instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CameraService::onFirstRef()
{
LOG1("CameraService::onFirstRef");
BnCameraService::onFirstRef();
if (hw_get_module(CAMERA_HARDWARE_MODULE_ID,
(const hw_module_t **)&mModule) < 0) {
ALOGE("Could not load camera HAL module");
mNumberOfCameras = 0;
}
else {
ALOGI("Loaded \"%s\" camera module", mModule->common.name);
mNumberOfCameras = mModule->get_number_of_cameras();
if (mNumberOfCameras > MAX_CAMERAS) {
ALOGE("Number of cameras(%d) > MAX_CAMERAS(%d).",
mNumberOfCameras, MAX_CAMERAS);
mNumberOfCameras = MAX_CAMERAS;
}
for (int i = 0; i < mNumberOfCameras; i++) {
setCameraFree(i);
}
if (mModule->common.module_api_version >=
CAMERA_MODULE_API_VERSION_2_1) {
mModule->set_callbacks(this);
}
CameraDeviceFactory::registerService(this);
}
}
Commit Message: Camera: Disallow dumping clients directly
Camera service dumps should only be initiated through
ICameraService::dump.
Bug: 26265403
Change-Id: If3ca4718ed74bf33ad8a416192689203029e2803
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 161,692
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int build_polexpire(struct sk_buff *skb, struct xfrm_policy *xp,
int dir, const struct km_event *c)
{
struct xfrm_user_polexpire *upe;
int hard = c->data.hard;
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
int err;
nlh = nlmsg_put(skb, c->pid, 0, XFRM_MSG_POLEXPIRE, sizeof(*upe), 0);
if (nlh == NULL)
return -EMSGSIZE;
upe = nlmsg_data(nlh);
copy_to_user_policy(xp, &upe->pol, dir);
err = copy_to_user_tmpl(xp, skb);
if (!err)
err = copy_to_user_sec_ctx(xp, skb);
if (!err)
err = copy_to_user_policy_type(xp->type, skb);
if (!err)
err = xfrm_mark_put(skb, &xp->mark);
if (err) {
nlmsg_cancel(skb, nlh);
return err;
}
upe->hard = !!hard;
return nlmsg_end(skb, nlh);
}
Commit Message: xfrm_user: return error pointer instead of NULL
When dump_one_state() returns an error, e.g. because of a too small
buffer to dump the whole xfrm state, xfrm_state_netlink() returns NULL
instead of an error pointer. But its callers expect an error pointer
and therefore continue to operate on a NULL skbuff.
This could lead to a privilege escalation (execution of user code in
kernel context) if the attacker has CAP_NET_ADMIN and is able to map
address 0.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 33,092
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int snd_seq_port_connect(struct snd_seq_client *connector,
struct snd_seq_client *src_client,
struct snd_seq_client_port *src_port,
struct snd_seq_client *dest_client,
struct snd_seq_client_port *dest_port,
struct snd_seq_port_subscribe *info)
{
struct snd_seq_subscribers *subs;
bool exclusive;
int err;
subs = kzalloc(sizeof(*subs), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!subs)
return -ENOMEM;
subs->info = *info;
atomic_set(&subs->ref_count, 0);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&subs->src_list);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&subs->dest_list);
exclusive = !!(info->flags & SNDRV_SEQ_PORT_SUBS_EXCLUSIVE);
err = check_and_subscribe_port(src_client, src_port, subs, true,
exclusive,
connector->number != src_client->number);
if (err < 0)
goto error;
err = check_and_subscribe_port(dest_client, dest_port, subs, false,
exclusive,
connector->number != dest_client->number);
if (err < 0)
goto error_dest;
return 0;
error_dest:
delete_and_unsubscribe_port(src_client, src_port, subs, true,
connector->number != src_client->number);
error:
kfree(subs);
return err;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: seq: Fix use-after-free at creating a port
There is a potential race window opened at creating and deleting a
port via ioctl, as spotted by fuzzing. snd_seq_create_port() creates
a port object and returns its pointer, but it doesn't take the
refcount, thus it can be deleted immediately by another thread.
Meanwhile, snd_seq_ioctl_create_port() still calls the function
snd_seq_system_client_ev_port_start() with the created port object
that is being deleted, and this triggers use-after-free like:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0x504/0x630 [snd_seq] at addr ffff8801f2241cb1
=============================================================================
BUG kmalloc-512 (Tainted: G B ): kasan: bad access detected
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
INFO: Allocated in snd_seq_create_port+0x94/0x9b0 [snd_seq] age=1 cpu=3 pid=4511
___slab_alloc+0x425/0x460
__slab_alloc+0x20/0x40
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x150/0x190
snd_seq_create_port+0x94/0x9b0 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0xd1/0x630 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x11c/0x190 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl+0x40/0x80 [snd_seq]
do_vfs_ioctl+0x54b/0xda0
SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x75
INFO: Freed in port_delete+0x136/0x1a0 [snd_seq] age=1 cpu=2 pid=4717
__slab_free+0x204/0x310
kfree+0x15f/0x180
port_delete+0x136/0x1a0 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_delete_port+0x235/0x350 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl_delete_port+0xc8/0x180 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x11c/0x190 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl+0x40/0x80 [snd_seq]
do_vfs_ioctl+0x54b/0xda0
SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x75
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81b03781>] dump_stack+0x63/0x82
[<ffffffff81531b3b>] print_trailer+0xfb/0x160
[<ffffffff81536db4>] object_err+0x34/0x40
[<ffffffff815392d3>] kasan_report.part.2+0x223/0x520
[<ffffffffa07aadf4>] ? snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0x504/0x630 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffff815395fe>] __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x2e/0x30
[<ffffffffa07aadf4>] snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0x504/0x630 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffffa07aa8f0>] ? snd_seq_ioctl_delete_port+0x180/0x180 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffff8136be50>] ? taskstats_exit+0xbc0/0xbc0
[<ffffffffa07abc5c>] snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x11c/0x190 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffffa07abd10>] snd_seq_ioctl+0x40/0x80 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffff8136d433>] ? acct_account_cputime+0x63/0x80
[<ffffffff815b515b>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x54b/0xda0
.....
We may fix this in a few different ways, and in this patch, it's fixed
simply by taking the refcount properly at snd_seq_create_port() and
letting the caller unref the object after use. Also, there is another
potential use-after-free by sprintf() call in snd_seq_create_port(),
and this is moved inside the lock.
This fix covers CVE-2017-15265.
Reported-and-tested-by: Michael23 Yu <ycqzsy@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 60,629
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void read_mv(stream_t *stream,mv_t *mv,mv_t *mvp)
{
mv_t mvd;
int mvabs, mvsign = 0;
/* MVX */
if ((mvabs = get_vlc(7, stream)))
mvsign = get_flc(1, stream);
mvd.x = mvabs * (mvsign ? -1 : 1);
mv->x = mvp->x + mvd.x;
/* MVY */
if ((mvabs = get_vlc(7, stream)))
mvsign = get_flc(1, stream);
mvd.y = mvabs * (mvsign ? -1 : 1);
mv->y = mvp->y + mvd.y;
}
Commit Message: Fix possible stack overflows in decoder for illegal bit streams
Fixes CVE-2018-0429
A vulnerability in the Thor decoder (available at:
https://github.com/cisco/thor) could allow an authenticated, local
attacker to cause segmentation faults and stack overflows when using a
non-conformant Thor bitstream as input.
The vulnerability is due to lack of input validation when parsing the
bitstream. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to cause a
stack overflow and potentially inject and execute arbitrary code.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 85,086
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DiskCacheBackendTest::BackendShutdownWithPendingIO(bool fast) {
net::TestCompletionCallback cb;
{
ASSERT_TRUE(CleanupCacheDir());
uint32_t flags = disk_cache::kNoBuffering;
if (!fast)
flags |= disk_cache::kNoRandom;
CreateBackend(flags);
disk_cache::Entry* entry;
int rv = cache_->CreateEntry("some key", &entry, cb.callback());
ASSERT_THAT(cb.GetResult(rv), IsOk());
entry->Close();
cache_.reset();
}
base::RunLoop().RunUntilIdle();
EXPECT_FALSE(cb.have_result());
}
Commit Message: Blockfile cache: fix long-standing sparse + evict reentrancy problem
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for an alternative perspective
plus a reduction to make fixing this much easier.
Bug: 826626, 518908, 537063, 802886
Change-Id: Ibfa01416f9a8e7f7b361e4f93b4b6b134728b85f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/985052
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547103}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 147,177
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ip6_dst_lookup_tail(struct sock *sk,
struct dst_entry **dst, struct flowi6 *fl6)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_OPTIMISTIC_DAD
struct neighbour *n;
#endif
int err;
if (*dst == NULL)
*dst = ip6_route_output(net, sk, fl6);
if ((err = (*dst)->error))
goto out_err_release;
if (ipv6_addr_any(&fl6->saddr)) {
struct rt6_info *rt = (struct rt6_info *) *dst;
err = ip6_route_get_saddr(net, rt, &fl6->daddr,
sk ? inet6_sk(sk)->srcprefs : 0,
&fl6->saddr);
if (err)
goto out_err_release;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_OPTIMISTIC_DAD
/*
* Here if the dst entry we've looked up
* has a neighbour entry that is in the INCOMPLETE
* state and the src address from the flow is
* marked as OPTIMISTIC, we release the found
* dst entry and replace it instead with the
* dst entry of the nexthop router
*/
n = dst_get_neighbour(*dst);
if (n && !(n->nud_state & NUD_VALID)) {
struct inet6_ifaddr *ifp;
struct flowi6 fl_gw6;
int redirect;
ifp = ipv6_get_ifaddr(net, &fl6->saddr,
(*dst)->dev, 1);
redirect = (ifp && ifp->flags & IFA_F_OPTIMISTIC);
if (ifp)
in6_ifa_put(ifp);
if (redirect) {
/*
* We need to get the dst entry for the
* default router instead
*/
dst_release(*dst);
memcpy(&fl_gw6, fl6, sizeof(struct flowi6));
memset(&fl_gw6.daddr, 0, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
*dst = ip6_route_output(net, sk, &fl_gw6);
if ((err = (*dst)->error))
goto out_err_release;
}
}
#endif
return 0;
out_err_release:
if (err == -ENETUNREACH)
IP6_INC_STATS_BH(net, NULL, IPSTATS_MIB_OUTNOROUTES);
dst_release(*dst);
*dst = NULL;
return err;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: make fragment identifications less predictable
IPv6 fragment identification generation is way beyond what we use for
IPv4 : It uses a single generator. Its not scalable and allows DOS
attacks.
Now inetpeer is IPv6 aware, we can use it to provide a more secure and
scalable frag ident generator (per destination, instead of system wide)
This patch :
1) defines a new secure_ipv6_id() helper
2) extends inet_getid() to provide 32bit results
3) extends ipv6_select_ident() with a new dest parameter
Reported-by: Fernando Gont <fernando@gont.com.ar>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 26,614
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: nfsd4_lockt(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct nfsd4_compound_state *cstate,
struct nfsd4_lockt *lockt)
{
struct file_lock *file_lock = NULL;
struct nfs4_lockowner *lo = NULL;
__be32 status;
struct nfsd_net *nn = net_generic(SVC_NET(rqstp), nfsd_net_id);
if (locks_in_grace(SVC_NET(rqstp)))
return nfserr_grace;
if (check_lock_length(lockt->lt_offset, lockt->lt_length))
return nfserr_inval;
if (!nfsd4_has_session(cstate)) {
status = lookup_clientid(&lockt->lt_clientid, cstate, nn);
if (status)
goto out;
}
if ((status = fh_verify(rqstp, &cstate->current_fh, S_IFREG, 0)))
goto out;
file_lock = locks_alloc_lock();
if (!file_lock) {
dprintk("NFSD: %s: unable to allocate lock!\n", __func__);
status = nfserr_jukebox;
goto out;
}
switch (lockt->lt_type) {
case NFS4_READ_LT:
case NFS4_READW_LT:
file_lock->fl_type = F_RDLCK;
break;
case NFS4_WRITE_LT:
case NFS4_WRITEW_LT:
file_lock->fl_type = F_WRLCK;
break;
default:
dprintk("NFSD: nfs4_lockt: bad lock type!\n");
status = nfserr_inval;
goto out;
}
lo = find_lockowner_str(cstate->clp, &lockt->lt_owner);
if (lo)
file_lock->fl_owner = (fl_owner_t)lo;
file_lock->fl_pid = current->tgid;
file_lock->fl_flags = FL_POSIX;
file_lock->fl_start = lockt->lt_offset;
file_lock->fl_end = last_byte_offset(lockt->lt_offset, lockt->lt_length);
nfs4_transform_lock_offset(file_lock);
status = nfsd_test_lock(rqstp, &cstate->current_fh, file_lock);
if (status)
goto out;
if (file_lock->fl_type != F_UNLCK) {
status = nfserr_denied;
nfs4_set_lock_denied(file_lock, &lockt->lt_denied);
}
out:
if (lo)
nfs4_put_stateowner(&lo->lo_owner);
if (file_lock)
locks_free_lock(file_lock);
return status;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 65,610
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int kvm_get_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, u64 *pdata)
{
u64 data;
switch (msr) {
case MSR_IA32_PLATFORM_ID:
case MSR_IA32_EBL_CR_POWERON:
case MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR:
case MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHFROMIP:
case MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHTOIP:
case MSR_IA32_LASTINTFROMIP:
case MSR_IA32_LASTINTTOIP:
case MSR_K8_SYSCFG:
case MSR_K7_HWCR:
case MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA:
case MSR_K7_EVNTSEL0:
case MSR_K7_EVNTSEL1:
case MSR_K7_EVNTSEL2:
case MSR_K7_EVNTSEL3:
case MSR_K7_PERFCTR0:
case MSR_K7_PERFCTR1:
case MSR_K7_PERFCTR2:
case MSR_K7_PERFCTR3:
case MSR_K8_INT_PENDING_MSG:
case MSR_AMD64_NB_CFG:
case MSR_FAM10H_MMIO_CONF_BASE:
case MSR_AMD64_BU_CFG2:
data = 0;
break;
case MSR_P6_PERFCTR0:
case MSR_P6_PERFCTR1:
case MSR_P6_EVNTSEL0:
case MSR_P6_EVNTSEL1:
if (kvm_pmu_msr(vcpu, msr))
return kvm_pmu_get_msr(vcpu, msr, pdata);
data = 0;
break;
case MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV:
data = 0x100000000ULL;
break;
case MSR_MTRRcap:
data = 0x500 | KVM_NR_VAR_MTRR;
break;
case 0x200 ... 0x2ff:
return get_msr_mtrr(vcpu, msr, pdata);
case 0xcd: /* fsb frequency */
data = 3;
break;
/*
* MSR_EBC_FREQUENCY_ID
* Conservative value valid for even the basic CPU models.
* Models 0,1: 000 in bits 23:21 indicating a bus speed of
* 100MHz, model 2 000 in bits 18:16 indicating 100MHz,
* and 266MHz for model 3, or 4. Set Core Clock
* Frequency to System Bus Frequency Ratio to 1 (bits
* 31:24) even though these are only valid for CPU
* models > 2, however guests may end up dividing or
* multiplying by zero otherwise.
*/
case MSR_EBC_FREQUENCY_ID:
data = 1 << 24;
break;
case MSR_IA32_APICBASE:
data = kvm_get_apic_base(vcpu);
break;
case APIC_BASE_MSR ... APIC_BASE_MSR + 0x3ff:
return kvm_x2apic_msr_read(vcpu, msr, pdata);
break;
case MSR_IA32_TSCDEADLINE:
data = kvm_get_lapic_tscdeadline_msr(vcpu);
break;
case MSR_IA32_TSC_ADJUST:
data = (u64)vcpu->arch.ia32_tsc_adjust_msr;
break;
case MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE:
data = vcpu->arch.ia32_misc_enable_msr;
break;
case MSR_IA32_PERF_STATUS:
/* TSC increment by tick */
data = 1000ULL;
/* CPU multiplier */
data |= (((uint64_t)4ULL) << 40);
break;
case MSR_EFER:
data = vcpu->arch.efer;
break;
case MSR_KVM_WALL_CLOCK:
case MSR_KVM_WALL_CLOCK_NEW:
data = vcpu->kvm->arch.wall_clock;
break;
case MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME:
case MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME_NEW:
data = vcpu->arch.time;
break;
case MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_EN:
data = vcpu->arch.apf.msr_val;
break;
case MSR_KVM_STEAL_TIME:
data = vcpu->arch.st.msr_val;
break;
case MSR_KVM_PV_EOI_EN:
data = vcpu->arch.pv_eoi.msr_val;
break;
case MSR_IA32_P5_MC_ADDR:
case MSR_IA32_P5_MC_TYPE:
case MSR_IA32_MCG_CAP:
case MSR_IA32_MCG_CTL:
case MSR_IA32_MCG_STATUS:
case MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL ... MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL + 4 * KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS - 1:
return get_msr_mce(vcpu, msr, pdata);
case MSR_K7_CLK_CTL:
/*
* Provide expected ramp-up count for K7. All other
* are set to zero, indicating minimum divisors for
* every field.
*
* This prevents guest kernels on AMD host with CPU
* type 6, model 8 and higher from exploding due to
* the rdmsr failing.
*/
data = 0x20000000;
break;
case HV_X64_MSR_GUEST_OS_ID ... HV_X64_MSR_SINT15:
if (kvm_hv_msr_partition_wide(msr)) {
int r;
mutex_lock(&vcpu->kvm->lock);
r = get_msr_hyperv_pw(vcpu, msr, pdata);
mutex_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->lock);
return r;
} else
return get_msr_hyperv(vcpu, msr, pdata);
break;
case MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL3:
/* This legacy MSR exists but isn't fully documented in current
* silicon. It is however accessed by winxp in very narrow
* scenarios where it sets bit #19, itself documented as
* a "reserved" bit. Best effort attempt to source coherent
* read data here should the balance of the register be
* interpreted by the guest:
*
* L2 cache control register 3: 64GB range, 256KB size,
* enabled, latency 0x1, configured
*/
data = 0xbe702111;
break;
case MSR_AMD64_OSVW_ID_LENGTH:
if (!guest_cpuid_has_osvw(vcpu))
return 1;
data = vcpu->arch.osvw.length;
break;
case MSR_AMD64_OSVW_STATUS:
if (!guest_cpuid_has_osvw(vcpu))
return 1;
data = vcpu->arch.osvw.status;
break;
default:
if (kvm_pmu_msr(vcpu, msr))
return kvm_pmu_get_msr(vcpu, msr, pdata);
if (!ignore_msrs) {
vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "unhandled rdmsr: 0x%x\n", msr);
return 1;
} else {
vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "ignored rdmsr: 0x%x\n", msr);
data = 0;
}
break;
}
*pdata = data;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Don't report guest userspace emulation error to userspace
Commit fc3a9157d314 ("KVM: X86: Don't report L2 emulation failures to
user-space") disabled the reporting of L2 (nested guest) emulation failures to
userspace due to race-condition between a vmexit and the instruction emulator.
The same rational applies also to userspace applications that are permitted by
the guest OS to access MMIO area or perform PIO.
This patch extends the current behavior - of injecting a #UD instead of
reporting it to userspace - also for guest userspace code.
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 35,790
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ksba_name_new (ksba_name_t *r_name)
{
*r_name = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof **r_name);
if (!*r_name)
return gpg_error_from_errno (errno);
(*r_name)->ref_count++;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 10,889
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void InspectorClientImpl::setShowFPSCounter(bool show)
{
m_inspectedWebView->setShowFPSCounter(show);
}
Commit Message: [4/4] Process clearBrowserCahce/cookies commands in browser.
BUG=366585
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/251183005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172984 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 114,183
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PaintPropertyTreeBuilderTest::PaintPropertiesForElement(const char* name) {
return GetDocument()
.getElementById(name)
->GetLayoutObject()
->FirstFragment()
.PaintProperties();
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 125,484
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int iriap_getvaluebyclass_request(struct iriap_cb *self,
__u32 saddr, __u32 daddr,
char *name, char *attr)
{
struct sk_buff *tx_skb;
int name_len, attr_len, skb_len;
__u8 *frame;
IRDA_ASSERT(self != NULL, return -1;);
IRDA_ASSERT(self->magic == IAS_MAGIC, return -1;);
/* Client must supply the destination device address */
if (!daddr)
return -1;
self->daddr = daddr;
self->saddr = saddr;
/*
* Save operation, so we know what the later indication is about
*/
self->operation = GET_VALUE_BY_CLASS;
/* Give ourselves 10 secs to finish this operation */
iriap_start_watchdog_timer(self, 10*HZ);
name_len = strlen(name); /* Up to IAS_MAX_CLASSNAME = 60 */
attr_len = strlen(attr); /* Up to IAS_MAX_ATTRIBNAME = 60 */
skb_len = self->max_header_size+2+name_len+1+attr_len+4;
tx_skb = alloc_skb(skb_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!tx_skb)
return -ENOMEM;
/* Reserve space for MUX and LAP header */
skb_reserve(tx_skb, self->max_header_size);
skb_put(tx_skb, 3+name_len+attr_len);
frame = tx_skb->data;
/* Build frame */
frame[0] = IAP_LST | GET_VALUE_BY_CLASS;
frame[1] = name_len; /* Insert length of name */
memcpy(frame+2, name, name_len); /* Insert name */
frame[2+name_len] = attr_len; /* Insert length of attr */
memcpy(frame+3+name_len, attr, attr_len); /* Insert attr */
iriap_do_client_event(self, IAP_CALL_REQUEST_GVBC, tx_skb);
/* Drop reference count - see state_s_disconnect(). */
dev_kfree_skb(tx_skb);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: irda: validate peer name and attribute lengths
Length fields provided by a peer for names and attributes may be longer
than the destination array sizes. Validate lengths to prevent stack
buffer overflows.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 35,208
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const AtomicString& AXObject::containerLiveRegionRelevant() const {
updateCachedAttributeValuesIfNeeded();
return m_cachedLiveRegionRoot ? m_cachedLiveRegionRoot->liveRegionRelevant()
: nullAtom;
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 127,242
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int proc_pid_personality(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *task)
{
int err = lock_trace(task);
if (!err) {
seq_printf(m, "%08x\n", task->personality);
unlock_trace(task);
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: proc: restrict access to /proc/PID/io
/proc/PID/io may be used for gathering private information. E.g. for
openssh and vsftpd daemons wchars/rchars may be used to learn the
precise password length. Restrict it to processes being able to ptrace
the target process.
ptrace_may_access() is needed to prevent keeping open file descriptor of
"io" file, executing setuid binary and gathering io information of the
setuid'ed process.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 26,872
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void kvm_lapic_set_vapic_addr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t vapic_addr)
{
vcpu->arch.apic->vapic_addr = vapic_addr;
if (vapic_addr)
__set_bit(KVM_APIC_CHECK_VAPIC, &vcpu->arch.apic_attention);
else
__clear_bit(KVM_APIC_CHECK_VAPIC, &vcpu->arch.apic_attention);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Fix potential divide by 0 in lapic (CVE-2013-6367)
Under guest controllable circumstances apic_get_tmcct will execute a
divide by zero and cause a crash. If the guest cpuid support
tsc deadline timers and performs the following sequence of requests
the host will crash.
- Set the mode to periodic
- Set the TMICT to 0
- Set the mode bits to 11 (neither periodic, nor one shot, nor tsc deadline)
- Set the TMICT to non-zero.
Then the lapic_timer.period will be 0, but the TMICT will not be. If the
guest then reads from the TMCCT then the host will perform a divide by 0.
This patch ensures that if the lapic_timer.period is 0, then the division
does not occur.
Reported-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 28,934
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void rwpng_warning_stderr_handler(png_structp png_ptr, png_const_charp msg) {
fprintf(stderr, " libpng warning: %s\n", msg);
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflow in rwpng.h (CVE-2016-5735)
Reported by Choi Jaeseung
Found with Sparrow (http://ropas.snu.ac.kr/sparrow)
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 73,858
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: query_info(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon,
u64 persistent_fid, u64 volatile_fid, u8 info_class, u8 info_type,
u32 additional_info, size_t output_len, size_t min_len, void **data,
u32 *dlen)
{
struct smb_rqst rqst;
struct smb2_query_info_rsp *rsp = NULL;
struct kvec iov[1];
struct kvec rsp_iov;
int rc = 0;
int resp_buftype = CIFS_NO_BUFFER;
struct cifs_ses *ses = tcon->ses;
int flags = 0;
bool allocated = false;
cifs_dbg(FYI, "Query Info\n");
if (!ses || !(ses->server))
return -EIO;
if (smb3_encryption_required(tcon))
flags |= CIFS_TRANSFORM_REQ;
memset(&rqst, 0, sizeof(struct smb_rqst));
memset(&iov, 0, sizeof(iov));
rqst.rq_iov = iov;
rqst.rq_nvec = 1;
rc = SMB2_query_info_init(tcon, &rqst, persistent_fid, volatile_fid,
info_class, info_type, additional_info,
output_len, 0, NULL);
if (rc)
goto qinf_exit;
trace_smb3_query_info_enter(xid, persistent_fid, tcon->tid,
ses->Suid, info_class, (__u32)info_type);
rc = cifs_send_recv(xid, ses, &rqst, &resp_buftype, flags, &rsp_iov);
rsp = (struct smb2_query_info_rsp *)rsp_iov.iov_base;
if (rc) {
cifs_stats_fail_inc(tcon, SMB2_QUERY_INFO_HE);
trace_smb3_query_info_err(xid, persistent_fid, tcon->tid,
ses->Suid, info_class, (__u32)info_type, rc);
goto qinf_exit;
}
trace_smb3_query_info_done(xid, persistent_fid, tcon->tid,
ses->Suid, info_class, (__u32)info_type);
if (dlen) {
*dlen = le32_to_cpu(rsp->OutputBufferLength);
if (!*data) {
*data = kmalloc(*dlen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!*data) {
cifs_dbg(VFS,
"Error %d allocating memory for acl\n",
rc);
*dlen = 0;
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto qinf_exit;
}
allocated = true;
}
}
rc = smb2_validate_and_copy_iov(le16_to_cpu(rsp->OutputBufferOffset),
le32_to_cpu(rsp->OutputBufferLength),
&rsp_iov, min_len, *data);
if (rc && allocated) {
kfree(*data);
*data = NULL;
*dlen = 0;
}
qinf_exit:
SMB2_query_info_free(&rqst);
free_rsp_buf(resp_buftype, rsp);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: cifs: Fix use-after-free in SMB2_read
There is a KASAN use-after-free:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in SMB2_read+0x1136/0x1190
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880b4e45e50 by task ln/1009
Should not release the 'req' because it will use in the trace.
Fixes: eccb4422cf97 ("smb3: Add ftrace tracepoints for improved SMB3 debugging")
Signed-off-by: ZhangXiaoxu <zhangxiaoxu5@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> 4.18+
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 88,125
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool blk_poll(struct request_queue *q, blk_qc_t cookie)
{
if (!q->poll_fn || !blk_qc_t_valid(cookie))
return false;
if (current->plug)
blk_flush_plug_list(current->plug, false);
return q->poll_fn(q, cookie);
}
Commit Message: block: blk_init_allocated_queue() set q->fq as NULL in the fail case
We find the memory use-after-free issue in __blk_drain_queue()
on the kernel 4.14. After read the latest kernel 4.18-rc6 we
think it has the same problem.
Memory is allocated for q->fq in the blk_init_allocated_queue().
If the elevator init function called with error return, it will
run into the fail case to free the q->fq.
Then the __blk_drain_queue() uses the same memory after the free
of the q->fq, it will lead to the unpredictable event.
The patch is to set q->fq as NULL in the fail case of
blk_init_allocated_queue().
Fixes: commit 7c94e1c157a2 ("block: introduce blk_flush_queue to drive flush machinery")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: xiao jin <jin.xiao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 92,001
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::unique_ptr<PageInfoUI::SecurityDescription> CreateSecurityDescription(
PageInfoUI::SecuritySummaryColor style,
int summary_id,
int details_id) {
std::unique_ptr<PageInfoUI::SecurityDescription> security_description(
new PageInfoUI::SecurityDescription());
security_description->summary_style = style;
security_description->summary = l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(summary_id);
security_description->details = l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(details_id);
return security_description;
}
Commit Message: Revert "PageInfo: decouple safe browsing and TLS statii."
This reverts commit ee95bc44021230127c7e6e9a8cf9d3820760f77c.
Reason for revert: suspect causing unit_tests failure on Linux MSAN Tests:
https://ci.chromium.org/p/chromium/builders/ci/Linux%20MSan%20Tests/17649
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.EnsureCloseCallback
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.NotificationPermissionRevokeUkm
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.OpenPageInfoBubbleAfterNavigationStart
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfo
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoForUsbGuard
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithPolicyUsbDevices
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithUsbDevice
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithUserAndPolicyUsbDevices
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.UpdatingSiteDataRetainsLayout
https://logs.chromium.org/logs/chromium/buildbucket/cr-buildbucket.appspot.com/8909718923797040064/+/steps/unit_tests/0/logs/Deterministic_failure:_PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered__status_CRASH_/0
[ RUN ] PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered
==9056==WARNING: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value
#0 0x561baaab15ec in PageInfoUI::GetSecurityDescription(PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo const&) const ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info_ui.cc:250:3
#1 0x561bab6a1548 in PageInfoBubbleView::SetIdentityInfo(PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo const&) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/views/page_info/page_info_bubble_view.cc:802:7
#2 0x561baaaab3bb in PageInfo::PresentSiteIdentity() ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info.cc:969:8
#3 0x561baaaa0a21 in PageInfo::PageInfo(PageInfoUI*, Profile*, TabSpecificContentSettings*, content::WebContents*, GURL const&, security_state::SecurityLevel, security_state::VisibleSecurityState const&) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info.cc:344:3
#4 0x561bab69b6dd in PageInfoBubbleView::PageInfoBubbleView(views::View*, gfx::Rect const&, aura::Window*, Profile*, content::WebContents*, GURL const&, security_state::SecurityLevel, security_state::VisibleSecurityState const&, base::OnceCallback<void (views::Widget::ClosedReason, bool)>) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/views/page_info/page_info_bubble_view.cc:576:24
...
Original change's description:
> PageInfo: decouple safe browsing and TLS statii.
>
> Previously, the Page Info bubble maintained a single variable to
> identify all reasons that a page might have a non-standard status. This
> lead to the display logic making assumptions about, for instance, the
> validity of a certificate when the page was flagged by Safe Browsing.
>
> This CL separates out the Safe Browsing status from the site identity
> status so that the page info bubble can inform the user that the site's
> certificate is invalid, even if it's also flagged by Safe Browsing.
>
> Bug: 869925
> Change-Id: I34107225b4206c8f32771ccd75e9367668d0a72b
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1662537
> Reviewed-by: Mustafa Emre Acer <meacer@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
> Auto-Submit: Joe DeBlasio <jdeblasio@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Joe DeBlasio <jdeblasio@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#671847}
TBR=meacer@chromium.org,bsep@chromium.org,jdeblasio@chromium.org
Change-Id: I8be652952e7276bcc9266124693352e467159cc4
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
Bug: 869925
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1673985
Reviewed-by: Takashi Sakamoto <tasak@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Takashi Sakamoto <tasak@google.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#671932}
CWE ID: CWE-311
| 0
| 138,015
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int hns_roce_init_hem(struct hns_roce_dev *hr_dev)
{
int ret;
struct device *dev = hr_dev->dev;
ret = hns_roce_init_hem_table(hr_dev, &hr_dev->mr_table.mtt_table,
HEM_TYPE_MTT, hr_dev->caps.mtt_entry_sz,
hr_dev->caps.num_mtt_segs, 1);
if (ret) {
dev_err(dev, "Failed to init MTT context memory, aborting.\n");
return ret;
}
if (hns_roce_check_whether_mhop(hr_dev, HEM_TYPE_CQE)) {
ret = hns_roce_init_hem_table(hr_dev,
&hr_dev->mr_table.mtt_cqe_table,
HEM_TYPE_CQE, hr_dev->caps.mtt_entry_sz,
hr_dev->caps.num_cqe_segs, 1);
if (ret) {
dev_err(dev, "Failed to init MTT CQE context memory, aborting.\n");
goto err_unmap_cqe;
}
}
ret = hns_roce_init_hem_table(hr_dev, &hr_dev->mr_table.mtpt_table,
HEM_TYPE_MTPT, hr_dev->caps.mtpt_entry_sz,
hr_dev->caps.num_mtpts, 1);
if (ret) {
dev_err(dev, "Failed to init MTPT context memory, aborting.\n");
goto err_unmap_mtt;
}
ret = hns_roce_init_hem_table(hr_dev, &hr_dev->qp_table.qp_table,
HEM_TYPE_QPC, hr_dev->caps.qpc_entry_sz,
hr_dev->caps.num_qps, 1);
if (ret) {
dev_err(dev, "Failed to init QP context memory, aborting.\n");
goto err_unmap_dmpt;
}
ret = hns_roce_init_hem_table(hr_dev, &hr_dev->qp_table.irrl_table,
HEM_TYPE_IRRL,
hr_dev->caps.irrl_entry_sz *
hr_dev->caps.max_qp_init_rdma,
hr_dev->caps.num_qps, 1);
if (ret) {
dev_err(dev, "Failed to init irrl_table memory, aborting.\n");
goto err_unmap_qp;
}
if (hr_dev->caps.trrl_entry_sz) {
ret = hns_roce_init_hem_table(hr_dev,
&hr_dev->qp_table.trrl_table,
HEM_TYPE_TRRL,
hr_dev->caps.trrl_entry_sz *
hr_dev->caps.max_qp_dest_rdma,
hr_dev->caps.num_qps, 1);
if (ret) {
dev_err(dev,
"Failed to init trrl_table memory, aborting.\n");
goto err_unmap_irrl;
}
}
ret = hns_roce_init_hem_table(hr_dev, &hr_dev->cq_table.table,
HEM_TYPE_CQC, hr_dev->caps.cqc_entry_sz,
hr_dev->caps.num_cqs, 1);
if (ret) {
dev_err(dev, "Failed to init CQ context memory, aborting.\n");
goto err_unmap_trrl;
}
return 0;
err_unmap_trrl:
if (hr_dev->caps.trrl_entry_sz)
hns_roce_cleanup_hem_table(hr_dev,
&hr_dev->qp_table.trrl_table);
err_unmap_irrl:
hns_roce_cleanup_hem_table(hr_dev, &hr_dev->qp_table.irrl_table);
err_unmap_qp:
hns_roce_cleanup_hem_table(hr_dev, &hr_dev->qp_table.qp_table);
err_unmap_dmpt:
hns_roce_cleanup_hem_table(hr_dev, &hr_dev->mr_table.mtpt_table);
err_unmap_mtt:
if (hns_roce_check_whether_mhop(hr_dev, HEM_TYPE_CQE))
hns_roce_cleanup_hem_table(hr_dev,
&hr_dev->mr_table.mtt_cqe_table);
err_unmap_cqe:
hns_roce_cleanup_hem_table(hr_dev, &hr_dev->mr_table.mtt_table);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: RDMA/hns: Fix init resp when alloc ucontext
The data in resp will be copied from kernel to userspace, thus it needs to
be initialized to zeros to avoid copying uninited stack memory.
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Fixes: e088a685eae9 ("RDMA/hns: Support rq record doorbell for the user space")
Signed-off-by: Yixian Liu <liuyixian@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-665
| 0
| 87,738
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void resolve_linearized_pdf(pdf_t *pdf)
{
int i;
xref_t buf;
if (pdf->n_xrefs < 2)
return;
if (!pdf->xrefs[0].is_linear)
return;
/* Swap Linear with Version 1 */
buf = pdf->xrefs[0];
pdf->xrefs[0] = pdf->xrefs[1];
pdf->xrefs[1] = buf;
/* Resolve is_linear flag and version */
pdf->xrefs[0].is_linear = 1;
pdf->xrefs[0].version = 1;
pdf->xrefs[1].is_linear = 0;
pdf->xrefs[1].version = 1;
/* Adjust the other version values now */
for (i=2; i<pdf->n_xrefs; ++i)
--pdf->xrefs[i].version;
}
Commit Message: Zero and sanity check all dynamic allocs.
This addresses the memory issues in Issue #6 expressed in
calloc_some.pdf and malloc_some.pdf
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 88,603
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void t1_printf(PDF pdf, const char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list args;
va_start(args, fmt);
vsprintf(t1_line_array, fmt, args);
t1_puts(pdf, t1_line_array);
va_end(args);
}
Commit Message: writet1 protection against buffer overflow
git-svn-id: svn://tug.org/texlive/trunk/Build/source@48697 c570f23f-e606-0410-a88d-b1316a301751
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 76,700
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int php_openssl_x509_fingerprint(X509 *peer, const char *method, zend_bool raw, char **out, int *out_len TSRMLS_DC)
{
unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
const EVP_MD *mdtype;
unsigned int n;
if (!(mdtype = EVP_get_digestbyname(method))) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unknown signature algorithm");
return FAILURE;
} else if (!X509_digest(peer, mdtype, md, &n)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_ERROR, "Could not generate signature");
return FAILURE;
}
if (raw) {
*out_len = n;
*out = estrndup((char *) md, n);
} else {
*out_len = n * 2;
*out = emalloc(*out_len + 1);
make_digest_ex(*out, md, n);
}
return SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-754
| 0
| 4,691
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DiskCacheBackendTest::BackendDoomAll2() {
EXPECT_EQ(2, cache_->GetEntryCount());
EXPECT_THAT(DoomAllEntries(), IsOk());
disk_cache::Entry* entry;
ASSERT_THAT(CreateEntry("Something new", &entry), IsOk());
entry->Close();
EXPECT_EQ(1, cache_->GetEntryCount());
}
Commit Message: Blockfile cache: fix long-standing sparse + evict reentrancy problem
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for an alternative perspective
plus a reduction to make fixing this much easier.
Bug: 826626, 518908, 537063, 802886
Change-Id: Ibfa01416f9a8e7f7b361e4f93b4b6b134728b85f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/985052
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547103}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 147,149
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: mrb_singleton_class_clone(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_value obj)
{
struct RClass *klass = mrb_basic_ptr(obj)->c;
if (klass->tt != MRB_TT_SCLASS)
return klass;
else {
/* copy singleton(unnamed) class */
struct RClass *clone = (struct RClass*)mrb_obj_alloc(mrb, klass->tt, mrb->class_class);
switch (mrb_type(obj)) {
case MRB_TT_CLASS:
case MRB_TT_SCLASS:
break;
default:
clone->c = mrb_singleton_class_clone(mrb, mrb_obj_value(klass));
break;
}
clone->super = klass->super;
if (klass->iv) {
mrb_iv_copy(mrb, mrb_obj_value(clone), mrb_obj_value(klass));
mrb_obj_iv_set(mrb, (struct RObject*)clone, mrb_intern_lit(mrb, "__attached__"), obj);
}
if (klass->mt) {
clone->mt = kh_copy(mt, mrb, klass->mt);
}
else {
clone->mt = kh_init(mt, mrb);
}
clone->tt = MRB_TT_SCLASS;
return clone;
}
}
Commit Message: Allow `Object#clone` to copy frozen status only; fix #4036
Copying all flags from the original object may overwrite the clone's
flags e.g. the embedded flag.
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 82,210
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: format_RESUBMIT(const struct ofpact_resubmit *a, struct ds *s)
{
if (a->in_port != OFPP_IN_PORT && a->table_id == 255) {
ds_put_format(s, "%sresubmit:%s", colors.special, colors.end);
ofputil_format_port(a->in_port, s);
} else {
ds_put_format(s, "%sresubmit(%s", colors.paren, colors.end);
if (a->in_port != OFPP_IN_PORT) {
ofputil_format_port(a->in_port, s);
}
ds_put_char(s, ',');
if (a->table_id != 255) {
ds_put_format(s, "%"PRIu8, a->table_id);
}
ds_put_format(s, "%s)%s", colors.paren, colors.end);
}
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 76,941
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xsltLREEffectiveNsNodesFree(xsltEffectiveNsPtr first)
{
xsltEffectiveNsPtr tmp;
while (first != NULL) {
tmp = first;
first = first->nextInStore;
xmlFree(tmp);
}
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 156,908
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static OPJ_BOOL opj_tcd_code_block_dec_allocate(opj_tcd_cblk_dec_t *
p_code_block)
{
if (! p_code_block->segs) {
p_code_block->segs = (opj_tcd_seg_t *) opj_calloc(OPJ_J2K_DEFAULT_NB_SEGS,
sizeof(opj_tcd_seg_t));
if (! p_code_block->segs) {
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
/*fprintf(stderr, "Allocate %d elements of code_block->data\n", OPJ_J2K_DEFAULT_NB_SEGS * sizeof(opj_tcd_seg_t));*/
p_code_block->m_current_max_segs = OPJ_J2K_DEFAULT_NB_SEGS;
/*fprintf(stderr, "m_current_max_segs of code_block->data = %d\n", p_code_block->m_current_max_segs);*/
} else {
/* sanitize */
opj_tcd_seg_t * l_segs = p_code_block->segs;
OPJ_UINT32 l_current_max_segs = p_code_block->m_current_max_segs;
opj_tcd_seg_data_chunk_t* l_chunks = p_code_block->chunks;
OPJ_UINT32 l_numchunksalloc = p_code_block->numchunksalloc;
OPJ_UINT32 i;
memset(p_code_block, 0, sizeof(opj_tcd_cblk_dec_t));
p_code_block->segs = l_segs;
p_code_block->m_current_max_segs = l_current_max_segs;
for (i = 0; i < l_current_max_segs; ++i) {
opj_tcd_reinit_segment(&l_segs[i]);
}
p_code_block->chunks = l_chunks;
p_code_block->numchunksalloc = l_numchunksalloc;
}
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Encoder: grow buffer size in opj_tcd_code_block_enc_allocate_data() to avoid write heap buffer overflow in opj_mqc_flush (#982)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 61,684
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SpoolssSetForm_q(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree, dcerpc_info *di, guint8 *drep _U_)
{
char *name = NULL;
guint32 level;
proto_item *hidden_item;
hidden_item = proto_tree_add_uint(
tree, hf_form, tvb, offset, 0, 1);
PROTO_ITEM_SET_HIDDEN(hidden_item);
/* Parse packet */
offset = dissect_nt_policy_hnd(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep, hf_hnd, NULL, NULL,
FALSE, FALSE);
offset = dissect_ndr_cvstring(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep,
sizeof(guint16), hf_form_name, TRUE, &name);
if (name)
col_append_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, ", %s", name);
offset = dissect_ndr_uint32(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep, hf_form_level, &level);
col_append_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, ", level %d", level);
offset = dissect_FORM_CTR(tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep);
return offset;
}
Commit Message: SPOOLSS: Try to avoid an infinite loop.
Use tvb_reported_length_remaining in dissect_spoolss_uint16uni. Make
sure our offset always increments in dissect_spoolss_keybuffer.
Change-Id: I7017c9685bb2fa27161d80a03b8fca4ef630e793
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/14687
Reviewed-by: Gerald Combs <gerald@wireshark.org>
Petri-Dish: Gerald Combs <gerald@wireshark.org>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <buildbot-no-reply@wireshark.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 51,984
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void rpc_task_set_debuginfo(struct rpc_task *task)
{
static atomic_t rpc_pid;
task->tk_pid = atomic_inc_return(&rpc_pid);
}
Commit Message: NLM: Don't hang forever on NLM unlock requests
If the NLM daemon is killed on the NFS server, we can currently end up
hanging forever on an 'unlock' request, instead of aborting. Basically,
if the rpcbind request fails, or the server keeps returning garbage, we
really want to quit instead of retrying.
Tested-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@sw.ru>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 34,977
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int fill_files_note(struct memelfnote *note)
{
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
unsigned count, size, names_ofs, remaining, n;
user_long_t *data;
user_long_t *start_end_ofs;
char *name_base, *name_curpos;
/* *Estimated* file count and total data size needed */
count = current->mm->map_count;
size = count * 64;
names_ofs = (2 + 3 * count) * sizeof(data[0]);
alloc:
if (size >= MAX_FILE_NOTE_SIZE) /* paranoia check */
return -EINVAL;
size = round_up(size, PAGE_SIZE);
data = vmalloc(size);
if (!data)
return -ENOMEM;
start_end_ofs = data + 2;
name_base = name_curpos = ((char *)data) + names_ofs;
remaining = size - names_ofs;
count = 0;
for (vma = current->mm->mmap; vma != NULL; vma = vma->vm_next) {
struct file *file;
const char *filename;
file = vma->vm_file;
if (!file)
continue;
filename = d_path(&file->f_path, name_curpos, remaining);
if (IS_ERR(filename)) {
if (PTR_ERR(filename) == -ENAMETOOLONG) {
vfree(data);
size = size * 5 / 4;
goto alloc;
}
continue;
}
/* d_path() fills at the end, move name down */
/* n = strlen(filename) + 1: */
n = (name_curpos + remaining) - filename;
remaining = filename - name_curpos;
memmove(name_curpos, filename, n);
name_curpos += n;
*start_end_ofs++ = vma->vm_start;
*start_end_ofs++ = vma->vm_end;
*start_end_ofs++ = vma->vm_pgoff;
count++;
}
/* Now we know exact count of files, can store it */
data[0] = count;
data[1] = PAGE_SIZE;
/*
* Count usually is less than current->mm->map_count,
* we need to move filenames down.
*/
n = current->mm->map_count - count;
if (n != 0) {
unsigned shift_bytes = n * 3 * sizeof(data[0]);
memmove(name_base - shift_bytes, name_base,
name_curpos - name_base);
name_curpos -= shift_bytes;
}
size = name_curpos - (char *)data;
fill_note(note, "CORE", NT_FILE, size, data);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: x86, mm/ASLR: Fix stack randomization on 64-bit systems
The issue is that the stack for processes is not properly randomized on
64 bit architectures due to an integer overflow.
The affected function is randomize_stack_top() in file
"fs/binfmt_elf.c":
static unsigned long randomize_stack_top(unsigned long stack_top)
{
unsigned int random_variable = 0;
if ((current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE) &&
!(current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE)) {
random_variable = get_random_int() & STACK_RND_MASK;
random_variable <<= PAGE_SHIFT;
}
return PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top) + random_variable;
return PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top) - random_variable;
}
Note that, it declares the "random_variable" variable as "unsigned int".
Since the result of the shifting operation between STACK_RND_MASK (which
is 0x3fffff on x86_64, 22 bits) and PAGE_SHIFT (which is 12 on x86_64):
random_variable <<= PAGE_SHIFT;
then the two leftmost bits are dropped when storing the result in the
"random_variable". This variable shall be at least 34 bits long to hold
the (22+12) result.
These two dropped bits have an impact on the entropy of process stack.
Concretely, the total stack entropy is reduced by four: from 2^28 to
2^30 (One fourth of expected entropy).
This patch restores back the entropy by correcting the types involved
in the operations in the functions randomize_stack_top() and
stack_maxrandom_size().
The successful fix can be tested with:
$ for i in `seq 1 10`; do cat /proc/self/maps | grep stack; done
7ffeda566000-7ffeda587000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
7fff5a332000-7fff5a353000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
7ffcdb7a1000-7ffcdb7c2000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
7ffd5e2c4000-7ffd5e2e5000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
...
Once corrected, the leading bytes should be between 7ffc and 7fff,
rather than always being 7fff.
Signed-off-by: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es>
Signed-off-by: Ismael Ripoll <iripoll@upv.es>
[ Rebased, fixed 80 char bugs, cleaned up commit message, added test example and CVE ]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Fixes: CVE-2015-1593
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150214173350.GA18393@www.outflux.net
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 44,284
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int git_index_remove_all(
git_index *index,
const git_strarray *pathspec,
git_index_matched_path_cb cb,
void *payload)
{
int error = index_apply_to_all(
index, INDEX_ACTION_REMOVE, pathspec, cb, payload);
if (error) /* make sure error is set if callback stopped iteration */
giterr_set_after_callback(error);
return error;
}
Commit Message: index: convert `read_entry` to return entry size via an out-param
The function `read_entry` does not conform to our usual coding style of
returning stuff via the out parameter and to use the return value for
reporting errors. Due to most of our code conforming to that pattern, it
has become quite natural for us to actually return `-1` in case there is
any error, which has also slipped in with commit 5625d86b9 (index:
support index v4, 2016-05-17). As the function returns an `size_t` only,
though, the return value is wrapped around, causing the caller of
`read_tree` to continue with an invalid index entry. Ultimately, this
can lead to a double-free.
Improve code and fix the bug by converting the function to return the
index entry size via an out parameter and only using the return value to
indicate errors.
Reported-by: Krishna Ram Prakash R <krp@gtux.in>
Reported-by: Vivek Parikh <viv0411.parikh@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 83,693
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ZEND_API int zend_set_local_var_str(const char *name, size_t len, zval *value, int force) /* {{{ */
{
zend_execute_data *execute_data = EG(current_execute_data);
while (execute_data && (!execute_data->func || !ZEND_USER_CODE(execute_data->func->common.type))) {
execute_data = execute_data->prev_execute_data;
}
if (execute_data) {
if (!execute_data->symbol_table) {
zend_ulong h = zend_hash_func(name, len);
zend_op_array *op_array = &execute_data->func->op_array;
if (EXPECTED(op_array->last_var)) {
zend_string **str = op_array->vars;
zend_string **end = str + op_array->last_var;
do {
if (ZSTR_H(*str) == h &&
ZSTR_LEN(*str) == len &&
memcmp(ZSTR_VAL(*str), name, len) == 0) {
zval *var = EX_VAR_NUM(str - op_array->vars);
zval_ptr_dtor(var);
ZVAL_COPY_VALUE(var, value);
return SUCCESS;
}
str++;
} while (str != end);
}
if (force) {
zend_array *symbol_table = zend_rebuild_symbol_table();
if (symbol_table) {
return zend_hash_str_update(symbol_table, name, len, value) ? SUCCESS : FAILURE;;
}
}
} else {
return (zend_hash_str_update_ind(execute_data->symbol_table, name, len, value) != NULL) ? SUCCESS : FAILURE;
}
}
return FAILURE;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Use format string
CWE ID: CWE-134
| 0
| 57,336
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void enter_lmode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
u32 guest_tr_ar;
vmx_segment_cache_clear(to_vmx(vcpu));
guest_tr_ar = vmcs_read32(GUEST_TR_AR_BYTES);
if ((guest_tr_ar & AR_TYPE_MASK) != AR_TYPE_BUSY_64_TSS) {
pr_debug_ratelimited("%s: tss fixup for long mode. \n",
__func__);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_TR_AR_BYTES,
(guest_tr_ar & ~AR_TYPE_MASK)
| AR_TYPE_BUSY_64_TSS);
}
vmx_set_efer(vcpu, vcpu->arch.efer | EFER_LMA);
}
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 37,036
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int ext3_feature_set_ok(struct super_block *sb)
{
if (EXT4_HAS_INCOMPAT_FEATURE(sb, ~EXT3_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_SUPP))
return 0;
if (!EXT4_HAS_COMPAT_FEATURE(sb, EXT4_FEATURE_COMPAT_HAS_JOURNAL))
return 0;
if (sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY)
return 1;
if (EXT4_HAS_RO_COMPAT_FEATURE(sb, ~EXT3_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_SUPP))
return 0;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix undefined behavior in ext4_fill_flex_info()
Commit 503358ae01b70ce6909d19dd01287093f6b6271c ("ext4: avoid divide by
zero when trying to mount a corrupted file system") fixes CVE-2009-4307
by performing a sanity check on s_log_groups_per_flex, since it can be
set to a bogus value by an attacker.
sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex = sbi->s_es->s_log_groups_per_flex;
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex < 2) { ... }
This patch fixes two potential issues in the previous commit.
1) The sanity check might only work on architectures like PowerPC.
On x86, 5 bits are used for the shifting amount. That means, given a
large s_log_groups_per_flex value like 36, groups_per_flex = 1 << 36
is essentially 1 << 4 = 16, rather than 0. This will bypass the check,
leaving s_log_groups_per_flex and groups_per_flex inconsistent.
2) The sanity check relies on undefined behavior, i.e., oversized shift.
A standard-confirming C compiler could rewrite the check in unexpected
ways. Consider the following equivalent form, assuming groups_per_flex
is unsigned for simplicity.
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex == 0 || groups_per_flex == 1) {
We compile the code snippet using Clang 3.0 and GCC 4.6. Clang will
completely optimize away the check groups_per_flex == 0, leaving the
patched code as vulnerable as the original. GCC keeps the check, but
there is no guarantee that future versions will do the same.
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 20,441
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ui64 get_pid_start_time(pid_t pid){
glibtop_proc_time buf={0};
glibtop_get_proc_time(&buf,pid);
return buf.start_time;
}
Commit Message: Fix memory overflow if the name of an environment is larger than 500 characters. Bug found by Adam Sampson.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 43,737
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void MediaPlayerService::AudioOutput::setMinBufferCount()
{
char value[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
if (property_get("ro.kernel.qemu", value, 0)) {
mIsOnEmulator = true;
mMinBufferCount = 12; // to prevent systematic buffer underrun for emulator
}
}
Commit Message: MediaPlayerService: avoid invalid static cast
Bug: 30204103
Change-Id: Ie0dd3568a375f1e9fed8615ad3d85184bcc99028
(cherry picked from commit ee0a0e39acdcf8f97e0d6945c31ff36a06a36e9d)
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 158,035
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ecryptfs_decode_and_decrypt_filename(char **plaintext_name,
size_t *plaintext_name_size,
struct super_block *sb,
const char *name, size_t name_size)
{
struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat =
&ecryptfs_superblock_to_private(sb)->mount_crypt_stat;
char *decoded_name;
size_t decoded_name_size;
size_t packet_size;
int rc = 0;
if ((mount_crypt_stat->flags & ECRYPTFS_GLOBAL_ENCRYPT_FILENAMES)
&& !(mount_crypt_stat->flags & ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED_VIEW_ENABLED)
&& (name_size > ECRYPTFS_FNEK_ENCRYPTED_FILENAME_PREFIX_SIZE)
&& (strncmp(name, ECRYPTFS_FNEK_ENCRYPTED_FILENAME_PREFIX,
ECRYPTFS_FNEK_ENCRYPTED_FILENAME_PREFIX_SIZE) == 0)) {
const char *orig_name = name;
size_t orig_name_size = name_size;
name += ECRYPTFS_FNEK_ENCRYPTED_FILENAME_PREFIX_SIZE;
name_size -= ECRYPTFS_FNEK_ENCRYPTED_FILENAME_PREFIX_SIZE;
ecryptfs_decode_from_filename(NULL, &decoded_name_size,
name, name_size);
decoded_name = kmalloc(decoded_name_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!decoded_name) {
printk(KERN_ERR "%s: Out of memory whilst attempting "
"to kmalloc [%zd] bytes\n", __func__,
decoded_name_size);
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
ecryptfs_decode_from_filename(decoded_name, &decoded_name_size,
name, name_size);
rc = ecryptfs_parse_tag_70_packet(plaintext_name,
plaintext_name_size,
&packet_size,
mount_crypt_stat,
decoded_name,
decoded_name_size);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_INFO "%s: Could not parse tag 70 packet "
"from filename; copying through filename "
"as-is\n", __func__);
rc = ecryptfs_copy_filename(plaintext_name,
plaintext_name_size,
orig_name, orig_name_size);
goto out_free;
}
} else {
rc = ecryptfs_copy_filename(plaintext_name,
plaintext_name_size,
name, name_size);
goto out;
}
out_free:
kfree(decoded_name);
out:
return rc;
}
Commit Message: eCryptfs: Remove buggy and unnecessary write in file name decode routine
Dmitry Chernenkov used KASAN to discover that eCryptfs writes past the
end of the allocated buffer during encrypted filename decoding. This
fix corrects the issue by getting rid of the unnecessary 0 write when
the current bit offset is 2.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v2.6.29+: 51ca58d eCryptfs: Filename Encryption: Encoding and encryption functions
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 45,409
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void TraceEllipse(PrimitiveInfo *primitive_info,const PointInfo start,
const PointInfo stop,const PointInfo degrees)
{
double
delta,
step,
y;
PointInfo
angle,
point;
register PrimitiveInfo
*p;
register ssize_t
i;
/*
Ellipses are just short segmented polys.
*/
if ((fabs(stop.x) < DrawEpsilon) && (fabs(stop.y) < DrawEpsilon))
{
TracePoint(primitive_info,start);
return;
}
delta=2.0/MagickMax(stop.x,stop.y);
step=MagickPI/8.0;
if ((delta >= 0.0) && (delta < (MagickPI/8.0)))
step=MagickPI/(4*(MagickPI/delta/2+0.5));
angle.x=DegreesToRadians(degrees.x);
y=degrees.y;
while (y < degrees.x)
y+=360.0;
angle.y=(double) (DegreesToRadians(y)-DrawEpsilon);
for (p=primitive_info; angle.x < angle.y; angle.x+=step)
{
point.x=cos(fmod(angle.x,DegreesToRadians(360.0)))*stop.x+start.x;
point.y=sin(fmod(angle.x,DegreesToRadians(360.0)))*stop.y+start.y;
TracePoint(p,point);
p+=p->coordinates;
}
point.x=cos(fmod(angle.y,DegreesToRadians(360.0)))*stop.x+start.x;
point.y=sin(fmod(angle.y,DegreesToRadians(360.0)))*stop.y+start.y;
TracePoint(p,point);
p+=p->coordinates;
primitive_info->coordinates=(size_t) (p-primitive_info);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) primitive_info->coordinates; i++)
{
p->primitive=primitive_info->primitive;
p--;
}
}
Commit Message: Prevent buffer overflow (bug report from Max Thrane)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 72,012
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RegisterNonNetworkSubresourceURLLoaderFactories(
int render_process_id,
int render_frame_id,
NonNetworkURLLoaderFactoryMap* factories) {
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS) || BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_EXTENSIONS)
content::RenderFrameHost* frame_host =
RenderFrameHost::FromID(render_process_id, render_frame_id);
WebContents* web_contents = WebContents::FromRenderFrameHost(frame_host);
#endif // defined(OS_CHROMEOS) || BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_EXTENSIONS)
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
if (web_contents) {
Profile* profile =
Profile::FromBrowserContext(web_contents->GetBrowserContext());
factories->emplace(content::kExternalFileScheme,
std::make_unique<chromeos::ExternalFileURLLoaderFactory>(
profile, render_process_id));
}
#endif // defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_EXTENSIONS)
auto factory = extensions::CreateExtensionURLLoaderFactory(render_process_id,
render_frame_id);
if (factory)
factories->emplace(extensions::kExtensionScheme, std::move(factory));
if (!web_contents)
return;
Profile* profile =
Profile::FromBrowserContext(web_contents->GetBrowserContext());
InstantService* instant_service =
InstantServiceFactory::GetForProfile(profile);
if (instant_service->IsInstantProcess(render_process_id)) {
factories->emplace(
chrome::kChromeSearchScheme,
content::CreateWebUIURLLoader(
frame_host, chrome::kChromeSearchScheme,
/*allowed_webui_hosts=*/base::flat_set<std::string>()));
}
extensions::ChromeExtensionWebContentsObserver* web_observer =
extensions::ChromeExtensionWebContentsObserver::FromWebContents(
web_contents);
if (!web_observer)
return;
const Extension* extension =
web_observer->GetExtensionFromFrame(frame_host, false);
if (!extension)
return;
std::vector<std::string> allowed_webui_hosts;
if ((extension->is_extension() || extension->is_platform_app()) &&
Manifest::IsComponentLocation(extension->location())) {
allowed_webui_hosts.emplace_back(content::kChromeUIResourcesHost);
allowed_webui_hosts.emplace_back(chrome::kChromeUIThemeHost);
}
if (extension->is_extension() || extension->is_legacy_packaged_app() ||
(extension->is_platform_app() &&
Manifest::IsComponentLocation(extension->location()))) {
allowed_webui_hosts.emplace_back(chrome::kChromeUIExtensionIconHost);
allowed_webui_hosts.emplace_back(chrome::kChromeUIFaviconHost);
}
if (!allowed_webui_hosts.empty()) {
factories->emplace(
content::kChromeUIScheme,
content::CreateWebUIURLLoader(frame_host, content::kChromeUIScheme,
std::move(allowed_webui_hosts)));
}
extensions::ExtensionHost* host =
extensions::ProcessManager::Get(web_contents->GetBrowserContext())
->GetBackgroundHostForExtension(extension->id());
if (host) {
factories->emplace(url::kFileScheme, std::make_unique<FileURLLoaderFactory>(
render_process_id));
}
#endif // BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_EXTENSIONS)
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 142,740
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int addFillStyle(SWFShape shape, SWFFillStyle fill)
{
int i;
for ( i=0; i<shape->nFills; ++i )
{
if ( SWFFillStyle_equals(fill, shape->fills[i]) )
return i;
}
if ( shape->isEnded )
return -1;
if ( shape->nFills%STYLE_INCREMENT == 0 )
{
int size = (shape->nFills+STYLE_INCREMENT) * sizeof(SWFFillStyle);
shape->fills = (SWFFillStyle*)realloc(shape->fills, size);
}
shape->fills[shape->nFills] = fill;
++shape->nFills;
return shape->nFills;
}
Commit Message: SWFShape_setLeftFillStyle: prevent fill overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 89,529
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool BluetoothSocketAbstractConnectFunction::PreRunValidation(
std::string* error) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
if (!BluetoothSocketAsyncApiFunction::PreRunValidation(error))
return false;
params_ = bluetooth_socket::Connect::Params::Create(*args_);
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_PRERUN_VALIDATE(params_.get());
socket_event_dispatcher_ = GetSocketEventDispatcher(browser_context());
return socket_event_dispatcher_ != nullptr;
}
Commit Message: chrome.bluetoothSocket: Fix regression in send()
In https://crrev.com/c/997098, params_ was changed to a local variable,
but it needs to last longer than that since net::WrappedIOBuffer may use
the data after the local variable goes out of scope.
This CL changed it back to be an instance variable.
Bug: 851799
Change-Id: I392f8acaef4c6473d6ea4fbee7209445aa09112e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1103676
Reviewed-by: Toni Barzic <tbarzic@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sonny Sasaka <sonnysasaka@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#568137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 154,079
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WebSpellCheckPanelHostClient* LocalFrameClientImpl::SpellCheckPanelHostClient()
const {
return web_frame_->SpellCheckPanelHostClient();
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 145,314
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void mem_put_le32(char *const mem, const unsigned int val) {
mem[0] = val;
mem[1] = val >> 8;
mem[2] = val >> 16;
mem[3] = val >> 24;
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 164,494
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FrameView::setVisibleContentScaleFactor(float visibleContentScaleFactor)
{
if (m_visibleContentScaleFactor == visibleContentScaleFactor)
return;
m_visibleContentScaleFactor = visibleContentScaleFactor;
updateScrollbars(scrollOffset());
}
Commit Message: Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
R=vollick@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 119,937
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: mrb_f_send(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_value self)
{
mrb_sym name;
mrb_value block, *argv, *regs;
mrb_int argc, i, len;
mrb_method_t m;
struct RClass *c;
mrb_callinfo *ci;
mrb_get_args(mrb, "n*&", &name, &argv, &argc, &block);
ci = mrb->c->ci;
if (ci->acc < 0) {
funcall:
return mrb_funcall_with_block(mrb, self, name, argc, argv, block);
}
c = mrb_class(mrb, self);
m = mrb_method_search_vm(mrb, &c, name);
if (MRB_METHOD_UNDEF_P(m)) { /* call method_mising */
goto funcall;
}
ci->mid = name;
ci->target_class = c;
regs = mrb->c->stack+1;
/* remove first symbol from arguments */
if (ci->argc >= 0) {
for (i=0,len=ci->argc; i<len; i++) {
regs[i] = regs[i+1];
}
ci->argc--;
}
else { /* variable length arguments */
mrb_ary_shift(mrb, regs[0]);
}
if (MRB_METHOD_CFUNC_P(m)) {
if (MRB_METHOD_PROC_P(m)) {
ci->proc = MRB_METHOD_PROC(m);
}
return MRB_METHOD_CFUNC(m)(mrb, self);
}
return mrb_exec_irep(mrb, self, MRB_METHOD_PROC(m));
}
Commit Message: Check length of env stack before accessing upvar; fix #3995
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 83,178
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: unpack_bz2_stream(transformer_state_t *xstate)
{
IF_DESKTOP(long long total_written = 0;)
bunzip_data *bd;
char *outbuf;
int i;
unsigned len;
if (check_signature16(xstate, BZIP2_MAGIC))
return -1;
outbuf = xmalloc(IOBUF_SIZE);
len = 0;
while (1) { /* "Process one BZ... stream" loop */
i = start_bunzip(&bd, xstate->src_fd, outbuf + 2, len);
if (i == 0) {
while (1) { /* "Produce some output bytes" loop */
i = read_bunzip(bd, outbuf, IOBUF_SIZE);
if (i < 0) /* error? */
break;
i = IOBUF_SIZE - i; /* number of bytes produced */
if (i == 0) /* EOF? */
break;
if (i != transformer_write(xstate, outbuf, i)) {
i = RETVAL_SHORT_WRITE;
goto release_mem;
}
IF_DESKTOP(total_written += i;)
}
}
if (i != RETVAL_LAST_BLOCK
/* Observed case when i == RETVAL_OK:
* "bzcat z.bz2", where "z.bz2" is a bzipped zero-length file
* (to be exact, z.bz2 is exactly these 14 bytes:
* 42 5a 68 39 17 72 45 38 50 90 00 00 00 00).
*/
&& i != RETVAL_OK
) {
bb_error_msg("bunzip error %d", i);
break;
}
if (bd->headerCRC != bd->totalCRC) {
bb_error_msg("CRC error");
break;
}
/* Successfully unpacked one BZ stream */
i = RETVAL_OK;
/* Do we have "BZ..." after last processed byte?
* pbzip2 (parallelized bzip2) produces such files.
*/
len = bd->inbufCount - bd->inbufPos;
memcpy(outbuf, &bd->inbuf[bd->inbufPos], len);
if (len < 2) {
if (safe_read(xstate->src_fd, outbuf + len, 2 - len) != 2 - len)
break;
len = 2;
}
if (*(uint16_t*)outbuf != BZIP2_MAGIC) /* "BZ"? */
break;
dealloc_bunzip(bd);
len -= 2;
}
release_mem:
dealloc_bunzip(bd);
free(outbuf);
return i ? i : IF_DESKTOP(total_written) + 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 1,789
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewGuest::WillWmDestroy() {
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 115,069
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool EnabledUndo(LocalFrame& frame, Event*, EditorCommandSource) {
return frame.GetEditor().CanUndo();
}
Commit Message: Move Editor::Transpose() out of Editor class
This patch moves |Editor::Transpose()| out of |Editor| class as preparation of
expanding it into |ExecutTranspose()| in "EditorCommand.cpp" to make |Editor|
class simpler for improving code health.
Following patch will expand |Transpose()| into |ExecutTranspose()|.
Bug: 672405
Change-Id: Icde253623f31813d2b4517c4da7d4798bd5fadf6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/583880
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#489518}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 128,493
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Com_Quit_f( void ) {
char *p = Cmd_Args( );
if ( !com_errorEntered ) {
VM_Forced_Unload_Start();
SV_Shutdown(p[0] ? p : "Server quit");
CL_Shutdown(p[0] ? p : "Client quit", qtrue, qtrue);
VM_Forced_Unload_Done();
Com_Shutdown();
FS_Shutdown( qtrue );
}
Sys_Quit();
}
Commit Message: All: Merge some file writing extension checks
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 95,611
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void sctp_v4_inaddr_any(union sctp_addr *addr, __be16 port)
{
addr->v4.sin_family = AF_INET;
addr->v4.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_ANY);
addr->v4.sin_port = port;
}
Commit Message: sctp: fix race on protocol/netns initialization
Consider sctp module is unloaded and is being requested because an user
is creating a sctp socket.
During initialization, sctp will add the new protocol type and then
initialize pernet subsys:
status = sctp_v4_protosw_init();
if (status)
goto err_protosw_init;
status = sctp_v6_protosw_init();
if (status)
goto err_v6_protosw_init;
status = register_pernet_subsys(&sctp_net_ops);
The problem is that after those calls to sctp_v{4,6}_protosw_init(), it
is possible for userspace to create SCTP sockets like if the module is
already fully loaded. If that happens, one of the possible effects is
that we will have readers for net->sctp.local_addr_list list earlier
than expected and sctp_net_init() does not take precautions while
dealing with that list, leading to a potential panic but not limited to
that, as sctp_sock_init() will copy a bunch of blank/partially
initialized values from net->sctp.
The race happens like this:
CPU 0 | CPU 1
socket() |
__sock_create | socket()
inet_create | __sock_create
list_for_each_entry_rcu( |
answer, &inetsw[sock->type], |
list) { | inet_create
/* no hits */ |
if (unlikely(err)) { |
... |
request_module() |
/* socket creation is blocked |
* the module is fully loaded |
*/ |
sctp_init |
sctp_v4_protosw_init |
inet_register_protosw |
list_add_rcu(&p->list, |
last_perm); |
| list_for_each_entry_rcu(
| answer, &inetsw[sock->type],
sctp_v6_protosw_init | list) {
| /* hit, so assumes protocol
| * is already loaded
| */
| /* socket creation continues
| * before netns is initialized
| */
register_pernet_subsys |
Simply inverting the initialization order between
register_pernet_subsys() and sctp_v4_protosw_init() is not possible
because register_pernet_subsys() will create a control sctp socket, so
the protocol must be already visible by then. Deferring the socket
creation to a work-queue is not good specially because we loose the
ability to handle its errors.
So, as suggested by Vlad, the fix is to split netns initialization in
two moments: defaults and control socket, so that the defaults are
already loaded by when we register the protocol, while control socket
initialization is kept at the same moment it is today.
Fixes: 4db67e808640 ("sctp: Make the address lists per network namespace")
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 42,941
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GDataEntry::SetBaseNameFromTitle() {
base_name_ = EscapeUtf8FileName(title_);
}
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 117,115
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int cma_resolve_ib_route(struct rdma_id_private *id_priv, int timeout_ms)
{
struct rdma_route *route = &id_priv->id.route;
struct cma_work *work;
int ret;
work = kzalloc(sizeof *work, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!work)
return -ENOMEM;
work->id = id_priv;
INIT_WORK(&work->work, cma_work_handler);
work->old_state = RDMA_CM_ROUTE_QUERY;
work->new_state = RDMA_CM_ROUTE_RESOLVED;
work->event.event = RDMA_CM_EVENT_ROUTE_RESOLVED;
route->path_rec = kmalloc(sizeof *route->path_rec, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!route->path_rec) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto err1;
}
ret = cma_query_ib_route(id_priv, timeout_ms, work);
if (ret)
goto err2;
return 0;
err2:
kfree(route->path_rec);
route->path_rec = NULL;
err1:
kfree(work);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <monis@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 38,514
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ArcVoiceInteractionFrameworkService::SetVoiceInteractionSetupCompleted() {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(content::BrowserThread::UI);
SetVoiceInteractionSetupCompletedInternal(true);
SetVoiceInteractionEnabled(true, base::BindOnce(&DoNothing<bool>));
SetVoiceInteractionContextEnabled(true);
}
Commit Message: arc: add test for blocking incognito windows in screenshot
BUG=778852
TEST=ArcVoiceInteractionFrameworkServiceUnittest.
CapturingScreenshotBlocksIncognitoWindows
Change-Id: I0bfa5a486759783d7c8926a309c6b5da9b02dcc6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/914983
Commit-Queue: Muyuan Li <muyuanli@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Luis Hector Chavez <lhchavez@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#536438}
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 152,310
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void QQuickWebView::focusInEvent(QFocusEvent* event)
{
Q_D(QQuickWebView);
d->pageView->eventHandler()->handleFocusInEvent(event);
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] Allow transparent WebViews
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=80608
Reviewed by Tor Arne Vestbø.
Added support for transparentBackground in QQuickWebViewExperimental.
This uses the existing drawsTransparentBackground property in WebKit2.
Also, changed LayerTreeHostQt to set the contentsOpaque flag when the root layer changes,
otherwise the change doesn't take effect.
A new API test was added.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::setTransparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::setTransparentBackground):
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p.h:
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
* UIProcess/API/qt/tests/qquickwebview/tst_qquickwebview.cpp:
(tst_QQuickWebView):
(tst_QQuickWebView::transparentWebViews):
* WebProcess/WebPage/qt/LayerTreeHostQt.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::LayerTreeHostQt):
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::setRootCompositingLayer):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@110254 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 101,708
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void setup_format_params(int track)
{
int n;
int il;
int count;
int head_shift;
int track_shift;
struct fparm {
unsigned char track, head, sect, size;
} *here = (struct fparm *)floppy_track_buffer;
raw_cmd = &default_raw_cmd;
raw_cmd->track = track;
raw_cmd->flags = (FD_RAW_WRITE | FD_RAW_INTR | FD_RAW_SPIN |
FD_RAW_NEED_DISK | FD_RAW_NEED_SEEK);
raw_cmd->rate = _floppy->rate & 0x43;
raw_cmd->cmd_count = NR_F;
COMMAND = FM_MODE(_floppy, FD_FORMAT);
DR_SELECT = UNIT(current_drive) + PH_HEAD(_floppy, format_req.head);
F_SIZECODE = FD_SIZECODE(_floppy);
F_SECT_PER_TRACK = _floppy->sect << 2 >> F_SIZECODE;
F_GAP = _floppy->fmt_gap;
F_FILL = FD_FILL_BYTE;
raw_cmd->kernel_data = floppy_track_buffer;
raw_cmd->length = 4 * F_SECT_PER_TRACK;
/* allow for about 30ms for data transport per track */
head_shift = (F_SECT_PER_TRACK + 5) / 6;
/* a ``cylinder'' is two tracks plus a little stepping time */
track_shift = 2 * head_shift + 3;
/* position of logical sector 1 on this track */
n = (track_shift * format_req.track + head_shift * format_req.head)
% F_SECT_PER_TRACK;
/* determine interleave */
il = 1;
if (_floppy->fmt_gap < 0x22)
il++;
/* initialize field */
for (count = 0; count < F_SECT_PER_TRACK; ++count) {
here[count].track = format_req.track;
here[count].head = format_req.head;
here[count].sect = 0;
here[count].size = F_SIZECODE;
}
/* place logical sectors */
for (count = 1; count <= F_SECT_PER_TRACK; ++count) {
here[n].sect = count;
n = (n + il) % F_SECT_PER_TRACK;
if (here[n].sect) { /* sector busy, find next free sector */
++n;
if (n >= F_SECT_PER_TRACK) {
n -= F_SECT_PER_TRACK;
while (here[n].sect)
++n;
}
}
}
if (_floppy->stretch & FD_SECTBASEMASK) {
for (count = 0; count < F_SECT_PER_TRACK; count++)
here[count].sect += FD_SECTBASE(_floppy) - 1;
}
}
Commit Message: floppy: don't write kernel-only members to FDRAWCMD ioctl output
Do not leak kernel-only floppy_raw_cmd structure members to userspace.
This includes the linked-list pointer and the pointer to the allocated
DMA space.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattd@bugfuzz.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 39,438
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void smp_proc_enc_info(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
uint8_t* p = p_data->p_data;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
STREAM_TO_ARRAY(p_cb->ltk, p, BT_OCTET16_LEN);
smp_key_distribution(p_cb, NULL);
}
Commit Message: Checks the SMP length to fix OOB read
Bug: 111937065
Test: manual
Change-Id: I330880a6e1671d0117845430db4076dfe1aba688
Merged-In: I330880a6e1671d0117845430db4076dfe1aba688
(cherry picked from commit fceb753bda651c4135f3f93a510e5fcb4c7542b8)
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 1
| 174,074
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool reg_is_refcounted(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
{
return type_is_refcounted(reg->type);
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix sanitation of alu op with pointer / scalar type from different paths
While 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer
arithmetic") took care of rejecting alu op on pointer when e.g. pointer
came from two different map values with different map properties such as
value size, Jann reported that a case was not covered yet when a given
alu op is used in both "ptr_reg += reg" and "numeric_reg += reg" from
different branches where we would incorrectly try to sanitize based
on the pointer's limit. Catch this corner case and reject the program
instead.
Fixes: 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 91,464
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __dwc3_cleanup_done_trbs(struct dwc3 *dwc, struct dwc3_ep *dep,
struct dwc3_request *req, struct dwc3_trb *trb,
const struct dwc3_event_depevt *event, int status,
int chain)
{
unsigned int count;
unsigned int s_pkt = 0;
unsigned int trb_status;
dwc3_ep_inc_deq(dep);
if (req->trb == trb)
dep->queued_requests--;
trace_dwc3_complete_trb(dep, trb);
/*
* If we're in the middle of series of chained TRBs and we
* receive a short transfer along the way, DWC3 will skip
* through all TRBs including the last TRB in the chain (the
* where CHN bit is zero. DWC3 will also avoid clearing HWO
* bit and SW has to do it manually.
*
* We're going to do that here to avoid problems of HW trying
* to use bogus TRBs for transfers.
*/
if (chain && (trb->ctrl & DWC3_TRB_CTRL_HWO))
trb->ctrl &= ~DWC3_TRB_CTRL_HWO;
/*
* If we're dealing with unaligned size OUT transfer, we will be left
* with one TRB pending in the ring. We need to manually clear HWO bit
* from that TRB.
*/
if ((req->zero || req->unaligned) && (trb->ctrl & DWC3_TRB_CTRL_HWO)) {
trb->ctrl &= ~DWC3_TRB_CTRL_HWO;
return 1;
}
count = trb->size & DWC3_TRB_SIZE_MASK;
req->remaining += count;
if ((trb->ctrl & DWC3_TRB_CTRL_HWO) && status != -ESHUTDOWN)
return 1;
if (dep->direction) {
if (count) {
trb_status = DWC3_TRB_SIZE_TRBSTS(trb->size);
if (trb_status == DWC3_TRBSTS_MISSED_ISOC) {
/*
* If missed isoc occurred and there is
* no request queued then issue END
* TRANSFER, so that core generates
* next xfernotready and we will issue
* a fresh START TRANSFER.
* If there are still queued request
* then wait, do not issue either END
* or UPDATE TRANSFER, just attach next
* request in pending_list during
* giveback.If any future queued request
* is successfully transferred then we
* will issue UPDATE TRANSFER for all
* request in the pending_list.
*/
dep->flags |= DWC3_EP_MISSED_ISOC;
} else {
dev_err(dwc->dev, "incomplete IN transfer %s\n",
dep->name);
status = -ECONNRESET;
}
} else {
dep->flags &= ~DWC3_EP_MISSED_ISOC;
}
} else {
if (count && (event->status & DEPEVT_STATUS_SHORT))
s_pkt = 1;
}
if (s_pkt && !chain)
return 1;
if ((event->status & DEPEVT_STATUS_IOC) &&
(trb->ctrl & DWC3_TRB_CTRL_IOC))
return 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: usb: dwc3: gadget: never call ->complete() from ->ep_queue()
This is a requirement which has always existed but, somehow, wasn't
reflected in the documentation and problems weren't found until now
when Tuba Yavuz found a possible deadlock happening between dwc3 and
f_hid. She described the situation as follows:
spin_lock_irqsave(&hidg->write_spinlock, flags); // first acquire
/* we our function has been disabled by host */
if (!hidg->req) {
free_ep_req(hidg->in_ep, hidg->req);
goto try_again;
}
[...]
status = usb_ep_queue(hidg->in_ep, hidg->req, GFP_ATOMIC);
=>
[...]
=> usb_gadget_giveback_request
=>
f_hidg_req_complete
=>
spin_lock_irqsave(&hidg->write_spinlock, flags); // second acquire
Note that this happens because dwc3 would call ->complete() on a
failed usb_ep_queue() due to failed Start Transfer command. This is,
anyway, a theoretical situation because dwc3 currently uses "No
Response Update Transfer" command for Bulk and Interrupt endpoints.
It's still good to make this case impossible to happen even if the "No
Reponse Update Transfer" command is changed.
Reported-by: Tuba Yavuz <tuba@ece.ufl.edu>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 88,627
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CrosMock::TearDownMocks() {
if (loader_)
test_api()->SetLibraryLoader(NULL, false);
if (mock_cryptohome_library_)
test_api()->SetCryptohomeLibrary(NULL, false);
if (mock_input_method_library_)
test_api()->SetInputMethodLibrary(NULL, false);
if (mock_network_library_)
test_api()->SetNetworkLibrary(NULL, false);
if (mock_power_library_)
test_api()->SetPowerLibrary(NULL, false);
if (mock_screen_lock_library_)
test_api()->SetScreenLockLibrary(NULL, false);
if (mock_speech_synthesis_library_)
test_api()->SetSpeechSynthesisLibrary(NULL, false);
if (mock_touchpad_library_)
test_api()->SetTouchpadLibrary(NULL, false);
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 100,826
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void __fput_sync(struct file *file)
{
if (atomic_long_dec_and_test(&file->f_count)) {
struct task_struct *task = current;
file_sb_list_del(file);
BUG_ON(!(task->flags & PF_KTHREAD));
__fput(file);
}
}
Commit Message: get rid of s_files and files_lock
The only thing we need it for is alt-sysrq-r (emergency remount r/o)
and these days we can do just as well without going through the
list of files.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-17
| 1
| 166,796
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool emulator_bad_iopl(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
int iopl;
if (ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_REAL)
return false;
if (ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_VM86)
return true;
iopl = (ctxt->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_IOPL) >> X86_EFLAGS_IOPL_BIT;
return ctxt->ops->cpl(ctxt) > iopl;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: drop error recovery in em_jmp_far and em_ret_far
em_jmp_far and em_ret_far assumed that setting IP can only fail in 64
bit mode, but syzkaller proved otherwise (and SDM agrees).
Code segment was restored upon failure, but it was left uninitialized
outside of long mode, which could lead to a leak of host kernel stack.
We could have fixed that by always saving and restoring the CS, but we
take a simpler approach and just break any guest that manages to fail
as the error recovery is error-prone and modern CPUs don't need emulator
for this.
Found by syzkaller:
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 3668 at arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2217 em_ret_far+0x428/0x480
Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...
CPU: 2 PID: 3668 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 4.9.0-rc4+ #49
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
[...]
Call Trace:
[...] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15
[...] dump_stack+0xb3/0x118 lib/dump_stack.c:51
[...] panic+0x1b7/0x3a3 kernel/panic.c:179
[...] __warn+0x1c4/0x1e0 kernel/panic.c:542
[...] warn_slowpath_null+0x2c/0x40 kernel/panic.c:585
[...] em_ret_far+0x428/0x480 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2217
[...] em_ret_far_imm+0x17/0x70 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2227
[...] x86_emulate_insn+0x87a/0x3730 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:5294
[...] x86_emulate_instruction+0x520/0x1ba0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:5545
[...] emulate_instruction arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h:1116
[...] complete_emulated_io arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6870
[...] complete_emulated_mmio+0x4e9/0x710 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6934
[...] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x3b7a/0x5a90 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6978
[...] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x61e/0xdd0 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:2557
[...] vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:43
[...] do_vfs_ioctl+0x18c/0x1040 fs/ioctl.c:679
[...] SYSC_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:694
[...] SyS_ioctl+0x8f/0xc0 fs/ioctl.c:685
[...] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d1442d85cc30 ("KVM: x86: Handle errors when RIP is set during far jumps")
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 47,960
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RemoveCookieTester() {}
Commit Message: Don't downcast DownloadManagerDelegate to ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate.
DownloadManager has public SetDelegate method and tests and or other subsystems
can install their own implementations of the delegate.
Bug: 805905
Change-Id: Iecf1e0aceada0e1048bed1e2d2ceb29ca64295b8
TBR: tests updated to follow the API change.
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/894702
Reviewed-by: David Vallet <dvallet@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Min Qin <qinmin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533515}
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 154,291
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int normal_prio(struct task_struct *p)
{
int prio;
if (task_has_rt_policy(p))
prio = MAX_RT_PRIO-1 - p->rt_priority;
else
prio = __normal_prio(p);
return prio;
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 22,490
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int wait_on_page_writeback_range(struct address_space *mapping,
pgoff_t start, pgoff_t end)
{
struct pagevec pvec;
int nr_pages;
int ret = 0;
pgoff_t index;
if (end < start)
return 0;
pagevec_init(&pvec, 0);
index = start;
while ((index <= end) &&
(nr_pages = pagevec_lookup_tag(&pvec, mapping, &index,
PAGECACHE_TAG_WRITEBACK,
min(end - index, (pgoff_t)PAGEVEC_SIZE-1) + 1)) != 0) {
unsigned i;
for (i = 0; i < nr_pages; i++) {
struct page *page = pvec.pages[i];
/* until radix tree lookup accepts end_index */
if (page->index > end)
continue;
wait_on_page_writeback(page);
if (PageError(page))
ret = -EIO;
}
pagevec_release(&pvec);
cond_resched();
}
/* Check for outstanding write errors */
if (test_and_clear_bit(AS_ENOSPC, &mapping->flags))
ret = -ENOSPC;
if (test_and_clear_bit(AS_EIO, &mapping->flags))
ret = -EIO;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: fix writev regression: pan hanging unkillable and un-straceable
Frederik Himpe reported an unkillable and un-straceable pan process.
Zero length iovecs can go into an infinite loop in writev, because the
iovec iterator does not always advance over them.
The sequence required to trigger this is not trivial. I think it
requires that a zero-length iovec be followed by a non-zero-length iovec
which causes a pagefault in the atomic usercopy. This causes the writev
code to drop back into single-segment copy mode, which then tries to
copy the 0 bytes of the zero-length iovec; a zero length copy looks like
a failure though, so it loops.
Put a test into iov_iter_advance to catch zero-length iovecs. We could
just put the test in the fallback path, but I feel it is more robust to
skip over zero-length iovecs throughout the code (iovec iterator may be
used in filesystems too, so it should be robust).
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 58,845
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int sock_create_kern(struct net *net, int family, int type, int protocol, struct socket **res)
{
return __sock_create(net, family, type, protocol, res, 1);
}
Commit Message: net: Fix use after free in the recvmmsg exit path
The syzkaller fuzzer hit the following use-after-free:
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff8175ea0e>] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x3e/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:295
[<ffffffff851cc31a>] __sys_recvmmsg+0x6fa/0x7f0 net/socket.c:2261
[< inline >] SYSC_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2281
[<ffffffff851cc57f>] SyS_recvmmsg+0x16f/0x180 net/socket.c:2270
[<ffffffff86332bb6>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185
And, as Dmitry rightly assessed, that is because we can drop the
reference and then touch it when the underlying recvmsg calls return
some packets and then hit an error, which will make recvmmsg to set
sock->sk->sk_err, oops, fix it.
Reported-and-Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Fixes: a2e2725541fa ("net: Introduce recvmmsg socket syscall")
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160122211644.GC2470@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-19
| 0
| 50,268
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cdf_read_sat(const cdf_info_t *info, cdf_header_t *h, cdf_sat_t *sat)
{
size_t i, j, k;
size_t ss = CDF_SEC_SIZE(h);
cdf_secid_t *msa, mid, sec;
size_t nsatpersec = (ss / sizeof(mid)) - 1;
for (i = 0; i < __arraycount(h->h_master_sat); i++)
if (h->h_master_sat[i] == CDF_SECID_FREE)
break;
#define CDF_SEC_LIMIT (UINT32_MAX / (4 * ss))
if ((nsatpersec > 0 &&
h->h_num_sectors_in_master_sat > CDF_SEC_LIMIT / nsatpersec) ||
i > CDF_SEC_LIMIT) {
DPRINTF(("Number of sectors in master SAT too big %u %"
SIZE_T_FORMAT "u\n", h->h_num_sectors_in_master_sat, i));
errno = EFTYPE;
return -1;
}
sat->sat_len = h->h_num_sectors_in_master_sat * nsatpersec + i;
DPRINTF(("sat_len = %" SIZE_T_FORMAT "u ss = %" SIZE_T_FORMAT "u\n",
sat->sat_len, ss));
if ((sat->sat_tab = CAST(cdf_secid_t *, calloc(sat->sat_len, ss)))
== NULL)
return -1;
for (i = 0; i < __arraycount(h->h_master_sat); i++) {
if (h->h_master_sat[i] < 0)
break;
if (cdf_read_sector(info, sat->sat_tab, ss * i, ss, h,
h->h_master_sat[i]) != (ssize_t)ss) {
DPRINTF(("Reading sector %d", h->h_master_sat[i]));
goto out1;
}
}
if ((msa = CAST(cdf_secid_t *, calloc(1, ss))) == NULL)
goto out1;
mid = h->h_secid_first_sector_in_master_sat;
for (j = 0; j < h->h_num_sectors_in_master_sat; j++) {
if (mid < 0)
goto out;
if (j >= CDF_LOOP_LIMIT) {
DPRINTF(("Reading master sector loop limit"));
errno = EFTYPE;
goto out2;
}
if (cdf_read_sector(info, msa, 0, ss, h, mid) != (ssize_t)ss) {
DPRINTF(("Reading master sector %d", mid));
goto out2;
}
for (k = 0; k < nsatpersec; k++, i++) {
sec = CDF_TOLE4((uint32_t)msa[k]);
if (sec < 0)
goto out;
if (i >= sat->sat_len) {
DPRINTF(("Out of bounds reading MSA %u >= %u",
i, sat->sat_len));
errno = EFTYPE;
goto out2;
}
if (cdf_read_sector(info, sat->sat_tab, ss * i, ss, h,
sec) != (ssize_t)ss) {
DPRINTF(("Reading sector %d",
CDF_TOLE4(msa[k])));
goto out2;
}
}
mid = CDF_TOLE4((uint32_t)msa[nsatpersec]);
}
out:
sat->sat_len = i;
free(msa);
return 0;
out2:
free(msa);
out1:
free(sat->sat_tab);
return -1;
}
Commit Message: add more check found by cert's fuzzer.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 94,312
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: make_capture_history_tree(OnigCaptureTreeNode* node, OnigStackType** kp,
OnigStackType* stk_top, UChar* str, regex_t* reg)
{
int n, r;
OnigCaptureTreeNode* child;
OnigStackType* k = *kp;
while (k < stk_top) {
if (k->type == STK_MEM_START) {
n = k->u.mem.num;
if (n <= ONIG_MAX_CAPTURE_HISTORY_GROUP &&
BIT_STATUS_AT(reg->capture_history, n) != 0) {
child = history_node_new();
CHECK_NULL_RETURN_MEMERR(child);
child->group = n;
child->beg = (int )(k->u.mem.pstr - str);
r = history_tree_add_child(node, child);
if (r != 0) return r;
*kp = (k + 1);
r = make_capture_history_tree(child, kp, stk_top, str, reg);
if (r != 0) return r;
k = *kp;
child->end = (int )(k->u.mem.pstr - str);
}
}
else if (k->type == STK_MEM_END) {
if (k->u.mem.num == node->group) {
node->end = (int )(k->u.mem.pstr - str);
*kp = k;
return 0;
}
}
k++;
}
return 1; /* 1: root node ending. */
}
Commit Message: fix #59 : access to invalid address by reg->dmax value
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 64,659
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChromeRenderMessageFilter::OnCanTriggerClipboardWrite(
const GURL& origin, bool* allowed) {
*allowed = (origin.SchemeIs(chrome::kExtensionScheme) ||
extension_info_map_->SecurityOriginHasAPIPermission(
origin, render_process_id_, APIPermission::kClipboardWrite));
}
Commit Message: Disable tcmalloc profile files.
BUG=154983
TBR=darin@chromium.org
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11087041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@161048 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 102,099
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ProcFreeGC(ClientPtr client)
{
GC *pGC;
int rc;
REQUEST(xResourceReq);
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xResourceReq);
rc = dixLookupGC(&pGC, stuff->id, client, DixDestroyAccess);
if (rc != Success)
return rc;
FreeResource(stuff->id, RT_NONE);
return Success;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 14,976
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GURL RenderViewImpl::GetAlternateErrorPageURL(const GURL& failed_url,
ErrorPageType error_type) {
if (failed_url.SchemeIsSecure()) {
return GURL();
}
if (!alternate_error_page_url_.is_valid())
return GURL();
GURL::Replacements remove_params;
remove_params.ClearUsername();
remove_params.ClearPassword();
remove_params.ClearQuery();
remove_params.ClearRef();
const GURL url_to_send = failed_url.ReplaceComponents(remove_params);
std::string spec_to_send = url_to_send.spec();
if (failed_url.has_query())
spec_to_send.append("?");
std::string params(alternate_error_page_url_.query());
params.append("&url=");
params.append(net::EscapeQueryParamValue(spec_to_send, true));
params.append("&sourceid=chrome");
params.append("&error=");
switch (error_type) {
case DNS_ERROR:
params.append("dnserror");
break;
case HTTP_404:
params.append("http404");
break;
case CONNECTION_ERROR:
params.append("connectionfailure");
break;
default:
NOTREACHED() << "unknown ErrorPageType";
}
GURL::Replacements link_doctor_params;
link_doctor_params.SetQueryStr(params);
GURL url = alternate_error_page_url_.ReplaceComponents(link_doctor_params);
return url;
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 108,356
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ut64 addr_to_offset(struct MACH0_(obj_t)* bin, ut64 addr) {
ut64 segment_base, segment_size;
int i;
if (!bin->segs) {
return 0;
}
for (i = 0; i < bin->nsegs; i++) {
segment_base = (ut64)bin->segs[i].vmaddr;
segment_size = (ut64)bin->segs[i].vmsize;
if (addr >= segment_base && addr < segment_base + segment_size) {
return bin->segs[i].fileoff + (addr - segment_base);
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix null deref and uaf in mach0 parser
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 66,812
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ImportCbYCrYQuantum(const Image *image,QuantumInfo *quantum_info,
const MagickSizeType number_pixels,const unsigned char *magick_restrict p,
Quantum *magick_restrict q,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
QuantumAny
range;
register ssize_t
x;
unsigned int
pixel;
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
switch (quantum_info->depth)
{
case 10:
{
Quantum
cbcr[4];
pixel=0;
if (quantum_info->pack == MagickFalse)
{
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
quantum;
ssize_t
n;
n=0;
quantum=0;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x+=2)
{
for (i=0; i < 4; i++)
{
switch (n % 3)
{
case 0:
{
p=PushLongPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
quantum=(size_t) (ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short)
(((pixel >> 22) & 0x3ff) << 6)));
break;
}
case 1:
{
quantum=(size_t) (ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short)
(((pixel >> 12) & 0x3ff) << 6)));
break;
}
case 2:
{
quantum=(size_t) (ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short)
(((pixel >> 2) & 0x3ff) << 6)));
break;
}
}
cbcr[i]=(Quantum) (quantum);
n++;
}
p+=quantum_info->pad;
SetPixelRed(image,cbcr[1],q);
SetPixelGreen(image,cbcr[0],q);
SetPixelBlue(image,cbcr[2],q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
SetPixelRed(image,cbcr[3],q);
SetPixelGreen(image,cbcr[0],q);
SetPixelBlue(image,cbcr[2],q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
}
default:
{
range=GetQuantumRange(quantum_info->depth);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushQuantumPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,range),q);
p=PushQuantumPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,range),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
}
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/126
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 1
| 168,793
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FetchContext::DispatchDidChangeResourcePriority(unsigned long,
ResourceLoadPriority,
int) {}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 138,851
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DocumentLoader::SetUserActivated() {
had_sticky_activation_ = true;
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when self-navigating to local-scheme URL
As the linked bug example shows, we should inherit CSP when we navigate
to a local-scheme URL (even if we are in a main browsing context).
Bug: 799747
Change-Id: I8413aa8e8049461ebcf0ffbf7b04c41d1340af02
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1234337
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597889}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 144,106
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void cparams(JF, js_Ast *list)
{
F->numparams = listlength(list);
while (list) {
addlocal(J, F, list->a, 0);
list = list->b;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 7,914
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Message(DOMArrayBuffer* arrayBuffer)
: type(MessageTypeArrayBuffer), arrayBuffer(arrayBuffer) {}
Commit Message: [Presentation API] Add layout test for connection.close() and fix test failures
Add layout test.
1-UA connection.close() hits NOTREACHED() in PresentationConnection::didChangeState(). Use PresentationConnection::didClose() instead.
BUG=697719
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2730123003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#455225}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 129,527
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool WebPagePrivate::executeJavaScript(const BlackBerry::Platform::String& scriptUTF8, JavaScriptDataType& returnType, WebString& returnValue)
{
BLACKBERRY_ASSERT(scriptUTF8.isUtf8());
String script = scriptUTF8;
if (script.isNull()) {
returnType = JSException;
return false;
}
if (script.isEmpty()) {
returnType = JSUndefined;
return true;
}
ScriptValue result = m_mainFrame->script()->executeScript(script, false);
JSC::JSValue value = result.jsValue();
if (!value) {
returnType = JSException;
return false;
}
if (value.isUndefined())
returnType = JSUndefined;
else if (value.isNull())
returnType = JSNull;
else if (value.isBoolean())
returnType = JSBoolean;
else if (value.isNumber())
returnType = JSNumber;
else if (value.isString())
returnType = JSString;
else if (value.isObject())
returnType = JSObject;
else
returnType = JSUndefined;
if (returnType == JSBoolean || returnType == JSNumber || returnType == JSString || returnType == JSObject) {
JSC::ExecState* exec = m_mainFrame->script()->globalObject(mainThreadNormalWorld())->globalExec();
returnValue = result.toString(exec);
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 104,197
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Resource::MarkAsPreload() {
DCHECK(!is_unused_preload_);
is_unused_preload_ = true;
}
Commit Message: Check CORS using PassesAccessControlCheck() with supplied SecurityOrigin
Partial revert of https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535694.
Bug: 799477
Change-Id: I878bb9bcb83afaafe8601293db9aa644fc5929b3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/898427
Commit-Queue: Hiroshige Hayashizaki <hiroshige@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kouhei Ueno <kouhei@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Takeshi Yoshino <tyoshino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#535176}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 149,737
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int isfun(enum js_AstType T)
{
return T == AST_FUNDEC || T == EXP_FUN || T == EXP_PROP_GET || T == EXP_PROP_SET;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 7,935
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool FrameView::usesCompositedScrolling() const
{
RenderView* renderView = this->renderView();
if (!renderView)
return false;
if (m_frame->settings() && m_frame->settings()->preferCompositingToLCDTextEnabled())
return renderView->compositor()->inCompositingMode();
return false;
}
Commit Message: Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
R=vollick@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 119,957
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct sighand_struct *__lock_task_sighand(struct task_struct *tsk,
unsigned long *flags)
{
struct sighand_struct *sighand;
for (;;) {
local_irq_save(*flags);
rcu_read_lock();
sighand = rcu_dereference(tsk->sighand);
if (unlikely(sighand == NULL)) {
rcu_read_unlock();
local_irq_restore(*flags);
break;
}
spin_lock(&sighand->siglock);
if (likely(sighand == tsk->sighand)) {
rcu_read_unlock();
break;
}
spin_unlock(&sighand->siglock);
rcu_read_unlock();
local_irq_restore(*flags);
}
return sighand;
}
Commit Message: kernel/signal.c: stop info leak via the tkill and the tgkill syscalls
This fixes a kernel memory contents leak via the tkill and tgkill syscalls
for compat processes.
This is visible in the siginfo_t->_sifields._rt.si_sigval.sival_ptr field
when handling signals delivered from tkill.
The place of the infoleak:
int copy_siginfo_to_user32(compat_siginfo_t __user *to, siginfo_t *from)
{
...
put_user_ex(ptr_to_compat(from->si_ptr), &to->si_ptr);
...
}
Signed-off-by: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 31,727
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int sctp_process_init(struct sctp_association *asoc, struct sctp_chunk *chunk,
const union sctp_addr *peer_addr,
sctp_init_chunk_t *peer_init, gfp_t gfp)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(asoc->base.sk);
union sctp_params param;
struct sctp_transport *transport;
struct list_head *pos, *temp;
struct sctp_af *af;
union sctp_addr addr;
char *cookie;
int src_match = 0;
/* We must include the address that the INIT packet came from.
* This is the only address that matters for an INIT packet.
* When processing a COOKIE ECHO, we retrieve the from address
* of the INIT from the cookie.
*/
/* This implementation defaults to making the first transport
* added as the primary transport. The source address seems to
* be a a better choice than any of the embedded addresses.
*/
if (!sctp_assoc_add_peer(asoc, peer_addr, gfp, SCTP_ACTIVE))
goto nomem;
if (sctp_cmp_addr_exact(sctp_source(chunk), peer_addr))
src_match = 1;
/* Process the initialization parameters. */
sctp_walk_params(param, peer_init, init_hdr.params) {
if (!src_match && (param.p->type == SCTP_PARAM_IPV4_ADDRESS ||
param.p->type == SCTP_PARAM_IPV6_ADDRESS)) {
af = sctp_get_af_specific(param_type2af(param.p->type));
af->from_addr_param(&addr, param.addr,
chunk->sctp_hdr->source, 0);
if (sctp_cmp_addr_exact(sctp_source(chunk), &addr))
src_match = 1;
}
if (!sctp_process_param(asoc, param, peer_addr, gfp))
goto clean_up;
}
/* source address of chunk may not match any valid address */
if (!src_match)
goto clean_up;
/* AUTH: After processing the parameters, make sure that we
* have all the required info to potentially do authentications.
*/
if (asoc->peer.auth_capable && (!asoc->peer.peer_random ||
!asoc->peer.peer_hmacs))
asoc->peer.auth_capable = 0;
/* In a non-backward compatible mode, if the peer claims
* support for ADD-IP but not AUTH, the ADD-IP spec states
* that we MUST ABORT the association. Section 6. The section
* also give us an option to silently ignore the packet, which
* is what we'll do here.
*/
if (!net->sctp.addip_noauth &&
(asoc->peer.asconf_capable && !asoc->peer.auth_capable)) {
asoc->peer.addip_disabled_mask |= (SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP |
SCTP_PARAM_DEL_IP |
SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY);
asoc->peer.asconf_capable = 0;
goto clean_up;
}
/* Walk list of transports, removing transports in the UNKNOWN state. */
list_for_each_safe(pos, temp, &asoc->peer.transport_addr_list) {
transport = list_entry(pos, struct sctp_transport, transports);
if (transport->state == SCTP_UNKNOWN) {
sctp_assoc_rm_peer(asoc, transport);
}
}
/* The fixed INIT headers are always in network byte
* order.
*/
asoc->peer.i.init_tag =
ntohl(peer_init->init_hdr.init_tag);
asoc->peer.i.a_rwnd =
ntohl(peer_init->init_hdr.a_rwnd);
asoc->peer.i.num_outbound_streams =
ntohs(peer_init->init_hdr.num_outbound_streams);
asoc->peer.i.num_inbound_streams =
ntohs(peer_init->init_hdr.num_inbound_streams);
asoc->peer.i.initial_tsn =
ntohl(peer_init->init_hdr.initial_tsn);
/* Apply the upper bounds for output streams based on peer's
* number of inbound streams.
*/
if (asoc->c.sinit_num_ostreams >
ntohs(peer_init->init_hdr.num_inbound_streams)) {
asoc->c.sinit_num_ostreams =
ntohs(peer_init->init_hdr.num_inbound_streams);
}
if (asoc->c.sinit_max_instreams >
ntohs(peer_init->init_hdr.num_outbound_streams)) {
asoc->c.sinit_max_instreams =
ntohs(peer_init->init_hdr.num_outbound_streams);
}
/* Copy Initiation tag from INIT to VT_peer in cookie. */
asoc->c.peer_vtag = asoc->peer.i.init_tag;
/* Peer Rwnd : Current calculated value of the peer's rwnd. */
asoc->peer.rwnd = asoc->peer.i.a_rwnd;
/* Copy cookie in case we need to resend COOKIE-ECHO. */
cookie = asoc->peer.cookie;
if (cookie) {
asoc->peer.cookie = kmemdup(cookie, asoc->peer.cookie_len, gfp);
if (!asoc->peer.cookie)
goto clean_up;
}
/* RFC 2960 7.2.1 The initial value of ssthresh MAY be arbitrarily
* high (for example, implementations MAY use the size of the receiver
* advertised window).
*/
list_for_each_entry(transport, &asoc->peer.transport_addr_list,
transports) {
transport->ssthresh = asoc->peer.i.a_rwnd;
}
/* Set up the TSN tracking pieces. */
if (!sctp_tsnmap_init(&asoc->peer.tsn_map, SCTP_TSN_MAP_INITIAL,
asoc->peer.i.initial_tsn, gfp))
goto clean_up;
/* RFC 2960 6.5 Stream Identifier and Stream Sequence Number
*
* The stream sequence number in all the streams shall start
* from 0 when the association is established. Also, when the
* stream sequence number reaches the value 65535 the next
* stream sequence number shall be set to 0.
*/
/* Allocate storage for the negotiated streams if it is not a temporary
* association.
*/
if (!asoc->temp) {
int error;
asoc->ssnmap = sctp_ssnmap_new(asoc->c.sinit_max_instreams,
asoc->c.sinit_num_ostreams, gfp);
if (!asoc->ssnmap)
goto clean_up;
error = sctp_assoc_set_id(asoc, gfp);
if (error)
goto clean_up;
}
/* ADDIP Section 4.1 ASCONF Chunk Procedures
*
* When an endpoint has an ASCONF signaled change to be sent to the
* remote endpoint it should do the following:
* ...
* A2) A serial number should be assigned to the Chunk. The serial
* number should be a monotonically increasing number. All serial
* numbers are defined to be initialized at the start of the
* association to the same value as the Initial TSN.
*/
asoc->peer.addip_serial = asoc->peer.i.initial_tsn - 1;
return 1;
clean_up:
/* Release the transport structures. */
list_for_each_safe(pos, temp, &asoc->peer.transport_addr_list) {
transport = list_entry(pos, struct sctp_transport, transports);
if (transport->state != SCTP_ACTIVE)
sctp_assoc_rm_peer(asoc, transport);
}
nomem:
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: sctp: fix NULL pointer dereference in af->from_addr_param on malformed packet
An SCTP server doing ASCONF will panic on malformed INIT ping-of-death
in the form of:
------------ INIT[PARAM: SET_PRIMARY_IP] ------------>
While the INIT chunk parameter verification dissects through many things
in order to detect malformed input, it misses to actually check parameters
inside of parameters. E.g. RFC5061, section 4.2.4 proposes a 'set primary
IP address' parameter in ASCONF, which has as a subparameter an address
parameter.
So an attacker may send a parameter type other than SCTP_PARAM_IPV4_ADDRESS
or SCTP_PARAM_IPV6_ADDRESS, param_type2af() will subsequently return 0
and thus sctp_get_af_specific() returns NULL, too, which we then happily
dereference unconditionally through af->from_addr_param().
The trace for the log:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000078
IP: [<ffffffffa01e9c62>] sctp_process_init+0x492/0x990 [sctp]
PGD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[...]
Pid: 0, comm: swapper Not tainted 2.6.32-504.el6.x86_64 #1 Bochs Bochs
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa01e9c62>] [<ffffffffa01e9c62>] sctp_process_init+0x492/0x990 [sctp]
[...]
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffffa01f2add>] ? sctp_bind_addr_copy+0x5d/0xe0 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e1fcb>] sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init+0x21b/0x340 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e3751>] sctp_do_sm+0x71/0x1210 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e5c09>] ? sctp_endpoint_lookup_assoc+0xc9/0xf0 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e61f6>] sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv+0x116/0x230 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01ee986>] sctp_inq_push+0x56/0x80 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01fcc42>] sctp_rcv+0x982/0xa10 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01d5123>] ? ipt_local_in_hook+0x23/0x28 [iptable_filter]
[<ffffffff8148bdc9>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0
[<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff8148bf86>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120
[<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[...]
A minimal way to address this is to check for NULL as we do on all
other such occasions where we know sctp_get_af_specific() could
possibly return with NULL.
Fixes: d6de3097592b ("[SCTP]: Add the handling of "Set Primary IP Address" parameter to INIT")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 35,887
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DECLAREcpFunc(cpContigStrips2ContigTiles)
{
return cpImage(in, out,
readContigStripsIntoBuffer,
writeBufferToContigTiles,
imagelength, imagewidth, spp);
}
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcp.c: fix out-of-bounds write on tiled images with odd
tile width vs image width. Reported as MSVR 35103
by Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities &
Mitigations team.
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 48,191
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static u64 vmx_read_l1_tsc_offset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) &&
(vmcs12->cpu_based_vm_exec_control & CPU_BASED_USE_TSC_OFFSETING))
return vcpu->arch.tsc_offset - vmcs12->tsc_offset;
return vcpu->arch.tsc_offset;
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Enforce cpl=0 for VMX instructions
VMX instructions executed inside a L1 VM will always trigger a VM exit
even when executed with cpl 3. This means we must perform the
privilege check in software.
Fixes: 70f3aac964ae("kvm: nVMX: Remove superfluous VMX instruction fault checks")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Felix Wilhelm <fwilhelm@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 81,055
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int tracing_resize_saved_cmdlines(unsigned int val)
{
struct saved_cmdlines_buffer *s, *savedcmd_temp;
s = kmalloc(sizeof(*s), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!s)
return -ENOMEM;
if (allocate_cmdlines_buffer(val, s) < 0) {
kfree(s);
return -ENOMEM;
}
arch_spin_lock(&trace_cmdline_lock);
savedcmd_temp = savedcmd;
savedcmd = s;
arch_spin_unlock(&trace_cmdline_lock);
free_saved_cmdlines_buffer(savedcmd_temp);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 81,507
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: sysapi_translate_arch( const char *machine, const char *)
{
char tmp[64];
char *tmparch;
#if defined(AIX)
/* AIX machines have a ton of different models encoded into the uname
structure, so go to some other function to decode and group the
architecture together */
struct utsname buf;
if( uname(&buf) < 0 ) {
return NULL;
}
return( get_aix_arch( &buf ) );
#elif defined(HPUX)
return( get_hpux_arch( ) );
#else
if( !strcmp(machine, "alpha") ) {
sprintf( tmp, "ALPHA" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "i86pc") ) {
sprintf( tmp, "INTEL" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "i686") ) {
sprintf( tmp, "INTEL" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "i586") ) {
sprintf( tmp, "INTEL" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "i486") ) {
sprintf( tmp, "INTEL" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "i386") ) { //LDAP entry
#if defined(Darwin)
/* Mac OS X often claims to be i386 in uname, even if the
* hardware is x86_64 and the OS can run 64-bit binaries.
* We'll base our architecture name on the default build
* target for gcc. In 10.5 and earlier, that's i386.
* On 10.6, it's x86_64.
* The value we're querying is the kernel version.
* 10.6 kernels have a version that starts with "10."
* Older versions have a lower first number.
*/
int ret;
char val[32];
size_t len = sizeof(val);
/* assume x86 */
sprintf( tmp, "INTEL" );
ret = sysctlbyname("kern.osrelease", &val, &len, NULL, 0);
if (ret == 0 && strncmp(val, "10.", 3) == 0) {
/* but we could be proven wrong */
sprintf( tmp, "X86_64" );
}
#else
sprintf( tmp, "INTEL" );
#endif
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "ia64") ) {
sprintf( tmp, "IA64" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "x86_64") ) {
sprintf( tmp, "X86_64" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "amd64") ) {
sprintf( tmp, "X86_64" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "sun4u") ) {
sprintf( tmp, "SUN4u" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "sun4m") ) {
sprintf( tmp, "SUN4x" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "sun4c") ) {
sprintf( tmp, "SUN4x" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "sparc") ) { //LDAP entry
sprintf( tmp, "SUN4x" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "Power Macintosh") ) { //LDAP entry
sprintf( tmp, "PPC" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "ppc") ) {
sprintf( tmp, "PPC" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "ppc32") ) {
sprintf( tmp, "PPC" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "ppc64") ) {
sprintf( tmp, "PPC64" );
}
else {
sprintf( tmp, machine );
}
tmparch = strdup( tmp );
if( !tmparch ) {
EXCEPT( "Out of memory!" );
}
return( tmparch );
#endif /* if HPUX else */
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134
| 1
| 165,380
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct net_device *ip6mr_reg_vif(struct net *net, struct mr6_table *mrt)
{
struct net_device *dev;
char name[IFNAMSIZ];
if (mrt->id == RT6_TABLE_DFLT)
sprintf(name, "pim6reg");
else
sprintf(name, "pim6reg%u", mrt->id);
dev = alloc_netdev(0, name, NET_NAME_UNKNOWN, reg_vif_setup);
if (!dev)
return NULL;
dev_net_set(dev, net);
if (register_netdevice(dev)) {
free_netdev(dev);
return NULL;
}
if (dev_open(dev))
goto failure;
dev_hold(dev);
return dev;
failure:
unregister_netdevice(dev);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: check sk sk_type and protocol early in ip_mroute_set/getsockopt
Commit 5e1859fbcc3c ("ipv4: ipmr: various fixes and cleanups") fixed
the issue for ipv4 ipmr:
ip_mroute_setsockopt() & ip_mroute_getsockopt() should not
access/set raw_sk(sk)->ipmr_table before making sure the socket
is a raw socket, and protocol is IGMP
The same fix should be done for ipv6 ipmr as well.
This patch can fix the panic caused by overwriting the same offset
as ipmr_table as in raw_sk(sk) when accessing other type's socket
by ip_mroute_setsockopt().
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 93,540
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static loff_t get_loop_size(struct loop_device *lo, struct file *file)
{
return get_size(lo->lo_offset, lo->lo_sizelimit, file);
}
Commit Message: loop: fix concurrent lo_open/lo_release
范龙飞 reports that KASAN can report a use-after-free in __lock_acquire.
The reason is due to insufficient serialization in lo_release(), which
will continue to use the loop device even after it has decremented the
lo_refcnt to zero.
In the meantime, another process can come in, open the loop device
again as it is being shut down. Confusion ensues.
Reported-by: 范龙飞 <long7573@126.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 84,691
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned int pid_entry_count_dirs(const struct pid_entry *entries,
unsigned int n)
{
unsigned int i;
unsigned int count;
count = 0;
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
if (S_ISDIR(entries[i].mode))
++count;
}
return count;
}
Commit Message: proc: restrict access to /proc/PID/io
/proc/PID/io may be used for gathering private information. E.g. for
openssh and vsftpd daemons wchars/rchars may be used to learn the
precise password length. Restrict it to processes being able to ptrace
the target process.
ptrace_may_access() is needed to prevent keeping open file descriptor of
"io" file, executing setuid binary and gathering io information of the
setuid'ed process.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 26,834
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: syncer::SyncDataList AppListSyncableService::GetAllSyncData(
syncer::ModelType type) const {
DCHECK_EQ(syncer::APP_LIST, type);
VLOG(1) << this << ": GetAllSyncData: " << sync_items_.size();
syncer::SyncDataList list;
for (SyncItemMap::const_iterator iter = sync_items_.begin();
iter != sync_items_.end(); ++iter) {
VLOG(2) << this << " -> SYNC: " << iter->second->ToString();
list.push_back(GetSyncDataFromSyncItem(iter->second));
}
return list;
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 123,901
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool DrawingBuffer::WantDepthOrStencil() {
return want_depth_ || want_stencil_;
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 133,974
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool PaintLayerScrollableArea::HasVerticalOverflow() const {
LayoutUnit client_height =
LayoutContentRect(kIncludeScrollbars).Height() -
HorizontalScrollbarHeight(kIgnorePlatformAndCSSOverlayScrollbarSize);
LayoutUnit scroll_height(ScrollHeight());
LayoutUnit box_y = GetLayoutBox()->Location().Y();
return SnapSizeToPixel(scroll_height, box_y) >
SnapSizeToPixel(client_height, box_y);
}
Commit Message: Always call UpdateCompositedScrollOffset, not just for the root layer
Bug: 927560
Change-Id: I1d5522aae4f11dd3f5b8947bb089bac1bf19bdb4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1452701
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mason Freed <masonfreed@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#628942}
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 130,056
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int dm_set_geometry(struct mapped_device *md, struct hd_geometry *geo)
{
sector_t sz = (sector_t)geo->cylinders * geo->heads * geo->sectors;
if (geo->start > sz) {
DMWARN("Start sector is beyond the geometry limits.");
return -EINVAL;
}
md->geometry = *geo;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: dm: fix race between dm_get_from_kobject() and __dm_destroy()
The following BUG_ON was hit when testing repeat creation and removal of
DM devices:
kernel BUG at drivers/md/dm.c:2919!
CPU: 7 PID: 750 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 4.1.44
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81649e8b>] dm_get_from_kobject+0x34/0x3a
[<ffffffff81650ef1>] dm_attr_show+0x2b/0x5e
[<ffffffff817b46d1>] ? mutex_lock+0x26/0x44
[<ffffffff811df7f5>] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x83/0xcf
[<ffffffff811de257>] kernfs_seq_show+0x23/0x25
[<ffffffff81199118>] seq_read+0x16f/0x325
[<ffffffff811de994>] kernfs_fop_read+0x3a/0x13f
[<ffffffff8117b625>] __vfs_read+0x26/0x9d
[<ffffffff8130eb59>] ? security_file_permission+0x3c/0x44
[<ffffffff8117bdb8>] ? rw_verify_area+0x83/0xd9
[<ffffffff8117be9d>] vfs_read+0x8f/0xcf
[<ffffffff81193e34>] ? __fdget_pos+0x12/0x41
[<ffffffff8117c686>] SyS_read+0x4b/0x76
[<ffffffff817b606e>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x71
The bug can be easily triggered, if an extra delay (e.g. 10ms) is added
between the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and dm_get() in
dm_get_from_kobject().
To fix it, we need to ensure the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and
dm_get() are done in an atomic way, so _minor_lock is used.
The other callers of dm_get() have also been checked to be OK: some
callers invoke dm_get() under _minor_lock, some callers invoke it under
_hash_lock, and dm_start_request() invoke it after increasing
md->open_count.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 85,929
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: tt_cmap12_validate( FT_Byte* table,
FT_Validator valid )
{
FT_Byte* p;
FT_ULong length;
FT_ULong num_groups;
if ( table + 16 > valid->limit )
FT_INVALID_TOO_SHORT;
p = table + 4;
length = TT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
p = table + 12;
num_groups = TT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
if ( length > (FT_ULong)( valid->limit - table ) ||
/* length < 16 + 12 * num_groups ? */
length < 16 ||
( length - 16 ) / 12 < num_groups )
FT_INVALID_TOO_SHORT;
/* check groups, they must be in increasing order */
{
FT_ULong n, start, end, start_id, last = 0;
for ( n = 0; n < num_groups; n++ )
{
start = TT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
end = TT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
start_id = TT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
if ( start > end )
FT_INVALID_DATA;
if ( n > 0 && start <= last )
FT_INVALID_DATA;
if ( valid->level >= FT_VALIDATE_TIGHT )
{
FT_UInt32 d = end - start;
/* start_id + end - start >= TT_VALID_GLYPH_COUNT( valid ) ? */
if ( d > TT_VALID_GLYPH_COUNT( valid ) ||
start_id >= TT_VALID_GLYPH_COUNT( valid ) - d )
FT_INVALID_GLYPH_ID;
}
last = end;
}
}
return FT_Err_Ok;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 7,089
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: OVS_EXCLUDED(ofproto_mutex)
{
rule_criteria_init(&ofm->criteria, fm->table_id, &fm->match, fm->priority,
OVS_VERSION_MAX, fm->cookie, fm->cookie_mask, OFPP_ANY,
OFPG_ANY);
rule_criteria_require_rw(&ofm->criteria,
(fm->flags & OFPUTIL_FF_NO_READONLY) != 0);
/* Must create a new flow in advance for the case that no matches are
* found. Also used for template for multiple modified flows. */
add_flow_init(ofproto, ofm, fm);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <vishal.deep.ajmera@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 77,127
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int mountinfo_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
return mounts_open_common(inode, file, &mountinfo_op);
}
Commit Message: proc: restrict access to /proc/PID/io
/proc/PID/io may be used for gathering private information. E.g. for
openssh and vsftpd daemons wchars/rchars may be used to learn the
precise password length. Restrict it to processes being able to ptrace
the target process.
ptrace_may_access() is needed to prevent keeping open file descriptor of
"io" file, executing setuid binary and gathering io information of the
setuid'ed process.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 26,821
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: CreateContextProviderOnWorkerThread(
Platform::ContextAttributes context_attributes,
Platform::GraphicsInfo* gl_info,
const KURL& url) {
WaitableEvent waitable_event;
ContextProviderCreationInfo creation_info;
creation_info.context_attributes = context_attributes;
creation_info.gl_info = gl_info;
creation_info.url = url.Copy();
RefPtr<WebTaskRunner> task_runner =
Platform::Current()->MainThread()->GetWebTaskRunner();
task_runner->PostTask(
BLINK_FROM_HERE, CrossThreadBind(&CreateContextProviderOnMainThread,
CrossThreadUnretained(&creation_info),
CrossThreadUnretained(&waitable_event)));
waitable_event.Wait();
return std::move(creation_info.created_context_provider);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 133,586
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool BrowserWindowGtk::ShouldShowWindowIcon() const {
return browser_->SupportsWindowFeature(Browser::FEATURE_TITLEBAR);
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 118,010
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int proxy_parse_opts(QemuOpts *opts, struct FsDriverEntry *fs)
{
const char *socket = qemu_opt_get(opts, "socket");
const char *sock_fd = qemu_opt_get(opts, "sock_fd");
if (!socket && !sock_fd) {
error_report("Must specify either socket or sock_fd");
return -1;
}
if (socket && sock_fd) {
error_report("Both socket and sock_fd options specified");
return -1;
}
if (socket) {
fs->path = g_strdup(socket);
fs->export_flags = V9FS_PROXY_SOCK_NAME;
} else {
fs->path = g_strdup(sock_fd);
fs->export_flags = V9FS_PROXY_SOCK_FD;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 7,642
|
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