move(creation_info.created_context_provider);
}
Commit Message: Tighten about IntRect use in WebGL with overflow detection
BUG=784183
TEST=test case in the bug in ASAN build
R=kbr@chromium.org
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ie25ca328af99de7828e28e6a6e3d775f1bebc43f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/811826
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522213}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 146,480 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void fdctrl_handle_recalibrate(FDCtrl *fdctrl, int direction)
{
FDrive *cur_drv;
SET_CUR_DRV(fdctrl, fdctrl->fifo[1] & FD_DOR_SELMASK);
cur_drv = get_cur_drv(fdctrl);
fd_recalibrate(cur_drv);
fdctrl_reset_fifo(fdctrl);
/* Raise Interrupt */
fdctrl->status0 |= FD_SR0_SEEK;
fdctrl_raise_irq(fdctrl);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 3,316 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int crypto_fpu_decrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc_in,
struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
unsigned int nbytes)
{
int err;
struct crypto_fpu_ctx *ctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc_in->tfm);
struct crypto_blkcipher *child = ctx->child;
struct blkcipher_desc desc = {
.tfm = child,
.info = desc_in->info,
.flags = desc_in->flags & ~CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
};
kernel_fpu_begin();
err = crypto_blkcipher_crt(desc.tfm)->decrypt(&desc, dst, src, nbytes);
kernel_fpu_end();
return err;
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 45,458 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void color_sycc_to_rgb(opj_image_t *img)
{
if (img->numcomps < 3) {
img->color_space = OPJ_CLRSPC_GRAY;
return;
}
if ((img->comps[0].dx == 1)
&& (img->comps[1].dx == 2)
&& (img->comps[2].dx == 2)
&& (img->comps[0].dy == 1)
&& (img->comps[1].dy == 2)
&& (img->comps[2].dy == 2)) { /* horizontal and vertical sub-sample */
sycc420_to_rgb(img);
} else if ((img->comps[0].dx == 1)
&& (img->comps[1].dx == 2)
&& (img->comps[2].dx == 2)
&& (img->comps[0].dy == 1)
&& (img->comps[1].dy == 1)
&& (img->comps[2].dy == 1)) { /* horizontal sub-sample only */
sycc422_to_rgb(img);
} else if ((img->comps[0].dx == 1)
&& (img->comps[1].dx == 1)
&& (img->comps[2].dx == 1)
&& (img->comps[0].dy == 1)
&& (img->comps[1].dy == 1)
&& (img->comps[2].dy == 1)) { /* no sub-sample */
sycc444_to_rgb(img);
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d:color_sycc_to_rgb\n\tCAN NOT CONVERT\n", __FILE__,
__LINE__);
return;
}
}/* color_sycc_to_rgb() */
Commit Message: color_apply_icc_profile: avoid potential heap buffer overflow
Derived from a patch by Thuan Pham
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 91,908 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void profile_graph_return(struct ftrace_graph_ret *trace)
{
struct ftrace_profile_stat *stat;
unsigned long long calltime;
struct ftrace_profile *rec;
unsigned long flags;
local_irq_save(flags);
stat = &__get_cpu_var(ftrace_profile_stats);
if (!stat->hash || !ftrace_profile_enabled)
goto out;
/* If the calltime was zero'd ignore it */
if (!trace->calltime)
goto out;
calltime = trace->rettime - trace->calltime;
if (!(trace_flags & TRACE_ITER_GRAPH_TIME)) {
int index;
index = trace->depth;
/* Append this call time to the parent time to subtract */
if (index)
current->ret_stack[index - 1].subtime += calltime;
if (current->ret_stack[index].subtime < calltime)
calltime -= current->ret_stack[index].subtime;
else
calltime = 0;
}
rec = ftrace_find_profiled_func(stat, trace->func);
if (rec) {
rec->time += calltime;
rec->time_squared += calltime * calltime;
}
out:
local_irq_restore(flags);
}
Commit Message: tracing: Fix possible NULL pointer dereferences
Currently set_ftrace_pid and set_graph_function files use seq_lseek
for their fops. However seq_open() is called only for FMODE_READ in
the fops->open() so that if an user tries to seek one of those file
when she open it for writing, it sees NULL seq_file and then panic.
It can be easily reproduced with following command:
$ cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
$ echo 1234 | sudo tee -a set_ftrace_pid
In this example, GNU coreutils' tee opens the file with fopen(, "a")
and then the fopen() internally calls lseek().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365663302-2170-1-git-send-email-namhyung@kernel.org
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung.kim@lge.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 30,258 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err gf_import_timed_text(GF_MediaImporter *import)
{
GF_Err e;
u32 fmt;
e = gf_text_guess_format(import->in_name, &fmt);
if (e) return e;
if (import->streamFormat) {
if (!strcmp(import->streamFormat, "VTT")) fmt = GF_TEXT_IMPORT_WEBVTT;
else if (!strcmp(import->streamFormat, "TTML")) fmt = GF_TEXT_IMPORT_TTML;
if ((strstr(import->in_name, ".swf") || strstr(import->in_name, ".SWF")) && !stricmp(import->streamFormat, "SVG")) fmt = GF_TEXT_IMPORT_SWF_SVG;
}
if (!fmt) {
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_WARNING, GF_LOG_PARSER, ("[TTXT Import] Input %s does not look like a supported text format - ignoring\n", import->in_name));
return GF_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
if (import->flags & GF_IMPORT_PROBE_ONLY) {
if (fmt==GF_TEXT_IMPORT_SUB) import->flags |= GF_IMPORT_OVERRIDE_FPS;
return GF_OK;
}
switch (fmt) {
case GF_TEXT_IMPORT_SRT:
return gf_text_import_srt(import);
case GF_TEXT_IMPORT_SUB:
return gf_text_import_sub(import);
case GF_TEXT_IMPORT_TTXT:
return gf_text_import_ttxt(import);
case GF_TEXT_IMPORT_TEXML:
return gf_text_import_texml(import);
#ifndef GPAC_DISABLE_VTT
case GF_TEXT_IMPORT_WEBVTT:
return gf_text_import_webvtt(import);
#endif
case GF_TEXT_IMPORT_SWF_SVG:
return gf_text_import_swf(import);
case GF_TEXT_IMPORT_TTML:
return gf_text_import_ttml(import);
default:
return GF_BAD_PARAM;
}
}
Commit Message: add some boundary checks on gf_text_get_utf8_line (#1188)
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 92,833 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int blkcipher_walk_next(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
struct blkcipher_walk *walk)
{
struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm = desc->tfm;
unsigned int alignmask = crypto_blkcipher_alignmask(tfm);
unsigned int bsize;
unsigned int n;
int err;
n = walk->total;
if (unlikely(n < crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(tfm))) {
desc->flags |= CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_BLOCK_LEN;
return blkcipher_walk_done(desc, walk, -EINVAL);
}
walk->flags &= ~(BLKCIPHER_WALK_SLOW | BLKCIPHER_WALK_COPY |
BLKCIPHER_WALK_DIFF);
if (!scatterwalk_aligned(&walk->in, alignmask) ||
!scatterwalk_aligned(&walk->out, alignmask)) {
walk->flags |= BLKCIPHER_WALK_COPY;
if (!walk->page) {
walk->page = (void *)__get_free_page(GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!walk->page)
n = 0;
}
}
bsize = min(walk->blocksize, n);
n = scatterwalk_clamp(&walk->in, n);
n = scatterwalk_clamp(&walk->out, n);
if (unlikely(n < bsize)) {
err = blkcipher_next_slow(desc, walk, bsize, alignmask);
goto set_phys_lowmem;
}
walk->nbytes = n;
if (walk->flags & BLKCIPHER_WALK_COPY) {
err = blkcipher_next_copy(walk);
goto set_phys_lowmem;
}
return blkcipher_next_fast(desc, walk);
set_phys_lowmem:
if (walk->flags & BLKCIPHER_WALK_PHYS) {
walk->src.phys.page = virt_to_page(walk->src.virt.addr);
walk->dst.phys.page = virt_to_page(walk->dst.virt.addr);
walk->src.phys.offset &= PAGE_SIZE - 1;
walk->dst.phys.offset &= PAGE_SIZE - 1;
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 31,282 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: XineramaCreateGC(GCPtr pGC)
{
ScreenPtr pScreen = pGC->pScreen;
PanoramiXScreenPtr pScreenPriv = (PanoramiXScreenPtr)
dixLookupPrivate(&pScreen->devPrivates, PanoramiXScreenKey);
Bool ret;
pScreen->CreateGC = pScreenPriv->CreateGC;
if ((ret = (*pScreen->CreateGC) (pGC))) {
PanoramiXGCPtr pGCPriv = (PanoramiXGCPtr)
dixLookupPrivate(&pGC->devPrivates, PanoramiXGCKey);
pGCPriv->wrapFuncs = pGC->funcs;
pGC->funcs = &XineramaGCFuncs;
pGCPriv->clipOrg.x = pGC->clipOrg.x;
pGCPriv->clipOrg.y = pGC->clipOrg.y;
pGCPriv->patOrg.x = pGC->patOrg.x;
pGCPriv->patOrg.y = pGC->patOrg.y;
}
pScreen->CreateGC = XineramaCreateGC;
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,387 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: JsVar *jspNewBuiltin(const char *instanceOf) {
JsVar *objFunc = jswFindBuiltInFunction(0, instanceOf);
if (!objFunc) return 0; // out of memory
return objFunc;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug if using an undefined member of an object for for..in (fix #1437)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 82,304 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ssize_t nbd_wr_syncv(QIOChannel *ioc,
struct iovec *iov,
size_t niov,
size_t length,
bool do_read)
{
ssize_t done = 0;
Error *local_err = NULL;
struct iovec *local_iov = g_new(struct iovec, niov);
struct iovec *local_iov_head = local_iov;
unsigned int nlocal_iov = niov;
nlocal_iov = iov_copy(local_iov, nlocal_iov, iov, niov, 0, length);
while (nlocal_iov > 0) {
ssize_t len;
if (do_read) {
len = qio_channel_readv(ioc, local_iov, nlocal_iov, &local_err);
} else {
len = qio_channel_writev(ioc, local_iov, nlocal_iov, &local_err);
}
if (len == QIO_CHANNEL_ERR_BLOCK) {
if (qemu_in_coroutine()) {
/* XXX figure out if we can create a variant on
* qio_channel_yield() that works with AIO contexts
* and consider using that in this branch */
qemu_coroutine_yield();
} else if (done) {
/* XXX this is needed by nbd_reply_ready. */
qio_channel_wait(ioc,
do_read ? G_IO_IN : G_IO_OUT);
} else {
return -EAGAIN;
}
} else if (done) {
/* XXX this is needed by nbd_reply_ready. */
qio_channel_wait(ioc,
do_read ? G_IO_IN : G_IO_OUT);
} else {
return -EAGAIN;
}
continue;
}
if (len < 0) {
TRACE("I/O error: %s", error_get_pretty(local_err));
error_free(local_err);
/* XXX handle Error objects */
done = -EIO;
goto cleanup;
}
if (do_read && len == 0) {
break;
}
iov_discard_front(&local_iov, &nlocal_iov, len);
done += len;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 165,451 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cmsBool CMSEXPORT cmsIT8SetDataDbl(cmsHANDLE hIT8, const char* cPatch,
const char* cSample,
cmsFloat64Number Val)
{
cmsIT8* it8 = (cmsIT8*) hIT8;
char Buff[256];
_cmsAssert(hIT8 != NULL);
snprintf(Buff, 255, it8->DoubleFormatter, Val);
return cmsIT8SetData(hIT8, cPatch, cSample, Buff);
}
Commit Message: Upgrade Visual studio 2017 15.8
- Upgrade to 15.8
- Add check on CGATS memory allocation (thanks to Quang Nguyen for
pointing out this)
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 78,078 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: stack_extend(mrb_state *mrb, int room)
{
if (mrb->c->stack + room >= mrb->c->stend) {
stack_extend_alloc(mrb, room);
}
}
Commit Message: Check length of env stack before accessing upvar; fix #3995
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 83,195 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PreconnectManager::OnPreresolveFinished(PreresolveJobId job_id,
bool success) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(content::BrowserThread::UI);
PreresolveJob* job = preresolve_jobs_.Lookup(job_id);
DCHECK(job);
if (observer_)
observer_->OnPreresolveFinished(job->url, success);
job->resolve_host_client = nullptr;
FinishPreresolveJob(job_id, success);
}
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 136,920 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Part::updateActions()
{
bool isWritable = m_model->archive() && !m_model->archive()->isReadOnly();
const Archive::Entry *entry = m_model->entryForIndex(m_view->selectionModel()->currentIndex());
int selectedEntriesCount = m_view->selectionModel()->selectedRows().count();
const bool isEncryptedButUnknownPassword = m_model->archive() &&
m_model->archive()->encryptionType() != Archive::Unencrypted &&
m_model->archive()->password().isEmpty();
if (isEncryptedButUnknownPassword) {
m_addFilesAction->setToolTip(xi18nc("@info:tooltip",
"Adding files to existing password-protected archives with no header-encryption is currently not supported."
"<nl/><nl/>Extract the files and create a new archive if you want to add files."));
m_testArchiveAction->setToolTip(xi18nc("@info:tooltip",
"Testing password-protected archives with no header-encryption is currently not supported."));
} else {
m_addFilesAction->setToolTip(i18nc("@info:tooltip", "Click to add files to the archive"));
m_testArchiveAction->setToolTip(i18nc("@info:tooltip", "Click to test the archive for integrity"));
}
const int maxPreviewSize = ArkSettings::previewFileSizeLimit() * 1024 * 1024;
const bool limit = ArkSettings::limitPreviewFileSize();
bool isPreviewable = (!limit || (limit && entry != Q_NULLPTR && entry->property("size").toLongLong() < maxPreviewSize));
const bool isDir = (entry == Q_NULLPTR) ? false : entry->isDir();
m_previewAction->setEnabled(!isBusy() &&
isPreviewable &&
!isDir &&
(selectedEntriesCount == 1));
m_extractArchiveAction->setEnabled(!isBusy() &&
(m_model->rowCount() > 0));
m_extractAction->setEnabled(!isBusy() &&
(m_model->rowCount() > 0));
m_saveAsAction->setEnabled(!isBusy() &&
m_model->rowCount() > 0);
m_addFilesAction->setEnabled(!isBusy() &&
isWritable &&
!isEncryptedButUnknownPassword);
m_deleteFilesAction->setEnabled(!isBusy() &&
isWritable &&
(selectedEntriesCount > 0));
m_openFileAction->setEnabled(!isBusy() &&
isPreviewable &&
!isDir &&
(selectedEntriesCount == 1));
m_openFileWithAction->setEnabled(!isBusy() &&
isPreviewable &&
!isDir &&
(selectedEntriesCount == 1));
m_propertiesAction->setEnabled(!isBusy() &&
m_model->archive());
m_renameFileAction->setEnabled(!isBusy() &&
isWritable &&
(selectedEntriesCount == 1));
m_cutFilesAction->setEnabled(!isBusy() &&
isWritable &&
(selectedEntriesCount > 0));
m_copyFilesAction->setEnabled(!isBusy() &&
isWritable &&
(selectedEntriesCount > 0));
m_pasteFilesAction->setEnabled(!isBusy() &&
isWritable &&
(selectedEntriesCount == 0 || (selectedEntriesCount == 1 && isDir)) &&
(m_model->filesToMove.count() > 0 || m_model->filesToCopy.count() > 0));
m_commentView->setEnabled(!isBusy());
m_commentMsgWidget->setEnabled(!isBusy());
m_editCommentAction->setEnabled(false);
m_testArchiveAction->setEnabled(false);
if (m_model->archive()) {
const KPluginMetaData metadata = PluginManager().preferredPluginFor(m_model->archive()->mimeType())->metaData();
bool supportsWriteComment = ArchiveFormat::fromMetadata(m_model->archive()->mimeType(), metadata).supportsWriteComment();
m_editCommentAction->setEnabled(!isBusy() &&
supportsWriteComment);
m_commentView->setReadOnly(!supportsWriteComment);
m_editCommentAction->setText(m_model->archive()->hasComment() ? i18nc("@action:inmenu mutually exclusive with Add &Comment", "Edit &Comment") :
i18nc("@action:inmenu mutually exclusive with Edit &Comment", "Add &Comment"));
bool supportsTesting = ArchiveFormat::fromMetadata(m_model->archive()->mimeType(), metadata).supportsTesting();
m_testArchiveAction->setEnabled(!isBusy() &&
supportsTesting &&
!isEncryptedButUnknownPassword);
} else {
m_commentView->setReadOnly(true);
m_editCommentAction->setText(i18nc("@action:inmenu mutually exclusive with Edit &Comment", "Add &Comment"));
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-78 | 0 | 9,948 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ContainerNode::disconnectDescendantFrames()
{
ChildFrameDisconnector(this).disconnect();
}
Commit Message: https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=93587
Node::replaceChild() can create bad DOM topology with MutationEvent, Part 2
Reviewed by Kent Tamura.
Source/WebCore:
This is a followup of r124156. replaceChild() has yet another hidden
MutationEvent trigger. This change added a guard for it.
Test: fast/events/mutation-during-replace-child-2.html
* dom/ContainerNode.cpp:
(WebCore::ContainerNode::replaceChild):
LayoutTests:
* fast/events/mutation-during-replace-child-2-expected.txt: Added.
* fast/events/mutation-during-replace-child-2.html: Added.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@125237 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 98,688 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ahci_populate_sglist(AHCIDevice *ad, QEMUSGList *sglist, int offset)
{
AHCICmdHdr *cmd = ad->cur_cmd;
uint32_t opts = le32_to_cpu(cmd->opts);
uint64_t prdt_addr = le64_to_cpu(cmd->tbl_addr) + 0x80;
int sglist_alloc_hint = opts >> AHCI_CMD_HDR_PRDT_LEN;
dma_addr_t prdt_len = (sglist_alloc_hint * sizeof(AHCI_SG));
dma_addr_t real_prdt_len = prdt_len;
uint8_t *prdt;
int i;
int r = 0;
int sum = 0;
int off_idx = -1;
int off_pos = -1;
int tbl_entry_size;
IDEBus *bus = &ad->port;
BusState *qbus = BUS(bus);
if (!sglist_alloc_hint) {
DPRINTF(ad->port_no, "no sg list given by guest: 0x%08x\n", opts);
return -1;
}
/* map PRDT */
if (!(prdt = dma_memory_map(ad->hba->as, prdt_addr, &prdt_len,
DMA_DIRECTION_TO_DEVICE))){
DPRINTF(ad->port_no, "map failed\n");
return -1;
}
if (prdt_len < real_prdt_len) {
DPRINTF(ad->port_no, "mapped less than expected\n");
r = -1;
goto out;
}
/* Get entries in the PRDT, init a qemu sglist accordingly */
if (sglist_alloc_hint > 0) {
AHCI_SG *tbl = (AHCI_SG *)prdt;
sum = 0;
for (i = 0; i < sglist_alloc_hint; i++) {
/* flags_size is zero-based */
tbl_entry_size = (le32_to_cpu(tbl[i].flags_size) + 1);
if (offset <= (sum + tbl_entry_size)) {
off_idx = i;
off_pos = offset - sum;
break;
}
sum += tbl_entry_size;
}
if ((off_idx == -1) || (off_pos < 0) || (off_pos > tbl_entry_size)) {
DPRINTF(ad->port_no, "%s: Incorrect offset! "
"off_idx: %d, off_pos: %d\n",
__func__, off_idx, off_pos);
r = -1;
goto out;
}
qemu_sglist_init(sglist, qbus->parent, (sglist_alloc_hint - off_idx),
ad->hba->as);
qemu_sglist_add(sglist, le64_to_cpu(tbl[off_idx].addr + off_pos),
le32_to_cpu(tbl[off_idx].flags_size) + 1 - off_pos);
for (i = off_idx + 1; i < sglist_alloc_hint; i++) {
/* flags_size is zero-based */
qemu_sglist_add(sglist, le64_to_cpu(tbl[i].addr),
le32_to_cpu(tbl[i].flags_size) + 1);
}
}
out:
dma_memory_unmap(ad->hba->as, prdt, prdt_len,
DMA_DIRECTION_TO_DEVICE, prdt_len);
return r;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 15,771 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void queue_put(struct queue *queue, void *data)
{
int nextp;
pthread_mutex_lock(&queue->mutex);
while((nextp = (queue->writep + 1) % queue->size) == queue->readp)
pthread_cond_wait(&queue->full, &queue->mutex);
queue->data[queue->writep] = data;
queue->writep = nextp;
pthread_cond_signal(&queue->empty);
pthread_mutex_unlock(&queue->mutex);
}
Commit Message: unsquashfs-4: Add more sanity checks + fix CVE-2015-4645/6
Add more filesystem table sanity checks to Unsquashfs-4 and
also properly fix CVE-2015-4645 and CVE-2015-4646.
The CVEs were raised due to Unsquashfs having variable
oveflow and stack overflow in a number of vulnerable
functions.
The suggested patch only "fixed" one such function and fixed
it badly, and so it was buggy and introduced extra bugs!
The suggested patch was not only buggy, but, it used the
essentially wrong approach too. It was "fixing" the
symptom but not the cause. The symptom is wrong values
causing overflow, the cause is filesystem corruption.
This corruption should be detected and the filesystem
rejected *before* trying to allocate memory.
This patch applies the following fixes:
1. The filesystem super-block tables are checked, and the values
must match across the filesystem.
This will trap corrupted filesystems created by Mksquashfs.
2. The maximum (theorectical) size the filesystem tables could grow
to, were analysed, and some variables were increased from int to
long long.
This analysis has been added as comments.
3. Stack allocation was removed, and a shared buffer (which is
checked and increased as necessary) is used to read the
table indexes.
Signed-off-by: Phillip Lougher <phillip@squashfs.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 74,294 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(openssl_sign)
{
zval *key, *signature;
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
unsigned int siglen;
zend_string *sigbuf;
zend_resource *keyresource = NULL;
char * data;
size_t data_len;
EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx;
zval *method = NULL;
zend_long signature_algo = OPENSSL_ALGO_SHA1;
const EVP_MD *mdtype;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "sz/z|z", &data, &data_len, &signature, &key, &method) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
pkey = php_openssl_evp_from_zval(key, 0, "", 0, 0, &keyresource);
if (pkey == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "supplied key param cannot be coerced into a private key");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (method == NULL || Z_TYPE_P(method) == IS_LONG) {
if (method != NULL) {
signature_algo = Z_LVAL_P(method);
}
mdtype = php_openssl_get_evp_md_from_algo(signature_algo);
} else if (Z_TYPE_P(method) == IS_STRING) {
mdtype = EVP_get_digestbyname(Z_STRVAL_P(method));
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Unknown signature algorithm.");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (!mdtype) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Unknown signature algorithm.");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
sigbuf = zend_string_alloc(siglen, 0);
md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
if (md_ctx != NULL &&
EVP_SignInit(md_ctx, mdtype) &&
EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, data, data_len) &&
EVP_SignFinal(md_ctx, (unsigned char*)ZSTR_VAL(sigbuf), &siglen, pkey)) {
zval_dtor(signature);
ZSTR_VAL(sigbuf)[siglen] = '\0';
ZSTR_LEN(sigbuf) = siglen;
ZVAL_NEW_STR(signature, sigbuf);
RETVAL_TRUE;
} else {
php_openssl_store_errors();
efree(sigbuf);
RETVAL_FALSE;
}
EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(md_ctx);
if (keyresource == NULL) {
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-754 | 0 | 4,607 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int jas_getdbglevel()
{
return jas_dbglevel;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 72,671 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoReadPixelsAsync(
GLint x,
GLint y,
GLsizei width,
GLsizei height,
GLenum format,
GLenum type,
GLsizei bufsize,
GLsizei* length,
GLsizei* columns,
GLsizei* rows,
uint32_t pixels_shm_id,
uint32_t pixels_shm_offset,
uint32_t result_shm_id,
uint32_t result_shm_offset) {
DCHECK(feature_info_->feature_flags().use_async_readpixels &&
bound_buffers_[GL_PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER] == 0);
CheckErrorCallbackState();
ScopedPackStateRowLengthReset reset_row_length(
api(), bufsize != 0 && feature_info_->gl_version_info().is_es3);
PendingReadPixels pending_read_pixels;
pending_read_pixels.pixels_shm_id = pixels_shm_id;
pending_read_pixels.pixels_shm_offset = pixels_shm_offset;
pending_read_pixels.result_shm_id = result_shm_id;
pending_read_pixels.result_shm_offset = result_shm_offset;
api()->glGenBuffersARBFn(1, &pending_read_pixels.buffer_service_id);
api()->glBindBufferFn(GL_PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER_ARB,
pending_read_pixels.buffer_service_id);
const GLenum usage_hint = feature_info_->gl_version_info().IsAtLeastGLES(3, 0)
? GL_STREAM_READ
: GL_STATIC_DRAW;
const uint32_t bytes_per_pixel =
GLES2Util::ComputeImageGroupSize(format, type);
if (bytes_per_pixel == 0) {
InsertError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "Invalid ReadPixels format or type.");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (width < 0 || height < 0) {
InsertError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "Width and height cannot be negative.");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (!base::CheckMul(bytes_per_pixel, width, height)
.AssignIfValid(&pending_read_pixels.pixels_size)) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
api()->glBufferDataFn(GL_PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER_ARB,
pending_read_pixels.pixels_size, nullptr, usage_hint);
api()->glReadPixelsFn(x, y, width, height, format, type, nullptr);
api()->glBindBufferFn(GL_PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER_ARB, 0);
if (CheckErrorCallbackState()) {
return error::kNoError;
}
pending_read_pixels.fence = gl::GLFence::Create();
if (CheckErrorCallbackState()) {
return error::kNoError;
}
pending_read_pixels_.push_back(std::move(pending_read_pixels));
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 142,079 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::OpenClearBrowsingDataDialogWindow(Profile* profile) {
Browser* browser = Browser::Create(profile);
browser->OpenClearBrowsingDataDialog();
browser->window()->Show();
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 97,292 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DocumentLoader::startDataLoadTimer()
{
m_dataLoadTimer.startOneShot(0);
#if HAVE(RUNLOOP_TIMER)
if (SchedulePairHashSet* scheduledPairs = m_frame->page()->scheduledRunLoopPairs())
m_dataLoadTimer.schedule(*scheduledPairs);
#endif
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 105,756 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _render_state_rescale( RenderState state )
{
if ( state->need_rescale && state->size )
{
FT_Set_Char_Size( state->face, 0,
(FT_F26Dot6)( state->char_size * 64.0 ),
0, state->resolution );
state->need_rescale = 0;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 9,984 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void __init udp_init(void)
{
unsigned long nr_pages, limit;
udp_table_init(&udp_table, "UDP");
/* Set the pressure threshold up by the same strategy of TCP. It is a
* fraction of global memory that is up to 1/2 at 256 MB, decreasing
* toward zero with the amount of memory, with a floor of 128 pages.
*/
nr_pages = totalram_pages - totalhigh_pages;
limit = min(nr_pages, 1UL<<(28-PAGE_SHIFT)) >> (20-PAGE_SHIFT);
limit = (limit * (nr_pages >> (20-PAGE_SHIFT))) >> (PAGE_SHIFT-11);
limit = max(limit, 128UL);
sysctl_udp_mem[0] = limit / 4 * 3;
sysctl_udp_mem[1] = limit;
sysctl_udp_mem[2] = sysctl_udp_mem[0] * 2;
sysctl_udp_rmem_min = SK_MEM_QUANTUM;
sysctl_udp_wmem_min = SK_MEM_QUANTUM;
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 19,086 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __btrfs_unlink_inode(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
struct btrfs_root *root,
struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode,
const char *name, int name_len)
{
struct btrfs_path *path;
int ret = 0;
struct extent_buffer *leaf;
struct btrfs_dir_item *di;
struct btrfs_key key;
u64 index;
u64 ino = btrfs_ino(inode);
u64 dir_ino = btrfs_ino(dir);
path = btrfs_alloc_path();
if (!path) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
path->leave_spinning = 1;
di = btrfs_lookup_dir_item(trans, root, path, dir_ino,
name, name_len, -1);
if (IS_ERR(di)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(di);
goto err;
}
if (!di) {
ret = -ENOENT;
goto err;
}
leaf = path->nodes[0];
btrfs_dir_item_key_to_cpu(leaf, di, &key);
ret = btrfs_delete_one_dir_name(trans, root, path, di);
if (ret)
goto err;
btrfs_release_path(path);
ret = btrfs_del_inode_ref(trans, root, name, name_len, ino,
dir_ino, &index);
if (ret) {
printk(KERN_INFO "btrfs failed to delete reference to %.*s, "
"inode %llu parent %llu\n", name_len, name,
(unsigned long long)ino, (unsigned long long)dir_ino);
btrfs_abort_transaction(trans, root, ret);
goto err;
}
ret = btrfs_delete_delayed_dir_index(trans, root, dir, index);
if (ret) {
btrfs_abort_transaction(trans, root, ret);
goto err;
}
ret = btrfs_del_inode_ref_in_log(trans, root, name, name_len,
inode, dir_ino);
if (ret != 0 && ret != -ENOENT) {
btrfs_abort_transaction(trans, root, ret);
goto err;
}
ret = btrfs_del_dir_entries_in_log(trans, root, name, name_len,
dir, index);
if (ret == -ENOENT)
ret = 0;
err:
btrfs_free_path(path);
if (ret)
goto out;
btrfs_i_size_write(dir, dir->i_size - name_len * 2);
inode_inc_iversion(inode);
inode_inc_iversion(dir);
inode->i_ctime = dir->i_mtime = dir->i_ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
ret = btrfs_update_inode(trans, root, dir);
out:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <chris.mason@fusionio.com>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <pascal@junod.info>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 34,270 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int xfrm_notify_sa(struct xfrm_state *x, const struct km_event *c)
{
struct net *net = xs_net(x);
struct xfrm_usersa_info *p;
struct xfrm_usersa_id *id;
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int len = xfrm_sa_len(x);
int headlen, err;
headlen = sizeof(*p);
if (c->event == XFRM_MSG_DELSA) {
len += nla_total_size(headlen);
headlen = sizeof(*id);
len += nla_total_size(sizeof(struct xfrm_mark));
}
len += NLMSG_ALIGN(headlen);
skb = nlmsg_new(len, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (skb == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
nlh = nlmsg_put(skb, c->portid, c->seq, c->event, headlen, 0);
err = -EMSGSIZE;
if (nlh == NULL)
goto out_free_skb;
p = nlmsg_data(nlh);
if (c->event == XFRM_MSG_DELSA) {
struct nlattr *attr;
id = nlmsg_data(nlh);
memset(id, 0, sizeof(*id));
memcpy(&id->daddr, &x->id.daddr, sizeof(id->daddr));
id->spi = x->id.spi;
id->family = x->props.family;
id->proto = x->id.proto;
attr = nla_reserve(skb, XFRMA_SA, sizeof(*p));
err = -EMSGSIZE;
if (attr == NULL)
goto out_free_skb;
p = nla_data(attr);
}
err = copy_to_user_state_extra(x, p, skb);
if (err)
goto out_free_skb;
nlmsg_end(skb, nlh);
return xfrm_nlmsg_multicast(net, skb, 0, XFRMNLGRP_SA);
out_free_skb:
kfree_skb(skb);
return err;
}
Commit Message: ipsec: Fix aborted xfrm policy dump crash
An independent security researcher, Mohamed Ghannam, has reported
this vulnerability to Beyond Security's SecuriTeam Secure Disclosure
program.
The xfrm_dump_policy_done function expects xfrm_dump_policy to
have been called at least once or it will crash. This can be
triggered if a dump fails because the target socket's receive
buffer is full.
This patch fixes it by using the cb->start mechanism to ensure that
the initialisation is always done regardless of the buffer situation.
Fixes: 12a169e7d8f4 ("ipsec: Put dumpers on the dump list")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 59,377 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: add_link(struct archive_read *a, struct xar *xar, struct xar_file *file)
{
struct hdlink *hdlink;
for (hdlink = xar->hdlink_list; hdlink != NULL; hdlink = hdlink->next) {
if (hdlink->id == file->link) {
file->hdnext = hdlink->files;
hdlink->cnt++;
hdlink->files = file;
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
}
hdlink = malloc(sizeof(*hdlink));
if (hdlink == NULL) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM, "Out of memory");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
file->hdnext = NULL;
hdlink->id = file->link;
hdlink->cnt = 1;
hdlink->files = file;
hdlink->next = xar->hdlink_list;
xar->hdlink_list = hdlink;
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
Commit Message: Do something sensible for empty strings to make fuzzers happy.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 61,637 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void padlock_xcrypt_ecb(const u8 *input, u8 *output, void *key,
void *control_word, u32 count)
{
u32 initial = count & (ecb_fetch_blocks - 1);
if (count < ecb_fetch_blocks) {
ecb_crypt(input, output, key, control_word, count);
return;
}
if (initial)
asm volatile (".byte 0xf3,0x0f,0xa7,0xc8" /* rep xcryptecb */
: "+S"(input), "+D"(output)
: "d"(control_word), "b"(key), "c"(initial));
asm volatile (".byte 0xf3,0x0f,0xa7,0xc8" /* rep xcryptecb */
: "+S"(input), "+D"(output)
: "d"(control_word), "b"(key), "c"(count - initial));
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 47,443 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OJPEGReadWord(OJPEGState* sp, uint16* word)
{
uint8 m;
if (OJPEGReadByte(sp,&m)==0)
return(0);
*word=(m<<8);
if (OJPEGReadByte(sp,&m)==0)
return(0);
*word|=m;
return(1);
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_ojpeg.c: make OJPEGDecode() early exit in case of failure in
OJPEGPreDecode(). This will avoid a divide by zero, and potential other issues.
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2611
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 70,306 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DECLAREcpFunc(cpSeparateStrips2ContigTiles)
{
return cpImage(in, out,
readSeparateStripsIntoBuffer,
writeBufferToContigTiles,
imagelength, imagewidth, spp);
}
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcp.c: fix out-of-bounds write on tiled images with odd
tile width vs image width. Reported as MSVR 35103
by Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities &
Mitigations team.
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 48,193 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool AuthenticatorPaaskSheetModel::IsActivityIndicatorVisible() const {
return true;
}
Commit Message: chrome/browser/ui/webauthn: long domains may cause a line break.
As requested by UX in [1], allow long host names to split a title into
two lines. This allows us to show more of the name before eliding,
although sufficiently long names will still trigger elision.
Screenshot at
https://drive.google.com/open?id=1_V6t2CeZDAVazy3Px-OET2LnB__aEW1r.
[1] https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1TtxkPUchyVZulqgdMcfui-68B0W-DWaFFVJEffGIbLA/edit#slide=id.g5913c4105f_1_12
Change-Id: I70f6541e0db3e9942239304de43b487a7561ca34
Bug: 870892
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1601812
Auto-Submit: Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nina Satragno <nsatragno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nina Satragno <nsatragno@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#658114}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 142,964 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::deleteFramebuffer(
WebGLFramebuffer* framebuffer) {
if (framebuffer && framebuffer->Opaque()) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "deleteFramebuffer",
"cannot delete an opaque framebuffer");
return;
}
if (!DeleteObject(framebuffer))
return;
GLenum target = 0;
if (framebuffer == framebuffer_binding_) {
if (framebuffer == read_framebuffer_binding_) {
target = GL_FRAMEBUFFER;
framebuffer_binding_ = nullptr;
read_framebuffer_binding_ = nullptr;
} else {
target = GL_DRAW_FRAMEBUFFER;
framebuffer_binding_ = nullptr;
}
} else if (framebuffer == read_framebuffer_binding_) {
target = GL_READ_FRAMEBUFFER;
read_framebuffer_binding_ = nullptr;
}
if (target) {
GetDrawingBuffer()->Bind(target);
}
}
Commit Message: Implement 2D texture uploading from client array with FLIP_Y or PREMULTIPLY_ALPHA.
BUG=774174
TEST=https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2555
R=kbr@chromium.org
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I4f4e7636314502451104730501a5048a5d7b9f3f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/808665
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522003}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 146,635 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void skb_trim(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int len)
{
if (skb->len > len)
__skb_trim(skb, len);
}
Commit Message: skbuff: skb_segment: orphan frags before copying
skb_segment copies frags around, so we need
to copy them carefully to avoid accessing
user memory after reporting completion to userspace
through a callback.
skb_segment doesn't normally happen on datapath:
TSO needs to be disabled - so disabling zero copy
in this case does not look like a big deal.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 39,928 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int sta_info_insert(struct sta_info *sta)
{
int err = sta_info_insert_rcu(sta);
rcu_read_unlock();
return err;
}
Commit Message: mac80211: fix AP powersave TX vs. wakeup race
There is a race between the TX path and the STA wakeup: while
a station is sleeping, mac80211 buffers frames until it wakes
up, then the frames are transmitted. However, the RX and TX
path are concurrent, so the packet indicating wakeup can be
processed while a packet is being transmitted.
This can lead to a situation where the buffered frames list
is emptied on the one side, while a frame is being added on
the other side, as the station is still seen as sleeping in
the TX path.
As a result, the newly added frame will not be send anytime
soon. It might be sent much later (and out of order) when the
station goes to sleep and wakes up the next time.
Additionally, it can lead to the crash below.
Fix all this by synchronising both paths with a new lock.
Both path are not fastpath since they handle PS situations.
In a later patch we'll remove the extra skb queue locks to
reduce locking overhead.
BUG: unable to handle kernel
NULL pointer dereference at 000000b0
IP: [<ff6f1791>] ieee80211_report_used_skb+0x11/0x3e0 [mac80211]
*pde = 00000000
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
EIP: 0060:[<ff6f1791>] EFLAGS: 00210282 CPU: 1
EIP is at ieee80211_report_used_skb+0x11/0x3e0 [mac80211]
EAX: e5900da0 EBX: 00000000 ECX: 00000001 EDX: 00000000
ESI: e41d00c0 EDI: e5900da0 EBP: ebe458e4 ESP: ebe458b0
DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068
CR0: 8005003b CR2: 000000b0 CR3: 25a78000 CR4: 000407d0
DR0: 00000000 DR1: 00000000 DR2: 00000000 DR3: 00000000
DR6: ffff0ff0 DR7: 00000400
Process iperf (pid: 3934, ti=ebe44000 task=e757c0b0 task.ti=ebe44000)
iwlwifi 0000:02:00.0: I iwl_pcie_enqueue_hcmd Sending command LQ_CMD (#4e), seq: 0x0903, 92 bytes at 3[3]:9
Stack:
e403b32c ebe458c4 00200002 00200286 e403b338 ebe458cc c10960bb e5900da0
ff76a6ec ebe458d8 00000000 e41d00c0 e5900da0 ebe458f0 ff6f1b75 e403b210
ebe4598c ff723dc1 00000000 ff76a6ec e597c978 e403b758 00000002 00000002
Call Trace:
[<ff6f1b75>] ieee80211_free_txskb+0x15/0x20 [mac80211]
[<ff723dc1>] invoke_tx_handlers+0x1661/0x1780 [mac80211]
[<ff7248a5>] ieee80211_tx+0x75/0x100 [mac80211]
[<ff7249bf>] ieee80211_xmit+0x8f/0xc0 [mac80211]
[<ff72550e>] ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0x4fe/0xe20 [mac80211]
[<c149ef70>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x450/0x950
[<c14b9aa9>] sch_direct_xmit+0xa9/0x250
[<c14b9c9b>] __qdisc_run+0x4b/0x150
[<c149f732>] dev_queue_xmit+0x2c2/0xca0
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Yaara Rozenblum <yaara.rozenblum@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com>
[reword commit log, use a separate lock]
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 38,595 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tg3_set_eeprom(struct net_device *dev, struct ethtool_eeprom *eeprom, u8 *data)
{
struct tg3 *tp = netdev_priv(dev);
int ret;
u32 offset, len, b_offset, odd_len;
u8 *buf;
__be32 start, end;
if (tp->phy_flags & TG3_PHYFLG_IS_LOW_POWER)
return -EAGAIN;
if (tg3_flag(tp, NO_NVRAM) ||
eeprom->magic != TG3_EEPROM_MAGIC)
return -EINVAL;
offset = eeprom->offset;
len = eeprom->len;
if ((b_offset = (offset & 3))) {
/* adjustments to start on required 4 byte boundary */
ret = tg3_nvram_read_be32(tp, offset-b_offset, &start);
if (ret)
return ret;
len += b_offset;
offset &= ~3;
if (len < 4)
len = 4;
}
odd_len = 0;
if (len & 3) {
/* adjustments to end on required 4 byte boundary */
odd_len = 1;
len = (len + 3) & ~3;
ret = tg3_nvram_read_be32(tp, offset+len-4, &end);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
buf = data;
if (b_offset || odd_len) {
buf = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buf)
return -ENOMEM;
if (b_offset)
memcpy(buf, &start, 4);
if (odd_len)
memcpy(buf+len-4, &end, 4);
memcpy(buf + b_offset, data, eeprom->len);
}
ret = tg3_nvram_write_block(tp, offset, len, buf);
if (buf != data)
kfree(buf);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <oded@privatecore.com>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matt Carlson <mcarlson@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 32,744 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void add_echo_byte(unsigned char c, struct n_tty_data *ldata)
{
*echo_buf_addr(ldata, ldata->echo_head++) = c;
}
Commit Message: n_tty: Fix n_tty_write crash when echoing in raw mode
The tty atomic_write_lock does not provide an exclusion guarantee for
the tty driver if the termios settings are LECHO & !OPOST. And since
it is unexpected and not allowed to call TTY buffer helpers like
tty_insert_flip_string concurrently, this may lead to crashes when
concurrect writers call pty_write. In that case the following two
writers:
* the ECHOing from a workqueue and
* pty_write from the process
race and can overflow the corresponding TTY buffer like follows.
If we look into tty_insert_flip_string_fixed_flag, there is:
int space = __tty_buffer_request_room(port, goal, flags);
struct tty_buffer *tb = port->buf.tail;
...
memcpy(char_buf_ptr(tb, tb->used), chars, space);
...
tb->used += space;
so the race of the two can result in something like this:
A B
__tty_buffer_request_room
__tty_buffer_request_room
memcpy(buf(tb->used), ...)
tb->used += space;
memcpy(buf(tb->used), ...) ->BOOM
B's memcpy is past the tty_buffer due to the previous A's tb->used
increment.
Since the N_TTY line discipline input processing can output
concurrently with a tty write, obtain the N_TTY ldisc output_lock to
serialize echo output with normal tty writes. This ensures the tty
buffer helper tty_insert_flip_string is not called concurrently and
everything is fine.
Note that this is nicely reproducible by an ordinary user using
forkpty and some setup around that (raw termios + ECHO). And it is
present in kernels at least after commit
d945cb9cce20ac7143c2de8d88b187f62db99bdc (pty: Rework the pty layer to
use the normal buffering logic) in 2.6.31-rc3.
js: add more info to the commit log
js: switch to bool
js: lock unconditionally
js: lock only the tty->ops->write call
References: CVE-2014-0196
Reported-and-tested-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 39,777 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: poppler_page_get_crop_box (PopplerPage *page, PopplerRectangle *rect)
{
PDFRectangle* cropBox = page->page->getCropBox ();
rect->x1 = cropBox->x1;
rect->x2 = cropBox->x2;
rect->y1 = cropBox->y1;
rect->y2 = cropBox->y2;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 777 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int Effect_setConfig(EffectContext *pContext, effect_config_t *pConfig){
LVM_Fs_en SampleRate;
CHECK_ARG(pContext != NULL);
CHECK_ARG(pConfig != NULL);
CHECK_ARG(pConfig->inputCfg.samplingRate == pConfig->outputCfg.samplingRate);
CHECK_ARG(pConfig->inputCfg.channels == pConfig->outputCfg.channels);
CHECK_ARG(pConfig->inputCfg.format == pConfig->outputCfg.format);
CHECK_ARG(pConfig->inputCfg.channels == AUDIO_CHANNEL_OUT_STEREO);
CHECK_ARG(pConfig->outputCfg.accessMode == EFFECT_BUFFER_ACCESS_WRITE
|| pConfig->outputCfg.accessMode == EFFECT_BUFFER_ACCESS_ACCUMULATE);
CHECK_ARG(pConfig->inputCfg.format == AUDIO_FORMAT_PCM_16_BIT);
pContext->config = *pConfig;
switch (pConfig->inputCfg.samplingRate) {
case 8000:
SampleRate = LVM_FS_8000;
pContext->pBundledContext->SamplesPerSecond = 8000*2; // 2 secs Stereo
break;
case 16000:
SampleRate = LVM_FS_16000;
pContext->pBundledContext->SamplesPerSecond = 16000*2; // 2 secs Stereo
break;
case 22050:
SampleRate = LVM_FS_22050;
pContext->pBundledContext->SamplesPerSecond = 22050*2; // 2 secs Stereo
break;
case 32000:
SampleRate = LVM_FS_32000;
pContext->pBundledContext->SamplesPerSecond = 32000*2; // 2 secs Stereo
break;
case 44100:
SampleRate = LVM_FS_44100;
pContext->pBundledContext->SamplesPerSecond = 44100*2; // 2 secs Stereo
break;
case 48000:
SampleRate = LVM_FS_48000;
pContext->pBundledContext->SamplesPerSecond = 48000*2; // 2 secs Stereo
break;
default:
ALOGV("\tEffect_setConfig invalid sampling rate %d", pConfig->inputCfg.samplingRate);
return -EINVAL;
}
if(pContext->pBundledContext->SampleRate != SampleRate){
LVM_ControlParams_t ActiveParams;
LVM_ReturnStatus_en LvmStatus = LVM_SUCCESS;
ALOGV("\tEffect_setConfig change sampling rate to %d", SampleRate);
/* Get the current settings */
LvmStatus = LVM_GetControlParameters(pContext->pBundledContext->hInstance,
&ActiveParams);
LVM_ERROR_CHECK(LvmStatus, "LVM_GetControlParameters", "Effect_setConfig")
if(LvmStatus != LVM_SUCCESS) return -EINVAL;
ActiveParams.SampleRate = SampleRate;
LvmStatus = LVM_SetControlParameters(pContext->pBundledContext->hInstance, &ActiveParams);
LVM_ERROR_CHECK(LvmStatus, "LVM_SetControlParameters", "Effect_setConfig")
ALOGV("\tEffect_setConfig Succesfully called LVM_SetControlParameters\n");
pContext->pBundledContext->SampleRate = SampleRate;
}else{
}
return 0;
} /* end Effect_setConfig */
Commit Message: audio effects: fix heap overflow
Check consistency of effect command reply sizes before
copying to reply address.
Also add null pointer check on reply size.
Also remove unused parameter warning.
Bug: 21953516.
Change-Id: I4cf00c12eaed696af28f3b7613f7e36f47a160c4
(cherry picked from commit 0f714a464d2425afe00d6450535e763131b40844)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 157,389 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: verify_client_san(krb5_context context,
pkinit_kdc_context plgctx,
pkinit_kdc_req_context reqctx,
krb5_kdcpreauth_callbacks cb,
krb5_kdcpreauth_rock rock,
krb5_const_principal client,
int *valid_san)
{
krb5_error_code retval;
krb5_principal *princs = NULL;
krb5_principal *upns = NULL;
int i;
#ifdef DEBUG_SAN_INFO
char *client_string = NULL, *san_string;
#endif
*valid_san = 0;
retval = crypto_retrieve_cert_sans(context, plgctx->cryptoctx,
reqctx->cryptoctx, plgctx->idctx,
&princs,
plgctx->opts->allow_upn ? &upns : NULL,
NULL);
if (retval == ENOENT) {
TRACE_PKINIT_SERVER_NO_SAN(context);
goto out;
} else if (retval) {
pkiDebug("%s: error from retrieve_certificate_sans()\n", __FUNCTION__);
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH;
goto out;
}
/* XXX Verify this is consistent with client side XXX */
#if 0
retval = call_san_checking_plugins(context, plgctx, reqctx, princs,
upns, NULL, &plugin_decision, &ignore);
pkiDebug("%s: call_san_checking_plugins() returned retval %d\n",
__FUNCTION__);
if (retval) {
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH;
goto cleanup;
}
pkiDebug("%s: call_san_checking_plugins() returned decision %d\n",
__FUNCTION__, plugin_decision);
if (plugin_decision != NO_DECISION) {
retval = plugin_decision;
goto out;
}
#endif
#ifdef DEBUG_SAN_INFO
krb5_unparse_name(context, client, &client_string);
#endif
pkiDebug("%s: Checking pkinit sans\n", __FUNCTION__);
for (i = 0; princs != NULL && princs[i] != NULL; i++) {
#ifdef DEBUG_SAN_INFO
krb5_unparse_name(context, princs[i], &san_string);
pkiDebug("%s: Comparing client '%s' to pkinit san value '%s'\n",
__FUNCTION__, client_string, san_string);
krb5_free_unparsed_name(context, san_string);
#endif
if (cb->match_client(context, rock, princs[i])) {
TRACE_PKINIT_SERVER_MATCHING_SAN_FOUND(context);
*valid_san = 1;
retval = 0;
goto out;
}
}
pkiDebug("%s: no pkinit san match found\n", __FUNCTION__);
/*
* XXX if cert has names but none match, should we
* be returning KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH here?
*/
if (upns == NULL) {
pkiDebug("%s: no upn sans (or we wouldn't accept them anyway)\n",
__FUNCTION__);
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH;
goto out;
}
pkiDebug("%s: Checking upn sans\n", __FUNCTION__);
for (i = 0; upns[i] != NULL; i++) {
#ifdef DEBUG_SAN_INFO
krb5_unparse_name(context, upns[i], &san_string);
pkiDebug("%s: Comparing client '%s' to upn san value '%s'\n",
__FUNCTION__, client_string, san_string);
krb5_free_unparsed_name(context, san_string);
#endif
if (cb->match_client(context, rock, upns[i])) {
TRACE_PKINIT_SERVER_MATCHING_UPN_FOUND(context);
*valid_san = 1;
retval = 0;
goto out;
}
}
pkiDebug("%s: no upn san match found\n", __FUNCTION__);
/* We found no match */
if (princs != NULL || upns != NULL) {
*valid_san = 0;
/* XXX ??? If there was one or more name in the cert, but
* none matched the client name, then return mismatch? */
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH;
}
retval = 0;
out:
if (princs != NULL) {
for (i = 0; princs[i] != NULL; i++)
krb5_free_principal(context, princs[i]);
free(princs);
}
if (upns != NULL) {
for (i = 0; upns[i] != NULL; i++)
krb5_free_principal(context, upns[i]);
free(upns);
}
#ifdef DEBUG_SAN_INFO
if (client_string != NULL)
krb5_free_unparsed_name(context, client_string);
#endif
pkiDebug("%s: returning retval %d, valid_san %d\n",
__FUNCTION__, retval, *valid_san);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: Fix certauth built-in module returns
The PKINIT certauth eku module should never authoritatively authorize
a certificate, because an extended key usage does not establish a
relationship between the certificate and any specific user; it only
establishes that the certificate was created for PKINIT client
authentication. Therefore, pkinit_eku_authorize() should return
KRB5_PLUGIN_NO_HANDLE on success, not 0.
The certauth san module should pass if it does not find any SANs of
the types it can match against; the presence of other types of SANs
should not cause it to explicitly deny a certificate. Check for an
empty result from crypto_retrieve_cert_sans() in verify_client_san(),
instead of returning ENOENT from crypto_retrieve_cert_sans() when
there are no SANs at all.
ticket: 8561
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 1 | 170,175 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SyncBackendHost::Core::SetParentJsEventRouter(JsEventRouter* router) {
DCHECK_EQ(MessageLoop::current(), host_->frontend_loop_);
DCHECK(router);
parent_router_ = router;
MessageLoop* core_message_loop = host_->core_thread_.message_loop();
CHECK(core_message_loop);
core_message_loop->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
NewRunnableMethod(this,
&SyncBackendHost::Core::ConnectChildJsEventRouter));
}
Commit Message: Enable HistoryModelWorker by default, now that bug 69561 is fixed.
BUG=69561
TEST=Run sync manually and run integration tests, sync should not crash.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7016007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@85211 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 101,482 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void virtio_gpu_resource_create_2d(VirtIOGPU *g,
struct virtio_gpu_ctrl_command *cmd)
{
pixman_format_code_t pformat;
struct virtio_gpu_simple_resource *res;
struct virtio_gpu_resource_create_2d c2d;
VIRTIO_GPU_FILL_CMD(c2d);
trace_virtio_gpu_cmd_res_create_2d(c2d.resource_id, c2d.format,
c2d.width, c2d.height);
if (c2d.resource_id == 0) {
qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR, "%s: resource id 0 is not allowed\n",
__func__);
cmd->error = VIRTIO_GPU_RESP_ERR_INVALID_RESOURCE_ID;
return;
}
res = virtio_gpu_find_resource(g, c2d.resource_id);
if (res) {
qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR, "%s: resource already exists %d\n",
__func__, c2d.resource_id);
cmd->error = VIRTIO_GPU_RESP_ERR_INVALID_RESOURCE_ID;
return;
}
res = g_new0(struct virtio_gpu_simple_resource, 1);
res->width = c2d.width;
res->height = c2d.height;
res->format = c2d.format;
res->resource_id = c2d.resource_id;
pformat = get_pixman_format(c2d.format);
if (!pformat) {
qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR,
"%s: host couldn't handle guest format %d\n",
__func__, c2d.format);
g_free(res);
cmd->error = VIRTIO_GPU_RESP_ERR_INVALID_PARAMETER;
return;
}
res->hostmem = PIXMAN_FORMAT_BPP(pformat) * c2d.width * c2d.height;
if (res->hostmem + g->hostmem < g->conf.max_hostmem) {
res->image = pixman_image_create_bits(pformat,
c2d.width,
c2d.height,
NULL, 0);
}
if (!res->image) {
qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR,
"%s: resource creation failed %d %d %d\n",
__func__, c2d.resource_id, c2d.width, c2d.height);
g_free(res);
cmd->error = VIRTIO_GPU_RESP_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
return;
}
QTAILQ_INSERT_HEAD(&g->reslist, res, next);
g->hostmem += res->hostmem;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 6,258 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void us_to_timespec(struct timespec *spec, int64_t us)
{
lldiv_t tvdiv = lldiv(us, 1000000);
spec->tv_sec = tvdiv.quot;
spec->tv_nsec = tvdiv.rem * 1000;
}
Commit Message: stratum: parse_notify(): Don't die on malformed bbversion/prev_hash/nbit/ntime.
Might have introduced a memory leak, don't have time to check. :(
Should the other hex2bin()'s be checked?
Thanks to Mick Ayzenberg <mick.dejavusecurity.com> for finding this.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 36,649 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE6(sendto, int, fd, void __user *, buff, size_t, len,
unsigned int, flags, struct sockaddr __user *, addr,
int, addr_len)
{
struct socket *sock;
struct sockaddr_storage address;
int err;
struct msghdr msg;
struct iovec iov;
int fput_needed;
if (len > INT_MAX)
len = INT_MAX;
sock = sockfd_lookup_light(fd, &err, &fput_needed);
if (!sock)
goto out;
iov.iov_base = buff;
iov.iov_len = len;
msg.msg_name = NULL;
iov_iter_init(&msg.msg_iter, WRITE, &iov, 1, len);
msg.msg_control = NULL;
msg.msg_controllen = 0;
msg.msg_namelen = 0;
if (addr) {
err = move_addr_to_kernel(addr, addr_len, &address);
if (err < 0)
goto out_put;
msg.msg_name = (struct sockaddr *)&address;
msg.msg_namelen = addr_len;
}
if (sock->file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK)
flags |= MSG_DONTWAIT;
msg.msg_flags = flags;
err = sock_sendmsg(sock, &msg, len);
out_put:
fput_light(sock->file, fput_needed);
out:
return err;
}
Commit Message: net: validate the range we feed to iov_iter_init() in sys_sendto/sys_recvfrom
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.19
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 1 | 167,570 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int airspy_set_if_gain(struct airspy *s)
{
int ret;
u8 u8tmp;
dev_dbg(s->dev, "val=%d->%d\n", s->if_gain->cur.val, s->if_gain->val);
ret = airspy_ctrl_msg(s, CMD_SET_VGA_GAIN, 0, s->if_gain->val,
&u8tmp, 1);
if (ret)
dev_dbg(s->dev, "failed=%d\n", ret);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: media: fix airspy usb probe error path
Fix a memory leak on probe error of the airspy usb device driver.
The problem is triggered when more than 64 usb devices register with
v4l2 of type VFL_TYPE_SDR or VFL_TYPE_SUBDEV.
The memory leak is caused by the probe function of the airspy driver
mishandeling errors and not freeing the corresponding control structures
when an error occours registering the device to v4l2 core.
A badusb device can emulate 64 of these devices, and then through
continual emulated connect/disconnect of the 65th device, cause the
kernel to run out of RAM and crash the kernel, thus causing a local DOS
vulnerability.
Fixes CVE-2016-5400
Signed-off-by: James Patrick-Evans <james@jmp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.17+
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 51,672 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::addMessage(MessageSource source, MessageLevel level, const String& message, const String& sourceURL, unsigned lineNumber, PassRefPtr<ScriptCallStack> callStack, ScriptState* state, unsigned long requestIdentifier)
{
if (!isContextThread()) {
postTask(AddConsoleMessageTask::create(source, level, message));
return;
}
if (Page* page = this->page())
page->console()->addMessage(source, level, message, sourceURL, lineNumber, callStack, state, requestIdentifier);
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 105,439 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool QuicStreamSequencerBuffer::HasBytesToRead() const {
return ReadableBytes() > 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix OOB Write in QuicStreamSequencerBuffer::OnStreamData
BUG=778505
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_cronet_tester;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
Change-Id: I1dfd1d26a2c7ee8fe047f7fe6e4ac2e9b97efa52
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/748282
Commit-Queue: Ryan Hamilton <rch@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Zhongyi Shi <zhongyi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513144}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 150,178 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate::DisableSafeBrowsing(DownloadItem* item) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
#if defined(FULL_SAFE_BROWSING)
SafeBrowsingState* state = static_cast<SafeBrowsingState*>(
item->GetUserData(&safe_browsing_id));
if (!state) {
state = new SafeBrowsingState();
item->SetUserData(&safe_browsing_id, state);
}
state->SetVerdict(DownloadProtectionService::SAFE);
#endif
}
Commit Message: For "Dangerous" file type, no user gesture will bypass the download warning.
BUG=170569
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12039015
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@178072 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 115,079 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static __latent_entropy void net_rx_action(struct softirq_action *h)
{
struct softnet_data *sd = this_cpu_ptr(&softnet_data);
unsigned long time_limit = jiffies +
usecs_to_jiffies(netdev_budget_usecs);
int budget = netdev_budget;
LIST_HEAD(list);
LIST_HEAD(repoll);
local_irq_disable();
list_splice_init(&sd->poll_list, &list);
local_irq_enable();
for (;;) {
struct napi_struct *n;
if (list_empty(&list)) {
if (!sd_has_rps_ipi_waiting(sd) && list_empty(&repoll))
goto out;
break;
}
n = list_first_entry(&list, struct napi_struct, poll_list);
budget -= napi_poll(n, &repoll);
/* If softirq window is exhausted then punt.
* Allow this to run for 2 jiffies since which will allow
* an average latency of 1.5/HZ.
*/
if (unlikely(budget <= 0 ||
time_after_eq(jiffies, time_limit))) {
sd->time_squeeze++;
break;
}
}
local_irq_disable();
list_splice_tail_init(&sd->poll_list, &list);
list_splice_tail(&repoll, &list);
list_splice(&list, &sd->poll_list);
if (!list_empty(&sd->poll_list))
__raise_softirq_irqoff(NET_RX_SOFTIRQ);
net_rps_action_and_irq_enable(sd);
out:
__kfree_skb_flush();
}
Commit Message: tun: call dev_get_valid_name() before register_netdevice()
register_netdevice() could fail early when we have an invalid
dev name, in which case ->ndo_uninit() is not called. For tun
device, this is a problem because a timer etc. are already
initialized and it expects ->ndo_uninit() to clean them up.
We could move these initializations into a ->ndo_init() so
that register_netdevice() knows better, however this is still
complicated due to the logic in tun_detach().
Therefore, I choose to just call dev_get_valid_name() before
register_netdevice(), which is quicker and much easier to audit.
And for this specific case, it is already enough.
Fixes: 96442e42429e ("tuntap: choose the txq based on rxq")
Reported-by: Dmitry Alexeev <avekceeb@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 93,409 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline u32 armv7_pmnc_getreset_flags(void)
{
u32 val;
/* Read */
asm volatile("mrc p15, 0, %0, c9, c12, 3" : "=r" (val));
/* Write to clear flags */
val &= ARMV7_FLAG_MASK;
asm volatile("mcr p15, 0, %0, c9, c12, 3" : : "r" (val));
return val;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,265 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void blk_mq_stop_hw_queue(struct blk_mq_hw_ctx *hctx)
{
cancel_delayed_work(&hctx->run_work);
cancel_delayed_work(&hctx->delay_work);
set_bit(BLK_MQ_S_STOPPED, &hctx->state);
}
Commit Message: blk-mq: fix race between timeout and freeing request
Inside timeout handler, blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is called
to retrieve the request from one tag. This way is obviously
wrong because the request can be freed any time and some
fiedds of the request can't be trusted, then kernel oops
might be triggered[1].
Currently wrt. blk_mq_tag_to_rq(), the only special case is
that the flush request can share same tag with the request
cloned from, and the two requests can't be active at the same
time, so this patch fixes the above issue by updating tags->rqs[tag]
with the active request(either flush rq or the request cloned
from) of the tag.
Also blk_mq_tag_to_rq() gets much simplified with this patch.
Given blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is mainly for drivers and the caller must
make sure the request can't be freed, so in bt_for_each() this
helper is replaced with tags->rqs[tag].
[1] kernel oops log
[ 439.696220] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.697162] IP: [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.700653] PGD 7ef765067 PUD 7ef764067 PMD 0 ^M
[ 439.700653] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC ^M
[ 439.700653] Dumping ftrace buffer:^M
[ 439.700653] (ftrace buffer empty)^M
[ 439.700653] Modules linked in: nbd ipv6 kvm_intel kvm serio_raw^M
[ 439.700653] CPU: 6 PID: 2779 Comm: stress-ng-sigfd Not tainted 4.2.0-rc5-next-20150805+ #265^M
[ 439.730500] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011^M
[ 439.730500] task: ffff880605308000 ti: ffff88060530c000 task.ti: ffff88060530c000^M
[ 439.730500] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812d89ba>] [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.730500] RSP: 0018:ffff880819203da0 EFLAGS: 00010283^M
[ 439.730500] RAX: ffff880811b0e000 RBX: ffff8800bb465f00 RCX: 0000000000000002^M
[ 439.730500] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000202 RDI: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] RBP: ffff880819203db0 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000202^M
[ 439.730500] R13: ffff880814104800 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: ffff880811a2ea00^M
[ 439.730500] FS: 00007f165b3f5740(0000) GS:ffff880819200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b^M
[ 439.730500] CR2: 0000000000000158 CR3: 00000007ef766000 CR4: 00000000000006e0^M
[ 439.730500] Stack:^M
[ 439.730500] 0000000000000008 ffff8808114eed90 ffff880819203e00 ffffffff812dc104^M
[ 439.755663] ffff880819203e40 ffffffff812d9f5e 0000020000000000 ffff8808114eed80^M
[ 439.755663] Call Trace:^M
[ 439.755663] <IRQ> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc104>] bt_for_each+0x6e/0xc8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc1b3>] blk_mq_tag_busy_iter+0x55/0x5e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d8911>] blk_mq_rq_timer+0x5d/0xd4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3e10>] call_timer_fn+0xf7/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3d1e>] ? call_timer_fn+0x5/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a46d6>] run_timer_softirq+0x1ce/0x1f8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c367>] __do_softirq+0x181/0x3a4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c76e>] irq_exit+0x40/0x94^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81031482>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x33/0x3e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff815559a4>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x84/0x90^M
[ 439.755663] <EOI> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81554350>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x32/0x4a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a98b>] finish_task_switch+0xe0/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a94d>] ? finish_task_switch+0xa2/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81550066>] __schedule+0x469/0x6cd^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8155039b>] schedule+0x82/0x9a^M
[ 439.789267] [<ffffffff8119b28b>] signalfd_read+0x186/0x49a^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8106d86a>] ? wake_up_q+0x47/0x47^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811618c2>] __vfs_read+0x28/0x9f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8117a289>] ? __fget_light+0x4d/0x74^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811620a7>] vfs_read+0x7a/0xc6^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8116292b>] SyS_read+0x49/0x7f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff81554c17>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f^M
[ 439.790911] Code: 48 89 e5 e8 a9 b8 e7 ff 5d c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 89
f2 48 89 e5 41 54 41 89 f4 53 48 8b 47 60 48 8b 1c d0 48 8b 7b 30 48 8b
53 38 <48> 8b 87 58 01 00 00 48 85 c0 75 09 48 8b 97 88 0c 00 00 eb 10
^M
[ 439.790911] RIP [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.790911] RSP <ffff880819203da0>^M
[ 439.790911] CR2: 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.790911] ---[ end trace d40af58949325661 ]---^M
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 86,744 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void voidMethodOptionalStringArgMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::voidMethodOptionalStringArgMethod(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,865 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ByteMethodMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
V8SetReturnValueInt(info, impl->byteMethod());
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 134,547 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int virtio_net_handle_mq(VirtIONet *n, uint8_t cmd,
struct iovec *iov, unsigned int iov_cnt)
{
VirtIODevice *vdev = VIRTIO_DEVICE(n);
struct virtio_net_ctrl_mq mq;
size_t s;
uint16_t queues;
s = iov_to_buf(iov, iov_cnt, 0, &mq, sizeof(mq));
if (s != sizeof(mq)) {
return VIRTIO_NET_ERR;
}
if (cmd != VIRTIO_NET_CTRL_MQ_VQ_PAIRS_SET) {
return VIRTIO_NET_ERR;
}
queues = lduw_p(&mq.virtqueue_pairs);
if (queues < VIRTIO_NET_CTRL_MQ_VQ_PAIRS_MIN ||
queues > VIRTIO_NET_CTRL_MQ_VQ_PAIRS_MAX ||
queues > n->max_queues ||
!n->multiqueue) {
return VIRTIO_NET_ERR;
}
n->curr_queues = queues;
/* stop the backend before changing the number of queues to avoid handling a
* disabled queue */
virtio_net_set_status(vdev, vdev->status);
virtio_net_set_queues(n);
return VIRTIO_NET_OK;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 15,839 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bson_iter_overwrite_oid (bson_iter_t *iter, const bson_oid_t *value)
{
BSON_ASSERT (iter);
if (ITER_TYPE (iter) == BSON_TYPE_OID) {
memcpy (
(void *) (iter->raw + iter->d1), value->bytes, sizeof (value->bytes));
}
}
Commit Message: Fix for CVE-2018-16790 -- Verify bounds before binary length read.
As reported here: https://jira.mongodb.org/browse/CDRIVER-2819,
a heap overread occurs due a failure to correctly verify data
bounds.
In the original check, len - o returns the data left including the
sizeof(l) we just read. Instead, the comparison should check
against the data left NOT including the binary int32, i.e. just
subtype (byte*) instead of int32 subtype (byte*).
Added in test for corrupted BSON example.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 77,854 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::string ASF_LegacyManager::NormalizeStringDisplayASCII ( std::string& operand )
{
std::basic_string<char>::iterator current = operand.begin();
std::basic_string<char>::iterator end = operand.end();;
for ( ; (current != end); ++current ) {
char element = *current;
if ( ( (element < 0x21) && (element != 0x00)) || (element > 0x7e) ) {
*current = '?';
}
}
return operand;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 15,925 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Pack<WebGLImageConversion::kDataFormatRGBA8,
WebGLImageConversion::kAlphaDoUnmultiply,
uint8_t,
uint8_t>(const uint8_t* source,
uint8_t* destination,
unsigned pixels_per_row) {
#if defined(ARCH_CPU_X86_FAMILY)
SIMD::PackOneRowOfRGBA8LittleToRGBA8(source, destination, pixels_per_row);
#endif
#if HAVE_MIPS_MSA_INTRINSICS
SIMD::packOneRowOfRGBA8LittleToRGBA8MSA(source, destination, pixels_per_row);
#endif
for (unsigned i = 0; i < pixels_per_row; ++i) {
float scale_factor = source[3] ? 255.0f / source[3] : 1.0f;
uint8_t source_r =
static_cast<uint8_t>(static_cast<float>(source[0]) * scale_factor);
uint8_t source_g =
static_cast<uint8_t>(static_cast<float>(source[1]) * scale_factor);
uint8_t source_b =
static_cast<uint8_t>(static_cast<float>(source[2]) * scale_factor);
destination[0] = source_r;
destination[1] = source_g;
destination[2] = source_b;
destination[3] = source[3];
source += 4;
destination += 4;
}
}
Commit Message: Implement 2D texture uploading from client array with FLIP_Y or PREMULTIPLY_ALPHA.
BUG=774174
TEST=https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2555
R=kbr@chromium.org
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I4f4e7636314502451104730501a5048a5d7b9f3f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/808665
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522003}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 146,672 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: acpi_status acpi_os_execute(acpi_execute_type type,
acpi_osd_exec_callback function, void *context)
{
acpi_status status = AE_OK;
struct acpi_os_dpc *dpc;
struct workqueue_struct *queue;
int ret;
ACPI_DEBUG_PRINT((ACPI_DB_EXEC,
"Scheduling function [%p(%p)] for deferred execution.\n",
function, context));
if (type == OSL_DEBUGGER_MAIN_THREAD) {
ret = acpi_debugger_create_thread(function, context);
if (ret) {
pr_err("Call to kthread_create() failed.\n");
status = AE_ERROR;
}
goto out_thread;
}
/*
* Allocate/initialize DPC structure. Note that this memory will be
* freed by the callee. The kernel handles the work_struct list in a
* way that allows us to also free its memory inside the callee.
* Because we may want to schedule several tasks with different
* parameters we can't use the approach some kernel code uses of
* having a static work_struct.
*/
dpc = kzalloc(sizeof(struct acpi_os_dpc), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!dpc)
return AE_NO_MEMORY;
dpc->function = function;
dpc->context = context;
/*
* To prevent lockdep from complaining unnecessarily, make sure that
* there is a different static lockdep key for each workqueue by using
* INIT_WORK() for each of them separately.
*/
if (type == OSL_NOTIFY_HANDLER) {
queue = kacpi_notify_wq;
INIT_WORK(&dpc->work, acpi_os_execute_deferred);
} else if (type == OSL_GPE_HANDLER) {
queue = kacpid_wq;
INIT_WORK(&dpc->work, acpi_os_execute_deferred);
} else {
pr_err("Unsupported os_execute type %d.\n", type);
status = AE_ERROR;
}
if (ACPI_FAILURE(status))
goto err_workqueue;
/*
* On some machines, a software-initiated SMI causes corruption unless
* the SMI runs on CPU 0. An SMI can be initiated by any AML, but
* typically it's done in GPE-related methods that are run via
* workqueues, so we can avoid the known corruption cases by always
* queueing on CPU 0.
*/
ret = queue_work_on(0, queue, &dpc->work);
if (!ret) {
printk(KERN_ERR PREFIX
"Call to queue_work() failed.\n");
status = AE_ERROR;
}
err_workqueue:
if (ACPI_FAILURE(status))
kfree(dpc);
out_thread:
return status;
}
Commit Message: acpi: Disable ACPI table override if securelevel is set
From the kernel documentation (initrd_table_override.txt):
If the ACPI_INITRD_TABLE_OVERRIDE compile option is true, it is possible
to override nearly any ACPI table provided by the BIOS with an
instrumented, modified one.
When securelevel is set, the kernel should disallow any unauthenticated
changes to kernel space. ACPI tables contain code invoked by the kernel, so
do not allow ACPI tables to be overridden if securelevel is set.
Signed-off-by: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 53,840 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int is_noslot_pfn(pfn_t pfn)
{
return pfn == bad_pfn;
}
Commit Message: KVM: unmap pages from the iommu when slots are removed
commit 32f6daad4651a748a58a3ab6da0611862175722f upstream.
We've been adding new mappings, but not destroying old mappings.
This can lead to a page leak as pages are pinned using
get_user_pages, but only unpinned with put_page if they still
exist in the memslots list on vm shutdown. A memslot that is
destroyed while an iommu domain is enabled for the guest will
therefore result in an elevated page reference count that is
never cleared.
Additionally, without this fix, the iommu is only programmed
with the first translation for a gpa. This can result in
peer-to-peer errors if a mapping is destroyed and replaced by a
new mapping at the same gpa as the iommu will still be pointing
to the original, pinned memory address.
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 20,330 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void t2p_compose_pdf_page_orient(T2P_BOX* boxp, uint16 orientation){
float m1[9];
float f=0.0;
if( boxp->x1 > boxp->x2){
f=boxp->x1;
boxp->x1=boxp->x2;
boxp->x2 = f;
}
if( boxp->y1 > boxp->y2){
f=boxp->y1;
boxp->y1=boxp->y2;
boxp->y2 = f;
}
boxp->mat[0]=m1[0]=boxp->x2-boxp->x1;
boxp->mat[1]=m1[1]=0.0;
boxp->mat[2]=m1[2]=0.0;
boxp->mat[3]=m1[3]=0.0;
boxp->mat[4]=m1[4]=boxp->y2-boxp->y1;
boxp->mat[5]=m1[5]=0.0;
boxp->mat[6]=m1[6]=boxp->x1;
boxp->mat[7]=m1[7]=boxp->y1;
boxp->mat[8]=m1[8]=1.0;
switch(orientation){
case 0:
case 1:
break;
case 2:
boxp->mat[0]=0.0F-m1[0];
boxp->mat[6]+=m1[0];
break;
case 3:
boxp->mat[0]=0.0F-m1[0];
boxp->mat[4]=0.0F-m1[4];
boxp->mat[6]+=m1[0];
boxp->mat[7]+=m1[4];
break;
case 4:
boxp->mat[4]=0.0F-m1[4];
boxp->mat[7]+=m1[4];
break;
case 5:
boxp->mat[0]=0.0F;
boxp->mat[1]=0.0F-m1[0];
boxp->mat[3]=0.0F-m1[4];
boxp->mat[4]=0.0F;
boxp->mat[6]+=m1[4];
boxp->mat[7]+=m1[0];
break;
case 6:
boxp->mat[0]=0.0F;
boxp->mat[1]=0.0F-m1[0];
boxp->mat[3]=m1[4];
boxp->mat[4]=0.0F;
boxp->mat[7]+=m1[0];
break;
case 7:
boxp->mat[0]=0.0F;
boxp->mat[1]=m1[0];
boxp->mat[3]=m1[4];
boxp->mat[4]=0.0F;
break;
case 8:
boxp->mat[0]=0.0F;
boxp->mat[1]=m1[0];
boxp->mat[3]=0.0F-m1[4];
boxp->mat[4]=0.0F;
boxp->mat[6]+=m1[4];
break;
}
return;
}
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcrop.c: fix various out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities
in heap or stack allocated buffers. Reported as MSVR 35093,
MSVR 35096 and MSVR 35097. Discovered by Axel Souchet and Vishal
Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
* tools/tiff2pdf.c: fix out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities in
heap allocate buffer in t2p_process_jpeg_strip(). Reported as MSVR
35098. Discovered by Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC
Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
* libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c: fix out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities
in heap allocated buffers. Reported as MSVR 35094. Discovered by
Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities &
Mitigations team.
* libtiff/tif_write.c: fix issue in error code path of TIFFFlushData1()
that didn't reset the tif_rawcc and tif_rawcp members. I'm not
completely sure if that could happen in practice outside of the odd
behaviour of t2p_seekproc() of tiff2pdf). The report points that a
better fix could be to check the return value of TIFFFlushData1() in
places where it isn't done currently, but it seems this patch is enough.
Reported as MSVR 35095. Discovered by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan &
Suha Can from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 48,340 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t skb_unix_socket_splice(struct sock *sk,
struct pipe_inode_info *pipe,
struct splice_pipe_desc *spd)
{
int ret;
struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(sk);
mutex_unlock(&u->readlock);
ret = splice_to_pipe(pipe, spd);
mutex_lock(&u->readlock);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: unix: avoid use-after-free in ep_remove_wait_queue
Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com> writes:
An AF_UNIX datagram socket being the client in an n:1 association with
some server socket is only allowed to send messages to the server if the
receive queue of this socket contains at most sk_max_ack_backlog
datagrams. This implies that prospective writers might be forced to go
to sleep despite none of the message presently enqueued on the server
receive queue were sent by them. In order to ensure that these will be
woken up once space becomes again available, the present unix_dgram_poll
routine does a second sock_poll_wait call with the peer_wait wait queue
of the server socket as queue argument (unix_dgram_recvmsg does a wake
up on this queue after a datagram was received). This is inherently
problematic because the server socket is only guaranteed to remain alive
for as long as the client still holds a reference to it. In case the
connection is dissolved via connect or by the dead peer detection logic
in unix_dgram_sendmsg, the server socket may be freed despite "the
polling mechanism" (in particular, epoll) still has a pointer to the
corresponding peer_wait queue. There's no way to forcibly deregister a
wait queue with epoll.
Based on an idea by Jason Baron, the patch below changes the code such
that a wait_queue_t belonging to the client socket is enqueued on the
peer_wait queue of the server whenever the peer receive queue full
condition is detected by either a sendmsg or a poll. A wake up on the
peer queue is then relayed to the ordinary wait queue of the client
socket via wake function. The connection to the peer wait queue is again
dissolved if either a wake up is about to be relayed or the client
socket reconnects or a dead peer is detected or the client socket is
itself closed. This enables removing the second sock_poll_wait from
unix_dgram_poll, thus avoiding the use-after-free, while still ensuring
that no blocked writer sleeps forever.
Signed-off-by: Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com>
Fixes: ec0d215f9420 ("af_unix: fix 'poll for write'/connected DGRAM sockets")
Reviewed-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 46,527 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLMediaElement::didRemoveTrackElement(HTMLTrackElement* trackElement) {
KURL url = trackElement->getNonEmptyURLAttribute(srcAttr);
BLINK_MEDIA_LOG << "didRemoveTrackElement(" << (void*)this << ") - 'src' is "
<< urlForLoggingMedia(url);
TextTrack* textTrack = trackElement->track();
if (!textTrack)
return;
textTrack->setHasBeenConfigured(false);
if (!m_textTracks)
return;
m_textTracks->remove(textTrack);
size_t index = m_textTracksWhenResourceSelectionBegan.find(textTrack);
if (index != kNotFound)
m_textTracksWhenResourceSelectionBegan.remove(index);
}
Commit Message: [Blink>Media] Allow autoplay muted on Android by default
There was a mistake causing autoplay muted is shipped on Android
but it will be disabled if the chromium embedder doesn't specify
content setting for "AllowAutoplay" preference. This CL makes the
AllowAutoplay preference true by default so that it is allowed by
embedders (including AndroidWebView) unless they explicitly
disable it.
Intent to ship:
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/Q1cnzNI2GpI/AL_eyUNABgAJ
BUG=689018
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2677173002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#448423}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 128,783 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void jpc_ns_invlift_row(jpc_fix_t *a, int numcols, int parity)
{
register jpc_fix_t *lptr;
register jpc_fix_t *hptr;
register int n;
int llen;
llen = (numcols + 1 - parity) >> 1;
if (numcols > 1) {
/* Apply the scaling step. */
#if defined(WT_DOSCALE)
lptr = &a[0];
n = llen;
while (n-- > 0) {
lptr[0] = jpc_fix_mul(lptr[0], jpc_dbltofix(1.0 / LGAIN));
++lptr;
}
hptr = &a[llen];
n = numcols - llen;
while (n-- > 0) {
hptr[0] = jpc_fix_mul(hptr[0], jpc_dbltofix(1.0 / HGAIN));
++hptr;
}
#endif
/* Apply the first lifting step. */
lptr = &a[0];
hptr = &a[llen];
if (!parity) {
jpc_fix_minuseq(lptr[0], jpc_fix_mul(jpc_dbltofix(2.0 * DELTA),
hptr[0]));
++lptr;
}
n = llen - (!parity) - (parity != (numcols & 1));
while (n-- > 0) {
jpc_fix_minuseq(lptr[0], jpc_fix_mul(jpc_dbltofix(DELTA),
jpc_fix_add(hptr[0], hptr[1])));
++lptr;
++hptr;
}
if (parity != (numcols & 1)) {
jpc_fix_minuseq(lptr[0], jpc_fix_mul(jpc_dbltofix(2.0 * DELTA),
hptr[0]));
}
/* Apply the second lifting step. */
lptr = &a[0];
hptr = &a[llen];
if (parity) {
jpc_fix_minuseq(hptr[0], jpc_fix_mul(jpc_dbltofix(2.0 * GAMMA),
lptr[0]));
++hptr;
}
n = numcols - llen - parity - (parity == (numcols & 1));
while (n-- > 0) {
jpc_fix_minuseq(hptr[0], jpc_fix_mul(jpc_dbltofix(GAMMA),
jpc_fix_add(lptr[0], lptr[1])));
++hptr;
++lptr;
}
if (parity == (numcols & 1)) {
jpc_fix_minuseq(hptr[0], jpc_fix_mul(jpc_dbltofix(2.0 * GAMMA),
lptr[0]));
}
/* Apply the third lifting step. */
lptr = &a[0];
hptr = &a[llen];
if (!parity) {
jpc_fix_minuseq(lptr[0], jpc_fix_mul(jpc_dbltofix(2.0 * BETA),
hptr[0]));
++lptr;
}
n = llen - (!parity) - (parity != (numcols & 1));
while (n-- > 0) {
jpc_fix_minuseq(lptr[0], jpc_fix_mul(jpc_dbltofix(BETA),
jpc_fix_add(hptr[0], hptr[1])));
++lptr;
++hptr;
}
if (parity != (numcols & 1)) {
jpc_fix_minuseq(lptr[0], jpc_fix_mul(jpc_dbltofix(2.0 * BETA),
hptr[0]));
}
/* Apply the fourth lifting step. */
lptr = &a[0];
hptr = &a[llen];
if (parity) {
jpc_fix_minuseq(hptr[0], jpc_fix_mul(jpc_dbltofix(2.0 * ALPHA),
lptr[0]));
++hptr;
}
n = numcols - llen - parity - (parity == (numcols & 1));
while (n-- > 0) {
jpc_fix_minuseq(hptr[0], jpc_fix_mul(jpc_dbltofix(ALPHA),
jpc_fix_add(lptr[0], lptr[1])));
++hptr;
++lptr;
}
if (parity == (numcols & 1)) {
jpc_fix_minuseq(hptr[0], jpc_fix_mul(jpc_dbltofix(2.0 * ALPHA),
lptr[0]));
}
} else {
#if defined(WT_LENONE)
if (parity) {
lptr = &a[0];
lptr[0] = jpc_fix_asr(lptr[0], 1);
}
#endif
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed a buffer overrun problem in the QMFB code in the JPC codec
that was caused by a buffer being allocated with a size that was too small
in some cases.
Added a new regression test case.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 86,556 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int trigger_fpga_config(void)
{
int ret = 0;
/* if the FPGA is already configured, we do not want to
* reconfigure it */
skip = 0;
if (fpga_done()) {
printf("PCIe FPGA config: skipped\n");
skip = 1;
return 0;
}
if (check_boco2()) {
/* we have a BOCO2, this has to be triggered here */
/* make sure the FPGA_can access the EEPROM */
ret = boco_clear_bits(SPI_REG, CFG_EEPROM);
if (ret)
return ret;
/* trigger the config start */
ret = boco_clear_bits(SPI_REG, FPGA_PROG | FPGA_INIT_B);
if (ret)
return ret;
/* small delay for the pulse */
udelay(10);
/* up signal for pulse end */
ret = boco_set_bits(SPI_REG, FPGA_PROG);
if (ret)
return ret;
/* finally, raise INIT_B to remove the config delay */
ret = boco_set_bits(SPI_REG, FPGA_INIT_B);
if (ret)
return ret;
} else {
/* we do it the old way, with the gpio pin */
kw_gpio_set_valid(KM_XLX_PROGRAM_B_PIN, 1);
kw_gpio_direction_output(KM_XLX_PROGRAM_B_PIN, 0);
/* small delay for the pulse */
udelay(10);
kw_gpio_direction_input(KM_XLX_PROGRAM_B_PIN);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch '2020-01-22-master-imports'
- Re-add U8500 platform support
- Add bcm968360bg support
- Assorted Keymile fixes
- Other assorted bugfixes
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 1 | 169,627 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mmap_rcvegrbufs(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
struct qib_ctxtdata *rcd)
{
struct qib_devdata *dd = rcd->dd;
unsigned long start, size;
size_t total_size, i;
unsigned long pfn;
int ret;
size = rcd->rcvegrbuf_size;
total_size = rcd->rcvegrbuf_chunks * size;
if ((vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start) > total_size) {
qib_devinfo(dd->pcidev,
"FAIL on egr bufs: reqlen %lx > actual %lx\n",
vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start,
(unsigned long) total_size);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto bail;
}
if (vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE) {
qib_devinfo(dd->pcidev,
"Can't map eager buffers as writable (flags=%lx)\n",
vma->vm_flags);
ret = -EPERM;
goto bail;
}
/* don't allow them to later change to writeable with mprotect */
vma->vm_flags &= ~VM_MAYWRITE;
start = vma->vm_start;
for (i = 0; i < rcd->rcvegrbuf_chunks; i++, start += size) {
pfn = virt_to_phys(rcd->rcvegrbuf[i]) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
ret = remap_pfn_range(vma, start, pfn, size,
vma->vm_page_prot);
if (ret < 0)
goto bail;
}
ret = 0;
bail:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface
The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl(). This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.
For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.
For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).
The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 52,923 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderBlock::checkPaginationAndFloatsAtEndLine(LineLayoutState& layoutState)
{
LayoutUnit lineDelta = logicalHeight() - layoutState.endLineLogicalTop();
bool paginated = view()->layoutState() && view()->layoutState()->isPaginated();
if (paginated && layoutState.flowThread()) {
for (RootInlineBox* lineBox = layoutState.endLine(); lineBox; lineBox = lineBox->nextRootBox()) {
if (paginated) {
LayoutUnit oldPaginationStrut = lineBox->paginationStrut();
lineDelta -= oldPaginationStrut;
adjustLinePositionForPagination(lineBox, lineDelta, layoutState.flowThread());
lineBox->setPaginationStrut(oldPaginationStrut);
}
if (lineWidthForPaginatedLineChanged(lineBox, lineDelta, layoutState.flowThread()))
return false;
}
}
if (!lineDelta || !m_floatingObjects)
return true;
LayoutUnit logicalTop = min(logicalHeight(), layoutState.endLineLogicalTop());
RootInlineBox* lastLine = layoutState.endLine();
while (RootInlineBox* nextLine = lastLine->nextRootBox())
lastLine = nextLine;
LayoutUnit logicalBottom = lastLine->lineBottomWithLeading() + absoluteValue(lineDelta);
const FloatingObjectSet& floatingObjectSet = m_floatingObjects->set();
FloatingObjectSetIterator end = floatingObjectSet.end();
for (FloatingObjectSetIterator it = floatingObjectSet.begin(); it != end; ++it) {
FloatingObject* f = *it;
if (f->logicalBottom(isHorizontalWritingMode()) >= logicalTop && f->logicalBottom(isHorizontalWritingMode()) < logicalBottom)
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Update containtingIsolate to go back all the way to top isolate from current root, rather than stopping at the first isolate it finds. This works because the current root is always updated with each isolate run.
BUG=279277
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23972003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@157268 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 111,320 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: luks_get_uid_from_dm_name (const char *dm_name,
uid_t *out_uid)
{
int n;
gboolean ret;
uid_t uid;
char *endp;
ret = FALSE;
if (!g_str_has_prefix (dm_name, "udisks-luks-uuid"))
goto out;
/* determine who unlocked the device */
for (n = strlen (dm_name) - 1; n >= 0; n--)
{
if (dm_name[n] == '-')
break;
}
if (strncmp (dm_name + n, "-uid", 4) != 0)
goto out;
uid = strtol (dm_name + n + 4, &endp, 10);
if (endp == NULL || *endp != '\0')
goto out;
if (out_uid != NULL)
*out_uid = uid;
ret = TRUE;
out:
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 11,767 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool PDFiumEngine::OnKeyUp(const pp::KeyboardInputEvent& event) {
if (last_page_mouse_down_ == -1)
return false;
return !!FORM_OnKeyUp(
form_, pages_[last_page_mouse_down_]->GetPage(),
event.GetKeyCode(), event.GetModifiers());
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Defer page unloading in JS callback.
One of the callbacks from PDFium JavaScript into the embedder is to get the
current page number. In Chromium, this will trigger a call to
CalculateMostVisiblePage that method will determine the visible pages and unload
any non-visible pages. But, if the originating JS is on a non-visible page
we'll delete the page and annotations associated with that page. This will
cause issues as we are currently working with those objects when the JavaScript
returns.
This Cl defers the page unloading triggered by getting the most visible page
until the next event is handled by the Chromium embedder.
BUG=chromium:653090
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2418533002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#424781}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 140,382 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ask_string(char **ret, const char *text, ...) {
int r;
assert(ret);
assert(text);
for (;;) {
_cleanup_free_ char *line = NULL;
va_list ap;
if (colors_enabled())
fputs(ANSI_HIGHLIGHT, stdout);
va_start(ap, text);
vprintf(text, ap);
va_end(ap);
if (colors_enabled())
fputs(ANSI_NORMAL, stdout);
fflush(stdout);
r = read_line(stdin, LONG_LINE_MAX, &line);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r == 0)
return -EIO;
if (!isempty(line)) {
*ret = TAKE_PTR(line);
return 0;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #12378 from rbalint/vt-kbd-reset-check
VT kbd reset check
CWE ID: CWE-255 | 0 | 92,380 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cricket::PortAllocatorSession* HostPortAllocator::CreateSessionInternal(
int component,
const std::string& ice_username_fragment,
const std::string& ice_password) {
return new HostPortAllocatorSession(
this, component, ice_username_fragment, ice_password,
stun_hosts(), relay_hosts(), relay_token(), url_context_);
}
Commit Message: Remove UrlFetcher from remoting and use the one in net instead.
BUG=133790
TEST=Stop and restart the Me2Me host. It should still work.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10637008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143798 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 105,289 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pdf14_recreate_device(gs_memory_t *mem, gs_gstate * pgs,
gx_device * dev, const gs_pdf14trans_t * pdf14pct)
{
pdf14_device * pdev = (pdf14_device *)dev;
gx_device * target = pdev->target;
pdf14_device * dev_proto;
pdf14_device temp_dev_proto;
bool has_tags = device_encodes_tags(dev);
int code;
if_debug0m('v', dev->memory, "[v]pdf14_recreate_device\n");
/*
* We will not use the entire prototype device but we will set the
* color related info and the device procs to match the prototype.
*/
code = get_pdf14_device_proto(target, &dev_proto, &temp_dev_proto, pgs,
pdf14pct, false);
if (code < 0)
return code;
pdev->color_info = dev_proto->color_info;
pdev->pad = target->pad;
pdev->log2_align_mod = target->log2_align_mod;
pdev->is_planar = target->is_planar;
pdev->procs = dev_proto->procs;
if (has_tags) {
set_dev_proc(pdev, encode_color, pdf14_encode_color_tag);
pdev->color_info.comp_shift[pdev->color_info.num_components] = pdev->color_info.depth;
pdev->color_info.depth += 8;
}
dev->static_procs = dev_proto->static_procs;
gx_device_set_procs(dev);
gx_device_fill_in_procs(dev);
check_device_separable(dev);
return dev_proc(pdev, open_device)(dev);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 2,975 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t CameraSource::checkVideoSize(
const CameraParameters& params,
int32_t width, int32_t height) {
ALOGV("checkVideoSize");
int32_t frameWidthActual = -1;
int32_t frameHeightActual = -1;
Vector<Size> sizes;
params.getSupportedVideoSizes(sizes);
if (sizes.size() == 0) {
params.getPreviewSize(&frameWidthActual, &frameHeightActual);
} else {
params.getVideoSize(&frameWidthActual, &frameHeightActual);
}
if (frameWidthActual < 0 || frameHeightActual < 0) {
ALOGE("Failed to retrieve video frame size (%dx%d)",
frameWidthActual, frameHeightActual);
return UNKNOWN_ERROR;
}
if (width != -1 && height != -1) {
if (frameWidthActual != width || frameHeightActual != height) {
ALOGE("Failed to set video frame size to %dx%d. "
"The actual video size is %dx%d ", width, height,
frameWidthActual, frameHeightActual);
return UNKNOWN_ERROR;
}
}
mVideoSize.width = frameWidthActual;
mVideoSize.height = frameHeightActual;
return OK;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Camera: Adjust pointers to ANW buffers to avoid infoleak
Subtract address of a random static object from pointers being routed
through app process.
Bug: 28466701
Change-Id: Idcbfe81e9507433769672f3dc6d67db5eeed4e04
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 159,335 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mrb_define_class_method(mrb_state *mrb, struct RClass *c, const char *name, mrb_func_t func, mrb_aspec aspec)
{
mrb_define_singleton_method(mrb, (struct RObject*)c, name, func, aspec);
}
Commit Message: `mrb_class_real()` did not work for `BasicObject`; fix #4037
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 82,081 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int __sys_sendmmsg(int fd, struct mmsghdr __user *mmsg, unsigned int vlen,
unsigned int flags)
{
int fput_needed, err, datagrams;
struct socket *sock;
struct mmsghdr __user *entry;
struct compat_mmsghdr __user *compat_entry;
struct msghdr msg_sys;
struct used_address used_address;
if (vlen > UIO_MAXIOV)
vlen = UIO_MAXIOV;
datagrams = 0;
sock = sockfd_lookup_light(fd, &err, &fput_needed);
if (!sock)
return err;
used_address.name_len = UINT_MAX;
entry = mmsg;
compat_entry = (struct compat_mmsghdr __user *)mmsg;
err = 0;
while (datagrams < vlen) {
if (MSG_CMSG_COMPAT & flags) {
err = ___sys_sendmsg(sock, (struct user_msghdr __user *)compat_entry,
&msg_sys, flags, &used_address);
if (err < 0)
break;
err = __put_user(err, &compat_entry->msg_len);
++compat_entry;
} else {
err = ___sys_sendmsg(sock,
(struct user_msghdr __user *)entry,
&msg_sys, flags, &used_address);
if (err < 0)
break;
err = put_user(err, &entry->msg_len);
++entry;
}
if (err)
break;
++datagrams;
}
fput_light(sock->file, fput_needed);
/* We only return an error if no datagrams were able to be sent */
if (datagrams != 0)
return datagrams;
return err;
}
Commit Message: net: validate the range we feed to iov_iter_init() in sys_sendto/sys_recvfrom
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.19
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 57,916 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const AtomicString& AXObject::getAttribute(
const QualifiedName& attribute) const {
Node* elementNode = getNode();
if (!elementNode)
return nullAtom;
if (!elementNode->isElementNode())
return nullAtom;
Element* element = toElement(elementNode);
return element->fastGetAttribute(attribute);
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,255 |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.