instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct hsr_node *find_node_by_AddrA(struct list_head *node_db,
const unsigned char addr[ETH_ALEN])
{
struct hsr_node *node;
list_for_each_entry_rcu(node, node_db, mac_list) {
if (ether_addr_equal(node->MacAddressA, addr))
return node;
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: net: hsr: fix memory leak in hsr_dev_finalize()
If hsr_add_port(hsr, hsr_dev, HSR_PT_MASTER) failed to
add port, it directly returns res and forgets to free the node
that allocated in hsr_create_self_node(), and forgets to delete
the node->mac_list linked in hsr->self_node_db.
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff8881cfa0c780 (size 64):
comm "syz-executor.0", pid 2077, jiffies 4294717969 (age 2415.377s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
e0 c7 a0 cf 81 88 ff ff 00 02 00 00 00 00 ad de ................
00 e6 49 cd 81 88 ff ff c0 9b 87 d0 81 88 ff ff ..I.............
backtrace:
[<00000000e2ff5070>] hsr_dev_finalize+0x736/0x960 [hsr]
[<000000003ed2e597>] hsr_newlink+0x2b2/0x3e0 [hsr]
[<000000003fa8c6b6>] __rtnl_newlink+0xf1f/0x1600 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3182
[<000000001247a7ad>] rtnl_newlink+0x66/0x90 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3240
[<00000000e7d1b61d>] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x54e/0xb90 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5130
[<000000005556bd3a>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x129/0x340 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2477
[<00000000741d5ee6>] netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1310 [inline]
[<00000000741d5ee6>] netlink_unicast+0x49a/0x650 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1336
[<000000009d56f9b7>] netlink_sendmsg+0x88b/0xdf0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1917
[<0000000046b35c59>] sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline]
[<0000000046b35c59>] sock_sendmsg+0xc3/0x100 net/socket.c:631
[<00000000d208adc9>] __sys_sendto+0x33e/0x560 net/socket.c:1786
[<00000000b582837a>] __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1798 [inline]
[<00000000b582837a>] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1794 [inline]
[<00000000b582837a>] __x64_sys_sendto+0xdd/0x1b0 net/socket.c:1794
[<00000000c866801d>] do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
[<00000000fea382d9>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[<00000000e01dacb3>] 0xffffffffffffffff
Fixes: c5a759117210 ("net/hsr: Use list_head (and rcu) instead of array for slave devices.")
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mao Wenan <maowenan@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 87,672 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: rio_timer (unsigned long data)
{
struct net_device *dev = (struct net_device *)data;
struct netdev_private *np = netdev_priv(dev);
unsigned int entry;
int next_tick = 1*HZ;
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&np->rx_lock, flags);
/* Recover rx ring exhausted error */
if (np->cur_rx - np->old_rx >= RX_RING_SIZE) {
printk(KERN_INFO "Try to recover rx ring exhausted...\n");
/* Re-allocate skbuffs to fill the descriptor ring */
for (; np->cur_rx - np->old_rx > 0; np->old_rx++) {
struct sk_buff *skb;
entry = np->old_rx % RX_RING_SIZE;
/* Dropped packets don't need to re-allocate */
if (np->rx_skbuff[entry] == NULL) {
skb = netdev_alloc_skb_ip_align(dev,
np->rx_buf_sz);
if (skb == NULL) {
np->rx_ring[entry].fraginfo = 0;
printk (KERN_INFO
"%s: Still unable to re-allocate Rx skbuff.#%d\n",
dev->name, entry);
break;
}
np->rx_skbuff[entry] = skb;
np->rx_ring[entry].fraginfo =
cpu_to_le64 (pci_map_single
(np->pdev, skb->data, np->rx_buf_sz,
PCI_DMA_FROMDEVICE));
}
np->rx_ring[entry].fraginfo |=
cpu_to_le64((u64)np->rx_buf_sz << 48);
np->rx_ring[entry].status = 0;
} /* end for */
} /* end if */
spin_unlock_irqrestore (&np->rx_lock, flags);
np->timer.expires = jiffies + next_tick;
add_timer(&np->timer);
}
Commit Message: dl2k: Clean up rio_ioctl
The dl2k driver's rio_ioctl call has a few issues:
- No permissions checking
- Implements SIOCGMIIREG and SIOCGMIIREG using the SIOCDEVPRIVATE numbers
- Has a few ioctls that may have been used for debugging at one point
but have no place in the kernel proper.
This patch removes all but the MII ioctls, renumbers them to use the
standard ones, and adds the proper permission check for SIOCSMIIREG.
We can also get rid of the dl2k-specific struct mii_data in favor of
the generic struct mii_ioctl_data.
Since we have the phyid on hand, we can add the SIOCGMIIPHY ioctl too.
Most of the MII code for the driver could probably be converted to use
the generic MII library but I don't have a device to test the results.
Reported-by: Stephan Mueller <stephan.mueller@atsec.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 20,102 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nfs4_proc_setlk(struct nfs4_state *state, int cmd, struct file_lock *request)
{
struct nfs4_exception exception = {
.state = state,
};
int err;
do {
err = _nfs4_proc_setlk(state, cmd, request);
if (err == -NFS4ERR_DENIED)
err = -EAGAIN;
err = nfs4_handle_exception(NFS_SERVER(state->inode),
err, &exception);
} while (exception.retry);
return err;
}
Commit Message: Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 19,998 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool WebGLImageConversion::ComputeFormatAndTypeParameters(
GLenum format,
GLenum type,
unsigned* components_per_pixel,
unsigned* bytes_per_component) {
switch (format) {
case GL_ALPHA:
case GL_LUMINANCE:
case GL_RED:
case GL_RED_INTEGER:
case GL_DEPTH_COMPONENT:
case GL_DEPTH_STENCIL: // Treat it as one component.
*components_per_pixel = 1;
break;
case GL_LUMINANCE_ALPHA:
case GL_RG:
case GL_RG_INTEGER:
*components_per_pixel = 2;
break;
case GL_RGB:
case GL_RGB_INTEGER:
case GL_SRGB_EXT: // GL_EXT_sRGB
*components_per_pixel = 3;
break;
case GL_RGBA:
case GL_RGBA_INTEGER:
case GL_BGRA_EXT: // GL_EXT_texture_format_BGRA8888
case GL_SRGB_ALPHA_EXT: // GL_EXT_sRGB
*components_per_pixel = 4;
break;
default:
return false;
}
switch (type) {
case GL_BYTE:
*bytes_per_component = sizeof(GLbyte);
break;
case GL_UNSIGNED_BYTE:
*bytes_per_component = sizeof(GLubyte);
break;
case GL_SHORT:
*bytes_per_component = sizeof(GLshort);
break;
case GL_UNSIGNED_SHORT:
*bytes_per_component = sizeof(GLushort);
break;
case GL_UNSIGNED_SHORT_5_6_5:
case GL_UNSIGNED_SHORT_4_4_4_4:
case GL_UNSIGNED_SHORT_5_5_5_1:
*components_per_pixel = 1;
*bytes_per_component = sizeof(GLushort);
break;
case GL_INT:
*bytes_per_component = sizeof(GLint);
break;
case GL_UNSIGNED_INT:
*bytes_per_component = sizeof(GLuint);
break;
case GL_UNSIGNED_INT_24_8_OES:
case GL_UNSIGNED_INT_10F_11F_11F_REV:
case GL_UNSIGNED_INT_5_9_9_9_REV:
case GL_UNSIGNED_INT_2_10_10_10_REV:
*components_per_pixel = 1;
*bytes_per_component = sizeof(GLuint);
break;
case GL_FLOAT: // OES_texture_float
*bytes_per_component = sizeof(GLfloat);
break;
case GL_HALF_FLOAT:
case GL_HALF_FLOAT_OES: // OES_texture_half_float
*bytes_per_component = sizeof(GLushort);
break;
default:
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Implement 2D texture uploading from client array with FLIP_Y or PREMULTIPLY_ALPHA.
BUG=774174
TEST=https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2555
R=kbr@chromium.org
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I4f4e7636314502451104730501a5048a5d7b9f3f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/808665
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522003}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 146,645 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct posix_acl *f2fs_acl_clone(const struct posix_acl *acl,
gfp_t flags)
{
struct posix_acl *clone = NULL;
if (acl) {
int size = sizeof(struct posix_acl) + acl->a_count *
sizeof(struct posix_acl_entry);
clone = kmemdup(acl, size, flags);
if (clone)
atomic_set(&clone->a_refcount, 1);
}
return clone;
}
Commit Message: posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting file permissions
When file permissions are modified via chmod(2) and the user is not in
the owning group or capable of CAP_FSETID, the setgid bit is cleared in
inode_change_ok(). Setting a POSIX ACL via setxattr(2) sets the file
permissions as well as the new ACL, but doesn't clear the setgid bit in
a similar way; this allows to bypass the check in chmod(2). Fix that.
References: CVE-2016-7097
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-285 | 0 | 50,332 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int kvp_file_init(void)
{
int ret, fd;
FILE *filep;
size_t records_read;
__u8 *fname;
struct kvp_record *record;
struct kvp_record *readp;
int num_blocks;
int i;
int alloc_unit = sizeof(struct kvp_record) * ENTRIES_PER_BLOCK;
if (access("/var/opt/hyperv", F_OK)) {
if (mkdir("/var/opt/hyperv", S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IROTH)) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, " Failed to create /var/opt/hyperv");
exit(-1);
}
}
for (i = 0; i < KVP_POOL_COUNT; i++) {
fname = kvp_file_info[i].fname;
records_read = 0;
num_blocks = 1;
sprintf(fname, "/var/opt/hyperv/.kvp_pool_%d", i);
fd = open(fname, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IROTH);
if (fd == -1)
return 1;
filep = fopen(fname, "r");
if (!filep)
return 1;
record = malloc(alloc_unit * num_blocks);
if (record == NULL) {
fclose(filep);
return 1;
}
while (!feof(filep)) {
readp = &record[records_read];
records_read += fread(readp, sizeof(struct kvp_record),
ENTRIES_PER_BLOCK,
filep);
if (!feof(filep)) {
/*
* We have more data to read.
*/
num_blocks++;
record = realloc(record, alloc_unit *
num_blocks);
if (record == NULL) {
fclose(filep);
return 1;
}
continue;
}
break;
}
kvp_file_info[i].fd = fd;
kvp_file_info[i].num_blocks = num_blocks;
kvp_file_info[i].records = record;
kvp_file_info[i].num_records = records_read;
fclose(filep);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Tools: hv: verify origin of netlink connector message
The SuSE security team suggested to use recvfrom instead of recv to be
certain that the connector message is originated from kernel.
CVE-2012-2669
Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Signed-off-by: Marcus Meissner <meissner@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Krahmer <krahmer@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: K. Y. Srinivasan <kys@microsoft.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 19,652 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OVS_REQUIRES(ofproto_mutex)
{
ofproto->ofproto_class->packet_xlate_revert(ofproto, opo);
}
Commit Message: ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <vishal.deep.ajmera@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 77,152 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline char *find_param_list(char *path, size_t path_l, char delim)
{
char *p;
p = memchr(path, delim, path_l);
return p ? p + 1 : NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 6,802 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AppResult::AppResult(Profile* profile,
const std::string& app_id,
AppListControllerDelegate* controller,
bool is_recommendation)
: profile_(profile),
app_id_(app_id),
controller_(controller),
extension_registry_(NULL) {
set_id(extensions::Extension::GetBaseURLFromExtensionId(app_id_).spec());
if (app_list::switches::IsExperimentalAppListEnabled())
set_display_type(is_recommendation ? DISPLAY_RECOMMENDATION : DISPLAY_TILE);
const extensions::Extension* extension =
extensions::ExtensionSystem::Get(profile_)->extension_service()
->GetInstalledExtension(app_id_);
DCHECK(extension);
is_platform_app_ = extension->is_platform_app();
icon_.reset(
new extensions::IconImage(profile_,
extension,
extensions::IconsInfo::GetIcons(extension),
GetPreferredIconDimension(),
extensions::util::GetDefaultAppIcon(),
this));
UpdateIcon();
StartObservingExtensionRegistry();
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036}
CWE ID: | 1 | 171,725 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AutofillDialogViews::AccountChooser::LinkClicked(views::Link* source,
int event_flags) {
delegate_->SignInLinkClicked();
}
Commit Message: Clear out some minor TODOs.
BUG=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1047063002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#322959}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 110,004 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GLboolean GLES2Implementation::UnmapBuffer(GLenum target) {
GPU_CLIENT_SINGLE_THREAD_CHECK();
GPU_CLIENT_LOG("[" << GetLogPrefix() << "] glUnmapBuffer("
<< GLES2Util::GetStringEnum(target) << ")");
switch (target) {
case GL_ARRAY_BUFFER:
case GL_ATOMIC_COUNTER_BUFFER:
case GL_ELEMENT_ARRAY_BUFFER:
case GL_COPY_READ_BUFFER:
case GL_COPY_WRITE_BUFFER:
case GL_PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER:
case GL_PIXEL_UNPACK_BUFFER:
case GL_SHADER_STORAGE_BUFFER:
case GL_TRANSFORM_FEEDBACK_BUFFER:
case GL_UNIFORM_BUFFER:
break;
default:
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "glUnmapBuffer", "invalid target");
return GL_FALSE;
}
GLuint buffer = GetBoundBufferHelper(target);
if (buffer == 0) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "glUnmapBuffer", "no buffer bound");
return GL_FALSE;
}
auto iter = mapped_buffer_range_map_.find(buffer);
if (iter == mapped_buffer_range_map_.end()) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "glUnmapBuffer", "buffer is unmapped");
return GL_FALSE;
}
bool was_mapped_by_readback_tracker = false;
if (auto* buffer_object =
readback_buffer_shadow_tracker_->GetBuffer(buffer)) {
was_mapped_by_readback_tracker = buffer_object->UnmapReadbackShm();
}
if (!was_mapped_by_readback_tracker) {
helper_->UnmapBuffer(target);
InvalidateReadbackBufferShadowDataCHROMIUM(GetBoundBufferHelper(target));
}
RemoveMappedBufferRangeById(buffer);
GPU_CLIENT_LOG(" returned " << GL_TRUE);
CheckGLError();
return GL_TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,149 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: explicit TouchSelectionControllerClientTestWrapper(
ui::TouchSelectionControllerClient* client)
: expected_event_(ui::SELECTION_HANDLES_SHOWN), client_(client) {}
Commit Message: Add a check for disallowing remote frame navigations to local resources.
Previously, RemoteFrame navigations did not perform any renderer-side
checks and relied solely on the browser-side logic to block disallowed
navigations via mechanisms like FilterURL. This means that blocked
remote frame navigations were silently navigated to about:blank
without any console error message.
This CL adds a CanDisplay check to the remote navigation path to match
an equivalent check done for local frame navigations. This way, the
renderer can consistently block disallowed navigations in both cases
and output an error message.
Bug: 894399
Change-Id: I172f68f77c1676f6ca0172d2a6c78f7edc0e3b7a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1282390
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#601022}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 143,911 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void aesni_xts_enc(void *ctx, u128 *dst, const u128 *src, le128 *iv)
{
glue_xts_crypt_128bit_one(ctx, dst, src, iv, GLUE_FUNC_CAST(aesni_enc));
}
Commit Message: crypto: aesni - fix memory usage in GCM decryption
The kernel crypto API logic requires the caller to provide the
length of (ciphertext || authentication tag) as cryptlen for the
AEAD decryption operation. Thus, the cipher implementation must
calculate the size of the plaintext output itself and cannot simply use
cryptlen.
The RFC4106 GCM decryption operation tries to overwrite cryptlen memory
in req->dst. As the destination buffer for decryption only needs to hold
the plaintext memory but cryptlen references the input buffer holding
(ciphertext || authentication tag), the assumption of the destination
buffer length in RFC4106 GCM operation leads to a too large size. This
patch simply uses the already calculated plaintext size.
In addition, this patch fixes the offset calculation of the AAD buffer
pointer: as mentioned before, cryptlen already includes the size of the
tag. Thus, the tag does not need to be added. With the addition, the AAD
will be written beyond the already allocated buffer.
Note, this fixes a kernel crash that can be triggered from user space
via AF_ALG(aead) -- simply use the libkcapi test application
from [1] and update it to use rfc4106-gcm-aes.
Using [1], the changes were tested using CAVS vectors to demonstrate
that the crypto operation still delivers the right results.
[1] http://www.chronox.de/libkcapi.html
CC: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 43,472 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: poppler_page_transition_new (void)
{
return (PopplerPageTransition *) g_new0 (PopplerPageTransition, 1);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 811 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: isdn_net_ciscohdlck_receive(isdn_net_local *lp, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
unsigned char *p;
u8 addr;
u8 ctrl;
u16 type;
if (skb->len < 4)
goto out_free;
p = skb->data;
addr = *(u8 *)(p + 0);
ctrl = *(u8 *)(p + 1);
type = be16_to_cpup((__be16 *)(p + 2));
p += 4;
skb_pull(skb, 4);
if (addr != CISCO_ADDR_UNICAST && addr != CISCO_ADDR_BROADCAST) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: Unknown Cisco addr 0x%02x\n",
lp->netdev->dev->name, addr);
goto out_free;
}
if (ctrl != CISCO_CTRL) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: Unknown Cisco ctrl 0x%02x\n",
lp->netdev->dev->name, ctrl);
goto out_free;
}
switch (type) {
case CISCO_TYPE_SLARP:
isdn_net_ciscohdlck_slarp_in(lp, skb);
goto out_free;
case CISCO_TYPE_CDP:
if (lp->cisco_debserint)
printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: Received CDP packet. use "
"\"no cdp enable\" on cisco.\n",
lp->netdev->dev->name);
goto out_free;
default:
/* no special cisco protocol */
skb->protocol = htons(type);
netif_rx(skb);
return;
}
out_free:
kfree_skb(skb);
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 23,625 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void free_rootdomain(struct root_domain *rd)
{
synchronize_sched();
cpupri_cleanup(&rd->cpupri);
free_cpumask_var(rd->rto_mask);
free_cpumask_var(rd->online);
free_cpumask_var(rd->span);
kfree(rd);
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,430 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual void SetUp() {
CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->AppendSwitch(
switches::kEnablePrintPreview);
RenderViewTest::SetUp();
}
Commit Message: Fix print preview workflow to reflect settings of selected printer.
BUG=95110
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7831041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@102242 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 97,550 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Com_InitJournaling( void ) {
Com_StartupVariable( "journal" );
com_journal = Cvar_Get ("journal", "0", CVAR_INIT);
if ( !com_journal->integer ) {
return;
}
if ( com_journal->integer == 1 ) {
Com_Printf( "Journaling events\n");
com_journalFile = FS_FOpenFileWrite( "journal.dat" );
com_journalDataFile = FS_FOpenFileWrite( "journaldata.dat" );
} else if ( com_journal->integer == 2 ) {
Com_Printf( "Replaying journaled events\n");
FS_FOpenFileRead( "journal.dat", &com_journalFile, qtrue );
FS_FOpenFileRead( "journaldata.dat", &com_journalDataFile, qtrue );
}
if ( !com_journalFile || !com_journalDataFile ) {
Cvar_Set( "com_journal", "0" );
com_journalFile = 0;
com_journalDataFile = 0;
Com_Printf( "Couldn't open journal files\n" );
}
}
Commit Message: Merge some file writing extension checks from OpenJK.
Thanks Ensiform.
https://github.com/JACoders/OpenJK/commit/05928a57f9e4aae15a3bd0
https://github.com/JACoders/OpenJK/commit/ef124fd0fc48af164581176
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 95,465 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int find_fstype_cb(char* buffer, void *data)
{
struct cbarg {
const char *rootfs;
const char *target;
const char *options;
} *cbarg = data;
unsigned long mntflags;
char *mntdata;
char *fstype;
/* we don't try 'nodev' entries */
if (strstr(buffer, "nodev"))
return 0;
fstype = buffer;
fstype += lxc_char_left_gc(fstype, strlen(fstype));
fstype[lxc_char_right_gc(fstype, strlen(fstype))] = '\0';
/* ignore blank line and comment */
if (fstype[0] == '\0' || fstype[0] == '#')
return 0;
DEBUG("trying to mount '%s'->'%s' with fstype '%s'",
cbarg->rootfs, cbarg->target, fstype);
if (parse_mntopts(cbarg->options, &mntflags, &mntdata) < 0) {
free(mntdata);
return -1;
}
if (mount(cbarg->rootfs, cbarg->target, fstype, mntflags, mntdata)) {
DEBUG("mount failed with error: %s", strerror(errno));
free(mntdata);
return 0;
}
free(mntdata);
INFO("mounted '%s' on '%s', with fstype '%s'",
cbarg->rootfs, cbarg->target, fstype);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 44,563 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool empty() const { return empty_; }
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,188 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Dispatcher::OnUpdateTabSpecificPermissions(const GURL& visible_url,
const std::string& extension_id,
const URLPatternSet& new_hosts,
bool update_origin_whitelist,
int tab_id) {
const Extension* extension =
RendererExtensionRegistry::Get()->GetByID(extension_id);
if (!extension)
return;
URLPatternSet old_effective =
extension->permissions_data()->GetEffectiveHostPermissions();
extension->permissions_data()->UpdateTabSpecificPermissions(
tab_id,
extensions::PermissionSet(extensions::APIPermissionSet(),
extensions::ManifestPermissionSet(), new_hosts,
extensions::URLPatternSet()));
if (update_origin_whitelist) {
UpdateOriginPermissions(
extension->url(),
old_effective,
extension->permissions_data()->GetEffectiveHostPermissions());
}
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Expand bindings access checks
BUG=601149
BUG=601073
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1866103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#387710}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 132,570 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: test_bson_append_maxkey (void)
{
bson_t *b;
bson_t *b2;
b = bson_new ();
BSON_ASSERT (bson_append_maxkey (b, "maxkey", -1));
b2 = get_bson ("test37.bson");
BSON_ASSERT_BSON_EQUAL (b, b2);
bson_destroy (b);
bson_destroy (b2);
}
Commit Message: Fix for CVE-2018-16790 -- Verify bounds before binary length read.
As reported here: https://jira.mongodb.org/browse/CDRIVER-2819,
a heap overread occurs due a failure to correctly verify data
bounds.
In the original check, len - o returns the data left including the
sizeof(l) we just read. Instead, the comparison should check
against the data left NOT including the binary int32, i.e. just
subtype (byte*) instead of int32 subtype (byte*).
Added in test for corrupted BSON example.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 77,886 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: vrrp_lower_prio_no_advert_handler(vector_t *strvec)
{
int res;
if (vector_size(strvec) >= 2) {
res = check_true_false(strvec_slot(strvec,1));
if (res < 0)
report_config_error(CONFIG_GENERAL_ERROR, "Invalid value for vrrp_lower_prio_no_advert specified");
else
global_data->vrrp_lower_prio_no_advert = res;
}
else
global_data->vrrp_lower_prio_no_advert = true;
}
Commit Message: Add command line and configuration option to set umask
Issue #1048 identified that files created by keepalived are created
with mode 0666. This commit changes the default to 0644, and also
allows the umask to be specified in the configuration or as a command
line option.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 75,873 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static plist_t parse_bin_node(struct bplist_data *bplist, const char** object)
{
uint16_t type = 0;
uint64_t size = 0;
if (!object)
return NULL;
type = (**object) & BPLIST_MASK;
size = (**object) & BPLIST_FILL;
(*object)++;
if (size == BPLIST_FILL) {
switch (type) {
case BPLIST_DATA:
case BPLIST_STRING:
case BPLIST_UNICODE:
case BPLIST_ARRAY:
case BPLIST_SET:
case BPLIST_DICT:
{
uint16_t next_size = **object & BPLIST_FILL;
if ((**object & BPLIST_MASK) != BPLIST_UINT) {
PLIST_BIN_ERR("%s: invalid size node type for node type 0x%02x: found 0x%02x, expected 0x%02x\n", __func__, type, **object & BPLIST_MASK, BPLIST_UINT);
return NULL;
}
(*object)++;
next_size = 1 << next_size;
if (*object + next_size > bplist->offset_table) {
PLIST_BIN_ERR("%s: size node data bytes for node type 0x%02x point outside of valid range\n", __func__, type);
return NULL;
}
size = UINT_TO_HOST(*object, next_size);
(*object) += next_size;
break;
}
default:
break;
}
}
switch (type)
{
case BPLIST_NULL:
switch (size)
{
case BPLIST_TRUE:
{
plist_data_t data = plist_new_plist_data();
data->type = PLIST_BOOLEAN;
data->boolval = TRUE;
data->length = 1;
return node_create(NULL, data);
}
case BPLIST_FALSE:
{
plist_data_t data = plist_new_plist_data();
data->type = PLIST_BOOLEAN;
data->boolval = FALSE;
data->length = 1;
return node_create(NULL, data);
}
case BPLIST_NULL:
default:
return NULL;
}
case BPLIST_UINT:
if (*object + (uint64_t)(1 << size) > bplist->offset_table) {
PLIST_BIN_ERR("%s: BPLIST_UINT data bytes point outside of valid range\n", __func__);
return NULL;
}
return parse_uint_node(object, size);
case BPLIST_REAL:
if (*object + (uint64_t)(1 << size) > bplist->offset_table) {
PLIST_BIN_ERR("%s: BPLIST_REAL data bytes point outside of valid range\n", __func__);
return NULL;
}
return parse_real_node(object, size);
case BPLIST_DATE:
if (3 != size) {
PLIST_BIN_ERR("%s: invalid data size for BPLIST_DATE node\n", __func__);
return NULL;
}
if (*object + (uint64_t)(1 << size) > bplist->offset_table) {
PLIST_BIN_ERR("%s: BPLIST_DATE data bytes point outside of valid range\n", __func__);
return NULL;
}
return parse_date_node(object, size);
case BPLIST_DATA:
if (*object + size > bplist->offset_table) {
PLIST_BIN_ERR("%s: BPLIST_DATA data bytes point outside of valid range\n", __func__);
return NULL;
}
return parse_data_node(object, size);
case BPLIST_STRING:
if (*object + size > bplist->offset_table) {
PLIST_BIN_ERR("%s: BPLIST_STRING data bytes point outside of valid range\n", __func__);
return NULL;
}
return parse_string_node(object, size);
case BPLIST_UNICODE:
if (size*2 < size) {
PLIST_BIN_ERR("%s: Integer overflow when calculating BPLIST_UNICODE data size.\n", __func__);
return NULL;
}
if (*object + size*2 > bplist->offset_table) {
PLIST_BIN_ERR("%s: BPLIST_UNICODE data bytes point outside of valid range\n", __func__);
return NULL;
}
return parse_unicode_node(object, size);
case BPLIST_SET:
case BPLIST_ARRAY:
if (*object + size > bplist->offset_table) {
PLIST_BIN_ERR("%s: BPLIST_ARRAY data bytes point outside of valid range\n", __func__);
return NULL;
}
return parse_array_node(bplist, object, size);
case BPLIST_UID:
if (*object + size+1 > bplist->offset_table) {
PLIST_BIN_ERR("%s: BPLIST_UID data bytes point outside of valid range\n", __func__);
return NULL;
}
return parse_uid_node(object, size);
case BPLIST_DICT:
if (*object + size > bplist->offset_table) {
PLIST_BIN_ERR("%s: BPLIST_REAL data bytes point outside of valid range\n", __func__);
return NULL;
}
return parse_dict_node(bplist, object, size);
default:
PLIST_BIN_ERR("%s: unexpected node type 0x%02x\n", __func__, type);
return NULL;
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: bplist: Fix data range check for string/data/dict/array nodes
Passing a size of 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF to parse_string_node() might result
in a memcpy with a size of -1, leading to undefined behavior.
This commit makes sure that the actual node data (which depends on the size)
is in the range start_of_object..start_of_object+size.
Credit to OSS-Fuzz
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 1 | 168,334 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int xts_aes_encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
unsigned int nbytes)
{
struct s390_xts_ctx *xts_ctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
struct blkcipher_walk walk;
if (unlikely(xts_ctx->key_len == 48))
return xts_fallback_encrypt(desc, dst, src, nbytes);
blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
return xts_aes_crypt(desc, xts_ctx->enc, xts_ctx, &walk);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 46,677 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int udp_v6_push_pending_frames(struct sock *sk)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct udphdr *uh;
struct udp_sock *up = udp_sk(sk);
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct flowi6 *fl6;
int err = 0;
int is_udplite = IS_UDPLITE(sk);
__wsum csum = 0;
if (up->pending == AF_INET)
return udp_push_pending_frames(sk);
fl6 = &inet->cork.fl.u.ip6;
/* Grab the skbuff where UDP header space exists. */
if ((skb = skb_peek(&sk->sk_write_queue)) == NULL)
goto out;
/*
* Create a UDP header
*/
uh = udp_hdr(skb);
uh->source = fl6->fl6_sport;
uh->dest = fl6->fl6_dport;
uh->len = htons(up->len);
uh->check = 0;
if (is_udplite)
csum = udplite_csum_outgoing(sk, skb);
else if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL) { /* UDP hardware csum */
udp6_hwcsum_outgoing(sk, skb, &fl6->saddr, &fl6->daddr,
up->len);
goto send;
} else
csum = udp_csum_outgoing(sk, skb);
/* add protocol-dependent pseudo-header */
uh->check = csum_ipv6_magic(&fl6->saddr, &fl6->daddr,
up->len, fl6->flowi6_proto, csum);
if (uh->check == 0)
uh->check = CSUM_MANGLED_0;
send:
err = ip6_push_pending_frames(sk);
if (err) {
if (err == -ENOBUFS && !inet6_sk(sk)->recverr) {
UDP6_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk),
UDP_MIB_SNDBUFERRORS, is_udplite);
err = 0;
}
} else
UDP6_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk),
UDP_MIB_OUTDATAGRAMS, is_udplite);
out:
up->len = 0;
up->pending = 0;
return err;
}
Commit Message: inet: prevent leakage of uninitialized memory to user in recv syscalls
Only update *addr_len when we actually fill in sockaddr, otherwise we
can return uninitialized memory from the stack to the caller in the
recvfrom, recvmmsg and recvmsg syscalls. Drop the the (addr_len == NULL)
checks because we only get called with a valid addr_len pointer either
from sock_common_recvmsg or inet_recvmsg.
If a blocking read waits on a socket which is concurrently shut down we
now return zero and set msg_msgnamelen to 0.
Reported-by: mpb <mpb.mail@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 40,223 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int dev_change_net_namespace(struct net_device *dev, struct net *net, const char *pat)
{
int err;
ASSERT_RTNL();
/* Don't allow namespace local devices to be moved. */
err = -EINVAL;
if (dev->features & NETIF_F_NETNS_LOCAL)
goto out;
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS
/* Don't allow real devices to be moved when sysfs
* is enabled.
*/
err = -EINVAL;
if (dev->dev.parent)
goto out;
#endif
/* Ensure the device has been registrered */
err = -EINVAL;
if (dev->reg_state != NETREG_REGISTERED)
goto out;
/* Get out if there is nothing todo */
err = 0;
if (net_eq(dev_net(dev), net))
goto out;
/* Pick the destination device name, and ensure
* we can use it in the destination network namespace.
*/
err = -EEXIST;
if (__dev_get_by_name(net, dev->name)) {
/* We get here if we can't use the current device name */
if (!pat)
goto out;
if (dev_get_valid_name(net, pat, dev->name, 1))
goto out;
}
/*
* And now a mini version of register_netdevice unregister_netdevice.
*/
/* If device is running close it first. */
dev_close(dev);
/* And unlink it from device chain */
err = -ENODEV;
unlist_netdevice(dev);
synchronize_net();
/* Shutdown queueing discipline. */
dev_shutdown(dev);
/* Notify protocols, that we are about to destroy
this device. They should clean all the things.
*/
call_netdevice_notifiers(NETDEV_UNREGISTER, dev);
call_netdevice_notifiers(NETDEV_UNREGISTER_BATCH, dev);
/*
* Flush the unicast and multicast chains
*/
dev_unicast_flush(dev);
dev_addr_discard(dev);
netdev_unregister_kobject(dev);
/* Actually switch the network namespace */
dev_net_set(dev, net);
/* If there is an ifindex conflict assign a new one */
if (__dev_get_by_index(net, dev->ifindex)) {
int iflink = (dev->iflink == dev->ifindex);
dev->ifindex = dev_new_index(net);
if (iflink)
dev->iflink = dev->ifindex;
}
/* Fixup kobjects */
err = netdev_register_kobject(dev);
WARN_ON(err);
/* Add the device back in the hashes */
list_netdevice(dev);
/* Notify protocols, that a new device appeared. */
call_netdevice_notifiers(NETDEV_REGISTER, dev);
/*
* Prevent userspace races by waiting until the network
* device is fully setup before sending notifications.
*/
rtmsg_ifinfo(RTM_NEWLINK, dev, ~0U);
synchronize_net();
err = 0;
out:
return err;
}
Commit Message: veth: Dont kfree_skb() after dev_forward_skb()
In case of congestion, netif_rx() frees the skb, so we must assume
dev_forward_skb() also consume skb.
Bug introduced by commit 445409602c092
(veth: move loopback logic to common location)
We must change dev_forward_skb() to always consume skb, and veth to not
double free it.
Bug report : http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=127310770900442&w=3
Reported-by: Martín Ferrari <martin.ferrari@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 32,101 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nfs_printfh(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const uint32_t *dp, const u_int len)
{
my_fsid fsid;
uint32_t ino;
const char *sfsname = NULL;
char *spacep;
if (ndo->ndo_uflag) {
u_int i;
char const *sep = "";
ND_PRINT((ndo, " fh["));
for (i=0; i<len; i++) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s%x", sep, dp[i]));
sep = ":";
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "]"));
return;
}
Parse_fh((const u_char *)dp, len, &fsid, &ino, NULL, &sfsname, 0);
if (sfsname) {
/* file system ID is ASCII, not numeric, for this server OS */
static char temp[NFSX_V3FHMAX+1];
/* Make sure string is null-terminated */
strncpy(temp, sfsname, NFSX_V3FHMAX);
temp[sizeof(temp) - 1] = '\0';
/* Remove trailing spaces */
spacep = strchr(temp, ' ');
if (spacep)
*spacep = '\0';
ND_PRINT((ndo, " fh %s/", temp));
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " fh %d,%d/",
fsid.Fsid_dev.Major, fsid.Fsid_dev.Minor));
}
if(fsid.Fsid_dev.Minor == 257)
/* Print the undecoded handle */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", fsid.Opaque_Handle));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%ld", (long) ino));
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13001/NFS: Don't copy more data than is in the file handle.
Also, put the buffer on the stack; no reason to make it static. (65
bytes isn't a lot.)
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 167,906 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int __net_init ip_vs_control_net_init(struct net *net)
{
int idx;
struct netns_ipvs *ipvs = net_ipvs(net);
rwlock_init(&ipvs->rs_lock);
/* Initialize rs_table */
for (idx = 0; idx < IP_VS_RTAB_SIZE; idx++)
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ipvs->rs_table[idx]);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ipvs->dest_trash);
atomic_set(&ipvs->ftpsvc_counter, 0);
atomic_set(&ipvs->nullsvc_counter, 0);
/* procfs stats */
ipvs->tot_stats.cpustats = alloc_percpu(struct ip_vs_cpu_stats);
if (!ipvs->tot_stats.cpustats)
return -ENOMEM;
spin_lock_init(&ipvs->tot_stats.lock);
proc_net_fops_create(net, "ip_vs", 0, &ip_vs_info_fops);
proc_net_fops_create(net, "ip_vs_stats", 0, &ip_vs_stats_fops);
proc_net_fops_create(net, "ip_vs_stats_percpu", 0,
&ip_vs_stats_percpu_fops);
if (ip_vs_control_net_init_sysctl(net))
goto err;
return 0;
err:
free_percpu(ipvs->tot_stats.cpustats);
return -ENOMEM;
}
Commit Message: ipvs: fix info leak in getsockopt(IP_VS_SO_GET_TIMEOUT)
If at least one of CONFIG_IP_VS_PROTO_TCP or CONFIG_IP_VS_PROTO_UDP is
not set, __ip_vs_get_timeouts() does not fully initialize the structure
that gets copied to userland and that for leaks up to 12 bytes of kernel
stack. Add an explicit memset(0) before passing the structure to
__ip_vs_get_timeouts() to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Wensong Zhang <wensong@linux-vs.org>
Cc: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au>
Cc: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 34,190 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DocumentLoader::ResponseReceived(
Resource* resource,
const ResourceResponse& response,
std::unique_ptr<WebDataConsumerHandle> handle) {
DCHECK_EQ(GetResource(), resource);
DCHECK(!handle);
DCHECK(frame_);
application_cache_host_->DidReceiveResponseForMainResource(response);
if (response.AppCacheID())
GetMemoryCache()->Remove(resource);
content_security_policy_ = ContentSecurityPolicy::Create();
content_security_policy_->SetOverrideURLForSelf(response.Url());
if (!frame_->GetSettings()->BypassCSP()) {
content_security_policy_->DidReceiveHeaders(
ContentSecurityPolicyResponseHeaders(response));
if (!content_security_policy_->HasPolicyFromSource(
kContentSecurityPolicyHeaderSourceOriginPolicy)) {
std::unique_ptr<OriginPolicy> origin_policy = OriginPolicy::From(
StringUTF8Adaptor(request_.GetOriginPolicy()).AsStringPiece());
if (origin_policy) {
for (auto csp : origin_policy->GetContentSecurityPolicies()) {
content_security_policy_->DidReceiveHeader(
WTF::String::FromUTF8(csp.policy.data(), csp.policy.length()),
csp.report_only ? kContentSecurityPolicyHeaderTypeReport
: kContentSecurityPolicyHeaderTypeEnforce,
kContentSecurityPolicyHeaderSourceOriginPolicy);
}
}
}
}
if (!content_security_policy_->AllowAncestors(frame_, response.Url())) {
CancelLoadAfterCSPDenied(response);
return;
}
if (!frame_->GetSettings()->BypassCSP() &&
!GetFrameLoader().RequiredCSP().IsEmpty()) {
const SecurityOrigin* parent_security_origin =
frame_->Tree().Parent()->GetSecurityContext()->GetSecurityOrigin();
if (ContentSecurityPolicy::ShouldEnforceEmbeddersPolicy(
response, parent_security_origin)) {
content_security_policy_->AddPolicyFromHeaderValue(
GetFrameLoader().RequiredCSP(),
kContentSecurityPolicyHeaderTypeEnforce,
kContentSecurityPolicyHeaderSourceHTTP);
} else {
ContentSecurityPolicy* required_csp = ContentSecurityPolicy::Create();
required_csp->AddPolicyFromHeaderValue(
GetFrameLoader().RequiredCSP(),
kContentSecurityPolicyHeaderTypeEnforce,
kContentSecurityPolicyHeaderSourceHTTP);
if (!required_csp->Subsumes(*content_security_policy_)) {
String message = "Refused to display '" +
response.Url().ElidedString() +
"' because it has not opted-into the following policy "
"required by its embedder: '" +
GetFrameLoader().RequiredCSP() + "'.";
ConsoleMessage* console_message = ConsoleMessage::CreateForRequest(
kSecurityMessageSource, kErrorMessageLevel, message, response.Url(),
this, MainResourceIdentifier());
frame_->GetDocument()->AddConsoleMessage(console_message);
CancelLoadAfterCSPDenied(response);
return;
}
}
}
DCHECK(!frame_->GetPage()->Paused());
if (response.DidServiceWorkerNavigationPreload())
UseCounter::Count(this, WebFeature::kServiceWorkerNavigationPreload);
response_ = response;
if (IsArchiveMIMEType(response_.MimeType()) &&
resource->GetDataBufferingPolicy() != kBufferData)
resource->SetDataBufferingPolicy(kBufferData);
if (!ShouldContinueForResponse()) {
probe::didReceiveResourceResponse(frame_->GetDocument(),
resource->Identifier(), this, response_,
resource);
fetcher_->StopFetching();
return;
}
if (frame_->Owner() && response_.IsHTTP() &&
!cors::IsOkStatus(response_.HttpStatusCode()))
frame_->Owner()->RenderFallbackContent(frame_);
}
Commit Message: Inherit the navigation initiator when navigating instead of the parent/opener
Spec PR: https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-csp/pull/358
Bug: 905301, 894228, 836148
Change-Id: I43ada2266d42d1cd56dbe3c6dd89d115e878a83a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1314633
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#610850}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 152,547 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NavigationRequest::OnRequestStarted(base::TimeTicks timestamp) {
if (frame_tree_node_->IsMainFrame()) {
TRACE_EVENT_ASYNC_END_WITH_TIMESTAMP0(
"navigation", "Navigation timeToNetworkStack", navigation_handle_.get(),
timestamp);
}
frame_tree_node_->navigator()->LogResourceRequestTime(timestamp,
common_params_.url);
}
Commit Message: Use an opaque URL rather than an empty URL for request's site for cookies.
Apparently this makes a big difference to the cookie settings backend.
Bug: 881715
Change-Id: Id87fa0c6a858bae6a3f8fff4d6af3f974b00d5e4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1212846
Commit-Queue: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#589512}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 132,955 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: evdns_getaddrinfo_gotresolve(int result, char type, int count,
int ttl, void *addresses, void *arg)
{
int i;
struct getaddrinfo_subrequest *req = arg;
struct getaddrinfo_subrequest *other_req;
struct evdns_getaddrinfo_request *data;
struct evutil_addrinfo *res;
struct sockaddr_in sin;
struct sockaddr_in6 sin6;
struct sockaddr *sa;
int socklen, addrlen;
void *addrp;
int err;
int user_canceled;
EVUTIL_ASSERT(req->type == DNS_IPv4_A || req->type == DNS_IPv6_AAAA);
if (req->type == DNS_IPv4_A) {
data = EVUTIL_UPCAST(req, struct evdns_getaddrinfo_request, ipv4_request);
other_req = &data->ipv6_request;
} else {
data = EVUTIL_UPCAST(req, struct evdns_getaddrinfo_request, ipv6_request);
other_req = &data->ipv4_request;
}
/** Called from evdns_base_free() with @fail_requests == 1 */
if (result != DNS_ERR_SHUTDOWN) {
EVDNS_LOCK(data->evdns_base);
if (evdns_result_is_answer(result)) {
if (req->type == DNS_IPv4_A)
++data->evdns_base->getaddrinfo_ipv4_answered;
else
++data->evdns_base->getaddrinfo_ipv6_answered;
}
user_canceled = data->user_canceled;
if (other_req->r == NULL)
data->request_done = 1;
EVDNS_UNLOCK(data->evdns_base);
} else {
data->evdns_base = NULL;
user_canceled = data->user_canceled;
}
req->r = NULL;
if (result == DNS_ERR_CANCEL && ! user_canceled) {
/* Internal cancel request from timeout or internal error.
* we already answered the user. */
if (other_req->r == NULL)
free_getaddrinfo_request(data);
return;
}
if (data->user_cb == NULL) {
/* We already answered. XXXX This shouldn't be needed; see
* comments in evdns_getaddrinfo_timeout_cb */
free_getaddrinfo_request(data);
return;
}
if (result == DNS_ERR_NONE) {
if (count == 0)
err = EVUTIL_EAI_NODATA;
else
err = 0;
} else {
err = evdns_err_to_getaddrinfo_err(result);
}
if (err) {
/* Looks like we got an error. */
if (other_req->r) {
/* The other request is still working; maybe it will
* succeed. */
/* XXXX handle failure from set_timeout */
if (result != DNS_ERR_SHUTDOWN) {
evdns_getaddrinfo_set_timeout(data->evdns_base, data);
}
data->pending_error = err;
return;
}
if (user_canceled) {
data->user_cb(EVUTIL_EAI_CANCEL, NULL, data->user_data);
} else if (data->pending_result) {
/* If we have an answer waiting, and we weren't
* canceled, ignore this error. */
add_cname_to_reply(data, data->pending_result);
data->user_cb(0, data->pending_result, data->user_data);
data->pending_result = NULL;
} else {
if (data->pending_error)
err = getaddrinfo_merge_err(err,
data->pending_error);
data->user_cb(err, NULL, data->user_data);
}
free_getaddrinfo_request(data);
return;
} else if (user_canceled) {
if (other_req->r) {
/* The other request is still working; let it hit this
* callback with EVUTIL_EAI_CANCEL callback and report
* the failure. */
return;
}
data->user_cb(EVUTIL_EAI_CANCEL, NULL, data->user_data);
free_getaddrinfo_request(data);
return;
}
/* Looks like we got some answers. We should turn them into addrinfos
* and then either queue those or return them all. */
EVUTIL_ASSERT(type == DNS_IPv4_A || type == DNS_IPv6_AAAA);
if (type == DNS_IPv4_A) {
memset(&sin, 0, sizeof(sin));
sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
sin.sin_port = htons(data->port);
sa = (struct sockaddr *)&sin;
socklen = sizeof(sin);
addrlen = 4;
addrp = &sin.sin_addr.s_addr;
} else {
memset(&sin6, 0, sizeof(sin6));
sin6.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
sin6.sin6_port = htons(data->port);
sa = (struct sockaddr *)&sin6;
socklen = sizeof(sin6);
addrlen = 16;
addrp = &sin6.sin6_addr.s6_addr;
}
res = NULL;
for (i=0; i < count; ++i) {
struct evutil_addrinfo *ai;
memcpy(addrp, ((char*)addresses)+i*addrlen, addrlen);
ai = evutil_new_addrinfo_(sa, socklen, &data->hints);
if (!ai) {
if (other_req->r) {
evdns_cancel_request(NULL, other_req->r);
}
data->user_cb(EVUTIL_EAI_MEMORY, NULL, data->user_data);
if (res)
evutil_freeaddrinfo(res);
if (other_req->r == NULL)
free_getaddrinfo_request(data);
return;
}
res = evutil_addrinfo_append_(res, ai);
}
if (other_req->r) {
/* The other request is still in progress; wait for it */
/* XXXX handle failure from set_timeout */
evdns_getaddrinfo_set_timeout(data->evdns_base, data);
data->pending_result = res;
return;
} else {
/* The other request is done or never started; append its
* results (if any) and return them. */
if (data->pending_result) {
if (req->type == DNS_IPv4_A)
res = evutil_addrinfo_append_(res,
data->pending_result);
else
res = evutil_addrinfo_append_(
data->pending_result, res);
data->pending_result = NULL;
}
/* Call the user callback. */
add_cname_to_reply(data, res);
data->user_cb(0, res, data->user_data);
/* Free data. */
free_getaddrinfo_request(data);
}
}
Commit Message: evdns: fix searching empty hostnames
From #332:
Here follows a bug report by **Guido Vranken** via the _Tor bug bounty program_. Please credit Guido accordingly.
## Bug report
The DNS code of Libevent contains this rather obvious OOB read:
```c
static char *
search_make_new(const struct search_state *const state, int n, const char *const base_name) {
const size_t base_len = strlen(base_name);
const char need_to_append_dot = base_name[base_len - 1] == '.' ? 0 : 1;
```
If the length of ```base_name``` is 0, then line 3125 reads 1 byte before the buffer. This will trigger a crash on ASAN-protected builds.
To reproduce:
Build libevent with ASAN:
```
$ CFLAGS='-fomit-frame-pointer -fsanitize=address' ./configure && make -j4
```
Put the attached ```resolv.conf``` and ```poc.c``` in the source directory and then do:
```
$ gcc -fsanitize=address -fomit-frame-pointer poc.c .libs/libevent.a
$ ./a.out
=================================================================
==22201== ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60060000efdf at pc 0x4429da bp 0x7ffe1ed47300 sp 0x7ffe1ed472f8
READ of size 1 at 0x60060000efdf thread T0
```
P.S. we can add a check earlier, but since this is very uncommon, I didn't add it.
Fixes: #332
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 70,612 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int vbg_input_open(struct input_dev *input)
{
struct vbg_dev *gdev = input_get_drvdata(input);
u32 feat = VMMDEV_MOUSE_GUEST_CAN_ABSOLUTE | VMMDEV_MOUSE_NEW_PROTOCOL;
int ret;
ret = vbg_core_set_mouse_status(gdev, feat);
if (ret)
return ret;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: virt: vbox: Only copy_from_user the request-header once
In vbg_misc_device_ioctl(), the header of the ioctl argument is copied from
the userspace pointer 'arg' and saved to the kernel object 'hdr'. Then the
'version', 'size_in', and 'size_out' fields of 'hdr' are verified.
Before this commit, after the checks a buffer for the entire request would
be allocated and then all data including the verified header would be
copied from the userspace 'arg' pointer again.
Given that the 'arg' pointer resides in userspace, a malicious userspace
process can race to change the data pointed to by 'arg' between the two
copies. By doing so, the user can bypass the verifications on the ioctl
argument.
This commit fixes this by using the already checked copy of the header
to fill the header part of the allocated buffer and only copying the
remainder of the data from userspace.
Signed-off-by: Wenwen Wang <wang6495@umn.edu>
Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 81,692 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int __br_ip6_hash(struct net_bridge_mdb_htable *mdb,
const struct in6_addr *ip)
{
return jhash2((__force u32 *)ip->s6_addr32, 4, mdb->secret) & (mdb->max - 1);
}
Commit Message: bridge: Fix mglist corruption that leads to memory corruption
The list mp->mglist is used to indicate whether a multicast group
is active on the bridge interface itself as opposed to one of the
constituent interfaces in the bridge.
Unfortunately the operation that adds the mp->mglist node to the
list neglected to check whether it has already been added. This
leads to list corruption in the form of nodes pointing to itself.
Normally this would be quite obvious as it would cause an infinite
loop when walking the list. However, as this list is never actually
walked (which means that we don't really need it, I'll get rid of
it in a subsequent patch), this instead is hidden until we perform
a delete operation on the affected nodes.
As the same node may now be pointed to by more than one node, the
delete operations can then cause modification of freed memory.
This was observed in practice to cause corruption in 512-byte slabs,
most commonly leading to crashes in jbd2.
Thanks to Josef Bacik for pointing me in the right direction.
Reported-by: Ian Page Hands <ihands@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 27,785 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BackTexture::Create() {
ScopedGLErrorSuppressor suppressor("BackTexture::Create",
state_->GetErrorState());
Destroy();
glGenTextures(1, &id_);
ScopedTextureBinder binder(state_, id_, GL_TEXTURE_2D);
glTexParameteri(GL_TEXTURE_2D, GL_TEXTURE_MAG_FILTER, GL_NEAREST);
glTexParameteri(GL_TEXTURE_2D, GL_TEXTURE_MIN_FILTER, GL_NEAREST);
glTexParameteri(GL_TEXTURE_2D, GL_TEXTURE_WRAP_S, GL_CLAMP_TO_EDGE);
glTexParameteri(GL_TEXTURE_2D, GL_TEXTURE_WRAP_T, GL_CLAMP_TO_EDGE);
glTexImage2D(
GL_TEXTURE_2D, 0, GL_RGBA, 16, 16, 0, GL_RGBA, GL_UNSIGNED_BYTE, NULL);
bytes_allocated_ = 16u * 16u * 4u;
memory_tracker_.TrackMemAlloc(bytes_allocated_);
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 120,759 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static uint32_t GetMaxIndex(JSObject* receiver, FixedArrayBase* elements) {
if (receiver->IsJSArray()) {
DCHECK(JSArray::cast(receiver)->length()->IsSmi());
return static_cast<uint32_t>(
Smi::cast(JSArray::cast(receiver)->length())->value());
}
return Subclass::GetCapacityImpl(receiver, elements);
}
Commit Message: Backport: Fix Object.entries/values with changing elements
Bug: 111274046
Test: m -j proxy_resolver_v8_unittest && adb sync && adb shell \
/data/nativetest64/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest
Change-Id: I705fc512cc5837e9364ed187559cc75d079aa5cb
(cherry picked from commit d8be9a10287afed07705ac8af027d6a46d4def99)
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 163,115 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SoftMP3::~SoftMP3() {
if (mDecoderBuf != NULL) {
free(mDecoderBuf);
mDecoderBuf = NULL;
}
delete mConfig;
mConfig = NULL;
}
Commit Message: SoftMP3: memset safely
Bug: 29422022
Change-Id: I70c9e33269d16bf8c163815706ac24e18e34fe97
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 158,345 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void invalid_filename(const char *fname) {
EUID_ASSERT();
assert(fname);
const char *ptr = fname;
if (arg_debug_check_filename)
printf("Checking filename %s\n", fname);
if (strncmp(ptr, "${HOME}", 7) == 0)
ptr = fname + 7;
else if (strncmp(ptr, "${PATH}", 7) == 0)
ptr = fname + 7;
else if (strcmp(fname, "${DOWNLOADS}") == 0)
return;
int len = strlen(ptr);
if (strcspn(ptr, "\\&!?\"'<>%^(){}[];,") != (size_t)len) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: \"%s\" is an invalid filename\n", ptr);
exit(1);
}
}
Commit Message: replace copy_file with copy_file_as_user
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 96,079 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool keyring_detect_restriction_cycle(const struct key *dest_keyring,
struct key_restriction *keyres)
{
while (keyres && keyres->key &&
keyres->key->type == &key_type_keyring) {
if (keyres->key == dest_keyring)
return true;
keyres = keyres->key->restrict_link;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.
(2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.
(3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.
This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.
The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.
The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.
Additionally, barriering is included:
(1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.
(2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.
Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.
Fixes: 146aa8b1453b ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 60,248 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err fpar_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
u32 i;
FilePartitionBox *ptr = (FilePartitionBox *) a;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "FilePartitionBox", trace);
fprintf(trace, "itemID=\"%d\" FEC_encoding_ID=\"%d\" FEC_instance_ID=\"%d\" max_source_block_length=\"%d\" encoding_symbol_length=\"%d\" max_number_of_encoding_symbols=\"%d\" ", ptr->itemID, ptr->FEC_encoding_ID, ptr->FEC_instance_ID, ptr->max_source_block_length, ptr->encoding_symbol_length, ptr->max_number_of_encoding_symbols);
if (ptr->scheme_specific_info)
dump_data_attribute(trace, "scheme_specific_info", (char*)ptr->scheme_specific_info, (u32)strlen(ptr->scheme_specific_info) );
fprintf(trace, ">\n");
for (i=0; i<ptr->nb_entries; i++) {
fprintf(trace, "<FilePartitionBoxEntry block_count=\"%d\" block_size=\"%d\"/>\n", ptr->entries[i].block_count, ptr->entries[i].block_size);
}
if (!ptr->size) {
fprintf(trace, "<FilePartitionBoxEntry block_count=\"\" block_size=\"\"/>\n");
}
gf_isom_box_dump_done("FilePartitionBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,732 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cmsInt32Number CMSEXPORT cmsIT8SetTable(cmsHANDLE IT8, cmsUInt32Number nTable)
{
cmsIT8* it8 = (cmsIT8*) IT8;
if (nTable >= it8 ->TablesCount) {
if (nTable == it8 ->TablesCount) {
AllocTable(it8);
}
else {
SynError(it8, "Table %d is out of sequence", nTable);
return -1;
}
}
it8 ->nTable = nTable;
return (cmsInt32Number) nTable;
}
Commit Message: Upgrade Visual studio 2017 15.8
- Upgrade to 15.8
- Add check on CGATS memory allocation (thanks to Quang Nguyen for
pointing out this)
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 78,089 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: swevent_hlist_deref(struct swevent_htable *swhash)
{
return rcu_dereference_protected(swhash->swevent_hlist,
lockdep_is_held(&swhash->hlist_mutex));
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 26,200 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_backbeat_8_3(struct net *net,
const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const sctp_subtype_t type,
void *arg,
sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands)
{
struct sctp_chunk *chunk = arg;
union sctp_addr from_addr;
struct sctp_transport *link;
sctp_sender_hb_info_t *hbinfo;
unsigned long max_interval;
if (!sctp_vtag_verify(chunk, asoc))
return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
/* Make sure that the HEARTBEAT-ACK chunk has a valid length. */
if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t) +
sizeof(sctp_sender_hb_info_t)))
return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
commands);
hbinfo = (sctp_sender_hb_info_t *) chunk->skb->data;
/* Make sure that the length of the parameter is what we expect */
if (ntohs(hbinfo->param_hdr.length) !=
sizeof(sctp_sender_hb_info_t)) {
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_DISCARD;
}
from_addr = hbinfo->daddr;
link = sctp_assoc_lookup_paddr(asoc, &from_addr);
/* This should never happen, but lets log it if so. */
if (unlikely(!link)) {
if (from_addr.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6) {
net_warn_ratelimited("%s association %p could not find address %pI6\n",
__func__,
asoc,
&from_addr.v6.sin6_addr);
} else {
net_warn_ratelimited("%s association %p could not find address %pI4\n",
__func__,
asoc,
&from_addr.v4.sin_addr.s_addr);
}
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_DISCARD;
}
/* Validate the 64-bit random nonce. */
if (hbinfo->hb_nonce != link->hb_nonce)
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_DISCARD;
max_interval = link->hbinterval + link->rto;
/* Check if the timestamp looks valid. */
if (time_after(hbinfo->sent_at, jiffies) ||
time_after(jiffies, hbinfo->sent_at + max_interval)) {
pr_debug("%s: HEARTBEAT ACK with invalid timestamp received "
"for transport:%p\n", __func__, link);
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_DISCARD;
}
/* 8.3 Upon the receipt of the HEARTBEAT ACK, the sender of
* the HEARTBEAT should clear the error counter of the
* destination transport address to which the HEARTBEAT was
* sent and mark the destination transport address as active if
* it is not so marked.
*/
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_TRANSPORT_ON, SCTP_TRANSPORT(link));
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_CONSUME;
}
Commit Message: net: sctp: fix remote memory pressure from excessive queueing
This scenario is not limited to ASCONF, just taken as one
example triggering the issue. When receiving ASCONF probes
in the form of ...
-------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------->
<----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------
-------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
<-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
---- ASCONF_a; [ASCONF_b; ...; ASCONF_n;] JUNK ------>
[...]
---- ASCONF_m; [ASCONF_o; ...; ASCONF_z;] JUNK ------>
... where ASCONF_a, ASCONF_b, ..., ASCONF_z are good-formed
ASCONFs and have increasing serial numbers, we process such
ASCONF chunk(s) marked with !end_of_packet and !singleton,
since we have not yet reached the SCTP packet end. SCTP does
only do verification on a chunk by chunk basis, as an SCTP
packet is nothing more than just a container of a stream of
chunks which it eats up one by one.
We could run into the case that we receive a packet with a
malformed tail, above marked as trailing JUNK. All previous
chunks are here goodformed, so the stack will eat up all
previous chunks up to this point. In case JUNK does not fit
into a chunk header and there are no more other chunks in
the input queue, or in case JUNK contains a garbage chunk
header, but the encoded chunk length would exceed the skb
tail, or we came here from an entirely different scenario
and the chunk has pdiscard=1 mark (without having had a flush
point), it will happen, that we will excessively queue up
the association's output queue (a correct final chunk may
then turn it into a response flood when flushing the
queue ;)): I ran a simple script with incremental ASCONF
serial numbers and could see the server side consuming
excessive amount of RAM [before/after: up to 2GB and more].
The issue at heart is that the chunk train basically ends
with !end_of_packet and !singleton markers and since commit
2e3216cd54b1 ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding
with 1 packet") therefore preventing an output queue flush
point in sctp_do_sm() -> sctp_cmd_interpreter() on the input
chunk (chunk = event_arg) even though local_cork is set,
but its precedence has changed since then. In the normal
case, the last chunk with end_of_packet=1 would trigger the
queue flush to accommodate possible outgoing bundling.
In the input queue, sctp_inq_pop() seems to do the right thing
in terms of discarding invalid chunks. So, above JUNK will
not enter the state machine and instead be released and exit
the sctp_assoc_bh_rcv() chunk processing loop. It's simply
the flush point being missing at loop exit. Adding a try-flush
approach on the output queue might not work as the underlying
infrastructure might be long gone at this point due to the
side-effect interpreter run.
One possibility, albeit a bit of a kludge, would be to defer
invalid chunk freeing into the state machine in order to
possibly trigger packet discards and thus indirectly a queue
flush on error. It would surely be better to discard chunks
as in the current, perhaps better controlled environment, but
going back and forth, it's simply architecturally not possible.
I tried various trailing JUNK attack cases and it seems to
look good now.
Joint work with Vlad Yasevich.
Fixes: 2e3216cd54b1 ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding with 1 packet")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 37,331 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: evutil_weakrand_seed_(struct evutil_weakrand_state *state, ev_uint32_t seed)
{
if (seed == 0) {
struct timeval tv;
evutil_gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
seed = (ev_uint32_t)tv.tv_sec + (ev_uint32_t)tv.tv_usec;
#ifdef _WIN32
seed += (ev_uint32_t) _getpid();
#else
seed += (ev_uint32_t) getpid();
#endif
}
state->seed = seed;
return seed;
}
Commit Message: evutil_parse_sockaddr_port(): fix buffer overflow
@asn-the-goblin-slayer:
"Length between '[' and ']' is cast to signed 32 bit integer on line 1815. Is
the length is more than 2<<31 (INT_MAX), len will hold a negative value.
Consequently, it will pass the check at line 1816. Segfault happens at line
1819.
Generate a resolv.conf with generate-resolv.conf, then compile and run
poc.c. See entry-functions.txt for functions in tor that might be
vulnerable.
Please credit 'Guido Vranken' for this discovery through the Tor bug bounty
program."
Reproducer for gdb (https://gist.github.com/azat/be2b0d5e9417ba0dfe2c):
start
p (1ULL<<31)+1ULL
# $1 = 2147483649
p malloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr))
# $2 = (void *) 0x646010
p malloc(sizeof(int))
# $3 = (void *) 0x646030
p malloc($1)
# $4 = (void *) 0x7fff76a2a010
p memset($4, 1, $1)
# $5 = 1990369296
p (char *)$4
# $6 = 0x7fff76a2a010 '\001' <repeats 200 times>...
set $6[0]='['
set $6[$1]=']'
p evutil_parse_sockaddr_port($4, $2, $3)
# $7 = -1
Before:
$ gdb bin/http-connect < gdb
(gdb) $1 = 2147483649
(gdb) (gdb) $2 = (void *) 0x646010
(gdb) (gdb) $3 = (void *) 0x646030
(gdb) (gdb) $4 = (void *) 0x7fff76a2a010
(gdb) (gdb) $5 = 1990369296
(gdb) (gdb) $6 = 0x7fff76a2a010 '\001' <repeats 200 times>...
(gdb) (gdb) (gdb) (gdb)
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
__memcpy_sse2_unaligned () at memcpy-sse2-unaligned.S:36
After:
$ gdb bin/http-connect < gdb
(gdb) $1 = 2147483649
(gdb) (gdb) $2 = (void *) 0x646010
(gdb) (gdb) $3 = (void *) 0x646030
(gdb) (gdb) $4 = (void *) 0x7fff76a2a010
(gdb) (gdb) $5 = 1990369296
(gdb) (gdb) $6 = 0x7fff76a2a010 '\001' <repeats 200 times>...
(gdb) (gdb) (gdb) (gdb) $7 = -1
(gdb) (gdb) quit
Fixes: #318
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 70,768 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CWebServer::Cmd_UpdateDevice(WebEmSession & session, const request& req, Json::Value &root)
{
if (session.rights < 1)
{
session.reply_status = reply::forbidden;
return; //only user or higher allowed
}
std::string idx = request::findValue(&req, "idx");
if (!IsIdxForUser(&session, atoi(idx.c_str())))
{
_log.Log(LOG_ERROR, "User: %s tried to update an Unauthorized device!", session.username.c_str());
session.reply_status = reply::forbidden;
return;
}
std::string hid = request::findValue(&req, "hid");
std::string did = request::findValue(&req, "did");
std::string dunit = request::findValue(&req, "dunit");
std::string dtype = request::findValue(&req, "dtype");
std::string dsubtype = request::findValue(&req, "dsubtype");
std::string nvalue = request::findValue(&req, "nvalue");
std::string svalue = request::findValue(&req, "svalue");
if ((nvalue.empty() && svalue.empty()))
{
return;
}
int signallevel = 12;
int batterylevel = 255;
if (idx.empty())
{
if (
(hid.empty()) ||
(did.empty()) ||
(dunit.empty()) ||
(dtype.empty()) ||
(dsubtype.empty())
)
return;
}
else
{
std::vector<std::vector<std::string> > result;
result = m_sql.safe_query("SELECT HardwareID, DeviceID, Unit, Type, SubType FROM DeviceStatus WHERE (ID=='%q')",
idx.c_str());
if (result.empty())
return;
hid = result[0][0];
did = result[0][1];
dunit = result[0][2];
dtype = result[0][3];
dsubtype = result[0][4];
}
int HardwareID = atoi(hid.c_str());
std::string DeviceID = did;
int unit = atoi(dunit.c_str());
int devType = atoi(dtype.c_str());
int subType = atoi(dsubtype.c_str());
uint64_t ulIdx = std::strtoull(idx.c_str(), nullptr, 10);
int invalue = atoi(nvalue.c_str());
std::string sSignalLevel = request::findValue(&req, "rssi");
if (sSignalLevel != "")
{
signallevel = atoi(sSignalLevel.c_str());
}
std::string sBatteryLevel = request::findValue(&req, "battery");
if (sBatteryLevel != "")
{
batterylevel = atoi(sBatteryLevel.c_str());
}
if (m_mainworker.UpdateDevice(HardwareID, DeviceID, unit, devType, subType, invalue, svalue, signallevel, batterylevel))
{
root["status"] = "OK";
root["title"] = "Update Device";
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed possible SQL Injection Vulnerability (Thanks to Fabio Carretto!)
CWE ID: CWE-89 | 0 | 91,021 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ExternalProtocolHandler::LaunchUrlWithoutSecurityCheck(
const GURL& url,
content::WebContents* web_contents) {
if (!web_contents)
return;
platform_util::OpenExternal(
Profile::FromBrowserContext(web_contents->GetBrowserContext()), url);
}
Commit Message: Reland "Launching an external protocol handler now escapes the URL."
This is a reland of 2401e58572884b3561e4348d64f11ac74667ef02
Original change's description:
> Launching an external protocol handler now escapes the URL.
>
> Fixes bug introduced in r102449.
>
> Bug: 785809
> Change-Id: I9e6dd1031dd7e7b8d378b138ab151daefdc0c6dc
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/778747
> Commit-Queue: Matt Giuca <mgiuca@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Eric Lawrence <elawrence@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Ben Wells <benwells@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#518848}
Bug: 785809
Change-Id: Ib8954584004ff5681654398db76d48cdf4437df7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/788551
Reviewed-by: Ben Wells <benwells@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Matt Giuca <mgiuca@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#519203}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 146,874 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_MINFO_FUNCTION(date)
{
const timelib_tzdb *tzdb = DATE_TIMEZONEDB;
php_info_print_table_start();
php_info_print_table_row(2, "date/time support", "enabled");
php_info_print_table_row(2, "\"Olson\" Timezone Database Version", tzdb->version);
php_info_print_table_row(2, "Timezone Database", php_date_global_timezone_db_enabled ? "external" : "internal");
php_info_print_table_row(2, "Default timezone", guess_timezone(tzdb TSRMLS_CC));
php_info_print_table_end();
DISPLAY_INI_ENTRIES();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 6,294 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int CLASS foveon_apply_curve (short *t_curve, int i)
{
if (abs(i) >= t_curve[0]) return 0;
return i < 0 ? -t_curve[1-i] : t_curve[1+i];
}
Commit Message: Fixed possible foveon buffer overrun (Secunia SA750000)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 67,882 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameHostManager::ClearWebUIInstances() {
current_frame_host()->ClearAllWebUI();
if (speculative_render_frame_host_)
speculative_render_frame_host_->ClearAllWebUI();
}
Commit Message: Fix issue with pending NavigationEntry being discarded incorrectly
This CL fixes an issue where we would attempt to discard a pending
NavigationEntry when a cross-process navigation to this NavigationEntry
is interrupted by another navigation to the same NavigationEntry.
BUG=760342,797656,796135
Change-Id: I204deff1efd4d572dd2e0b20e492592d48d787d9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/850877
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528611}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 146,812 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void bpf_prog_uncharge_memlock(struct bpf_prog *prog)
{
struct user_struct *user = prog->aux->user;
atomic_long_sub(prog->pages, &user->locked_vm);
free_uid(user);
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix refcnt overflow
On a system with >32Gbyte of phyiscal memory and infinite RLIMIT_MEMLOCK,
the malicious application may overflow 32-bit bpf program refcnt.
It's also possible to overflow map refcnt on 1Tb system.
Impose 32k hard limit which means that the same bpf program or
map cannot be shared by more than 32k processes.
Fixes: 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 53,066 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void tg3_ptp_init(struct tg3 *tp)
{
if (!tg3_flag(tp, PTP_CAPABLE))
return;
/* Initialize the hardware clock to the system time. */
tg3_refclk_write(tp, ktime_to_ns(ktime_get_real()));
tp->ptp_adjust = 0;
tp->ptp_info = tg3_ptp_caps;
}
Commit Message: tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <oded@privatecore.com>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matt Carlson <mcarlson@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 32,694 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ZEND_API int add_assoc_long_ex(zval *arg, const char *key, uint key_len, long n) /* {{{ */
{
zval *tmp;
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(tmp);
ZVAL_LONG(tmp, n);
return zend_symtable_update(Z_ARRVAL_P(arg), key, key_len, (void *) &tmp, sizeof(zval *), NULL);
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 13,720 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nodelist_set_routerinfo(routerinfo_t *ri, routerinfo_t **ri_old_out)
{
node_t *node;
const char *id_digest;
int had_router = 0;
tor_assert(ri);
init_nodelist();
id_digest = ri->cache_info.identity_digest;
node = node_get_or_create(id_digest);
if (node->ri) {
if (!routers_have_same_or_addrs(node->ri, ri)) {
node_addrs_changed(node);
}
had_router = 1;
if (ri_old_out)
*ri_old_out = node->ri;
} else {
if (ri_old_out)
*ri_old_out = NULL;
}
node->ri = ri;
if (node->country == -1)
node_set_country(node);
if (authdir_mode(get_options()) && !had_router) {
const char *discard=NULL;
uint32_t status = dirserv_router_get_status(ri, &discard, LOG_INFO);
dirserv_set_node_flags_from_authoritative_status(node, status);
}
return node;
}
Commit Message: Consider the exit family when applying guard restrictions.
When the new path selection logic went into place, I accidentally
dropped the code that considered the _family_ of the exit node when
deciding if the guard was usable, and we didn't catch that during
code review.
This patch makes the guard_restriction_t code consider the exit
family as well, and adds some (hopefully redundant) checks for the
case where we lack a node_t for a guard but we have a bridge_info_t
for it.
Fixes bug 22753; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha. Tracked as TROVE-2016-006
and CVE-2017-0377.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 69,825 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void drm_crtc_convert_to_umode(struct drm_mode_modeinfo *out,
struct drm_display_mode *in)
{
out->clock = in->clock;
out->hdisplay = in->hdisplay;
out->hsync_start = in->hsync_start;
out->hsync_end = in->hsync_end;
out->htotal = in->htotal;
out->hskew = in->hskew;
out->vdisplay = in->vdisplay;
out->vsync_start = in->vsync_start;
out->vsync_end = in->vsync_end;
out->vtotal = in->vtotal;
out->vscan = in->vscan;
out->vrefresh = in->vrefresh;
out->flags = in->flags;
out->type = in->type;
strncpy(out->name, in->name, DRM_DISPLAY_MODE_LEN);
out->name[DRM_DISPLAY_MODE_LEN-1] = 0;
}
Commit Message: drm: integer overflow in drm_mode_dirtyfb_ioctl()
There is a potential integer overflow in drm_mode_dirtyfb_ioctl()
if userspace passes in a large num_clips. The call to kmalloc would
allocate a small buffer, and the call to fb->funcs->dirty may result
in a memory corruption.
Reported-by: Haogang Chen <haogangchen@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 21,865 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __poke_user(struct task_struct *child, addr_t addr, addr_t data)
{
struct user *dummy = NULL;
addr_t offset;
if (addr < (addr_t) &dummy->regs.acrs) {
/*
* psw and gprs are stored on the stack
*/
if (addr == (addr_t) &dummy->regs.psw.mask) {
unsigned long mask = PSW_MASK_USER;
mask |= is_ri_task(child) ? PSW_MASK_RI : 0;
if ((data & ~mask) != PSW_USER_BITS)
return -EINVAL;
if ((data & PSW_MASK_EA) && !(data & PSW_MASK_BA))
return -EINVAL;
}
*(addr_t *)((addr_t) &task_pt_regs(child)->psw + addr) = data;
} else if (addr < (addr_t) (&dummy->regs.orig_gpr2)) {
/*
* access registers are stored in the thread structure
*/
offset = addr - (addr_t) &dummy->regs.acrs;
#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
/*
* Very special case: old & broken 64 bit gdb writing
* to acrs[15] with a 64 bit value. Ignore the lower
* half of the value and write the upper 32 bit to
* acrs[15]. Sick...
*/
if (addr == (addr_t) &dummy->regs.acrs[15])
child->thread.acrs[15] = (unsigned int) (data >> 32);
else
#endif
*(addr_t *)((addr_t) &child->thread.acrs + offset) = data;
} else if (addr == (addr_t) &dummy->regs.orig_gpr2) {
/*
* orig_gpr2 is stored on the kernel stack
*/
task_pt_regs(child)->orig_gpr2 = data;
} else if (addr < (addr_t) &dummy->regs.fp_regs) {
/*
* prevent writes of padding hole between
* orig_gpr2 and fp_regs on s390.
*/
return 0;
} else if (addr < (addr_t) (&dummy->regs.fp_regs + 1)) {
/*
* floating point regs. are stored in the thread structure
*/
if (addr == (addr_t) &dummy->regs.fp_regs.fpc)
if ((unsigned int) data != 0 ||
test_fp_ctl(data >> (BITS_PER_LONG - 32)))
return -EINVAL;
offset = addr - (addr_t) &dummy->regs.fp_regs;
*(addr_t *)((addr_t) &child->thread.fp_regs + offset) = data;
} else if (addr < (addr_t) (&dummy->regs.per_info + 1)) {
/*
* Handle access to the per_info structure.
*/
addr -= (addr_t) &dummy->regs.per_info;
__poke_user_per(child, addr, data);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: s390/ptrace: fix PSW mask check
The PSW mask check of the PTRACE_POKEUSR_AREA command is incorrect.
The PSW_MASK_USER define contains the PSW_MASK_ASC bits, the ptrace
interface accepts all combinations for the address-space-control
bits. To protect the kernel space the PSW mask check in ptrace needs
to reject the address-space-control bit combination for home space.
Fixes CVE-2014-3534
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 1 | 166,362 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void test_file_descriptor()
{
YR_COMPILER* compiler = NULL;
YR_RULES* rules = NULL;
#if defined(_WIN32) || defined(__CYGWIN__)
HANDLE fd = CreateFile("tests/data/true.yar", GENERIC_READ, 0, NULL, OPEN_EXISTING, 0, NULL);
if (fd == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE)
{
fputs("CreateFile failed", stderr);
exit(1);
}
#else
int fd = open("tests/data/true.yar", O_RDONLY);
if (fd < 0)
{
perror("open");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
#endif
if (yr_compiler_create(&compiler) != ERROR_SUCCESS)
{
perror("yr_compiler_create");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
if (yr_compiler_add_fd(compiler, fd, NULL, NULL) != 0) {
perror("yr_compiler_add_fd");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
#if defined(_WIN32) || defined(__CYGWIN__)
CloseHandle(fd);
#else
close(fd);
#endif
if (yr_compiler_get_rules(compiler, &rules) != ERROR_SUCCESS) {
perror("yr_compiler_add_fd");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
if (compiler)
{
yr_compiler_destroy(compiler);
}
if (rules)
{
yr_rules_destroy(rules);
}
return;
}
Commit Message: re_lexer: Make reading escape sequences more robust (#586)
* Add test for issue #503
* re_lexer: Make reading escape sequences more robust
This commit fixes parsing incomplete escape sequences at the end of a
regular expression and parsing things like \xxy (invalid hex digits)
which before were silently turned into (char)255.
Close #503
* Update re_lexer.c
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 70,517 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MockNetworkTransaction::~MockNetworkTransaction() {}
Commit Message: Replace fixed string uses of AddHeaderFromString
Uses of AddHeaderFromString() with a static string may as well be
replaced with SetHeader(). Do so.
BUG=None
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2236933005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#418161}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 119,359 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebGLRenderingContextBase::GetStaticBitmapImage(
std::unique_ptr<viz::SingleReleaseCallback>* out_release_callback) {
if (!GetDrawingBuffer())
return nullptr;
if (CreationAttributes().preserve_drawing_buffer)
return GetImage();
return GetDrawingBuffer()->TransferToStaticBitmapImage(out_release_callback);
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 142,264 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderProcessHostImpl::StopWebRTCEventLog() {
return webrtc_eventlog_host_.StopWebRTCEventLog();
}
Commit Message: Switching AudioOutputAuthorizationHandler from using AudioManager interface to AudioSystem one.
BUG=672468
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2692203003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450939}
CWE ID: | 0 | 128,328 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: exsltDateCreateDate (exsltDateType type)
{
exsltDateValPtr ret;
ret = (exsltDateValPtr) xmlMalloc(sizeof(exsltDateVal));
if (ret == NULL) {
xsltGenericError(xsltGenericErrorContext,
"exsltDateCreateDate: out of memory\n");
return (NULL);
}
memset (ret, 0, sizeof(exsltDateVal));
if (type != EXSLT_UNKNOWN)
ret->type = type;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 173,291 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline bool cfs_bandwidth_used(void)
{
return static_key_false(&__cfs_bandwidth_used);
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 92,482 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AccessibilityExpanded AXNodeObject::isExpanded() const {
if (getNode() && isHTMLSummaryElement(*getNode())) {
if (getNode()->parentNode() &&
isHTMLDetailsElement(getNode()->parentNode()))
return toElement(getNode()->parentNode())->hasAttribute(openAttr)
? ExpandedExpanded
: ExpandedCollapsed;
}
const AtomicString& expanded = getAttribute(aria_expandedAttr);
if (equalIgnoringCase(expanded, "true"))
return ExpandedExpanded;
if (equalIgnoringCase(expanded, "false"))
return ExpandedCollapsed;
return ExpandedUndefined;
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 1 | 171,915 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int fr_rx(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct net_device *frad = skb->dev;
hdlc_device *hdlc = dev_to_hdlc(frad);
fr_hdr *fh = (fr_hdr*)skb->data;
u8 *data = skb->data;
u16 dlci;
pvc_device *pvc;
struct net_device *dev = NULL;
if (skb->len <= 4 || fh->ea1 || data[2] != FR_UI)
goto rx_error;
dlci = q922_to_dlci(skb->data);
if ((dlci == LMI_CCITT_ANSI_DLCI &&
(state(hdlc)->settings.lmi == LMI_ANSI ||
state(hdlc)->settings.lmi == LMI_CCITT)) ||
(dlci == LMI_CISCO_DLCI &&
state(hdlc)->settings.lmi == LMI_CISCO)) {
if (fr_lmi_recv(frad, skb))
goto rx_error;
dev_kfree_skb_any(skb);
return NET_RX_SUCCESS;
}
pvc = find_pvc(hdlc, dlci);
if (!pvc) {
#ifdef DEBUG_PKT
netdev_info(frad, "No PVC for received frame's DLCI %d\n",
dlci);
#endif
dev_kfree_skb_any(skb);
return NET_RX_DROP;
}
if (pvc->state.fecn != fh->fecn) {
#ifdef DEBUG_ECN
printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: DLCI %d FECN O%s\n", frad->name,
dlci, fh->fecn ? "N" : "FF");
#endif
pvc->state.fecn ^= 1;
}
if (pvc->state.becn != fh->becn) {
#ifdef DEBUG_ECN
printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: DLCI %d BECN O%s\n", frad->name,
dlci, fh->becn ? "N" : "FF");
#endif
pvc->state.becn ^= 1;
}
if ((skb = skb_share_check(skb, GFP_ATOMIC)) == NULL) {
frad->stats.rx_dropped++;
return NET_RX_DROP;
}
if (data[3] == NLPID_IP) {
skb_pull(skb, 4); /* Remove 4-byte header (hdr, UI, NLPID) */
dev = pvc->main;
skb->protocol = htons(ETH_P_IP);
} else if (data[3] == NLPID_IPV6) {
skb_pull(skb, 4); /* Remove 4-byte header (hdr, UI, NLPID) */
dev = pvc->main;
skb->protocol = htons(ETH_P_IPV6);
} else if (skb->len > 10 && data[3] == FR_PAD &&
data[4] == NLPID_SNAP && data[5] == FR_PAD) {
u16 oui = ntohs(*(__be16*)(data + 6));
u16 pid = ntohs(*(__be16*)(data + 8));
skb_pull(skb, 10);
switch ((((u32)oui) << 16) | pid) {
case ETH_P_ARP: /* routed frame with SNAP */
case ETH_P_IPX:
case ETH_P_IP: /* a long variant */
case ETH_P_IPV6:
dev = pvc->main;
skb->protocol = htons(pid);
break;
case 0x80C20007: /* bridged Ethernet frame */
if ((dev = pvc->ether) != NULL)
skb->protocol = eth_type_trans(skb, dev);
break;
default:
netdev_info(frad, "Unsupported protocol, OUI=%x PID=%x\n",
oui, pid);
dev_kfree_skb_any(skb);
return NET_RX_DROP;
}
} else {
netdev_info(frad, "Unsupported protocol, NLPID=%x length=%i\n",
data[3], skb->len);
dev_kfree_skb_any(skb);
return NET_RX_DROP;
}
if (dev) {
dev->stats.rx_packets++; /* PVC traffic */
dev->stats.rx_bytes += skb->len;
if (pvc->state.becn)
dev->stats.rx_compressed++;
skb->dev = dev;
netif_rx(skb);
return NET_RX_SUCCESS;
} else {
dev_kfree_skb_any(skb);
return NET_RX_DROP;
}
rx_error:
frad->stats.rx_errors++; /* Mark error */
dev_kfree_skb_any(skb);
return NET_RX_DROP;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 23,916 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int dissolve_free_huge_pages(unsigned long start_pfn, unsigned long end_pfn)
{
unsigned long pfn;
struct page *page;
int rc = 0;
if (!hugepages_supported())
return rc;
for (pfn = start_pfn; pfn < end_pfn; pfn += 1 << minimum_order) {
page = pfn_to_page(pfn);
if (PageHuge(page) && !page_count(page)) {
rc = dissolve_free_huge_page(page);
if (rc)
break;
}
}
return rc;
}
Commit Message: userfaultfd: hugetlbfs: prevent UFFDIO_COPY to fill beyond the end of i_size
This oops:
kernel BUG at fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c:484!
RIP: remove_inode_hugepages+0x3d0/0x410
Call Trace:
hugetlbfs_setattr+0xd9/0x130
notify_change+0x292/0x410
do_truncate+0x65/0xa0
do_sys_ftruncate.constprop.3+0x11a/0x180
SyS_ftruncate+0xe/0x10
tracesys+0xd9/0xde
was caused by the lack of i_size check in hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte.
mmap() can still succeed beyond the end of the i_size after vmtruncate
zapped vmas in those ranges, but the faults must not succeed, and that
includes UFFDIO_COPY.
We could differentiate the retval to userland to represent a SIGBUS like
a page fault would do (vs SIGSEGV), but it doesn't seem very useful and
we'd need to pick a random retval as there's no meaningful syscall
retval that would differentiate from SIGSEGV and SIGBUS, there's just
-EFAULT.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171016223914.2421-2-aarcange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 86,343 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleReadPixels(uint32_t immediate_data_size,
const volatile void* cmd_data) {
const char* func_name = "glReadPixels";
const volatile gles2::cmds::ReadPixels& c =
*static_cast<const volatile gles2::cmds::ReadPixels*>(cmd_data);
TRACE_EVENT0("gpu", "GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleReadPixels");
error::Error fbo_error = WillAccessBoundFramebufferForRead();
if (fbo_error != error::kNoError)
return fbo_error;
GLint x = c.x;
GLint y = c.y;
GLsizei width = c.width;
GLsizei height = c.height;
GLenum format = c.format;
GLenum type = c.type;
uint32_t pixels_shm_id = c.pixels_shm_id;
uint32_t pixels_shm_offset = c.pixels_shm_offset;
uint32_t result_shm_id = c.result_shm_id;
uint32_t result_shm_offset = c.result_shm_offset;
GLboolean async = static_cast<GLboolean>(c.async);
if (width < 0 || height < 0) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, func_name, "dimensions < 0");
return error::kNoError;
}
typedef cmds::ReadPixels::Result Result;
PixelStoreParams params;
if (pixels_shm_id == 0) {
params = state_.GetPackParams();
} else {
params.alignment = state_.pack_alignment;
}
uint32_t pixels_size = 0;
uint32_t unpadded_row_size = 0;
uint32_t padded_row_size = 0;
uint32_t skip_size = 0;
uint32_t padding = 0;
if (!GLES2Util::ComputeImageDataSizesES3(width, height, 1,
format, type,
params,
&pixels_size,
&unpadded_row_size,
&padded_row_size,
&skip_size,
&padding)) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
uint8_t* pixels = nullptr;
Buffer* buffer = state_.bound_pixel_pack_buffer.get();
if (pixels_shm_id == 0) {
if (!buffer) {
return error::kInvalidArguments;
}
if (!buffer_manager()->RequestBufferAccess(
error_state_.get(), buffer, func_name, "pixel pack buffer")) {
return error::kNoError;
}
uint32_t size = 0;
if (!base::CheckAdd(pixels_size + skip_size, pixels_shm_offset)
.AssignIfValid(&size)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, func_name, "size + offset overflow");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (static_cast<uint32_t>(buffer->size()) < size) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "glReadPixels",
"pixel pack buffer is not large enough");
return error::kNoError;
}
pixels = reinterpret_cast<uint8_t *>(pixels_shm_offset);
pixels += skip_size;
} else {
if (buffer) {
return error::kInvalidArguments;
}
DCHECK_EQ(0u, skip_size);
pixels = GetSharedMemoryAs<uint8_t*>(
pixels_shm_id, pixels_shm_offset, pixels_size);
if (!pixels) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
}
Result* result = nullptr;
if (result_shm_id != 0) {
result = GetSharedMemoryAs<Result*>(
result_shm_id, result_shm_offset, sizeof(*result));
if (!result) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
if (result->success != 0) {
return error::kInvalidArguments;
}
}
if (!validators_->read_pixel_format.IsValid(format)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR_INVALID_ENUM(func_name, format, "format");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (!validators_->read_pixel_type.IsValid(type)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR_INVALID_ENUM(func_name, type, "type");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (!CheckBoundReadFramebufferValid(
func_name, GL_INVALID_FRAMEBUFFER_OPERATION)) {
return error::kNoError;
}
GLenum src_internal_format = GetBoundReadFramebufferInternalFormat();
if (src_internal_format == 0) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, func_name, "no valid color image");
return error::kNoError;
}
std::vector<GLenum> accepted_formats;
std::vector<GLenum> accepted_types;
switch (src_internal_format) {
case GL_R8UI:
case GL_R16UI:
case GL_R32UI:
case GL_RG8UI:
case GL_RG16UI:
case GL_RG32UI:
case GL_RGBA8UI:
case GL_RGB10_A2UI:
case GL_RGBA16UI:
case GL_RGBA32UI:
accepted_formats.push_back(GL_RGBA_INTEGER);
accepted_types.push_back(GL_UNSIGNED_INT);
break;
case GL_R8I:
case GL_R16I:
case GL_R32I:
case GL_RG8I:
case GL_RG16I:
case GL_RG32I:
case GL_RGBA8I:
case GL_RGBA16I:
case GL_RGBA32I:
accepted_formats.push_back(GL_RGBA_INTEGER);
accepted_types.push_back(GL_INT);
break;
case GL_RGB10_A2:
accepted_formats.push_back(GL_RGBA);
accepted_types.push_back(GL_UNSIGNED_BYTE);
accepted_formats.push_back(GL_RGBA);
accepted_types.push_back(GL_UNSIGNED_INT_2_10_10_10_REV);
break;
default:
accepted_formats.push_back(GL_RGBA);
{
GLenum src_type = GetBoundReadFramebufferTextureType();
switch (src_type) {
case GL_HALF_FLOAT:
case GL_HALF_FLOAT_OES:
case GL_FLOAT:
case GL_UNSIGNED_INT_10F_11F_11F_REV:
accepted_types.push_back(GL_FLOAT);
break;
default:
accepted_types.push_back(GL_UNSIGNED_BYTE);
break;
}
}
break;
}
if (!feature_info_->IsWebGLContext()) {
accepted_formats.push_back(GL_BGRA_EXT);
accepted_types.push_back(GL_UNSIGNED_BYTE);
}
DCHECK_EQ(accepted_formats.size(), accepted_types.size());
bool format_type_acceptable = false;
for (size_t ii = 0; ii < accepted_formats.size(); ++ii) {
if (format == accepted_formats[ii] && type == accepted_types[ii]) {
format_type_acceptable = true;
break;
}
}
if (!format_type_acceptable) {
GLint preferred_format = 0;
DoGetIntegerv(GL_IMPLEMENTATION_COLOR_READ_FORMAT, &preferred_format, 1);
GLint preferred_type = 0;
DoGetIntegerv(GL_IMPLEMENTATION_COLOR_READ_TYPE, &preferred_type, 1);
if (format == static_cast<GLenum>(preferred_format) &&
type == static_cast<GLenum>(preferred_type)) {
format_type_acceptable = true;
}
}
if (!format_type_acceptable) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, func_name,
"format and type incompatible with the current read framebuffer");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (width == 0 || height == 0) {
return error::kNoError;
}
gfx::Size max_size = GetBoundReadFramebufferSize();
int32_t max_x;
int32_t max_y;
if (!base::CheckAdd(x, width).AssignIfValid(&max_x) ||
!base::CheckAdd(y, height).AssignIfValid(&max_y)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, func_name, "dimensions out of range");
return error::kNoError;
}
LOCAL_COPY_REAL_GL_ERRORS_TO_WRAPPER(func_name);
ScopedResolvedFramebufferBinder binder(this, false, true);
GLenum read_format = GetBoundReadFramebufferInternalFormat();
gfx::Rect rect(x, y, width, height); // Safe before we checked above.
gfx::Rect max_rect(max_size);
if (!max_rect.Contains(rect)) {
rect.Intersect(max_rect);
if (!rect.IsEmpty()) {
std::unique_ptr<ScopedFramebufferCopyBinder> binder;
if (workarounds()
.use_copyteximage2d_instead_of_readpixels_on_multisampled_textures &&
framebuffer_state_.bound_read_framebuffer.get() &&
framebuffer_state_.bound_read_framebuffer.get()
->GetReadBufferIsMultisampledTexture()) {
binder = std::make_unique<ScopedFramebufferCopyBinder>(this);
}
if (y < 0) {
pixels += static_cast<uint32_t>(-y) * padded_row_size;;
}
if (x < 0) {
uint32_t group_size = GLES2Util::ComputeImageGroupSize(format, type);
uint32_t leading_bytes = static_cast<uint32_t>(-x) * group_size;
pixels += leading_bytes;
}
for (GLint iy = rect.y(); iy < rect.bottom(); ++iy) {
bool reset_row_length = false;
if (iy + 1 == max_y && pixels_shm_id == 0 &&
workarounds().pack_parameters_workaround_with_pack_buffer &&
state_.pack_row_length > 0 && state_.pack_row_length < width) {
api()->glPixelStoreiFn(GL_PACK_ROW_LENGTH, width);
reset_row_length = true;
}
api()->glReadPixelsFn(rect.x(), iy, rect.width(), 1, format, type,
pixels);
if (reset_row_length) {
api()->glPixelStoreiFn(GL_PACK_ROW_LENGTH, state_.pack_row_length);
}
pixels += padded_row_size;
}
}
} else {
if (async && features().use_async_readpixels &&
!state_.bound_pixel_pack_buffer.get()) {
DCHECK(
!workarounds()
.use_copyteximage2d_instead_of_readpixels_on_multisampled_textures ||
!framebuffer_state_.bound_read_framebuffer.get() ||
!framebuffer_state_.bound_read_framebuffer.get()
->GetReadBufferIsMultisampledTexture());
GLuint buffer = 0;
api()->glGenBuffersARBFn(1, &buffer);
api()->glBindBufferFn(GL_PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER_ARB, buffer);
const GLenum usage_hint =
gl_version_info().is_angle ? GL_STATIC_DRAW : GL_STREAM_READ;
api()->glBufferDataFn(GL_PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER_ARB, pixels_size, nullptr,
usage_hint);
GLenum error = api()->glGetErrorFn();
if (error == GL_NO_ERROR) {
api()->glReadPixelsFn(x, y, width, height, format, type, 0);
pending_readpixel_fences_.push(FenceCallback());
WaitForReadPixels(base::BindOnce(
&GLES2DecoderImpl::FinishReadPixels, weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
width, height, format, type, pixels_shm_id, pixels_shm_offset,
result_shm_id, result_shm_offset, state_.pack_alignment,
read_format, buffer));
api()->glBindBufferFn(GL_PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER_ARB, 0);
return error::kNoError;
} else {
api()->glBindBufferFn(GL_PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER_ARB, 0);
api()->glDeleteBuffersARBFn(1, &buffer);
}
}
if (pixels_shm_id == 0 &&
workarounds().pack_parameters_workaround_with_pack_buffer) {
DCHECK(
!workarounds()
.use_copyteximage2d_instead_of_readpixels_on_multisampled_textures);
if (state_.pack_row_length > 0 && state_.pack_row_length < width) {
api()->glPixelStoreiFn(GL_PACK_ROW_LENGTH, width);
for (GLint iy = y; iy < max_y; ++iy) {
if (iy + 1 == max_y && padding > 0)
api()->glPixelStoreiFn(GL_PACK_ALIGNMENT, 1);
api()->glReadPixelsFn(x, iy, width, 1, format, type, pixels);
if (iy + 1 == max_y && padding > 0)
api()->glPixelStoreiFn(GL_PACK_ALIGNMENT, state_.pack_alignment);
pixels += padded_row_size;
}
api()->glPixelStoreiFn(GL_PACK_ROW_LENGTH, state_.pack_row_length);
} else if (padding > 0) {
if (height > 1)
api()->glReadPixelsFn(x, y, width, height - 1, format, type, pixels);
api()->glPixelStoreiFn(GL_PACK_ALIGNMENT, 1);
pixels += padded_row_size * (height - 1);
api()->glReadPixelsFn(x, max_y - 1, width, 1, format, type, pixels);
api()->glPixelStoreiFn(GL_PACK_ALIGNMENT, state_.pack_alignment);
} else {
api()->glReadPixelsFn(x, y, width, height, format, type, pixels);
}
} else if (
workarounds()
.use_copyteximage2d_instead_of_readpixels_on_multisampled_textures &&
framebuffer_state_.bound_read_framebuffer.get() &&
framebuffer_state_.bound_read_framebuffer.get()
->GetReadBufferIsMultisampledTexture()) {
ScopedFramebufferCopyBinder binder(this, x, y, width, height);
api()->glReadPixelsFn(0, 0, width, height, format, type, pixels);
} else {
api()->glReadPixelsFn(x, y, width, height, format, type, pixels);
}
}
if (pixels_shm_id != 0) {
GLenum error = LOCAL_PEEK_GL_ERROR(func_name);
if (error == GL_NO_ERROR) {
if (result) {
result->success = 1;
result->row_length = static_cast<uint32_t>(rect.width());
result->num_rows = static_cast<uint32_t>(rect.height());
}
FinishReadPixels(width, height, format, type, pixels_shm_id,
pixels_shm_offset, result_shm_id, result_shm_offset,
state_.pack_alignment, read_format, 0);
}
}
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,576 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void mutablePointAttrSetter(v8::Local<v8::String> name, v8::Local<v8::Value> value, const v8::AccessorInfo& info)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.mutablePoint._set");
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(info.Holder());
RefPtr<SVGPropertyTearOff<FloatPoint> > v = V8SVGPoint::HasInstance(value) ? V8SVGPoint::toNative(v8::Handle<v8::Object>::Cast(value)) : 0;
imp->setMutablePoint(WTF::getPtr(v));
return;
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 109,582 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ofputil_append_ofp15_group_desc_reply(const struct ofputil_group_desc *gds,
const struct ovs_list *buckets,
struct ovs_list *replies,
enum ofp_version version)
{
struct ofpbuf *reply = ofpbuf_from_list(ovs_list_back(replies));
struct ofp15_group_desc_stats *ogds;
struct ofputil_bucket *bucket;
size_t start_ogds, start_buckets;
start_ogds = reply->size;
ofpbuf_put_zeros(reply, sizeof *ogds);
start_buckets = reply->size;
LIST_FOR_EACH (bucket, list_node, buckets) {
ofputil_put_ofp15_bucket(bucket, bucket->bucket_id,
gds->type, reply, version);
}
ogds = ofpbuf_at_assert(reply, start_ogds, sizeof *ogds);
ogds->type = gds->type;
ogds->group_id = htonl(gds->group_id);
ogds->bucket_list_len = htons(reply->size - start_buckets);
/* Add group properties */
if (gds->props.selection_method[0]) {
ofputil_put_group_prop_ntr_selection_method(version, &gds->props,
reply);
}
ogds = ofpbuf_at_assert(reply, start_ogds, sizeof *ogds);
ogds->length = htons(reply->size - start_ogds);
ofpmp_postappend(replies, start_ogds);
}
Commit Message: ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <pkusunyifeng@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 77,469 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool omx_venc::dev_loaded_stop_done()
{
return handle->venc_loaded_stop_done();
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: add checks before accessing heap pointers
Heap pointers do not point to user virtual addresses in case
of secure session.
Set them to NULL and add checks to avoid accesing them
Bug: 28815329
Bug: 28920116
Change-Id: I94fd5808e753b58654d65e175d3857ef46ffba26
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 159,228 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: NTSTATUS cli_resolve_path(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
const char *mountpt,
const struct user_auth_info *dfs_auth_info,
struct cli_state *rootcli,
const char *path,
struct cli_state **targetcli,
char **pp_targetpath)
{
struct client_dfs_referral *refs = NULL;
size_t num_refs = 0;
size_t consumed = 0;
struct cli_state *cli_ipc = NULL;
char *dfs_path = NULL;
char *cleanpath = NULL;
char *extrapath = NULL;
int pathlen;
struct cli_state *newcli = NULL;
struct cli_state *ccli = NULL;
int count = 0;
char *newpath = NULL;
char *newmount = NULL;
char *ppath = NULL;
SMB_STRUCT_STAT sbuf;
uint32_t attributes;
NTSTATUS status;
struct smbXcli_tcon *root_tcon = NULL;
struct smbXcli_tcon *target_tcon = NULL;
struct cli_dfs_path_split *dfs_refs = NULL;
if ( !rootcli || !path || !targetcli ) {
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
/* Don't do anything if this is not a DFS root. */
if (smbXcli_conn_protocol(rootcli->conn) >= PROTOCOL_SMB2_02) {
root_tcon = rootcli->smb2.tcon;
} else {
root_tcon = rootcli->smb1.tcon;
}
if (!smbXcli_tcon_is_dfs_share(root_tcon)) {
*targetcli = rootcli;
*pp_targetpath = talloc_strdup(ctx, path);
if (!*pp_targetpath) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
*targetcli = NULL;
/* Send a trans2_query_path_info to check for a referral. */
cleanpath = clean_path(ctx, path);
if (!cleanpath) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
dfs_path = cli_dfs_make_full_path(ctx, rootcli, cleanpath);
if (!dfs_path) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
status = cli_qpathinfo_basic( rootcli, dfs_path, &sbuf, &attributes);
if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
/* This is an ordinary path, just return it. */
*targetcli = rootcli;
*pp_targetpath = talloc_strdup(ctx, path);
if (!*pp_targetpath) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
goto done;
}
/* Special case where client asked for a path that does not exist */
if (cli_dfs_check_error(rootcli, NT_STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND,
status)) {
*targetcli = rootcli;
*pp_targetpath = talloc_strdup(ctx, path);
if (!*pp_targetpath) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
goto done;
}
/* We got an error, check for DFS referral. */
if (!cli_dfs_check_error(rootcli, NT_STATUS_PATH_NOT_COVERED,
status)) {
return status;
}
/* Check for the referral. */
status = cli_cm_open(ctx,
rootcli,
smbXcli_conn_remote_name(rootcli->conn),
"IPC$",
dfs_auth_info,
false,
smb1cli_conn_encryption_on(rootcli->conn),
smbXcli_conn_protocol(rootcli->conn),
0,
0x20,
&cli_ipc);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
return status;
}
status = cli_dfs_get_referral(ctx, cli_ipc, dfs_path, &refs,
&num_refs, &consumed);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
return status;
}
if (!num_refs || !refs[0].dfspath) {
return NT_STATUS_NOT_FOUND;
}
/*
* Bug#10123 - DFS referal entries can be provided in a random order,
* so check the connection cache for each item to avoid unnecessary
* reconnections.
*/
dfs_refs = talloc_array(ctx, struct cli_dfs_path_split, num_refs);
if (dfs_refs == NULL) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
for (count = 0; count < num_refs; count++) {
if (!split_dfs_path(dfs_refs, refs[count].dfspath,
&dfs_refs[count].server,
&dfs_refs[count].share,
&dfs_refs[count].extrapath)) {
TALLOC_FREE(dfs_refs);
return NT_STATUS_NOT_FOUND;
}
ccli = cli_cm_find(rootcli, dfs_refs[count].server,
dfs_refs[count].share);
if (ccli != NULL) {
extrapath = dfs_refs[count].extrapath;
*targetcli = ccli;
break;
}
}
/*
* If no cached connection was found, then connect to the first live
* referral server in the list.
*/
for (count = 0; (ccli == NULL) && (count < num_refs); count++) {
/* Connect to the target server & share */
status = cli_cm_connect(ctx, rootcli,
dfs_refs[count].server,
dfs_refs[count].share,
dfs_auth_info,
false,
smb1cli_conn_encryption_on(rootcli->conn),
smbXcli_conn_protocol(rootcli->conn),
0,
0x20,
targetcli);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
d_printf("Unable to follow dfs referral [\\%s\\%s]\n",
dfs_refs[count].server,
dfs_refs[count].share);
continue;
} else {
extrapath = dfs_refs[count].extrapath;
break;
}
}
/* No available referral server for the connection */
if (*targetcli == NULL) {
TALLOC_FREE(dfs_refs);
return status;
}
/* Make sure to recreate the original string including any wildcards. */
dfs_path = cli_dfs_make_full_path(ctx, rootcli, path);
if (!dfs_path) {
TALLOC_FREE(dfs_refs);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
pathlen = strlen(dfs_path);
consumed = MIN(pathlen, consumed);
*pp_targetpath = talloc_strdup(ctx, &dfs_path[consumed]);
if (!*pp_targetpath) {
TALLOC_FREE(dfs_refs);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
dfs_path[consumed] = '\0';
/*
* *pp_targetpath is now the unconsumed part of the path.
* dfs_path is now the consumed part of the path
* (in \server\share\path format).
*/
if (extrapath && strlen(extrapath) > 0) {
/* EMC Celerra NAS version 5.6.50 (at least) doesn't appear to */
/* put the trailing \ on the path, so to be save we put one in if needed */
if (extrapath[strlen(extrapath)-1] != '\\' && **pp_targetpath != '\\') {
*pp_targetpath = talloc_asprintf(ctx,
"%s\\%s",
extrapath,
*pp_targetpath);
} else {
*pp_targetpath = talloc_asprintf(ctx,
"%s%s",
extrapath,
*pp_targetpath);
}
if (!*pp_targetpath) {
TALLOC_FREE(dfs_refs);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
}
/* parse out the consumed mount path */
/* trim off the \server\share\ */
ppath = dfs_path;
if (*ppath != '\\') {
d_printf("cli_resolve_path: "
"dfs_path (%s) not in correct format.\n",
dfs_path );
TALLOC_FREE(dfs_refs);
return NT_STATUS_NOT_FOUND;
}
ppath++; /* Now pointing at start of server name. */
if ((ppath = strchr_m( dfs_path, '\\' )) == NULL) {
TALLOC_FREE(dfs_refs);
return NT_STATUS_NOT_FOUND;
}
ppath++; /* Now pointing at start of share name. */
if ((ppath = strchr_m( ppath+1, '\\' )) == NULL) {
TALLOC_FREE(dfs_refs);
return NT_STATUS_NOT_FOUND;
}
ppath++; /* Now pointing at path component. */
newmount = talloc_asprintf(ctx, "%s\\%s", mountpt, ppath );
if (!newmount) {
TALLOC_FREE(dfs_refs);
return NT_STATUS_NOT_FOUND;
}
cli_set_mntpoint(*targetcli, newmount);
/* Check for another dfs referral, note that we are not
checking for loops here. */
if (!strequal(*pp_targetpath, "\\") && !strequal(*pp_targetpath, "/")) {
status = cli_resolve_path(ctx,
newmount,
dfs_auth_info,
*targetcli,
*pp_targetpath,
&newcli,
&newpath);
if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
/*
* When cli_resolve_path returns true here it's always
* returning the complete path in newpath, so we're done
* here.
*/
*targetcli = newcli;
*pp_targetpath = newpath;
TALLOC_FREE(dfs_refs);
return status;
}
}
done:
if (smbXcli_conn_protocol((*targetcli)->conn) >= PROTOCOL_SMB2_02) {
target_tcon = (*targetcli)->smb2.tcon;
} else {
target_tcon = (*targetcli)->smb1.tcon;
}
/* If returning true ensure we return a dfs root full path. */
if (smbXcli_tcon_is_dfs_share(target_tcon)) {
dfs_path = talloc_strdup(ctx, *pp_targetpath);
if (!dfs_path) {
TALLOC_FREE(dfs_refs);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
*pp_targetpath = cli_dfs_make_full_path(ctx, *targetcli, dfs_path);
if (*pp_targetpath == NULL) {
TALLOC_FREE(dfs_refs);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
}
TALLOC_FREE(dfs_refs);
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 2,506 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void unite(const OverlapMapContainer& otherContainer)
{
m_layerRects.append(otherContainer.m_layerRects);
m_boundingBox.unite(otherContainer.m_boundingBox);
}
Commit Message: Disable some more query compositingState asserts.
This gets the tests passing again on Mac. See the bug for the stacktrace.
A future patch will need to actually fix the incorrect reading of
compositingState.
BUG=343179
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/162153002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@167069 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 113,871 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int tcp_conn_request(struct request_sock_ops *rsk_ops,
const struct tcp_request_sock_ops *af_ops,
struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct tcp_fastopen_cookie foc = { .len = -1 };
__u32 isn = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_tw_isn;
struct tcp_options_received tmp_opt;
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
struct sock *fastopen_sk = NULL;
struct dst_entry *dst = NULL;
struct request_sock *req;
bool want_cookie = false;
struct flowi fl;
/* TW buckets are converted to open requests without
* limitations, they conserve resources and peer is
* evidently real one.
*/
if ((sysctl_tcp_syncookies == 2 ||
inet_csk_reqsk_queue_is_full(sk)) && !isn) {
want_cookie = tcp_syn_flood_action(sk, skb, rsk_ops->slab_name);
if (!want_cookie)
goto drop;
}
/* Accept backlog is full. If we have already queued enough
* of warm entries in syn queue, drop request. It is better than
* clogging syn queue with openreqs with exponentially increasing
* timeout.
*/
if (sk_acceptq_is_full(sk) && inet_csk_reqsk_queue_young(sk) > 1) {
NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_LISTENOVERFLOWS);
goto drop;
}
req = inet_reqsk_alloc(rsk_ops, sk, !want_cookie);
if (!req)
goto drop;
tcp_rsk(req)->af_specific = af_ops;
tcp_clear_options(&tmp_opt);
tmp_opt.mss_clamp = af_ops->mss_clamp;
tmp_opt.user_mss = tp->rx_opt.user_mss;
tcp_parse_options(skb, &tmp_opt, 0, want_cookie ? NULL : &foc);
if (want_cookie && !tmp_opt.saw_tstamp)
tcp_clear_options(&tmp_opt);
tmp_opt.tstamp_ok = tmp_opt.saw_tstamp;
tcp_openreq_init(req, &tmp_opt, skb, sk);
/* Note: tcp_v6_init_req() might override ir_iif for link locals */
inet_rsk(req)->ir_iif = sk->sk_bound_dev_if;
af_ops->init_req(req, sk, skb);
if (security_inet_conn_request(sk, skb, req))
goto drop_and_free;
if (!want_cookie && !isn) {
/* VJ's idea. We save last timestamp seen
* from the destination in peer table, when entering
* state TIME-WAIT, and check against it before
* accepting new connection request.
*
* If "isn" is not zero, this request hit alive
* timewait bucket, so that all the necessary checks
* are made in the function processing timewait state.
*/
if (tcp_death_row.sysctl_tw_recycle) {
bool strict;
dst = af_ops->route_req(sk, &fl, req, &strict);
if (dst && strict &&
!tcp_peer_is_proven(req, dst, true,
tmp_opt.saw_tstamp)) {
NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_PAWSPASSIVEREJECTED);
goto drop_and_release;
}
}
/* Kill the following clause, if you dislike this way. */
else if (!sysctl_tcp_syncookies &&
(sysctl_max_syn_backlog - inet_csk_reqsk_queue_len(sk) <
(sysctl_max_syn_backlog >> 2)) &&
!tcp_peer_is_proven(req, dst, false,
tmp_opt.saw_tstamp)) {
/* Without syncookies last quarter of
* backlog is filled with destinations,
* proven to be alive.
* It means that we continue to communicate
* to destinations, already remembered
* to the moment of synflood.
*/
pr_drop_req(req, ntohs(tcp_hdr(skb)->source),
rsk_ops->family);
goto drop_and_release;
}
isn = af_ops->init_seq(skb);
}
if (!dst) {
dst = af_ops->route_req(sk, &fl, req, NULL);
if (!dst)
goto drop_and_free;
}
tcp_ecn_create_request(req, skb, sk, dst);
if (want_cookie) {
isn = cookie_init_sequence(af_ops, sk, skb, &req->mss);
req->cookie_ts = tmp_opt.tstamp_ok;
if (!tmp_opt.tstamp_ok)
inet_rsk(req)->ecn_ok = 0;
}
tcp_rsk(req)->snt_isn = isn;
tcp_rsk(req)->txhash = net_tx_rndhash();
tcp_openreq_init_rwin(req, sk, dst);
if (!want_cookie) {
tcp_reqsk_record_syn(sk, req, skb);
fastopen_sk = tcp_try_fastopen(sk, skb, req, &foc, dst);
}
if (fastopen_sk) {
af_ops->send_synack(fastopen_sk, dst, &fl, req,
&foc, false);
/* Add the child socket directly into the accept queue */
inet_csk_reqsk_queue_add(sk, req, fastopen_sk);
sk->sk_data_ready(sk);
bh_unlock_sock(fastopen_sk);
sock_put(fastopen_sk);
} else {
tcp_rsk(req)->tfo_listener = false;
if (!want_cookie)
inet_csk_reqsk_queue_hash_add(sk, req, TCP_TIMEOUT_INIT);
af_ops->send_synack(sk, dst, &fl, req,
&foc, !want_cookie);
if (want_cookie)
goto drop_and_free;
}
reqsk_put(req);
return 0;
drop_and_release:
dst_release(dst);
drop_and_free:
reqsk_free(req);
drop:
NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_LISTENDROPS);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: tcp: fix zero cwnd in tcp_cwnd_reduction
Patch 3759824da87b ("tcp: PRR uses CRB mode by default and SS mode
conditionally") introduced a bug that cwnd may become 0 when both
inflight and sndcnt are 0 (cwnd = inflight + sndcnt). This may lead
to a div-by-zero if the connection starts another cwnd reduction
phase by setting tp->prior_cwnd to the current cwnd (0) in
tcp_init_cwnd_reduction().
To prevent this we skip PRR operation when nothing is acked or
sacked. Then cwnd must be positive in all cases as long as ssthresh
is positive:
1) The proportional reduction mode
inflight > ssthresh > 0
2) The reduction bound mode
a) inflight == ssthresh > 0
b) inflight < ssthresh
sndcnt > 0 since newly_acked_sacked > 0 and inflight < ssthresh
Therefore in all cases inflight and sndcnt can not both be 0.
We check invalid tp->prior_cwnd to avoid potential div0 bugs.
In reality this bug is triggered only with a sequence of less common
events. For example, the connection is terminating an ECN-triggered
cwnd reduction with an inflight 0, then it receives reordered/old
ACKs or DSACKs from prior transmission (which acks nothing). Or the
connection is in fast recovery stage that marks everything lost,
but fails to retransmit due to local issues, then receives data
packets from other end which acks nothing.
Fixes: 3759824da87b ("tcp: PRR uses CRB mode by default and SS mode conditionally")
Reported-by: Oleksandr Natalenko <oleksandr@natalenko.name>
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 55,382 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int push_insn(int t, int w, int e, struct verifier_env *env)
{
if (e == FALLTHROUGH && insn_state[t] >= (DISCOVERED | FALLTHROUGH))
return 0;
if (e == BRANCH && insn_state[t] >= (DISCOVERED | BRANCH))
return 0;
if (w < 0 || w >= env->prog->len) {
verbose("jump out of range from insn %d to %d\n", t, w);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (e == BRANCH)
/* mark branch target for state pruning */
env->explored_states[w] = STATE_LIST_MARK;
if (insn_state[w] == 0) {
/* tree-edge */
insn_state[t] = DISCOVERED | e;
insn_state[w] = DISCOVERED;
if (cur_stack >= env->prog->len)
return -E2BIG;
insn_stack[cur_stack++] = w;
return 1;
} else if ((insn_state[w] & 0xF0) == DISCOVERED) {
verbose("back-edge from insn %d to %d\n", t, w);
return -EINVAL;
} else if (insn_state[w] == EXPLORED) {
/* forward- or cross-edge */
insn_state[t] = DISCOVERED | e;
} else {
verbose("insn state internal bug\n");
return -EFAULT;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix refcnt overflow
On a system with >32Gbyte of phyiscal memory and infinite RLIMIT_MEMLOCK,
the malicious application may overflow 32-bit bpf program refcnt.
It's also possible to overflow map refcnt on 1Tb system.
Impose 32k hard limit which means that the same bpf program or
map cannot be shared by more than 32k processes.
Fixes: 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 53,109 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::string TemplateURLRef::ParseURL(const std::string& url,
Replacements* replacements,
PostParams* post_params,
bool* valid) const {
*valid = false;
std::string parsed_url = url;
for (size_t last = 0; last != std::string::npos; ) {
last = parsed_url.find(kStartParameter, last);
if (last != std::string::npos) {
size_t template_end = parsed_url.find(kEndParameter, last);
if (template_end != std::string::npos) {
size_t next_template_start = parsed_url.find(kStartParameter, last + 1);
if (next_template_start == std::string::npos ||
next_template_start > template_end) {
if (!ParseParameter(last, template_end, &parsed_url, replacements)) {
last = template_end;
}
} else {
last = next_template_start;
}
} else {
return std::string();
}
}
}
const std::string& post_params_string = GetPostParamsString();
if (!post_params_string.empty()) {
for (const base::StringPiece& cur : base::SplitStringPiece(
post_params_string, ",",
base::TRIM_WHITESPACE, base::SPLIT_WANT_ALL)) {
std::vector<std::string> parts = base::SplitString(
cur, "=", base::TRIM_WHITESPACE, base::SPLIT_WANT_ALL);
if ((parts.size() != 2U) || parts[0].empty())
return std::string();
std::string& value = parts[1];
size_t replacements_size = replacements->size();
if (IsTemplateParameterString(value))
ParseParameter(0, value.length() - 1, &value, replacements);
PostParam param = { parts[0], value };
post_params->push_back(param);
if (replacements->size() > replacements_size) {
DCHECK_EQ(replacements_size + 1, replacements->size());
Replacement* r = &replacements->back();
r->is_post_param = true;
r->index = post_params->size() - 1;
}
}
DCHECK(!post_params->empty());
}
*valid = true;
return parsed_url;
}
Commit Message: [Contextual Search] Change "Now on Tap" to "Contextual Cards"
BUG=644934
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2361163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#420899}
CWE ID: | 0 | 120,304 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ftp_retrieve_dirs (struct url *u, struct fileinfo *f, ccon *con)
{
char *container = NULL;
int container_size = 0;
for (; f; f = f->next)
{
int size;
char *odir, *newdir;
if (opt.quota && total_downloaded_bytes > opt.quota)
break;
if (f->type != FT_DIRECTORY)
continue;
/* Allocate u->dir off stack, but reallocate only if a larger
string is needed. It's a pity there's no "realloca" for an
item on the bottom of the stack. */
size = strlen (u->dir) + 1 + strlen (f->name) + 1;
if (size > container_size)
container = (char *)alloca (size);
newdir = container;
odir = u->dir;
if (*odir == '\0'
|| (*odir == '/' && *(odir + 1) == '\0'))
/* If ODIR is empty or just "/", simply append f->name to
ODIR. (In the former case, to preserve u->dir being
relative; in the latter case, to avoid double slash.) */
sprintf (newdir, "%s%s", odir, f->name);
else
/* Else, use a separator. */
sprintf (newdir, "%s/%s", odir, f->name);
DEBUGP (("Composing new CWD relative to the initial directory.\n"));
DEBUGP ((" odir = '%s'\n f->name = '%s'\n newdir = '%s'\n\n",
odir, f->name, newdir));
if (!accdir (newdir))
{
logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, _("\
Not descending to %s as it is excluded/not-included.\n"),
quote (newdir));
continue;
}
con->st &= ~DONE_CWD;
odir = xstrdup (u->dir); /* because url_set_dir will free
u->dir. */
url_set_dir (u, newdir);
ftp_retrieve_glob (u, con, GLOB_GETALL);
url_set_dir (u, odir);
xfree (odir);
/* Set the time-stamp? */
}
if (opt.quota && total_downloaded_bytes > opt.quota)
return QUOTEXC;
else
return RETROK;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 221 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void __net_exit ip_vs_control_net_cleanup(struct net *net)
{
struct netns_ipvs *ipvs = net_ipvs(net);
ip_vs_trash_cleanup(net);
ip_vs_stop_estimator(net, &ipvs->tot_stats);
ip_vs_control_net_cleanup_sysctl(net);
proc_net_remove(net, "ip_vs_stats_percpu");
proc_net_remove(net, "ip_vs_stats");
proc_net_remove(net, "ip_vs");
free_percpu(ipvs->tot_stats.cpustats);
}
Commit Message: ipvs: fix info leak in getsockopt(IP_VS_SO_GET_TIMEOUT)
If at least one of CONFIG_IP_VS_PROTO_TCP or CONFIG_IP_VS_PROTO_UDP is
not set, __ip_vs_get_timeouts() does not fully initialize the structure
that gets copied to userland and that for leaks up to 12 bytes of kernel
stack. Add an explicit memset(0) before passing the structure to
__ip_vs_get_timeouts() to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Wensong Zhang <wensong@linux-vs.org>
Cc: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au>
Cc: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 34,187 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::DidChooseColorInColorChooser(SkColor color) {
Send(new ViewMsg_DidChooseColorResponse(
GetRoutingID(), color_chooser_identifier_, color));
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 110,592 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static size_t consumeDigits(const char16_t* start, const char16_t* end) {
const char16_t* c = start;
for (; c != end && *c >= u'0' && *c <= u'9'; c++) {}
return static_cast<size_t>(c - start);
}
Commit Message: Add bound checks to utf16_to_utf8
Test: ran libaapt2_tests64
Bug: 29250543
Change-Id: I1ebc017af623b6514cf0c493e8cd8e1d59ea26c3
(cherry picked from commit 4781057e78f63e0e99af109cebf3b6a78f4bfbb6)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 163,642 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GDataDirectoryService::InitFromDB(
const FilePath& db_path,
base::SequencedTaskRunner* blocking_task_runner,
const FileOperationCallback& callback) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
DCHECK(!db_path.empty());
DCHECK(blocking_task_runner);
if (directory_service_db_.get()) {
if (!callback.is_null())
callback.Run(GDATA_FILE_ERROR_FAILED);
return;
}
blocking_task_runner_ = blocking_task_runner;
DVLOG(1) << "InitFromDB " << db_path.value();
CreateDBParams* create_params =
new CreateDBParams(db_path, blocking_task_runner);
blocking_task_runner_->PostTaskAndReply(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&CreateResourceMetadataDBOnBlockingPool,
create_params),
base::Bind(&GDataDirectoryService::InitResourceMap,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
base::Owned(create_params),
callback));
}
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 117,095 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_set_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_regs *regs)
{
vcpu->arch.emulate_regs_need_sync_from_vcpu = true;
vcpu->arch.emulate_regs_need_sync_to_vcpu = false;
kvm_register_write(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RAX, regs->rax);
kvm_register_write(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RBX, regs->rbx);
kvm_register_write(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RCX, regs->rcx);
kvm_register_write(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RDX, regs->rdx);
kvm_register_write(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RSI, regs->rsi);
kvm_register_write(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RDI, regs->rdi);
kvm_register_write(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RSP, regs->rsp);
kvm_register_write(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RBP, regs->rbp);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
kvm_register_write(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_R8, regs->r8);
kvm_register_write(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_R9, regs->r9);
kvm_register_write(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_R10, regs->r10);
kvm_register_write(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_R11, regs->r11);
kvm_register_write(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_R12, regs->r12);
kvm_register_write(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_R13, regs->r13);
kvm_register_write(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_R14, regs->r14);
kvm_register_write(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_R15, regs->r15);
#endif
kvm_rip_write(vcpu, regs->rip);
kvm_set_rflags(vcpu, regs->rflags);
vcpu->arch.exception.pending = false;
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 20,741 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __perf_event_header_size(struct perf_event *event, u64 sample_type)
{
struct perf_sample_data *data;
u16 size = 0;
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_IP)
size += sizeof(data->ip);
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_ADDR)
size += sizeof(data->addr);
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_PERIOD)
size += sizeof(data->period);
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_WEIGHT)
size += sizeof(data->weight);
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_READ)
size += event->read_size;
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_DATA_SRC)
size += sizeof(data->data_src.val);
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_TRANSACTION)
size += sizeof(data->txn);
event->header_size = size;
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix race in swevent hash
There's a race on CPU unplug where we free the swevent hash array
while it can still have events on. This will result in a
use-after-free which is BAD.
Simply do not free the hash array on unplug. This leaves the thing
around and no use-after-free takes place.
When the last swevent dies, we do a for_each_possible_cpu() iteration
anyway to clean these up, at which time we'll free it, so no leakage
will occur.
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 56,021 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ofproto_port_set_stp(struct ofproto *ofproto, ofp_port_t ofp_port,
const struct ofproto_port_stp_settings *s)
{
struct ofport *ofport = ofproto_get_port(ofproto, ofp_port);
if (!ofport) {
VLOG_WARN("%s: cannot configure STP on nonexistent port %"PRIu32,
ofproto->name, ofp_port);
return ENODEV;
}
return (ofproto->ofproto_class->set_stp_port
? ofproto->ofproto_class->set_stp_port(ofport, s)
: EOPNOTSUPP);
}
Commit Message: ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <vishal.deep.ajmera@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 77,369 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableBackgroundFetch(bool enable) {
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SetBackgroundFetchEnabled(enable);
}
Commit Message: Remove RequireCSSExtensionForFile runtime enabled flag.
The feature has long since been stable (since M64) and doesn't seem
to be a need for this flag.
BUG=788936
Change-Id: I666390b869289c328acb4a2daa5bf4154e1702c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1324143
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dave Tapuska <dtapuska@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#607329}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 154,594 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: base::string16 IDNToUnicode(base::StringPiece host) {
return IDNToUnicodeWithAdjustments(host, nullptr);
}
Commit Message: Block domain labels made of Cyrillic letters that look alike Latin
Block a label made entirely of Latin-look-alike Cyrillic letters when the TLD is not an IDN (i.e. this check is ON only for TLDs like 'com', 'net', 'uk', but not applied for IDN TLDs like рф.
BUG=683314
TEST=components_unittests --gtest_filter=U*IDN*
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2683793010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#459226}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 137,082 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool vma_is_valid(struct vm_area_struct *vma, bool write_fault)
{
if (unlikely(!(vma->vm_flags & VM_READ)))
return false;
if (write_fault && (unlikely(!(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE))))
return false;
return true;
}
Commit Message: KVM: perform an invalid memslot step for gpa base change
PPC must flush all translations before the new memory slot
is visible.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 29,108 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ChromeWebUIControllerFactory::HasWebUIScheme(const GURL& url) const {
return url.SchemeIs(chrome::kChromeDevToolsScheme) ||
url.SchemeIs(chrome::kChromeInternalScheme) ||
url.SchemeIs(chrome::kChromeUIScheme);
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 1 | 171,008 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool DefaultBrowserInfoBarDelegate::Cancel() {
action_taken_ = true;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS("DefaultBrowserWarning.DontSetAsDefault", 1);
prefs_->SetBoolean(prefs::kCheckDefaultBrowser, false);
return true;
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Move audio, power, and UI files into subdirs.
This moves more files from chrome/browser/chromeos/ into
subdirectories.
BUG=chromium-os:22896
TEST=did chrome os builds both with and without aura
TBR=sky
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9125006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 109,363 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void pfkey_insert(struct sock *sk)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
struct netns_pfkey *net_pfkey = net_generic(net, pfkey_net_id);
mutex_lock(&pfkey_mutex);
sk_add_node_rcu(sk, &net_pfkey->table);
mutex_unlock(&pfkey_mutex);
}
Commit Message: af_key: initialize satype in key_notify_policy_flush()
This field was left uninitialized. Some user daemons perform check against this
field.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 31,428 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int dtls1_query_mtu(SSL *s)
{
if (s->d1->link_mtu) {
s->d1->mtu =
s->d1->link_mtu - BIO_dgram_get_mtu_overhead(SSL_get_wbio(s));
s->d1->link_mtu = 0;
}
/* AHA! Figure out the MTU, and stick to the right size */
if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu(s)) {
if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)) {
s->d1->mtu =
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU, 0, NULL);
/*
* I've seen the kernel return bogus numbers when it doesn't know
* (initial write), so just make sure we have a reasonable number
*/
if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu(s)) {
/* Set to min mtu */
s->d1->mtu = dtls1_min_mtu(s);
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_MTU,
s->d1->mtu, NULL);
}
} else
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 12,710 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ArcBridgeService* arc_bridge_service() const {
return arc_bridge_service_.get();
}
Commit Message: arc: add test for blocking incognito windows in screenshot
BUG=778852
TEST=ArcVoiceInteractionFrameworkServiceUnittest.
CapturingScreenshotBlocksIncognitoWindows
Change-Id: I0bfa5a486759783d7c8926a309c6b5da9b02dcc6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/914983
Commit-Queue: Muyuan Li <muyuanli@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Luis Hector Chavez <lhchavez@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#536438}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 152,328 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::DetachParser() {
if (!parser_)
return;
parser_->Detach();
parser_.Clear();
DocumentParserTiming::From(*this).MarkParserDetached();
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 129,643 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ProcBadRequest(ClientPtr client)
{
return BadRequest;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 14,948 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SERVER_REC *server_connect(SERVER_CONNECT_REC *conn)
{
CHAT_PROTOCOL_REC *proto;
SERVER_REC *server;
proto = CHAT_PROTOCOL(conn);
server = proto->server_init_connect(conn);
proto->server_connect(server);
return server;
}
Commit Message: Check if an SSL certificate matches the hostname of the server we are connecting to
git-svn-id: http://svn.irssi.org/repos/irssi/trunk@5104 dbcabf3a-b0e7-0310-adc4-f8d773084564
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 18,195 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: reassemble_pkcs12_name(const char *filename)
{
char *ret;
if (asprintf(&ret, "PKCS12:%s", filename) < 0)
return NULL;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: PKINIT null pointer deref [CVE-2013-1415]
Don't dereference a null pointer when cleaning up.
The KDC plugin for PKINIT can dereference a null pointer when a
malformed packet causes processing to terminate early, leading to
a crash of the KDC process. An attacker would need to have a valid
PKINIT certificate or have observed a successful PKINIT authentication,
or an unauthenticated attacker could execute the attack if anonymous
PKINIT is enabled.
CVSSv2 vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:P/RL:O/RC:C
This is a minimal commit for pullup; style fixes in a followup.
[kaduk@mit.edu: reformat and edit commit message]
(cherry picked from commit c773d3c775e9b2d88bcdff5f8a8ba88d7ec4e8ed)
ticket: 7570
version_fixed: 1.11.1
status: resolved
CWE ID: | 0 | 33,697 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool valid_msr_intercept(u32 index)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; direct_access_msrs[i].index != MSR_INVALID; i++)
if (direct_access_msrs[i].index == index)
return true;
return false;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Check non-canonical addresses upon WRMSR
Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).
Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD. To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.
Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:
According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."
According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers. If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."
This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 37,924 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GtkWidget* webkit_web_view_new(void)
{
WebKitWebView* webView = WEBKIT_WEB_VIEW(g_object_new(WEBKIT_TYPE_WEB_VIEW, NULL));
return GTK_WIDGET(webView);
}
Commit Message: 2011-06-02 Joone Hur <joone.hur@collabora.co.uk>
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
[GTK] Only load dictionaries if spell check is enabled
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32879
We don't need to call enchant if enable-spell-checking is false.
* webkit/webkitwebview.cpp:
(webkit_web_view_update_settings): Skip loading dictionaries when enable-spell-checking is false.
(webkit_web_view_settings_notify): Ditto.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@87925 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,599 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: trace_buffer_unlock_commit_nostack(struct ring_buffer *buffer,
struct ring_buffer_event *event)
{
__buffer_unlock_commit(buffer, event);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 81,374 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool AuthenticatorNoAvailableTransportsErrorModel::IsBackButtonVisible() const {
return false;
}
Commit Message: chrome/browser/ui/webauthn: long domains may cause a line break.
As requested by UX in [1], allow long host names to split a title into
two lines. This allows us to show more of the name before eliding,
although sufficiently long names will still trigger elision.
Screenshot at
https://drive.google.com/open?id=1_V6t2CeZDAVazy3Px-OET2LnB__aEW1r.
[1] https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1TtxkPUchyVZulqgdMcfui-68B0W-DWaFFVJEffGIbLA/edit#slide=id.g5913c4105f_1_12
Change-Id: I70f6541e0db3e9942239304de43b487a7561ca34
Bug: 870892
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1601812
Auto-Submit: Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nina Satragno <nsatragno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nina Satragno <nsatragno@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#658114}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 142,969 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void perf_sample_regs_user(struct perf_regs_user *regs_user,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
if (!user_mode(regs)) {
if (current->mm)
regs = task_pt_regs(current);
else
regs = NULL;
}
if (regs) {
regs_user->regs = regs;
regs_user->abi = perf_reg_abi(current);
}
}
Commit Message: perf: Treat attr.config as u64 in perf_swevent_init()
Trinity discovered that we fail to check all 64 bits of
attr.config passed by user space, resulting to out-of-bounds
access of the perf_swevent_enabled array in
sw_perf_event_destroy().
Introduced in commit b0a873ebb ("perf: Register PMU
implementations").
Signed-off-by: Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: davej@redhat.com
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@ghostprotocols.net>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365882554-30259-1-git-send-email-tt.rantala@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 31,976 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RebuildState(const std::vector<flags_ui::FeatureEntry>& entries) {
flags_state_ = std::make_unique<flags_ui::FlagsState>(
entries.data(), entries.size(),
base::Bind(&FlagsStateSingleton::IsFlagExpired));
}
Commit Message: Add Virtual Keyboard bordered key experiment to chrome flag
BUG: b/143232594
Change-Id: I76b160ad565649db32a21b984fbed1594b0ae6ec
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1875347
Reviewed-by: Scott Violet <sky@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: My Nguyen <myy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#710190}
CWE ID: | 0 | 148,381 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: fz_colorspace *fz_new_icc_colorspace_from_stream(fz_context *ctx, const char *name, fz_stream *in)
{
fz_colorspace *cs = NULL;
fz_buffer *buffer = fz_read_all(ctx, in, 1024);
fz_try(ctx)
cs = fz_new_icc_colorspace(ctx, name, 0, buffer);
fz_always(ctx)
fz_drop_buffer(ctx, buffer);
fz_catch(ctx)
fz_rethrow(ctx);
return cs;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 399 |
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