instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void controloptions (lua_State *L, int opt, const char **fmt,
Header *h) {
switch (opt) {
case ' ': return; /* ignore white spaces */
case '>': h->endian = BIG; return;
case '<': h->endian = LITTLE; return;
case '!': {
int a = getnum(L, fmt, MAXALIGN);
if (!isp2(a))
luaL_error(L, "alignment %d is not a power of 2", a);
h->align = a;
return;
}
default: {
const char *msg = lua_pushfstring(L, "invalid format option '%c'", opt);
luaL_argerror(L, 1, msg);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Security: update Lua struct package for security.
During an auditing Apple found that the "struct" Lua package
we ship with Redis (http://www.inf.puc-rio.br/~roberto/struct/) contains
a security problem. A bound-checking statement fails because of integer
overflow. The bug exists since we initially integrated this package with
Lua, when scripting was introduced, so every version of Redis with
EVAL/EVALSHA capabilities exposed is affected.
Instead of just fixing the bug, the library was updated to the latest
version shipped by the author.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 1
| 170,164
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int zerocopy_sg_from_iovec(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct iovec *from,
int offset, size_t count)
{
int len = iov_length(from, count) - offset;
int copy = skb_headlen(skb);
int size, offset1 = 0;
int i = 0;
/* Skip over from offset */
while (count && (offset >= from->iov_len)) {
offset -= from->iov_len;
++from;
--count;
}
/* copy up to skb headlen */
while (count && (copy > 0)) {
size = min_t(unsigned int, copy, from->iov_len - offset);
if (copy_from_user(skb->data + offset1, from->iov_base + offset,
size))
return -EFAULT;
if (copy > size) {
++from;
--count;
offset = 0;
} else
offset += size;
copy -= size;
offset1 += size;
}
if (len == offset1)
return 0;
while (count--) {
struct page *page[MAX_SKB_FRAGS];
int num_pages;
unsigned long base;
unsigned long truesize;
len = from->iov_len - offset;
if (!len) {
offset = 0;
++from;
continue;
}
base = (unsigned long)from->iov_base + offset;
size = ((base & ~PAGE_MASK) + len + ~PAGE_MASK) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
num_pages = get_user_pages_fast(base, size, 0, &page[i]);
if ((num_pages != size) ||
(num_pages > MAX_SKB_FRAGS - skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags)) {
for (i = 0; i < num_pages; i++)
put_page(page[i]);
return -EFAULT;
}
truesize = size * PAGE_SIZE;
skb->data_len += len;
skb->len += len;
skb->truesize += truesize;
atomic_add(truesize, &skb->sk->sk_wmem_alloc);
while (len) {
int off = base & ~PAGE_MASK;
int size = min_t(int, len, PAGE_SIZE - off);
__skb_fill_page_desc(skb, i, page[i], off, size);
skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags++;
/* increase sk_wmem_alloc */
base += size;
len -= size;
i++;
}
offset = 0;
++from;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: macvtap: zerocopy: validate vectors before building skb
There're several reasons that the vectors need to be validated:
- Return error when caller provides vectors whose num is greater than UIO_MAXIOV.
- Linearize part of skb when userspace provides vectors grater than MAX_SKB_FRAGS.
- Return error when userspace provides vectors whose total length may exceed
- MAX_SKB_FRAGS * PAGE_SIZE.
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 166,205
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int xts_aes_decrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
unsigned int nbytes)
{
struct s390_xts_ctx *xts_ctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
struct blkcipher_walk walk;
if (unlikely(xts_ctx->key_len == 48))
return xts_fallback_decrypt(desc, dst, src, nbytes);
blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
return xts_aes_crypt(desc, xts_ctx->dec, xts_ctx, &walk);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 46,676
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoUniform1iv(
GLint fake_location, GLsizei count, const GLint *value) {
GLenum type = 0;
GLint real_location = -1;
if (!PrepForSetUniformByLocation(
fake_location, "glUniform1iv", &real_location, &type, &count)) {
return;
}
if (type == GL_SAMPLER_2D || type == GL_SAMPLER_CUBE ||
type == GL_SAMPLER_EXTERNAL_OES) {
current_program_->SetSamplers(fake_location, count, value);
}
glUniform1iv(real_location, count, value);
}
Commit Message: Always write data to new buffer in SimulateAttrib0
This is to work around linux nvidia driver bug.
TEST=asan
BUG=118970
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/10019003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@131538 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 108,986
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool regsafe(struct bpf_reg_state *rold, struct bpf_reg_state *rcur,
struct idpair *idmap)
{
if (!(rold->live & REG_LIVE_READ))
/* explored state didn't use this */
return true;
if (memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, live)) == 0)
return true;
if (rold->type == NOT_INIT)
/* explored state can't have used this */
return true;
if (rcur->type == NOT_INIT)
return false;
switch (rold->type) {
case SCALAR_VALUE:
if (rcur->type == SCALAR_VALUE) {
/* new val must satisfy old val knowledge */
return range_within(rold, rcur) &&
tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off);
} else {
/* if we knew anything about the old value, we're not
* equal, because we can't know anything about the
* scalar value of the pointer in the new value.
*/
return rold->umin_value == 0 &&
rold->umax_value == U64_MAX &&
rold->smin_value == S64_MIN &&
rold->smax_value == S64_MAX &&
tnum_is_unknown(rold->var_off);
}
case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
/* If the new min/max/var_off satisfy the old ones and
* everything else matches, we are OK.
* We don't care about the 'id' value, because nothing
* uses it for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE (only for ..._OR_NULL)
*/
return memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, id)) == 0 &&
range_within(rold, rcur) &&
tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off);
case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL:
/* a PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE could be safe to use as a
* PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL into the same map.
* However, if the old PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL then got NULL-
* checked, doing so could have affected others with the same
* id, and we can't check for that because we lost the id when
* we converted to a PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE.
*/
if (rcur->type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL)
return false;
if (memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, id)))
return false;
/* Check our ids match any regs they're supposed to */
return check_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap);
case PTR_TO_PACKET_META:
case PTR_TO_PACKET:
if (rcur->type != rold->type)
return false;
/* We must have at least as much range as the old ptr
* did, so that any accesses which were safe before are
* still safe. This is true even if old range < old off,
* since someone could have accessed through (ptr - k), or
* even done ptr -= k in a register, to get a safe access.
*/
if (rold->range > rcur->range)
return false;
/* If the offsets don't match, we can't trust our alignment;
* nor can we be sure that we won't fall out of range.
*/
if (rold->off != rcur->off)
return false;
/* id relations must be preserved */
if (rold->id && !check_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap))
return false;
/* new val must satisfy old val knowledge */
return range_within(rold, rcur) &&
tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off);
case PTR_TO_CTX:
case CONST_PTR_TO_MAP:
case PTR_TO_STACK:
case PTR_TO_PACKET_END:
/* Only valid matches are exact, which memcmp() above
* would have accepted
*/
default:
/* Don't know what's going on, just say it's not safe */
return false;
}
/* Shouldn't get here; if we do, say it's not safe */
WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
return false;
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix branch pruning logic
when the verifier detects that register contains a runtime constant
and it's compared with another constant it will prune exploration
of the branch that is guaranteed not to be taken at runtime.
This is all correct, but malicious program may be constructed
in such a way that it always has a constant comparison and
the other branch is never taken under any conditions.
In this case such path through the program will not be explored
by the verifier. It won't be taken at run-time either, but since
all instructions are JITed the malicious program may cause JITs
to complain about using reserved fields, etc.
To fix the issue we have to track the instructions explored by
the verifier and sanitize instructions that are dead at run time
with NOPs. We cannot reject such dead code, since llvm generates
it for valid C code, since it doesn't do as much data flow
analysis as the verifier does.
Fixes: 17a5267067f3 ("bpf: verifier (add verifier core)")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 59,168
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ACodec::LoadedToIdleState::onMessageReceived(const sp<AMessage> &msg) {
switch (msg->what()) {
case kWhatSetParameters:
case kWhatShutdown:
{
mCodec->deferMessage(msg);
return true;
}
case kWhatSignalEndOfInputStream:
{
mCodec->onSignalEndOfInputStream();
return true;
}
case kWhatResume:
{
return true;
}
case kWhatFlush:
{
sp<AMessage> notify = mCodec->mNotify->dup();
notify->setInt32("what", CodecBase::kWhatFlushCompleted);
notify->post();
return true;
}
default:
return BaseState::onMessageReceived(msg);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix initialization of AAC presentation struct
Otherwise the new size checks trip on this.
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I1f8f01097e3a88ff041b69279a6121be842f1766
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 164,087
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void h2_wake_some_streams(struct h2c *h2c, int last, uint32_t flags)
{
struct eb32_node *node;
struct h2s *h2s;
if (h2c->st0 >= H2_CS_ERROR || h2c->conn->flags & CO_FL_ERROR)
flags |= CS_FL_ERROR;
if (conn_xprt_read0_pending(h2c->conn))
flags |= CS_FL_EOS;
node = eb32_lookup_ge(&h2c->streams_by_id, last + 1);
while (node) {
h2s = container_of(node, struct h2s, by_id);
if (h2s->id <= last)
break;
node = eb32_next(node);
if (!h2s->cs) {
/* this stream was already orphaned */
h2s_destroy(h2s);
continue;
}
h2s->cs->flags |= flags;
/* recv is used to force to detect CS_FL_EOS that wake()
* doesn't handle in the stream int code.
*/
h2s->cs->data_cb->recv(h2s->cs);
h2s->cs->data_cb->wake(h2s->cs);
if (flags & CS_FL_ERROR && h2s->st < H2_SS_ERROR)
h2s->st = H2_SS_ERROR;
else if (flags & CS_FL_EOS && h2s->st == H2_SS_OPEN)
h2s->st = H2_SS_HREM;
else if (flags & CS_FL_EOS && h2s->st == H2_SS_HLOC)
h2s_close(h2s);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 7,789
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int imap_access(const char *path)
{
struct ImapData *idata = NULL;
struct ImapMbox mx;
char buf[LONG_STRING];
char mailbox[LONG_STRING];
char mbox[LONG_STRING];
int rc;
if (imap_parse_path(path, &mx))
return -1;
idata = imap_conn_find(&mx.account, ImapPassive ? MUTT_IMAP_CONN_NONEW : 0);
if (!idata)
{
FREE(&mx.mbox);
return -1;
}
imap_fix_path(idata, mx.mbox, mailbox, sizeof(mailbox));
if (!*mailbox)
mutt_str_strfcpy(mailbox, "INBOX", sizeof(mailbox));
/* we may already be in the folder we're checking */
if (mutt_str_strcmp(idata->mailbox, mx.mbox) == 0)
{
FREE(&mx.mbox);
return 0;
}
FREE(&mx.mbox);
if (imap_mboxcache_get(idata, mailbox, 0))
{
mutt_debug(3, "found %s in cache\n", mailbox);
return 0;
}
imap_munge_mbox_name(idata, mbox, sizeof(mbox), mailbox);
if (mutt_bit_isset(idata->capabilities, IMAP4REV1))
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "STATUS %s (UIDVALIDITY)", mbox);
else if (mutt_bit_isset(idata->capabilities, STATUS))
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "STATUS %s (UID-VALIDITY)", mbox);
else
{
mutt_debug(2, "STATUS not supported?\n");
return -1;
}
rc = imap_exec(idata, buf, IMAP_CMD_FAIL_OK);
if (rc < 0)
{
mutt_debug(1, "Can't check STATUS of %s\n", mbox);
return rc;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: quote imap strings more carefully
Co-authored-by: JerikoOne <jeriko.one@gmx.us>
CWE ID: CWE-77
| 0
| 79,579
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct samldb_ctx *samldb_ctx_init(struct ldb_module *module,
struct ldb_request *req)
{
struct ldb_context *ldb;
struct samldb_ctx *ac;
ldb = ldb_module_get_ctx(module);
ac = talloc_zero(req, struct samldb_ctx);
if (ac == NULL) {
ldb_oom(ldb);
return NULL;
}
ac->module = module;
ac->req = req;
return ac;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 8
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OmniboxViewViews::OnBeforePossibleChange() {
GetState(&state_before_change_);
ime_composing_before_change_ = IsIMEComposing();
ClearAccessibilityLabel();
}
Commit Message: omnibox: experiment with restoring placeholder when caret shows
Shows the "Search Google or type a URL" omnibox placeholder even when
the caret (text edit cursor) is showing / when focused. views::Textfield
works this way, as does <input placeholder="">. Omnibox and the NTP's
"fakebox" are exceptions in this regard and this experiment makes this
more consistent.
R=tommycli@chromium.org
BUG=955585
Change-Id: I23c299c0973f2feb43f7a2be3bd3425a80b06c2d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1582315
Commit-Queue: Dan Beam <dbeam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Li <tommycli@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654279}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 142,441
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void eager_reader_unregister(eager_reader_t *reader) {
assert(reader != NULL);
if (reader->outbound_registration) {
reactor_unregister(reader->outbound_registration);
reader->outbound_registration = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 159,007
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void on_activating_ticketing(void)
{
if (!ticketing_enabled && reds_main_channel_connected()) {
spice_warning("disconnecting");
reds_disconnect();
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 1,840
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ExtensionInstallPrompt::GetViewsShowDialogCallback() {
return base::Bind(&ShowExtensionInstallDialogImpl);
}
Commit Message: [Extensions UI] Initially disabled OK button for extension install prompts and enable them after a 500 ms time period.
BUG=394518
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2716353003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461933}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 154,027
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Err rvcc_Read(GF_Box *s,GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_RVCConfigurationBox *ptr = (GF_RVCConfigurationBox*)s;
ptr->predefined_rvc_config = gf_bs_read_u16(bs);
ISOM_DECREASE_SIZE(ptr, 2);
if (!ptr->predefined_rvc_config) {
ptr->rvc_meta_idx = gf_bs_read_u16(bs);
ISOM_DECREASE_SIZE(ptr, 2);
}
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,368
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xmlParseExternalEntity(xmlDocPtr doc, xmlSAXHandlerPtr sax, void *user_data,
int depth, const xmlChar *URL, const xmlChar *ID, xmlNodePtr *lst) {
return(xmlParseExternalEntityPrivate(doc, NULL, sax, user_data, depth, URL,
ID, lst));
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Add validation for eternal enities
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=780691
Bug: 36556310
Change-Id: I9450743e167c3c73af5e4071f3fc85e81d061648
(cherry picked from commit bef9af3d89d241bcb518c20cba6da2a2fd9ba049)
CWE ID: CWE-611
| 0
| 163,472
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int start_packet(vorb *f)
{
while (f->next_seg == -1) {
if (!start_page(f)) return FALSE;
if (f->page_flag & PAGEFLAG_continued_packet)
return error(f, VORBIS_continued_packet_flag_invalid);
}
f->last_seg = FALSE;
f->valid_bits = 0;
f->packet_bytes = 0;
f->bytes_in_seg = 0;
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: fix unchecked length in stb_vorbis that could crash on corrupt/invalid files
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 75,299
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderThreadImpl::IdleHandlerInForegroundTab() {
int64 new_delay_ms = idle_notification_delay_in_ms_ +
1000000 / (idle_notification_delay_in_ms_ + 2000);
if (new_delay_ms >= kLongIdleHandlerDelayMs)
new_delay_ms = kShortIdleHandlerDelayMs;
if (idle_notifications_to_skip_ > 0) {
idle_notifications_to_skip_--;
} else {
int cpu_usage = 0;
Send(new ViewHostMsg_GetCPUUsage(&cpu_usage));
int idle_hint = static_cast<int>(new_delay_ms / 10);
if (cpu_usage < kIdleCPUUsageThresholdInPercents) {
base::allocator::ReleaseFreeMemory();
bool finished_idle_work = true;
if (!v8::V8::IdleNotification(idle_hint))
finished_idle_work = false;
if (!base::DiscardableMemory::ReduceMemoryUsage())
finished_idle_work = false;
if (finished_idle_work)
new_delay_ms = kLongIdleHandlerDelayMs;
}
}
ScheduleIdleHandler(new_delay_ms);
}
Commit Message: Suspend shared timers while blockingly closing databases
BUG=388771
R=michaeln@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/409863002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@284785 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 111,147
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int GetDPI(const PrintMsg_Print_Params* print_params) {
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
return kPointsPerInch;
#else
return static_cast<int>(print_params->dpi);
#endif // defined(OS_MACOSX)
}
Commit Message: Crash on nested IPC handlers in PrintWebViewHelper
Class is not designed to handle nested IPC. Regular flows also does not
expect them. Still during printing of plugging them may show message
boxes and start nested message loops.
For now we are going just crash. If stats show us that this case is
frequent we will have to do something more complicated.
BUG=502562
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1228693002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338100}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 126,627
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ServiceWorkerProcessManager* ServiceWorkerContextCore::process_manager() {
return wrapper_->process_manager();
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 139,502
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleDeleteProgram(
uint32_t immediate_data_size,
const volatile void* cmd_data) {
const volatile gles2::cmds::DeleteProgram& c =
*static_cast<const volatile gles2::cmds::DeleteProgram*>(cmd_data);
GLuint client_id = c.program;
if (client_id) {
Program* program = GetProgram(client_id);
if (program) {
if (!program->IsDeleted()) {
program_manager()->MarkAsDeleted(shader_manager(), program);
}
} else {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glDeleteProgram", "unknown program");
}
}
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,521
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: IndexedDBTransaction* IndexedDBConnection::GetTransaction(int64_t id) const {
auto it = transactions_.find(id);
if (it == transactions_.end())
return nullptr;
return it->second.get();
}
Commit Message: [IndexedDB] Fixed transaction use-after-free vuln
Bug: 725032
Change-Id: I689ded6c74d5563403587b149c3f3e02e807e4aa
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/518483
Reviewed-by: Joshua Bell <jsbell@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#475952}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 136,656
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ext4_lblk_t ext4_ext_determine_hole(struct inode *inode,
struct ext4_ext_path *path,
ext4_lblk_t *lblk)
{
int depth = ext_depth(inode);
struct ext4_extent *ex;
ext4_lblk_t len;
ex = path[depth].p_ext;
if (ex == NULL) {
/* there is no extent yet, so gap is [0;-] */
*lblk = 0;
len = EXT_MAX_BLOCKS;
} else if (*lblk < le32_to_cpu(ex->ee_block)) {
len = le32_to_cpu(ex->ee_block) - *lblk;
} else if (*lblk >= le32_to_cpu(ex->ee_block)
+ ext4_ext_get_actual_len(ex)) {
ext4_lblk_t next;
*lblk = le32_to_cpu(ex->ee_block) + ext4_ext_get_actual_len(ex);
next = ext4_ext_next_allocated_block(path);
BUG_ON(next == *lblk);
len = next - *lblk;
} else {
BUG();
}
return len;
}
Commit Message: ext4: zero out the unused memory region in the extent tree block
This commit zeroes out the unused memory region in the buffer_head
corresponding to the extent metablock after writing the extent header
and the corresponding extent node entries.
This is done to prevent random uninitialized data from getting into
the filesystem when the extent block is synced.
This fixes CVE-2019-11833.
Signed-off-by: Sriram Rajagopalan <sriramr@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 90,161
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void t1_read_subrs(PDF pdf)
{
int i, s;
cs_entry *ptr;
t1_getline();
while (!(t1_charstrings() || t1_subrs())) {
t1_scan_param(pdf);
if (!t1_prefix("/UniqueID")) {
/*tex Ignore |/UniqueID| for subsetted fonts. */
t1_putline(pdf);
}
t1_getline();
}
found:
t1_cs = true;
t1_scan = false;
if (!t1_subrs())
return;
subr_size_pos = strlen("/Subrs") + 1;
/*tex |subr_size_pos| points to the number indicating dict size after |Subrs|. */
subr_size = (int) t1_scan_num(t1_line_array + subr_size_pos, 0);
if (subr_size == 0) {
while (!t1_charstrings())
t1_getline();
return;
}
subr_tab = xtalloc((unsigned) subr_size, cs_entry);
for (ptr = subr_tab; ptr - subr_tab < subr_size; ptr++)
init_cs_entry(ptr);
subr_array_start = xstrdup(t1_line_array);
t1_getline();
while (t1_cslen) {
store_subr();
t1_getline();
}
/*tex Mark the first four entries without parsing. */
for (i = 0; i < subr_size && i < 4; i++)
subr_tab[i].used = true;
/*tex
The end of the |Subrs| array might have more than one line so we need to
concatenate them to |subr_array_end|. Unfortunately some fonts don't have
the |Subrs| array followed by the |CharStrings| dict immediately (synthetic
fonts). If we cannot find |CharStrings| in next |POST_SUBRS_SCAN| lines
then we will treat the font as synthetic and ignore everything until next
|Subrs| is found.
*/
#define POST_SUBRS_SCAN 5
s = 0;
*t1_buf_array = 0;
for (i = 0; i < POST_SUBRS_SCAN; i++) {
if (t1_charstrings())
break;
s = (int) (s + t1_line_ptr - t1_line_array);
alloc_array(t1_buf, s, T1_BUF_SIZE);
strcat(t1_buf_array, t1_line_array);
t1_getline();
}
subr_array_end = xstrdup(t1_buf_array);
if (i == POST_SUBRS_SCAN) {
/*tex |CharStrings| not found: assume a synthetic font. */
for (ptr = subr_tab; ptr - subr_tab < subr_size; ptr++)
if (ptr->valid)
xfree(ptr->data);
xfree(subr_tab);
xfree(subr_array_start);
xfree(subr_array_end);
cs_init();
t1_cs = false;
t1_synthetic = true;
while (!(t1_charstrings() || t1_subrs()))
t1_getline();
goto found;
}
}
Commit Message: writet1 protection against buffer overflow
git-svn-id: svn://tug.org/texlive/trunk/Build/source@48697 c570f23f-e606-0410-a88d-b1316a301751
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 76,703
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int kernel_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
char *optval, unsigned int optlen)
{
mm_segment_t oldfs = get_fs();
char __user *uoptval;
int err;
uoptval = (char __user __force *) optval;
set_fs(KERNEL_DS);
if (level == SOL_SOCKET)
err = sock_setsockopt(sock, level, optname, uoptval, optlen);
else
err = sock->ops->setsockopt(sock, level, optname, uoptval,
optlen);
set_fs(oldfs);
return err;
}
Commit Message: Fix order of arguments to compat_put_time[spec|val]
Commit 644595f89620 ("compat: Handle COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME in
net/socket.c") introduced a bug where the helper functions to take
either a 64-bit or compat time[spec|val] got the arguments in the wrong
order, passing the kernel stack pointer off as a user pointer (and vice
versa).
Because of the user address range check, that in turn then causes an
EFAULT due to the user pointer range checking failing for the kernel
address. Incorrectly resuling in a failed system call for 32-bit
processes with a 64-bit kernel.
On odder architectures like HP-PA (with separate user/kernel address
spaces), it can be used read kernel memory.
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 18,666
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ScopedRenderBufferBinder::~ScopedRenderBufferBinder() {
ScopedGLErrorSuppressor suppressor(
"ScopedRenderBufferBinder::dtor", state_->GetErrorState());
state_->RestoreRenderbufferBindings();
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 121,073
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::OnMsgUpdateRect(
const ViewHostMsg_UpdateRect_Params& params) {
TRACE_EVENT0("renderer_host", "RenderWidgetHostImpl::OnMsgUpdateRect");
TimeTicks paint_start = TimeTicks::Now();
current_size_ = params.view_size;
last_scroll_offset_ = params.scroll_offset;
bool is_resize_ack =
ViewHostMsg_UpdateRect_Flags::is_resize_ack(params.flags);
if (is_resize_ack) {
DCHECK(resize_ack_pending_);
resize_ack_pending_ = false;
in_flight_size_.SetSize(0, 0);
}
bool is_repaint_ack =
ViewHostMsg_UpdateRect_Flags::is_repaint_ack(params.flags);
if (is_repaint_ack) {
repaint_ack_pending_ = false;
TimeDelta delta = TimeTicks::Now() - repaint_start_time_;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_TIMES("MPArch.RWH_RepaintDelta", delta);
}
DCHECK(!params.view_size.IsEmpty());
bool was_async = false;
TransportDIB* dib = process_->GetTransportDIB(params.bitmap);
if (dib) {
DCHECK(!params.bitmap_rect.IsEmpty());
gfx::Size pixel_size = gfx::ToFlooredSize(
gfx::ScaleSize(params.bitmap_rect.size(), params.scale_factor));
const size_t size = pixel_size.height() * pixel_size.width() * 4;
if (dib->size() < size) {
DLOG(WARNING) << "Transport DIB too small for given rectangle";
RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("BadMessageTerminate_RWH1"));
GetProcess()->ReceivedBadMessage();
} else {
UNSHIPPED_TRACE_EVENT_INSTANT2("test_latency", "UpdateRect",
"x+y", params.bitmap_rect.x() + params.bitmap_rect.y(),
"color", 0xffffff & *static_cast<uint32*>(dib->memory()));
UNSHIPPED_TRACE_EVENT_INSTANT1("test_latency", "UpdateRectWidth",
"width", params.bitmap_rect.width());
if (!params.scroll_rect.IsEmpty()) {
ScrollBackingStoreRect(params.scroll_delta,
params.scroll_rect,
params.view_size);
}
was_async = PaintBackingStoreRect(
params.bitmap,
params.bitmap_rect,
params.copy_rects,
params.view_size,
params.scale_factor,
base::Bind(&RenderWidgetHostImpl::DidUpdateBackingStore,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), params, paint_start));
}
}
if (!was_async) {
DidUpdateBackingStore(params, paint_start);
}
if (should_auto_resize_) {
bool post_callback = new_auto_size_.IsEmpty();
new_auto_size_ = params.view_size;
if (post_callback) {
MessageLoop::current()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&RenderWidgetHostImpl::DelayedAutoResized,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
}
}
TimeDelta delta = TimeTicks::Now() - paint_start;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_TIMES("MPArch.RWH_OnMsgUpdateRect", delta);
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 114,671
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sc_pkcs15emu_gemsafeV1_init( sc_pkcs15_card_t *p15card)
{
int r;
unsigned int i;
struct sc_path path;
struct sc_file *file = NULL;
struct sc_card *card = p15card->card;
struct sc_apdu apdu;
u8 rbuf[SC_MAX_APDU_BUFFER_SIZE];
sc_log(p15card->card->ctx, "Setting pkcs15 parameters");
if (p15card->tokeninfo->label)
free(p15card->tokeninfo->label);
p15card->tokeninfo->label = malloc(strlen(APPLET_NAME) + 1);
if (!p15card->tokeninfo->label)
return SC_ERROR_INTERNAL;
strcpy(p15card->tokeninfo->label, APPLET_NAME);
if (p15card->tokeninfo->serial_number)
free(p15card->tokeninfo->serial_number);
p15card->tokeninfo->serial_number = malloc(strlen(DRIVER_SERIAL_NUMBER) + 1);
if (!p15card->tokeninfo->serial_number)
return SC_ERROR_INTERNAL;
strcpy(p15card->tokeninfo->serial_number, DRIVER_SERIAL_NUMBER);
/* the GemSAFE applet version number */
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_2_SHORT, 0xca, 0xdf, 0x03);
apdu.cla = 0x80;
apdu.resp = rbuf;
apdu.resplen = sizeof(rbuf);
/* Manual says Le=0x05, but should be 0x08 to return full version number */
apdu.le = 0x08;
apdu.lc = 0;
apdu.datalen = 0;
r = sc_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu);
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "APDU transmit failed");
if (apdu.sw1 != 0x90 || apdu.sw2 != 0x00)
return SC_ERROR_INTERNAL;
if (r != SC_SUCCESS)
return SC_ERROR_INTERNAL;
/* the manufacturer ID, in this case GemPlus */
if (p15card->tokeninfo->manufacturer_id)
free(p15card->tokeninfo->manufacturer_id);
p15card->tokeninfo->manufacturer_id = malloc(strlen(MANU_ID) + 1);
if (!p15card->tokeninfo->manufacturer_id)
return SC_ERROR_INTERNAL;
strcpy(p15card->tokeninfo->manufacturer_id, MANU_ID);
/* determine allocated key containers and length of certificates */
r = gemsafe_get_cert_len(card);
if (r != SC_SUCCESS)
return SC_ERROR_INTERNAL;
/* set certs */
sc_log(p15card->card->ctx, "Setting certificates");
for (i = 0; i < gemsafe_cert_max; i++) {
struct sc_pkcs15_id p15Id;
struct sc_path path;
if (gemsafe_cert[i].label == NULL)
continue;
sc_format_path(gemsafe_cert[i].path, &path);
sc_pkcs15_format_id(gemsafe_cert[i].id, &p15Id);
path.index = gemsafe_cert[i].index;
path.count = gemsafe_cert[i].count;
sc_pkcs15emu_add_cert(p15card, SC_PKCS15_TYPE_CERT_X509,
gemsafe_cert[i].authority, &path, &p15Id,
gemsafe_cert[i].label, gemsafe_cert[i].obj_flags);
}
/* set gemsafe_pin */
sc_log(p15card->card->ctx, "Setting PIN");
for (i=0; i < gemsafe_pin_max; i++) {
struct sc_pkcs15_id p15Id;
struct sc_path path;
sc_pkcs15_format_id(gemsafe_pin[i].id, &p15Id);
sc_format_path(gemsafe_pin[i].path, &path);
if (gemsafe_pin[i].atr_len == 0 ||
(gemsafe_pin[i].atr_len == p15card->card->atr.len &&
memcmp(p15card->card->atr.value, gemsafe_pin[i].atr,
p15card->card->atr.len) == 0)) {
sc_pkcs15emu_add_pin(p15card, &p15Id, gemsafe_pin[i].label,
&path, gemsafe_pin[i].ref, gemsafe_pin[i].type,
gemsafe_pin[i].minlen, gemsafe_pin[i].maxlen,
gemsafe_pin[i].flags, gemsafe_pin[i].tries_left,
gemsafe_pin[i].pad_char, gemsafe_pin[i].obj_flags);
break;
}
};
/* set private keys */
sc_log(p15card->card->ctx, "Setting private keys");
for (i = 0; i < gemsafe_cert_max; i++) {
struct sc_pkcs15_id p15Id, authId, *pauthId;
struct sc_path path;
int key_ref = 0x03;
if (gemsafe_prkeys[i].label == NULL)
continue;
sc_pkcs15_format_id(gemsafe_prkeys[i].id, &p15Id);
if (gemsafe_prkeys[i].auth_id) {
sc_pkcs15_format_id(gemsafe_prkeys[i].auth_id, &authId);
pauthId = &authId;
} else
pauthId = NULL;
sc_format_path(gemsafe_prkeys[i].path, &path);
/*
* The key ref may be different for different sites;
* by adding flags=n where the low order 4 bits can be
* the key ref we can force it.
*/
if ( p15card->card->flags & 0x0F) {
key_ref = p15card->card->flags & 0x0F;
sc_debug(p15card->card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,
"Overriding key_ref %d with %d\n",
gemsafe_prkeys[i].ref, key_ref);
} else
key_ref = gemsafe_prkeys[i].ref;
sc_pkcs15emu_add_prkey(p15card, &p15Id, gemsafe_prkeys[i].label,
SC_PKCS15_TYPE_PRKEY_RSA,
gemsafe_prkeys[i].modulus_len, gemsafe_prkeys[i].usage,
&path, key_ref, pauthId,
gemsafe_prkeys[i].obj_flags);
}
/* select the application DF */
sc_log(p15card->card->ctx, "Selecting application DF");
sc_format_path(GEMSAFE_APP_PATH, &path);
r = sc_select_file(card, &path, &file);
if (r != SC_SUCCESS || !file)
return SC_ERROR_INTERNAL;
/* set the application DF */
if (p15card->file_app)
free(p15card->file_app);
p15card->file_app = file;
return SC_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds writes
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problems.
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 78,801
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void rose_kill_by_device(struct net_device *dev)
{
struct sock *s;
spin_lock_bh(&rose_list_lock);
sk_for_each(s, &rose_list) {
struct rose_sock *rose = rose_sk(s);
if (rose->device == dev) {
rose_disconnect(s, ENETUNREACH, ROSE_OUT_OF_ORDER, 0);
rose->neighbour->use--;
rose->device = NULL;
}
}
spin_unlock_bh(&rose_list_lock);
}
Commit Message: rose: fix info leak via msg_name in rose_recvmsg()
The code in rose_recvmsg() does not initialize all of the members of
struct sockaddr_rose/full_sockaddr_rose when filling the sockaddr info.
Nor does it initialize the padding bytes of the structure inserted by
the compiler for alignment. This will lead to leaking uninitialized
kernel stack bytes in net/socket.c.
Fix the issue by initializing the memory used for sockaddr info with
memset(0).
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 30,476
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void sg_timeout(unsigned long _req)
{
struct usb_sg_request *req = (struct usb_sg_request *) _req;
usb_sg_cancel(req);
}
Commit Message: usb: usbtest: fix NULL pointer dereference
If the usbtest driver encounters a device with an IN bulk endpoint but
no OUT bulk endpoint, it will try to dereference a NULL pointer
(out->desc.bEndpointAddress). The problem can be solved by adding a
missing test.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 59,861
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GDataDirectoryService::InitResourceMap(
CreateDBParams* create_params,
const FileOperationCallback& callback) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
DCHECK(create_params);
DCHECK(!directory_service_db_.get());
SerializedMap* serialized_resources = &create_params->serialized_resources;
directory_service_db_ = create_params->db.Pass();
if (serialized_resources->empty()) {
origin_ = INITIALIZING;
if (!callback.is_null())
callback.Run(GDATA_FILE_ERROR_NOT_FOUND);
return;
}
ClearRoot();
int32 version = 0;
SerializedMap::iterator iter = serialized_resources->find(kDBKeyVersion);
if (iter == serialized_resources->end() ||
!base::StringToInt(iter->second, &version) ||
version != kProtoVersion) {
if (!callback.is_null())
callback.Run(GDATA_FILE_ERROR_FAILED);
return;
}
serialized_resources->erase(iter);
iter = serialized_resources->find(kDBKeyLargestChangestamp);
if (iter == serialized_resources->end() ||
!base::StringToInt64(iter->second, &largest_changestamp_)) {
NOTREACHED() << "Could not find/parse largest_changestamp";
if (!callback.is_null())
callback.Run(GDATA_FILE_ERROR_FAILED);
return;
} else {
DVLOG(1) << "InitResourceMap largest_changestamp_" << largest_changestamp_;
serialized_resources->erase(iter);
}
ResourceMap resource_map;
for (SerializedMap::const_iterator iter = serialized_resources->begin();
iter != serialized_resources->end(); ++iter) {
if (iter->first.find(kDBKeyResourceIdPrefix) != 0) {
NOTREACHED() << "Incorrect prefix for db key " << iter->first;
continue;
}
const std::string resource_id =
iter->first.substr(strlen(kDBKeyResourceIdPrefix));
scoped_ptr<GDataEntry> entry = FromProtoString(iter->second);
if (entry.get()) {
DVLOG(1) << "Inserting resource " << resource_id
<< " into resource_map";
resource_map.insert(std::make_pair(resource_id, entry.release()));
} else {
NOTREACHED() << "Failed to parse GDataEntry for resource " << resource_id;
}
}
for (ResourceMap::iterator iter = resource_map.begin();
iter != resource_map.end(); ++iter) {
GDataEntry* entry = iter->second;
ResourceMap::iterator parent_it =
resource_map.find(entry->parent_resource_id());
if (parent_it != resource_map.end()) {
GDataDirectory* parent = parent_it->second->AsGDataDirectory();
if (parent) {
DVLOG(1) << "Adding " << entry->resource_id()
<< " as a child of " << parent->resource_id();
parent->AddEntry(entry);
} else {
NOTREACHED() << "Parent is not a directory " << parent->resource_id();
}
} else if (entry->resource_id() == kGDataRootDirectoryResourceId) {
root_.reset(entry->AsGDataDirectory());
DCHECK(root_.get());
AddEntryToResourceMap(root_.get());
} else {
NOTREACHED() << "Missing parent id " << entry->parent_resource_id()
<< " for resource " << entry->resource_id();
}
}
DCHECK(root_.get());
DCHECK_EQ(resource_map.size(), resource_map_.size());
DCHECK_EQ(resource_map.size(), serialized_resources->size());
origin_ = FROM_CACHE;
if (!callback.is_null())
callback.Run(GDATA_FILE_OK);
}
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 117,096
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static uint64_t cirrus_vga_ioport_read(void *opaque, hwaddr addr,
unsigned size)
{
CirrusVGAState *c = opaque;
VGACommonState *s = &c->vga;
int val, index;
addr += 0x3b0;
if (vga_ioport_invalid(s, addr)) {
val = 0xff;
} else {
switch (addr) {
case 0x3c0:
if (s->ar_flip_flop == 0) {
val = s->ar_index;
} else {
val = 0;
}
break;
case 0x3c1:
index = s->ar_index & 0x1f;
if (index < 21)
val = s->ar[index];
else
val = 0;
break;
case 0x3c2:
val = s->st00;
break;
case 0x3c4:
val = s->sr_index;
break;
case 0x3c5:
val = cirrus_vga_read_sr(c);
break;
#ifdef DEBUG_VGA_REG
printf("vga: read SR%x = 0x%02x\n", s->sr_index, val);
#endif
break;
case 0x3c6:
val = cirrus_read_hidden_dac(c);
break;
case 0x3c7:
val = s->dac_state;
break;
case 0x3c8:
val = s->dac_write_index;
c->cirrus_hidden_dac_lockindex = 0;
break;
case 0x3c9:
val = cirrus_vga_read_palette(c);
break;
case 0x3ca:
val = s->fcr;
break;
case 0x3cc:
val = s->msr;
break;
case 0x3ce:
val = s->gr_index;
break;
case 0x3cf:
val = cirrus_vga_read_gr(c, s->gr_index);
#ifdef DEBUG_VGA_REG
printf("vga: read GR%x = 0x%02x\n", s->gr_index, val);
#endif
break;
case 0x3b4:
case 0x3d4:
val = s->cr_index;
break;
case 0x3b5:
case 0x3d5:
val = cirrus_vga_read_cr(c, s->cr_index);
#ifdef DEBUG_VGA_REG
printf("vga: read CR%x = 0x%02x\n", s->cr_index, val);
#endif
break;
case 0x3ba:
case 0x3da:
/* just toggle to fool polling */
val = s->st01 = s->retrace(s);
s->ar_flip_flop = 0;
break;
default:
val = 0x00;
break;
}
}
#if defined(DEBUG_VGA)
printf("VGA: read addr=0x%04x data=0x%02x\n", addr, val);
#endif
return val;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 7,600
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChromeContentBrowserClient::NavigationRequestRedirected(
int frame_tree_node_id,
const GURL& url,
base::Optional<net::HttpRequestHeaders>* modified_request_headers) {
WebContents* web_contents =
WebContents::FromFrameTreeNodeId(frame_tree_node_id);
content::BrowserContext* browser_context = web_contents->GetBrowserContext();
if (!browser_context->IsOffTheRecord()) {
policy::PolicyHeaderService* policy_header_service =
policy::PolicyHeaderServiceFactory::GetForBrowserContext(
browser_context);
if (policy_header_service) {
std::unique_ptr<net::HttpRequestHeaders> extra_headers;
policy_header_service->AddPolicyHeaders(url, &extra_headers);
if (extra_headers)
*modified_request_headers = std::move(*extra_headers);
}
}
}
Commit Message: service worker: Make navigate/openWindow go through more security checks.
WindowClient.navigate() and Clients.openWindow() were implemented in
a way that directly navigated to the URL without going through
some checks that the normal navigation path goes through. This CL
attempts to fix that:
- WindowClient.navigate() now goes through Navigator::RequestOpenURL()
instead of directly through WebContents::OpenURL().
- Clients.openWindow() now calls more ContentBrowserClient functions
for manipulating the navigation before invoking
ContentBrowserClient::OpenURL().
Bug: 904219
Change-Id: Ic38978aee98c09834fdbbc240164068faa3fd4f5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1345686
Commit-Queue: Matt Falkenhagen <falken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#610753}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 153,482
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gx_device_retain(gx_device *dev, bool retained)
{
int delta = (int)retained - (int)dev->retained;
if (delta) {
dev->retained = retained; /* do first in case dev is freed */
rc_adjust_only(dev, delta, "gx_device_retain");
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-78
| 0
| 2,815
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual status_t setDefaultBufferDataSpace(
android_dataspace defaultDataSpace) {
Parcel data, reply;
data.writeInterfaceToken(IGraphicBufferConsumer::getInterfaceDescriptor());
data.writeInt32(static_cast<int32_t>(defaultDataSpace));
status_t result = remote()->transact(SET_DEFAULT_BUFFER_DATA_SPACE,
data, &reply);
if (result != NO_ERROR) {
return result;
}
return reply.readInt32();
}
Commit Message: BQ: fix some uninitialized variables
Bug 27555981
Bug 27556038
Change-Id: I436b6fec589677d7e36c0e980f6e59808415dc0e
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 160,913
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameImpl::PepperTextInputTypeChanged(
PepperPluginInstanceImpl* instance) {
if (instance != render_view_->focused_pepper_plugin())
return;
GetRenderWidget()->UpdateTextInputState(
RenderWidget::NO_SHOW_IME, RenderWidget::FROM_NON_IME);
FocusedNodeChangedForAccessibility(WebNode());
}
Commit Message: Connect WebUSB client interface to the devices app
This provides a basic WebUSB client interface in
content/renderer. Most of the interface is unimplemented,
but this CL hooks up navigator.usb.getDevices() to the
browser's Mojo devices app to enumerate available USB
devices.
BUG=492204
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1293253002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344881}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 123,183
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct usb_interface *usb_ifnum_to_if(const struct usb_device *dev,
unsigned ifnum)
{
struct usb_host_config *config = dev->actconfig;
int i;
if (!config)
return NULL;
for (i = 0; i < config->desc.bNumInterfaces; i++)
if (config->interface[i]->altsetting[0]
.desc.bInterfaceNumber == ifnum)
return config->interface[i];
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: USB: check usb_get_extra_descriptor for proper size
When reading an extra descriptor, we need to properly check the minimum
and maximum size allowed, to prevent from invalid data being sent by a
device.
Reported-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Co-developed-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 75,564
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::SubmitCompositorFrameSync(
const viz::LocalSurfaceId& local_surface_id,
viz::CompositorFrame frame,
base::Optional<viz::HitTestRegionList> hit_test_region_list,
uint64_t submit_time,
const SubmitCompositorFrameSyncCallback callback) {
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
}
Commit Message: Start rendering timer after first navigation
Currently the new content rendering timer in the browser process,
which clears an old page's contents 4 seconds after a navigation if the
new page doesn't draw in that time, is not set on the first navigation
for a top-level frame.
This is problematic because content can exist before the first
navigation, for instance if it was created by a javascript: URL.
This CL removes the code that skips the timer activation on the first
navigation.
Bug: 844881
Change-Id: I19b3ad1ff62c69ded3a5f7b1c0afde191aaf4584
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1188589
Reviewed-by: Fady Samuel <fsamuel@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: ccameron <ccameron@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586913}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 145,568
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
{
CERT *ct = s->cert;
if (c->algorithm_ssl & ct->mask_ssl || c->algorithm_mkey & ct->mask_k || c->algorithm_auth & ct->mask_a)
return 1;
return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 12,462
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int read_uint64(BlockDriverState *bs, int64_t offset, uint64_t *result)
{
uint64_t buffer;
int ret;
ret = bdrv_pread(bs->file, offset, &buffer, 8);
if (ret < 0) {
return ret;
}
*result = be64_to_cpu(buffer);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 16,791
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ComponentUpdaterPolicyTest::CallAsync(TestCaseAction action) {
base::PostTaskWithTraits(FROM_HERE, {BrowserThread::UI},
base::BindOnce(action, base::Unretained(this)));
}
Commit Message: Enforce the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy
This change modifies UsbChooserContext to use the UsbAllowDevicesForUrls
class to consider devices allowed by the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls
policy. The WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy overrides the other WebUSB
policies. Unit tests are also added to ensure that the policy is being
enforced correctly.
The design document for this feature is found at:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1MPvsrWiVD_jAC8ELyk8njFpy6j1thfVU5aWT3TCWE8w
Bug: 854329
Change-Id: I5f82e662ca9dc544da5918eae766b5535a31296b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1259289
Commit-Queue: Ovidio Henriquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Julian Pastarmov <pastarmovj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597926}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 157,012
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int usb_cypress_load_firmware(struct usb_device *udev, const struct firmware *fw, int type)
{
struct hexline *hx;
u8 reset;
int ret,pos=0;
hx = kmalloc(sizeof(*hx), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!hx)
return -ENOMEM;
/* stop the CPU */
reset = 1;
if ((ret = usb_cypress_writemem(udev,cypress[type].cpu_cs_register,&reset,1)) != 1)
err("could not stop the USB controller CPU.");
while ((ret = dvb_usb_get_hexline(fw, hx, &pos)) > 0) {
deb_fw("writing to address 0x%04x (buffer: 0x%02x %02x)\n", hx->addr, hx->len, hx->chk);
ret = usb_cypress_writemem(udev, hx->addr, hx->data, hx->len);
if (ret != hx->len) {
err("error while transferring firmware (transferred size: %d, block size: %d)",
ret, hx->len);
ret = -EINVAL;
break;
}
}
if (ret < 0) {
err("firmware download failed at %d with %d",pos,ret);
kfree(hx);
return ret;
}
if (ret == 0) {
/* restart the CPU */
reset = 0;
if (ret || usb_cypress_writemem(udev,cypress[type].cpu_cs_register,&reset,1) != 1) {
err("could not restart the USB controller CPU.");
ret = -EINVAL;
}
} else
ret = -EIO;
kfree(hx);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: [media] dvb-usb-firmware: don't do DMA on stack
The buffer allocation for the firmware data was changed in
commit 43fab9793c1f ("[media] dvb-usb: don't use stack for firmware load")
but the same applies for the reset value.
Fixes: 43fab9793c1f ("[media] dvb-usb: don't use stack for firmware load")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stefan Brüns <stefan.bruens@rwth-aachen.de>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 168,230
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
krb5_error_code retval;
krb5_context kcontext;
verto_ctx *ctx;
int errout = 0;
int i;
setlocale(LC_MESSAGES, "");
if (strrchr(argv[0], '/'))
argv[0] = strrchr(argv[0], '/')+1;
if (!(kdc_realmlist = (kdc_realm_t **) malloc(sizeof(kdc_realm_t *) *
KRB5_KDC_MAX_REALMS))) {
fprintf(stderr, _("%s: cannot get memory for realm list\n"), argv[0]);
exit(1);
}
memset(kdc_realmlist, 0,
(size_t) (sizeof(kdc_realm_t *) * KRB5_KDC_MAX_REALMS));
/*
* A note about Kerberos contexts: This context, "kcontext", is used
* for the KDC operations, i.e. setup, network connection and error
* reporting. The per-realm operations use the "realm_context"
* associated with each realm.
*/
retval = krb5int_init_context_kdc(&kcontext);
if (retval) {
com_err(argv[0], retval, _("while initializing krb5"));
exit(1);
}
krb5_klog_init(kcontext, "kdc", argv[0], 1);
kdc_err_context = kcontext;
kdc_progname = argv[0];
/* N.B.: After this point, com_err sends output to the KDC log
file, and not to stderr. We use the kdc_err wrapper around
com_err to ensure that the error state exists in the context
known to the krb5_klog callback. */
initialize_kdc5_error_table();
/*
* Scan through the argument list
*/
initialize_realms(kcontext, argc, argv);
ctx = loop_init(VERTO_EV_TYPE_NONE);
if (!ctx) {
kdc_err(kcontext, ENOMEM, _("while creating main loop"));
finish_realms();
return 1;
}
load_preauth_plugins(kcontext);
load_authdata_plugins(kcontext);
retval = setup_sam();
if (retval) {
kdc_err(kcontext, retval, _("while initializing SAM"));
finish_realms();
return 1;
}
/* Handle each realm's ports */
for (i=0; i<kdc_numrealms; i++) {
char *cp = kdc_realmlist[i]->realm_ports;
int port;
while (cp && *cp) {
if (*cp == ',' || isspace((int) *cp)) {
cp++;
continue;
}
port = strtol(cp, &cp, 10);
if (cp == 0)
break;
retval = loop_add_udp_port(port);
if (retval)
goto net_init_error;
}
cp = kdc_realmlist[i]->realm_tcp_ports;
while (cp && *cp) {
if (*cp == ',' || isspace((int) *cp)) {
cp++;
continue;
}
port = strtol(cp, &cp, 10);
if (cp == 0)
break;
retval = loop_add_tcp_port(port);
if (retval)
goto net_init_error;
}
}
/*
* Setup network listeners. Disallow network reconfig in response to
* routing socket messages if we're using worker processes, since the
* children won't be able to re-open the listener sockets. Hopefully our
* platform has pktinfo support and doesn't need reconfigs.
*/
if (workers == 0) {
retval = loop_setup_routing_socket(ctx, NULL, kdc_progname);
if (retval) {
kdc_err(kcontext, retval, _("while initializing routing socket"));
finish_realms();
return 1;
}
retval = loop_setup_signals(ctx, NULL, reset_for_hangup);
if (retval) {
kdc_err(kcontext, retval, _("while initializing signal handlers"));
finish_realms();
return 1;
}
}
if ((retval = loop_setup_network(ctx, NULL, kdc_progname))) {
net_init_error:
kdc_err(kcontext, retval, _("while initializing network"));
finish_realms();
return 1;
}
if (!nofork && daemon(0, 0)) {
kdc_err(kcontext, errno, _("while detaching from tty"));
finish_realms();
return 1;
}
if (pid_file != NULL) {
retval = write_pid_file(pid_file);
if (retval) {
kdc_err(kcontext, retval, _("while creating PID file"));
finish_realms();
return 1;
}
}
if (workers > 0) {
finish_realms();
retval = create_workers(ctx, workers);
if (retval) {
kdc_err(kcontext, errno, _("creating worker processes"));
return 1;
}
/* We get here only in a worker child process; re-initialize realms. */
initialize_realms(kcontext, argc, argv);
}
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("commencing operation"));
if (nofork)
fprintf(stderr, _("%s: starting...\n"), kdc_progname);
verto_run(ctx);
loop_free(ctx);
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("shutting down"));
unload_preauth_plugins(kcontext);
unload_authdata_plugins(kcontext);
krb5_klog_close(kdc_context);
finish_realms();
if (kdc_realmlist)
free(kdc_realmlist);
#ifndef NOCACHE
kdc_free_lookaside(kcontext);
#endif
krb5_free_context(kcontext);
return errout;
}
Commit Message: Multi-realm KDC null deref [CVE-2013-1418]
If a KDC serves multiple realms, certain requests can cause
setup_server_realm() to dereference a null pointer, crashing the KDC.
CVSSv2: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
A related but more minor vulnerability requires authentication to
exploit, and is only present if a third-party KDC database module can
dereference a null pointer under certain conditions.
(back ported from commit 5d2d9a1abe46a2c1a8614d4672d08d9d30a5f8bf)
ticket: 7757 (new)
version_fixed: 1.10.7
status: resolved
CWE ID:
| 0
| 28,280
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE3(osf_readv, unsigned long, fd,
const struct iovec __user *, vector, unsigned long, count)
{
if (unlikely(personality(current->personality) == PER_OSF4))
if (osf_fix_iov_len(vector, count))
return -EFAULT;
return sys_readv(fd, vector, count);
}
Commit Message: alpha: fix several security issues
Fix several security issues in Alpha-specific syscalls. Untested, but
mostly trivial.
1. Signedness issue in osf_getdomainname allows copying out-of-bounds
kernel memory to userland.
2. Signedness issue in osf_sysinfo allows copying large amounts of
kernel memory to userland.
3. Typo (?) in osf_getsysinfo bounds minimum instead of maximum copy
size, allowing copying large amounts of kernel memory to userland.
4. Usage of user pointer in osf_wait4 while under KERNEL_DS allows
privilege escalation via writing return value of sys_wait4 to kernel
memory.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 27,228
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct sk_buff *__netdev_alloc_skb(struct net_device *dev,
unsigned int length, gfp_t gfp_mask)
{
struct sk_buff *skb = NULL;
unsigned int fragsz = SKB_DATA_ALIGN(length + NET_SKB_PAD) +
SKB_DATA_ALIGN(sizeof(struct skb_shared_info));
if (fragsz <= PAGE_SIZE && !(gfp_mask & (__GFP_WAIT | GFP_DMA))) {
void *data;
if (sk_memalloc_socks())
gfp_mask |= __GFP_MEMALLOC;
data = __netdev_alloc_frag(fragsz, gfp_mask);
if (likely(data)) {
skb = build_skb(data, fragsz);
if (unlikely(!skb))
put_page(virt_to_head_page(data));
}
} else {
skb = __alloc_skb(length + NET_SKB_PAD, gfp_mask,
SKB_ALLOC_RX, NUMA_NO_NODE);
}
if (likely(skb)) {
skb_reserve(skb, NET_SKB_PAD);
skb->dev = dev;
}
return skb;
}
Commit Message: skbuff: skb_segment: orphan frags before copying
skb_segment copies frags around, so we need
to copy them carefully to avoid accessing
user memory after reporting completion to userspace
through a callback.
skb_segment doesn't normally happen on datapath:
TSO needs to be disabled - so disabling zero copy
in this case does not look like a big deal.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 39,851
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::OnGpuSwapBuffersCompletedInternal(
const ui::LatencyInfo& latency_info) {
ui::LatencyInfo::LatencyComponent window_snapshot_component;
if (latency_info.FindLatency(ui::BROWSER_SNAPSHOT_FRAME_NUMBER_COMPONENT,
GetLatencyComponentId(),
&window_snapshot_component)) {
int sequence_number =
static_cast<int>(window_snapshot_component.sequence_number);
#if defined(OS_MACOSX) || defined(OS_WIN)
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostDelayedTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&RenderWidgetHostImpl::WindowSnapshotReachedScreen,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), sequence_number),
base::TimeDelta::FromSecondsD(1. / 6));
#else
WindowSnapshotReachedScreen(sequence_number);
#endif
}
latency_tracker_.OnGpuSwapBuffersCompleted(latency_info);
}
Commit Message: Force a flush of drawing to the widget when a dialog is shown.
BUG=823353
TEST=as in bug
Change-Id: I5da777068fc29c5638ef02d50e59d5d7b2729260
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/971661
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#544518}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 155,591
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: asmlinkage long compat_sys_ioctl(unsigned int fd, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg)
{
struct fd f = fdget(fd);
int error = -EBADF;
if (!f.file)
goto out;
/* RED-PEN how should LSM module know it's handling 32bit? */
error = security_file_ioctl(f.file, cmd, arg);
if (error)
goto out_fput;
/*
* To allow the compat_ioctl handlers to be self contained
* we need to check the common ioctls here first.
* Just handle them with the standard handlers below.
*/
switch (cmd) {
case FIOCLEX:
case FIONCLEX:
case FIONBIO:
case FIOASYNC:
case FIOQSIZE:
break;
#if defined(CONFIG_IA64) || defined(CONFIG_X86_64)
case FS_IOC_RESVSP_32:
case FS_IOC_RESVSP64_32:
error = compat_ioctl_preallocate(f.file, compat_ptr(arg));
goto out_fput;
#else
case FS_IOC_RESVSP:
case FS_IOC_RESVSP64:
error = ioctl_preallocate(f.file, compat_ptr(arg));
goto out_fput;
#endif
case FIBMAP:
case FIGETBSZ:
case FIONREAD:
if (S_ISREG(f.file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_mode))
break;
/*FALL THROUGH*/
default:
if (f.file->f_op && f.file->f_op->compat_ioctl) {
error = f.file->f_op->compat_ioctl(f.file, cmd, arg);
if (error != -ENOIOCTLCMD)
goto out_fput;
}
if (!f.file->f_op || !f.file->f_op->unlocked_ioctl)
goto do_ioctl;
break;
}
if (compat_ioctl_check_table(XFORM(cmd)))
goto found_handler;
error = do_ioctl_trans(fd, cmd, arg, f.file);
if (error == -ENOIOCTLCMD)
error = -ENOTTY;
goto out_fput;
found_handler:
arg = (unsigned long)compat_ptr(arg);
do_ioctl:
error = do_vfs_ioctl(f.file, fd, cmd, arg);
out_fput:
fdput(f);
out:
return error;
}
Commit Message: fs/compat_ioctl.c: VIDEO_SET_SPU_PALETTE missing error check
The compat ioctl for VIDEO_SET_SPU_PALETTE was missing an error check
while converting ioctl arguments. This could lead to leaking kernel
stack contents into userspace.
Patch extracted from existing fix in grsecurity.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 32,815
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: crm_element_value_const(const xmlNode * data, const char *name)
{
return crm_element_value((xmlNode *) data, name);
}
Commit Message: Fix: acl: Do not delay evaluation of added nodes in some situations
It is not appropriate when the node has no children as it is not a
placeholder
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 44,018
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int afiucv_hs_callback_win(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct iucv_sock *iucv = iucv_sk(sk);
struct af_iucv_trans_hdr *trans_hdr =
(struct af_iucv_trans_hdr *)skb->data;
if (!iucv)
return NET_RX_SUCCESS;
if (sk->sk_state != IUCV_CONNECTED)
return NET_RX_SUCCESS;
atomic_sub(trans_hdr->window, &iucv->msg_sent);
iucv_sock_wake_msglim(sk);
return NET_RX_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: iucv: Fix missing msg_namelen update in iucv_sock_recvmsg()
The current code does not fill the msg_name member in case it is set.
It also does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore makes
net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable
to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory.
Fix that by simply setting msg_namelen to 0 as obviously nobody cared
about iucv_sock_recvmsg() not filling the msg_name in case it was set.
Cc: Ursula Braun <ursula.braun@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 30,580
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: local void help(void)
{
int n;
if (g.verbosity == 0)
return;
for (n = 0; n < (int)(sizeof(helptext) / sizeof(char *)); n++)
fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", helptext[n]);
fflush(stderr);
exit(0);
}
Commit Message: When decompressing with -N or -NT, strip any path from header name.
This uses the path of the compressed file combined with the name
from the header as the name of the decompressed output file. Any
path information in the header name is stripped. This avoids a
possible vulnerability where absolute or descending paths are put
in the gzip header.
CWE ID: CWE-22
| 0
| 44,799
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ParseCommon(map_string_t *settings, const char *conf_filename)
{
const char *value;
value = get_map_string_item_or_NULL(settings, "WatchCrashdumpArchiveDir");
if (value)
{
g_settings_sWatchCrashdumpArchiveDir = xstrdup(value);
remove_map_string_item(settings, "WatchCrashdumpArchiveDir");
}
value = get_map_string_item_or_NULL(settings, "MaxCrashReportsSize");
if (value)
{
char *end;
errno = 0;
unsigned long ul = strtoul(value, &end, 10);
if (errno || end == value || *end != '\0' || ul > INT_MAX)
error_msg("Error parsing %s setting: '%s'", "MaxCrashReportsSize", value);
else
g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize = ul;
remove_map_string_item(settings, "MaxCrashReportsSize");
}
value = get_map_string_item_or_NULL(settings, "DumpLocation");
if (value)
{
g_settings_dump_location = xstrdup(value);
remove_map_string_item(settings, "DumpLocation");
}
else
g_settings_dump_location = xstrdup(DEFAULT_DUMP_LOCATION);
value = get_map_string_item_or_NULL(settings, "DeleteUploaded");
if (value)
{
g_settings_delete_uploaded = string_to_bool(value);
remove_map_string_item(settings, "DeleteUploaded");
}
value = get_map_string_item_or_NULL(settings, "AutoreportingEnabled");
if (value)
{
g_settings_autoreporting = string_to_bool(value);
remove_map_string_item(settings, "AutoreportingEnabled");
}
value = get_map_string_item_or_NULL(settings, "AutoreportingEvent");
if (value)
{
g_settings_autoreporting_event = xstrdup(value);
remove_map_string_item(settings, "AutoreportingEvent");
}
else
g_settings_autoreporting_event = xstrdup("report_uReport");
value = get_map_string_item_or_NULL(settings, "ShortenedReporting");
if (value)
{
g_settings_shortenedreporting = string_to_bool(value);
remove_map_string_item(settings, "ShortenedReporting");
}
else
g_settings_shortenedreporting = 0;
GHashTableIter iter;
const char *name;
/*char *value; - already declared */
init_map_string_iter(&iter, settings);
while (next_map_string_iter(&iter, &name, &value))
{
error_msg("Unrecognized variable '%s' in '%s'", name, conf_filename);
}
}
Commit Message: make the dump directories owned by root by default
It was discovered that the abrt event scripts create a user-readable
copy of a sosreport file in abrt problem directories, and include
excerpts of /var/log/messages selected by the user-controlled process
name, leading to an information disclosure.
This issue was discovered by Florian Weimer of Red Hat Product Security.
Related: #1212868
Signed-off-by: Jakub Filak <jfilak@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 1
| 170,150
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Browser* Browser::GetTabbedBrowser(Profile* profile, bool match_incognito) {
return BrowserList::FindTabbedBrowser(profile, match_incognito);
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 97,237
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ext4_block_zero_page_range(handle_t *handle,
struct address_space *mapping, loff_t from, loff_t length)
{
struct inode *inode = mapping->host;
unsigned offset = from & (PAGE_SIZE-1);
unsigned blocksize = inode->i_sb->s_blocksize;
unsigned max = blocksize - (offset & (blocksize - 1));
/*
* correct length if it does not fall between
* 'from' and the end of the block
*/
if (length > max || length < 0)
length = max;
if (IS_DAX(inode))
return dax_zero_page_range(inode, from, length, ext4_get_block);
return __ext4_block_zero_page_range(handle, mapping, from, length);
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix data exposure after a crash
Huang has reported that in his powerfail testing he is seeing stale
block contents in some of recently allocated blocks although he mounts
ext4 in data=ordered mode. After some investigation I have found out
that indeed when delayed allocation is used, we don't add inode to
transaction's list of inodes needing flushing before commit. Originally
we were doing that but commit f3b59291a69d removed the logic with a
flawed argument that it is not needed.
The problem is that although for delayed allocated blocks we write their
contents immediately after allocating them, there is no guarantee that
the IO scheduler or device doesn't reorder things and thus transaction
allocating blocks and attaching them to inode can reach stable storage
before actual block contents. Actually whenever we attach freshly
allocated blocks to inode using a written extent, we should add inode to
transaction's ordered inode list to make sure we properly wait for block
contents to be written before committing the transaction. So that is
what we do in this patch. This also handles other cases where stale data
exposure was possible - like filling hole via mmap in
data=ordered,nodelalloc mode.
The only exception to the above rule are extending direct IO writes where
blkdev_direct_IO() waits for IO to complete before increasing i_size and
thus stale data exposure is not possible. For now we don't complicate
the code with optimizing this special case since the overhead is pretty
low. In case this is observed to be a performance problem we can always
handle it using a special flag to ext4_map_blocks().
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: f3b59291a69d0b734be1fc8be489fef2dd846d3d
Reported-by: "HUANG Weller (CM/ESW12-CN)" <Weller.Huang@cn.bosch.com>
Tested-by: "HUANG Weller (CM/ESW12-CN)" <Weller.Huang@cn.bosch.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 67,512
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SSH_PACKET_CALLBACK(ssh_packet_dh_reply){
int rc;
(void)type;
(void)user;
SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_PROTOCOL,"Received SSH_KEXDH_REPLY");
if(session->session_state!= SSH_SESSION_STATE_DH &&
session->dh_handshake_state != DH_STATE_INIT_SENT){
ssh_set_error(session,SSH_FATAL,"ssh_packet_dh_reply called in wrong state : %d:%d",
session->session_state,session->dh_handshake_state);
goto error;
}
switch(session->next_crypto->kex_type){
case SSH_KEX_DH_GROUP1_SHA1:
case SSH_KEX_DH_GROUP14_SHA1:
rc=ssh_client_dh_reply(session, packet);
break;
#ifdef HAVE_ECDH
case SSH_KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP256:
rc = ssh_client_ecdh_reply(session, packet);
break;
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_CURVE25519
case SSH_KEX_CURVE25519_SHA256_LIBSSH_ORG:
rc = ssh_client_curve25519_reply(session, packet);
break;
#endif
default:
ssh_set_error(session,SSH_FATAL,"Wrong kex type in ssh_packet_dh_reply");
goto error;
}
if(rc==SSH_OK) {
session->dh_handshake_state = DH_STATE_NEWKEYS_SENT;
return SSH_PACKET_USED;
}
error:
session->session_state=SSH_SESSION_STATE_ERROR;
return SSH_PACKET_USED;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 1
| 165,323
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_set_guest_debug(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_guest_debug *dbg)
{
unsigned long rflags;
int i, r;
if (dbg->control & (KVM_GUESTDBG_INJECT_DB | KVM_GUESTDBG_INJECT_BP)) {
r = -EBUSY;
if (vcpu->arch.exception.pending)
goto out;
if (dbg->control & KVM_GUESTDBG_INJECT_DB)
kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, DB_VECTOR);
else
kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, BP_VECTOR);
}
/*
* Read rflags as long as potentially injected trace flags are still
* filtered out.
*/
rflags = kvm_get_rflags(vcpu);
vcpu->guest_debug = dbg->control;
if (!(vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_ENABLE))
vcpu->guest_debug = 0;
if (vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP) {
for (i = 0; i < KVM_NR_DB_REGS; ++i)
vcpu->arch.eff_db[i] = dbg->arch.debugreg[i];
vcpu->arch.guest_debug_dr7 = dbg->arch.debugreg[7];
} else {
for (i = 0; i < KVM_NR_DB_REGS; i++)
vcpu->arch.eff_db[i] = vcpu->arch.db[i];
}
kvm_update_dr7(vcpu);
if (vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP)
vcpu->arch.singlestep_rip = kvm_rip_read(vcpu) +
get_segment_base(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_CS);
/*
* Trigger an rflags update that will inject or remove the trace
* flags.
*/
kvm_set_rflags(vcpu, rflags);
kvm_x86_ops->update_db_bp_intercept(vcpu);
r = 0;
out:
return r;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Convert vapic synchronization to _cached functions (CVE-2013-6368)
In kvm_lapic_sync_from_vapic and kvm_lapic_sync_to_vapic there is the
potential to corrupt kernel memory if userspace provides an address that
is at the end of a page. This patches concerts those functions to use
kvm_write_guest_cached and kvm_read_guest_cached. It also checks the
vapic_address specified by userspace during ioctl processing and returns
an error to userspace if the address is not a valid GPA.
This is generally not guest triggerable, because the required write is
done by firmware that runs before the guest. Also, it only affects AMD
processors and oldish Intel that do not have the FlexPriority feature
(unless you disable FlexPriority, of course; then newer processors are
also affected).
Fixes: b93463aa59d6 ('KVM: Accelerated apic support')
Reported-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 28,852
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: test_bson_append_symbol (void)
{
bson_t *b;
bson_t *b2;
b = bson_new ();
b2 = get_bson ("test32.bson");
BSON_ASSERT (bson_append_symbol (b, "hello", -1, "world", -1));
BSON_ASSERT_BSON_EQUAL (b, b2);
bson_destroy (b);
bson_destroy (b2);
}
Commit Message: Fix for CVE-2018-16790 -- Verify bounds before binary length read.
As reported here: https://jira.mongodb.org/browse/CDRIVER-2819,
a heap overread occurs due a failure to correctly verify data
bounds.
In the original check, len - o returns the data left including the
sizeof(l) we just read. Instead, the comparison should check
against the data left NOT including the binary int32, i.e. just
subtype (byte*) instead of int32 subtype (byte*).
Added in test for corrupted BSON example.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 77,893
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __reg_combine_min_max(struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg,
struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg)
{
src_reg->umin_value = dst_reg->umin_value = max(src_reg->umin_value,
dst_reg->umin_value);
src_reg->umax_value = dst_reg->umax_value = min(src_reg->umax_value,
dst_reg->umax_value);
src_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->smin_value = max(src_reg->smin_value,
dst_reg->smin_value);
src_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->smax_value = min(src_reg->smax_value,
dst_reg->smax_value);
src_reg->var_off = dst_reg->var_off = tnum_intersect(src_reg->var_off,
dst_reg->var_off);
/* We might have learned new bounds from the var_off. */
__update_reg_bounds(src_reg);
__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
/* We might have learned something about the sign bit. */
__reg_deduce_bounds(src_reg);
__reg_deduce_bounds(dst_reg);
/* We might have learned some bits from the bounds. */
__reg_bound_offset(src_reg);
__reg_bound_offset(dst_reg);
/* Intersecting with the old var_off might have improved our bounds
* slightly. e.g. if umax was 0x7f...f and var_off was (0; 0xf...fc),
* then new var_off is (0; 0x7f...fc) which improves our umax.
*/
__update_reg_bounds(src_reg);
__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix branch pruning logic
when the verifier detects that register contains a runtime constant
and it's compared with another constant it will prune exploration
of the branch that is guaranteed not to be taken at runtime.
This is all correct, but malicious program may be constructed
in such a way that it always has a constant comparison and
the other branch is never taken under any conditions.
In this case such path through the program will not be explored
by the verifier. It won't be taken at run-time either, but since
all instructions are JITed the malicious program may cause JITs
to complain about using reserved fields, etc.
To fix the issue we have to track the instructions explored by
the verifier and sanitize instructions that are dead at run time
with NOPs. We cannot reject such dead code, since llvm generates
it for valid C code, since it doesn't do as much data flow
analysis as the verifier does.
Fixes: 17a5267067f3 ("bpf: verifier (add verifier core)")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 59,097
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int exif_process_IFD_in_MAKERNOTE(image_info_type *ImageInfo, char * value_ptr, int value_len, char *offset_base, size_t IFDlength, size_t displacement TSRMLS_DC)
{
int de, i=0, section_index = SECTION_MAKERNOTE;
int NumDirEntries, old_motorola_intel, offset_diff;
const maker_note_type *maker_note;
char *dir_start;
for (i=0; i<=sizeof(maker_note_array)/sizeof(maker_note_type); i++) {
if (i==sizeof(maker_note_array)/sizeof(maker_note_type))
return FALSE;
maker_note = maker_note_array+i;
/*exif_error_docref(NULL EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_NOTICE, "check (%s,%s)", maker_note->make?maker_note->make:"", maker_note->model?maker_note->model:"");*/
if (maker_note->make && (!ImageInfo->make || strcmp(maker_note->make, ImageInfo->make)))
continue;
if (maker_note->model && (!ImageInfo->model || strcmp(maker_note->model, ImageInfo->model)))
continue;
if (maker_note->id_string && strncmp(maker_note->id_string, value_ptr, maker_note->id_string_len))
continue;
break;
}
dir_start = value_ptr + maker_note->offset;
#ifdef EXIF_DEBUG
exif_error_docref(NULL EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_NOTICE, "Process %s @x%04X + 0x%04X=%d: %s", exif_get_sectionname(section_index), (int)dir_start-(int)offset_base+maker_note->offset+displacement, value_len, value_len, exif_char_dump(value_ptr, value_len, (int)dir_start-(int)offset_base+maker_note->offset+displacement));
#endif
ImageInfo->sections_found |= FOUND_MAKERNOTE;
old_motorola_intel = ImageInfo->motorola_intel;
switch (maker_note->byte_order) {
case MN_ORDER_INTEL:
ImageInfo->motorola_intel = 0;
break;
case MN_ORDER_MOTOROLA:
ImageInfo->motorola_intel = 1;
break;
default:
case MN_ORDER_NORMAL:
break;
}
NumDirEntries = php_ifd_get16u(dir_start, ImageInfo->motorola_intel);
switch (maker_note->offset_mode) {
case MN_OFFSET_MAKER:
offset_base = value_ptr;
break;
case MN_OFFSET_GUESS:
offset_diff = 2 + NumDirEntries*12 + 4 - php_ifd_get32u(dir_start+10, ImageInfo->motorola_intel);
#ifdef EXIF_DEBUG
exif_error_docref(NULL EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_NOTICE, "Using automatic offset correction: 0x%04X", ((int)dir_start-(int)offset_base+maker_note->offset+displacement) + offset_diff);
#endif
offset_base = value_ptr + offset_diff;
break;
default:
case MN_OFFSET_NORMAL:
break;
}
if ((2+NumDirEntries*12) > value_len) {
exif_error_docref("exif_read_data#error_ifd" EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_WARNING, "Illegal IFD size: 2 + x%04X*12 = x%04X > x%04X", NumDirEntries, 2+NumDirEntries*12, value_len);
return FALSE;
}
for (de=0;de<NumDirEntries;de++) {
if (!exif_process_IFD_TAG(ImageInfo, dir_start + 2 + 12 * de,
offset_base, IFDlength, displacement, section_index, 0, maker_note->tag_table TSRMLS_CC)) {
return FALSE;
}
}
ImageInfo->motorola_intel = old_motorola_intel;
/* NextDirOffset (must be NULL) = php_ifd_get32u(dir_start+2+12*de, ImageInfo->motorola_intel);*/
#ifdef EXIF_DEBUG
exif_error_docref(NULL EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_NOTICE, "Subsection %s done", exif_get_sectionname(SECTION_MAKERNOTE));
#endif
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 10,949
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: hook_process (struct t_weechat_plugin *plugin,
const char *command, int timeout,
t_hook_callback_process *callback, void *callback_data)
{
return hook_process_hashtable (plugin, command, NULL, timeout,
callback, callback_data);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 7,315
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t ims_pcu_attribute_show(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *dattr,
char *buf)
{
struct usb_interface *intf = to_usb_interface(dev);
struct ims_pcu *pcu = usb_get_intfdata(intf);
struct ims_pcu_attribute *attr =
container_of(dattr, struct ims_pcu_attribute, dattr);
char *field = (char *)pcu + attr->field_offset;
return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%.*s\n", attr->field_length, field);
}
Commit Message: Input: ims-pcu - sanity check against missing interfaces
A malicious device missing interface can make the driver oops.
Add sanity checking.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 53,990
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void dct_unquantize_h263_intra_c(MpegEncContext *s,
int16_t *block, int n, int qscale)
{
int i, level, qmul, qadd;
int nCoeffs;
av_assert2(s->block_last_index[n]>=0 || s->h263_aic);
qmul = qscale << 1;
if (!s->h263_aic) {
block[0] *= n < 4 ? s->y_dc_scale : s->c_dc_scale;
qadd = (qscale - 1) | 1;
}else{
qadd = 0;
}
if(s->ac_pred)
nCoeffs=63;
else
nCoeffs= s->intra_scantable.raster_end[ s->block_last_index[n] ];
for(i=1; i<=nCoeffs; i++) {
level = block[i];
if (level) {
if (level < 0) {
level = level * qmul - qadd;
} else {
level = level * qmul + qadd;
}
block[i] = level;
}
}
}
Commit Message: avcodec/idctdsp: Transmit studio_profile to init instead of using AVCodecContext profile
These 2 fields are not always the same, it is simpler to always use the same field
for detecting studio profile
Fixes: null pointer dereference
Fixes: ffmpeg_crash_3.avi
Found-by: Thuan Pham <thuanpv@comp.nus.edu.sg>, Marcel Böhme, Andrew Santosa and Alexandru RazvanCaciulescu with AFLSmart
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 81,720
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void comps_objmrtree_set_x(COMPS_ObjMRTree *rt, char *key, COMPS_Object *data) {
__comps_objmrtree_set(rt, key, strlen(key), data);
}
Commit Message: Fix UAF in comps_objmrtree_unite function
The added field is not used at all in many places and it is probably the
left-over of some copy-paste.
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 91,778
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void expandRow(Guchar *srcBuf, Guchar *dstBuf, int srcWidth, int scaledWidth, int nComps)
{
double xStep = (double)srcWidth/scaledWidth;
double xSrc = 0.0;
double xFrac, xInt;
int p;
for (int i = 0; i < nComps; i++)
srcBuf[srcWidth*nComps + i] = srcBuf[(srcWidth-1)*nComps + i];
for (int x = 0; x < scaledWidth; x++) {
xFrac = modf(xSrc, &xInt);
p = (int)xInt;
for (int c = 0; c < nComps; c++) {
dstBuf[nComps*x + c] = srcBuf[nComps*p + c]*(1.0 - xFrac) + srcBuf[nComps*(p+1) + c]*xFrac;
}
xSrc += xStep;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 4,100
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PropertyTreeManager::CreateCompositorScrollNode(
const ScrollPaintPropertyNode* scroll_node,
const cc::TransformNode& scroll_offset_translation) {
DCHECK(!scroll_node_map_.Contains(scroll_node));
auto parent_it = scroll_node_map_.find(scroll_node->Parent());
DCHECK(parent_it != scroll_node_map_.end());
int parent_id = parent_it->value;
int id = GetScrollTree().Insert(cc::ScrollNode(), parent_id);
cc::ScrollNode& compositor_node = *GetScrollTree().Node(id);
compositor_node.scrollable = true;
compositor_node.container_bounds =
static_cast<gfx::Size>(scroll_node->ContainerRect().Size());
compositor_node.bounds =
static_cast<gfx::Size>(scroll_node->ContentsRect().Size());
compositor_node.user_scrollable_horizontal =
scroll_node->UserScrollableHorizontal();
compositor_node.user_scrollable_vertical =
scroll_node->UserScrollableVertical();
compositor_node.main_thread_scrolling_reasons =
scroll_node->GetMainThreadScrollingReasons();
auto compositor_element_id = scroll_node->GetCompositorElementId();
if (compositor_element_id) {
compositor_node.element_id = compositor_element_id;
property_trees_.element_id_to_scroll_node_index[compositor_element_id] = id;
}
compositor_node.transform_id = scroll_offset_translation.id;
auto result = scroll_node_map_.Set(scroll_node, id);
DCHECK(result.is_new_entry);
GetScrollTree().SetScrollOffset(compositor_element_id,
scroll_offset_translation.scroll_offset);
GetScrollTree().set_needs_update(true);
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 125,604
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FT_Done_Face( FT_Face face )
{
FT_Error error;
FT_Driver driver;
FT_Memory memory;
FT_ListNode node;
error = FT_Err_Invalid_Face_Handle;
if ( face && face->driver )
{
driver = face->driver;
memory = driver->root.memory;
/* find face in driver's list */
node = FT_List_Find( &driver->faces_list, face );
if ( node )
{
/* remove face object from the driver's list */
FT_List_Remove( &driver->faces_list, node );
FT_FREE( node );
/* now destroy the object proper */
destroy_face( memory, face, driver );
error = FT_Err_Ok;
}
}
return error;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 10,230
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
{
return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 5,014
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void end_output_stream(request_rec *r)
{
conn_rec *c = r->connection;
apr_bucket_brigade *bb;
apr_bucket *b;
bb = apr_brigade_create(r->pool, c->bucket_alloc);
b = apr_bucket_eos_create(c->bucket_alloc);
APR_BRIGADE_INSERT_TAIL(bb, b);
ap_pass_brigade(r->output_filters, bb);
}
Commit Message: *) SECURITY: CVE-2015-0253 (cve.mitre.org)
core: Fix a crash introduced in with ErrorDocument 400 pointing
to a local URL-path with the INCLUDES filter active, introduced
in 2.4.11. PR 57531. [Yann Ylavic]
Submitted By: ylavic
Committed By: covener
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1664205 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID:
| 0
| 45,004
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: uint32_t address_space_lduw(AddressSpace *as, hwaddr addr,
MemTxAttrs attrs, MemTxResult *result)
{
return address_space_lduw_internal(as, addr, attrs, result,
DEVICE_NATIVE_ENDIAN);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 14,297
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static __always_inline void __vmcs_writel(unsigned long field, unsigned long value)
{
u8 error;
asm volatile (__ex(ASM_VMX_VMWRITE_RAX_RDX) "; setna %0"
: "=q"(error) : "a"(value), "d"(field) : "cc");
if (unlikely(error))
vmwrite_error(field, value);
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Allow L1 to intercept software exceptions (#BP and #OF)
When L2 exits to L0 due to "exception or NMI", software exceptions
(#BP and #OF) for which L1 has requested an intercept should be
handled by L1 rather than L0. Previously, only hardware exceptions
were forwarded to L1.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-388
| 0
| 48,008
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static IW_INLINE void put_raw_sample_16(struct iw_context *ctx, double s,
int x, int y, int channel)
{
size_t z;
unsigned short tmpui16;
tmpui16 = (unsigned short)(0.5+s);
z = y*ctx->img2.bpr + (ctx->img2_numchannels*x + channel)*2;
ctx->img2.pixels[z+0] = (iw_byte)(tmpui16>>8);
ctx->img2.pixels[z+1] = (iw_byte)(tmpui16&0xff);
}
Commit Message: Fixed a bug that could cause invalid memory to be accessed
The bug could happen when transparency is removed from an image.
Also fixed a semi-related BMP error handling logic bug.
Fixes issue #21
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 64,946
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: size_t mptsas_config_io_unit_0(MPTSASState *s, uint8_t **data, int address)
{
PCIDevice *pci = PCI_DEVICE(s);
uint64_t unique_value = 0x53504D554D4551LL; /* "QEMUMPTx" */
unique_value |= (uint64_t)pci->devfn << 56;
return MPTSAS_CONFIG_PACK(0, MPI_CONFIG_PAGETYPE_IO_UNIT, 0x00,
"q", unique_value);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 8,637
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SVGDocumentExtensions::registerPendingSVGFontFaceElementsForRemoval(PassRefPtrWillBeRawPtr<SVGFontFaceElement> font)
{
m_pendingSVGFontFaceElementsForRemoval.add(font);
}
Commit Message: SVG: Moving animating <svg> to other iframe should not crash.
Moving SVGSVGElement with its SMILTimeContainer already started caused crash before this patch.
|SVGDocumentExtentions::startAnimations()| calls begin() against all SMILTimeContainers in the document, but the SMILTimeContainer for <svg> moved from other document may be already started.
BUG=369860
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/290353002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@174338 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 120,388
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: fdiv(struct sh_fpu_soft_struct *fregs, struct pt_regs *regs, int m, int n)
{
BOTH_PRmn(ARITH_X, DIV);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 25,593
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int hidp_hidinput_event(struct input_dev *dev, unsigned int type, unsigned int code, int value)
{
struct hid_device *hid = input_get_drvdata(dev);
struct hidp_session *session = hid->driver_data;
return hidp_queue_event(session, dev, type, code, value);
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: Fix incorrect strncpy() in hidp_setup_hid()
The length parameter should be sizeof(req->name) - 1 because there is no
guarantee that string provided by userspace will contain the trailing
'\0'.
Can be easily reproduced by manually setting req->name to 128 non-zero
bytes prior to ioctl(HIDPCONNADD) and checking the device name setup on
input subsystem:
$ cat /sys/devices/pnp0/00\:04/tty/ttyS0/hci0/hci0\:1/input8/name
AAAAAA[...]AAAAAAAAf0:af:f0:af:f0:af
("f0:af:f0:af:f0:af" is the device bluetooth address, taken from "phys"
field in struct hid_device due to overflow.)
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Anderson Lizardo <anderson.lizardo@openbossa.org>
Acked-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo.padovan@collabora.co.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 33,735
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gp_ga8(Pixel *p, png_const_voidp pb)
{
png_const_bytep pp = voidcast(png_const_bytep, pb);
p->r = p->g = p->b = pp[0];
p->a = pp[1];
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
| 0
| 159,889
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void dccp_v6_send_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct dccp_hdr *dh = dccp_hdr(skb);
dccp_csum_outgoing(skb);
dh->dccph_checksum = dccp_v6_csum_finish(skb, &np->saddr, &sk->sk_v6_daddr);
}
Commit Message: ipv6: add complete rcu protection around np->opt
This patch addresses multiple problems :
UDP/RAW sendmsg() need to get a stable struct ipv6_txoptions
while socket is not locked : Other threads can change np->opt
concurrently. Dmitry posted a syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller) program desmonstrating
use-after-free.
Starting with TCP/DCCP lockless listeners, tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock()
and dccp_v6_request_recv_sock() also need to use RCU protection
to dereference np->opt once (before calling ipv6_dup_options())
This patch adds full RCU protection to np->opt
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 53,656
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const wchar_t* ChromeContentBrowserClient::GetResourceDllName() {
return chrome::kBrowserResourcesDll;
}
Commit Message: Ensure extensions and the Chrome Web Store are loaded in new BrowsingInstances.
BUG=174943
TEST=Can't post message to CWS. See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12301013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 115,759
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebPagePrivate::setTextReflowAnchorPoint(const Platform::IntPoint& documentFocalPoint)
{
ASSERT(m_webPage->settings()->textReflowMode() == WebSettings::TextReflowEnabled);
m_currentPinchZoomNode = bestNodeForZoomUnderPoint(documentFocalPoint);
if (!m_currentPinchZoomNode)
return;
IntRect nodeRect = rectForNode(m_currentPinchZoomNode.get());
m_anchorInNodeRectRatio.set(
static_cast<float>(documentFocalPoint.x() - nodeRect.x()) / nodeRect.width(),
static_cast<float>(documentFocalPoint.y() - nodeRect.y()) / nodeRect.height());
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 104,422
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: views::View* top_container() { return top_container_; }
Commit Message: cros: Enable some tests in //ash/wm in ash_unittests --mash
For the ones that fail, disable them via filter file instead of in the
code, per our disablement policy.
Bug: 698085, 695556, 698878, 698888, 698093, 698894
Test: ash_unittests --mash
Change-Id: Ic145ab6a95508968d6884d14fac2a3ca08888d26
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/752423
Commit-Queue: James Cook <jamescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Steven Bennetts <stevenjb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513836}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 133,189
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: string16 OmniboxViewWin::GetText() const {
const int len = GetTextLength() + 1;
string16 str;
if (len > 1)
GetWindowText(WriteInto(&str, len), len);
return str;
}
Commit Message: Change omnibox behavior when stripping javascript schema to navigate after stripping the schema on drag drop.
BUG=109245
TEST=N/A
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9116016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116692 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 107,454
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool DrawingBuffer::PrepareTextureMailbox(
viz::TextureMailbox* out_mailbox,
std::unique_ptr<cc::SingleReleaseCallback>* out_release_callback) {
ScopedStateRestorer scoped_state_restorer(this);
bool force_gpu_result = false;
return PrepareTextureMailboxInternal(out_mailbox, out_release_callback,
force_gpu_result);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 133,955
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static netdev_tx_t start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
{
struct virtnet_info *vi = netdev_priv(dev);
int qnum = skb_get_queue_mapping(skb);
struct send_queue *sq = &vi->sq[qnum];
int err;
struct netdev_queue *txq = netdev_get_tx_queue(dev, qnum);
bool kick = !skb->xmit_more;
/* Free up any pending old buffers before queueing new ones. */
free_old_xmit_skbs(sq);
/* timestamp packet in software */
skb_tx_timestamp(skb);
/* Try to transmit */
err = xmit_skb(sq, skb);
/* This should not happen! */
if (unlikely(err)) {
dev->stats.tx_fifo_errors++;
if (net_ratelimit())
dev_warn(&dev->dev,
"Unexpected TXQ (%d) queue failure: %d\n", qnum, err);
dev->stats.tx_dropped++;
dev_kfree_skb_any(skb);
return NETDEV_TX_OK;
}
/* Don't wait up for transmitted skbs to be freed. */
skb_orphan(skb);
nf_reset(skb);
/* If running out of space, stop queue to avoid getting packets that we
* are then unable to transmit.
* An alternative would be to force queuing layer to requeue the skb by
* returning NETDEV_TX_BUSY. However, NETDEV_TX_BUSY should not be
* returned in a normal path of operation: it means that driver is not
* maintaining the TX queue stop/start state properly, and causes
* the stack to do a non-trivial amount of useless work.
* Since most packets only take 1 or 2 ring slots, stopping the queue
* early means 16 slots are typically wasted.
*/
if (sq->vq->num_free < 2+MAX_SKB_FRAGS) {
netif_stop_subqueue(dev, qnum);
if (unlikely(!virtqueue_enable_cb_delayed(sq->vq))) {
/* More just got used, free them then recheck. */
free_old_xmit_skbs(sq);
if (sq->vq->num_free >= 2+MAX_SKB_FRAGS) {
netif_start_subqueue(dev, qnum);
virtqueue_disable_cb(sq->vq);
}
}
}
if (kick || netif_xmit_stopped(txq))
virtqueue_kick(sq->vq);
return NETDEV_TX_OK;
}
Commit Message: virtio-net: drop NETIF_F_FRAGLIST
virtio declares support for NETIF_F_FRAGLIST, but assumes
that there are at most MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 2 fragments which isn't
always true with a fraglist.
A longer fraglist in the skb will make the call to skb_to_sgvec overflow
the sg array, leading to memory corruption.
Drop NETIF_F_FRAGLIST so we only get what we can handle.
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 42,983
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void dump_backtrace(struct pt_regs *regs, struct task_struct *tsk)
{
unsigned int fp, mode;
int ok = 1;
printk("Backtrace: ");
if (!tsk)
tsk = current;
if (regs) {
fp = regs->ARM_fp;
mode = processor_mode(regs);
} else if (tsk != current) {
fp = thread_saved_fp(tsk);
mode = 0x10;
} else {
asm("mov %0, fp" : "=r" (fp) : : "cc");
mode = 0x10;
}
if (!fp) {
printk("no frame pointer");
ok = 0;
} else if (verify_stack(fp)) {
printk("invalid frame pointer 0x%08x", fp);
ok = 0;
} else if (fp < (unsigned long)end_of_stack(tsk))
printk("frame pointer underflow");
printk("\n");
if (ok)
c_backtrace(fp, mode);
}
Commit Message: ARM: 7735/2: Preserve the user r/w register TPIDRURW on context switch and fork
Since commit 6a1c53124aa1 the user writeable TLS register was zeroed to
prevent it from being used as a covert channel between two tasks.
There are more and more applications coming to Windows RT,
Wine could support them, but mostly they expect to have
the thread environment block (TEB) in TPIDRURW.
This patch preserves that register per thread instead of clearing it.
Unlike the TPIDRURO, which is already switched, the TPIDRURW
can be updated from userspace so needs careful treatment in the case that we
modify TPIDRURW and call fork(). To avoid this we must always read
TPIDRURW in copy_thread.
Signed-off-by: André Hentschel <nerv@dawncrow.de>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Austin <jonathan.austin@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 58,375
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int cm_alloc_response_msg(struct cm_port *port,
struct ib_mad_recv_wc *mad_recv_wc,
struct ib_mad_send_buf **msg)
{
struct ib_mad_send_buf *m;
struct ib_ah *ah;
ah = ib_create_ah_from_wc(port->mad_agent->qp->pd, mad_recv_wc->wc,
mad_recv_wc->recv_buf.grh, port->port_num);
if (IS_ERR(ah))
return PTR_ERR(ah);
m = ib_create_send_mad(port->mad_agent, 1, mad_recv_wc->wc->pkey_index,
0, IB_MGMT_MAD_HDR, IB_MGMT_MAD_DATA,
GFP_ATOMIC);
if (IS_ERR(m)) {
ib_destroy_ah(ah);
return PTR_ERR(m);
}
m->ah = ah;
*msg = m;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <monis@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 38,346
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: fc_dma_map_sg(struct device *dev, struct scatterlist *sg, int nents,
enum dma_data_direction dir)
{
return dev ? dma_map_sg(dev, sg, nents, dir) : fc_map_sg(sg, nents);
}
Commit Message: nvmet-fc: ensure target queue id within range.
When searching for queue id's ensure they are within the expected range.
Signed-off-by: James Smart <james.smart@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 93,580
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType IsDCX(const unsigned char *magick,const size_t length)
{
if (length < 4)
return(MagickFalse);
if (memcmp(magick,"\261\150\336\72",4) == 0)
return(MagickTrue);
return(MagickFalse);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/575
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 62,673
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderViewHostImpl::OnShowWidget(int route_id,
const gfx::Rect& initial_pos) {
if (!is_swapped_out_)
delegate_->ShowCreatedWidget(route_id, initial_pos);
Send(new ViewMsg_Move_ACK(route_id));
}
Commit Message: Filter more incoming URLs in the CreateWindow path.
BUG=170532
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12036002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@178728 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 117,272
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool GLES2DecoderImpl::DoIsVertexArrayOES(GLuint client_id) {
const VertexAttribManager* vao =
GetVertexAttribManager(client_id);
return vao && vao->IsValid() && !vao->IsDeleted();
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 120,836
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int BrowserWindowGtk::GetThemeFrameResource() {
bool incognito = browser()->profile()->IsOffTheRecord();
int image_name;
if (DrawFrameAsActive()) {
image_name = incognito ? IDR_THEME_FRAME_INCOGNITO : IDR_THEME_FRAME;
} else {
image_name = incognito ? IDR_THEME_FRAME_INCOGNITO_INACTIVE :
IDR_THEME_FRAME_INACTIVE;
}
return image_name;
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 117,943
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ProcessTask() {
OnceClosure task;
{
AutoLock auto_lock(tasks_lock_);
if (pending_tasks_.empty())
return false;
task = std::move(pending_tasks_.front());
pending_tasks_.pop();
}
std::move(task).Run();
return true;
}
Commit Message: Introduce RunLoop::Type::NESTABLE_TASKS_ALLOWED to replace MessageLoop::ScopedNestableTaskAllower.
(as well as MessageLoop::SetNestableTasksAllowed())
Surveying usage: the scoped object is always instantiated right before
RunLoop().Run(). The intent is really to allow nestable tasks in that
RunLoop so it's better to explicitly label that RunLoop as such and it
allows us to break the last dependency that forced some RunLoop users
to use MessageLoop APIs.
There's also the odd case of allowing nestable tasks for loops that are
reentrant from a native task (without going through RunLoop), these
are the minority but will have to be handled (after cleaning up the
majority of cases that are RunLoop induced).
As highlighted by robliao@ in https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/600517
(which was merged in this CL).
R=danakj@chromium.org
Bug: 750779
Change-Id: I43d122c93ec903cff3a6fe7b77ec461ea0656448
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/594713
Commit-Queue: Gabriel Charette <gab@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Liao <robliao@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: danakj <danakj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492263}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 126,598
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gst_asf_demux_add_video_stream (GstASFDemux * demux,
asf_stream_video_format * video, guint16 id,
guint8 ** p_data, guint64 * p_size)
{
GstTagList *tags = NULL;
GstStructure *caps_s;
GstBuffer *extradata = NULL;
GstPad *src_pad;
GstCaps *caps;
gchar *str;
gchar *name = NULL;
gchar *codec_name = NULL;
guint64 size_left = video->size - 40;
GstBuffer *streamheader = NULL;
guint par_w = 1, par_h = 1;
/* Create the video pad */
name = g_strdup_printf ("video_%u", demux->num_video_streams);
src_pad = gst_pad_new_from_static_template (&video_src_template, name);
g_free (name);
/* Now try some gstreamer formatted MIME types (from gst_avi_demux_strf_vids) */
if (size_left) {
GST_LOG ("Video header has %" G_GUINT64_FORMAT
" bytes of codec specific data (vs %" G_GUINT64_FORMAT ")", size_left,
*p_size);
g_assert (size_left <= *p_size);
gst_asf_demux_get_buffer (&extradata, size_left, p_data, p_size);
}
GST_DEBUG ("video codec %" GST_FOURCC_FORMAT, GST_FOURCC_ARGS (video->tag));
/* yes, asf_stream_video_format and gst_riff_strf_vids are the same */
caps = gst_riff_create_video_caps (video->tag, NULL,
(gst_riff_strf_vids *) video, extradata, NULL, &codec_name);
if (caps == NULL) {
caps = gst_caps_new_simple ("video/x-asf-unknown", "fourcc",
G_TYPE_UINT, video->tag, NULL);
} else {
GstStructure *s;
gint ax, ay;
s = gst_asf_demux_get_metadata_for_stream (demux, id);
if (gst_structure_get_int (s, "AspectRatioX", &ax) &&
gst_structure_get_int (s, "AspectRatioY", &ay) && (ax > 0 && ay > 0)) {
par_w = ax;
par_h = ay;
gst_caps_set_simple (caps, "pixel-aspect-ratio", GST_TYPE_FRACTION,
ax, ay, NULL);
} else {
guint ax, ay;
/* retry with the global metadata */
GST_DEBUG ("Retrying with global metadata %" GST_PTR_FORMAT,
demux->global_metadata);
s = demux->global_metadata;
if (gst_structure_get_uint (s, "AspectRatioX", &ax) &&
gst_structure_get_uint (s, "AspectRatioY", &ay)) {
GST_DEBUG ("ax:%d, ay:%d", ax, ay);
if (ax > 0 && ay > 0) {
par_w = ax;
par_h = ay;
gst_caps_set_simple (caps, "pixel-aspect-ratio", GST_TYPE_FRACTION,
ax, ay, NULL);
}
}
}
s = gst_caps_get_structure (caps, 0);
gst_structure_remove_field (s, "framerate");
}
caps_s = gst_caps_get_structure (caps, 0);
/* add format field with fourcc to WMV/VC1 caps to differentiate variants */
if (gst_structure_has_name (caps_s, "video/x-wmv")) {
str = g_strdup_printf ("%" GST_FOURCC_FORMAT, GST_FOURCC_ARGS (video->tag));
gst_caps_set_simple (caps, "format", G_TYPE_STRING, str, NULL);
g_free (str);
/* check if h264 has codec_data (avc) or streamheaders (bytestream) */
} else if (gst_structure_has_name (caps_s, "video/x-h264")) {
const GValue *value = gst_structure_get_value (caps_s, "codec_data");
if (value) {
GstBuffer *buf = gst_value_get_buffer (value);
GstMapInfo mapinfo;
if (gst_buffer_map (buf, &mapinfo, GST_MAP_READ)) {
if (mapinfo.size >= 4 && GST_READ_UINT32_BE (mapinfo.data) == 1) {
/* this looks like a bytestream start */
streamheader = gst_buffer_ref (buf);
gst_asf_demux_add_stream_headers_to_caps (demux, buf, caps_s);
gst_structure_remove_field (caps_s, "codec_data");
}
gst_buffer_unmap (buf, &mapinfo);
}
}
}
/* For a 3D video, set multiview information into the caps based on
* what was detected during object parsing */
if (demux->asf_3D_mode != GST_ASF_3D_NONE) {
GstVideoMultiviewMode mv_mode = GST_VIDEO_MULTIVIEW_MODE_NONE;
GstVideoMultiviewFlags mv_flags = GST_VIDEO_MULTIVIEW_FLAGS_NONE;
const gchar *mview_mode_str;
switch (demux->asf_3D_mode) {
case GST_ASF_3D_SIDE_BY_SIDE_HALF_LR:
mv_mode = GST_VIDEO_MULTIVIEW_MODE_SIDE_BY_SIDE;
break;
case GST_ASF_3D_SIDE_BY_SIDE_HALF_RL:
mv_mode = GST_VIDEO_MULTIVIEW_MODE_SIDE_BY_SIDE;
mv_flags = GST_VIDEO_MULTIVIEW_FLAGS_RIGHT_VIEW_FIRST;
break;
case GST_ASF_3D_TOP_AND_BOTTOM_HALF_LR:
mv_mode = GST_VIDEO_MULTIVIEW_MODE_TOP_BOTTOM;
break;
case GST_ASF_3D_TOP_AND_BOTTOM_HALF_RL:
mv_mode = GST_VIDEO_MULTIVIEW_MODE_TOP_BOTTOM;
mv_flags = GST_VIDEO_MULTIVIEW_FLAGS_RIGHT_VIEW_FIRST;
break;
case GST_ASF_3D_DUAL_STREAM:{
gboolean is_right_view = FALSE;
/* if Advanced_Mutual_Exclusion object exists, use it
* to figure out which is the left view (lower ID) */
if (demux->mut_ex_streams != NULL) {
guint length;
gint i;
length = g_slist_length (demux->mut_ex_streams);
for (i = 0; i < length; i++) {
gpointer v_s_id;
v_s_id = g_slist_nth_data (demux->mut_ex_streams, i);
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (demux,
"has Mutual_Exclusion object. stream id in object is %d",
GPOINTER_TO_INT (v_s_id));
if (id > GPOINTER_TO_INT (v_s_id))
is_right_view = TRUE;
}
} else {
/* if the Advaced_Mutual_Exclusion object doesn't exist, assume the
* first video stream encountered has the lower ID */
if (demux->num_video_streams > 0) {
/* This is not the first video stream, assuming right eye view */
is_right_view = TRUE;
}
}
if (is_right_view)
mv_mode = GST_VIDEO_MULTIVIEW_MODE_RIGHT;
else
mv_mode = GST_VIDEO_MULTIVIEW_MODE_LEFT;
break;
}
default:
break;
}
GST_INFO_OBJECT (demux,
"stream_id %d, has multiview-mode %d flags 0x%x", id, mv_mode,
(guint) mv_flags);
mview_mode_str = gst_video_multiview_mode_to_caps_string (mv_mode);
if (mview_mode_str != NULL) {
if (gst_video_multiview_guess_half_aspect (mv_mode, video->width,
video->height, par_w, par_h))
mv_flags |= GST_VIDEO_MULTIVIEW_FLAGS_HALF_ASPECT;
gst_caps_set_simple (caps,
"multiview-mode", G_TYPE_STRING, mview_mode_str,
"multiview-flags", GST_TYPE_VIDEO_MULTIVIEW_FLAGSET, mv_flags,
GST_FLAG_SET_MASK_EXACT, NULL);
}
}
if (codec_name) {
tags = gst_tag_list_new (GST_TAG_VIDEO_CODEC, codec_name, NULL);
g_free (codec_name);
}
if (extradata)
gst_buffer_unref (extradata);
GST_INFO ("Adding video stream #%u, id %u, codec %"
GST_FOURCC_FORMAT " (0x%08x)", demux->num_video_streams, id,
GST_FOURCC_ARGS (video->tag), video->tag);
++demux->num_video_streams;
return gst_asf_demux_setup_pad (demux, src_pad, caps, id, TRUE,
streamheader, tags);
}
Commit Message: asfdemux: Check that we have enough data available before parsing bool/uint extended content descriptors
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777955
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 68,526
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static length_t compress_packet(uint8_t *dest, const uint8_t *source, length_t len, int level) {
if(level == 0) {
memcpy(dest, source, len);
return len;
} else if(level == 10) {
#ifdef HAVE_LZO
lzo_uint lzolen = MAXSIZE;
lzo1x_1_compress(source, len, dest, &lzolen, lzo_wrkmem);
return lzolen;
#else
return -1;
#endif
} else if(level < 10) {
#ifdef HAVE_ZLIB
unsigned long destlen = MAXSIZE;
if(compress2(dest, &destlen, source, len, level) == Z_OK)
return destlen;
else
#endif
return -1;
} else {
#ifdef HAVE_LZO
lzo_uint lzolen = MAXSIZE;
lzo1x_999_compress(source, len, dest, &lzolen, lzo_wrkmem);
return lzolen;
#else
return -1;
#endif
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message: Drop packets forwarded via TCP if they are too big (CVE-2013-1428).
Normally all requests sent via the meta connections are checked so that they
cannot be larger than the input buffer. However, when packets are forwarded via
meta connections, they are copied into a packet buffer without checking whether
it fits into it. Since the packet buffer is allocated on the stack, this in
effect allows an authenticated remote node to cause a stack overflow.
This issue was found by Martin Schobert.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 33,581
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline uint32_t ne2000_mem_readw(NE2000State *s, uint32_t addr)
{
addr &= ~1; /* XXX: check exact behaviour if not even */
if (addr < 32 ||
(addr >= NE2000_PMEM_START && addr < NE2000_MEM_SIZE)) {
return le16_to_cpu(*(uint16_t *)(s->mem + addr));
} else {
return 0xffff;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 12,575
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int sock_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size)
{
struct kiocb iocb;
struct sock_iocb siocb;
int ret;
init_sync_kiocb(&iocb, NULL);
iocb.private = &siocb;
ret = __sock_sendmsg(&iocb, sock, msg, size);
if (-EIOCBQUEUED == ret)
ret = wait_on_sync_kiocb(&iocb);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix order of arguments to compat_put_time[spec|val]
Commit 644595f89620 ("compat: Handle COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME in
net/socket.c") introduced a bug where the helper functions to take
either a 64-bit or compat time[spec|val] got the arguments in the wrong
order, passing the kernel stack pointer off as a user pointer (and vice
versa).
Because of the user address range check, that in turn then causes an
EFAULT due to the user pointer range checking failing for the kernel
address. Incorrectly resuling in a failed system call for 32-bit
processes with a 64-bit kernel.
On odder architectures like HP-PA (with separate user/kernel address
spaces), it can be used read kernel memory.
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 18,699
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ScriptValue ScriptController::executeScript(const ScriptSourceCode& sourceCode)
{
if (!canExecuteScripts(AboutToExecuteScript) || isPaused())
return ScriptValue();
RefPtr<Frame> protect(m_frame); // Script execution can destroy the frame, and thus the ScriptController.
return executeScriptInMainWorld(sourceCode);
}
Commit Message: Call didAccessInitialDocument when javascript: URLs are used.
BUG=265221
TEST=See bug for repro.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/22572004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@155790 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 111,224
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual void didOpenFileSystem(const WebKit::WebString& name, const WebKit::WebURL& rootURL)
{
ASSERT_NOT_REACHED();
delete this;
}
Commit Message: Remove BlobRegistry indirection since there is only one implementation.
BUG=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15851008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152746 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 102,462
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PrintWebViewHelper::PrintWebViewHelper(RenderView* render_view)
: RenderViewObserver(render_view),
RenderViewObserverTracker<PrintWebViewHelper>(render_view),
print_web_view_(NULL),
is_preview_(switches::IsPrintPreviewEnabled()),
is_print_ready_metafile_sent_(false),
user_cancelled_scripted_print_count_(0),
notify_browser_of_print_failure_(true) {
}
Commit Message: Fix print preview workflow to reflect settings of selected printer.
BUG=95110
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7831041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@102242 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 97,534
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: keytab_key_proc(krb5_context context, krb5_enctype enctype,
krb5_const_pointer keyseed,
krb5_salt salt, krb5_data *s2kparms,
krb5_keyblock **key)
{
krb5_keytab_key_proc_args *args = rk_UNCONST(keyseed);
krb5_keytab keytab = args->keytab;
krb5_principal principal = args->principal;
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_keytab real_keytab;
krb5_keytab_entry entry;
if(keytab == NULL)
krb5_kt_default(context, &real_keytab);
else
real_keytab = keytab;
ret = krb5_kt_get_entry (context, real_keytab, principal,
0, enctype, &entry);
if (keytab == NULL)
krb5_kt_close (context, real_keytab);
if (ret)
return ret;
ret = krb5_copy_keyblock (context, &entry.keyblock, key);
krb5_kt_free_entry(context, &entry);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2019-12098: krb5: always confirm PA-PKINIT-KX for anon PKINIT
RFC8062 Section 7 requires verification of the PA-PKINIT-KX key excahnge
when anonymous PKINIT is used. Failure to do so can permit an active
attacker to become a man-in-the-middle.
Introduced by a1ef548600c5bb51cf52a9a9ea12676506ede19f. First tagged
release Heimdal 1.4.0.
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N (4.8)
Change-Id: I6cc1c0c24985936468af08693839ac6c3edda133
Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
Approved-by: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auritor.com>
(cherry picked from commit 38c797e1ae9b9c8f99ae4aa2e73957679031fd2b)
CWE ID: CWE-320
| 0
| 89,915
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int RenderBlock::heightForLineCount(int l)
{
int count = 0;
return getHeightForLineCount(this, l, true, count);
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 116,212
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GfxColorSpace *GfxCalRGBColorSpace::copy() {
GfxCalRGBColorSpace *cs;
int i;
cs = new GfxCalRGBColorSpace();
cs->whiteX = whiteX;
cs->whiteY = whiteY;
cs->whiteZ = whiteZ;
cs->blackX = blackX;
cs->blackY = blackY;
cs->blackZ = blackZ;
cs->gammaR = gammaR;
cs->gammaG = gammaG;
cs->gammaB = gammaB;
for (i = 0; i < 9; ++i) {
cs->mat[i] = mat[i];
}
return cs;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 991
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void rle_write_trns(struct rle_context *rlectx, int num_trns)
{
iw_byte dstbuf[4];
int num_remaining = num_trns;
int num_to_write;
while(num_remaining>0) {
num_to_write = num_remaining;
if(num_to_write>255) num_to_write=255;
dstbuf[0]=0x00; // 00 02 = Delta
dstbuf[1]=0x02;
dstbuf[2]=(iw_byte)num_to_write; // X offset
dstbuf[3]=0x00; // Y offset
iwbmp_write(rlectx->wctx,dstbuf,4);
rlectx->total_bytes_written+=4;
num_remaining -= num_to_write;
}
rlectx->pending_data_start += num_trns;
}
Commit Message: Fixed a bug that could cause invalid memory to be accessed
The bug could happen when transparency is removed from an image.
Also fixed a semi-related BMP error handling logic bug.
Fixes issue #21
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 64,893
|
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