instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xfs_ioctl_setattr(
xfs_inode_t *ip,
struct fsxattr *fa,
int mask)
{
struct xfs_mount *mp = ip->i_mount;
struct xfs_trans *tp;
unsigned int lock_flags = 0;
struct xfs_dquot *udqp = NULL;
struct xfs_dquot *pdqp = NULL;
struct xfs_dquot *olddquot = NULL;
int code;
trace_xfs_ioctl_setattr(ip);
if (mp->m_flags & XFS_MOUNT_RDONLY)
return XFS_ERROR(EROFS);
if (XFS_FORCED_SHUTDOWN(mp))
return XFS_ERROR(EIO);
/*
* Disallow 32bit project ids when projid32bit feature is not enabled.
*/
if ((mask & FSX_PROJID) && (fa->fsx_projid > (__uint16_t)-1) &&
!xfs_sb_version_hasprojid32bit(&ip->i_mount->m_sb))
return XFS_ERROR(EINVAL);
/*
* If disk quotas is on, we make sure that the dquots do exist on disk,
* before we start any other transactions. Trying to do this later
* is messy. We don't care to take a readlock to look at the ids
* in inode here, because we can't hold it across the trans_reserve.
* If the IDs do change before we take the ilock, we're covered
* because the i_*dquot fields will get updated anyway.
*/
if (XFS_IS_QUOTA_ON(mp) && (mask & FSX_PROJID)) {
code = xfs_qm_vop_dqalloc(ip, ip->i_d.di_uid,
ip->i_d.di_gid, fa->fsx_projid,
XFS_QMOPT_PQUOTA, &udqp, NULL, &pdqp);
if (code)
return code;
}
/*
* For the other attributes, we acquire the inode lock and
* first do an error checking pass.
*/
tp = xfs_trans_alloc(mp, XFS_TRANS_SETATTR_NOT_SIZE);
code = xfs_trans_reserve(tp, &M_RES(mp)->tr_ichange, 0, 0);
if (code)
goto error_return;
lock_flags = XFS_ILOCK_EXCL;
xfs_ilock(ip, lock_flags);
/*
* CAP_FOWNER overrides the following restrictions:
*
* The user ID of the calling process must be equal
* to the file owner ID, except in cases where the
* CAP_FSETID capability is applicable.
*/
if (!inode_owner_or_capable(VFS_I(ip))) {
code = XFS_ERROR(EPERM);
goto error_return;
}
/*
* Do a quota reservation only if projid is actually going to change.
* Only allow changing of projid from init_user_ns since it is a
* non user namespace aware identifier.
*/
if (mask & FSX_PROJID) {
if (current_user_ns() != &init_user_ns) {
code = XFS_ERROR(EINVAL);
goto error_return;
}
if (XFS_IS_QUOTA_RUNNING(mp) &&
XFS_IS_PQUOTA_ON(mp) &&
xfs_get_projid(ip) != fa->fsx_projid) {
ASSERT(tp);
code = xfs_qm_vop_chown_reserve(tp, ip, udqp, NULL,
pdqp, capable(CAP_FOWNER) ?
XFS_QMOPT_FORCE_RES : 0);
if (code) /* out of quota */
goto error_return;
}
}
if (mask & FSX_EXTSIZE) {
/*
* Can't change extent size if any extents are allocated.
*/
if (ip->i_d.di_nextents &&
((ip->i_d.di_extsize << mp->m_sb.sb_blocklog) !=
fa->fsx_extsize)) {
code = XFS_ERROR(EINVAL); /* EFBIG? */
goto error_return;
}
/*
* Extent size must be a multiple of the appropriate block
* size, if set at all. It must also be smaller than the
* maximum extent size supported by the filesystem.
*
* Also, for non-realtime files, limit the extent size hint to
* half the size of the AGs in the filesystem so alignment
* doesn't result in extents larger than an AG.
*/
if (fa->fsx_extsize != 0) {
xfs_extlen_t size;
xfs_fsblock_t extsize_fsb;
extsize_fsb = XFS_B_TO_FSB(mp, fa->fsx_extsize);
if (extsize_fsb > MAXEXTLEN) {
code = XFS_ERROR(EINVAL);
goto error_return;
}
if (XFS_IS_REALTIME_INODE(ip) ||
((mask & FSX_XFLAGS) &&
(fa->fsx_xflags & XFS_XFLAG_REALTIME))) {
size = mp->m_sb.sb_rextsize <<
mp->m_sb.sb_blocklog;
} else {
size = mp->m_sb.sb_blocksize;
if (extsize_fsb > mp->m_sb.sb_agblocks / 2) {
code = XFS_ERROR(EINVAL);
goto error_return;
}
}
if (fa->fsx_extsize % size) {
code = XFS_ERROR(EINVAL);
goto error_return;
}
}
}
if (mask & FSX_XFLAGS) {
/*
* Can't change realtime flag if any extents are allocated.
*/
if ((ip->i_d.di_nextents || ip->i_delayed_blks) &&
(XFS_IS_REALTIME_INODE(ip)) !=
(fa->fsx_xflags & XFS_XFLAG_REALTIME)) {
code = XFS_ERROR(EINVAL); /* EFBIG? */
goto error_return;
}
/*
* If realtime flag is set then must have realtime data.
*/
if ((fa->fsx_xflags & XFS_XFLAG_REALTIME)) {
if ((mp->m_sb.sb_rblocks == 0) ||
(mp->m_sb.sb_rextsize == 0) ||
(ip->i_d.di_extsize % mp->m_sb.sb_rextsize)) {
code = XFS_ERROR(EINVAL);
goto error_return;
}
}
/*
* Can't modify an immutable/append-only file unless
* we have appropriate permission.
*/
if ((ip->i_d.di_flags &
(XFS_DIFLAG_IMMUTABLE|XFS_DIFLAG_APPEND) ||
(fa->fsx_xflags &
(XFS_XFLAG_IMMUTABLE | XFS_XFLAG_APPEND))) &&
!capable(CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE)) {
code = XFS_ERROR(EPERM);
goto error_return;
}
}
xfs_trans_ijoin(tp, ip, 0);
/*
* Change file ownership. Must be the owner or privileged.
*/
if (mask & FSX_PROJID) {
/*
* CAP_FSETID overrides the following restrictions:
*
* The set-user-ID and set-group-ID bits of a file will be
* cleared upon successful return from chown()
*/
if ((ip->i_d.di_mode & (S_ISUID|S_ISGID)) &&
!inode_capable(VFS_I(ip), CAP_FSETID))
ip->i_d.di_mode &= ~(S_ISUID|S_ISGID);
/*
* Change the ownerships and register quota modifications
* in the transaction.
*/
if (xfs_get_projid(ip) != fa->fsx_projid) {
if (XFS_IS_QUOTA_RUNNING(mp) && XFS_IS_PQUOTA_ON(mp)) {
olddquot = xfs_qm_vop_chown(tp, ip,
&ip->i_pdquot, pdqp);
}
xfs_set_projid(ip, fa->fsx_projid);
/*
* We may have to rev the inode as well as
* the superblock version number since projids didn't
* exist before DINODE_VERSION_2 and SB_VERSION_NLINK.
*/
if (ip->i_d.di_version == 1)
xfs_bump_ino_vers2(tp, ip);
}
}
if (mask & FSX_EXTSIZE)
ip->i_d.di_extsize = fa->fsx_extsize >> mp->m_sb.sb_blocklog;
if (mask & FSX_XFLAGS) {
xfs_set_diflags(ip, fa->fsx_xflags);
xfs_diflags_to_linux(ip);
}
xfs_trans_ichgtime(tp, ip, XFS_ICHGTIME_CHG);
xfs_trans_log_inode(tp, ip, XFS_ILOG_CORE);
XFS_STATS_INC(xs_ig_attrchg);
/*
* If this is a synchronous mount, make sure that the
* transaction goes to disk before returning to the user.
* This is slightly sub-optimal in that truncates require
* two sync transactions instead of one for wsync filesystems.
* One for the truncate and one for the timestamps since we
* don't want to change the timestamps unless we're sure the
* truncate worked. Truncates are less than 1% of the laddis
* mix so this probably isn't worth the trouble to optimize.
*/
if (mp->m_flags & XFS_MOUNT_WSYNC)
xfs_trans_set_sync(tp);
code = xfs_trans_commit(tp, 0);
xfs_iunlock(ip, lock_flags);
/*
* Release any dquot(s) the inode had kept before chown.
*/
xfs_qm_dqrele(olddquot);
xfs_qm_dqrele(udqp);
xfs_qm_dqrele(pdqp);
return code;
error_return:
xfs_qm_dqrele(udqp);
xfs_qm_dqrele(pdqp);
xfs_trans_cancel(tp, 0);
if (lock_flags)
xfs_iunlock(ip, lock_flags);
return code;
}
Commit Message: fs,userns: Change inode_capable to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid
The kernel has no concept of capabilities with respect to inodes; inodes
exist independently of namespaces. For example, inode_capable(inode,
CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) would be nonsense.
This patch changes inode_capable to check for uid and gid mappings and
renames it to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid, which should make it more
obvious what it does.
Fixes CVE-2014-4014.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 1
| 166,322
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DefaultTabHandler::CreateHistoricalTab(TabContentsWrapper* contents) {
delegate_->AsBrowser()->CreateHistoricalTab(contents);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 98,044
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: char *charset_client2fs(const char * const string)
{
char *output = NULL, *output_;
size_t inlen, outlen, outlen_;
inlen = strlen(string);
outlen_ = outlen = inlen * (size_t) 4U + (size_t) 1U;
if (outlen <= inlen ||
(output_ = output = calloc(outlen, (size_t) 1U)) == NULL) {
die_mem();
}
if (utf8 > 0 && strcasecmp(charset_fs, "utf-8") != 0) {
if (iconv(iconv_fd_utf82fs, (char **) &string,
&inlen, &output_, &outlen_) == (size_t) -1) {
strncpy(output, string, outlen);
}
} else if (utf8 <= 0 && strcasecmp(charset_fs, charset_client) != 0) {
if (iconv(iconv_fd_client2fs, (char **) &string,
&inlen, &output_, &outlen_) == (size_t) -1) {
strncpy(output, string, outlen);
}
} else {
strncpy(output, string, outlen);
}
output[outlen - 1] = 0;
return output;
}
Commit Message: Flush the command buffer after switching to TLS.
Fixes a flaw similar to CVE-2011-0411.
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 18,419
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: nvmet_fc_tgtport_get(struct nvmet_fc_tgtport *tgtport)
{
return kref_get_unless_zero(&tgtport->ref);
}
Commit Message: nvmet-fc: ensure target queue id within range.
When searching for queue id's ensure they are within the expected range.
Signed-off-by: James Smart <james.smart@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 93,639
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gpm_process_mouse(Gpm_Event * event, void *data)
{
int btn = MOUSE_BTN_RESET, x, y;
if (event->type & GPM_UP)
btn = MOUSE_BTN_UP;
else if (event->type & GPM_DOWN) {
switch (event->buttons) {
case GPM_B_LEFT:
btn = MOUSE_BTN1_DOWN;
break;
case GPM_B_MIDDLE:
btn = MOUSE_BTN2_DOWN;
break;
case GPM_B_RIGHT:
btn = MOUSE_BTN3_DOWN;
break;
}
}
else {
GPM_DRAWPOINTER(event);
return 0;
}
x = event->x;
y = event->y;
process_mouse(btn, x - 1, y - 1);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Make temporary directory safely when ~/.w3m is unwritable
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 84,505
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: _zip_dirent_init(zip_dirent_t *de)
{
de->changed = 0;
de->local_extra_fields_read = 0;
de->cloned = 0;
de->crc_valid = true;
de->version_madeby = 63 | (ZIP_OPSYS_DEFAULT << 8);
de->version_needed = 10; /* 1.0 */
de->bitflags = 0;
de->comp_method = ZIP_CM_DEFAULT;
de->last_mod = 0;
de->crc = 0;
de->comp_size = 0;
de->uncomp_size = 0;
de->filename = NULL;
de->extra_fields = NULL;
de->comment = NULL;
de->disk_number = 0;
de->int_attrib = 0;
de->ext_attrib = ZIP_EXT_ATTRIB_DEFAULT;
de->offset = 0;
de->compression_level = 0;
de->encryption_method = ZIP_EM_NONE;
de->password = NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fix double free().
Found by Brian 'geeknik' Carpenter using AFL.
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 62,650
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FLAC__StreamDecoderTellStatus file_tell_callback_(const FLAC__StreamDecoder *decoder, FLAC__uint64 *absolute_byte_offset, void *client_data)
{
FLAC__off_t pos;
(void)client_data;
if(decoder->private_->file == stdin)
return FLAC__STREAM_DECODER_TELL_STATUS_UNSUPPORTED;
else if((pos = ftello(decoder->private_->file)) < 0)
return FLAC__STREAM_DECODER_TELL_STATUS_ERROR;
else {
*absolute_byte_offset = (FLAC__uint64)pos;
return FLAC__STREAM_DECODER_TELL_STATUS_OK;
}
}
Commit Message: Avoid free-before-initialize vulnerability in heap
Bug: 27211885
Change-Id: Ib9c93bd9ffdde2a5f8d31a86f06e267dc9c152db
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 161,219
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AutofillDialogViews::HideErrorBubble() {
if (error_bubble_)
error_bubble_->Hide();
}
Commit Message: Clear out some minor TODOs.
BUG=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1047063002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#322959}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 109,994
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: png_do_expand(png_row_infop row_info, png_bytep row,
png_color_16p trans_value)
{
int shift, value;
png_bytep sp, dp;
png_uint_32 i;
png_uint_32 row_width=row_info->width;
png_debug(1, "in png_do_expand");
#ifdef PNG_USELESS_TESTS_SUPPORTED
if (row != NULL && row_info != NULL)
#endif
{
if (row_info->color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY)
{
png_uint_16 gray = (png_uint_16)(trans_value ? trans_value->gray : 0);
if (row_info->bit_depth < 8)
{
switch (row_info->bit_depth)
{
case 1:
{
gray = (png_uint_16)((gray&0x01)*0xff);
sp = row + (png_size_t)((row_width - 1) >> 3);
dp = row + (png_size_t)row_width - 1;
shift = 7 - (int)((row_width + 7) & 0x07);
for (i = 0; i < row_width; i++)
{
if ((*sp >> shift) & 0x01)
*dp = 0xff;
else
*dp = 0;
if (shift == 7)
{
shift = 0;
sp--;
}
else
shift++;
dp--;
}
break;
}
case 2:
{
gray = (png_uint_16)((gray&0x03)*0x55);
sp = row + (png_size_t)((row_width - 1) >> 2);
dp = row + (png_size_t)row_width - 1;
shift = (int)((3 - ((row_width + 3) & 0x03)) << 1);
for (i = 0; i < row_width; i++)
{
value = (*sp >> shift) & 0x03;
*dp = (png_byte)(value | (value << 2) | (value << 4) |
(value << 6));
if (shift == 6)
{
shift = 0;
sp--;
}
else
shift += 2;
dp--;
}
break;
}
case 4:
{
gray = (png_uint_16)((gray&0x0f)*0x11);
sp = row + (png_size_t)((row_width - 1) >> 1);
dp = row + (png_size_t)row_width - 1;
shift = (int)((1 - ((row_width + 1) & 0x01)) << 2);
for (i = 0; i < row_width; i++)
{
value = (*sp >> shift) & 0x0f;
*dp = (png_byte)(value | (value << 4));
if (shift == 4)
{
shift = 0;
sp--;
}
else
shift = 4;
dp--;
}
break;
}
}
row_info->bit_depth = 8;
row_info->pixel_depth = 8;
row_info->rowbytes = row_width;
}
if (trans_value != NULL)
{
if (row_info->bit_depth == 8)
{
gray = gray & 0xff;
sp = row + (png_size_t)row_width - 1;
dp = row + (png_size_t)(row_width << 1) - 1;
for (i = 0; i < row_width; i++)
{
if (*sp == gray)
*dp-- = 0;
else
*dp-- = 0xff;
*dp-- = *sp--;
}
}
else if (row_info->bit_depth == 16)
{
png_byte gray_high = (gray >> 8) & 0xff;
png_byte gray_low = gray & 0xff;
sp = row + row_info->rowbytes - 1;
dp = row + (row_info->rowbytes << 1) - 1;
for (i = 0; i < row_width; i++)
{
if (*(sp - 1) == gray_high && *(sp) == gray_low)
{
*dp-- = 0;
*dp-- = 0;
}
else
{
*dp-- = 0xff;
*dp-- = 0xff;
}
*dp-- = *sp--;
*dp-- = *sp--;
}
}
row_info->color_type = PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA;
row_info->channels = 2;
row_info->pixel_depth = (png_byte)(row_info->bit_depth << 1);
row_info->rowbytes = PNG_ROWBYTES(row_info->pixel_depth,
row_width);
}
}
else if (row_info->color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB && trans_value)
{
if (row_info->bit_depth == 8)
{
png_byte red = trans_value->red & 0xff;
png_byte green = trans_value->green & 0xff;
png_byte blue = trans_value->blue & 0xff;
sp = row + (png_size_t)row_info->rowbytes - 1;
dp = row + (png_size_t)(row_width << 2) - 1;
for (i = 0; i < row_width; i++)
{
if (*(sp - 2) == red && *(sp - 1) == green && *(sp) == blue)
*dp-- = 0;
else
*dp-- = 0xff;
*dp-- = *sp--;
*dp-- = *sp--;
*dp-- = *sp--;
}
}
else if (row_info->bit_depth == 16)
{
png_byte red_high = (trans_value->red >> 8) & 0xff;
png_byte green_high = (trans_value->green >> 8) & 0xff;
png_byte blue_high = (trans_value->blue >> 8) & 0xff;
png_byte red_low = trans_value->red & 0xff;
png_byte green_low = trans_value->green & 0xff;
png_byte blue_low = trans_value->blue & 0xff;
sp = row + row_info->rowbytes - 1;
dp = row + (png_size_t)(row_width << 3) - 1;
for (i = 0; i < row_width; i++)
{
if (*(sp - 5) == red_high &&
*(sp - 4) == red_low &&
*(sp - 3) == green_high &&
*(sp - 2) == green_low &&
*(sp - 1) == blue_high &&
*(sp ) == blue_low)
{
*dp-- = 0;
*dp-- = 0;
}
else
{
*dp-- = 0xff;
*dp-- = 0xff;
}
*dp-- = *sp--;
*dp-- = *sp--;
*dp-- = *sp--;
*dp-- = *sp--;
*dp-- = *sp--;
*dp-- = *sp--;
}
}
row_info->color_type = PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB_ALPHA;
row_info->channels = 4;
row_info->pixel_depth = (png_byte)(row_info->bit_depth << 2);
row_info->rowbytes = PNG_ROWBYTES(row_info->pixel_depth, row_width);
}
}
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 131,358
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void errflush_nomem(void)
{
errflush(mem_err_print);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 14,009
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: find_check_match(struct xt_entry_match *m, struct xt_mtchk_param *par)
{
struct xt_match *match;
int ret;
match = xt_request_find_match(NFPROTO_IPV4, m->u.user.name,
m->u.user.revision);
if (IS_ERR(match))
return PTR_ERR(match);
m->u.kernel.match = match;
ret = check_match(m, par);
if (ret)
goto err;
return 0;
err:
module_put(m->u.kernel.match->me);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: add back stackpointer size checks
The rationale for removing the check is only correct for rulesets
generated by ip(6)tables.
In iptables, a jump can only occur to a user-defined chain, i.e.
because we size the stack based on number of user-defined chains we
cannot exceed stack size.
However, the underlying binary format has no such restriction,
and the validation step only ensures that the jump target is a
valid rule start point.
IOW, its possible to build a rule blob that has no user-defined
chains but does contain a jump.
If this happens, no jump stack gets allocated and crash occurs
because no jumpstack was allocated.
Fixes: 7814b6ec6d0d6 ("netfilter: xtables: don't save/restore jumpstack offset")
Reported-by: syzbot+e783f671527912cd9403@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 84,998
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct sas_phy *sas_get_local_phy(struct domain_device *dev)
{
struct sas_ha_struct *ha = dev->port->ha;
struct sas_phy *phy;
unsigned long flags;
/* a published domain device always has a valid phy, it may be
* stale, but it is never NULL
*/
BUG_ON(!dev->phy);
spin_lock_irqsave(&ha->phy_port_lock, flags);
phy = dev->phy;
get_device(&phy->dev);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ha->phy_port_lock, flags);
return phy;
}
Commit Message: scsi: libsas: defer ata device eh commands to libata
When ata device doing EH, some commands still attached with tasks are
not passed to libata when abort failed or recover failed, so libata did
not handle these commands. After these commands done, sas task is freed,
but ata qc is not freed. This will cause ata qc leak and trigger a
warning like below:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 28512 at drivers/ata/libata-eh.c:4037
ata_eh_finish+0xb4/0xcc
CPU: 0 PID: 28512 Comm: kworker/u32:2 Tainted: G W OE 4.14.0#1
......
Call trace:
[<ffff0000088b7bd0>] ata_eh_finish+0xb4/0xcc
[<ffff0000088b8420>] ata_do_eh+0xc4/0xd8
[<ffff0000088b8478>] ata_std_error_handler+0x44/0x8c
[<ffff0000088b8068>] ata_scsi_port_error_handler+0x480/0x694
[<ffff000008875fc4>] async_sas_ata_eh+0x4c/0x80
[<ffff0000080f6be8>] async_run_entry_fn+0x4c/0x170
[<ffff0000080ebd70>] process_one_work+0x144/0x390
[<ffff0000080ec100>] worker_thread+0x144/0x418
[<ffff0000080f2c98>] kthread+0x10c/0x138
[<ffff0000080855dc>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
If ata qc leaked too many, ata tag allocation will fail and io blocked
for ever.
As suggested by Dan Williams, defer ata device commands to libata and
merge sas_eh_finish_cmd() with sas_eh_defer_cmd(). libata will handle
ata qcs correctly after this.
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
CC: Xiaofei Tan <tanxiaofei@huawei.com>
CC: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
CC: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 83,264
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int flexarray_get_bin(struct flexarray *flex, int index)
{
int i;
(void)flex;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(bin_offset); i++)
if (index < bin_offset[i])
return i - 1;
return -1;
}
Commit Message: jpeg: Fix another possible buffer overrun
Found via the clang libfuzzer
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 82,979
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int snd_seq_ioctl_set_client_info(struct snd_seq_client *client,
void *arg)
{
struct snd_seq_client_info *client_info = arg;
/* it is not allowed to set the info fields for an another client */
if (client->number != client_info->client)
return -EPERM;
/* also client type must be set now */
if (client->type != client_info->type)
return -EINVAL;
/* fill the info fields */
if (client_info->name[0])
strlcpy(client->name, client_info->name, sizeof(client->name));
client->filter = client_info->filter;
client->event_lost = client_info->event_lost;
memcpy(client->event_filter, client_info->event_filter, 32);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: seq: Fix use-after-free at creating a port
There is a potential race window opened at creating and deleting a
port via ioctl, as spotted by fuzzing. snd_seq_create_port() creates
a port object and returns its pointer, but it doesn't take the
refcount, thus it can be deleted immediately by another thread.
Meanwhile, snd_seq_ioctl_create_port() still calls the function
snd_seq_system_client_ev_port_start() with the created port object
that is being deleted, and this triggers use-after-free like:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0x504/0x630 [snd_seq] at addr ffff8801f2241cb1
=============================================================================
BUG kmalloc-512 (Tainted: G B ): kasan: bad access detected
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
INFO: Allocated in snd_seq_create_port+0x94/0x9b0 [snd_seq] age=1 cpu=3 pid=4511
___slab_alloc+0x425/0x460
__slab_alloc+0x20/0x40
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x150/0x190
snd_seq_create_port+0x94/0x9b0 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0xd1/0x630 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x11c/0x190 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl+0x40/0x80 [snd_seq]
do_vfs_ioctl+0x54b/0xda0
SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x75
INFO: Freed in port_delete+0x136/0x1a0 [snd_seq] age=1 cpu=2 pid=4717
__slab_free+0x204/0x310
kfree+0x15f/0x180
port_delete+0x136/0x1a0 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_delete_port+0x235/0x350 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl_delete_port+0xc8/0x180 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x11c/0x190 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl+0x40/0x80 [snd_seq]
do_vfs_ioctl+0x54b/0xda0
SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x75
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81b03781>] dump_stack+0x63/0x82
[<ffffffff81531b3b>] print_trailer+0xfb/0x160
[<ffffffff81536db4>] object_err+0x34/0x40
[<ffffffff815392d3>] kasan_report.part.2+0x223/0x520
[<ffffffffa07aadf4>] ? snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0x504/0x630 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffff815395fe>] __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x2e/0x30
[<ffffffffa07aadf4>] snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0x504/0x630 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffffa07aa8f0>] ? snd_seq_ioctl_delete_port+0x180/0x180 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffff8136be50>] ? taskstats_exit+0xbc0/0xbc0
[<ffffffffa07abc5c>] snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x11c/0x190 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffffa07abd10>] snd_seq_ioctl+0x40/0x80 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffff8136d433>] ? acct_account_cputime+0x63/0x80
[<ffffffff815b515b>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x54b/0xda0
.....
We may fix this in a few different ways, and in this patch, it's fixed
simply by taking the refcount properly at snd_seq_create_port() and
letting the caller unref the object after use. Also, there is another
potential use-after-free by sprintf() call in snd_seq_create_port(),
and this is moved inside the lock.
This fix covers CVE-2017-15265.
Reported-and-tested-by: Michael23 Yu <ycqzsy@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 60,602
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OnSwapOutACKHelper(int render_process_id, int render_view_id) {
RenderViewHostImpl* rvh = RenderViewHostImpl::FromID(render_process_id,
render_view_id);
if (rvh)
rvh->OnSwapOutACK();
}
Commit Message: Make chrome.appWindow.create() provide access to the child window at a predictable time.
When you first create a window with chrome.appWindow.create(), it won't have
loaded any resources. So, at create time, you are guaranteed that:
child_window.location.href == 'about:blank'
child_window.document.documentElement.outerHTML ==
'<html><head></head><body></body></html>'
This is in line with the behaviour of window.open().
BUG=131735
TEST=browser_tests:PlatformAppBrowserTest.WindowsApi
Committed: http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome?view=rev&revision=144072
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10644006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@144356 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 105,408
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int unix_dgram_sendmsg(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
{
struct sock_iocb *siocb = kiocb_to_siocb(kiocb);
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(sk);
struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr = msg->msg_name;
struct sock *other = NULL;
int namelen = 0; /* fake GCC */
int err;
unsigned int hash;
struct sk_buff *skb;
long timeo;
struct scm_cookie tmp_scm;
int max_level;
int data_len = 0;
if (NULL == siocb->scm)
siocb->scm = &tmp_scm;
wait_for_unix_gc();
err = scm_send(sock, msg, siocb->scm, false);
if (err < 0)
return err;
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (msg->msg_flags&MSG_OOB)
goto out;
if (msg->msg_namelen) {
err = unix_mkname(sunaddr, msg->msg_namelen, &hash);
if (err < 0)
goto out;
namelen = err;
} else {
sunaddr = NULL;
err = -ENOTCONN;
other = unix_peer_get(sk);
if (!other)
goto out;
}
if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &sock->flags) && !u->addr
&& (err = unix_autobind(sock)) != 0)
goto out;
err = -EMSGSIZE;
if (len > sk->sk_sndbuf - 32)
goto out;
if (len > SKB_MAX_ALLOC)
data_len = min_t(size_t,
len - SKB_MAX_ALLOC,
MAX_SKB_FRAGS * PAGE_SIZE);
skb = sock_alloc_send_pskb(sk, len - data_len, data_len,
msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &err,
PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER);
if (skb == NULL)
goto out;
err = unix_scm_to_skb(siocb->scm, skb, true);
if (err < 0)
goto out_free;
max_level = err + 1;
unix_get_secdata(siocb->scm, skb);
skb_put(skb, len - data_len);
skb->data_len = data_len;
skb->len = len;
err = skb_copy_datagram_from_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, 0, len);
if (err)
goto out_free;
timeo = sock_sndtimeo(sk, msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
restart:
if (!other) {
err = -ECONNRESET;
if (sunaddr == NULL)
goto out_free;
other = unix_find_other(net, sunaddr, namelen, sk->sk_type,
hash, &err);
if (other == NULL)
goto out_free;
}
if (sk_filter(other, skb) < 0) {
/* Toss the packet but do not return any error to the sender */
err = len;
goto out_free;
}
unix_state_lock(other);
err = -EPERM;
if (!unix_may_send(sk, other))
goto out_unlock;
if (sock_flag(other, SOCK_DEAD)) {
/*
* Check with 1003.1g - what should
* datagram error
*/
unix_state_unlock(other);
sock_put(other);
err = 0;
unix_state_lock(sk);
if (unix_peer(sk) == other) {
unix_peer(sk) = NULL;
unix_state_unlock(sk);
unix_dgram_disconnected(sk, other);
sock_put(other);
err = -ECONNREFUSED;
} else {
unix_state_unlock(sk);
}
other = NULL;
if (err)
goto out_free;
goto restart;
}
err = -EPIPE;
if (other->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN)
goto out_unlock;
if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_SEQPACKET) {
err = security_unix_may_send(sk->sk_socket, other->sk_socket);
if (err)
goto out_unlock;
}
if (unix_peer(other) != sk && unix_recvq_full(other)) {
if (!timeo) {
err = -EAGAIN;
goto out_unlock;
}
timeo = unix_wait_for_peer(other, timeo);
err = sock_intr_errno(timeo);
if (signal_pending(current))
goto out_free;
goto restart;
}
if (sock_flag(other, SOCK_RCVTSTAMP))
__net_timestamp(skb);
maybe_add_creds(skb, sock, other);
skb_queue_tail(&other->sk_receive_queue, skb);
if (max_level > unix_sk(other)->recursion_level)
unix_sk(other)->recursion_level = max_level;
unix_state_unlock(other);
other->sk_data_ready(other, len);
sock_put(other);
scm_destroy(siocb->scm);
return len;
out_unlock:
unix_state_unlock(other);
out_free:
kfree_skb(skb);
out:
if (other)
sock_put(other);
scm_destroy(siocb->scm);
return err;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 40,735
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FileBrowserPrivateSearchDriveFunction::OnEntryDefinitionList(
const GURL& next_link,
scoped_ptr<SearchResultInfoList> search_result_info_list,
scoped_ptr<EntryDefinitionList> entry_definition_list) {
DCHECK_EQ(search_result_info_list->size(), entry_definition_list->size());
base::ListValue* entries = new base::ListValue();
for (EntryDefinitionList::const_iterator it = entry_definition_list->begin();
it != entry_definition_list->end();
++it) {
base::DictionaryValue* entry = new base::DictionaryValue();
entry->SetString("fileSystemName", it->file_system_name);
entry->SetString("fileSystemRoot", it->file_system_root_url);
entry->SetString("fileFullPath", "/" + it->full_path.AsUTF8Unsafe());
entry->SetBoolean("fileIsDirectory", it->is_directory);
entries->Append(entry);
}
base::DictionaryValue* result = new base::DictionaryValue();
result->Set("entries", entries);
result->SetString("nextFeed", next_link.spec());
SetResult(result);
SendResponse(true);
}
Commit Message: Reland r286968: The CL borrows ShareDialog from Files.app and add it to Gallery.
Previous Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/431293002
BUG=374667
TEST=manually
R=yoshiki@chromium.org, mtomasz@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/433733004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@286975 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 111,767
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const views::Widget* ShellWindowViews::GetWidget() const {
return window_;
}
Commit Message: [views] Remove header bar on shell windows created with {frame: none}.
BUG=130182
R=ben@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10597003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143439 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 103,177
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AffiliationFetcher::SetFactoryForTesting(
TestAffiliationFetcherFactory* factory) {
g_testing_factory = factory;
}
Commit Message: Update AffiliationFetcher to use new Affiliation API wire format.
The new format is not backward compatible with the old one, therefore this CL updates the client side protobuf definitions to be in line with the API definition. However, this CL does not yet make use of any additional fields introduced in the new wire format.
BUG=437865
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/996613002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#319860}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 110,127
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int mbedtls_ecp_copy( mbedtls_ecp_point *P, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q )
{
int ret;
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &P->X, &Q->X ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &P->Y, &Q->Y ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &P->Z, &Q->Z ) );
cleanup:
return( ret );
}
Commit Message: Merge remote-tracking branch 'upstream-restricted/pr/549' into mbedtls-2.7-restricted
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 96,565
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void IOThread::InitializeNetworkSessionParams(
net::HttpNetworkSession::Params* params) {
params->host_resolver = globals_->host_resolver.get();
params->cert_verifier = globals_->cert_verifier.get();
params->server_bound_cert_service =
globals_->system_server_bound_cert_service.get();
params->transport_security_state = globals_->transport_security_state.get();
params->ssl_config_service = globals_->ssl_config_service.get();
params->http_auth_handler_factory = globals_->http_auth_handler_factory.get();
params->http_server_properties =
globals_->http_server_properties->GetWeakPtr();
params->network_delegate = globals_->system_network_delegate.get();
params->host_mapping_rules = globals_->host_mapping_rules.get();
params->ignore_certificate_errors = globals_->ignore_certificate_errors;
params->http_pipelining_enabled = globals_->http_pipelining_enabled;
params->testing_fixed_http_port = globals_->testing_fixed_http_port;
params->testing_fixed_https_port = globals_->testing_fixed_https_port;
globals_->initial_max_spdy_concurrent_streams.CopyToIfSet(
¶ms->spdy_initial_max_concurrent_streams);
globals_->max_spdy_concurrent_streams_limit.CopyToIfSet(
¶ms->spdy_max_concurrent_streams_limit);
globals_->force_spdy_single_domain.CopyToIfSet(
¶ms->force_spdy_single_domain);
globals_->enable_spdy_ip_pooling.CopyToIfSet(
¶ms->enable_spdy_ip_pooling);
globals_->enable_spdy_compression.CopyToIfSet(
¶ms->enable_spdy_compression);
globals_->enable_spdy_ping_based_connection_checking.CopyToIfSet(
¶ms->enable_spdy_ping_based_connection_checking);
globals_->spdy_default_protocol.CopyToIfSet(
¶ms->spdy_default_protocol);
globals_->trusted_spdy_proxy.CopyToIfSet(
¶ms->trusted_spdy_proxy);
globals_->enable_quic.CopyToIfSet(¶ms->enable_quic);
globals_->enable_quic_https.CopyToIfSet(¶ms->enable_quic_https);
globals_->quic_max_packet_length.CopyToIfSet(¶ms->quic_max_packet_length);
globals_->origin_to_force_quic_on.CopyToIfSet(
¶ms->origin_to_force_quic_on);
params->enable_user_alternate_protocol_ports =
globals_->enable_user_alternate_protocol_ports;
}
Commit Message: Added daily UMA for non-data-reduction-proxy data usage when the proxy is enabled.
BUG=325325
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/106113002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@239897 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 113,519
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct dm_md_mempools *dm_alloc_md_mempools(struct mapped_device *md, enum dm_queue_mode type,
unsigned integrity, unsigned per_io_data_size)
{
struct dm_md_mempools *pools = kzalloc_node(sizeof(*pools), GFP_KERNEL, md->numa_node_id);
unsigned int pool_size = 0;
unsigned int front_pad;
if (!pools)
return NULL;
switch (type) {
case DM_TYPE_BIO_BASED:
case DM_TYPE_DAX_BIO_BASED:
pool_size = dm_get_reserved_bio_based_ios();
front_pad = roundup(per_io_data_size, __alignof__(struct dm_target_io)) + offsetof(struct dm_target_io, clone);
pools->io_pool = mempool_create_slab_pool(pool_size, _io_cache);
if (!pools->io_pool)
goto out;
break;
case DM_TYPE_REQUEST_BASED:
case DM_TYPE_MQ_REQUEST_BASED:
pool_size = dm_get_reserved_rq_based_ios();
front_pad = offsetof(struct dm_rq_clone_bio_info, clone);
/* per_io_data_size is used for blk-mq pdu at queue allocation */
break;
default:
BUG();
}
pools->bs = bioset_create(pool_size, front_pad, BIOSET_NEED_RESCUER);
if (!pools->bs)
goto out;
if (integrity && bioset_integrity_create(pools->bs, pool_size))
goto out;
return pools;
out:
dm_free_md_mempools(pools);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: dm: fix race between dm_get_from_kobject() and __dm_destroy()
The following BUG_ON was hit when testing repeat creation and removal of
DM devices:
kernel BUG at drivers/md/dm.c:2919!
CPU: 7 PID: 750 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 4.1.44
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81649e8b>] dm_get_from_kobject+0x34/0x3a
[<ffffffff81650ef1>] dm_attr_show+0x2b/0x5e
[<ffffffff817b46d1>] ? mutex_lock+0x26/0x44
[<ffffffff811df7f5>] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x83/0xcf
[<ffffffff811de257>] kernfs_seq_show+0x23/0x25
[<ffffffff81199118>] seq_read+0x16f/0x325
[<ffffffff811de994>] kernfs_fop_read+0x3a/0x13f
[<ffffffff8117b625>] __vfs_read+0x26/0x9d
[<ffffffff8130eb59>] ? security_file_permission+0x3c/0x44
[<ffffffff8117bdb8>] ? rw_verify_area+0x83/0xd9
[<ffffffff8117be9d>] vfs_read+0x8f/0xcf
[<ffffffff81193e34>] ? __fdget_pos+0x12/0x41
[<ffffffff8117c686>] SyS_read+0x4b/0x76
[<ffffffff817b606e>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x71
The bug can be easily triggered, if an extra delay (e.g. 10ms) is added
between the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and dm_get() in
dm_get_from_kobject().
To fix it, we need to ensure the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and
dm_get() are done in an atomic way, so _minor_lock is used.
The other callers of dm_get() have also been checked to be OK: some
callers invoke dm_get() under _minor_lock, some callers invoke it under
_hash_lock, and dm_start_request() invoke it after increasing
md->open_count.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 85,868
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FocusFirstNameField() {
bool result = false;
ASSERT_TRUE(content::ExecuteScriptAndExtractBool(
GetRenderViewHost(),
"if (document.readyState === 'complete')"
" document.getElementById('firstname').focus();"
"else"
" domAutomationController.send(false);",
&result));
ASSERT_TRUE(result);
}
Commit Message: Disable AutofillInteractiveTest.OnChangeAfterAutofill test.
Failing due to http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=revision&revision=170278.
BUG=353691
TBR=isherman@chromium.org, dbeam@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/216853002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@260106 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 112,159
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void init_cfs_bandwidth(struct cfs_bandwidth *cfs_b) {}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 92,587
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void rpc_init_priority_wait_queue(struct rpc_wait_queue *queue, const char *qname)
{
__rpc_init_priority_wait_queue(queue, qname, RPC_NR_PRIORITY);
}
Commit Message: NLM: Don't hang forever on NLM unlock requests
If the NLM daemon is killed on the NFS server, we can currently end up
hanging forever on an 'unlock' request, instead of aborting. Basically,
if the rpcbind request fails, or the server keeps returning garbage, we
really want to quit instead of retrying.
Tested-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@sw.ru>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 34,962
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual WebString message() { return WebString::fromUTF8(msg); }
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 98,847
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int compat_raw_getsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
{
if (level != SOL_RAW)
return compat_ip_getsockopt(sk, level, optname, optval, optlen);
return do_raw_getsockopt(sk, level, optname, optval, optlen);
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 18,941
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int gdTransformAffineBoundingBox(gdRectPtr src, const double affine[6], gdRectPtr bbox)
{
gdPointF extent[4], min, max, point;
int i;
extent[0].x=0.0;
extent[0].y=0.0;
extent[1].x=(double) src->width;
extent[1].y=0.0;
extent[2].x=(double) src->width;
extent[2].y=(double) src->height;
extent[3].x=0.0;
extent[3].y=(double) src->height;
for (i=0; i < 4; i++) {
point=extent[i];
if (gdAffineApplyToPointF(&extent[i], &point, affine) != GD_TRUE) {
return GD_FALSE;
}
}
min=extent[0];
max=extent[0];
for (i=1; i < 4; i++) {
if (min.x > extent[i].x)
min.x=extent[i].x;
if (min.y > extent[i].y)
min.y=extent[i].y;
if (max.x < extent[i].x)
max.x=extent[i].x;
if (max.y < extent[i].y)
max.y=extent[i].y;
}
bbox->x = (int) min.x;
bbox->y = (int) min.y;
bbox->width = (int) floor(max.x - min.x) - 1;
bbox->height = (int) floor(max.y - min.y);
return GD_TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fixed bug #72227: imagescale out-of-bounds read
Ported from https://github.com/libgd/libgd/commit/4f65a3e4eedaffa1efcf9ee1eb08f0b504fbc31a
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 95,068
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Automation::SetCookie(const std::string& url,
DictionaryValue* cookie_dict,
Error** error) {
std::string error_msg;
if (!SendSetCookieJSONRequest(automation(), url, cookie_dict, &error_msg))
*error = new Error(kUnknownError, error_msg);
}
Commit Message: In chromedriver, add /log url to get the contents of the chromedriver log
remotely. Also add a 'chrome.verbose' boolean startup option.
Remove usage of VLOG(1) in chromedriver. We do not need as complicated
logging as in Chrome.
BUG=85241
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7104085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88591 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 100,723
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ofputil_group_stats_to_ofp11(const struct ofputil_group_stats *gs,
struct ofp11_group_stats *gs11, size_t length,
struct ofp11_bucket_counter bucket_cnts[])
{
memset(gs11, 0, sizeof *gs11);
gs11->length = htons(length);
gs11->group_id = htonl(gs->group_id);
gs11->ref_count = htonl(gs->ref_count);
gs11->packet_count = htonll(gs->packet_count);
gs11->byte_count = htonll(gs->byte_count);
ofputil_group_bucket_counters_to_ofp11(gs, bucket_cnts);
}
Commit Message: ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <pkusunyifeng@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 77,621
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int unix_may_send(struct sock *sk, struct sock *osk)
{
return unix_peer(osk) == NULL || unix_our_peer(sk, osk);
}
Commit Message: af_netlink: force credentials passing [CVE-2012-3520]
Pablo Neira Ayuso discovered that avahi and
potentially NetworkManager accept spoofed Netlink messages because of a
kernel bug. The kernel passes all-zero SCM_CREDENTIALS ancillary data
to the receiver if the sender did not provide such data, instead of not
including any such data at all or including the correct data from the
peer (as it is the case with AF_UNIX).
This bug was introduced in commit 16e572626961
(af_unix: dont send SCM_CREDENTIALS by default)
This patch forces passing credentials for netlink, as
before the regression.
Another fix would be to not add SCM_CREDENTIALS in
netlink messages if not provided by the sender, but it
might break some programs.
With help from Florian Weimer & Petr Matousek
This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3520
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-287
| 0
| 19,307
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void do_perf_sw_event(enum perf_type_id type, u32 event_id,
u64 nr,
struct perf_sample_data *data,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct swevent_htable *swhash = this_cpu_ptr(&swevent_htable);
struct perf_event *event;
struct hlist_head *head;
rcu_read_lock();
head = find_swevent_head_rcu(swhash, type, event_id);
if (!head)
goto end;
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(event, head, hlist_entry) {
if (perf_swevent_match(event, type, event_id, data, regs))
perf_swevent_event(event, nr, data, regs);
}
end:
rcu_read_unlock();
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix event->ctx locking
There have been a few reported issues wrt. the lack of locking around
changing event->ctx. This patch tries to address those.
It avoids the whole rwsem thing; and while it appears to work, please
give it some thought in review.
What I did fail at is sensible runtime checks on the use of
event->ctx, the RCU use makes it very hard.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150123125834.209535886@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 50,432
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: invalidate_persistent (void)
{
DEBUGP (("Disabling further reuse of socket %d.\n", pconn.socket));
pconn_active = false;
fd_close (pconn.socket);
xfree (pconn.host);
xzero (pconn);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 15,487
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PluginObserver::OnCrashedPlugin(const FilePath& plugin_path) {
DCHECK(!plugin_path.value().empty());
string16 plugin_name = plugin_path.LossyDisplayName();
webkit::npapi::WebPluginInfo plugin_info;
if (webkit::npapi::PluginList::Singleton()->GetPluginInfoByPath(
plugin_path, &plugin_info) &&
!plugin_info.name.empty()) {
plugin_name = plugin_info.name;
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
const std::string kPluginExtension = ".plugin";
if (EndsWith(plugin_name, ASCIIToUTF16(kPluginExtension), true))
plugin_name.erase(plugin_name.length() - kPluginExtension.length());
#endif // OS_MACOSX
}
gfx::Image* icon = &ResourceBundle::GetSharedInstance().GetNativeImageNamed(
IDR_INFOBAR_PLUGIN_CRASHED);
tab_contents_->AddInfoBar(new SimpleAlertInfoBarDelegate(tab_contents(),
icon,
l10n_util::GetStringFUTF16(IDS_PLUGIN_CRASHED_PROMPT, plugin_name),
true));
}
Commit Message: Infobar Windows Media Player plug-in by default.
BUG=51464
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7080048
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87500 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 97,963
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FrameView::frameRectsChanged()
{
if (layoutSizeFixedToFrameSize())
setLayoutSizeInternal(frameRect().size());
ScrollView::frameRectsChanged();
}
Commit Message: Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
R=vollick@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 119,837
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void fill_elf_header(struct elfhdr *elf, int segs,
u16 machine, u32 flags, u8 osabi)
{
memset(elf, 0, sizeof(*elf));
memcpy(elf->e_ident, ELFMAG, SELFMAG);
elf->e_ident[EI_CLASS] = ELF_CLASS;
elf->e_ident[EI_DATA] = ELF_DATA;
elf->e_ident[EI_VERSION] = EV_CURRENT;
elf->e_ident[EI_OSABI] = ELF_OSABI;
elf->e_type = ET_CORE;
elf->e_machine = machine;
elf->e_version = EV_CURRENT;
elf->e_phoff = sizeof(struct elfhdr);
elf->e_flags = flags;
elf->e_ehsize = sizeof(struct elfhdr);
elf->e_phentsize = sizeof(struct elf_phdr);
elf->e_phnum = segs;
return;
}
Commit Message: regset: Prevent null pointer reference on readonly regsets
The regset common infrastructure assumed that regsets would always
have .get and .set methods, but not necessarily .active methods.
Unfortunately people have since written regsets without .set methods.
Rather than putting in stub functions everywhere, handle regsets with
null .get or .set methods explicitly.
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 21,449
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: LIBOPENMPT_MODPLUG_API char ModPlug_ExportIT(ModPlugFile* file, const char* filepath)
{
(void)file;
/* not implemented */
fprintf(stderr,"libopenmpt-modplug: error: ModPlug_ExportIT(%s) not implemented.\n",filepath);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: [Fix] libmodplug: C API: Limit the length of strings copied to the output buffer of ModPlug_InstrumentName() and ModPlug_SampleName() to 32 bytes (including terminating null) as is done by original libmodplug. This avoids potential buffer overflows in software relying on this limit instead of querying the required buffer size beforehand. libopenmpt can return strings longer than 32 bytes here beacuse the internal limit of 32 bytes applies to strings encoded in arbitrary character encodings but the API returns them converted to UTF-8, which can be longer. (reported by Antonio Morales Maldonado of Semmle Security Research Team)
git-svn-id: https://source.openmpt.org/svn/openmpt/trunk/OpenMPT@12127 56274372-70c3-4bfc-bfc3-4c3a0b034d27
CWE ID: CWE-120
| 0
| 87,623
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static jpc_fix_t jpc_calcabsstepsize(int stepsize, int numbits)
{
jpc_fix_t absstepsize;
int n;
absstepsize = jpc_inttofix(1);
n = JPC_FIX_FRACBITS - 11;
absstepsize |= (n >= 0) ? (JPC_QCX_GETMANT(stepsize) << n) :
(JPC_QCX_GETMANT(stepsize) >> (-n));
n = numbits - JPC_QCX_GETEXPN(stepsize);
absstepsize = (n >= 0) ? (absstepsize << n) : (absstepsize >> (-n));
return absstepsize;
}
Commit Message: Fixed an integral type promotion problem by adding a JAS_CAST.
Modified the jpc_tsfb_synthesize function so that it will be a noop for
an empty sequence (in order to avoid dereferencing a null pointer).
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 70,404
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void ep_set_ffd(struct epoll_filefd *ffd,
struct file *file, int fd)
{
ffd->file = file;
ffd->fd = fd;
}
Commit Message: epoll: clear the tfile_check_list on -ELOOP
An epoll_ctl(,EPOLL_CTL_ADD,,) operation can return '-ELOOP' to prevent
circular epoll dependencies from being created. However, in that case we
do not properly clear the 'tfile_check_list'. Thus, add a call to
clear_tfile_check_list() for the -ELOOP case.
Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Yurij M. Plotnikov <Yurij.Plotnikov@oktetlabs.ru>
Cc: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@nelhage.com>
Cc: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Tested-by: Alexandra N. Kossovsky <Alexandra.Kossovsky@oktetlabs.ru>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 19,585
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int __udp4_lib_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct udp_table *udptable,
int proto)
{
struct sock *sk;
struct udphdr *uh;
unsigned short ulen;
struct rtable *rt = skb_rtable(skb);
__be32 saddr, daddr;
struct net *net = dev_net(skb->dev);
/*
* Validate the packet.
*/
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct udphdr)))
goto drop; /* No space for header. */
uh = udp_hdr(skb);
ulen = ntohs(uh->len);
saddr = ip_hdr(skb)->saddr;
daddr = ip_hdr(skb)->daddr;
if (ulen > skb->len)
goto short_packet;
if (proto == IPPROTO_UDP) {
/* UDP validates ulen. */
if (ulen < sizeof(*uh) || pskb_trim_rcsum(skb, ulen))
goto short_packet;
uh = udp_hdr(skb);
}
if (udp4_csum_init(skb, uh, proto))
goto csum_error;
if (rt->rt_flags & (RTCF_BROADCAST|RTCF_MULTICAST))
return __udp4_lib_mcast_deliver(net, skb, uh,
saddr, daddr, udptable);
sk = __udp4_lib_lookup_skb(skb, uh->source, uh->dest, udptable);
if (sk != NULL) {
int ret = udp_queue_rcv_skb(sk, skb);
sock_put(sk);
/* a return value > 0 means to resubmit the input, but
* it wants the return to be -protocol, or 0
*/
if (ret > 0)
return -ret;
return 0;
}
if (!xfrm4_policy_check(NULL, XFRM_POLICY_IN, skb))
goto drop;
nf_reset(skb);
/* No socket. Drop packet silently, if checksum is wrong */
if (udp_lib_checksum_complete(skb))
goto csum_error;
UDP_INC_STATS_BH(net, UDP_MIB_NOPORTS, proto == IPPROTO_UDPLITE);
icmp_send(skb, ICMP_DEST_UNREACH, ICMP_PORT_UNREACH, 0);
/*
* Hmm. We got an UDP packet to a port to which we
* don't wanna listen. Ignore it.
*/
kfree_skb(skb);
return 0;
short_packet:
LIMIT_NETDEBUG(KERN_DEBUG "UDP%s: short packet: From %pI4:%u %d/%d to %pI4:%u\n",
proto == IPPROTO_UDPLITE ? "-Lite" : "",
&saddr,
ntohs(uh->source),
ulen,
skb->len,
&daddr,
ntohs(uh->dest));
goto drop;
csum_error:
/*
* RFC1122: OK. Discards the bad packet silently (as far as
* the network is concerned, anyway) as per 4.1.3.4 (MUST).
*/
LIMIT_NETDEBUG(KERN_DEBUG "UDP%s: bad checksum. From %pI4:%u to %pI4:%u ulen %d\n",
proto == IPPROTO_UDPLITE ? "-Lite" : "",
&saddr,
ntohs(uh->source),
&daddr,
ntohs(uh->dest),
ulen);
drop:
UDP_INC_STATS_BH(net, UDP_MIB_INERRORS, proto == IPPROTO_UDPLITE);
kfree_skb(skb);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 19,056
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int read_wrapper_data (WavpackContext *wpc, WavpackMetadata *wpmd)
{
if ((wpc->open_flags & OPEN_WRAPPER) && wpc->wrapper_bytes < MAX_WRAPPER_BYTES && wpmd->byte_length) {
wpc->wrapper_data = realloc (wpc->wrapper_data, wpc->wrapper_bytes + wpmd->byte_length);
if (!wpc->wrapper_data)
return FALSE;
memcpy (wpc->wrapper_data + wpc->wrapper_bytes, wpmd->data, wpmd->byte_length);
wpc->wrapper_bytes += wpmd->byte_length;
}
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: fixes for 4 fuzz failures posted to SourceForge mailing list
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 70,900
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ecryptfs_init_lower_file(struct dentry *dentry,
struct file **lower_file)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
struct dentry *lower_dentry = ecryptfs_dentry_to_lower(dentry);
struct vfsmount *lower_mnt = ecryptfs_dentry_to_lower_mnt(dentry);
int rc;
rc = ecryptfs_privileged_open(lower_file, lower_dentry, lower_mnt,
cred);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "Error opening lower file "
"for lower_dentry [0x%p] and lower_mnt [0x%p]; "
"rc = [%d]\n", lower_dentry, lower_mnt, rc);
(*lower_file) = NULL;
}
return rc;
}
Commit Message: Ecryptfs: Add mount option to check uid of device being mounted = expect uid
Close a TOCTOU race for mounts done via ecryptfs-mount-private. The mount
source (device) can be raced when the ownership test is done in userspace.
Provide Ecryptfs a means to force the uid check at mount time.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 27,367
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MagickExport Cache ReferencePixelCache(Cache cache)
{
CacheInfo
*magick_restrict cache_info;
assert(cache != (Cache *) NULL);
cache_info=(CacheInfo *) cache;
assert(cache_info->signature == MagickSignature);
LockSemaphoreInfo(cache_info->semaphore);
cache_info->reference_count++;
UnlockSemaphoreInfo(cache_info->semaphore);
return(cache_info);
}
Commit Message: http://www.imagemagick.org/discourse-server/viewtopic.php?f=2&t=28946
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 73,504
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void InspectorCSSOMWrappers::collectFromStyleSheetIfNeeded(CSSStyleSheet* styleSheet)
{
if (!m_styleRuleToCSSOMWrapperMap.isEmpty())
collect(styleSheet);
}
Commit Message: Remove the Simple Default Stylesheet, it's just a foot-gun.
We've been bitten by the Simple Default Stylesheet being out
of sync with the real html.css twice this week.
The Simple Default Stylesheet was invented years ago for Mac:
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/36135
It nicely handles the case where you just want to create
a single WebView and parse some simple HTML either without
styling said HTML, or only to display a small string, etc.
Note that this optimization/complexity *only* helps for the
very first document, since the default stylesheets are
all static (process-global) variables. Since any real page
on the internet uses a tag not covered by the simple default
stylesheet, not real load benefits from this optimization.
Only uses of WebView which were just rendering small bits
of text might have benefited from this. about:blank would
also have used this sheet.
This was a common application for some uses of WebView back
in those days. These days, even with WebView on Android,
there are likely much larger overheads than parsing the
html.css stylesheet, so making it required seems like the
right tradeoff of code-simplicity for this case.
BUG=319556
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73723005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162153 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 118,937
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: get_modifiers(char *buf, int16 *weight, bool *prefix)
{
*weight = 0;
*prefix = false;
if (!t_iseq(buf, ':'))
return buf;
buf++;
while (*buf && pg_mblen(buf) == 1)
{
switch (*buf)
{
case 'a':
case 'A':
*weight |= 1 << 3;
break;
case 'b':
case 'B':
*weight |= 1 << 2;
break;
case 'c':
case 'C':
*weight |= 1 << 1;
break;
case 'd':
case 'D':
*weight |= 1;
break;
case '*':
*prefix = true;
break;
default:
return buf;
}
buf++;
}
return buf;
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 39,021
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool EditorClientBlackBerry::isSelectTrailingWhitespaceEnabled()
{
if (m_webPagePrivate->m_dumpRenderTree)
return m_webPagePrivate->m_dumpRenderTree->isSelectTrailingWhitespaceEnabled();
return false;
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Prevent text selection inside Colour and Date/Time input fields
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=111733
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
PR 305194.
Prevent selection for popup input fields as they are buttons.
Informally Reviewed Gen Mak.
* WebCoreSupport/EditorClientBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::EditorClientBlackBerry::shouldChangeSelectedRange):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@145121 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 104,753
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ok_to_run(const char *program) {
if (strstr(program, "/")) {
if (access(program, X_OK) == 0) // it will also dereference symlinks
return 1;
}
else { // search $PATH
char *path1 = getenv("PATH");
if (path1) {
if (arg_debug)
printf("Searching $PATH for %s\n", program);
char *path2 = strdup(path1);
if (!path2)
errExit("strdup");
char *ptr = strtok(path2, ":");
while (ptr) {
char *fname;
if (asprintf(&fname, "%s/%s", ptr, program) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
if (arg_debug)
printf("trying #%s#\n", fname);
struct stat s;
int rv = stat(fname, &s);
if (rv == 0) {
if (access(fname, X_OK) == 0) {
free(path2);
free(fname);
return 1;
}
else
fprintf(stderr, "Error: execute permission denied for %s\n", fname);
free(fname);
break;
}
free(fname);
ptr = strtok(NULL, ":");
}
free(path2);
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mount runtime seccomp files read-only (#2602)
avoid creating locations in the file system that are both writable and
executable (in this case for processes with euid of the user).
for the same reason also remove user owned libfiles
when it is not needed any more
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 89,760
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __init init_nlm(void)
{
int err;
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
err = -ENOMEM;
nlm_sysctl_table = register_sysctl_table(nlm_sysctl_root);
if (nlm_sysctl_table == NULL)
goto err_sysctl;
#endif
err = register_pernet_subsys(&lockd_net_ops);
if (err)
goto err_pernet;
err = lockd_create_procfs();
if (err)
goto err_procfs;
return 0;
err_procfs:
unregister_pernet_subsys(&lockd_net_ops);
err_pernet:
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
unregister_sysctl_table(nlm_sysctl_table);
err_sysctl:
#endif
return err;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 65,195
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cib_send_tls(gnutls_session * session, xmlNode * msg)
{
char *xml_text = NULL;
# if 0
const char *name = crm_element_name(msg);
if (safe_str_neq(name, "cib_command")) {
xmlNodeSetName(msg, "cib_result");
}
# endif
xml_text = dump_xml_unformatted(msg);
if (xml_text != NULL) {
char *unsent = xml_text;
int len = strlen(xml_text);
int rc = 0;
len++; /* null char */
crm_trace("Message size: %d", len);
while (TRUE) {
rc = gnutls_record_send(*session, unsent, len);
crm_debug("Sent %d bytes", rc);
if (rc == GNUTLS_E_INTERRUPTED || rc == GNUTLS_E_AGAIN) {
crm_debug("Retry");
} else if (rc < 0) {
crm_debug("Connection terminated");
break;
} else if (rc < len) {
crm_debug("Only sent %d of %d bytes", rc, len);
len -= rc;
unsent += rc;
} else {
break;
}
}
}
free(xml_text);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 1
| 166,161
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void voidMethodLongLongArgMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
ExceptionState exceptionState(ExceptionState::ExecutionContext, "voidMethodLongLongArg", "TestObjectPython", info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate());
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() < 1)) {
exceptionState.throwTypeError(ExceptionMessages::notEnoughArguments(1, info.Length()));
exceptionState.throwIfNeeded();
return;
}
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_EXCEPTION_VOID(long long, longLongArg, toInt64(info[0], exceptionState), exceptionState);
imp->voidMethodLongLongArg(longLongArg);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 122,844
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool FileUtilProxy::ReadDirectory(
scoped_refptr<MessageLoopProxy> message_loop_proxy,
const FilePath& file_path,
ReadDirectoryCallback* callback) {
return Start(FROM_HERE, message_loop_proxy, new RelayReadDirectory(
file_path, callback));
}
Commit Message: Fix a small leak in FileUtilProxy
BUG=none
TEST=green mem bots
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7669046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97451 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 97,642
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: evdns_search_add(const char *domain) {
evdns_base_search_add(current_base, domain);
}
Commit Message: evdns: fix searching empty hostnames
From #332:
Here follows a bug report by **Guido Vranken** via the _Tor bug bounty program_. Please credit Guido accordingly.
## Bug report
The DNS code of Libevent contains this rather obvious OOB read:
```c
static char *
search_make_new(const struct search_state *const state, int n, const char *const base_name) {
const size_t base_len = strlen(base_name);
const char need_to_append_dot = base_name[base_len - 1] == '.' ? 0 : 1;
```
If the length of ```base_name``` is 0, then line 3125 reads 1 byte before the buffer. This will trigger a crash on ASAN-protected builds.
To reproduce:
Build libevent with ASAN:
```
$ CFLAGS='-fomit-frame-pointer -fsanitize=address' ./configure && make -j4
```
Put the attached ```resolv.conf``` and ```poc.c``` in the source directory and then do:
```
$ gcc -fsanitize=address -fomit-frame-pointer poc.c .libs/libevent.a
$ ./a.out
=================================================================
==22201== ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60060000efdf at pc 0x4429da bp 0x7ffe1ed47300 sp 0x7ffe1ed472f8
READ of size 1 at 0x60060000efdf thread T0
```
P.S. we can add a check earlier, but since this is very uncommon, I didn't add it.
Fixes: #332
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 70,638
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t Parcel::writeString16Vector(
const std::unique_ptr<std::vector<std::unique_ptr<String16>>>& val)
{
return writeNullableTypedVector(val, &Parcel::writeString16);
}
Commit Message: Add bound checks to utf16_to_utf8
Bug: 29250543
Change-Id: I518e7b2fe10aaa3f1c1987586a09b1110aff7e1a
(cherry picked from commit 7e93b2ddcb49b5365fbe1dab134ffb38e6f1c719)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 163,628
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: av_cold int ff_h263_decode_init(AVCodecContext *avctx)
{
MpegEncContext *s = avctx->priv_data;
int ret;
s->out_format = FMT_H263;
ff_mpv_decode_defaults(s);
ff_mpv_decode_init(s, avctx);
s->quant_precision = 5;
s->decode_mb = ff_h263_decode_mb;
s->low_delay = 1;
s->unrestricted_mv = 1;
/* select sub codec */
switch (avctx->codec->id) {
case AV_CODEC_ID_H263:
case AV_CODEC_ID_H263P:
s->unrestricted_mv = 0;
avctx->chroma_sample_location = AVCHROMA_LOC_CENTER;
break;
case AV_CODEC_ID_MPEG4:
break;
case AV_CODEC_ID_MSMPEG4V1:
s->h263_pred = 1;
s->msmpeg4_version = 1;
break;
case AV_CODEC_ID_MSMPEG4V2:
s->h263_pred = 1;
s->msmpeg4_version = 2;
break;
case AV_CODEC_ID_MSMPEG4V3:
s->h263_pred = 1;
s->msmpeg4_version = 3;
break;
case AV_CODEC_ID_WMV1:
s->h263_pred = 1;
s->msmpeg4_version = 4;
break;
case AV_CODEC_ID_WMV2:
s->h263_pred = 1;
s->msmpeg4_version = 5;
break;
case AV_CODEC_ID_VC1:
case AV_CODEC_ID_WMV3:
case AV_CODEC_ID_VC1IMAGE:
case AV_CODEC_ID_WMV3IMAGE:
case AV_CODEC_ID_MSS2:
s->h263_pred = 1;
s->msmpeg4_version = 6;
avctx->chroma_sample_location = AVCHROMA_LOC_LEFT;
break;
case AV_CODEC_ID_H263I:
break;
case AV_CODEC_ID_FLV1:
s->h263_flv = 1;
break;
default:
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Unsupported codec %d\n",
avctx->codec->id);
return AVERROR(ENOSYS);
}
s->codec_id = avctx->codec->id;
if (avctx->codec_tag == AV_RL32("L263") || avctx->codec_tag == AV_RL32("S263"))
if (avctx->extradata_size == 56 && avctx->extradata[0] == 1)
s->ehc_mode = 1;
/* for H.263, we allocate the images after having read the header */
if (avctx->codec->id != AV_CODEC_ID_H263 &&
avctx->codec->id != AV_CODEC_ID_H263P &&
avctx->codec->id != AV_CODEC_ID_MPEG4) {
avctx->pix_fmt = h263_get_format(avctx);
ff_mpv_idct_init(s);
if ((ret = ff_mpv_common_init(s)) < 0)
return ret;
}
ff_h263dsp_init(&s->h263dsp);
ff_qpeldsp_init(&s->qdsp);
ff_h263_decode_init_vlc();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/mpeg4videodec: Remove use of FF_PROFILE_MPEG4_SIMPLE_STUDIO as indicator of studio profile
The profile field is changed by code inside and outside the decoder,
its not a reliable indicator of the internal codec state.
Maintaining it consistency with studio_profile is messy.
Its easier to just avoid it and use only studio_profile
Fixes: assertion failure
Fixes: ffmpeg_crash_9.avi
Found-by: Thuan Pham, Marcel Böhme, Andrew Santosa and Alexandru Razvan Caciulescu with AFLSmart
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 79,880
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FindInPageControllerTest() {
EnableDOMAutomation();
#if defined(TOOLKIT_VIEWS)
DropdownBarHost::disable_animations_during_testing_ = true;
#elif defined(TOOLKIT_GTK)
SlideAnimatorGtk::SetAnimationsForTesting(false);
#elif defined(OS_MACOSX)
FindBarBridge::disable_animations_during_testing_ = true;
#endif
}
Commit Message: Rename the TabContentWrapper pieces to be "TabHelper"s. (Except for the PasswordManager... for now.) Also, just pre-create them up-front. It saves us effort, as they're all going to be eventually created anyway, so being lazy saves us nothing and creates headaches since the rules about what can be lazy differ from feature to feature.
BUG=71097
TEST=zero visible change
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6480117
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@75170 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 102,083
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HTMLFormControlElement::setAutofilled(bool autofilled)
{
if (autofilled == m_isAutofilled)
return;
m_isAutofilled = autofilled;
setNeedsStyleRecalc();
}
Commit Message: Add HTMLFormControlElement::supportsAutofocus to fix a FIXME comment.
This virtual function should return true if the form control can hanlde
'autofocucs' attribute if it is specified.
Note: HTMLInputElement::supportsAutofocus reuses InputType::isInteractiveContent
because interactiveness is required for autofocus capability.
BUG=none
TEST=none; no behavior changes.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/143343003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165432 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 113,936
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BrowserRenderProcessHost::OnUserMetricsRecordAction(
const std::string& action) {
UserMetrics::RecordComputedAction(action);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 98,805
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static TEE_Result get_prop_tee_sys_time_prot_level(
struct tee_ta_session *sess __unused,
void *buf, size_t *blen)
{
uint32_t prot;
if (*blen < sizeof(prot)) {
*blen = sizeof(prot);
return TEE_ERROR_SHORT_BUFFER;
}
*blen = sizeof(prot);
prot = tee_time_get_sys_time_protection_level();
return tee_svc_copy_to_user(buf, &prot, sizeof(prot));
}
Commit Message: core: svc: always check ta parameters
Always check TA parameters from a user TA. This prevents a user TA from
passing invalid pointers to a pseudo TA.
Fixes: OP-TEE-2018-0007: "Buffer checks missing when calling pseudo
TAs".
Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org> (QEMU v7, v8)
Reviewed-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Riscure <inforequest@riscure.com>
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <a.a.milburn@vu.nl>
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@linaro.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 86,909
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int dcbnl_setall(struct net_device *netdev, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
u32 seq, struct nlattr **tb, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
int ret;
if (!tb[DCB_ATTR_SET_ALL])
return -EINVAL;
if (!netdev->dcbnl_ops->setall)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
ret = nla_put_u8(skb, DCB_ATTR_SET_ALL,
netdev->dcbnl_ops->setall(netdev));
dcbnl_cee_notify(netdev, RTM_SETDCB, DCB_CMD_SET_ALL, seq, 0);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: dcbnl: fix various netlink info leaks
The dcb netlink interface leaks stack memory in various places:
* perm_addr[] buffer is only filled at max with 12 of the 32 bytes but
copied completely,
* no in-kernel driver fills all fields of an IEEE 802.1Qaz subcommand,
so we're leaking up to 58 bytes for ieee_ets structs, up to 136 bytes
for ieee_pfc structs, etc.,
* the same is true for CEE -- no in-kernel driver fills the whole
struct,
Prevent all of the above stack info leaks by properly initializing the
buffers/structures involved.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 31,112
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::ExecuteScriptsWaitingForResources() {
if (!IsScriptExecutionReady())
return;
if (ScriptableDocumentParser* parser = GetScriptableDocumentParser())
parser->ExecuteScriptsWaitingForResources();
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 129,703
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int wa_fill_descr(struct wahc *wa)
{
int result;
struct device *dev = &wa->usb_iface->dev;
char *itr;
struct usb_device *usb_dev = wa->usb_dev;
struct usb_descriptor_header *hdr;
struct usb_wa_descriptor *wa_descr;
size_t itr_size, actconfig_idx;
actconfig_idx = (usb_dev->actconfig - usb_dev->config) /
sizeof(usb_dev->config[0]);
itr = usb_dev->rawdescriptors[actconfig_idx];
itr_size = le16_to_cpu(usb_dev->actconfig->desc.wTotalLength);
while (itr_size >= sizeof(*hdr)) {
hdr = (struct usb_descriptor_header *) itr;
dev_dbg(dev, "Extra device descriptor: "
"type %02x/%u bytes @ %zu (%zu left)\n",
hdr->bDescriptorType, hdr->bLength,
(itr - usb_dev->rawdescriptors[actconfig_idx]),
itr_size);
if (hdr->bDescriptorType == USB_DT_WIRE_ADAPTER)
goto found;
itr += hdr->bLength;
itr_size -= hdr->bLength;
}
dev_err(dev, "cannot find Wire Adapter Class descriptor\n");
return -ENODEV;
found:
result = -EINVAL;
if (hdr->bLength > itr_size) { /* is it available? */
dev_err(dev, "incomplete Wire Adapter Class descriptor "
"(%zu bytes left, %u needed)\n",
itr_size, hdr->bLength);
goto error;
}
if (hdr->bLength < sizeof(*wa->wa_descr)) {
dev_err(dev, "short Wire Adapter Class descriptor\n");
goto error;
}
wa->wa_descr = wa_descr = (struct usb_wa_descriptor *) hdr;
if (le16_to_cpu(wa_descr->bcdWAVersion) > 0x0100)
dev_warn(dev, "Wire Adapter v%d.%d newer than groked v1.0\n",
(le16_to_cpu(wa_descr->bcdWAVersion) & 0xff00) >> 8,
le16_to_cpu(wa_descr->bcdWAVersion) & 0x00ff);
result = 0;
error:
return result;
}
Commit Message: USB: check usb_get_extra_descriptor for proper size
When reading an extra descriptor, we need to properly check the minimum
and maximum size allowed, to prevent from invalid data being sent by a
device.
Reported-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Co-developed-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 75,594
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ikev2_n_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay _U_,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext,
u_int item_len, const u_char *ep,
uint32_t phase _U_, uint32_t doi _U_,
uint32_t proto _U_, int depth _U_)
{
const struct ikev2_n *p;
struct ikev2_n n;
const u_char *cp;
u_char showspi, showdata, showsomedata;
const char *notify_name;
uint32_t type;
p = (const struct ikev2_n *)ext;
ND_TCHECK(*p);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&n, ext, sizeof(n));
ikev2_pay_print(ndo, NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_N), n.h.critical);
showspi = 1;
showdata = 0;
showsomedata=0;
notify_name=NULL;
ND_PRINT((ndo," prot_id=%s", PROTOIDSTR(n.prot_id)));
type = ntohs(n.type);
/* notify space is annoying sparse */
switch(type) {
case IV2_NOTIFY_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_PAYLOAD:
notify_name = "unsupported_critical_payload";
showspi = 0;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_INVALID_IKE_SPI:
notify_name = "invalid_ike_spi";
showspi = 1;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_INVALID_MAJOR_VERSION:
notify_name = "invalid_major_version";
showspi = 0;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_INVALID_SYNTAX:
notify_name = "invalid_syntax";
showspi = 1;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_INVALID_MESSAGE_ID:
notify_name = "invalid_message_id";
showspi = 1;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_INVALID_SPI:
notify_name = "invalid_spi";
showspi = 1;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN:
notify_name = "no_protocol_chosen";
showspi = 1;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_INVALID_KE_PAYLOAD:
notify_name = "invalid_ke_payload";
showspi = 1;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED:
notify_name = "authentication_failed";
showspi = 1;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_SINGLE_PAIR_REQUIRED:
notify_name = "single_pair_required";
showspi = 1;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_NO_ADDITIONAL_SAS:
notify_name = "no_additional_sas";
showspi = 0;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_INTERNAL_ADDRESS_FAILURE:
notify_name = "internal_address_failure";
showspi = 0;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_FAILED_CP_REQUIRED:
notify_name = "failed:cp_required";
showspi = 0;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_INVALID_SELECTORS:
notify_name = "invalid_selectors";
showspi = 0;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_INITIAL_CONTACT:
notify_name = "initial_contact";
showspi = 0;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_SET_WINDOW_SIZE:
notify_name = "set_window_size";
showspi = 0;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_ADDITIONAL_TS_POSSIBLE:
notify_name = "additional_ts_possible";
showspi = 0;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_IPCOMP_SUPPORTED:
notify_name = "ipcomp_supported";
showspi = 0;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP:
notify_name = "nat_detection_source_ip";
showspi = 1;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP:
notify_name = "nat_detection_destination_ip";
showspi = 1;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_COOKIE:
notify_name = "cookie";
showspi = 1;
showsomedata= 1;
showdata= 0;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_USE_TRANSPORT_MODE:
notify_name = "use_transport_mode";
showspi = 0;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_HTTP_CERT_LOOKUP_SUPPORTED:
notify_name = "http_cert_lookup_supported";
showspi = 0;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_REKEY_SA:
notify_name = "rekey_sa";
showspi = 1;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_ESP_TFC_PADDING_NOT_SUPPORTED:
notify_name = "tfc_padding_not_supported";
showspi = 0;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_NON_FIRST_FRAGMENTS_ALSO:
notify_name = "non_first_fragment_also";
showspi = 0;
break;
default:
if (type < 8192) {
notify_name="error";
} else if(type < 16384) {
notify_name="private-error";
} else if(type < 40960) {
notify_name="status";
} else {
notify_name="private-status";
}
}
if(notify_name) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%u(%s)", type, notify_name));
}
if (showspi && n.spi_size) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," spi="));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(p + 1), n.spi_size))
goto trunc;
}
cp = (const u_char *)(p + 1) + n.spi_size;
if(3 < ndo->ndo_vflag) {
showdata = 1;
}
if ((showdata || (showsomedata && ep-cp < 30)) && cp < ep) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," data=("));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(cp), ep - cp))
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
} else if(showsomedata && cp < ep) {
if(!ike_show_somedata(ndo, cp, ep)) goto trunc;
}
return (const u_char *)ext + item_len;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_N)));
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12990/Fix printing of ISAKMPv1 Notification payload data.
The closest thing to a specification for the contents of the payload
data is draft-ietf-ipsec-notifymsg-04, and nothing in there says that it
is ever a complete ISAKMP message, so don't dissect types we don't have
specific code for as a complete ISAKMP message.
While we're at it, fix a comment, and clean up printing of V1 Nonce,
V2 Authentication payloads, and v2 Notice payloads.
This fixes an infinite loop discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 1
| 167,927
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int regulator_suspend_prepare(suspend_state_t state)
{
struct regulator_dev *rdev;
int ret = 0;
/* ON is handled by regulator active state */
if (state == PM_SUSPEND_ON)
return -EINVAL;
mutex_lock(®ulator_list_mutex);
list_for_each_entry(rdev, ®ulator_list, list) {
mutex_lock(&rdev->mutex);
ret = suspend_prepare(rdev, state);
mutex_unlock(&rdev->mutex);
if (ret < 0) {
rdev_err(rdev, "failed to prepare\n");
goto out;
}
}
out:
mutex_unlock(®ulator_list_mutex);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: regulator: core: Fix regualtor_ena_gpio_free not to access pin after freeing
After freeing pin from regulator_ena_gpio_free, loop can access
the pin. So this patch fixes not to access pin after freeing.
Signed-off-by: Seung-Woo Kim <sw0312.kim@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 74,551
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: InputDispatcher::Connection::Connection(const sp<InputChannel>& inputChannel,
const sp<InputWindowHandle>& inputWindowHandle, bool monitor) :
status(STATUS_NORMAL), inputChannel(inputChannel), inputWindowHandle(inputWindowHandle),
monitor(monitor),
inputPublisher(inputChannel), inputPublisherBlocked(false) {
}
Commit Message: Add new MotionEvent flag for partially obscured windows.
Due to more complex window layouts resulting in lots of overlapping
windows, the policy around FLAG_WINDOW_IS_OBSCURED has changed to
only be set when the point at which the window was touched is
obscured. Unfortunately, this doesn't prevent tapjacking attacks that
overlay the dialog's text, making a potentially dangerous operation
seem innocuous. To avoid this on particularly sensitive dialogs,
introduce a new flag that really does tell you when your window is
being even partially overlapped.
We aren't exposing this as API since we plan on making the original
flag more robust. This is really a workaround for system dialogs
since we generally know their layout and screen position, and that
they're unlikely to be overlapped by other applications.
Bug: 26677796
Change-Id: I9e336afe90f262ba22015876769a9c510048fd47
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 163,710
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: lseg_eq(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
LSEG *l1 = PG_GETARG_LSEG_P(0);
LSEG *l2 = PG_GETARG_LSEG_P(1);
PG_RETURN_BOOL(FPeq(l1->p[0].x, l2->p[0].x) &&
FPeq(l1->p[0].y, l2->p[0].y) &&
FPeq(l1->p[1].x, l2->p[1].x) &&
FPeq(l1->p[1].y, l2->p[1].y));
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 38,917
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::OnDocumentLoadedInFrame() {
if (!HasValidFrameSource())
return;
RenderFrameHostImpl* rfh =
static_cast<RenderFrameHostImpl*>(render_frame_message_source_);
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(
WebContentsObserver, observers_, DocumentLoadedInFrame(rfh));
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 131,922
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cJSON *cJSON_CreateIntArray(const int *numbers,int count) {int i;cJSON *n=0,*p=0,*a=cJSON_CreateArray();for(i=0;a && i<count;i++){n=cJSON_CreateNumber(numbers[i]);if(!n){cJSON_Delete(a);return 0;}if(!i)a->child=n;else suffix_object(p,n);p=n;}return a;}
Commit Message: fix buffer overflow (#30)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 93,700
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static WebURLRequest::RequestContext DetermineRequestContextFromNavigationType(
const NavigationType navigation_type) {
switch (navigation_type) {
case kNavigationTypeLinkClicked:
return WebURLRequest::kRequestContextHyperlink;
case kNavigationTypeOther:
return WebURLRequest::kRequestContextLocation;
case kNavigationTypeFormResubmitted:
case kNavigationTypeFormSubmitted:
return WebURLRequest::kRequestContextForm;
case kNavigationTypeBackForward:
case kNavigationTypeReload:
return WebURLRequest::kRequestContextInternal;
}
NOTREACHED();
return WebURLRequest::kRequestContextHyperlink;
}
Commit Message: Fix detach with open()ed document leaving parent loading indefinitely
Change-Id: I26c2a054b9f1e5eb076acd677e1223058825f6d6
Bug: 803416
Test: fast/loader/document-open-iframe-then-detach.html
Change-Id: I26c2a054b9f1e5eb076acd677e1223058825f6d6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/887298
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532967}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 125,787
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __init ftrace_mod_cmd_init(void)
{
return register_ftrace_command(&ftrace_mod_cmd);
}
Commit Message: tracing: Fix possible NULL pointer dereferences
Currently set_ftrace_pid and set_graph_function files use seq_lseek
for their fops. However seq_open() is called only for FMODE_READ in
the fops->open() so that if an user tries to seek one of those file
when she open it for writing, it sees NULL seq_file and then panic.
It can be easily reproduced with following command:
$ cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
$ echo 1234 | sudo tee -a set_ftrace_pid
In this example, GNU coreutils' tee opens the file with fopen(, "a")
and then the fopen() internally calls lseek().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365663302-2170-1-git-send-email-namhyung@kernel.org
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung.kim@lge.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 30,180
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void fill_elf_header(struct elfhdr *elf, int segs,
u16 machine, u32 flags)
{
memset(elf, 0, sizeof(*elf));
memcpy(elf->e_ident, ELFMAG, SELFMAG);
elf->e_ident[EI_CLASS] = ELF_CLASS;
elf->e_ident[EI_DATA] = ELF_DATA;
elf->e_ident[EI_VERSION] = EV_CURRENT;
elf->e_ident[EI_OSABI] = ELF_OSABI;
elf->e_type = ET_CORE;
elf->e_machine = machine;
elf->e_version = EV_CURRENT;
elf->e_phoff = sizeof(struct elfhdr);
elf->e_flags = flags;
elf->e_ehsize = sizeof(struct elfhdr);
elf->e_phentsize = sizeof(struct elf_phdr);
elf->e_phnum = segs;
return;
}
Commit Message: x86, mm/ASLR: Fix stack randomization on 64-bit systems
The issue is that the stack for processes is not properly randomized on
64 bit architectures due to an integer overflow.
The affected function is randomize_stack_top() in file
"fs/binfmt_elf.c":
static unsigned long randomize_stack_top(unsigned long stack_top)
{
unsigned int random_variable = 0;
if ((current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE) &&
!(current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE)) {
random_variable = get_random_int() & STACK_RND_MASK;
random_variable <<= PAGE_SHIFT;
}
return PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top) + random_variable;
return PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top) - random_variable;
}
Note that, it declares the "random_variable" variable as "unsigned int".
Since the result of the shifting operation between STACK_RND_MASK (which
is 0x3fffff on x86_64, 22 bits) and PAGE_SHIFT (which is 12 on x86_64):
random_variable <<= PAGE_SHIFT;
then the two leftmost bits are dropped when storing the result in the
"random_variable". This variable shall be at least 34 bits long to hold
the (22+12) result.
These two dropped bits have an impact on the entropy of process stack.
Concretely, the total stack entropy is reduced by four: from 2^28 to
2^30 (One fourth of expected entropy).
This patch restores back the entropy by correcting the types involved
in the operations in the functions randomize_stack_top() and
stack_maxrandom_size().
The successful fix can be tested with:
$ for i in `seq 1 10`; do cat /proc/self/maps | grep stack; done
7ffeda566000-7ffeda587000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
7fff5a332000-7fff5a353000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
7ffcdb7a1000-7ffcdb7c2000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
7ffd5e2c4000-7ffd5e2e5000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
...
Once corrected, the leading bytes should be between 7ffc and 7fff,
rather than always being 7fff.
Signed-off-by: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es>
Signed-off-by: Ismael Ripoll <iripoll@upv.es>
[ Rebased, fixed 80 char bugs, cleaned up commit message, added test example and CVE ]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Fixes: CVE-2015-1593
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150214173350.GA18393@www.outflux.net
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 44,283
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool DevToolsConfirmInfoBarDelegate::Accept() {
callback_.Run(true);
callback_.Reset();
return true;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: handle devtools renderer unresponsiveness during beforeunload event interception
This patch fixes the crash which happenes under the following conditions:
1. DevTools window is in undocked state
2. DevTools renderer is unresponsive
3. User attempts to close inspected page
BUG=322380
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/84883002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@237611 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 113,122
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gfx::ImageSkia BrowserView::GetWindowIcon() {
if (browser_->is_app())
return browser_->GetCurrentPageIcon().AsImageSkia();
return gfx::ImageSkia();
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 118,377
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HTMLMediaElement::setLoop(bool b) {
BLINK_MEDIA_LOG << "setLoop(" << (void*)this << ", " << boolString(b) << ")";
setBooleanAttribute(loopAttr, b);
}
Commit Message: [Blink>Media] Allow autoplay muted on Android by default
There was a mistake causing autoplay muted is shipped on Android
but it will be disabled if the chromium embedder doesn't specify
content setting for "AllowAutoplay" preference. This CL makes the
AllowAutoplay preference true by default so that it is allowed by
embedders (including AndroidWebView) unless they explicitly
disable it.
Intent to ship:
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/Q1cnzNI2GpI/AL_eyUNABgAJ
BUG=689018
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2677173002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#448423}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 128,911
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xfs_ioc_setxflags(
xfs_inode_t *ip,
struct file *filp,
void __user *arg)
{
struct fsxattr fa;
unsigned int flags;
unsigned int mask;
int error;
if (copy_from_user(&flags, arg, sizeof(flags)))
return -EFAULT;
if (flags & ~(FS_IMMUTABLE_FL | FS_APPEND_FL | \
FS_NOATIME_FL | FS_NODUMP_FL | \
FS_SYNC_FL))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
mask = FSX_XFLAGS;
if (filp->f_flags & (O_NDELAY|O_NONBLOCK))
mask |= FSX_NONBLOCK;
fa.fsx_xflags = xfs_merge_ioc_xflags(flags, xfs_ip2xflags(ip));
error = mnt_want_write_file(filp);
if (error)
return error;
error = xfs_ioctl_setattr(ip, &fa, mask);
mnt_drop_write_file(filp);
return -error;
}
Commit Message: fs,userns: Change inode_capable to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid
The kernel has no concept of capabilities with respect to inodes; inodes
exist independently of namespaces. For example, inode_capable(inode,
CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) would be nonsense.
This patch changes inode_capable to check for uid and gid mappings and
renames it to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid, which should make it more
obvious what it does.
Fixes CVE-2014-4014.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 36,923
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __net_exit default_device_exit(struct net *net)
{
struct net_device *dev, *aux;
/*
* Push all migratable network devices back to the
* initial network namespace
*/
rtnl_lock();
for_each_netdev_safe(net, dev, aux) {
int err;
char fb_name[IFNAMSIZ];
/* Ignore unmoveable devices (i.e. loopback) */
if (dev->features & NETIF_F_NETNS_LOCAL)
continue;
/* Leave virtual devices for the generic cleanup */
if (dev->rtnl_link_ops)
continue;
/* Push remaining network devices to init_net */
snprintf(fb_name, IFNAMSIZ, "dev%d", dev->ifindex);
err = dev_change_net_namespace(dev, &init_net, fb_name);
if (err) {
pr_emerg("%s: failed to move %s to init_net: %d\n",
__func__, dev->name, err);
BUG();
}
}
rtnl_unlock();
}
Commit Message: tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 48,770
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: R_API int r_core_cmd_foreach3(RCore *core, const char *cmd, char *each) { // "@@@"
RDebug *dbg = core->dbg;
RList *list, *head;
RListIter *iter;
int i;
const char *filter = NULL;
if (each[1] == ':') {
filter = each + 2;
}
switch (each[0]) {
case '=':
foreach_pairs (core, cmd, each + 1);
break;
case '?':
r_core_cmd_help (core, help_msg_at_at_at);
break;
case 'c':
if (filter) {
char *arg = r_core_cmd_str (core, filter);
foreach_pairs (core, cmd, arg);
free (arg);
} else {
eprintf ("Usage: @@@c:command # same as @@@=`command`\n");
}
break;
case 'C':
r_meta_list_cb (core->anal, R_META_TYPE_COMMENT, 0, foreach_comment, (void*)cmd, UT64_MAX);
break;
case 'm':
{
int fd = r_io_fd_get_current (core->io);
RList *maps = r_io_map_get_for_fd (core->io, fd);
RIOMap *map;
if (maps) {
RListIter *iter;
r_list_foreach (maps, iter, map) {
r_core_seek (core, map->itv.addr, 1);
r_core_block_size (core, map->itv.size);
r_core_cmd0 (core, cmd);
}
r_list_free (maps);
}
}
break;
case 'M':
if (dbg && dbg->h && dbg->maps) {
RDebugMap *map;
r_list_foreach (dbg->maps, iter, map) {
r_core_seek (core, map->addr, 1);
r_core_cmd0 (core, cmd);
}
}
break;
case 't':
if (dbg && dbg->h && dbg->h->threads) {
int origpid = dbg->pid;
RDebugPid *p;
list = dbg->h->threads (dbg, dbg->pid);
if (!list) {
return false;
}
r_list_foreach (list, iter, p) {
r_core_cmdf (core, "dp %d", p->pid);
r_cons_printf ("PID %d\n", p->pid);
r_core_cmd0 (core, cmd);
}
r_core_cmdf (core, "dp %d", origpid);
r_list_free (list);
}
break;
case 'r':
{
ut64 offorig = core->offset;
for (i = 0; i < 128; i++) {
RRegItem *item;
ut64 value;
head = r_reg_get_list (dbg->reg, i);
if (!head) {
continue;
}
r_list_foreach (head, iter, item) {
if (item->size != core->anal->bits) {
continue;
}
value = r_reg_get_value (dbg->reg, item);
r_core_seek (core, value, 1);
r_cons_printf ("%s: ", item->name);
r_core_cmd0 (core, cmd);
}
}
r_core_seek (core, offorig, 1);
}
break;
case 'i': // @@@i
{
RBinImport *imp;
ut64 offorig = core->offset;
list = r_bin_get_imports (core->bin);
r_list_foreach (list, iter, imp) {
char *impflag = r_str_newf ("sym.imp.%s", imp->name);
ut64 addr = r_num_math (core->num, impflag);
free (impflag);
if (addr && addr != UT64_MAX) {
r_core_seek (core, addr, 1);
r_core_cmd0 (core, cmd);
}
}
r_core_seek (core, offorig, 1);
}
break;
case 'S': // "@@@S"
{
RBinObject *obj = r_bin_cur_object (core->bin);
if (obj) {
ut64 offorig = core->offset;
ut64 bszorig = core->blocksize;
RBinSection *sec;
RListIter *iter;
r_list_foreach (obj->sections, iter, sec) {
r_core_seek (core, sec->vaddr, 1);
r_core_block_size (core, sec->vsize);
r_core_cmd0 (core, cmd);
}
r_core_block_size (core, bszorig);
r_core_seek (core, offorig, 1);
}
}
#if ATTIC
if (each[1] == 'S') {
RListIter *it;
RBinSection *sec;
RBinObject *obj = r_bin_cur_object (core->bin);
int cbsz = core->blocksize;
r_list_foreach (obj->sections, it, sec){
ut64 addr = sec->vaddr;
ut64 size = sec->vsize;
r_core_seek_size (core, addr, size);
r_core_cmd (core, cmd, 0);
}
r_core_block_size (core, cbsz);
}
#endif
break;
case 's':
if (each[1] == 't') { // strings
list = r_bin_get_strings (core->bin);
RBinString *s;
if (list) {
ut64 offorig = core->offset;
ut64 obs = core->blocksize;
r_list_foreach (list, iter, s) {
r_core_block_size (core, s->size);
r_core_seek (core, s->vaddr, 1);
r_core_cmd0 (core, cmd);
}
r_core_block_size (core, obs);
r_core_seek (core, offorig, 1);
}
} else {
RBinSymbol *sym;
ut64 offorig = core->offset;
ut64 obs = core->blocksize;
list = r_bin_get_symbols (core->bin);
r_cons_break_push (NULL, NULL);
r_list_foreach (list, iter, sym) {
if (r_cons_is_breaked ()) {
break;
}
r_core_block_size (core, sym->size);
r_core_seek (core, sym->vaddr, 1);
r_core_cmd0 (core, cmd);
}
r_cons_break_pop ();
r_core_block_size (core, obs);
r_core_seek (core, offorig, 1);
}
break;
case 'f': // flags
{
char *glob = filter? r_str_trim_dup (filter): NULL;
ut64 off = core->offset;
ut64 obs = core->blocksize;
struct exec_command_t u = { .core = core, .cmd = cmd };
r_flag_foreach_glob (core->flags, glob, exec_command_on_flag, &u);
r_core_seek (core, off, 0);
r_core_block_size (core, obs);
free (glob);
}
break;
case 'F': // functions
{
ut64 obs = core->blocksize;
ut64 offorig = core->offset;
RAnalFunction *fcn;
list = core->anal->fcns;
r_cons_break_push (NULL, NULL);
r_list_foreach (list, iter, fcn) {
if (r_cons_is_breaked ()) {
break;
}
if (!filter || r_str_glob (fcn->name, filter)) {
r_core_seek (core, fcn->addr, 1);
r_core_block_size (core, r_anal_fcn_size (fcn));
r_core_cmd0 (core, cmd);
}
}
r_cons_break_pop ();
r_core_block_size (core, obs);
r_core_seek (core, offorig, 1);
}
break;
case 'b':
{
RAnalFunction *fcn = r_anal_get_fcn_in (core->anal, core->offset, 0);
ut64 offorig = core->offset;
ut64 obs = core->blocksize;
if (fcn) {
RListIter *iter;
RAnalBlock *bb;
r_list_foreach (fcn->bbs, iter, bb) {
r_core_seek (core, bb->addr, 1);
r_core_block_size (core, bb->size);
r_core_cmd0 (core, cmd);
}
r_core_block_size (core, obs);
r_core_seek (core, offorig, 1);
}
}
break;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix #14990 - multiple quoted command parsing issue ##core
> "?e hello""?e world"
hello
world"
> "?e hello";"?e world"
hello
world
CWE ID: CWE-78
| 0
| 87,814
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct fib6_node * fib6_lookup(struct fib6_node *root, const struct in6_addr *daddr,
const struct in6_addr *saddr)
{
struct fib6_node *fn;
struct lookup_args args[] = {
{
.offset = offsetof(struct rt6_info, rt6i_dst),
.addr = daddr,
},
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_SUBTREES
{
.offset = offsetof(struct rt6_info, rt6i_src),
.addr = saddr,
},
#endif
{
.offset = 0, /* sentinel */
}
};
fn = fib6_lookup_1(root, daddr ? args : args + 1);
if (!fn || fn->fn_flags & RTN_TL_ROOT)
fn = root;
return fn;
}
Commit Message: net: fib: fib6_add: fix potential NULL pointer dereference
When the kernel is compiled with CONFIG_IPV6_SUBTREES, and we return
with an error in fn = fib6_add_1(), then error codes are encoded into
the return pointer e.g. ERR_PTR(-ENOENT). In such an error case, we
write the error code into err and jump to out, hence enter the if(err)
condition. Now, if CONFIG_IPV6_SUBTREES is enabled, we check for:
if (pn != fn && pn->leaf == rt)
...
if (pn != fn && !pn->leaf && !(pn->fn_flags & RTN_RTINFO))
...
Since pn is NULL and fn is f.e. ERR_PTR(-ENOENT), then pn != fn
evaluates to true and causes a NULL-pointer dereference on further
checks on pn. Fix it, by setting both NULL in error case, so that
pn != fn already evaluates to false and no further dereference
takes place.
This was first correctly implemented in 4a287eba2 ("IPv6 routing,
NLM_F_* flag support: REPLACE and EXCL flags support, warn about
missing CREATE flag"), but the bug got later on introduced by
188c517a0 ("ipv6: return errno pointers consistently for fib6_add_1()").
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Lin Ming <mlin@ss.pku.edu.cn>
Cc: Matti Vaittinen <matti.vaittinen@nsn.com>
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Matti Vaittinen <matti.vaittinen@nsn.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 28,417
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ieee80211_set_multicast_list(struct net_device *dev)
{
struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata = IEEE80211_DEV_TO_SUB_IF(dev);
struct ieee80211_local *local = sdata->local;
int allmulti, promisc, sdata_allmulti, sdata_promisc;
allmulti = !!(dev->flags & IFF_ALLMULTI);
promisc = !!(dev->flags & IFF_PROMISC);
sdata_allmulti = !!(sdata->flags & IEEE80211_SDATA_ALLMULTI);
sdata_promisc = !!(sdata->flags & IEEE80211_SDATA_PROMISC);
if (allmulti != sdata_allmulti) {
if (dev->flags & IFF_ALLMULTI)
atomic_inc(&local->iff_allmultis);
else
atomic_dec(&local->iff_allmultis);
sdata->flags ^= IEEE80211_SDATA_ALLMULTI;
}
if (promisc != sdata_promisc) {
if (dev->flags & IFF_PROMISC)
atomic_inc(&local->iff_promiscs);
else
atomic_dec(&local->iff_promiscs);
sdata->flags ^= IEEE80211_SDATA_PROMISC;
}
spin_lock_bh(&local->filter_lock);
__hw_addr_sync(&local->mc_list, &dev->mc, dev->addr_len);
spin_unlock_bh(&local->filter_lock);
ieee80211_queue_work(&local->hw, &local->reconfig_filter);
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 24,335
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: char *path_name(const struct name_path *path, const char *name)
{
const struct name_path *p;
char *n, *m;
int nlen = strlen(name);
int len = nlen + 1;
for (p = path; p; p = p->up) {
if (p->elem_len)
len += p->elem_len + 1;
}
n = xmalloc(len);
m = n + len - (nlen + 1);
strcpy(m, name);
for (p = path; p; p = p->up) {
if (p->elem_len) {
m -= p->elem_len + 1;
memcpy(m, p->elem, p->elem_len);
m[p->elem_len] = '/';
}
}
return n;
}
Commit Message: prefer memcpy to strcpy
When we already know the length of a string (e.g., because
we just malloc'd to fit it), it's nicer to use memcpy than
strcpy, as it makes it more obvious that we are not going to
overflow the buffer (because the size we pass matches the
size in the allocation).
This also eliminates calls to strcpy, which make auditing
the code base harder.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 167,429
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLES2Implementation::Viewport(GLint x,
GLint y,
GLsizei width,
GLsizei height) {
GPU_CLIENT_SINGLE_THREAD_CHECK();
GPU_CLIENT_LOG("[" << GetLogPrefix() << "] glViewport(" << x << ", " << y
<< ", " << width << ", " << height << ")");
if (width < 0 || height < 0) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glViewport", "negative width/height");
return;
}
state_.SetViewport(x, y, width, height);
helper_->Viewport(x, y, width, height);
CheckGLError();
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,161
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: LayoutTestContentRendererClient::OverrideCreateMIDIAccessor(
WebMIDIAccessorClient* client) {
WebTestInterfaces* interfaces =
LayoutTestRenderProcessObserver::GetInstance()->test_interfaces();
return interfaces->CreateMIDIAccessor(client);
}
Commit Message: content: Rename webkit_test_helpers.{cc,h} to blink_test_helpers.{cc,h}
Now that webkit/ is gone, we are preparing ourselves for the merge of
third_party/WebKit into //blink.
BUG=None
BUG=content_shell && content_unittests
R=avi@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1118183003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#328202}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 123,618
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: sc_parse_ef_gdo(struct sc_card *card,
unsigned char *iccsn, size_t *iccsn_len,
unsigned char *chn, size_t *chn_len)
{
struct sc_context *ctx;
struct sc_path path;
struct sc_file *file;
unsigned char *gdo = NULL;
size_t gdo_len = 0;
int r;
if (!card)
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS;
ctx = card->ctx;
LOG_FUNC_CALLED(ctx);
sc_format_path("3F002F02", &path);
r = sc_select_file(card, &path, &file);
LOG_TEST_GOTO_ERR(ctx, r, "Cannot select EF(GDO) file");
if (file->size) {
gdo_len = file->size;
} else {
gdo_len = 64;
}
gdo = malloc(gdo_len);
if (!gdo) {
r = SC_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
goto err;
}
r = sc_read_binary(card, 0, gdo, gdo_len, 0);
LOG_TEST_GOTO_ERR(ctx, r, "Cannot read EF(GDO) file");
r = sc_parse_ef_gdo_content(gdo, r, iccsn, iccsn_len, chn, chn_len);
err:
sc_file_free(file);
free(gdo);
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, r);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 78,708
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: archive_read_format_lha_read_data_skip(struct archive_read *a)
{
struct lha *lha;
int64_t bytes_skipped;
lha = (struct lha *)(a->format->data);
if (lha->entry_unconsumed) {
/* Consume as much as the decompressor actually used. */
__archive_read_consume(a, lha->entry_unconsumed);
lha->entry_unconsumed = 0;
}
/* if we've already read to end of data, we're done. */
if (lha->end_of_entry_cleanup)
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
/*
* If the length is at the beginning, we can skip the
* compressed data much more quickly.
*/
bytes_skipped = __archive_read_consume(a, lha->entry_bytes_remaining);
if (bytes_skipped < 0)
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
/* This entry is finished and done. */
lha->end_of_entry_cleanup = lha->end_of_entry = 1;
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
Commit Message: Fail with negative lha->compsize in lha_read_file_header_1()
Fixes a heap buffer overflow reported in Secunia SA74169
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 68,621
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_vcpu_events(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_vcpu_events *events)
{
process_nmi(vcpu);
events->exception.injected =
vcpu->arch.exception.pending &&
!kvm_exception_is_soft(vcpu->arch.exception.nr);
events->exception.nr = vcpu->arch.exception.nr;
events->exception.has_error_code = vcpu->arch.exception.has_error_code;
events->exception.pad = 0;
events->exception.error_code = vcpu->arch.exception.error_code;
events->interrupt.injected =
vcpu->arch.interrupt.pending && !vcpu->arch.interrupt.soft;
events->interrupt.nr = vcpu->arch.interrupt.nr;
events->interrupt.soft = 0;
events->interrupt.shadow = kvm_x86_ops->get_interrupt_shadow(vcpu);
events->nmi.injected = vcpu->arch.nmi_injected;
events->nmi.pending = vcpu->arch.nmi_pending != 0;
events->nmi.masked = kvm_x86_ops->get_nmi_mask(vcpu);
events->nmi.pad = 0;
events->sipi_vector = 0; /* never valid when reporting to user space */
events->smi.smm = is_smm(vcpu);
events->smi.pending = vcpu->arch.smi_pending;
events->smi.smm_inside_nmi =
!!(vcpu->arch.hflags & HF_SMM_INSIDE_NMI_MASK);
events->smi.latched_init = kvm_lapic_latched_init(vcpu);
events->flags = (KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_NMI_PENDING
| KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_SHADOW
| KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_SMM);
memset(&events->reserved, 0, sizeof(events->reserved));
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Reload pit counters for all channels when restoring state
Currently if userspace restores the pit counters with a count of 0
on channels 1 or 2 and the guest attempts to read the count on those
channels, then KVM will perform a mod of 0 and crash. This will ensure
that 0 values are converted to 65536 as per the spec.
This is CVE-2015-7513.
Signed-off-by: Andy Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 57,769
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static PHP_FUNCTION(xmlwriter_start_cdata)
{
zval *pind;
xmlwriter_object *intern;
xmlTextWriterPtr ptr;
int retval;
#ifdef ZEND_ENGINE_2
zval *this = getThis();
if (this) {
XMLWRITER_FROM_OBJECT(intern, this);
} else
#endif
{
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "r", &pind) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(intern,xmlwriter_object *, &pind, -1, "XMLWriter", le_xmlwriter);
}
ptr = intern->ptr;
if (ptr) {
retval = xmlTextWriterStartCDATA(ptr);
if (retval != -1) {
RETURN_TRUE;
}
}
RETURN_FALSE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 15,307
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RunCallbacksWithDisabled(LogoCallbacks callbacks) {
if (callbacks.on_cached_encoded_logo_available) {
std::move(callbacks.on_cached_encoded_logo_available)
.Run(LogoCallbackReason::DISABLED, base::nullopt);
}
if (callbacks.on_cached_decoded_logo_available) {
std::move(callbacks.on_cached_decoded_logo_available)
.Run(LogoCallbackReason::DISABLED, base::nullopt);
}
if (callbacks.on_fresh_encoded_logo_available) {
std::move(callbacks.on_fresh_encoded_logo_available)
.Run(LogoCallbackReason::DISABLED, base::nullopt);
}
if (callbacks.on_fresh_decoded_logo_available) {
std::move(callbacks.on_fresh_decoded_logo_available)
.Run(LogoCallbackReason::DISABLED, base::nullopt);
}
}
Commit Message: Local NTP: add smoke tests for doodles
Split LogoService into LogoService interface and LogoServiceImpl to make
it easier to provide fake data to the test.
Bug: 768419
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:closure_compilation
Change-Id: I84639189d2db1b24a2e139936c99369352bab587
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/690198
Reviewed-by: Sylvain Defresne <sdefresne@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Marc Treib <treib@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Chris Pickel <sfiera@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#505374}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 171,958
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned int llcp_sock_poll(struct file *file, struct socket *sock,
poll_table *wait)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
unsigned int mask = 0;
pr_debug("%p\n", sk);
sock_poll_wait(file, sk_sleep(sk), wait);
if (sk->sk_state == LLCP_LISTEN)
return llcp_accept_poll(sk);
if (sk->sk_err || !skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_error_queue))
mask |= POLLERR;
if (!skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_receive_queue))
mask |= POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;
if (sk->sk_state == LLCP_CLOSED)
mask |= POLLHUP;
if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN)
mask |= POLLRDHUP | POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;
if (sk->sk_shutdown == SHUTDOWN_MASK)
mask |= POLLHUP;
if (sock_writeable(sk))
mask |= POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM | POLLWRBAND;
else
set_bit(SOCK_ASYNC_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags);
pr_debug("mask 0x%x\n", mask);
return mask;
}
Commit Message: NFC: llcp: fix info leaks via msg_name in llcp_sock_recvmsg()
The code in llcp_sock_recvmsg() does not initialize all the members of
struct sockaddr_nfc_llcp when filling the sockaddr info. Nor does it
initialize the padding bytes of the structure inserted by the compiler
for alignment.
Also, if the socket is in state LLCP_CLOSED or is shutting down during
receive the msg_namelen member is not updated to 0 while otherwise
returning with 0, i.e. "success". The msg_namelen update is also
missing for stream and seqpacket sockets which don't fill the sockaddr
info.
Both issues lead to the fact that the code will leak uninitialized
kernel stack bytes in net/socket.c.
Fix the first issue by initializing the memory used for sockaddr info
with memset(0). Fix the second one by setting msg_namelen to 0 early.
It will be updated later if we're going to fill the msg_name member.
Cc: Lauro Ramos Venancio <lauro.venancio@openbossa.org>
Cc: Aloisio Almeida Jr <aloisio.almeida@openbossa.org>
Cc: Samuel Ortiz <sameo@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 30,489
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sctp_getsockopt_peer_addrs(struct sock *sk, int len,
char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
{
struct sctp_association *asoc;
int cnt = 0;
struct sctp_getaddrs getaddrs;
struct sctp_transport *from;
void __user *to;
union sctp_addr temp;
struct sctp_sock *sp = sctp_sk(sk);
int addrlen;
size_t space_left;
int bytes_copied;
if (len < sizeof(struct sctp_getaddrs))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&getaddrs, optval, sizeof(struct sctp_getaddrs)))
return -EFAULT;
/* For UDP-style sockets, id specifies the association to query. */
asoc = sctp_id2assoc(sk, getaddrs.assoc_id);
if (!asoc)
return -EINVAL;
to = optval + offsetof(struct sctp_getaddrs, addrs);
space_left = len - offsetof(struct sctp_getaddrs, addrs);
list_for_each_entry(from, &asoc->peer.transport_addr_list,
transports) {
memcpy(&temp, &from->ipaddr, sizeof(temp));
addrlen = sctp_get_pf_specific(sk->sk_family)
->addr_to_user(sp, &temp);
if (space_left < addrlen)
return -ENOMEM;
if (copy_to_user(to, &temp, addrlen))
return -EFAULT;
to += addrlen;
cnt++;
space_left -= addrlen;
}
if (put_user(cnt, &((struct sctp_getaddrs __user *)optval)->addr_num))
return -EFAULT;
bytes_copied = ((char __user *)to) - optval;
if (put_user(bytes_copied, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: sctp: fix ASCONF list handling
->auto_asconf_splist is per namespace and mangled by functions like
sctp_setsockopt_auto_asconf() which doesn't guarantee any serialization.
Also, the call to inet_sk_copy_descendant() was backuping
->auto_asconf_list through the copy but was not honoring
->do_auto_asconf, which could lead to list corruption if it was
different between both sockets.
This commit thus fixes the list handling by using ->addr_wq_lock
spinlock to protect the list. A special handling is done upon socket
creation and destruction for that. Error handlig on sctp_init_sock()
will never return an error after having initialized asconf, so
sctp_destroy_sock() can be called without addrq_wq_lock. The lock now
will be take on sctp_close_sock(), before locking the socket, so we
don't do it in inverse order compared to sctp_addr_wq_timeout_handler().
Instead of taking the lock on sctp_sock_migrate() for copying and
restoring the list values, it's preferred to avoid rewritting it by
implementing sctp_copy_descendant().
Issue was found with a test application that kept flipping sysctl
default_auto_asconf on and off, but one could trigger it by issuing
simultaneous setsockopt() calls on multiple sockets or by
creating/destroying sockets fast enough. This is only triggerable
locally.
Fixes: 9f7d653b67ae ("sctp: Add Auto-ASCONF support (core).")
Reported-by: Ji Jianwen <jiji@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Suggested-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 43,546
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void MeasureAsLongAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
V8SetReturnValueInt(info, impl->measureAsLongAttribute());
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 134,857
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void r_bin_dwarf_row_free(void *p) {
RBinDwarfRow *row = (RBinDwarfRow*)p;
free (row->file);
free (row);
}
Commit Message: Fix #8813 - segfault in dwarf parser
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 59,719
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int flashgchar(struct airo_info *ai,int matchbyte,int dwelltime){
int rchar;
unsigned char rbyte=0;
do {
rchar = IN4500(ai,SWS1);
if(dwelltime && !(0x8000 & rchar)){
dwelltime -= 10;
mdelay(10);
continue;
}
rbyte = 0xff & rchar;
if( (rbyte == matchbyte) && (0x8000 & rchar) ){
OUT4500(ai,SWS1,0);
return 0;
}
if( rbyte == 0x81 || rbyte == 0x82 || rbyte == 0x83 || rbyte == 0x1a || 0xffff == rchar)
break;
OUT4500(ai,SWS1,0);
}while(dwelltime > 0);
return -EIO;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 24,029
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned short pmcraid_get_minor(void)
{
int minor;
minor = find_first_zero_bit(pmcraid_minor, sizeof(pmcraid_minor));
__set_bit(minor, pmcraid_minor);
return minor;
}
Commit Message: [SCSI] pmcraid: reject negative request size
There's a code path in pmcraid that can be reached via device ioctl that
causes all sorts of ugliness, including heap corruption or triggering the
OOM killer due to consecutive allocation of large numbers of pages.
First, the user can call pmcraid_chr_ioctl(), with a type
PMCRAID_PASSTHROUGH_IOCTL. This calls through to
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough(). Next, a pmcraid_passthrough_ioctl_buffer
is copied in, and the request_size variable is set to
buffer->ioarcb.data_transfer_length, which is an arbitrary 32-bit
signed value provided by the user. If a negative value is provided
here, bad things can happen. For example,
pmcraid_build_passthrough_ioadls() is called with this request_size,
which immediately calls pmcraid_alloc_sglist() with a negative size.
The resulting math on allocating a scatter list can result in an
overflow in the kzalloc() call (if num_elem is 0, the sglist will be
smaller than expected), or if num_elem is unexpectedly large the
subsequent loop will call alloc_pages() repeatedly, a high number of
pages will be allocated and the OOM killer might be invoked.
It looks like preventing this value from being negative in
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough() would be sufficient.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <JBottomley@Parallels.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 26,450
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CheckURLIsBlocked(Browser* browser, const std::string& spec) {
GURL url(spec);
ui_test_utils::NavigateToURL(browser, url);
content::WebContents* contents =
browser->tab_strip_model()->GetActiveWebContents();
CheckURLIsBlockedInWebContents(contents, url);
}
Commit Message: Enforce the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy
This change modifies UsbChooserContext to use the UsbAllowDevicesForUrls
class to consider devices allowed by the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls
policy. The WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy overrides the other WebUSB
policies. Unit tests are also added to ensure that the policy is being
enforced correctly.
The design document for this feature is found at:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1MPvsrWiVD_jAC8ELyk8njFpy6j1thfVU5aWT3TCWE8w
Bug: 854329
Change-Id: I5f82e662ca9dc544da5918eae766b5535a31296b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1259289
Commit-Queue: Ovidio Henriquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Julian Pastarmov <pastarmovj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597926}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 157,016
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int nfs4_proc_unlck(struct nfs4_state *state, int cmd, struct file_lock *request)
{
struct nfs_inode *nfsi = NFS_I(state->inode);
struct nfs_seqid *seqid;
struct nfs4_lock_state *lsp;
struct rpc_task *task;
int status = 0;
unsigned char fl_flags = request->fl_flags;
status = nfs4_set_lock_state(state, request);
/* Unlock _before_ we do the RPC call */
request->fl_flags |= FL_EXISTS;
down_read(&nfsi->rwsem);
if (do_vfs_lock(request->fl_file, request) == -ENOENT) {
up_read(&nfsi->rwsem);
goto out;
}
up_read(&nfsi->rwsem);
if (status != 0)
goto out;
/* Is this a delegated lock? */
if (test_bit(NFS_DELEGATED_STATE, &state->flags))
goto out;
lsp = request->fl_u.nfs4_fl.owner;
seqid = nfs_alloc_seqid(&lsp->ls_seqid);
status = -ENOMEM;
if (seqid == NULL)
goto out;
task = nfs4_do_unlck(request, nfs_file_open_context(request->fl_file), lsp, seqid);
status = PTR_ERR(task);
if (IS_ERR(task))
goto out;
status = nfs4_wait_for_completion_rpc_task(task);
rpc_put_task(task);
out:
request->fl_flags = fl_flags;
return status;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 22,905
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline size_t MagickMin(const size_t x,const size_t y)
{
if (x < y)
return(x);
return(y);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 71,477
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static char *to_led_name(int selector)
{
switch (selector) {
case HUB_LED_AMBER:
return "amber";
case HUB_LED_GREEN:
return "green";
case HUB_LED_OFF:
return "off";
case HUB_LED_AUTO:
return "auto";
default:
return "??";
}
}
Commit Message: USB: fix invalid memory access in hub_activate()
Commit 8520f38099cc ("USB: change hub initialization sleeps to
delayed_work") changed the hub_activate() routine to make part of it
run in a workqueue. However, the commit failed to take a reference to
the usb_hub structure or to lock the hub interface while doing so. As
a result, if a hub is plugged in and quickly unplugged before the work
routine can run, the routine will try to access memory that has been
deallocated. Or, if the hub is unplugged while the routine is
running, the memory may be deallocated while it is in active use.
This patch fixes the problem by taking a reference to the usb_hub at
the start of hub_activate() and releasing it at the end (when the work
is finished), and by locking the hub interface while the work routine
is running. It also adds a check at the start of the routine to see
if the hub has already been disconnected, in which nothing should be
done.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Reported-by: Alexandru Cornea <alexandru.cornea@intel.com>
Tested-by: Alexandru Cornea <alexandru.cornea@intel.com>
Fixes: 8520f38099cc ("USB: change hub initialization sleeps to delayed_work")
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 56,787
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xfs_attr_args_init(
struct xfs_da_args *args,
struct xfs_inode *dp,
const unsigned char *name,
int flags)
{
if (!name)
return -EINVAL;
memset(args, 0, sizeof(*args));
args->geo = dp->i_mount->m_attr_geo;
args->whichfork = XFS_ATTR_FORK;
args->dp = dp;
args->flags = flags;
args->name = name;
args->namelen = strlen((const char *)name);
if (args->namelen >= MAXNAMELEN)
return -EFAULT; /* match IRIX behaviour */
args->hashval = xfs_da_hashname(args->name, args->namelen);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: xfs: don't fail when converting shortform attr to long form during ATTR_REPLACE
Kanda Motohiro reported that expanding a tiny xattr into a large xattr
fails on XFS because we remove the tiny xattr from a shortform fork and
then try to re-add it after converting the fork to extents format having
not removed the ATTR_REPLACE flag. This fails because the attr is no
longer present, causing a fs shutdown.
This is derived from the patch in his bug report, but we really
shouldn't ignore a nonzero retval from the remove call.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199119
Reported-by: kanda.motohiro@gmail.com
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-754
| 0
| 76,313
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int tgr192_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
{
struct tgr192_ctx *tctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
tctx->a = 0x0123456789abcdefULL;
tctx->b = 0xfedcba9876543210ULL;
tctx->c = 0xf096a5b4c3b2e187ULL;
tctx->nblocks = 0;
tctx->count = 0;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 47,391
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ArcInputMethodManagerServiceTest()
: arc_service_manager_(std::make_unique<ArcServiceManager>()) {}
Commit Message: Clear |composing_text_| after CommitText() is called.
|composing_text_| of InputConnectionImpl should be cleared after
CommitText() is called. Otherwise, FinishComposingText() will commit the
same text twice.
Bug: 899736
Test: unit_tests
Change-Id: Idb22d968ffe95d946789fbe62454e8e79cb0b384
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1304773
Commit-Queue: Yusuke Sato <yusukes@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yusuke Sato <yusukes@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#603518}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 156,925
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PanoramiXRenderTrapezoids(ClientPtr client)
{
PanoramiXRes *src, *dst;
int result = Success, j;
REQUEST(xRenderTrapezoidsReq);
char *extra;
int extra_len;
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRenderTrapezoidsReq);
VERIFY_XIN_PICTURE(src, stuff->src, client, DixReadAccess);
VERIFY_XIN_PICTURE(dst, stuff->dst, client, DixWriteAccess);
extra_len = (client->req_len << 2) - sizeof(xRenderTrapezoidsReq);
if (extra_len && (extra = (char *) malloc(extra_len))) {
memcpy(extra, stuff + 1, extra_len);
FOR_NSCREENS_FORWARD(j) {
if (j)
memcpy(stuff + 1, extra, extra_len);
if (dst->u.pict.root) {
int x_off = screenInfo.screens[j]->x;
int y_off = screenInfo.screens[j]->y;
if (x_off || y_off) {
xTrapezoid *trap = (xTrapezoid *) (stuff + 1);
int i = extra_len / sizeof(xTrapezoid);
while (i--) {
trap->top -= y_off;
trap->bottom -= y_off;
trap->left.p1.x -= x_off;
trap->left.p1.y -= y_off;
trap->left.p2.x -= x_off;
trap->left.p2.y -= y_off;
trap->right.p1.x -= x_off;
trap->right.p1.y -= y_off;
trap->right.p2.x -= x_off;
trap->right.p2.y -= y_off;
trap++;
}
}
}
stuff->src = src->info[j].id;
stuff->dst = dst->info[j].id;
result = (*PanoramiXSaveRenderVector[X_RenderTrapezoids]) (client);
if (result != Success)
break;
}
free(extra);
}
return result;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,565
|
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