instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct bio *bio_split(struct bio *bio, int sectors,
gfp_t gfp, struct bio_set *bs)
{
struct bio *split = NULL;
BUG_ON(sectors <= 0);
BUG_ON(sectors >= bio_sectors(bio));
split = bio_clone_fast(bio, gfp, bs);
if (!split)
return NULL;
split->bi_iter.bi_size = sectors << 9;
if (bio_integrity(split))
bio_integrity_trim(split);
bio_advance(bio, split->bi_iter.bi_size);
if (bio_flagged(bio, BIO_TRACE_COMPLETION))
bio_set_flag(bio, BIO_TRACE_COMPLETION);
return split;
}
Commit Message: fix unbalanced page refcounting in bio_map_user_iov
bio_map_user_iov and bio_unmap_user do unbalanced pages refcounting if
IO vector has small consecutive buffers belonging to the same page.
bio_add_pc_page merges them into one, but the page reference is never
dropped.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Mayatskikh <v.mayatskih@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 62,844 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OmniboxViewViews::OnAfterCutOrCopy(ui::ClipboardType clipboard_type) {
ui::Clipboard* cb = ui::Clipboard::GetForCurrentThread();
base::string16 selected_text;
cb->ReadText(clipboard_type, &selected_text);
GURL url;
bool write_url = false;
model()->AdjustTextForCopy(GetSelectedRange().GetMin(), &selected_text, &url,
&write_url);
if (IsSelectAll())
UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS_1M(OmniboxEditModel::kCutOrCopyAllTextHistogram, 1);
ui::ScopedClipboardWriter scoped_clipboard_writer(clipboard_type);
scoped_clipboard_writer.WriteText(selected_text);
if (write_url &&
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(kOmniboxCanCopyHyperlinksToClipboard)) {
scoped_clipboard_writer.WriteHyperlink(selected_text, url.spec());
}
}
Commit Message: omnibox: experiment with restoring placeholder when caret shows
Shows the "Search Google or type a URL" omnibox placeholder even when
the caret (text edit cursor) is showing / when focused. views::Textfield
works this way, as does <input placeholder="">. Omnibox and the NTP's
"fakebox" are exceptions in this regard and this experiment makes this
more consistent.
R=tommycli@chromium.org
BUG=955585
Change-Id: I23c299c0973f2feb43f7a2be3bd3425a80b06c2d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1582315
Commit-Queue: Dan Beam <dbeam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Li <tommycli@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654279}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 142,438 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cachedAttributeAnyAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::cachedAttributeAnyAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,167 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool HTMLInputElement::matchesReadOnlyPseudoClass() const
{
return m_inputType->supportsReadOnly() && isReadOnly();
}
Commit Message: Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 112,953 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int proto_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
{
if (v == &proto_list)
seq_printf(seq, "%-9s %-4s %-8s %-6s %-5s %-7s %-4s %-10s %s",
"protocol",
"size",
"sockets",
"memory",
"press",
"maxhdr",
"slab",
"module",
"cl co di ac io in de sh ss gs se re sp bi br ha uh gp em\n");
else
proto_seq_printf(seq, list_entry(v, struct proto, node));
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: sock: validate data_len before allocating skb in sock_alloc_send_pskb()
We need to validate the number of pages consumed by data_len, otherwise frags
array could be overflowed by userspace. So this patch validate data_len and
return -EMSGSIZE when data_len may occupies more frags than MAX_SKB_FRAGS.
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 20,130 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ExtensionFunction::ResponseAction BluetoothSocketListenFunction::Run() {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(work_thread_id());
device::BluetoothAdapterFactory::GetAdapter(
base::Bind(&BluetoothSocketListenFunction::OnGetAdapter, this));
return did_respond() ? AlreadyResponded() : RespondLater();
}
Commit Message: chrome.bluetoothSocket: Fix regression in send()
In https://crrev.com/c/997098, params_ was changed to a local variable,
but it needs to last longer than that since net::WrappedIOBuffer may use
the data after the local variable goes out of scope.
This CL changed it back to be an instance variable.
Bug: 851799
Change-Id: I392f8acaef4c6473d6ea4fbee7209445aa09112e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1103676
Reviewed-by: Toni Barzic <tbarzic@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sonny Sasaka <sonnysasaka@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#568137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 154,084 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: is_xioctl_allowed(u8 mode, int cmd)
{
if(sizeof(xioctl_filter)-1 < cmd) {
A_PRINTF("Filter for this cmd=%d not defined\n",cmd);
return 0;
}
if(xioctl_filter[cmd] == 0xFF) return 0;
if(xioctl_filter[cmd] & mode) return 0;
return A_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 24,255 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sco_debugfs_show(struct seq_file *f, void *p)
{
struct sock *sk;
read_lock(&sco_sk_list.lock);
sk_for_each(sk, &sco_sk_list.head) {
seq_printf(f, "%pMR %pMR %d\n", &sco_pi(sk)->src,
&sco_pi(sk)->dst, sk->sk_state);
}
read_unlock(&sco_sk_list.lock);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 40,391 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: handle_t *jbd2__journal_start(journal_t *journal, int nblocks, gfp_t gfp_mask)
{
handle_t *handle = journal_current_handle();
int err;
if (!journal)
return ERR_PTR(-EROFS);
if (handle) {
J_ASSERT(handle->h_transaction->t_journal == journal);
handle->h_ref++;
return handle;
}
handle = new_handle(nblocks);
if (!handle)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
current->journal_info = handle;
err = start_this_handle(journal, handle, gfp_mask);
if (err < 0) {
jbd2_free_handle(handle);
current->journal_info = NULL;
handle = ERR_PTR(err);
}
return handle;
}
Commit Message: jbd2: clear BH_Delay & BH_Unwritten in journal_unmap_buffer
journal_unmap_buffer()'s zap_buffer: code clears a lot of buffer head
state ala discard_buffer(), but does not touch _Delay or _Unwritten as
discard_buffer() does.
This can be problematic in some areas of the ext4 code which assume
that if they have found a buffer marked unwritten or delay, then it's
a live one. Perhaps those spots should check whether it is mapped
as well, but if jbd2 is going to tear down a buffer, let's really
tear it down completely.
Without this I get some fsx failures on sub-page-block filesystems
up until v3.2, at which point 4e96b2dbbf1d7e81f22047a50f862555a6cb87cb
and 189e868fa8fdca702eb9db9d8afc46b5cb9144c9 make the failures go
away, because buried within that large change is some more flag
clearing. I still think it's worth doing in jbd2, since
->invalidatepage leads here directly, and it's the right place
to clear away these flags.
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 24,370 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mfr_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *p, u_int length)
{
u_int tlen,idx,hdr_len = 0;
uint16_t sequence_num;
uint8_t ie_type,ie_len;
const uint8_t *tptr;
/*
* FRF.16 Link Integrity Control Frame
*
* 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
* +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
* | B | E | C=1| 0 0 0 0 | EA |
* +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
* | 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 |
* +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
* | message type |
* +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
*/
ND_TCHECK2(*p, 4); /* minimum frame header length */
if ((p[0] & MFR_BEC_MASK) == MFR_CTRL_FRAME && p[1] == 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "FRF.16 Control, Flags [%s], %s, length %u",
bittok2str(frf_flag_values,"none",(p[0] & MFR_BEC_MASK)),
tok2str(mfr_ctrl_msg_values,"Unknown Message (0x%02x)",p[2]),
length));
tptr = p + 3;
tlen = length -3;
hdr_len = 3;
if (!ndo->ndo_vflag)
return hdr_len;
while (tlen>sizeof(struct ie_tlv_header_t)) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, sizeof(struct ie_tlv_header_t));
ie_type=tptr[0];
ie_len=tptr[1];
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tIE %s (%u), length %u: ",
tok2str(mfr_ctrl_ie_values,"Unknown",ie_type),
ie_type,
ie_len));
/* infinite loop check */
if (ie_type == 0 || ie_len <= sizeof(struct ie_tlv_header_t))
return hdr_len;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, ie_len);
tptr+=sizeof(struct ie_tlv_header_t);
/* tlv len includes header */
ie_len-=sizeof(struct ie_tlv_header_t);
tlen-=sizeof(struct ie_tlv_header_t);
switch (ie_type) {
case MFR_CTRL_IE_MAGIC_NUM:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "0x%08x", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)));
break;
case MFR_CTRL_IE_BUNDLE_ID: /* same message format */
case MFR_CTRL_IE_LINK_ID:
for (idx = 0; idx < ie_len && idx < MFR_ID_STRING_MAXLEN; idx++) {
if (*(tptr+idx) != 0) /* don't print null termination */
safeputchar(ndo, *(tptr + idx));
else
break;
}
break;
case MFR_CTRL_IE_TIMESTAMP:
if (ie_len == sizeof(struct timeval)) {
ts_print(ndo, (const struct timeval *)tptr);
break;
}
/* fall through and hexdump if no unix timestamp */
/*
* FIXME those are the defined IEs that lack a decoder
* you are welcome to contribute code ;-)
*/
case MFR_CTRL_IE_VENDOR_EXT:
case MFR_CTRL_IE_CAUSE:
default:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", ie_len);
break;
}
/* do we want to see a hexdump of the IE ? */
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1 )
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", ie_len);
tlen-=ie_len;
tptr+=ie_len;
}
return hdr_len;
}
/*
* FRF.16 Fragmentation Frame
*
* 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
* +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
* | B | E | C=0|seq. (high 4 bits) | EA |
* +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
* | sequence (low 8 bits) |
* +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
* | DLCI (6 bits) | CR | EA |
* +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
* | DLCI (4 bits) |FECN|BECN| DE | EA |
* +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
*/
sequence_num = (p[0]&0x1e)<<7 | p[1];
/* whole packet or first fragment ? */
if ((p[0] & MFR_BEC_MASK) == MFR_FRAG_FRAME ||
(p[0] & MFR_BEC_MASK) == MFR_B_BIT) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "FRF.16 Frag, seq %u, Flags [%s], ",
sequence_num,
bittok2str(frf_flag_values,"none",(p[0] & MFR_BEC_MASK))));
hdr_len = 2;
fr_print(ndo, p+hdr_len,length-hdr_len);
return hdr_len;
}
/* must be a middle or the last fragment */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "FRF.16 Frag, seq %u, Flags [%s]",
sequence_num,
bittok2str(frf_flag_values,"none",(p[0] & MFR_BEC_MASK))));
print_unknown_data(ndo, p, "\n\t", length);
return hdr_len;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|mfr]"));
return length;
}
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14468/FRF.16: Add a missing length check.
The specification says in a well-formed Magic Number information element
the data is exactly 4 bytes long. In mfr_print() check this before trying
to read those 4 bytes.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 169,843 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int vmx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr_index, u64 *pdata)
{
u64 data;
struct shared_msr_entry *msr;
if (!pdata) {
printk(KERN_ERR "BUG: get_msr called with NULL pdata\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
switch (msr_index) {
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
case MSR_FS_BASE:
data = vmcs_readl(GUEST_FS_BASE);
break;
case MSR_GS_BASE:
data = vmcs_readl(GUEST_GS_BASE);
break;
case MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE:
vmx_load_host_state(to_vmx(vcpu));
data = to_vmx(vcpu)->msr_guest_kernel_gs_base;
break;
#endif
case MSR_EFER:
return kvm_get_msr_common(vcpu, msr_index, pdata);
case MSR_IA32_TSC:
data = guest_read_tsc();
break;
case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS:
data = vmcs_read32(GUEST_SYSENTER_CS);
break;
case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP:
data = vmcs_readl(GUEST_SYSENTER_EIP);
break;
case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP:
data = vmcs_readl(GUEST_SYSENTER_ESP);
break;
case MSR_TSC_AUX:
if (!to_vmx(vcpu)->rdtscp_enabled)
return 1;
/* Otherwise falls through */
default:
if (vmx_get_vmx_msr(vcpu, msr_index, pdata))
return 0;
msr = find_msr_entry(to_vmx(vcpu), msr_index);
if (msr) {
data = msr->data;
break;
}
return kvm_get_msr_common(vcpu, msr_index, pdata);
}
*pdata = data;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <nyh@il.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <xinhao.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 37,668 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LowBatteryObserver::Hide() {
notification_.Hide();
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Move audio, power, and UI files into subdirs.
This moves more files from chrome/browser/chromeos/ into
subdirectories.
BUG=chromium-os:22896
TEST=did chrome os builds both with and without aura
TBR=sky
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9125006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 109,292 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::SyncHistoryWithTabs(int index) {
SessionService* session_service =
SessionServiceFactory::GetForProfileIfExisting(profile());
if (session_service) {
for (int i = index; i < tab_strip_model_->count(); ++i) {
WebContents* web_contents = tab_strip_model_->GetWebContentsAt(i);
if (web_contents) {
SessionTabHelper* session_tab_helper =
SessionTabHelper::FromWebContents(web_contents);
session_service->SetTabIndexInWindow(
session_id(), session_tab_helper->session_id(), i);
session_service->SetPinnedState(
session_id(),
session_tab_helper->session_id(),
tab_strip_model_->IsTabPinned(i));
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: Don't focus the location bar for NTP navigations in non-selected tabs.
BUG=677716
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2624373002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#443338}
CWE ID: | 0 | 139,070 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserView::ActivateAppModalDialog() const {
app_modal::JavaScriptAppModalDialog* active_dialog =
app_modal::AppModalDialogQueue::GetInstance()->active_dialog();
if (!active_dialog)
return;
Browser* modal_browser =
chrome::FindBrowserWithWebContents(active_dialog->web_contents());
if (modal_browser && (browser_.get() != modal_browser)) {
modal_browser->window()->FlashFrame(true);
modal_browser->window()->Activate();
}
app_modal::AppModalDialogQueue::GetInstance()->ActivateModalDialog();
}
Commit Message: Mac: turn popups into new tabs while in fullscreen.
It's platform convention to show popups as new tabs while in
non-HTML5 fullscreen. (Popups cause tabs to lose HTML5 fullscreen.)
This was implemented for Cocoa in a BrowserWindow override, but
it makes sense to just stick it into Browser and remove a ton
of override code put in just to support this.
BUG=858929, 868416
TEST=as in bugs
Change-Id: I43471f242813ec1159d9c690bab73dab3e610b7d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1153455
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <sdy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#578755}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 155,139 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LayerTreeHostImpl::FrameData::FrameData()
: render_surface_layer_list(nullptr),
has_no_damage(false),
may_contain_video(false) {}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 137,271 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void exit_thread(void)
{
discard_lazy_cpu_state();
}
Commit Message: powerpc/tm: Fix crash when forking inside a transaction
When we fork/clone we currently don't copy any of the TM state to the new
thread. This results in a TM bad thing (program check) when the new process is
switched in as the kernel does a tmrechkpt with TEXASR FS not set. Also, since
R1 is from userspace, we trigger the bad kernel stack pointer detection. So we
end up with something like this:
Bad kernel stack pointer 0 at c0000000000404fc
cpu 0x2: Vector: 700 (Program Check) at [c00000003ffefd40]
pc: c0000000000404fc: restore_gprs+0xc0/0x148
lr: 0000000000000000
sp: 0
msr: 9000000100201030
current = 0xc000001dd1417c30
paca = 0xc00000000fe00800 softe: 0 irq_happened: 0x01
pid = 0, comm = swapper/2
WARNING: exception is not recoverable, can't continue
The below fixes this by flushing the TM state before we copy the task_struct to
the clone. To do this we go through the tmreclaim patch, which removes the
checkpointed registers from the CPU and transitions the CPU out of TM suspend
mode. Hence we need to call tmrechkpt after to restore the checkpointed state
and the TM mode for the current task.
To make this fail from userspace is simply:
tbegin
li r0, 2
sc
<boom>
Kudos to Adhemerval Zanella Neto for finding this.
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
cc: Adhemerval Zanella Neto <azanella@br.ibm.com>
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 38,622 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int __attribute__((weak)) arch_update_cpu_topology(void)
{
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,342 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ShellSurface::SetApplicationId(const std::string& application_id) {
TRACE_EVENT1("exo", "ShellSurface::SetApplicationId", "application_id",
application_id);
application_id_ = application_id;
}
Commit Message: exo: Reduce side-effects of dynamic activation code.
This code exists for clients that need to managed their own system
modal dialogs. Since the addition of the remote surface API we
can limit the impact of this to surfaces created for system modal
container.
BUG=29528396
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2084023003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#401115}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 120,093 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType ReadPSDMergedImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
Image* image,const PSDInfo* psd_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
MagickOffsetType
*sizes;
MagickBooleanType
status;
PSDCompressionType
compression;
register ssize_t
i;
compression=(PSDCompressionType) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
image->compression=ConvertPSDCompression(compression);
if (compression != Raw && compression != RLE)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
TypeWarning,"CompressionNotSupported","'%.20g'",(double) compression);
return(MagickFalse);
}
sizes=(MagickOffsetType *) NULL;
if (compression == RLE)
{
sizes=ReadPSDRLESizes(image,psd_info,image->rows*psd_info->channels);
if (sizes == (MagickOffsetType *) NULL)
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
}
status=MagickTrue;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) psd_info->channels; i++)
{
if (compression == RLE)
status=ReadPSDChannelRLE(image,psd_info,i,sizes+(i*image->rows),
exception);
else
status=ReadPSDChannelRaw(image,psd_info->channels,i,exception);
if (status != MagickFalse)
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,i,psd_info->channels);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
if ((status != MagickFalse) && (image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace))
status=NegateImage(image,MagickFalse);
if (status != MagickFalse)
status=CorrectPSDAlphaBlend(image_info,image,exception);
sizes=(MagickOffsetType *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sizes);
return(status);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/714
CWE ID: CWE-834 | 0 | 61,519 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RemoteFrame* RemoteFrame::Create(RemoteFrameClient* client,
Page& page,
FrameOwner* owner) {
RemoteFrame* frame = new RemoteFrame(client, page, owner);
PageScheduler* page_scheduler = page.GetPageScheduler();
if (frame->IsMainFrame() && page_scheduler)
page_scheduler->SetIsMainFrameLocal(false);
return frame;
}
Commit Message: Add a check for disallowing remote frame navigations to local resources.
Previously, RemoteFrame navigations did not perform any renderer-side
checks and relied solely on the browser-side logic to block disallowed
navigations via mechanisms like FilterURL. This means that blocked
remote frame navigations were silently navigated to about:blank
without any console error message.
This CL adds a CanDisplay check to the remote navigation path to match
an equivalent check done for local frame navigations. This way, the
renderer can consistently block disallowed navigations in both cases
and output an error message.
Bug: 894399
Change-Id: I172f68f77c1676f6ca0172d2a6c78f7edc0e3b7a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1282390
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#601022}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 143,949 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void* PPB_ImageData_Impl::Map() {
return backend_->Map();
}
Commit Message: Security fix: integer overflow on checking image size
Test is left in another CL (codereview.chromiu,.org/11274036) to avoid conflict there. Hope it's fine.
BUG=160926
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11410081
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167882 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 102,388 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned int num_demux_regs(void)
{
unsigned int i, count = 0;
for (i = 0; i < CSSELR_MAX; i++)
if (is_valid_cache(i))
count++;
return count;
}
Commit Message: arm64: KVM: pmu: Fix AArch32 cycle counter access
We're missing the handling code for the cycle counter accessed
from a 32bit guest, leading to unexpected results.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.6+
Signed-off-by: Wei Huang <wei@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 62,908 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cqspi_suspend(struct device *dev)
{
struct cqspi_st *cqspi = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
cqspi_controller_enable(cqspi, 0);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mtd: spi-nor: Off by one in cqspi_setup_flash()
There are CQSPI_MAX_CHIPSELECT elements in the ->f_pdata array so the >
should be >=.
Fixes: 140623410536 ('mtd: spi-nor: Add driver for Cadence Quad SPI Flash Controller')
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Marek Vasut <marex@denx.de>
Signed-off-by: Cyrille Pitchen <cyrille.pitchen@atmel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 93,684 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderThreadImpl::AddRoute(int32 routing_id, IPC::Listener* listener) {
ChildThread::GetRouter()->AddRoute(routing_id, listener);
std::map<int, mojo::MessagePipeHandle>::iterator it =
pending_render_frame_connects_.find(routing_id);
if (it == pending_render_frame_connects_.end())
return;
RenderFrameImpl* frame = RenderFrameImpl::FromRoutingID(routing_id);
if (!frame)
return;
mojo::ScopedMessagePipeHandle handle(it->second);
pending_render_frame_connects_.erase(it);
frame->BindServiceRegistry(handle.Pass());
}
Commit Message: Suspend shared timers while blockingly closing databases
BUG=388771
R=michaeln@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/409863002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@284785 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 111,117 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int allocateSpace(MemPage *pPage, int nByte, int *pIdx){
const int hdr = pPage->hdrOffset; /* Local cache of pPage->hdrOffset */
u8 * const data = pPage->aData; /* Local cache of pPage->aData */
int top; /* First byte of cell content area */
int rc = SQLITE_OK; /* Integer return code */
int gap; /* First byte of gap between cell pointers and cell content */
assert( sqlite3PagerIswriteable(pPage->pDbPage) );
assert( pPage->pBt );
assert( sqlite3_mutex_held(pPage->pBt->mutex) );
assert( nByte>=0 ); /* Minimum cell size is 4 */
assert( pPage->nFree>=nByte );
assert( pPage->nOverflow==0 );
assert( nByte < (int)(pPage->pBt->usableSize-8) );
assert( pPage->cellOffset == hdr + 12 - 4*pPage->leaf );
gap = pPage->cellOffset + 2*pPage->nCell;
assert( gap<=65536 );
/* EVIDENCE-OF: R-29356-02391 If the database uses a 65536-byte page size
** and the reserved space is zero (the usual value for reserved space)
** then the cell content offset of an empty page wants to be 65536.
** However, that integer is too large to be stored in a 2-byte unsigned
** integer, so a value of 0 is used in its place. */
top = get2byte(&data[hdr+5]);
assert( top<=(int)pPage->pBt->usableSize ); /* Prevent by getAndInitPage() */
if( gap>top ){
if( top==0 && pPage->pBt->usableSize==65536 ){
top = 65536;
}else{
return SQLITE_CORRUPT_BKPT;
}
}
/* If there is enough space between gap and top for one more cell pointer
** array entry offset, and if the freelist is not empty, then search the
** freelist looking for a free slot big enough to satisfy the request.
*/
testcase( gap+2==top );
testcase( gap+1==top );
testcase( gap==top );
if( (data[hdr+2] || data[hdr+1]) && gap+2<=top ){
u8 *pSpace = pageFindSlot(pPage, nByte, &rc);
if( pSpace ){
assert( pSpace>=data && (pSpace - data)<65536 );
*pIdx = (int)(pSpace - data);
return SQLITE_OK;
}else if( rc ){
return rc;
}
}
/* The request could not be fulfilled using a freelist slot. Check
** to see if defragmentation is necessary.
*/
testcase( gap+2+nByte==top );
if( gap+2+nByte>top ){
assert( pPage->nCell>0 || CORRUPT_DB );
rc = defragmentPage(pPage);
if( rc ) return rc;
top = get2byteNotZero(&data[hdr+5]);
assert( gap+nByte<=top );
}
/* Allocate memory from the gap in between the cell pointer array
** and the cell content area. The btreeInitPage() call has already
** validated the freelist. Given that the freelist is valid, there
** is no way that the allocation can extend off the end of the page.
** The assert() below verifies the previous sentence.
*/
top -= nByte;
put2byte(&data[hdr+5], top);
assert( top+nByte <= (int)pPage->pBt->usableSize );
*pIdx = top;
return SQLITE_OK;
}
Commit Message: sqlite: safely move pointer values through SQL.
This lands https://www.sqlite.org/src/timeline?c=d6a44b35 in
third_party/sqlite/src/ and
third_party/sqlite/patches/0013-Add-new-interfaces-sqlite3_bind_pointer-sqlite3_resu.patch
and re-generates third_party/sqlite/amalgamation/* using the script at
third_party/sqlite/google_generate_amalgamation.sh.
The CL also adds a layout test that verifies the patch works as intended.
BUG=742407
Change-Id: I2e1a457459cd2e975e6241b630e7b79c82545981
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/572976
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#487275}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 136,293 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void blk_pre_runtime_resume(struct request_queue *q)
{
if (!q->dev)
return;
spin_lock_irq(q->queue_lock);
q->rpm_status = RPM_RESUMING;
spin_unlock_irq(q->queue_lock);
}
Commit Message: block: blk_init_allocated_queue() set q->fq as NULL in the fail case
We find the memory use-after-free issue in __blk_drain_queue()
on the kernel 4.14. After read the latest kernel 4.18-rc6 we
think it has the same problem.
Memory is allocated for q->fq in the blk_init_allocated_queue().
If the elevator init function called with error return, it will
run into the fail case to free the q->fq.
Then the __blk_drain_queue() uses the same memory after the free
of the q->fq, it will lead to the unpredictable event.
The patch is to set q->fq as NULL in the fail case of
blk_init_allocated_queue().
Fixes: commit 7c94e1c157a2 ("block: introduce blk_flush_queue to drive flush machinery")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: xiao jin <jin.xiao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 92,004 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static opj_bool pi_next_pcrl(opj_pi_iterator_t * pi)
{
opj_pi_comp_t *comp = NULL;
opj_pi_resolution_t *res = NULL;
long index = 0;
if (!pi->first) {
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
goto LABEL_SKIP;
} else {
int compno, resno;
pi->first = 0;
pi->dx = 0;
pi->dy = 0;
for (compno = 0; compno < pi->numcomps; compno++) {
comp = &pi->comps[compno];
for (resno = 0; resno < comp->numresolutions; resno++) {
int dx, dy;
res = &comp->resolutions[resno];
dx = comp->dx * (1 << (res->pdx + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
dy = comp->dy * (1 << (res->pdy + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
pi->dx = !pi->dx ? dx : int_min(pi->dx, dx);
pi->dy = !pi->dy ? dy : int_min(pi->dy, dy);
}
}
}
if (!pi->tp_on) {
pi->poc.ty0 = pi->ty0;
pi->poc.tx0 = pi->tx0;
pi->poc.ty1 = pi->ty1;
pi->poc.tx1 = pi->tx1;
}
for (pi->y = pi->poc.ty0; pi->y < pi->poc.ty1;
pi->y += pi->dy - (pi->y % pi->dy)) {
for (pi->x = pi->poc.tx0; pi->x < pi->poc.tx1;
pi->x += pi->dx - (pi->x % pi->dx)) {
for (pi->compno = pi->poc.compno0; pi->compno < pi->poc.compno1; pi->compno++) {
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
for (pi->resno = pi->poc.resno0;
pi->resno < int_min(pi->poc.resno1, comp->numresolutions); pi->resno++) {
int levelno;
int trx0, try0;
int trx1, try1;
int rpx, rpy;
int prci, prcj;
res = &comp->resolutions[pi->resno];
levelno = comp->numresolutions - 1 - pi->resno;
trx0 = int_ceildiv(pi->tx0, comp->dx << levelno);
try0 = int_ceildiv(pi->ty0, comp->dy << levelno);
trx1 = int_ceildiv(pi->tx1, comp->dx << levelno);
try1 = int_ceildiv(pi->ty1, comp->dy << levelno);
rpx = res->pdx + levelno;
rpy = res->pdy + levelno;
/* To avoid divisions by zero / undefined behaviour on shift */
if (rpx >= 31 || ((comp->dx << rpx) >> rpx) != comp->dx ||
rpy >= 31 || ((comp->dy << rpy) >> rpy) != comp->dy) {
continue;
}
if (!((pi->y % (comp->dy << rpy) == 0) || ((pi->y == pi->ty0) &&
((try0 << levelno) % (1 << rpy))))) {
continue;
}
if (!((pi->x % (comp->dx << rpx) == 0) || ((pi->x == pi->tx0) &&
((trx0 << levelno) % (1 << rpx))))) {
continue;
}
if ((res->pw == 0) || (res->ph == 0)) {
continue;
}
if ((trx0 == trx1) || (try0 == try1)) {
continue;
}
prci = int_floordivpow2(int_ceildiv(pi->x, comp->dx << levelno), res->pdx)
- int_floordivpow2(trx0, res->pdx);
prcj = int_floordivpow2(int_ceildiv(pi->y, comp->dy << levelno), res->pdy)
- int_floordivpow2(try0, res->pdy);
pi->precno = prci + prcj * res->pw;
for (pi->layno = pi->poc.layno0; pi->layno < pi->poc.layno1; pi->layno++) {
index = pi->layno * pi->step_l + pi->resno * pi->step_r + pi->compno *
pi->step_c + pi->precno * pi->step_p;
if (!pi->include[index]) {
pi->include[index] = 1;
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
LABEL_SKIP:
;
}
}
}
}
}
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
Commit Message: [MJ2] Avoid index out of bounds access to pi->include[]
Signed-off-by: Young_X <YangX92@hotmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 169,769 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ssd_int8_vs_int16_c(const int8_t *pix1, const int16_t *pix2,
int size){
int score=0;
int i;
for(i=0; i<size; i++)
score += (pix1[i]-pix2[i])*(pix1[i]-pix2[i]);
return score;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/dsputil: fix signedness in sizeof() comparissions
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 28,180 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: convert_to_enterprise(krb5_context context, krb5_principal princ,
krb5_principal *eprinc_out)
{
krb5_error_code code;
char *str;
*eprinc_out = NULL;
code = krb5_unparse_name(context, princ, &str);
if (code != 0)
return code;
code = krb5_parse_name_flags(context, str,
KRB5_PRINCIPAL_PARSE_ENTERPRISE |
KRB5_PRINCIPAL_PARSE_IGNORE_REALM,
eprinc_out);
krb5_free_unparsed_name(context, str);
return code;
}
Commit Message: Ignore password attributes for S4U2Self requests
For consistency with Windows KDCs, allow protocol transition to work
even if the password has expired or needs changing.
Also, when looking up an enterprise principal with an AS request,
treat ERR_KEY_EXP as confirmation that the client is present in the
realm.
[ghudson@mit.edu: added comment in kdc_process_s4u2self_req(); edited
commit message]
ticket: 8763 (new)
tags: pullup
target_version: 1.17
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 75,484 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: test_function (char * (*my_asnprintf) (char *, size_t *, const char *, ...))
{
char buf[8];
int size;
for (size = 0; size <= 8; size++)
{
size_t length = size;
char *result = my_asnprintf (NULL, &length, "%d", 12345);
ASSERT (result != NULL);
ASSERT (strcmp (result, "12345") == 0);
ASSERT (length == 5);
free (result);
}
for (size = 0; size <= 8; size++)
{
size_t length;
char *result;
memcpy (buf, "DEADBEEF", 8);
length = size;
result = my_asnprintf (buf, &length, "%d", 12345);
ASSERT (result != NULL);
ASSERT (strcmp (result, "12345") == 0);
ASSERT (length == 5);
if (size < 6)
ASSERT (result != buf);
ASSERT (memcmp (buf + size, &"DEADBEEF"[size], 8 - size) == 0);
if (result != buf)
free (result);
}
}
Commit Message: vasnprintf: Fix heap memory overrun bug.
Reported by Ben Pfaff <blp@cs.stanford.edu> in
<https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/bug-gnulib/2018-09/msg00107.html>.
* lib/vasnprintf.c (convert_to_decimal): Allocate one more byte of
memory.
* tests/test-vasnprintf.c (test_function): Add another test.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 169,014 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: views::View* ProfileChooserView::CreateAutofillHomeView() {
if (browser_->profile()->IsGuestSession())
return nullptr;
views::View* view = new views::View();
view->SetLayoutManager(
std::make_unique<views::BoxLayout>(views::BoxLayout::kVertical));
passwords_button_ = new HoverButton(
this, gfx::CreateVectorIcon(kKeyIcon, kIconSize, gfx::kChromeIconGrey),
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_PROFILES_PASSWORDS_LINK));
view->AddChildView(passwords_button_);
credit_cards_button_ = new HoverButton(
this,
gfx::CreateVectorIcon(kCreditCardIcon, kIconSize, gfx::kChromeIconGrey),
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_PROFILES_CREDIT_CARDS_LINK));
view->AddChildView(credit_cards_button_);
addresses_button_ =
new HoverButton(this,
gfx::CreateVectorIcon(vector_icons::kLocationOnIcon,
kIconSize, gfx::kChromeIconGrey),
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_PROFILES_ADDRESSES_LINK));
view->AddChildView(addresses_button_);
return view;
}
Commit Message: [signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <droger@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <isherman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <msarda@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 143,137 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OxideQQuickWebViewPrivate::CertificateError(
std::unique_ptr<OxideQCertificateError> cert_error) {
Q_Q(OxideQQuickWebView);
QQmlEngine* engine = qmlEngine(q);
if (!engine) {
return;
}
{
QJSValue val = engine->newQObject(cert_error.get());
if (!val.isQObject()) {
return;
}
cert_error.release();
emit q->certificateError(val);
}
engine->collectGarbage();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,025 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct mfc6_cache *ip6mr_cache_find_any_parent(struct mr6_table *mrt,
mifi_t mifi)
{
int line = MFC6_HASH(&in6addr_any, &in6addr_any);
struct mfc6_cache *c;
list_for_each_entry(c, &mrt->mfc6_cache_array[line], list)
if (ipv6_addr_any(&c->mf6c_origin) &&
ipv6_addr_any(&c->mf6c_mcastgrp) &&
(c->mfc_un.res.ttls[mifi] < 255))
return c;
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: check sk sk_type and protocol early in ip_mroute_set/getsockopt
Commit 5e1859fbcc3c ("ipv4: ipmr: various fixes and cleanups") fixed
the issue for ipv4 ipmr:
ip_mroute_setsockopt() & ip_mroute_getsockopt() should not
access/set raw_sk(sk)->ipmr_table before making sure the socket
is a raw socket, and protocol is IGMP
The same fix should be done for ipv6 ipmr as well.
This patch can fix the panic caused by overwriting the same offset
as ipmr_table as in raw_sk(sk) when accessing other type's socket
by ip_mroute_setsockopt().
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 93,517 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int setup_kmem_cache_node(struct kmem_cache *cachep,
int node, gfp_t gfp, bool force_change)
{
int ret = -ENOMEM;
struct kmem_cache_node *n;
struct array_cache *old_shared = NULL;
struct array_cache *new_shared = NULL;
struct alien_cache **new_alien = NULL;
LIST_HEAD(list);
if (use_alien_caches) {
new_alien = alloc_alien_cache(node, cachep->limit, gfp);
if (!new_alien)
goto fail;
}
if (cachep->shared) {
new_shared = alloc_arraycache(node,
cachep->shared * cachep->batchcount, 0xbaadf00d, gfp);
if (!new_shared)
goto fail;
}
ret = init_cache_node(cachep, node, gfp);
if (ret)
goto fail;
n = get_node(cachep, node);
spin_lock_irq(&n->list_lock);
if (n->shared && force_change) {
free_block(cachep, n->shared->entry,
n->shared->avail, node, &list);
n->shared->avail = 0;
}
if (!n->shared || force_change) {
old_shared = n->shared;
n->shared = new_shared;
new_shared = NULL;
}
if (!n->alien) {
n->alien = new_alien;
new_alien = NULL;
}
spin_unlock_irq(&n->list_lock);
slabs_destroy(cachep, &list);
/*
* To protect lockless access to n->shared during irq disabled context.
* If n->shared isn't NULL in irq disabled context, accessing to it is
* guaranteed to be valid until irq is re-enabled, because it will be
* freed after synchronize_sched().
*/
if (old_shared && force_change)
synchronize_sched();
fail:
kfree(old_shared);
kfree(new_shared);
free_alien_cache(new_alien);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: mm/slab.c: fix SLAB freelist randomization duplicate entries
This patch fixes a bug in the freelist randomization code. When a high
random number is used, the freelist will contain duplicate entries. It
will result in different allocations sharing the same chunk.
It will result in odd behaviours and crashes. It should be uncommon but
it depends on the machines. We saw it happening more often on some
machines (every few hours of running tests).
Fixes: c7ce4f60ac19 ("mm: SLAB freelist randomization")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170103181908.143178-1-thgarnie@google.com
Signed-off-by: John Sperbeck <jsperbeck@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 68,927 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t regulator_status_show(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
struct regulator_dev *rdev = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
int status;
char *label;
status = rdev->desc->ops->get_status(rdev);
if (status < 0)
return status;
switch (status) {
case REGULATOR_STATUS_OFF:
label = "off";
break;
case REGULATOR_STATUS_ON:
label = "on";
break;
case REGULATOR_STATUS_ERROR:
label = "error";
break;
case REGULATOR_STATUS_FAST:
label = "fast";
break;
case REGULATOR_STATUS_NORMAL:
label = "normal";
break;
case REGULATOR_STATUS_IDLE:
label = "idle";
break;
case REGULATOR_STATUS_STANDBY:
label = "standby";
break;
case REGULATOR_STATUS_BYPASS:
label = "bypass";
break;
case REGULATOR_STATUS_UNDEFINED:
label = "undefined";
break;
default:
return -ERANGE;
}
return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", label);
}
Commit Message: regulator: core: Fix regualtor_ena_gpio_free not to access pin after freeing
After freeing pin from regulator_ena_gpio_free, loop can access
the pin. So this patch fixes not to access pin after freeing.
Signed-off-by: Seung-Woo Kim <sw0312.kim@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 74,542 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FT_Bitmap_Embolden( FT_Library library,
FT_Bitmap* bitmap,
FT_Pos xStrength,
FT_Pos yStrength )
{
FT_Error error;
unsigned char* p;
FT_Int i, x, y, pitch;
FT_Int xstr, ystr;
return FT_THROW( Invalid_Library_Handle );
if ( !bitmap || !bitmap->buffer )
return FT_THROW( Invalid_Argument );
if ( ( ( FT_PIX_ROUND( xStrength ) >> 6 ) > FT_INT_MAX ) ||
( ( FT_PIX_ROUND( yStrength ) >> 6 ) > FT_INT_MAX ) )
return FT_THROW( Invalid_Argument );
xstr = (FT_Int)FT_PIX_ROUND( xStrength ) >> 6;
ystr = (FT_Int)FT_PIX_ROUND( yStrength ) >> 6;
if ( xstr == 0 && ystr == 0 )
return FT_Err_Ok;
else if ( xstr < 0 || ystr < 0 )
return FT_THROW( Invalid_Argument );
switch ( bitmap->pixel_mode )
{
case FT_PIXEL_MODE_GRAY2:
case FT_PIXEL_MODE_GRAY4:
{
FT_Bitmap tmp;
/* convert to 8bpp */
FT_Bitmap_New( &tmp );
error = FT_Bitmap_Convert( library, bitmap, &tmp, 1 );
if ( error )
return error;
FT_Bitmap_Done( library, bitmap );
*bitmap = tmp;
}
break;
case FT_PIXEL_MODE_MONO:
if ( xstr > 8 )
xstr = 8;
break;
case FT_PIXEL_MODE_LCD:
xstr *= 3;
break;
case FT_PIXEL_MODE_LCD_V:
ystr *= 3;
break;
case FT_PIXEL_MODE_BGRA:
/* We don't embolden color glyphs. */
return FT_Err_Ok;
}
error = ft_bitmap_assure_buffer( library->memory, bitmap, xstr, ystr );
if ( error )
return error;
/* take care of bitmap flow */
pitch = bitmap->pitch;
if ( pitch > 0 )
p = bitmap->buffer + pitch * ystr;
else
{
pitch = -pitch;
p = bitmap->buffer + pitch * ( bitmap->rows - 1 );
}
/* for each row */
for ( y = 0; y < bitmap->rows ; y++ )
{
/*
* Horizontally:
*
* From the last pixel on, make each pixel or'ed with the
* `xstr' pixels before it.
*/
for ( x = pitch - 1; x >= 0; x-- )
{
unsigned char tmp;
tmp = p[x];
for ( i = 1; i <= xstr; i++ )
{
if ( bitmap->pixel_mode == FT_PIXEL_MODE_MONO )
{
p[x] |= tmp >> i;
/* the maximum value of 8 for `xstr' comes from here */
if ( x > 0 )
p[x] |= p[x - 1] << ( 8 - i );
#if 0
if ( p[x] == 0xff )
break;
#endif
}
else
{
if ( x - i >= 0 )
{
if ( p[x] + p[x - i] > bitmap->num_grays - 1 )
{
p[x] = (unsigned char)( bitmap->num_grays - 1 );
break;
}
else
{
p[x] = (unsigned char)( p[x] + p[x - i] );
if ( p[x] == bitmap->num_grays - 1 )
break;
}
}
else
break;
}
}
}
/*
* Vertically:
*
* Make the above `ystr' rows or'ed with it.
*/
for ( x = 1; x <= ystr; x++ )
{
unsigned char* q;
q = p - bitmap->pitch * x;
for ( i = 0; i < pitch; i++ )
q[i] |= p[i];
}
p += bitmap->pitch;
}
bitmap->width += xstr;
bitmap->rows += ystr;
return FT_Err_Ok;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 164,849 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ResourceFetcher::derefResourceLoaderHost()
{
deref();
}
Commit Message: Enforce SVG image security rules
SVG images have unique security rules that prevent them from loading
any external resources. This patch enforces these rules in
ResourceFetcher::canRequest for all non-data-uri resources. This locks
down our SVG resource handling and fixes two security bugs.
In the case of SVG images that reference other images, we had a bug
where a cached subresource would be used directly from the cache.
This has been fixed because the canRequest check occurs before we use
cached resources.
In the case of SVG images that use CSS imports, we had a bug where
imports were blindly requested. This has been fixed by stopping all
non-data-uri requests in SVG images.
With this patch we now match Gecko's behavior on both testcases.
BUG=380885, 382296
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/320763002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@176084 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 121,225 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __perf_event_overflow(struct perf_event *event,
int throttle, struct perf_sample_data *data,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
int events = atomic_read(&event->event_limit);
struct hw_perf_event *hwc = &event->hw;
u64 seq;
int ret = 0;
/*
* Non-sampling counters might still use the PMI to fold short
* hardware counters, ignore those.
*/
if (unlikely(!is_sampling_event(event)))
return 0;
seq = __this_cpu_read(perf_throttled_seq);
if (seq != hwc->interrupts_seq) {
hwc->interrupts_seq = seq;
hwc->interrupts = 1;
} else {
hwc->interrupts++;
if (unlikely(throttle
&& hwc->interrupts >= max_samples_per_tick)) {
__this_cpu_inc(perf_throttled_count);
hwc->interrupts = MAX_INTERRUPTS;
perf_log_throttle(event, 0);
ret = 1;
}
}
if (event->attr.freq) {
u64 now = perf_clock();
s64 delta = now - hwc->freq_time_stamp;
hwc->freq_time_stamp = now;
if (delta > 0 && delta < 2*TICK_NSEC)
perf_adjust_period(event, delta, hwc->last_period, true);
}
/*
* XXX event_limit might not quite work as expected on inherited
* events
*/
event->pending_kill = POLL_IN;
if (events && atomic_dec_and_test(&event->event_limit)) {
ret = 1;
event->pending_kill = POLL_HUP;
event->pending_disable = 1;
irq_work_queue(&event->pending);
}
if (event->overflow_handler)
event->overflow_handler(event, data, regs);
else
perf_event_output(event, data, regs);
if (event->fasync && event->pending_kill) {
event->pending_wakeup = 1;
irq_work_queue(&event->pending);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: perf: Treat attr.config as u64 in perf_swevent_init()
Trinity discovered that we fail to check all 64 bits of
attr.config passed by user space, resulting to out-of-bounds
access of the perf_swevent_enabled array in
sw_perf_event_destroy().
Introduced in commit b0a873ebb ("perf: Register PMU
implementations").
Signed-off-by: Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: davej@redhat.com
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@ghostprotocols.net>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365882554-30259-1-git-send-email-tt.rantala@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 31,902 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ip_vs_get_debug_level(void)
{
return sysctl_ip_vs_debug_level;
}
Commit Message: ipvs: Add boundary check on ioctl arguments
The ipvs code has a nifty system for doing the size of ioctl command
copies; it defines an array with values into which it indexes the cmd
to find the right length.
Unfortunately, the ipvs code forgot to check if the cmd was in the
range that the array provides, allowing for an index outside of the
array, which then gives a "garbage" result into the length, which
then gets used for copying into a stack buffer.
Fix this by adding sanity checks on these as well as the copy size.
[ horms@verge.net.au: adjusted limit to IP_VS_SO_GET_MAX ]
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 29,272 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: char * getname(const char __user * filename)
{
char *tmp, *result;
result = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
tmp = __getname();
if (tmp) {
int retval = do_getname(filename, tmp);
result = tmp;
if (retval < 0) {
__putname(tmp);
result = ERR_PTR(retval);
}
}
audit_getname(result);
return result;
}
Commit Message: fix autofs/afs/etc. magic mountpoint breakage
We end up trying to kfree() nd.last.name on open("/mnt/tmp", O_CREAT)
if /mnt/tmp is an autofs direct mount. The reason is that nd.last_type
is bogus here; we want LAST_BIND for everything of that kind and we
get LAST_NORM left over from finding parent directory.
So make sure that it *is* set properly; set to LAST_BIND before
doing ->follow_link() - for normal symlinks it will be changed
by __vfs_follow_link() and everything else needs it set that way.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 39,690 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline const char* toString(bool value) {
return value ? "true" : "false";
}
Commit Message: Add new MotionEvent flag for partially obscured windows.
Due to more complex window layouts resulting in lots of overlapping
windows, the policy around FLAG_WINDOW_IS_OBSCURED has changed to
only be set when the point at which the window was touched is
obscured. Unfortunately, this doesn't prevent tapjacking attacks that
overlay the dialog's text, making a potentially dangerous operation
seem innocuous. To avoid this on particularly sensitive dialogs,
introduce a new flag that really does tell you when your window is
being even partially overlapped.
We aren't exposing this as API since we plan on making the original
flag more robust. This is really a workaround for system dialogs
since we generally know their layout and screen position, and that
they're unlikely to be overlapped by other applications.
Bug: 26677796
Change-Id: I9e336afe90f262ba22015876769a9c510048fd47
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 163,846 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void StatusNoOpKeepingRegistration(
scoped_refptr<content::ServiceWorkerRegistration> protect,
ServiceWorkerStatusCode status) {
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 148,612 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ap_queue_enable_interruption(ap_qid_t qid, void *ind)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
struct ap_queue_status status;
int t_depth, t_device_type, rc, i;
rc = -EBUSY;
status = ap_queue_interruption_control(qid, ind);
for (i = 0; i < AP_MAX_RESET; i++) {
switch (status.response_code) {
case AP_RESPONSE_NORMAL:
if (status.int_enabled)
return 0;
break;
case AP_RESPONSE_RESET_IN_PROGRESS:
case AP_RESPONSE_BUSY:
if (i < AP_MAX_RESET - 1) {
udelay(5);
status = ap_queue_interruption_control(qid,
ind);
continue;
}
break;
case AP_RESPONSE_Q_NOT_AVAIL:
case AP_RESPONSE_DECONFIGURED:
case AP_RESPONSE_CHECKSTOPPED:
case AP_RESPONSE_INVALID_ADDRESS:
return -ENODEV;
case AP_RESPONSE_OTHERWISE_CHANGED:
if (status.int_enabled)
return 0;
break;
default:
break;
}
if (i < AP_MAX_RESET - 1) {
udelay(5);
status = ap_test_queue(qid, &t_depth, &t_device_type);
}
}
return rc;
#else
return -EINVAL;
#endif
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 47,621 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SimulateMouseMove(int x, int y, int modifiers) {
SimulateMouseEvent(WebInputEvent::kMouseMove, x, y, modifiers, false);
}
Commit Message: Start rendering timer after first navigation
Currently the new content rendering timer in the browser process,
which clears an old page's contents 4 seconds after a navigation if the
new page doesn't draw in that time, is not set on the first navigation
for a top-level frame.
This is problematic because content can exist before the first
navigation, for instance if it was created by a javascript: URL.
This CL removes the code that skips the timer activation on the first
navigation.
Bug: 844881
Change-Id: I19b3ad1ff62c69ded3a5f7b1c0afde191aaf4584
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1188589
Reviewed-by: Fady Samuel <fsamuel@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: ccameron <ccameron@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586913}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 145,654 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ExtensionSettingsHandler::HandleShowButtonMessage(const ListValue* args) {
const Extension* extension = GetExtension(args);
extension_service_->SetBrowserActionVisibility(extension, true);
}
Commit Message: [i18n-fixlet] Make strings branding specific in extension code.
IDS_EXTENSIONS_UNINSTALL
IDS_EXTENSIONS_INCOGNITO_WARNING
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_HEADING
IDS_EXTENSION_ALERT_ITEM_EXTERNAL And fix a $1 $1 bug.
IDS_EXTENSION_INLINE_INSTALL_PROMPT_TITLE
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9107061
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@118018 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 107,814 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init rmd256_mod_init(void)
{
return crypto_register_shash(&alg);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 47,316 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bson_iter_init_find_case (bson_iter_t *iter, /* INOUT */
const bson_t *bson, /* IN */
const char *key) /* IN */
{
BSON_ASSERT (iter);
BSON_ASSERT (bson);
BSON_ASSERT (key);
return bson_iter_init (iter, bson) && bson_iter_find_case (iter, key);
}
Commit Message: Fix for CVE-2018-16790 -- Verify bounds before binary length read.
As reported here: https://jira.mongodb.org/browse/CDRIVER-2819,
a heap overread occurs due a failure to correctly verify data
bounds.
In the original check, len - o returns the data left including the
sizeof(l) we just read. Instead, the comparison should check
against the data left NOT including the binary int32, i.e. just
subtype (byte*) instead of int32 subtype (byte*).
Added in test for corrupted BSON example.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 77,837 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate::GetSaveDir(
content::BrowserContext* browser_context,
base::FilePath* website_save_dir,
base::FilePath* download_save_dir,
bool* skip_dir_check) {
*website_save_dir = download_prefs_->SaveFilePath();
DCHECK(!website_save_dir->empty());
*download_save_dir = download_prefs_->DownloadPath();
*skip_dir_check = false;
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
*skip_dir_check = drive::util::IsUnderDriveMountPoint(*website_save_dir);
#endif
}
Commit Message: Downloads : Fixed an issue of opening incorrect download file
When one download overwrites another completed download, calling download.open in the old download causes the new download to open, which could be dangerous and undesirable. In this CL, we are trying to avoid this by blocking the opening of the old download.
Bug: 793620
Change-Id: Ic948175756700ad7c08489c3cc347330daedb6f8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/826477
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <dtrainor@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Shakti Sahu <shaktisahu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525810}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 146,250 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: uint16_t smbXcli_conn_max_requests(struct smbXcli_conn *conn)
{
if (conn->protocol >= PROTOCOL_SMB2_02) {
/*
* TODO...
*/
return 1;
}
return conn->smb1.server.max_mux;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 2,461 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::OnFrameDetached(int64 parent_frame_id, int64 frame_id) {
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(WebContentsObserver, observers_,
FrameDetached(message_source_, frame_id));
FrameTreeNode* parent = FindFrameTreeNodeByID(parent_frame_id);
if (!parent)
return;
parent->RemoveChild(frame_id);
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 110,729 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BpMemoryHeap::assertMapped() const
{
if (mHeapId == -1) {
sp<IBinder> binder(const_cast<BpMemoryHeap*>(this)->asBinder());
sp<BpMemoryHeap> heap(static_cast<BpMemoryHeap*>(find_heap(binder).get()));
heap->assertReallyMapped();
if (heap->mBase != MAP_FAILED) {
Mutex::Autolock _l(mLock);
if (mHeapId == -1) {
mBase = heap->mBase;
mSize = heap->mSize;
mOffset = heap->mOffset;
android_atomic_write( dup( heap->mHeapId ), &mHeapId );
}
} else {
free_heap(binder);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Sanity check IMemory access versus underlying mmap
Bug 26877992
Change-Id: Ibbf4b1061e4675e4e96bc944a865b53eaf6984fe
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 161,474 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8TestObject::ReflectReflectedNameAttributeTestAttributeAttributeSetterCallback(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_reflectReflectedNameAttributeTestAttribute_Setter");
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value = info[0];
test_object_v8_internal::ReflectReflectedNameAttributeTestAttributeAttributeSetter(v8_value, info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 135,088 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LocalRTCStatsRequest::~LocalRTCStatsRequest() {}
Commit Message: Check weak pointers in RTCPeerConnectionHandler::WebRtcSetDescriptionObserverImpl
Bug: 912074
Change-Id: I8ba86751f5d5bf12db51520f985ef0d3dae63ed8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1411916
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <hbos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#622945}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 153,020 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const char *c_strnstr(const char *s, const char *find, size_t slen) {
size_t find_length = strlen(find);
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < slen; i++) {
if (i + find_length > slen) {
return NULL;
}
if (strncmp(&s[i], find, find_length) == 0) {
return &s[i];
}
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fix heap-based overflow in parse_mqtt
PUBLISHED_FROM=3306592896298597fff5269634df0c1a1555113b
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 89,599 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: IntRect WebGL2RenderingContextBase::GetTextureSourceSubRectangle(
GLsizei width,
GLsizei height) {
return IntRect(unpack_skip_pixels_, unpack_skip_rows_, width, height);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,328 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __net_init dccp_v4_init_net(struct net *net)
{
if (dccp_hashinfo.bhash == NULL)
return -ESOCKTNOSUPPORT;
return inet_ctl_sock_create(&net->dccp.v4_ctl_sk, PF_INET,
SOCK_DCCP, IPPROTO_DCCP, net);
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 18,749 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void add_objects_in_unpacked_packs(struct rev_info *revs)
{
struct packed_git *p;
struct in_pack in_pack;
uint32_t i;
memset(&in_pack, 0, sizeof(in_pack));
for (p = packed_git; p; p = p->next) {
const unsigned char *sha1;
struct object *o;
if (!p->pack_local || p->pack_keep)
continue;
if (open_pack_index(p))
die("cannot open pack index");
ALLOC_GROW(in_pack.array,
in_pack.nr + p->num_objects,
in_pack.alloc);
for (i = 0; i < p->num_objects; i++) {
sha1 = nth_packed_object_sha1(p, i);
o = lookup_unknown_object(sha1);
if (!(o->flags & OBJECT_ADDED))
mark_in_pack_object(o, p, &in_pack);
o->flags |= OBJECT_ADDED;
}
}
if (in_pack.nr) {
qsort(in_pack.array, in_pack.nr, sizeof(in_pack.array[0]),
ofscmp);
for (i = 0; i < in_pack.nr; i++) {
struct object *o = in_pack.array[i].object;
add_object_entry(o->oid.hash, o->type, "", 0);
}
}
free(in_pack.array);
}
Commit Message: list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 54,825 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void guess_mv(ERContext *s)
{
int (*blocklist)[2], (*next_blocklist)[2];
uint8_t *fixed;
const ptrdiff_t mb_stride = s->mb_stride;
const int mb_width = s->mb_width;
int mb_height = s->mb_height;
int i, depth, num_avail;
int mb_x, mb_y;
ptrdiff_t mot_step, mot_stride;
int blocklist_length, next_blocklist_length;
if (s->last_pic.f && s->last_pic.f->data[0])
mb_height = FFMIN(mb_height, (s->last_pic.f->height+15)>>4);
if (s->next_pic.f && s->next_pic.f->data[0])
mb_height = FFMIN(mb_height, (s->next_pic.f->height+15)>>4);
blocklist = (int (*)[2])s->er_temp_buffer;
next_blocklist = blocklist + s->mb_stride * s->mb_height;
fixed = (uint8_t *)(next_blocklist + s->mb_stride * s->mb_height);
set_mv_strides(s, &mot_step, &mot_stride);
num_avail = 0;
if (s->last_pic.motion_val[0])
ff_thread_await_progress(s->last_pic.tf, mb_height-1, 0);
for (i = 0; i < mb_width * mb_height; i++) {
const int mb_xy = s->mb_index2xy[i];
int f = 0;
int error = s->error_status_table[mb_xy];
if (IS_INTRA(s->cur_pic.mb_type[mb_xy]))
f = MV_FROZEN; // intra // FIXME check
if (!(error & ER_MV_ERROR))
f = MV_FROZEN; // inter with undamaged MV
fixed[mb_xy] = f;
if (f == MV_FROZEN)
num_avail++;
else if(s->last_pic.f->data[0] && s->last_pic.motion_val[0]){
const int mb_y= mb_xy / s->mb_stride;
const int mb_x= mb_xy % s->mb_stride;
const int mot_index= (mb_x + mb_y*mot_stride) * mot_step;
s->cur_pic.motion_val[0][mot_index][0]= s->last_pic.motion_val[0][mot_index][0];
s->cur_pic.motion_val[0][mot_index][1]= s->last_pic.motion_val[0][mot_index][1];
s->cur_pic.ref_index[0][4*mb_xy] = s->last_pic.ref_index[0][4*mb_xy];
}
}
if ((!(s->avctx->error_concealment&FF_EC_GUESS_MVS)) ||
num_avail <= mb_width / 2) {
for (mb_y = 0; mb_y < mb_height; mb_y++) {
for (mb_x = 0; mb_x < s->mb_width; mb_x++) {
const int mb_xy = mb_x + mb_y * s->mb_stride;
int mv_dir = (s->last_pic.f && s->last_pic.f->data[0]) ? MV_DIR_FORWARD : MV_DIR_BACKWARD;
if (IS_INTRA(s->cur_pic.mb_type[mb_xy]))
continue;
if (!(s->error_status_table[mb_xy] & ER_MV_ERROR))
continue;
s->mv[0][0][0] = 0;
s->mv[0][0][1] = 0;
s->decode_mb(s->opaque, 0, mv_dir, MV_TYPE_16X16, &s->mv,
mb_x, mb_y, 0, 0);
}
}
return;
}
blocklist_length = 0;
for (mb_y = 0; mb_y < mb_height; mb_y++) {
for (mb_x = 0; mb_x < mb_width; mb_x++) {
const int mb_xy = mb_x + mb_y * mb_stride;
if (fixed[mb_xy] == MV_FROZEN) {
if (mb_x) add_blocklist(blocklist, &blocklist_length, fixed, mb_x - 1, mb_y, mb_xy - 1);
if (mb_y) add_blocklist(blocklist, &blocklist_length, fixed, mb_x, mb_y - 1, mb_xy - mb_stride);
if (mb_x+1 < mb_width) add_blocklist(blocklist, &blocklist_length, fixed, mb_x + 1, mb_y, mb_xy + 1);
if (mb_y+1 < mb_height) add_blocklist(blocklist, &blocklist_length, fixed, mb_x, mb_y + 1, mb_xy + mb_stride);
}
}
}
for (depth = 0; ; depth++) {
int changed, pass, none_left;
int blocklist_index;
none_left = 1;
changed = 1;
for (pass = 0; (changed || pass < 2) && pass < 10; pass++) {
int score_sum = 0;
changed = 0;
for (blocklist_index = 0; blocklist_index < blocklist_length; blocklist_index++) {
const int mb_x = blocklist[blocklist_index][0];
const int mb_y = blocklist[blocklist_index][1];
const int mb_xy = mb_x + mb_y * mb_stride;
int mv_predictor[8][2];
int ref[8];
int pred_count;
int j;
int best_score;
int best_pred;
int mot_index;
int prev_x, prev_y, prev_ref;
if ((mb_x ^ mb_y ^ pass) & 1)
continue;
av_assert2(fixed[mb_xy] != MV_FROZEN);
av_assert1(!IS_INTRA(s->cur_pic.mb_type[mb_xy]));
av_assert1(s->last_pic.f && s->last_pic.f->data[0]);
j = 0;
if (mb_x > 0)
j |= fixed[mb_xy - 1];
if (mb_x + 1 < mb_width)
j |= fixed[mb_xy + 1];
if (mb_y > 0)
j |= fixed[mb_xy - mb_stride];
if (mb_y + 1 < mb_height)
j |= fixed[mb_xy + mb_stride];
av_assert2(j & MV_FROZEN);
if (!(j & MV_CHANGED) && pass > 1)
continue;
none_left = 0;
pred_count = 0;
mot_index = (mb_x + mb_y * mot_stride) * mot_step;
if (mb_x > 0 && fixed[mb_xy - 1] > 1) {
mv_predictor[pred_count][0] =
s->cur_pic.motion_val[0][mot_index - mot_step][0];
mv_predictor[pred_count][1] =
s->cur_pic.motion_val[0][mot_index - mot_step][1];
ref[pred_count] =
s->cur_pic.ref_index[0][4 * (mb_xy - 1)];
pred_count++;
}
if (mb_x + 1 < mb_width && fixed[mb_xy + 1] > 1) {
mv_predictor[pred_count][0] =
s->cur_pic.motion_val[0][mot_index + mot_step][0];
mv_predictor[pred_count][1] =
s->cur_pic.motion_val[0][mot_index + mot_step][1];
ref[pred_count] =
s->cur_pic.ref_index[0][4 * (mb_xy + 1)];
pred_count++;
}
if (mb_y > 0 && fixed[mb_xy - mb_stride] > 1) {
mv_predictor[pred_count][0] =
s->cur_pic.motion_val[0][mot_index - mot_stride * mot_step][0];
mv_predictor[pred_count][1] =
s->cur_pic.motion_val[0][mot_index - mot_stride * mot_step][1];
ref[pred_count] =
s->cur_pic.ref_index[0][4 * (mb_xy - s->mb_stride)];
pred_count++;
}
if (mb_y + 1<mb_height && fixed[mb_xy + mb_stride] > 1) {
mv_predictor[pred_count][0] =
s->cur_pic.motion_val[0][mot_index + mot_stride * mot_step][0];
mv_predictor[pred_count][1] =
s->cur_pic.motion_val[0][mot_index + mot_stride * mot_step][1];
ref[pred_count] =
s->cur_pic.ref_index[0][4 * (mb_xy + s->mb_stride)];
pred_count++;
}
if (pred_count == 0)
continue;
if (pred_count > 1) {
int sum_x = 0, sum_y = 0, sum_r = 0;
int max_x, max_y, min_x, min_y, max_r, min_r;
for (j = 0; j < pred_count; j++) {
sum_x += mv_predictor[j][0];
sum_y += mv_predictor[j][1];
sum_r += ref[j];
if (j && ref[j] != ref[j - 1])
goto skip_mean_and_median;
}
/* mean */
mv_predictor[pred_count][0] = sum_x / j;
mv_predictor[pred_count][1] = sum_y / j;
ref[pred_count] = sum_r / j;
/* median */
if (pred_count >= 3) {
min_y = min_x = min_r = 99999;
max_y = max_x = max_r = -99999;
} else {
min_x = min_y = max_x = max_y = min_r = max_r = 0;
}
for (j = 0; j < pred_count; j++) {
max_x = FFMAX(max_x, mv_predictor[j][0]);
max_y = FFMAX(max_y, mv_predictor[j][1]);
max_r = FFMAX(max_r, ref[j]);
min_x = FFMIN(min_x, mv_predictor[j][0]);
min_y = FFMIN(min_y, mv_predictor[j][1]);
min_r = FFMIN(min_r, ref[j]);
}
mv_predictor[pred_count + 1][0] = sum_x - max_x - min_x;
mv_predictor[pred_count + 1][1] = sum_y - max_y - min_y;
ref[pred_count + 1] = sum_r - max_r - min_r;
if (pred_count == 4) {
mv_predictor[pred_count + 1][0] /= 2;
mv_predictor[pred_count + 1][1] /= 2;
ref[pred_count + 1] /= 2;
}
pred_count += 2;
}
skip_mean_and_median:
/* zero MV */
mv_predictor[pred_count][0] =
mv_predictor[pred_count][1] =
ref[pred_count] = 0;
pred_count++;
prev_x = s->cur_pic.motion_val[0][mot_index][0];
prev_y = s->cur_pic.motion_val[0][mot_index][1];
prev_ref = s->cur_pic.ref_index[0][4 * mb_xy];
/* last MV */
mv_predictor[pred_count][0] = prev_x;
mv_predictor[pred_count][1] = prev_y;
ref[pred_count] = prev_ref;
pred_count++;
best_pred = 0;
best_score = 256 * 256 * 256 * 64;
for (j = 0; j < pred_count; j++) {
int *linesize = s->cur_pic.f->linesize;
int score = 0;
uint8_t *src = s->cur_pic.f->data[0] +
mb_x * 16 + mb_y * 16 * linesize[0];
s->cur_pic.motion_val[0][mot_index][0] =
s->mv[0][0][0] = mv_predictor[j][0];
s->cur_pic.motion_val[0][mot_index][1] =
s->mv[0][0][1] = mv_predictor[j][1];
if (ref[j] < 0)
continue;
s->decode_mb(s->opaque, ref[j], MV_DIR_FORWARD,
MV_TYPE_16X16, &s->mv, mb_x, mb_y, 0, 0);
if (mb_x > 0 && fixed[mb_xy - 1] > 1) {
int k;
for (k = 0; k < 16; k++)
score += FFABS(src[k * linesize[0] - 1] -
src[k * linesize[0]]);
}
if (mb_x + 1 < mb_width && fixed[mb_xy + 1] > 1) {
int k;
for (k = 0; k < 16; k++)
score += FFABS(src[k * linesize[0] + 15] -
src[k * linesize[0] + 16]);
}
if (mb_y > 0 && fixed[mb_xy - mb_stride] > 1) {
int k;
for (k = 0; k < 16; k++)
score += FFABS(src[k - linesize[0]] - src[k]);
}
if (mb_y + 1 < mb_height && fixed[mb_xy + mb_stride] > 1) {
int k;
for (k = 0; k < 16; k++)
score += FFABS(src[k + linesize[0] * 15] -
src[k + linesize[0] * 16]);
}
if (score <= best_score) { // <= will favor the last MV
best_score = score;
best_pred = j;
}
}
score_sum += best_score;
s->mv[0][0][0] = mv_predictor[best_pred][0];
s->mv[0][0][1] = mv_predictor[best_pred][1];
for (i = 0; i < mot_step; i++)
for (j = 0; j < mot_step; j++) {
s->cur_pic.motion_val[0][mot_index + i + j * mot_stride][0] = s->mv[0][0][0];
s->cur_pic.motion_val[0][mot_index + i + j * mot_stride][1] = s->mv[0][0][1];
}
s->decode_mb(s->opaque, ref[best_pred], MV_DIR_FORWARD,
MV_TYPE_16X16, &s->mv, mb_x, mb_y, 0, 0);
if (s->mv[0][0][0] != prev_x || s->mv[0][0][1] != prev_y) {
fixed[mb_xy] = MV_CHANGED;
changed++;
} else
fixed[mb_xy] = MV_UNCHANGED;
}
}
if (none_left)
return;
next_blocklist_length = 0;
for (blocklist_index = 0; blocklist_index < blocklist_length; blocklist_index++) {
const int mb_x = blocklist[blocklist_index][0];
const int mb_y = blocklist[blocklist_index][1];
const int mb_xy = mb_x + mb_y * mb_stride;
if (fixed[mb_xy] & (MV_CHANGED|MV_UNCHANGED|MV_FROZEN)) {
fixed[mb_xy] = MV_FROZEN;
if (mb_x > 0)
add_blocklist(next_blocklist, &next_blocklist_length, fixed, mb_x - 1, mb_y, mb_xy - 1);
if (mb_y > 0)
add_blocklist(next_blocklist, &next_blocklist_length, fixed, mb_x, mb_y - 1, mb_xy - mb_stride);
if (mb_x + 1 < mb_width)
add_blocklist(next_blocklist, &next_blocklist_length, fixed, mb_x + 1, mb_y, mb_xy + 1);
if (mb_y + 1 < mb_height)
add_blocklist(next_blocklist, &next_blocklist_length, fixed, mb_x, mb_y + 1, mb_xy + mb_stride);
}
}
av_assert0(next_blocklist_length <= mb_height * mb_width);
FFSWAP(int , blocklist_length, next_blocklist_length);
FFSWAP(void*, blocklist, next_blocklist);
}
}
Commit Message: avcodec/mpeg4videodec: Remove use of FF_PROFILE_MPEG4_SIMPLE_STUDIO as indicator of studio profile
The profile field is changed by code inside and outside the decoder,
its not a reliable indicator of the internal codec state.
Maintaining it consistency with studio_profile is messy.
Its easier to just avoid it and use only studio_profile
Fixes: assertion failure
Fixes: ffmpeg_crash_9.avi
Found-by: Thuan Pham, Marcel Böhme, Andrew Santosa and Alexandru Razvan Caciulescu with AFLSmart
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 79,872 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int i2d_RSAPublicKey_bio(BIO *bp, RSA *rsa)
{
return ASN1_item_i2d_bio(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSAPublicKey), bp, rsa);
}
Commit Message: Fix various certificate fingerprint issues.
By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a
certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature.
Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed
this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the
certificate fingerprint for blacklists.
1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits.
If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject
the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits.
2. Check certificate algorithm consistency.
Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the
certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure
errors for some broken certificates.
3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER.
Reencode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received
signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch.
This will reject various cases including garbage after signature
(thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS
program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs
(negative or with leading zeroes).
CVE-2014-8275
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 94,686 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xfs_handle_acceptable(
void *context,
struct dentry *dentry)
{
return 1;
}
Commit Message: fs,userns: Change inode_capable to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid
The kernel has no concept of capabilities with respect to inodes; inodes
exist independently of namespaces. For example, inode_capable(inode,
CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) would be nonsense.
This patch changes inode_capable to check for uid and gid mappings and
renames it to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid, which should make it more
obvious what it does.
Fixes CVE-2014-4014.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 36,912 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: set_table_matrix0(struct table *t, int maxwidth)
{
int size = t->maxcol + 1;
int i, j, k, bcol, ecol;
int width;
double w0, w1, w, s, b;
#ifdef __GNUC__
double we[size];
char expand[size];
#else /* not __GNUC__ */
double we[MAXCOL];
char expand[MAXCOL];
#endif /* not __GNUC__ */
struct table_cell *cell = &t->cell;
w0 = 0.;
for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
we[i] = weight(t->tabwidth[i]);
w0 += we[i];
}
if (w0 <= 0.)
w0 = 1.;
if (cell->necell == 0) {
for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
s = we[i] / w0;
b = sigma_td_nw((int)(s * maxwidth));
correct_table_matrix2(t, i, 1, s, b);
}
return;
}
bzero(expand, size);
for (k = 0; k < cell->necell; k++) {
j = cell->eindex[k];
bcol = cell->col[j];
ecol = bcol + cell->colspan[j];
width = cell->width[j] - (cell->colspan[j] - 1) * t->cellspacing;
w1 = 0.;
for (i = bcol; i < ecol; i++) {
w1 += t->tabwidth[i] + 0.1;
expand[i]++;
}
for (i = bcol; i < ecol; i++) {
w = weight(width * (t->tabwidth[i] + 0.1) / w1);
if (w > we[i])
we[i] = w;
}
}
w0 = 0.;
w1 = 0.;
for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
w0 += we[i];
if (expand[i] == 0)
w1 += we[i];
}
if (w0 <= 0.)
w0 = 1.;
for (k = 0; k < cell->necell; k++) {
j = cell->eindex[k];
bcol = cell->col[j];
width = cell->width[j] - (cell->colspan[j] - 1) * t->cellspacing;
w = weight(width);
s = w / (w1 + w);
b = sigma_td_nw((int)(s * maxwidth));
correct_table_matrix4(t, bcol, cell->colspan[j], expand, s, b);
}
for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
if (expand[i] == 0) {
s = we[i] / max(w1, 1.);
b = sigma_td_nw((int)(s * maxwidth));
}
else {
s = we[i] / max(w0 - w1, 1.);
b = sigma_td_nw(maxwidth);
}
correct_table_matrix3(t, i, expand, s, b);
}
}
Commit Message: Prevent negative indent value in feed_table_block_tag()
Bug-Debian: https://github.com/tats/w3m/issues/88
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 84,645 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderThreadImpl::OnMemoryPressure(
base::MemoryPressureListener::MemoryPressureLevel memory_pressure_level) {
TRACE_EVENT0("memory", "RenderThreadImpl::OnMemoryPressure");
if (blink_platform_impl_) {
blink::WebMemoryCoordinator::OnMemoryPressure(
static_cast<blink::WebMemoryPressureLevel>(memory_pressure_level));
}
if (memory_pressure_level ==
base::MemoryPressureListener::MEMORY_PRESSURE_LEVEL_CRITICAL) {
ReleaseFreeMemory();
ClearMemory();
}
}
Commit Message: Roll src/third_party/boringssl/src 664e99a64..696c13bd6
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+log/664e99a6486c293728097c661332f92bf2d847c6..696c13bd6ab78011adfe7b775519c8b7cc82b604
BUG=778101
Change-Id: I8dda4f3db952597148e3c7937319584698d00e1c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747941
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513774}
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 150,554 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool SharedMemory::Map(uint32 bytes) {
if (mapped_file_ == NULL)
return false;
memory_ = MapViewOfFile(mapped_file_,
read_only_ ? FILE_MAP_READ : FILE_MAP_ALL_ACCESS, 0, 0, bytes);
if (memory_ != NULL) {
DCHECK_EQ(0U, reinterpret_cast<uintptr_t>(memory_) &
(SharedMemory::MAP_MINIMUM_ALIGNMENT - 1));
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflow in Windows shared memory handling.
BUG=164490
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11450016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171369 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 118,707 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: standard_name_from_id(char *buffer, size_t bufsize, size_t pos, png_uint_32 id)
{
return standard_name(buffer, bufsize, pos, COL_FROM_ID(id),
DEPTH_FROM_ID(id), PALETTE_FROM_ID(id), INTERLACE_FROM_ID(id),
WIDTH_FROM_ID(id), HEIGHT_FROM_ID(id), DO_INTERLACE_FROM_ID(id));
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 0 | 160,044 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport void *ResizeQuantumMemory(void *memory,const size_t count,
const size_t quantum)
{
size_t
extent;
if (CheckMemoryOverflow(count,quantum) != MagickFalse)
{
memory=RelinquishMagickMemory(memory);
return((void *) NULL);
}
extent=count*quantum;
return(ResizeMagickMemory(memory,extent));
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/129
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 71,861 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TabStripModel::NotifyTabSelectedIfChanged(TabContentsWrapper* old_contents,
int to_index,
bool user_gesture) {
TabContentsWrapper* new_contents = GetContentsAt(to_index);
if (old_contents == new_contents)
return;
TabContentsWrapper* last_selected_contents = old_contents;
if (last_selected_contents) {
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(TabStripModelObserver, observers_,
TabDeselected(last_selected_contents));
}
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(TabStripModelObserver, observers_,
TabSelectedAt(last_selected_contents, new_contents,
active_index(), user_gesture));
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,116 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, unsigned long *len)
{
long n;
unsigned char *p;
int i;
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
/* We've already read everything in */
*len = (unsigned long)s->init_num;
return 1;
}
p = s->init_msg;
n = s->s3->tmp.message_size - s->init_num;
while (n > 0) {
i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL,
&p[s->init_num], n, 0);
if (i <= 0) {
s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
*len = 0;
return 0;
}
s->init_num += i;
n -= i;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
/*
* If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
* Finished verification.
*/
if (*s->init_buf->data == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
ssl3_take_mac(s);
#endif
/* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
s->init_num)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
*len = 0;
return 0;
}
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data,
(size_t)s->init_num, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
} else {
if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
*len = 0;
return 0;
}
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data,
(size_t)s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
s->msg_callback_arg);
}
/*
* init_num should never be negative...should probably be declared
* unsigned
*/
if (s->init_num < 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
*len = 0;
return 0;
}
*len = (unsigned long)s->init_num;
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 12,727 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TimeDelta SyncManager::SyncInternal::GetNudgeDelayTimeDelta(
const ModelType& model_type) {
return NudgeStrategy::GetNudgeDelayTimeDelta(model_type, this);
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 105,131 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void dev_seq_stop(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
{
kfree(s->private);
}
Commit Message: sg_start_req(): make sure that there's not too many elements in iovec
unfortunately, allowing an arbitrary 16bit value means a possibility of
overflow in the calculation of total number of pages in bio_map_user_iov() -
we rely on there being no more than PAGE_SIZE members of sum in the
first loop there. If that sum wraps around, we end up allocating
too small array of pointers to pages and it's easy to overflow it in
the second loop.
X-Coverup: TINC (and there's no lumber cartel either)
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # way, way back
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 42,251 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void fuse_sync_release(struct fuse_file *ff, int flags)
{
WARN_ON(atomic_read(&ff->count) > 1);
fuse_prepare_release(ff, flags, FUSE_RELEASE);
__set_bit(FR_FORCE, &ff->reserved_req->flags);
__clear_bit(FR_BACKGROUND, &ff->reserved_req->flags);
fuse_request_send(ff->fc, ff->reserved_req);
fuse_put_request(ff->fc, ff->reserved_req);
kfree(ff);
}
Commit Message: fuse: break infinite loop in fuse_fill_write_pages()
I got a report about unkillable task eating CPU. Further
investigation shows, that the problem is in the fuse_fill_write_pages()
function. If iov's first segment has zero length, we get an infinite
loop, because we never reach iov_iter_advance() call.
Fix this by calling iov_iter_advance() before repeating an attempt to
copy data from userspace.
A similar problem is described in 124d3b7041f ("fix writev regression:
pan hanging unkillable and un-straceable"). If zero-length segmend
is followed by segment with invalid address,
iov_iter_fault_in_readable() checks only first segment (zero-length),
iov_iter_copy_from_user_atomic() skips it, fails at second and
returns zero -> goto again without skipping zero-length segment.
Patch calls iov_iter_advance() before goto again: we'll skip zero-length
segment at second iteraction and iov_iter_fault_in_readable() will detect
invalid address.
Special thanks to Konstantin Khlebnikov, who helped a lot with the commit
description.
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Maxim Patlasov <mpatlasov@parallels.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <klamm@yandex-team.ru>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Fixes: ea9b9907b82a ("fuse: implement perform_write")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 56,972 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: test_bson_macros (void)
{
const uint8_t data[] = {1, 2, 3, 4};
bson_t b = BSON_INITIALIZER;
bson_t ar = BSON_INITIALIZER;
bson_decimal128_t dec;
bson_oid_t oid;
struct timeval tv;
time_t t;
dec.high = 0x3040000000000000ULL;
dec.low = 0x0ULL;
t = time (NULL);
#ifdef BSON_OS_WIN32
tv.tv_sec = (long) t;
#else
tv.tv_sec = t;
#endif
tv.tv_usec = 0;
bson_oid_init (&oid, NULL);
BSON_APPEND_ARRAY (&b, "0", &ar);
BSON_APPEND_BINARY (&b, "1", 0, data, sizeof data);
BSON_APPEND_BOOL (&b, "2", true);
BSON_APPEND_CODE (&b, "3", "function(){}");
BSON_APPEND_CODE_WITH_SCOPE (&b, "4", "function(){}", &ar);
BSON_APPEND_DOUBLE (&b, "6", 123.45);
BSON_APPEND_DOCUMENT (&b, "7", &ar);
BSON_APPEND_INT32 (&b, "8", 123);
BSON_APPEND_INT64 (&b, "9", 456);
BSON_APPEND_MINKEY (&b, "10");
BSON_APPEND_MAXKEY (&b, "11");
BSON_APPEND_NULL (&b, "12");
BSON_APPEND_OID (&b, "13", &oid);
BSON_APPEND_REGEX (&b, "14", "^abc", "i");
BSON_APPEND_UTF8 (&b, "15", "utf8");
BSON_APPEND_SYMBOL (&b, "16", "symbol");
BSON_APPEND_TIME_T (&b, "17", t);
BSON_APPEND_TIMEVAL (&b, "18", &tv);
BSON_APPEND_DATE_TIME (&b, "19", 123);
BSON_APPEND_TIMESTAMP (&b, "20", 123, 0);
BSON_APPEND_UNDEFINED (&b, "21");
BSON_APPEND_DECIMAL128 (&b, "22", &dec);
bson_destroy (&b);
bson_destroy (&ar);
}
Commit Message: Fix for CVE-2018-16790 -- Verify bounds before binary length read.
As reported here: https://jira.mongodb.org/browse/CDRIVER-2819,
a heap overread occurs due a failure to correctly verify data
bounds.
In the original check, len - o returns the data left including the
sizeof(l) we just read. Instead, the comparison should check
against the data left NOT including the binary int32, i.e. just
subtype (byte*) instead of int32 subtype (byte*).
Added in test for corrupted BSON example.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 77,921 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void usb_serial_console_disconnect(struct usb_serial *serial)
{
if (serial->port[0] && serial->port[0] == usbcons_info.port) {
usb_serial_console_exit();
usb_serial_put(serial);
}
}
Commit Message: USB: serial: console: fix use-after-free after failed setup
Make sure to reset the USB-console port pointer when console setup fails
in order to avoid having the struct usb_serial be prematurely freed by
the console code when the device is later disconnected.
Fixes: 73e487fdb75f ("[PATCH] USB console: fix disconnection issues")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 2.6.18
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 60,023 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Frame* Document::findUnsafeParentScrollPropagationBoundary()
{
Frame* currentFrame = m_frame;
Frame* ancestorFrame = currentFrame->tree()->parent();
while (ancestorFrame) {
if (!ancestorFrame->document()->securityOrigin()->canAccess(securityOrigin()))
return currentFrame;
currentFrame = ancestorFrame;
ancestorFrame = ancestorFrame->tree()->parent();
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 105,511 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static zend_op_array *phar_compile_file(zend_file_handle *file_handle, int type) /* {{{ */
{
zend_op_array *res;
char *name = NULL;
int failed;
phar_archive_data *phar;
if (!file_handle || !file_handle->filename) {
return phar_orig_compile_file(file_handle, type);
}
if (strstr(file_handle->filename, ".phar") && !strstr(file_handle->filename, "://")) {
if (SUCCESS == phar_open_from_filename((char*)file_handle->filename, strlen(file_handle->filename), NULL, 0, 0, &phar, NULL)) {
if (phar->is_zip || phar->is_tar) {
zend_file_handle f = *file_handle;
/* zip or tar-based phar */
spprintf(&name, 4096, "phar://%s/%s", file_handle->filename, ".phar/stub.php");
if (SUCCESS == phar_orig_zend_open((const char *)name, file_handle)) {
efree(name);
name = NULL;
file_handle->filename = f.filename;
if (file_handle->opened_path) {
efree(file_handle->opened_path);
}
file_handle->opened_path = f.opened_path;
file_handle->free_filename = f.free_filename;
} else {
*file_handle = f;
}
} else if (phar->flags & PHAR_FILE_COMPRESSION_MASK) {
/* compressed phar */
file_handle->type = ZEND_HANDLE_STREAM;
/* we do our own reading directly from the phar, don't change the next line */
file_handle->handle.stream.handle = phar;
file_handle->handle.stream.reader = phar_zend_stream_reader;
file_handle->handle.stream.closer = NULL;
file_handle->handle.stream.fsizer = phar_zend_stream_fsizer;
file_handle->handle.stream.isatty = 0;
phar->is_persistent ?
php_stream_rewind(PHAR_G(cached_fp)[phar->phar_pos].fp) :
php_stream_rewind(phar->fp);
memset(&file_handle->handle.stream.mmap, 0, sizeof(file_handle->handle.stream.mmap));
}
}
}
zend_try {
failed = 0;
CG(zend_lineno) = 0;
res = phar_orig_compile_file(file_handle, type);
} zend_catch {
failed = 1;
res = NULL;
} zend_end_try();
if (name) {
efree(name);
}
if (failed) {
zend_bailout();
}
return res;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 11,112 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gs_main_init0(gs_main_instance * minst, FILE * in, FILE * out, FILE * err,
int max_lib_paths)
{
ref *array;
/* Do platform-dependent initialization. */
/* We have to do this as the very first thing, */
/* because it detects attempts to run 80N86 executables (N>0) */
/* on incompatible processors. */
gp_init();
/* Initialize the imager. */
/* Reset debugging flags */
#ifdef PACIFY_VALGRIND
VALGRIND_HG_DISABLE_CHECKING(gs_debug, 128);
#endif
memset(gs_debug, 0, 128);
gs_log_errors = 0; /* gs_debug['#'] = 0 */
gp_get_realtime(minst->base_time);
/* Initialize the file search paths. */
array = (ref *) gs_alloc_byte_array(minst->heap, max_lib_paths, sizeof(ref),
"lib_path array");
if (array == 0) {
gs_lib_finit(1, gs_error_VMerror, minst->heap);
return_error(gs_error_VMerror);
}
make_array(&minst->lib_path.container, avm_foreign, max_lib_paths,
array);
make_array(&minst->lib_path.list, avm_foreign | a_readonly, 0,
minst->lib_path.container.value.refs);
minst->lib_path.env = 0;
minst->lib_path.final = 0;
minst->lib_path.count = 0;
minst->user_errors = 1;
minst->init_done = 0;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 2,897 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void SetUpTestCase() {
scoped_task_environment = std::make_unique<TestBrowserThreadBundle>(
TestBrowserThreadBundle::REAL_IO_THREAD);
io_runner =
base::CreateSingleThreadTaskRunnerWithTraits({BrowserThread::IO});
base::Thread::Options options(base::MessageLoop::TYPE_IO, 0);
background_thread.reset(new base::Thread("AppCacheTest::BackgroundThread"));
ASSERT_TRUE(background_thread->StartWithOptions(options));
}
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 151,371 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void webkit_web_view_get_preferred_height(GtkWidget* widget, gint* minimum, gint* natural)
{
WebKitWebView* web_view = WEBKIT_WEB_VIEW(widget);
Frame* coreFrame = core(webkit_web_view_get_main_frame(web_view));
if (!coreFrame)
return;
FrameView* view = coreFrame->view();
if (!view)
return;
*minimum = *natural = view->contentsHeight();
}
Commit Message: 2011-06-02 Joone Hur <joone.hur@collabora.co.uk>
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
[GTK] Only load dictionaries if spell check is enabled
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32879
We don't need to call enchant if enable-spell-checking is false.
* webkit/webkitwebview.cpp:
(webkit_web_view_update_settings): Skip loading dictionaries when enable-spell-checking is false.
(webkit_web_view_settings_notify): Ditto.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@87925 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,568 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: size_t CancelableFileOperation(Function operation,
HANDLE file,
BufferType* buffer,
size_t length,
WaitableEvent* io_event,
WaitableEvent* cancel_event,
CancelableSyncSocket* socket,
DWORD timeout_in_ms) {
ThreadRestrictions::AssertIOAllowed();
COMPILE_ASSERT(sizeof(buffer[0]) == sizeof(char), incorrect_buffer_type);
DCHECK_GT(length, 0u);
DCHECK_LE(length, kMaxMessageLength);
DCHECK_NE(file, SyncSocket::kInvalidHandle);
TimeTicks current_time, finish_time;
if (timeout_in_ms != INFINITE) {
current_time = TimeTicks::Now();
finish_time =
current_time + base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(timeout_in_ms);
}
size_t count = 0;
do {
OVERLAPPED ol = { 0 };
ol.hEvent = io_event->handle();
const DWORD chunk = GetNextChunkSize(count, length);
DWORD len = 0;
const BOOL operation_ok = operation(
file, static_cast<BufferType*>(buffer) + count, chunk, &len, &ol);
if (!operation_ok) {
if (::GetLastError() == ERROR_IO_PENDING) {
HANDLE events[] = { io_event->handle(), cancel_event->handle() };
const int wait_result = WaitForMultipleObjects(
ARRAYSIZE_UNSAFE(events), events, FALSE,
timeout_in_ms == INFINITE ?
timeout_in_ms :
static_cast<DWORD>(
(finish_time - current_time).InMilliseconds()));
if (wait_result != WAIT_OBJECT_0 + 0) {
CancelIo(file);
}
if (!GetOverlappedResult(file, &ol, &len, TRUE))
len = 0;
if (wait_result == WAIT_OBJECT_0 + 1) {
DVLOG(1) << "Shutdown was signaled. Closing socket.";
socket->Close();
return count;
}
DCHECK(wait_result == WAIT_OBJECT_0 + 0 || wait_result == WAIT_TIMEOUT);
} else {
break;
}
}
count += len;
if (len != chunk)
break;
if (timeout_in_ms != INFINITE && count < length)
current_time = base::TimeTicks::Now();
} while (count < length &&
(timeout_in_ms == INFINITE || current_time < finish_time));
return count;
}
Commit Message: Convert ARRAYSIZE_UNSAFE -> arraysize in base/.
R=thestig@chromium.org
BUG=423134
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/656033009
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#299835}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 1 | 171,163 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: has_problem (NautilusDirectory *directory,
NautilusFile *file,
FileCheck problem)
{
GList *node;
if (file != NULL)
{
return (*problem)(file);
}
for (node = directory->details->file_list; node != NULL; node = node->next)
{
if ((*problem)(node->data))
{
return TRUE;
}
}
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 60,912 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void locationReplaceableAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* proxyImp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
TestNode* imp = WTF::getPtr(proxyImp->locationReplaceable());
if (!imp)
return;
V8TRYCATCH_FOR_V8STRINGRESOURCE_VOID(V8StringResource<>, cppValue, jsValue);
imp->setHref(cppValue);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 171,686 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int xfer_finalsync(struct xfer_header *xfer)
{
struct sync_name_list *master_quotaroots = sync_name_list_create();
struct sync_folder_list *replica_folders = sync_folder_list_create();
struct sync_folder *rfolder;
struct sync_name_list *replica_subs = NULL;
struct sync_sieve_list *replica_sieve = NULL;
struct sync_seen_list *replica_seen = NULL;
struct sync_quota_list *replica_quota = sync_quota_list_create();
const char *cmd;
struct dlist *kl = NULL;
struct xfer_item *item;
struct mailbox *mailbox = NULL;
mbentry_t newentry;
unsigned flags = SYNC_FLAG_LOGGING | SYNC_FLAG_LOCALONLY;
int r;
if (xfer->userid) {
syslog(LOG_INFO, "XFER: final sync of user %s", xfer->userid);
replica_subs = sync_name_list_create();
replica_sieve = sync_sieve_list_create();
replica_seen = sync_seen_list_create();
cmd = "USER";
kl = dlist_setatom(NULL, cmd, xfer->userid);
}
else {
syslog(LOG_INFO, "XFER: final sync of mailbox %s",
xfer->items->mbentry->name);
cmd = "MAILBOXES";
kl = dlist_newlist(NULL, cmd);
dlist_setatom(kl, "MBOXNAME", xfer->items->mbentry->name);
}
sync_send_lookup(kl, xfer->be->out);
dlist_free(&kl);
r = sync_response_parse(xfer->be->in, cmd, replica_folders, replica_subs,
replica_sieve, replica_seen, replica_quota);
if (r) goto done;
for (item = xfer->items; item; item = item->next) {
r = mailbox_open_iwl(item->mbentry->name, &mailbox);
if (!r) r = sync_mailbox_version_check(&mailbox);
if (r) {
syslog(LOG_ERR,
"Failed to open mailbox %s for xfer_final_sync() %s",
item->mbentry->name, error_message(r));
goto done;
}
/* Open cyrus.annotations before we set mailbox to MOVING and
change its location to destination server and partition */
r = mailbox_get_annotate_state(mailbox, ANNOTATE_ANY_UID, NULL);
if (r) {
syslog(LOG_ERR,
"Failed to get annotate state for mailbox %s"
" for xfer_final_sync() %s",
mailbox->name, error_message(r));
mailbox_close(&mailbox);
goto done;
}
/* Step 3.5: Set mailbox as MOVING on local server */
/* XXX - this code is awful... need a sane way to manage mbentries */
newentry.name = item->mbentry->name;
newentry.acl = item->mbentry->acl;
newentry.uniqueid = item->mbentry->uniqueid;
newentry.uidvalidity = item->mbentry->uidvalidity;
newentry.mbtype = item->mbentry->mbtype|MBTYPE_MOVING;
newentry.server = xfer->toserver;
newentry.partition = xfer->topart;
r = mboxlist_update(&newentry, 1);
if (r) {
syslog(LOG_ERR,
"Could not move mailbox: %s, mboxlist_update() failed %s",
item->mbentry->name, error_message(r));
}
else item->state = XFER_LOCAL_MOVING;
/* Step 4: Sync local -> remote */
if (!r) {
r = sync_mailbox(mailbox, replica_folders, xfer->topart, xfer->be);
if (r) {
syslog(LOG_ERR,
"Could not move mailbox: %s, sync_mailbox() failed %s",
item->mbentry->name, error_message(r));
}
else {
if (mailbox->quotaroot &&
!sync_name_lookup(master_quotaroots, mailbox->quotaroot)) {
sync_name_list_add(master_quotaroots, mailbox->quotaroot);
}
r = sync_do_annotation(mailbox->name, xfer->be, flags);
if (r) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "Could not move mailbox: %s,"
" sync_do_annotation() failed %s",
item->mbentry->name, error_message(r));
}
}
}
mailbox_close(&mailbox);
if (r) goto done;
item->state = XFER_UNDUMPED;
}
/* Delete folders on replica which no longer exist on master */
for (rfolder = replica_folders->head; rfolder; rfolder = rfolder->next) {
if (rfolder->mark) continue;
r = sync_folder_delete(rfolder->name, xfer->be, flags);
if (r) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "sync_folder_delete(): failed: %s '%s'",
rfolder->name, error_message(r));
goto done;
}
}
/* Handle any mailbox/user metadata */
r = sync_do_user_quota(master_quotaroots, replica_quota, xfer->be, flags);
if (!r && xfer->userid) {
r = sync_do_user_seen(xfer->userid, replica_seen, xfer->be, flags);
if (!r) r = sync_do_user_sub(xfer->userid, replica_subs,
xfer->be, flags);
if (!r) r = sync_do_user_sieve(xfer->userid, replica_sieve,
xfer->be, flags);
}
done:
sync_name_list_free(&master_quotaroots);
sync_folder_list_free(&replica_folders);
if (replica_subs) sync_name_list_free(&replica_subs);
if (replica_sieve) sync_sieve_list_free(&replica_sieve);
if (replica_seen) sync_seen_list_free(&replica_seen);
if (replica_quota) sync_quota_list_free(&replica_quota);
return r;
}
Commit Message: imapd: check for isadmin BEFORE parsing sync lines
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 95,277 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PassRefPtr<ComputedStyle> Document::styleForElementIgnoringPendingStylesheets(Element* element)
{
ASSERT_ARG(element, element->document() == this);
StyleEngine::IgnoringPendingStylesheet ignoring(styleEngine());
return ensureStyleResolver().styleForElement(element, element->parentNode() ? element->parentNode()->ensureComputedStyle() : 0);
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 124,532 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: STALE_CLIENTID(clientid_t *clid, struct nfsd_net *nn)
{
/*
* We're assuming the clid was not given out from a boot
* precisely 2^32 (about 136 years) before this one. That seems
* a safe assumption:
*/
if (clid->cl_boot == (u32)nn->boot_time)
return 0;
dprintk("NFSD stale clientid (%08x/%08x) boot_time %08lx\n",
clid->cl_boot, clid->cl_id, nn->boot_time);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,390 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: setwidth0(struct table *t, struct table_mode *mode)
{
int w;
int width = t->tabcontentssize;
struct table_cell *cell = &t->cell;
if (t->col < 0)
return -1;
if (t->tabwidth[t->col] < 0)
return -1;
check_row(t, t->row);
if (t->linfo.prev_spaces > 0)
width -= t->linfo.prev_spaces;
w = table_colspan(t, t->row, t->col);
if (w == 1) {
if (t->tabwidth[t->col] < width)
t->tabwidth[t->col] = width;
}
else if (cell->icell >= 0) {
if (cell->width[cell->icell] < width)
cell->width[cell->icell] = width;
}
return width;
}
Commit Message: Prevent negative indent value in feed_table_block_tag()
Bug-Debian: https://github.com/tats/w3m/issues/88
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 84,647 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int fbiogscursor(struct fb_info *info, unsigned long arg)
{
struct fbcursor __user *p = compat_alloc_user_space(sizeof(*p));
struct fbcursor32 __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
compat_uptr_t addr;
int ret;
ret = copy_in_user(p, argp,
2 * sizeof (short) + 2 * sizeof(struct fbcurpos));
ret |= copy_in_user(&p->size, &argp->size, sizeof(struct fbcurpos));
ret |= copy_in_user(&p->cmap, &argp->cmap, 2 * sizeof(int));
ret |= get_user(addr, &argp->cmap.red);
ret |= put_user(compat_ptr(addr), &p->cmap.red);
ret |= get_user(addr, &argp->cmap.green);
ret |= put_user(compat_ptr(addr), &p->cmap.green);
ret |= get_user(addr, &argp->cmap.blue);
ret |= put_user(compat_ptr(addr), &p->cmap.blue);
ret |= get_user(addr, &argp->mask);
ret |= put_user(compat_ptr(addr), &p->mask);
ret |= get_user(addr, &argp->image);
ret |= put_user(compat_ptr(addr), &p->image);
if (ret)
return -EFAULT;
return info->fbops->fb_ioctl(info, FBIOSCURSOR, (unsigned long)p);
}
Commit Message: fbdev: Fixing arbitrary kernel leak in case FBIOGETCMAP_SPARC in sbusfb_ioctl_helper().
Fixing arbitrary kernel leak in case FBIOGETCMAP_SPARC in
sbusfb_ioctl_helper().
'index' is defined as an int in sbusfb_ioctl_helper().
We retrieve this from the user:
if (get_user(index, &c->index) ||
__get_user(count, &c->count) ||
__get_user(ured, &c->red) ||
__get_user(ugreen, &c->green) ||
__get_user(ublue, &c->blue))
return -EFAULT;
and then we use 'index' in the following way:
red = cmap->red[index + i] >> 8;
green = cmap->green[index + i] >> 8;
blue = cmap->blue[index + i] >> 8;
This is a classic information leak vulnerability. 'index' should be
an unsigned int, given its usage above.
This patch is straight-forward; it changes 'index' to unsigned int
in two switch-cases: FBIOGETCMAP_SPARC && FBIOPUTCMAP_SPARC.
This patch fixes CVE-2018-6412.
Signed-off-by: Peter Malone <peter.malone@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Mathieu Malaterre <malat@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <b.zolnierkie@samsung.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 84,435 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cxusb_rc_query(struct dvb_usb_device *d)
{
u8 ircode[4];
cxusb_ctrl_msg(d, CMD_GET_IR_CODE, NULL, 0, ircode, 4);
if (ircode[2] || ircode[3])
rc_keydown(d->rc_dev, RC_TYPE_UNKNOWN,
RC_SCANCODE_RC5(ircode[2], ircode[3]), 0);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: [media] cxusb: Use a dma capable buffer also for reading
Commit 17ce039b4e54 ("[media] cxusb: don't do DMA on stack")
added a kmalloc'ed bounce buffer for writes, but missed to do the same
for reads. As the read only happens after the write is finished, we can
reuse the same buffer.
As dvb_usb_generic_rw handles a read length of 0 by itself, avoid calling
it using the dvb_usb_generic_read wrapper function.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Brüns <stefan.bruens@rwth-aachen.de>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 66,749 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cff_parser_done( CFF_Parser parser )
{
FT_Memory memory = parser->library->memory; /* for FT_FREE */
FT_FREE( parser->stack );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 13,250 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool CanAccessDataForOrigin(const GURL& gurl) {
if (origin_lock_.is_empty())
return true;
GURL site_gurl = SiteInstanceImpl::GetSiteForURL(NULL, gurl);
return origin_lock_ == site_gurl;
}
Commit Message: This patch implements a mechanism for more granular link URL permissions (filtering on scheme/host). This fixes the bug that allowed PDFs to have working links to any "chrome://" URLs.
BUG=528505,226927
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1362433002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351705}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 125,127 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int detect_unicard(
sc_pkcs15_card_t *p15card
){
if(!insert_cert(p15card,"41004352", 0x45, 1, "Zertifikat 1")){
p15card->tokeninfo->manufacturer_id = strdup("JLU Giessen");
p15card->tokeninfo->label = strdup("JLU Giessen Card");
insert_cert(p15card,"41004353", 0x46, 1, "Zertifikat 2");
insert_cert(p15card,"41004354", 0x47, 1, "Zertifikat 3");
insert_key(p15card,"41005103", 0x45, 0x83, 1024, 1, "Schluessel 1");
insert_key(p15card,"41005104", 0x46, 0x84, 1024, 1, "Schluessel 2");
insert_key(p15card,"41005105", 0x47, 0x85, 1024, 1, "Schluessel 3");
} else if(!insert_cert(p15card,"41014352", 0x45, 1, "Zertifikat 1")){
p15card->tokeninfo->manufacturer_id = strdup("TU Darmstadt");
p15card->tokeninfo->label = strdup("TUD Card");
insert_cert(p15card,"41014353", 0x46, 1, "Zertifikat 2");
insert_cert(p15card,"41014354", 0x47, 1, "Zertifikat 3");
insert_key(p15card,"41015103", 0x45, 0x83, 1024, 1, "Schluessel 1");
insert_key(p15card,"41015104", 0x46, 0x84, 1024, 1, "Schluessel 2");
insert_key(p15card,"41015105", 0x47, 0x85, 1024, 1, "Schluessel 3");
} else return 1;
insert_pin(p15card,"5000", 1, 2, 0x00, 6, "PIN",
SC_PKCS15_PIN_FLAG_CASE_SENSITIVE | SC_PKCS15_PIN_FLAG_INITIALIZED
);
insert_pin(p15card,"5008", 2, 0, 0x01, 8, "PUK",
SC_PKCS15_PIN_FLAG_CASE_SENSITIVE | SC_PKCS15_PIN_FLAG_INITIALIZED |
SC_PKCS15_PIN_FLAG_UNBLOCKING_PIN | SC_PKCS15_PIN_FLAG_SO_PIN
);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 78,725 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tipc_sk_withdraw(struct tipc_sock *tsk, uint scope,
struct tipc_name_seq const *seq)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(&tsk->sk);
struct publication *publ;
struct publication *safe;
int rc = -EINVAL;
list_for_each_entry_safe(publ, safe, &tsk->publications, pport_list) {
if (seq) {
if (publ->scope != scope)
continue;
if (publ->type != seq->type)
continue;
if (publ->lower != seq->lower)
continue;
if (publ->upper != seq->upper)
break;
tipc_nametbl_withdraw(net, publ->type, publ->lower,
publ->ref, publ->key);
rc = 0;
break;
}
tipc_nametbl_withdraw(net, publ->type, publ->lower,
publ->ref, publ->key);
rc = 0;
}
if (list_empty(&tsk->publications))
tsk->published = 0;
return rc;
}
Commit Message: tipc: check nl sock before parsing nested attributes
Make sure the socket for which the user is listing publication exists
before parsing the socket netlink attributes.
Prior to this patch a call without any socket caused a NULL pointer
dereference in tipc_nl_publ_dump().
Tested-and-reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Alpe <richard.alpe@ericsson.com>
Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.cm>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 52,512 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool time_more(struct timeval *a, struct timeval *b)
{
return timercmp(a, b, >);
}
Commit Message: stratum: parse_notify(): Don't die on malformed bbversion/prev_hash/nbit/ntime.
Might have introduced a memory leak, don't have time to check. :(
Should the other hex2bin()'s be checked?
Thanks to Mick Ayzenberg <mick.dejavusecurity.com> for finding this.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 36,635 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int do_sigaction(int sig, struct k_sigaction *act, struct k_sigaction *oact)
{
struct task_struct *t = current;
struct k_sigaction *k;
sigset_t mask;
if (!valid_signal(sig) || sig < 1 || (act && sig_kernel_only(sig)))
return -EINVAL;
k = &t->sighand->action[sig-1];
spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
if (oact)
*oact = *k;
if (act) {
sigdelsetmask(&act->sa.sa_mask,
sigmask(SIGKILL) | sigmask(SIGSTOP));
*k = *act;
/*
* POSIX 3.3.1.3:
* "Setting a signal action to SIG_IGN for a signal that is
* pending shall cause the pending signal to be discarded,
* whether or not it is blocked."
*
* "Setting a signal action to SIG_DFL for a signal that is
* pending and whose default action is to ignore the signal
* (for example, SIGCHLD), shall cause the pending signal to
* be discarded, whether or not it is blocked"
*/
if (sig_handler_ignored(sig_handler(t, sig), sig)) {
sigemptyset(&mask);
sigaddset(&mask, sig);
rm_from_queue_full(&mask, &t->signal->shared_pending);
do {
rm_from_queue_full(&mask, &t->pending);
t = next_thread(t);
} while (t != current);
}
}
spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: kernel/signal.c: stop info leak via the tkill and the tgkill syscalls
This fixes a kernel memory contents leak via the tkill and tgkill syscalls
for compat processes.
This is visible in the siginfo_t->_sifields._rt.si_sigval.sival_ptr field
when handling signals delivered from tkill.
The place of the infoleak:
int copy_siginfo_to_user32(compat_siginfo_t __user *to, siginfo_t *from)
{
...
put_user_ex(ptr_to_compat(from->si_ptr), &to->si_ptr);
...
}
Signed-off-by: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 31,750 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void bond_ab_arp_commit(struct bonding *bond, int delta_in_ticks)
{
struct slave *slave;
int i;
unsigned long trans_start;
bond_for_each_slave(bond, slave, i) {
switch (slave->new_link) {
case BOND_LINK_NOCHANGE:
continue;
case BOND_LINK_UP:
trans_start = dev_trans_start(slave->dev);
if ((!bond->curr_active_slave &&
time_in_range(jiffies,
trans_start - delta_in_ticks,
trans_start + delta_in_ticks)) ||
bond->curr_active_slave != slave) {
slave->link = BOND_LINK_UP;
bond->current_arp_slave = NULL;
pr_info("%s: link status definitely up for interface %s.\n",
bond->dev->name, slave->dev->name);
if (!bond->curr_active_slave ||
(slave == bond->primary_slave))
goto do_failover;
}
continue;
case BOND_LINK_DOWN:
if (slave->link_failure_count < UINT_MAX)
slave->link_failure_count++;
slave->link = BOND_LINK_DOWN;
bond_set_slave_inactive_flags(slave);
pr_info("%s: link status definitely down for interface %s, disabling it\n",
bond->dev->name, slave->dev->name);
if (slave == bond->curr_active_slave) {
bond->current_arp_slave = NULL;
goto do_failover;
}
continue;
default:
pr_err("%s: impossible: new_link %d on slave %s\n",
bond->dev->name, slave->new_link,
slave->dev->name);
continue;
}
do_failover:
ASSERT_RTNL();
block_netpoll_tx();
write_lock_bh(&bond->curr_slave_lock);
bond_select_active_slave(bond);
write_unlock_bh(&bond->curr_slave_lock);
unblock_netpoll_tx();
}
bond_set_carrier(bond);
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 23,683 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int __init ndisc_init(void)
{
int err;
err = register_pernet_subsys(&ndisc_net_ops);
if (err)
return err;
/*
* Initialize the neighbour table
*/
neigh_table_init(NEIGH_ND_TABLE, &nd_tbl);
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
err = neigh_sysctl_register(NULL, &nd_tbl.parms,
ndisc_ifinfo_sysctl_change);
if (err)
goto out_unregister_pernet;
out:
#endif
return err;
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
out_unregister_pernet:
unregister_pernet_subsys(&ndisc_net_ops);
goto out;
#endif
}
Commit Message: ipv6: Don't reduce hop limit for an interface
A local route may have a lower hop_limit set than global routes do.
RFC 3756, Section 4.2.7, "Parameter Spoofing"
> 1. The attacker includes a Current Hop Limit of one or another small
> number which the attacker knows will cause legitimate packets to
> be dropped before they reach their destination.
> As an example, one possible approach to mitigate this threat is to
> ignore very small hop limits. The nodes could implement a
> configurable minimum hop limit, and ignore attempts to set it below
> said limit.
Signed-off-by: D.S. Ljungmark <ljungmark@modio.se>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 43,705 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void readpng2_version_info(void)
{
fprintf(stderr, " Compiled with libpng %s; using libpng %s\n",
PNG_LIBPNG_VER_STRING, png_libpng_ver);
fprintf(stderr, " and with zlib %s; using zlib %s.\n",
ZLIB_VERSION, zlib_version);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 0 | 159,784 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LayerTreeHostImpl::DidLoseCompositorFrameSink() {
if (resource_provider_)
resource_provider_->DidLoseContextProvider();
has_valid_compositor_frame_sink_ = false;
client_->DidLoseCompositorFrameSinkOnImplThread();
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 137,256 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DelegatedFrameHost::RequestCopyOfOutput(
scoped_ptr<cc::CopyOutputRequest> request) {
client_->GetLayer()->RequestCopyOfOutput(request.Pass());
}
Commit Message: repairs CopyFromCompositingSurface in HighDPI
This CL removes the DIP=>Pixel transform in
DelegatedFrameHost::CopyFromCompositingSurface(), because said
transformation seems to be happening later in the copy logic
and is currently being applied twice.
BUG=397708
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/421293002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@286414 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 111,741 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ResourceFetcher::didFinishLoading(const Resource* resource, double finishTime, int64_t encodedDataLength)
{
TRACE_EVENT_ASYNC_END0("net", "Resource", resource);
context().dispatchDidFinishLoading(m_documentLoader, resource->identifier(), finishTime, encodedDataLength);
}
Commit Message: Enforce SVG image security rules
SVG images have unique security rules that prevent them from loading
any external resources. This patch enforces these rules in
ResourceFetcher::canRequest for all non-data-uri resources. This locks
down our SVG resource handling and fixes two security bugs.
In the case of SVG images that reference other images, we had a bug
where a cached subresource would be used directly from the cache.
This has been fixed because the canRequest check occurs before we use
cached resources.
In the case of SVG images that use CSS imports, we had a bug where
imports were blindly requested. This has been fixed by stopping all
non-data-uri requests in SVG images.
With this patch we now match Gecko's behavior on both testcases.
BUG=380885, 382296
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/320763002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@176084 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 121,231 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: String RenderLayerCompositor::debugName(const GraphicsLayer* graphicsLayer)
{
String name;
if (graphicsLayer == m_rootContentLayer.get()) {
name = "Content Root Layer";
#if USE(RUBBER_BANDING)
} else if (graphicsLayer == m_layerForOverhangShadow.get()) {
name = "Overhang Areas Shadow";
#endif
} else if (graphicsLayer == m_overflowControlsHostLayer.get()) {
name = "Overflow Controls Host Layer";
} else if (graphicsLayer == m_layerForHorizontalScrollbar.get()) {
name = "Horizontal Scrollbar Layer";
} else if (graphicsLayer == m_layerForVerticalScrollbar.get()) {
name = "Vertical Scrollbar Layer";
} else if (graphicsLayer == m_layerForScrollCorner.get()) {
name = "Scroll Corner Layer";
} else if (graphicsLayer == m_containerLayer.get()) {
name = "Frame Clipping Layer";
} else if (graphicsLayer == m_scrollLayer.get()) {
name = "Frame Scrolling Layer";
} else {
ASSERT_NOT_REACHED();
}
return name;
}
Commit Message: Disable some more query compositingState asserts.
This gets the tests passing again on Mac. See the bug for the stacktrace.
A future patch will need to actually fix the incorrect reading of
compositingState.
BUG=343179
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/162153002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@167069 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 113,788 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CSoundFile::SetCurrentOrder(UINT nPos)
{
while ((nPos < MAX_ORDERS) && (Order[nPos] == 0xFE)) nPos++;
if ((nPos >= MAX_ORDERS) || (Order[nPos] >= MAX_PATTERNS)) return;
for (UINT j=0; j<MAX_CHANNELS; j++)
{
Chn[j].nPeriod = 0;
Chn[j].nNote = 0;
Chn[j].nPortamentoDest = 0;
Chn[j].nCommand = 0;
Chn[j].nPatternLoopCount = 0;
Chn[j].nPatternLoop = 0;
Chn[j].nTremorCount = 0;
}
if (!nPos)
{
SetCurrentPos(0);
} else
{
m_nNextPattern = nPos;
m_nRow = m_nNextRow = 0;
m_nPattern = 0;
m_nTickCount = m_nMusicSpeed;
m_nBufferCount = 0;
m_nTotalCount = 0;
m_nPatternDelay = 0;
m_nFrameDelay = 0;
}
m_dwSongFlags &= ~(SONG_PATTERNLOOP|SONG_CPUVERYHIGH|SONG_FADINGSONG|SONG_ENDREACHED|SONG_GLOBALFADE);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 8,494 |
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