instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebMediaPlayer::Preload HTMLMediaElement::preloadType() const {
const AtomicString& preload = fastGetAttribute(preloadAttr);
if (equalIgnoringCase(preload, "none")) {
UseCounter::count(document(), UseCounter::HTMLMediaElementPreloadNone);
return WebMediaPlayer::PreloadNone;
}
if (document().settings() &&
(document().settings()->getDataSaverEnabled() ||
document().settings()->getForcePreloadNoneForMediaElements()) &&
(m_currentSrc.protocol() != "blob" && m_currentSrc.protocol() != "data" &&
m_currentSrc.protocol() != "file")) {
UseCounter::count(document(),
UseCounter::HTMLMediaElementPreloadForcedNone);
return WebMediaPlayer::PreloadNone;
}
if (equalIgnoringCase(preload, "metadata")) {
UseCounter::count(document(), UseCounter::HTMLMediaElementPreloadMetadata);
return WebMediaPlayer::PreloadMetaData;
}
if (networkStateNotifier().isCellularConnectionType()) {
UseCounter::count(document(),
UseCounter::HTMLMediaElementPreloadForcedMetadata);
return WebMediaPlayer::PreloadMetaData;
}
if (equalIgnoringCase(preload, "auto")) {
UseCounter::count(document(), UseCounter::HTMLMediaElementPreloadAuto);
return WebMediaPlayer::PreloadAuto;
}
UseCounter::count(document(), UseCounter::HTMLMediaElementPreloadDefault);
return WebMediaPlayer::PreloadAuto;
}
Commit Message: [Blink>Media] Allow autoplay muted on Android by default
There was a mistake causing autoplay muted is shipped on Android
but it will be disabled if the chromium embedder doesn't specify
content setting for "AllowAutoplay" preference. This CL makes the
AllowAutoplay preference true by default so that it is allowed by
embedders (including AndroidWebView) unless they explicitly
disable it.
Intent to ship:
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/Q1cnzNI2GpI/AL_eyUNABgAJ
BUG=689018
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2677173002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#448423}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 128,868 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BackendImpl::SubstractStorageSize(int32_t bytes) {
data_->header.num_bytes -= bytes;
DCHECK_GE(data_->header.num_bytes, 0);
}
Commit Message: Blockfile cache: fix long-standing sparse + evict reentrancy problem
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for an alternative perspective
plus a reduction to make fixing this much easier.
Bug: 826626, 518908, 537063, 802886
Change-Id: Ibfa01416f9a8e7f7b361e4f93b4b6b134728b85f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/985052
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547103}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 147,282 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void voidMethodOptionalLongArgMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
ExceptionState exceptionState(ExceptionState::ExecutionContext, "voidMethodOptionalLongArg", "TestObjectPython", info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate());
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() <= 0)) {
imp->voidMethodOptionalLongArg();
return;
}
V8TRYCATCH_EXCEPTION_VOID(int, optionalLongArg, toInt32(info[0], exceptionState), exceptionState);
imp->voidMethodOptionalLongArg(optionalLongArg);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,862 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void _6502_anal_esil_flags(RAnalOp *op, ut8 data0) {
int enabled=0;
char flag ='u';
switch(data0) {
case 0x78: // sei
enabled = 1;
flag = 'I';
break;
case 0x58: // cli
enabled = 0;
flag = 'I';
break;
case 0x38: // sec
enabled = 1;
flag = 'C';
break;
case 0x18: // clc
enabled = 0;
flag = 'C';
break;
case 0xf8: // sed
enabled = 1;
flag = 'D';
break;
case 0xd8: // cld
enabled = 0;
flag = 'D';
break;
case 0xb8: // clv
enabled = 0;
flag = 'V';
break;
break;
}
r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "%d,%c,=", enabled, flag);
}
Commit Message: Fix #10294 - crash in r2_hoobr__6502_op
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 81,995 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SocketStreamDispatcherHost::~SocketStreamDispatcherHost() {
for (IDMap<SocketStreamHost>::const_iterator iter(&hosts_);
!iter.IsAtEnd();
iter.Advance()) {
int socket_id = iter.GetCurrentKey();
const SocketStreamHost* socket_stream_host = iter.GetCurrentValue();
delete socket_stream_host;
hosts_.Remove(socket_id);
}
}
Commit Message: Inherits SupportsWeakPtr<T> instead of having WeakPtrFactory<T>
This change refines r137676.
BUG=122654
TEST=browser_test
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332233
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139771 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 107,929 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void disk_alloc_events(struct gendisk *disk)
{
struct disk_events *ev;
if (!disk->fops->check_events)
return;
ev = kzalloc(sizeof(*ev), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ev) {
pr_warn("%s: failed to initialize events\n", disk->disk_name);
return;
}
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ev->node);
ev->disk = disk;
spin_lock_init(&ev->lock);
mutex_init(&ev->block_mutex);
ev->block = 1;
ev->poll_msecs = -1;
INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&ev->dwork, disk_events_workfn);
disk->ev = ev;
}
Commit Message: block: fix use-after-free in seq file
I got a KASAN report of use-after-free:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in klist_iter_exit+0x61/0x70 at addr ffff8800b6581508
Read of size 8 by task trinity-c1/315
=============================================================================
BUG kmalloc-32 (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
INFO: Allocated in disk_seqf_start+0x66/0x110 age=144 cpu=1 pid=315
___slab_alloc+0x4f1/0x520
__slab_alloc.isra.58+0x56/0x80
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x260/0x2a0
disk_seqf_start+0x66/0x110
traverse+0x176/0x860
seq_read+0x7e3/0x11a0
proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
do_preadv+0x126/0x170
SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
do_syscall_64+0x1a1/0x460
return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
INFO: Freed in disk_seqf_stop+0x42/0x50 age=160 cpu=1 pid=315
__slab_free+0x17a/0x2c0
kfree+0x20a/0x220
disk_seqf_stop+0x42/0x50
traverse+0x3b5/0x860
seq_read+0x7e3/0x11a0
proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
do_preadv+0x126/0x170
SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
do_syscall_64+0x1a1/0x460
return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
CPU: 1 PID: 315 Comm: trinity-c1 Tainted: G B 4.7.0+ #62
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
ffffea0002d96000 ffff880119b9f918 ffffffff81d6ce81 ffff88011a804480
ffff8800b6581500 ffff880119b9f948 ffffffff8146c7bd ffff88011a804480
ffffea0002d96000 ffff8800b6581500 fffffffffffffff4 ffff880119b9f970
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81d6ce81>] dump_stack+0x65/0x84
[<ffffffff8146c7bd>] print_trailer+0x10d/0x1a0
[<ffffffff814704ff>] object_err+0x2f/0x40
[<ffffffff814754d1>] kasan_report_error+0x221/0x520
[<ffffffff8147590e>] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x3e/0x40
[<ffffffff83888161>] klist_iter_exit+0x61/0x70
[<ffffffff82404389>] class_dev_iter_exit+0x9/0x10
[<ffffffff81d2e8ea>] disk_seqf_stop+0x3a/0x50
[<ffffffff8151f812>] seq_read+0x4b2/0x11a0
[<ffffffff815f8fdc>] proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
[<ffffffff814b24e4>] do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
[<ffffffff814b4c45>] do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
[<ffffffff814b8a17>] vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
[<ffffffff814b8de6>] do_preadv+0x126/0x170
[<ffffffff814b92ec>] SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
This problem can occur in the following situation:
open()
- pread()
- .seq_start()
- iter = kmalloc() // succeeds
- seqf->private = iter
- .seq_stop()
- kfree(seqf->private)
- pread()
- .seq_start()
- iter = kmalloc() // fails
- .seq_stop()
- class_dev_iter_exit(seqf->private) // boom! old pointer
As the comment in disk_seqf_stop() says, stop is called even if start
failed, so we need to reinitialise the private pointer to NULL when seq
iteration stops.
An alternative would be to set the private pointer to NULL when the
kmalloc() in disk_seqf_start() fails.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 49,669 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static const char *flat_escape_value_str(AVBPrint *dst, const char *src)
{
const char *p;
for (p = src; *p; p++) {
switch (*p) {
case '\n': av_bprintf(dst, "%s", "\\n"); break;
case '\r': av_bprintf(dst, "%s", "\\r"); break;
case '\\': av_bprintf(dst, "%s", "\\\\"); break;
case '"': av_bprintf(dst, "%s", "\\\""); break;
case '`': av_bprintf(dst, "%s", "\\`"); break;
case '$': av_bprintf(dst, "%s", "\\$"); break;
default: av_bprint_chars(dst, *p, 1); break;
}
}
return dst->str;
}
Commit Message: ffprobe: Fix null pointer dereference with color primaries
Found-by: AD-lab of venustech
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 61,333 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct condition * compiler_create_condition(struct filter_op *fop)
{
struct condition *cnd;
SAFE_CALLOC(cnd, 1, sizeof(struct condition));
/* copy the instruction */
memcpy(&cnd->fop, fop, sizeof(struct filter_op));
return cnd;
}
Commit Message: Exit gracefully in case of corrupted filters (Closes issue #782)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 68,062 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int get_appcontext_input_count_offset(void)
{
#define low_offset offsetof(struct _XtAppStruct, __maxed__nfds)
#define high_offset offsetof(struct _XtAppStruct, __maybe__input_max)
#define n_offsets_max (high_offset - low_offset)/2
int i, ofs, n_offsets = 0;
int offsets[n_offsets_max] = { 0, };
#define n_inputs_max 4 /* number of refinements/input sources */
int fd, id, n_inputs = 0;
struct { int fd, id; } inputs[n_inputs_max] = { 0, };
if ((fd = open("/dev/null", O_WRONLY)) < 0)
return 0;
if ((id = add_appcontext_input(fd, 0)) < 0) {
close(fd);
return 0;
}
inputs[n_inputs].fd = fd;
inputs[n_inputs].id = id;
n_inputs++;
for (ofs = low_offset; ofs < high_offset; ofs += 2) {
if (get_appcontext_input_count_at(ofs) == 1)
offsets[n_offsets++] = ofs;
}
while (n_inputs < n_inputs_max) {
if ((fd = open("/dev/null", O_WRONLY)) < 0)
break;
if ((id = add_appcontext_input(fd, n_inputs)) < 0) {
close(fd);
break;
}
inputs[n_inputs].fd = fd;
inputs[n_inputs].id = id;
n_inputs++;
int n = 0;
for (i = 0; i < n_offsets; i++) {
if (get_appcontext_input_count_at(offsets[i]) == n_inputs)
offsets[n++] = offsets[i];
}
for (i = n; i < n_offsets; i++)
offsets[i] = 0;
n_offsets = n;
}
for (i = 0; i < n_inputs; i++) {
XtRemoveInput(inputs[i].id);
close(inputs[i].fd);
}
if (n_offsets == 1)
return offsets[0];
#undef n_fds_max
#undef n_offsets_max
#undef high_offset
#undef low_offset
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 27,098 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TestWillInsertBodyWebFrameClient() : m_numBodies(0), m_didLoad(false)
{
}
Commit Message: Call didAccessInitialDocument when javascript: URLs are used.
BUG=265221
TEST=See bug for repro.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/22572004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@155790 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 111,254 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Extension::SetCachedImage(const ExtensionResource& source,
const SkBitmap& image,
const gfx::Size& original_size) const {
DCHECK(source.extension_root() == path()); // The resource must come from
const FilePath& path = source.relative_path();
gfx::Size actual_size(image.width(), image.height());
std::string location;
if (actual_size != original_size)
location = SizeToString(actual_size);
image_cache_[ImageCacheKey(path, location)] = image;
}
Commit Message: Tighten restrictions on hosted apps calling extension APIs
Only allow component apps to make any API calls, and for them only allow the namespaces they explicitly have permission for (plus chrome.test - I need to see if I can rework some WebStore tests to remove even this).
BUG=172369
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12095095
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180426 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 114,370 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t NuPlayer::GenericSource::dequeueAccessUnit(
bool audio, sp<ABuffer> *accessUnit) {
Track *track = audio ? &mAudioTrack : &mVideoTrack;
if (track->mSource == NULL) {
return -EWOULDBLOCK;
}
if (mIsWidevine && !audio) {
postReadBuffer(MEDIA_TRACK_TYPE_VIDEO);
}
status_t finalResult;
if (!track->mPackets->hasBufferAvailable(&finalResult)) {
return (finalResult == OK ? -EWOULDBLOCK : finalResult);
}
status_t result = track->mPackets->dequeueAccessUnit(accessUnit);
if (!track->mPackets->hasBufferAvailable(&finalResult)) {
postReadBuffer(audio? MEDIA_TRACK_TYPE_AUDIO : MEDIA_TRACK_TYPE_VIDEO);
}
if (result != OK) {
if (mSubtitleTrack.mSource != NULL) {
mSubtitleTrack.mPackets->clear();
mFetchSubtitleDataGeneration++;
}
if (mTimedTextTrack.mSource != NULL) {
mTimedTextTrack.mPackets->clear();
mFetchTimedTextDataGeneration++;
}
return result;
}
int64_t timeUs;
status_t eosResult; // ignored
CHECK((*accessUnit)->meta()->findInt64("timeUs", &timeUs));
if (mSubtitleTrack.mSource != NULL
&& !mSubtitleTrack.mPackets->hasBufferAvailable(&eosResult)) {
sp<AMessage> msg = new AMessage(kWhatFetchSubtitleData, id());
msg->setInt64("timeUs", timeUs);
msg->setInt32("generation", mFetchSubtitleDataGeneration);
msg->post();
}
if (mTimedTextTrack.mSource != NULL
&& !mTimedTextTrack.mPackets->hasBufferAvailable(&eosResult)) {
sp<AMessage> msg = new AMessage(kWhatFetchTimedTextData, id());
msg->setInt64("timeUs", timeUs);
msg->setInt32("generation", mFetchTimedTextDataGeneration);
msg->post();
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: GenericSource: reset mDrmManagerClient when mDataSource is cleared.
Bug: 25070434
Change-Id: Iade3472c496ac42456e42db35e402f7b66416f5b
(cherry picked from commit b41fd0d4929f0a89811bafcc4fd944b128f00ce2)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 161,979 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int vmx_deliver_nested_posted_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
int vector)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) &&
vector == vmx->nested.posted_intr_nv) {
/* the PIR and ON have been set by L1. */
kvm_vcpu_trigger_posted_interrupt(vcpu, true);
/*
* If a posted intr is not recognized by hardware,
* we will accomplish it in the next vmentry.
*/
vmx->nested.pi_pending = true;
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
return 0;
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Don't allow L2 to access the hardware CR8
If L1 does not specify the "use TPR shadow" VM-execution control in
vmcs12, then L0 must specify the "CR8-load exiting" and "CR8-store
exiting" VM-execution controls in vmcs02. Failure to do so will give
the L2 VM unrestricted read/write access to the hardware CR8.
This fixes CVE-2017-12154.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 63,032 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool IPAttributesGetterMac::GetAddressAttributes(const ifaddrs* if_addr,
int* attributes) {
struct in6_ifreq ifr = {};
strncpy(ifr.ifr_name, if_addr->ifa_name, sizeof(ifr.ifr_name) - 1);
memcpy(&ifr.ifr_ifru.ifru_addr, if_addr->ifa_addr, if_addr->ifa_addr->sa_len);
int rv = ioctl(ioctl_socket_, SIOCGIFAFLAG_IN6, &ifr);
if (rv >= 0) {
*attributes = AddressFlagsToNetAddressAttributes(ifr.ifr_ifru.ifru_flags);
}
return (rv >= 0);
}
Commit Message: Replace base::MakeUnique with std::make_unique in net/.
base/memory/ptr_util.h includes will be cleaned up later.
Bug: 755727
Change-Id: Ibaf46f05c9b02b76f9a91e819984b087a8c0d434
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/627300
Commit-Queue: Jeremy Roman <jbroman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Bence Béky <bnc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498123}
CWE ID: CWE-311 | 0 | 156,299 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mailimf_zone_parse(const char * message, size_t length,
size_t * indx, int * result)
{
int zone;
int sign;
size_t cur_token;
int r;
uint32_t value;
cur_token = * indx;
if (cur_token + 1 < length) {
if ((message[cur_token] == 'U') && (message[cur_token + 1] == 'T')) {
* result = TRUE;
* indx = cur_token + 2;
return MAILIMF_NO_ERROR;
}
}
zone = 0;
if (cur_token + 2 < length) {
int state;
state = STATE_ZONE_1;
while (state <= 2) {
switch (state) {
case STATE_ZONE_1:
switch (message[cur_token]) {
case 'G':
if (message[cur_token + 1] == 'M' && message[cur_token + 2] == 'T') {
if ((cur_token + 3 < length) && ((message[cur_token + 3] == '+') || (message[cur_token + 3] == '-'))) {
cur_token += 3;
state = STATE_ZONE_CONT;
}
else {
zone = 0;
state = STATE_ZONE_OK;
}
}
else {
state = STATE_ZONE_ERR;
}
break;
case 'E':
zone = -5;
state = STATE_ZONE_2;
break;
case 'C':
zone = -6;
state = STATE_ZONE_2;
break;
case 'M':
zone = -7;
state = STATE_ZONE_2;
break;
case 'P':
zone = -8;
state = STATE_ZONE_2;
break;
default:
state = STATE_ZONE_CONT;
break;
}
break;
case STATE_ZONE_2:
switch (message[cur_token + 1]) {
case 'S':
state = STATE_ZONE_3;
break;
case 'D':
zone ++;
state = STATE_ZONE_3;
break;
default:
state = STATE_ZONE_ERR;
break;
}
break;
case STATE_ZONE_3:
if (message[cur_token + 2] == 'T') {
zone *= 100;
state = STATE_ZONE_OK;
}
else
state = STATE_ZONE_ERR;
break;
}
}
switch (state) {
case STATE_ZONE_OK:
* result = zone;
* indx = cur_token + 3;
return MAILIMF_NO_ERROR;
case STATE_ZONE_ERR:
return MAILIMF_ERROR_PARSE;
}
}
sign = 1;
r = mailimf_plus_parse(message, length, &cur_token);
if (r == MAILIMF_NO_ERROR)
sign = 1;
if (r == MAILIMF_ERROR_PARSE) {
r = mailimf_minus_parse(message, length, &cur_token);
if (r == MAILIMF_NO_ERROR)
sign = -1;
}
if (r == MAILIMF_NO_ERROR) {
/* do nothing */
}
else if (r == MAILIMF_ERROR_PARSE)
sign = 1;
else
return r;
r = mailimf_number_parse(message, length, &cur_token, &value);
if (r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR)
return r;
zone = value * sign;
* indx = cur_token;
* result = zone;
return MAILIMF_NO_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: Fixed crash #274
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 66,252 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void t1_scan_param(PDF pdf)
{
static const char *lenIV = "/lenIV";
if (!t1_scan || *t1_line_array != '/')
return;
if (t1_prefix(lenIV)) {
t1_lenIV = (short) t1_scan_num(t1_line_array + strlen(lenIV), 0);
if (t1_lenIV < 0)
normal_error("type 1","negative value of lenIV is not supported");
return;
}
t1_scan_keys(pdf);
}
Commit Message: writet1 protection against buffer overflow
git-svn-id: svn://tug.org/texlive/trunk/Build/source@48697 c570f23f-e606-0410-a88d-b1316a301751
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 76,706 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _rpc_network_callerid(slurm_msg_t *msg)
{
network_callerid_msg_t *req = (network_callerid_msg_t *)msg->data;
slurm_msg_t resp_msg;
network_callerid_resp_t *resp = NULL;
uid_t req_uid = -1;
uid_t job_uid = -1;
uint32_t job_id = (uint32_t)NO_VAL;
callerid_conn_t conn;
int rc = ESLURM_INVALID_JOB_ID;
char ip_src_str[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
char ip_dst_str[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
debug3("Entering _rpc_network_callerid");
resp = xmalloc(sizeof(network_callerid_resp_t));
slurm_msg_t_copy(&resp_msg, msg);
/* Ideally this would be in an if block only when debug3 is enabled */
inet_ntop(req->af, req->ip_src, ip_src_str, INET6_ADDRSTRLEN);
inet_ntop(req->af, req->ip_dst, ip_dst_str, INET6_ADDRSTRLEN);
debug3("network_callerid checking %s:%u => %s:%u",
ip_src_str, req->port_src, ip_dst_str, req->port_dst);
/* My remote is the other's source */
memcpy((void*)&conn.ip_dst, (void*)&req->ip_src, 16);
memcpy((void*)&conn.ip_src, (void*)&req->ip_dst, 16);
conn.port_src = req->port_dst;
conn.port_dst = req->port_src;
conn.af = req->af;
/* Find the job id */
rc = _callerid_find_job(conn, &job_id);
if (rc == SLURM_SUCCESS) {
/* We found the job */
req_uid = g_slurm_auth_get_uid(msg->auth_cred, conf->auth_info);
if (!_slurm_authorized_user(req_uid)) {
/* Requestor is not root or SlurmUser */
job_uid = _get_job_uid(job_id);
if (job_uid != req_uid) {
/* RPC call sent by non-root user who does not
* own this job. Do not send them the job ID. */
error("Security violation, REQUEST_NETWORK_CALLERID from uid=%d",
req_uid);
job_id = NO_VAL;
rc = ESLURM_INVALID_JOB_ID;
}
}
}
resp->job_id = job_id;
resp->node_name = xstrdup(conf->node_name);
resp_msg.msg_type = RESPONSE_NETWORK_CALLERID;
resp_msg.data = resp;
slurm_send_node_msg(msg->conn_fd, &resp_msg);
slurm_free_network_callerid_resp(resp);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: Fix security issue in _prolog_error().
Fix security issue caused by insecure file path handling triggered by
the failure of a Prolog script. To exploit this a user needs to
anticipate or cause the Prolog to fail for their job.
(This commit is slightly different from the fix to the 15.08 branch.)
CVE-2016-10030.
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 72,119 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sctp_msghdr_parse(const struct msghdr *msg, sctp_cmsgs_t *cmsgs)
{
struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
struct msghdr *my_msg = (struct msghdr *)msg;
for_each_cmsghdr(cmsg, my_msg) {
if (!CMSG_OK(my_msg, cmsg))
return -EINVAL;
/* Should we parse this header or ignore? */
if (cmsg->cmsg_level != IPPROTO_SCTP)
continue;
/* Strictly check lengths following example in SCM code. */
switch (cmsg->cmsg_type) {
case SCTP_INIT:
/* SCTP Socket API Extension
* 5.3.1 SCTP Initiation Structure (SCTP_INIT)
*
* This cmsghdr structure provides information for
* initializing new SCTP associations with sendmsg().
* The SCTP_INITMSG socket option uses this same data
* structure. This structure is not used for
* recvmsg().
*
* cmsg_level cmsg_type cmsg_data[]
* ------------ ------------ ----------------------
* IPPROTO_SCTP SCTP_INIT struct sctp_initmsg
*/
if (cmsg->cmsg_len != CMSG_LEN(sizeof(struct sctp_initmsg)))
return -EINVAL;
cmsgs->init = CMSG_DATA(cmsg);
break;
case SCTP_SNDRCV:
/* SCTP Socket API Extension
* 5.3.2 SCTP Header Information Structure(SCTP_SNDRCV)
*
* This cmsghdr structure specifies SCTP options for
* sendmsg() and describes SCTP header information
* about a received message through recvmsg().
*
* cmsg_level cmsg_type cmsg_data[]
* ------------ ------------ ----------------------
* IPPROTO_SCTP SCTP_SNDRCV struct sctp_sndrcvinfo
*/
if (cmsg->cmsg_len != CMSG_LEN(sizeof(struct sctp_sndrcvinfo)))
return -EINVAL;
cmsgs->srinfo = CMSG_DATA(cmsg);
if (cmsgs->srinfo->sinfo_flags &
~(SCTP_UNORDERED | SCTP_ADDR_OVER |
SCTP_SACK_IMMEDIATELY | SCTP_PR_SCTP_MASK |
SCTP_ABORT | SCTP_EOF))
return -EINVAL;
break;
case SCTP_SNDINFO:
/* SCTP Socket API Extension
* 5.3.4 SCTP Send Information Structure (SCTP_SNDINFO)
*
* This cmsghdr structure specifies SCTP options for
* sendmsg(). This structure and SCTP_RCVINFO replaces
* SCTP_SNDRCV which has been deprecated.
*
* cmsg_level cmsg_type cmsg_data[]
* ------------ ------------ ---------------------
* IPPROTO_SCTP SCTP_SNDINFO struct sctp_sndinfo
*/
if (cmsg->cmsg_len != CMSG_LEN(sizeof(struct sctp_sndinfo)))
return -EINVAL;
cmsgs->sinfo = CMSG_DATA(cmsg);
if (cmsgs->sinfo->snd_flags &
~(SCTP_UNORDERED | SCTP_ADDR_OVER |
SCTP_SACK_IMMEDIATELY | SCTP_PR_SCTP_MASK |
SCTP_ABORT | SCTP_EOF))
return -EINVAL;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: sctp: deny peeloff operation on asocs with threads sleeping on it
commit 2dcab5984841 ("sctp: avoid BUG_ON on sctp_wait_for_sndbuf")
attempted to avoid a BUG_ON call when the association being used for a
sendmsg() is blocked waiting for more sndbuf and another thread did a
peeloff operation on such asoc, moving it to another socket.
As Ben Hutchings noticed, then in such case it would return without
locking back the socket and would cause two unlocks in a row.
Further analysis also revealed that it could allow a double free if the
application managed to peeloff the asoc that is created during the
sendmsg call, because then sctp_sendmsg() would try to free the asoc
that was created only for that call.
This patch takes another approach. It will deny the peeloff operation
if there is a thread sleeping on the asoc, so this situation doesn't
exist anymore. This avoids the issues described above and also honors
the syscalls that are already being handled (it can be multiple sendmsg
calls).
Joint work with Xin Long.
Fixes: 2dcab5984841 ("sctp: avoid BUG_ON on sctp_wait_for_sndbuf")
Cc: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 68,145 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Storage::StorageType GetTypeName(storage::QuotaClient::ID id) {
switch (id) {
case storage::QuotaClient::kFileSystem:
return Storage::StorageTypeEnum::File_systems;
case storage::QuotaClient::kDatabase:
return Storage::StorageTypeEnum::Websql;
case storage::QuotaClient::kAppcache:
return Storage::StorageTypeEnum::Appcache;
case storage::QuotaClient::kIndexedDatabase:
return Storage::StorageTypeEnum::Indexeddb;
case storage::QuotaClient::kServiceWorkerCache:
return Storage::StorageTypeEnum::Cache_storage;
case storage::QuotaClient::kServiceWorker:
return Storage::StorageTypeEnum::Service_workers;
default:
return Storage::StorageTypeEnum::Other;
}
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 148,624 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool GetNetworkList(NetworkInterfaceList* networks, int policy) {
if (networks == NULL)
return false;
base::ThreadRestrictions::AssertIOAllowed();
ifaddrs* interfaces;
if (getifaddrs(&interfaces) < 0) {
PLOG(ERROR) << "getifaddrs";
return false;
}
std::unique_ptr<internal::IPAttributesGetter> ip_attributes_getter;
#if defined(OS_MACOSX) && !defined(OS_IOS)
ip_attributes_getter = base::MakeUnique<internal::IPAttributesGetterMac>();
#endif
bool result = internal::IfaddrsToNetworkInterfaceList(
policy, interfaces, ip_attributes_getter.get(), networks);
freeifaddrs(interfaces);
return result;
}
Commit Message: Replace base::MakeUnique with std::make_unique in net/.
base/memory/ptr_util.h includes will be cleaned up later.
Bug: 755727
Change-Id: Ibaf46f05c9b02b76f9a91e819984b087a8c0d434
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/627300
Commit-Queue: Jeremy Roman <jbroman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Bence Béky <bnc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498123}
CWE ID: CWE-311 | 1 | 173,265 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: size_t RenderFrameHostImpl::GetProxyCount() {
if (!IsCurrent())
return 0;
return frame_tree_node_->render_manager()->GetProxyCount();
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,298 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: config_phone(
config_tree *ptree
)
{
int i;
string_node * sn;
i = 0;
sn = HEAD_PFIFO(ptree->phone);
for (; sn != NULL; sn = sn->link) {
/* need to leave array entry for NULL terminator */
if (i < COUNTOF(sys_phone) - 1) {
sys_phone[i++] = estrdup(sn->s);
sys_phone[i] = NULL;
} else {
msyslog(LOG_INFO,
"phone: Number of phone entries exceeds %lu. Ignoring phone %s...",
(u_long)(COUNTOF(sys_phone) - 1), sn->s);
}
}
}
Commit Message: [Bug 1773] openssl not detected during ./configure.
[Bug 1774] Segfaults if cryptostats enabled and built without OpenSSL.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 74,139 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const AtomicString& DocumentLoader::ResponseMIMEType() const {
return response_.MimeType();
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 134,456 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static BOOL gdi_Glyph_SetBounds(rdpContext* context, INT32 x, INT32 y, INT32 width, INT32 height)
{
rdpGdi* gdi;
if (!context || !context->gdi)
return FALSE;
gdi = context->gdi;
if (!gdi->drawing || !gdi->drawing->hdc)
return FALSE;
return gdi_SetClipRgn(gdi->drawing->hdc, x, y, width, height);
}
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8787
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 83,544 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int adf_ctl_ioctl_get_status(struct file *fp, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg)
{
struct adf_hw_device_data *hw_data;
struct adf_dev_status_info dev_info;
struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev;
if (copy_from_user(&dev_info, (void __user *)arg,
sizeof(struct adf_dev_status_info))) {
pr_err("QAT: failed to copy from user.\n");
return -EFAULT;
}
accel_dev = adf_devmgr_get_dev_by_id(dev_info.accel_id);
if (!accel_dev) {
pr_err("QAT: Device %d not found\n", dev_info.accel_id);
return -ENODEV;
}
hw_data = accel_dev->hw_device;
dev_info.state = adf_dev_started(accel_dev) ? DEV_UP : DEV_DOWN;
dev_info.num_ae = hw_data->get_num_aes(hw_data);
dev_info.num_accel = hw_data->get_num_accels(hw_data);
dev_info.num_logical_accel = hw_data->num_logical_accel;
dev_info.banks_per_accel = hw_data->num_banks
/ hw_data->num_logical_accel;
strlcpy(dev_info.name, hw_data->dev_class->name, sizeof(dev_info.name));
dev_info.instance_id = hw_data->instance_id;
dev_info.type = hw_data->dev_class->type;
dev_info.bus = accel_to_pci_dev(accel_dev)->bus->number;
dev_info.dev = PCI_SLOT(accel_to_pci_dev(accel_dev)->devfn);
dev_info.fun = PCI_FUNC(accel_to_pci_dev(accel_dev)->devfn);
if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg, &dev_info,
sizeof(struct adf_dev_status_info))) {
pr_err("QAT: failed to copy status.\n");
return -EFAULT;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 47,474 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err metx_AddBox(GF_Box *s, GF_Box *a)
{
GF_MetaDataSampleEntryBox *ptr = (GF_MetaDataSampleEntryBox *)s;
switch (a->type) {
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_SINF:
gf_list_add(ptr->protections, a);
break;
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_TXTC:
if (ptr->config) ERROR_ON_DUPLICATED_BOX(a, ptr)
ptr->config = (GF_TextConfigBox *)a;
break;
default:
return gf_isom_box_add_default(s, a);
}
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,227 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: JSTestEventTarget::~JSTestEventTarget()
{
releaseImplIfNotNull();
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 101,117 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool ExecuteMoveWordForward(LocalFrame& frame,
Event*,
EditorCommandSource,
const String&) {
frame.Selection().Modify(SelectionModifyAlteration::kMove,
SelectionModifyDirection::kForward,
TextGranularity::kWord, SetSelectionBy::kUser);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Move Editor::Transpose() out of Editor class
This patch moves |Editor::Transpose()| out of |Editor| class as preparation of
expanding it into |ExecutTranspose()| in "EditorCommand.cpp" to make |Editor|
class simpler for improving code health.
Following patch will expand |Transpose()| into |ExecutTranspose()|.
Bug: 672405
Change-Id: Icde253623f31813d2b4517c4da7d4798bd5fadf6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/583880
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#489518}
CWE ID: | 0 | 128,586 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: NPP_GetMIMEDescription(void)
{
return const_cast<char *>(MIME_TYPES_DESCRIPTION);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 13,203 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: asmlinkage long compat_sys_set_mempolicy(int mode, compat_ulong_t __user *nmask,
compat_ulong_t maxnode)
{
long err = 0;
unsigned long __user *nm = NULL;
unsigned long nr_bits, alloc_size;
DECLARE_BITMAP(bm, MAX_NUMNODES);
nr_bits = min_t(unsigned long, maxnode-1, MAX_NUMNODES);
alloc_size = ALIGN(nr_bits, BITS_PER_LONG) / 8;
if (nmask) {
err = compat_get_bitmap(bm, nmask, nr_bits);
nm = compat_alloc_user_space(alloc_size);
err |= copy_to_user(nm, bm, alloc_size);
}
if (err)
return -EFAULT;
return sys_set_mempolicy(mode, nm, nr_bits+1);
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 21,301 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BrowserClosedNotificationObserver::~BrowserClosedNotificationObserver() {}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 117,662 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BTM_SetOutService(BD_ADDR bd_addr, UINT8 service_id, UINT32 mx_chan_id)
{
tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC *p_dev_rec;
tBTM_SEC_SERV_REC *p_serv_rec = &btm_cb.sec_serv_rec[0];
int i;
btm_cb.p_out_serv = p_serv_rec;
p_dev_rec = btm_find_dev (bd_addr);
for (i = 0; i < BTM_SEC_MAX_SERVICE_RECORDS; i++, p_serv_rec++)
{
if ((p_serv_rec->security_flags & BTM_SEC_IN_USE)
&& (p_serv_rec->service_id == service_id)
&& (p_serv_rec->orig_mx_chan_id == mx_chan_id))
{
BTM_TRACE_API("BTM_SetOutService p_out_serv id %d, psm 0x%04x, proto_id %d, chan_id %d",
p_serv_rec->service_id, p_serv_rec->psm, p_serv_rec->mx_proto_id, p_serv_rec->orig_mx_chan_id);
btm_cb.p_out_serv = p_serv_rec;
if (p_dev_rec)
p_dev_rec->p_cur_service = p_serv_rec;
break;
}
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Remove Porsche car-kit pairing workaround
Bug: 26551752
Change-Id: I14c5e3fcda0849874c8a94e48aeb7d09585617e1
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 161,397 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ResetWheelAndTouchEventHandlerProperties(LocalFrame& frame) {
auto& chrome_client = frame.GetPage()->GetChromeClient();
chrome_client.SetEventListenerProperties(
&frame, cc::EventListenerClass::kTouchStartOrMove,
cc::EventListenerProperties::kNone);
chrome_client.SetEventListenerProperties(&frame,
cc::EventListenerClass::kMouseWheel,
cc::EventListenerProperties::kNone);
chrome_client.SetEventListenerProperties(
&frame, cc::EventListenerClass::kTouchEndOrCancel,
cc::EventListenerProperties::kNone);
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 145,302 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int nlm_async_call(struct nlm_rqst *req, u32 proc, const struct rpc_call_ops *tk_ops)
{
struct rpc_message msg = {
.rpc_argp = &req->a_args,
.rpc_resp = &req->a_res,
};
return nlm_do_async_call(req, proc, &msg, tk_ops);
}
Commit Message: NLM: Don't hang forever on NLM unlock requests
If the NLM daemon is killed on the NFS server, we can currently end up
hanging forever on an 'unlock' request, instead of aborting. Basically,
if the rpcbind request fails, or the server keeps returning garbage, we
really want to quit instead of retrying.
Tested-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@sw.ru>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 34,852 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int mk_vhost_fdt_worker_init()
{
int i;
int j;
struct host *h;
struct mk_list *list;
struct mk_list *head;
struct vhost_fdt_host *fdt;
struct vhost_fdt_hash_table *ht;
struct vhost_fdt_hash_chain *hc;
if (config->fdt == MK_FALSE) {
return -1;
}
/*
* We are under a thread context and the main configuration is
* already in place. Now for every existent virtual host we are
* going to create the File Descriptor Table (FDT) which aims to
* hold references of 'open and shared' file descriptors under
* the Virtual Host context.
*/
/*
* Under an initialization context we need to protect this critical
* section
*/
pthread_mutex_lock(&mk_vhost_fdt_mutex);
/*
* Initialize the thread FDT/Hosts list and create an entry per
* existent virtual host
*/
list = mk_mem_malloc_z(sizeof(struct mk_list));
mk_list_init(list);
mk_list_foreach(head, &config->hosts) {
h = mk_list_entry(head, struct host, _head);
fdt = mk_mem_malloc(sizeof(struct vhost_fdt_host));
fdt->host = h;
/* Initialize hash table */
for (i = 0; i < VHOST_FDT_HASHTABLE_SIZE; i++) {
ht = &fdt->hash_table[i];
ht->av_slots = VHOST_FDT_HASHTABLE_CHAINS;
/* for each chain under the hash table, set the fd */
for (j = 0; j < VHOST_FDT_HASHTABLE_CHAINS; j++) {
hc = &ht->chain[j];
hc->fd = -1;
hc->hash = 0;
hc->readers = 0;
}
}
mk_list_add(&fdt->_head, list);
}
mk_vhost_fdt_key = list;
pthread_mutex_unlock(&mk_vhost_fdt_mutex);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Request: new request session flag to mark those files opened by FDT
This patch aims to fix a potential DDoS problem that can be caused
in the server quering repetitive non-existent resources.
When serving a static file, the core use Vhost FDT mechanism, but if
it sends a static error page it does a direct open(2). When closing
the resources for the same request it was just calling mk_vhost_close()
which did not clear properly the file descriptor.
This patch adds a new field on the struct session_request called 'fd_is_fdt',
which contains MK_TRUE or MK_FALSE depending of how fd_file was opened.
Thanks to Matthew Daley <mattd@bugfuzz.com> for report and troubleshoot this
problem.
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Silva <eduardo@monkey.io>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 36,170 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int sctp_assoc_set_bind_addr_from_ep(struct sctp_association *asoc,
sctp_scope_t scope, gfp_t gfp)
{
int flags;
/* Use scoping rules to determine the subset of addresses from
* the endpoint.
*/
flags = (PF_INET6 == asoc->base.sk->sk_family) ? SCTP_ADDR6_ALLOWED : 0;
if (asoc->peer.ipv4_address)
flags |= SCTP_ADDR4_PEERSUPP;
if (asoc->peer.ipv6_address)
flags |= SCTP_ADDR6_PEERSUPP;
return sctp_bind_addr_copy(sock_net(asoc->base.sk),
&asoc->base.bind_addr,
&asoc->ep->base.bind_addr,
scope, gfp, flags);
}
Commit Message: net: sctp: inherit auth_capable on INIT collisions
Jason reported an oops caused by SCTP on his ARM machine with
SCTP authentication enabled:
Internal error: Oops: 17 [#1] ARM
CPU: 0 PID: 104 Comm: sctp-test Not tainted 3.13.0-68744-g3632f30c9b20-dirty #1
task: c6eefa40 ti: c6f52000 task.ti: c6f52000
PC is at sctp_auth_calculate_hmac+0xc4/0x10c
LR is at sg_init_table+0x20/0x38
pc : [<c024bb80>] lr : [<c00f32dc>] psr: 40000013
sp : c6f538e8 ip : 00000000 fp : c6f53924
r10: c6f50d80 r9 : 00000000 r8 : 00010000
r7 : 00000000 r6 : c7be4000 r5 : 00000000 r4 : c6f56254
r3 : c00c8170 r2 : 00000001 r1 : 00000008 r0 : c6f1e660
Flags: nZcv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment user
Control: 0005397f Table: 06f28000 DAC: 00000015
Process sctp-test (pid: 104, stack limit = 0xc6f521c0)
Stack: (0xc6f538e8 to 0xc6f54000)
[...]
Backtrace:
[<c024babc>] (sctp_auth_calculate_hmac+0x0/0x10c) from [<c0249af8>] (sctp_packet_transmit+0x33c/0x5c8)
[<c02497bc>] (sctp_packet_transmit+0x0/0x5c8) from [<c023e96c>] (sctp_outq_flush+0x7fc/0x844)
[<c023e170>] (sctp_outq_flush+0x0/0x844) from [<c023ef78>] (sctp_outq_uncork+0x24/0x28)
[<c023ef54>] (sctp_outq_uncork+0x0/0x28) from [<c0234364>] (sctp_side_effects+0x1134/0x1220)
[<c0233230>] (sctp_side_effects+0x0/0x1220) from [<c02330b0>] (sctp_do_sm+0xac/0xd4)
[<c0233004>] (sctp_do_sm+0x0/0xd4) from [<c023675c>] (sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x118/0x160)
[<c0236644>] (sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x0/0x160) from [<c023d5bc>] (sctp_inq_push+0x6c/0x74)
[<c023d550>] (sctp_inq_push+0x0/0x74) from [<c024a6b0>] (sctp_rcv+0x7d8/0x888)
While we already had various kind of bugs in that area
ec0223ec48a9 ("net: sctp: fix sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce to verify if
we/peer is AUTH capable") and b14878ccb7fa ("net: sctp: cache
auth_enable per endpoint"), this one is a bit of a different
kind.
Giving a bit more background on why SCTP authentication is
needed can be found in RFC4895:
SCTP uses 32-bit verification tags to protect itself against
blind attackers. These values are not changed during the
lifetime of an SCTP association.
Looking at new SCTP extensions, there is the need to have a
method of proving that an SCTP chunk(s) was really sent by
the original peer that started the association and not by a
malicious attacker.
To cause this bug, we're triggering an INIT collision between
peers; normal SCTP handshake where both sides intent to
authenticate packets contains RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO
parameters that are being negotiated among peers:
---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------->
<------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------
-------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
<-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
RFC4895 says that each endpoint therefore knows its own random
number and the peer's random number *after* the association
has been established. The local and peer's random number along
with the shared key are then part of the secret used for
calculating the HMAC in the AUTH chunk.
Now, in our scenario, we have 2 threads with 1 non-blocking
SEQ_PACKET socket each, setting up common shared SCTP_AUTH_KEY
and SCTP_AUTH_ACTIVE_KEY properly, and each of them calling
sctp_bindx(3), listen(2) and connect(2) against each other,
thus the handshake looks similar to this, e.g.:
---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------->
<------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------
<--------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] -----------
-------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] -------->
...
Since such collisions can also happen with verification tags,
the RFC4895 for AUTH rather vaguely says under section 6.1:
In case of INIT collision, the rules governing the handling
of this Random Number follow the same pattern as those for
the Verification Tag, as explained in Section 5.2.4 of
RFC 2960 [5]. Therefore, each endpoint knows its own Random
Number and the peer's Random Number after the association
has been established.
In RFC2960, section 5.2.4, we're eventually hitting Action B:
B) In this case, both sides may be attempting to start an
association at about the same time but the peer endpoint
started its INIT after responding to the local endpoint's
INIT. Thus it may have picked a new Verification Tag not
being aware of the previous Tag it had sent this endpoint.
The endpoint should stay in or enter the ESTABLISHED
state but it MUST update its peer's Verification Tag from
the State Cookie, stop any init or cookie timers that may
running and send a COOKIE ACK.
In other words, the handling of the Random parameter is the
same as behavior for the Verification Tag as described in
Action B of section 5.2.4.
Looking at the code, we exactly hit the sctp_sf_do_dupcook_b()
case which triggers an SCTP_CMD_UPDATE_ASSOC command to the
side effect interpreter, and in fact it properly copies over
peer_{random, hmacs, chunks} parameters from the newly created
association to update the existing one.
Also, the old asoc_shared_key is being released and based on
the new params, sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() updated.
However, the issue observed in this case is that the previous
asoc->peer.auth_capable was 0, and has *not* been updated, so
that instead of creating a new secret, we're doing an early
return from the function sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key()
leaving asoc->asoc_shared_key as NULL. However, we now have to
authenticate chunks from the updated chunk list (e.g. COOKIE-ACK).
That in fact causes the server side when responding with ...
<------------------ AUTH; COOKIE-ACK -----------------
... to trigger a NULL pointer dereference, since in
sctp_packet_transmit(), it discovers that an AUTH chunk is
being queued for xmit, and thus it calls sctp_auth_calculate_hmac().
Since the asoc->active_key_id is still inherited from the
endpoint, and the same as encoded into the chunk, it uses
asoc->asoc_shared_key, which is still NULL, as an asoc_key
and dereferences it in ...
crypto_hash_setkey(desc.tfm, &asoc_key->data[0], asoc_key->len)
... causing an oops. All this happens because sctp_make_cookie_ack()
called with the *new* association has the peer.auth_capable=1
and therefore marks the chunk with auth=1 after checking
sctp_auth_send_cid(), but it is *actually* sent later on over
the then *updated* association's transport that didn't initialize
its shared key due to peer.auth_capable=0. Since control chunks
in that case are not sent by the temporary association which
are scheduled for deletion, they are issued for xmit via
SCTP_CMD_REPLY in the interpreter with the context of the
*updated* association. peer.auth_capable was 0 in the updated
association (which went from COOKIE_WAIT into ESTABLISHED state),
since all previous processing that performed sctp_process_init()
was being done on temporary associations, that we eventually
throw away each time.
The correct fix is to update to the new peer.auth_capable
value as well in the collision case via sctp_assoc_update(),
so that in case the collision migrated from 0 -> 1,
sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() can properly recalculate
the secret. This therefore fixes the observed server panic.
Fixes: 730fc3d05cd4 ("[SCTP]: Implete SCTP-AUTH parameter processing")
Reported-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 36,259 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void GCC_FMT_ATTR(2, 3) dprint(int level, const char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list args;
if (level <= debug) {
va_start(args, fmt);
vfprintf(stderr, fmt, args);
va_end(args);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 12,178 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int8_t udf_current_aext(struct inode *inode, struct extent_position *epos,
struct kernel_lb_addr *eloc, uint32_t *elen, int inc)
{
int alen;
int8_t etype;
uint8_t *ptr;
struct short_ad *sad;
struct long_ad *lad;
struct udf_inode_info *iinfo = UDF_I(inode);
if (!epos->bh) {
if (!epos->offset)
epos->offset = udf_file_entry_alloc_offset(inode);
ptr = iinfo->i_ext.i_data + epos->offset -
udf_file_entry_alloc_offset(inode) +
iinfo->i_lenEAttr;
alen = udf_file_entry_alloc_offset(inode) +
iinfo->i_lenAlloc;
} else {
if (!epos->offset)
epos->offset = sizeof(struct allocExtDesc);
ptr = epos->bh->b_data + epos->offset;
alen = sizeof(struct allocExtDesc) +
le32_to_cpu(((struct allocExtDesc *)epos->bh->b_data)->
lengthAllocDescs);
}
switch (iinfo->i_alloc_type) {
case ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_SHORT:
sad = udf_get_fileshortad(ptr, alen, &epos->offset, inc);
if (!sad)
return -1;
etype = le32_to_cpu(sad->extLength) >> 30;
eloc->logicalBlockNum = le32_to_cpu(sad->extPosition);
eloc->partitionReferenceNum =
iinfo->i_location.partitionReferenceNum;
*elen = le32_to_cpu(sad->extLength) & UDF_EXTENT_LENGTH_MASK;
break;
case ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_LONG:
lad = udf_get_filelongad(ptr, alen, &epos->offset, inc);
if (!lad)
return -1;
etype = le32_to_cpu(lad->extLength) >> 30;
*eloc = lelb_to_cpu(lad->extLocation);
*elen = le32_to_cpu(lad->extLength) & UDF_EXTENT_LENGTH_MASK;
break;
default:
udf_debug("alloc_type = %d unsupported\n", iinfo->i_alloc_type);
return -1;
}
return etype;
}
Commit Message: udf: Avoid infinite loop when processing indirect ICBs
We did not implement any bound on number of indirect ICBs we follow when
loading inode. Thus corrupted medium could cause kernel to go into an
infinite loop, possibly causing a stack overflow.
Fix the possible stack overflow by removing recursion from
__udf_read_inode() and limit number of indirect ICBs we follow to avoid
infinite loops.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 36,045 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: tt_cmap2_char_next( TT_CMap cmap,
FT_UInt32 *pcharcode )
{
FT_Byte* table = cmap->data;
FT_UInt gindex = 0;
FT_UInt32 result = 0;
FT_UInt32 charcode = *pcharcode + 1;
FT_Byte* subheader;
while ( charcode < 0x10000UL )
{
subheader = tt_cmap2_get_subheader( table, charcode );
if ( subheader )
{
FT_Byte* p = subheader;
FT_UInt start = TT_NEXT_USHORT( p );
FT_UInt count = TT_NEXT_USHORT( p );
FT_Int delta = TT_NEXT_SHORT ( p );
FT_UInt offset = TT_PEEK_USHORT( p );
FT_UInt char_lo = (FT_UInt)( charcode & 0xFF );
FT_UInt pos, idx;
if ( offset == 0 )
goto Next_SubHeader;
if ( char_lo < start )
{
char_lo = start;
pos = 0;
}
else
pos = (FT_UInt)( char_lo - start );
p += offset + pos * 2;
charcode = FT_PAD_FLOOR( charcode, 256 ) + char_lo;
for ( ; pos < count; pos++, charcode++ )
{
idx = TT_NEXT_USHORT( p );
if ( idx != 0 )
{
gindex = (FT_UInt)( (FT_Int)idx + delta ) & 0xFFFFU;
if ( gindex != 0 )
{
result = charcode;
goto Exit;
}
}
}
}
/* jump to next sub-header, i.e. higher byte value */
Next_SubHeader:
charcode = FT_PAD_FLOOR( charcode, 256 ) + 256;
}
Exit:
*pcharcode = result;
return gindex;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 17,268 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline struct external_name *external_name(struct dentry *dentry)
{
return container_of(dentry->d_name.name, struct external_name, name[0]);
}
Commit Message: dentry name snapshots
take_dentry_name_snapshot() takes a safe snapshot of dentry name;
if the name is a short one, it gets copied into caller-supplied
structure, otherwise an extra reference to external name is grabbed
(those are never modified). In either case the pointer to stable
string is stored into the same structure.
dentry must be held by the caller of take_dentry_name_snapshot(),
but may be freely dropped afterwards - the snapshot will stay
until destroyed by release_dentry_name_snapshot().
Intended use:
struct name_snapshot s;
take_dentry_name_snapshot(&s, dentry);
...
access s.name
...
release_dentry_name_snapshot(&s);
Replaces fsnotify_oldname_...(), gets used in fsnotify to obtain the name
to pass down with event.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 67,352 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: scoped_refptr<const Extension> CreateExtensionWithPermissions(
std::unique_ptr<base::Value> permissions,
const std::string& name,
bool allow_file_access) {
int creation_flags = Extension::NO_FLAGS;
if (allow_file_access)
creation_flags |= Extension::ALLOW_FILE_ACCESS;
return ExtensionBuilder()
.SetLocation(Manifest::INTERNAL)
.SetManifest(DictionaryBuilder()
.Set("name", name)
.Set("description", "foo")
.Set("manifest_version", 2)
.Set("version", "0.1.2.3")
.Set("permissions", std::move(permissions))
.Build())
.AddFlags(creation_flags)
.SetID(crx_file::id_util::GenerateId(name))
.Build();
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Have URLPattern::Contains() properly check schemes
Have URLPattern::Contains() properly check the schemes of the patterns
when evaluating if one pattern contains another. This is important in
order to prevent extensions from requesting chrome:-scheme permissions
via the permissions API when <all_urls> is specified as an optional
permission.
Bug: 859600,918470
Change-Id: If04d945ad0c939e84a80d83502c0f84b6ef0923d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1396561
Commit-Queue: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Karan Bhatia <karandeepb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621410}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 153,447 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess) {
return ctx->new_session_cb;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 12,773 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ssl2_accept(SSL *s)
{
unsigned long l = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
BUF_MEM *buf = NULL;
int ret = -1;
long num1;
void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
int new_state, state;
RAND_add(&l, sizeof(l), 0);
ERR_clear_error();
clear_sys_error();
if (s->info_callback != NULL)
cb = s->info_callback;
else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
/* init things to blank */
s->in_handshake++;
if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))
SSL_clear(s);
if (s->cert == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_ACCEPT, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
return (-1);
}
clear_sys_error();
for (;;) {
state = s->state;
switch (s->state) {
case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
s->server = 1;
if (cb != NULL)
cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
s->version = SSL2_VERSION;
s->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
if (!BUF_MEM_grow
(buf, (int)SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER)) {
BUF_MEM_free(buf);
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
s->init_buf = buf;
}
s->init_num = 0;
s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
s->handshake_func = ssl2_accept;
s->state = SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_A;
BREAK;
case SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_A:
case SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_B:
case SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_C:
s->shutdown = 0;
ret = get_client_hello(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
s->init_num = 0;
s->state = SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_HELLO_A;
BREAK;
case SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_HELLO_A:
case SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_HELLO_B:
ret = server_hello(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
s->init_num = 0;
if (!s->hit) {
s->state = SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_A;
BREAK;
} else {
s->state = SSL2_ST_SERVER_START_ENCRYPTION;
BREAK;
}
case SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_A:
case SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_B:
ret = get_client_master_key(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
s->init_num = 0;
s->state = SSL2_ST_SERVER_START_ENCRYPTION;
BREAK;
case SSL2_ST_SERVER_START_ENCRYPTION:
/*
* Ok we how have sent all the stuff needed to start encrypting,
* the next packet back will be encrypted.
*/
if (!ssl2_enc_init(s, 0)) {
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
s->s2->clear_text = 0;
s->state = SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_VERIFY_A;
BREAK;
case SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_VERIFY_A:
case SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_VERIFY_B:
ret = server_verify(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
s->init_num = 0;
if (s->hit) {
/*
* If we are in here, we have been buffering the output, so
* we need to flush it and remove buffering from future
* traffic
*/
s->state = SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_VERIFY_C;
BREAK;
} else {
s->state = SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED_A;
break;
}
case SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_VERIFY_C:
/* get the number of bytes to write */
num1 = BIO_ctrl(s->wbio, BIO_CTRL_INFO, 0, NULL);
if (num1 > 0) {
s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
num1 = BIO_flush(s->wbio);
if (num1 <= 0) {
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
}
/* flushed and now remove buffering */
s->wbio = BIO_pop(s->wbio);
s->state = SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED_A;
BREAK;
case SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED_A:
case SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED_B:
ret = get_client_finished(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
s->init_num = 0;
s->state = SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_A;
BREAK;
case SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_A:
case SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_B:
case SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_C:
case SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_D:
/*
* don't do a 'request certificate' if we don't want to, or we
* already have one, and we only want to do it once.
*/
if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))) {
s->state = SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_FINISHED_A;
break;
} else {
ret = request_certificate(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
s->init_num = 0;
s->state = SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_FINISHED_A;
}
BREAK;
case SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_FINISHED_A:
case SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_FINISHED_B:
ret = server_finish(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
s->init_num = 0;
s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
break;
case SSL_ST_OK:
BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
s->init_buf = NULL;
s->init_num = 0;
/* ERR_clear_error(); */
ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
/* s->server=1; */
ret = 1;
if (cb != NULL)
cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
goto end;
/* BREAK; */
default:
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
ret = -1;
goto end;
/* BREAK; */
}
if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) {
new_state = s->state;
s->state = state;
cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1);
s->state = new_state;
}
}
end:
s->in_handshake--;
if (cb != NULL)
cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret);
return (ret);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 6,123 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void WriteAlphaData(
void *pixels, uint32 row_count, uint32 channel_count,
uint32 alpha_channel_index, uint32 unpadded_row_size,
uint32 padded_row_size, pixel_data_type alpha_value) {
DCHECK_GT(channel_count, 0U);
DCHECK_EQ(unpadded_row_size % sizeof(pixel_data_type), 0U);
uint32 unpadded_row_size_in_elements =
unpadded_row_size / sizeof(pixel_data_type);
DCHECK_EQ(padded_row_size % sizeof(pixel_data_type), 0U);
uint32 padded_row_size_in_elements =
padded_row_size / sizeof(pixel_data_type);
pixel_data_type* dst =
static_cast<pixel_data_type*>(pixels) + alpha_channel_index;
for (uint32 yy = 0; yy < row_count; ++yy) {
pixel_data_type* end = dst + unpadded_row_size_in_elements;
for (pixel_data_type* d = dst; d < end; d += channel_count) {
*d = alpha_value;
}
dst += padded_row_size_in_elements;
}
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 121,058 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool GDataDirectory::TakeEntry(GDataEntry* entry) {
DCHECK(entry);
DCHECK(entry->parent());
entry->parent()->RemoveChild(entry);
AddEntry(entry);
return true;
}
Commit Message: gdata: Define the resource ID for the root directory
Per the spec, the resource ID for the root directory is defined
as "folder:root". Add the resource ID to the root directory in our
file system representation so we can look up the root directory by
the resource ID.
BUG=127697
TEST=add unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332253
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137928 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,712 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int shutdown_vlan(struct lxc_handler *handler, struct lxc_netdev *netdev)
{
return 0;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 44,655 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void uipc_flush_locked(tUIPC_CH_ID ch_id)
{
if (ch_id >= UIPC_CH_NUM)
return;
switch(ch_id)
{
case UIPC_CH_ID_AV_CTRL:
uipc_flush_ch_locked(UIPC_CH_ID_AV_CTRL);
break;
case UIPC_CH_ID_AV_AUDIO:
uipc_flush_ch_locked(UIPC_CH_ID_AV_AUDIO);
break;
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 159,058 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
int ret = 0;
const int max = BN_num_bits(p) + 1;
int *arr = NULL;
bn_check_top(a);
bn_check_top(p);
if ((arr = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*arr) * max)) == NULL)
goto err;
ret = BN_GF2m_poly2arr(p, arr, max);
if (!ret || ret > max) {
BNerr(BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SQRT, BN_R_INVALID_LENGTH);
goto err;
}
ret = BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt_arr(r, a, arr, ctx);
bn_check_top(r);
err:
OPENSSL_free(arr);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: bn/bn_gf2m.c: avoid infinite loop wich malformed ECParamters.
CVE-2015-1788
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 44,265 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int add_dirent_to_buf(handle_t *handle, struct dentry *dentry,
struct inode *inode, struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de,
struct buffer_head *bh)
{
struct inode *dir = dentry->d_parent->d_inode;
const char *name = dentry->d_name.name;
int namelen = dentry->d_name.len;
unsigned int blocksize = dir->i_sb->s_blocksize;
unsigned short reclen;
int csum_size = 0;
int err;
if (EXT4_HAS_RO_COMPAT_FEATURE(inode->i_sb,
EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_METADATA_CSUM))
csum_size = sizeof(struct ext4_dir_entry_tail);
reclen = EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(namelen);
if (!de) {
err = ext4_find_dest_de(dir, inode,
bh, bh->b_data, blocksize - csum_size,
name, namelen, &de);
if (err)
return err;
}
BUFFER_TRACE(bh, "get_write_access");
err = ext4_journal_get_write_access(handle, bh);
if (err) {
ext4_std_error(dir->i_sb, err);
return err;
}
/* By now the buffer is marked for journaling */
ext4_insert_dentry(inode, de, blocksize, name, namelen);
/*
* XXX shouldn't update any times until successful
* completion of syscall, but too many callers depend
* on this.
*
* XXX similarly, too many callers depend on
* ext4_new_inode() setting the times, but error
* recovery deletes the inode, so the worst that can
* happen is that the times are slightly out of date
* and/or different from the directory change time.
*/
dir->i_mtime = dir->i_ctime = ext4_current_time(dir);
ext4_update_dx_flag(dir);
dir->i_version++;
ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, dir);
BUFFER_TRACE(bh, "call ext4_handle_dirty_metadata");
err = ext4_handle_dirty_dirent_node(handle, dir, bh);
if (err)
ext4_std_error(dir->i_sb, err);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ext4: avoid hang when mounting non-journal filesystems with orphan list
When trying to mount a file system which does not contain a journal,
but which does have a orphan list containing an inode which needs to
be truncated, the mount call with hang forever in
ext4_orphan_cleanup() because ext4_orphan_del() will return
immediately without removing the inode from the orphan list, leading
to an uninterruptible loop in kernel code which will busy out one of
the CPU's on the system.
This can be trivially reproduced by trying to mount the file system
found in tests/f_orphan_extents_inode/image.gz from the e2fsprogs
source tree. If a malicious user were to put this on a USB stick, and
mount it on a Linux desktop which has automatic mounts enabled, this
could be considered a potential denial of service attack. (Not a big
deal in practice, but professional paranoids worry about such things,
and have even been known to allocate CVE numbers for such problems.)
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Zheng Liu <wenqing.lz@taobao.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 32,240 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool InputEngine::IsImeSupportedByRulebased(const std::string& ime_spec) {
return rulebased::Engine::IsImeSupported(GetIdFromImeSpec(ime_spec));
}
Commit Message: ime-service: Delete InputEngine.ProcessText.
It is deprecated and no longer used.
Bug: 1009903
Change-Id: I6774a4506bd0bb41a5d1a5909a40a2a781564b16
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1833029
Auto-Submit: Darren Shen <shend@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Chris Palmer <palmer@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Keith Lee <keithlee@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Shu Chen <shuchen@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Darren Shen <shend@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#705445}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 137,589 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PrintingContextDelegate::~PrintingContextDelegate() {
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 135,607 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLMediaElement::mediaSourceOpened(WebMediaSource* webMediaSource) {
setShouldDelayLoadEvent(false);
m_mediaSource->setWebMediaSourceAndOpen(WTF::wrapUnique(webMediaSource));
}
Commit Message: [Blink>Media] Allow autoplay muted on Android by default
There was a mistake causing autoplay muted is shipped on Android
but it will be disabled if the chromium embedder doesn't specify
content setting for "AllowAutoplay" preference. This CL makes the
AllowAutoplay preference true by default so that it is allowed by
embedders (including AndroidWebView) unless they explicitly
disable it.
Intent to ship:
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/Q1cnzNI2GpI/AL_eyUNABgAJ
BUG=689018
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2677173002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#448423}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 128,847 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ConvertOfferOptionsToWebrtcOfferOptions(
const blink::WebRTCOfferOptions& options,
webrtc::PeerConnectionInterface::RTCOfferAnswerOptions* output) {
output->offer_to_receive_audio = options.OfferToReceiveAudio();
output->offer_to_receive_video = options.OfferToReceiveVideo();
output->voice_activity_detection = options.VoiceActivityDetection();
output->ice_restart = options.IceRestart();
}
Commit Message: Check weak pointers in RTCPeerConnectionHandler::WebRtcSetDescriptionObserverImpl
Bug: 912074
Change-Id: I8ba86751f5d5bf12db51520f985ef0d3dae63ed8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1411916
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <hbos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#622945}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 152,925 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void lsi_script_dma_interrupt(LSIState *s, int stat)
{
trace_lsi_script_dma_interrupt(stat, s->dstat);
s->dstat |= stat;
lsi_update_irq(s);
lsi_stop_script(s);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 3,697 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void rfcomm_dev_state_change(struct rfcomm_dlc *dlc, int err)
{
struct rfcomm_dev *dev = dlc->owner;
if (!dev)
return;
BT_DBG("dlc %p dev %p err %d", dlc, dev, err);
dev->err = err;
wake_up_interruptible(&dev->wait);
if (dlc->state == BT_CLOSED) {
if (!dev->port.tty) {
if (test_bit(RFCOMM_RELEASE_ONHUP, &dev->flags)) {
/* Drop DLC lock here to avoid deadlock
* 1. rfcomm_dev_get will take rfcomm_dev_lock
* but in rfcomm_dev_add there's lock order:
* rfcomm_dev_lock -> dlc lock
* 2. tty_port_put will deadlock if it's
* the last reference
*/
rfcomm_dlc_unlock(dlc);
if (rfcomm_dev_get(dev->id) == NULL) {
rfcomm_dlc_lock(dlc);
return;
}
rfcomm_dev_del(dev);
tty_port_put(&dev->port);
rfcomm_dlc_lock(dlc);
}
} else
tty_hangup(dev->port.tty);
}
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: RFCOMM - Fix info leak in ioctl(RFCOMMGETDEVLIST)
The RFCOMM code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of struct
rfcomm_dev_list_req inserted for alignment before copying it to
userland. Additionally there are two padding bytes in each instance of
struct rfcomm_dev_info. The ioctl() that for disclosures two bytes plus
dev_num times two bytes uninitialized kernel heap memory.
Allocate the memory using kzalloc() to fix this issue.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 94,485 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool rt_bind_exception(struct rtable *rt, struct fib_nh_exception *fnhe,
__be32 daddr)
{
bool ret = false;
spin_lock_bh(&fnhe_lock);
if (daddr == fnhe->fnhe_daddr) {
struct rtable __rcu **porig;
struct rtable *orig;
int genid = fnhe_genid(dev_net(rt->dst.dev));
if (rt_is_input_route(rt))
porig = &fnhe->fnhe_rth_input;
else
porig = &fnhe->fnhe_rth_output;
orig = rcu_dereference(*porig);
if (fnhe->fnhe_genid != genid) {
fnhe->fnhe_genid = genid;
fnhe->fnhe_gw = 0;
fnhe->fnhe_pmtu = 0;
fnhe->fnhe_expires = 0;
fnhe_flush_routes(fnhe);
orig = NULL;
}
fill_route_from_fnhe(rt, fnhe);
if (!rt->rt_gateway)
rt->rt_gateway = daddr;
if (!(rt->dst.flags & DST_NOCACHE)) {
rcu_assign_pointer(*porig, rt);
if (orig)
rt_free(orig);
ret = true;
}
fnhe->fnhe_stamp = jiffies;
}
spin_unlock_bh(&fnhe_lock);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ipv4: try to cache dst_entries which would cause a redirect
Not caching dst_entries which cause redirects could be exploited by hosts
on the same subnet, causing a severe DoS attack. This effect aggravated
since commit f88649721268999 ("ipv4: fix dst race in sk_dst_get()").
Lookups causing redirects will be allocated with DST_NOCACHE set which
will force dst_release to free them via RCU. Unfortunately waiting for
RCU grace period just takes too long, we can end up with >1M dst_entries
waiting to be released and the system will run OOM. rcuos threads cannot
catch up under high softirq load.
Attaching the flag to emit a redirect later on to the specific skb allows
us to cache those dst_entries thus reducing the pressure on allocation
and deallocation.
This issue was discovered by Marcelo Leitner.
Cc: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 44,355 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: media_status_t AMediaCodec_setAsyncNotifyCallback(
AMediaCodec *mData,
AMediaCodecOnAsyncNotifyCallback callback,
void *userdata) {
if (mData->mAsyncNotify == NULL && userdata != NULL) {
mData->mAsyncNotify = new AMessage(kWhatAsyncNotify, mData->mHandler);
status_t err = mData->mCodec->setCallback(mData->mAsyncNotify);
if (err != OK) {
ALOGE("setAsyncNotifyCallback: err(%d), failed to set async callback", err);
return translate_error(err);
}
}
Mutex::Autolock _l(mData->mAsyncCallbackLock);
mData->mAsyncCallback = callback;
mData->mAsyncCallbackUserData = userdata;
return AMEDIA_OK;
}
Commit Message: Check for overflow of crypto size
Bug: 111603051
Test: CTS
Change-Id: Ib5b1802b9b35769a25c16e2b977308cf7a810606
(cherry picked from commit d1fd02761236b35a336434367131f71bef7405c9)
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 163,007 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pushval_asis(QPRS_STATE *state, int type, char *strval, int lenval, uint16 flag)
{
if (lenval > 0xffff)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
errmsg("word is too long")));
pushquery(state, type, ltree_crc32_sz(strval, lenval),
state->curop - state->op, lenval, flag);
while (state->curop - state->op + lenval + 1 >= state->lenop)
{
int32 tmp = state->curop - state->op;
state->lenop *= 2;
state->op = (char *) repalloc((void *) state->op, state->lenop);
state->curop = state->op + tmp;
}
memcpy((void *) state->curop, (void *) strval, lenval);
state->curop += lenval;
*(state->curop) = '\0';
state->curop++;
state->sumlen += lenval + 1;
return;
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 38,790 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> overloadedMethodCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.overloadedMethod");
if ((args.Length() == 2 && (args[0]->IsNull() || V8TestObj::HasInstance(args[0])) && (args[1]->IsNull() || args[1]->IsUndefined() || args[1]->IsString() || args[1]->IsObject())))
return overloadedMethod1Callback(args);
if ((args.Length() == 1 && (args[0]->IsNull() || V8TestObj::HasInstance(args[0]))) || (args.Length() == 2 && (args[0]->IsNull() || V8TestObj::HasInstance(args[0]))))
return overloadedMethod2Callback(args);
if ((args.Length() == 1 && (args[0]->IsNull() || args[0]->IsUndefined() || args[0]->IsString() || args[0]->IsObject())))
return overloadedMethod3Callback(args);
if (args.Length() == 1)
return overloadedMethod4Callback(args);
if ((args.Length() == 1 && (args[0]->IsNull() || args[0]->IsFunction())))
return overloadedMethod5Callback(args);
if ((args.Length() == 1 && (args[0]->IsNull() || V8DOMStringList::HasInstance(args[0]))))
return overloadedMethod6Callback(args);
if ((args.Length() == 1 && (args[0]->IsNull() || args[0]->IsArray())))
return overloadedMethod7Callback(args);
V8Proxy::throwTypeError();
return notHandledByInterceptor();
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 109,587 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool __munlock_isolate_lru_page(struct page *page, bool getpage)
{
if (PageLRU(page)) {
struct lruvec *lruvec;
lruvec = mem_cgroup_page_lruvec(page, page_pgdat(page));
if (getpage)
get_page(page);
ClearPageLRU(page);
del_page_from_lru_list(page, lruvec, page_lru(page));
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: mlock: fix mlock count can not decrease in race condition
Kefeng reported that when running the follow test, the mlock count in
meminfo will increase permanently:
[1] testcase
linux:~ # cat test_mlockal
grep Mlocked /proc/meminfo
for j in `seq 0 10`
do
for i in `seq 4 15`
do
./p_mlockall >> log &
done
sleep 0.2
done
# wait some time to let mlock counter decrease and 5s may not enough
sleep 5
grep Mlocked /proc/meminfo
linux:~ # cat p_mlockall.c
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#define SPACE_LEN 4096
int main(int argc, char ** argv)
{
int ret;
void *adr = malloc(SPACE_LEN);
if (!adr)
return -1;
ret = mlockall(MCL_CURRENT | MCL_FUTURE);
printf("mlcokall ret = %d\n", ret);
ret = munlockall();
printf("munlcokall ret = %d\n", ret);
free(adr);
return 0;
}
In __munlock_pagevec() we should decrement NR_MLOCK for each page where
we clear the PageMlocked flag. Commit 1ebb7cc6a583 ("mm: munlock: batch
NR_MLOCK zone state updates") has introduced a bug where we don't
decrement NR_MLOCK for pages where we clear the flag, but fail to
isolate them from the lru list (e.g. when the pages are on some other
cpu's percpu pagevec). Since PageMlocked stays cleared, the NR_MLOCK
accounting gets permanently disrupted by this.
Fix it by counting the number of page whose PageMlock flag is cleared.
Fixes: 1ebb7cc6a583 (" mm: munlock: batch NR_MLOCK zone state updates")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1495678405-54569-1-git-send-email-xieyisheng1@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Yisheng Xie <xieyisheng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Joern Engel <joern@logfs.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: Xishi Qiu <qiuxishi@huawei.com>
Cc: zhongjiang <zhongjiang@huawei.com>
Cc: Hanjun Guo <guohanjun@huawei.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 85,656 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: XineramaXvPutImage(ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xvPutImageReq);
PanoramiXRes *draw, *gc, *port;
Bool isRoot;
int result, i, x, y;
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xvPutImageReq);
result = dixLookupResourceByClass((void **) &draw, stuff->drawable,
XRC_DRAWABLE, client, DixWriteAccess);
if (result != Success)
return (result == BadValue) ? BadDrawable : result;
result = dixLookupResourceByType((void **) &gc, stuff->gc,
XRT_GC, client, DixReadAccess);
if (result != Success)
return result;
result = dixLookupResourceByType((void **) &port, stuff->port,
XvXRTPort, client, DixReadAccess);
if (result != Success)
return result;
isRoot = (draw->type == XRT_WINDOW) && draw->u.win.root;
x = stuff->drw_x;
y = stuff->drw_y;
FOR_NSCREENS_BACKWARD(i) {
if (port->info[i].id) {
stuff->drawable = draw->info[i].id;
stuff->port = port->info[i].id;
stuff->gc = gc->info[i].id;
stuff->drw_x = x;
stuff->drw_y = y;
if (isRoot) {
stuff->drw_x -= screenInfo.screens[i]->x;
stuff->drw_y -= screenInfo.screens[i]->y;
}
result = ProcXvPutImage(client);
}
}
return result;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,514 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PanoramiXRenderCreateSolidFill (ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xRenderCreateSolidFillReq);
PanoramiXRes *newPict;
int result = Success, j;
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRenderCreateSolidFillReq);
if(!(newPict = (PanoramiXRes *) malloc(sizeof(PanoramiXRes))))
return BadAlloc;
newPict->type = XRT_PICTURE;
newPict->info[0].id = stuff->pid;
newPict->u.pict.root = FALSE;
for(j = 1; j < PanoramiXNumScreens; j++)
newPict->info[j].id = FakeClientID(client->index);
FOR_NSCREENS_BACKWARD(j) {
stuff->pid = newPict->info[j].id;
result = (*PanoramiXSaveRenderVector[X_RenderCreateSolidFill]) (client);
if(result != Success) break;
}
if (result == Success)
AddResource(newPict->info[0].id, XRT_PICTURE, newPict);
else
free(newPict);
return result;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 14,039 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AppendExtraRendererCommandLineSwitches(base::CommandLine* command_line,
content::RenderProcessHost* process,
Profile* profile) {
if (!process)
return;
DCHECK(profile);
if (ProcessMap::Get(profile)->Contains(process->GetID())) {
command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kExtensionProcess);
}
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Update navigations across hypothetical extension extents
Update code to treat navigations across hypothetical extension extents
(e.g. for nonexistent extensions) the same as we do for navigations
crossing installed extension extents.
Bug: 598265
Change-Id: Ibdf2f563ce1fd108ead279077901020a24de732b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/617180
Commit-Queue: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#495779}
CWE ID: | 0 | 150,990 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Address NormalPageArena::outOfLineAllocate(size_t allocationSize,
size_t gcInfoIndex) {
ASSERT(allocationSize > remainingAllocationSize());
ASSERT(allocationSize >= allocationGranularity);
if (allocationSize >= largeObjectSizeThreshold)
return allocateLargeObject(allocationSize, gcInfoIndex);
updateRemainingAllocationSize();
Address result = allocateFromFreeList(allocationSize, gcInfoIndex);
if (result)
return result;
setAllocationPoint(nullptr, 0);
result = lazySweep(allocationSize, gcInfoIndex);
if (result)
return result;
if (coalesce()) {
result = allocateFromFreeList(allocationSize, gcInfoIndex);
if (result)
return result;
}
getThreadState()->completeSweep();
getThreadState()->scheduleGCIfNeeded();
allocatePage();
result = allocateFromFreeList(allocationSize, gcInfoIndex);
RELEASE_ASSERT(result);
return result;
}
Commit Message: Call HeapObjectHeader::checkHeader solely for its side-effect.
This requires changing its signature. This is a preliminary stage to making it
private.
BUG=633030
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2698673003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#460489}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 147,576 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sctp_v4_available(union sctp_addr *addr, struct sctp_sock *sp)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(&sp->inet.sk);
int ret = inet_addr_type(net, addr->v4.sin_addr.s_addr);
if (addr->v4.sin_addr.s_addr != htonl(INADDR_ANY) &&
ret != RTN_LOCAL &&
!sp->inet.freebind &&
!net->ipv4.sysctl_ip_nonlocal_bind)
return 0;
if (ipv6_only_sock(sctp_opt2sk(sp)))
return 0;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: sctp: fix race on protocol/netns initialization
Consider sctp module is unloaded and is being requested because an user
is creating a sctp socket.
During initialization, sctp will add the new protocol type and then
initialize pernet subsys:
status = sctp_v4_protosw_init();
if (status)
goto err_protosw_init;
status = sctp_v6_protosw_init();
if (status)
goto err_v6_protosw_init;
status = register_pernet_subsys(&sctp_net_ops);
The problem is that after those calls to sctp_v{4,6}_protosw_init(), it
is possible for userspace to create SCTP sockets like if the module is
already fully loaded. If that happens, one of the possible effects is
that we will have readers for net->sctp.local_addr_list list earlier
than expected and sctp_net_init() does not take precautions while
dealing with that list, leading to a potential panic but not limited to
that, as sctp_sock_init() will copy a bunch of blank/partially
initialized values from net->sctp.
The race happens like this:
CPU 0 | CPU 1
socket() |
__sock_create | socket()
inet_create | __sock_create
list_for_each_entry_rcu( |
answer, &inetsw[sock->type], |
list) { | inet_create
/* no hits */ |
if (unlikely(err)) { |
... |
request_module() |
/* socket creation is blocked |
* the module is fully loaded |
*/ |
sctp_init |
sctp_v4_protosw_init |
inet_register_protosw |
list_add_rcu(&p->list, |
last_perm); |
| list_for_each_entry_rcu(
| answer, &inetsw[sock->type],
sctp_v6_protosw_init | list) {
| /* hit, so assumes protocol
| * is already loaded
| */
| /* socket creation continues
| * before netns is initialized
| */
register_pernet_subsys |
Simply inverting the initialization order between
register_pernet_subsys() and sctp_v4_protosw_init() is not possible
because register_pernet_subsys() will create a control sctp socket, so
the protocol must be already visible by then. Deferring the socket
creation to a work-queue is not good specially because we loose the
ability to handle its errors.
So, as suggested by Vlad, the fix is to split netns initialization in
two moments: defaults and control socket, so that the defaults are
already loaded by when we register the protocol, while control socket
initialization is kept at the same moment it is today.
Fixes: 4db67e808640 ("sctp: Make the address lists per network namespace")
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 42,929 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OJPEGLibjpegJpegErrorMgrOutputMessage(jpeg_common_struct* cinfo)
{
char buffer[JMSG_LENGTH_MAX];
(*cinfo->err->format_message)(cinfo,buffer);
TIFFWarningExt(((TIFF*)(cinfo->client_data))->tif_clientdata,"LibJpeg","%s",buffer);
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_ojpeg.c: make OJPEGDecode() early exit in case of failure in
OJPEGPreDecode(). This will avoid a divide by zero, and potential other issues.
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2611
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 70,277 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ftrace_graph_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
seq_release(inode, file);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: tracing: Fix possible NULL pointer dereferences
Currently set_ftrace_pid and set_graph_function files use seq_lseek
for their fops. However seq_open() is called only for FMODE_READ in
the fops->open() so that if an user tries to seek one of those file
when she open it for writing, it sees NULL seq_file and then panic.
It can be easily reproduced with following command:
$ cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
$ echo 1234 | sudo tee -a set_ftrace_pid
In this example, GNU coreutils' tee opens the file with fopen(, "a")
and then the fopen() internally calls lseek().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365663302-2170-1-git-send-email-namhyung@kernel.org
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung.kim@lge.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 30,157 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Com_AppendCDKey( const char *filename ) {
fileHandle_t f;
char buffer[33];
char fbuffer[MAX_OSPATH];
Com_sprintf(fbuffer, sizeof(fbuffer), "%s/q3key", filename);
FS_SV_FOpenFileRead( fbuffer, &f );
if (!f) {
Q_strncpyz( &cl_cdkey[16], " ", 17 );
return;
}
Com_Memset( buffer, 0, sizeof(buffer) );
FS_Read( buffer, 16, f );
FS_FCloseFile( f );
if (CL_CDKeyValidate(buffer, NULL)) {
strcat( &cl_cdkey[16], buffer );
} else {
Q_strncpyz( &cl_cdkey[16], " ", 17 );
}
}
Commit Message: Merge some file writing extension checks from OpenJK.
Thanks Ensiform.
https://github.com/JACoders/OpenJK/commit/05928a57f9e4aae15a3bd0
https://github.com/JACoders/OpenJK/commit/ef124fd0fc48af164581176
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 95,443 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int vfs_path_lookup(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
const char *name, unsigned int flags,
struct path *path)
{
struct filename *filename = getname_kernel(name);
int err = PTR_ERR(filename);
BUG_ON(flags & LOOKUP_PARENT);
/* the first argument of filename_lookup() is ignored with LOOKUP_ROOT */
if (!IS_ERR(filename)) {
struct nameidata nd;
nd.root.dentry = dentry;
nd.root.mnt = mnt;
err = filename_lookup(AT_FDCWD, filename,
flags | LOOKUP_ROOT, &nd);
if (!err)
*path = nd.path;
putname(filename);
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: path_openat(): fix double fput()
path_openat() jumps to the wrong place after do_tmpfile() - it has
already done path_cleanup() (as part of path_lookupat() called by
do_tmpfile()), so doing that again can lead to double fput().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.11+
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: | 0 | 42,347 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: check_cell_width(short *tabwidth, short *cellwidth,
short *col, short *colspan, short maxcell,
short *indexarray, int space, int dir)
{
int i, j, k, bcol, ecol;
int swidth, width;
for (k = 0; k <= maxcell; k++) {
j = indexarray[k];
if (cellwidth[j] <= 0)
continue;
bcol = col[j];
ecol = bcol + colspan[j];
swidth = 0;
for (i = bcol; i < ecol; i++)
swidth += tabwidth[i];
width = cellwidth[j] - (colspan[j] - 1) * space;
if (width > swidth) {
int w = (width - swidth) / colspan[j];
int r = (width - swidth) % colspan[j];
for (i = bcol; i < ecol; i++)
tabwidth[i] += w;
/* dir {0: horizontal, 1: vertical} */
if (dir == 1 && r > 0)
r = colspan[j];
for (i = 1; i <= r; i++)
tabwidth[ecol - i]++;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Prevent negative indent value in feed_table_block_tag()
Bug-Debian: https://github.com/tats/w3m/issues/88
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 84,604 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int fsck_object(struct object *obj, void *data, unsigned long size,
struct fsck_options *options)
{
if (!obj)
return report(options, obj, FSCK_MSG_BAD_OBJECT_SHA1, "no valid object to fsck");
if (obj->type == OBJ_BLOB)
return fsck_blob((struct blob *)obj, data, size, options);
if (obj->type == OBJ_TREE)
return fsck_tree((struct tree *) obj, options);
if (obj->type == OBJ_COMMIT)
return fsck_commit((struct commit *) obj, (const char *) data,
size, options);
if (obj->type == OBJ_TAG)
return fsck_tag((struct tag *) obj, (const char *) data,
size, options);
return report(options, obj, FSCK_MSG_UNKNOWN_TYPE, "unknown type '%d' (internal fsck error)",
obj->type);
}
Commit Message: fsck: detect submodule urls starting with dash
Urls with leading dashes can cause mischief on older
versions of Git. We should detect them so that they can be
rejected by receive.fsckObjects, preventing modern versions
of git from being a vector by which attacks can spread.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 76,608 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RecordInterventionUserDecision(bool accepted) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN("Memory.Experimental.OomIntervention.UserDecision",
accepted);
}
Commit Message: OomIntervention opt-out should work properly with 'show original'
OomIntervention should not be re-triggered on the same page if the user declines the intervention once.
This CL fixes the bug.
Bug: 889131, 887119
Change-Id: Idb9eebb2bb9f79756b63f0e010fe018ba5c490e8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1245019
Commit-Queue: Yuzu Saijo <yuzus@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#594574}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 130,897 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType SkipRGBMipmaps(Image *image,DDSInfo *dds_info,
int pixel_size,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
MagickOffsetType
offset;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
h,
w;
/*
Only skip mipmaps for textures and cube maps
*/
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
return(MagickFalse);
}
if (dds_info->ddscaps1 & DDSCAPS_MIPMAP
&& (dds_info->ddscaps1 & DDSCAPS_TEXTURE
|| dds_info->ddscaps2 & DDSCAPS2_CUBEMAP))
{
w = DIV2(dds_info->width);
h = DIV2(dds_info->height);
/*
Mipmapcount includes the main image, so start from one
*/
for (i=1; (i < (ssize_t) dds_info->mipmapcount) && w && h; i++)
{
offset = (MagickOffsetType) w * h * pixel_size;
if (SeekBlob(image,offset,SEEK_CUR) < 0)
break;
w = DIV2(w);
h = DIV2(h);
}
}
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message: Added check to prevent image being 0x0 (reported in #489).
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 65,111 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool hns_nic_rx_fini_pro(struct hns_nic_ring_data *ring_data)
{
struct hnae_ring *ring = ring_data->ring;
int num = 0;
ring_data->ring->q->handle->dev->ops->toggle_ring_irq(ring, 0);
/* for hardware bug fixed */
num = readl_relaxed(ring->io_base + RCB_REG_FBDNUM);
if (num > 0) {
ring_data->ring->q->handle->dev->ops->toggle_ring_irq(
ring_data->ring, 1);
return false;
} else {
return true;
}
}
Commit Message: net: hns: Fix a skb used after free bug
skb maybe freed in hns_nic_net_xmit_hw() and return NETDEV_TX_OK,
which cause hns_nic_net_xmit to use a freed skb.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hns_nic_net_xmit_hw+0x62c/0x940...
[17659.112635] alloc_debug_processing+0x18c/0x1a0
[17659.117208] __slab_alloc+0x52c/0x560
[17659.120909] kmem_cache_alloc_node+0xac/0x2c0
[17659.125309] __alloc_skb+0x6c/0x260
[17659.128837] tcp_send_ack+0x8c/0x280
[17659.132449] __tcp_ack_snd_check+0x9c/0xf0
[17659.136587] tcp_rcv_established+0x5a4/0xa70
[17659.140899] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x27c/0x620
[17659.144687] tcp_prequeue_process+0x108/0x170
[17659.149085] tcp_recvmsg+0x940/0x1020
[17659.152787] inet_recvmsg+0x124/0x180
[17659.156488] sock_recvmsg+0x64/0x80
[17659.160012] SyS_recvfrom+0xd8/0x180
[17659.163626] __sys_trace_return+0x0/0x4
[17659.167506] INFO: Freed in kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0 age=23 cpu=1 pid=13
[17659.174000] free_debug_processing+0x1d4/0x2c0
[17659.178486] __slab_free+0x240/0x390
[17659.182100] kmem_cache_free+0x24c/0x270
[17659.186062] kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0
[17659.189587] __kfree_skb+0x28/0x40
[17659.193025] napi_gro_receive+0x168/0x1c0
[17659.197074] hns_nic_rx_up_pro+0x58/0x90
[17659.201038] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x518/0xbc0
[17659.205352] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17659.209576] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17659.213363] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17659.217062] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17659.220679] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17659.224821] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17659.228084] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hns_nic_net_xmit+0x8c/0xc0...
[17751.080490] __slab_alloc+0x52c/0x560
[17751.084188] kmem_cache_alloc+0x244/0x280
[17751.088238] __build_skb+0x40/0x150
[17751.091764] build_skb+0x28/0x100
[17751.095115] __alloc_rx_skb+0x94/0x150
[17751.098900] __napi_alloc_skb+0x34/0x90
[17751.102776] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x180/0xbc0
[17751.107097] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17751.111333] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17751.115123] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17751.118823] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17751.122437] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17751.126575] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17751.129838] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
[17751.133454] INFO: Freed in kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0 age=19 cpu=7 pid=43
[17751.139951] free_debug_processing+0x1d4/0x2c0
[17751.144436] __slab_free+0x240/0x390
[17751.148051] kmem_cache_free+0x24c/0x270
[17751.152014] kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0
[17751.155543] __kfree_skb+0x28/0x40
[17751.159022] napi_gro_receive+0x168/0x1c0
[17751.163074] hns_nic_rx_up_pro+0x58/0x90
[17751.167041] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x518/0xbc0
[17751.171358] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17751.175585] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17751.179373] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17751.183076] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17751.186691] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17751.190826] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17751.194093] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
Fixes: 13ac695e7ea1 ("net:hns: Add support of Hip06 SoC to the Hislicon Network Subsystem")
Signed-off-by: Yunsheng Lin <linyunsheng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: lipeng <lipeng321@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Jun He <hjat2005@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 85,711 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderView::AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped(
gfx::PluginWindowHandle window, uint64 surface_id) {
Send(new ViewHostMsg_AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped(
routing_id(), window, surface_id));
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,894 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: copy_entries_to_user(unsigned int total_size,
const struct xt_table *table,
void __user *userptr)
{
unsigned int off, num;
const struct ip6t_entry *e;
struct xt_counters *counters;
const struct xt_table_info *private = table->private;
int ret = 0;
const void *loc_cpu_entry;
counters = alloc_counters(table);
if (IS_ERR(counters))
return PTR_ERR(counters);
loc_cpu_entry = private->entries;
/* FIXME: use iterator macros --RR */
/* ... then go back and fix counters and names */
for (off = 0, num = 0; off < total_size; off += e->next_offset, num++){
unsigned int i;
const struct xt_entry_match *m;
const struct xt_entry_target *t;
e = loc_cpu_entry + off;
if (copy_to_user(userptr + off, e, sizeof(*e))) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto free_counters;
}
if (copy_to_user(userptr + off
+ offsetof(struct ip6t_entry, counters),
&counters[num],
sizeof(counters[num])) != 0) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto free_counters;
}
for (i = sizeof(struct ip6t_entry);
i < e->target_offset;
i += m->u.match_size) {
m = (void *)e + i;
if (xt_match_to_user(m, userptr + off + i)) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto free_counters;
}
}
t = ip6t_get_target_c(e);
if (xt_target_to_user(t, userptr + off + e->target_offset)) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto free_counters;
}
}
free_counters:
vfree(counters);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: add back stackpointer size checks
The rationale for removing the check is only correct for rulesets
generated by ip(6)tables.
In iptables, a jump can only occur to a user-defined chain, i.e.
because we size the stack based on number of user-defined chains we
cannot exceed stack size.
However, the underlying binary format has no such restriction,
and the validation step only ensures that the jump target is a
valid rule start point.
IOW, its possible to build a rule blob that has no user-defined
chains but does contain a jump.
If this happens, no jump stack gets allocated and crash occurs
because no jumpstack was allocated.
Fixes: 7814b6ec6d0d6 ("netfilter: xtables: don't save/restore jumpstack offset")
Reported-by: syzbot+e783f671527912cd9403@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 85,020 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: alt_merge_node_opt_info(OptNode* to, OptNode* add, OptEnv* env)
{
alt_merge_opt_anc_info(&to->anc, &add->anc);
alt_merge_opt_exact(&to->sb, &add->sb, env);
alt_merge_opt_exact(&to->sm, &add->sm, env);
alt_merge_opt_exact(&to->spr, &add->spr, env);
alt_merge_opt_map(env->enc, &to->map, &add->map);
alt_merge_mml(&to->len, &add->len);
}
Commit Message: Fix CVE-2019-13225: problem in converting if-then-else pattern to bytecode.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 89,106 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void hub_irq(struct urb *urb)
{
struct usb_hub *hub = urb->context;
int status = urb->status;
unsigned i;
unsigned long bits;
switch (status) {
case -ENOENT: /* synchronous unlink */
case -ECONNRESET: /* async unlink */
case -ESHUTDOWN: /* hardware going away */
return;
default: /* presumably an error */
/* Cause a hub reset after 10 consecutive errors */
dev_dbg(hub->intfdev, "transfer --> %d\n", status);
if ((++hub->nerrors < 10) || hub->error)
goto resubmit;
hub->error = status;
/* FALL THROUGH */
/* let hub_wq handle things */
case 0: /* we got data: port status changed */
bits = 0;
for (i = 0; i < urb->actual_length; ++i)
bits |= ((unsigned long) ((*hub->buffer)[i]))
<< (i*8);
hub->event_bits[0] = bits;
break;
}
hub->nerrors = 0;
/* Something happened, let hub_wq figure it out */
kick_hub_wq(hub);
resubmit:
if (hub->quiescing)
return;
status = usb_submit_urb(hub->urb, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (status != 0 && status != -ENODEV && status != -EPERM)
dev_err(hub->intfdev, "resubmit --> %d\n", status);
}
Commit Message: USB: fix invalid memory access in hub_activate()
Commit 8520f38099cc ("USB: change hub initialization sleeps to
delayed_work") changed the hub_activate() routine to make part of it
run in a workqueue. However, the commit failed to take a reference to
the usb_hub structure or to lock the hub interface while doing so. As
a result, if a hub is plugged in and quickly unplugged before the work
routine can run, the routine will try to access memory that has been
deallocated. Or, if the hub is unplugged while the routine is
running, the memory may be deallocated while it is in active use.
This patch fixes the problem by taking a reference to the usb_hub at
the start of hub_activate() and releasing it at the end (when the work
is finished), and by locking the hub interface while the work routine
is running. It also adds a check at the start of the routine to see
if the hub has already been disconnected, in which nothing should be
done.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Reported-by: Alexandru Cornea <alexandru.cornea@intel.com>
Tested-by: Alexandru Cornea <alexandru.cornea@intel.com>
Fixes: 8520f38099cc ("USB: change hub initialization sleeps to delayed_work")
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 56,751 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int security_bounded_transition(u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
{
struct context *old_context, *new_context;
struct type_datum *type;
int index;
int rc;
read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
rc = -EINVAL;
old_context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, old_sid);
if (!old_context) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %u\n",
__func__, old_sid);
goto out;
}
rc = -EINVAL;
new_context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, new_sid);
if (!new_context) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %u\n",
__func__, new_sid);
goto out;
}
rc = 0;
/* type/domain unchanged */
if (old_context->type == new_context->type)
goto out;
index = new_context->type;
while (true) {
type = flex_array_get_ptr(policydb.type_val_to_struct_array,
index - 1);
BUG_ON(!type);
/* not bounded anymore */
rc = -EPERM;
if (!type->bounds)
break;
/* @newsid is bounded by @oldsid */
rc = 0;
if (type->bounds == old_context->type)
break;
index = type->bounds;
}
if (rc) {
char *old_name = NULL;
char *new_name = NULL;
u32 length;
if (!context_struct_to_string(old_context,
&old_name, &length) &&
!context_struct_to_string(new_context,
&new_name, &length)) {
audit_log(current->audit_context,
GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
"op=security_bounded_transition "
"result=denied "
"oldcontext=%s newcontext=%s",
old_name, new_name);
}
kfree(new_name);
kfree(old_name);
}
out:
read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: SELinux: Fix kernel BUG on empty security contexts.
Setting an empty security context (length=0) on a file will
lead to incorrectly dereferencing the type and other fields
of the security context structure, yielding a kernel BUG.
As a zero-length security context is never valid, just reject
all such security contexts whether coming from userspace
via setxattr or coming from the filesystem upon a getxattr
request by SELinux.
Setting a security context value (empty or otherwise) unknown to
SELinux in the first place is only possible for a root process
(CAP_MAC_ADMIN), and, if running SELinux in enforcing mode, only
if the corresponding SELinux mac_admin permission is also granted
to the domain by policy. In Fedora policies, this is only allowed for
specific domains such as livecd for setting down security contexts
that are not defined in the build host policy.
Reproducer:
su
setenforce 0
touch foo
setfattr -n security.selinux foo
Caveat:
Relabeling or removing foo after doing the above may not be possible
without booting with SELinux disabled. Any subsequent access to foo
after doing the above will also trigger the BUG.
BUG output from Matthew Thode:
[ 473.893141] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 473.962110] kernel BUG at security/selinux/ss/services.c:654!
[ 473.995314] invalid opcode: 0000 [#6] SMP
[ 474.027196] Modules linked in:
[ 474.058118] CPU: 0 PID: 8138 Comm: ls Tainted: G D I
3.13.0-grsec #1
[ 474.116637] Hardware name: Supermicro X8ST3/X8ST3, BIOS 2.0
07/29/10
[ 474.149768] task: ffff8805f50cd010 ti: ffff8805f50cd488 task.ti:
ffff8805f50cd488
[ 474.183707] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff814681c7>] [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 474.219954] RSP: 0018:ffff8805c0ac3c38 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 474.252253] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8805c0ac3d94 RCX:
0000000000000100
[ 474.287018] RDX: ffff8805e8aac000 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI:
ffff8805e8aaa000
[ 474.321199] RBP: ffff8805c0ac3cb8 R08: 0000000000000010 R09:
0000000000000006
[ 474.357446] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8805c567a000 R12:
0000000000000006
[ 474.419191] R13: ffff8805c2b74e88 R14: 00000000000001da R15:
0000000000000000
[ 474.453816] FS: 00007f2e75220800(0000) GS:ffff88061fc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 474.489254] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 474.522215] CR2: 00007f2e74716090 CR3: 00000005c085e000 CR4:
00000000000207f0
[ 474.556058] Stack:
[ 474.584325] ffff8805c0ac3c98 ffffffff811b549b ffff8805c0ac3c98
ffff8805f1190a40
[ 474.618913] ffff8805a6202f08 ffff8805c2b74e88 00068800d0464990
ffff8805e8aac860
[ 474.653955] ffff8805c0ac3cb8 000700068113833a ffff880606c75060
ffff8805c0ac3d94
[ 474.690461] Call Trace:
[ 474.723779] [<ffffffff811b549b>] ? lookup_fast+0x1cd/0x22a
[ 474.778049] [<ffffffff81468824>] security_compute_av+0xf4/0x20b
[ 474.811398] [<ffffffff8196f419>] avc_compute_av+0x2a/0x179
[ 474.843813] [<ffffffff8145727b>] avc_has_perm+0x45/0xf4
[ 474.875694] [<ffffffff81457d0e>] inode_has_perm+0x2a/0x31
[ 474.907370] [<ffffffff81457e76>] selinux_inode_getattr+0x3c/0x3e
[ 474.938726] [<ffffffff81455cf6>] security_inode_getattr+0x1b/0x22
[ 474.970036] [<ffffffff811b057d>] vfs_getattr+0x19/0x2d
[ 475.000618] [<ffffffff811b05e5>] vfs_fstatat+0x54/0x91
[ 475.030402] [<ffffffff811b063b>] vfs_lstat+0x19/0x1b
[ 475.061097] [<ffffffff811b077e>] SyS_newlstat+0x15/0x30
[ 475.094595] [<ffffffff8113c5c1>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xa1/0xc3
[ 475.148405] [<ffffffff8197791e>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[ 475.179201] Code: 00 48 85 c0 48 89 45 b8 75 02 0f 0b 48 8b 45 a0 48
8b 3d 45 d0 b6 00 8b 40 08 89 c6 ff ce e8 d1 b0 06 00 48 85 c0 49 89 c7
75 02 <0f> 0b 48 8b 45 b8 4c 8b 28 eb 1e 49 8d 7d 08 be 80 01 00 00 e8
[ 475.255884] RIP [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 475.296120] RSP <ffff8805c0ac3c38>
[ 475.328734] ---[ end trace f076482e9d754adc ]---
Reported-by: Matthew Thode <mthode@mthode.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 39,261 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int red_channel_client_test_remote_cap(RedChannelClient *rcc, uint32_t cap)
{
return test_capabilty(rcc->remote_caps.caps,
rcc->remote_caps.num_caps,
cap);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 2,147 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GpuCommandBufferStub::OnRescheduled() {
gpu::CommandBuffer::State pre_state = command_buffer_->GetLastState();
command_buffer_->Flush(pre_state.put_offset);
gpu::CommandBuffer::State post_state = command_buffer_->GetLastState();
if (pre_state.get_offset != post_state.get_offset)
ReportState();
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 106,902 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: jsonb_each_text(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
return each_worker_jsonb(fcinfo, "jsonb_each_text", true);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 2,624 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool nl80211_can_set_dev_channel(struct wireless_dev *wdev)
{
/*
* You can only set the channel explicitly for AP, mesh
* and WDS type interfaces; all others have their channel
* managed via their respective "establish a connection"
* command (connect, join, ...)
*
* Monitors are special as they are normally slaved to
* whatever else is going on, so they behave as though
* you tried setting the wiphy channel itself.
*/
return !wdev ||
wdev->iftype == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP ||
wdev->iftype == NL80211_IFTYPE_WDS ||
wdev->iftype == NL80211_IFTYPE_MESH_POINT ||
wdev->iftype == NL80211_IFTYPE_MONITOR ||
wdev->iftype == NL80211_IFTYPE_P2P_GO;
}
Commit Message: nl80211: fix check for valid SSID size in scan operations
In both trigger_scan and sched_scan operations, we were checking for
the SSID length before assigning the value correctly. Since the
memory was just kzalloc'ed, the check was always failing and SSID with
over 32 characters were allowed to go through.
This was causing a buffer overflow when copying the actual SSID to the
proper place.
This bug has been there since 2.6.29-rc4.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Luciano Coelho <coelho@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 26,666 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bt_status_t btif_storage_set_remote_addr_type(bt_bdaddr_t *remote_bd_addr,
UINT8 addr_type)
{
bdstr_t bdstr;
bdaddr_to_string(remote_bd_addr, bdstr, sizeof(bdstr));
int ret = btif_config_set_int(bdstr, "AddrType", (int)addr_type);
btif_config_save();
return ret ? BT_STATUS_SUCCESS : BT_STATUS_FAIL;
}
Commit Message: Add guest mode functionality (2/3)
Add a flag to enable() to start Bluetooth in restricted
mode. In restricted mode, all devices that are paired during
restricted mode are deleted upon leaving restricted mode.
Right now restricted mode is only entered while a guest
user is active.
Bug: 27410683
Change-Id: I8f23d28ef0aa3a8df13d469c73005c8e1b894d19
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 159,701 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static Image *ReadJNGImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
logging,
status;
MngInfo
*mng_info;
char
magic_number[MagickPathExtent];
size_t
count;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
logging=LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"Enter ReadJNGImage()");
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
mng_info=(MngInfo *) NULL;
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return((Image *) NULL);
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"JNG") != 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
/* Verify JNG signature. */
count=(size_t) ReadBlob(image,8,(unsigned char *) magic_number);
if (count < 8 || memcmp(magic_number,"\213JNG\r\n\032\n",8) != 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
/* Allocate a MngInfo structure. */
mng_info=(MngInfo *) AcquireMagickMemory(sizeof(*mng_info));
if (mng_info == (MngInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
/* Initialize members of the MngInfo structure. */
(void) ResetMagickMemory(mng_info,0,sizeof(MngInfo));
mng_info->image=image;
image=ReadOneJNGImage(mng_info,image_info,exception);
mng_info=MngInfoFreeStruct(mng_info);
if (image == (Image *) NULL)
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"exit ReadJNGImage() with error");
return((Image *) NULL);
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
if (image->columns == 0 || image->rows == 0)
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"exit ReadJNGImage() with error");
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage");
}
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"exit ReadJNGImage()");
return(image);
}
Commit Message: coders/png.c: Stop a memory leak in read_user_chunk_callback() (reference
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/517).
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 63,496 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: size_t ZSTD_initCStream_usingDict(ZSTD_CStream* zcs, const void* dict, size_t dictSize, int compressionLevel)
{
ZSTD_CCtxParams_init(&zcs->requestedParams, compressionLevel);
return ZSTD_initCStream_internal(zcs, dict, dictSize, NULL, zcs->requestedParams, ZSTD_CONTENTSIZE_UNKNOWN);
}
Commit Message: fixed T36302429
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 90,086 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void UserSelectionScreen::OnUserImageChanged(const user_manager::User& user) {
if (!handler_)
return;
handler_->OnUserImageChanged(user);
}
Commit Message: cros: Check initial auth type when showing views login.
Bug: 859611
Change-Id: I0298db9bbf4aed6bd40600aef2e1c5794e8cd058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1123056
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyin Hu <xiaoyinh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jacob Dufault <jdufault@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572224}
CWE ID: | 0 | 131,589 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void IsolateOrigin(const std::string& hostname) {
IsolateOriginsForTesting(embedded_test_server(), shell()->web_contents(),
{hostname});
}
Commit Message: Fix a crash on FileChooserImpl
If a renderer process is compromised, and it calls both of
FileChooserImpl::OpenFileChooser() and EnumerateChosenDirectory() via
Mojo, the browser process could crash because ResetOwner() for
the first FileChooserImpl::proxy_ instance was not called. We
should check nullness of proxy_ before updating it.
Bug: 941008
Change-Id: Ie0c1895ec46ce78d40594b543e49e43b420af675
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1520509
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#640580}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 151,790 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void voidMethodNullableTestCallbackInterfaceArgMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::voidMethodNullableTestCallbackInterfaceArgMethod(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,857 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GraphicsContext::drawFocusRing(const Vector<IntRect>& rects, int width, int offset, const Color& color)
{
if (paintingDisabled())
return;
notImplemented();
}
Commit Message: Reviewed by Kevin Ollivier.
[wx] Fix strokeArc and fillRoundedRect drawing, and add clipPath support.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=60847
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@86502 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,082 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int check_map_prog_compatibility(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_map *map,
struct bpf_prog *prog)
{
/* Make sure that BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT programs only use
* preallocated hash maps, since doing memory allocation
* in overflow_handler can crash depending on where nmi got
* triggered.
*/
if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT) {
if (!check_map_prealloc(map)) {
verbose(env, "perf_event programs can only use preallocated hash map\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (map->inner_map_meta &&
!check_map_prealloc(map->inner_map_meta)) {
verbose(env, "perf_event programs can only use preallocated inner hash map\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
}
if ((bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(prog->aux) || bpf_map_is_dev_bound(map)) &&
!bpf_offload_prog_map_match(prog, map)) {
verbose(env, "offload device mismatch between prog and map\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: bpf: 32-bit RSH verification must truncate input before the ALU op
When I wrote commit 468f6eafa6c4 ("bpf: fix 32-bit ALU op verification"), I
assumed that, in order to emulate 64-bit arithmetic with 32-bit logic, it
is sufficient to just truncate the output to 32 bits; and so I just moved
the register size coercion that used to be at the start of the function to
the end of the function.
That assumption is true for almost every op, but not for 32-bit right
shifts, because those can propagate information towards the least
significant bit. Fix it by always truncating inputs for 32-bit ops to 32
bits.
Also get rid of the coerce_reg_to_size() after the ALU op, since that has
no effect.
Fixes: 468f6eafa6c4 ("bpf: fix 32-bit ALU op verification")
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 76,377 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct sock *netlink_seq_socket_idx(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t pos)
{
struct nl_seq_iter *iter = seq->private;
int i, j;
struct sock *s;
loff_t off = 0;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_LINKS; i++) {
struct nl_portid_hash *hash = &nl_table[i].hash;
for (j = 0; j <= hash->mask; j++) {
sk_for_each(s, &hash->table[j]) {
if (sock_net(s) != seq_file_net(seq))
continue;
if (off == pos) {
iter->link = i;
iter->hash_idx = j;
return s;
}
++off;
}
}
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 40,558 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CGaiaCredentialBase::~CGaiaCredentialBase() {}
Commit Message: [GCPW] Disallow sign in of consumer accounts when mdm is enabled.
Unless the registry key "mdm_aca" is explicitly set to 1, always
fail sign in of consumer accounts when mdm enrollment is enabled.
Consumer accounts are defined as accounts with gmail.com or
googlemail.com domain.
Bug: 944049
Change-Id: Icb822f3737d90931de16a8d3317616dd2b159edd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1532903
Commit-Queue: Tien Mai <tienmai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Roger Tawa <rogerta@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#646278}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 130,726 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Response CreateDomainNotEnabledErrorResponse() {
return Response::Error("ServiceWorker domain not enabled");
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 148,592 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int netlink_has_listeners(struct sock *sk, unsigned int group)
{
int res = 0;
struct listeners *listeners;
BUG_ON(!netlink_is_kernel(sk));
rcu_read_lock();
listeners = rcu_dereference(nl_table[sk->sk_protocol].listeners);
if (listeners && group - 1 < nl_table[sk->sk_protocol].groups)
res = test_bit(group - 1, listeners->masks);
rcu_read_unlock();
return res;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 40,533 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void qemu_spice_display_refresh(SimpleSpiceDisplay *ssd)
{
dprint(3, "%s/%d:\n", __func__, ssd->qxl.id);
graphic_hw_update(ssd->dcl.con);
qemu_mutex_lock(&ssd->lock);
if (QTAILQ_EMPTY(&ssd->updates) && ssd->ds) {
qemu_spice_create_update(ssd);
ssd->notify++;
}
qemu_spice_cursor_refresh_unlocked(ssd);
qemu_mutex_unlock(&ssd->lock);
if (ssd->notify) {
ssd->notify = 0;
qemu_spice_wakeup(ssd);
dprint(2, "%s/%d: notify\n", __func__, ssd->qxl.id);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 12,192 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sc_asn1_sig_value_sequence_to_rs(struct sc_context *ctx, unsigned char *in, size_t inlen,
unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen)
{
struct sc_asn1_entry asn1_sig_value[C_ASN1_SIG_VALUE_SIZE];
struct sc_asn1_entry asn1_sig_value_coefficients[C_ASN1_SIG_VALUE_COEFFICIENTS_SIZE];
unsigned char *r, *s;
size_t r_len, s_len, halflen = buflen/2;
int rv;
LOG_FUNC_CALLED(ctx);
if (!buf || !buflen)
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS);
sc_copy_asn1_entry(c_asn1_sig_value, asn1_sig_value);
sc_format_asn1_entry(asn1_sig_value + 0, asn1_sig_value_coefficients, NULL, 0);
sc_copy_asn1_entry(c_asn1_sig_value_coefficients, asn1_sig_value_coefficients);
sc_format_asn1_entry(asn1_sig_value_coefficients + 0, &r, &r_len, 0);
sc_format_asn1_entry(asn1_sig_value_coefficients + 1, &s, &s_len, 0);
rv = sc_asn1_decode(ctx, asn1_sig_value, in, inlen, NULL, NULL);
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, rv, "ASN.1 decoding ECDSA-Sig-Value failed");
if (halflen < r_len || halflen < s_len) {
rv = SC_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
goto done;
}
memset(buf, 0, buflen);
memcpy(buf + (halflen - r_len), r, r_len);
memcpy(buf + (buflen - s_len), s, s_len);
sc_log(ctx, "r(%"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u): %s", halflen,
sc_dump_hex(buf, halflen));
sc_log(ctx, "s(%"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u): %s", halflen,
sc_dump_hex(buf + halflen, halflen));
rv = SC_SUCCESS;
done:
free(r);
free(s);
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, rv);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 78,142 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: png_set_keep_unknown_chunks(png_structp png_ptr, int keep, png_bytep
chunk_list, int num_chunks)
{
png_bytep new_list, p;
int i, old_num_chunks;
if (png_ptr == NULL)
return;
if (num_chunks == 0)
{
if (keep == PNG_HANDLE_CHUNK_ALWAYS || keep == PNG_HANDLE_CHUNK_IF_SAFE)
png_ptr->flags |= PNG_FLAG_KEEP_UNKNOWN_CHUNKS;
else
png_ptr->flags &= ~PNG_FLAG_KEEP_UNKNOWN_CHUNKS;
if (keep == PNG_HANDLE_CHUNK_ALWAYS)
png_ptr->flags |= PNG_FLAG_KEEP_UNSAFE_CHUNKS;
else
png_ptr->flags &= ~PNG_FLAG_KEEP_UNSAFE_CHUNKS;
return;
}
if (chunk_list == NULL)
return;
old_num_chunks = png_ptr->num_chunk_list;
new_list=(png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr,
(png_uint_32)
(5*(num_chunks + old_num_chunks)));
if (png_ptr->chunk_list != NULL)
{
png_memcpy(new_list, png_ptr->chunk_list,
(png_size_t)(5*old_num_chunks));
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->chunk_list);
png_ptr->chunk_list=NULL;
}
png_memcpy(new_list + 5*old_num_chunks, chunk_list,
(png_size_t)(5*num_chunks));
for (p = new_list + 5*old_num_chunks + 4, i = 0; i<num_chunks; i++, p += 5)
*p=(png_byte)keep;
png_ptr->num_chunk_list = old_num_chunks + num_chunks;
png_ptr->chunk_list = new_list;
#ifdef PNG_FREE_ME_SUPPORTED
png_ptr->free_me |= PNG_FREE_LIST;
#endif
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 131,404 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ExtensionFunction::ResponseAction UsbBulkTransferFunction::Run() {
scoped_ptr<extensions::core_api::usb::BulkTransfer::Params> parameters =
BulkTransfer::Params::Create(*args_);
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(parameters.get());
scoped_refptr<UsbDeviceHandle> device_handle =
GetDeviceHandle(parameters->handle);
if (!device_handle.get()) {
return RespondNow(Error(kErrorNoConnection));
}
const GenericTransferInfo& transfer = parameters->transfer_info;
UsbEndpointDirection direction;
size_t size = 0;
if (!ConvertDirectionFromApi(transfer.direction, &direction)) {
return RespondNow(Error(kErrorConvertDirection));
}
if (!GetTransferSize(transfer, &size)) {
return RespondNow(Error(kErrorInvalidTransferLength));
}
scoped_refptr<net::IOBuffer> buffer =
CreateBufferForTransfer(transfer, direction, size);
if (!buffer.get()) {
return RespondNow(Error(kErrorMalformedParameters));
}
int timeout = transfer.timeout ? *transfer.timeout : 0;
if (timeout < 0) {
return RespondNow(Error(kErrorInvalidTimeout));
}
device_handle->BulkTransfer(
direction, transfer.endpoint, buffer.get(), size, timeout,
base::Bind(&UsbBulkTransferFunction::OnCompleted, this));
return RespondLater();
}
Commit Message: Remove fallback when requesting a single USB interface.
This reverts commit 2d475d0ed37bf8f19385537ad31e361f1b21624b. The
permission broker now supports opening devices that are partially
claimed through the OpenPath method and RequestPathAccess will always
fail for these devices so the fallback path from RequestPathAccess to
OpenPath is always taken.
BUG=500057
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1227313003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338354}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 123,409 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleBindUniformLocationCHROMIUMBucket(
uint32_t immediate_data_size,
const volatile void* cmd_data) {
const volatile gles2::cmds::BindUniformLocationCHROMIUMBucket& c =
*static_cast<
const volatile gles2::cmds::BindUniformLocationCHROMIUMBucket*>(
cmd_data);
GLuint program = static_cast<GLuint>(c.program);
GLint location = static_cast<GLint>(c.location);
Bucket* bucket = GetBucket(c.name_bucket_id);
if (!bucket || bucket->size() == 0) {
return error::kInvalidArguments;
}
std::string name_str;
if (!bucket->GetAsString(&name_str)) {
return error::kInvalidArguments;
}
DoBindUniformLocationCHROMIUM(program, location, name_str);
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,506 |
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